Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
The Project Gutenberg eBook of A history of criticism and
literary taste in Europe from the earliest texts to the present
day. Volume 2 (of 3), From the Renaissance to the decline of
eighteenth century orthodoxy
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: A history of criticism and literary taste in Europe from the
earliest texts to the present day. Volume 2 (of 3), From the
Renaissance to the decline of eighteenth century orthodoxy
Author: George Saintsbury
Release date: March 9, 2024 [eBook #73128]
Language: English
Original publication: Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1902
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73128
Credits: Jonathan Ingram, KD Weeks, and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF
CRITICISM AND LITERARY TASTE IN EUROPE FROM THE
EARLIEST TEXTS TO THE PRESENT DAY. VOLUME 2 (OF 3), FROM
literary taste in Europe from the earliest texts to the present
day. Volume 2 (of 3), From the Renaissance to the decline of
eighteenth century orthodoxy
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: A history of criticism and literary taste in Europe from the
earliest texts to the present day. Volume 2 (of 3), From the
Renaissance to the decline of eighteenth century orthodoxy
Author: George Saintsbury
Release date: March 9, 2024 [eBook #73128]
Language: English
Original publication: Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1902
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/73128
Credits: Jonathan Ingram, KD Weeks, and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF
CRITICISM AND LITERARY TASTE IN EUROPE FROM THE
EARLIEST TEXTS TO THE PRESENT DAY. VOLUME 2 (OF 3), FROM
Page 4
THE RENAISSANCE TO THE DECLINE OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
ORTHODOXY ***
Transcriber’s Note:
Footnotes have been collected at the end of each chapter,
and are linked for ease of reference. Internal references in the
text and index are also linked.
The marginal notes follow the topics enumerated in the table
of contents, and appeared several lines after the paragraph
topic opening. Here, they usually appear mid-paragraph.
phrase
On occasion, where the opening sentence is
inordinately lengthy or the paragraph short, the note will
appear adjacent to the opening line.
There are a number of issues in the Index regarding
misnumbered or missing references. These explanatory notes
are linked from the name of the entry.
Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected.
Please see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for
details regarding the handling of any textual issues
encountered during its preparation.
Any corrections are indicated as hyperlinks, which will
navigate the reader to the corresponding entry in the
corrections table in the note at the end of the text.
ORTHODOXY ***
Transcriber’s Note:
Footnotes have been collected at the end of each chapter,
and are linked for ease of reference. Internal references in the
text and index are also linked.
The marginal notes follow the topics enumerated in the table
of contents, and appeared several lines after the paragraph
topic opening. Here, they usually appear mid-paragraph.
phrase
On occasion, where the opening sentence is
inordinately lengthy or the paragraph short, the note will
appear adjacent to the opening line.
There are a number of issues in the Index regarding
misnumbered or missing references. These explanatory notes
are linked from the name of the entry.
Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected.
Please see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for
details regarding the handling of any textual issues
encountered during its preparation.
Any corrections are indicated as hyperlinks, which will
navigate the reader to the corresponding entry in the
corrections table in the note at the end of the text.
Page 5
Page 6
A HISTORY OF CRITICISM
AND LITERARY TASTE
Ignorantium temeraria plerumque sunt judicia.
—Polycarp Leyser.
AND LITERARY TASTE
Ignorantium temeraria plerumque sunt judicia.
—Polycarp Leyser.
Page 7
A History of Criticism
AND
LITERARY TASTE IN EUROPE
FROM THE EARLIEST TEXTS TO THE PRESENT DAY
BY
GEORGE SAINTSBURY
M.A. Oxon.; Hon. LL.D. Aberd.
PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AND ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. II.
FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE DECLINE OF
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ORTHODOXY
SECOND EDITION
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MCMV
AND
LITERARY TASTE IN EUROPE
FROM THE EARLIEST TEXTS TO THE PRESENT DAY
BY
GEORGE SAINTSBURY
M.A. Oxon.; Hon. LL.D. Aberd.
PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC AND ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. II.
FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE DECLINE OF
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ORTHODOXY
SECOND EDITION
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MCMV
Page 8
PREFACE.
In presenting the second volume of this attempt, I feel no compunction,
and offer no apology, for what may seem to some the surprisingly large
space given to English critics. That the book itself is intended primarily for
English readers would be but a poor-spirited plea; and the greatness of
English literature as a whole, though a worthier, is still an unnecessary
argument. For the fact is, that the positive value and importance of English
criticism itself are far greater than has been usually allowed. Owing very
mainly to the not unintelligible or inexcusable, but unfortunate, initiative of
Mr Matthew Arnold, it has become a fashion to speak of this branch of our
national literature, if not even of the function of the national genius which it
expresses, with bated breath, and with humble acknowledgment of the
superiority of German, and still more of French, critics. This superiority, I
say without the slightest fear, is a fond thing vainly invented. English
criticism was rather late, and for a long time rather intermittent; nor did it
fail, after the manner of the nation, to derive fresh impulses and new
departures in the sixteenth century from Italian, in the seventeenth and
again in the nineteenth century from French, and at the end of the
eighteenth from German. But it is not true that in so much as one of these
cases it was contented slavishly to imitate; and it is not true that, with the
doubtful exception of Sainte-Beuve, foreign countries have had any critics
greater than our own, while they have, even put together, hardly so many
great ones. In everything but mere superficial consistency Dryden is a head
and shoulders above Boileau as a critic; Coleridge a head, shoulders, and
body above the Schlegels, whom he followed. Long before Sainte-Beuve,
Hazlitt had shown a genius for real criticism, as distinguished from barren
formula-making, which no critic has surpassed. And Mr Arnold himself,
with less range, equity, and sureness than Sainte-Beuve, has a finer literary
taste and touch. As for that general superiority of French criticism of which
we have heard so much, the unerring voice of actual history will tell us that
In presenting the second volume of this attempt, I feel no compunction,
and offer no apology, for what may seem to some the surprisingly large
space given to English critics. That the book itself is intended primarily for
English readers would be but a poor-spirited plea; and the greatness of
English literature as a whole, though a worthier, is still an unnecessary
argument. For the fact is, that the positive value and importance of English
criticism itself are far greater than has been usually allowed. Owing very
mainly to the not unintelligible or inexcusable, but unfortunate, initiative of
Mr Matthew Arnold, it has become a fashion to speak of this branch of our
national literature, if not even of the function of the national genius which it
expresses, with bated breath, and with humble acknowledgment of the
superiority of German, and still more of French, critics. This superiority, I
say without the slightest fear, is a fond thing vainly invented. English
criticism was rather late, and for a long time rather intermittent; nor did it
fail, after the manner of the nation, to derive fresh impulses and new
departures in the sixteenth century from Italian, in the seventeenth and
again in the nineteenth century from French, and at the end of the
eighteenth from German. But it is not true that in so much as one of these
cases it was contented slavishly to imitate; and it is not true that, with the
doubtful exception of Sainte-Beuve, foreign countries have had any critics
greater than our own, while they have, even put together, hardly so many
great ones. In everything but mere superficial consistency Dryden is a head
and shoulders above Boileau as a critic; Coleridge a head, shoulders, and
body above the Schlegels, whom he followed. Long before Sainte-Beuve,
Hazlitt had shown a genius for real criticism, as distinguished from barren
formula-making, which no critic has surpassed. And Mr Arnold himself,
with less range, equity, and sureness than Sainte-Beuve, has a finer literary
taste and touch. As for that general superiority of French criticism of which
we have heard so much, the unerring voice of actual history will tell us that
Page 9
it never existed at all, except, perhaps, for a generation before 1660, and a
generation before 1860, the latter being the period which called forth, but
misled, Mr Arnold’s admiration. With this last we do not here deal; nor with
the Romantic revolt, in dealing with which it will be pertinent to appraise
the relative excellence of Lessing and Goethe as compared with Coleridge
and Hazlitt. But we have within our present range an almost better field of
comparison, in that “neo-classic” period from Boileau to La Harpe, and
from Dryden to Johnson, in which, on the whole, and taking recognised
orthodoxy only, the critics of France and of England worshipped the same
idols, subscribed the same confessions of faith, and to no small extent even
applied their principles to the same texts and subjects. I am, after careful
examination, certain myself, and I hope that the results of that examination
may make it clear to others, that they did not “order these things better in
France,” that they did not order them nearly so well.
The subject of this volume has more unity than that of the last; and I have
thought it permissible to avail myself of this fact in the arrangement of the
Interchapters. The whole of so-called Classical or Neo-classic Criticism is
so intimately connected that almost any of its characteristic documents from
Vida to La Harpe might be made the text of a sermon on the entire
phenomenon in its complete development. And in the same way, though
with an opposite effect, all general comment might, without any grave
historical or logical impropriety, have been postponed to the end of the
volume. But this would, in the first place, have broken the uniformity of the
book; in the second, it would have necessitated a final Interchapter (or
“inter-conclusion”) of portentous and disproportionate length; and in the
third, it would have too long withheld from the reader those resting-places
and intermediate views, as from various stations on Pisgah, which seem to
me to be the great advantages and conveniences of the arrangement. I have
therefore, while keeping the historical character and distribution of the
summaries of the three centuries which happen pretty accurately to coincide
with the three stages of the whole phase, made the logical gist of the first to
concern chiefly the rise of the classical-critical attitude; of the second that
constituted creed or code which was explicitly assented to, or implicitly
accepted, by the entire period except in the case of rebels; while in the third
I have concentrated criticism of this criticism as a whole. The three
Interchapters are thus in manner consecutive and interdependent; but they
will, I hope, serve not less to connect and illuminate the contents of the
generation before 1860, the latter being the period which called forth, but
misled, Mr Arnold’s admiration. With this last we do not here deal; nor with
the Romantic revolt, in dealing with which it will be pertinent to appraise
the relative excellence of Lessing and Goethe as compared with Coleridge
and Hazlitt. But we have within our present range an almost better field of
comparison, in that “neo-classic” period from Boileau to La Harpe, and
from Dryden to Johnson, in which, on the whole, and taking recognised
orthodoxy only, the critics of France and of England worshipped the same
idols, subscribed the same confessions of faith, and to no small extent even
applied their principles to the same texts and subjects. I am, after careful
examination, certain myself, and I hope that the results of that examination
may make it clear to others, that they did not “order these things better in
France,” that they did not order them nearly so well.
The subject of this volume has more unity than that of the last; and I have
thought it permissible to avail myself of this fact in the arrangement of the
Interchapters. The whole of so-called Classical or Neo-classic Criticism is
so intimately connected that almost any of its characteristic documents from
Vida to La Harpe might be made the text of a sermon on the entire
phenomenon in its complete development. And in the same way, though
with an opposite effect, all general comment might, without any grave
historical or logical impropriety, have been postponed to the end of the
volume. But this would, in the first place, have broken the uniformity of the
book; in the second, it would have necessitated a final Interchapter (or
“inter-conclusion”) of portentous and disproportionate length; and in the
third, it would have too long withheld from the reader those resting-places
and intermediate views, as from various stations on Pisgah, which seem to
me to be the great advantages and conveniences of the arrangement. I have
therefore, while keeping the historical character and distribution of the
summaries of the three centuries which happen pretty accurately to coincide
with the three stages of the whole phase, made the logical gist of the first to
concern chiefly the rise of the classical-critical attitude; of the second that
constituted creed or code which was explicitly assented to, or implicitly
accepted, by the entire period except in the case of rebels; while in the third
I have concentrated criticism of this criticism as a whole. The three
Interchapters are thus in manner consecutive and interdependent; but they
will, I hope, serve not less to connect and illuminate the contents of the
Page 10
several books and of the whole volume than to conduct the story and the
argument of the entire work duly from the beginning to the end of the
appointed stage. They are perhaps specially important here because of the
mass and number of minor figures with whom I have had to deal. I know
that some excellent judges dislike this numerus and would have attention
concentrated on the chiefs. But that is not my conception of literary history.
After full consideration of the matter, I have thought it better not to
attempt any comment on criticisms of the first volume of this History of
Criticism. I am much indebted to many of my critics, and perhaps I may be
permitted to say that I was not a little surprised, and, to speak as a fool, very
much pleased, by the generally favourable reception given to, rather than
deserved by, an undoubtedly audacious undertaking. In cases where those
critics obliged me with a substantive correction (as, for instance, in that
relating to Trissino’s version of the De Vulgari Eloquio, v. infra, p. 40), I
have taken opportunity, wherever it was possible, to acknowledge the
obligation, and I subjoin some corrigenda and addenda in a flyleaf. But
beyond this I do not think it desirable to go. In the case of merely snarling
or carping censure, the conduct of Johnson as regards Kenrick gives the
absolute precedent, even for those who have to acknowledge how far nearer
their censors have come to Kenrick than they themselves can ever hope to
come to Johnson. To those who pronounce a task impossible the best
answer is to go and do it; to those who object to style and manner one may
once more plead those disabilities of la plus belle fille de France which
attach also to those who are neither French, nor girls, nor beautiful; for
those who hate jokes and literary allusions one can only pray, “God help
them!” And in the case of bona fide misunderstanding the wisest thing for
an author to do is to make his meaning plainer, if he can, in the rest of his
book.
It would probably be still more idle to attempt to anticipate strictures on
the present volume. That its subject might advantageously have been dealt
with in twice or thrice the space is obvious, and perhaps I may say without
impropriety that the writer could have so treated it with no additional labour
except the mere writing—for the preparation necessitated would have
sufficed for half-a-dozen volumes. But to keep proportion, and observe the
plan, is one of those critical warnings to which Classic and Romantic alike
had much better attend. In the division which I have adopted of eighteenth-
century writers into those who, as adherents of Neo-Classicism, are to be
argument of the entire work duly from the beginning to the end of the
appointed stage. They are perhaps specially important here because of the
mass and number of minor figures with whom I have had to deal. I know
that some excellent judges dislike this numerus and would have attention
concentrated on the chiefs. But that is not my conception of literary history.
After full consideration of the matter, I have thought it better not to
attempt any comment on criticisms of the first volume of this History of
Criticism. I am much indebted to many of my critics, and perhaps I may be
permitted to say that I was not a little surprised, and, to speak as a fool, very
much pleased, by the generally favourable reception given to, rather than
deserved by, an undoubtedly audacious undertaking. In cases where those
critics obliged me with a substantive correction (as, for instance, in that
relating to Trissino’s version of the De Vulgari Eloquio, v. infra, p. 40), I
have taken opportunity, wherever it was possible, to acknowledge the
obligation, and I subjoin some corrigenda and addenda in a flyleaf. But
beyond this I do not think it desirable to go. In the case of merely snarling
or carping censure, the conduct of Johnson as regards Kenrick gives the
absolute precedent, even for those who have to acknowledge how far nearer
their censors have come to Kenrick than they themselves can ever hope to
come to Johnson. To those who pronounce a task impossible the best
answer is to go and do it; to those who object to style and manner one may
once more plead those disabilities of la plus belle fille de France which
attach also to those who are neither French, nor girls, nor beautiful; for
those who hate jokes and literary allusions one can only pray, “God help
them!” And in the case of bona fide misunderstanding the wisest thing for
an author to do is to make his meaning plainer, if he can, in the rest of his
book.
It would probably be still more idle to attempt to anticipate strictures on
the present volume. That its subject might advantageously have been dealt
with in twice or thrice the space is obvious, and perhaps I may say without
impropriety that the writer could have so treated it with no additional labour
except the mere writing—for the preparation necessitated would have
sufficed for half-a-dozen volumes. But to keep proportion, and observe the
plan, is one of those critical warnings to which Classic and Romantic alike
had much better attend. In the division which I have adopted of eighteenth-
century writers into those who, as adherents of Neo-Classicism, are to be
Page 11
treated here, and those who, as forerunners or actual exponents of Modern
Criticism, are to be reserved for our next, there must necessarily be much
which invites cavil, and not a little which excuses objection. I shall only say
that the distribution has not been made hastily; and that it may be possible
to make its principle clearer when the reserved writers have been treated.
The advantage of keeping the subject of the volume as homogeneous as
possible seemed paramount.
In writing Vol. I. it was possible, with rare exceptions, to rely upon texts
in my own possession. This has, of course, here been impossible: though I
possess a fair collection of the Italians of the Renaissance, while I have long
had many of the French and English writers of the whole time. For the
supply of deficiencies I have not only to make the usual acknowledgment to
the authorities of the British Museum—than which surely no institution
ever better deserved the patronage of its name-giving goddesses—but also
to thank those of the libraries belonging to the Faculty of Advocates and the
Society of Writers to the Signet in Edinburgh, which bodies admit others
besides their own members with remarkable liberality. In the library of the
University of Edinburgh I suppose I may consider myself at home; but I
owe cordial thanks to Bodley’s Librarian, to the University Librarian at
Cambridge, and to the librarian of the John Rylands collection at
Manchester, for information about books which I have been unable to find
elsewhere. There are one or two mentioned in the notes which I have not
been able to get hold of yet; and I shall be extremely obliged to any reader
of this history who may happen to know their whereabouts, and will take
the trouble to tell me of it.
I am only the Satan of this journey across Chaos, and I daresay I have
been driven out of the best course by the impact of more than one nitrous
cloud. In other words, I not merely daresay, but am pretty sure, that I have
made some blunders, especially in summary of readings not always
controllable by reference to the actual books when the matter came before
me again in print. And I daresay, further, that these will be obvious enough
to specialists. I have found some such blunders even in the first volume,
where the literature of the subject was far less extensive and, even in
proportion to its extent, far more accessible; and I have thought it best to
include corrections of some of these in the present volume, in order that
those who already possess the first may not be in an inferior position to
those who acquire the new edition of it which is, or will shortly be, ready.
Criticism, are to be reserved for our next, there must necessarily be much
which invites cavil, and not a little which excuses objection. I shall only say
that the distribution has not been made hastily; and that it may be possible
to make its principle clearer when the reserved writers have been treated.
The advantage of keeping the subject of the volume as homogeneous as
possible seemed paramount.
In writing Vol. I. it was possible, with rare exceptions, to rely upon texts
in my own possession. This has, of course, here been impossible: though I
possess a fair collection of the Italians of the Renaissance, while I have long
had many of the French and English writers of the whole time. For the
supply of deficiencies I have not only to make the usual acknowledgment to
the authorities of the British Museum—than which surely no institution
ever better deserved the patronage of its name-giving goddesses—but also
to thank those of the libraries belonging to the Faculty of Advocates and the
Society of Writers to the Signet in Edinburgh, which bodies admit others
besides their own members with remarkable liberality. In the library of the
University of Edinburgh I suppose I may consider myself at home; but I
owe cordial thanks to Bodley’s Librarian, to the University Librarian at
Cambridge, and to the librarian of the John Rylands collection at
Manchester, for information about books which I have been unable to find
elsewhere. There are one or two mentioned in the notes which I have not
been able to get hold of yet; and I shall be extremely obliged to any reader
of this history who may happen to know their whereabouts, and will take
the trouble to tell me of it.
I am only the Satan of this journey across Chaos, and I daresay I have
been driven out of the best course by the impact of more than one nitrous
cloud. In other words, I not merely daresay, but am pretty sure, that I have
made some blunders, especially in summary of readings not always
controllable by reference to the actual books when the matter came before
me again in print. And I daresay, further, that these will be obvious enough
to specialists. I have found some such blunders even in the first volume,
where the literature of the subject was far less extensive and, even in
proportion to its extent, far more accessible; and I have thought it best to
include corrections of some of these in the present volume, in order that
those who already possess the first may not be in an inferior position to
those who acquire the new edition of it which is, or will shortly be, ready.
Page 12
When the work reaches its close (if it ever does so) will be the proper time
to digest and incorporate these alterations as Fortune may allow. The
kindness of Professor Elton, King Alfred Professor of English in University
College, Liverpool, of Professor Ker iterum, and of my colleague Mr
Gregory Smith, has beyond all doubt enabled me to forestall some part of
these corrections in regard to the present volume. These friends were
obliging enough to undertake between them the reading of the whole; others
have assisted me on particular points, in regard to most of which I have, I
think, made due acknowledgment in the notes. As before, I have taken some
trouble with the Index, and I hope it may be found useful.
GEORGE SAINTSBURY.
Edinburgh, September 1902.
to digest and incorporate these alterations as Fortune may allow. The
kindness of Professor Elton, King Alfred Professor of English in University
College, Liverpool, of Professor Ker iterum, and of my colleague Mr
Gregory Smith, has beyond all doubt enabled me to forestall some part of
these corrections in regard to the present volume. These friends were
obliging enough to undertake between them the reading of the whole; others
have assisted me on particular points, in regard to most of which I have, I
think, made due acknowledgment in the notes. As before, I have taken some
trouble with the Index, and I hope it may be found useful.
GEORGE SAINTSBURY.
Edinburgh, September 1902.
Page 13
ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA TO VOLUME II.
P. 23 sq. A reference of Hallam’s (Literature of Europe, iii. 5, 76, 77) to
the Miscellanies of Politian has led some critics, who apparently do not
know the book itself, and have not even read Hallam carefully, to object to
its omission here. Their authority might have saved them; for he very
correctly describes these Miscellanies as “sometimes grammatical, but more
frequently relating to obscure customs and mythological allusions.” In other
words, the book—which I have read—is hardly, in my sense, critical at all.
P. 80, note. When I wrote on Castelvetro I was not aware that the
Commentary on Dante (at least that on Inf., Cantos i.-xxix.) had been
recovered and published by Signor Giovanni Franciosi (Modena, 1886) in a
stately royal 4to (which I have now read, and possess), with the owl and the
pitcher, but without the Kekrika, and without the proper resolution in the
owl’s countenance. This may be metaphysically connected with the fact that
the editor is rather unhappy about his author, and tells us that he was long in
two minds about sending him out at last to the world. He admires
Castelvetro’s boldness, scholarship, intellect; but thinks him sadly destitute
of reverence for Dante, and deplores his “lack of lively and cheerful sense
of the Beautiful.” If it were not that my gratitude to the man who gives me a
text seals my mouth as to everything else, I should be a little inclined to cry
“Fudge!” at this. Nobody would expect from any Renaissance scholar, and
least of all from Castelvetro, “unction,” mysticism, rapture at the things that
give us rapture in Dante. All the more honour to him that, as in the case of
Petrarch, he thought it worth while to bestow on that vernacular, which too
many Renaissance scholars despised, the same intense desire to understand,
the same pains, the same “taking seriously,” which he showed towards the
ancients. This is the true reverence: the rest is but “leather and prunella.”
P. 107. Some time after vol. ii. was published I came across (in the
catalogues of Mr Voynich, who might really inscribe on these documents
for motto
“Das Unzulängliche
P. 23 sq. A reference of Hallam’s (Literature of Europe, iii. 5, 76, 77) to
the Miscellanies of Politian has led some critics, who apparently do not
know the book itself, and have not even read Hallam carefully, to object to
its omission here. Their authority might have saved them; for he very
correctly describes these Miscellanies as “sometimes grammatical, but more
frequently relating to obscure customs and mythological allusions.” In other
words, the book—which I have read—is hardly, in my sense, critical at all.
P. 80, note. When I wrote on Castelvetro I was not aware that the
Commentary on Dante (at least that on Inf., Cantos i.-xxix.) had been
recovered and published by Signor Giovanni Franciosi (Modena, 1886) in a
stately royal 4to (which I have now read, and possess), with the owl and the
pitcher, but without the Kekrika, and without the proper resolution in the
owl’s countenance. This may be metaphysically connected with the fact that
the editor is rather unhappy about his author, and tells us that he was long in
two minds about sending him out at last to the world. He admires
Castelvetro’s boldness, scholarship, intellect; but thinks him sadly destitute
of reverence for Dante, and deplores his “lack of lively and cheerful sense
of the Beautiful.” If it were not that my gratitude to the man who gives me a
text seals my mouth as to everything else, I should be a little inclined to cry
“Fudge!” at this. Nobody would expect from any Renaissance scholar, and
least of all from Castelvetro, “unction,” mysticism, rapture at the things that
give us rapture in Dante. All the more honour to him that, as in the case of
Petrarch, he thought it worth while to bestow on that vernacular, which too
many Renaissance scholars despised, the same intense desire to understand,
the same pains, the same “taking seriously,” which he showed towards the
ancients. This is the true reverence: the rest is but “leather and prunella.”
P. 107. Some time after vol. ii. was published I came across (in the
catalogues of Mr Voynich, who might really inscribe on these documents
for motto
“Das Unzulängliche
Page 14
Hier wird’s Ereignis”)
quite a nest of Zinanos, mostly written about that year 1590, which seems to
have been this curious writer’s most active time; and I bought two of them
as specially appurtenant to our subject. One is a Discorso della Tragedia,
appended (though separately paged and dedicated) to the author’s tragedy
of Almerigo; the other Le Due Giornate della Ninfa overo del Diletto e delle
Muse, all printed by Bartholi, at Reggio, and the two prose books or
booklets dated 1590. The Discorso is chiefly occupied with an attack on the
position that Tragedy (especially according to Aristotle) ought to be busied
with true subjects only. The Giornate (which contain another reference to
Patrizzi) deal—more or less fancifully, but in a manner following Boethius,
which is interesting at so late a date—with philosophy and things in
general, rather than with literature.
P. 322, bk. IV. chap. i. I ought, perhaps, to have noticed in this context a
book rather widely spread—Sorel’s De La Connaissance des Bons Livres,
Paris, 1671. It contains some not uninteresting things on literature in
general, on novels, poetry, comedy, &c., on the laws of good speaking and
writing, on the “new language of French.” But it is, on the whole, as
anybody acquainted with any part of the voluminous work of the author of
Francion would expect, mainly not disagreeable nor ignorant chat—
newspaper work before the newspaper.
P. 350. The opposition of the two “doctors” is perhaps too sharply put.
P. 436. I should like to add as a special “place” for Dennis’s criticism, his
comparatively early Remarks on Prince Arthur and Virgil (title abbreviated),
London, 1696. It is, as it stands, of some elaboration; but its author tells us
that he “meant” to do things which would have made it an almost complete
Poetic from his point of view. It is pervaded with that refrain of “this ought
to be” and “that must have been” to which I have referred in the text; and
bristles with purely arbitrary preceptist statements, such as that Criticism
cannot be ill-natured because Good Nature in man cannot be contrary to
Justice and Reason; that a man must not like what he ought not to like—a
doctrine underlying, of course, the whole Neo-classic teaching, and not that
only; almost literally cropping up in Wordsworth; and the very formulation,
in categorical-imperative, of La Harpe’s “monstrous beauty.” The book (in
which poet and critic are very comfortably and equally yoked together) is
full of agreeable things; and may possibly have suggested one of Swift’s
quite a nest of Zinanos, mostly written about that year 1590, which seems to
have been this curious writer’s most active time; and I bought two of them
as specially appurtenant to our subject. One is a Discorso della Tragedia,
appended (though separately paged and dedicated) to the author’s tragedy
of Almerigo; the other Le Due Giornate della Ninfa overo del Diletto e delle
Muse, all printed by Bartholi, at Reggio, and the two prose books or
booklets dated 1590. The Discorso is chiefly occupied with an attack on the
position that Tragedy (especially according to Aristotle) ought to be busied
with true subjects only. The Giornate (which contain another reference to
Patrizzi) deal—more or less fancifully, but in a manner following Boethius,
which is interesting at so late a date—with philosophy and things in
general, rather than with literature.
P. 322, bk. IV. chap. i. I ought, perhaps, to have noticed in this context a
book rather widely spread—Sorel’s De La Connaissance des Bons Livres,
Paris, 1671. It contains some not uninteresting things on literature in
general, on novels, poetry, comedy, &c., on the laws of good speaking and
writing, on the “new language of French.” But it is, on the whole, as
anybody acquainted with any part of the voluminous work of the author of
Francion would expect, mainly not disagreeable nor ignorant chat—
newspaper work before the newspaper.
P. 350. The opposition of the two “doctors” is perhaps too sharply put.
P. 436. I should like to add as a special “place” for Dennis’s criticism, his
comparatively early Remarks on Prince Arthur and Virgil (title abbreviated),
London, 1696. It is, as it stands, of some elaboration; but its author tells us
that he “meant” to do things which would have made it an almost complete
Poetic from his point of view. It is pervaded with that refrain of “this ought
to be” and “that must have been” to which I have referred in the text; and
bristles with purely arbitrary preceptist statements, such as that Criticism
cannot be ill-natured because Good Nature in man cannot be contrary to
Justice and Reason; that a man must not like what he ought not to like—a
doctrine underlying, of course, the whole Neo-classic teaching, and not that
only; almost literally cropping up in Wordsworth; and the very formulation,
in categorical-imperative, of La Harpe’s “monstrous beauty.” The book (in
which poet and critic are very comfortably and equally yoked together) is
full of agreeable things; and may possibly have suggested one of Swift’s
Page 15
most exquisite pieces of irony in its contention that Mr Blackmore’s
Celestial Machines are directly contrary to the Doctrine of the Church of
England.
P. 546. Denina. This author is a good instance of the things which the
reader sometimes rather reproachfully demands, when the writer would
only too fain have supplied them. I could write more than a page with
satisfaction on Denina’s Discorso sopra le Vicende della Litteratura, which,
rather surprisingly, underwent its second edition in Glasgow at the Foulis
press (1763), and which not only deals at large with the subject in an
interesting manner, but accepts the religio loci by dealing specially with
Scottish literature. But, once more, this is for a fourth volume—or even a
fifth—things belonging to the Thinkable-Unthinkable.
P. 554, l. 3. For the Paragone see vol. iii. under Conti, Antonio.
Celestial Machines are directly contrary to the Doctrine of the Church of
England.
P. 546. Denina. This author is a good instance of the things which the
reader sometimes rather reproachfully demands, when the writer would
only too fain have supplied them. I could write more than a page with
satisfaction on Denina’s Discorso sopra le Vicende della Litteratura, which,
rather surprisingly, underwent its second edition in Glasgow at the Foulis
press (1763), and which not only deals at large with the subject in an
interesting manner, but accepts the religio loci by dealing specially with
Scottish literature. But, once more, this is for a fourth volume—or even a
fifth—things belonging to the Thinkable-Unthinkable.
P. 554, l. 3. For the Paragone see vol. iii. under Conti, Antonio.
Page 16
Page 17
CONTENTS.
BOOK IV.
RENAISSANCE CRITICISM.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY—ERASMUS.
PAGE PAGE
The Critical starting-point of the 3 Not necessarily anti-mediæval 8
Renaissance. But classical 9
Influences at work: General 4 And anti-Puritan 9
Particular 5 Erasmus 10
Weakness of Vernaculars 6 The Ciceronianus 11
Recovery of Ancient Criticism 6 The Colloquies 13
Necessity of defence against 7 The Letters 15
Puritanism
Distribution of the Book 17
The line of criticism resultant 7
CHAPTER II.
EARLY ITALIAN CRITICS.
BOOK IV.
RENAISSANCE CRITICISM.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY—ERASMUS.
PAGE PAGE
The Critical starting-point of the 3 Not necessarily anti-mediæval 8
Renaissance. But classical 9
Influences at work: General 4 And anti-Puritan 9
Particular 5 Erasmus 10
Weakness of Vernaculars 6 The Ciceronianus 11
Recovery of Ancient Criticism 6 The Colloquies 13
Necessity of defence against 7 The Letters 15
Puritanism
Distribution of the Book 17
The line of criticism resultant 7
CHAPTER II.
EARLY ITALIAN CRITICS.
Page 18
The beginnings 19 Theorists: Daniello 42
Savonarola 20 Fracastoro 44
Pico, &c. 22 Formalists: Mutio. Tolomei and 46
Politian 23 classical metres
The Manto 24 Others: Tomitano, Lionardi, B. 47
Tasso, Capriano
The Ambra and Rusticus 25
Il Lasca 48
The Nutricia 25
Bembo 49
Their merits 26
Caro 49
And danger 26
Varchi 49
Petrus Crinitus: his De Poetis 27
Latinis Minturno 51
Augustinus Olmucensis: his 27 The De Poeta 52
Defence of Poetry The Arte Poetica 55
Paradoxical attacks on it by 28 Their value 57
Cornelius Agrippa, Landi, Berni Giraldi Cinthio’s Discorsi 58
Vida 29 On Romance 58
Importance of the Poetics 30 On Drama 59
Analysis of the piece 30 Some points in both 59
Essential poverty of its theory 34 On Satire 61
Historical and symptomatic 34 Pigna 62
significance
Lilius Giraldus: his De Poetis 63
The alleged appeal to reason and 35 Nostrorum Temporum
Nature
Its width of range 64
The main stream started 37
But narrowness of view 64
Trissino 38
Horror at preference of vernacular 64
Division of his Poetic 39 to Latin
His critical value 40 Yet a real critic in both kinds 65
Editors, &c., of the Poetics 41 Short précis of the dialogues 66
Pazzi 41 Their great historic value 68
Robortello, Segni, Maggi, Vettori 42
CHAPTER III.
SCALIGER, CASTELVETRO, AND THE LATER ITALIAN CRITICS OF
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
Savonarola 20 Fracastoro 44
Pico, &c. 22 Formalists: Mutio. Tolomei and 46
Politian 23 classical metres
The Manto 24 Others: Tomitano, Lionardi, B. 47
Tasso, Capriano
The Ambra and Rusticus 25
Il Lasca 48
The Nutricia 25
Bembo 49
Their merits 26
Caro 49
And danger 26
Varchi 49
Petrus Crinitus: his De Poetis 27
Latinis Minturno 51
Augustinus Olmucensis: his 27 The De Poeta 52
Defence of Poetry The Arte Poetica 55
Paradoxical attacks on it by 28 Their value 57
Cornelius Agrippa, Landi, Berni Giraldi Cinthio’s Discorsi 58
Vida 29 On Romance 58
Importance of the Poetics 30 On Drama 59
Analysis of the piece 30 Some points in both 59
Essential poverty of its theory 34 On Satire 61
Historical and symptomatic 34 Pigna 62
significance
Lilius Giraldus: his De Poetis 63
The alleged appeal to reason and 35 Nostrorum Temporum
Nature
Its width of range 64
The main stream started 37
But narrowness of view 64
Trissino 38
Horror at preference of vernacular 64
Division of his Poetic 39 to Latin
His critical value 40 Yet a real critic in both kinds 65
Editors, &c., of the Poetics 41 Short précis of the dialogues 66
Pazzi 41 Their great historic value 68
Robortello, Segni, Maggi, Vettori 42
CHAPTER III.
SCALIGER, CASTELVETRO, AND THE LATER ITALIAN CRITICS OF
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
Page 19
Julius Cæsar Scaliger 69 His exceptional interest and 88
The Poetic 70 importance
Book I.: Historicus 71 Tasso and the controversies over 89
the Gerusalemme
Book II.: Hyle 72
Tasso’s Critical writings 92
Books III. and IV.: Idea and 73
Parasceve And position 93
Books V. and VI.: Criticus and 73 Patrizzi: his Poetica 94
Hypercriticus The Deca Istoriale 95
Book VII.: Epinomis 75 The Deca Disputata 96
General ideas on Unity and the like 76 The Trimerone on Tasso 100
His Virgil-worship 77 Remarkable position of Patrizzi 101
His solid merits 78 Sed contra mundum 101
Castelvetro 80 The latest group of sixteenth- 102
The Opere Varie 81 century Critics
The Poetica 82 Partenio 102
On Dramatic conditions 83 Viperano 103
On the Three Unities 83 Piccolomini 103
On the freedom of Epic 84 Gilio 104
His eccentric acuteness 84 Mazzoni 105
Examples: Homer’s nodding, prose 86 Denores 106
in tragedy, Virgil, minor poetry Zinano 107
The medium and end of Poetry 86 Mazzone da Miglionico, &c. 107
Uncompromising championship of 87 Summo 108
Delight
CHAPTER IV.
THE CRITICISM OF THE PLÉIADE.
The Poetic 70 importance
Book I.: Historicus 71 Tasso and the controversies over 89
the Gerusalemme
Book II.: Hyle 72
Tasso’s Critical writings 92
Books III. and IV.: Idea and 73
Parasceve And position 93
Books V. and VI.: Criticus and 73 Patrizzi: his Poetica 94
Hypercriticus The Deca Istoriale 95
Book VII.: Epinomis 75 The Deca Disputata 96
General ideas on Unity and the like 76 The Trimerone on Tasso 100
His Virgil-worship 77 Remarkable position of Patrizzi 101
His solid merits 78 Sed contra mundum 101
Castelvetro 80 The latest group of sixteenth- 102
The Opere Varie 81 century Critics
The Poetica 82 Partenio 102
On Dramatic conditions 83 Viperano 103
On the Three Unities 83 Piccolomini 103
On the freedom of Epic 84 Gilio 104
His eccentric acuteness 84 Mazzoni 105
Examples: Homer’s nodding, prose 86 Denores 106
in tragedy, Virgil, minor poetry Zinano 107
The medium and end of Poetry 86 Mazzone da Miglionico, &c. 107
Uncompromising championship of 87 Summo 108
Delight
CHAPTER IV.
THE CRITICISM OF THE PLÉIADE.
Page 20
The Rhetorics of the Transition 109 Vauquelin de la Fresnaye 128
Sibilet 111 Analysis of his Art Poétique 129
Du Bellay 112 The First Book 130
The Défense et Illustration de la 113 The Second 130
Langue Française The Third 132
Its positive gospel and the value 114 His exposition of Pléiade criticism 133
thereof
Outliers: Tory, Fauchet, &c. 134
The Quintil Horatien 116
Pasquier: The Recherches 135
Pelletier’s Art Poétique 117
His knowledge of older French 136
Ronsard: his general importance 119 literature
The Abrégé de l’Art Poétique 120 And criticism of contemporary 137
The Prefaces to the Franciade 122 French poetry
His critical gospel 125 Montaigne: his references to 138
Some minors 127 literature
Pierre de Laudun 127 The Essay On Books 140
CHAPTER V.
ELIZABETHAN CRITICISM.
Sibilet 111 Analysis of his Art Poétique 129
Du Bellay 112 The First Book 130
The Défense et Illustration de la 113 The Second 130
Langue Française The Third 132
Its positive gospel and the value 114 His exposition of Pléiade criticism 133
thereof
Outliers: Tory, Fauchet, &c. 134
The Quintil Horatien 116
Pasquier: The Recherches 135
Pelletier’s Art Poétique 117
His knowledge of older French 136
Ronsard: his general importance 119 literature
The Abrégé de l’Art Poétique 120 And criticism of contemporary 137
The Prefaces to the Franciade 122 French poetry
His critical gospel 125 Montaigne: his references to 138
Some minors 127 literature
Pierre de Laudun 127 The Essay On Books 140
CHAPTER V.
ELIZABETHAN CRITICISM.
Page 21
Backwardness of English Criticism 144 Its minor shortcomings 174
not implying inferiority And major heresies 175
Its cause 145 The excuses of both 175
The influence of Rhetoric and other 146 And their ample compensation 176
matters
King James’s Reulis and Cautelis 176
Hawes 146
Webbe’s Discourse 178
The first Tudor critics 147
Slight in knowledge 179
Wilson: his Art of Rhetoric 149
But enthusiastic 180
His attack on “Inkhorn terms” 149
If uncritical 180
His dealing with Figures 150
In appreciation 182
Cheke: his resolute Anglicism and 151
Puttenham’s (?) Art of English 182
anti-preciosity
Poesie
His criticism of Sallust 152
Its erudition 183
Ascham 153
Systematic arrangement 184
His patriotism 154
And exuberant indulgence in 185
His horror of Romance 154 Figures
And of the Morte d’Arthur 155 Minors: Harington, Meres, 186
His general critical attitude to Prose 156 Webster, Bolton, &c.
And to Poetry 156 Campion and his Observations 187
The craze for Classical Metres 157 Daniel and his Defence of Rhyme 189
Special wants of English Prosody 157 Bacon 191
Its kinds— The Essays 192
(1) Chaucerian 158 The Advancement of Learning 192
(2) Alliterative 158 Its denunciation of mere word- 193
(3) Italianated 159 study
Deficiencies of all three 159 Its view of Poetry 194
The temptations of Criticism in this 160 Some obiter dicta 194
respect The whole of very slight 195
Its adventurers: Ascham himself 160 importance
Watson and Drant 161 Stirling’s Anacrisis 196
Gascoigne 162 Ben Jonson: his equipment 197
His Notes of Instruction 163 His Prefaces, &c. 198
Their capital value 164 The Drummond Conversations 199
Spenser and Harvey 165 The Discoveries 200
The Puritan attack on Poetry 169 Form of the book 203
Gosson 169 Its date 204
The School of Abuse 170 Mosaic of old and new 204
Lodge’s Reply 170 The fling at Montaigne 205
Sidney’s Apology for Poetry 171 At Tamerlane 206
Abstract of it 172 The Shakespeare Passage 206
And that on Bacon 206
General character of the book 208
not implying inferiority And major heresies 175
Its cause 145 The excuses of both 175
The influence of Rhetoric and other 146 And their ample compensation 176
matters
King James’s Reulis and Cautelis 176
Hawes 146
Webbe’s Discourse 178
The first Tudor critics 147
Slight in knowledge 179
Wilson: his Art of Rhetoric 149
But enthusiastic 180
His attack on “Inkhorn terms” 149
If uncritical 180
His dealing with Figures 150
In appreciation 182
Cheke: his resolute Anglicism and 151
Puttenham’s (?) Art of English 182
anti-preciosity
Poesie
His criticism of Sallust 152
Its erudition 183
Ascham 153
Systematic arrangement 184
His patriotism 154
And exuberant indulgence in 185
His horror of Romance 154 Figures
And of the Morte d’Arthur 155 Minors: Harington, Meres, 186
His general critical attitude to Prose 156 Webster, Bolton, &c.
And to Poetry 156 Campion and his Observations 187
The craze for Classical Metres 157 Daniel and his Defence of Rhyme 189
Special wants of English Prosody 157 Bacon 191
Its kinds— The Essays 192
(1) Chaucerian 158 The Advancement of Learning 192
(2) Alliterative 158 Its denunciation of mere word- 193
(3) Italianated 159 study
Deficiencies of all three 159 Its view of Poetry 194
The temptations of Criticism in this 160 Some obiter dicta 194
respect The whole of very slight 195
Its adventurers: Ascham himself 160 importance
Watson and Drant 161 Stirling’s Anacrisis 196
Gascoigne 162 Ben Jonson: his equipment 197
His Notes of Instruction 163 His Prefaces, &c. 198
Their capital value 164 The Drummond Conversations 199
Spenser and Harvey 165 The Discoveries 200
The Puritan attack on Poetry 169 Form of the book 203
Gosson 169 Its date 204
The School of Abuse 170 Mosaic of old and new 204
Lodge’s Reply 170 The fling at Montaigne 205
Sidney’s Apology for Poetry 171 At Tamerlane 206
Abstract of it 172 The Shakespeare Passage 206
And that on Bacon 206
General character of the book 208
Page 22
INTERCHAPTER IV. 211
BOOK V.
THE CRYSTALLISING OF THE NEO-CLASSIC CREED.
CHAPTER I.
FROM MALHERBE TO BOILEAU.
BOOK V.
THE CRYSTALLISING OF THE NEO-CLASSIC CREED.
CHAPTER I.
FROM MALHERBE TO BOILEAU.
Page 23
The supplanting of Italy by France 240 The history of Boileau’s reputation 280
Brilliancy of the French 241 The Art Poétique 281
representatives Its false literary history 281
Malherbe 242 Abstract of it 282
The Commentary on Desportes 244 Critical examination of it 286
What can be said for his criticism 246 Want of originality 287
Its defects stigmatised at once by 247 Faults of method 287
Regnier
Obsession of good sense 288
His Ninth Satire 247
Arbitrary proscriptions 289
The contrast of the two a lasting 249
Boileau’s other works 290
one
The Satires 290
The diffusion of seventeenth 250
century criticism The Epigrams and Epistles 292
Vaugelas 251 Prose—The Héros de Roman; the 292
Réflexions sur Longin
Balzac 252
The “Dissertation on Joconde” 293
His Letters 252
A “Solifidian of Good Sense” 295
His critical Dissertations 253
The plea for his practical services 296
Ogier and the Preface to Tyr et 254
Sidon Historical examination of this 296
Chapelain: the hopelessness of his 257 Concluding remarks on him 299
verse La Bruyère and Fénelon 300
The interest of his criticism 257 The “Des Ouvrages de l’Esprit” 301
The Sentiments de l’Académie sur 258 General observations 302
le Cid Judgments of authors 303
Prefaces 259 Fénelon. The Dialogues sur 305
Sur les Vieux Romans 260 l’Eloquence
Letters, &c. 261 Sur les Occupations de l’Académie 306
Corneille 261 Française
The Three Discourses 263 And its challenge to correctness 307
The Examens 263 The Abbé D’Aubignac 309
La Mesnardière—Sarrasin— 264 His Pratique du Théâtre 309
Scudéry Rapin 310
Mambrun 266 His method partly good 311
Saint-Evremond 268 His particular absurdities as to 311
His critical quality and 269 Homer in blame
accomplishment As to Virgil in praise 312
His views on Corneille 270 As to others 313
On Christian subjects, &c. 270 The reading of his riddle 313
On Ancients and Moderns 270 Le Bossu and the Abstract Epic 314
Gui Patin—his judgment of 272 Bouhours 315
Browne Encyclopædias and Newspapers 316
Tallemant, Pellisson, Ménage, 273 Bayle 316
Madame de Sévigné Baillet 317
Brilliancy of the French 241 The Art Poétique 281
representatives Its false literary history 281
Malherbe 242 Abstract of it 282
The Commentary on Desportes 244 Critical examination of it 286
What can be said for his criticism 246 Want of originality 287
Its defects stigmatised at once by 247 Faults of method 287
Regnier
Obsession of good sense 288
His Ninth Satire 247
Arbitrary proscriptions 289
The contrast of the two a lasting 249
Boileau’s other works 290
one
The Satires 290
The diffusion of seventeenth 250
century criticism The Epigrams and Epistles 292
Vaugelas 251 Prose—The Héros de Roman; the 292
Réflexions sur Longin
Balzac 252
The “Dissertation on Joconde” 293
His Letters 252
A “Solifidian of Good Sense” 295
His critical Dissertations 253
The plea for his practical services 296
Ogier and the Preface to Tyr et 254
Sidon Historical examination of this 296
Chapelain: the hopelessness of his 257 Concluding remarks on him 299
verse La Bruyère and Fénelon 300
The interest of his criticism 257 The “Des Ouvrages de l’Esprit” 301
The Sentiments de l’Académie sur 258 General observations 302
le Cid Judgments of authors 303
Prefaces 259 Fénelon. The Dialogues sur 305
Sur les Vieux Romans 260 l’Eloquence
Letters, &c. 261 Sur les Occupations de l’Académie 306
Corneille 261 Française
The Three Discourses 263 And its challenge to correctness 307
The Examens 263 The Abbé D’Aubignac 309
La Mesnardière—Sarrasin— 264 His Pratique du Théâtre 309
Scudéry Rapin 310
Mambrun 266 His method partly good 311
Saint-Evremond 268 His particular absurdities as to 311
His critical quality and 269 Homer in blame
accomplishment As to Virgil in praise 312
His views on Corneille 270 As to others 313
On Christian subjects, &c. 270 The reading of his riddle 313
On Ancients and Moderns 270 Le Bossu and the Abstract Epic 314
Gui Patin—his judgment of 272 Bouhours 315
Browne Encyclopædias and Newspapers 316
Tallemant, Pellisson, Ménage, 273 Bayle 316
Madame de Sévigné Baillet 317
Page 24
The Ana other than Ménage’s, 274 The ethos of a Critical Pedant 318
especially
Gibert 319
The Huetiana 275
The Ancient and Modern Quarrel 320
Valesiana 275
Its small critical value 321
Scaligerana 276
And Parrhasiana 276
Patru, Desmarets, and others 277
Malebranche 279
CHAPTER II.
THE ITALIAN DECADENCE AND THE SPANIARDS.
Decadence of Italian Criticism 323 Poetics: Rengifo 337
Paolo Beni 324 Pinciano 338
Possevino: his Bibliotheca Selecta 325 La Cueva 341
Tassoni: his Pensieri Diversi 326 Carvallo 341
Aromatari 328 Gonzales de Salas 341
His Degli Autori del Ben Parlare 329 The Cigarrales of Tirso de Molina 343
Boccalini and Minors 329 Lope’s Arte Nuevo, &c. 344
Influence of the Ragguagli 330 His assailants and defenders 346
The set of Seicentist taste 331 The fight over the Spanish drama 347
Spanish criticism: highly ranked by 331 Cervantes and Calderon 347
Dryden? Gongorism, Culteranism, &c. 349
The Origins—Villena 333 Quevedo 349
Santillana 333 Gracián 349
Encina 335 The limitations of Spanish criticism 350
Valdés 335
The beginning of regular Criticism. 336
Humanist Rhetoricians
CHAPTER III.
GERMAN AND DUTCH CRITICISM.
The hindmost of all 352 Heinsius: the De Tragœdiæ 356
Origins 353 Constitutione
Sturm 353 Voss 357
Fabricius 354 His Rhetoric 358
Version A. 354 His Poetics 359
Version B. 354 Opitz 360
Jac. Pontanus 355 The Buch der Deutschen Poeterei 361
CHAPTER IV.
especially
Gibert 319
The Huetiana 275
The Ancient and Modern Quarrel 320
Valesiana 275
Its small critical value 321
Scaligerana 276
And Parrhasiana 276
Patru, Desmarets, and others 277
Malebranche 279
CHAPTER II.
THE ITALIAN DECADENCE AND THE SPANIARDS.
Decadence of Italian Criticism 323 Poetics: Rengifo 337
Paolo Beni 324 Pinciano 338
Possevino: his Bibliotheca Selecta 325 La Cueva 341
Tassoni: his Pensieri Diversi 326 Carvallo 341
Aromatari 328 Gonzales de Salas 341
His Degli Autori del Ben Parlare 329 The Cigarrales of Tirso de Molina 343
Boccalini and Minors 329 Lope’s Arte Nuevo, &c. 344
Influence of the Ragguagli 330 His assailants and defenders 346
The set of Seicentist taste 331 The fight over the Spanish drama 347
Spanish criticism: highly ranked by 331 Cervantes and Calderon 347
Dryden? Gongorism, Culteranism, &c. 349
The Origins—Villena 333 Quevedo 349
Santillana 333 Gracián 349
Encina 335 The limitations of Spanish criticism 350
Valdés 335
The beginning of regular Criticism. 336
Humanist Rhetoricians
CHAPTER III.
GERMAN AND DUTCH CRITICISM.
The hindmost of all 352 Heinsius: the De Tragœdiæ 356
Origins 353 Constitutione
Sturm 353 Voss 357
Fabricius 354 His Rhetoric 358
Version A. 354 His Poetics 359
Version B. 354 Opitz 360
Jac. Pontanus 355 The Buch der Deutschen Poeterei 361
CHAPTER IV.
Page 25
DRYDEN AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES.
Dead water in English Criticism 365 The Essay on Satire and the 385
Milton 365 Dedication of the Æneis
Cowley 366 The Parallel of Poetry and Painting 386
The Prefatory matter of Gondibert 367 The Preface to the Fables 386
The “Heroic Poem” 368 Dryden’s general critical position 386
Davenant’s Examen 369 His special critical method 387
Hobbes’s Answer 370 Dryden and Boileau 389
Dryden 371 Rymer 391
His advantages 372 The Preface to Rapin 392
The early Prefaces 373 The Tragedies of the Last Age 394
The Essay of Dramatic Poesy 376 The Short View of Tragedy 395
Its setting and overture 376 The Rule of Tom the Second 397
Crites for the Ancients 377 Sprat 398
Eugenius for the “last age” 378 Edward Phillips 398
Lisideius for the French 378 His Theatrum Poetarum 399
Dryden for England and Liberty 379 Winstanley’s Lives 400
Coda on rhymed plays, and 380 Langbaine’s Dramatic Poets 400
conclusion Temple 401
Conspicuous merits of the piece 381 Bentley 401
The Middle Prefaces 382 Collier’s Short View 402
Sir T. P. Blount 404
Periodicals: The Athenian Mercury, 406
&c.
INTERCHAPTER V. 407
BOOK VI.
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ORTHODOXY.
CHAPTER I.
FROM ADDISON TO JOHNSON.
Dead water in English Criticism 365 The Essay on Satire and the 385
Milton 365 Dedication of the Æneis
Cowley 366 The Parallel of Poetry and Painting 386
The Prefatory matter of Gondibert 367 The Preface to the Fables 386
The “Heroic Poem” 368 Dryden’s general critical position 386
Davenant’s Examen 369 His special critical method 387
Hobbes’s Answer 370 Dryden and Boileau 389
Dryden 371 Rymer 391
His advantages 372 The Preface to Rapin 392
The early Prefaces 373 The Tragedies of the Last Age 394
The Essay of Dramatic Poesy 376 The Short View of Tragedy 395
Its setting and overture 376 The Rule of Tom the Second 397
Crites for the Ancients 377 Sprat 398
Eugenius for the “last age” 378 Edward Phillips 398
Lisideius for the French 378 His Theatrum Poetarum 399
Dryden for England and Liberty 379 Winstanley’s Lives 400
Coda on rhymed plays, and 380 Langbaine’s Dramatic Poets 400
conclusion Temple 401
Conspicuous merits of the piece 381 Bentley 401
The Middle Prefaces 382 Collier’s Short View 402
Sir T. P. Blount 404
Periodicals: The Athenian Mercury, 406
&c.
INTERCHAPTER V. 407
BOOK VI.
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ORTHODOXY.
CHAPTER I.
FROM ADDISON TO JOHNSON.
Page 26
Criticism at Dryden’s death 426 Trapp 462
Bysshe’s Art of English Poetry 426 Blair 462
Gildon 429 The Lectures on Rhetoric 463
Welsted 430 The Dissertation on Ossian 464
Dennis 431 Kames 465
On Rymer 432 The Elements of Criticism 466
On Shakespeare 434 Campbell 470
On “Machines” 435 The Philosophy of Rhetoric 470
His general theory of Poetry 435 Harris 473
Addison 437 The Philological Enquiries 474
The Account of the Best known 438 “Estimate” Brown: his History of 476
English Poets Poetry
The Spectator criticisms 440 Johnson: his preparation for 477
On True and False Wit 441 criticism
On Tragedy 441 The Rambler on Milton 480
On Milton 443 On Spenser 482
The “Pleasures of the Imagination” 444 On History and Letter-writing 483
His general critical value 447 On Tragi-comedy 483
Steele 448 “Dick Minim” 484
Atterbury 449 Rasselas 484
Swift 450 The Shakespeare Preface 485
The Battle of the Books 450 The Lives of the Poets 486
The Tale of a Tub 451 Their general merits 487
Minor works 451 The Cowley 489
Pope 452 The Milton 489
The Letters 453 The Dryden and Pope 490
The Shakespeare Preface 454 The Collins and Gray 491
Spence’s Anecdotes 454 The critical greatness of the Lives 493
and of Johnson
The Essay on Criticism 455
Minor Criticism: Periodical and 496
The Epistle to Augustus 457
other
Remarks on Pope as a critic 457
Goldsmith 498
And the critical attitude of his 460
Vicesimus Knox 499
group
Scott of Amwell 500
Philosophical and Professional 461
Critics
CHAPTER II.
THE CONTEMPORARIES OF VOLTAIRE.
Bysshe’s Art of English Poetry 426 Blair 462
Gildon 429 The Lectures on Rhetoric 463
Welsted 430 The Dissertation on Ossian 464
Dennis 431 Kames 465
On Rymer 432 The Elements of Criticism 466
On Shakespeare 434 Campbell 470
On “Machines” 435 The Philosophy of Rhetoric 470
His general theory of Poetry 435 Harris 473
Addison 437 The Philological Enquiries 474
The Account of the Best known 438 “Estimate” Brown: his History of 476
English Poets Poetry
The Spectator criticisms 440 Johnson: his preparation for 477
On True and False Wit 441 criticism
On Tragedy 441 The Rambler on Milton 480
On Milton 443 On Spenser 482
The “Pleasures of the Imagination” 444 On History and Letter-writing 483
His general critical value 447 On Tragi-comedy 483
Steele 448 “Dick Minim” 484
Atterbury 449 Rasselas 484
Swift 450 The Shakespeare Preface 485
The Battle of the Books 450 The Lives of the Poets 486
The Tale of a Tub 451 Their general merits 487
Minor works 451 The Cowley 489
Pope 452 The Milton 489
The Letters 453 The Dryden and Pope 490
The Shakespeare Preface 454 The Collins and Gray 491
Spence’s Anecdotes 454 The critical greatness of the Lives 493
and of Johnson
The Essay on Criticism 455
Minor Criticism: Periodical and 496
The Epistle to Augustus 457
other
Remarks on Pope as a critic 457
Goldsmith 498
And the critical attitude of his 460
Vicesimus Knox 499
group
Scott of Amwell 500
Philosophical and Professional 461
Critics
CHAPTER II.
THE CONTEMPORARIES OF VOLTAIRE.
Page 27
Close connection of French 501 Examples of it 515
seventeenth and eighteenth Causes of his failure 518
century Criticism: Fontenelle
Others: Buffon 519
Exceptional character of his 502
“Style and the man” 520
criticism
Vauvenargues 521
His attitude to the “Ancient and 503
Modern” Quarrel Batteux 522
The Dialogues des Morts 503 His adjustment of Rules and Taste 523
Other critical work 504 His incompleteness 524
La Motte 507 Marmontel 525
His “Unity of Interest” 508 Oddities and qualities of his 526
criticism
Rollin 509
Others 529
Brumoy 509
Thomas, Suard, &c. 529
Rémond de Saint-Mard 510
La Harpe 530
L. Racine 511
His Cours de Littérature 530
Du Bos 511
His critical position as ultimus 531
Stimulating but desultory character 512
suorum
of his Réflexions
The Academic Essay 533
Montesquieu 514
Rivarol 534
Voltaire: disappointment of his 515
criticism
CHAPTER III.
CLASSICISM IN THE OTHER NATIONS.
Preliminary remarks 537 Neo-classicism triumphs in Spain 546
Temporary revival of Italian 538 The absurdities of Artiga 547
Criticism Luzán 548
Gravina 538 The rest uninteresting 549
Muratori: his Della Perfetta Poesia 541 Feyjóo, Isla, and others 549
Crescimbeni 542 Rise at last of German Criticism 550
Quadrio 542 Its school time 551
The emergence of literary history 545 Classicism at bay almost from the 552
Further decadence of Italian 545 first—Gottsched
criticism The Versuch einer Critischen 553
Metastasio 546 Dichtkunst
Its chief idea 553
Specimen details 555
Gellert: he transacts 557
INTERCHAPTER VI.
§ I. THE NEMESIS OF CORRECTNESS 559
seventeenth and eighteenth Causes of his failure 518
century Criticism: Fontenelle
Others: Buffon 519
Exceptional character of his 502
“Style and the man” 520
criticism
Vauvenargues 521
His attitude to the “Ancient and 503
Modern” Quarrel Batteux 522
The Dialogues des Morts 503 His adjustment of Rules and Taste 523
Other critical work 504 His incompleteness 524
La Motte 507 Marmontel 525
His “Unity of Interest” 508 Oddities and qualities of his 526
criticism
Rollin 509
Others 529
Brumoy 509
Thomas, Suard, &c. 529
Rémond de Saint-Mard 510
La Harpe 530
L. Racine 511
His Cours de Littérature 530
Du Bos 511
His critical position as ultimus 531
Stimulating but desultory character 512
suorum
of his Réflexions
The Academic Essay 533
Montesquieu 514
Rivarol 534
Voltaire: disappointment of his 515
criticism
CHAPTER III.
CLASSICISM IN THE OTHER NATIONS.
Preliminary remarks 537 Neo-classicism triumphs in Spain 546
Temporary revival of Italian 538 The absurdities of Artiga 547
Criticism Luzán 548
Gravina 538 The rest uninteresting 549
Muratori: his Della Perfetta Poesia 541 Feyjóo, Isla, and others 549
Crescimbeni 542 Rise at last of German Criticism 550
Quadrio 542 Its school time 551
The emergence of literary history 545 Classicism at bay almost from the 552
Further decadence of Italian 545 first—Gottsched
criticism The Versuch einer Critischen 553
Metastasio 546 Dichtkunst
Its chief idea 553
Specimen details 555
Gellert: he transacts 557
INTERCHAPTER VI.
§ I. THE NEMESIS OF CORRECTNESS 559
Page 28
§ II. THE BALANCE-SHEET OF NEO-CLASSIC CRITICISM 566
INDEX 579
INDEX 579
Page 29
BOOK IV
RENAISSANCE CRITICISM
“Le materie da scienza, o da arte, o da istoria
comprese, possano esser convenevoli soggetti a
poesia, e a poemi, pure che poeticamente sieno
trattate.”—Patrizzi.
RENAISSANCE CRITICISM
“Le materie da scienza, o da arte, o da istoria
comprese, possano esser convenevoli soggetti a
poesia, e a poemi, pure che poeticamente sieno
trattate.”—Patrizzi.
Page 30
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTORY—ERASMUS.
THE CRITICAL STARTING-POINT OF THE RENAISSANCE—INFLUENCES AT WORK:
GENERAL—PARTICULAR—WEAKNESS OF VERNACULARS—RECOVERY OF
ANCIENT CRITICISM—NECESSITY OF DEFENCE AGAINST PURITANISM—THE
LINE OF CRITICISM RESULTANT—NOT NECESSARILY ANTI-MEDIÆVAL, BUT
CLASSICAL AND ANTI-PURITAN—ERASMUS—THE ‘CICERONIANUS'—THE
‘COLLOQUIES’—THE ‘LETTERS’—DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOOK.
We saw, in the second section of the Interchapter which served as
Conclusion to the first volume of this work, to what a point the Middle
The Critical starting-point of Ages had brought the materials and the methods
the Renaissance.
of Literary Criticism, and what the new age with
its combined opportunities might have done. We also endeavoured to
indicate generally, and so to speak, proleptically, what it did not do. It is
now time to examine what it did: and in the course of the examination to
develop the reasons, the character, and the consequences, both of its
commission and of its abstention.[1]
If no period has ever been more guilty of that too usual injustice to
predecessors which we noted, it is fair to acknowledge that none had greater
temptations to such injustice. The breach between the Classical and the
Dark Ages had been almost astonishingly gradual—so gradual that it has
needed no great hardiness of paradox to enable men to deny that there was
any breach at all. On the other hand, though the breach at the Renaissance[2]
is capable of being, and has sometimes been, much exaggerated; though it
was preceded by a considerable transition period, and though mediæval
characteristics survived it long and far, yet the turning over of the new leaf
is again incontestable, and was as necessary in the order of thought as it is
certain in the sequence of fact.
It is not much more than a hundred years since the French Revolution, a
Influences at single event in one department only of things actual, was
work: General.
sufficient to precipitate a change which is only less—which
INTRODUCTORY—ERASMUS.
THE CRITICAL STARTING-POINT OF THE RENAISSANCE—INFLUENCES AT WORK:
GENERAL—PARTICULAR—WEAKNESS OF VERNACULARS—RECOVERY OF
ANCIENT CRITICISM—NECESSITY OF DEFENCE AGAINST PURITANISM—THE
LINE OF CRITICISM RESULTANT—NOT NECESSARILY ANTI-MEDIÆVAL, BUT
CLASSICAL AND ANTI-PURITAN—ERASMUS—THE ‘CICERONIANUS'—THE
‘COLLOQUIES’—THE ‘LETTERS’—DISTRIBUTION OF THE BOOK.
We saw, in the second section of the Interchapter which served as
Conclusion to the first volume of this work, to what a point the Middle
The Critical starting-point of Ages had brought the materials and the methods
the Renaissance.
of Literary Criticism, and what the new age with
its combined opportunities might have done. We also endeavoured to
indicate generally, and so to speak, proleptically, what it did not do. It is
now time to examine what it did: and in the course of the examination to
develop the reasons, the character, and the consequences, both of its
commission and of its abstention.[1]
If no period has ever been more guilty of that too usual injustice to
predecessors which we noted, it is fair to acknowledge that none had greater
temptations to such injustice. The breach between the Classical and the
Dark Ages had been almost astonishingly gradual—so gradual that it has
needed no great hardiness of paradox to enable men to deny that there was
any breach at all. On the other hand, though the breach at the Renaissance[2]
is capable of being, and has sometimes been, much exaggerated; though it
was preceded by a considerable transition period, and though mediæval
characteristics survived it long and far, yet the turning over of the new leaf
is again incontestable, and was as necessary in the order of thought as it is
certain in the sequence of fact.
It is not much more than a hundred years since the French Revolution, a
Influences at single event in one department only of things actual, was
work: General.
sufficient to precipitate a change which is only less—which
Page 31
some would hold likely to be not less—than the change at the beginning of
the Dark Ages, and the change at the end of the Middle. At the Renaissance,
not one but three or four such events, in as many different departments,
brought their shock to bear upon the life and mind of Europe. The final
disappearance of the Eastern Empire, and the apparent—perhaps, indeed, a
little more than apparent—danger of a wide and considerable barbarian
invasion of even Western Europe, with the balancing of this after a sort a
little later by the extinction of the Moorish power in Spain, coincided, as
regards politics, with a general tendency throughout Europe towards the
change of feudal into centralised monarchy. The determination (resulting no
doubt from no single cause, and taking effect after long preparation) of
direct, practical, and extensive study to the Classics, especially to Greek,
affected not merely literature, but almost everything of which literature
treats. The invention of printing enormously facilitated, not merely the
study but, the diffusion and propagation of ideas and patterns. The
discovery of America, and of the sea-route to the East, excited that spirit of
exploration and adventure which, once aroused, is sure not to limit itself to
the material world. And, lastly, the long-threatened and at last realised
protest against the corruptions of the Christian Church, and the domination
of the Pope, unsettled, directly or indirectly, every convention, every
compromise, every accepted doctrine. In fact, to use the words of one of the
greatest of English writers,[3] in what is perhaps his most brilliant passage,
“in the fabric of habit which they had so laboriously built for themselves,
men could remain no longer.”
Their critical habits, as we have seen sufficiently in the last Book, had
been mainly negative; and for this reason, if for no other, a considerable
critical development would have been certain to spring up. But there were
other reasons, and powerful ones. In the first place, the atmosphere of revolt
which was abroad necessarily breeds, or rather necessarily implies,
criticism. A few, whom the equal Jove has loved, may be able to criticise
while acquiescing, approving, even loving and strenuously championing;
but this equity is not exceedingly common, and the general tendency of
acceptance, and even of acquiescence, is distinctly uncritical. On the other
hand, the rebel is driven either to his rebellion by the exercise of his critical
faculty, or to the exercise of his critical faculty in order to justify his
rebellion. I do not myself hold that the Devil was the first critic. I have not
the slightest desire to serve myself and my subject heirs to that spirit
the Dark Ages, and the change at the end of the Middle. At the Renaissance,
not one but three or four such events, in as many different departments,
brought their shock to bear upon the life and mind of Europe. The final
disappearance of the Eastern Empire, and the apparent—perhaps, indeed, a
little more than apparent—danger of a wide and considerable barbarian
invasion of even Western Europe, with the balancing of this after a sort a
little later by the extinction of the Moorish power in Spain, coincided, as
regards politics, with a general tendency throughout Europe towards the
change of feudal into centralised monarchy. The determination (resulting no
doubt from no single cause, and taking effect after long preparation) of
direct, practical, and extensive study to the Classics, especially to Greek,
affected not merely literature, but almost everything of which literature
treats. The invention of printing enormously facilitated, not merely the
study but, the diffusion and propagation of ideas and patterns. The
discovery of America, and of the sea-route to the East, excited that spirit of
exploration and adventure which, once aroused, is sure not to limit itself to
the material world. And, lastly, the long-threatened and at last realised
protest against the corruptions of the Christian Church, and the domination
of the Pope, unsettled, directly or indirectly, every convention, every
compromise, every accepted doctrine. In fact, to use the words of one of the
greatest of English writers,[3] in what is perhaps his most brilliant passage,
“in the fabric of habit which they had so laboriously built for themselves,
men could remain no longer.”
Their critical habits, as we have seen sufficiently in the last Book, had
been mainly negative; and for this reason, if for no other, a considerable
critical development would have been certain to spring up. But there were
other reasons, and powerful ones. In the first place, the atmosphere of revolt
which was abroad necessarily breeds, or rather necessarily implies,
criticism. A few, whom the equal Jove has loved, may be able to criticise
while acquiescing, approving, even loving and strenuously championing;
but this equity is not exceedingly common, and the general tendency of
acceptance, and even of acquiescence, is distinctly uncritical. On the other
hand, the rebel is driven either to his rebellion by the exercise of his critical
faculty, or to the exercise of his critical faculty in order to justify his
rebellion. I do not myself hold that the Devil was the first critic. I have not
the slightest desire to serve myself and my subject heirs to that spirit
Page 32
unfortunate; but I recognise the necessity of some argument to rebut the
filiation.
And that these generalities should become particular in reference to
Literary Criticism more especially, there were additional and momentous
Particular. inducements of two different kinds. In the first place, the
malcontents with the immediate past must in any case have been drawn to
attack the literary side of its battlements, because of their extreme
weakness. Everywhere but in the two extremities of the West, Italy and
Scotland (the latter, owing to the very small bulk of its literary production,
and the rudimentary condition of its language, being hardly an exception at
all), the fifteenth century, even with a generous eking from the earliest
sixteenth, had been a time of literary torpor and literary decadence, relieved
only by a few—a very few—brilliant individual performances. In England
the successors of Chaucer, not content with carrying his method and his
choice of subject no further, had almost incomprehensibly lost command of
both. In France the rhétoriqueur school of poets had degenerated less in
form, but had been almost equally unable to show any progress, or even any
Weakness of maintained command, of matter. Germany was far worse
Vernaculars.
than either. If Chaucer himself could criticise, indirectly but
openly, the faults of the still vigorous and beautiful romance—of the
romance which in his own country was yet to boast Chester in verse and
Malory in prose—how much more must any one with sharp sense and
sound taste, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, have been tempted to
apply some similar process to the fossilised formalism of rondeau and
ballade; to the lifeless and lumbering allegory of the latest “Rose”
imitations; to the “aureate,” or rather tinselled, bombast of Chastellain and
Robertet?
But, as it happened, no inconsiderable part of the newly disinterred
Recovery of classics dealt with this very subject of Literary Criticism,
Ancient
Criticism.
and, having been most neglected, was certain to be most
attended to. Later mediæval practice had provided the
examples of disease: earlier classical theory was to provide the remedy.
Plato, the most cherished of the recovered treasures, had—in his own
peculiar way, no doubt—criticised very largely; the Poetics and the
Rhetoric were quickly set afresh before the new age in the originals; Horace
had always been known; Quintilian was, since Rhetoric had not yet fallen
into disfavour, studied direct;[4] and, before the sixteenth century was half
filiation.
And that these generalities should become particular in reference to
Literary Criticism more especially, there were additional and momentous
Particular. inducements of two different kinds. In the first place, the
malcontents with the immediate past must in any case have been drawn to
attack the literary side of its battlements, because of their extreme
weakness. Everywhere but in the two extremities of the West, Italy and
Scotland (the latter, owing to the very small bulk of its literary production,
and the rudimentary condition of its language, being hardly an exception at
all), the fifteenth century, even with a generous eking from the earliest
sixteenth, had been a time of literary torpor and literary decadence, relieved
only by a few—a very few—brilliant individual performances. In England
the successors of Chaucer, not content with carrying his method and his
choice of subject no further, had almost incomprehensibly lost command of
both. In France the rhétoriqueur school of poets had degenerated less in
form, but had been almost equally unable to show any progress, or even any
Weakness of maintained command, of matter. Germany was far worse
Vernaculars.
than either. If Chaucer himself could criticise, indirectly but
openly, the faults of the still vigorous and beautiful romance—of the
romance which in his own country was yet to boast Chester in verse and
Malory in prose—how much more must any one with sharp sense and
sound taste, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, have been tempted to
apply some similar process to the fossilised formalism of rondeau and
ballade; to the lifeless and lumbering allegory of the latest “Rose”
imitations; to the “aureate,” or rather tinselled, bombast of Chastellain and
Robertet?
But, as it happened, no inconsiderable part of the newly disinterred
Recovery of classics dealt with this very subject of Literary Criticism,
Ancient
Criticism.
and, having been most neglected, was certain to be most
attended to. Later mediæval practice had provided the
examples of disease: earlier classical theory was to provide the remedy.
Plato, the most cherished of the recovered treasures, had—in his own
peculiar way, no doubt—criticised very largely; the Poetics and the
Rhetoric were quickly set afresh before the new age in the originals; Horace
had always been known; Quintilian was, since Rhetoric had not yet fallen
into disfavour, studied direct;[4] and, before the sixteenth century was half
Page 33
over, Longinus himself had been unearthed and presented to a world which
(if it had chosen to attend thereto) was also for the first time furnished with
Dante’s critical performance.[5] With such an arsenal; with such a
disposition of mind abroad; and with such real or imagined enemies to
attack, it would have been odd if the forces of criticism, so long
disorganised, and indeed disembodied, had not taken formidable shape.
There was, however, yet another influence which is not very easy to
estimate, and which has sometimes perhaps been not quite rightly
estimated, but which undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the matter.
Necessity of Almost as soon as—almost before indeed—the main battle
defence against
Puritanism.
of the Renaissance engaged itself, certain phenomena, not
unusual in similar cases, made their appearance. Men of
letters, humanists, students, were necessarily the protagonists of revolt or
reform. There had always, as we have seen, been a certain jealousy of
Letters on the part of the Church; and this was not likely to be lessened in
the new arrangement of circumstance. But the jealousy was by no means
confined to the party of order and of the defence. It had been necessary, or it
would have had no rank-and-file, for the attack to enlist the descendants of
the old Lollards and other opponents of the Romish Church in different
countries. But in these, to no small extent, and in men like Calvin, when
they made their appearance, perhaps still more, the Puritan dislike of Art,
and of Literature as part of Art, was even more rampant than in the
obscurest of obscuri viri on the Catholic and Conservative side. And so men
of letters had not merely to attack what they thought unworthy and obsolete
foes of literature, but to defend literature itself from their own political and
ecclesiastical allies.
The line which they took had been taken before, and was no doubt partly
suggested to them by Boccaccio in the remarkable book already referred
to[6]—the De Genealogia Deorum—which was repeatedly printed in the
The line of early days of the press. There can be very little question
criticism
resultant.
that this anticipates the peculiar tone of what we may call
anti-Platonic Platonism, which is so noticeable in the
Italian critics of the Renaissance, and which was caught from them by
Englishmen of great note and worth, from Sidney to Milton. The excellent
historian of the subject—whom I have already quoted, and my indebtedness
to whom must not be supposed to be repudiated because I cannot agree with
him on some important points—is, I think, entirely wrong in speaking of
(if it had chosen to attend thereto) was also for the first time furnished with
Dante’s critical performance.[5] With such an arsenal; with such a
disposition of mind abroad; and with such real or imagined enemies to
attack, it would have been odd if the forces of criticism, so long
disorganised, and indeed disembodied, had not taken formidable shape.
There was, however, yet another influence which is not very easy to
estimate, and which has sometimes perhaps been not quite rightly
estimated, but which undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the matter.
Necessity of Almost as soon as—almost before indeed—the main battle
defence against
Puritanism.
of the Renaissance engaged itself, certain phenomena, not
unusual in similar cases, made their appearance. Men of
letters, humanists, students, were necessarily the protagonists of revolt or
reform. There had always, as we have seen, been a certain jealousy of
Letters on the part of the Church; and this was not likely to be lessened in
the new arrangement of circumstance. But the jealousy was by no means
confined to the party of order and of the defence. It had been necessary, or it
would have had no rank-and-file, for the attack to enlist the descendants of
the old Lollards and other opponents of the Romish Church in different
countries. But in these, to no small extent, and in men like Calvin, when
they made their appearance, perhaps still more, the Puritan dislike of Art,
and of Literature as part of Art, was even more rampant than in the
obscurest of obscuri viri on the Catholic and Conservative side. And so men
of letters had not merely to attack what they thought unworthy and obsolete
foes of literature, but to defend literature itself from their own political and
ecclesiastical allies.
The line which they took had been taken before, and was no doubt partly
suggested to them by Boccaccio in the remarkable book already referred
to[6]—the De Genealogia Deorum—which was repeatedly printed in the
The line of early days of the press. There can be very little question
criticism
resultant.
that this anticipates the peculiar tone of what we may call
anti-Platonic Platonism, which is so noticeable in the
Italian critics of the Renaissance, and which was caught from them by
Englishmen of great note and worth, from Sidney to Milton. The excellent
historian of the subject—whom I have already quoted, and my indebtedness
to whom must not be supposed to be repudiated because I cannot agree with
him on some important points—is, I think, entirely wrong in speaking of
Page 34
mediæval “distrust of literature,” while the statement with which he
supports this, that “popular literature had fallen into decay, and, in its
contemporary form, was beneath serious consideration,”[7] is so astonishing,
that I fear we must class it with those judicia ignorantium of which our
general motto speaks. In his context Mr Spingarn mentions, as examples of
mediæval treatment of literature, Fulgentius, Isidore, John of Salisbury,
Dante, Boccaccio. What “popular” (by which I presume is meant
vernacular) literature was there in the times of Fulgentius or of Isidore? Is
not the statement that “popular literature had fallen into decay” in the time
of Dante self-exploded? And the same may be said of Boccaccio. As for
John of Salisbury, he certainly, as we have seen,[8] was not much of a critic
himself; but that popular literature was decaying in his time is a statement
which no one who knows the Chansons de Gestes and the Arthurian Legend
can accept for one moment; while the documents also quoted supra, the
Labyrinthus, the Nova Poetria, and the rest—entirely disprove any
“distrust” of letters.
The truth is, with submission to Mr Spingarn, that there never was any
such, except from the Puritan-religious side, and that this was by no means
Not necessarily specially conspicuous in the Middle Ages. The “Defence of
anti-mediæval,
Poesy,” and of literature generally, which animates men so
different as Boccaccio and Milton, as Scaliger and Sidney, is no direct
revolt against the Middle Ages at all, but, as has been said, a discourse Pro
Domo, in the first place, against the severer and more obscurantist partisans
of Catholicism, who were disposed to dislike men of letters as Reformers,
and literature as the instrument of Reformation; secondly, and much more
urgently, against the Puritan and Philistine variety of Protestantism itself,
which so soon turned against its literary leaders and allies. And the special
form which this defence took was in turn mainly conditioned, not by anti-
mediæval animus, but in part by the circumstances of the case, in part by
the character of the critical weapons which men found in their new arsenal
of the Classics.
Classical Criticism, as we have seen in the preceding volume, had
invariably in theory, and almost as invariably in practice, confined itself
but classical wholly or mainly to the consideration of “the subject.”
Although Aristotle himself had not denied the special pleasure of art and the
various kinds of art, although Plato, in distrusting and denouncing, had
admitted the psychagogic faculties thereof; yet nobody except Longinus had
supports this, that “popular literature had fallen into decay, and, in its
contemporary form, was beneath serious consideration,”[7] is so astonishing,
that I fear we must class it with those judicia ignorantium of which our
general motto speaks. In his context Mr Spingarn mentions, as examples of
mediæval treatment of literature, Fulgentius, Isidore, John of Salisbury,
Dante, Boccaccio. What “popular” (by which I presume is meant
vernacular) literature was there in the times of Fulgentius or of Isidore? Is
not the statement that “popular literature had fallen into decay” in the time
of Dante self-exploded? And the same may be said of Boccaccio. As for
John of Salisbury, he certainly, as we have seen,[8] was not much of a critic
himself; but that popular literature was decaying in his time is a statement
which no one who knows the Chansons de Gestes and the Arthurian Legend
can accept for one moment; while the documents also quoted supra, the
Labyrinthus, the Nova Poetria, and the rest—entirely disprove any
“distrust” of letters.
The truth is, with submission to Mr Spingarn, that there never was any
such, except from the Puritan-religious side, and that this was by no means
Not necessarily specially conspicuous in the Middle Ages. The “Defence of
anti-mediæval,
Poesy,” and of literature generally, which animates men so
different as Boccaccio and Milton, as Scaliger and Sidney, is no direct
revolt against the Middle Ages at all, but, as has been said, a discourse Pro
Domo, in the first place, against the severer and more obscurantist partisans
of Catholicism, who were disposed to dislike men of letters as Reformers,
and literature as the instrument of Reformation; secondly, and much more
urgently, against the Puritan and Philistine variety of Protestantism itself,
which so soon turned against its literary leaders and allies. And the special
form which this defence took was in turn mainly conditioned, not by anti-
mediæval animus, but in part by the circumstances of the case, in part by
the character of the critical weapons which men found in their new arsenal
of the Classics.
Classical Criticism, as we have seen in the preceding volume, had
invariably in theory, and almost as invariably in practice, confined itself
but classical wholly or mainly to the consideration of “the subject.”
Although Aristotle himself had not denied the special pleasure of art and the
various kinds of art, although Plato, in distrusting and denouncing, had
admitted the psychagogic faculties thereof; yet nobody except Longinus had
Page 35
boldly identified the chief end of it with “transport,” not with persuasion,
with edification, or anything of the kind. Accordingly, those who looked to
the ancients to help them against the Obscuri Viri on the one hand, and
against good Puritan folk like our own Ascham on the other, were almost
bound to keep the pleasure of poetry and literature generally in the
background; or, if they brought it to the front at all, to extol it and defend it
on ethical and philosophical, not on æsthetic grounds. Taking a hint from
their “sweet enemy” Plato, from Plutarch, and from such neo-Platonic
utterances as that tractate of Plotinus, which has been discussed in its place,
[9]
they set themselves to prove that poetry was not a sweet pleasant deceit
or corrupting influence in the republic, but a stronghold and rampart of
and anti- religious and philosophical truth. Calling in turn Aristotle
Puritan.
to their assistance, and working him in with his master and
rival, they dwelt with redoubled and at length altogether misleading and
misled energy on “Action,” “Unity,” and the like. And when they did
consider form it was, always or too often, from the belittling point of view
of the ancients themselves in spirit, and from the meticulous point of view
of Horace (who had always been known) in detail. Here and there in such a
man as Erasmus (v. infra), who was nothing if not sensible, we find the
Gellian and Macrobian particularisms taken up with a really progressive
twist towards inquiry as to the bearing of these particularities on the
pleasure of the reader. But Erasmus was writing in the “false dawn”; the
Puritan tyranny of Protestantism on the one side, and of the Catholic revival
on the other, had not brought back a partial night as yet; and some of the
best as well as some of the worst characteristics of the new age inclined
those of his immediate successors rather than contemporaries, who adopted
criticism directly, to quite different ways.
It would, however, be a glaring omission if the critical position of
Erasmus. Erasmus himself were not set forth at some length.[10]
Standing as he does, the most eminent literary figure of Europe on the
bridge of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, nothing if not critical as he is
in his general temperament, and on the textual and exegetical, if not on the
strictly literary sides of the Art, one of its great historical figures—his
absence from this gallery would be justly regarded as inexcusable. And if
his voluminous work does not yield us very much within the more special
and fully enfranchising lines of our system, it might be regarded as a
sufficient answer to say that the imperfection of the vernaculars, his own
with edification, or anything of the kind. Accordingly, those who looked to
the ancients to help them against the Obscuri Viri on the one hand, and
against good Puritan folk like our own Ascham on the other, were almost
bound to keep the pleasure of poetry and literature generally in the
background; or, if they brought it to the front at all, to extol it and defend it
on ethical and philosophical, not on æsthetic grounds. Taking a hint from
their “sweet enemy” Plato, from Plutarch, and from such neo-Platonic
utterances as that tractate of Plotinus, which has been discussed in its place,
[9]
they set themselves to prove that poetry was not a sweet pleasant deceit
or corrupting influence in the republic, but a stronghold and rampart of
and anti- religious and philosophical truth. Calling in turn Aristotle
Puritan.
to their assistance, and working him in with his master and
rival, they dwelt with redoubled and at length altogether misleading and
misled energy on “Action,” “Unity,” and the like. And when they did
consider form it was, always or too often, from the belittling point of view
of the ancients themselves in spirit, and from the meticulous point of view
of Horace (who had always been known) in detail. Here and there in such a
man as Erasmus (v. infra), who was nothing if not sensible, we find the
Gellian and Macrobian particularisms taken up with a really progressive
twist towards inquiry as to the bearing of these particularities on the
pleasure of the reader. But Erasmus was writing in the “false dawn”; the
Puritan tyranny of Protestantism on the one side, and of the Catholic revival
on the other, had not brought back a partial night as yet; and some of the
best as well as some of the worst characteristics of the new age inclined
those of his immediate successors rather than contemporaries, who adopted
criticism directly, to quite different ways.
It would, however, be a glaring omission if the critical position of
Erasmus. Erasmus himself were not set forth at some length.[10]
Standing as he does, the most eminent literary figure of Europe on the
bridge of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, nothing if not critical as he is
in his general temperament, and on the textual and exegetical, if not on the
strictly literary sides of the Art, one of its great historical figures—his
absence from this gallery would be justly regarded as inexcusable. And if
his voluminous work does not yield us very much within the more special
and fully enfranchising lines of our system, it might be regarded as a
sufficient answer to say that the imperfection of the vernaculars, his own
Page 36
concentration on particular forms of Biblical and patristic text-criticism,
and that peculiar cosmopolitanism which made him practically of no
country at all, served to draw him away from a practice in which he would,
but for these circumstances and conditions, have certainly indulged.
It may, however, be doubted whether Erasmus would ever have made a
capital figure as a purely literary critic. Very great man of letters as he was,
and almost wholly literary as were his interests, those interests were
suspiciously directed towards the applied rather than the pure aspects of
literature—were, in short, per se rather scientific than literary proper. It is at
least noteworthy that the Ciceronianus (though Erasmus was undoubtedly
on the right side in it) was directed against a purely literary folly, against an
exaggeration of one of the tastes and appetites which spur on the critic. And
it is almost enough to read the Adagia and Apophthegmata—books much
forgotten now, but written with enormous zest and pains by him, and
received with corresponding attention and respect by two whole centuries at
least—to see how much is there left out which a literary critic pur sang
could not but have said.
The Ciceronianus, however, must receive a little fuller treatment, both
because of its intimate connection with our subject, and because hardly any
work of Erasmus, except the Colloquies, so definitely estates him in the
new position of critical man of letters, as distinguished from that of
The philosophical or rhetorical teacher. The piece[11] (which has
Ciceronianus.
for its second title De Optimo Dicendi Genere) did not
appear, and could not have appeared, very early in his career. He might
even, in the earlier part of that career, have been slow to recognise the
popular exaggeration which, as in the other matter of the Reformation itself,
struck his maturer intelligence. He glances at its genesis in divers of his
letters, to Budæus, to Alciatus, and others, from 1527 onwards, and the
chief “begetter” of it seems to have been the Flemish scholar, Longolius
(Christophe de Longueil), who during the latter part of his short life was
actually very much such a fanatic as the Nosoponus of the dialogue. This
person is described by his friends Bulephorus and Hypologus as olim
rubicundulus, obesulus, Veneribus et gratiis undique scatens, but now an
austere shadow, who has no aspiration in life but to be “Ciceronian.” In
order to achieve this distinction, he has given his days and nights wholly to
the study of Cicero. The “copy” of his Ciceronian lexicon would already
overload two stout porters. He has noted the differing sense of every word,
and that peculiar cosmopolitanism which made him practically of no
country at all, served to draw him away from a practice in which he would,
but for these circumstances and conditions, have certainly indulged.
It may, however, be doubted whether Erasmus would ever have made a
capital figure as a purely literary critic. Very great man of letters as he was,
and almost wholly literary as were his interests, those interests were
suspiciously directed towards the applied rather than the pure aspects of
literature—were, in short, per se rather scientific than literary proper. It is at
least noteworthy that the Ciceronianus (though Erasmus was undoubtedly
on the right side in it) was directed against a purely literary folly, against an
exaggeration of one of the tastes and appetites which spur on the critic. And
it is almost enough to read the Adagia and Apophthegmata—books much
forgotten now, but written with enormous zest and pains by him, and
received with corresponding attention and respect by two whole centuries at
least—to see how much is there left out which a literary critic pur sang
could not but have said.
The Ciceronianus, however, must receive a little fuller treatment, both
because of its intimate connection with our subject, and because hardly any
work of Erasmus, except the Colloquies, so definitely estates him in the
new position of critical man of letters, as distinguished from that of
The philosophical or rhetorical teacher. The piece[11] (which has
Ciceronianus.
for its second title De Optimo Dicendi Genere) did not
appear, and could not have appeared, very early in his career. He might
even, in the earlier part of that career, have been slow to recognise the
popular exaggeration which, as in the other matter of the Reformation itself,
struck his maturer intelligence. He glances at its genesis in divers of his
letters, to Budæus, to Alciatus, and others, from 1527 onwards, and the
chief “begetter” of it seems to have been the Flemish scholar, Longolius
(Christophe de Longueil), who during the latter part of his short life was
actually very much such a fanatic as the Nosoponus of the dialogue. This
person is described by his friends Bulephorus and Hypologus as olim
rubicundulus, obesulus, Veneribus et gratiis undique scatens, but now an
austere shadow, who has no aspiration in life but to be “Ciceronian.” In
order to achieve this distinction, he has given his days and nights wholly to
the study of Cicero. The “copy” of his Ciceronian lexicon would already
overload two stout porters. He has noted the differing sense of every word,
Page 37
whether alone or in context; and by the actual occurrence, not merely of the
word itself, but of its form and case, he will be absolutely governed. Thus,
if you are to be a true Ciceronian, you may say ornatus and ornatissimus,
but not ornatior; while, though nasutus is permitted to you, both
comparative and superlative are barred. In the same way, he will only pass
the actual cases and numbers found in the Arpinate; though every one but,
let us say, the dative plural occurs, the faithful must not presume to usurp
that dative. Further, he intends to reduce the whole of Cicero to quantitative
rhythm, fully specified; and in his own writing he thinks he has done well if
he accomplishes one short period in a winter night. The piece begins with
the characteristic Erasmian banter,—Nosoponus is a bachelor, and
Bulephorus observes that it is just as well, for his wife would in the
circumstances either make an irruption into the study, and turn it topsy-
turvy, or console herself with somebody else in some other place,—but by
degrees becomes more serious, and ends with a sort of adjustment of most
ancient and many modern Latin writers to the Ciceronian point of view.
That Erasmus, with his usual shrewdness, hits the great blot of the time—
the merely literal and “Capernaite” interpretation of the classics—is perhaps
less surprising than that he should hit such much later crazes as the
Flaubertian devotion of a night to a clause, and the still prevalent reluctance
of many really literary persons to allow a reasonable analogy and extension
from the actual practice of authority. It was inevitable that he should offend
the pedants (from Scaliger downwards), and be attacked by them with the
usual scurrility; and it is not quite certain that any but very few of his
readers thoroughly sympathised with him. In this as in other matters he was
not so much before his time (for the time of the wise is a nunc stans), as
outside of the time of his contemporaries. But even here we see that he was
still of that time as well. He has no real sympathy with the vernaculars, nor
any comprehension of the fact that they are on equal literary terms with the
classical tongues; and even in regard to this—even when he is vindicating
the freedom of the letter—his thoughts are fixed on the letter mainly.
That it was better so, there can be no doubt. Literary criticism proper
could wait: correction of the mediæval habit of indiscriminate acceptance of
texts could not. And still, as it is, we have from Erasmus not a little
agreeable material of that kind which we have sedulously gathered in the
preceding volume; which, from men like him, we shall not neglect in this;
word itself, but of its form and case, he will be absolutely governed. Thus,
if you are to be a true Ciceronian, you may say ornatus and ornatissimus,
but not ornatior; while, though nasutus is permitted to you, both
comparative and superlative are barred. In the same way, he will only pass
the actual cases and numbers found in the Arpinate; though every one but,
let us say, the dative plural occurs, the faithful must not presume to usurp
that dative. Further, he intends to reduce the whole of Cicero to quantitative
rhythm, fully specified; and in his own writing he thinks he has done well if
he accomplishes one short period in a winter night. The piece begins with
the characteristic Erasmian banter,—Nosoponus is a bachelor, and
Bulephorus observes that it is just as well, for his wife would in the
circumstances either make an irruption into the study, and turn it topsy-
turvy, or console herself with somebody else in some other place,—but by
degrees becomes more serious, and ends with a sort of adjustment of most
ancient and many modern Latin writers to the Ciceronian point of view.
That Erasmus, with his usual shrewdness, hits the great blot of the time—
the merely literal and “Capernaite” interpretation of the classics—is perhaps
less surprising than that he should hit such much later crazes as the
Flaubertian devotion of a night to a clause, and the still prevalent reluctance
of many really literary persons to allow a reasonable analogy and extension
from the actual practice of authority. It was inevitable that he should offend
the pedants (from Scaliger downwards), and be attacked by them with the
usual scurrility; and it is not quite certain that any but very few of his
readers thoroughly sympathised with him. In this as in other matters he was
not so much before his time (for the time of the wise is a nunc stans), as
outside of the time of his contemporaries. But even here we see that he was
still of that time as well. He has no real sympathy with the vernaculars, nor
any comprehension of the fact that they are on equal literary terms with the
classical tongues; and even in regard to this—even when he is vindicating
the freedom of the letter—his thoughts are fixed on the letter mainly.
That it was better so, there can be no doubt. Literary criticism proper
could wait: correction of the mediæval habit of indiscriminate acceptance of
texts could not. And still, as it is, we have from Erasmus not a little
agreeable material of that kind which we have sedulously gathered in the
preceding volume; which, from men like him, we shall not neglect in this;
Page 38
but for which there will be decreasingly little and less room, both here and
still more in the “not impossible” third.
Considering the very wide range in subject of the Colloquies,[12] it is not
quite insignificant that literary matters have but a small place in them; there
is perhaps more significance still in the nature of the treatment where it
The Colloquies. does occur. The chief locus is inevitably the Convivium
Poeticum, where, except the account of the feast itself, and the excellent by-
play with the termagant gouvernante Margaret, the whole piece is literary,
and in a manner critical. But the manner is wholly verbal; or else concerned
with the very mint and anise of form. A various reading in Terence from a
codex of Linacre’s; the possibility of eliding or slurring the consonantal v;
whether Exilis in the Palinode to Canidia is a noun or a verb; whether the
Ambrosian rhymes are to be scanned on strict metrical principles; the
mistakes made by Latin translators of Aristotle,—this is the farrago
libelluli. I must particularly beg to be understood as not in the least
slighting these discussions. They had to be done; it is our great debt on this
side to the Renaissance that it got over the doing of them for us in so many
cases; they are the necessary preliminary to all criticism—nay, they are an
important part of criticism itself. But they are only the rudiments.
The Concio, sive Merdardus, after an explanation of the offensive sub-
title (which has less of good-humoured superiority, and more of the
snappish Humanist temper, than is usual with Erasmus), declines into
similar matters of reading and rendering—here in reference not to profane
but to sacred literature. And the curious Conflictus Thaliæ et Barbariei,
which is more dramatically arranged than most of the Colloquies, and may
even have taken a hint from the French Morality of Science et Asnerye,[13]
loses, as it may seem to us, an opportunity of being critical in the best and
real kind. The antagonists exchange a good deal of abuse, which on Thalia’s
part extends to some mediæval writers cited by Barbaries (among whom
our poor old friend John of Garlandia rather unfairly figures), and the piece,
which is short, ends with a contest in actual citation of verse—Leonine and
scholastic enough on the part of Barbaries, gracefully enough pastiched
from the classics on the part of Thalia. But Erasmus either deliberately
declines, or simply does not perceive, the opening given for a critical
indication of the charms of purity and the deformities of barbarism.
To thread the mighty maze of the Letters[14] completely, for the critical
utterances to be picked up there, were more tempting than strictly
still more in the “not impossible” third.
Considering the very wide range in subject of the Colloquies,[12] it is not
quite insignificant that literary matters have but a small place in them; there
is perhaps more significance still in the nature of the treatment where it
The Colloquies. does occur. The chief locus is inevitably the Convivium
Poeticum, where, except the account of the feast itself, and the excellent by-
play with the termagant gouvernante Margaret, the whole piece is literary,
and in a manner critical. But the manner is wholly verbal; or else concerned
with the very mint and anise of form. A various reading in Terence from a
codex of Linacre’s; the possibility of eliding or slurring the consonantal v;
whether Exilis in the Palinode to Canidia is a noun or a verb; whether the
Ambrosian rhymes are to be scanned on strict metrical principles; the
mistakes made by Latin translators of Aristotle,—this is the farrago
libelluli. I must particularly beg to be understood as not in the least
slighting these discussions. They had to be done; it is our great debt on this
side to the Renaissance that it got over the doing of them for us in so many
cases; they are the necessary preliminary to all criticism—nay, they are an
important part of criticism itself. But they are only the rudiments.
The Concio, sive Merdardus, after an explanation of the offensive sub-
title (which has less of good-humoured superiority, and more of the
snappish Humanist temper, than is usual with Erasmus), declines into
similar matters of reading and rendering—here in reference not to profane
but to sacred literature. And the curious Conflictus Thaliæ et Barbariei,
which is more dramatically arranged than most of the Colloquies, and may
even have taken a hint from the French Morality of Science et Asnerye,[13]
loses, as it may seem to us, an opportunity of being critical in the best and
real kind. The antagonists exchange a good deal of abuse, which on Thalia’s
part extends to some mediæval writers cited by Barbaries (among whom
our poor old friend John of Garlandia rather unfairly figures), and the piece,
which is short, ends with a contest in actual citation of verse—Leonine and
scholastic enough on the part of Barbaries, gracefully enough pastiched
from the classics on the part of Thalia. But Erasmus either deliberately
declines, or simply does not perceive, the opening given for a critical
indication of the charms of purity and the deformities of barbarism.
To thread the mighty maze of the Letters[14] completely, for the critical
utterances to be picked up there, were more tempting than strictly
Page 39
incumbent on the present adventurer, who has, however, not neglected a
reasonable essay at the adventure. The adroit and good-humoured attempt
to soothe the poetic discontent of Eobanus Hessus, who thought Erasmus
had not paid him proper attention,[15] contains, for instance, a little matter of
the kind, and several references to contemporary Latin poets. The most
important thing, perhaps, is the opinion—sensible as usual with the writer
—that, as the knowledge of Greek becomes more and more extended,
translation of it into Latin is more and more lost labour. But Erasmus, as we
should expect, evidently has more at heart the questions of “reading and
rendering” which fill his correspondence with Budæus and others. To take
the matter in order, a curious glimpse of the literary manners, as well as the
literary judgments, of the time is afforded by an enclosure in a letter to John
Watson of Cambridge. Watson wanted to know what Erasmus had been
doing, and Erasmus, answering indirectly, sends him a letter on the subject
The Letters. by one Adrian Barland of Louvain to his brother. Some
incidental expressions here about Euripides as nobilissimus poeta, and
Apuleius as producing pestilentissimas facetias, are more valuable to us
than the copious laudations of Barland on Erasmus’ own work, which pass
without any “Spare my blushes!” from the recipient and transmitter. We
note that the moral point of view is still uppermost, though the observations
are taken from a different angle. Aristophanes would have regarded
Euripides as much more “pestilent,” morally speaking, than Apuleius. The
long and necessarily complimentary letter (ii. 1) to Leo the Tenth contains
some praise of Politian and much of Jerome, on whom Erasmus was then
engaged; and while the language of this correspondence naturally abounds
in Ciceronian hyperbole, it is not insignificant that Erasmus describes the
Father with the Lion as omni in genere litterarum absolutissimus, which,
assuming any real meaning in it, is not quite critical, though Jerome was
certainly no small man of letters. The letter to Henry Bovill (ii. 10), which
contains the famous story of “mumpsimus” and “sumpsimus,” as well as
the almost equally famous account of the studies of the University of
Cambridge in the ninth decade of the fifteenth century, contains also a
notable division of his own critics of the unfavourable kind. They are aut
adeo morosi ut nihil omnino probent nisi quod ipsi faciunt; aut adeo stolidi
ut nihil sentiant; aut adeo stupidi ut nec legant quod carpunt; aut adeo
indocti ut nihil judicent; aut adeo gloriæ jejuni avidique ut carpendis
reasonable essay at the adventure. The adroit and good-humoured attempt
to soothe the poetic discontent of Eobanus Hessus, who thought Erasmus
had not paid him proper attention,[15] contains, for instance, a little matter of
the kind, and several references to contemporary Latin poets. The most
important thing, perhaps, is the opinion—sensible as usual with the writer
—that, as the knowledge of Greek becomes more and more extended,
translation of it into Latin is more and more lost labour. But Erasmus, as we
should expect, evidently has more at heart the questions of “reading and
rendering” which fill his correspondence with Budæus and others. To take
the matter in order, a curious glimpse of the literary manners, as well as the
literary judgments, of the time is afforded by an enclosure in a letter to John
Watson of Cambridge. Watson wanted to know what Erasmus had been
doing, and Erasmus, answering indirectly, sends him a letter on the subject
The Letters. by one Adrian Barland of Louvain to his brother. Some
incidental expressions here about Euripides as nobilissimus poeta, and
Apuleius as producing pestilentissimas facetias, are more valuable to us
than the copious laudations of Barland on Erasmus’ own work, which pass
without any “Spare my blushes!” from the recipient and transmitter. We
note that the moral point of view is still uppermost, though the observations
are taken from a different angle. Aristophanes would have regarded
Euripides as much more “pestilent,” morally speaking, than Apuleius. The
long and necessarily complimentary letter (ii. 1) to Leo the Tenth contains
some praise of Politian and much of Jerome, on whom Erasmus was then
engaged; and while the language of this correspondence naturally abounds
in Ciceronian hyperbole, it is not insignificant that Erasmus describes the
Father with the Lion as omni in genere litterarum absolutissimus, which,
assuming any real meaning in it, is not quite critical, though Jerome was
certainly no small man of letters. The letter to Henry Bovill (ii. 10), which
contains the famous story of “mumpsimus” and “sumpsimus,” as well as
the almost equally famous account of the studies of the University of
Cambridge in the ninth decade of the fifteenth century, contains also a
notable division of his own critics of the unfavourable kind. They are aut
adeo morosi ut nihil omnino probent nisi quod ipsi faciunt; aut adeo stolidi
ut nihil sentiant; aut adeo stupidi ut nec legant quod carpunt; aut adeo
indocti ut nihil judicent; aut adeo gloriæ jejuni avidique ut carpendis
Page 40
aliorum laboribus sibi laudem parent. And their children are alive with us
unto this day.
There is a very curious, half modest and severe, half confident criticism
of his own verses in ii. 22. He admits that there is nothing “tumultuous” in
them, “no torrent overflowing its banks,” no deinosis: but claims elegance
and Atticism. It would be perhaps unfair to attach the character of deliberate
critical utterance to his effusive laudation of the style of Colet in an early
letter (v. 4, dated 1498, but Mr Seebohm has thrown doubt on these dates,
and Mr Nichols appears to be completely redistributing them), as placidus
sedatus inaffectatus, fontis limpidissimi in morem ditissimo e pectore
scatens, æqualis, sui undique similis, apertus, simplex, modestiæ plenus,
nihil usquam habens scabri contorti conturbati. But it is interesting, and
significant of his own performances, as is the comparison (v. 19) of Jerome
and Cicero as masters of rhetoric. The somewhat intemperate and
promiscuous contempt of mediæval writing which appears in the Conflictus
(vide supra) reappears, with the very same names mentioned, in an epistle
(vii. 3), Cornelio Suo, of 1490, which, if it be rightly dated, must be long
anterior to the Colloquy. But a much more important expression of critical
opinion than any of these appears in v. 20 to Ammonius, where Erasmus
gives his views on poetry at large. They are much what we should suspect
or expect beforehand. Some folk, he says, think that a poem is not a poem
unless you poke in all the gods from heaven, and from earth, and from
under the earth. He has always liked poetry which is at no great distance
from prose—but the best prose.[16] He likes rhetorical poetry and poetical
rhetoric. He does not care for far-fetched thoughts; let the poet stick to his
subject, but give fair attention to smoothness of versification. “Prose and
sense,” in short: with a little rhetoric and versification added.
But on such matters he always touches lightly, and with little elaboration;
and to see where his real interest lay we have but to turn to the above-
quoted verbal discussions with Budæus on the one hand, to the minute and
well-known account of More’s life and conversation given to Hutten in x.
30 on the other. Nor do I think that it is worth while to extend to the
remaining two-thirds of the letters the more exact examination which has
here been given to the first third or thereabouts.[17]
Once more, far be it from any reasonable person to blame Erasmus, or
any of his immediate contemporaries, for not doing what it was not their
chief business to do. That chief business, in the direction of criticism, was
unto this day.
There is a very curious, half modest and severe, half confident criticism
of his own verses in ii. 22. He admits that there is nothing “tumultuous” in
them, “no torrent overflowing its banks,” no deinosis: but claims elegance
and Atticism. It would be perhaps unfair to attach the character of deliberate
critical utterance to his effusive laudation of the style of Colet in an early
letter (v. 4, dated 1498, but Mr Seebohm has thrown doubt on these dates,
and Mr Nichols appears to be completely redistributing them), as placidus
sedatus inaffectatus, fontis limpidissimi in morem ditissimo e pectore
scatens, æqualis, sui undique similis, apertus, simplex, modestiæ plenus,
nihil usquam habens scabri contorti conturbati. But it is interesting, and
significant of his own performances, as is the comparison (v. 19) of Jerome
and Cicero as masters of rhetoric. The somewhat intemperate and
promiscuous contempt of mediæval writing which appears in the Conflictus
(vide supra) reappears, with the very same names mentioned, in an epistle
(vii. 3), Cornelio Suo, of 1490, which, if it be rightly dated, must be long
anterior to the Colloquy. But a much more important expression of critical
opinion than any of these appears in v. 20 to Ammonius, where Erasmus
gives his views on poetry at large. They are much what we should suspect
or expect beforehand. Some folk, he says, think that a poem is not a poem
unless you poke in all the gods from heaven, and from earth, and from
under the earth. He has always liked poetry which is at no great distance
from prose—but the best prose.[16] He likes rhetorical poetry and poetical
rhetoric. He does not care for far-fetched thoughts; let the poet stick to his
subject, but give fair attention to smoothness of versification. “Prose and
sense,” in short: with a little rhetoric and versification added.
But on such matters he always touches lightly, and with little elaboration;
and to see where his real interest lay we have but to turn to the above-
quoted verbal discussions with Budæus on the one hand, to the minute and
well-known account of More’s life and conversation given to Hutten in x.
30 on the other. Nor do I think that it is worth while to extend to the
remaining two-thirds of the letters the more exact examination which has
here been given to the first third or thereabouts.[17]
Once more, far be it from any reasonable person to blame Erasmus, or
any of his immediate contemporaries, for not doing what it was not their
chief business to do. That chief business, in the direction of criticism, was
Page 41
to shake off the critical promiscuousness of the Middle Ages, to insist on
the importance of accurate texts and exact renderings, to stigmatise the
actual barbarism, the mere mumpsimus, which had no doubt too often taken
the place not only of pure classical Latinity, not only of the fine if not
classical Latin of Tertullian and Augustine and Jerome, but of that exquisite
“sport” the Latin of the early Middle Age hymns, to hammer Greek into
men’s heads (or elsewhere), to clear up the confusion of dates and times and
values, which had put the false Callisthenes on a level with Arrian, and
exalted Dares above Homer. Even the literary beauty of the classics
themselves was not their main affair;—they had to inculcate school-work
rather than University work, University work rather than the maturer study
of literature. Of the vernaculars it was best that they should say nothing: for
except Italian none was in a very good state, and Humanists were much
more likely to speak unadvisedly with their lips if they did speak on the
subject. They worked their work: well were it for all if others did the same.
For the reasons given, then, Erasmus and those whom he represents[18]
Distribution of could do little for criticism proper; and for the same (or yet
the Book.
others closely connected) the northern nations, of whom
Erasmus is the most distinguished literary representative, could for a long
time do as little: while some of them for a much longer did nothing at all.
Of the others, the criticism of Spain, the criticism of France, and the
criticism of England were all borrowed directly from that of Italy. The
Spaniards did not begin till so late that their results, like those of Opitz and
other Germans, cannot be properly treated till the next Book. France was
stirred about the middle of the century, and England a very little later. These
two countries, therefore, will properly have each its chapter in the present
book. But two of much more importance must first be given to those Italian
developments, in our Art or Study, on which both French and English
criticism are based. The first will deal with those who write, roundly
speaking, before Scaliger; the second with the work of that redoubted
Aristarch, with the equally—perhaps the more—important name of
Castelvetro, with the weary wrangle over the Gerusalemme Liberata
(which, weary as it is, is the first great critical debate over a contemporary
vernacular work of importance, and therefore within measure not to be
missed by us), and with certain of the later Italian critical theorists, of the
sixteenth and earliest seventeenth century, who are valuable, some as
the importance of accurate texts and exact renderings, to stigmatise the
actual barbarism, the mere mumpsimus, which had no doubt too often taken
the place not only of pure classical Latinity, not only of the fine if not
classical Latin of Tertullian and Augustine and Jerome, but of that exquisite
“sport” the Latin of the early Middle Age hymns, to hammer Greek into
men’s heads (or elsewhere), to clear up the confusion of dates and times and
values, which had put the false Callisthenes on a level with Arrian, and
exalted Dares above Homer. Even the literary beauty of the classics
themselves was not their main affair;—they had to inculcate school-work
rather than University work, University work rather than the maturer study
of literature. Of the vernaculars it was best that they should say nothing: for
except Italian none was in a very good state, and Humanists were much
more likely to speak unadvisedly with their lips if they did speak on the
subject. They worked their work: well were it for all if others did the same.
For the reasons given, then, Erasmus and those whom he represents[18]
Distribution of could do little for criticism proper; and for the same (or yet
the Book.
others closely connected) the northern nations, of whom
Erasmus is the most distinguished literary representative, could for a long
time do as little: while some of them for a much longer did nothing at all.
Of the others, the criticism of Spain, the criticism of France, and the
criticism of England were all borrowed directly from that of Italy. The
Spaniards did not begin till so late that their results, like those of Opitz and
other Germans, cannot be properly treated till the next Book. France was
stirred about the middle of the century, and England a very little later. These
two countries, therefore, will properly have each its chapter in the present
book. But two of much more importance must first be given to those Italian
developments, in our Art or Study, on which both French and English
criticism are based. The first will deal with those who write, roundly
speaking, before Scaliger; the second with the work of that redoubted
Aristarch, with the equally—perhaps the more—important name of
Castelvetro, with the weary wrangle over the Gerusalemme Liberata
(which, weary as it is, is the first great critical debate over a contemporary
vernacular work of importance, and therefore within measure not to be
missed by us), and with certain of the later Italian critical theorists, of the
sixteenth and earliest seventeenth century, who are valuable, some as
Page 42
continuing, some as more or less ineffectually fighting against, the neo-
classic domination.
1. At the beginning of Book III. I had practically no obligations to any
general guide to confess; at the beginning of Book II. not very many. Here,
as in the case of M. Egger in regard to Book I., I have cheerfully to
acknowledge the forerunnership and help of Mr Joel Elias Spingarn, whose
History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance appeared (New York and
London) in 1899. I shall have occasion to differ with Mr Spingarn here and
there; and his conception of a History of Criticism is not mine, just as, no
doubt, mine is not his. But the obligations of the second treader of a
previously untrodden path to the first are perhaps the greatest that fall to be
acknowledged in any literary task; and I acknowledge them in Mr
Spingarn’s case to the fullest extent possible.
2. The complaints sometimes made as to the ambiguity and want of
authority of this term may have some justification; but convenience and (by
this time) usage must be allowed their way.
3. Mr Froude in the opening of his History.
4. The complete text was, as is well known, not discovered (by Poggio at
St Gallen) till the fifteenth century had nearly filled its second decade, but
the book had been studied long before.
5. Very great influence on sixteenth, and even on seventeenth, century
criticism has also been frequently, and perhaps correctly, assigned to the
grammatical works and Terentian Scholia of Donatus.
6. Vol. i. p. 457 sq.
7. Spingarn, op. cit., p. 2. On the previous page there is the equally
surprising statement that in the Middle Ages “Poetry was disregarded or
contemned, or was valued, if at all, for qualities that least belong to it.”
What were these “qualities”?
8. Vol. i. p. 414 note
classic domination.
1. At the beginning of Book III. I had practically no obligations to any
general guide to confess; at the beginning of Book II. not very many. Here,
as in the case of M. Egger in regard to Book I., I have cheerfully to
acknowledge the forerunnership and help of Mr Joel Elias Spingarn, whose
History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance appeared (New York and
London) in 1899. I shall have occasion to differ with Mr Spingarn here and
there; and his conception of a History of Criticism is not mine, just as, no
doubt, mine is not his. But the obligations of the second treader of a
previously untrodden path to the first are perhaps the greatest that fall to be
acknowledged in any literary task; and I acknowledge them in Mr
Spingarn’s case to the fullest extent possible.
2. The complaints sometimes made as to the ambiguity and want of
authority of this term may have some justification; but convenience and (by
this time) usage must be allowed their way.
3. Mr Froude in the opening of his History.
4. The complete text was, as is well known, not discovered (by Poggio at
St Gallen) till the fifteenth century had nearly filled its second decade, but
the book had been studied long before.
5. Very great influence on sixteenth, and even on seventeenth, century
criticism has also been frequently, and perhaps correctly, assigned to the
grammatical works and Terentian Scholia of Donatus.
6. Vol. i. p. 457 sq.
7. Spingarn, op. cit., p. 2. On the previous page there is the equally
surprising statement that in the Middle Ages “Poetry was disregarded or
contemned, or was valued, if at all, for qualities that least belong to it.”
What were these “qualities”?
8. Vol. i. p. 414 note
Page 43
9. Vol. i. pp. 67, 68.
10. Erasmus is still only readable as a whole, or in combination of his
really important literary work, in the folios of Beatus Rhenanus (8 vols.,
Basle, 1540-1) or Le Clerc (10 vols., Lyons, 1703-6). It is a thousand pities
that this more important literary work, at least, has not been re-edited
together accessibly and cheaply.
11. First printed at Basle, 1528. Besides the general editions, there are
some separate reprints (e.g., Oxford, 1693). But it ought to have shared the
popular diffusion of the Colloquies.
12. I use the Tauchnitz ed. (with the Encomium Moriæ) in 2 vols.
(Leipsic: 1829).
13. V. E. Fournier, Théâtre Français avant la Renaissance (Paris, n. d.),
p. 334 sq. It is not at all impossible that the indebtedness may be the other
way. The dates of these pieces are very uncertain.
14. I use the London folio of 1642, where the letter to Hessus, the Fifth
of the Twenty-sixth book, will be found at col. 1407-10. I wish Mr Nichols’
excellent rearrangement had been available. But even its first volume only
appeared when this book was in the printer’s hands.
15. Hessus, it may be not superfluous to say, was one of the authors of
the Epistolæ Obscurorum, and in verse one of the very best Humanists of
Germany.
16. Mihi semper placuit carmen quod a prosa, sed optima, non longe
recederet.—Op. cit., col. 420.
17. Those who would like to continue this may look, among many other
places, at xii. 7 (praise of Politian); xv. 17 (jubilation over the confusion of
Humanism); xvii. 11 (ditto to Vives); xxi. 4 (a good deal on writers both
ancient and modern), and especially xxvi. 5 (above noticed).
18. See infra (pp. 27-29) on Augustinus Olmucensis (Käsenbrot) and
Cornelius Agrippa.
10. Erasmus is still only readable as a whole, or in combination of his
really important literary work, in the folios of Beatus Rhenanus (8 vols.,
Basle, 1540-1) or Le Clerc (10 vols., Lyons, 1703-6). It is a thousand pities
that this more important literary work, at least, has not been re-edited
together accessibly and cheaply.
11. First printed at Basle, 1528. Besides the general editions, there are
some separate reprints (e.g., Oxford, 1693). But it ought to have shared the
popular diffusion of the Colloquies.
12. I use the Tauchnitz ed. (with the Encomium Moriæ) in 2 vols.
(Leipsic: 1829).
13. V. E. Fournier, Théâtre Français avant la Renaissance (Paris, n. d.),
p. 334 sq. It is not at all impossible that the indebtedness may be the other
way. The dates of these pieces are very uncertain.
14. I use the London folio of 1642, where the letter to Hessus, the Fifth
of the Twenty-sixth book, will be found at col. 1407-10. I wish Mr Nichols’
excellent rearrangement had been available. But even its first volume only
appeared when this book was in the printer’s hands.
15. Hessus, it may be not superfluous to say, was one of the authors of
the Epistolæ Obscurorum, and in verse one of the very best Humanists of
Germany.
16. Mihi semper placuit carmen quod a prosa, sed optima, non longe
recederet.—Op. cit., col. 420.
17. Those who would like to continue this may look, among many other
places, at xii. 7 (praise of Politian); xv. 17 (jubilation over the confusion of
Humanism); xvii. 11 (ditto to Vives); xxi. 4 (a good deal on writers both
ancient and modern), and especially xxvi. 5 (above noticed).
18. See infra (pp. 27-29) on Augustinus Olmucensis (Käsenbrot) and
Cornelius Agrippa.
Page 44
Page 45
CHAPTER II.
EARLY ITALIAN CRITICS.
THE BEGINNINGS—SAVONAROLA—PICO, ETC.—POLITIAN—THE ‘MANTO’—THE
‘AMBRA’ AND ‘RUSTICUS’—THE ‘NUTRICIA’—THEIR MERITS AND DANGER—
PETRUS CRINITUS: HIS ‘DE POETIS LATINIS’—AUGUSTINUS OLMUCENSIS: HIS
‘DEFENCE OF POETRY’—PARADOXICAL ATTACKS ON IT BY CORNELIUS AGRIPPA,
LANDI, BERNI—VIDA—IMPORTANCE OF THE ‘POETICS’—ANALYSIS OF THE
PIECE—ESSENTIAL POVERTY OF ITS THEORY—HISTORICAL AND SYMPTOMATIC
SIGNIFICANCE—THE ALLEGED APPEAL TO REASON AND NATURE—THE MAIN
STREAM STARTED—TRISSINO—DIVISION OF HIS ‘POETIC’—HIS CRITICAL VALUE
—EDITORS, ETC., OF THE ‘POETICS’—PAZZI—ROBORTELLO, SEGNI, MAGGI,
VETTORI—THEORISTS: DANIELLO—FRACASTORO—FORMALISTS: MUTIO.
TOLOMEI AND CLASSICAL METRES—OTHERS: TOMITANO, LIONARDI, B. TASSO,
CAPRIANO—IL LASCA—BEMBO—CARO—VARCHI—MINTURNO—THE ‘DE
POETA’—THE ‘ARTE POETICA’—THEIR VALUE—GIRALDI CINTHIO’S ‘DISCORSI’—
ON ROMANCE—ON DRAMA—SOME POINTS IN BOTH—ON SATIRE—PIGNA—
LILIUS GIRALDUS: HIS ‘DE POETIS NOSTRORUM TEMPORUM’—ITS WIDTH OF
RANGE—BUT NARROWNESS OF VIEW—HORROR AT PREFERENCE OF
VERNACULAR TO LATIN—YET A REAL CRITIC IN BOTH KINDS—SHORT ‘PRÉCIS’
OF THE DIALOGUES—THEIR GREAT HISTORIC VALUE.
It is not necessary to discuss, or even to expose at any length, the causes
of the relative precocity of Italian Criticism in the Renaissance. They are
The beginnings. practically all contained in, and can by the very slightest
expense of learning and intelligence be extracted from, the fact that Italy
was at once the cradle of Humanist study of the Classics, and the only
country in Europe which possessed a fully developed vernacular. But for
the greater part of the fifteenth century attention was diverted from actual
criticism—except of the validating or invalidating kind—by the prior and
eagerer appetite for the discovery, study, and popularising, by translation
and otherwise, of the actual authors and texts. For a long time, indeed, this
appetite showed the usual promiscuity of such affections; and it was
scarcely till the time of Vittorino da Feltre that much critical discrimination
of styles was introduced. But these and other kindred things came surely,
and brought criticism with them, though criticism still generally of the
EARLY ITALIAN CRITICS.
THE BEGINNINGS—SAVONAROLA—PICO, ETC.—POLITIAN—THE ‘MANTO’—THE
‘AMBRA’ AND ‘RUSTICUS’—THE ‘NUTRICIA’—THEIR MERITS AND DANGER—
PETRUS CRINITUS: HIS ‘DE POETIS LATINIS’—AUGUSTINUS OLMUCENSIS: HIS
‘DEFENCE OF POETRY’—PARADOXICAL ATTACKS ON IT BY CORNELIUS AGRIPPA,
LANDI, BERNI—VIDA—IMPORTANCE OF THE ‘POETICS’—ANALYSIS OF THE
PIECE—ESSENTIAL POVERTY OF ITS THEORY—HISTORICAL AND SYMPTOMATIC
SIGNIFICANCE—THE ALLEGED APPEAL TO REASON AND NATURE—THE MAIN
STREAM STARTED—TRISSINO—DIVISION OF HIS ‘POETIC’—HIS CRITICAL VALUE
—EDITORS, ETC., OF THE ‘POETICS’—PAZZI—ROBORTELLO, SEGNI, MAGGI,
VETTORI—THEORISTS: DANIELLO—FRACASTORO—FORMALISTS: MUTIO.
TOLOMEI AND CLASSICAL METRES—OTHERS: TOMITANO, LIONARDI, B. TASSO,
CAPRIANO—IL LASCA—BEMBO—CARO—VARCHI—MINTURNO—THE ‘DE
POETA’—THE ‘ARTE POETICA’—THEIR VALUE—GIRALDI CINTHIO’S ‘DISCORSI’—
ON ROMANCE—ON DRAMA—SOME POINTS IN BOTH—ON SATIRE—PIGNA—
LILIUS GIRALDUS: HIS ‘DE POETIS NOSTRORUM TEMPORUM’—ITS WIDTH OF
RANGE—BUT NARROWNESS OF VIEW—HORROR AT PREFERENCE OF
VERNACULAR TO LATIN—YET A REAL CRITIC IN BOTH KINDS—SHORT ‘PRÉCIS’
OF THE DIALOGUES—THEIR GREAT HISTORIC VALUE.
It is not necessary to discuss, or even to expose at any length, the causes
of the relative precocity of Italian Criticism in the Renaissance. They are
The beginnings. practically all contained in, and can by the very slightest
expense of learning and intelligence be extracted from, the fact that Italy
was at once the cradle of Humanist study of the Classics, and the only
country in Europe which possessed a fully developed vernacular. But for
the greater part of the fifteenth century attention was diverted from actual
criticism—except of the validating or invalidating kind—by the prior and
eagerer appetite for the discovery, study, and popularising, by translation
and otherwise, of the actual authors and texts. For a long time, indeed, this
appetite showed the usual promiscuity of such affections; and it was
scarcely till the time of Vittorino da Feltre that much critical discrimination
of styles was introduced. But these and other kindred things came surely,
and brought criticism with them, though criticism still generally of the
Page 46
moral and educational kind. The Boccaccian defence was taken up by
various writers of note—Bruni,[19] Guarino, Æneas Sylvius—and before the
close of the fifteenth century two of the greatest of Florentines had
indicated in different ways the main lines which Italian criticism was to
take. These two were Savonarola and Politian.
The tendency of each could be anticipated by any one who, though
actually ignorant of it, knew the characteristics of the two men in other
Savonarola. ways. Fra Girolamo’s, of course, is wholly ethical-
religious, mainly neo-Platonic, but already presenting the effect of
Aristotelian details on the general Platonic attitude to Poetry. Yet he is still
scholastic in his general treatment of the subject, and still adopts that close
subordination of poetry to Logic which is as old as Averroes and Aquinas,
and which, odd as it may seem to merely modern readers, is a very simple
matter when examined.[20] He disclaims, as usual, any attack on poetry
itself, urging only the abuse of poetry; but he follows Plato in looking more
than askance at it, and Aristotle in denying its necessary association with
verse. The Scriptures are the noblest poetry; all ancient poetry is doubtfully
profitable. In fact, he regards poetry altogether as specially liable to abuse,
and dubiously admissible into, or certainly to be expelled from, a perfect
community, such as that on which the fancy of the Renaissance was so
much fixed.
Savonarola’s remarks, which are contained in his four-book tractate, De
Scientiis,[21] are more curious than really important. Yet they derive some
importance from the great name and influence of their propounder, from his
position at the very watershed, so to speak, of time in Europe, if not in Italy,
dividing Middle Age from Renaissance, and from the fact that they
undoubtedly summarise that dubitative, if not utterly hostile, view of
literature in general, and of poetry in particular, which, as we have seen,[22]
was borrowed by the Fathers from the ancients, and very much intensified
by the borrowers. Fra Girolamo’s attitude is a rigidly scholastic one; and to
those who omit to take account of this, or do not understand it, his view
must seem wholly out of focus, if not wholly obscure. Poetry is a part of
Rational Philosophy; and therefore its object must be pars entis rationis. It
differs from Rhetoric in working purely by Example, not Enthymeme. Its
end is to induce men to live virtuously by decent representations; and as the
soul loves harmony, it uses harmonic forms. But a poet who merely knows
how to play gracefully with feet only deserves the name as an old woman
various writers of note—Bruni,[19] Guarino, Æneas Sylvius—and before the
close of the fifteenth century two of the greatest of Florentines had
indicated in different ways the main lines which Italian criticism was to
take. These two were Savonarola and Politian.
The tendency of each could be anticipated by any one who, though
actually ignorant of it, knew the characteristics of the two men in other
Savonarola. ways. Fra Girolamo’s, of course, is wholly ethical-
religious, mainly neo-Platonic, but already presenting the effect of
Aristotelian details on the general Platonic attitude to Poetry. Yet he is still
scholastic in his general treatment of the subject, and still adopts that close
subordination of poetry to Logic which is as old as Averroes and Aquinas,
and which, odd as it may seem to merely modern readers, is a very simple
matter when examined.[20] He disclaims, as usual, any attack on poetry
itself, urging only the abuse of poetry; but he follows Plato in looking more
than askance at it, and Aristotle in denying its necessary association with
verse. The Scriptures are the noblest poetry; all ancient poetry is doubtfully
profitable. In fact, he regards poetry altogether as specially liable to abuse,
and dubiously admissible into, or certainly to be expelled from, a perfect
community, such as that on which the fancy of the Renaissance was so
much fixed.
Savonarola’s remarks, which are contained in his four-book tractate, De
Scientiis,[21] are more curious than really important. Yet they derive some
importance from the great name and influence of their propounder, from his
position at the very watershed, so to speak, of time in Europe, if not in Italy,
dividing Middle Age from Renaissance, and from the fact that they
undoubtedly summarise that dubitative, if not utterly hostile, view of
literature in general, and of poetry in particular, which, as we have seen,[22]
was borrowed by the Fathers from the ancients, and very much intensified
by the borrowers. Fra Girolamo’s attitude is a rigidly scholastic one; and to
those who omit to take account of this, or do not understand it, his view
must seem wholly out of focus, if not wholly obscure. Poetry is a part of
Rational Philosophy; and therefore its object must be pars entis rationis. It
differs from Rhetoric in working purely by Example, not Enthymeme. Its
end is to induce men to live virtuously by decent representations; and as the
soul loves harmony, it uses harmonic forms. But a poet who merely knows
how to play gracefully with feet only deserves the name as an old woman
Page 47
deserves that of a pretty girl.[23] Still more preposterous is the habit of
calling poetry “divine.” Cosmos becomes chaos, if you admit that. Scientia
autem divina est cujus objectum Deus: non illa cujus objectum exemplum.
The making of verses is only poetry per accidens; and as for the Heathen
poets, magnus diaboli laqueus absconditus est in them. He does not, he
says, actually “damn” poetry; but the gist of his tractatule is that poets as a
rule quite misunderstand their function, and that poetry had better keep its
place, and abstain from silly, not to say blasphemous, airs.
Such a point of view was, of course, liable to be taken by persons alike
unlikely to assume the “know-nothing” attitude of the more ignorant
Catholics, the Philistine-Puritan attitude of Protestantism, or the merely
Platonic and non-Christian theory of some free-thinkers. It might well seem
to thoughtful lovers of literature that its very existence was in danger when
it was attacked from so many sides, and that it was necessary to intrench it
as strongly as possible. Nor were the materials and the plan of the
fortification far to seek. The suggestion has been rather oddly discovered in
the Geographer Strabo;[24] but authorities much more germane to the matter
were at hand. Boccaccio himself had, as we have seen, both taken note of
the danger and indicated the means of defence: Maximus Tyrius and
Plutarch, the one in a manner more, the other in a manner less, favourable
to poetry, had in effect long before traced out the whole Camp of Refuge on
lines suitable either to the bolder or to the more timid defender of Poesy.
The latter could represent it as the philosophy of the young, as a sort of
Kindergarten-keeper in the vestibule of the higher mysteries, as not
necessarily bad at all, and possibly very good. The former could argue for
its equality with philosophy itself, as pursuing the same ends by different
means, and appealing, not in the least in forma pauperis, to its own part of
human nature.
It seems by no means improbable that this view was partly brought about
by that remarkable influencer both of early mediæval and of early
Pico, &c. Renaissance thought, Dionysius the Areopagite. Readers of
Mr Seebohm’s Oxford Reformers[25] will remember the curious and
interesting extracts there given from Colet’s correspondence with
Radulphus, and the explanation of the Mosaic cosmogony as intended to
present the Divine proceedings “after the manner of a poet.” This view
Colet seems to have extracted partly from Dionysius himself, partly from
Pico della Mirandola, the most remarkable of Savonarola’s converts, while
calling poetry “divine.” Cosmos becomes chaos, if you admit that. Scientia
autem divina est cujus objectum Deus: non illa cujus objectum exemplum.
The making of verses is only poetry per accidens; and as for the Heathen
poets, magnus diaboli laqueus absconditus est in them. He does not, he
says, actually “damn” poetry; but the gist of his tractatule is that poets as a
rule quite misunderstand their function, and that poetry had better keep its
place, and abstain from silly, not to say blasphemous, airs.
Such a point of view was, of course, liable to be taken by persons alike
unlikely to assume the “know-nothing” attitude of the more ignorant
Catholics, the Philistine-Puritan attitude of Protestantism, or the merely
Platonic and non-Christian theory of some free-thinkers. It might well seem
to thoughtful lovers of literature that its very existence was in danger when
it was attacked from so many sides, and that it was necessary to intrench it
as strongly as possible. Nor were the materials and the plan of the
fortification far to seek. The suggestion has been rather oddly discovered in
the Geographer Strabo;[24] but authorities much more germane to the matter
were at hand. Boccaccio himself had, as we have seen, both taken note of
the danger and indicated the means of defence: Maximus Tyrius and
Plutarch, the one in a manner more, the other in a manner less, favourable
to poetry, had in effect long before traced out the whole Camp of Refuge on
lines suitable either to the bolder or to the more timid defender of Poesy.
The latter could represent it as the philosophy of the young, as a sort of
Kindergarten-keeper in the vestibule of the higher mysteries, as not
necessarily bad at all, and possibly very good. The former could argue for
its equality with philosophy itself, as pursuing the same ends by different
means, and appealing, not in the least in forma pauperis, to its own part of
human nature.
It seems by no means improbable that this view was partly brought about
by that remarkable influencer both of early mediæval and of early
Pico, &c. Renaissance thought, Dionysius the Areopagite. Readers of
Mr Seebohm’s Oxford Reformers[25] will remember the curious and
interesting extracts there given from Colet’s correspondence with
Radulphus, and the explanation of the Mosaic cosmogony as intended to
present the Divine proceedings “after the manner of a poet.” This view
Colet seems to have extracted partly from Dionysius himself, partly from
Pico della Mirandola, the most remarkable of Savonarola’s converts, while
Page 48
time and place are not inconsistent with the belief that the future Dean of St
Paul’s may have come into contact with Fra Girolamo himself. Now, this
kind of envisagement of poetry, certain to turn to spiritual account in
spiritually minded persons like Colet and Savonarola, and in mystically, if
not spiritually, minded ones like Pico, would, in the general temper of the
Renaissance, of which all three were early illustrations, as certainly turn to
more or less spiritualised philosophy—ethical, metaphysical, or purely
æsthetic, as the case might be. And we can see in it a vera causa of that
certainly excessive, if not altogether mistaken, devotion to the abstract
questions, “What is a poet?” “What is poetry?” “What is drama?” and so
forth, which we perceive in almost all the Italian critics of the mid-sixteenth
century, and which is almost equally, if less originally, present in their
Elizabethan pupils and followers. If Colet himself had paid more attention
to literature, we cannot doubt that this is the line which his own literary
criticism would have taken; and as his influence, direct or through Erasmus
and More, was very great on English thought, both at Oxford and
Cambridge, it is not impossible that it may have been exerted in this very
way.
The other line (the line which, according to the definitions of the present
work, we must call the line of criticism proper), though it was perhaps
hardly in this instance traced with boldness and without deflection, started
Politian. under yet more distinguished auspices. The Sylvæ of
Politian consist, in the main, of a direct critical survey of classical poetry
couched in the, as we may think, somewhat awkward form of verse, decked
with all the ornament that could suggest itself to the author’s rich, varied,
and not seldom really poetical fancy, and arranged with a view to actual
recitation in the lecture-room for the delight and encouragement of actual
students.[26]
Neither purpose nor method can be regarded as wholly favourable to
criticism. The popular conférencier (for this term best expresses Politian’s
position) is sure to be rather more of a panegyrist or a detractor, as the case
may be, than of a critic; and the lecturer in verse is sure to be thinking
rather of showing his own rhetorical and poetical gifts than of the strict
merits and defects of his subject. But if we take the Nutricia or the Rusticus,
the Ambra or the Manto, and compare any of them with the well-
intentioned summary of the Labyrinthus,[27] we shall see without the least
unfairness, and fully admitting the difference of ability and of opportunity
Paul’s may have come into contact with Fra Girolamo himself. Now, this
kind of envisagement of poetry, certain to turn to spiritual account in
spiritually minded persons like Colet and Savonarola, and in mystically, if
not spiritually, minded ones like Pico, would, in the general temper of the
Renaissance, of which all three were early illustrations, as certainly turn to
more or less spiritualised philosophy—ethical, metaphysical, or purely
æsthetic, as the case might be. And we can see in it a vera causa of that
certainly excessive, if not altogether mistaken, devotion to the abstract
questions, “What is a poet?” “What is poetry?” “What is drama?” and so
forth, which we perceive in almost all the Italian critics of the mid-sixteenth
century, and which is almost equally, if less originally, present in their
Elizabethan pupils and followers. If Colet himself had paid more attention
to literature, we cannot doubt that this is the line which his own literary
criticism would have taken; and as his influence, direct or through Erasmus
and More, was very great on English thought, both at Oxford and
Cambridge, it is not impossible that it may have been exerted in this very
way.
The other line (the line which, according to the definitions of the present
work, we must call the line of criticism proper), though it was perhaps
hardly in this instance traced with boldness and without deflection, started
Politian. under yet more distinguished auspices. The Sylvæ of
Politian consist, in the main, of a direct critical survey of classical poetry
couched in the, as we may think, somewhat awkward form of verse, decked
with all the ornament that could suggest itself to the author’s rich, varied,
and not seldom really poetical fancy, and arranged with a view to actual
recitation in the lecture-room for the delight and encouragement of actual
students.[26]
Neither purpose nor method can be regarded as wholly favourable to
criticism. The popular conférencier (for this term best expresses Politian’s
position) is sure to be rather more of a panegyrist or a detractor, as the case
may be, than of a critic; and the lecturer in verse is sure to be thinking
rather of showing his own rhetorical and poetical gifts than of the strict
merits and defects of his subject. But if we take the Nutricia or the Rusticus,
the Ambra or the Manto, and compare any of them with the well-
intentioned summary of the Labyrinthus,[27] we shall see without the least
unfairness, and fully admitting the difference of ability and of opportunity
Page 49
in the two men, the difference, from the critical point of view, of the two
stand-points.
In the “Manto,” the first of the Sylvæ, the most important characteristic of
sixteenth-century Italian criticism proper, the exaltation of Virgil, is already
The Manto. prominent. Politian, indeed, was too much of a wit, and too
much of a poet himself, to let his Virgil-worship take the gross and prosaic
form which it assumed a little later in Vida. But he has proceeded a long
way from the comparatively uncritical (and yet so more critical) standpoint
of Dante. He comes to details. Cicero had won the palms of sweetness from
Nestor and of tempestuous eloquence from Ulysses (a little vague this), but
Greece consoled herself in poetry. Ennius was too rude to give Latium the
glory of that. Then came Virgil. Even with the Syracusan reed (i.e., in his
Eclogues) he crushes Hesiod and contends with Homer. Calliope took him
in her arms as an infant, and kissed him thrice. Manto, the guardian nymph
of his native place, hailed his advent, and summarised in prophetic detail
his achievements in verse. Her town shall enter the lists—secure of victory
—with the seven competitors for Homer’s origin. And then a whirlwind of
magniloquent peroration (charged with epanaphora,[28] that favourite figure
of the sixteenth century) extols the poet above all poets and all wonders of
the world, past, present, and to come.
But Politian would have been faithful neither to those individual qualities
which have been noted in him, nor to that sworn service of Greek which
was the chivalry of the true Humanist, if he had thought of depreciating
The Ambra and Homer. The “Ambra,” a poem longer than the “Manto,”
Rusticus.
and not much less enthusiastic, is mainly devoted to a
fanciful description of the youth of the poet, and a verse-summary of the
poems. Indeed the peroration (till it is turned into a panegyric of Ambra, a
favourite villa of Lorenzo) is a brilliant, forcible, and true indication of the
enormous debt of all ancient literature, science, and in fact life, to Homer,
of the universality of his influence, and of the consensus of testimony in his
favour. The “Rusticus” is rather an independent description and panegyric
of country life, as a preface to the reading of Virgil, Hesiod, and other
bucolic and georgic writers, than a criticism or comparison of them. But the
The Nutricia. “Nutricia” is again ours in the fullest sense. Its avowed
argument is De poetica et poetis, and, in handling this vast and congenial
theme, Politian gives the fullest possible scope at once to his genius, to his
learning, and to that intense love for literature without which learning is but
stand-points.
In the “Manto,” the first of the Sylvæ, the most important characteristic of
sixteenth-century Italian criticism proper, the exaltation of Virgil, is already
The Manto. prominent. Politian, indeed, was too much of a wit, and too
much of a poet himself, to let his Virgil-worship take the gross and prosaic
form which it assumed a little later in Vida. But he has proceeded a long
way from the comparatively uncritical (and yet so more critical) standpoint
of Dante. He comes to details. Cicero had won the palms of sweetness from
Nestor and of tempestuous eloquence from Ulysses (a little vague this), but
Greece consoled herself in poetry. Ennius was too rude to give Latium the
glory of that. Then came Virgil. Even with the Syracusan reed (i.e., in his
Eclogues) he crushes Hesiod and contends with Homer. Calliope took him
in her arms as an infant, and kissed him thrice. Manto, the guardian nymph
of his native place, hailed his advent, and summarised in prophetic detail
his achievements in verse. Her town shall enter the lists—secure of victory
—with the seven competitors for Homer’s origin. And then a whirlwind of
magniloquent peroration (charged with epanaphora,[28] that favourite figure
of the sixteenth century) extols the poet above all poets and all wonders of
the world, past, present, and to come.
But Politian would have been faithful neither to those individual qualities
which have been noted in him, nor to that sworn service of Greek which
was the chivalry of the true Humanist, if he had thought of depreciating
The Ambra and Homer. The “Ambra,” a poem longer than the “Manto,”
Rusticus.
and not much less enthusiastic, is mainly devoted to a
fanciful description of the youth of the poet, and a verse-summary of the
poems. Indeed the peroration (till it is turned into a panegyric of Ambra, a
favourite villa of Lorenzo) is a brilliant, forcible, and true indication of the
enormous debt of all ancient literature, science, and in fact life, to Homer,
of the universality of his influence, and of the consensus of testimony in his
favour. The “Rusticus” is rather an independent description and panegyric
of country life, as a preface to the reading of Virgil, Hesiod, and other
bucolic and georgic writers, than a criticism or comparison of them. But the
The Nutricia. “Nutricia” is again ours in the fullest sense. Its avowed
argument is De poetica et poetis, and, in handling this vast and congenial
theme, Politian gives the fullest possible scope at once to his genius, to his
learning, and to that intense love for literature without which learning is but
Page 50
as the Carlylian “marine-stores.” In nearly eight hundred exultant
hexameters,[29] the vigour and fulness of which enable them to carry off
without difficulty the frippery of their occasional trappings, he traces the
origin of poetry, the transition from mere stupid wonder and the miseries of
barbarism to sacred and profane verse, the elaboration of its laws in Judea
by David and Solomon, in Greece by Orpheus, the succession of the Greek
and Latin poets in the various forms (it is noteworthy that Politian is not at
all copious on the drama) through the exploits of Dante, Petrarch, and
Boccaccio to the patronage of poetry by Lorenzo himself.
This is criticism leaning dangerously on the one side to panegyric, and
likely to be (though it is not actually) dragged to the other still more
Their merits dangerously by partisanship; but it is still criticism. The
liker does not “like grossly,” or in accordance with mere tradition. He loves,
as the American poet says, “not by allowance but with personal love”; and
he can give reasons for the love that is in him. He seeks the poetic pleasure
from the Muse; he obtains it from her; and he savours it, not merely with
eagerness, but with acutely sensitive taste. Though he might not at some
moments be averse to refining on the character of poetry generally, as well
as on the character of this poetic pleasure, it is this itself that he seeks,
finds, and rejoices in. Part at least of the spirit of Longinus is on him; he is
transported, and he knows the power that transports.
At the same time, it must be difficult, for all but the extremest Virgilians,
to think that he does not err by way of excess in his estimate of that poet;
and it must be still more difficult, even for them, not to perceive that the
pitch, even if excusable in the individual, is dangerous as an example.
and danger. Followers will make-believe; they will give inept reasons
to support their made belief; and worst of all, by that fatal catachresis of
“imitation” which is always waiting upon the critic, they will begin to think,
and to say, that by simply copying and borrowing from Virgil and other
great ones you may go near to be thought not entirely destitute of their so-
much-praised charm. The danger very soon ceased to be a danger only, and
we find a victim to it in Vida; but before coming to him we may divagate a
little.
The furor poeticus of Politian put him much beyond other Humanists in
Petrus Crinitus: critical respects. His contemporary and friend, Petrus
his De Poetis
Latinis.
Crinitus,[30] was, if not quite of the same caste as Politian,
by no means of the mere ordinary Humanist type. His
hexameters,[29] the vigour and fulness of which enable them to carry off
without difficulty the frippery of their occasional trappings, he traces the
origin of poetry, the transition from mere stupid wonder and the miseries of
barbarism to sacred and profane verse, the elaboration of its laws in Judea
by David and Solomon, in Greece by Orpheus, the succession of the Greek
and Latin poets in the various forms (it is noteworthy that Politian is not at
all copious on the drama) through the exploits of Dante, Petrarch, and
Boccaccio to the patronage of poetry by Lorenzo himself.
This is criticism leaning dangerously on the one side to panegyric, and
likely to be (though it is not actually) dragged to the other still more
Their merits dangerously by partisanship; but it is still criticism. The
liker does not “like grossly,” or in accordance with mere tradition. He loves,
as the American poet says, “not by allowance but with personal love”; and
he can give reasons for the love that is in him. He seeks the poetic pleasure
from the Muse; he obtains it from her; and he savours it, not merely with
eagerness, but with acutely sensitive taste. Though he might not at some
moments be averse to refining on the character of poetry generally, as well
as on the character of this poetic pleasure, it is this itself that he seeks,
finds, and rejoices in. Part at least of the spirit of Longinus is on him; he is
transported, and he knows the power that transports.
At the same time, it must be difficult, for all but the extremest Virgilians,
to think that he does not err by way of excess in his estimate of that poet;
and it must be still more difficult, even for them, not to perceive that the
pitch, even if excusable in the individual, is dangerous as an example.
and danger. Followers will make-believe; they will give inept reasons
to support their made belief; and worst of all, by that fatal catachresis of
“imitation” which is always waiting upon the critic, they will begin to think,
and to say, that by simply copying and borrowing from Virgil and other
great ones you may go near to be thought not entirely destitute of their so-
much-praised charm. The danger very soon ceased to be a danger only, and
we find a victim to it in Vida; but before coming to him we may divagate a
little.
The furor poeticus of Politian put him much beyond other Humanists in
Petrus Crinitus: critical respects. His contemporary and friend, Petrus
his De Poetis
Latinis.
Crinitus,[30] was, if not quite of the same caste as Politian,
by no means of the mere ordinary Humanist type. His
Page 51
kissing-verses, Dum te Neæra savior, are among the best of their kind
between Petronius and Johannes Secundus; and his curious pot-pourri, De
Honesta Sapientia, is quite worth reading, though one may know most of its
constituents well enough beforehand. Yet the literary inquiries here are
surprisingly few, and treated in no critical spirit whatsoever, so that there is
no disappointment in one sense, though there may be in another, with his
three books, De Poetis Latinis. These consist of a large number of separate
articles in more or less chronological order, by no means ill-written in the
classical-dictionary fashion: Genitus est here; obiisse traditur there, and in
such a year; totum se dicavit poeticæ facultati, and the rest. The taste as
expressed by preferences is not bad, and the approaches (they are hardly
more) to critical estimate, though very obvious and mostly traditional, are
sound enough and fairly supported by quotation. But of original attempt to
grasp and to render the character of Latin poetry generally, or of any one
Latin poet by himself, there is hardly a vestige.
It is not at all improbable that Poetics in one form or another, both Italian
Augustinus and “Tedescan,” may exist in MSS. of this period: there is
Olmucensis: his
Defence of
certainly work, even in print, of which very little notice has
Poetry. been taken hitherto. For instance, a few months ago my
friend Mr Gregory Smith saw in a catalogue, bought, and
very kindly lent to me, a Dialogus in Defensionem Poetices, printed at
Venice in 1493, and written by a certain Augustinus Moravus Olmucensis.
[31]
This writer’s family name in vernacular appears to have been Käsenbrot;
and he was one of the early German Humanists whose most famous chiefs
were Reuchlin earlier, Conrad Celtes and Eobanus Hessus later, who
achieved much tolerable verse, and in the Epistolæ Obscurorum one
immortal piece of prose, but who were whelmed in the deluge of the
Reformation struggles, and accomplished little of the good which they
might have done to Germany. The Dialogus—which has the perhaps not
quite accidental interest of having appeared in the year between the writing
of Savonarola’s somewhat dubious backing of Poetry, and the first printing
of Boccaccio’s uncompromising and generous championship thereof—
cannot be said to be of much intrinsic importance. The author gives, or
rather adopts, the definition of Poetry as “a metrical structure of true or
feigned narration, composed in suitable rhythm or feet, and adjusted to
utility and pleasure.” But his text is rather rambling. A parallel with
Medicine (the piece seems to have been written at Padua, which helps it to
between Petronius and Johannes Secundus; and his curious pot-pourri, De
Honesta Sapientia, is quite worth reading, though one may know most of its
constituents well enough beforehand. Yet the literary inquiries here are
surprisingly few, and treated in no critical spirit whatsoever, so that there is
no disappointment in one sense, though there may be in another, with his
three books, De Poetis Latinis. These consist of a large number of separate
articles in more or less chronological order, by no means ill-written in the
classical-dictionary fashion: Genitus est here; obiisse traditur there, and in
such a year; totum se dicavit poeticæ facultati, and the rest. The taste as
expressed by preferences is not bad, and the approaches (they are hardly
more) to critical estimate, though very obvious and mostly traditional, are
sound enough and fairly supported by quotation. But of original attempt to
grasp and to render the character of Latin poetry generally, or of any one
Latin poet by himself, there is hardly a vestige.
It is not at all improbable that Poetics in one form or another, both Italian
Augustinus and “Tedescan,” may exist in MSS. of this period: there is
Olmucensis: his
Defence of
certainly work, even in print, of which very little notice has
Poetry. been taken hitherto. For instance, a few months ago my
friend Mr Gregory Smith saw in a catalogue, bought, and
very kindly lent to me, a Dialogus in Defensionem Poetices, printed at
Venice in 1493, and written by a certain Augustinus Moravus Olmucensis.
[31]
This writer’s family name in vernacular appears to have been Käsenbrot;
and he was one of the early German Humanists whose most famous chiefs
were Reuchlin earlier, Conrad Celtes and Eobanus Hessus later, who
achieved much tolerable verse, and in the Epistolæ Obscurorum one
immortal piece of prose, but who were whelmed in the deluge of the
Reformation struggles, and accomplished little of the good which they
might have done to Germany. The Dialogus—which has the perhaps not
quite accidental interest of having appeared in the year between the writing
of Savonarola’s somewhat dubious backing of Poetry, and the first printing
of Boccaccio’s uncompromising and generous championship thereof—
cannot be said to be of much intrinsic importance. The author gives, or
rather adopts, the definition of Poetry as “a metrical structure of true or
feigned narration, composed in suitable rhythm or feet, and adjusted to
utility and pleasure.” But his text is rather rambling. A parallel with
Medicine (the piece seems to have been written at Padua, which helps it to
Page 52
its place here) is not very well worked out, and the latter part is chiefly
occupied with rather dull-fantastic allegorisings of the stories of Tiresias,
the Gorgons, the geography of Hades, and so forth. Still it is a sign, and
welcome as such.
Another Transalpine may be admitted here, for reasons of time rather
Paradoxical than of place, to introduce two undoubted Italians. It is
attacks on it by
Cornelius
customary to mention the name at least of Cornelius
Agrippa, Landi, Agrippa,[32] if not exactly as a critic, at any rate as being a
Berni. denouncer, though no mean practitioner, of literature. It is
perhaps a just punishment for his blasphemy that no one who only knew
this would dream that the adept of Nettesheim was as good a man of letters
as he is. It constitutes the fourth chapter of the De Vanitate Scientiarum
(1527), and is a mere piece of hackneyed railing at the art which aures
stultorum demulcet, which is architectrix mendaciorum et cultrix
perversorum dogmatum, which is pertenuis et nuda, insulsa, esuriens,
famelica. Alas! if some tales are true, Cornelius (who really was a clever
man) found that Occultism could starve its votaries as well as Poetry. His
attack is, in fact, nothing but an instance of that measles of the Renaissance
(nor of the Renaissance only) paradox-quackery; and it has no solid
foundation whatever. The later (1543) Paradossi of Ortensio Landi[33]
exhibit more frankly the same spirit, but in regard to individuals, especially
Aristotle, rather than to poetry and literature generally. And it is probably
not absent from Berni’s Dialogo contra i Poeti[34] (1537, but written earlier),
in which Poetry is dismissed by this agreeable poet as suitable enough
pastime for a gentleman, but out of the question as a regular vocation or
serious business.
But we must return to serious persons. Of the critical texts to which we
pay chief attention in this book, there are not a few which are of far higher
Vida. critical value than Vida’s Poetics.[35] But it may be doubted
whether even the similarly named treatises of Aristotle and of Horace have
had a greater actual influence; and I at least am nearly certain that no
modern treatise has had, or has yet had a chance of having, anything like so
much. In the recently renewed study of Renaissance Criticism there has
been, naturally enough, a repetition of a phenomenon familiar on such
occasions—that is to say, the deflection of attention from pretty well-known
if half-forgotten material to material which had been still more forgotten,
and was hardly known at all. Daniello, Minturno, and the rest had, since the
occupied with rather dull-fantastic allegorisings of the stories of Tiresias,
the Gorgons, the geography of Hades, and so forth. Still it is a sign, and
welcome as such.
Another Transalpine may be admitted here, for reasons of time rather
Paradoxical than of place, to introduce two undoubted Italians. It is
attacks on it by
Cornelius
customary to mention the name at least of Cornelius
Agrippa, Landi, Agrippa,[32] if not exactly as a critic, at any rate as being a
Berni. denouncer, though no mean practitioner, of literature. It is
perhaps a just punishment for his blasphemy that no one who only knew
this would dream that the adept of Nettesheim was as good a man of letters
as he is. It constitutes the fourth chapter of the De Vanitate Scientiarum
(1527), and is a mere piece of hackneyed railing at the art which aures
stultorum demulcet, which is architectrix mendaciorum et cultrix
perversorum dogmatum, which is pertenuis et nuda, insulsa, esuriens,
famelica. Alas! if some tales are true, Cornelius (who really was a clever
man) found that Occultism could starve its votaries as well as Poetry. His
attack is, in fact, nothing but an instance of that measles of the Renaissance
(nor of the Renaissance only) paradox-quackery; and it has no solid
foundation whatever. The later (1543) Paradossi of Ortensio Landi[33]
exhibit more frankly the same spirit, but in regard to individuals, especially
Aristotle, rather than to poetry and literature generally. And it is probably
not absent from Berni’s Dialogo contra i Poeti[34] (1537, but written earlier),
in which Poetry is dismissed by this agreeable poet as suitable enough
pastime for a gentleman, but out of the question as a regular vocation or
serious business.
But we must return to serious persons. Of the critical texts to which we
pay chief attention in this book, there are not a few which are of far higher
Vida. critical value than Vida’s Poetics.[35] But it may be doubted
whether even the similarly named treatises of Aristotle and of Horace have
had a greater actual influence; and I at least am nearly certain that no
modern treatise has had, or has yet had a chance of having, anything like so
much. In the recently renewed study of Renaissance Criticism there has
been, naturally enough, a repetition of a phenomenon familiar on such
occasions—that is to say, the deflection of attention from pretty well-known
if half-forgotten material to material which had been still more forgotten,
and was hardly known at all. Daniello, Minturno, and the rest had, since the
Page 53
seventeenth century, rested almost undisturbed; even Castelvetro and
Scaliger had more or less shrunk to the position of authorities, of some
importance, in regard to ancient criticism. But Vida, owing to the
unmistakable though unacknowledged borrowing of Boileau, the franker
discipleship of Pope, and the inclusion of a very characteristic translation
by Pitt among the usual collections of “British Poets,” had taken rank once
for all. It is true that it was a rank somewhat of the museum order, but it
existed. Now, the critics who followed him and refined upon him have been
disinterred, and are enjoying their modest second vogue; and he is
comparatively neglected, though a judicious American[36] has put him in
modern dress once more between his master Horace and his pupil Boileau.
Of three things, however, the one is absolutely incontestable as a fact,
and the other two are not easily, I think, to be gainsaid by competent
Importance of authority. The first is, that Vida anticipates in time even the
the Poetics.
earliest of the prose critics of the new Italian school by
some couple of years, while he anticipates the main group of these critics
by more than twenty. The second is, that though no doubt he took some
impulse from Politian and other Humanists, he is practically the first to
codify that extravagant Virgil-worship which reigned throughout the Neo-
Classical dispensation. The third is that, not merely in this point but in
others, he seems, by a sort of intuition, to have anticipated, at the beginning
of the sixteenth century, almost the whole critical orthodoxy of the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth. It is this which makes the translation
of him by Pitt so interesting; because the translator is, for once, no traitor,
but plus royaliste que le roi—fanatically imbued with the principles, and
equipped to the finger-tips with the practice, of his original. But for the
purposes of the scholar that original itself must of course be taken.
The temper and the faith in which Vida writes are made manifest by the
very beginning of his poem—an invocation to the Muses woven of
unexceptionable gradus-tags, and deftly dovetailed into a dedication to the
luckless Dauphin Francis, who had then taken his father’s place as Charles
the Fifth’s prisoner at Madrid, and to whose captivity the poem is modestly
Analysis of the offered as a solace or pastime. These invocations
piece.
accomplished more majorum, Vida proceeds to occupy his
First Book with a sort of general clearing of the ground. He is ready to
teach the secret of all kinds of poetry; but the poet must very carefully
inquire what are the kinds to which he himself is best adapted and best
Scaliger had more or less shrunk to the position of authorities, of some
importance, in regard to ancient criticism. But Vida, owing to the
unmistakable though unacknowledged borrowing of Boileau, the franker
discipleship of Pope, and the inclusion of a very characteristic translation
by Pitt among the usual collections of “British Poets,” had taken rank once
for all. It is true that it was a rank somewhat of the museum order, but it
existed. Now, the critics who followed him and refined upon him have been
disinterred, and are enjoying their modest second vogue; and he is
comparatively neglected, though a judicious American[36] has put him in
modern dress once more between his master Horace and his pupil Boileau.
Of three things, however, the one is absolutely incontestable as a fact,
and the other two are not easily, I think, to be gainsaid by competent
Importance of authority. The first is, that Vida anticipates in time even the
the Poetics.
earliest of the prose critics of the new Italian school by
some couple of years, while he anticipates the main group of these critics
by more than twenty. The second is, that though no doubt he took some
impulse from Politian and other Humanists, he is practically the first to
codify that extravagant Virgil-worship which reigned throughout the Neo-
Classical dispensation. The third is that, not merely in this point but in
others, he seems, by a sort of intuition, to have anticipated, at the beginning
of the sixteenth century, almost the whole critical orthodoxy of the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth. It is this which makes the translation
of him by Pitt so interesting; because the translator is, for once, no traitor,
but plus royaliste que le roi—fanatically imbued with the principles, and
equipped to the finger-tips with the practice, of his original. But for the
purposes of the scholar that original itself must of course be taken.
The temper and the faith in which Vida writes are made manifest by the
very beginning of his poem—an invocation to the Muses woven of
unexceptionable gradus-tags, and deftly dovetailed into a dedication to the
luckless Dauphin Francis, who had then taken his father’s place as Charles
the Fifth’s prisoner at Madrid, and to whose captivity the poem is modestly
Analysis of the offered as a solace or pastime. These invocations
piece.
accomplished more majorum, Vida proceeds to occupy his
First Book with a sort of general clearing of the ground. He is ready to
teach the secret of all kinds of poetry; but the poet must very carefully
inquire what are the kinds to which he himself is best adapted and best
Page 54
inclined. Commissioned work is dubious, unless under a king’s command.
But there is more than this: the poetic child must be carefully nursed in the
arts suitable to his great calling. He must be as carefully guarded from the
taint of vulgar and incorrect speech; and must be regularly initiated into
Poetry—Latin first, especially Virgil, and then Greek, especially Homer. A
short historical sketch of poetry follows; but it, like everything else, is
brought round to the deification of the Mantuan. Hence Vida (who must be
pronounced rather long in weighing anchor) diverges to a good-natured
intercession with parents and teachers not to have the boys whipped too
much, telling a moving legend of an extremely pretty[37] boy who was
actually whipped to death, or at least died of fear. Emulation, however, is
quite a good stimulus; and by degrees work will be loved for itself. But
original poetical production must not be attempted too young; there must be
time for play; the rudiments of metre and so forth must be thoroughly
learnt; and, above all, non omnes omnia must be constantly kept in mind. It
is better to begin with pastorals and minor subjects; solitude and country
life are very desirable circumstances. And so Book I. closes with a fresh
invocation of the spirit of poetry and a fresh celebration of its power.
After this rather ample prelude the author somewhat unreasonably
(seeing that the delay has been his own doing), but in coachmanlike
fashion, says Pergite! Pierides, and proposes to unfold the whole of
Helicon to coming ages. The first disclosure is scarcely novel. You must
invoke Jove and the Muses; nor will one Invocation do. When in doubt
always invoke.[38] Next you should, without holding out bombastic
promises, allure your reader by a modest but sufficient description of the
subject of your poem. So far the method of turning the practice of the
ancients into a principle is impartially adjusted to Homer and Virgil alike;
but after a few score verses the partisan appears. The beginnings of the Iliad
and the Odyssey, the plunging into the midst of things with the wrath of
Achilles, and the sojourn with Calypso, instead of the rape of Helen (why
not of Hesione?) or the launching from Troy, are duly praised. But the
elaborate Homeric descriptions—as that of the car—are boggled at; the
introduction of Thersites shocks Vida (Drances seems a far nobler figure),
and the pettiness of the subjects of some of the Homeric similes would
never suit the magniloquence of the Latian Muse.[39] In Virgil, on the other
hand, he can see no fault; even the demand of Venus for arms to clothe her
bastard son, which had given qualms to admirers of old, does not disturb
But there is more than this: the poetic child must be carefully nursed in the
arts suitable to his great calling. He must be as carefully guarded from the
taint of vulgar and incorrect speech; and must be regularly initiated into
Poetry—Latin first, especially Virgil, and then Greek, especially Homer. A
short historical sketch of poetry follows; but it, like everything else, is
brought round to the deification of the Mantuan. Hence Vida (who must be
pronounced rather long in weighing anchor) diverges to a good-natured
intercession with parents and teachers not to have the boys whipped too
much, telling a moving legend of an extremely pretty[37] boy who was
actually whipped to death, or at least died of fear. Emulation, however, is
quite a good stimulus; and by degrees work will be loved for itself. But
original poetical production must not be attempted too young; there must be
time for play; the rudiments of metre and so forth must be thoroughly
learnt; and, above all, non omnes omnia must be constantly kept in mind. It
is better to begin with pastorals and minor subjects; solitude and country
life are very desirable circumstances. And so Book I. closes with a fresh
invocation of the spirit of poetry and a fresh celebration of its power.
After this rather ample prelude the author somewhat unreasonably
(seeing that the delay has been his own doing), but in coachmanlike
fashion, says Pergite! Pierides, and proposes to unfold the whole of
Helicon to coming ages. The first disclosure is scarcely novel. You must
invoke Jove and the Muses; nor will one Invocation do. When in doubt
always invoke.[38] Next you should, without holding out bombastic
promises, allure your reader by a modest but sufficient description of the
subject of your poem. So far the method of turning the practice of the
ancients into a principle is impartially adjusted to Homer and Virgil alike;
but after a few score verses the partisan appears. The beginnings of the Iliad
and the Odyssey, the plunging into the midst of things with the wrath of
Achilles, and the sojourn with Calypso, instead of the rape of Helen (why
not of Hesione?) or the launching from Troy, are duly praised. But the
elaborate Homeric descriptions—as that of the car—are boggled at; the
introduction of Thersites shocks Vida (Drances seems a far nobler figure),
and the pettiness of the subjects of some of the Homeric similes would
never suit the magniloquence of the Latian Muse.[39] In Virgil, on the other
hand, he can see no fault; even the demand of Venus for arms to clothe her
bastard son, which had given qualms to admirers of old, does not disturb
Page 55
Vida at all; and his poem seems to be slipping by degrees into a mere précis
of the Æneid, that each trait actually found in Virgil may be registered as a
pattern to poets generally. He wrenches himself free for a moment to
inculcate the following of nature; but presently lapses into an elaborate
demonstration of the beautiful way in which the Mantuan does follow
nature. In short, though now and then to “save his face” an illustration is
drawn honoris causa from Homer, this Second Book on the ordonnance of
the poem is, till it ceases with a panegyric of Leo X., little more than a
descant On the Imitation of Virgil.
It cannot be said that the Third Book offers much difference in this
respect—though the idolatry of Virgil is in parts a little more disguised. It
is, again more majorum, devoted to Diction, and, the Muses having been
invited to cross the stage once more, our Mentor first reprobates Obscurity.
But though you must not be obscure, you may and should be Figurative,
and not a few of the best known of our ancient acquaintances the Figures—
Metaphor, Hyperbole, Apostrophe, and so forth—are introduced and
commended, or sometimes discommended. It is extremely noteworthy that
the warnings-off include one far from ugly conceit—
“Aut crines Magnæ Genetricis gramina dicat.”
This, of course, is quite in accordance with the horror of a daring metaphor
—of one which runs the risk of seeming “frigid”—which we find prevailing
from Aristotle to Longinus, and even in both these great men. To us, most
assuredly, the likening of the grass to the tresses of Mother Earth is not in
the least absurd, but a very beautiful and poetical phrase, awaking, and
adjusting itself aptly to, a train of equally poetical suggestion. But before
very long the advice as to the choice of language takes the plain and simple
form, “Strip the Ancients!” The poet is bidden to fit
“exuvias veterumque insignia”
to himself; he is to gird himself up to the “theft,” and drive the spoil on
every occasion. He who trusts to his own wit and invention is unhesitatingly
condemned and pitied. If you want to live, to have your works escape
decay, you must “steal.” Vida repeats the very word over and over again,
and without the slightest bashfulness or compunction. He is, however, good
enough to admit that, if a new word is absolutely wanted to express
of the Æneid, that each trait actually found in Virgil may be registered as a
pattern to poets generally. He wrenches himself free for a moment to
inculcate the following of nature; but presently lapses into an elaborate
demonstration of the beautiful way in which the Mantuan does follow
nature. In short, though now and then to “save his face” an illustration is
drawn honoris causa from Homer, this Second Book on the ordonnance of
the poem is, till it ceases with a panegyric of Leo X., little more than a
descant On the Imitation of Virgil.
It cannot be said that the Third Book offers much difference in this
respect—though the idolatry of Virgil is in parts a little more disguised. It
is, again more majorum, devoted to Diction, and, the Muses having been
invited to cross the stage once more, our Mentor first reprobates Obscurity.
But though you must not be obscure, you may and should be Figurative,
and not a few of the best known of our ancient acquaintances the Figures—
Metaphor, Hyperbole, Apostrophe, and so forth—are introduced and
commended, or sometimes discommended. It is extremely noteworthy that
the warnings-off include one far from ugly conceit—
“Aut crines Magnæ Genetricis gramina dicat.”
This, of course, is quite in accordance with the horror of a daring metaphor
—of one which runs the risk of seeming “frigid”—which we find prevailing
from Aristotle to Longinus, and even in both these great men. To us, most
assuredly, the likening of the grass to the tresses of Mother Earth is not in
the least absurd, but a very beautiful and poetical phrase, awaking, and
adjusting itself aptly to, a train of equally poetical suggestion. But before
very long the advice as to the choice of language takes the plain and simple
form, “Strip the Ancients!” The poet is bidden to fit
“exuvias veterumque insignia”
to himself; he is to gird himself up to the “theft,” and drive the spoil on
every occasion. He who trusts to his own wit and invention is unhesitatingly
condemned and pitied. If you want to live, to have your works escape
decay, you must “steal.” Vida repeats the very word over and over again,
and without the slightest bashfulness or compunction. He is, however, good
enough to admit that, if a new word is absolutely wanted to express
Page 56
something not in the ancients, it may be invented or borrowed—say from
Greek—as the older Latins had themselves done. When one word is
difficult to find or awkward if found, you must employ Periphrasis.
Compounds are permitted to a certain extent (the weakness of Latin and its
brood in this respect is well known), but never to a greater than that of two
words. Perterricrepas is stigmatised by innuendo, though the word itself is
Lucretian, and though there is absolutely no principle in the restriction. You
are to tone down ill-sounding proper names, as Sicharbas into Sichæus. But
in all cases your words are to be entirely subservient to the sense, though
they may and should be suited to it—a doctrine which lends itself of course
to extensive Virgilian illustration. And so the poem concludes with a
peroration of some length, drawing ever and ever closer to, and at last
ending in, the laudation of the unrivalled Maro.
Had it not been for the astonishing accuracy with which, as has been said,
Vida actually anticipated the dominant critical taste of something like three
hundred years, and the creative taste of about half that period, not many
Essential more lines than we have given pages might have been
poverty of its
theory.
devoted to him. That the poem as a composition is a
sufficiently elegant piece of patchwork may of course be
freely granted; and it deserves perhaps less grudging praise for the extreme
fidelity and ingenuity with which it illustrates its own doctrines. But those
doctrines themselves are, whether we look at them in gross or in detail,
some of the poorest and most beggarly things to be found in the whole
range of criticism. That the prescriptions are practically limited to those
necessary for turning out the epic or “heroic” poem does not so much
matter—though it is not entirely without significance. Vida’s idea of poetry
is simply and literally shoddy.[40] That fabric—the fact is perhaps not
invariably known to those who use the word—differs from others, not as
pinchbeck differs from gold, or cotton from silk, but in being exclusively
composed of already manufactured and worn textures which are torn up and
passed afresh through mill and loom. And this is the process—and
practically the sole process—which Vida enjoins on the poet, going so far
as to pronounce anathema on any one who dares to pursue any other.
When it is examined in detail the proceeding may excite even more
astonishment, which will be wisely directed not more to the original
Historical and symptomatic conception of it than to the extent to which, from
significance.
what followed, it seems to have hit certain
Greek—as the older Latins had themselves done. When one word is
difficult to find or awkward if found, you must employ Periphrasis.
Compounds are permitted to a certain extent (the weakness of Latin and its
brood in this respect is well known), but never to a greater than that of two
words. Perterricrepas is stigmatised by innuendo, though the word itself is
Lucretian, and though there is absolutely no principle in the restriction. You
are to tone down ill-sounding proper names, as Sicharbas into Sichæus. But
in all cases your words are to be entirely subservient to the sense, though
they may and should be suited to it—a doctrine which lends itself of course
to extensive Virgilian illustration. And so the poem concludes with a
peroration of some length, drawing ever and ever closer to, and at last
ending in, the laudation of the unrivalled Maro.
Had it not been for the astonishing accuracy with which, as has been said,
Vida actually anticipated the dominant critical taste of something like three
hundred years, and the creative taste of about half that period, not many
Essential more lines than we have given pages might have been
poverty of its
theory.
devoted to him. That the poem as a composition is a
sufficiently elegant piece of patchwork may of course be
freely granted; and it deserves perhaps less grudging praise for the extreme
fidelity and ingenuity with which it illustrates its own doctrines. But those
doctrines themselves are, whether we look at them in gross or in detail,
some of the poorest and most beggarly things to be found in the whole
range of criticism. That the prescriptions are practically limited to those
necessary for turning out the epic or “heroic” poem does not so much
matter—though it is not entirely without significance. Vida’s idea of poetry
is simply and literally shoddy.[40] That fabric—the fact is perhaps not
invariably known to those who use the word—differs from others, not as
pinchbeck differs from gold, or cotton from silk, but in being exclusively
composed of already manufactured and worn textures which are torn up and
passed afresh through mill and loom. And this is the process—and
practically the sole process—which Vida enjoins on the poet, going so far
as to pronounce anathema on any one who dares to pursue any other.
When it is examined in detail the proceeding may excite even more
astonishment, which will be wisely directed not more to the original
Historical and symptomatic conception of it than to the extent to which, from
significance.
what followed, it seems to have hit certain
Page 57
peculiarities in the æsthetic sense of mankind as regards poetry. We may
easily go wrong by devoting too much attention to the fact of Vida’s
individual selection of the poet to whom all other poets are bound jurare in
verba. It is certain that, from his own day to this, Virgil has appealed to
many tastes—and to some of the greatest—secure of his result of being
pronounced altissimo poeta. Those who like him least cannot but admit that
Dante and Tennyson among poets, that Quintilian and Scaliger—nay, that
even Boileau—among critics, are not precisely negligible quantities. But
the real subject—not merely of astonishment but of reasonable and
deliberate determination to adopt a position of “No Surrender” in the denial
of Vida’s position—is this selection of any poet, no matter who it may be,
as not only a positive pattern of all poetic excellence, but a negative index
expurgatorius of all poetic delinquency. Not Homer, not Dante, not
Shakespeare himself, can be allowed the first position; and the main
principle and axiom of all sound Criticism is, that not merely no actual poet,
but no possible one, can be allowed the second. This kind of poetical
predestination—this fixing of a hard-and-fast type, within which lies all
salvation and without which lies none—is utter blasphemy against the
poetical spirit. Not only will simple imitation of the means whereby one
poet has achieved poetry not suffice to enable another to achieve it, but this
suggestion is by far the least dangerous part of the doctrine. It will probably
lead to the composition of much bad poetry, but it will not necessarily cause
the abortion, or the mistaking when born, of any that is good. The
damnatory clauses of the creed must have, and did have, this fatal effect.
Vida and those who followed him excused themselves, were accepted by
their disciples, and have recently been eulogised by our newest Neo-
The alleged Classics, as following Nature and Reason. That they said—
appeal to
Reason and
perhaps that they thought—they followed both is
Nature. unquestionable.[41] But as a matter of fact their Law of
Nature—like the Articles of War in Marryat’s novel—was a
dead letter, owing to the proviso, from the first more or less clearly hinted at
and latterly avowed, that all of Nature that was worth imitating had already
been imitated by the ancients. As for the appeal to Reason, it is a mere
juggle with words; and it is astonishing that at this time of day any one
should be deluded by it. What Reason prescribes Invocations to the Muses?
What Reason insists upon beginning at the middle instead of at the
beginning? What Reason is there in the preference of the pale académie of
easily go wrong by devoting too much attention to the fact of Vida’s
individual selection of the poet to whom all other poets are bound jurare in
verba. It is certain that, from his own day to this, Virgil has appealed to
many tastes—and to some of the greatest—secure of his result of being
pronounced altissimo poeta. Those who like him least cannot but admit that
Dante and Tennyson among poets, that Quintilian and Scaliger—nay, that
even Boileau—among critics, are not precisely negligible quantities. But
the real subject—not merely of astonishment but of reasonable and
deliberate determination to adopt a position of “No Surrender” in the denial
of Vida’s position—is this selection of any poet, no matter who it may be,
as not only a positive pattern of all poetic excellence, but a negative index
expurgatorius of all poetic delinquency. Not Homer, not Dante, not
Shakespeare himself, can be allowed the first position; and the main
principle and axiom of all sound Criticism is, that not merely no actual poet,
but no possible one, can be allowed the second. This kind of poetical
predestination—this fixing of a hard-and-fast type, within which lies all
salvation and without which lies none—is utter blasphemy against the
poetical spirit. Not only will simple imitation of the means whereby one
poet has achieved poetry not suffice to enable another to achieve it, but this
suggestion is by far the least dangerous part of the doctrine. It will probably
lead to the composition of much bad poetry, but it will not necessarily cause
the abortion, or the mistaking when born, of any that is good. The
damnatory clauses of the creed must have, and did have, this fatal effect.
Vida and those who followed him excused themselves, were accepted by
their disciples, and have recently been eulogised by our newest Neo-
The alleged Classics, as following Nature and Reason. That they said—
appeal to
Reason and
perhaps that they thought—they followed both is
Nature. unquestionable.[41] But as a matter of fact their Law of
Nature—like the Articles of War in Marryat’s novel—was a
dead letter, owing to the proviso, from the first more or less clearly hinted at
and latterly avowed, that all of Nature that was worth imitating had already
been imitated by the ancients. As for the appeal to Reason, it is a mere
juggle with words; and it is astonishing that at this time of day any one
should be deluded by it. What Reason prescribes Invocations to the Muses?
What Reason insists upon beginning at the middle instead of at the
beginning? What Reason is there in the preference of the pale académie of
Page 58
Drances to the Rembrandt sketch of the demagogue whom Ulysses
cudgelled? of the shield of Æneas to the car of Achilles? of Sichæus to
Sicharbas? What has Reason to say (more than she has to say against poetic
transports altogether) against the exquisite and endlessly suggestive
metaphor of “the tresses of the Mighty Mother” for the grass, with its wave,
and its light, and its shadow, and the outline of the everlasting hills and
vales as of the sleeping body beneath it? In all these cases, and in a hundred
others, we may boldly answer “None and Nothing!” The true Reason—the
Mind of the World—has not a word to say against any of these forbidden
things, or in favour of any of those preferred ones.
But there is, let it be freely enough granted, a false Reason which has, no
doubt, very much to say against the one and in favour of the other. The
warped and stunted common-sense, the pedestrian and prosaic matter-of-
factness, which is no doubt natural enough in a certain way to mankind, had
made little appearance during the Middle Ages. These Ages may be called,
if any one chooses, childish, they may be still more justly called fantastic;
but they were never prosaic. It might be said of their Time-Spirit as of the
albatross, that
“Ses ailes de géant l’empêchent de marcher.”
But there was no doubt about the wings. With the Renaissance, prose, in the
good sense no doubt as well as in the bad, returned; and as if to revenge
itself for the universal employment of poetry during the Middle Ages
themselves, it proceeded to lay hands even upon the poet. He might
“transport”; with Longinus before them (if Vida had him not, his followers
had), they could not very well deny this. But his methods of transporting
must be previously submitted to a kind of inspectorship; and anything
dangerous or unusual was strictly forbidden. His bolt was not to be “shot
too soon nor beyond the moon”: he was most particularly not to be “of
imagination all compact.” On the contrary, his imagination was to be
alloyed with doses of the commonest common-sense. He might not even
imp his wings save with registered feathers, and these feathers were to be
neither too long nor too gay.
Such are the principles that we find in Vida, and such their inevitable
result. Only let us once more repeat, not merely that he may well, in the
admirable words of Lord Foppington, “be proud to belong to so prevailing a
cudgelled? of the shield of Æneas to the car of Achilles? of Sichæus to
Sicharbas? What has Reason to say (more than she has to say against poetic
transports altogether) against the exquisite and endlessly suggestive
metaphor of “the tresses of the Mighty Mother” for the grass, with its wave,
and its light, and its shadow, and the outline of the everlasting hills and
vales as of the sleeping body beneath it? In all these cases, and in a hundred
others, we may boldly answer “None and Nothing!” The true Reason—the
Mind of the World—has not a word to say against any of these forbidden
things, or in favour of any of those preferred ones.
But there is, let it be freely enough granted, a false Reason which has, no
doubt, very much to say against the one and in favour of the other. The
warped and stunted common-sense, the pedestrian and prosaic matter-of-
factness, which is no doubt natural enough in a certain way to mankind, had
made little appearance during the Middle Ages. These Ages may be called,
if any one chooses, childish, they may be still more justly called fantastic;
but they were never prosaic. It might be said of their Time-Spirit as of the
albatross, that
“Ses ailes de géant l’empêchent de marcher.”
But there was no doubt about the wings. With the Renaissance, prose, in the
good sense no doubt as well as in the bad, returned; and as if to revenge
itself for the universal employment of poetry during the Middle Ages
themselves, it proceeded to lay hands even upon the poet. He might
“transport”; with Longinus before them (if Vida had him not, his followers
had), they could not very well deny this. But his methods of transporting
must be previously submitted to a kind of inspectorship; and anything
dangerous or unusual was strictly forbidden. His bolt was not to be “shot
too soon nor beyond the moon”: he was most particularly not to be “of
imagination all compact.” On the contrary, his imagination was to be
alloyed with doses of the commonest common-sense. He might not even
imp his wings save with registered feathers, and these feathers were to be
neither too long nor too gay.
Such are the principles that we find in Vida, and such their inevitable
result. Only let us once more repeat, not merely that he may well, in the
admirable words of Lord Foppington, “be proud to belong to so prevailing a
Page 59
party” as the Neo-Classics of the following three centuries, but that he
actually led and almost made that party himself.
A considerable time—more than a quarter of a century—had elapsed
between Politian and Vida; but from the appearance of the latter’s book to
the end of the century not more than three years on the average[42] passed
without the appearance of a critical treatise of some importance. Every now
The main stream and then a short lull would occur; but this was always made
started.
up by a greater crowd of writers after the interval. Such
“rallies” of criticism (which occurred particularly during the fourth
decade[43] of the century, about its very centre,[44] throughout the seventh,[45]
eighth,[46] and ninth[47] decades, and just at the end[48]) were no doubt to
some extent determined by the academic habits of the Italians, and the
readiness with which members of the same academy, or different
academies, took up the cudgels against each other. The individual exercises
took various forms. A very large part of the work consists of commentaries
on Aristotle’s Poetics; another, closely connected, of set “Arts Poetic,”
more ostensibly original; some deal with vulgar and some with “regular”
poetry, while the concrete and comparative method is by no means
neglected, though the abstract and theoretic is on the whole preferred. To
attempt classification by kind would be a sacrifice of real to apparent
method; and to trace the development of the same ideas in different writers
would lead to inextricable confusion and criss-cross reference. We shall
probably find it best to follow the rule which has been observed with rare
exceptions throughout this History—that of giving the gist of particular
books and the opinions of particular authors together, and leaving bird’s-eye
views to the Interchapters.
Only two years after the appearance of Vida’s poem appeared the next
critical Italian book of importance, the first instalment of Trissino’s Poetica.
Trissino. The first instalment—for a singular interval took place
between the beginning and the completion of this work. The first four parts
were, as has just been said, published in 1529, when the main stream of
Italian criticism had hardly begun to flow; the two last not till 1563, two
years after the publication of Scaliger’s great work, and after a full
generation (in the ordinary count) of active discussion of the matters.[49]
Such conditions cannot fail to affect the homogeneity of a book. But still
Trissino put it forth as one book in different parts, not, as he might very
well have done, and as others actually did, as two books; and we are
actually led and almost made that party himself.
A considerable time—more than a quarter of a century—had elapsed
between Politian and Vida; but from the appearance of the latter’s book to
the end of the century not more than three years on the average[42] passed
without the appearance of a critical treatise of some importance. Every now
The main stream and then a short lull would occur; but this was always made
started.
up by a greater crowd of writers after the interval. Such
“rallies” of criticism (which occurred particularly during the fourth
decade[43] of the century, about its very centre,[44] throughout the seventh,[45]
eighth,[46] and ninth[47] decades, and just at the end[48]) were no doubt to
some extent determined by the academic habits of the Italians, and the
readiness with which members of the same academy, or different
academies, took up the cudgels against each other. The individual exercises
took various forms. A very large part of the work consists of commentaries
on Aristotle’s Poetics; another, closely connected, of set “Arts Poetic,”
more ostensibly original; some deal with vulgar and some with “regular”
poetry, while the concrete and comparative method is by no means
neglected, though the abstract and theoretic is on the whole preferred. To
attempt classification by kind would be a sacrifice of real to apparent
method; and to trace the development of the same ideas in different writers
would lead to inextricable confusion and criss-cross reference. We shall
probably find it best to follow the rule which has been observed with rare
exceptions throughout this History—that of giving the gist of particular
books and the opinions of particular authors together, and leaving bird’s-eye
views to the Interchapters.
Only two years after the appearance of Vida’s poem appeared the next
critical Italian book of importance, the first instalment of Trissino’s Poetica.
Trissino. The first instalment—for a singular interval took place
between the beginning and the completion of this work. The first four parts
were, as has just been said, published in 1529, when the main stream of
Italian criticism had hardly begun to flow; the two last not till 1563, two
years after the publication of Scaliger’s great work, and after a full
generation (in the ordinary count) of active discussion of the matters.[49]
Such conditions cannot fail to affect the homogeneity of a book. But still
Trissino put it forth as one book in different parts, not, as he might very
well have done, and as others actually did, as two books; and we are
Page 60
therefore entitled, and indeed bound, with the caution just given, to treat it
as a whole. The handsome quartos,[50] well printed and beautifully
frontispieced and vignetted, of the standard edition of Trissino’s Opere, are
perhaps, taking them together, rather an ornament to the shelf than a
plentiful provision of furniture for the mind. The disadvantages of versi
sciolti have not often been shown more conspicuously than in the Italia
Liberata, and the Sofonisba has little but its earliness and regularity to plead
as a set-off to the general shortcomings of the modern classical Drama. The
better repute of Italian comedy would hardly have arisen from such pieces
as I Simillimi; and the Rime are most ordinary things. In our own division
he is of some historical account; for it is impossible not to be grateful to the
first publisher of the De Vulgari Eloquio, and that praise of earliness, which
he has earned in more than one respect, must be extended to the first four
parts of the Poetica. He boasts justly enough that nobody, save Dante and
Antonio da Tempo, was before him, and that both of these had written in
Latin.
Trissino does not, in his first instalment, busy himself with those abstract
discussions which were soon to furnish the staple of Italian criticism. He
Division of his adopts Aristotle’s “Imitation” briefly without cavil or
Poetic.
qualification; and then passes, in his First Part or
“Division,” to the question of choosing your language, in which he
generally follows Dante, but with an adaptation to the time. It is not with
him a question of making an “Illustrious Vulgar Tongue,” an “Italian,” but
of calling by that name one already adopted. In his further remarks on
Diction he sometimes borrows, and often expands or supplements, the very
words of Dante at first, and then passes to elaborate discussion, with
examples, of the qualities of speech—Clearness, Grandeur, Beauty,
Swiftness. Next he deals with what he calls the costume—character, ethos,
suiting of style to person—with truth, artifice, and what he calls the
“fashions”—that is to say, the alterations of quantity, &c., by dwelling,
slurring, syncope, and the like. The arrangement of this First Division is not
very logical; but, as we have seen, cross-division has been the curse of
rhetorical-formal discussion of the kind from a very early period to the
present day. The Second Division deals with pure prosody, the division of
feet, shortening (rimozione), as in ciel for cielo, elision, cæsura, &c.; the
Third with arrangement of verses and stanzas; the Fourth with the complete
as a whole. The handsome quartos,[50] well printed and beautifully
frontispieced and vignetted, of the standard edition of Trissino’s Opere, are
perhaps, taking them together, rather an ornament to the shelf than a
plentiful provision of furniture for the mind. The disadvantages of versi
sciolti have not often been shown more conspicuously than in the Italia
Liberata, and the Sofonisba has little but its earliness and regularity to plead
as a set-off to the general shortcomings of the modern classical Drama. The
better repute of Italian comedy would hardly have arisen from such pieces
as I Simillimi; and the Rime are most ordinary things. In our own division
he is of some historical account; for it is impossible not to be grateful to the
first publisher of the De Vulgari Eloquio, and that praise of earliness, which
he has earned in more than one respect, must be extended to the first four
parts of the Poetica. He boasts justly enough that nobody, save Dante and
Antonio da Tempo, was before him, and that both of these had written in
Latin.
Trissino does not, in his first instalment, busy himself with those abstract
discussions which were soon to furnish the staple of Italian criticism. He
Division of his adopts Aristotle’s “Imitation” briefly without cavil or
Poetic.
qualification; and then passes, in his First Part or
“Division,” to the question of choosing your language, in which he
generally follows Dante, but with an adaptation to the time. It is not with
him a question of making an “Illustrious Vulgar Tongue,” an “Italian,” but
of calling by that name one already adopted. In his further remarks on
Diction he sometimes borrows, and often expands or supplements, the very
words of Dante at first, and then passes to elaborate discussion, with
examples, of the qualities of speech—Clearness, Grandeur, Beauty,
Swiftness. Next he deals with what he calls the costume—character, ethos,
suiting of style to person—with truth, artifice, and what he calls the
“fashions”—that is to say, the alterations of quantity, &c., by dwelling,
slurring, syncope, and the like. The arrangement of this First Division is not
very logical; but, as we have seen, cross-division has been the curse of
rhetorical-formal discussion of the kind from a very early period to the
present day. The Second Division deals with pure prosody, the division of
feet, shortening (rimozione), as in ciel for cielo, elision, cæsura, &c.; the
Third with arrangement of verses and stanzas; the Fourth with the complete
Page 61
forms of Sonnet, Ballata, and Canzone, the sub-varieties of which were
detailed with great care and plentiful examples.
Here what might more properly be called the First Part, consisting of
these four divisions, ends; the long subsequent Second Part (made up of the
Fifth and Sixth Divisions) has a separate Preface-dedication referring to the
gap. These parts are not, like the others, divided into sections with
headings; and, doubtless on the pattern if not of any one particular treatise,
of the spirit of many which had gone between, they deal with general
questions. The Imitation theory is handled at some length, and with citation
of Plato as well as of Aristotle; the kinds of poetry are treated on a more
general standard, and not with mere reference to the rules of constructing
each. The larger part of the Fifth Division is given entirely to Tragedy: the
Sixth begins with that Heroic Poem which was so much on the mind of the
country and the century. But it ends chiefly on Figures—the formal heart of
Trissino, long-travelled as it has been, fondly turning to its old loves at the
last.
The contents of the treatise or treatises, especially if we take them with
Trissino’s attempts to introduce the Greek Omega and the Greek Epsilon
into Italian spelling, his grammatical “Doubts,” and his later “Introduction
to Grammar,” his dialogue Il Castellano, and so forth,[51] will show his
His critical standpoint with sufficient clearness. It is almost purely
value.
formal in the minor, not to say the minim, kinds of form.
He is indeed credited by some with a position of importance, in the history
of the Unities. He is, they say, the first to refer to the observance of the
Unity of Time as a distinction from “ignorant poets,”[52] giving therewith a
disparaging glance at mediæval drama.[53] But this overlooks the fact that he
is simply repeating what Aristotle says, with an addition much more
likely[54] to refer to non-Humanist contemporaries than to the almost
forgotten “mystery.” His theory of the Heroic Poem, like his practice in the
Italia Liberata, is slavishly Aristotelian. The chief evidence of real
development that I can find is in his treatment of Comedy, where the
extremely rapid and contemptuous dismissal of the Master called
imperatively for some supplement, considering the popularity of the kind in
the writer’s own time and country. Possibly reinforcing Aristotle here with
Cicero, and certainly using the famous Suave mari magno of Lucretius, he
succeeds in putting together a theory of the ludicrous to which, or to some
subsequent developments of it in Italy, Hobbes’s “passion of sudden glory”
detailed with great care and plentiful examples.
Here what might more properly be called the First Part, consisting of
these four divisions, ends; the long subsequent Second Part (made up of the
Fifth and Sixth Divisions) has a separate Preface-dedication referring to the
gap. These parts are not, like the others, divided into sections with
headings; and, doubtless on the pattern if not of any one particular treatise,
of the spirit of many which had gone between, they deal with general
questions. The Imitation theory is handled at some length, and with citation
of Plato as well as of Aristotle; the kinds of poetry are treated on a more
general standard, and not with mere reference to the rules of constructing
each. The larger part of the Fifth Division is given entirely to Tragedy: the
Sixth begins with that Heroic Poem which was so much on the mind of the
country and the century. But it ends chiefly on Figures—the formal heart of
Trissino, long-travelled as it has been, fondly turning to its old loves at the
last.
The contents of the treatise or treatises, especially if we take them with
Trissino’s attempts to introduce the Greek Omega and the Greek Epsilon
into Italian spelling, his grammatical “Doubts,” and his later “Introduction
to Grammar,” his dialogue Il Castellano, and so forth,[51] will show his
His critical standpoint with sufficient clearness. It is almost purely
value.
formal in the minor, not to say the minim, kinds of form.
He is indeed credited by some with a position of importance, in the history
of the Unities. He is, they say, the first to refer to the observance of the
Unity of Time as a distinction from “ignorant poets,”[52] giving therewith a
disparaging glance at mediæval drama.[53] But this overlooks the fact that he
is simply repeating what Aristotle says, with an addition much more
likely[54] to refer to non-Humanist contemporaries than to the almost
forgotten “mystery.” His theory of the Heroic Poem, like his practice in the
Italia Liberata, is slavishly Aristotelian. The chief evidence of real
development that I can find is in his treatment of Comedy, where the
extremely rapid and contemptuous dismissal of the Master called
imperatively for some supplement, considering the popularity of the kind in
the writer’s own time and country. Possibly reinforcing Aristotle here with
Cicero, and certainly using the famous Suave mari magno of Lucretius, he
succeeds in putting together a theory of the ludicrous to which, or to some
subsequent developments of it in Italy, Hobbes’s “passion of sudden glory”
Page 62
has been[55] not unjustly traced. The “sudden” seems indeed to be directly
due to Maggi, a critic who will be presently mentioned with other
commentators on the Poetics. And Maggi had published long before
Trissino’s later Divisions appeared, though, it may be, not before they were
written.[56]
The growth during the interval had been of three kinds, sometimes
Editors, &c., of blended, sometimes kept apart. The first kind consisted of
the Poetics.
translations, editions, and commentaries of and on the
Poetics; the second, of abstract discussions of Poetry; the third, of more or
less formal “Arts” not very different from Trissino’s own. The first class
produced later, in the work of Castelvetro, a contribution of almost the first
importance to the History and to the Art of Criticism; and it could not but
exercise a powerful influence. It belongs, however, in all but its most
prominent examples (such as that just referred to, which will be fully
discussed in the next chapter), rather to monographers on Aristotle than to
general historians of Criticism, inasmuch as it is mainly parasitic. Before
Pazzi. any book of original critical importance later than
Trissino’s had been issued, in 1536,[57] Alessandro de’ Pazzi published a
Latin translation of the Poetics, which for some time held the position of
standard, and a dozen years later came three important works on the book—
Robortello’s edition of 1548, Segni’s Italian translation of 1549, and
Maggi’s edition of 1550—all showing the attention and interest which the
subject was exciting, while, still before the later “Divisions” of Trissino
appeared, Vettori in 1560 added his edition, of greater importance than any
earlier one. Long before this the book had become a regular subject of
lectures. Of these writers Robortello, and still more Vettori (“Victorius”),
were of the greatest service to the text; Maggi, who was assisted by
Lombardi, to the discussion of the matter.[58]
In the critical handling of these editors and commentators we find, as we
Robortello, Segni, Maggi, should expect, much of the old rhetorical trifling.
Vettori.
For all their scorn, expressed or implied, of the
Middle Ages, they repeat the distinctions of poetica, poesis, poeta, and
poema[59] as docilely as Martianus, or a student of Martianus, could have
done a thousand or five hundred years before, and they hand it on too as a
sort of charmed catchword to Scaliger[60] and Jonson.[61] But brought face to
face as they are with the always weighty, though by no means always
transparently clear, doctrines of Aristotle, and self-charged with the duty of
due to Maggi, a critic who will be presently mentioned with other
commentators on the Poetics. And Maggi had published long before
Trissino’s later Divisions appeared, though, it may be, not before they were
written.[56]
The growth during the interval had been of three kinds, sometimes
Editors, &c., of blended, sometimes kept apart. The first kind consisted of
the Poetics.
translations, editions, and commentaries of and on the
Poetics; the second, of abstract discussions of Poetry; the third, of more or
less formal “Arts” not very different from Trissino’s own. The first class
produced later, in the work of Castelvetro, a contribution of almost the first
importance to the History and to the Art of Criticism; and it could not but
exercise a powerful influence. It belongs, however, in all but its most
prominent examples (such as that just referred to, which will be fully
discussed in the next chapter), rather to monographers on Aristotle than to
general historians of Criticism, inasmuch as it is mainly parasitic. Before
Pazzi. any book of original critical importance later than
Trissino’s had been issued, in 1536,[57] Alessandro de’ Pazzi published a
Latin translation of the Poetics, which for some time held the position of
standard, and a dozen years later came three important works on the book—
Robortello’s edition of 1548, Segni’s Italian translation of 1549, and
Maggi’s edition of 1550—all showing the attention and interest which the
subject was exciting, while, still before the later “Divisions” of Trissino
appeared, Vettori in 1560 added his edition, of greater importance than any
earlier one. Long before this the book had become a regular subject of
lectures. Of these writers Robortello, and still more Vettori (“Victorius”),
were of the greatest service to the text; Maggi, who was assisted by
Lombardi, to the discussion of the matter.[58]
In the critical handling of these editors and commentators we find, as we
Robortello, Segni, Maggi, should expect, much of the old rhetorical trifling.
Vettori.
For all their scorn, expressed or implied, of the
Middle Ages, they repeat the distinctions of poetica, poesis, poeta, and
poema[59] as docilely as Martianus, or a student of Martianus, could have
done a thousand or five hundred years before, and they hand it on too as a
sort of charmed catchword to Scaliger[60] and Jonson.[61] But brought face to
face as they are with the always weighty, though by no means always
transparently clear, doctrines of Aristotle, and self-charged with the duty of
Page 63
explaining and commenting them, they cannot, if they would, escape the
necessity of grappling with the more abstract and less merely technological
questions. Robortello,[62] like Maggi, though less elaborately, has a theory of
the ludicrous. Both, and others, necessarily grapple with that crux of the
katharsis which has not yet ceased to be crucial. Both, with Segni, discuss
the Unity of Time and differ about it; though none of the three has yet
discovered (as indeed it is not discoverable in Aristotle or Aristotle’s literary
documents) the yet more malignant Unity of Place. Vettori would extend the
cramp in time (not of course with the twenty-four hours’ limit) from tragedy
to epic. Most of them have arrived at that besotment as to “verisimilitude”
which is responsible for the worst parts of the Neo-Classic theory, and
which, in the pleasant irony common to all entanglements with Duessas of
the kind, makes the unfortunate lovers guilty of the wildest excesses of
artificial improbability. And in all, whether they project their reflections on
their text into more general forms or not, we can see the gradual
crystallising of a theory of poetry, heroic, or dramatic, or general.
Nor was such theory left without direct and independent exposition
Theorists: during the period which we are considering. The first
Daniello.
author of one is generally taken to be Daniello, whose
Poetica appeared in 1536; and I have not discovered any earlier claimant. I
do not quite understand how Mr Spingarn has arrived at the conclusion that
“in Daniello’s theory of tragedy there is no single Aristotelian element,”
especially as he himself elsewhere acknowledges the close—almost verbal
—adherence of this early writer to the Stagirite. But it is probably true that
Daniello was thinking more of the Platonic objections and of following out
the Boccaccian defence, than of merely treading in the footprints of
Aristotle. He is the first, since Boccaccio himself, to undertake that
generous, if rather wide and vague as well as superfluous, “defence of
poesy” which many Italians repeated after him, and which was repeated
after them by our Elizabethans, notably by Sir Philip Sidney.
As his little book is somewhat rare, and as it has such good claims to be
among the very earliest vernacular disputations of a general character on
poetry in Italy, if not also in Europe, it may be well to give some account of
it. My copy has no title-page, but dates itself by a colophon on the recto of
the errata-leaf at the end, with a veto-privilege, by concession of the Pope,
the seignory of Venice, and all the other princes and lords of Italy,
advertised by Giovan Antonio di Nicolini da Sabio, Venice, 1536. It fills
necessity of grappling with the more abstract and less merely technological
questions. Robortello,[62] like Maggi, though less elaborately, has a theory of
the ludicrous. Both, and others, necessarily grapple with that crux of the
katharsis which has not yet ceased to be crucial. Both, with Segni, discuss
the Unity of Time and differ about it; though none of the three has yet
discovered (as indeed it is not discoverable in Aristotle or Aristotle’s literary
documents) the yet more malignant Unity of Place. Vettori would extend the
cramp in time (not of course with the twenty-four hours’ limit) from tragedy
to epic. Most of them have arrived at that besotment as to “verisimilitude”
which is responsible for the worst parts of the Neo-Classic theory, and
which, in the pleasant irony common to all entanglements with Duessas of
the kind, makes the unfortunate lovers guilty of the wildest excesses of
artificial improbability. And in all, whether they project their reflections on
their text into more general forms or not, we can see the gradual
crystallising of a theory of poetry, heroic, or dramatic, or general.
Nor was such theory left without direct and independent exposition
Theorists: during the period which we are considering. The first
Daniello.
author of one is generally taken to be Daniello, whose
Poetica appeared in 1536; and I have not discovered any earlier claimant. I
do not quite understand how Mr Spingarn has arrived at the conclusion that
“in Daniello’s theory of tragedy there is no single Aristotelian element,”
especially as he himself elsewhere acknowledges the close—almost verbal
—adherence of this early writer to the Stagirite. But it is probably true that
Daniello was thinking more of the Platonic objections and of following out
the Boccaccian defence, than of merely treading in the footprints of
Aristotle. He is the first, since Boccaccio himself, to undertake that
generous, if rather wide and vague as well as superfluous, “defence of
poesy” which many Italians repeated after him, and which was repeated
after them by our Elizabethans, notably by Sir Philip Sidney.
As his little book is somewhat rare, and as it has such good claims to be
among the very earliest vernacular disputations of a general character on
poetry in Italy, if not also in Europe, it may be well to give some account of
it. My copy has no title-page, but dates itself by a colophon on the recto of
the errata-leaf at the end, with a veto-privilege, by concession of the Pope,
the seignory of Venice, and all the other princes and lords of Italy,
advertised by Giovan Antonio di Nicolini da Sabio, Venice, 1536. It fills
Page 64
136 small pages of italic type, and is in dialogue form, rather rhetorically
but not inelegantly written, and dedicated by Bernardo Daniello of Lucca to
Andrea Cornelio, Bishop-Elect of Brescia. Daniello does refer to Aristotle,
and borrows (not perhaps quite intelligently) from him; but his chief
sources are the Latins, and he sets or resets, with no small interest for us,
that note of apology for the Poets against Plato which was to dominate
Italian criticism, and after exercising some, but less, effect on French, to be
strenuously echoed in England. There are some rather striking things in
Daniello. He is sound enough on the mission of the poet as being to delight
(though he is to teach too) and also to persuade—the ancient union of
Poetics and limited Rhetoric evidently working in him. On the relations of
poetry and philosophy he might be echoing Maximus Tyrius and Boccaccio,
and very likely is thinking of the latter. But he strikes a certain cold into us
by remarking that Dante (whom he nevertheless admires very much) was
perhaps greater and more perfect as a philosopher than as a poet; and it does
not seem likely that he was aware of the far-reaching import of his own
words when he lays it down (p. 26) that Invention, Disposition, and
Elocution being the three important things, the poet is not, as some think,
limited to any special matter. If he had meant this, of course he would have
come to one of those arcana of criticism which are even yet revealed, as
matter of serene conviction, to very few critics. But he pretty certainly did
not fully understand his own assertion; and indeed slurs it off immediately
afterwards. After taking some examples from Dante and more from
Petrarch, Daniello adopts (again prophetically) the doctrine that the Poet
must practically know all arts and sciences, in order that he may properly
deal with his universal subject. He is specially to study what is called in
Latin Decorum and in Italian Convenevolezza. Tragedy and Comedy are to
be rigidly distinguished. And so this curious First Blast of the Trumpet of
sixteenth-century vernacular criticism is emphatic against the confusion
which was to bring about the mightiest glories of sixteenth-century
literature. A large part of the small treatise is taken up with examples, in the
old rhetorical manner of qualities, “colours,” figures, &c. The whole of the
latter part of the First Book consists of these, as does almost the whole of
the Second, with an extension into verbal criticism of the passages cited as
illustrating kinds, technical terms, and the like. Indeed the general
considerations are chiefly to be found in the first forty or fifty pages; and it
is really remarkable how much there is in this short space which practically
but not inelegantly written, and dedicated by Bernardo Daniello of Lucca to
Andrea Cornelio, Bishop-Elect of Brescia. Daniello does refer to Aristotle,
and borrows (not perhaps quite intelligently) from him; but his chief
sources are the Latins, and he sets or resets, with no small interest for us,
that note of apology for the Poets against Plato which was to dominate
Italian criticism, and after exercising some, but less, effect on French, to be
strenuously echoed in England. There are some rather striking things in
Daniello. He is sound enough on the mission of the poet as being to delight
(though he is to teach too) and also to persuade—the ancient union of
Poetics and limited Rhetoric evidently working in him. On the relations of
poetry and philosophy he might be echoing Maximus Tyrius and Boccaccio,
and very likely is thinking of the latter. But he strikes a certain cold into us
by remarking that Dante (whom he nevertheless admires very much) was
perhaps greater and more perfect as a philosopher than as a poet; and it does
not seem likely that he was aware of the far-reaching import of his own
words when he lays it down (p. 26) that Invention, Disposition, and
Elocution being the three important things, the poet is not, as some think,
limited to any special matter. If he had meant this, of course he would have
come to one of those arcana of criticism which are even yet revealed, as
matter of serene conviction, to very few critics. But he pretty certainly did
not fully understand his own assertion; and indeed slurs it off immediately
afterwards. After taking some examples from Dante and more from
Petrarch, Daniello adopts (again prophetically) the doctrine that the Poet
must practically know all arts and sciences, in order that he may properly
deal with his universal subject. He is specially to study what is called in
Latin Decorum and in Italian Convenevolezza. Tragedy and Comedy are to
be rigidly distinguished. And so this curious First Blast of the Trumpet of
sixteenth-century vernacular criticism is emphatic against the confusion
which was to bring about the mightiest glories of sixteenth-century
literature. A large part of the small treatise is taken up with examples, in the
old rhetorical manner of qualities, “colours,” figures, &c. The whole of the
latter part of the First Book consists of these, as does almost the whole of
the Second, with an extension into verbal criticism of the passages cited as
illustrating kinds, technical terms, and the like. Indeed the general
considerations are chiefly to be found in the first forty or fifty pages; and it
is really remarkable how much there is in this short space which practically
Page 65
anticipates in summary the ideas of most of the much more voluminous
writers who follow.[63]
Fracastoro, physician, logician, and not ungraceful poet of the graceless
subject of Syphilis, deals with both Plato and Aristotle in his dialogue
Naugerius, and discourses deeply on the doctrine of Imitation, the Theory
of Beauty, the Aristotelian conception of the poet as more universal and
philosophical than the historian, and the Platonic objection to the intervals
Fracastoro. between poetry and truth. This dialogue,[64] however (the
full title is Naugerius sive de Poetica, its chief interlocutor being Andrea
Navagero, the best follower of Catullus in Renaissance Latin[65]), tells a
certain tale by its coupling with another, Turrius sive de Intellectione. It is
wholly philosophical in intent and drift: it is perhaps the very “farthest”—
comparatively early (1555) as is its date—of those Italian excursions, in the
direction of making Criticism an almost wholly abstract and a priori
subject, which balance the unblushing “Convey—do nothing but convey,”
of Vida and his followers. One of its very earliest axioms (p. 324 ed. cit.
infra) is that “qui recte dicere de hac re velit, prius sciat necesse est,
quænam poetæ natura est, quidque ipsa poetica, tum et quis philosophi
genius,” &c. It must be admitted that Fracastoro is among the very ablest
and most thoroughgoing explorers of these altitudes. No one has more
clearly grasped, or put more forcibly, than he has that compromise between
Plato and Aristotle which has been and will be mentioned so often as
characteristic of the Italian thinkers in this kind. Indeed, the fifty pages of
his Dialogue are almost a locus classicus for the first drawing up of the
creed which converted Sidney, and to which Milton, indocile to creeds as he
was, gave scarcely grudging allegiance. It is full, too, of interest in
deliverances on minor points—the difference between the orator and the
rhetor (p. 343), the shaping of a particular kind of “orator” into a poet, his
universality and his usefulness, the limits of his permitted fiction and the
character of his charm. But Fracastoro is wholly in these generals: it is
much if he permits himself a rare illustration from an actual poet.
And always in these writers we find the old deviations, the old red
herrings drawn across the scent. Fracastoro himself, reasonable as he is in
many ways, falls into the foolish old fallacy that a good poet must be a
good man, and the less obviously ridiculous but still mischievous demand
from him of the all-accomplished acquirements once asked of the
rhetorician.
writers who follow.[63]
Fracastoro, physician, logician, and not ungraceful poet of the graceless
subject of Syphilis, deals with both Plato and Aristotle in his dialogue
Naugerius, and discourses deeply on the doctrine of Imitation, the Theory
of Beauty, the Aristotelian conception of the poet as more universal and
philosophical than the historian, and the Platonic objection to the intervals
Fracastoro. between poetry and truth. This dialogue,[64] however (the
full title is Naugerius sive de Poetica, its chief interlocutor being Andrea
Navagero, the best follower of Catullus in Renaissance Latin[65]), tells a
certain tale by its coupling with another, Turrius sive de Intellectione. It is
wholly philosophical in intent and drift: it is perhaps the very “farthest”—
comparatively early (1555) as is its date—of those Italian excursions, in the
direction of making Criticism an almost wholly abstract and a priori
subject, which balance the unblushing “Convey—do nothing but convey,”
of Vida and his followers. One of its very earliest axioms (p. 324 ed. cit.
infra) is that “qui recte dicere de hac re velit, prius sciat necesse est,
quænam poetæ natura est, quidque ipsa poetica, tum et quis philosophi
genius,” &c. It must be admitted that Fracastoro is among the very ablest
and most thoroughgoing explorers of these altitudes. No one has more
clearly grasped, or put more forcibly, than he has that compromise between
Plato and Aristotle which has been and will be mentioned so often as
characteristic of the Italian thinkers in this kind. Indeed, the fifty pages of
his Dialogue are almost a locus classicus for the first drawing up of the
creed which converted Sidney, and to which Milton, indocile to creeds as he
was, gave scarcely grudging allegiance. It is full, too, of interest in
deliverances on minor points—the difference between the orator and the
rhetor (p. 343), the shaping of a particular kind of “orator” into a poet, his
universality and his usefulness, the limits of his permitted fiction and the
character of his charm. But Fracastoro is wholly in these generals: it is
much if he permits himself a rare illustration from an actual poet.
And always in these writers we find the old deviations, the old red
herrings drawn across the scent. Fracastoro himself, reasonable as he is in
many ways, falls into the foolish old fallacy that a good poet must be a
good man, and the less obviously ridiculous but still mischievous demand
from him of the all-accomplished acquirements once asked of the
rhetorician.
Page 66
Putting aside, for the moment, such rather later and much more important
works as the Discorsi of Giraldi Cinthio, the De Poetis Nostrorum
Temporum of his half-namesake Lilius Giraldus, and the two capital
treatises of Minturno, one of which appeared after Trissino’s book, we may
give a few words to two Italian tractates, the Versi e Regole della Nuova
Poesia Toscanaof Claudio Tolomei (1539) and Muzio’s or Mutio’s Italian
verse Arte Poetica, which was published with some other work in 1551.[66]
Formalists: The last is noteworthy as an early example of the
Mutio. Tolomei
and classical
vernacular critical poem—a kind suggested by Horace, and
metres. illustrated later by Boileau and Pope, but certainly more
honoured by its practitioners than in itself. Yet it would not
be just to deny Mutio a high if rather vague conception of poetry, and, in
particular, a most salutary conviction that the poet must disrealise his
subjects. Tolomei’s book, on the other hand, challenges attention as
probably the beginning of that pestilent heresy of “classical metres” which,
arising in Italy, and tainting France but slightly (as was natural considering
the almost unquantified character of the modern French language), fastened
with virulence upon England, affected some of our best wits, and was
within measurable distance of doing serious harm. The plague was so much
at its worst with us that the chapter on Elizabethan Criticism will be the
proper place for its discussion. But though Ascham himself thought it no
plague at all, it was certainly one of the very worst of these “Italianations”
to which he objected so violently; and Tolomei was its first prophet in the
country of its origin.
Not a few names, some famous in European literature for other
performances of their bearers, some almost unknown except to the student
of this subject, fall into one or other of these classes, or, as very commonly
Others: happens, qualify in a undecided manner for two, or for all.
Tomitano,
Lionardi, B.
As early as 1545 Tomitano[67] had dwelt on the above-
Tasso, Capriano. mentioned fallacy of the necessary learning of poets:
Lionardi,[68] nine years later, in a pair of Dialogues
expressly devoted to Poetic Invention, extended this in the widest and
wildest manner, so that the poet becomes a perfect good-man-of-the-Stoics
—an all-round and impeccable Grandison-Aristotle. The same idea and
others were emitted by Bernardo Tasso, good father of a great son, who not
only practised poetry to the vast extent of the Amadigi, but discussed it in a
formal Ragionamento of the subject.[69] Later, Capriano[70] gave the more
works as the Discorsi of Giraldi Cinthio, the De Poetis Nostrorum
Temporum of his half-namesake Lilius Giraldus, and the two capital
treatises of Minturno, one of which appeared after Trissino’s book, we may
give a few words to two Italian tractates, the Versi e Regole della Nuova
Poesia Toscanaof Claudio Tolomei (1539) and Muzio’s or Mutio’s Italian
verse Arte Poetica, which was published with some other work in 1551.[66]
Formalists: The last is noteworthy as an early example of the
Mutio. Tolomei
and classical
vernacular critical poem—a kind suggested by Horace, and
metres. illustrated later by Boileau and Pope, but certainly more
honoured by its practitioners than in itself. Yet it would not
be just to deny Mutio a high if rather vague conception of poetry, and, in
particular, a most salutary conviction that the poet must disrealise his
subjects. Tolomei’s book, on the other hand, challenges attention as
probably the beginning of that pestilent heresy of “classical metres” which,
arising in Italy, and tainting France but slightly (as was natural considering
the almost unquantified character of the modern French language), fastened
with virulence upon England, affected some of our best wits, and was
within measurable distance of doing serious harm. The plague was so much
at its worst with us that the chapter on Elizabethan Criticism will be the
proper place for its discussion. But though Ascham himself thought it no
plague at all, it was certainly one of the very worst of these “Italianations”
to which he objected so violently; and Tolomei was its first prophet in the
country of its origin.
Not a few names, some famous in European literature for other
performances of their bearers, some almost unknown except to the student
of this subject, fall into one or other of these classes, or, as very commonly
Others: happens, qualify in a undecided manner for two, or for all.
Tomitano,
Lionardi, B.
As early as 1545 Tomitano[67] had dwelt on the above-
Tasso, Capriano. mentioned fallacy of the necessary learning of poets:
Lionardi,[68] nine years later, in a pair of Dialogues
expressly devoted to Poetic Invention, extended this in the widest and
wildest manner, so that the poet becomes a perfect good-man-of-the-Stoics
—an all-round and impeccable Grandison-Aristotle. The same idea and
others were emitted by Bernardo Tasso, good father of a great son, who not
only practised poetry to the vast extent of the Amadigi, but discussed it in a
formal Ragionamento of the subject.[69] Later, Capriano[70] gave the more
Page 67
elaborate exaltation of poetry as a sort of Art of Arts, combining and
subduing to its own purpose all forms of Imitation, and following up Vida’s
superfine objections to Homer as trivial and undignified, and his rapturous
exaltation of the “decency” of Virgil. This book, very short, is also rather
important—more so than might be judged from some accounts of it. It is
neither paged, nor numbered in folio, but does not extend beyond signature
F ii. of a small quarto, with a brief appendix of Italian verse. There are eight
chapters—the first discussing what things are imitable and what imitation
is; the second vindicating for poetry the portion of supreme imitative art;
the third dividing it into “natural” and “moral”; the fourth arguing that Epic
or Heroic (not, as Aristotle thinks, drama) is the highest kind of “moral”
poetry; the fifth containing, among other things, an interesting revolt
against Greek; the sixth discoursing on number and sound; the seventh
exalting the good poem above everything; and the eighth rapidly discussing
the origin, rank, necessity, parts, force, end, &c., of Poetry. Capriano does
not give himself much room, and fails, like most of these critics, in the all-
important connection of his theories with actual work; but he must have
been a man of no common independence and force of thought.[71]
More important than these to us, though less technically critical, and
therefore in some cases commending themselves less to students of the
subject from some points of view, are some poets and men of letters of the
earlier and middle parts of the century who have touched critical subjects. I
Il Lasca. should myself regard the Prologues[72] of Grazzini (“Il
Lasca”)—in which he repeatedly and unweariedly protests against the
practice of moulding Italian comedy upon Plautus and Terence, regardless
of the utter change in manners, and so forth—as worth shelves full of “in-
the-air” treatises. For this application of the speculum vitæ[73] notion, the
idea of The Muses’ Looking-glass, which was obtained from Cicero through
Donatus, was the salvation of the time, keeping Comedy at least free from
the fossilising influences of the false Imitation. Although the unwary might
reasonably take the author of the famous caution not to read St Paul for fear
of spoiling style (there are at least half-a-dozen of the greatest pieces of
style in the world to be found in the two Epistles to the Corinthians alone)
as either a silly practitioner of undergraduate paradox or a serious dolt, yet
the Della Volgar Lingua of Bembo[74] is by no possibility to be neglected in
Bembo. taking account of the critical attitude of Italy at the time. It
is of course too purist and “precious”; it “sticks in the letter” to a perilous
subduing to its own purpose all forms of Imitation, and following up Vida’s
superfine objections to Homer as trivial and undignified, and his rapturous
exaltation of the “decency” of Virgil. This book, very short, is also rather
important—more so than might be judged from some accounts of it. It is
neither paged, nor numbered in folio, but does not extend beyond signature
F ii. of a small quarto, with a brief appendix of Italian verse. There are eight
chapters—the first discussing what things are imitable and what imitation
is; the second vindicating for poetry the portion of supreme imitative art;
the third dividing it into “natural” and “moral”; the fourth arguing that Epic
or Heroic (not, as Aristotle thinks, drama) is the highest kind of “moral”
poetry; the fifth containing, among other things, an interesting revolt
against Greek; the sixth discoursing on number and sound; the seventh
exalting the good poem above everything; and the eighth rapidly discussing
the origin, rank, necessity, parts, force, end, &c., of Poetry. Capriano does
not give himself much room, and fails, like most of these critics, in the all-
important connection of his theories with actual work; but he must have
been a man of no common independence and force of thought.[71]
More important than these to us, though less technically critical, and
therefore in some cases commending themselves less to students of the
subject from some points of view, are some poets and men of letters of the
earlier and middle parts of the century who have touched critical subjects. I
Il Lasca. should myself regard the Prologues[72] of Grazzini (“Il
Lasca”)—in which he repeatedly and unweariedly protests against the
practice of moulding Italian comedy upon Plautus and Terence, regardless
of the utter change in manners, and so forth—as worth shelves full of “in-
the-air” treatises. For this application of the speculum vitæ[73] notion, the
idea of The Muses’ Looking-glass, which was obtained from Cicero through
Donatus, was the salvation of the time, keeping Comedy at least free from
the fossilising influences of the false Imitation. Although the unwary might
reasonably take the author of the famous caution not to read St Paul for fear
of spoiling style (there are at least half-a-dozen of the greatest pieces of
style in the world to be found in the two Epistles to the Corinthians alone)
as either a silly practitioner of undergraduate paradox or a serious dolt, yet
the Della Volgar Lingua of Bembo[74] is by no possibility to be neglected in
Bembo. taking account of the critical attitude of Italy at the time. It
is of course too purist and “precious”; it “sticks in the letter” to a perilous
Page 68
extent; but there is real appreciation in it of what the writer can appreciate,
and among the things that he can appreciate are good and great things.
Caro. Annibale Caro has (and deserves) a bad name, not merely
for the unfair manner in which he carried on his controversy with
Castelvetro (see next chapter), but for the tedious logomachy of the
controversy itself, which on his side, besides filling a regular Apologia and
Varchi. other pieces, overflows constantly into his letters.[75] But
this very controversy testifies to the zest and the undoubted sincerity with
which literary matters were dealt with by the Italians, and it served further
as a starting-point for the elaborate Ercolano[76] of Varchi, who in divers
lectures, &c., also dealt with the more abstract questions of the nature of
poetry, the status of the poet, and the like. In short, the documents on the
subject have already reached the condition referred to by the warning given
in the introductory chapter to the first volume of this book, that while in that
volume we had to search for and discuss every scrap bearing on the subject,
here large classes of document would have to be treated by summary and
representation only.
Moreover, great as are the volume and the intensity of Italian attention to
criticism in the years between 1535 and 1560, the Devil’s Advocate may,
without mere cavilling, cast disparagement upon most of its expressions.
The dealings of the scholars with the subject are no doubt to a certain extent
accidental or obligatory; they might have bestowed, and in fact actually did
bestow,[77] at least equal pains on texts not directly, or not at all, concerning
criticism. The work of Tolomei is merely an example of those Puckish
tricks which something sometimes plays on the human intellect; that of
Muzio a dilettante exercise mainly. The treatises of the others from Daniello
to Varchi hover between abstract discussion, which sometimes approaches
twaddle, dilettante trifling which makes the same approach on another side,
and an estimable, but for literature at large comparatively unimportant,
guerilla about the virtues and qualities, the vices and defects, of the Italian
language—a language which had already seen its very best days, and was
settling down to days very far from its best. The three authors to whom we
shall now come, and who will occupy us to the end of this chapter, escape,
in one way or another, the brunt of all these grudgements. Minturno
supplies us with the most wide-ranging and systematic handlings of poetry
in its general, and of “regular” and “vulgar” poetry in their particular,
aspects that had yet been produced, Giraldi Cinthio with some of the most
and among the things that he can appreciate are good and great things.
Caro. Annibale Caro has (and deserves) a bad name, not merely
for the unfair manner in which he carried on his controversy with
Castelvetro (see next chapter), but for the tedious logomachy of the
controversy itself, which on his side, besides filling a regular Apologia and
Varchi. other pieces, overflows constantly into his letters.[75] But
this very controversy testifies to the zest and the undoubted sincerity with
which literary matters were dealt with by the Italians, and it served further
as a starting-point for the elaborate Ercolano[76] of Varchi, who in divers
lectures, &c., also dealt with the more abstract questions of the nature of
poetry, the status of the poet, and the like. In short, the documents on the
subject have already reached the condition referred to by the warning given
in the introductory chapter to the first volume of this book, that while in that
volume we had to search for and discuss every scrap bearing on the subject,
here large classes of document would have to be treated by summary and
representation only.
Moreover, great as are the volume and the intensity of Italian attention to
criticism in the years between 1535 and 1560, the Devil’s Advocate may,
without mere cavilling, cast disparagement upon most of its expressions.
The dealings of the scholars with the subject are no doubt to a certain extent
accidental or obligatory; they might have bestowed, and in fact actually did
bestow,[77] at least equal pains on texts not directly, or not at all, concerning
criticism. The work of Tolomei is merely an example of those Puckish
tricks which something sometimes plays on the human intellect; that of
Muzio a dilettante exercise mainly. The treatises of the others from Daniello
to Varchi hover between abstract discussion, which sometimes approaches
twaddle, dilettante trifling which makes the same approach on another side,
and an estimable, but for literature at large comparatively unimportant,
guerilla about the virtues and qualities, the vices and defects, of the Italian
language—a language which had already seen its very best days, and was
settling down to days very far from its best. The three authors to whom we
shall now come, and who will occupy us to the end of this chapter, escape,
in one way or another, the brunt of all these grudgements. Minturno
supplies us with the most wide-ranging and systematic handlings of poetry
in its general, and of “regular” and “vulgar” poetry in their particular,
aspects that had yet been produced, Giraldi Cinthio with some of the most
Page 69
original critical essays, Lilius Giraldus with a survey of the poetical, and to
some extent the literary, state of Europe in his time, for the like of which we
may look in vain before and not too successfully since.
Antonio Sebastiano, called Minturno (which is stated—I know not with
what correctness—in a MS. note in my copy of the Arte Poetica to be
merely an “academic” surname), is a good example of that combination of
scholastic thoroughness and diligence with wider range of study which
honourably distinguishes the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but
which, save in rare instances, went out in the later years of the last-named
Minturno. age, and has too seldom been recovered since. In 1559 he
produced a De Poeta and in 1563 an Arte Poetica, one of which, as the
respective titles imply, is written in Latin and the other in Italian, but which
are by no means replicas of each other with the language changed. Both
were printed at Venice; and though they came from different presses, they
range very well together, both being in a smallish quarto, but with very
close type, so that the 560 odd pages of the De Poeta and the 450 odd of the
Arte contain between them a vast amount of matter. The plans of the two
treatises—which are allotted naturally according to their language, the Latin
to poetry in general and to classical verse, the Italian to its own kind—are
not strikingly but slightly different. The De Poeta, which is addressed to
Ettore Pignatelli, Duke of Bivona, takes the time-honoured form of a
symposium or dialogue, the persons being the poet Sannazar (who is always
introduced by his Latin names of Actius Syncerus) and his friends, and the
scene the famous Villa Mergellina. Indeed, Minturno seems to have written
the book at Naples, whence he dates it a year before that of its appearance.
In the later work he himself is the principal speaker, his antagonists or
interlocutors being Vespasiano Gonzaga in the First book, Angelo Costanzo
in the Second, Bernardino Rota in the Third, and Ferrante Carafa in the
Fourth. The dialogue-form, it may also be mentioned, is less, and that of the
formal treatise more, prominent in the Arte.
Both volumes have the invaluable accompaniment of side-notes—an
accompaniment which not only makes the writer’s point more easily
intelligible to the reader, but prevents the writer himself from straying. But
The De Poeta. the De Poeta is not furnished with either Contents or Index,
while the Arte is liberally provided with both. This, in the first case, is to be
regretted, not merely because the book is much the longer of the two, but
because the indulgences of the dialogic form are more fully taken in it.
some extent the literary, state of Europe in his time, for the like of which we
may look in vain before and not too successfully since.
Antonio Sebastiano, called Minturno (which is stated—I know not with
what correctness—in a MS. note in my copy of the Arte Poetica to be
merely an “academic” surname), is a good example of that combination of
scholastic thoroughness and diligence with wider range of study which
honourably distinguishes the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but
which, save in rare instances, went out in the later years of the last-named
Minturno. age, and has too seldom been recovered since. In 1559 he
produced a De Poeta and in 1563 an Arte Poetica, one of which, as the
respective titles imply, is written in Latin and the other in Italian, but which
are by no means replicas of each other with the language changed. Both
were printed at Venice; and though they came from different presses, they
range very well together, both being in a smallish quarto, but with very
close type, so that the 560 odd pages of the De Poeta and the 450 odd of the
Arte contain between them a vast amount of matter. The plans of the two
treatises—which are allotted naturally according to their language, the Latin
to poetry in general and to classical verse, the Italian to its own kind—are
not strikingly but slightly different. The De Poeta, which is addressed to
Ettore Pignatelli, Duke of Bivona, takes the time-honoured form of a
symposium or dialogue, the persons being the poet Sannazar (who is always
introduced by his Latin names of Actius Syncerus) and his friends, and the
scene the famous Villa Mergellina. Indeed, Minturno seems to have written
the book at Naples, whence he dates it a year before that of its appearance.
In the later work he himself is the principal speaker, his antagonists or
interlocutors being Vespasiano Gonzaga in the First book, Angelo Costanzo
in the Second, Bernardino Rota in the Third, and Ferrante Carafa in the
Fourth. The dialogue-form, it may also be mentioned, is less, and that of the
formal treatise more, prominent in the Arte.
Both volumes have the invaluable accompaniment of side-notes—an
accompaniment which not only makes the writer’s point more easily
intelligible to the reader, but prevents the writer himself from straying. But
The De Poeta. the De Poeta is not furnished with either Contents or Index,
while the Arte is liberally provided with both. This, in the first case, is to be
regretted, not merely because the book is much the longer of the two, but
because the indulgences of the dialogic form are more fully taken in it.
Page 70
After a suitable beginning (with a fons and a platanus and other properties),
the subject is opened with a panegyric of poetry. The origins of literature
were in verse; all nations practised it. A more sensible line is taken (it will
be understood that the interlocutors of course take different views, and one
judges by the general drift) on the subject of the all-accomplishment of the
poets, than is the case with some of the writers above mentioned; but
Minturno points out (which is no doubt true enough) that poetry in a
manner “holds all the Arts in fee,” can draw upon and dignify all. On the
connection of verse with poetry he holds a middle position, close to that of
Aristotle himself, and not very different from that long after taken up by
Coleridge in the Biographia Literaria. He will not pronounce verse
essential to poetry, but evidently thinks that poetry would be extremely
foolish to dispense with its practically inseparable companion. The
consecrated procession of poets from Amphion and Orpheus to Homer and
even Virgil is set a-going as usual. Then the discussion, after a little
skirmishing, settles down at p. 22 to the question of Imitation; and, amid
much scholastic subdivision of its kinds and manners, the delight produced
by this is very strongly insisted on. Next, the Platonic onslaught is
discussed, and urged or repelled by turns; the defence being clearly the
author’s side, and maintained with considerable vigour, and with plentiful
examples from Homer and Virgil both. The line taken, however, leads
Minturno to lay stress on the instructive power of poetry. The poet’s
purpose will, he holds, govern his imitation, and direct it so as to excite
admiration in the reader or hearer. This is possibly the source of the next-
century endeavour to elevate Admiration to the level of Pity and Terror
themselves.[78] Hence Minturno is constrained to share the idea of the
necessarily virtuous character of the poet: and, except that he never
separates the delectare from the prodesse altogether, he hugs the dangerous
shore of the hérésie de l’enseignement too closely in his endeavour to
escape the Platonic privateers. By degrees the discussion glides into the
comparison of Epic and Tragedy, and the question whether Poetry is a
matter of Art or of Inspiration—and decides that it is both. And the First
Book ends with the pronouncement that a good poet must be a good man,
but that he may sometimes deal with not-good things.
The Second begins with one of the demonstrations (which to us seem
otiose, but which were very important, not merely to the ideas of the age,
but as bulwarks against the Puritan and Utilitarian objections of all times)
the subject is opened with a panegyric of poetry. The origins of literature
were in verse; all nations practised it. A more sensible line is taken (it will
be understood that the interlocutors of course take different views, and one
judges by the general drift) on the subject of the all-accomplishment of the
poets, than is the case with some of the writers above mentioned; but
Minturno points out (which is no doubt true enough) that poetry in a
manner “holds all the Arts in fee,” can draw upon and dignify all. On the
connection of verse with poetry he holds a middle position, close to that of
Aristotle himself, and not very different from that long after taken up by
Coleridge in the Biographia Literaria. He will not pronounce verse
essential to poetry, but evidently thinks that poetry would be extremely
foolish to dispense with its practically inseparable companion. The
consecrated procession of poets from Amphion and Orpheus to Homer and
even Virgil is set a-going as usual. Then the discussion, after a little
skirmishing, settles down at p. 22 to the question of Imitation; and, amid
much scholastic subdivision of its kinds and manners, the delight produced
by this is very strongly insisted on. Next, the Platonic onslaught is
discussed, and urged or repelled by turns; the defence being clearly the
author’s side, and maintained with considerable vigour, and with plentiful
examples from Homer and Virgil both. The line taken, however, leads
Minturno to lay stress on the instructive power of poetry. The poet’s
purpose will, he holds, govern his imitation, and direct it so as to excite
admiration in the reader or hearer. This is possibly the source of the next-
century endeavour to elevate Admiration to the level of Pity and Terror
themselves.[78] Hence Minturno is constrained to share the idea of the
necessarily virtuous character of the poet: and, except that he never
separates the delectare from the prodesse altogether, he hugs the dangerous
shore of the hérésie de l’enseignement too closely in his endeavour to
escape the Platonic privateers. By degrees the discussion glides into the
comparison of Epic and Tragedy, and the question whether Poetry is a
matter of Art or of Inspiration—and decides that it is both. And the First
Book ends with the pronouncement that a good poet must be a good man,
but that he may sometimes deal with not-good things.
The Second begins with one of the demonstrations (which to us seem
otiose, but which were very important, not merely to the ideas of the age,
but as bulwarks against the Puritan and Utilitarian objections of all times)
Page 71
that the poets, especially Homer and Virgil, are masters, whether necessarily
or not, of all the liberal arts and of philosophy as well. When we remember
the Philistine anti-poetics of Locke much more than a century after
Minturno’s time—nay, the still existing, if lurking, idea that “great poet”
must be (as somebody asserts that it is or was in Irish slang) synonym for
“utter fool”[79]—we shall not bear too hardly on our author. But this
discussion, in its turn, is bid to “come up higher.” What is to be the
Institutio Poetæ? What is he to do and learn that he may in turn (p. 102)
“delight, teach, transport.”[80]
In all cases the admiration of the reader or hearer (p. 104) must follow.
But it will be obtained not quite in the same way as by the orator, and with a
difference in the different kinds of poetry. The parts of a poem, too, are
dealt with in a more or less Aristotelian manner, but with large additions
and substitutions, in view of the greater range of literature that Minturno
has before him, and of the desire specially to bring in Virgil, of whom our
critic, though not quite such a fanatical partisan as Vida and Scaliger, is a
hearty admirer (see for instance p. 135). All the “parts” have more or less
attention in this book, both with reference to the different “kinds,”
especially epic and “heroic,” and also with regard to those general
principles of poetry which Minturno never forgets. The Third Book of
nearly 100 pages is directly devoted to tragedy; and Minturno pursues in
reference to this the same plan of following, but with a certain
independence and a great deal of expatiation, in Aristotelian footsteps. He
still lays great stress on Admiration; and it is really curious that in thus
forestalling, no doubt, Corneille’s teaching, he has by anticipation hit at
Racine and the doucereux in a phrase[81] which has been fairly guessed to
have supplied Milton with a famous one[82] of his own. He does not pay so
much attention to the crux of the katharsis (on which most of these critics
necessarily dwell more or less) in this treatise as in the Arte (v. infra).
The Fourth Book, even longer than the Third, is, like it, entirely devoted
to one subject; and the change of modern as compared with ancient view is
shown strongly by the fact that this subject is Comedy. The admirers of
Plautus and Terence, the countrymen of Ariosto and Machiavelli, could not,
indeed, be expected to turn from Comedy with the disdainful shoulder of
Aristotle; but such elaborate treatment as this shows the hold which the
subject had obtained. Yet it is ominous that Minturno devotes especial
attention to the subject of types; though, in accordance with his usual
or not, of all the liberal arts and of philosophy as well. When we remember
the Philistine anti-poetics of Locke much more than a century after
Minturno’s time—nay, the still existing, if lurking, idea that “great poet”
must be (as somebody asserts that it is or was in Irish slang) synonym for
“utter fool”[79]—we shall not bear too hardly on our author. But this
discussion, in its turn, is bid to “come up higher.” What is to be the
Institutio Poetæ? What is he to do and learn that he may in turn (p. 102)
“delight, teach, transport.”[80]
In all cases the admiration of the reader or hearer (p. 104) must follow.
But it will be obtained not quite in the same way as by the orator, and with a
difference in the different kinds of poetry. The parts of a poem, too, are
dealt with in a more or less Aristotelian manner, but with large additions
and substitutions, in view of the greater range of literature that Minturno
has before him, and of the desire specially to bring in Virgil, of whom our
critic, though not quite such a fanatical partisan as Vida and Scaliger, is a
hearty admirer (see for instance p. 135). All the “parts” have more or less
attention in this book, both with reference to the different “kinds,”
especially epic and “heroic,” and also with regard to those general
principles of poetry which Minturno never forgets. The Third Book of
nearly 100 pages is directly devoted to tragedy; and Minturno pursues in
reference to this the same plan of following, but with a certain
independence and a great deal of expatiation, in Aristotelian footsteps. He
still lays great stress on Admiration; and it is really curious that in thus
forestalling, no doubt, Corneille’s teaching, he has by anticipation hit at
Racine and the doucereux in a phrase[81] which has been fairly guessed to
have supplied Milton with a famous one[82] of his own. He does not pay so
much attention to the crux of the katharsis (on which most of these critics
necessarily dwell more or less) in this treatise as in the Arte (v. infra).
The Fourth Book, even longer than the Third, is, like it, entirely devoted
to one subject; and the change of modern as compared with ancient view is
shown strongly by the fact that this subject is Comedy. The admirers of
Plautus and Terence, the countrymen of Ariosto and Machiavelli, could not,
indeed, be expected to turn from Comedy with the disdainful shoulder of
Aristotle; but such elaborate treatment as this shows the hold which the
subject had obtained. Yet it is ominous that Minturno devotes especial
attention to the subject of types; though, in accordance with his usual
Page 72
practice, he gives much space to a general treatment of the Ludicrous and
its sources. There is also a good deal of curious detail in this Book as to
costume and theatrical arrangements generally. The Fifth turns to Lyric, and
sets forth its different kinds, including Satire among them. And the Sixth
deals with Diction and Prosody, the section allotted to the latter being
comparatively short and interspersed between two on Style, proceeding of
course a good deal by Figures, though not in the most cut-and-dried
manner, and illustrated (as indeed are all the later Books) by abundant and
unceasing quotation. It may be observed that, as perhaps might be expected,
the dialogue-character disappears in them more and more, and the book
takes the form of a simple exposition by one or other of the personages.
This change prepares us for the arrangement of the Arte.
This book, as dates given and to be given show, was published
subsequently to the appearance of Scaliger’s Poetic, and may have been to
some extent influenced by it; but I do not think that Minturno, who
mentions Trissino and Bembo and Tolomei, ever refers to it, and he does
The Arte not give one the idea of a man who would conceal debts. In
Poetica.
fact, his work upon the same subject had been completed
earlier. In this he has necessarily to go over some of the same ground; but,
as noted above, he repeats very little. He starts with a general definition of
poetry as an imitation of various manners and persons in various modes,
either with words or with harmonies or with “times” separately, or with all
these things together, or with part of them. Other ternaries follow, as matter,
instrument, and mode; manners, affections, and deeds; suprahuman, human,
and infrahuman; personages; words, music, and “times”; epic, scenic, and
melic; prose, verse, and mixed narrative. These distinctions are put forth in
an orderly manner, but succinctly and without the discussion which is a
feature of the general parts of the De Poeta, Minturno evidently thinking
that he has sufficiently cleared the ground in that work. After some further
exposition of forms, &c., the handling is more specially directed to Epic
(i.e., narrative generally), and its parts and conditions are expounded, still
with a certain swiftness, but at greater length than before. And once more
the treatment concentrates itself—this time upon Romance. The origin of
the name and thing is lightly touched, and then the great question is
broached,[83] “Is Romance poetry?” Minturno will not refuse it the name;
but he cannot admit that it is the same kind of poetry as that of which
Aristotle and Horace have spoken. The contrarieties of Romance and
its sources. There is also a good deal of curious detail in this Book as to
costume and theatrical arrangements generally. The Fifth turns to Lyric, and
sets forth its different kinds, including Satire among them. And the Sixth
deals with Diction and Prosody, the section allotted to the latter being
comparatively short and interspersed between two on Style, proceeding of
course a good deal by Figures, though not in the most cut-and-dried
manner, and illustrated (as indeed are all the later Books) by abundant and
unceasing quotation. It may be observed that, as perhaps might be expected,
the dialogue-character disappears in them more and more, and the book
takes the form of a simple exposition by one or other of the personages.
This change prepares us for the arrangement of the Arte.
This book, as dates given and to be given show, was published
subsequently to the appearance of Scaliger’s Poetic, and may have been to
some extent influenced by it; but I do not think that Minturno, who
mentions Trissino and Bembo and Tolomei, ever refers to it, and he does
The Arte not give one the idea of a man who would conceal debts. In
Poetica.
fact, his work upon the same subject had been completed
earlier. In this he has necessarily to go over some of the same ground; but,
as noted above, he repeats very little. He starts with a general definition of
poetry as an imitation of various manners and persons in various modes,
either with words or with harmonies or with “times” separately, or with all
these things together, or with part of them. Other ternaries follow, as matter,
instrument, and mode; manners, affections, and deeds; suprahuman, human,
and infrahuman; personages; words, music, and “times”; epic, scenic, and
melic; prose, verse, and mixed narrative. These distinctions are put forth in
an orderly manner, but succinctly and without the discussion which is a
feature of the general parts of the De Poeta, Minturno evidently thinking
that he has sufficiently cleared the ground in that work. After some further
exposition of forms, &c., the handling is more specially directed to Epic
(i.e., narrative generally), and its parts and conditions are expounded, still
with a certain swiftness, but at greater length than before. And once more
the treatment concentrates itself—this time upon Romance. The origin of
the name and thing is lightly touched, and then the great question is
broached,[83] “Is Romance poetry?” Minturno will not refuse it the name;
but he cannot admit that it is the same kind of poetry as that of which
Aristotle and Horace have spoken. The contrarieties of Romance and
Page 73
Heroic poetry are then carefully examined; and while much praise is given
to Ariosto, some fault is found with him, and the mantle of the Odyssey is
especially refused him. In fact, Minturno holds generally that the Romance
is a defective form of poetry, ennobled by the excellence of some of its
writers—a sort of middle position which is very noteworthy. But he hardens
his heart against the irresistible historical and inductive argument which the
defenders of the Romance had already discovered, and will have it that the
laws of poetry are antecedent to poetic production (p. 32). And for his main
style of narrative poetry he returns to Epic or “Heroic” proper, and
discusses it on the old lines of Plot, Character, Manners, Passions or
Affections, &c., always with modern examples from the great Italian poets.
He also makes the very important, but very disastrous, suggestion that the
Christian religion provides all the necessary “machinery” of Heroic,—a
suggestion which was elaborately followed out by Tasso and by Milton and
by many a lesser man, and which Dryden had thought of following, though
he luckily did not.[84]
The Second Book takes up Drama in the same manner, but—as was
always made legitimate by the parasitic character of at least Italian Tragedy
—with much more reference to ancient and less to modern writers. The
Third Book deals with Lyric, the same inclusion of Satire which we have
noticed in the De Poeta being made; and the Fourth with Poetic Diction,
Prosody, &c., still on the lines of the earlier treatise, but with entire
adaptation to the Italian subject. The latter books, as is natural, are much
more meticulous in their arrangement, descending, with complete propriety,
to the minutest details of rhyme and metre, as well as, where necessary, of
grammar. But Minturno never loses an opportunity of ascending to the
higher and more general considerations—the nature of harmony, the origin
and quality of rhyme, &c., the characters of kinds, and even, to some extent,
of authors. It is characteristic of him to give an elaborate discussion of the
Italian alphabet letter by letter from the poetical point of view, and to strike
off from this to a consideration of the relations of Italian, Latin, and foreign
modern languages, the general methods of elevating style, and the question
whether there ought to be completely separate diction for poetry and prose.
It is the presence of this contrast, or combination, in him which, as much
as anything else, has determined more attention in this place to Minturno
Their value. than to some other authors before noticed. In combination
of thoroughness and range he seems to me to hold a position both high and
to Ariosto, some fault is found with him, and the mantle of the Odyssey is
especially refused him. In fact, Minturno holds generally that the Romance
is a defective form of poetry, ennobled by the excellence of some of its
writers—a sort of middle position which is very noteworthy. But he hardens
his heart against the irresistible historical and inductive argument which the
defenders of the Romance had already discovered, and will have it that the
laws of poetry are antecedent to poetic production (p. 32). And for his main
style of narrative poetry he returns to Epic or “Heroic” proper, and
discusses it on the old lines of Plot, Character, Manners, Passions or
Affections, &c., always with modern examples from the great Italian poets.
He also makes the very important, but very disastrous, suggestion that the
Christian religion provides all the necessary “machinery” of Heroic,—a
suggestion which was elaborately followed out by Tasso and by Milton and
by many a lesser man, and which Dryden had thought of following, though
he luckily did not.[84]
The Second Book takes up Drama in the same manner, but—as was
always made legitimate by the parasitic character of at least Italian Tragedy
—with much more reference to ancient and less to modern writers. The
Third Book deals with Lyric, the same inclusion of Satire which we have
noticed in the De Poeta being made; and the Fourth with Poetic Diction,
Prosody, &c., still on the lines of the earlier treatise, but with entire
adaptation to the Italian subject. The latter books, as is natural, are much
more meticulous in their arrangement, descending, with complete propriety,
to the minutest details of rhyme and metre, as well as, where necessary, of
grammar. But Minturno never loses an opportunity of ascending to the
higher and more general considerations—the nature of harmony, the origin
and quality of rhyme, &c., the characters of kinds, and even, to some extent,
of authors. It is characteristic of him to give an elaborate discussion of the
Italian alphabet letter by letter from the poetical point of view, and to strike
off from this to a consideration of the relations of Italian, Latin, and foreign
modern languages, the general methods of elevating style, and the question
whether there ought to be completely separate diction for poetry and prose.
It is the presence of this contrast, or combination, in him which, as much
as anything else, has determined more attention in this place to Minturno
Their value. than to some other authors before noticed. In combination
of thoroughness and range he seems to me to hold a position both high and
Page 74
rather solitary. He has not quite the elaborate system of Scaliger, but then he
is much less one-eyed; he is less original—has less diable au corps—than
Castelvetro, but he is far less eccentric and incalculable. His unfeigned
belief in the noble and general theories of poetry and the poet is set off by
his sedulous attention to particulars, as his attention to particulars is by his
escapes of relief into the region of generalisation, and by his all-important
addition of “transport” to “teach” and “delight.” He has not reached—he
has in fact declined—the historical antinomianism of Patrizzi (v. next
chap.); but that was inevitable, since this view was in part a reaction from
the movement which he represented, in part a development of theories
contemporary with himself. And his attitude in regard to the Romanzi is a
significant sign of the turn of the tide. Earlier, and in the neo-classics quand
même later, the fact that a thing differs in kind from the accepted forms of
poetry is proof that it is not poetry at all. Minturno cannot go this length. It
is poetry inferior in kind, he still insists; but the excellence of those who
have adopted it saves it, no matter to what extent. The concession is fatal. If
Balbus builds a wall contrary to the laws of nature and architecture, it will
not be an inferior wall; it will tumble down, and not be a wall at all. If he
works a sum on the principle that two and two make five, his answer will be
hopelessly wrong. But if the wall stands, if the sum comes right, the laws,
the principles, cannot be wrong, though they may be different from others.
The infallible and exclusive Kind-rules of the ancients are doomed to be
swept away through the little gap in the dam that Minturno has opened.
The Discorsi[85] of Giraldi Cinthio—famous author of Novelle, and now
much less famous, but perhaps not much less remarkable, producer of the
chief Italian horror-tragedy, the Orbecche—supply a very interesting
supplement-contrast to Minturno, whose earlier work they preceded by but
a few years, and whom they provided with a theory of Romance to protest
Giraldi Cinthio’s against. The exact date of the most interesting of them, and
Discorsi.
the question of property or plagiarism in their contents,
have been the subject of one of those tedious “quarrels of authors” which
are thickening upon us, but which we shall avoid as far as possible. Cinthio
On Romance. and a certain pupil of his, Giovanbattista Pigna, published
in the same year (1554) books on the “Romances”—i.e., poems like
Ariosto’s. Authorities decide in favour of the novelist, who asserts that his
book was written in 1549, while each asserted that he had furnished the
other with ideas; but it really does not matter. The point is, that on one of
is much less one-eyed; he is less original—has less diable au corps—than
Castelvetro, but he is far less eccentric and incalculable. His unfeigned
belief in the noble and general theories of poetry and the poet is set off by
his sedulous attention to particulars, as his attention to particulars is by his
escapes of relief into the region of generalisation, and by his all-important
addition of “transport” to “teach” and “delight.” He has not reached—he
has in fact declined—the historical antinomianism of Patrizzi (v. next
chap.); but that was inevitable, since this view was in part a reaction from
the movement which he represented, in part a development of theories
contemporary with himself. And his attitude in regard to the Romanzi is a
significant sign of the turn of the tide. Earlier, and in the neo-classics quand
même later, the fact that a thing differs in kind from the accepted forms of
poetry is proof that it is not poetry at all. Minturno cannot go this length. It
is poetry inferior in kind, he still insists; but the excellence of those who
have adopted it saves it, no matter to what extent. The concession is fatal. If
Balbus builds a wall contrary to the laws of nature and architecture, it will
not be an inferior wall; it will tumble down, and not be a wall at all. If he
works a sum on the principle that two and two make five, his answer will be
hopelessly wrong. But if the wall stands, if the sum comes right, the laws,
the principles, cannot be wrong, though they may be different from others.
The infallible and exclusive Kind-rules of the ancients are doomed to be
swept away through the little gap in the dam that Minturno has opened.
The Discorsi[85] of Giraldi Cinthio—famous author of Novelle, and now
much less famous, but perhaps not much less remarkable, producer of the
chief Italian horror-tragedy, the Orbecche—supply a very interesting
supplement-contrast to Minturno, whose earlier work they preceded by but
a few years, and whom they provided with a theory of Romance to protest
Giraldi Cinthio’s against. The exact date of the most interesting of them, and
Discorsi.
the question of property or plagiarism in their contents,
have been the subject of one of those tedious “quarrels of authors” which
are thickening upon us, but which we shall avoid as far as possible. Cinthio
On Romance. and a certain pupil of his, Giovanbattista Pigna, published
in the same year (1554) books on the “Romances”—i.e., poems like
Ariosto’s. Authorities decide in favour of the novelist, who asserts that his
book was written in 1549, while each asserted that he had furnished the
other with ideas; but it really does not matter. The point is, that on one of
Page 75
the two, and very probably on both, there had dawned the critical truth,
which nobody had seen earlier, and on which Minturno himself would have
pulled down “the blanket of the dark” once more if he could. Cinthio, it
seems, first struck out the true line, and Pigna later developed it in still
greater detail. Aristotle did not know Romance, and therefore his rules do
not and cannot apply to it; while Italian literature generally is so different in
circumstances from Greek that it must follow its own laws. Then Cinthio
takes Ariosto and Boiardo, as Aristotle himself had taken the poets that
were before him, and formulates laws from them. He does not ostracise the
single-action and single-hero poem, the Aristotelian epic. But he adds the
many-actioned and many-heroed poem like Ariosto’s, and the chronicle-
poem of successive actions by one party, of which there are examples from
Statius downward (and of which, we may add, the Odyssey itself is really an
example). For these two latter, which he rightly regards as both Romantic,
he and Pigna (who is more specially Ariostian) gave rules accordingly, and
Cinthio even illustrated his by a poem on Hercules. Both, but especially
Pigna, despite their revolutionary tendencies in certain ways, cling to the
ethical point of view, and maintain, perhaps a little hardily, that the modern
romantic writers actually surpass the ancients in this respect.
In their main contention Cinthio and Pigna were no doubt right, and
On Drama. much in advance of their time. The reply of Minturno that
Poetry may adapt itself to the times, but cannot depart from its own
fundamental laws, is clearly a petitio principii. In his less important
Discorso on the Drama Cinthio is hardly at all rebel to Aristotle—indeed it
is very important to observe that even in the Romance Essay he has none of
the partisan and somewhat illiberal anti-Peripateticism which we find later
in Bruno and others. There he goes on the solid ground that Aristotle did not
know the Kind for which he does not account—that he was no more
blamable than, as we may say, supposing that he had given a definition of
mammalia which excluded the kangaroo. In the Drama Cinthio had not
been brought face to face with any similarly new facts. Italian tragedy, his
own included, was scrupulously Senecan, if not quite scrupulously
Aristotelian, in general lines. Italian comedy followed Plautus and Terence
only too closely; and though Cinthio’s lines of criticism (strengthened by
the Ciceronian-Donatist theory of the speculum vitæ) led him, like Il Lasca
and others, to insist on the different circumstances of Italian literature here
also, they necessitated no new lawmaking as in the case of the Romanzi.
which nobody had seen earlier, and on which Minturno himself would have
pulled down “the blanket of the dark” once more if he could. Cinthio, it
seems, first struck out the true line, and Pigna later developed it in still
greater detail. Aristotle did not know Romance, and therefore his rules do
not and cannot apply to it; while Italian literature generally is so different in
circumstances from Greek that it must follow its own laws. Then Cinthio
takes Ariosto and Boiardo, as Aristotle himself had taken the poets that
were before him, and formulates laws from them. He does not ostracise the
single-action and single-hero poem, the Aristotelian epic. But he adds the
many-actioned and many-heroed poem like Ariosto’s, and the chronicle-
poem of successive actions by one party, of which there are examples from
Statius downward (and of which, we may add, the Odyssey itself is really an
example). For these two latter, which he rightly regards as both Romantic,
he and Pigna (who is more specially Ariostian) gave rules accordingly, and
Cinthio even illustrated his by a poem on Hercules. Both, but especially
Pigna, despite their revolutionary tendencies in certain ways, cling to the
ethical point of view, and maintain, perhaps a little hardily, that the modern
romantic writers actually surpass the ancients in this respect.
In their main contention Cinthio and Pigna were no doubt right, and
On Drama. much in advance of their time. The reply of Minturno that
Poetry may adapt itself to the times, but cannot depart from its own
fundamental laws, is clearly a petitio principii. In his less important
Discorso on the Drama Cinthio is hardly at all rebel to Aristotle—indeed it
is very important to observe that even in the Romance Essay he has none of
the partisan and somewhat illiberal anti-Peripateticism which we find later
in Bruno and others. There he goes on the solid ground that Aristotle did not
know the Kind for which he does not account—that he was no more
blamable than, as we may say, supposing that he had given a definition of
mammalia which excluded the kangaroo. In the Drama Cinthio had not
been brought face to face with any similarly new facts. Italian tragedy, his
own included, was scrupulously Senecan, if not quite scrupulously
Aristotelian, in general lines. Italian comedy followed Plautus and Terence
only too closely; and though Cinthio’s lines of criticism (strengthened by
the Ciceronian-Donatist theory of the speculum vitæ) led him, like Il Lasca
and others, to insist on the different circumstances of Italian literature here
also, they necessitated no new lawmaking as in the case of the Romanzi.
Page 76
Both Discorsi are full of ingenious aperçus, sometimes followed out—
Some points in sometimes not. For instance, when Cinthio (i. 24) cites his
both.
three examples of writers who have treated their heroes
from childhood upwards contrary to the Aristotelian principles, he instances
Xenophon in the Cyropædia as well as Statius and Silius Italicus. The
instance does not in his expressed remarks, but it might very well in his
own or others’ thoughts, lead to the consideration that whether verse is or is
not essential to poetry, it is certainly not essential to Romance—with all the
momentous and far-reaching consequences of that discovery. Again he
seems (i. 82) to have appreciated, with a taste and sense rare in his age, the
impropriety of mixing up Christian and Pagan mythology. And the same
taste and sense appear, as a rule, in the minuter remarks (p. 100 sq.) on
verse and phrase, and even on those minutest points not merely of verbal
but of literal criticism which the Italians, more sensible than some modern
critics, never despised, though they may sometimes have gone to the other
extreme. In fact, the last half, and rather more, of the Discorso is not so
much concerned with the Romances as with poetic diction and arrangement
in general, or even with these matters as concerns literature both in prose
and in verse.
The dramatic Discorso, or rather Discorsi (for we may throw in a third
piece on Satiric Composition), is much shorter than that on the Romances,
being necessarily less controversial, and therefore, as has been said, less
original. But Cinthio’s independence of mind does not desert him even here.
He is said to have been the first Italian who dared, in the Orbecche before
mentioned, to disregard the Senecan practice[86] (so tedious in all modern
imitations of it, and so crushingly exhibited in our own earliest tragic
attempts) of beginning with an entire scene, or even act, of monologue. But,
as often happens, his licences in some directions invite condonation by a
tighter drawing of the reins elsewhere. He is credited (or debited) with the
first reference in modern literature to the Unity of Time: and though it is
well always to accept these assertions of priority with a certain suspension
of judgment, it may be so. It is at any rate certain that he does out-Aristotle
Aristotle in regard to this Unity, upon which, as is well known, the Stagirite
lays very little stress. But he makes some amends by relaxing the
proscription of the happy ending, so long as the proper purging effects of
pity and terror are achieved. He also to some extent relaxes the extremest
stringency of the old rule about trucidations coram populo. There may be
Some points in sometimes not. For instance, when Cinthio (i. 24) cites his
both.
three examples of writers who have treated their heroes
from childhood upwards contrary to the Aristotelian principles, he instances
Xenophon in the Cyropædia as well as Statius and Silius Italicus. The
instance does not in his expressed remarks, but it might very well in his
own or others’ thoughts, lead to the consideration that whether verse is or is
not essential to poetry, it is certainly not essential to Romance—with all the
momentous and far-reaching consequences of that discovery. Again he
seems (i. 82) to have appreciated, with a taste and sense rare in his age, the
impropriety of mixing up Christian and Pagan mythology. And the same
taste and sense appear, as a rule, in the minuter remarks (p. 100 sq.) on
verse and phrase, and even on those minutest points not merely of verbal
but of literal criticism which the Italians, more sensible than some modern
critics, never despised, though they may sometimes have gone to the other
extreme. In fact, the last half, and rather more, of the Discorso is not so
much concerned with the Romances as with poetic diction and arrangement
in general, or even with these matters as concerns literature both in prose
and in verse.
The dramatic Discorso, or rather Discorsi (for we may throw in a third
piece on Satiric Composition), is much shorter than that on the Romances,
being necessarily less controversial, and therefore, as has been said, less
original. But Cinthio’s independence of mind does not desert him even here.
He is said to have been the first Italian who dared, in the Orbecche before
mentioned, to disregard the Senecan practice[86] (so tedious in all modern
imitations of it, and so crushingly exhibited in our own earliest tragic
attempts) of beginning with an entire scene, or even act, of monologue. But,
as often happens, his licences in some directions invite condonation by a
tighter drawing of the reins elsewhere. He is credited (or debited) with the
first reference in modern literature to the Unity of Time: and though it is
well always to accept these assertions of priority with a certain suspension
of judgment, it may be so. It is at any rate certain that he does out-Aristotle
Aristotle in regard to this Unity, upon which, as is well known, the Stagirite
lays very little stress. But he makes some amends by relaxing the
proscription of the happy ending, so long as the proper purging effects of
pity and terror are achieved. He also to some extent relaxes the extremest
stringency of the old rule about trucidations coram populo. There may be
Page 77
death on the stage: but generally the bienséances of domestic life should be
preserved there. On one point, in which Cinthio has had assigned to him the
position of anti-Aristotelian origin, I venture to differ as to the interpretation
of the Poetics themselves, not merely from Mr Spingarn but from Professor
Butcher.[87] The later Neo-Classics, and especially the French, may have
made rank too absolute a qualification of the tragic Hero. But I must say
that I think they had their justification from Aristotle himself, and that
Cinthio is at worst but dotting the i's of the Stagirite as to σπουδαῖοι and
χρηστοί. His extreme admiration of the choruses of Seneca (in justification
whereof he cites Erasmus) is not wholly unwarranted. Few modern readers,
unfortunately, know the stately beauty of these artful odes: though of course
his preference (p. 81) of them to “all the Greeks” is wrong, and was
probably occasioned by the very small attention which most Renaissance
writers paid to Æschylus. The elaborate distinctions which he, like others,
seeks to draw between Tragedy and Comedy from artificial points of view
are to some extent justified by the very absence of such distinctions in
Aristotle. They thought it their duty to supply what they did not find.
The Discourse, or rather Letter (for it bears both titles, and in scale and
character rather deserves the latter name) on Satire is confessedly
supplementary to the other Discorsi, and may be at least connected with the
fact that the indefatigable author had himself attempted a satiric piece, Egle.
On Satire. He lays stress on the special connection of the Satire with
the cult of Bacchus, takes into consideration the poetical as well as the
scenic form, mentions the mixed or Varronian variety, and even extends his
view to the Bucolic or Pastoral proper. But there are only some five-and-
twenty pages, and the thing seems to have been really composed at “request
of friends.”
From a critic who did so much it would be somewhat unreasonable to
demand more. In fact, though Cinthio did not go so far along the high
historic path of truth as did Patrizzi thirty years later, he set on that path a
firm foot. For the moment, and in Italy, the romanzi were the true battle-
ground; just as in England, for instance, that battle-ground was to be found
a little later in the drama. At a period so early as this, and so close to the
actual revolution of the Renaissance, it could hardly be expected that any
one should reach the vantage-ground of a comprehensive survey of all
literature, so as to deduce from it the positive and enfranchising, and not
even from it the negative and disfranchising, laws of poetry. Not only had
preserved there. On one point, in which Cinthio has had assigned to him the
position of anti-Aristotelian origin, I venture to differ as to the interpretation
of the Poetics themselves, not merely from Mr Spingarn but from Professor
Butcher.[87] The later Neo-Classics, and especially the French, may have
made rank too absolute a qualification of the tragic Hero. But I must say
that I think they had their justification from Aristotle himself, and that
Cinthio is at worst but dotting the i's of the Stagirite as to σπουδαῖοι and
χρηστοί. His extreme admiration of the choruses of Seneca (in justification
whereof he cites Erasmus) is not wholly unwarranted. Few modern readers,
unfortunately, know the stately beauty of these artful odes: though of course
his preference (p. 81) of them to “all the Greeks” is wrong, and was
probably occasioned by the very small attention which most Renaissance
writers paid to Æschylus. The elaborate distinctions which he, like others,
seeks to draw between Tragedy and Comedy from artificial points of view
are to some extent justified by the very absence of such distinctions in
Aristotle. They thought it their duty to supply what they did not find.
The Discourse, or rather Letter (for it bears both titles, and in scale and
character rather deserves the latter name) on Satire is confessedly
supplementary to the other Discorsi, and may be at least connected with the
fact that the indefatigable author had himself attempted a satiric piece, Egle.
On Satire. He lays stress on the special connection of the Satire with
the cult of Bacchus, takes into consideration the poetical as well as the
scenic form, mentions the mixed or Varronian variety, and even extends his
view to the Bucolic or Pastoral proper. But there are only some five-and-
twenty pages, and the thing seems to have been really composed at “request
of friends.”
From a critic who did so much it would be somewhat unreasonable to
demand more. In fact, though Cinthio did not go so far along the high
historic path of truth as did Patrizzi thirty years later, he set on that path a
firm foot. For the moment, and in Italy, the romanzi were the true battle-
ground; just as in England, for instance, that battle-ground was to be found
a little later in the drama. At a period so early as this, and so close to the
actual revolution of the Renaissance, it could hardly be expected that any
one should reach the vantage-ground of a comprehensive survey of all
literature, so as to deduce from it the positive and enfranchising, and not
even from it the negative and disfranchising, laws of poetry. Not only had
Page 78
the vernaculars, with the exception of Italian itself, hardly furnished, at the
time when Cinthio wrote, any modern literature fit to rank with the ancient
—not only was it far too late, or far too early, to expect any one to give
mediæval literature a fair chance with both—but men were still actually
disputing whether the vernaculars had a right to exist. They were, like his
namesake and clansman, to whom we come next, hinting surprise that any
man of genius and culture should employ these vernaculars when he might
write Latin, or, like one of his antagonists, Celio Calcagnini, aspiring to the
disuse of vernacular for literary purposes altogether. In an atmosphere still
so far from clear, with such heats and mists about, it is no small credit to
Cinthio that, whether moved by mere parochial patriotism or by the secret
feeling that sua res as a novelist was at question, or by anything else, he
heard and caught at the dominant of the tune of criticism proper.
Pigna’s I Romanzi,[88] whatever we may think of the quarrel between him
and Cinthio, is a book not to be mentioned without considerable respect, or
dismissed with mention so merely incidental as that given to it above. It is
Pigna. mainly, but not solely, a defence of Ariosto, and has not a
few merits,—a just conception of the essentially Romantic nature of the
Odyssey, a very careful and in the main sensible discussion of Prosody, and
a widish comparison of instances. The main defect of it is the besetting sin
of the whole three centuries with which this volume deals—the Obsession
of the Kind. Instead of being satisfied with the demonstration (which he and
Cinthio had reached) that Romance is not Epic, and is not bound by Epic
laws, Pigna torments himself to show that Romance is Epic in this
particular, not-Epic in that, and is alternately subject to and free from
bondage: while some of his detailed investigations may raise smile, or sigh,
or shrug, according to mood or temperament. Thus for instance he inquires
(after a fashion which we shall find echoed in Ronsard) into the character of
the objects—Lance, Horn, Ring—with which fatura (fairy agency) is
usually associated, till we feel inclined to say, “O learned and excellent
signor, the poet may put fatura in a warming-pan—if he pleases, and can do
it poeticamente!” But the book is, on the whole, a good book: and Pigna
deserves to rank with Cinthio and Patrizzi as one of the Three who, alone in
this first modern stage, saw, if but afar-off and by glimpses, the Promised
Land from which the ship of criticism was to be once more driven by
adverse winds for centuries to come.
time when Cinthio wrote, any modern literature fit to rank with the ancient
—not only was it far too late, or far too early, to expect any one to give
mediæval literature a fair chance with both—but men were still actually
disputing whether the vernaculars had a right to exist. They were, like his
namesake and clansman, to whom we come next, hinting surprise that any
man of genius and culture should employ these vernaculars when he might
write Latin, or, like one of his antagonists, Celio Calcagnini, aspiring to the
disuse of vernacular for literary purposes altogether. In an atmosphere still
so far from clear, with such heats and mists about, it is no small credit to
Cinthio that, whether moved by mere parochial patriotism or by the secret
feeling that sua res as a novelist was at question, or by anything else, he
heard and caught at the dominant of the tune of criticism proper.
Pigna’s I Romanzi,[88] whatever we may think of the quarrel between him
and Cinthio, is a book not to be mentioned without considerable respect, or
dismissed with mention so merely incidental as that given to it above. It is
Pigna. mainly, but not solely, a defence of Ariosto, and has not a
few merits,—a just conception of the essentially Romantic nature of the
Odyssey, a very careful and in the main sensible discussion of Prosody, and
a widish comparison of instances. The main defect of it is the besetting sin
of the whole three centuries with which this volume deals—the Obsession
of the Kind. Instead of being satisfied with the demonstration (which he and
Cinthio had reached) that Romance is not Epic, and is not bound by Epic
laws, Pigna torments himself to show that Romance is Epic in this
particular, not-Epic in that, and is alternately subject to and free from
bondage: while some of his detailed investigations may raise smile, or sigh,
or shrug, according to mood or temperament. Thus for instance he inquires
(after a fashion which we shall find echoed in Ronsard) into the character of
the objects—Lance, Horn, Ring—with which fatura (fairy agency) is
usually associated, till we feel inclined to say, “O learned and excellent
signor, the poet may put fatura in a warming-pan—if he pleases, and can do
it poeticamente!” But the book is, on the whole, a good book: and Pigna
deserves to rank with Cinthio and Patrizzi as one of the Three who, alone in
this first modern stage, saw, if but afar-off and by glimpses, the Promised
Land from which the ship of criticism was to be once more driven by
adverse winds for centuries to come.
Page 79
A document of exceptional importance for us is provided by the two
curious dialogues De Poetis Nostrorum Temporum[89] of Lilius Gregorius
Giraldus, written about 1548-50, and dedicated partly to Renée of Ferrara,
the French Princess who for a time protected Marot and others, partly to
Lilius Giraldus: Cardinal Rangoni. Lilius, who was now in a good old age
his De Poetis
Nostrorum
(he had been born in 1478), a Humanist of the better class,
Temporum. and a sincere Catholic possessed of sufficient independence
of current ill-fashions to speak with severity of the verses
of Beccadelli, would seem also to have been, at first- or second-hand, a man
of very wide literary knowledge. His acquaintance with More[90] might be
partly (as his very high estimate is certainly) conditioned by ecclesiastical
partisanship; but he speaks of Wyatt long before Tottel’s Miscellany made
that poet’s works publicly known, even in his own country, and, what is still
Its width of more remarkable, of Chaucer.[91] Neither France nor
range.
Germany is excluded with the usual Italian uppishness,[92]
though Giraldus cannot help slipping the word barbarus more than once off
his tongue. And though Italy herself has, as we should expect, the lion’s
share, yet the process of sharing is not pursued to that extreme of ridiculous
arrogance which has been shown by the Greeks in their decadence, by the
French in their Augustanism, and by the Italians themselves more than
once.
But this real knowledge on Giraldus’ part, and the fairness of his spirit,
only serve to accentuate the drift in the course and direction of this, the
most important general summary of its kind that we meet between the
But narrowness Labyrinthus and the seventeenth century. Giraldus, though
of view.
he does not absolutely exclude the vernaculars, is perfectly
convinced that poetry, and indeed literature generally, means—first of all,
and as far as its aristocracy goes exclusively—writing in Latin; nay, with
him even translation from the classical languages is a more important thing
Horror at preference of than original composition in the vulgar tongue.
vernacular to Latin.
His contempt of this latter is thinly though
decently veiled in the passage on drama (ed. cit., p. 40), where, speaking of
the writers of comedy, and rightly preferring Ariosto to Bibbiena, he says,
“sed enim vernaculo sermone id plerique opus aggressi pauci mea sententia
assecuti sunt;” speaks (with a sort of visible shake of the head, as over a
good man lost) of Ariosto himself as one who “Latino carmine aliquando
ludit, sed nunc totum se vernaculis tradidit, atque inter cetera furentem
curious dialogues De Poetis Nostrorum Temporum[89] of Lilius Gregorius
Giraldus, written about 1548-50, and dedicated partly to Renée of Ferrara,
the French Princess who for a time protected Marot and others, partly to
Lilius Giraldus: Cardinal Rangoni. Lilius, who was now in a good old age
his De Poetis
Nostrorum
(he had been born in 1478), a Humanist of the better class,
Temporum. and a sincere Catholic possessed of sufficient independence
of current ill-fashions to speak with severity of the verses
of Beccadelli, would seem also to have been, at first- or second-hand, a man
of very wide literary knowledge. His acquaintance with More[90] might be
partly (as his very high estimate is certainly) conditioned by ecclesiastical
partisanship; but he speaks of Wyatt long before Tottel’s Miscellany made
that poet’s works publicly known, even in his own country, and, what is still
Its width of more remarkable, of Chaucer.[91] Neither France nor
range.
Germany is excluded with the usual Italian uppishness,[92]
though Giraldus cannot help slipping the word barbarus more than once off
his tongue. And though Italy herself has, as we should expect, the lion’s
share, yet the process of sharing is not pursued to that extreme of ridiculous
arrogance which has been shown by the Greeks in their decadence, by the
French in their Augustanism, and by the Italians themselves more than
once.
But this real knowledge on Giraldus’ part, and the fairness of his spirit,
only serve to accentuate the drift in the course and direction of this, the
most important general summary of its kind that we meet between the
But narrowness Labyrinthus and the seventeenth century. Giraldus, though
of view.
he does not absolutely exclude the vernaculars, is perfectly
convinced that poetry, and indeed literature generally, means—first of all,
and as far as its aristocracy goes exclusively—writing in Latin; nay, with
him even translation from the classical languages is a more important thing
Horror at preference of than original composition in the vulgar tongue.
vernacular to Latin.
His contempt of this latter is thinly though
decently veiled in the passage on drama (ed. cit., p. 40), where, speaking of
the writers of comedy, and rightly preferring Ariosto to Bibbiena, he says,
“sed enim vernaculo sermone id plerique opus aggressi pauci mea sententia
assecuti sunt;” speaks (with a sort of visible shake of the head, as over a
good man lost) of Ariosto himself as one who “Latino carmine aliquando
ludit, sed nunc totum se vernaculis tradidit, atque inter cetera furentem
Page 80
Orlandum dare curat in publicum;”[93] patronisingly remarks of Trissino’s
projected Sophonisba, that if the whole of it is as good as the acts that the
author recites, “erit, licet vernacula ipsa, Latinorum tamen non indigna
lectione,” wonders at this George who “est ipse et Græce et Latine bene
doctus, at nunc fere in vernaculis conquiescit,” and ends with an impatient
“Verum de vernaculis jam satis,” and a mutter about tonsores sellulariique.
He speaks still less ambiguously later (ibid., p. 85), where cobblers and
other dregs of the people are added to barbers and mechanics in general (as
a tail to a list headed by Boiardo, Pulci, Politian, and Lorenzo de' Medici!),
and at last liberates his real feeling in a sentence, which many very
excellent men in all European countries would have indorsed till nearly the
end of the eighteenth century, “Ex quo nescioqui viri alioqui docti in eam
hæresim incidere ut non modo vernaculas velint Latinis litteris æquare
verum etiam anteponere, quin et id etiam litteris prodidere.” “Whence some
persons, in other respects learned, have fallen into such a heresy that they
not only choose to make the vernaculars equal with Latin, but even to set
them above it—nay, they have actually given literary expression to the
doctrine.” A terrible thing to Humanists, and, alas! one to which they have
since had to make up their minds! Unfortunately, the two great classical
languages now pay, and for some time to come are likely to continue
paying, the penalty of this idle miscalculation and outrecuidance on the part
of their mistaken partisans; and it is the first duty of all lovers of letters now
to fight for their maintenance in due place.
But still the almost invincible equity of the man displays itself even in his
judgment of these unhappy schismatics; and he seems to make some
difference between the vernacular dialects and the Sermo Etruscus. On
Berni, Alamanni, the two “gentlewomen-poetesses,” as the Italians call
them, Vittoria Colonna and Veronica Gambara, Speroni, La Casa, Aonio
Paleario, Molza, he has things amiable and acute at once to say.
But his heart is not here, nor in the mention of the poor barbarous
foreigners who may perhaps have some better excuse than “Latins” for not
Yet a real critic writing in the Latin tongue. It is of those who do so write—
in both kinds.
Italians first of all but also others—that he really thinks as
“the poets of his time.” He can find room for a mere grammarian (though a
very excellent grammarian) like William Lilly: he speaks of him
magnificentissime, and if this notice contrasts rather comically with the
brief and cold reference to Erasmus, it is fair to remember not merely that
projected Sophonisba, that if the whole of it is as good as the acts that the
author recites, “erit, licet vernacula ipsa, Latinorum tamen non indigna
lectione,” wonders at this George who “est ipse et Græce et Latine bene
doctus, at nunc fere in vernaculis conquiescit,” and ends with an impatient
“Verum de vernaculis jam satis,” and a mutter about tonsores sellulariique.
He speaks still less ambiguously later (ibid., p. 85), where cobblers and
other dregs of the people are added to barbers and mechanics in general (as
a tail to a list headed by Boiardo, Pulci, Politian, and Lorenzo de' Medici!),
and at last liberates his real feeling in a sentence, which many very
excellent men in all European countries would have indorsed till nearly the
end of the eighteenth century, “Ex quo nescioqui viri alioqui docti in eam
hæresim incidere ut non modo vernaculas velint Latinis litteris æquare
verum etiam anteponere, quin et id etiam litteris prodidere.” “Whence some
persons, in other respects learned, have fallen into such a heresy that they
not only choose to make the vernaculars equal with Latin, but even to set
them above it—nay, they have actually given literary expression to the
doctrine.” A terrible thing to Humanists, and, alas! one to which they have
since had to make up their minds! Unfortunately, the two great classical
languages now pay, and for some time to come are likely to continue
paying, the penalty of this idle miscalculation and outrecuidance on the part
of their mistaken partisans; and it is the first duty of all lovers of letters now
to fight for their maintenance in due place.
But still the almost invincible equity of the man displays itself even in his
judgment of these unhappy schismatics; and he seems to make some
difference between the vernacular dialects and the Sermo Etruscus. On
Berni, Alamanni, the two “gentlewomen-poetesses,” as the Italians call
them, Vittoria Colonna and Veronica Gambara, Speroni, La Casa, Aonio
Paleario, Molza, he has things amiable and acute at once to say.
But his heart is not here, nor in the mention of the poor barbarous
foreigners who may perhaps have some better excuse than “Latins” for not
Yet a real critic writing in the Latin tongue. It is of those who do so write—
in both kinds.
Italians first of all but also others—that he really thinks as
“the poets of his time.” He can find room for a mere grammarian (though a
very excellent grammarian) like William Lilly: he speaks of him
magnificentissime, and if this notice contrasts rather comically with the
brief and cold reference to Erasmus, it is fair to remember not merely that
Page 81
Erasmus was by no means persona grata to the Roman orthodox, but that
his poetical work is really nothing as compared with his exquisite prose.
He begins with the two Mirandolas, Pontanus, Marullus, and Sannazar,
and is copious though not uncritical on them all: non numquam nimis
Short précis of lascivire et vagari videtur, he says of Pontanus. Recalled
the dialogues.
by his interlocutor to still earlier writers, he has the
judgment of “the Panormitan”[94] (Beccadelli), which has been noticed, and
a by no means unremarkable one, dwelling ominously on the “facility” of
Mapheus Vegius, the egregious person who took upon himself to write a
thirteenth Æneid. Many forgotten worthies (among whom Filelfo and the
better Aretines, Charles and Leonard, are the least forgotten) lead us (for
Bembo and Sadolet have had their position earlier, and will have it again) to
a famous pair, Mantuan and Politian. Giraldus is decisive and refreshing on
Mantuan. This loudly over-praised poet is extemporalis magis quam poeta
maturus, and as to his being alter Maro, why “Bone Deus! quam dispar
ingenium!”[95] He is much more favourable to the author of the Nutricia and
the Manto, but does not forget his swashing blow even here. Politian seems
to him to have written calore potius quam arte, and to have used little
diligence either in choosing his subjects or correcting his work. The Strozzi
and Urceus Codrus follow, with many minor lights, from the notices of
whom the judgment on Ludovicus Bigus Pictorius of Ferrara stands out as
applicable, unfortunately, to some greater men and many as small or
smaller. “Cum pius deflexit ad religionem, ut vita melior ita carmine
deterior visus est.” Then one of the regulation pieces of flattery as to the
Augustan character of the rule of Leo Maximus conducts us to notices of
Naugerius and Vida, where the moderate and deserved praise of the first
would contrast oddly (if we did not know how the pseudo-classical tradition
for two hundred years and more said vehement “ditto” to Giraldus) with the
extravagant eulogies on the polished emptiness of the latter. And then a
great turba comes, among which the two Beroalds, Acciauoli and, among
blind poets, Bello, the author of the Mambriano, chiefly take the eye.
We have noted the condescension to such poor vernacular creatures as
Ariosto, Bibbiena, and (with a long interval certainly) Trissino and the
author of the first Rosmunda. It is succeeded by another review of persons
long relinquished to dusty shelves and memories, with a few better known
names like Molza and Longolius. The praise of the great Fracastorius is
much more moderate than we might have expected—probably Giraldus did
his poetical work is really nothing as compared with his exquisite prose.
He begins with the two Mirandolas, Pontanus, Marullus, and Sannazar,
and is copious though not uncritical on them all: non numquam nimis
Short précis of lascivire et vagari videtur, he says of Pontanus. Recalled
the dialogues.
by his interlocutor to still earlier writers, he has the
judgment of “the Panormitan”[94] (Beccadelli), which has been noticed, and
a by no means unremarkable one, dwelling ominously on the “facility” of
Mapheus Vegius, the egregious person who took upon himself to write a
thirteenth Æneid. Many forgotten worthies (among whom Filelfo and the
better Aretines, Charles and Leonard, are the least forgotten) lead us (for
Bembo and Sadolet have had their position earlier, and will have it again) to
a famous pair, Mantuan and Politian. Giraldus is decisive and refreshing on
Mantuan. This loudly over-praised poet is extemporalis magis quam poeta
maturus, and as to his being alter Maro, why “Bone Deus! quam dispar
ingenium!”[95] He is much more favourable to the author of the Nutricia and
the Manto, but does not forget his swashing blow even here. Politian seems
to him to have written calore potius quam arte, and to have used little
diligence either in choosing his subjects or correcting his work. The Strozzi
and Urceus Codrus follow, with many minor lights, from the notices of
whom the judgment on Ludovicus Bigus Pictorius of Ferrara stands out as
applicable, unfortunately, to some greater men and many as small or
smaller. “Cum pius deflexit ad religionem, ut vita melior ita carmine
deterior visus est.” Then one of the regulation pieces of flattery as to the
Augustan character of the rule of Leo Maximus conducts us to notices of
Naugerius and Vida, where the moderate and deserved praise of the first
would contrast oddly (if we did not know how the pseudo-classical tradition
for two hundred years and more said vehement “ditto” to Giraldus) with the
extravagant eulogies on the polished emptiness of the latter. And then a
great turba comes, among which the two Beroalds, Acciauoli and, among
blind poets, Bello, the author of the Mambriano, chiefly take the eye.
We have noted the condescension to such poor vernacular creatures as
Ariosto, Bibbiena, and (with a long interval certainly) Trissino and the
author of the first Rosmunda. It is succeeded by another review of persons
long relinquished to dusty shelves and memories, with a few better known
names like Molza and Longolius. The praise of the great Fracastorius is
much more moderate than we might have expected—probably Giraldus did
Page 82
not like his subject—and then there is a curious passage on “fancy” verses,
leonine, serpentine, and others, leading to yet another, in which the worse
side of the Renaissance—its contempt for the Middle Ages—is shown by a
scornful reference to Architrenios et Anti-claudianos, which finishes the
first dialogue. The second is of a wider cast, but needs less minute account
here, though it is at least as well worth reading. It begins with the Greeks,
who did so much for Italy, from Gemistus Pletho and Chrysoloras
downwards, then takes the Spaniards and Portuguese, then our own
countrymen, then the Germans and French. Here comes the description of
Erasmus as inter Germanos Latinus inter Latinos aliquando Germanus; and
here Giraldus frankly confesses that he is not going to say anything about
persons like Œcolampadius, Bucer, Sturm, and Melanchthon, since they
were not contented to confine themselves to good literature, and would
know too much, and trouble Israel with Luther. But a good word is spared,
justly, for the author of the Basia, with a reversion to still younger men,
among whom Palingenius, Julius Cæsar Scaliger, and Castelvetro are the
best known, and with the final fling at the vernaculars above given.
Such a book, with its wonderful width of range[96] and its sometimes
equally wonderful contraction of view, is worth, to the historian of real
criticism, a dozen long-winded tractates hunting the old red-herrings of
Their great critical theory. The De Poetis Nostrorum Temporum gives
historic value.
us one of those veritable and inestimable rallying-points of
which our History should be little more than a reasoned catalogue,
connected by summary of less important phenomena. Referring duly to it,
we find ourselves at the standpoint of a man who has really wide
knowledge, and who, when his general assumptions do not interfere, has a
real critical grasp. But the chief of these assumptions is not merely that the
vernaculars have not attained equality with the classics—this, allowing for
inevitable defects of perspective and other things, would not be fatal—but
that they cannot attain such equality, much less any superiority. The point of
view—to us plain common-sense—that if Sannazar and others wrote in
Latin about Christian subjects, they should use Christian Latin, seems to
Giraldus the point of view of a kind of maniac. Without the details and
developments of Vida, he is apparently in exact accordance with that
excellent Bishop. Cicero and Virgil, not to mention others, have achieved
for literature a medium which cannot be improved upon, and all those who
adopt any other are, if not exactly wicked, hopelessly deceived and deluded.
leonine, serpentine, and others, leading to yet another, in which the worse
side of the Renaissance—its contempt for the Middle Ages—is shown by a
scornful reference to Architrenios et Anti-claudianos, which finishes the
first dialogue. The second is of a wider cast, but needs less minute account
here, though it is at least as well worth reading. It begins with the Greeks,
who did so much for Italy, from Gemistus Pletho and Chrysoloras
downwards, then takes the Spaniards and Portuguese, then our own
countrymen, then the Germans and French. Here comes the description of
Erasmus as inter Germanos Latinus inter Latinos aliquando Germanus; and
here Giraldus frankly confesses that he is not going to say anything about
persons like Œcolampadius, Bucer, Sturm, and Melanchthon, since they
were not contented to confine themselves to good literature, and would
know too much, and trouble Israel with Luther. But a good word is spared,
justly, for the author of the Basia, with a reversion to still younger men,
among whom Palingenius, Julius Cæsar Scaliger, and Castelvetro are the
best known, and with the final fling at the vernaculars above given.
Such a book, with its wonderful width of range[96] and its sometimes
equally wonderful contraction of view, is worth, to the historian of real
criticism, a dozen long-winded tractates hunting the old red-herrings of
Their great critical theory. The De Poetis Nostrorum Temporum gives
historic value.
us one of those veritable and inestimable rallying-points of
which our History should be little more than a reasoned catalogue,
connected by summary of less important phenomena. Referring duly to it,
we find ourselves at the standpoint of a man who has really wide
knowledge, and who, when his general assumptions do not interfere, has a
real critical grasp. But the chief of these assumptions is not merely that the
vernaculars have not attained equality with the classics—this, allowing for
inevitable defects of perspective and other things, would not be fatal—but
that they cannot attain such equality, much less any superiority. The point of
view—to us plain common-sense—that if Sannazar and others wrote in
Latin about Christian subjects, they should use Christian Latin, seems to
Giraldus the point of view of a kind of maniac. Without the details and
developments of Vida, he is apparently in exact accordance with that
excellent Bishop. Cicero and Virgil, not to mention others, have achieved
for literature a medium which cannot be improved upon, and all those who
adopt any other are, if not exactly wicked, hopelessly deceived and deluded.
Page 83
This is the major premiss for practically every syllogism of our critic.
Where it does not come in—between vernacular and vernacular, between
Latin and Latin of the classical type—he can judge just judgment. Where it
comes in, the more perfect his logic, the more inevitably vitiated is his
conclusion.
Where it does not come in—between vernacular and vernacular, between
Latin and Latin of the classical type—he can judge just judgment. Where it
comes in, the more perfect his logic, the more inevitably vitiated is his
conclusion.
Page 84
19. Since I wrote this, an obliging correspondent, Mr P.G. Thomas of
Liverpool, has suggested actual quotation of a passage of Bruni’s on prose
style in his De Studiis et Literis. If I do not give this it is, first, because
indulgence in quotation here is as the letting out of waters; and, secondly,
because the tractate is translated in Mr W. H. Woodward’s well-known and
excellent book on Vittorino da Feltre (Cambridge, 1897), where other
matter of interest to us will also be found.
20. The connecting and explaining link, sometimes omitted, is to be
found in Rhetoric—the close connection of which with Logic and Grammar
is no puzzle, while the connection of poetry with it was then an accepted
fact. It is rather dangerous to say that Savonarola, in connecting poetry with
logic, was “tending towards the elimination of the Imagination in art.” The
extremely equivocal nature of the word “Imagination” (v. vol. i. pp. 120,
165) needs constantly to be pointed out. In the ancient sense, Imagination is
as much connected with Logic as anything else; in the modern, Savonarola
probably never even thought of it.
21. Otherwise, De Divisione et Utilitate Omnium Scientiarum. I have
read this in the Wittemberg ed. of his Philosophiæ Epitome (1596, 8vo).
The passages quoted and referred to will be found at p. 807 sq. of this.
22. Vol. i. p. 380 sq.
23. Or, “a pretty old woman that of a girl,” the position of the epithet
between the two nouns being ambiguous.
24. Geog. i. 11, 5, where he describes poetry as a rudimentary
philosophy, providing an introduction to life, and educating pleasantly. I do
not remember who first, or who successively, pointed this out before
Shaftesbury, Advice to an Author, Part I. sect. 3, note sub fin. But
Castelvetro (Op. Var., p. 83), and Opitz (v. inf., p. 361), among others, refer
to it.
25. More especially p. 46 sq. (2nd ed.) The influence of the Somnium
Scipionis of Macrobius may also have been considerable.
Liverpool, has suggested actual quotation of a passage of Bruni’s on prose
style in his De Studiis et Literis. If I do not give this it is, first, because
indulgence in quotation here is as the letting out of waters; and, secondly,
because the tractate is translated in Mr W. H. Woodward’s well-known and
excellent book on Vittorino da Feltre (Cambridge, 1897), where other
matter of interest to us will also be found.
20. The connecting and explaining link, sometimes omitted, is to be
found in Rhetoric—the close connection of which with Logic and Grammar
is no puzzle, while the connection of poetry with it was then an accepted
fact. It is rather dangerous to say that Savonarola, in connecting poetry with
logic, was “tending towards the elimination of the Imagination in art.” The
extremely equivocal nature of the word “Imagination” (v. vol. i. pp. 120,
165) needs constantly to be pointed out. In the ancient sense, Imagination is
as much connected with Logic as anything else; in the modern, Savonarola
probably never even thought of it.
21. Otherwise, De Divisione et Utilitate Omnium Scientiarum. I have
read this in the Wittemberg ed. of his Philosophiæ Epitome (1596, 8vo).
The passages quoted and referred to will be found at p. 807 sq. of this.
22. Vol. i. p. 380 sq.
23. Or, “a pretty old woman that of a girl,” the position of the epithet
between the two nouns being ambiguous.
24. Geog. i. 11, 5, where he describes poetry as a rudimentary
philosophy, providing an introduction to life, and educating pleasantly. I do
not remember who first, or who successively, pointed this out before
Shaftesbury, Advice to an Author, Part I. sect. 3, note sub fin. But
Castelvetro (Op. Var., p. 83), and Opitz (v. inf., p. 361), among others, refer
to it.
25. More especially p. 46 sq. (2nd ed.) The influence of the Somnium
Scipionis of Macrobius may also have been considerable.
Page 85
26. Politian’s critical faculty shows to more advantage here than in his
attribution of the Epistles of the Pseudo-Phalaris to Lucian (see Bentley’s
immortal Dissertation). He had almost better—from the literary point of
view—have believed them genuine.
27. V. vol. i. p. 408.
28.
Aut telo, Summane, tuo traxere ruinam,
Aut trucibus nimbis aut iræ obnoxia Cauri,
Aut tacitis lenti perierunt dentibus ævi.
Dum ver tristis hyems, autumnum proferet æstas,
Dumque fluet spirans refluetque reciproca Tethys,
Dum mixta alternas capient elementa figuras,
Semper erit magni decus immortale Maronis,
Semper inexhaustis ibunt hæc flumina venis,
Semper ab his docti ducentur fontibus haustus,
Semper odoratos fundent hæc gramina flores.
—Manto, 335-337, 342-348, p. 303, ed. cit. inf.
29. If anybody charges me with plagiarism from Mr Symonds’ “leaping,”
I had rather plead guilty than quibble. The metaphor is too obviously the
right and only one, for the peculiar motion of Politian’s verse, to any one
who has an ear. I keep, however, the order of the edition I use (that of
Signor Isidoro del Lugo, Florence, 1867), not the perhaps more logical one
of Nutricia—Rusticus—Manto—Ambra, which Mr Symonds followed and
which is that of Pope, op. cit. inf.
30. My copy is the edition of Gryphius (Lugduni, 1554). Crinitus (Ricci
or Riccio) had dedicated it nearly fifty years earlier, and just before his own
death, I believe, to Cosmo Pazzi, Bishop of Arezzo, on November 1, 1505.
31. A fellow-citizen and contemporary printer generally appears in
biographical dictionaries under the heading “Olmucensis.” The history of
Olmütz, by W. Müller (Vienna, 1882), has not come in my way, so I do not
know whether Augustinus appears there. The Dialogus is duly in Hain, but
has not, I think, been much noticed by literary historians.
attribution of the Epistles of the Pseudo-Phalaris to Lucian (see Bentley’s
immortal Dissertation). He had almost better—from the literary point of
view—have believed them genuine.
27. V. vol. i. p. 408.
28.
Aut telo, Summane, tuo traxere ruinam,
Aut trucibus nimbis aut iræ obnoxia Cauri,
Aut tacitis lenti perierunt dentibus ævi.
Dum ver tristis hyems, autumnum proferet æstas,
Dumque fluet spirans refluetque reciproca Tethys,
Dum mixta alternas capient elementa figuras,
Semper erit magni decus immortale Maronis,
Semper inexhaustis ibunt hæc flumina venis,
Semper ab his docti ducentur fontibus haustus,
Semper odoratos fundent hæc gramina flores.
—Manto, 335-337, 342-348, p. 303, ed. cit. inf.
29. If anybody charges me with plagiarism from Mr Symonds’ “leaping,”
I had rather plead guilty than quibble. The metaphor is too obviously the
right and only one, for the peculiar motion of Politian’s verse, to any one
who has an ear. I keep, however, the order of the edition I use (that of
Signor Isidoro del Lugo, Florence, 1867), not the perhaps more logical one
of Nutricia—Rusticus—Manto—Ambra, which Mr Symonds followed and
which is that of Pope, op. cit. inf.
30. My copy is the edition of Gryphius (Lugduni, 1554). Crinitus (Ricci
or Riccio) had dedicated it nearly fifty years earlier, and just before his own
death, I believe, to Cosmo Pazzi, Bishop of Arezzo, on November 1, 1505.
31. A fellow-citizen and contemporary printer generally appears in
biographical dictionaries under the heading “Olmucensis.” The history of
Olmütz, by W. Müller (Vienna, 1882), has not come in my way, so I do not
know whether Augustinus appears there. The Dialogus is duly in Hain, but
has not, I think, been much noticed by literary historians.
Page 86
32. I have used the Opera, 2 vols., Lugduni, 1531, 8vo. The passages
cited will be found at ii. 14 sq.
33. For Landi or Lando, see an interesting paper by Mr W. E. A. Axon, in
vol. xx. of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature.
34. This, which is very amusing, opens the ed. of Berni’s Opere in the
Sonzogno collection (Milan, 1888).
35. For the Latin I use Pope’s Selecta Poemata Italorum (2 vols.,
London, 1740), i. 131-189, and the anonymous Poemata Selecta Italorum
(Oxford, 1808), 207-266; for Pitt’s Englishing, Chalmers’s Poets, xix. 633-
651. The original is Rome, 1527, 4to.
36. Prof. A. S. Cook (Boston, 1892).
37. Insignis facie ante alios, ed. Oxon., p. 215.
38. For a very interesting and characteristic view of this “invoking” in the
next generation, see Castelvetro, Op. Var., ed. cit. inf., pp. 79-99.
39.
“Drances ... consiliis non futilis auctor,
Dives opum, pollens lingua et popularibus auris.
... Neque enim in Latio magno ore sonantem
Arma ducesque decet tam viles decidere in res.”
It is interesting to hear the watchword “Low!” so early.
40. Some would plead for “mosaic.” But the mosaic worker works his
tiny cubes himself—he does not steal them ready made and arranged.
41. Cf. Poet., ii. 162. Semper nutu rationis eant res.
42. Mr Spingarn’s useful chronological table gives twenty-five books by
nearly as many different authors for the seventy-three years. Nor does this
list pretend to be exhaustive; for instance, it omits Robortello’s Longinus
(1554), and the important De poetis nostrorum temporum of Lilius
Giraldus.
cited will be found at ii. 14 sq.
33. For Landi or Lando, see an interesting paper by Mr W. E. A. Axon, in
vol. xx. of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature.
34. This, which is very amusing, opens the ed. of Berni’s Opere in the
Sonzogno collection (Milan, 1888).
35. For the Latin I use Pope’s Selecta Poemata Italorum (2 vols.,
London, 1740), i. 131-189, and the anonymous Poemata Selecta Italorum
(Oxford, 1808), 207-266; for Pitt’s Englishing, Chalmers’s Poets, xix. 633-
651. The original is Rome, 1527, 4to.
36. Prof. A. S. Cook (Boston, 1892).
37. Insignis facie ante alios, ed. Oxon., p. 215.
38. For a very interesting and characteristic view of this “invoking” in the
next generation, see Castelvetro, Op. Var., ed. cit. inf., pp. 79-99.
39.
“Drances ... consiliis non futilis auctor,
Dives opum, pollens lingua et popularibus auris.
... Neque enim in Latio magno ore sonantem
Arma ducesque decet tam viles decidere in res.”
It is interesting to hear the watchword “Low!” so early.
40. Some would plead for “mosaic.” But the mosaic worker works his
tiny cubes himself—he does not steal them ready made and arranged.
41. Cf. Poet., ii. 162. Semper nutu rationis eant res.
42. Mr Spingarn’s useful chronological table gives twenty-five books by
nearly as many different authors for the seventy-three years. Nor does this
list pretend to be exhaustive; for instance, it omits Robortello’s Longinus
(1554), and the important De poetis nostrorum temporum of Lilius
Giraldus.
Page 87
43. Dolce’s (1535) translation of Horace; Pazzi’s (1536) of Aristotle;
Daniello’s Poetica (1536), and Tolomei’s Versi e Regole (1539).
44. Robortello’s ed. of Poetics (1548), and Segni’s translation (1549);
Maggi’s ed. (1550); Muzio’s Arte Poetica (1551); Giraldi Cinthio’s
Discorsi (1554).
45. Minturno’s Latin De Poeta (1559); Victorius’ Aristotle’s Poetics
(1560); Scaliger’s own Poetics (1561); the completion of Trissino (1563);
Minturno’s Italian Arte Poetica (1564), and Castelvetro’s Poetics (1570).
46. The work of Piccolomini and Viperano.
47. That of Patrizzi, Tasso, and Denores.
48. That of Buonamici, Ingegneri, and Summo.
49. But most of this latter part had been written in 1548-49, and all must
have been before 1550, when Trissino died. Even this, however, leaves a
twenty years’ gap, which Trissino attributes to the composition of his great
(or at any rate large) poem on the Goths.
50. 2 vols., Verona, 1729.
51. All these, with the Poetica and the translation of Dante, will be found
in the second volume of the edition cited. I take the opportunity of
correcting an injustice to Trissino which I committed at i. 417, and which
was brought to my notice by a reviewer in the Athenæum. “Giovan- [or
Giam-] battista Doria” does say, in his dedication to the Cardinal de'
Medici, that Dante wrote it in Latin, adding, however, a clause of such
singular obscurity that at first sight one takes it as meaning that Dante
himself translated the book into Italian. For discussion of this see Rajna’s
ed. of the De V. E., p. li sq.
52. II. 95. Perhaps better “unlearned,” indotti Poeti.
53. Spingarn, p. 92.
54. Et ancor oggi si fa.
Daniello’s Poetica (1536), and Tolomei’s Versi e Regole (1539).
44. Robortello’s ed. of Poetics (1548), and Segni’s translation (1549);
Maggi’s ed. (1550); Muzio’s Arte Poetica (1551); Giraldi Cinthio’s
Discorsi (1554).
45. Minturno’s Latin De Poeta (1559); Victorius’ Aristotle’s Poetics
(1560); Scaliger’s own Poetics (1561); the completion of Trissino (1563);
Minturno’s Italian Arte Poetica (1564), and Castelvetro’s Poetics (1570).
46. The work of Piccolomini and Viperano.
47. That of Patrizzi, Tasso, and Denores.
48. That of Buonamici, Ingegneri, and Summo.
49. But most of this latter part had been written in 1548-49, and all must
have been before 1550, when Trissino died. Even this, however, leaves a
twenty years’ gap, which Trissino attributes to the composition of his great
(or at any rate large) poem on the Goths.
50. 2 vols., Verona, 1729.
51. All these, with the Poetica and the translation of Dante, will be found
in the second volume of the edition cited. I take the opportunity of
correcting an injustice to Trissino which I committed at i. 417, and which
was brought to my notice by a reviewer in the Athenæum. “Giovan- [or
Giam-] battista Doria” does say, in his dedication to the Cardinal de'
Medici, that Dante wrote it in Latin, adding, however, a clause of such
singular obscurity that at first sight one takes it as meaning that Dante
himself translated the book into Italian. For discussion of this see Rajna’s
ed. of the De V. E., p. li sq.
52. II. 95. Perhaps better “unlearned,” indotti Poeti.
53. Spingarn, p. 92.
54. Et ancor oggi si fa.
Page 88
55. Spingarn, p. 102.
56. The discussion occupies nearly four quarto pages, ii. 127-130.
Trissino, of course, does not neglect Quintilian’s handling of the subject in
Inst., vi. 3, and he quotes modern as well as ancient examples.
57. Dolce had translated the Ars Poetica of Horace into Italian the year
before.
58. Mr Spingarn has extracted from MS., and published as an appendix to
his book, an interesting review of these commentators and others, by
Leonardo Salviati, a successor of theirs in 1586, and too famous in the
Tasso controversy.
59. Maggi in his commentary. See Spingarn, p. 27.
60. V. infra, p. 71.
61. Discoveries, sub fin. (iii. 419 of Cunningham’s 3 vol. ed.)
62. On him see also note infra, pp. 49, 50.
63. M. Breitinger (Les Unités d’Aristote avant Corneille, p. 7) says, “ce
livre n’est qu’un commentaire du Canzoniere de Pétrarque.” He can hardly
have read it; and most probably confused it with the Spositione by Daniello
which accompanies an edition of Petrarch (Venice, 1549), and had been
partially published eight years earlier. This is a full but rather wooden
commentary, chiefly interesting to contrast with Castelvetro’s, and as
showing the Italian tendency to expatiate rather than to appreciate.
64. Fracastorii Opera, 2 vols., Lyons, 1591. The Naugerius is at i. 319-
365.
65. A few of these poems of Navagero will be found in Pope’s Selecta
Poemata Italorum (Londoni, 1740); more in the Oxford Selection (1808);
most in Carmina Quinque Illustrium Poetarum (Florence, 1552).
66. Rime Diverse (Venice, f. 68-94). The name on the title-page is Mutio,
and the spelling Muzio, which some books have, may lead to confusions;
56. The discussion occupies nearly four quarto pages, ii. 127-130.
Trissino, of course, does not neglect Quintilian’s handling of the subject in
Inst., vi. 3, and he quotes modern as well as ancient examples.
57. Dolce had translated the Ars Poetica of Horace into Italian the year
before.
58. Mr Spingarn has extracted from MS., and published as an appendix to
his book, an interesting review of these commentators and others, by
Leonardo Salviati, a successor of theirs in 1586, and too famous in the
Tasso controversy.
59. Maggi in his commentary. See Spingarn, p. 27.
60. V. infra, p. 71.
61. Discoveries, sub fin. (iii. 419 of Cunningham’s 3 vol. ed.)
62. On him see also note infra, pp. 49, 50.
63. M. Breitinger (Les Unités d’Aristote avant Corneille, p. 7) says, “ce
livre n’est qu’un commentaire du Canzoniere de Pétrarque.” He can hardly
have read it; and most probably confused it with the Spositione by Daniello
which accompanies an edition of Petrarch (Venice, 1549), and had been
partially published eight years earlier. This is a full but rather wooden
commentary, chiefly interesting to contrast with Castelvetro’s, and as
showing the Italian tendency to expatiate rather than to appreciate.
64. Fracastorii Opera, 2 vols., Lyons, 1591. The Naugerius is at i. 319-
365.
65. A few of these poems of Navagero will be found in Pope’s Selecta
Poemata Italorum (Londoni, 1740); more in the Oxford Selection (1808);
most in Carmina Quinque Illustrium Poetarum (Florence, 1552).
66. Rime Diverse (Venice, f. 68-94). The name on the title-page is Mutio,
and the spelling Muzio, which some books have, may lead to confusions;
Page 89
for there appears to be another Rime Diverse of Muzio four years earlier,
which does not contain the Arte. This is in blank-verse, agreeably written,
with some general observations on Poets and Poetry, Ancient and Modern,
and practical enough. Says Mutio, e.g.,—
La catena
Di Dante non e leggiadra, se non
Fa punto con la terza sua rima.
67. Delia Lingua Toscana. The four Books of this are rather empty
things. The first goes to show that Philosophy is necessary to the perfect
orator; the second that it is equally necessary to the perfect poet; the third
that Rhetoric is useful for writing and speaking with eloquence; while the
fourth discusses oratorical diction and its ornaments. Few of the books cited
here better justify De Quincey’s too sweeping ban.
68. Due Dialogi dell' Inventione Poetica di Alessandro Lionardi (Venice,
1554). No one carries the ventosa loquacitas about the origin of laws, and
virtues, and opinions, and what not, farther than Lionardi; no one is more
set on defining “the Historian,” “the Orator,” “the Poet,” &c.; no one pays
more attention to all the abstractions. At p. 18 he has a curious catalogue,
occupying the greater part of a small quarto page, and capable of being
extended to a large folio, or many large folios, of “subjects” and “effects,”
in regard to history, enmity, discord, war, peace; in short, all the contents of
the dictionary. “Perdonatemi,,” says another interlocutor, “se interrompo i
vostri ragionamenti,” and indeed they might have gone on for ever. But the
new man has his catalogue ready, too.
69. Venice, 1562. It is very short and very general. There are some
literary touches in his Lettere (2 vols., Venice, 1562), especially a
correspondence with Cinthio on the Amadigi.
70. Della Vera Poetica, Venice, 1555.
71. His volume appears to be almost introuvable for sale; but the British
Museum has no less than three copies. I wish it would give me one of them.
which does not contain the Arte. This is in blank-verse, agreeably written,
with some general observations on Poets and Poetry, Ancient and Modern,
and practical enough. Says Mutio, e.g.,—
La catena
Di Dante non e leggiadra, se non
Fa punto con la terza sua rima.
67. Delia Lingua Toscana. The four Books of this are rather empty
things. The first goes to show that Philosophy is necessary to the perfect
orator; the second that it is equally necessary to the perfect poet; the third
that Rhetoric is useful for writing and speaking with eloquence; while the
fourth discusses oratorical diction and its ornaments. Few of the books cited
here better justify De Quincey’s too sweeping ban.
68. Due Dialogi dell' Inventione Poetica di Alessandro Lionardi (Venice,
1554). No one carries the ventosa loquacitas about the origin of laws, and
virtues, and opinions, and what not, farther than Lionardi; no one is more
set on defining “the Historian,” “the Orator,” “the Poet,” &c.; no one pays
more attention to all the abstractions. At p. 18 he has a curious catalogue,
occupying the greater part of a small quarto page, and capable of being
extended to a large folio, or many large folios, of “subjects” and “effects,”
in regard to history, enmity, discord, war, peace; in short, all the contents of
the dictionary. “Perdonatemi,,” says another interlocutor, “se interrompo i
vostri ragionamenti,” and indeed they might have gone on for ever. But the
new man has his catalogue ready, too.
69. Venice, 1562. It is very short and very general. There are some
literary touches in his Lettere (2 vols., Venice, 1562), especially a
correspondence with Cinthio on the Amadigi.
70. Della Vera Poetica, Venice, 1555.
71. His volume appears to be almost introuvable for sale; but the British
Museum has no less than three copies. I wish it would give me one of them.
Page 90
72. Especially in those to La Strega and l’Arzigoglio (Commedie di A.
Grazzini, ed. Fanfani, Florence, 1897), pp. 173 and 435. Gelli and others do
much the same.
73. The proper quotation is imitatio vitæ, speculum consuetudinis, imago
veritatis. It is given as early as by Robortello (see note opposite). But with
that intelligent operation of the communis sensus which pedants dislike,
speculum vitæ was what took the general.
74. In Prose Scelte di P. Bembo, ed. Costero (Milan, 1880), pp. 141-278.
75. Ed. Costero, 2 vols. (Milan, 1879 and 1884).
76. Ed. Costero (Milan, 1888).
77. Robortello edited Ælian and Æschylus as well as Longinus and
Aristotle; Petrus Victorius was busied very widely with the classics. The
combined treatment of Aristotle and Horace by the former in his
Explicationes (Basle, 1555) is distinctly noteworthy. His dealings with the
Greek are almost pure commentary; those with the Roman, though called a
“Paraphrase,” are much freer. He begins with a sort of expository lecture on
the Epistola ad Pisones, introducing most of its matter and much
illustration from other authors. Then separate short essays follow on Satire,
Epigram, Comedy, Sales, and Elegy. The heading “Sales” is especially
worthy of attention as illustrating that tormenting preoccupation of the
classics on Wit, which transmitted itself to the Renaissance, and is found in
moderns as recent as Whately. Robortello exercised much authority, and is
shown by M. Morel-Fatio in his recent edition of Lope de Vega’s Arte
Nuevo (v. infra, p. 343) to have furnished the Spanish poet with much, if not
most, of the miscellaneous erudition which he displays to no great purpose.
Robortello’s earlier editio princeps of Longinus (ibid., 1554) is noteworthy
in a different way. He was by no means more modest than the average
Renaissance scholar; on the contrary, he is accused of special arrogance.
But this opus redivivum, antea ignotum, e tenebris in lucem editum, as he
calls it, seems to have puzzled, if not actually abashed, him. He has no
introduction, no regular commentary: only side-headings of the matter, from
which, he says, “all the method of the book, and the order of the questions
treated, and the whole rationale of the teaching,” and much else, can be
Grazzini, ed. Fanfani, Florence, 1897), pp. 173 and 435. Gelli and others do
much the same.
73. The proper quotation is imitatio vitæ, speculum consuetudinis, imago
veritatis. It is given as early as by Robortello (see note opposite). But with
that intelligent operation of the communis sensus which pedants dislike,
speculum vitæ was what took the general.
74. In Prose Scelte di P. Bembo, ed. Costero (Milan, 1880), pp. 141-278.
75. Ed. Costero, 2 vols. (Milan, 1879 and 1884).
76. Ed. Costero (Milan, 1888).
77. Robortello edited Ælian and Æschylus as well as Longinus and
Aristotle; Petrus Victorius was busied very widely with the classics. The
combined treatment of Aristotle and Horace by the former in his
Explicationes (Basle, 1555) is distinctly noteworthy. His dealings with the
Greek are almost pure commentary; those with the Roman, though called a
“Paraphrase,” are much freer. He begins with a sort of expository lecture on
the Epistola ad Pisones, introducing most of its matter and much
illustration from other authors. Then separate short essays follow on Satire,
Epigram, Comedy, Sales, and Elegy. The heading “Sales” is especially
worthy of attention as illustrating that tormenting preoccupation of the
classics on Wit, which transmitted itself to the Renaissance, and is found in
moderns as recent as Whately. Robortello exercised much authority, and is
shown by M. Morel-Fatio in his recent edition of Lope de Vega’s Arte
Nuevo (v. infra, p. 343) to have furnished the Spanish poet with much, if not
most, of the miscellaneous erudition which he displays to no great purpose.
Robortello’s earlier editio princeps of Longinus (ibid., 1554) is noteworthy
in a different way. He was by no means more modest than the average
Renaissance scholar; on the contrary, he is accused of special arrogance.
But this opus redivivum, antea ignotum, e tenebris in lucem editum, as he
calls it, seems to have puzzled, if not actually abashed, him. He has no
introduction, no regular commentary: only side-headings of the matter, from
which, he says, “all the method of the book, and the order of the questions
treated, and the whole rationale of the teaching,” and much else, can be
Page 91
learnt. The spirit was too potent for him who had called it up. Of other
mainly classical commentators, Riccoboni (Compendium Artis Poeticæ,
1591) is again useful, because he combines Horace and Aristotle, and
practicalises the combination, identifying the Aristotelian or pseudo-
Aristotelian (see vol. i. p. 34) “Episode” with the first Four Acts, the
Exodus with the Fifth, &c. Maggi, Segni, Zabarella are even farther from
our sphere.
78. Let, however, the reader beware of being misled by the occurrence of
the word “Admiratio” in the side-notes of pp. 52, 53. It is used in quite a
different sense.
79. Perhaps, if this be true, the Irish got it from their French friends of the
seventeenth century, among whom, according to the Ménagiana, poeta
regius was the correct title of the King’s Fool.
80. Ut doceat, ut delectet, ut moveat. Suggested by Cicero on the orator.
81. P. 173. Amatorio mollique sermone effeminat. See Spingarn, p. 70. It
should, however, be observed that Minturno is here avowedly expressing
the censure of Aristophanes on Euripides rather than his own opinion.
82. “Vain and amatorious.”
83. Minturno mentions neither Cinthio (v. infra) nor Pigna—probably to
avoid the appearance of direct attack; but he must have been thinking of one
or the other or both. Something the same line was taken by Sperone
Speroni.
84. See next Book, p. 369.
85. Scritti Estetici di Giambattista Giraldi Cinthio, 2 vols., Milan, 1864.
(In Daelli’s Biblioteca Rara.) This edition gives extracts from Pigna’s work,
and documents respecting the quarrel.
86. To speak correctly, Seneca prefers (Agamemnon, Hercules Furens, H.
Œtæus, Medea, Troades) to compose the First Act of a soliloquy and a
chorus. This, when the chorus is not present, becomes of course a
mainly classical commentators, Riccoboni (Compendium Artis Poeticæ,
1591) is again useful, because he combines Horace and Aristotle, and
practicalises the combination, identifying the Aristotelian or pseudo-
Aristotelian (see vol. i. p. 34) “Episode” with the first Four Acts, the
Exodus with the Fifth, &c. Maggi, Segni, Zabarella are even farther from
our sphere.
78. Let, however, the reader beware of being misled by the occurrence of
the word “Admiratio” in the side-notes of pp. 52, 53. It is used in quite a
different sense.
79. Perhaps, if this be true, the Irish got it from their French friends of the
seventeenth century, among whom, according to the Ménagiana, poeta
regius was the correct title of the King’s Fool.
80. Ut doceat, ut delectet, ut moveat. Suggested by Cicero on the orator.
81. P. 173. Amatorio mollique sermone effeminat. See Spingarn, p. 70. It
should, however, be observed that Minturno is here avowedly expressing
the censure of Aristophanes on Euripides rather than his own opinion.
82. “Vain and amatorious.”
83. Minturno mentions neither Cinthio (v. infra) nor Pigna—probably to
avoid the appearance of direct attack; but he must have been thinking of one
or the other or both. Something the same line was taken by Sperone
Speroni.
84. See next Book, p. 369.
85. Scritti Estetici di Giambattista Giraldi Cinthio, 2 vols., Milan, 1864.
(In Daelli’s Biblioteca Rara.) This edition gives extracts from Pigna’s work,
and documents respecting the quarrel.
86. To speak correctly, Seneca prefers (Agamemnon, Hercules Furens, H.
Œtæus, Medea, Troades) to compose the First Act of a soliloquy and a
chorus. This, when the chorus is not present, becomes of course a
Page 92
monologue. In the Hippolytus, Octavia, Thebais, and Thyestes, there is
dialogue in the first Act. But, even of these, the first two begin with a lyrical
monologue, which is in effect a first Scene.
87. Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, p. 232.
88. Venice, 1554, 4to.
89. For the neat little edition of this by Karl Wotke (Berlin, 1894) one
must be thankful, and also for the careful bibliographical introduction on
recent work concerning Renaissance Literature.
90. Op. cit., pp. 62, 63, 70. Giraldus also knows Colet, Grocyn, and
others of the set.
91. “Fuere et in Britannorum idiomate et eorum vernaculo sermone aliqui
poetæ ab iis summo in pretio habiti, inter quos Galfridus Chaucerus qui
multa scripsit, et Thomas Viatus.” That he adds “ambo insignes equites” is
very pardonable.
92. Not merely northern Humanists like Reuchlin, Erasmus, Eobanus
Hessus, and Hutten, not merely Greeks from Gemistus Pletho to Musurus
and Lascaris, but foreign vernacular writers like Ressendi, Juan de la Mena,
Marot, Martial d’Auvergne receive notice.
93. The supposed date of the conversation is, as usual in such case,
thrown a good deal back.
94. He allows him (p. 18, ed. cit.) “sweetness and wit,” but says nescio
quare as to the contemporary praise of the Hermaphroditus, and adds
plumply, nec poeta bonus nec bonus orator. The simple fact is that, if the
subjects of this notorious book were decent, nobody would see anything but
quite ordinary merit in their treatment.
95. Ed. cit., p. 25.
96. As a rough but not misleading gauge of this it may be mentioned that
Herr Wotke’s Namenregister contains for less than 100 printed pages,
dialogue in the first Act. But, even of these, the first two begin with a lyrical
monologue, which is in effect a first Scene.
87. Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, p. 232.
88. Venice, 1554, 4to.
89. For the neat little edition of this by Karl Wotke (Berlin, 1894) one
must be thankful, and also for the careful bibliographical introduction on
recent work concerning Renaissance Literature.
90. Op. cit., pp. 62, 63, 70. Giraldus also knows Colet, Grocyn, and
others of the set.
91. “Fuere et in Britannorum idiomate et eorum vernaculo sermone aliqui
poetæ ab iis summo in pretio habiti, inter quos Galfridus Chaucerus qui
multa scripsit, et Thomas Viatus.” That he adds “ambo insignes equites” is
very pardonable.
92. Not merely northern Humanists like Reuchlin, Erasmus, Eobanus
Hessus, and Hutten, not merely Greeks from Gemistus Pletho to Musurus
and Lascaris, but foreign vernacular writers like Ressendi, Juan de la Mena,
Marot, Martial d’Auvergne receive notice.
93. The supposed date of the conversation is, as usual in such case,
thrown a good deal back.
94. He allows him (p. 18, ed. cit.) “sweetness and wit,” but says nescio
quare as to the contemporary praise of the Hermaphroditus, and adds
plumply, nec poeta bonus nec bonus orator. The simple fact is that, if the
subjects of this notorious book were decent, nobody would see anything but
quite ordinary merit in their treatment.
95. Ed. cit., p. 25.
96. As a rough but not misleading gauge of this it may be mentioned that
Herr Wotke’s Namenregister contains for less than 100 printed pages,
Page 93
between four and five hundred entries, including, besides those noticed in
the text, names like those of Olympia Morata and Bilibald Pirkheimer,
Castiglione and Alciati, Conrad Celtes and Paulus Jovius, Cardinal Perotti
and Jacob Wimpheling. In fact, hardly any one in Europe who had to do
with belles lettres seems to have been outside the cognisance, in closer or
vaguer kind, of Giraldus.
the text, names like those of Olympia Morata and Bilibald Pirkheimer,
Castiglione and Alciati, Conrad Celtes and Paulus Jovius, Cardinal Perotti
and Jacob Wimpheling. In fact, hardly any one in Europe who had to do
with belles lettres seems to have been outside the cognisance, in closer or
vaguer kind, of Giraldus.
Page 94
CHAPTER III.
SCALIGER, CASTELVETRO, AND THE LATER ITALIAN
CRITICS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
JULIUS CÆSAR SCALIGER—THE ‘POETIC’—BOOK I.: ‘HISTORICUS’—BOOK II.:
‘HYLE’—BOOKS III. AND IV.: ‘IDEA’ AND ‘PARASCEVE’—BOOKS V. AND VI.:
‘CRITICUS’ AND ‘HYPERCRITICUS’—BOOK VII.: EPINOMIS—GENERAL IDEAS ON
UNITY AND THE LIKE—HIS VIRGIL-WORSHIP—HIS SOLID MERITS—
CASTELVETRO—THE OPERE VARIE—THE ‘POETICA’—ON DRAMATIC
CONDITIONS—ON THE THREE UNITIES—ON THE FREEDOM OF EPIC—HIS
ECCENTRIC ACUTENESS—EXAMPLES: HOMER’S NODDING, PROSE IN TRAGEDY,
VIRGIL, MINOR POETRY—THE MEDIUM AND END OF POETRY—
UNCOMPROMISING CHAMPIONSHIP OF DELIGHT—HIS EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST
AND IMPORTANCE—TASSO AND THE CONTROVERSIES OVER THE
‘GERUSALEMME’—TASSO’S CRITICAL WRITINGS AND POSITION—PATRIZZI: HIS
‘POETICA’—THE ‘DECA ISTORIALE’—THE ‘DECA DISPUTATA’—THE ‘TRIMERONE’
ON TASSO—REMARKABLE POSITION OF PATRIZZI—‘SED CONTRA MUNDUM’—
THE LATEST GROUP OF SIXTEENTH-CENTURY CRITICS—PARTENIO—VIPERANO
—PICCOLOMINI—GILIO—MAZZONI—DENORES—ZINANO—MAZZONE DA
MIGLIONICO, ETC.—SUMMO.
In the remarkable little book, a notice of which concluded the last
chapter, Lilius Giraldus, as we observed, includes—for their verse-work
nominally, as became his title, but, with his usual acuteness, obviously
perceiving that their importance lay elsewhere—both of the most famous
and influential critics of the central sixteenth century in Italy. His reference
Julius Cæsar to Julius Cæsar Scaliger (who was, indeed, not more than
Scaliger.
six years younger than himself) contains some touches
(such as the mention of him by the name he took, but with the addition “qui
primus Bordonus cognomine fuit,” and the description of his book on
Comic Metres, as “arranged with such wonderful subtlety as not to be
intelligible save to a reader well versed in the subject”) which are of
doubtful friendliness, but allows the Veronese gladiator to be apprime
eruditus and capable of carmina elegantia. For us nothing of Scaliger’s
needs detailed notice except the once world-famous and still famous
Poetices Libri Septem,[97] which appeared in 1561 after the death of
Giraldus, and indeed after his own.
SCALIGER, CASTELVETRO, AND THE LATER ITALIAN
CRITICS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
JULIUS CÆSAR SCALIGER—THE ‘POETIC’—BOOK I.: ‘HISTORICUS’—BOOK II.:
‘HYLE’—BOOKS III. AND IV.: ‘IDEA’ AND ‘PARASCEVE’—BOOKS V. AND VI.:
‘CRITICUS’ AND ‘HYPERCRITICUS’—BOOK VII.: EPINOMIS—GENERAL IDEAS ON
UNITY AND THE LIKE—HIS VIRGIL-WORSHIP—HIS SOLID MERITS—
CASTELVETRO—THE OPERE VARIE—THE ‘POETICA’—ON DRAMATIC
CONDITIONS—ON THE THREE UNITIES—ON THE FREEDOM OF EPIC—HIS
ECCENTRIC ACUTENESS—EXAMPLES: HOMER’S NODDING, PROSE IN TRAGEDY,
VIRGIL, MINOR POETRY—THE MEDIUM AND END OF POETRY—
UNCOMPROMISING CHAMPIONSHIP OF DELIGHT—HIS EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST
AND IMPORTANCE—TASSO AND THE CONTROVERSIES OVER THE
‘GERUSALEMME’—TASSO’S CRITICAL WRITINGS AND POSITION—PATRIZZI: HIS
‘POETICA’—THE ‘DECA ISTORIALE’—THE ‘DECA DISPUTATA’—THE ‘TRIMERONE’
ON TASSO—REMARKABLE POSITION OF PATRIZZI—‘SED CONTRA MUNDUM’—
THE LATEST GROUP OF SIXTEENTH-CENTURY CRITICS—PARTENIO—VIPERANO
—PICCOLOMINI—GILIO—MAZZONI—DENORES—ZINANO—MAZZONE DA
MIGLIONICO, ETC.—SUMMO.
In the remarkable little book, a notice of which concluded the last
chapter, Lilius Giraldus, as we observed, includes—for their verse-work
nominally, as became his title, but, with his usual acuteness, obviously
perceiving that their importance lay elsewhere—both of the most famous
and influential critics of the central sixteenth century in Italy. His reference
Julius Cæsar to Julius Cæsar Scaliger (who was, indeed, not more than
Scaliger.
six years younger than himself) contains some touches
(such as the mention of him by the name he took, but with the addition “qui
primus Bordonus cognomine fuit,” and the description of his book on
Comic Metres, as “arranged with such wonderful subtlety as not to be
intelligible save to a reader well versed in the subject”) which are of
doubtful friendliness, but allows the Veronese gladiator to be apprime
eruditus and capable of carmina elegantia. For us nothing of Scaliger’s
needs detailed notice except the once world-famous and still famous
Poetices Libri Septem,[97] which appeared in 1561 after the death of
Giraldus, and indeed after his own.
Page 95
Scaliger was very much better qualified than Boileau to be législateur du
Parnasse in the sense in which both understood Parnassus: or perhaps it
would be better to say that without a Scaliger a Boileau would have been
The Poetic. impossible. He had immense learning; he had absolute
confidence in his own judgment; and within limits which, if they reduce his
positive value, make him an even more complete and direct exponent of his
own particular school and creed, he had great acuteness, an orderly and
logical spirit, and a thorough command of method. Nothing (certain
inevitable postulates being granted) can be more luminous and intelligible
than the book, in which the author, through all his thousand pages, never
loses sight, nor permits his reader to lose sight, of the subject, the process,
and the goal. That he stands forth in the preface to his son Sylvius with an
air of patronage at once paternal and pedagogic, announcing himself as the
pioneer of the subject, dismissing those who allege Varro, as with levity
ignoring the fact that neither Varro nor anybody else in antiquity did, or
could do, anything of the kind: that he blandly sweeps away the plebs
grammaticorum; that he labels the Ars Poetica itself as teaching adeo sine
ulla arte ut saturæ propius esse videatur, Aristotle as fragmentary, Vida as
optimus poeta in theatro, claudus magister in schola—is all of it agreeably
Scaligerian in manner. But it is far from being untrue in fact. And there is a
touch of sublimity in the Quare porro opera danda est nobis, “wherefore
we must put our shoulders to the wheel,” with which he concludes. “Let
others grub money, or canvass for office, or talk about the wars as parasite
guests at dinner: we will let them alone, and simply defend the nobility of
our studies, the magnanimity and simplicity of our purpose.” After this
magnificent pose and draping, and before commendatory verses (the main
copy being by no less a person than Etienne de La Boétie) comes a table of
contents of antique clearness and solidity, filling nearly a dozen pages, by
means of which, and of the more than sixty of index at the end, the study of
the text is not a little facilitated.
The First Book has the special title, Qui et Historicus, which it deserves,
Book I.: if not exactly or exclusively in our sense of History. The
Historicus.
critic begins, scholastically enough, with a distribution of
everything into necessary, useful, or delightful, and proceeds to apply the
classification in a beneficial manner to literary expression in general and
Poetry in particular, ending the chapter with a characteristic gibe (for
Scaliger is far from unhumorous) at the moderns who confine the
Parnasse in the sense in which both understood Parnassus: or perhaps it
would be better to say that without a Scaliger a Boileau would have been
The Poetic. impossible. He had immense learning; he had absolute
confidence in his own judgment; and within limits which, if they reduce his
positive value, make him an even more complete and direct exponent of his
own particular school and creed, he had great acuteness, an orderly and
logical spirit, and a thorough command of method. Nothing (certain
inevitable postulates being granted) can be more luminous and intelligible
than the book, in which the author, through all his thousand pages, never
loses sight, nor permits his reader to lose sight, of the subject, the process,
and the goal. That he stands forth in the preface to his son Sylvius with an
air of patronage at once paternal and pedagogic, announcing himself as the
pioneer of the subject, dismissing those who allege Varro, as with levity
ignoring the fact that neither Varro nor anybody else in antiquity did, or
could do, anything of the kind: that he blandly sweeps away the plebs
grammaticorum; that he labels the Ars Poetica itself as teaching adeo sine
ulla arte ut saturæ propius esse videatur, Aristotle as fragmentary, Vida as
optimus poeta in theatro, claudus magister in schola—is all of it agreeably
Scaligerian in manner. But it is far from being untrue in fact. And there is a
touch of sublimity in the Quare porro opera danda est nobis, “wherefore
we must put our shoulders to the wheel,” with which he concludes. “Let
others grub money, or canvass for office, or talk about the wars as parasite
guests at dinner: we will let them alone, and simply defend the nobility of
our studies, the magnanimity and simplicity of our purpose.” After this
magnificent pose and draping, and before commendatory verses (the main
copy being by no less a person than Etienne de La Boétie) comes a table of
contents of antique clearness and solidity, filling nearly a dozen pages, by
means of which, and of the more than sixty of index at the end, the study of
the text is not a little facilitated.
The First Book has the special title, Qui et Historicus, which it deserves,
Book I.: if not exactly or exclusively in our sense of History. The
Historicus.
critic begins, scholastically enough, with a distribution of
everything into necessary, useful, or delightful, and proceeds to apply the
classification in a beneficial manner to literary expression in general and
Poetry in particular, ending the chapter with a characteristic gibe (for
Scaliger is far from unhumorous) at the moderns who confine the
Page 96
appellation “Makers” to candle-makers.[98] Then he follows the safe road by
discussing the causes (material, formal, &c.) of poetry; and indulges in a
free review (for Scaliger, to do him justice, is paratus nullius jurare in
verba) of ancient opinions. Hence he sets off to a full enumeration and
examination, not merely of the kinds of poetry, but (in connection more
especially with the drama) of the theatres and games of the ancients.
Nothing escapes the extensive view of his observation, neither palinodes
nor parodies, neither centos nor enigmas. And he is intensive as well as
extensive. He rebukes, in his usual magisterial manner, the Græculas nugas
of Plutarch, who explains the number of the Muses by that of the letters in
the name of their mother, Mnemosyne; and as for Plato’s blame of poetry,
respiceat ipse sese quot ineptas quot spurcas fabellas inserat.[99] The
distinction of Poesis, Poema, and Poeta, which follows (and which many
grave writers, including Ben, copy), we have often met in kind or in itself
before, nor is it quite so meticulous as it looks. For Scaliger utilises it to
stop the blunder of Plutarch and others, who make a distinction in kind
between great poems and smaller ones. It is tempting but impossible to
follow him through the multitudinous, though far from mazy, ramifications
of his plan. It must be enough to say that he leaves few items of the
dictionary of his subject untouched, and (however inclined one may be to
cry “Halt and fight!” at not a few of his definitions) formulates them with a
roundness and a touch of confident mastery which fully explain, and to
some extent justify, the practical dictatorship which he so long enjoyed. As
thus (at the opening of chap. vi. p. 27), “Tragedy, like Comedy established
in examples of human life, differs from it in three things—the condition of
the persons, the quality of the fortunes and actions, the end. Whence it is
necessary that it should also differ in style.” And this legislative calmness is
accompanied and fortified by a profusion of erudite example, which might
well awe the disciple.
The second book, Qui et Hyle, gives us an important point at once, in the
Book II.: Hyle. fact that this hyle—this “material” of poetry—is frankly
acknowledged to be verse.[100] The entire book is occupied, at the rate of a
chapter apiece, after the half-dozen general ones which open it, with almost
every classical metre, if not from pyrrhic to dochmiac, at least from iambic
to galliambic. A great number of interesting dicta might be extracted from
this book—as, for instance, Scaliger’s remarkable distinction of Rhythm
discussing the causes (material, formal, &c.) of poetry; and indulges in a
free review (for Scaliger, to do him justice, is paratus nullius jurare in
verba) of ancient opinions. Hence he sets off to a full enumeration and
examination, not merely of the kinds of poetry, but (in connection more
especially with the drama) of the theatres and games of the ancients.
Nothing escapes the extensive view of his observation, neither palinodes
nor parodies, neither centos nor enigmas. And he is intensive as well as
extensive. He rebukes, in his usual magisterial manner, the Græculas nugas
of Plutarch, who explains the number of the Muses by that of the letters in
the name of their mother, Mnemosyne; and as for Plato’s blame of poetry,
respiceat ipse sese quot ineptas quot spurcas fabellas inserat.[99] The
distinction of Poesis, Poema, and Poeta, which follows (and which many
grave writers, including Ben, copy), we have often met in kind or in itself
before, nor is it quite so meticulous as it looks. For Scaliger utilises it to
stop the blunder of Plutarch and others, who make a distinction in kind
between great poems and smaller ones. It is tempting but impossible to
follow him through the multitudinous, though far from mazy, ramifications
of his plan. It must be enough to say that he leaves few items of the
dictionary of his subject untouched, and (however inclined one may be to
cry “Halt and fight!” at not a few of his definitions) formulates them with a
roundness and a touch of confident mastery which fully explain, and to
some extent justify, the practical dictatorship which he so long enjoyed. As
thus (at the opening of chap. vi. p. 27), “Tragedy, like Comedy established
in examples of human life, differs from it in three things—the condition of
the persons, the quality of the fortunes and actions, the end. Whence it is
necessary that it should also differ in style.” And this legislative calmness is
accompanied and fortified by a profusion of erudite example, which might
well awe the disciple.
The second book, Qui et Hyle, gives us an important point at once, in the
Book II.: Hyle. fact that this hyle—this “material” of poetry—is frankly
acknowledged to be verse.[100] The entire book is occupied, at the rate of a
chapter apiece, after the half-dozen general ones which open it, with almost
every classical metre, if not from pyrrhic to dochmiac, at least from iambic
to galliambic. A great number of interesting dicta might be extracted from
this book—as, for instance, Scaliger’s remarkable distinction of Rhythm
Page 97
and Metre, as giving, the latter the more exact measure of the line, the
former its continuity and “temperament.”[101]
The third, Qui et Idea, is far longer than either of the preceding, and is
Books III. and less easily describable to modern readers. Those who have
IV.: Idea and
Parasceve.
read the first volume of this book with some care will
understand it without much difficulty, if we call it a
throwing of the traditional and technical treatment of Rhetoric into a form
suitable to Poetry. Prosopopœia and ethopœia; the bearings or “colours” of
time, place, race, sex, and the rest; the considerations of chance and
manners and fortune; lead us to our old friends the Figures. To these, giving
them the most liberal interpretation possible, so as to include fresh kinds of
poetry as well as actual turns of speech, Scaliger complacently allows
nearly a hundred out of the nearly hundred and thirty chapters of this
overgrown Book, comprising by itself nearly a full quarter of the volume.
Nor does even this devotion to Figures satisfy him, for the Fourth Book,
Qui et Parasceve (preparation), beginning with the characters or
distinctions of style, turns before long to more Figures, and is, in fact, a sort
of Part II. of the Third. Naturally, there is no part of the book more difficult
to analyse, but, as naturally, there is none in which analysis is less required.
Scaliger luxuriates in his opportunities of sub-division and sub-definition;
but he abounds ever more and more in those examples which we have
recognised as, from the time of Hermogenes downwards, the “solace of this
sin,” and the plentifulness of which in Scaliger himself would, even if they
stood alone, go some way to atone for the absence of a larger examination
of writers as wholes. And he does not allow us to lack even this.
Another pair of Books, the Fifth (Qui et Criticus) and the Sixth (Qui et
Hypercriticus), together constitute the pith and body of the book in spirit,
Books V. and and occupy more than a third of it in space. It is here that
VI.: Criticus
and
Scaliger lets himself and his learning loose. The Fifth Book
Hypercriticus. consists of a vast series of cross-comparisons, Homer with
Virgil, Greeks with Latins, Virgil with Greeks other than
Homer, Horace and Ovid with Greeks, Latins with other Latins, special
subject-passages of the same theme from different authors. Its sequel, the
Hypercriticus, undertakes, for the first time, an actual survey of belles
lettres as Scaliger understood them, beginning, after an odd discussion of
Plautus and Terence, with the Renaissance Humanists (many Italians and a
few Germans and French), and then receding through three Ages (the
former its continuity and “temperament.”[101]
The third, Qui et Idea, is far longer than either of the preceding, and is
Books III. and less easily describable to modern readers. Those who have
IV.: Idea and
Parasceve.
read the first volume of this book with some care will
understand it without much difficulty, if we call it a
throwing of the traditional and technical treatment of Rhetoric into a form
suitable to Poetry. Prosopopœia and ethopœia; the bearings or “colours” of
time, place, race, sex, and the rest; the considerations of chance and
manners and fortune; lead us to our old friends the Figures. To these, giving
them the most liberal interpretation possible, so as to include fresh kinds of
poetry as well as actual turns of speech, Scaliger complacently allows
nearly a hundred out of the nearly hundred and thirty chapters of this
overgrown Book, comprising by itself nearly a full quarter of the volume.
Nor does even this devotion to Figures satisfy him, for the Fourth Book,
Qui et Parasceve (preparation), beginning with the characters or
distinctions of style, turns before long to more Figures, and is, in fact, a sort
of Part II. of the Third. Naturally, there is no part of the book more difficult
to analyse, but, as naturally, there is none in which analysis is less required.
Scaliger luxuriates in his opportunities of sub-division and sub-definition;
but he abounds ever more and more in those examples which we have
recognised as, from the time of Hermogenes downwards, the “solace of this
sin,” and the plentifulness of which in Scaliger himself would, even if they
stood alone, go some way to atone for the absence of a larger examination
of writers as wholes. And he does not allow us to lack even this.
Another pair of Books, the Fifth (Qui et Criticus) and the Sixth (Qui et
Hypercriticus), together constitute the pith and body of the book in spirit,
Books V. and and occupy more than a third of it in space. It is here that
VI.: Criticus
and
Scaliger lets himself and his learning loose. The Fifth Book
Hypercriticus. consists of a vast series of cross-comparisons, Homer with
Virgil, Greeks with Latins, Virgil with Greeks other than
Homer, Horace and Ovid with Greeks, Latins with other Latins, special
subject-passages of the same theme from different authors. Its sequel, the
Hypercriticus, undertakes, for the first time, an actual survey of belles
lettres as Scaliger understood them, beginning, after an odd discussion of
Plautus and Terence, with the Renaissance Humanists (many Italians and a
few Germans and French), and then receding through three Ages (the
Page 98
Middle disdainfully excluded), to Catullus and Horace. Here, of course, one
may, according to taste or temperament, most revel in, or most shudder
away from, “criticism of criticism.” Here the citation is most opulent and
useful. Here, above all, the most hostile judge must be forced to admire and
acknowledge the erudition which not merely for the first time attempts, but
for the first time completely meets the initial requirements of, a complete
examination of poetic literature on a definite and reasoned basis. But here,
inevitably, the weakness of Scaliger comes out most strongly, as well as his
strength. Not only was his judgment warped in more ways than one by
prejudice, but we are, with all the goodwill in the world, forced before long
to conclude[102] that his taste itself was radically defective. Nor does this
conclusion rest merely on his preference (anticipated by Vida and others,
and almost an article of national faith) of Virgil to Homer. His estimate of
Musæus also as far superior to Homer, as incomparable among Greeks, as
“worthy of Virgil,” speaks this taste only too well; and the fearless good
faith with which, disdaining the “guile that lurks in generals,” he quotes line
after line as specially beautiful, delivers him into our hands, a respectable
but self-convicted victim. After this the “coldness” and “childishness” and
“unsuitability” of the Homeric epithet, the “semper-august” character of
Virgil, and innumerable other things of the kind, disturb us not. Scaliger’s
idol has spoken Scaliger’s doom in Qui Bavium non odit—not, of course,
that Hero and Leander is itself by any means Bavian, but that it is so in
comparison with Homer. Nearly a hundred pages are given up to this main
comparison of Homer and Virgil. The others are shorter, but always result in
the same dogged maintenance of the superiority of Latins to Greeks—that is
to say, the same involuntary confession of Scaliger’s preference of Rhetoric
to Poetry. It is interesting, however, to find him conducting his comparisons
in a way in which, as in most other cases, posterity for two centuries
thronged to follow him—the assemblage, that is to say, of passages on the
same subject from different poets.
Still less can we abstract the curious and invaluable survey of the
Hypercriticus. Not a little of it is actual review of actual contemporaries or
very recent predecessors, and review of the ancients takes the same form,
reinforced constantly by discussed quotations. Sometimes, as in the case of
Juvenal, these are arranged into a little anthology of “jewels five words
long,” strung together with acute et hoc, illud valde festivum, and the like
may, according to taste or temperament, most revel in, or most shudder
away from, “criticism of criticism.” Here the citation is most opulent and
useful. Here, above all, the most hostile judge must be forced to admire and
acknowledge the erudition which not merely for the first time attempts, but
for the first time completely meets the initial requirements of, a complete
examination of poetic literature on a definite and reasoned basis. But here,
inevitably, the weakness of Scaliger comes out most strongly, as well as his
strength. Not only was his judgment warped in more ways than one by
prejudice, but we are, with all the goodwill in the world, forced before long
to conclude[102] that his taste itself was radically defective. Nor does this
conclusion rest merely on his preference (anticipated by Vida and others,
and almost an article of national faith) of Virgil to Homer. His estimate of
Musæus also as far superior to Homer, as incomparable among Greeks, as
“worthy of Virgil,” speaks this taste only too well; and the fearless good
faith with which, disdaining the “guile that lurks in generals,” he quotes line
after line as specially beautiful, delivers him into our hands, a respectable
but self-convicted victim. After this the “coldness” and “childishness” and
“unsuitability” of the Homeric epithet, the “semper-august” character of
Virgil, and innumerable other things of the kind, disturb us not. Scaliger’s
idol has spoken Scaliger’s doom in Qui Bavium non odit—not, of course,
that Hero and Leander is itself by any means Bavian, but that it is so in
comparison with Homer. Nearly a hundred pages are given up to this main
comparison of Homer and Virgil. The others are shorter, but always result in
the same dogged maintenance of the superiority of Latins to Greeks—that is
to say, the same involuntary confession of Scaliger’s preference of Rhetoric
to Poetry. It is interesting, however, to find him conducting his comparisons
in a way in which, as in most other cases, posterity for two centuries
thronged to follow him—the assemblage, that is to say, of passages on the
same subject from different poets.
Still less can we abstract the curious and invaluable survey of the
Hypercriticus. Not a little of it is actual review of actual contemporaries or
very recent predecessors, and review of the ancients takes the same form,
reinforced constantly by discussed quotations. Sometimes, as in the case of
Juvenal, these are arranged into a little anthology of “jewels five words
long,” strung together with acute et hoc, illud valde festivum, and the like
Page 99
appreciative interjections. His preference of Juvenal to Horace is seasoned
with a characteristic fling at Erasmus (p. 876).
Book VII.: Lastly comes an Epinomis or Codicil, which is divided
Epinomis.
into two parts, and takes up some of the special points of
poetical or dramatic criticism then most interesting—the relative
importance of action and character, the parts of tragedy, the Chorus, the
metres most appropriate to the stage, and the like, ending with a sort of
“gratillity” or bonus in the shape of an examination of a codex of Terence,
which we could spare, at least in this place. More piquant, at least, are the
diatribes de negligentia aut inscitia professorum, directed (with a show of
respect) against Erasmus once more; the occasional flights, such as “Variety
is the tirewoman of poetry”[103] (p. 906); the amusing references to mea
poemata, which in some parts of the book he has obligingly, and once more
with a fearlessness drawing nigh to rashness, exposed to the arrows; and
other things which are perhaps here all the more numerous because the
Book is an avowed Appendix, and, as it were, omnium gatherum. They are,
however, plentiful everywhere; and if it were possible to revive the old
periodical Literary Miscellanies of commonplace-book character—a thing
which will have to be done sooner or later, if the accumulations of the last
few centuries are not to became mere Nineveh-mounds, as yet unexplored
—I should like to compose a florilegium of memorabilia out of Scaliger.
For in this great space, occupied with equal method and erudition, it
could not be but that remarkable pronouncements on the more general
questions of literary criticism, whether given obiter or in definite reference
General ideas on to argued questions, should emerge. Scaliger is, indeed, less
Unity and the
like.
set than most of his predecessors in Italian criticism, and
than some at least of his successors, on these general
pronouncements. “The disinterested and philosophic treatment of æsthetic
problems wholly aside from all practical considerations,” as the tendency of
Italian criticism has been rather unguardedly characterised,[104] does not
seem to have had the first attraction for him. Yet he could not, in the wide
sweep of his net, have avoided such questions if he would; and, with his
fearless temper and eager literary interests, there is no reason to suppose
that he would have avoided them if he could. He did not explicitly enjoin
the Three Unities,[105] but he did more than any other man had done to
inculcate that unfortunate notion of “verisimilitude”[106] from which, much
more than from Aristotle, they were deduced. Not many words need be
with a characteristic fling at Erasmus (p. 876).
Book VII.: Lastly comes an Epinomis or Codicil, which is divided
Epinomis.
into two parts, and takes up some of the special points of
poetical or dramatic criticism then most interesting—the relative
importance of action and character, the parts of tragedy, the Chorus, the
metres most appropriate to the stage, and the like, ending with a sort of
“gratillity” or bonus in the shape of an examination of a codex of Terence,
which we could spare, at least in this place. More piquant, at least, are the
diatribes de negligentia aut inscitia professorum, directed (with a show of
respect) against Erasmus once more; the occasional flights, such as “Variety
is the tirewoman of poetry”[103] (p. 906); the amusing references to mea
poemata, which in some parts of the book he has obligingly, and once more
with a fearlessness drawing nigh to rashness, exposed to the arrows; and
other things which are perhaps here all the more numerous because the
Book is an avowed Appendix, and, as it were, omnium gatherum. They are,
however, plentiful everywhere; and if it were possible to revive the old
periodical Literary Miscellanies of commonplace-book character—a thing
which will have to be done sooner or later, if the accumulations of the last
few centuries are not to became mere Nineveh-mounds, as yet unexplored
—I should like to compose a florilegium of memorabilia out of Scaliger.
For in this great space, occupied with equal method and erudition, it
could not be but that remarkable pronouncements on the more general
questions of literary criticism, whether given obiter or in definite reference
General ideas on to argued questions, should emerge. Scaliger is, indeed, less
Unity and the
like.
set than most of his predecessors in Italian criticism, and
than some at least of his successors, on these general
pronouncements. “The disinterested and philosophic treatment of æsthetic
problems wholly aside from all practical considerations,” as the tendency of
Italian criticism has been rather unguardedly characterised,[104] does not
seem to have had the first attraction for him. Yet he could not, in the wide
sweep of his net, have avoided such questions if he would; and, with his
fearless temper and eager literary interests, there is no reason to suppose
that he would have avoided them if he could. He did not explicitly enjoin
the Three Unities,[105] but he did more than any other man had done to
inculcate that unfortunate notion of “verisimilitude”[106] from which, much
more than from Aristotle, they were deduced. Not many words need be
Page 100
wasted (especially as the point will recur only too often during the volume)
on the absurdity of this wresting of Incredulus odi. The whole arrangements
of the theatre are invraisemblables, no matter whether you have electric
light or cross-shaped laths with candles on them, marquises sitting on the
stage or millionaires in stage-boxes, elaborate scenery or directions to the
audience, “Here is Thebes.” You do not murder, or (if you can help it) make
love, in real life, before a miscellaneous audience who have paid to see you
do it; in real life you do not talk in any regular stage lingo that has hitherto
been invented, whether the outward form of it be senarii, or fourteeners, or
complicated rhymed stanzas, or doggerel, or couplet, or blank verse, or
stage prose. The sixteenth century Globe, and the twentieth century Lyceum,
are alike unlike any place in which one habitually performs any action of
life from birth, through marriage, to death. That there is a stage
verisimilitude, which it is dangerous or fatal to break, need not be denied.
But neither Scaliger nor any of his successors in purism has proved that we
are, or ought to be, any more shocked by Æschylus when he shifts from
Delphi to Athens than by Thackeray when he transports us from Flanders to
Chelsea.
We may venture indeed to suspect that Scaliger “had more wit than to be
here.” One may frequently differ with him; but he seldom runs mad on mere
theory. It is he, for instance, who, while, as we have seen, he lays down
uncompromisingly that the material of poetry is verse, instances the
Æthiopica as a perfect epic. Instead of confusing poetry and learning, as
some have done, he holds the much more sensible position that learning is
useful to a poet. He takes the hard-and-fast ethical view of the ends both of
tragedy and of all poetry, and he believes firmly in the type. But he does not
bemuse himself, as some had done and more were to do, in the explanation
of katharsis, and the definition of the tragic hero.
His greatest and also his most pervading critical fault is that “deification
of Virgil,” whereof, though by no means the inventor, he was the chief
His Virgil- prophet to the best part of three centuries. Let it be
worship.
admitted (with every possible emphasis on the fact that it is
no mere extorted admission but a genuine and spontaneous opinion) that
anybody is free to admire Virgil or any one else as much as he likes. “She
that is fair to him” is so, and there’s an end on’t. But if any one proceed, not
merely to intimate indifference to other fair ones, but to find positive fault
with them because they are not like her, then he becomes at once uncritical:
on the absurdity of this wresting of Incredulus odi. The whole arrangements
of the theatre are invraisemblables, no matter whether you have electric
light or cross-shaped laths with candles on them, marquises sitting on the
stage or millionaires in stage-boxes, elaborate scenery or directions to the
audience, “Here is Thebes.” You do not murder, or (if you can help it) make
love, in real life, before a miscellaneous audience who have paid to see you
do it; in real life you do not talk in any regular stage lingo that has hitherto
been invented, whether the outward form of it be senarii, or fourteeners, or
complicated rhymed stanzas, or doggerel, or couplet, or blank verse, or
stage prose. The sixteenth century Globe, and the twentieth century Lyceum,
are alike unlike any place in which one habitually performs any action of
life from birth, through marriage, to death. That there is a stage
verisimilitude, which it is dangerous or fatal to break, need not be denied.
But neither Scaliger nor any of his successors in purism has proved that we
are, or ought to be, any more shocked by Æschylus when he shifts from
Delphi to Athens than by Thackeray when he transports us from Flanders to
Chelsea.
We may venture indeed to suspect that Scaliger “had more wit than to be
here.” One may frequently differ with him; but he seldom runs mad on mere
theory. It is he, for instance, who, while, as we have seen, he lays down
uncompromisingly that the material of poetry is verse, instances the
Æthiopica as a perfect epic. Instead of confusing poetry and learning, as
some have done, he holds the much more sensible position that learning is
useful to a poet. He takes the hard-and-fast ethical view of the ends both of
tragedy and of all poetry, and he believes firmly in the type. But he does not
bemuse himself, as some had done and more were to do, in the explanation
of katharsis, and the definition of the tragic hero.
His greatest and also his most pervading critical fault is that “deification
of Virgil,” whereof, though by no means the inventor, he was the chief
His Virgil- prophet to the best part of three centuries. Let it be
worship.
admitted (with every possible emphasis on the fact that it is
no mere extorted admission but a genuine and spontaneous opinion) that
anybody is free to admire Virgil or any one else as much as he likes. “She
that is fair to him” is so, and there’s an end on’t. But if any one proceed, not
merely to intimate indifference to other fair ones, but to find positive fault
with them because they are not like her, then he becomes at once uncritical:
Page 101
still more so if he erect her qualities, features, style, into abstract virtues and
positive truths, all opposites to which are sin and vileness. He may call
“Simula Silene, nervosa et lignea Dorcas,” to take two only out of the
famous list in the classic place of this matter. But he must not declare that a
girl who has a straight Grecian nose is therefore ugly, or that softness and
plumpness are not excellent things in woman. Scaliger does this. For him
Virgil is, at once, the standard of excellence and the infallible touchstone of
defect. Nay, he is actually a better Nature; a wiser but more perfect
Creation, whereby you may save yourself the trouble of outside imitation,
inasmuch as everything worth imitating is there better done than by Nature
herself. It is impossible to exaggerate or caricature Scaliger’s Maronolatry:
as the Highfliers did in the case of Defoe’s Shortest Way, he would
cheerfully accept and indorse the most outrageous statement of it.
Grave, however, as is this fault, and seriously as it vitiates Scaliger’s
attitude as a critic, there is no doubt that it served in itself as the backbone
of that attitude, and gave it the stiffness which enabled it to resist at once
argument and time. A cause of disquiet to some critics themselves, and a
rallying-cry to most enemies of criticism, has been constantly found in the
apparently floating and uncertain character of the completest critical
orthodoxy. Longinus himself, perhaps the best exponent of that orthodoxy,
has been and is charged with vagueness; and all those who follow him must
lay their account with the same accusation. In the last resort we often
cannot give a clear, definite, cut-and-dried reason for the faith that is in us,
and we still oftener had better not try to do so. Scaliger and Scaligerism are
in no such plight. Their Sortes Virgilianæ are ex hypothesi decisive, and of
universal application. What is found in Virgil is good, is the best; what is
different from Virgil is bad or mediocre; what is like Virgil is good in direct
proportion to the likeness. This of itself gives confidence both to the critic
and to his disciples.
Again, Scaliger, though he has no more right to arrogate Reason and
Nature as on his side than the rest of his school, possesses, like all of the
His solid merits. best of them, a certain sturdy prima facie common-sense. It
is this which dictates his theory of dramatic verisimilitude; this which
palliates some of his Homeric and other blasphemies. Though
uncompromisingly moral, and by no means illogical (when you have once
granted his bundle of postulates), he is not in the least metaphysical. The
positive truths, all opposites to which are sin and vileness. He may call
“Simula Silene, nervosa et lignea Dorcas,” to take two only out of the
famous list in the classic place of this matter. But he must not declare that a
girl who has a straight Grecian nose is therefore ugly, or that softness and
plumpness are not excellent things in woman. Scaliger does this. For him
Virgil is, at once, the standard of excellence and the infallible touchstone of
defect. Nay, he is actually a better Nature; a wiser but more perfect
Creation, whereby you may save yourself the trouble of outside imitation,
inasmuch as everything worth imitating is there better done than by Nature
herself. It is impossible to exaggerate or caricature Scaliger’s Maronolatry:
as the Highfliers did in the case of Defoe’s Shortest Way, he would
cheerfully accept and indorse the most outrageous statement of it.
Grave, however, as is this fault, and seriously as it vitiates Scaliger’s
attitude as a critic, there is no doubt that it served in itself as the backbone
of that attitude, and gave it the stiffness which enabled it to resist at once
argument and time. A cause of disquiet to some critics themselves, and a
rallying-cry to most enemies of criticism, has been constantly found in the
apparently floating and uncertain character of the completest critical
orthodoxy. Longinus himself, perhaps the best exponent of that orthodoxy,
has been and is charged with vagueness; and all those who follow him must
lay their account with the same accusation. In the last resort we often
cannot give a clear, definite, cut-and-dried reason for the faith that is in us,
and we still oftener had better not try to do so. Scaliger and Scaligerism are
in no such plight. Their Sortes Virgilianæ are ex hypothesi decisive, and of
universal application. What is found in Virgil is good, is the best; what is
different from Virgil is bad or mediocre; what is like Virgil is good in direct
proportion to the likeness. This of itself gives confidence both to the critic
and to his disciples.
Again, Scaliger, though he has no more right to arrogate Reason and
Nature as on his side than the rest of his school, possesses, like all of the
His solid merits. best of them, a certain sturdy prima facie common-sense. It
is this which dictates his theory of dramatic verisimilitude; this which
palliates some of his Homeric and other blasphemies. Though
uncompromisingly moral, and by no means illogical (when you have once
granted his bundle of postulates), he is not in the least metaphysical. The
Page 102
wayfaring man, with tolerable intelligence and a very little trouble, can
understand him perfectly.
Still more unmixed praise can be given to him from other points of view.
To any scholar his scholarship is singularly refreshing in its thoroughness
and range; he really neglects nothing proper to his subject, though he may
define that subject with a somewhat arbitrary hand. Agree with him or differ
with him as we may, it is an infinite comfort to be brought thus in contact
and confrontation with the actual texts—to exchange the paper symbols of
“the poet,” “the dramatist,” “the satirist” in the abstract, for sound ringing
coin of actual poetry, drama, satire, told down on the counter, and tested by
file and acid if required. The literary atlas of the Hypercriticus is, as has
been said, the first attempt at a complete thing of the kind since Quintilian,
and of necessity far more complete than his. In fact, Scaliger taught the
school opposed to him—the school which after many a generation of
desultory fighting at last worsted his own—the way to conquer. History and
Comparison—the twin lights of criticism, the only road-makers across the
abyss—are resorted to by him fearlessly. That he loses the best of their
light, and twists the road in the wrong direction, by following Will-o'-the-
wisps like his Virgil-worship, matters in detail but not in principle. He has
practically come back to the safe way which Aristotle entered, but was
precluded from treading far enough, which Quintilian and Longinus trod,
but on which most of the ancients would not set foot. He has not found the
last secret—the secret of submitting to History and to Comparison; he still
looks upon both as instruments to be used merely under the direction of,
and in subordination to, the purposes of a priori theory. His neglect of the
vernaculars is not only wrong, but by his time absurd. His minor prejudices
(as against Erasmus) are sometimes contemptible. His actual taste, as has
been said, was probably neither delicate nor versatile. But he has learning,
logic, lucidity within his range, laborious industry, and love of literature.
The multitude which followed him followed him partly to do evil; but it
would have been a surprise, and almost a shame, had so bold and capable a
leader lacked a multitude of followers.
As has been said, Lilius Giraldus also refers to Lodovico Castelvetro,
who at least resembled Scaliger in the characteristic Ishmaelitism of the
Castelvetro. Renaissance critic. His quarrel with Caro, also already
referred to, was unluckily, we must not say distinguished, but marked, by
unfair play on the part of his adversary, who “delated” him to the
understand him perfectly.
Still more unmixed praise can be given to him from other points of view.
To any scholar his scholarship is singularly refreshing in its thoroughness
and range; he really neglects nothing proper to his subject, though he may
define that subject with a somewhat arbitrary hand. Agree with him or differ
with him as we may, it is an infinite comfort to be brought thus in contact
and confrontation with the actual texts—to exchange the paper symbols of
“the poet,” “the dramatist,” “the satirist” in the abstract, for sound ringing
coin of actual poetry, drama, satire, told down on the counter, and tested by
file and acid if required. The literary atlas of the Hypercriticus is, as has
been said, the first attempt at a complete thing of the kind since Quintilian,
and of necessity far more complete than his. In fact, Scaliger taught the
school opposed to him—the school which after many a generation of
desultory fighting at last worsted his own—the way to conquer. History and
Comparison—the twin lights of criticism, the only road-makers across the
abyss—are resorted to by him fearlessly. That he loses the best of their
light, and twists the road in the wrong direction, by following Will-o'-the-
wisps like his Virgil-worship, matters in detail but not in principle. He has
practically come back to the safe way which Aristotle entered, but was
precluded from treading far enough, which Quintilian and Longinus trod,
but on which most of the ancients would not set foot. He has not found the
last secret—the secret of submitting to History and to Comparison; he still
looks upon both as instruments to be used merely under the direction of,
and in subordination to, the purposes of a priori theory. His neglect of the
vernaculars is not only wrong, but by his time absurd. His minor prejudices
(as against Erasmus) are sometimes contemptible. His actual taste, as has
been said, was probably neither delicate nor versatile. But he has learning,
logic, lucidity within his range, laborious industry, and love of literature.
The multitude which followed him followed him partly to do evil; but it
would have been a surprise, and almost a shame, had so bold and capable a
leader lacked a multitude of followers.
As has been said, Lilius Giraldus also refers to Lodovico Castelvetro,
who at least resembled Scaliger in the characteristic Ishmaelitism of the
Castelvetro. Renaissance critic. His quarrel with Caro, also already
referred to, was unluckily, we must not say distinguished, but marked, by
unfair play on the part of his adversary, who “delated” him to the
Page 103
Inquisition for heresy; and Castelvetro had to fly the country. His most
important work appeared late, the famous edition and translation, with
commentary, of the Poetics[107] not being published till a year before his
death. “He was of his nature choleric,” says his biographer; and he
bestowed a good deal of this choler not merely upon Caro, but upon the
majestic Bembo and others. Yet Castelvetro was a very remarkable critic,
and perhaps deserved the ascription of actual critical genius better than any
man who has yet been mentioned in this volume. It is but for chequered
righteousness that his practically certain formulation of the Three Unities
can be counted to him; but, as we shall see, he has other claims, from which
it is not necessary to write off anything.
His impartial attachment to both classical and vulgar tongues ranks him,
of itself, in a higher sphere than that of Scaliger; and a certain impetuous,
incalculable, prime-sautier genius puts him higher still. Even
contemporaries seem to have recognised this in him, though they sometimes
shook their heads over its pronouncements.[108] It may, indeed, sometimes
seem that these pronouncements are, if not inconsistent, difficult to connect
by any central tie-beam of critical theory. But this is almost inevitable in the
case of a critic whose work takes the form, not of regular treatises on large
subjects, nor even of connected essays on separate authors and books, but
of commentaries and adversaria, where the passage immediately under
consideration is uppermost in the writer’s mind, and may—not
illegitimately in a fashion—induce him to display a facet of his thought
which does not seem logically connected with other facets. This peculiarity
is perhaps the only excuse for the depreciation of Dacier, who, reinforcing
his native dulness with the superciliousness of a Frenchman in the later
years of Louis XIV., accused Castelvetro of ignorance, and even of
contradiction of Aristotle. The fact is, that Castelvetro is first of all an
independent critic, and that, though there are few less common, there are no
more valuable critical qualities than independence, even when it is
sometimes pushed to the verge of eccentricity, providing only that it is
sincere, and not ill-informed. It seems to me uncharitable, if not flagrantly
unjust, to deny Castelvetro sincerity, and either impudent or ignorant to
deny him information.
But he had also acuteness and taste. I do not know a better example in
little of the latter quality at the time than his short and scornful
description[109] of a preposterous comparison by another critic,
important work appeared late, the famous edition and translation, with
commentary, of the Poetics[107] not being published till a year before his
death. “He was of his nature choleric,” says his biographer; and he
bestowed a good deal of this choler not merely upon Caro, but upon the
majestic Bembo and others. Yet Castelvetro was a very remarkable critic,
and perhaps deserved the ascription of actual critical genius better than any
man who has yet been mentioned in this volume. It is but for chequered
righteousness that his practically certain formulation of the Three Unities
can be counted to him; but, as we shall see, he has other claims, from which
it is not necessary to write off anything.
His impartial attachment to both classical and vulgar tongues ranks him,
of itself, in a higher sphere than that of Scaliger; and a certain impetuous,
incalculable, prime-sautier genius puts him higher still. Even
contemporaries seem to have recognised this in him, though they sometimes
shook their heads over its pronouncements.[108] It may, indeed, sometimes
seem that these pronouncements are, if not inconsistent, difficult to connect
by any central tie-beam of critical theory. But this is almost inevitable in the
case of a critic whose work takes the form, not of regular treatises on large
subjects, nor even of connected essays on separate authors and books, but
of commentaries and adversaria, where the passage immediately under
consideration is uppermost in the writer’s mind, and may—not
illegitimately in a fashion—induce him to display a facet of his thought
which does not seem logically connected with other facets. This peculiarity
is perhaps the only excuse for the depreciation of Dacier, who, reinforcing
his native dulness with the superciliousness of a Frenchman in the later
years of Louis XIV., accused Castelvetro of ignorance, and even of
contradiction of Aristotle. The fact is, that Castelvetro is first of all an
independent critic, and that, though there are few less common, there are no
more valuable critical qualities than independence, even when it is
sometimes pushed to the verge of eccentricity, providing only that it is
sincere, and not ill-informed. It seems to me uncharitable, if not flagrantly
unjust, to deny Castelvetro sincerity, and either impudent or ignorant to
deny him information.
But he had also acuteness and taste. I do not know a better example in
little of the latter quality at the time than his short and scornful
description[109] of a preposterous comparison by another critic,
Page 104
Bartolommeo Riccio, between the “Sparrow” of Catullus and a pretty but
The Opere commonplace poem of Navagero on a dog. One may sigh
Varie.
over the ruling passion, not to say the original sin, of
critical man, on passing from this to a tangle of recrimination and “that’s my
thunder” which follows with reference to Riccio and Pigna and Cinthio. But
this passes again into a solid discussion on the material and form of poetry,
and on the office of the Muses. Many of these animadversions are, as we
should expect, purely verbal, sometimes not beyond the powers of the
grammaticuccio, of whom Castelvetro himself not unfrequently talks with
piquant scorn. But the comfort of finding annotations on Virgil alternating
with discourses on Dante, like that of placing a quarto on Petrarch side by
side with one on Aristotle, more than atones for any occasional hair-
splitting. We are at last in the Jerusalem of general Literature which is the
mother of us all, which is free and universal; not in this or that separatist
Samaria or exclusive Hebron. The Platonic annotations, which are
numerous, are important, because they show just the other side of
Castelvetro’s talent from the merely verbal one—almost the whole of them
being devoted to the exposition and illustration of meaning. It is a great pity
that he did not work his notes[110] on the Gorgias (which he regards
expressly as Plato’s Rhetoric) into a regular treatise of contrast and
comparison on this subject between Aristotle and Plato. But all these notes
show us the qualification of the commentator to deal with so difficult a
subject as the Poetics.
The stout post quarto, with its vignette of an exceedingly determined-
looking owl standing on a prostrate pitcher and hooting Kekrika, is
The Poetica. dedicated to Maximilian II. It is arranged on a system
equally simple and thorough. First comes a section of the Greek Text; then a
short Italian summary of its contents; then the Italian translation; and then
the spositione—the Commentary—which may be long or short as
circumstances require. Often, on a Greek text of a few lines, it will run to as
many quarto pages, full-packed with small print. Not the least advantageous
part of this quadripartite arrangement is that the summaries—being, though
very brief, to the point—are capable of being put together as a table of
contents. This, however, but partially applies to Castelvetro’s commentary,
which is often not a little discursive from the text. The defect was, however,
supplied in the second edition by an elaborate index specially devoted to the
The Opere commonplace poem of Navagero on a dog. One may sigh
Varie.
over the ruling passion, not to say the original sin, of
critical man, on passing from this to a tangle of recrimination and “that’s my
thunder” which follows with reference to Riccio and Pigna and Cinthio. But
this passes again into a solid discussion on the material and form of poetry,
and on the office of the Muses. Many of these animadversions are, as we
should expect, purely verbal, sometimes not beyond the powers of the
grammaticuccio, of whom Castelvetro himself not unfrequently talks with
piquant scorn. But the comfort of finding annotations on Virgil alternating
with discourses on Dante, like that of placing a quarto on Petrarch side by
side with one on Aristotle, more than atones for any occasional hair-
splitting. We are at last in the Jerusalem of general Literature which is the
mother of us all, which is free and universal; not in this or that separatist
Samaria or exclusive Hebron. The Platonic annotations, which are
numerous, are important, because they show just the other side of
Castelvetro’s talent from the merely verbal one—almost the whole of them
being devoted to the exposition and illustration of meaning. It is a great pity
that he did not work his notes[110] on the Gorgias (which he regards
expressly as Plato’s Rhetoric) into a regular treatise of contrast and
comparison on this subject between Aristotle and Plato. But all these notes
show us the qualification of the commentator to deal with so difficult a
subject as the Poetics.
The stout post quarto, with its vignette of an exceedingly determined-
looking owl standing on a prostrate pitcher and hooting Kekrika, is
The Poetica. dedicated to Maximilian II. It is arranged on a system
equally simple and thorough. First comes a section of the Greek Text; then a
short Italian summary of its contents; then the Italian translation; and then
the spositione—the Commentary—which may be long or short as
circumstances require. Often, on a Greek text of a few lines, it will run to as
many quarto pages, full-packed with small print. Not the least advantageous
part of this quadripartite arrangement is that the summaries—being, though
very brief, to the point—are capable of being put together as a table of
contents. This, however, but partially applies to Castelvetro’s commentary,
which is often not a little discursive from the text. The defect was, however,
supplied in the second edition by an elaborate index specially devoted to the
Page 105
Spositioni, and consisting, not of mere words or names with page
references, but of reasoned descriptions of the subjects, as thus—
"Allegrezza.
“Come nasca dalla tristitia, che si sente del male del giusto, e del bene
del malvagio.
oblica, che si prende dalla miseria, o dalla felicita altrui qual sia,” &c.
&c.
This is a great help in tackling Castelvetro’s text, the book containing some
seven hundred pages, of perhaps as many words each.
No analysis of a book of such a size, so necessarily parasitic or satellitic
on another in general run, and yet branching and winding with such a self-
On Dramatic willed originality of its own, is possible. One might easily
conditions.
write a folio on Castelvetro’s quarto. Here we can only, as
in most other cases now, except those of books or parts of books at once
epoch-making in character and moderate in bulk, give an idea of the
author’s most important views on general and particular points. It was
necessary, since Castelvetro is revolving round Aristotle, that the greater
part of his treatise should deal with the drama: and perhaps nowhere is that
originality which has been praised more visible than here, whether it lead
him wrong or right. He has undoubtedly made a step, from the
mathematical towards the æsthetic view of literature, in conditioning, as he
does, his view of the Drama by a consideration of the stage. To literary a-
priorists this is of course horrible; to those who take the facts of literature,
as they take the facts of life, it is a welcome and reconciling discovery. The
conditions of the Greek stage were admittedly such as can never be
naturally reproduced, and therefore, however great and perfect the Greek
Tragedy may be in its own way, it cannot usurp the position of “best in all
ways”; and can still less pretend to dictate to other kinds that they shall not
be good at all in ways different from its own.
If the details of Castelvetro’s theory do not always correspond in
excellence to the sense and novelty of the general view, this is because he
adulterates his notion of stage requirements with that unlucky
“verisimilitude” misunderstood, which is the curse of all the neo-classic
critics, and which comes from neglect of the Aristotelian preference of the
probable-impossible to the improbable-possible. The huge Mysteries of the
references, but of reasoned descriptions of the subjects, as thus—
"Allegrezza.
“Come nasca dalla tristitia, che si sente del male del giusto, e del bene
del malvagio.
oblica, che si prende dalla miseria, o dalla felicita altrui qual sia,” &c.
&c.
This is a great help in tackling Castelvetro’s text, the book containing some
seven hundred pages, of perhaps as many words each.
No analysis of a book of such a size, so necessarily parasitic or satellitic
on another in general run, and yet branching and winding with such a self-
On Dramatic willed originality of its own, is possible. One might easily
conditions.
write a folio on Castelvetro’s quarto. Here we can only, as
in most other cases now, except those of books or parts of books at once
epoch-making in character and moderate in bulk, give an idea of the
author’s most important views on general and particular points. It was
necessary, since Castelvetro is revolving round Aristotle, that the greater
part of his treatise should deal with the drama: and perhaps nowhere is that
originality which has been praised more visible than here, whether it lead
him wrong or right. He has undoubtedly made a step, from the
mathematical towards the æsthetic view of literature, in conditioning, as he
does, his view of the Drama by a consideration of the stage. To literary a-
priorists this is of course horrible; to those who take the facts of literature,
as they take the facts of life, it is a welcome and reconciling discovery. The
conditions of the Greek stage were admittedly such as can never be
naturally reproduced, and therefore, however great and perfect the Greek
Tragedy may be in its own way, it cannot usurp the position of “best in all
ways”; and can still less pretend to dictate to other kinds that they shall not
be good at all in ways different from its own.
If the details of Castelvetro’s theory do not always correspond in
excellence to the sense and novelty of the general view, this is because he
adulterates his notion of stage requirements with that unlucky
“verisimilitude” misunderstood, which is the curse of all the neo-classic
critics, and which comes from neglect of the Aristotelian preference of the
probable-impossible to the improbable-possible. The huge Mysteries of the
Page 106
On the Three Middle Ages, which ranged from Heaven to Hell, which
Unities.
took weeks to act, and covered millennia in their action, did
at least this good to the English and some other theatres—that they
familiarised the mind with the neglect of this verisimilitude. But Castelvetro
would have none of such neglect. His play must be adjusted, not merely in
Action, but in Space and Time, as nearly as possible to the actual capacity
of the stage, the actual duration of the performance.[111] And so the Fatal
Three, the Weird Sisters of dramatic criticism, the vampires that sucked the
blood out of nearly all European tragedy, save in England and Spain, for
three centuries, make their appearance. They “enter the critical literature of
Europe,” as Mr Spingarn has very truly laid it down,[112] “from the time of
Castelvetro.”
But to balance this enslaving of the Drama (in which he far exceeds
Aristotle), Castelvetro frees the Epic from Aristotelian restrictions in an
On the freedom almost equally important manner. From his references in
of Epic.
the Opere Varie to Cinthio and Pigna, it would appear that
he claimed, if not priority, an even portion with them in the consideration of
the subject of Epic Poetry. And though not agreeing with them altogether,
he certainly agrees with them in enlarging the domains of the Epic. Poetry,
he says in effect,[113] may do anything that History can do; and, like the
latter, it may deal, not only with one action of one man, but with his life-
actions, or with many actions of many men.
With Castelvetro, however,—and it is probably the cause why pedants
like Dacier undervalue him,—both the character of his compositions, and
probably also the character of his mind, draw him much more to
independent, though by no means always or often isolated, critical aperçus
and judgments, than to theoretical discourses, with or without illustration.
His eccentric To put it differently, while there is usually a theory at the
acuteness.
back of his appreciations, the appreciation generally stands
in front of the theory. But however this may be, that quality of
“unexpectedness,” in which some æsthetic theorists have found such a
charm, belongs to him as it does to few critics. One might, for instance,
give half-a-dozen guesses to a tolerably ingenious person without his hitting
on Castelvetro’s objection to the story of Ricciardetto and Fiordispina in the
Orlando.[114] That objection is not moral: not on the ground of what is
ordinarily called decorum: not on that of digression, on that of
improbability generally, on any other that is likely to occur. It is, if you
Unities.
took weeks to act, and covered millennia in their action, did
at least this good to the English and some other theatres—that they
familiarised the mind with the neglect of this verisimilitude. But Castelvetro
would have none of such neglect. His play must be adjusted, not merely in
Action, but in Space and Time, as nearly as possible to the actual capacity
of the stage, the actual duration of the performance.[111] And so the Fatal
Three, the Weird Sisters of dramatic criticism, the vampires that sucked the
blood out of nearly all European tragedy, save in England and Spain, for
three centuries, make their appearance. They “enter the critical literature of
Europe,” as Mr Spingarn has very truly laid it down,[112] “from the time of
Castelvetro.”
But to balance this enslaving of the Drama (in which he far exceeds
Aristotle), Castelvetro frees the Epic from Aristotelian restrictions in an
On the freedom almost equally important manner. From his references in
of Epic.
the Opere Varie to Cinthio and Pigna, it would appear that
he claimed, if not priority, an even portion with them in the consideration of
the subject of Epic Poetry. And though not agreeing with them altogether,
he certainly agrees with them in enlarging the domains of the Epic. Poetry,
he says in effect,[113] may do anything that History can do; and, like the
latter, it may deal, not only with one action of one man, but with his life-
actions, or with many actions of many men.
With Castelvetro, however,—and it is probably the cause why pedants
like Dacier undervalue him,—both the character of his compositions, and
probably also the character of his mind, draw him much more to
independent, though by no means always or often isolated, critical aperçus
and judgments, than to theoretical discourses, with or without illustration.
His eccentric To put it differently, while there is usually a theory at the
acuteness.
back of his appreciations, the appreciation generally stands
in front of the theory. But however this may be, that quality of
“unexpectedness,” in which some æsthetic theorists have found such a
charm, belongs to him as it does to few critics. One might, for instance,
give half-a-dozen guesses to a tolerably ingenious person without his hitting
on Castelvetro’s objection to the story of Ricciardetto and Fiordispina in the
Orlando.[114] That objection is not moral: not on the ground of what is
ordinarily called decorum: not on that of digression, on that of
improbability generally, on any other that is likely to occur. It is, if you
Page 107
please, that as Fiordispina was a Mahometan, and Ricciardetto a Christian,
and as Christians and Mahometans do not believe in the same kind of Fauns
and Fairies, as, further, Fauns do not eat ladies or goddesses, whether alive
or dead, Ricciardetto’s explanation of his alleged transformation of sex is
not credible. In a modern writer this would look like an absolute absence of
humour, or like a clumsy attempt at it; and I am not prepared to say that
humour was a strong point with these Italian critics as a rule. But
Castelvetro strikes me as being by no means exceptionally unprovided with
it: and such a glaring lapse as this is probably due to the intense seriousness
with which these critical questions, new as they were, presented themselves
to him and to his class.
They get, as was once said, “into logical coaches”; and are perfectly
content to be driven over no matter what minor precipices, and into no
matter what sloughs of despond, so long as they are not actually thrown out.
Yet Castelvetro at least is never dull. At one time[115] he compares the
“somnolent indecorum,” the sconvenevolezza sonnachiosa, of Homer to the
practice of German innkeepers (whether observed by himself in his exile, or
taken from Erasmus, one cannot say) in putting the worst wines and viands
on the table first, and the best later. Elsewhere[116] he gives a very curious
reason against that other sconvenevolezza (this sonorous word is a great
favourite with him) which he too saw in the use of prose for tragedy—
namely, that in reciting verse the speaker naturally raises his voice, and so
makes it more audible to the audience. He has been blamed for adopting the
notion of rank being necessary to tragic characters, but on this see ante (p.
61).
His irreverent independence in regard to Virgil is noticeable in a critic of
Examples: Homer’s his time, and of course especially so if one comes
nodding, prose in tragedy,
Virgil, minor poetry.
to him straight from Scaliger. It would not be fair
to represent him as a “Virgiliomastix,” but his
finer critical sense enables him to perceive the superiority of Homer, in
respect of whom he goes so far[117] as to say that Virgil “is not a poet.” But
this—per se, of course, excessive—had been provoked by the extravagance
of Maronolatry from Vida downwards: and Castelvetro does not scruple to
praise the Mantuan for his grasp, his variety of phrase, and other good
things. He has an extremely sensible passage—not novel to us, but by no
means a truism to his contemporaries or to a good many poets still—on
what he who publishes miscellaneous poetry has to expect. By the
and as Christians and Mahometans do not believe in the same kind of Fauns
and Fairies, as, further, Fauns do not eat ladies or goddesses, whether alive
or dead, Ricciardetto’s explanation of his alleged transformation of sex is
not credible. In a modern writer this would look like an absolute absence of
humour, or like a clumsy attempt at it; and I am not prepared to say that
humour was a strong point with these Italian critics as a rule. But
Castelvetro strikes me as being by no means exceptionally unprovided with
it: and such a glaring lapse as this is probably due to the intense seriousness
with which these critical questions, new as they were, presented themselves
to him and to his class.
They get, as was once said, “into logical coaches”; and are perfectly
content to be driven over no matter what minor precipices, and into no
matter what sloughs of despond, so long as they are not actually thrown out.
Yet Castelvetro at least is never dull. At one time[115] he compares the
“somnolent indecorum,” the sconvenevolezza sonnachiosa, of Homer to the
practice of German innkeepers (whether observed by himself in his exile, or
taken from Erasmus, one cannot say) in putting the worst wines and viands
on the table first, and the best later. Elsewhere[116] he gives a very curious
reason against that other sconvenevolezza (this sonorous word is a great
favourite with him) which he too saw in the use of prose for tragedy—
namely, that in reciting verse the speaker naturally raises his voice, and so
makes it more audible to the audience. He has been blamed for adopting the
notion of rank being necessary to tragic characters, but on this see ante (p.
61).
His irreverent independence in regard to Virgil is noticeable in a critic of
Examples: Homer’s his time, and of course especially so if one comes
nodding, prose in tragedy,
Virgil, minor poetry.
to him straight from Scaliger. It would not be fair
to represent him as a “Virgiliomastix,” but his
finer critical sense enables him to perceive the superiority of Homer, in
respect of whom he goes so far[117] as to say that Virgil “is not a poet.” But
this—per se, of course, excessive—had been provoked by the extravagance
of Maronolatry from Vida downwards: and Castelvetro does not scruple to
praise the Mantuan for his grasp, his variety of phrase, and other good
things. He has an extremely sensible passage—not novel to us, but by no
means a truism to his contemporaries or to a good many poets still—on
what he who publishes miscellaneous poetry has to expect. By the
Page 108
publication, says this other Messer Lodovico, of a thing which nobody
asked him for (cosa non richiesta) without any necessity, he publishes at the
same time his confidence in himself, and affirms that the thing is good.
“Which thing,” goes on Castelvetro in his pitiless critical manner, “if it be
found to be faulty (rea) and blameworthy, it convicts him who publishes it
either of malice or of folly.” Alas! for the minor bard.
His attitude[118] to the everlastingly vexed question of the connection of
verse and poetry is very sensible, and practically anticipates, with less
reluctant circumlocution, that of Coleridge, who in more things than one
The medium and comes close to Castelvetro, and who probably knew him.
end of Poetry.
He does not here contradict Aristotle by denying that verse
is un-essential to poetry. But he insists—and points out the undoubted truth
that Aristotle’s practice, whatever his theory may do, admits this—that
Verse is a kind of inseparable accident of poetry,—that it is the appropriate
garb and uniform thereof, which cannot be abandoned without impropriety.
And he takes up this attitude still more emphatically in regard to the closely
connected, and still more important, question of the end of Poetry. Here, as
Uncompromisin we have seen, the great Master of Criticism temporised. He
g championship
of Delight.
did not doubt that this end was Delight: but in deference to
idols, partly of the Cavern, partly of the Market-place, he
yokes and hampers this end with moral improvement, with Imitation, itself
for itself, and so on. Castelvetro is much more uncompromising. One
shudders, almost as much as one rejoices, at the audacity of a critic who in
mid-sixteenth-century calmly says, “What do beginning, middle, and end
matter in a poem, provided it delights?”[119] Nay, Castelvetro has reached a
point of view which has since been attained by very few critics, and which
some who thought they had gained this peak in Darien first may be mildly
chagrined to find occupied by him—the view that there are different
qualities of poetry, suited to delight different qualities of persons and of
mind.
How seldom this view has been taken all critics ought to know, if they do
not. Even now he who climbs the peak must lay his account with stone-
throwing from the garrisons of other points. That Burns administers, and
has a right to administer, one delight to one class of mind, Shelley another
to another; that Béranger is not to be denied the wine of poetry because his
vintage is not the vintage of Hugo: that Longfellow, and Cowper, and
George Herbert are not to be sneered at because their delight is the delight
asked him for (cosa non richiesta) without any necessity, he publishes at the
same time his confidence in himself, and affirms that the thing is good.
“Which thing,” goes on Castelvetro in his pitiless critical manner, “if it be
found to be faulty (rea) and blameworthy, it convicts him who publishes it
either of malice or of folly.” Alas! for the minor bard.
His attitude[118] to the everlastingly vexed question of the connection of
verse and poetry is very sensible, and practically anticipates, with less
reluctant circumlocution, that of Coleridge, who in more things than one
The medium and comes close to Castelvetro, and who probably knew him.
end of Poetry.
He does not here contradict Aristotle by denying that verse
is un-essential to poetry. But he insists—and points out the undoubted truth
that Aristotle’s practice, whatever his theory may do, admits this—that
Verse is a kind of inseparable accident of poetry,—that it is the appropriate
garb and uniform thereof, which cannot be abandoned without impropriety.
And he takes up this attitude still more emphatically in regard to the closely
connected, and still more important, question of the end of Poetry. Here, as
Uncompromisin we have seen, the great Master of Criticism temporised. He
g championship
of Delight.
did not doubt that this end was Delight: but in deference to
idols, partly of the Cavern, partly of the Market-place, he
yokes and hampers this end with moral improvement, with Imitation, itself
for itself, and so on. Castelvetro is much more uncompromising. One
shudders, almost as much as one rejoices, at the audacity of a critic who in
mid-sixteenth-century calmly says, “What do beginning, middle, and end
matter in a poem, provided it delights?”[119] Nay, Castelvetro has reached a
point of view which has since been attained by very few critics, and which
some who thought they had gained this peak in Darien first may be mildly
chagrined to find occupied by him—the view that there are different
qualities of poetry, suited to delight different qualities of persons and of
mind.
How seldom this view has been taken all critics ought to know, if they do
not. Even now he who climbs the peak must lay his account with stone-
throwing from the garrisons of other points. That Burns administers, and
has a right to administer, one delight to one class of mind, Shelley another
to another; that Béranger is not to be denied the wine of poetry because his
vintage is not the vintage of Hugo: that Longfellow, and Cowper, and
George Herbert are not to be sneered at because their delight is the delight
Page 109
of cheering but not of intoxication; that Keble is not intrinsically the less a
poet because he is not Beddoes, or Charles Wesley because he is not
Charles Baudelaire—or vice versa in all the cases—these are propositions
which not every critic—which perhaps not very many critics—will admit
even in the abstract, and which in practice almost every critic falsifies and
renounces at some time or other.[120] But they are propositions which follow
fairly, and indeed inevitably, from Castelvetro’s theory of the necessary end,
Delight, and the varying adjustment of the delighting agent to the patient’s
faculty of being delighted.
He is perhaps less sound in his absolute condemnation of “knowledge” as
material for poetry. He is right in black-marking Fracastoro from this point
of view: but he is certainly not right in extending the black mark to
Lucretius. The fact is, that even he could not wrench himself sufficiently
free from the trammels of old time to see that in the treatment lies the
faculty of delighting, and that therefore, on his own scheme, the treatment is
the poetry.
There are few writers to be dealt with in this volume—none, I think,
already dealt with—to whom it would be more satisfactory to devote the
His exceptional minutest handling than to Castelvetro. He has been called
interest and
importance.
by Mr Spingarn “revolutionary.” The term, in an American
mouth, probably has no unfavourable connotation; but
waiving that connotation altogether, I should be inclined to demur to it.
Even the Vehmgericht (if one may rely on the leading case of Vgr. v.
Philipson, reported by Sir Walter Scott) acquitted of High Treason those
who had spoken evil of it in countries where its authority was not
acknowledged, and indeed its name hardly known. Now, Castelvetro was
dealing—as we must, for his honour as well as for our comprehension of
him, remember that he dealt—with modern as well as with ancient literature
at once, and instead of adopting the injudicious though natural separation of
Minturno, or the one-sided treatment of Scaliger, was constantly exploring,
and always more or less keeping in view, territories not merely in which
Aristotle’s writ did not run, but which in Aristotle’s time were No Man’s
Land and terra incognita. He can no more be regarded as a revolutionary or
a rebel, in framing new laws for the new facts, than a man could be
regarded in either light for disregarding the Curfew Law at the North Pole,
or for disobeying sumptuary regulations as to the use of woollen in the
tropics. His ethos is really that of the self-reliant, resourceful, and
poet because he is not Beddoes, or Charles Wesley because he is not
Charles Baudelaire—or vice versa in all the cases—these are propositions
which not every critic—which perhaps not very many critics—will admit
even in the abstract, and which in practice almost every critic falsifies and
renounces at some time or other.[120] But they are propositions which follow
fairly, and indeed inevitably, from Castelvetro’s theory of the necessary end,
Delight, and the varying adjustment of the delighting agent to the patient’s
faculty of being delighted.
He is perhaps less sound in his absolute condemnation of “knowledge” as
material for poetry. He is right in black-marking Fracastoro from this point
of view: but he is certainly not right in extending the black mark to
Lucretius. The fact is, that even he could not wrench himself sufficiently
free from the trammels of old time to see that in the treatment lies the
faculty of delighting, and that therefore, on his own scheme, the treatment is
the poetry.
There are few writers to be dealt with in this volume—none, I think,
already dealt with—to whom it would be more satisfactory to devote the
His exceptional minutest handling than to Castelvetro. He has been called
interest and
importance.
by Mr Spingarn “revolutionary.” The term, in an American
mouth, probably has no unfavourable connotation; but
waiving that connotation altogether, I should be inclined to demur to it.
Even the Vehmgericht (if one may rely on the leading case of Vgr. v.
Philipson, reported by Sir Walter Scott) acquitted of High Treason those
who had spoken evil of it in countries where its authority was not
acknowledged, and indeed its name hardly known. Now, Castelvetro was
dealing—as we must, for his honour as well as for our comprehension of
him, remember that he dealt—with modern as well as with ancient literature
at once, and instead of adopting the injudicious though natural separation of
Minturno, or the one-sided treatment of Scaliger, was constantly exploring,
and always more or less keeping in view, territories not merely in which
Aristotle’s writ did not run, but which in Aristotle’s time were No Man’s
Land and terra incognita. He can no more be regarded as a revolutionary or
a rebel, in framing new laws for the new facts, than a man could be
regarded in either light for disregarding the Curfew Law at the North Pole,
or for disobeying sumptuary regulations as to the use of woollen in the
tropics. His ethos is really that of the self-reliant, resourceful, and
Page 110
adventurous explorer, as he has been called—of the experimenter in new
material and under new conditions. That the paths he strikes out sometimes
lead to culs-de-sac—that the experiments he makes sometimes fail, is
nothing more than is natural, than is inevitable in the circumstances.
More generally his value is great, and we may forgive him (especially
since he did us little or no harm) the binding of the Unities on the necks of
Frenchmen and Italians, in consideration of the inestimable service which
he did in standing up for Epic—that is, Romantic—Unity of a different
kind, and in formulating, in a “No Surrender” fashion, the doctrine of
Delight as the Poetic Criterion. By doing this he not merely fought for the
freedom of the long narrative poem (which, as it happens, has been a matter
of minor importance, save at rare intervals, since his time), but he
unknowingly safeguarded the freedom of the long narrative prose romance
or novel, which was to be the most important new contribution of modern
times to literature. Nor may it be amiss once more to draw attention to a
more general merit still, the inestimable indifference with which he
continually handles ancient and modern examples. Only by this—the wisest
“indifference of the wise”—can true criticism be reached. It is an
indifference which neglects no change of condition, which takes count of all
features and circumstances, but which, for that very reason, declines to
allow ancient literature to prescribe unconditionally to modern, or modern
to ancient, or either to mediæval. As to this last, Castelvetro has, and could
be expected to have, nothing to say: as to the others, he is more eloquent in
practice than in express theory. But his practice speaks his conviction, and it
is the practice by which, and by which alone, the serene temples of the
really Higher Criticism can be reached.
The last third of the century provides only one author who deserves
(though he has seldom received) at least equal attention with Scaliger and
Castelvetro: but it has, like the second, a crowd of minor critics who must
Tasso and the not be wholly passed over. Moreover, it boasts—if such a
controversies
over the
thing be a subject of boasting—one equally famous and
Gerusalemme. weary controversy, that over the Gerusalemme. This, which
expects the critical historian as its prey, and will test his
powers to the utmost if haply he may wrestle free of it at once without
inadequacy and without tedium, we may dare first: may take the interesting
single figure of Patrizzi or Patrici second, and then may sweep the rest into
material and under new conditions. That the paths he strikes out sometimes
lead to culs-de-sac—that the experiments he makes sometimes fail, is
nothing more than is natural, than is inevitable in the circumstances.
More generally his value is great, and we may forgive him (especially
since he did us little or no harm) the binding of the Unities on the necks of
Frenchmen and Italians, in consideration of the inestimable service which
he did in standing up for Epic—that is, Romantic—Unity of a different
kind, and in formulating, in a “No Surrender” fashion, the doctrine of
Delight as the Poetic Criterion. By doing this he not merely fought for the
freedom of the long narrative poem (which, as it happens, has been a matter
of minor importance, save at rare intervals, since his time), but he
unknowingly safeguarded the freedom of the long narrative prose romance
or novel, which was to be the most important new contribution of modern
times to literature. Nor may it be amiss once more to draw attention to a
more general merit still, the inestimable indifference with which he
continually handles ancient and modern examples. Only by this—the wisest
“indifference of the wise”—can true criticism be reached. It is an
indifference which neglects no change of condition, which takes count of all
features and circumstances, but which, for that very reason, declines to
allow ancient literature to prescribe unconditionally to modern, or modern
to ancient, or either to mediæval. As to this last, Castelvetro has, and could
be expected to have, nothing to say: as to the others, he is more eloquent in
practice than in express theory. But his practice speaks his conviction, and it
is the practice by which, and by which alone, the serene temples of the
really Higher Criticism can be reached.
The last third of the century provides only one author who deserves
(though he has seldom received) at least equal attention with Scaliger and
Castelvetro: but it has, like the second, a crowd of minor critics who must
Tasso and the not be wholly passed over. Moreover, it boasts—if such a
controversies
over the
thing be a subject of boasting—one equally famous and
Gerusalemme. weary controversy, that over the Gerusalemme. This, which
expects the critical historian as its prey, and will test his
powers to the utmost if haply he may wrestle free of it at once without
inadequacy and without tedium, we may dare first: may take the interesting
single figure of Patrizzi or Patrici second, and then may sweep the rest into
Page 111
a conclusion, which will itself leave not a little summarising to be done in
the Interchapter succeeding this Book.
Torquato Tasso was, in more ways than one, fated to the ordeal of
controversy. His work would, in the already unfolded state and temper of
Italian criticism on the subject of the “heroic poem,” have invited it in any
case; but he had, in a manner, inherited the adventure. His father, Bernardo,
as has been briefly recorded above, had himself taken much interest in
critical questions; and after being at first a classicist, had come round to the
position of Cinthio. It was Torquato’s object, by argument and example
alike, to reconcile the combatants. His Discorsi did not appear till late in
1587;[121] but they are said to have been written some twenty years earlier,
after the appearance of Minturno’s Italian book. His plan is as simply
obvious—shall we say as obviously defective?—as that of the immortal
contributor to the Eatanswill Gazette. He, too, “combined his information.”
Some kind of Unity is to be imposed on the Romantic Variety; and though
this Unity cannot possibly be the Aristotelian, it need not be quite such a
different kind as that of Castelvetro. It is to be organic, but may permit itself
the organs of a complex animal system.
Nor did Tasso stick to generalities; nor did he shrink from giving
hostages to fortune, and his enemies, by embodying his ideas in practice.
These ideas we have already seen floating in various critical minds from
Fracastorius to Castelvetro. The “heroic poem”—for his theory and his
example alike consecrated that word for use, instead of either “epic” or
“romance,” for nearly two centuries—must not be pure invention, but must
avail itself of the authority of history. It must be animated by religion, true
religion—that is to say, Christianity. It must have the supernatural. The hero
must be a pious and moral, if not necessarily faultless, character. It must not
be too dogmatic—that the poet may be free. It must deal with ancient or
modern history so as to be neither absolutely unfamiliar, nor too familiar in
its atmosphere and manners. The persons, things, and scenes must be noble
and stately. It will probably strike every one that this is an admirable receipt
for a historical novel; and thus do we constantly find blind strivings at
things that cannot yet get themselves born. But whether it is an equally
good receipt for a poem may be doubted. Some of us, at least, have no
doubt that the Gerusalemme, which is faithfully constructed in accordance
with it, is not nearly so good a poem as the Orlando, for the graceless
the Interchapter succeeding this Book.
Torquato Tasso was, in more ways than one, fated to the ordeal of
controversy. His work would, in the already unfolded state and temper of
Italian criticism on the subject of the “heroic poem,” have invited it in any
case; but he had, in a manner, inherited the adventure. His father, Bernardo,
as has been briefly recorded above, had himself taken much interest in
critical questions; and after being at first a classicist, had come round to the
position of Cinthio. It was Torquato’s object, by argument and example
alike, to reconcile the combatants. His Discorsi did not appear till late in
1587;[121] but they are said to have been written some twenty years earlier,
after the appearance of Minturno’s Italian book. His plan is as simply
obvious—shall we say as obviously defective?—as that of the immortal
contributor to the Eatanswill Gazette. He, too, “combined his information.”
Some kind of Unity is to be imposed on the Romantic Variety; and though
this Unity cannot possibly be the Aristotelian, it need not be quite such a
different kind as that of Castelvetro. It is to be organic, but may permit itself
the organs of a complex animal system.
Nor did Tasso stick to generalities; nor did he shrink from giving
hostages to fortune, and his enemies, by embodying his ideas in practice.
These ideas we have already seen floating in various critical minds from
Fracastorius to Castelvetro. The “heroic poem”—for his theory and his
example alike consecrated that word for use, instead of either “epic” or
“romance,” for nearly two centuries—must not be pure invention, but must
avail itself of the authority of history. It must be animated by religion, true
religion—that is to say, Christianity. It must have the supernatural. The hero
must be a pious and moral, if not necessarily faultless, character. It must not
be too dogmatic—that the poet may be free. It must deal with ancient or
modern history so as to be neither absolutely unfamiliar, nor too familiar in
its atmosphere and manners. The persons, things, and scenes must be noble
and stately. It will probably strike every one that this is an admirable receipt
for a historical novel; and thus do we constantly find blind strivings at
things that cannot yet get themselves born. But whether it is an equally
good receipt for a poem may be doubted. Some of us, at least, have no
doubt that the Gerusalemme, which is faithfully constructed in accordance
with it, is not nearly so good a poem as the Orlando, for the graceless
Page 112
graces of which it was expressly devised to substitute something more
orderly and decent.
The extensive and execrable controversy which followed did not,
however, turn wholly, though it very largely turned, on the actual case of
Ariosto v. Tasso. But, as usually happens, the partisans of the latter
provoked it by unadvised laudations of him, and worse-advised attacks on
his great predecessor. The Florentines had not, as such, any special reason
for championing the “turnip-eating” Ariosto; but Tasso had offended the
coteries of the Della Crusca, and a Della Cruscan chief, the Salviati already
mentioned, took the field against the author of the Gerusalemme. He sallied
forth in turn; and the bickering became universal. Five mortal volumes of
the standard edition of Tasso appear to be occupied with an incomplete
collection of the documents on the subject—a collection which I have not
read and do not intend to read, but which whosoever rejoices in such things
may, if he likes, supplement with all the Histories of Italian Literature from
Tiraboschi downwards, and all the Lives of Tasso, especially those of
Serassi in the eighteenth century and Solerti in the nineteenth.
The most important upshot of the controversy is not itself in dispute. The
impregnable historical position of Cinthio was strangely neglected by both
sides (except by Ishmaelite outsiders like Bruno and Patrizzi); nor was even
the modified Aristotelianism and “Unitarianism” of Castelvetro, as a rule,
attempted. Both sides swore fealty to Aristotle, and all debated what
Aristotle meant—what Unity was. And, in spite of the exceptions, this was
the condition in which the question was left to the next century.
The controversy, like that between Caro and Castelvetro, and (I fear it
must be said) like literary controversies in general, did not pass off without
a muddying of the waters. Salviati, Tasso’s chief adversary, and author of
the dialogue L’Infarinato against him, had at first been a great admirer and
almost flatterer of the Gerusalemme, had offered the author his friendship,
had praised his scheme, and had actually proposed to celebrate it in that
very commentary on the Poetics which Mr Spingarn (who has read it in
MS.) describes as actually devoted to “undermining Tasso’s pretensions.”
Exactly by what personal, or cliquish, or patriotic offences he was induced
to take the opposite line, belongs to the obscure, dull, and disgusting history
of these literary squabbles generally, and we need not concern ourselves
with it. The points “for us” in the whole matter are, first, that the
controversy shows the strong hold which a certain conception of criticism
orderly and decent.
The extensive and execrable controversy which followed did not,
however, turn wholly, though it very largely turned, on the actual case of
Ariosto v. Tasso. But, as usually happens, the partisans of the latter
provoked it by unadvised laudations of him, and worse-advised attacks on
his great predecessor. The Florentines had not, as such, any special reason
for championing the “turnip-eating” Ariosto; but Tasso had offended the
coteries of the Della Crusca, and a Della Cruscan chief, the Salviati already
mentioned, took the field against the author of the Gerusalemme. He sallied
forth in turn; and the bickering became universal. Five mortal volumes of
the standard edition of Tasso appear to be occupied with an incomplete
collection of the documents on the subject—a collection which I have not
read and do not intend to read, but which whosoever rejoices in such things
may, if he likes, supplement with all the Histories of Italian Literature from
Tiraboschi downwards, and all the Lives of Tasso, especially those of
Serassi in the eighteenth century and Solerti in the nineteenth.
The most important upshot of the controversy is not itself in dispute. The
impregnable historical position of Cinthio was strangely neglected by both
sides (except by Ishmaelite outsiders like Bruno and Patrizzi); nor was even
the modified Aristotelianism and “Unitarianism” of Castelvetro, as a rule,
attempted. Both sides swore fealty to Aristotle, and all debated what
Aristotle meant—what Unity was. And, in spite of the exceptions, this was
the condition in which the question was left to the next century.
The controversy, like that between Caro and Castelvetro, and (I fear it
must be said) like literary controversies in general, did not pass off without
a muddying of the waters. Salviati, Tasso’s chief adversary, and author of
the dialogue L’Infarinato against him, had at first been a great admirer and
almost flatterer of the Gerusalemme, had offered the author his friendship,
had praised his scheme, and had actually proposed to celebrate it in that
very commentary on the Poetics which Mr Spingarn (who has read it in
MS.) describes as actually devoted to “undermining Tasso’s pretensions.”
Exactly by what personal, or cliquish, or patriotic offences he was induced
to take the opposite line, belongs to the obscure, dull, and disgusting history
of these literary squabbles generally, and we need not concern ourselves
with it. The points “for us” in the whole matter are, first, that the
controversy shows the strong hold which a certain conception of criticism
Page 113
(whether the right one or not) had obtained of the Italian mind; and,
secondly, that the main question on which it turned—“What sort of Unity
heroic poems must have?”—“In what manner must the precepts of Aristotle
be interpreted and adjusted?”—shows more than the shadow of coming
Neo-Classicism. The path of safety and truth which Giraldi and Pigna had
opened up many years earlier, and which even Castelvetro, Unitarian as he
was, had been careful to leave open—the path starting, that is to say, from
the positions that Aristotle had not all literature before him, and that the
kinds of literature which he had not before him could not, therefore, be
subject to his dicta—was now ignored or barred. Apparent diræ facies, the
faces of the Unities, and there is nothing left to do, in the general opinion,
but to wrangle about their exact lineaments.
The critical work of Tasso is far from inconsiderable, and only a sense of
Tasso’s Critical duty prevents the consideration of it here at greater length.
writings
It consists[122] of the Discorsi which, as noted above,
appeared at Venice (with divers Lettere Poetiche) in one of the thin small
parchment-covered quartos for which the student of this literature begins,
after a time, to feel a distinct affection. The much longer and later Discorsi
del Poema Epico partly repeat, partly correct, partly expand, the earlier
work; and sometimes stand in a curious relation to it.[123] But this by no
means exhausts the tale. Tasso, nothing if not conscientious, appears to have
taken his art in general, and his work in particular, very seriously indeed.
He makes extracts from Castelvetro; writes on the Allegory of his own
Gerusalemme, an Apology for it in dialogue, a formal Reply to the
strictures of the Della Cruscans, a tractate in answer to Patrizzi’s defence of
Ariosto, another on Poetical Differences, a long “Judgment of the
Conquistata,” a discourse on the Art of the Dialogue. Also he has some
curious considerations on three Canzoni of Pigna’s entitled Le Tre Sorelle,
written in honour of Lucrezia Bendidio, and dealing with Sacred and
Profane Love. These considerations have the additional interest of being
addressed to Leonora d’Este, and of breathing a peculiar blend of that half-
sensual, half-Platonic Renaissance rapture of which the great locus is the
discourse assigned to Bembo at the end of Castiglione’s Courtier, with the
religiosity which we more specially think of in Tasso. He has an elaborate
lecture on a single sonnet of La Casa,—a great favourite of Tasso’s, and
deservedly so as far as his serious poetry goes,—and some minor matter of
the kind.
secondly, that the main question on which it turned—“What sort of Unity
heroic poems must have?”—“In what manner must the precepts of Aristotle
be interpreted and adjusted?”—shows more than the shadow of coming
Neo-Classicism. The path of safety and truth which Giraldi and Pigna had
opened up many years earlier, and which even Castelvetro, Unitarian as he
was, had been careful to leave open—the path starting, that is to say, from
the positions that Aristotle had not all literature before him, and that the
kinds of literature which he had not before him could not, therefore, be
subject to his dicta—was now ignored or barred. Apparent diræ facies, the
faces of the Unities, and there is nothing left to do, in the general opinion,
but to wrangle about their exact lineaments.
The critical work of Tasso is far from inconsiderable, and only a sense of
Tasso’s Critical duty prevents the consideration of it here at greater length.
writings
It consists[122] of the Discorsi which, as noted above,
appeared at Venice (with divers Lettere Poetiche) in one of the thin small
parchment-covered quartos for which the student of this literature begins,
after a time, to feel a distinct affection. The much longer and later Discorsi
del Poema Epico partly repeat, partly correct, partly expand, the earlier
work; and sometimes stand in a curious relation to it.[123] But this by no
means exhausts the tale. Tasso, nothing if not conscientious, appears to have
taken his art in general, and his work in particular, very seriously indeed.
He makes extracts from Castelvetro; writes on the Allegory of his own
Gerusalemme, an Apology for it in dialogue, a formal Reply to the
strictures of the Della Cruscans, a tractate in answer to Patrizzi’s defence of
Ariosto, another on Poetical Differences, a long “Judgment of the
Conquistata,” a discourse on the Art of the Dialogue. Also he has some
curious considerations on three Canzoni of Pigna’s entitled Le Tre Sorelle,
written in honour of Lucrezia Bendidio, and dealing with Sacred and
Profane Love. These considerations have the additional interest of being
addressed to Leonora d’Este, and of breathing a peculiar blend of that half-
sensual, half-Platonic Renaissance rapture of which the great locus is the
discourse assigned to Bembo at the end of Castiglione’s Courtier, with the
religiosity which we more specially think of in Tasso. He has an elaborate
lecture on a single sonnet of La Casa,—a great favourite of Tasso’s, and
deservedly so as far as his serious poetry goes,—and some minor matter of
the kind.
Page 114
To the writing of this not inconsiderable corpus of criticism Tasso
brought, besides his own genius and the interesting association of his
creative power, really wide reading, and, as has been said, an indefatigable
and position. interest in the subject. He exercised a good deal of
influence in the time to come—both Milton and Dryden, for instance (the
latter again and again), refer to his critical work. Yet it may perhaps be said
without presumption that this criticism is rather more interesting to a
student of Tasso, or to one who wishes to obtain at famous hands some
knowledge of the Italian sixteenth century ethos in this kind without going
any further, than to the student of criticism itself. Tasso is very fairly
representative of it in its combination of Plato and Aristotle, in its anxiety to
get general notions of poetry and poetic kinds, in its respect for the ancients,
in its ethical turn. But he is rather more representative than original or
distinct; and his criticism is not perhaps improved by the very natural fact
that sometimes avowedly, and probably in most cases really, it is less a
disinterested consideration of Poetry in general than an apologetic of the
poetry of Torquato Tasso. And as that poetry itself, beautiful as it often is, is
notoriously something of a compromise between the Romantic and the
Classical, so the criticism which is connected with it is compromising and
compromised likewise. Tasso has many interesting observations, intelligent
aperçus, just remarks: he is a link, and a very early link, in the apostolic
succession of those who have held and taught the great doctrine that poetry
makes the familiar unfamiliar, the accustomed strange and new.[124] But he
has not shaken himself free enough to gain the standpoint of his friendly
antagonist Patrizzi, and to recognise, even imperfectly, that the secret of
poetry is treatment poeticamente, and that only the historic method
unfettered by rules will tell you what poeticamente has been and is, even
thus leaving unknown what it will be.
At about the same time, however, a last, and the most vigorous, if not
altogether the best informed, attempt was made to put the matter on this
Patrizzi: his true historical basis. A year (1586) before the publication of
Poetica.
Tasso’s Discorsi, and of his Apologia, though long after the
writing of the first, and not without reference to himself and the dispute
between his partisans and those of Ariosto, there had been printed at
Ferrara, in two parts, one of the most important and original of the
numerous treatises which appeared during this half-century or more, under
the title of Della Poetica. It was the work of Francesco Patrizzi (as he is
brought, besides his own genius and the interesting association of his
creative power, really wide reading, and, as has been said, an indefatigable
and position. interest in the subject. He exercised a good deal of
influence in the time to come—both Milton and Dryden, for instance (the
latter again and again), refer to his critical work. Yet it may perhaps be said
without presumption that this criticism is rather more interesting to a
student of Tasso, or to one who wishes to obtain at famous hands some
knowledge of the Italian sixteenth century ethos in this kind without going
any further, than to the student of criticism itself. Tasso is very fairly
representative of it in its combination of Plato and Aristotle, in its anxiety to
get general notions of poetry and poetic kinds, in its respect for the ancients,
in its ethical turn. But he is rather more representative than original or
distinct; and his criticism is not perhaps improved by the very natural fact
that sometimes avowedly, and probably in most cases really, it is less a
disinterested consideration of Poetry in general than an apologetic of the
poetry of Torquato Tasso. And as that poetry itself, beautiful as it often is, is
notoriously something of a compromise between the Romantic and the
Classical, so the criticism which is connected with it is compromising and
compromised likewise. Tasso has many interesting observations, intelligent
aperçus, just remarks: he is a link, and a very early link, in the apostolic
succession of those who have held and taught the great doctrine that poetry
makes the familiar unfamiliar, the accustomed strange and new.[124] But he
has not shaken himself free enough to gain the standpoint of his friendly
antagonist Patrizzi, and to recognise, even imperfectly, that the secret of
poetry is treatment poeticamente, and that only the historic method
unfettered by rules will tell you what poeticamente has been and is, even
thus leaving unknown what it will be.
At about the same time, however, a last, and the most vigorous, if not
altogether the best informed, attempt was made to put the matter on this
Patrizzi: his true historical basis. A year (1586) before the publication of
Poetica.
Tasso’s Discorsi, and of his Apologia, though long after the
writing of the first, and not without reference to himself and the dispute
between his partisans and those of Ariosto, there had been printed at
Ferrara, in two parts, one of the most important and original of the
numerous treatises which appeared during this half-century or more, under
the title of Della Poetica. It was the work of Francesco Patrizzi (as he is
Page 115
generally cited in books, though both in the title-pages of this work, and in
the signature of his Dedication, it is spelt Patrici). The inspiration of the
book was, at least partly, due to the violent anti-Peripateticism of which
Patrizzi was at this time the twin champion with Bruno;[125] and while we
must no doubt thank this party spirit for being in great part the cause of the
volume, there may be room for objecting that it somewhat obscures the pure
critical value of the treatises. That value, however, remains great, and would
be great even if there were nothing in the book but an ill-carried-out idea.
For its idea is the basing of the inquiry into poetry, not on a priori
discussion of the nature of the thing, and of its exponent the poet,—not on
previous authority as to these questions,—but on a historical examination of
extant poetical composition. It is, of course, true that an examination of the
kind was ready at hand in Scaliger’s book. But nothing was further from
Scaliger’s mind than to base his inquiry on this: on the contrary, it comes
late, and is merely intended to supply illustration and texts for verbal
criticism.
Patrizzi’s plan is quite different. His book consists of two parts or
“decades”—La Deca Istoriale and La Deca Disputata; and though in some
copies (my own is an instance) the cart is perversely put before the horse,
this is evidently a mere stupidity of the binder, due to the fact that both
books, which are separately paged and title-paged, are of the same year
(1586), and perhaps to the other fact that the Dedication of the Disputata to
Don Ferrando Gonzaga, Signor di Guastalla, is dated, while that of the
Istoriale to Lucrezia d’Este, Duchess of Urbino, is not. But the very first
line of the Disputata makes references to the other as already done.
That the “History of Poetry” of il gran Patricio, as his commendatory
sonneteers love to call him, should be either completely exhaustive or
The Deca impeccably methodical, it would be unreasonable to expect.
Istoriale.
There are indeed some surprising touches,[126] both of
knowledge and of liberality, in his admissions of the Architrenius and the
Anticlaudianus, of Marbod and Bede. But for the most part he confines
himself to classic and scriptural authors; and his notices are rather those of a
classical dictionary maker, or hand-list man, than of a critical historian in
the best sense. Still, all things must have beginnings; and it is a very great
beginning indeed to find the actual documents of the matter produced and
arranged in any orderly fashion, even if we do begin a little in the air with
the signature of his Dedication, it is spelt Patrici). The inspiration of the
book was, at least partly, due to the violent anti-Peripateticism of which
Patrizzi was at this time the twin champion with Bruno;[125] and while we
must no doubt thank this party spirit for being in great part the cause of the
volume, there may be room for objecting that it somewhat obscures the pure
critical value of the treatises. That value, however, remains great, and would
be great even if there were nothing in the book but an ill-carried-out idea.
For its idea is the basing of the inquiry into poetry, not on a priori
discussion of the nature of the thing, and of its exponent the poet,—not on
previous authority as to these questions,—but on a historical examination of
extant poetical composition. It is, of course, true that an examination of the
kind was ready at hand in Scaliger’s book. But nothing was further from
Scaliger’s mind than to base his inquiry on this: on the contrary, it comes
late, and is merely intended to supply illustration and texts for verbal
criticism.
Patrizzi’s plan is quite different. His book consists of two parts or
“decades”—La Deca Istoriale and La Deca Disputata; and though in some
copies (my own is an instance) the cart is perversely put before the horse,
this is evidently a mere stupidity of the binder, due to the fact that both
books, which are separately paged and title-paged, are of the same year
(1586), and perhaps to the other fact that the Dedication of the Disputata to
Don Ferrando Gonzaga, Signor di Guastalla, is dated, while that of the
Istoriale to Lucrezia d’Este, Duchess of Urbino, is not. But the very first
line of the Disputata makes references to the other as already done.
That the “History of Poetry” of il gran Patricio, as his commendatory
sonneteers love to call him, should be either completely exhaustive or
The Deca impeccably methodical, it would be unreasonable to expect.
Istoriale.
There are indeed some surprising touches,[126] both of
knowledge and of liberality, in his admissions of the Architrenius and the
Anticlaudianus, of Marbod and Bede. But for the most part he confines
himself to classic and scriptural authors; and his notices are rather those of a
classical dictionary maker, or hand-list man, than of a critical historian in
the best sense. Still, all things must have beginnings; and it is a very great
beginning indeed to find the actual documents of the matter produced and
arranged in any orderly fashion, even if we do begin a little in the air with
Page 116
Giubale and Giafeto, and end a little in the dark with Gaufredo and
Guntero.
Only when he has spent 150 pages on this arrangement does Patrizzi pass
to his Second Book, in which (once more in the true logical order) he
arranges the productions of his poets in kinds, of which he is a generous and
careful distributor. The much shorter Third deals with the kinds of verses;
and the Fourth with the festivals and spectacles at which poetry was
produced, the Fifth continuing this with special reference to Games and
Contests. The Sixth deals with the singing of ancient poetry; the Seventh
with its accompanying Music; the Eighth with Rhythm; the Ninth with the
Chorus; and the Tenth with the persons who produced ancient poetry—
rhapsodists, priests, actors, &c.
It is, of course, to be observed that all this is strictly limited to Ancient
Poetry; indeed Patrizzi repeats the very words religiously in the title of
The Deca every Book. To support his examination with a further one
Disputata.
of modern or even Italian “vulgar” poetry does not seem to
have occurred to him. Perhaps, indeed—since he refers, as has been said, in
the very first line of his second part to la lunga e faticosa istoria delle cose
a poeti, a poemi, e a poetica spettanti as “condetta a fine” with a sort of
sigh of relief—he may have thought that his readers would not stand it. But
it is noteworthy that in this Decade he constantly cites Italian writers, and
that the last forty pages of his Tenth Book consist of a Trimerone of
controversy with Tasso himself, amicable (they were actually friends), but
by no means unanimated.
The First Book of the Disputata is given up to the cause of poetry, which
Patrizzi, again in accordance with Bruno, decides to be Enthusiasm
(Furori[127]), relying much on Plato, especially on the Tynnichus passage (v.
supra, vol. i. p. 20), and even a little on Aristotle. The Second Book attacks,
with a good deal of acerbity, and some wire-drawing, but also with learning,
acuteness, and common-sense, the Aristotelian doctrine of Imitation, and
the philosopher’s order and distribution of poetic kinds. The Third follows
this up by an inquiry whether, in a general way, Poetry is Imitation at all;
the Fourth by one whether the poet is an imitator. And the conclusion of the
three, enforced with great dialectical skill, and with a real knowledge of
Greek criticism,—that of Plato, Longinus, and the Rhetoricians, as well as
Aristotle’s,—is that Poetry is not Imitation, or at any rate that Imitation is
not proper and peculiar to poets. In which point it will go hard but any
Guntero.
Only when he has spent 150 pages on this arrangement does Patrizzi pass
to his Second Book, in which (once more in the true logical order) he
arranges the productions of his poets in kinds, of which he is a generous and
careful distributor. The much shorter Third deals with the kinds of verses;
and the Fourth with the festivals and spectacles at which poetry was
produced, the Fifth continuing this with special reference to Games and
Contests. The Sixth deals with the singing of ancient poetry; the Seventh
with its accompanying Music; the Eighth with Rhythm; the Ninth with the
Chorus; and the Tenth with the persons who produced ancient poetry—
rhapsodists, priests, actors, &c.
It is, of course, to be observed that all this is strictly limited to Ancient
Poetry; indeed Patrizzi repeats the very words religiously in the title of
The Deca every Book. To support his examination with a further one
Disputata.
of modern or even Italian “vulgar” poetry does not seem to
have occurred to him. Perhaps, indeed—since he refers, as has been said, in
the very first line of his second part to la lunga e faticosa istoria delle cose
a poeti, a poemi, e a poetica spettanti as “condetta a fine” with a sort of
sigh of relief—he may have thought that his readers would not stand it. But
it is noteworthy that in this Decade he constantly cites Italian writers, and
that the last forty pages of his Tenth Book consist of a Trimerone of
controversy with Tasso himself, amicable (they were actually friends), but
by no means unanimated.
The First Book of the Disputata is given up to the cause of poetry, which
Patrizzi, again in accordance with Bruno, decides to be Enthusiasm
(Furori[127]), relying much on Plato, especially on the Tynnichus passage (v.
supra, vol. i. p. 20), and even a little on Aristotle. The Second Book attacks,
with a good deal of acerbity, and some wire-drawing, but also with learning,
acuteness, and common-sense, the Aristotelian doctrine of Imitation, and
the philosopher’s order and distribution of poetic kinds. The Third follows
this up by an inquiry whether, in a general way, Poetry is Imitation at all;
the Fourth by one whether the poet is an imitator. And the conclusion of the
three, enforced with great dialectical skill, and with a real knowledge of
Greek criticism,—that of Plato, Longinus, and the Rhetoricians, as well as
Aristotle’s,—is that Poetry is not Imitation, or at any rate that Imitation is
not proper and peculiar to poets. In which point it will go hard but any
Page 117
catholic student of literature, however great his respect for Aristotle, must
now “say ditto” to Patrizzi.
In his Fifth Book Patrizzi tackles a matter of far greater importance—for
after all the discussion, “Is Poetry Imitation, or is it not?” is very mainly a
logomachy. As Miss Edgeworth’s philosophic boy remarks, “You may call
your hat your cadwallader,” when you have once explained that by this term
you mean “a black thing that you wear on your head.” But the question of
this Fifth Book, “Whether Poetry can be in prose?” is of a very different
kind. It goes, not to words but to things, and to the very roots of them; it
involves—if it may not be said actually to be—the gravest, deepest, most
vital question of literary criticism itself; and on the answer given to it will
turn the further answer which must be given to a whole crowd of minor
questions.
On this point il gran Patricio has at least this quality of greatness, that he
knows his own mind with perfect clearness, and expounds it as clearly as he
knows it. His conclusion[128] is, “That verse is so proper and so essential to
every manner of poetry that, without verse, no composition either can or
ought to be Poetry.” This is refreshing, whether we consider that Patrizzi
has taken the best way of establishing his dogma or not. He proceeds as
usual by posing and examining the places—four in number—in which
Aristotle deals with the question; and discusses them with proper exactness
from the verbal point of view, dwelling specially, as we should expect, on
the term ψιλὸς for prose. Then, as we should expect also, he enters into a
still longer examination of the very obscure and difficult passage about the
Mimes and the Socratic Dialogues. To say that the argument is conducted in
a manner wholly free from quibbling and wire-drawing would perhaps be
too much. Patrizzi—and his logic is certainly not the worse for it—was still
in the habit of bringing things to directly syllogistic head now and then; and
of this modern readers are too often impatient. But he does succeed in
convicting Aristotle of using language by no means wholly consistent; and
he succeeds still better in getting and keeping fast hold of that really final
argument which made De Quincey so angry when Whately so forcibly put
it[129]—the argument that from time immemorial everybody, who has had no
special point to prove, when speaking of a poem has meant something in
verse, that everybody, with the same exception, has called things in verse
poems.
now “say ditto” to Patrizzi.
In his Fifth Book Patrizzi tackles a matter of far greater importance—for
after all the discussion, “Is Poetry Imitation, or is it not?” is very mainly a
logomachy. As Miss Edgeworth’s philosophic boy remarks, “You may call
your hat your cadwallader,” when you have once explained that by this term
you mean “a black thing that you wear on your head.” But the question of
this Fifth Book, “Whether Poetry can be in prose?” is of a very different
kind. It goes, not to words but to things, and to the very roots of them; it
involves—if it may not be said actually to be—the gravest, deepest, most
vital question of literary criticism itself; and on the answer given to it will
turn the further answer which must be given to a whole crowd of minor
questions.
On this point il gran Patricio has at least this quality of greatness, that he
knows his own mind with perfect clearness, and expounds it as clearly as he
knows it. His conclusion[128] is, “That verse is so proper and so essential to
every manner of poetry that, without verse, no composition either can or
ought to be Poetry.” This is refreshing, whether we consider that Patrizzi
has taken the best way of establishing his dogma or not. He proceeds as
usual by posing and examining the places—four in number—in which
Aristotle deals with the question; and discusses them with proper exactness
from the verbal point of view, dwelling specially, as we should expect, on
the term ψιλὸς for prose. Then, as we should expect also, he enters into a
still longer examination of the very obscure and difficult passage about the
Mimes and the Socratic Dialogues. To say that the argument is conducted in
a manner wholly free from quibbling and wire-drawing would perhaps be
too much. Patrizzi—and his logic is certainly not the worse for it—was still
in the habit of bringing things to directly syllogistic head now and then; and
of this modern readers are too often impatient. But he does succeed in
convicting Aristotle of using language by no means wholly consistent; and
he succeeds still better in getting and keeping fast hold of that really final
argument which made De Quincey so angry when Whately so forcibly put
it[129]—the argument that from time immemorial everybody, who has had no
special point to prove, when speaking of a poem has meant something in
verse, that everybody, with the same exception, has called things in verse
poems.
Page 118
Our author’s acuteness is not less seen in the selection and treatment of
the subject of his Sixth Book, which is the intimately allied question—
indeed, the same question from another point of view—“Whether the Fable
rather than the verse makes the property of the poem?” He is equally
uncompromising on this point; and has of course no difficulty in showing—
against Plutarch rather than Aristotle—that “fable” in the sense of “made-up
subject” is not only not necessary to Poetry, but does not exist in any of the
most celebrated poems of the most celebrated poets.[130] But he is not even
yet satisfied in his onslaught on the Four Places. He devotes a special Book
(VII.—it is true that all the constituents of this group of books are short) to
Aristotle’s contrast of Empedocles and Homer, labelling the latter only as
poet, the former as rather Physiologist. And with this he takes the same
course, convicting Aristotle, partly out of his own mouth,[131] partly by
citing the “clatter” (schiamaccio) which even his own commentators had
made on this subject. And, indeed, at the time even the stoutest Aristotelians
must have been puzzled to uphold a judgment which, taken literally, would
have excluded from the name of poetry the adored Georgics of old, and the
admired Syphilis of recent, times.
But, indefatigable as he is, he is still not “satiate with his victory,” and in
the Eighth Book attacks yet another facet of the same great problem,
“Whether Poetry can be based upon, or formed from, History?” This was,
as we have seen, a question which had already interested the Italians much;
and Patrizzi in handling it draws nearer and nearer to his controversy with
Tasso, whom he here actually mentions. He has little difficulty in showing
that Aristotle’s contrast between Poetry and History itself by no means
denies historical subjects to the poet, and that Aristotle is not at all
responsible for, or in accordance with, Plutarch’s extravagant insistence on
“mendacity” as a poetic proprium. “All the materials comprised in Art, or
Science, or study,” says he[132] (in that manner of his which we have already
called refreshing, and which we shall meet again seldom in this volume),
“can be suitable subjects for poetry and poems, provided that they be
poetically treated.” Verily, a gran Patricio!
The subject of the Ninth Book is less important and more purely
antiquarian, but interesting enough. It discusses the question whether
ancient poetry necessarily involved “harmony” and “rhythm,” and what
these terms exactly mean—dancing and gestic accompaniment being
considered as well as music. Patrizzi decides, sensibly enough on the
the subject of his Sixth Book, which is the intimately allied question—
indeed, the same question from another point of view—“Whether the Fable
rather than the verse makes the property of the poem?” He is equally
uncompromising on this point; and has of course no difficulty in showing—
against Plutarch rather than Aristotle—that “fable” in the sense of “made-up
subject” is not only not necessary to Poetry, but does not exist in any of the
most celebrated poems of the most celebrated poets.[130] But he is not even
yet satisfied in his onslaught on the Four Places. He devotes a special Book
(VII.—it is true that all the constituents of this group of books are short) to
Aristotle’s contrast of Empedocles and Homer, labelling the latter only as
poet, the former as rather Physiologist. And with this he takes the same
course, convicting Aristotle, partly out of his own mouth,[131] partly by
citing the “clatter” (schiamaccio) which even his own commentators had
made on this subject. And, indeed, at the time even the stoutest Aristotelians
must have been puzzled to uphold a judgment which, taken literally, would
have excluded from the name of poetry the adored Georgics of old, and the
admired Syphilis of recent, times.
But, indefatigable as he is, he is still not “satiate with his victory,” and in
the Eighth Book attacks yet another facet of the same great problem,
“Whether Poetry can be based upon, or formed from, History?” This was,
as we have seen, a question which had already interested the Italians much;
and Patrizzi in handling it draws nearer and nearer to his controversy with
Tasso, whom he here actually mentions. He has little difficulty in showing
that Aristotle’s contrast between Poetry and History itself by no means
denies historical subjects to the poet, and that Aristotle is not at all
responsible for, or in accordance with, Plutarch’s extravagant insistence on
“mendacity” as a poetic proprium. “All the materials comprised in Art, or
Science, or study,” says he[132] (in that manner of his which we have already
called refreshing, and which we shall meet again seldom in this volume),
“can be suitable subjects for poetry and poems, provided that they be
poetically treated.” Verily, a gran Patricio!
The subject of the Ninth Book is less important and more purely
antiquarian, but interesting enough. It discusses the question whether
ancient poetry necessarily involved “harmony” and “rhythm,” and what
these terms exactly mean—dancing and gestic accompaniment being
considered as well as music. Patrizzi decides, sensibly enough on the
Page 119
historical comparison, that all these things, though old and not unsuitable
companions of poetry, are in no sense formative or constitutive parts of
Poetry itself.[133]
The title-question of the Tenth Book is, “Whether the modes of Imitation
are three?” He discusses this generally, and specially in regard to narrative
and dramatic delivery of the poetic matter, and then passes in an appendix
(which, however, he declares to be part of the book) to the Trimerone of
The Trimerone on reply to Tasso. This is a necessarily rather obscure
Tasso.
summary, with some quotations, of a fuller controversy
between the two, complicated by glances at the other literature of the
Gerusalemme quarrel, especially at the work of Camillo Pellegrino.[134] To
disentangle the spool, and wind it in expository form, is out of the question
here. Fortunately the piece concludes with a tabular statement[135] of forty-
three opposition theses to Pellegrino and Tasso. A good many of these turn
on rather “pot-and-kettle” recriminations between Homerists and
Ariostians; but the general principles of comparative criticism are fairly
observed in them, and there is no acerbity of language. In fact, although on
some of the points of the controversy Patrizzi took the Della Cruscan side,
it does not seem to have interrupted his friendship with Tasso, who attended
his lectures,[136] and whose funeral he attended.
The intrinsic importance of Patrizzi’s criticism may be matter of opinion;
but it will hardly be denied that both its system and its conclusions are
widely different from those of nearly all the Italian critics whom we have
yet considered, though there may be approaches to both in Cinthio on the
Remarkable one hand and in Castelvetro on the other. The bickering
position of
Patrizzi.
with Aristotle on particular points is of much less
importance than the constant implicit, and not rare explicit,
reliance on the historic method—on the poets and the poems that exist, the
ideas of poetry conveyed by common parlance, the body of the written
Word in short, and not the letter of the written Rule. I am not sure that
Patrizzi ever lays down the doctrine that “Rules follow practice, not
practice rules,” with quite the distinctness of Bruno in the passage cited
above.[137] But he makes a fight for it in a passage of the Trimerone,[138] and
his entire critical method involves it more or less. If he does not quote
modern literature much, it is obviously because the controversy in which he
was mixing took its documents and texts mainly from the ancients; but he is
so well acquainted with the modern literature, not merely of his own
companions of poetry, are in no sense formative or constitutive parts of
Poetry itself.[133]
The title-question of the Tenth Book is, “Whether the modes of Imitation
are three?” He discusses this generally, and specially in regard to narrative
and dramatic delivery of the poetic matter, and then passes in an appendix
(which, however, he declares to be part of the book) to the Trimerone of
The Trimerone on reply to Tasso. This is a necessarily rather obscure
Tasso.
summary, with some quotations, of a fuller controversy
between the two, complicated by glances at the other literature of the
Gerusalemme quarrel, especially at the work of Camillo Pellegrino.[134] To
disentangle the spool, and wind it in expository form, is out of the question
here. Fortunately the piece concludes with a tabular statement[135] of forty-
three opposition theses to Pellegrino and Tasso. A good many of these turn
on rather “pot-and-kettle” recriminations between Homerists and
Ariostians; but the general principles of comparative criticism are fairly
observed in them, and there is no acerbity of language. In fact, although on
some of the points of the controversy Patrizzi took the Della Cruscan side,
it does not seem to have interrupted his friendship with Tasso, who attended
his lectures,[136] and whose funeral he attended.
The intrinsic importance of Patrizzi’s criticism may be matter of opinion;
but it will hardly be denied that both its system and its conclusions are
widely different from those of nearly all the Italian critics whom we have
yet considered, though there may be approaches to both in Cinthio on the
Remarkable one hand and in Castelvetro on the other. The bickering
position of
Patrizzi.
with Aristotle on particular points is of much less
importance than the constant implicit, and not rare explicit,
reliance on the historic method—on the poets and the poems that exist, the
ideas of poetry conveyed by common parlance, the body of the written
Word in short, and not the letter of the written Rule. I am not sure that
Patrizzi ever lays down the doctrine that “Rules follow practice, not
practice rules,” with quite the distinctness of Bruno in the passage cited
above.[137] But he makes a fight for it in a passage of the Trimerone,[138] and
his entire critical method involves it more or less. If he does not quote
modern literature much, it is obviously because the controversy in which he
was mixing took its documents and texts mainly from the ancients; but he is
so well acquainted with the modern literature, not merely of his own
Page 120
language, that he actually cites[139] Claude Fauchet’s Origines de la Poésie
Française, which had appeared in 1581. That his interest in the whole
matter may have been philosophical rather than strictly, or at least
exclusively, literary is very possible—he was actually a Professor of
Philosophy; but however this may be, he has hit on the solid causeway
under the floods, and has held his way steadily along it for as far as he
chose to go. Nay, in the sentence which has been chosen for the epigraph of
this Book, he has kept it open for all to the end of Poetry and of Time.
There are, however, few propositions in literature truer than this—that it
Sed contra is of no present use to be wise for the future. If a man
mundum.
chooses the wisdom of the morrow, he must be content for
the morrow to appreciate him—which it does not always, though no one but
a poor creature will trouble himself much about that. Patrizzi had a really
considerable reputation, and deserved it; but in matters literary he was two
hundred years in front of his time, and his time avenged itself by taking
little practical notice of him.[140] The critical writers of the last fifteen or
twenty years of the century are fairly numerous; and though none of them
can pretend to great importance, the names of some have survived, and the
writings of some of these are worth examination, certainly by the historian
and perhaps by the student. But the general drift of them is usually anti-
Patrician and pro-Aristotelian, in that very decidedly sophisticated
interpretation of Aristotle which was settling itself down upon the world as
The latest group critical orthodoxy. Among them we may mention one or
of sixteenth-
century Critics.
two which, though actually earlier than Patrizzi, are later
than Castelvetro, and will help to complete, as far as we
can here attempt it, the conspectus of that remarkable flourishing time of
Italian critical inquiry which actually founded, and very nearly finished, the
edifice of European criticism generally for three centuries at least. The
authors to whom we return are Partenio, Viperano, Piccolomini, Gilio da
Fabriano, and Mazzoni; those to whom we proceed are Jason Denores,
Gabriele Zinano, and Faustino Summo. This latter, who, with an odd
coincidence of name, date, and purport, does really sum up the sixteenth
century for Aristotle, and so govern the decisions of the seventeenth and
eighteenth, had been immediately preceded in the same sense by
Buonamici,[141] Ingegneri,[142] and others.
Partenio, like Minturno and some others, gave his thoughts on the subject
Partenio. to the world in both “vulgar” and “regular”;[143] but the two
Française, which had appeared in 1581. That his interest in the whole
matter may have been philosophical rather than strictly, or at least
exclusively, literary is very possible—he was actually a Professor of
Philosophy; but however this may be, he has hit on the solid causeway
under the floods, and has held his way steadily along it for as far as he
chose to go. Nay, in the sentence which has been chosen for the epigraph of
this Book, he has kept it open for all to the end of Poetry and of Time.
There are, however, few propositions in literature truer than this—that it
Sed contra is of no present use to be wise for the future. If a man
mundum.
chooses the wisdom of the morrow, he must be content for
the morrow to appreciate him—which it does not always, though no one but
a poor creature will trouble himself much about that. Patrizzi had a really
considerable reputation, and deserved it; but in matters literary he was two
hundred years in front of his time, and his time avenged itself by taking
little practical notice of him.[140] The critical writers of the last fifteen or
twenty years of the century are fairly numerous; and though none of them
can pretend to great importance, the names of some have survived, and the
writings of some of these are worth examination, certainly by the historian
and perhaps by the student. But the general drift of them is usually anti-
Patrician and pro-Aristotelian, in that very decidedly sophisticated
interpretation of Aristotle which was settling itself down upon the world as
The latest group critical orthodoxy. Among them we may mention one or
of sixteenth-
century Critics.
two which, though actually earlier than Patrizzi, are later
than Castelvetro, and will help to complete, as far as we
can here attempt it, the conspectus of that remarkable flourishing time of
Italian critical inquiry which actually founded, and very nearly finished, the
edifice of European criticism generally for three centuries at least. The
authors to whom we return are Partenio, Viperano, Piccolomini, Gilio da
Fabriano, and Mazzoni; those to whom we proceed are Jason Denores,
Gabriele Zinano, and Faustino Summo. This latter, who, with an odd
coincidence of name, date, and purport, does really sum up the sixteenth
century for Aristotle, and so govern the decisions of the seventeenth and
eighteenth, had been immediately preceded in the same sense by
Buonamici,[141] Ingegneri,[142] and others.
Partenio, like Minturno and some others, gave his thoughts on the subject
Partenio. to the world in both “vulgar” and “regular”;[143] but the two
Page 121
forms, while not identical, are closer together than is sometimes the case,
though there is in the Latin a curious appended anthology of translation and
parallel in the two languages. He is rather a formal person (as indeed may
be judged from his particular addiction to Hermogenes as an authority), but
he is not destitute of wits. Throughout he quotes Italian as well as Latin
examples, and refers to Italian critics such as Trissino; while in one place he
gives something like a regular survey of contemporary Latin poetry by
Italians from Pontanus to Cotta. He lays special stress on the importance of
poetic diction; he thinks that Art can and should improve nature; but he is as
classical as the stiffest perruque of the French anti-Romantic school in
believing Aristotle and Horace to contain everything necessary to poetical
salvation.
Viperano. Viperano[144] (who by a natural error is sometimes cited
as Vituperano) somewhere makes the half-admission, half-boast, scripsimus
autem varios libros de variis rebus, and is indeed a sort of rhetorical
bookmaker who oscillates between instruction and epideictic. This
character is sufficiently reflected in his De Arte Poetica. He had some
influence—even as far as Spain (v. inf.)
Piccolomini’s book,[145] which is a compact small quarto of 422 pages,
differs in arrangement from Castelvetro’s merely in not giving the Greek—
the particelle of the original in translation being followed by solid blocks of
Piccolomini. annotationi. The author was of that well-known type of
Renaissance scholar which aspired to a generous if perhaps impossible
universalism; and as he puts this encyclopædic information at the service of
his notes, they are naturally things not easily to be given account of in any
small space, or with definite reference to a particular subject. That
Piccolomini, however, was not destitute of acuteness or judgment to back
his learning, reference to test passages will very easily show. He has not
allowed the possible force of the μᾶλλον, for instance, to escape him in the
Homer-and-Empedocles passage referred to a little earlier—indeed Maggi
had put him in the right way here. But, in this and other cases, he is
somewhat too fond of “hedging.” “We must remember this; but we must not
forget that,” &c. The inspiriting downrightness of Scaliger on the one side,
and Patrizzi on the other, is not in him; and we see the approach, in this
subject also, of a time of mere piling up of authorities, and marshalling of
arguments pro and con, to the darkening rather than the illumination of
judgment.
though there is in the Latin a curious appended anthology of translation and
parallel in the two languages. He is rather a formal person (as indeed may
be judged from his particular addiction to Hermogenes as an authority), but
he is not destitute of wits. Throughout he quotes Italian as well as Latin
examples, and refers to Italian critics such as Trissino; while in one place he
gives something like a regular survey of contemporary Latin poetry by
Italians from Pontanus to Cotta. He lays special stress on the importance of
poetic diction; he thinks that Art can and should improve nature; but he is as
classical as the stiffest perruque of the French anti-Romantic school in
believing Aristotle and Horace to contain everything necessary to poetical
salvation.
Viperano. Viperano[144] (who by a natural error is sometimes cited
as Vituperano) somewhere makes the half-admission, half-boast, scripsimus
autem varios libros de variis rebus, and is indeed a sort of rhetorical
bookmaker who oscillates between instruction and epideictic. This
character is sufficiently reflected in his De Arte Poetica. He had some
influence—even as far as Spain (v. inf.)
Piccolomini’s book,[145] which is a compact small quarto of 422 pages,
differs in arrangement from Castelvetro’s merely in not giving the Greek—
the particelle of the original in translation being followed by solid blocks of
Piccolomini. annotationi. The author was of that well-known type of
Renaissance scholar which aspired to a generous if perhaps impossible
universalism; and as he puts this encyclopædic information at the service of
his notes, they are naturally things not easily to be given account of in any
small space, or with definite reference to a particular subject. That
Piccolomini, however, was not destitute of acuteness or judgment to back
his learning, reference to test passages will very easily show. He has not
allowed the possible force of the μᾶλλον, for instance, to escape him in the
Homer-and-Empedocles passage referred to a little earlier—indeed Maggi
had put him in the right way here. But, in this and other cases, he is
somewhat too fond of “hedging.” “We must remember this; but we must not
forget that,” &c. The inspiriting downrightness of Scaliger on the one side,
and Patrizzi on the other, is not in him; and we see the approach, in this
subject also, of a time of mere piling up of authorities, and marshalling of
arguments pro and con, to the darkening rather than the illumination of
judgment.
Page 122
The Topica Poetica of Giovanni Andrea Gilio da Fabriano[146] comes well
next to Piccolomini, because the pair are characteristic examples of the two
parallel lines in which, as we have seen throughout, Italian criticism
Gilio. proceeds during the century. In plan it presents no inconsiderable
resemblance to that work of our own Puttenham (v. infra) which followed it
at no great interval; but it is, as its special title will have indicated to the
expert, even more definitely rhetorical. In fact, it must be one of the very
latest treatises in which, on the partial precedent of antiquity, Poetics are
brought directly under Rhetoric. We actually start with accounts, illustrated
by poetical examples in the vernacular, of the Deliberative, Demonstrative,
and Judicial kinds; we pass thence to Invention, Imitation, and Style; and
thence again to Decorum, the Proper, and so forth, all still illustrated from
the vulgar tongue mainly, but with a Latin example here and there. And this
finishes the short First Book. The longer Second is the most strictly
“topical,” with its sections (at first sight bewildering to the modern non-
expert mind) on Definition and Etymology, on Genus and Species, on
Example and Induction, on Proceeding from Less to Greater and from
Greater to Less, on Amplification, Authority, Custom, and Love. The Third
is wholly on Figures of Speech, and the Fourth on Tropes or Figures of
“Conceit.” The poetical illustration is all-pervading, and there is an odd
appendix of sonnets from ladies of Petrarch’s time. The book is chiefly
worth notice here because, as has been said, it is one of the latest—perhaps,
with the exception of Puttenham’s own, the actually latest—of its special
subdivision that we shall have to notice,—the subdivision, that is to say, in
which the literature handled is absolutely subordinate to an artificial system
of classification, in which the stamped and registered ticket is everything,
so that, when the critic has tied it on, his task is done.
Giacomo Mazzoni is perhaps better known[147] than at least some of the
Mazzoni. subjects of this chapter, owing to his connection with Dante. He
first, in 1573, published at Cesena a brief Difesa di Dante of some fifty
folios, in fairly large print, and followed it up fourteen years later with an
immense Della Difesa, containing 750 pages of very small print without the
index. The points of the actual Difesa are not uncurious—such as an
argument that discourses on Poetry are not improper for the philosopher,
and that Dante is a particularly philosophical poet, in fact encyclopædic.
From the Imitation point of view the Comedy can be easily defended, as it
is a real following of action, and not the mere relation of a dream: and as
next to Piccolomini, because the pair are characteristic examples of the two
parallel lines in which, as we have seen throughout, Italian criticism
Gilio. proceeds during the century. In plan it presents no inconsiderable
resemblance to that work of our own Puttenham (v. infra) which followed it
at no great interval; but it is, as its special title will have indicated to the
expert, even more definitely rhetorical. In fact, it must be one of the very
latest treatises in which, on the partial precedent of antiquity, Poetics are
brought directly under Rhetoric. We actually start with accounts, illustrated
by poetical examples in the vernacular, of the Deliberative, Demonstrative,
and Judicial kinds; we pass thence to Invention, Imitation, and Style; and
thence again to Decorum, the Proper, and so forth, all still illustrated from
the vulgar tongue mainly, but with a Latin example here and there. And this
finishes the short First Book. The longer Second is the most strictly
“topical,” with its sections (at first sight bewildering to the modern non-
expert mind) on Definition and Etymology, on Genus and Species, on
Example and Induction, on Proceeding from Less to Greater and from
Greater to Less, on Amplification, Authority, Custom, and Love. The Third
is wholly on Figures of Speech, and the Fourth on Tropes or Figures of
“Conceit.” The poetical illustration is all-pervading, and there is an odd
appendix of sonnets from ladies of Petrarch’s time. The book is chiefly
worth notice here because, as has been said, it is one of the latest—perhaps,
with the exception of Puttenham’s own, the actually latest—of its special
subdivision that we shall have to notice,—the subdivision, that is to say, in
which the literature handled is absolutely subordinate to an artificial system
of classification, in which the stamped and registered ticket is everything,
so that, when the critic has tied it on, his task is done.
Giacomo Mazzoni is perhaps better known[147] than at least some of the
Mazzoni. subjects of this chapter, owing to his connection with Dante. He
first, in 1573, published at Cesena a brief Difesa di Dante of some fifty
folios, in fairly large print, and followed it up fourteen years later with an
immense Della Difesa, containing 750 pages of very small print without the
index. The points of the actual Difesa are not uncurious—such as an
argument that discourses on Poetry are not improper for the philosopher,
and that Dante is a particularly philosophical poet, in fact encyclopædic.
From the Imitation point of view the Comedy can be easily defended, as it
is a real following of action, and not the mere relation of a dream: and as
Page 123
dealing with costume (manners) it is a comedy, not a tragedy or heroic
poem. The Della Difesa, on the other hand, is a wilderness of erudition and
controversy, arranged under abstract heads (“how the poets have conducted
themselves towards the predicaments of Time and Place,” &c.), and
diverging into inquiries and sub-inquiries of the most intricate character—
the trustworthiness of dreams,[148] the opinions held of them in antiquity, the
nature and kinds of allegory, Dante’s orthodoxy—in short, all things
Dantean, and very many others. If I cannot with Mr Spingarn[149] discover “a
whole new theory of poetry” in the Difesa itself, I am ready to admit that
almost anything might be discovered in the Della Difesa.
The Poetica of Jason Denores[150] is remarkable from one point of view
for its thoroughgoing and “charcoal-burner” Aristotelianism, from another
for the extraordinary and meticulous precision of its typographical
arrangements. How many sizes and kinds of type there are in Jason’s book I
Denores. am not enough of an expert in printing to attempt to say exactly:
and the arrangement of his page is as precious as the selection of his type.
Sometimes his text overflows the opened sheet, with decent margins indeed
but according to ordinary proportions; at others (and by no means always
because he requires side-notes) it is contracted to a canal down the centre,
with banks broader than itself. It is, however, when Denores comes to the
tabular arrangement and subdivision of statement and argument, in which
nearly all these writers delight, that he becomes most eccentric. As many
divisions, so many parallel columns; under no circumstances will his rigid
equity give one section the advantage of appearing on the recto of a leaf
while the others are banished to the verso. This is all very well when the
divisions are two or three or even four. But when, as sometimes happens,
there are six or even eight, the cross-reading of the parallel columns is at
once tempting and conducive to madness. As each column is but some half-
inch broad, almost every word longer than a monosyllable has to be broken
into, and as only a single em of space is allowed between the columns, there
is a strong temptation to “follow the line.” By doing this you get such
bewilderments as
“gue do-diEdip-di Laio, ttappas-menosia ra il Poe mu tio lipo, per,” &c.,
a moderate dose of which should suffice to drive a person of some
imagination, and excessive nerves, to Bedlam. Read straight, however,
poem. The Della Difesa, on the other hand, is a wilderness of erudition and
controversy, arranged under abstract heads (“how the poets have conducted
themselves towards the predicaments of Time and Place,” &c.), and
diverging into inquiries and sub-inquiries of the most intricate character—
the trustworthiness of dreams,[148] the opinions held of them in antiquity, the
nature and kinds of allegory, Dante’s orthodoxy—in short, all things
Dantean, and very many others. If I cannot with Mr Spingarn[149] discover “a
whole new theory of poetry” in the Difesa itself, I am ready to admit that
almost anything might be discovered in the Della Difesa.
The Poetica of Jason Denores[150] is remarkable from one point of view
for its thoroughgoing and “charcoal-burner” Aristotelianism, from another
for the extraordinary and meticulous precision of its typographical
arrangements. How many sizes and kinds of type there are in Jason’s book I
Denores. am not enough of an expert in printing to attempt to say exactly:
and the arrangement of his page is as precious as the selection of his type.
Sometimes his text overflows the opened sheet, with decent margins indeed
but according to ordinary proportions; at others (and by no means always
because he requires side-notes) it is contracted to a canal down the centre,
with banks broader than itself. It is, however, when Denores comes to the
tabular arrangement and subdivision of statement and argument, in which
nearly all these writers delight, that he becomes most eccentric. As many
divisions, so many parallel columns; under no circumstances will his rigid
equity give one section the advantage of appearing on the recto of a leaf
while the others are banished to the verso. This is all very well when the
divisions are two or three or even four. But when, as sometimes happens,
there are six or even eight, the cross-reading of the parallel columns is at
once tempting and conducive to madness. As each column is but some half-
inch broad, almost every word longer than a monosyllable has to be broken
into, and as only a single em of space is allowed between the columns, there
is a strong temptation to “follow the line.” By doing this you get such
bewilderments as
“gue do-diEdip-di Laio, ttappas-menosia ra il Poe mu tio lipo, per,” &c.,
a moderate dose of which should suffice to drive a person of some
imagination, and excessive nerves, to Bedlam. Read straight, however,
Page 124
Denores is much more sedative, not to say soporific, than exciting: and his
dealings with Tragedy, the Heroic Poem, and Comedy have scarcely any
other interest than as symptoms of that determination towards unqualified,
if not wholly unadulterated, Aristotelianism which has been remarked upon.
Il Sogno, overo della Poesia, by Gabriele Zinano,[151] dedicated at Reggio
on the 15th October 1590 to the above-mentioned Ferrando Gonzaga of
Zinano. Guastalla, is a very tiny treatise, written with much pomp of
style, but apparently unnoticed by most of the authorities on the subject.
The author had studied Patrizzi (or Patrici, as he, too, calls him), and was
troubled in his mind about Imitation, and about the equivocal position of
Empedocles. He comforts himself as he goes on, and at last comes to a sort
of eclectic opportunism, which extols the instruction and delight of poetry,
admits that it can practically take in all arts and sciences, but will not admit
fable as making it without verse, or verse without fable, and denies that
both, even together, make it necessarily good. The little piece may deserve
mention for its rarity, and yet once more, as symptomatic of the hold which
critical discussion had got of the Italian mind, Zinano is evidently full of the
Deca Istoriale and the Deca Disputata, but alarmed at their heresies.
Paolo Beni, the antagonist of Summo, the champion of prose for tragedy
as well as for comedy, and a combatant in the controversy over the Pastor
Fido, which succeeded in time, and almost equalled in tedium, that over the
Gerusalemme, will come best in the next Book; and though I have not
neglected, I find little to say about, Correa[152] and others.[153] A sign of the
Mazzone da times is the somewhat earlier I Fiori della Poesia[154] of
Miglionico, &c.
Mazzone da Miglionico (not to be confounded with the
above-mentioned Mazzoni), a tightly packed quarto of five hundred pages,
plus an elaborate index. This is a sort of “Bysshe” ante Bysshium—a huge
gradus of poetic tags from Virgil, Ovid, and Horace, arranged ready for
anybody who wishes to pursue the art of poetry according to the principles
of Vida. Here you may find choice of phrases to express the ideas of “going
to bed for the purpose of sleeping,” of “black and beautiful eyes,” of “shoes
that hurt the feet,” and of “horses that run rapidly.” It was inevitable that
this manual at once and reductio ad absurdum of the mechanic Art of
Poetical Imitation should come—indeed, others had preceded Mazzone, for
instance Fabricius, in Germany (see next Book). But one cannot help
invoking a little woe on those by whom it came.
Summo.
dealings with Tragedy, the Heroic Poem, and Comedy have scarcely any
other interest than as symptoms of that determination towards unqualified,
if not wholly unadulterated, Aristotelianism which has been remarked upon.
Il Sogno, overo della Poesia, by Gabriele Zinano,[151] dedicated at Reggio
on the 15th October 1590 to the above-mentioned Ferrando Gonzaga of
Zinano. Guastalla, is a very tiny treatise, written with much pomp of
style, but apparently unnoticed by most of the authorities on the subject.
The author had studied Patrizzi (or Patrici, as he, too, calls him), and was
troubled in his mind about Imitation, and about the equivocal position of
Empedocles. He comforts himself as he goes on, and at last comes to a sort
of eclectic opportunism, which extols the instruction and delight of poetry,
admits that it can practically take in all arts and sciences, but will not admit
fable as making it without verse, or verse without fable, and denies that
both, even together, make it necessarily good. The little piece may deserve
mention for its rarity, and yet once more, as symptomatic of the hold which
critical discussion had got of the Italian mind, Zinano is evidently full of the
Deca Istoriale and the Deca Disputata, but alarmed at their heresies.
Paolo Beni, the antagonist of Summo, the champion of prose for tragedy
as well as for comedy, and a combatant in the controversy over the Pastor
Fido, which succeeded in time, and almost equalled in tedium, that over the
Gerusalemme, will come best in the next Book; and though I have not
neglected, I find little to say about, Correa[152] and others.[153] A sign of the
Mazzone da times is the somewhat earlier I Fiori della Poesia[154] of
Miglionico, &c.
Mazzone da Miglionico (not to be confounded with the
above-mentioned Mazzoni), a tightly packed quarto of five hundred pages,
plus an elaborate index. This is a sort of “Bysshe” ante Bysshium—a huge
gradus of poetic tags from Virgil, Ovid, and Horace, arranged ready for
anybody who wishes to pursue the art of poetry according to the principles
of Vida. Here you may find choice of phrases to express the ideas of “going
to bed for the purpose of sleeping,” of “black and beautiful eyes,” of “shoes
that hurt the feet,” and of “horses that run rapidly.” It was inevitable that
this manual at once and reductio ad absurdum of the mechanic Art of
Poetical Imitation should come—indeed, others had preceded Mazzone, for
instance Fabricius, in Germany (see next Book). But one cannot help
invoking a little woe on those by whom it came.
Summo.
Page 125
The twelve Discorsi[155] of Faustino Summo manage to cover as many
questions in their 93 leaves: the end of Poetry; the meaning of the word
philanthropia;[156] the last words (the purgation clause) of the Definition of
Tragedy; the possibility of a happy ending; the representation of atrocities
and deaths; the admissibility of true fables; the necessity of unity of action;
the propriety of drama in prose; furor poeticus; the sufficiency of verse to
make poetry; the legitimacy of tragi-comedy and pastoral; and the quality of
the Pastor Fido. Summo gives us our last word here with singular propriety.
He is not quite Aristotelian to the point of infallibility, and his orthodoxy is
what may be called a learned orthodoxy—that is to say, he is careful to
quote comments or arguments of many of the writers whom we have
mentioned in this chapter and the last, from Trissino to Denores, and of a
few whom we have not. But in him this orthodoxy is in the main
constituted: it is out of the stage of formation and struggle; and it is ready—
all the more so that many of its documents have already passed with
authority to other countries and languages—to take its place as the creed of
Europe.
97. My copy is the second edition (apud Petrum Santandreanum, s. l.,
1581).
98. This joke requires a little explanation and adaptation to get it into
English. The Latin is miror majores nostros sibi tam iniquos fuisse ut
factoris vocem maluerint oleariorum cancellis circumscribere. In fact,
Fattojo and Fattojano, if not fattore, do mean in Italian “Oil-Press” and
“Oil-Presser.”
99. Scaliger goes so far as to say that “it would be better never to have
read” the Symposium and the Phædrus, because of their taint with the
Grœcanicum scelus.
100. The decision of this is all the more remarkable that Scaliger does
not, as unwary moderns might expect, make verse the form of Poetry, but
the matter. Feet, rhythm, metre, these are the things that Poetry works in,
her stuff, her raw material. The skill of the poet in its various applications is
the form. A very little thought will show this to be the most decisive
negation possible of the Wordsworthian heresy—anticipated by many
questions in their 93 leaves: the end of Poetry; the meaning of the word
philanthropia;[156] the last words (the purgation clause) of the Definition of
Tragedy; the possibility of a happy ending; the representation of atrocities
and deaths; the admissibility of true fables; the necessity of unity of action;
the propriety of drama in prose; furor poeticus; the sufficiency of verse to
make poetry; the legitimacy of tragi-comedy and pastoral; and the quality of
the Pastor Fido. Summo gives us our last word here with singular propriety.
He is not quite Aristotelian to the point of infallibility, and his orthodoxy is
what may be called a learned orthodoxy—that is to say, he is careful to
quote comments or arguments of many of the writers whom we have
mentioned in this chapter and the last, from Trissino to Denores, and of a
few whom we have not. But in him this orthodoxy is in the main
constituted: it is out of the stage of formation and struggle; and it is ready—
all the more so that many of its documents have already passed with
authority to other countries and languages—to take its place as the creed of
Europe.
97. My copy is the second edition (apud Petrum Santandreanum, s. l.,
1581).
98. This joke requires a little explanation and adaptation to get it into
English. The Latin is miror majores nostros sibi tam iniquos fuisse ut
factoris vocem maluerint oleariorum cancellis circumscribere. In fact,
Fattojo and Fattojano, if not fattore, do mean in Italian “Oil-Press” and
“Oil-Presser.”
99. Scaliger goes so far as to say that “it would be better never to have
read” the Symposium and the Phædrus, because of their taint with the
Grœcanicum scelus.
100. The decision of this is all the more remarkable that Scaliger does
not, as unwary moderns might expect, make verse the form of Poetry, but
the matter. Feet, rhythm, metre, these are the things that Poetry works in,
her stuff, her raw material. The skill of the poet in its various applications is
the form. A very little thought will show this to be the most decisive
negation possible of the Wordsworthian heresy—anticipated by many
Page 126
sixteenth-century writers, from Italy to England, and though not exactly
authorised, countenanced by the ancients, from Aristotle downwards—that
verse is not essential in any way.
101. One cannot help thinking that this distinction, which is quite
contrary to those entertained by Aristotle and Quintilian, must have been
influenced by the cadences of the modern languages—Italian and French—
with which Scaliger was familiar. In both, but especially in French, the
actual “measuring-off” of syllables was the be-all and end-all of metre, the
easements provided in English and German by syllabic equivalence being
in French refused altogether, in Italian replaced only by the more meagre
aid of syncope and apocope.
102. As, even throughout the neo-classic age, very orthodox neo-classics
admitted, especially in the “Musæus v. Homer” case.
103. Varietas poetices κομητικὴ, sicut Cypassis Corinnæ. The text has
κομωτικὴ, which I do not find.
104. Spingarn, p. 172. “Disinterested treatment” of practical problems,
such as poems certainly are, “wholly aside from all practical
considerations,” sometimes leads to awkward results.
105. Mr Spingarn (p. 94) apparently states that he “formulated” them, but
the gist of the next two pages fully corrects this slip or ambiguity; and he
has himself pointed out with equal decision and correctness that the French
assumption contained in the phrase, Unités Scaligériennes, is unfounded.
106. P. 365.
107. Vienna, 1570. My copy is the second enlarged and improved issue,
which appeared at Basle five years later. I have also the companion edition
of Petrarch (Basle, 1582), and the Opere Varie Critiche, published, with a
Life, by Muratori, in 4to (Lione, 1727). Besides these he wrote an
“exposition” of Dante, which was lost, and he is said, by Muratori, to have
been never tired of reading, and discovering new beauties in, Boccaccio.
Bentley, Diss. on Phal., ed. 1817, p. liii, defending Castelvetro against
Boyle, says that “his books have at this present time such a mighty
authorised, countenanced by the ancients, from Aristotle downwards—that
verse is not essential in any way.
101. One cannot help thinking that this distinction, which is quite
contrary to those entertained by Aristotle and Quintilian, must have been
influenced by the cadences of the modern languages—Italian and French—
with which Scaliger was familiar. In both, but especially in French, the
actual “measuring-off” of syllables was the be-all and end-all of metre, the
easements provided in English and German by syllabic equivalence being
in French refused altogether, in Italian replaced only by the more meagre
aid of syncope and apocope.
102. As, even throughout the neo-classic age, very orthodox neo-classics
admitted, especially in the “Musæus v. Homer” case.
103. Varietas poetices κομητικὴ, sicut Cypassis Corinnæ. The text has
κομωτικὴ, which I do not find.
104. Spingarn, p. 172. “Disinterested treatment” of practical problems,
such as poems certainly are, “wholly aside from all practical
considerations,” sometimes leads to awkward results.
105. Mr Spingarn (p. 94) apparently states that he “formulated” them, but
the gist of the next two pages fully corrects this slip or ambiguity; and he
has himself pointed out with equal decision and correctness that the French
assumption contained in the phrase, Unités Scaligériennes, is unfounded.
106. P. 365.
107. Vienna, 1570. My copy is the second enlarged and improved issue,
which appeared at Basle five years later. I have also the companion edition
of Petrarch (Basle, 1582), and the Opere Varie Critiche, published, with a
Life, by Muratori, in 4to (Lione, 1727). Besides these he wrote an
“exposition” of Dante, which was lost, and he is said, by Muratori, to have
been never tired of reading, and discovering new beauties in, Boccaccio.
Bentley, Diss. on Phal., ed. 1817, p. liii, defending Castelvetro against
Boyle, says that “his books have at this present time such a mighty
Page 127
reputation, that they are sold for their weight in silver in most countries of
Europe.” I am glad that this is not true now, for the Poetic by itself weighs
nearly 3 lb. But Europe often makes its valuations worse. I have seen,
though not bought, a copy for a shilling in these days.
108. See the curious remarks of Salviati, printed from MS. by Mr
Spingarn (op. cit., p. 316). Salviati thinks that Castelvetro too often wrote to
show off subtlety of opinion, and to be not like other people.
109. Op. Var., p. 83 sq.
110. Op. Var., pp. 288-306.
111. In fact, he subordinates the first to the other two. They make it
necessary. In order to appreciate his views, it is necessary to read the
commentary on all the Aristotelian places concerned, and also on that
touching Epic.
112. P. 101.
113. Poet. d’Arist., p. 278.
114. Poet. d’Arist., pp. 585, 586.
115. Ibid., p. 576.
116. Ibid., p. 23.
117. Poet. d’Arist., p. 545. It is fair to say that the ban is only pronounced
in reference to a single point—the management of speeches.
118. Ibid., p. 23.
119. Poet. d’Arist., p. 158.
120. It is perhaps well to meet a possible, though surely not probable
objection “Do you deny ranks in poetry?” Certainly not—but only the
propriety of excluding ranks which do not seem, to the censor, of the
highest.
Europe.” I am glad that this is not true now, for the Poetic by itself weighs
nearly 3 lb. But Europe often makes its valuations worse. I have seen,
though not bought, a copy for a shilling in these days.
108. See the curious remarks of Salviati, printed from MS. by Mr
Spingarn (op. cit., p. 316). Salviati thinks that Castelvetro too often wrote to
show off subtlety of opinion, and to be not like other people.
109. Op. Var., p. 83 sq.
110. Op. Var., pp. 288-306.
111. In fact, he subordinates the first to the other two. They make it
necessary. In order to appreciate his views, it is necessary to read the
commentary on all the Aristotelian places concerned, and also on that
touching Epic.
112. P. 101.
113. Poet. d’Arist., p. 278.
114. Poet. d’Arist., pp. 585, 586.
115. Ibid., p. 576.
116. Ibid., p. 23.
117. Poet. d’Arist., p. 545. It is fair to say that the ban is only pronounced
in reference to a single point—the management of speeches.
118. Ibid., p. 23.
119. Poet. d’Arist., p. 158.
120. It is perhaps well to meet a possible, though surely not probable
objection “Do you deny ranks in poetry?” Certainly not—but only the
propriety of excluding ranks which do not seem, to the censor, of the
highest.
Page 128
121. At Venice, but ad instanza of a Ferrarese bookseller.
122. These pieces form the major part of Cesare Guasti’s Prose Diverse
di T. T. (2 vols., Florence, 1875).
123. For instance, my attention was drawn by Mr Ker to the fact that the
description of the subject of the third original Discorso given at the end of
the second (f. 24 original ed. vol. i. p. 48, Guasti) does not in the least fit the
actual contents, while the missing matter is duly supplied in the later book
(i. 162 sq., Guasti).
122. These pieces form the major part of Cesare Guasti’s Prose Diverse
di T. T. (2 vols., Florence, 1875).
123. For instance, my attention was drawn by Mr Ker to the fact that the
description of the subject of the third original Discorso given at the end of
the second (f. 24 original ed. vol. i. p. 48, Guasti) does not in the least fit the
actual contents, while the missing matter is duly supplied in the later book
(i. 162 sq., Guasti).
Page 129
124. For instance in the opening of the first Discorsi (f. 2, verso):
Variamente tessendolo, di commune proprio, e di vecchio novo il facevano.
125. Bruno himself, in more places than one, takes the same line; indeed
his statement in the Eroici Furori, that “the rules are derived from the
poetry, and there are as many kinds and sorts of true rules as there are kinds
and sorts of true poets,” is the conclusion of the whole matter, and would
have done his friend Sidney a great deal of good. (The passage may be
found at p. 38 of the first vol. of the translation by I. Williams (London,
1887, or in the original, ed. Lagarde, p. 625).) But Bruno’s genius, as erratic
as it was brilliant, could not settle to mere Rhetoric.
126. Especially when they are contrasted with the superciliousness (v.
supra) of Lilius Giraldus and Scaliger.
127. It would be rather interesting to know whether the Furor Poeticus of
the second part of the Return from Parnassus has anything to do with
Patrizzi. There need be no connection, of course; but the correspondence of
England and Italy at this time in matters literary was so quick and intimate
that there might have been. Patrizzi’s book appeared in the probable year of
Shakespeare’s going to London, and of the production of Tamburlaine.
Bruno had then left England.
128. Deca Disputata, p. 122.
129. See Whately, Rhetoric, III. iii. 3, p. 216 (ed. 8, London, 1857), and
De Quincey, Rhetoric (Works, ed. Masson, x. 131).
130. Deca Disputata, p. 134 sq.
131. Of course an Aristotelian advocate may justly point out that the
Master after all only says μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν, without absolutely denying the
latter title to Empedocles.
132. Deca Disputata, p. 175.
133. Deca Disputata, p. 192.
Variamente tessendolo, di commune proprio, e di vecchio novo il facevano.
125. Bruno himself, in more places than one, takes the same line; indeed
his statement in the Eroici Furori, that “the rules are derived from the
poetry, and there are as many kinds and sorts of true rules as there are kinds
and sorts of true poets,” is the conclusion of the whole matter, and would
have done his friend Sidney a great deal of good. (The passage may be
found at p. 38 of the first vol. of the translation by I. Williams (London,
1887, or in the original, ed. Lagarde, p. 625).) But Bruno’s genius, as erratic
as it was brilliant, could not settle to mere Rhetoric.
126. Especially when they are contrasted with the superciliousness (v.
supra) of Lilius Giraldus and Scaliger.
127. It would be rather interesting to know whether the Furor Poeticus of
the second part of the Return from Parnassus has anything to do with
Patrizzi. There need be no connection, of course; but the correspondence of
England and Italy at this time in matters literary was so quick and intimate
that there might have been. Patrizzi’s book appeared in the probable year of
Shakespeare’s going to London, and of the production of Tamburlaine.
Bruno had then left England.
128. Deca Disputata, p. 122.
129. See Whately, Rhetoric, III. iii. 3, p. 216 (ed. 8, London, 1857), and
De Quincey, Rhetoric (Works, ed. Masson, x. 131).
130. Deca Disputata, p. 134 sq.
131. Of course an Aristotelian advocate may justly point out that the
Master after all only says μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν, without absolutely denying the
latter title to Empedocles.
132. Deca Disputata, p. 175.
133. Deca Disputata, p. 192.
Page 130
134. Who had been pars non minima in the exaltation of Tasso and
depreciation of Ariosto. See Spingarn, pp. 122, 123; and Serassi, Vita di
Tasso (Rome, 1785), pp. 331-348.
135. Deca Disputata, pp. 246-249.
136. This was long after the publication of the Trimerone (1586), and
when Patrizzi had been translated from Ferrara to a newly founded chair of
Platonic Philosophy at Rome, V. Serassi, op. cit., p. 475.
137. P. 95.
138. Pp. 221, 222. Of course it is possible to take exception even to
poeticamente—to ask “Yes; but what is this?” But the demurrer is only
specious. The very adverbial form shifts the sovereignty from the subject to
the treatment.
139. Ibid., p. 235.
140. The way in which Patrizzi is referred to after the lapse of a century
by Baillet and Gibert (v. inf., p. 320) shows at once the sort of magni
nominis umbra which still made itself felt, and the absence of any definite
knowledge to give body to the shade. For his dealings with Rhetoric, see
next Book, p. 329.
141. Discorsi Poetici, 1597.
142. Poesia Rappresentativa, 1598.
143. Della Imitatione Poetica, Venice, 1560; De Poetica Imitatione, ibid.,
1565.
144. His De Arte Poetica seems to have first appeared at Antwerp in
1579: I know it in his Opera, Naples, 1606.
145. Annotationi di M. Alessandro Piccolomini nel Libro della Poetica
d’Aristotele: Vinegia. The dedication to Cardinal Ferdinand dei Medici is
dated Ap. 20, 1572, from Piccolomini’s native town of Sienna, where he
became co-adjutor-archbishop. Some of Salviati’s MS. observations, printed
depreciation of Ariosto. See Spingarn, pp. 122, 123; and Serassi, Vita di
Tasso (Rome, 1785), pp. 331-348.
135. Deca Disputata, pp. 246-249.
136. This was long after the publication of the Trimerone (1586), and
when Patrizzi had been translated from Ferrara to a newly founded chair of
Platonic Philosophy at Rome, V. Serassi, op. cit., p. 475.
137. P. 95.
138. Pp. 221, 222. Of course it is possible to take exception even to
poeticamente—to ask “Yes; but what is this?” But the demurrer is only
specious. The very adverbial form shifts the sovereignty from the subject to
the treatment.
139. Ibid., p. 235.
140. The way in which Patrizzi is referred to after the lapse of a century
by Baillet and Gibert (v. inf., p. 320) shows at once the sort of magni
nominis umbra which still made itself felt, and the absence of any definite
knowledge to give body to the shade. For his dealings with Rhetoric, see
next Book, p. 329.
141. Discorsi Poetici, 1597.
142. Poesia Rappresentativa, 1598.
143. Della Imitatione Poetica, Venice, 1560; De Poetica Imitatione, ibid.,
1565.
144. His De Arte Poetica seems to have first appeared at Antwerp in
1579: I know it in his Opera, Naples, 1606.
145. Annotationi di M. Alessandro Piccolomini nel Libro della Poetica
d’Aristotele: Vinegia. The dedication to Cardinal Ferdinand dei Medici is
dated Ap. 20, 1572, from Piccolomini’s native town of Sienna, where he
became co-adjutor-archbishop. Some of Salviati’s MS. observations, printed
Page 131
by Mr Spingarn, seem to show that even Piccolomini’s contemporaries
regarded him as a little too polymathic, while his Raffaella exhibits the less
grave side of the Renaissance. But he was now getting an old man, and died
six years later at the full three score and ten.
146. In Venetia, 1580. Why has Time, in the title-page woodcut of this,
an hour-glass as head-dress, but a scourge instead of a scythe in his hand?
147. Milton had read Mazzoni, and cites him.
148. There is a large folding table of the causes and kinds of visions.
149. Op. cit., p. 124.
150. Padua, 1588. Denores (whose name is often separated into “de
Nores”) was, like Patrizzi, a Professor of Philosophy, and, like Piccolomini,
very polymathic and polygraphic. He had a year earlier published a
Discourse (which I have not) on the Philosophical Principles of poetical
kinds, and had very much earlier still, in 1553, commented the Epistola ad
Pisones. His son Pietro was an affectionate and attentive disciple of Tasso’s
in his last days at Rome.
151. I have not found much about Zinano near to hand, nor have I
thought it worth while to go far afield in search of him. Tiraboschi (vii.,
1716, 1900) names him as a poet-miscellanist in almost every kind. My
copy, of 42 duodecimo pages, has been torn out of what was its cover, and
may have been its company.
152. His Explanationes de Arte Poetica (Rome, 1587) are simply notes
on Horace.
153. I have not yet been able to see L. Gambara, De Perfecta Poeseos
Ratione (Rome, 1576), and I gather that Mr Spingarn was in the same case,
as he refers not to the book, but to Baillet. According to that invaluable
person (iii. 70), Gambara must have been an early champion of the
uncompromisingly religious view of Poetry which appears in several
French seventeenth-century writers, and in our own Dennis. The poet is not
even to introduce a heathen divinity.
regarded him as a little too polymathic, while his Raffaella exhibits the less
grave side of the Renaissance. But he was now getting an old man, and died
six years later at the full three score and ten.
146. In Venetia, 1580. Why has Time, in the title-page woodcut of this,
an hour-glass as head-dress, but a scourge instead of a scythe in his hand?
147. Milton had read Mazzoni, and cites him.
148. There is a large folding table of the causes and kinds of visions.
149. Op. cit., p. 124.
150. Padua, 1588. Denores (whose name is often separated into “de
Nores”) was, like Patrizzi, a Professor of Philosophy, and, like Piccolomini,
very polymathic and polygraphic. He had a year earlier published a
Discourse (which I have not) on the Philosophical Principles of poetical
kinds, and had very much earlier still, in 1553, commented the Epistola ad
Pisones. His son Pietro was an affectionate and attentive disciple of Tasso’s
in his last days at Rome.
151. I have not found much about Zinano near to hand, nor have I
thought it worth while to go far afield in search of him. Tiraboschi (vii.,
1716, 1900) names him as a poet-miscellanist in almost every kind. My
copy, of 42 duodecimo pages, has been torn out of what was its cover, and
may have been its company.
152. His Explanationes de Arte Poetica (Rome, 1587) are simply notes
on Horace.
153. I have not yet been able to see L. Gambara, De Perfecta Poeseos
Ratione (Rome, 1576), and I gather that Mr Spingarn was in the same case,
as he refers not to the book, but to Baillet. According to that invaluable
person (iii. 70), Gambara must have been an early champion of the
uncompromisingly religious view of Poetry which appears in several
French seventeenth-century writers, and in our own Dennis. The poet is not
even to introduce a heathen divinity.
Page 132
154. Venice, 1592-93.
155. Padua, 1600.
156. Cf. Butcher, op. cit., p. 297 and note.
155. Padua, 1600.
156. Cf. Butcher, op. cit., p. 297 and note.
Page 133
CHAPTER IV.
THE CRITICISM OF THE PLÉIADE.
THE ‘RHETORICS’ OF THE TRANSITION—SIBILET—DU BELLAY—THE ‘DÉFENSE ET
ILLUSTRATION DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE’—ITS POSITIVE GOSPEL AND THE
VALUE THEREOF—THE ‘QUINTIL HORATIEN’—PELLETIER’S ‘ART POÉTIQUE’—
RONSARD: HIS GENERAL IMPORTANCE—THE ‘ABRÉGÉ DE L’ART POÉTIQUE’—
THE ‘PREFACES TO THE FRANCIADE’—HIS CRITICAL GOSPEL—SOME MINORS—
PIERRE DE LAUDUN—VAUQUELIN DE LA FRESNAYE—ANALYSIS OF HIS ‘ART
POÉTIQUE’—THE FIRST BOOK—THE SECOND—THE THIRD—HIS EXPOSITION OF
‘PLÉIADE’ CRITICISM—OUTLIERS: TORY, FAUCHET, ETC.—PASQUIER: THE
‘RECHERCHES’—HIS KNOWLEDGE OF OLDER FRENCH LITERATURE, AND
CRITICISM OF CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POETRY—MONTAIGNE: HIS
REFERENCES TO LITERATURE—THE ESSAY ‘ON BOOKS.’
There is, perhaps, no more remarkable proof of the extraordinarily
germinal character of Italian literature than the influence which it exercised
The Rhetorics on France in the department with which we here deal. It is
of the
Transition.
needless to say that the subsequent story of French
literature has shown how deep and wide is the critical vein
in the French literary spirit. But up to the middle of the sixteenth century
this vein was almost absolutely irrepertum—whether sic melius situm or
not. A few Arts of Poetry and Rhetoric had indeed been introduced across
the Channel long before we had any on this side, as we should expect in a
language so much more advanced than English, and as we have partly seen
in the preceding volume. The Art de dittier of Eustache Deschamps, at the
end of the fourteenth century, had been followed[157] throughout the fifteenth
by others, some of them bearing the not uninteresting or unimportant title of
“Seconde Rhétorique,” as distinguishing Poetics from the Art of Oratory.
The chief of these,[158] almost exactly a century later than the treatise of
Deschamps, used to be assigned to Henri de Croy, and is now (very likely
with no more reason) handed over to Molinet. But they were almost
entirely, if not entirely, occupied with the intricacies of the “forms” of
ballade, &c., and included no criticism properly so called.
THE CRITICISM OF THE PLÉIADE.
THE ‘RHETORICS’ OF THE TRANSITION—SIBILET—DU BELLAY—THE ‘DÉFENSE ET
ILLUSTRATION DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE’—ITS POSITIVE GOSPEL AND THE
VALUE THEREOF—THE ‘QUINTIL HORATIEN’—PELLETIER’S ‘ART POÉTIQUE’—
RONSARD: HIS GENERAL IMPORTANCE—THE ‘ABRÉGÉ DE L’ART POÉTIQUE’—
THE ‘PREFACES TO THE FRANCIADE’—HIS CRITICAL GOSPEL—SOME MINORS—
PIERRE DE LAUDUN—VAUQUELIN DE LA FRESNAYE—ANALYSIS OF HIS ‘ART
POÉTIQUE’—THE FIRST BOOK—THE SECOND—THE THIRD—HIS EXPOSITION OF
‘PLÉIADE’ CRITICISM—OUTLIERS: TORY, FAUCHET, ETC.—PASQUIER: THE
‘RECHERCHES’—HIS KNOWLEDGE OF OLDER FRENCH LITERATURE, AND
CRITICISM OF CONTEMPORARY FRENCH POETRY—MONTAIGNE: HIS
REFERENCES TO LITERATURE—THE ESSAY ‘ON BOOKS.’
There is, perhaps, no more remarkable proof of the extraordinarily
germinal character of Italian literature than the influence which it exercised
The Rhetorics on France in the department with which we here deal. It is
of the
Transition.
needless to say that the subsequent story of French
literature has shown how deep and wide is the critical vein
in the French literary spirit. But up to the middle of the sixteenth century
this vein was almost absolutely irrepertum—whether sic melius situm or
not. A few Arts of Poetry and Rhetoric had indeed been introduced across
the Channel long before we had any on this side, as we should expect in a
language so much more advanced than English, and as we have partly seen
in the preceding volume. The Art de dittier of Eustache Deschamps, at the
end of the fourteenth century, had been followed[157] throughout the fifteenth
by others, some of them bearing the not uninteresting or unimportant title of
“Seconde Rhétorique,” as distinguishing Poetics from the Art of Oratory.
The chief of these,[158] almost exactly a century later than the treatise of
Deschamps, used to be assigned to Henri de Croy, and is now (very likely
with no more reason) handed over to Molinet. But they were almost
entirely, if not entirely, occupied with the intricacies of the “forms” of
ballade, &c., and included no criticism properly so called.
Page 134
The spirit and substance of these treatises seems to have been caught up
and embodied, about the year 1500, in another Rhetoric,[159] which became
very popular, and was known by such titles as the “Flower” or “Garden of
Rhetoric,” but the author of which is only known by one of those agreeably
conceited noms de guerre so frequent at the time, as “‘l’Infortunaté’” Its
matter appeared, without much alteration or real extension, in the works of
Pierre Fabri[160] and Gratien du Pont (1539),[161] and the actual birth of
French criticism proper is postponed, by most if not all historians, till the
fifth decade of the century, when Pelletier translated the Ars Poetica of
Horace in 1545, while Sibilet wrote an original Art Poétique three years
later, and just before Du Bellay’s epoch-making Défense.
There is little possibility of difference of opinion as to the striking critical
Sibilet. moment presented to us by the juxtaposition, with but a single
twelvemonth between, of Sibilet and Du Bellay. The importance of this
movement is increased, not lessened, by the fact that Sibilet himself is by
no means such a copyist of Gratien du Pont as Du Pont is of Fabri, and
Fabri of the unknown “Unfortunate,” and the “Unfortunate” of all his
predecessors to Deschamps. He does repeat the lessons of the Rhetorics as
to verse and rhyme, and so forth. He has no doubt about the excellence of
that “equivocal” rhyme to which France yet clings, though it has always
been unpleasing to an English ear. And (though with an indication that they
are passing out of fashion) he admits the most labyrinthine intricacies of the
ballade and its group.[162]
But he is far indeed from stopping here. He was (and small blame to him)
a great admirer of Marot, and he had already learnt to distrust that
outrageous “aureation” of French with Greek and Latin words which the
rhétoriqueurs had begun, which the intermediate school of Scève and
Heroet were continuing,[163] and which the Pléiade, though with an atoning
touch of elegance and indeed of poetry, was to maintain and increase, in the
very act of breaking with other rhétoriqueur traditions. He delights in
Marot’s own epigrams, and in the sonnets of Mellin de Saint-Gelais; and he
is said to have anticipated Ronsard in the adoption of the term “ode” in
French, though his odes are not in the least Pindaric (as for the matter of
that Ronsard’s are not). The epistle and the elegy give fresh intimation of
his independent following of the classics, and he pays particular attention to
the eclogue, dwells on the importance of the “version” (translation from
Greek or Latin into French verse), and in the opening of his book is not
and embodied, about the year 1500, in another Rhetoric,[159] which became
very popular, and was known by such titles as the “Flower” or “Garden of
Rhetoric,” but the author of which is only known by one of those agreeably
conceited noms de guerre so frequent at the time, as “‘l’Infortunaté’” Its
matter appeared, without much alteration or real extension, in the works of
Pierre Fabri[160] and Gratien du Pont (1539),[161] and the actual birth of
French criticism proper is postponed, by most if not all historians, till the
fifth decade of the century, when Pelletier translated the Ars Poetica of
Horace in 1545, while Sibilet wrote an original Art Poétique three years
later, and just before Du Bellay’s epoch-making Défense.
There is little possibility of difference of opinion as to the striking critical
Sibilet. moment presented to us by the juxtaposition, with but a single
twelvemonth between, of Sibilet and Du Bellay. The importance of this
movement is increased, not lessened, by the fact that Sibilet himself is by
no means such a copyist of Gratien du Pont as Du Pont is of Fabri, and
Fabri of the unknown “Unfortunate,” and the “Unfortunate” of all his
predecessors to Deschamps. He does repeat the lessons of the Rhetorics as
to verse and rhyme, and so forth. He has no doubt about the excellence of
that “equivocal” rhyme to which France yet clings, though it has always
been unpleasing to an English ear. And (though with an indication that they
are passing out of fashion) he admits the most labyrinthine intricacies of the
ballade and its group.[162]
But he is far indeed from stopping here. He was (and small blame to him)
a great admirer of Marot, and he had already learnt to distrust that
outrageous “aureation” of French with Greek and Latin words which the
rhétoriqueurs had begun, which the intermediate school of Scève and
Heroet were continuing,[163] and which the Pléiade, though with an atoning
touch of elegance and indeed of poetry, was to maintain and increase, in the
very act of breaking with other rhétoriqueur traditions. He delights in
Marot’s own epigrams, and in the sonnets of Mellin de Saint-Gelais; and he
is said to have anticipated Ronsard in the adoption of the term “ode” in
French, though his odes are not in the least Pindaric (as for the matter of
that Ronsard’s are not). The epistle and the elegy give fresh intimation of
his independent following of the classics, and he pays particular attention to
the eclogue, dwells on the importance of the “version” (translation from
Greek or Latin into French verse), and in the opening of his book is not
Page 135
very far from that half-Platonic, half anti-Platonic, deification of Poetry
which is the catch-cry of the true Renaissance critic everywhere. There is
not very much real, and probably still less intentional, innovation or revolt
in Sibilet; and it is precisely this that makes him so valuable. Fabri and
Gratien du Pont are merely of the old: in no important way do the form and
pressure of the coming time set their mark on them. Du Bellay is wholly of
the new: he is its champion and crusader, full of scorn for the old. Sibilet,
between them, shows, uncontentiously, the amount of leaning towards
sometimes revised or exotic novelty, and away from immediate and
domestic antiquity, which influenced the generation.
The position of the Défense et Illustration de la Langue Française may
be said to be in the main assured and uncontested, nor do I think it
necessary to make such a curious dictum as that it is “not in any true sense a
work of literary criticism at all” the subject of much counter-argument. In
Du Bellay. that case most undoubtedly the De Vulgari Eloquio, of
which it has been not much less strangely held to be little more than a
version adapted to the latitude of Paris, is not such a work either. I think it
very likely that Du Bellay knew the De Vulgari, which Trissino had long
before published in Italian; but both the circumstances and the purpose of
the two books seem to me as entirely different as their position in literary
criticism seems to me absolutely secure.
Whether this be so or not, Du Bellay’s circumstances are perfectly well
known, and his purpose is sun-clear, alike before him and before his
The Défense et readers. He is justifying the vulgar tongue,[164] but he is
Illustration de la
Langue Française.
justifying it as Ascham and his friends were doing in
England; with the proviso that it shall be reformed
upon, strengthened by, and altogether put to school to, the classical
languages in the first place, with in the second (and here Ascham would not
have agreed) Italian and even Spanish. His dealing is no doubt titularly and
ostensibly directed to the language; but his anxieties are wholly
concentrated on the language as the organ of literature—and specially of
poetry. That he made a mistake in turning his back, with the scorn he
shows, on the older language itself, and even on the verse-forms which had
so long occupied it, is perfectly true. This is the besetting sin of the
Renaissance—its special form of that general sin which, as we said at the
outset, doth so easily beset every age. But his scheme for the improvement
is far more original; and, except in so far as it may have been faintly
which is the catch-cry of the true Renaissance critic everywhere. There is
not very much real, and probably still less intentional, innovation or revolt
in Sibilet; and it is precisely this that makes him so valuable. Fabri and
Gratien du Pont are merely of the old: in no important way do the form and
pressure of the coming time set their mark on them. Du Bellay is wholly of
the new: he is its champion and crusader, full of scorn for the old. Sibilet,
between them, shows, uncontentiously, the amount of leaning towards
sometimes revised or exotic novelty, and away from immediate and
domestic antiquity, which influenced the generation.
The position of the Défense et Illustration de la Langue Française may
be said to be in the main assured and uncontested, nor do I think it
necessary to make such a curious dictum as that it is “not in any true sense a
work of literary criticism at all” the subject of much counter-argument. In
Du Bellay. that case most undoubtedly the De Vulgari Eloquio, of
which it has been not much less strangely held to be little more than a
version adapted to the latitude of Paris, is not such a work either. I think it
very likely that Du Bellay knew the De Vulgari, which Trissino had long
before published in Italian; but both the circumstances and the purpose of
the two books seem to me as entirely different as their position in literary
criticism seems to me absolutely secure.
Whether this be so or not, Du Bellay’s circumstances are perfectly well
known, and his purpose is sun-clear, alike before him and before his
The Défense et readers. He is justifying the vulgar tongue,[164] but he is
Illustration de la
Langue Française.
justifying it as Ascham and his friends were doing in
England; with the proviso that it shall be reformed
upon, strengthened by, and altogether put to school to, the classical
languages in the first place, with in the second (and here Ascham would not
have agreed) Italian and even Spanish. His dealing is no doubt titularly and
ostensibly directed to the language; but his anxieties are wholly
concentrated on the language as the organ of literature—and specially of
poetry. That he made a mistake in turning his back, with the scorn he
shows, on the older language itself, and even on the verse-forms which had
so long occupied it, is perfectly true. This is the besetting sin of the
Renaissance—its special form of that general sin which, as we said at the
outset, doth so easily beset every age. But his scheme for the improvement
is far more original; and, except in so far as it may have been faintly
Page 136
suggested by a passage of Quintilian,[165] had not, so far as I know, been
anticipated by any one in ancient or modern times. Unlike Sibilet, and
unlike preceding writers generally, he did not believe so very much in
translation—seeing justly that by it you get the matter, but nothing, or at
least not much, more.[166] He did not believe in the mere “imitation” of the
ancients either. I cannot but think that M. Brunetière[167] has been rather
unjust in upbraiding Du Bellay with the use of this word. He does use it: but
he explains it. He wishes the ancients to be imitated in their processes, not
merely in their results. His is no Ciceronianism; no “Bembism”; none of
that frank advice to “convey” which Vida had given before him, and to
which, unluckily, his master Ronsard condescended later. “How,” he asks,
“did Greek and Latin become such great literary languages?” Were they
always so? Not at all. It was due to culture, to care, to (in the case of Latin
at least) ingenious grafting of fresh branches from Greek. So is French to
graft from Greek, from Latin, from Italian, from Spanish even—so is the
essence of the classics and the other tongues to be converted into the blood
and nourishment of French.[168]
Is this “not in any pure sense literary criticism at all”? Is this “young”
Its positive gospel and the and “pedantic” and “too much praised” by (of all
value thereof.
Sauls among the prophets!) Désiré Nisard? I have
a great respect for Mr Spingarn’s erudition; I have a greater for M.
Brunetière’s masterly insight and grasp in criticism; but here I throw down
the glove to both. That Du Bellay was absolutely wrong in his scorn for
ballade and rondeau and other “épiceries” I am sure; that his master was
right in looking at least as much to the old French lexicon as to new
constructions or adoptions I am sure. But Du Bellay (half or all unawares,
as is the wont of finders and founders) has seized a secret of criticism which
is of the most precious, and which—with all politeness be it spoken—I
venture to think that M. Brunetière himself rather acknowledges and
trembles at, than really ignores. This free trade in language, in forms, in
processes,—this resolute determination to convert all the treasures of
antiquity and modernity alike into “food” for the literary organism, “blood”
for the literary veins, marrow for the literary bones,—is no small thing. It
may not be the absolute and sole secret of literary greatness. But we can
almost see that Greek, the most perfectly literary of all languages for a time,
withered and dwindled because it did not pursue this course; that Latin
followed it on too small a scale; above all, that English owes great part of
anticipated by any one in ancient or modern times. Unlike Sibilet, and
unlike preceding writers generally, he did not believe so very much in
translation—seeing justly that by it you get the matter, but nothing, or at
least not much, more.[166] He did not believe in the mere “imitation” of the
ancients either. I cannot but think that M. Brunetière[167] has been rather
unjust in upbraiding Du Bellay with the use of this word. He does use it: but
he explains it. He wishes the ancients to be imitated in their processes, not
merely in their results. His is no Ciceronianism; no “Bembism”; none of
that frank advice to “convey” which Vida had given before him, and to
which, unluckily, his master Ronsard condescended later. “How,” he asks,
“did Greek and Latin become such great literary languages?” Were they
always so? Not at all. It was due to culture, to care, to (in the case of Latin
at least) ingenious grafting of fresh branches from Greek. So is French to
graft from Greek, from Latin, from Italian, from Spanish even—so is the
essence of the classics and the other tongues to be converted into the blood
and nourishment of French.[168]
Is this “not in any pure sense literary criticism at all”? Is this “young”
Its positive gospel and the and “pedantic” and “too much praised” by (of all
value thereof.
Sauls among the prophets!) Désiré Nisard? I have
a great respect for Mr Spingarn’s erudition; I have a greater for M.
Brunetière’s masterly insight and grasp in criticism; but here I throw down
the glove to both. That Du Bellay was absolutely wrong in his scorn for
ballade and rondeau and other “épiceries” I am sure; that his master was
right in looking at least as much to the old French lexicon as to new
constructions or adoptions I am sure. But Du Bellay (half or all unawares,
as is the wont of finders and founders) has seized a secret of criticism which
is of the most precious, and which—with all politeness be it spoken—I
venture to think that M. Brunetière himself rather acknowledges and
trembles at, than really ignores. This free trade in language, in forms, in
processes,—this resolute determination to convert all the treasures of
antiquity and modernity alike into “food” for the literary organism, “blood”
for the literary veins, marrow for the literary bones,—is no small thing. It
may not be the absolute and sole secret of literary greatness. But we can
almost see that Greek, the most perfectly literary of all languages for a time,
withered and dwindled because it did not pursue this course; that Latin
followed it on too small a scale; above all, that English owes great part of
Page 137
its strength, and life, and splendid flourishing of centuries, to it. Du Bellay
preached, perhaps more or less unconsciously, what Shakespeare practised
—whether consciously or unconsciously we need neither know nor care,
any more than in all probability he knew or cared himself.
No doubt all languages and all literatures have not the digestive strength
required to swallow poison and food, bread and stones, almost
indiscriminately, assimilating all the good, and dismissing most if not all of
the evil. There are not, and never have been in England, wanting people,
from the towering head of Swift down to quite creeping things of our own
time, who have been distressed by “mob” and by “bamboozle,” by
“velleity” and by “meticulous.” No doubt in France the objection has been
still greater, and perhaps better founded on reason. But these propositions
will not affect, in the slightest degree, the other proposition that Du Bellay,
in the Défense, stumbled upon, and perhaps even half-consciously realised,
that view of literature, and of language as the instrument of literature, which
will have the whole to be mainly un grand peut-être—a vast and endless
series of explorations in unknown seas, rather than a mathematical or
chemical process of compounding definite formulas and prescriptions, so as
to reach results antecedently certain. Very far would it have been from
Nisard, who was no doubt bribed by the militant classicism of the Pléiade,
to have given his praise had he thought this: I am even prepared to admit
that Du Bellay himself would probably not have thanked me for the
compliment of my theory. But hatred is often more sagacious than
friendship. Malherbe and those about Malherbe knew perfectly well what
the real spirit of the Pléiade was. And so does M. Brunetière, who has a
scent as keen as that of Malherbe and those about Malherbe, and is very
much better read, very much more scientifically equipped, and quite
infinitely better provided with intellectual and critical gift.[169]
It was unlikely, or rather impossible, that so revolutionary a challenge
should lack its answer, which duly appeared a year later under the odd title
The Quintil of Le Quintil Horatien.[170] This used to be attributed to
Horatien.
Charles Fontaine, a poet of parts; but it seems that he
repudiated it, and it is now handed over to a pedagogue of the name of
Aneau. It is a dogged little book, which treats the Défense very much as if it
were an impertinent school exercise, and goes through it with the lead
pencil in a fashion at once laborious, ineffectual, and suggestive of a vain
desire to substitute the birch rod. The author, whoever he was, might have
preached, perhaps more or less unconsciously, what Shakespeare practised
—whether consciously or unconsciously we need neither know nor care,
any more than in all probability he knew or cared himself.
No doubt all languages and all literatures have not the digestive strength
required to swallow poison and food, bread and stones, almost
indiscriminately, assimilating all the good, and dismissing most if not all of
the evil. There are not, and never have been in England, wanting people,
from the towering head of Swift down to quite creeping things of our own
time, who have been distressed by “mob” and by “bamboozle,” by
“velleity” and by “meticulous.” No doubt in France the objection has been
still greater, and perhaps better founded on reason. But these propositions
will not affect, in the slightest degree, the other proposition that Du Bellay,
in the Défense, stumbled upon, and perhaps even half-consciously realised,
that view of literature, and of language as the instrument of literature, which
will have the whole to be mainly un grand peut-être—a vast and endless
series of explorations in unknown seas, rather than a mathematical or
chemical process of compounding definite formulas and prescriptions, so as
to reach results antecedently certain. Very far would it have been from
Nisard, who was no doubt bribed by the militant classicism of the Pléiade,
to have given his praise had he thought this: I am even prepared to admit
that Du Bellay himself would probably not have thanked me for the
compliment of my theory. But hatred is often more sagacious than
friendship. Malherbe and those about Malherbe knew perfectly well what
the real spirit of the Pléiade was. And so does M. Brunetière, who has a
scent as keen as that of Malherbe and those about Malherbe, and is very
much better read, very much more scientifically equipped, and quite
infinitely better provided with intellectual and critical gift.[169]
It was unlikely, or rather impossible, that so revolutionary a challenge
should lack its answer, which duly appeared a year later under the odd title
The Quintil of Le Quintil Horatien.[170] This used to be attributed to
Horatien.
Charles Fontaine, a poet of parts; but it seems that he
repudiated it, and it is now handed over to a pedagogue of the name of
Aneau. It is a dogged little book, which treats the Défense very much as if it
were an impertinent school exercise, and goes through it with the lead
pencil in a fashion at once laborious, ineffectual, and suggestive of a vain
desire to substitute the birch rod. The author, whoever he was, might have
Page 138
found plenty of things to say against Du Bellay, and he is on fairly solid
ground when he indignantly protests that William of Lorris, Chartier,
Villon, and others were not the artless clowns, or positive sinners, that this
petulant-sparkling star of the Pléiade had looked awry upon. But even here
his own ignorance of the still better things before the Rose disabled him:
and it is by no means certain that he would have had the wit to appreciate
them if he had known them. He thinks the sonnet too “easy,” poor man!
condemns the elegy on the absurd ground that it saddens the reader; and
(committing the same fault in defence which more modern critics have
committed in attack) bases his main, if not his whole, praise of Ballade and
Chant Royal, Rondeau and Rondel, on their mere difficulty. But his most
unfortunate, if not his most absurd, error was the line which, in common
with most respectable persons, both then and since, he takes up against the
verbum inusitatum, as shown in the new poetic diction of the Pléiade. This
was doubly unlucky: first, because the fifteenth-century poets whom he
champions had themselves “aureated” the language in or out of all
conscience already; and secondly, because this kind of criticism, whether it
be applied to Montaigne or Dryden, to Carlyle or Browning, is always a
dangerous delusion. Very classical critics have pecked and mocked at the
author of the Quintil Horatien because he black-marks not merely words
useful or beautiful, like sinueux, oblivieux, rasséréner, but even such now
sterling coin as liquide and patrie. It would be well if they, or those like
them, would think twice before condemning, as neologisms, terms which
may not impossibly seem as much matter of course to the twenty-fourth
century as patrie does to the twentieth. But the author of the Quintil is
really of that breed of carping critics which carps itself out of all common-
sense. He makes ponderous fun of the initial signature I. D. B. A. (“J. du
Bellay Angevin”); objects to the statement that “nature gave us tongues to
speak,” because Aristotle, Galen, and Petrus Hispanus agree that palate,
throat, lips, and teeth are also necessary to the process; to the use of voix
instead of son, where animals are not concerned. The sea would have no
voice for him—and doubtless had none.
From such mere “denigration” (the censor permits himself this word as a
Pelletier’s Art stone to throw at Du Bellay) no good thing could come:
Poétique.
and besides, for some generation or more, the brother stars
were to fight in their courses for Pléiade criticism as well as for Pléiade
poetry. The second Ars Poetica of the French Renaissance—the first in any
ground when he indignantly protests that William of Lorris, Chartier,
Villon, and others were not the artless clowns, or positive sinners, that this
petulant-sparkling star of the Pléiade had looked awry upon. But even here
his own ignorance of the still better things before the Rose disabled him:
and it is by no means certain that he would have had the wit to appreciate
them if he had known them. He thinks the sonnet too “easy,” poor man!
condemns the elegy on the absurd ground that it saddens the reader; and
(committing the same fault in defence which more modern critics have
committed in attack) bases his main, if not his whole, praise of Ballade and
Chant Royal, Rondeau and Rondel, on their mere difficulty. But his most
unfortunate, if not his most absurd, error was the line which, in common
with most respectable persons, both then and since, he takes up against the
verbum inusitatum, as shown in the new poetic diction of the Pléiade. This
was doubly unlucky: first, because the fifteenth-century poets whom he
champions had themselves “aureated” the language in or out of all
conscience already; and secondly, because this kind of criticism, whether it
be applied to Montaigne or Dryden, to Carlyle or Browning, is always a
dangerous delusion. Very classical critics have pecked and mocked at the
author of the Quintil Horatien because he black-marks not merely words
useful or beautiful, like sinueux, oblivieux, rasséréner, but even such now
sterling coin as liquide and patrie. It would be well if they, or those like
them, would think twice before condemning, as neologisms, terms which
may not impossibly seem as much matter of course to the twenty-fourth
century as patrie does to the twentieth. But the author of the Quintil is
really of that breed of carping critics which carps itself out of all common-
sense. He makes ponderous fun of the initial signature I. D. B. A. (“J. du
Bellay Angevin”); objects to the statement that “nature gave us tongues to
speak,” because Aristotle, Galen, and Petrus Hispanus agree that palate,
throat, lips, and teeth are also necessary to the process; to the use of voix
instead of son, where animals are not concerned. The sea would have no
voice for him—and doubtless had none.
From such mere “denigration” (the censor permits himself this word as a
Pelletier’s Art stone to throw at Du Bellay) no good thing could come:
Poétique.
and besides, for some generation or more, the brother stars
were to fight in their courses for Pléiade criticism as well as for Pléiade
poetry. The second Ars Poetica of the French Renaissance—the first in any
Page 139
full modern sense—appeared in 1555 from the hand of Jacques Pelletier,
himself a spelling reformer, a professor, and, what is more, a
mathematician; but a man of versatile ability and much eagerness to
welcome any new good thing, with no small power of starting such things.
He was a pleasant poet, full of Pléiade manner before the Pléiade had been
formed; nor can even his absurd spelling[171] quite hide the beauty of such
things as
“Alors que la vermeille Aurore.”
And when, at the age of nearly forty, he wrote his Poetic, nobody could
charge him with being a mere theorist. He went heart and soul for the
Pléiade ideas, and like Du Bellay and the rest, as indeed was unavoidable,
busied himself first of all with the reform of the language. He recommends
the formation of a regular poetic diction, and goes so far (I do not say that it
is too far) as to approve of retaining double forms, one fully “frenchified,”
one simply Latin with a French termination (e.g., repousse and repulse), the
first for prosaic, the second for poetic use. The famous Pléiade stumbling-
blocks, the compound epithet and the inverted order of words, are no
stumbling-blocks for him—he takes them triumphantly in the stride of his
revolutionary ardour: and he joins Ronsard also in the safer if not more
popular recommendation of archaism, and of adoption of didactic forms at
pleasure. No doubt he is not always wise: though the Classical school which
followed had lost the right to reproach him with abusing the principle of
suiting the sound to the sense. But still there is a great wisdom in him.
Himself an excellent rhymer, he has some of the qualms about rhyme which
were so frequent in the sixteenth century; but he is sound on the point (in
French not admitting of any serious contest) that without rhyme poetry
becomes prose, and he is more than lukewarm as to classical metres. It is
sad but not surprising that he joins Du Bellay in condemning the delightful
if not all-sufficing metrical kinds which had produced such charming things
from Lescurel to Villon; and he duly recommends comedy, tragedy, and
epic in their place. As he had himself translated the Epistle to the Pisos
eleven years earlier, it is not wonderful that he sticks very close to it.
Whether, as has been said by some, he does not know Aristotle, may not be
quite certain; but it is certain that Aristotelian doctrines make no figure in
him: it will be remembered that they had not made much even in Italy at
himself a spelling reformer, a professor, and, what is more, a
mathematician; but a man of versatile ability and much eagerness to
welcome any new good thing, with no small power of starting such things.
He was a pleasant poet, full of Pléiade manner before the Pléiade had been
formed; nor can even his absurd spelling[171] quite hide the beauty of such
things as
“Alors que la vermeille Aurore.”
And when, at the age of nearly forty, he wrote his Poetic, nobody could
charge him with being a mere theorist. He went heart and soul for the
Pléiade ideas, and like Du Bellay and the rest, as indeed was unavoidable,
busied himself first of all with the reform of the language. He recommends
the formation of a regular poetic diction, and goes so far (I do not say that it
is too far) as to approve of retaining double forms, one fully “frenchified,”
one simply Latin with a French termination (e.g., repousse and repulse), the
first for prosaic, the second for poetic use. The famous Pléiade stumbling-
blocks, the compound epithet and the inverted order of words, are no
stumbling-blocks for him—he takes them triumphantly in the stride of his
revolutionary ardour: and he joins Ronsard also in the safer if not more
popular recommendation of archaism, and of adoption of didactic forms at
pleasure. No doubt he is not always wise: though the Classical school which
followed had lost the right to reproach him with abusing the principle of
suiting the sound to the sense. But still there is a great wisdom in him.
Himself an excellent rhymer, he has some of the qualms about rhyme which
were so frequent in the sixteenth century; but he is sound on the point (in
French not admitting of any serious contest) that without rhyme poetry
becomes prose, and he is more than lukewarm as to classical metres. It is
sad but not surprising that he joins Du Bellay in condemning the delightful
if not all-sufficing metrical kinds which had produced such charming things
from Lescurel to Villon; and he duly recommends comedy, tragedy, and
epic in their place. As he had himself translated the Epistle to the Pisos
eleven years earlier, it is not wonderful that he sticks very close to it.
Whether, as has been said by some, he does not know Aristotle, may not be
quite certain; but it is certain that Aristotelian doctrines make no figure in
him: it will be remembered that they had not made much even in Italy at
Page 140
this time. In fact, it seems reasonable to doubt whether, despite their
adoration of Greek, the Pléiade writers ever drew much direct inspiration
from the Poetics, though, in Italian translations and commentaries at least, it
must have influenced them to some extent.
The most interesting figure of Pléiade criticism, however, is, as it should
Ronsard: his be, Ronsard[172] himself. The greatness of this really great
general
importance.
poet must be injuriously affected, but ought not to be
obscured to critical judgment, both by the fact (for which
he is to blame) that he tried too many things and wrote too much; and by
the other fact (for which he is blameless) that he attempted a new theory
and practice of poetry, not, like his younger and more fortunate
contemporary Spenser, at the beginning of a great poetic wave in his own
country, but at a time when that country’s energies were steadily settling
towards prose. Yet he was nothing if not critical. The actual amount of
critical expression that he has left us is not large: it is a pity that he did not
devote to it some of the time which he might well have spared from his too
copious, and sometimes too undistinguished, versemanship. He is, like
Dryden (whom he resembles in not a few ways so much that I should be
surprised if the parallel has not struck others), somewhat careless of
outward consistency in his critical utterances—a carelessness indicative in
each case of real critical sincerity, of the fact that the two poets were
honestly seeking the way, and had the sense not to persevere in blind alleys
when they found them blind. Above all, like the whole of his school, he is
distinguished by a critical note, which must be dwelt on in the Interchapter
succeeding this book, but which may well be indicated here—the note that
they are much more bent on the production of new literature than on the
study of old.
But, for all this, he is a remarkable critic, and in his critical aperçus we
can ourselves perceive germs, indications, suggestions, which might have
resulted in the creation of a much larger body of actual criticism. Indeed
these are (as M. Pellissier[173] and others have shown) actually responsible
for much that is most characteristic, and for most of what is best, in the
Classical school of the next century, which affected to despise him, as well
as for other things which, if that school had followed them out, would have
saved it from its most fatal mistakes and shortcomings.
The main critical loci in Ronsard have been duly pointed out by his
editor, M. Prosper Blanchemain. They are the formal Abrégé de l’Art
adoration of Greek, the Pléiade writers ever drew much direct inspiration
from the Poetics, though, in Italian translations and commentaries at least, it
must have influenced them to some extent.
The most interesting figure of Pléiade criticism, however, is, as it should
Ronsard: his be, Ronsard[172] himself. The greatness of this really great
general
importance.
poet must be injuriously affected, but ought not to be
obscured to critical judgment, both by the fact (for which
he is to blame) that he tried too many things and wrote too much; and by
the other fact (for which he is blameless) that he attempted a new theory
and practice of poetry, not, like his younger and more fortunate
contemporary Spenser, at the beginning of a great poetic wave in his own
country, but at a time when that country’s energies were steadily settling
towards prose. Yet he was nothing if not critical. The actual amount of
critical expression that he has left us is not large: it is a pity that he did not
devote to it some of the time which he might well have spared from his too
copious, and sometimes too undistinguished, versemanship. He is, like
Dryden (whom he resembles in not a few ways so much that I should be
surprised if the parallel has not struck others), somewhat careless of
outward consistency in his critical utterances—a carelessness indicative in
each case of real critical sincerity, of the fact that the two poets were
honestly seeking the way, and had the sense not to persevere in blind alleys
when they found them blind. Above all, like the whole of his school, he is
distinguished by a critical note, which must be dwelt on in the Interchapter
succeeding this book, but which may well be indicated here—the note that
they are much more bent on the production of new literature than on the
study of old.
But, for all this, he is a remarkable critic, and in his critical aperçus we
can ourselves perceive germs, indications, suggestions, which might have
resulted in the creation of a much larger body of actual criticism. Indeed
these are (as M. Pellissier[173] and others have shown) actually responsible
for much that is most characteristic, and for most of what is best, in the
Classical school of the next century, which affected to despise him, as well
as for other things which, if that school had followed them out, would have
saved it from its most fatal mistakes and shortcomings.
The main critical loci in Ronsard have been duly pointed out by his
editor, M. Prosper Blanchemain. They are the formal Abrégé de l’Art
Page 141
The Abrégé de Poétique of 1565; the prefatory matter to his not too well-
l’Art Poétique.
starred epic, the Franciade, ten years later and onwards;
and the remarkable Caprice au Seigneur Simon Nicolas—a poem written
late, and not, it seems, published save posthumously. The
“Abridgement”[174] answers to its name, for it only fills just twenty
Elzevirian pages. It begins in a manner which shows (as so many other
things do in Ronsard) the gaps which separated him from, as well as the ties
which united him to, the usual thought of the Renaissance, and still more
that of the seventeenth century. Although there are of course exceptions, the
general drift of Italian criticism had been that poetry, like any other art or
science, is a thing teachable and learnable. On no other ground could the
“archæolatry,” which we have found almost universal, be maintained for a
moment. Now Ronsard, though he dwells again and again on the necessity
of study, begins with an apology for writing an Art of Poetry at all. He has
had, he says modestly, some experience and practice, and he will do his best
to give his correspondent[175] the benefit thereof. But poesy is plus mental
que traditif, which we may translate “more native to the mind than
communicable to it.” He accordingly converts (with an agreeable twist) the
stock invocation to the Muses into a real prayer for this mental endowment,
and with equal ingenuity freshens up the stale clichés about the divinity of
Ancient poets, and about the Muses refusing to lodge save in a virtuous and
pious mind. Therefore, too, study of these former favourites of poetry is
requisite. But from these generalities he plunges straight into extremely
minute details. Greek, Latin, and French—it is probable that he does not
mention Italian because his correspondent, Delbène, was of Italian
extraction—are to be carefully studied as languages. The rules of French
prosody—among which is here for the first time authoritatively included
the alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes—are to be carefully
observed, and e is to be always elided before a vowel. It is perhaps worth
noting that Ronsard uses “cæsura” for “elision,” a catachresis in which he
had followers, and which even affected Dryden. Greek and Roman proper
names are, where possible, to be frenchified in termination. “The old words
of our romances” (this is of the first importance) are not to be ejected, but to
be chosen with care and prudence. Terms of art and technical similes are to
be sought out with extreme diligence, so as to supply life and nerve to the
book. Dialect-words may be used at need; the example of the Greeks being
invoked here—perhaps a little rashly. Invention, says Ronsard, is the
l’Art Poétique.
starred epic, the Franciade, ten years later and onwards;
and the remarkable Caprice au Seigneur Simon Nicolas—a poem written
late, and not, it seems, published save posthumously. The
“Abridgement”[174] answers to its name, for it only fills just twenty
Elzevirian pages. It begins in a manner which shows (as so many other
things do in Ronsard) the gaps which separated him from, as well as the ties
which united him to, the usual thought of the Renaissance, and still more
that of the seventeenth century. Although there are of course exceptions, the
general drift of Italian criticism had been that poetry, like any other art or
science, is a thing teachable and learnable. On no other ground could the
“archæolatry,” which we have found almost universal, be maintained for a
moment. Now Ronsard, though he dwells again and again on the necessity
of study, begins with an apology for writing an Art of Poetry at all. He has
had, he says modestly, some experience and practice, and he will do his best
to give his correspondent[175] the benefit thereof. But poesy is plus mental
que traditif, which we may translate “more native to the mind than
communicable to it.” He accordingly converts (with an agreeable twist) the
stock invocation to the Muses into a real prayer for this mental endowment,
and with equal ingenuity freshens up the stale clichés about the divinity of
Ancient poets, and about the Muses refusing to lodge save in a virtuous and
pious mind. Therefore, too, study of these former favourites of poetry is
requisite. But from these generalities he plunges straight into extremely
minute details. Greek, Latin, and French—it is probable that he does not
mention Italian because his correspondent, Delbène, was of Italian
extraction—are to be carefully studied as languages. The rules of French
prosody—among which is here for the first time authoritatively included
the alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes—are to be carefully
observed, and e is to be always elided before a vowel. It is perhaps worth
noting that Ronsard uses “cæsura” for “elision,” a catachresis in which he
had followers, and which even affected Dryden. Greek and Roman proper
names are, where possible, to be frenchified in termination. “The old words
of our romances” (this is of the first importance) are not to be ejected, but to
be chosen with care and prudence. Terms of art and technical similes are to
be sought out with extreme diligence, so as to supply life and nerve to the
book. Dialect-words may be used at need; the example of the Greeks being
invoked here—perhaps a little rashly. Invention, says Ronsard, is the
Page 142
working of the Imagination; but he seems still inclined to the old limitation
of this word to the retailing of images, and reprobates more strongly than is
perhaps necessary or desirable ces inventions fantastiques et
mélancholiques qui ne se rapportent non plus l’une à l’autre que les songes
entrecoupés des frénétiques. There is to be first of all (note the Frenchman)
Order and Disposition in poetical devices.
This order and this disposition are to be secured by a happy nature in the
first place, and by a careful study of good models in the second. Among
these good models, “those who have illustrated our language in the last
fifteen years” (i.e., since the Défense) are to be counted in; and (this was
added later) foreign modern languages are also to be carefully studied for
the enriching of the mother tongue. “Elocution” is nothing else than “a
propriety and splendour of words well chosen, and ornamented with grave
and short sentences, which make verses shine, like as do precious stones,
well mounted, the fingers of some great seignior.”[176] The vocabulary must
be copious and composed of well-sifted words, with plentiful description
and comparison, moulded specially on Homer. The common form of
“great” poem-making follows, with reference to Aristotle as well as Horace,
with caution against trite and otiose epithets, against epithet-strings à
l’Italienne, but with a strong praise of the mot propre. Rhyme is treated
rather briefly; and then Ronsard drops to minutiæ of e's and h's, discusses
Alexandrines (which, in a later edition, he says he should have employed in
the Franciade but for powerful command) and “common” (decasyllabic)
verse, and others, passes to some grammatical and orthographical cautions,
and ends with the promise, unluckily never fulfilled, of a longer Poetic
some day.
It may have been in part payment of this promise that he wrote the
The Prefaces to Prefatory matter to the Franciade.[177] This, which, as it
the Franciade.
stands in the modern editions, is triform, consists of a short
Preface (or Au Lecteur) in prose, from the master’s own hand, to the
original edition; of a verse exordium, or rather Introduction, separate from
the poem proper; and, between the two, of a second Preface or Treatise on
Heroic Poetry of some length, which we have, not as it left the author’s pen,
but arranged and revised (it is said under his direction) by Claude Binet.
The critical interest of the verse Proem lies in the enthusiastic glorification
of Homer and Virgil (who have shown the whole secret of epic-writing, and
whose work the author bids his own “adore on its knees”), and in a spirited
of this word to the retailing of images, and reprobates more strongly than is
perhaps necessary or desirable ces inventions fantastiques et
mélancholiques qui ne se rapportent non plus l’une à l’autre que les songes
entrecoupés des frénétiques. There is to be first of all (note the Frenchman)
Order and Disposition in poetical devices.
This order and this disposition are to be secured by a happy nature in the
first place, and by a careful study of good models in the second. Among
these good models, “those who have illustrated our language in the last
fifteen years” (i.e., since the Défense) are to be counted in; and (this was
added later) foreign modern languages are also to be carefully studied for
the enriching of the mother tongue. “Elocution” is nothing else than “a
propriety and splendour of words well chosen, and ornamented with grave
and short sentences, which make verses shine, like as do precious stones,
well mounted, the fingers of some great seignior.”[176] The vocabulary must
be copious and composed of well-sifted words, with plentiful description
and comparison, moulded specially on Homer. The common form of
“great” poem-making follows, with reference to Aristotle as well as Horace,
with caution against trite and otiose epithets, against epithet-strings à
l’Italienne, but with a strong praise of the mot propre. Rhyme is treated
rather briefly; and then Ronsard drops to minutiæ of e's and h's, discusses
Alexandrines (which, in a later edition, he says he should have employed in
the Franciade but for powerful command) and “common” (decasyllabic)
verse, and others, passes to some grammatical and orthographical cautions,
and ends with the promise, unluckily never fulfilled, of a longer Poetic
some day.
It may have been in part payment of this promise that he wrote the
The Prefaces to Prefatory matter to the Franciade.[177] This, which, as it
the Franciade.
stands in the modern editions, is triform, consists of a short
Preface (or Au Lecteur) in prose, from the master’s own hand, to the
original edition; of a verse exordium, or rather Introduction, separate from
the poem proper; and, between the two, of a second Preface or Treatise on
Heroic Poetry of some length, which we have, not as it left the author’s pen,
but arranged and revised (it is said under his direction) by Claude Binet.
The critical interest of the verse Proem lies in the enthusiastic glorification
of Homer and Virgil (who have shown the whole secret of epic-writing, and
whose work the author bids his own “adore on its knees”), and in a spirited
Page 143
reissue of the cardinal doctrine of the Pléiade that French is a fertile soil, all
overgrown and untilled, which must be brought under cultivation by the
unsparing labour of poets and scholars.
The first Preface begins with the time-honoured comparison, or contrast,
between History and Poetry, as dealing, the one with verity, the other with
verisimilitude. Hence Ronsard strikes off to set Homer and Virgil far above
all others, and to fix a stigma on Ariosto as presenting a body handsome
enough in members, but so counterfeit and monstrous as a whole that it is
like an unwholesome dream. He has evidently on his mind the objections,
perhaps of the ancients, perhaps of some Italians, to the combination of
historical poetry, and endeavours to meet the objection that he comes nearer
to actual history “than Virgilian art permits” by the rather perilous excuse
that Virgil only lived under a second emperor, while he himself lives under
the successor of a long line of kings, and that Charles our Lord and King
insisted on no invidious preference being shown to some of his ancestors
over the others. Indeed Ronsard is too typical a Frenchman for a sense of
humour to be exactly his strong point.
He then proceeds to name, as his example, rather “the naïve facility of
Homer than the curious diligence of Virgil”: though he ventures to
reprehend some excess of improbability in the scheme and details of the
Iliad, and ends with some particulars of apology and explanation. The most
curious of these are a passage giving reasons (by no means in strict
accordance with the sentence referred to above) for rejecting the
Alexandrine in favour of the decasyllable, and a pathetic appeal to the
reader not to read his poem like an official document,[178] but to
accommodate his voice to its passion, and especially to raise that voice
whenever he comes to a mark of exclamation.
The second, later, longer, and, as we have said, not quite authentic,
Preface, addressed to the Lecteur Aprentif, is a discourse on the Heroic
Poem in general; and as such is responsible for the specimens of the kind
with which the next century was troubled in France, if not for those from
the Henriade downwards, which serve as even less cheerful ornaments to
the French literature of the eighteenth. We have seen already how
carefulness and trouble about this thing had been gathering and growing in
Italy, and how it was, in Ronsard’s own days, causing the storm about the
Gerusalemme. The “Maronolatry” which France shared with Italy led to it
directly; and even the championship of Homer (as in Ronsard’s own case)
overgrown and untilled, which must be brought under cultivation by the
unsparing labour of poets and scholars.
The first Preface begins with the time-honoured comparison, or contrast,
between History and Poetry, as dealing, the one with verity, the other with
verisimilitude. Hence Ronsard strikes off to set Homer and Virgil far above
all others, and to fix a stigma on Ariosto as presenting a body handsome
enough in members, but so counterfeit and monstrous as a whole that it is
like an unwholesome dream. He has evidently on his mind the objections,
perhaps of the ancients, perhaps of some Italians, to the combination of
historical poetry, and endeavours to meet the objection that he comes nearer
to actual history “than Virgilian art permits” by the rather perilous excuse
that Virgil only lived under a second emperor, while he himself lives under
the successor of a long line of kings, and that Charles our Lord and King
insisted on no invidious preference being shown to some of his ancestors
over the others. Indeed Ronsard is too typical a Frenchman for a sense of
humour to be exactly his strong point.
He then proceeds to name, as his example, rather “the naïve facility of
Homer than the curious diligence of Virgil”: though he ventures to
reprehend some excess of improbability in the scheme and details of the
Iliad, and ends with some particulars of apology and explanation. The most
curious of these are a passage giving reasons (by no means in strict
accordance with the sentence referred to above) for rejecting the
Alexandrine in favour of the decasyllable, and a pathetic appeal to the
reader not to read his poem like an official document,[178] but to
accommodate his voice to its passion, and especially to raise that voice
whenever he comes to a mark of exclamation.
The second, later, longer, and, as we have said, not quite authentic,
Preface, addressed to the Lecteur Aprentif, is a discourse on the Heroic
Poem in general; and as such is responsible for the specimens of the kind
with which the next century was troubled in France, if not for those from
the Henriade downwards, which serve as even less cheerful ornaments to
the French literature of the eighteenth. We have seen already how
carefulness and trouble about this thing had been gathering and growing in
Italy, and how it was, in Ronsard’s own days, causing the storm about the
Gerusalemme. The “Maronolatry” which France shared with Italy led to it
directly; and even the championship of Homer (as in Ronsard’s own case)
Page 144
—the attempt to establish two kings of the Epic Brentford—was certain to
conduce to it. Ronsard himself, however, does not at first attempt the
general question; indeed it is hardly possible to draw attention too often to
the far greater abstinence from general and deductive consideration which
at this time characterises the French critics, as compared with the Italians.
He begins with a fresh attack (not quite in the best faith, if his own later
remarks be pressed, as perhaps they need not be) on the Alexandrine; and,
by a deflection more natural in the original than it appears in a summary,
goes off to a panegyric of periphrasis, which again was only too docilely
received by his successors of all schools for the next two centuries in
France. His examples are taken from Virgil—indeed the earlier part of this
Preface, at any rate, is as enthusiastically Virgilian as Scaliger himself could
desire. Then he puts stress once more on the significant epithet, lays down
obiter the delightfully arbitrary dictum that, as the unity of drama is the
revolution of a day, so the unity of at least a war-epic is the revolution of a
year, dwells largely on his favourite distinction between the poet and the
versifier, which he justifies (not too well) by insisting on artful variations of
the narrative by speeches, dreams, prophecies, pictures,[179] auguries,
fantastic visions, and appearances of gods and demons. All this time we
have heard nothing of Homer, and indeed have read nearly half a score
pages before his name occurs as furnishing Virgil with some of his facts and
personages, just as he had drawn his own from older stories, “comme nous
faisons des contes de Lancelot, de Tristan, de Gauvain, et d’Artus,” a
passage to be noted. The dozen or so which remain are oddly occupied by a
sort of jumble of notes and hints to the epic poet, reminding one of that
valuable paper of advice which Sir John Hawkins sent to Captain Amyas
Leigh, on “all points from the mounting of ordnance to the use of vitriol and
limmons against the scurvy.” He must describe splendid palaces and
grounds, trace heroes and heroines to gods and nymphs, dress them
handsomely, wound them in the right places,[180] not invent too much, allow
himself enjambement and hiatus, use plentiful comparisons and terms of art,
do things handsomely in general, boil his very kettles with a Homeric
afflatus,[180] be thoroughly careful about study, but, above all, attend to
diction, as to which the cautions and licences of the Abrégé are repeated in
fuller form, with a special injunction not to Ciceronianise idly, but to faire
un lexicon des vieils mots d’Artus, de Lancelot, et de Gauvain.
conduce to it. Ronsard himself, however, does not at first attempt the
general question; indeed it is hardly possible to draw attention too often to
the far greater abstinence from general and deductive consideration which
at this time characterises the French critics, as compared with the Italians.
He begins with a fresh attack (not quite in the best faith, if his own later
remarks be pressed, as perhaps they need not be) on the Alexandrine; and,
by a deflection more natural in the original than it appears in a summary,
goes off to a panegyric of periphrasis, which again was only too docilely
received by his successors of all schools for the next two centuries in
France. His examples are taken from Virgil—indeed the earlier part of this
Preface, at any rate, is as enthusiastically Virgilian as Scaliger himself could
desire. Then he puts stress once more on the significant epithet, lays down
obiter the delightfully arbitrary dictum that, as the unity of drama is the
revolution of a day, so the unity of at least a war-epic is the revolution of a
year, dwells largely on his favourite distinction between the poet and the
versifier, which he justifies (not too well) by insisting on artful variations of
the narrative by speeches, dreams, prophecies, pictures,[179] auguries,
fantastic visions, and appearances of gods and demons. All this time we
have heard nothing of Homer, and indeed have read nearly half a score
pages before his name occurs as furnishing Virgil with some of his facts and
personages, just as he had drawn his own from older stories, “comme nous
faisons des contes de Lancelot, de Tristan, de Gauvain, et d’Artus,” a
passage to be noted. The dozen or so which remain are oddly occupied by a
sort of jumble of notes and hints to the epic poet, reminding one of that
valuable paper of advice which Sir John Hawkins sent to Captain Amyas
Leigh, on “all points from the mounting of ordnance to the use of vitriol and
limmons against the scurvy.” He must describe splendid palaces and
grounds, trace heroes and heroines to gods and nymphs, dress them
handsomely, wound them in the right places,[180] not invent too much, allow
himself enjambement and hiatus, use plentiful comparisons and terms of art,
do things handsomely in general, boil his very kettles with a Homeric
afflatus,[180] be thoroughly careful about study, but, above all, attend to
diction, as to which the cautions and licences of the Abrégé are repeated in
fuller form, with a special injunction not to Ciceronianise idly, but to faire
un lexicon des vieils mots d’Artus, de Lancelot, et de Gauvain.
Page 145
Ronsard will necessarily give us text for remark on the criticism of the
His critical Pléiade in the Interchapter following this Book. But we
gospel.
must say a little of his critical attitude here. That it is of
more interest than positive importance cannot easily be denied. Not only for
our purpose, but for its own, it is injured by the very sincerity, practicalness,
and common-sense of the writer’s purpose and view. He clearly does not
regard the past of French literature with quite such a petulant contempt as
that of Pelletier and Du Bellay. But he is even more steadily and thoroughly
convinced that something better can, should, and shall be done: and it is on
the doing of this, by himself and others, that all his thoughts are fixed. He
does not give himself the time—he does not, it is evident, think it in the
least worth while—to take a critical survey of the past in any detail, or with
any general grouping. It is enough for him that Homer and Virgil are of the
greatest, and that their work is also of the greatest; and he wishes
Frenchmen to go and do likewise. He almost, if not altogether, accepts the
end as a datum; and is only troubled about the means. In regard to some of
these means his doctrine, though somewhat ondoyant and even inconsistent,
is surprisingly sound and original. If part of it was accepted with advantage
by his countrymen in the centuries which followed, other parts were
discarded and neglected, with an almost incalculably disastrous result. That
“lexicon of the old words of Lancelot and Artus” would have saved French
from the drab smug insignificance of its eighteenth-century garb; those
cautions about enjambement and the like might almost have done for France
what Spenser and Shakespeare did for England.
But this comparative independence in some points was—probably from
the want of that real historical horizontality of view which, of all the
sixteenth-century critics, Cinthio, Castelvetro, and Patrizzi alone seem in
various degrees to have attained—accompanied by a singular servility and
conventionality in others. “Why, O Prince of Poets!” one feels inclined to
say, “with all reverence to your grey and laurelled head—why should we
trouble ourselves about peintures insérées contre le dos d’une muraille, et
des harnois, et principalement des boucliers because one very great poet
found them useful to produce historical effects nearly three thousand years
ago, and another much lesser poet chose to imitate him slavishly some
thousand years later? Why should we do it, even supposing the two poets to
be on a level? Very likely Homer’s warriors had painted or graven bucklers.
We have not. Arthur’s knights had not—at least the paintings (assuming
His critical Pléiade in the Interchapter following this Book. But we
gospel.
must say a little of his critical attitude here. That it is of
more interest than positive importance cannot easily be denied. Not only for
our purpose, but for its own, it is injured by the very sincerity, practicalness,
and common-sense of the writer’s purpose and view. He clearly does not
regard the past of French literature with quite such a petulant contempt as
that of Pelletier and Du Bellay. But he is even more steadily and thoroughly
convinced that something better can, should, and shall be done: and it is on
the doing of this, by himself and others, that all his thoughts are fixed. He
does not give himself the time—he does not, it is evident, think it in the
least worth while—to take a critical survey of the past in any detail, or with
any general grouping. It is enough for him that Homer and Virgil are of the
greatest, and that their work is also of the greatest; and he wishes
Frenchmen to go and do likewise. He almost, if not altogether, accepts the
end as a datum; and is only troubled about the means. In regard to some of
these means his doctrine, though somewhat ondoyant and even inconsistent,
is surprisingly sound and original. If part of it was accepted with advantage
by his countrymen in the centuries which followed, other parts were
discarded and neglected, with an almost incalculably disastrous result. That
“lexicon of the old words of Lancelot and Artus” would have saved French
from the drab smug insignificance of its eighteenth-century garb; those
cautions about enjambement and the like might almost have done for France
what Spenser and Shakespeare did for England.
But this comparative independence in some points was—probably from
the want of that real historical horizontality of view which, of all the
sixteenth-century critics, Cinthio, Castelvetro, and Patrizzi alone seem in
various degrees to have attained—accompanied by a singular servility and
conventionality in others. “Why, O Prince of Poets!” one feels inclined to
say, “with all reverence to your grey and laurelled head—why should we
trouble ourselves about peintures insérées contre le dos d’une muraille, et
des harnois, et principalement des boucliers because one very great poet
found them useful to produce historical effects nearly three thousand years
ago, and another much lesser poet chose to imitate him slavishly some
thousand years later? Why should we do it, even supposing the two poets to
be on a level? Very likely Homer’s warriors had painted or graven bucklers.
We have not. Arthur’s knights had not—at least the paintings (assuming
Page 146
them to be armorial) were quite different. Why should we have the
‘monstrous language of horses wounded to death’? Why this childish
limitation in imitation? Handsome dresses are admirable things: but why
must we be limited to lion-skins and panther-skins and bearskins for the
material? If we have got to make a cauldron boil, let it double double, boil
and bubble by all means: but suppose we don’t want to boil it?” To all this
we not only get no answer from Ronsard; but in his critical writing (not, as
we have said, extensive nor always outwardly consistent, but thoroughly
uniform in spirit) we find no trace of any such aporia ever having presented
itself to his mind. They did these things and produced good effects: let us do
them that we may produce good. It seems a “good old rule” enough: yet
perhaps it is “a simple plan” also in more senses than one.
Good or bad, complete or incomplete, this criticism is the very soul of the
Pléiade. Its playwrights, such as Grévin[181] and Jean de la Taille,[182]
followed Italian practice in prefixing argumentative discussions to their
plays—reflecting on the mediæval drama, comparing, in modest or buoyant
Some minors. spirit, their own work to that of the ancients, and the like. A
section of the school (as was almost unavoidable, despite the “No-
Surrender” resistance which French as a language opposes to the
proceeding) tried classical metres after the principles of Tolomei: and
Jacques de la Taille, the brother of Jean, a poet and dramatist of fantastic
but distinct ability, wrote a tractate[183] in defence of them. They made closer
and closer approximations to the absolute Trinity of Unities: and though Du
Bellay in his youthful fervour had committed himself to a not unwise
antinomianism, they more and more showed themselves as the true
ancestors of the neo-classic school, by framing and insisting on “rules.” The
great men of letters who were more or less unattached, but well-willing
irregulars of the school, such as Pasquier and Montaigne, bestow, in their
different ways, increasing attention on literary criticism and literary history.
And, just before and after the junction of the centuries, when the Pléiade
proper had set, and its influence was about to wane before the narrow and
arbitrary classicism of Malherbe on the one hand, and the rococo-
picaresque of the Spanish school on the other, there appeared two formal
Arts of Poetry, the one the complete and final code of Pléiade Poetic, the
other a rather hybrid and nondescript product, chequering Ronsardism with
a good deal of Italian matter.
‘monstrous language of horses wounded to death’? Why this childish
limitation in imitation? Handsome dresses are admirable things: but why
must we be limited to lion-skins and panther-skins and bearskins for the
material? If we have got to make a cauldron boil, let it double double, boil
and bubble by all means: but suppose we don’t want to boil it?” To all this
we not only get no answer from Ronsard; but in his critical writing (not, as
we have said, extensive nor always outwardly consistent, but thoroughly
uniform in spirit) we find no trace of any such aporia ever having presented
itself to his mind. They did these things and produced good effects: let us do
them that we may produce good. It seems a “good old rule” enough: yet
perhaps it is “a simple plan” also in more senses than one.
Good or bad, complete or incomplete, this criticism is the very soul of the
Pléiade. Its playwrights, such as Grévin[181] and Jean de la Taille,[182]
followed Italian practice in prefixing argumentative discussions to their
plays—reflecting on the mediæval drama, comparing, in modest or buoyant
Some minors. spirit, their own work to that of the ancients, and the like. A
section of the school (as was almost unavoidable, despite the “No-
Surrender” resistance which French as a language opposes to the
proceeding) tried classical metres after the principles of Tolomei: and
Jacques de la Taille, the brother of Jean, a poet and dramatist of fantastic
but distinct ability, wrote a tractate[183] in defence of them. They made closer
and closer approximations to the absolute Trinity of Unities: and though Du
Bellay in his youthful fervour had committed himself to a not unwise
antinomianism, they more and more showed themselves as the true
ancestors of the neo-classic school, by framing and insisting on “rules.” The
great men of letters who were more or less unattached, but well-willing
irregulars of the school, such as Pasquier and Montaigne, bestow, in their
different ways, increasing attention on literary criticism and literary history.
And, just before and after the junction of the centuries, when the Pléiade
proper had set, and its influence was about to wane before the narrow and
arbitrary classicism of Malherbe on the one hand, and the rococo-
picaresque of the Spanish school on the other, there appeared two formal
Arts of Poetry, the one the complete and final code of Pléiade Poetic, the
other a rather hybrid and nondescript product, chequering Ronsardism with
a good deal of Italian matter.
Page 147
This last,[184] the earlier to appear, in 1598, had for author Pierre de
Laudun, sometimes spoken of, from a seignory of his, as de Laudun
Pierre de d’Aigaliers. It is in prose, and its author, who is roundly
Laudun.
described by Herr Rücktaschel as a “copyist of the purest
water,” diversifies his borrowings from Sibilet, Ronsard, and Pelletier on
the one hand, from Scaliger and “Vituperani” on the other, with plentiful
examples from his own work; for he had followed one greater man with a
Franciade and ante-dated another with a Horace. I cannot enter any strong
protest against the hard words (not confined to those already quoted) which
his German critic bestows on him.[185] His real interest is purely that of
symptom and tendency, in which respect he shows a rather odd but not
uninstructive mixture. On one side he rejects the Ronsardising coinage of
words and adoption of dialect forms, with other Pléiade traits. On another
he shows himself recalcitrant to the coming classicastry by declaring that
“we are not bound by their laws”—e.g., in regard to the number of acts. On
a third we find him emphasising this attitude into an absolute refusal of the
Unity of Time, against which he says almost all the obvious and sensible
things, in a fashion to some extent redeeming what is on the whole the work
of a not very intelligent bookmaker.
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye has not this sudden cry of the voice in the
desert: but his Art Poétique is, as a whole, a book of infinitely greater
interest and value than Laudun’s. Vauquelin was a gentleman and lawyer of
Normandy, who, born at the château whence he took his name, near
Falaise, fought, amused himself, loved the country and its sports, became
President at Caen, and wrote verses of no small merit in various kinds. His
Vauquelin de la Art Poétique was more than thirty years on the stocks: and
Fresnaye.
having had its keel laid in 1574, when the Pléiade, though a
quarter of a century old, was still in full flourishing, did not get launched till
1605, when a new age had begun in more than chronological fashion. It is a
composition of considerable bulk, consisting of three books, each running
to rather under twelve hundred lines. Either of deliberation, or as a result of
intermittent attention during the time in which it was a-preparing, Vauquelin
arranged it (or failed to arrange it) in most admired disorder. The precisians
of the next age would have been horrified at the promiscuous character of
its observations; and some would have been grateful to its latest editor[186] if,
in addition to, or instead of, part of the elaborate and very valuable
apparatus criticus of various kinds which he has given, he had prefixed an
Laudun, sometimes spoken of, from a seignory of his, as de Laudun
Pierre de d’Aigaliers. It is in prose, and its author, who is roundly
Laudun.
described by Herr Rücktaschel as a “copyist of the purest
water,” diversifies his borrowings from Sibilet, Ronsard, and Pelletier on
the one hand, from Scaliger and “Vituperani” on the other, with plentiful
examples from his own work; for he had followed one greater man with a
Franciade and ante-dated another with a Horace. I cannot enter any strong
protest against the hard words (not confined to those already quoted) which
his German critic bestows on him.[185] His real interest is purely that of
symptom and tendency, in which respect he shows a rather odd but not
uninstructive mixture. On one side he rejects the Ronsardising coinage of
words and adoption of dialect forms, with other Pléiade traits. On another
he shows himself recalcitrant to the coming classicastry by declaring that
“we are not bound by their laws”—e.g., in regard to the number of acts. On
a third we find him emphasising this attitude into an absolute refusal of the
Unity of Time, against which he says almost all the obvious and sensible
things, in a fashion to some extent redeeming what is on the whole the work
of a not very intelligent bookmaker.
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye has not this sudden cry of the voice in the
desert: but his Art Poétique is, as a whole, a book of infinitely greater
interest and value than Laudun’s. Vauquelin was a gentleman and lawyer of
Normandy, who, born at the château whence he took his name, near
Falaise, fought, amused himself, loved the country and its sports, became
President at Caen, and wrote verses of no small merit in various kinds. His
Vauquelin de la Art Poétique was more than thirty years on the stocks: and
Fresnaye.
having had its keel laid in 1574, when the Pléiade, though a
quarter of a century old, was still in full flourishing, did not get launched till
1605, when a new age had begun in more than chronological fashion. It is a
composition of considerable bulk, consisting of three books, each running
to rather under twelve hundred lines. Either of deliberation, or as a result of
intermittent attention during the time in which it was a-preparing, Vauquelin
arranged it (or failed to arrange it) in most admired disorder. The precisians
of the next age would have been horrified at the promiscuous character of
its observations; and some would have been grateful to its latest editor[186] if,
in addition to, or instead of, part of the elaborate and very valuable
apparatus criticus of various kinds which he has given, he had prefixed an
Page 148
argument. As it is, we must make one: for the book, if not one of our very
greatest points de repère, is yet such a point.
After a prose address to the Reader, containing a rather touching
reference to the flight of time and the change of public opinion since he had
begun his work, to the cares of life, and the troubles of the realm, and the
Analysis of his death of old friends—he begins with the proper invocation.
Art Poétique.
Immediately after he gives, as has been justly observed, a
warning note by an elaborate simile-description of Poesy as an ordered
garden, with beds and paths and hedges, wherein if any rude boy should
trample on the beds, desert the paths, and break down the espaliers, the
gardener would assuredly make injurious observations to him, and drive
him out—the Gardener being further identified as no less a person than the
Divinity. This comparison would of itself show that Vauquelin aims at no
arrogant originality; but he is yet more explicit. His four guides are le fils de
Nicomache (Aristotle, of course; but note how Ronsard’s fatal counsel of
periphrasis has already sunk, never to be quite extracted, into the French
mind!), the “harper of Calabria” (Horace), Vida, and Minturno.[187] But he
hardly apologises for writing in French. Then, borrowing from Cleanthes,
through Seneca, the old comparison of verse to “a trumpet which adds
power to the voice,” he passes non sine Dis—with abundant indulgence in
mythology—to the exaltation of Number and Harmony at large, and to
theorising in the Imitation of Nature. He holds high the banner of the
Ronsardian unification of Arts; and while insisting that even the ugly may
be made interesting, if not beautiful, in the imitation of it, repeats the old
cautions about inconsistent and too fantastic admixture of imagery. Among
other followings of Ronsard we note the earnest advice to cultivate stately
descriptions and abundant ornament. But he does not omit—though it must
be allowed he does not observe it over strictly himself—the caution to keep
the thread,
“Si tu fais un Sonnet, ou si tu fais une Ode.”
The praise of order and consistency gives place to remarks on diction
which repeat the Ronsardist canons and cautions, and to a fashionable
contempt (to be taken up later, as so much else was, by the thankless Neo-
The First Book. Classics) of Anagrams and Acrostics. The usual twinning of
Homer and Virgil is succeeded by reference to some other classics: and for
greatest points de repère, is yet such a point.
After a prose address to the Reader, containing a rather touching
reference to the flight of time and the change of public opinion since he had
begun his work, to the cares of life, and the troubles of the realm, and the
Analysis of his death of old friends—he begins with the proper invocation.
Art Poétique.
Immediately after he gives, as has been justly observed, a
warning note by an elaborate simile-description of Poesy as an ordered
garden, with beds and paths and hedges, wherein if any rude boy should
trample on the beds, desert the paths, and break down the espaliers, the
gardener would assuredly make injurious observations to him, and drive
him out—the Gardener being further identified as no less a person than the
Divinity. This comparison would of itself show that Vauquelin aims at no
arrogant originality; but he is yet more explicit. His four guides are le fils de
Nicomache (Aristotle, of course; but note how Ronsard’s fatal counsel of
periphrasis has already sunk, never to be quite extracted, into the French
mind!), the “harper of Calabria” (Horace), Vida, and Minturno.[187] But he
hardly apologises for writing in French. Then, borrowing from Cleanthes,
through Seneca, the old comparison of verse to “a trumpet which adds
power to the voice,” he passes non sine Dis—with abundant indulgence in
mythology—to the exaltation of Number and Harmony at large, and to
theorising in the Imitation of Nature. He holds high the banner of the
Ronsardian unification of Arts; and while insisting that even the ugly may
be made interesting, if not beautiful, in the imitation of it, repeats the old
cautions about inconsistent and too fantastic admixture of imagery. Among
other followings of Ronsard we note the earnest advice to cultivate stately
descriptions and abundant ornament. But he does not omit—though it must
be allowed he does not observe it over strictly himself—the caution to keep
the thread,
“Si tu fais un Sonnet, ou si tu fais une Ode.”
The praise of order and consistency gives place to remarks on diction
which repeat the Ronsardist canons and cautions, and to a fashionable
contempt (to be taken up later, as so much else was, by the thankless Neo-
The First Book. Classics) of Anagrams and Acrostics. The usual twinning of
Homer and Virgil is succeeded by reference to some other classics: and for
Page 149
a time Vauquelin seems to be confining himself (in so far as his expatiatory
manner ever admits confinement) to the ouvrage héroique, whence he turns
to other kinds, and the verse-forms suitable for them. He repeats Du
Bellay’s curse on ballade and rondeau,[188] and passes like him to a special
eulogy of the Sonnet, in which (as Du Bellay was not able to do) he is able
now to produce a stately list of French practitioners. This part of the Book,
a little after its middle, is full of literary history and allusion, the latter
touching foreign languages and literatures as well as French. And the rest of
it is occupied with a fresh and rather disorderly account of styles and kinds,
with the verse and diction proper to each, ending up with a curious
amplification of Quintilian’s story[189] about Apelles and Antigonus, the
moral of which seems to be a sort of Medio tutissimus ibis
The Second Book also has its due invocations to the Muses and the King:
and Vauquelin divagates, in his amiable way, for some hundred lines before
he settles down to paraphrase Horace’s warning about the scriptor cyclicus,
and to give, as examples of exordium, not merely a refashioning in
Alexandrines of the opening of Ronsard’s Franciade, but a long extract
The Second. from his own projected epic of the Israëlide. But as soon as
he has done this (to the extent, it is true, of some fifty lines) he affects
shame at quoting himself, and bids the poet swim in the Greek and Latin
sea, especially in Virgil. In fact, Vauquelin is much more of a Virgil-
worshipper than Ronsard, and almost as much as Vida, if not as Scaliger;
and it is curious to see in his work that unconquerable, and as it were
magnetic, repulsion from the greater poetry of Homer, and attraction
towards the lesser verse of Virgil, which more and more shows itself, from
the start of the Renaissance to the finish of the eighteenth century. Although
he again and again diverges to the prose Epic (with the usual example of
Heliodorus and the Æthiopica), to the artificial epic unity of a year (which
he doubtless took, after Ronsard, from Minturno), and so forth, he as
constantly returns to Virgil, describing him in one place plumply as “second
to Homer in age, but first in rank.”
Then he reverts to his Horace, and, not forgetting a hint to the poet (one
frequent with him) that he had better take French and Christian subjects
such as the crusade of St Louis, he dilutes largely the famous clauses of his
model on keeping the type of age and youth, &c. This leads him naturally to
the subject of drama, on which he is, of course, severely Horatian;
especially in regard to messengers and the avoidance of awkward things on
manner ever admits confinement) to the ouvrage héroique, whence he turns
to other kinds, and the verse-forms suitable for them. He repeats Du
Bellay’s curse on ballade and rondeau,[188] and passes like him to a special
eulogy of the Sonnet, in which (as Du Bellay was not able to do) he is able
now to produce a stately list of French practitioners. This part of the Book,
a little after its middle, is full of literary history and allusion, the latter
touching foreign languages and literatures as well as French. And the rest of
it is occupied with a fresh and rather disorderly account of styles and kinds,
with the verse and diction proper to each, ending up with a curious
amplification of Quintilian’s story[189] about Apelles and Antigonus, the
moral of which seems to be a sort of Medio tutissimus ibis
The Second Book also has its due invocations to the Muses and the King:
and Vauquelin divagates, in his amiable way, for some hundred lines before
he settles down to paraphrase Horace’s warning about the scriptor cyclicus,
and to give, as examples of exordium, not merely a refashioning in
Alexandrines of the opening of Ronsard’s Franciade, but a long extract
The Second. from his own projected epic of the Israëlide. But as soon as
he has done this (to the extent, it is true, of some fifty lines) he affects
shame at quoting himself, and bids the poet swim in the Greek and Latin
sea, especially in Virgil. In fact, Vauquelin is much more of a Virgil-
worshipper than Ronsard, and almost as much as Vida, if not as Scaliger;
and it is curious to see in his work that unconquerable, and as it were
magnetic, repulsion from the greater poetry of Homer, and attraction
towards the lesser verse of Virgil, which more and more shows itself, from
the start of the Renaissance to the finish of the eighteenth century. Although
he again and again diverges to the prose Epic (with the usual example of
Heliodorus and the Æthiopica), to the artificial epic unity of a year (which
he doubtless took, after Ronsard, from Minturno), and so forth, he as
constantly returns to Virgil, describing him in one place plumply as “second
to Homer in age, but first in rank.”
Then he reverts to his Horace, and, not forgetting a hint to the poet (one
frequent with him) that he had better take French and Christian subjects
such as the crusade of St Louis, he dilutes largely the famous clauses of his
model on keeping the type of age and youth, &c. This leads him naturally to
the subject of drama, on which he is, of course, severely Horatian;
especially in regard to messengers and the avoidance of awkward things on
Page 150
the stage. He has the Pléiade drama, too, before him as he writes; extols the
Chorus, and again does not forget his hints of Christian subjects. But in the
sequel he leaves his ancient authorities, and their severer tastes, rather on
one side, in order to dwell at great length on the accessories of the stage—
music, mise-en-scène, &c., with a not uninteresting reference—like that of
Sibilet (v. supra) earlier, and possibly due to it—to the moralities of nos
vieux François, as well as a welcome to the Ballet and to his native Vaux-
de-Vire. He indulges in a warm eulogy of French as a language passing all
the vulgars of Europe, and of French poetry, and then handles Satire, a
subject in which he was an expert, and which he had treated in a prose
Discourse, joined to his own exercises in the kind. He connects it with the
Provençal Sirvente, allows the coq-à-l'âne a sort of poor-relationship, and
dwells on French lyric poets at some length, once more commending Latin
models and (in a deflection, more logical than some of his, to the subject of
iambic and other metre) noticing the recent attempts at a quantified
prosody. On this subject he prudently declines to commit himself: posterity
must decide. And the rest of the Book again busies itself with various styles
and kinds, the measures proper to them, and the authors, modern as well as
ancient, who have treated them best.
These lucubrations, however, disorderly as they may seem, contain
numerous things of interest—a just remark on rhyme as practically the
equivalent of stricter metrical arrangement; observations on the prose
Lancelot, &c., showing that Vauquelin was not destitute of that knowledge
of the older literature of his country which distinguished France and
Frenchmen rather creditably in the Renaissance, and to which we shall
presently return. Divers contemporary authors are also mentioned, Garnier
being singled out for special (and well deserved) praise; and there is a
pleasant reminiscence of the time when
Nous passions dans Poitiers l’Avril de notre vie,
and, instead of attending to the study of the law, followed the frolics of the
Muses. The actual close of the Second Book is a neither undignified nor ill-
felt wail over the sufferings of France in the religious wars, and an
expression of confidence in the King’s powers of healing.
The Third. The Third Book, after the usual decorative beginnings,
returns to Drama, and takes up Comedy, with praise for Grévin and Belleau,
Chorus, and again does not forget his hints of Christian subjects. But in the
sequel he leaves his ancient authorities, and their severer tastes, rather on
one side, in order to dwell at great length on the accessories of the stage—
music, mise-en-scène, &c., with a not uninteresting reference—like that of
Sibilet (v. supra) earlier, and possibly due to it—to the moralities of nos
vieux François, as well as a welcome to the Ballet and to his native Vaux-
de-Vire. He indulges in a warm eulogy of French as a language passing all
the vulgars of Europe, and of French poetry, and then handles Satire, a
subject in which he was an expert, and which he had treated in a prose
Discourse, joined to his own exercises in the kind. He connects it with the
Provençal Sirvente, allows the coq-à-l'âne a sort of poor-relationship, and
dwells on French lyric poets at some length, once more commending Latin
models and (in a deflection, more logical than some of his, to the subject of
iambic and other metre) noticing the recent attempts at a quantified
prosody. On this subject he prudently declines to commit himself: posterity
must decide. And the rest of the Book again busies itself with various styles
and kinds, the measures proper to them, and the authors, modern as well as
ancient, who have treated them best.
These lucubrations, however, disorderly as they may seem, contain
numerous things of interest—a just remark on rhyme as practically the
equivalent of stricter metrical arrangement; observations on the prose
Lancelot, &c., showing that Vauquelin was not destitute of that knowledge
of the older literature of his country which distinguished France and
Frenchmen rather creditably in the Renaissance, and to which we shall
presently return. Divers contemporary authors are also mentioned, Garnier
being singled out for special (and well deserved) praise; and there is a
pleasant reminiscence of the time when
Nous passions dans Poitiers l’Avril de notre vie,
and, instead of attending to the study of the law, followed the frolics of the
Muses. The actual close of the Second Book is a neither undignified nor ill-
felt wail over the sufferings of France in the religious wars, and an
expression of confidence in the King’s powers of healing.
The Third. The Third Book, after the usual decorative beginnings,
returns to Drama, and takes up Comedy, with praise for Grévin and Belleau,
Page 151
and a long discussion of the nature and varieties of the kind, including
Tragi-comedy, in which, naturally, the Bradamante of Garnier, the only
considerable example, is taken for study. Next a turn, half abrupt, is made to
Pastoral; and then Vauquelin returns to his favourite Satire and to other
forms, taking his texts from Horace, Vida, and his own fancy, in a slightly
bewildering manner, but to some extent carrying off the à propos de bottes
of his argument by his serene indifference to it, and the total absence of any
awkward apologies or attempts to join. By degrees he settles, or seems to be
settling, to the general questions (What is the end of poetry? Instruction or
Pleasure? and the like), but turns from them to a long catalogue of the poets
of his time.
The foot-by-foot following of Horace, which is more noticeable than ever
in the last three or four hundred lines—with the licence of going off at any
tangent from Horatian texts which Vauquelin also permits himself—would
account for any amount of the desultoriness which is only disguised (if,
indeed, it can be said to be disguised) from the most careless, in Horace
himself, by the brevity of his scale and the brilliancy of his phrase. But we
do not, of course, go to Vauquelin for an orderly treatise; we go to him that
he may tell us what an interesting and remarkable division of French men of
letters knew of criticism and thought of literature.
His answer is not the less, but the more, valuable because of its apparent
incoherence, this incoherence being itself a piece of evidence in the case.
His exposition of The Pléiade, as we have said more than once, was eagerly
Pléiade
criticism.
critical; but it had a strictly practical object, its criticism
being entirely subsidiary and preliminary to the desire of
creation. We meet here with nothing of the rather fatally “disinterested”
investigation of the Italians. Even the ancients are studied less with a view
to appreciating their beauties than with the desire to steal their thunder.
The precepts of Vauquelin’s four guides—of Horace first and most of all,
of Aristotle occasionally, of Vida pretty often, and of Minturno
nonnunquam, are all adjusted to this end. Incidentally, of course, Vauquelin
shows us some general critical views—the canonisation of Virgil, the
adherence to the classical Senecan drama, the discouragement of mediæval
forms, if not entirely of mediæval subjects and language. But, directly, he is
the technical instructor, not the theoretical critic. His technique, with some
slight alterations, is almost purely that of Ronsard, and displays the same
admixture of the classical tendency which the seventeenth century took up
Tragi-comedy, in which, naturally, the Bradamante of Garnier, the only
considerable example, is taken for study. Next a turn, half abrupt, is made to
Pastoral; and then Vauquelin returns to his favourite Satire and to other
forms, taking his texts from Horace, Vida, and his own fancy, in a slightly
bewildering manner, but to some extent carrying off the à propos de bottes
of his argument by his serene indifference to it, and the total absence of any
awkward apologies or attempts to join. By degrees he settles, or seems to be
settling, to the general questions (What is the end of poetry? Instruction or
Pleasure? and the like), but turns from them to a long catalogue of the poets
of his time.
The foot-by-foot following of Horace, which is more noticeable than ever
in the last three or four hundred lines—with the licence of going off at any
tangent from Horatian texts which Vauquelin also permits himself—would
account for any amount of the desultoriness which is only disguised (if,
indeed, it can be said to be disguised) from the most careless, in Horace
himself, by the brevity of his scale and the brilliancy of his phrase. But we
do not, of course, go to Vauquelin for an orderly treatise; we go to him that
he may tell us what an interesting and remarkable division of French men of
letters knew of criticism and thought of literature.
His answer is not the less, but the more, valuable because of its apparent
incoherence, this incoherence being itself a piece of evidence in the case.
His exposition of The Pléiade, as we have said more than once, was eagerly
Pléiade
criticism.
critical; but it had a strictly practical object, its criticism
being entirely subsidiary and preliminary to the desire of
creation. We meet here with nothing of the rather fatally “disinterested”
investigation of the Italians. Even the ancients are studied less with a view
to appreciating their beauties than with the desire to steal their thunder.
The precepts of Vauquelin’s four guides—of Horace first and most of all,
of Aristotle occasionally, of Vida pretty often, and of Minturno
nonnunquam, are all adjusted to this end. Incidentally, of course, Vauquelin
shows us some general critical views—the canonisation of Virgil, the
adherence to the classical Senecan drama, the discouragement of mediæval
forms, if not entirely of mediæval subjects and language. But, directly, he is
the technical instructor, not the theoretical critic. His technique, with some
slight alterations, is almost purely that of Ronsard, and displays the same
admixture of the classical tendency which the seventeenth century took up
Page 152
and hardened, with a quasi-romantic breadth and licence which that century
rejected. It is easy to say, and not very difficult to see, that it might—that it
actually did—result in a practice too promiscuous at worst, at best a little
too eclectic—that French was not ready in point of time, and perhaps not
quite suited in point of temperament, for the bridle to be flung too freely on
the neck of Pegasus; and that Vauquelin is almost directly responsible for
inciting the growth of the weeds at which his successor Boileau slashed
with such a desperate hook sixty years later. It is even possible to say, on
the other side, that Du Bellay’s questioning of rules altogether was, from
the Romantic point of view, sounder than Vauquelin’s provision of what
may be called conditional licences. We ought, however, to look at the Art
Poétique rather in the light of what had gone before its long-delayed
appearance than of what followed—at the production of 1559-1600, not at
that of 1600-1660. It is in effect an a posteriori rationalising and
methodising of Pléiade Poetry. This poetry is even now not much known in
England, and its defects—inequality, heaviness at times, pedantry, a strange
and almost irritating inability to get the wings quite free save at rare
moments—are undeniable. But there is something, in the Art itself, of the
better qualities of its subjects: and to those who give themselves the trouble
to make their acquaintance, these subjects have a strange and a peculiar
charm, in their mixture of gravity and grace, of love and lore, of paganism
and piety, yea, of Classic and Romantic themselves. The hedone of the
Pléiade is alethes as well as oikeia, and in this handbook of the school
Vauquelin has revealed at least some of its secrets. Those who can do this
are no contemptible, and no common, critics.
But though Vauquelin thus sums up, in spirit as in time, the formal
criticism of the Pléiade, we have not yet quite done with this. It has been,
Outliers: Tory, throughout, the practice of this book to take into
Fauchet, &c.
consideration not only such formal expressions, but also
those of men who, outside formal rhetoric or deliberate criticism, represent
the literary taste of their time. The latter part of the French sixteenth century
is not poor in such. On the contrary, the interest in literature of this kind
which it displays perhaps exceeds that shown in any country of Europe.
Even Italy, despite its immensely greater volume of formal literary
discussion and academic literary history, falls short in a certain intelligent
independence of consideration. We might draw on works of many kinds,
from the eccentric and mainly grammatical or typographical but extremely
rejected. It is easy to say, and not very difficult to see, that it might—that it
actually did—result in a practice too promiscuous at worst, at best a little
too eclectic—that French was not ready in point of time, and perhaps not
quite suited in point of temperament, for the bridle to be flung too freely on
the neck of Pegasus; and that Vauquelin is almost directly responsible for
inciting the growth of the weeds at which his successor Boileau slashed
with such a desperate hook sixty years later. It is even possible to say, on
the other side, that Du Bellay’s questioning of rules altogether was, from
the Romantic point of view, sounder than Vauquelin’s provision of what
may be called conditional licences. We ought, however, to look at the Art
Poétique rather in the light of what had gone before its long-delayed
appearance than of what followed—at the production of 1559-1600, not at
that of 1600-1660. It is in effect an a posteriori rationalising and
methodising of Pléiade Poetry. This poetry is even now not much known in
England, and its defects—inequality, heaviness at times, pedantry, a strange
and almost irritating inability to get the wings quite free save at rare
moments—are undeniable. But there is something, in the Art itself, of the
better qualities of its subjects: and to those who give themselves the trouble
to make their acquaintance, these subjects have a strange and a peculiar
charm, in their mixture of gravity and grace, of love and lore, of paganism
and piety, yea, of Classic and Romantic themselves. The hedone of the
Pléiade is alethes as well as oikeia, and in this handbook of the school
Vauquelin has revealed at least some of its secrets. Those who can do this
are no contemptible, and no common, critics.
But though Vauquelin thus sums up, in spirit as in time, the formal
criticism of the Pléiade, we have not yet quite done with this. It has been,
Outliers: Tory, throughout, the practice of this book to take into
Fauchet, &c.
consideration not only such formal expressions, but also
those of men who, outside formal rhetoric or deliberate criticism, represent
the literary taste of their time. The latter part of the French sixteenth century
is not poor in such. On the contrary, the interest in literature of this kind
which it displays perhaps exceeds that shown in any country of Europe.
Even Italy, despite its immensely greater volume of formal literary
discussion and academic literary history, falls short in a certain intelligent
independence of consideration. We might draw on works of many kinds,
from the eccentric and mainly grammatical or typographical but extremely
Page 153
interesting Champfleury of Geoffroy Tory (which, as is well known,
contains the original of Rabelais’ Limousin scholar) as early as 1529; we
might without too great straining bring in Master Francis himself, and we
cannot justly neglect the name of Claude Fauchet, who almost deserves that
of Premier historian of literature in Europe. But, obeying that system of
representative treatment, especially in the outlying departments, of the
subject, the necessity of which grows more urgent at every chapter and
almost every page of this book, we may chiefly deal with two writers, the
one almost as much of an antiquary and historian as Fauchet, but of greater
literary faculty and a pleasanter style; the other one of the great names of
the world’s letters, and, in his own fitful fashion, referring to literature itself
frequently and importantly enough. To those who know anything of the
time this last sentence will have already named, without naming, Etienne
Pasquier and Michel de Montaigne.
The chapters of Pasquier’s[190] Recherches de la France, in which he deals
with French literature, are perhaps the most interesting of the whole. He had
Pasquier: The himself been an ardent disciple of the Pléiade, and a
Recherches.
pleasant poet, in his youth; and in his maturer years he
applied to the history of literature the same untiring research and sound
good sense which made him the first historical inquirer, as distinguished
from mere chroniclers, in France. It is not entirely unimportant that, in his
preliminary remarks on the subject, he announces his intention of devoting
his seventh book to French Poetry and his eighth to French language—a
pointed if unintentional expression of the predominance of poetry in
literature even as late as the end of the sixteenth century. His first
observations are directed to the difference between French and other
modern languages on the one hand, and ancient poetry on the other, in the
matter of rhyme, which he would derive (not without at least as much
justification of probability and history as other theorists can allege) from the
rhythmical parallelisms of prose speech, at first accidentally sweetened by
homœoteleuton, and then deliberately by rhyme itself. He is well aware that
the language of the Franks must have been German; and his theory of
French as composed of three languages, Walloon (by which he probably
means Gallic or Celtic), Latin, and Frankish, will be more obnoxious to
philological pedants than to philosophical philologists. He knows the
monorhymed chansons such as Berte aux grans Piés, but is disposed to put
them unnecessarily late—nay, he seems to think that there was little before
contains the original of Rabelais’ Limousin scholar) as early as 1529; we
might without too great straining bring in Master Francis himself, and we
cannot justly neglect the name of Claude Fauchet, who almost deserves that
of Premier historian of literature in Europe. But, obeying that system of
representative treatment, especially in the outlying departments, of the
subject, the necessity of which grows more urgent at every chapter and
almost every page of this book, we may chiefly deal with two writers, the
one almost as much of an antiquary and historian as Fauchet, but of greater
literary faculty and a pleasanter style; the other one of the great names of
the world’s letters, and, in his own fitful fashion, referring to literature itself
frequently and importantly enough. To those who know anything of the
time this last sentence will have already named, without naming, Etienne
Pasquier and Michel de Montaigne.
The chapters of Pasquier’s[190] Recherches de la France, in which he deals
with French literature, are perhaps the most interesting of the whole. He had
Pasquier: The himself been an ardent disciple of the Pléiade, and a
Recherches.
pleasant poet, in his youth; and in his maturer years he
applied to the history of literature the same untiring research and sound
good sense which made him the first historical inquirer, as distinguished
from mere chroniclers, in France. It is not entirely unimportant that, in his
preliminary remarks on the subject, he announces his intention of devoting
his seventh book to French Poetry and his eighth to French language—a
pointed if unintentional expression of the predominance of poetry in
literature even as late as the end of the sixteenth century. His first
observations are directed to the difference between French and other
modern languages on the one hand, and ancient poetry on the other, in the
matter of rhyme, which he would derive (not without at least as much
justification of probability and history as other theorists can allege) from the
rhythmical parallelisms of prose speech, at first accidentally sweetened by
homœoteleuton, and then deliberately by rhyme itself. He is well aware that
the language of the Franks must have been German; and his theory of
French as composed of three languages, Walloon (by which he probably
means Gallic or Celtic), Latin, and Frankish, will be more obnoxious to
philological pedants than to philosophical philologists. He knows the
monorhymed chansons such as Berte aux grans Piés, but is disposed to put
them unnecessarily late—nay, he seems to think that there was little before
Page 154
the thirteenth century and Philip Augustus. Yet he is not unaware of the
much greater antiquity of the decasyllable as compared with the
Alexandrine.
Indeed Pasquier has a not inconsiderable knowledge of mediæval poetry
—a knowledge at any rate extending far beyond that of the Pléiade
generally, who were as a rule content to recognise, with a certain toleration,
His knowledge the Roman de la Rose. He knows and praises Helinand, the
of older French
literature,
authors of the great Alixandre, Thibaut de Champagne,
Chrestien de Troyes, Raoul de Houdenc—not merely, it
would seem, from Fauchet’s book, but in themselves; and he quotes Ogier
le Danois, Athis et Prophilias, Cléomadès, &c. Like a sensible man, he has
that indispensable chapter on Provençal literature which some would cast
out of French literary history, thereby making it unintelligible. And then he
passes to the prose Arthurian romances, and to the formal poetry of the
fourteenth century, of which he speaks without any of the exaggerated and
slightly unintelligent—certainly intolerant—contempt of Du Bellay and
Vauquelin. “Servitude, que je ne die gêne d’esprit, admirable,” “ces
mignardises” are his mild censures of them, and he gives particular
attention to Froissart and Alain Chartier, with mention of Villon and others,
and a very high eulogium of Pathelin. He does not, he says, know the
author (nor do we), but he will dare to say that this farce, as a whole and in
parts, fait contrecarre to the comedies of both Greeks and Romans. He is
fairly copious on the men of letters of the first half of the century, and then
begins a new chapter with the picturesque and often-quoted phrase about
the “great fleet of poets” that the reign of Henri II. brought forth, and their
new style of poetry.
He gives to Maurice Scève the honour of captaining the leading ship of
this fleet; and then follow all the well-known names (and some not so well
known) of the school proper, the catalogue being capped by some extremely
interesting and valuable critical-anecdotic remarks on the greater writers,
and criticism of especially Ronsard himself. One could hardly be more just
contemporary
French poetry.
on this difficult[191] poet than is Pasquier, who allows him
not merely grandeur but sweetness to almost any extent,
“quand il a voulu doux couler”; calls him grand poète entre poètes, but
admits that he was “très mauvais censeur et aristarque de ses livres.” Then
he partly returns upon his steps in another chapter, where he approaches
French poetry from a different side, considering especially its verse-
much greater antiquity of the decasyllable as compared with the
Alexandrine.
Indeed Pasquier has a not inconsiderable knowledge of mediæval poetry
—a knowledge at any rate extending far beyond that of the Pléiade
generally, who were as a rule content to recognise, with a certain toleration,
His knowledge the Roman de la Rose. He knows and praises Helinand, the
of older French
literature,
authors of the great Alixandre, Thibaut de Champagne,
Chrestien de Troyes, Raoul de Houdenc—not merely, it
would seem, from Fauchet’s book, but in themselves; and he quotes Ogier
le Danois, Athis et Prophilias, Cléomadès, &c. Like a sensible man, he has
that indispensable chapter on Provençal literature which some would cast
out of French literary history, thereby making it unintelligible. And then he
passes to the prose Arthurian romances, and to the formal poetry of the
fourteenth century, of which he speaks without any of the exaggerated and
slightly unintelligent—certainly intolerant—contempt of Du Bellay and
Vauquelin. “Servitude, que je ne die gêne d’esprit, admirable,” “ces
mignardises” are his mild censures of them, and he gives particular
attention to Froissart and Alain Chartier, with mention of Villon and others,
and a very high eulogium of Pathelin. He does not, he says, know the
author (nor do we), but he will dare to say that this farce, as a whole and in
parts, fait contrecarre to the comedies of both Greeks and Romans. He is
fairly copious on the men of letters of the first half of the century, and then
begins a new chapter with the picturesque and often-quoted phrase about
the “great fleet of poets” that the reign of Henri II. brought forth, and their
new style of poetry.
He gives to Maurice Scève the honour of captaining the leading ship of
this fleet; and then follow all the well-known names (and some not so well
known) of the school proper, the catalogue being capped by some extremely
interesting and valuable critical-anecdotic remarks on the greater writers,
and criticism of especially Ronsard himself. One could hardly be more just
contemporary
French poetry.
on this difficult[191] poet than is Pasquier, who allows him
not merely grandeur but sweetness to almost any extent,
“quand il a voulu doux couler”; calls him grand poète entre poètes, but
admits that he was “très mauvais censeur et aristarque de ses livres.” Then
he partly returns upon his steps in another chapter, where he approaches
French poetry from a different side, considering especially its verse-
Page 155
structure, with examples from Marot downwards, and dwelling on the
alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes which Ronsard had
sanctioned. On this matter the historical equity of Pasquier is especially
noticeable, as opposed to the somewhat excessive correctness (according to
pedagogic ideas of the correct) shown by most Frenchmen. He declines to
take a side between “this new diligence and the old nonchalance.” And he
makes the very acute observation that Marot only allowed himself this
nonchalance in verse which was not to be sung—a proof, as he remarks,
that though Master Clement might not be Ronsard’s equal in learning, he
had a facilité d’esprit admirable. In yet another passage he compares
French with Italian poetry, and, emboldened by this, with Latin itself;
taking the patriotic side with equal courage and ingenuity, and ending with
the citation of some of his own Latin verses on Ronsard, and with the sigh,
“De toute cette grande compagnie qui mit la main à la plume sous Henri II.
il restait quatre, Théodore de Bèze, Ponthus de Thyard, Louis le Caron, et
moi.” Then, after a short appendix-chapter on classical metres in French
(which he would like to approve, but seems in two minds about), he passes
to language, on his treatment of which we cannot dwell. But he never
allows himself to stray far from literature, and makes a pretext for returning
at some length to his beloved Pathelin.
It may be observed that Pasquier, though interested in letters to an
extreme degree, enjoys more than he judges—not perhaps the worst defect
of the critic.
The agile and penetrating intelligence of Montaigne could hardly have
failed in any age to devote itself to literature; in his own age this devotion
Montaigne: his was especially inevitable. That his dealings with the subject
references to
literature.
are dealings in the height of his own fashion, it is
unnecessary to say. Not many things could be more
characteristic than the Essay on Pedantry (I. 24), in which the whole spirit
and motive, not merely of the Pléiade, but of the sixteenth century
generally, are subjected to the irregular glancing criticism of the essayist.
This single paper would enable one to understand the fling of a man like
Ben Jonson—the reverse of unintelligent, the reverse of unhumorous, but
full of erudition, and of sixteenth-century reverence for it—at “All the
essayists, even their master Montaigne.” On the general question whether
what is commonly called pedantry is a good or a bad thing, Montaigne’s
verdict comes simply to a “Mass! I cannot tell!” He bestows hearty praise
alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes which Ronsard had
sanctioned. On this matter the historical equity of Pasquier is especially
noticeable, as opposed to the somewhat excessive correctness (according to
pedagogic ideas of the correct) shown by most Frenchmen. He declines to
take a side between “this new diligence and the old nonchalance.” And he
makes the very acute observation that Marot only allowed himself this
nonchalance in verse which was not to be sung—a proof, as he remarks,
that though Master Clement might not be Ronsard’s equal in learning, he
had a facilité d’esprit admirable. In yet another passage he compares
French with Italian poetry, and, emboldened by this, with Latin itself;
taking the patriotic side with equal courage and ingenuity, and ending with
the citation of some of his own Latin verses on Ronsard, and with the sigh,
“De toute cette grande compagnie qui mit la main à la plume sous Henri II.
il restait quatre, Théodore de Bèze, Ponthus de Thyard, Louis le Caron, et
moi.” Then, after a short appendix-chapter on classical metres in French
(which he would like to approve, but seems in two minds about), he passes
to language, on his treatment of which we cannot dwell. But he never
allows himself to stray far from literature, and makes a pretext for returning
at some length to his beloved Pathelin.
It may be observed that Pasquier, though interested in letters to an
extreme degree, enjoys more than he judges—not perhaps the worst defect
of the critic.
The agile and penetrating intelligence of Montaigne could hardly have
failed in any age to devote itself to literature; in his own age this devotion
Montaigne: his was especially inevitable. That his dealings with the subject
references to
literature.
are dealings in the height of his own fashion, it is
unnecessary to say. Not many things could be more
characteristic than the Essay on Pedantry (I. 24), in which the whole spirit
and motive, not merely of the Pléiade, but of the sixteenth century
generally, are subjected to the irregular glancing criticism of the essayist.
This single paper would enable one to understand the fling of a man like
Ben Jonson—the reverse of unintelligent, the reverse of unhumorous, but
full of erudition, and of sixteenth-century reverence for it—at “All the
essayists, even their master Montaigne.” On the general question whether
what is commonly called pedantry is a good or a bad thing, Montaigne’s
verdict comes simply to a “Mass! I cannot tell!” He bestows hearty praise
Page 156
on Du Bellay, a non-pedantic and courtier-like man of letters, who yet was
enthusiastic for learning; heartier on Adrian Turnebus, a pedant in the
common injurious sense; and in the middle of his essay he plays on study of
Greek and Latin, on quotations from Plato and Cicero, on “arming oneself
against the fear of death, at the cost and charges of Seneca.”[192] The much
longer chapter on Education, addressed to Diane de Foix, which
immediately follows, contains one of the worst expressions of Renaissance
contempt of mediæval literature, in the boast that “of the Lancelots of the
Lake, the Amadis, the Huons of Bordeaux, with which childhood amuses
itself,” he did not know so much as the name. “My Lord Michael” is great,
but even he might have been greater if he had known them.
Indeed hardly anywhere does Montaigne exhibit his own undulation and
diversity more fully than in relation to letters—at one time amassing ancient
instances as if he were totally oblivious of the remarks above about Plato
and Seneca; at another criticising for himself[193] with inimitable freshness
and gusto; and at another again informing the scholar, with much coolness,
that if he will take off hood and gown, drop Latin, and not deafen men’s
ears with unmitigated Aristotle, he will be at the level of all the world, and
perhaps below it.
Even this, it will be seen, is not so very far from the cardinal Pléiade
principle, that study of the ancients is an excellent thing, but that its chief
value is to equip and strengthen the student for practice in French. And
Montaigne, like the rest of his contemporaries and compatriots, always had
this “cultivation of the garden” before him. It is well known how the real
pedants of his own time objected to his neologisms, just as Fontaine (or
whoever was the author of the Quintil) did to those of Du Bellay; and how
large a part these neologisms played in the development and nourishing of
French prose. Every one who knows anything of Montaigne knows his
enthusiastic eulogy of Amyot, and of the services which that grant
translateur had rendered to French. And everybody should know the
delicate and subtle appreciation which he lavishes, in a fashion so different
from the indiscriminate laudations of Scaliger, on favourite passages of the
ancients, more particularly[194] on the Venus and Vulcan passage of Virgil,
and the Venus and Mars passage of Lucretius.
Of course Montaigne’s interests, despite his exquisite literary
The Essay On accomplishment, are not primarily literary. But he has
Books.
given one entire Essay (II. 10), and that not of the shortest,
enthusiastic for learning; heartier on Adrian Turnebus, a pedant in the
common injurious sense; and in the middle of his essay he plays on study of
Greek and Latin, on quotations from Plato and Cicero, on “arming oneself
against the fear of death, at the cost and charges of Seneca.”[192] The much
longer chapter on Education, addressed to Diane de Foix, which
immediately follows, contains one of the worst expressions of Renaissance
contempt of mediæval literature, in the boast that “of the Lancelots of the
Lake, the Amadis, the Huons of Bordeaux, with which childhood amuses
itself,” he did not know so much as the name. “My Lord Michael” is great,
but even he might have been greater if he had known them.
Indeed hardly anywhere does Montaigne exhibit his own undulation and
diversity more fully than in relation to letters—at one time amassing ancient
instances as if he were totally oblivious of the remarks above about Plato
and Seneca; at another criticising for himself[193] with inimitable freshness
and gusto; and at another again informing the scholar, with much coolness,
that if he will take off hood and gown, drop Latin, and not deafen men’s
ears with unmitigated Aristotle, he will be at the level of all the world, and
perhaps below it.
Even this, it will be seen, is not so very far from the cardinal Pléiade
principle, that study of the ancients is an excellent thing, but that its chief
value is to equip and strengthen the student for practice in French. And
Montaigne, like the rest of his contemporaries and compatriots, always had
this “cultivation of the garden” before him. It is well known how the real
pedants of his own time objected to his neologisms, just as Fontaine (or
whoever was the author of the Quintil) did to those of Du Bellay; and how
large a part these neologisms played in the development and nourishing of
French prose. Every one who knows anything of Montaigne knows his
enthusiastic eulogy of Amyot, and of the services which that grant
translateur had rendered to French. And everybody should know the
delicate and subtle appreciation which he lavishes, in a fashion so different
from the indiscriminate laudations of Scaliger, on favourite passages of the
ancients, more particularly[194] on the Venus and Vulcan passage of Virgil,
and the Venus and Mars passage of Lucretius.
Of course Montaigne’s interests, despite his exquisite literary
The Essay On accomplishment, are not primarily literary. But he has
Books.
given one entire Essay (II. 10), and that not of the shortest,
Page 157
to Books; and he has frequent glancings at the subject, sometimes
characteristically racy, as that at the Heptameron, “un gentil livre pour son
estoffe.” The “Books” essay begins with one of his familiar jactations of
imperfection. He has some reading, but no faculty of retention. He often
intentionally plagiarises—for instance from Plutarch and Seneca. He does
not seek in books anything more than amusement and knowledge of himself
and of life. He refuses to grapple—at any great expense of labour—with
difficulties. He likes Rabelais, Boccaccio, and Johannes Secundus for mere
pastime, but repeats his depressing scorn for romances, and confesses, as
did Darwin on the score of Shakespeare, that he cannot take the pleasure he
used to take in Ariosto and Ovid. He thinks Virgil, Lucretius, Horace, and
Catullus (especially Virgil in the Georgics and the Fifth Æneid) at the top of
poetry—a grouping which makes us long to pin the elusive Perigourdin
down, and force him, Proteus as he is, to give us his exquisite reasons. His
judgment on Lucan is a little commonplace, “not the style but the
sentiments”—whereas the sentiments of Lucan are but Roman “common
form,” and his style, if not of the best kind, is great in a kind not the best.
He thinks Terence “the very darling and grace of Latin,” and is half
apologetic as to the equalling of Lucretius to Virgil, positively violent (it is,
he thinks, bestise et stupidité barbarique)[195] on that of Virgil to Ariosto,
and depressing again in regard to Plautus (Terence sent bien mieux son
gentilhomme). He returns again and again to the style of Terence; and warns
us of the coming classicism by his objections to the “fantastiques élévations
Espagnoles et Pétrarchistes,” being equally “correct” in exalting (or at least
in his reasons for the exaltation, there being no doubt about the fact)
Catullus above Martial. On Greek authors as such he frankly and repeatedly
declares his incompetence to give judgment; but “now that Plutarch has
been made French,” he can as frankly yoke him once more with Seneca,
and extol the pair super æthera, boldly expressing his comparative distaste
for Cicero. He would like to have “a dozen of [Diogenes] Laertius,” for the
“human document,” of course; and puts Cæsar above all other historians,
including Sallust, while he has something to say of divers French writers of
the class—Froissart (who, he thinks, gives “the crude matter of history”),
Comines, Du Bellay-Langey, and others. It is to be noted that in this place
he says nothing about French poetry. And when he does take up the subject
much later, in II. 17, at the end of the “Essay on Presumption,” he is very
brief, only saying that he thinks Ronsard and Du Bellay “hardly far from
characteristically racy, as that at the Heptameron, “un gentil livre pour son
estoffe.” The “Books” essay begins with one of his familiar jactations of
imperfection. He has some reading, but no faculty of retention. He often
intentionally plagiarises—for instance from Plutarch and Seneca. He does
not seek in books anything more than amusement and knowledge of himself
and of life. He refuses to grapple—at any great expense of labour—with
difficulties. He likes Rabelais, Boccaccio, and Johannes Secundus for mere
pastime, but repeats his depressing scorn for romances, and confesses, as
did Darwin on the score of Shakespeare, that he cannot take the pleasure he
used to take in Ariosto and Ovid. He thinks Virgil, Lucretius, Horace, and
Catullus (especially Virgil in the Georgics and the Fifth Æneid) at the top of
poetry—a grouping which makes us long to pin the elusive Perigourdin
down, and force him, Proteus as he is, to give us his exquisite reasons. His
judgment on Lucan is a little commonplace, “not the style but the
sentiments”—whereas the sentiments of Lucan are but Roman “common
form,” and his style, if not of the best kind, is great in a kind not the best.
He thinks Terence “the very darling and grace of Latin,” and is half
apologetic as to the equalling of Lucretius to Virgil, positively violent (it is,
he thinks, bestise et stupidité barbarique)[195] on that of Virgil to Ariosto,
and depressing again in regard to Plautus (Terence sent bien mieux son
gentilhomme). He returns again and again to the style of Terence; and warns
us of the coming classicism by his objections to the “fantastiques élévations
Espagnoles et Pétrarchistes,” being equally “correct” in exalting (or at least
in his reasons for the exaltation, there being no doubt about the fact)
Catullus above Martial. On Greek authors as such he frankly and repeatedly
declares his incompetence to give judgment; but “now that Plutarch has
been made French,” he can as frankly yoke him once more with Seneca,
and extol the pair super æthera, boldly expressing his comparative distaste
for Cicero. He would like to have “a dozen of [Diogenes] Laertius,” for the
“human document,” of course; and puts Cæsar above all other historians,
including Sallust, while he has something to say of divers French writers of
the class—Froissart (who, he thinks, gives “the crude matter of history”),
Comines, Du Bellay-Langey, and others. It is to be noted that in this place
he says nothing about French poetry. And when he does take up the subject
much later, in II. 17, at the end of the “Essay on Presumption,” he is very
brief, only saying that he thinks Ronsard and Du Bellay “hardly far from
Page 158
the ancient perfection.” At the beginning of II. 36 he divides with the
majority on the merits of Homer and Virgil, though he once more admits a
disqualification, which in this case is, of course, total. And in the famous
remark,[196] “Poetry is an amusement proper for women; it is a frolic and
subtle art, disguised, talkative, quite occupied with pleasure and display,
like them,” he gives no doubt a certain measure of his critical capacity in
less specially conditioned matters.
This capacity is, indeed, strictly limited. Montaigne is almost, if not
quite, as much set as his beloved Plutarch on the life-side of literature, as
the only one that really interests him; and, in addition, he has an obstinate
prosaic inclination, with which Plutarch does not seem to be nearly so
chargeable. Yet he must have found mention here, not merely as our first
very great French man of letters,[197] who has left us literary opinions, but as
the very light and glory of the French intellect at the meeting of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and as thus giving an index of the
greatest value to its tastes and opinions. He displays (conditioning it in the
ways just mentioned, and others, by his intense idiosyncrasy) the general
literary attitude of the time—an active, practical, striving towards
performance, a rather conventional and arbitrary admiration of the farther
past, a contempt, or at least good-natured underestimation, of the nearer,
and fair, if vague, hopes for the future. But considering the intensely critical
character of Montaigne’s intellect in most directions, its exertions in this
direction tell us even more by what they do not, than by what they do.
157. See Petit de Julleville, ii. 392, who quotes four between c. 1405 and
c. 1475; and for a monograph E. Langlois, De Artibus Rhetoricæ Rythmicæ,
Paris, 1890. To this may be added, as commentaries on this chapter, the
corresponding division in Spingarn, op. cit., Part II., pp. 172-250; the
extensive and valuable Introduction to M. Georges Pellissier’s edition of
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye (Paris, 1885); and Herr Rücktaschel’s Einige Arts
Poétiques aus der Zeit Ronsards und Malherbes (Leipsic, 1889).
158. L’Art et Science de Rhétorique, 1493, printed by Verard, and
reprinted by Crapelet. Another, a little later, was printed about 1500, and
reprinted in the Bibliothèque Elzévirienne, Anciennes Poésies Françaises,
iii. 118. It is odd that M. Petit de Julleville, who does not give the volume
majority on the merits of Homer and Virgil, though he once more admits a
disqualification, which in this case is, of course, total. And in the famous
remark,[196] “Poetry is an amusement proper for women; it is a frolic and
subtle art, disguised, talkative, quite occupied with pleasure and display,
like them,” he gives no doubt a certain measure of his critical capacity in
less specially conditioned matters.
This capacity is, indeed, strictly limited. Montaigne is almost, if not
quite, as much set as his beloved Plutarch on the life-side of literature, as
the only one that really interests him; and, in addition, he has an obstinate
prosaic inclination, with which Plutarch does not seem to be nearly so
chargeable. Yet he must have found mention here, not merely as our first
very great French man of letters,[197] who has left us literary opinions, but as
the very light and glory of the French intellect at the meeting of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and as thus giving an index of the
greatest value to its tastes and opinions. He displays (conditioning it in the
ways just mentioned, and others, by his intense idiosyncrasy) the general
literary attitude of the time—an active, practical, striving towards
performance, a rather conventional and arbitrary admiration of the farther
past, a contempt, or at least good-natured underestimation, of the nearer,
and fair, if vague, hopes for the future. But considering the intensely critical
character of Montaigne’s intellect in most directions, its exertions in this
direction tell us even more by what they do not, than by what they do.
157. See Petit de Julleville, ii. 392, who quotes four between c. 1405 and
c. 1475; and for a monograph E. Langlois, De Artibus Rhetoricæ Rythmicæ,
Paris, 1890. To this may be added, as commentaries on this chapter, the
corresponding division in Spingarn, op. cit., Part II., pp. 172-250; the
extensive and valuable Introduction to M. Georges Pellissier’s edition of
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye (Paris, 1885); and Herr Rücktaschel’s Einige Arts
Poétiques aus der Zeit Ronsards und Malherbes (Leipsic, 1889).
158. L’Art et Science de Rhétorique, 1493, printed by Verard, and
reprinted by Crapelet. Another, a little later, was printed about 1500, and
reprinted in the Bibliothèque Elzévirienne, Anciennes Poésies Françaises,
iii. 118. It is odd that M. Petit de Julleville, who does not give the volume
Page 159
and page of that very extensive collection, and misquotes its title, should
speak of this as “in prose.” It is in verse: divided under short headings,
sometimes of teaching, sometimes of example, as in this notable “Rondel
équivoqué,” Avoir, Fait Avoir Avoir, Avoir Fait-Avoir, Fait, where each
word is a line. The interpretation may be left as a treat for the reader.
159. L’Instructif de la seconde Rhétorique, or Le Jardin de Plaisance.
160. Grant et vray art de pleine Rhétorique, Rouen, 1521.
161. Rhétorique Métrifiée, Paris, 1539. Between Fabri and Gratien du
Pont appeared in 1529 Geoffrey Tory’s Champfleury, a more grammatical
than critical miscellany, which is elsewhere glanced at; and the very
noteworthy critical remarks prefixed by Marot to his edition of Villon in
1533. M. Gaston Paris is assuredly right when he calls this (in his charming
little book on the author of the Ballade des Pendus, Paris, 1901) “un des
plus anciens morceaux de critique littéraire que l’on ait écrits en français,”
and its appreciative sympathy, if not co-extensive with the merits of the
work, leaves little to desire in the points which it touches. In fact, the mere
selection of Villon and of the Roman de la Rose, as the subjects of his
editorial care, shows in Master Clement the presence of a deep instinctive
critical faculty, which has only partially and incidentally developed itself. In
this, as in not a few other points, Marot himself seems to me to have had for
the most part inadequate justice from critics; though here as elsewhere it
may be allowed that time and circumstance prevented him from doing
himself justice. His intense affection for literature and poetry, the light
glancing quality of his wit and intellect, the absence of all pomposity,
pedantry, and parade, and the shrewd sense which (in judgment if not quite
in conduct) distinguished him, go very far to constitute the equipment of the
accomplished critic. But his short life, perhaps a certain instability of
character, and the immature condition of the special state of literature in his
time, with the ever-deplorable distractions of the religious upheaval, gave
him little chance.
162. With the Lyons reprint (v. infra) of Sibilet and the Quintil Horatien
is given an Autre Art Poétique, short and strictly practical. It notices
Ronsard, but gives the old forms.
speak of this as “in prose.” It is in verse: divided under short headings,
sometimes of teaching, sometimes of example, as in this notable “Rondel
équivoqué,” Avoir, Fait Avoir Avoir, Avoir Fait-Avoir, Fait, where each
word is a line. The interpretation may be left as a treat for the reader.
159. L’Instructif de la seconde Rhétorique, or Le Jardin de Plaisance.
160. Grant et vray art de pleine Rhétorique, Rouen, 1521.
161. Rhétorique Métrifiée, Paris, 1539. Between Fabri and Gratien du
Pont appeared in 1529 Geoffrey Tory’s Champfleury, a more grammatical
than critical miscellany, which is elsewhere glanced at; and the very
noteworthy critical remarks prefixed by Marot to his edition of Villon in
1533. M. Gaston Paris is assuredly right when he calls this (in his charming
little book on the author of the Ballade des Pendus, Paris, 1901) “un des
plus anciens morceaux de critique littéraire que l’on ait écrits en français,”
and its appreciative sympathy, if not co-extensive with the merits of the
work, leaves little to desire in the points which it touches. In fact, the mere
selection of Villon and of the Roman de la Rose, as the subjects of his
editorial care, shows in Master Clement the presence of a deep instinctive
critical faculty, which has only partially and incidentally developed itself. In
this, as in not a few other points, Marot himself seems to me to have had for
the most part inadequate justice from critics; though here as elsewhere it
may be allowed that time and circumstance prevented him from doing
himself justice. His intense affection for literature and poetry, the light
glancing quality of his wit and intellect, the absence of all pomposity,
pedantry, and parade, and the shrewd sense which (in judgment if not quite
in conduct) distinguished him, go very far to constitute the equipment of the
accomplished critic. But his short life, perhaps a certain instability of
character, and the immature condition of the special state of literature in his
time, with the ever-deplorable distractions of the religious upheaval, gave
him little chance.
162. With the Lyons reprint (v. infra) of Sibilet and the Quintil Horatien
is given an Autre Art Poétique, short and strictly practical. It notices
Ronsard, but gives the old forms.
Page 160
163. It would be clearly improper to load this book with much general
French literary history. But those who would thoroughly appreciate the
position may find an endeavour to put it briefly in my Short History of the
subject, Book II. chaps, i., ii., and iv. (6th ed., Oxford, 1901). If they want
more they had better go to MM. Darmesteter and Hatzfeld’s admirable
Seizième Siècle in France (Paris, 1878), or, best of all, to the last 150 pp. of
the first vol. of Crepet’s Poètes Français. M. Ch. d’Héricault’s prefaces
here, with his introduction to Marot (ed. Garnier), are not likely to be soon
equalled.
164. For a poet of such eminence and a book of such importance, Du
Bellay and the Défense are curiously difficult of access. M. Marty-Laveaux'
ed. of the Works, with the Pléiade generally (Paris, 1876), is very scarce and
dear. M. Becq de Fouquières’ Selections are, it is said, out of print, though
they can be obtained. A Versailles reprint I know only through the British
Museum Catalogue. It is odd how, in almost all languages, reprinting, like a
more agreeable, if less troublesome, process, seems to “go by favour.”
165. That quoted supra, at i. 316.
166. Of course in an earlier stage you do get much more. English, for
instance, profited almost infinitely by translation from French and from
Latin prose in the late fourteenth century, and throughout the fifteenth. But
French was past this stage, or nearly past it, when Du Bellay wrote.
167. L’Evolution des genres (Paris, 1890), p. 43 sq.
168. M. Brunetière quotes this famous and striking expression, but
complains that we are not told how it is to be done. Our English supplies a
sufficient reply to this in famous words, “by reading, marking, learning, and
inwardly digesting.”
169. The small space given to the Défense here may seem inconsistent
with the importance assigned to it. The fact is, however,—and this fact no
doubt explains to some extent, if it does not excuse, the views of those who
do not think it very important,—that its details require little notice. Its claim
lies in its eager eloquence, in the new position sketched above, and
(negatively) in its onslaught on the forms of French poetry for two hundred
French literary history. But those who would thoroughly appreciate the
position may find an endeavour to put it briefly in my Short History of the
subject, Book II. chaps, i., ii., and iv. (6th ed., Oxford, 1901). If they want
more they had better go to MM. Darmesteter and Hatzfeld’s admirable
Seizième Siècle in France (Paris, 1878), or, best of all, to the last 150 pp. of
the first vol. of Crepet’s Poètes Français. M. Ch. d’Héricault’s prefaces
here, with his introduction to Marot (ed. Garnier), are not likely to be soon
equalled.
164. For a poet of such eminence and a book of such importance, Du
Bellay and the Défense are curiously difficult of access. M. Marty-Laveaux'
ed. of the Works, with the Pléiade generally (Paris, 1876), is very scarce and
dear. M. Becq de Fouquières’ Selections are, it is said, out of print, though
they can be obtained. A Versailles reprint I know only through the British
Museum Catalogue. It is odd how, in almost all languages, reprinting, like a
more agreeable, if less troublesome, process, seems to “go by favour.”
165. That quoted supra, at i. 316.
166. Of course in an earlier stage you do get much more. English, for
instance, profited almost infinitely by translation from French and from
Latin prose in the late fourteenth century, and throughout the fifteenth. But
French was past this stage, or nearly past it, when Du Bellay wrote.
167. L’Evolution des genres (Paris, 1890), p. 43 sq.
168. M. Brunetière quotes this famous and striking expression, but
complains that we are not told how it is to be done. Our English supplies a
sufficient reply to this in famous words, “by reading, marking, learning, and
inwardly digesting.”
169. The small space given to the Défense here may seem inconsistent
with the importance assigned to it. The fact is, however,—and this fact no
doubt explains to some extent, if it does not excuse, the views of those who
do not think it very important,—that its details require little notice. Its claim
lies in its eager eloquence, in the new position sketched above, and
(negatively) in its onslaught on the forms of French poetry for two hundred
Page 161
years past. Du Bellay’s critical views reappear in the “Epistle to the Reader”
in his Olive (ed. Becq de Fouquières, pp. 67-76), in that prefixed to his Vers
Traduits (ibid., pp. 151-157), in the vigorous defence of vernacular verse
addressed to the second of the three Valois Marguerites (ibid., pp. 127-129),
and elsewhere.
170. Others call it Le Quintil Censeur. It appears not unnecessary to say
that “Quintil” has not, and could not have, any reference to “Quintilian,”
but refers to the Quintilius of Horace (Art. Po., 438). The original edition
seems to be very rare: the British Museum only possesses the Lyons reprint
(with Sibilet) of 1556. It seems to have been also reprinted with Du Bellay
at Versailles in 1878, but this I do not possess. Some make the title
Horatian or Horace.
171. “Vermeille” with him is “vermeilhæ”; “voix,” “voès”; “neigeux,”
“negeus”; Lucan, “Lukein,” &c.
172. Œuvres Complètes, ed. Blanchemain, 8 vols., Paris, 1857-1867.
They are not quite “complete,” but the omissions (which may be found, if
anybody wants them, in such respectable works as the Cabinet Satirique
&c.) fortunately do not concern us.
173. In ed. of Vauquelin (sup. cit.), xxviii. sq.
174. Ed. cit., vii. 317-337
175. Alphonse Delbène, Abbé of Haute-Combe in Savoy.
176.
“Jewels five words long
That on the stretched forefinger of all time
Sparkle for ever.”
—Tennyson, The Princess.
177. Ed. cit., iii. 7-39.
in his Olive (ed. Becq de Fouquières, pp. 67-76), in that prefixed to his Vers
Traduits (ibid., pp. 151-157), in the vigorous defence of vernacular verse
addressed to the second of the three Valois Marguerites (ibid., pp. 127-129),
and elsewhere.
170. Others call it Le Quintil Censeur. It appears not unnecessary to say
that “Quintil” has not, and could not have, any reference to “Quintilian,”
but refers to the Quintilius of Horace (Art. Po., 438). The original edition
seems to be very rare: the British Museum only possesses the Lyons reprint
(with Sibilet) of 1556. It seems to have been also reprinted with Du Bellay
at Versailles in 1878, but this I do not possess. Some make the title
Horatian or Horace.
171. “Vermeille” with him is “vermeilhæ”; “voix,” “voès”; “neigeux,”
“negeus”; Lucan, “Lukein,” &c.
172. Œuvres Complètes, ed. Blanchemain, 8 vols., Paris, 1857-1867.
They are not quite “complete,” but the omissions (which may be found, if
anybody wants them, in such respectable works as the Cabinet Satirique
&c.) fortunately do not concern us.
173. In ed. of Vauquelin (sup. cit.), xxviii. sq.
174. Ed. cit., vii. 317-337
175. Alphonse Delbène, Abbé of Haute-Combe in Savoy.
176.
“Jewels five words long
That on the stretched forefinger of all time
Sparkle for ever.”
—Tennyson, The Princess.
177. Ed. cit., iii. 7-39.
Page 162
178. Plustost à la façon d’une missive, ou de quelques lettres royaux, que
d’un poème bien prononcé.
179. Principalement des boucliers.
180. Odd as these things may seem, they are not fool-born jests of an idle
historian. Ronsard actually says them, though at greater length. See p. 28,
“Su tu veux faire mourir sur-le-champ quelque capitaine, il le faut navrer
au plus mortel lieu du corps, comme le cerveau, le cœur, la gorge,” &c.,
&c.; and, p. 29, “Car s’il fait bouillir de l’eau en un chaudron,” &c., &c.
181. In the Prefatory Discourse to his Mort de César (1562). He extols
Aristotle and Horace, but does not like Seneca.
182. In the prefatory matter of his Saül le Furieux, 1572. Jean assails the
native drama, especially the Moralities, and thinks highly of Seneca.
183. La Manière de faire des vers en Français comme en Grec et en
Latin, Paris, 1573. There is a useful abstract of this in Rücktaschel, op. cit.,
pp. 23-27.
184. L’art Poétique Français, Paris, 1598. This, like almost all the works
noticed in this chapter, is but a little book, odd to compare with the close-
packed Italian quartos. But it is longer than most of its fellows.
185. Some abatement, however, may be claimed, if only on the ground
that Laudun is absolutely sound on the vernacular question.
186. M. Pellissier, to whose already cited edition the references following
are made.
187. I agree with Mr Spingarn (p. 187) and disagree with M. Pellissier (p.
xxxviii) in thinking that this reference to Minturno is quite serious. The
French editor, indeed, speaks of Minturno rather oddly, coupling him with
Vida as “les deux poètes Italiens,” and saying that both “ne font que
remâcher les préceptes des anciens,” which Vauquelin only says of Vida.
This is of more than doubtful justice as to Minturno, and why call him a
d’un poème bien prononcé.
179. Principalement des boucliers.
180. Odd as these things may seem, they are not fool-born jests of an idle
historian. Ronsard actually says them, though at greater length. See p. 28,
“Su tu veux faire mourir sur-le-champ quelque capitaine, il le faut navrer
au plus mortel lieu du corps, comme le cerveau, le cœur, la gorge,” &c.,
&c.; and, p. 29, “Car s’il fait bouillir de l’eau en un chaudron,” &c., &c.
181. In the Prefatory Discourse to his Mort de César (1562). He extols
Aristotle and Horace, but does not like Seneca.
182. In the prefatory matter of his Saül le Furieux, 1572. Jean assails the
native drama, especially the Moralities, and thinks highly of Seneca.
183. La Manière de faire des vers en Français comme en Grec et en
Latin, Paris, 1573. There is a useful abstract of this in Rücktaschel, op. cit.,
pp. 23-27.
184. L’art Poétique Français, Paris, 1598. This, like almost all the works
noticed in this chapter, is but a little book, odd to compare with the close-
packed Italian quartos. But it is longer than most of its fellows.
185. Some abatement, however, may be claimed, if only on the ground
that Laudun is absolutely sound on the vernacular question.
186. M. Pellissier, to whose already cited edition the references following
are made.
187. I agree with Mr Spingarn (p. 187) and disagree with M. Pellissier (p.
xxxviii) in thinking that this reference to Minturno is quite serious. The
French editor, indeed, speaks of Minturno rather oddly, coupling him with
Vida as “les deux poètes Italiens,” and saying that both “ne font que
remâcher les préceptes des anciens,” which Vauquelin only says of Vida.
This is of more than doubtful justice as to Minturno, and why call him a
Page 163
“poet”? He may have written in verse on other occasions, for aught I know,
but his two Poetics are as unquestionably in prose as Vida’s one is in verse.
188. Oste moy la Ballade, oste moy le Rondeau.
189. Inst. Orat., II. xiii. 13. The anecdote in Quintilian is very simple:
Apelles paints Antigonus in profile to hide a lost eye. Vauquelin (on
uncertain authority) expands this into a long story of a competition between
Polygnotus, Scopas, and Diocles.
190. The Recherches have not been completely reprinted, I think, since
1723. All their literary matter, however, is included in M. Léon Feugère’s
extremely useful and well-edited Œuvres Choisies d’E. P. (2 vols., Paris,
1849). It extends from i. 230 to ii. 134, what follows on the University of
Paris being itself not quite irrelevant.
191. Difficult, that is, to appraise critically—not to understand.
192. Vol. i. p. 165, ed. Courbet and Royer. Je n’aime point cette
suffisance relative et mendiée, he goes on with his own absolute and
unborrowed stamp of phrase and epithet.
193. Cf., for instance, the remarkable critical comparison of Tacitus and
Seneca in the Eighth Essay of the Third Book, towards the close (iv. 37 ed.
cit.)
194. If there is anywhere a happier critical phrase, in its particular kind,
than “cette noble circumfusa, mère du gentil infusus,” I do not know it.
195. Ed. cit., ii. 112. Most of the expressions quoted are in the immediate
context.
196. III. 3, Les Trois Commerces, ed. cit., iii. 288.
197. Rabelais is no real exception. It is needless to say that Gargantua
and Pantagruel do contain matter touching on literature. But Rabelais
comes too early to be critical. The “Library of Saint-Victor” and other
things are simply alarums and excursions of his general campaign against
but his two Poetics are as unquestionably in prose as Vida’s one is in verse.
188. Oste moy la Ballade, oste moy le Rondeau.
189. Inst. Orat., II. xiii. 13. The anecdote in Quintilian is very simple:
Apelles paints Antigonus in profile to hide a lost eye. Vauquelin (on
uncertain authority) expands this into a long story of a competition between
Polygnotus, Scopas, and Diocles.
190. The Recherches have not been completely reprinted, I think, since
1723. All their literary matter, however, is included in M. Léon Feugère’s
extremely useful and well-edited Œuvres Choisies d’E. P. (2 vols., Paris,
1849). It extends from i. 230 to ii. 134, what follows on the University of
Paris being itself not quite irrelevant.
191. Difficult, that is, to appraise critically—not to understand.
192. Vol. i. p. 165, ed. Courbet and Royer. Je n’aime point cette
suffisance relative et mendiée, he goes on with his own absolute and
unborrowed stamp of phrase and epithet.
193. Cf., for instance, the remarkable critical comparison of Tacitus and
Seneca in the Eighth Essay of the Third Book, towards the close (iv. 37 ed.
cit.)
194. If there is anywhere a happier critical phrase, in its particular kind,
than “cette noble circumfusa, mère du gentil infusus,” I do not know it.
195. Ed. cit., ii. 112. Most of the expressions quoted are in the immediate
context.
196. III. 3, Les Trois Commerces, ed. cit., iii. 288.
197. Rabelais is no real exception. It is needless to say that Gargantua
and Pantagruel do contain matter touching on literature. But Rabelais
comes too early to be critical. The “Library of Saint-Victor” and other
things are simply alarums and excursions of his general campaign against
Page 164
the rearguard of “monkish ignorance”; and in his references to French
poetry he does not seem to have got beyond—or to have wished to get
beyond—complacent acquiescence in rhétoriqueur pedantry.
poetry he does not seem to have got beyond—or to have wished to get
beyond—complacent acquiescence in rhétoriqueur pedantry.
Page 165
CHAPTER V.
ELIZABETHAN CRITICISM.
BACKWARDNESS OF ENGLISH CRITICISM NOT IMPLYING INFERIORITY—ITS CAUSE—
THE INFLUENCE OF RHETORIC AND OTHER MATTERS—HAWES—THE FIRST
TUDOR CRITICS—WILSON: HIS ‘ART OF RHETORIC’; HIS ATTACK ON “INKHORN
TERMS”—HIS DEALING WITH FIGURES—CHEKE: HIS RESOLUTE ANGLICISM AND
ANTI-PRECIOSITY—HIS CRITICISM OF SALLUST—ASCHAM—HIS PATRIOTISM—
HIS HORROR OF ROMANCE, AND OF THE ‘MORTE D’ARTHUR’—HIS GENERAL
CRITICAL ATTITUDE TO PROSE, AND TO POETRY—THE CRAZE FOR CLASSICAL
METRES—SPECIAL WANTS OF ENGLISH PROSODY—ITS KINDS: (1) CHAUCERIAN
—(2) ALLITERATIVE—(3) ITALIANATED—DEFICIENCIES OF ALL THREE—THE
TEMPTATIONS OF CRITICISM IN THIS RESPECT—ITS ADVENTURERS: ASCHAM
HIMSELF—WATSON AND DRANT—GASCOIGNE—HIS ‘NOTES OF INSTRUCTION’—
THEIR CAPITAL VALUE—SPENSER AND HARVEY—THE PURITAN ATTACK ON
POETRY—GOSSON—‘THE SCHOOL OF ABUSE’—LODGE’S ‘REPLY’—SIDNEY’S
‘APOLOGY FOR POETRY’—ABSTRACT OF IT—ITS MINOR SHORTCOMINGS AND
MAJOR HERESIES—THE EXCUSES OF BOTH, AND THEIR AMPLE COMPENSATION
—KING JAMES’S ‘REULIS AND CAUTELIS’—WEBBE’S ‘DISCOURSE’—SLIGHT IN
KNOWLEDGE, BUT ENTHUSIASTIC, IF UNCRITICAL, IN APPRECIATION—
PUTTENHAM’S (?) ‘ART OF ENGLISH POESIE’—ITS ERUDITION—SYSTEMATIC
ARRANGEMENT AND EXUBERANT INDULGENCE IN FIGURES—MINORS:
HARINGTON, MERES, WEBSTER, BOLTON, ETC.—CAMPION AND HIS
‘OBSERVATIONS’—DANIEL AND HIS ‘DEFENCE OF RHYME’—BACON—THE
‘ESSAYS’—THE ‘ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING’—ITS DENUNCIATION OF MERE
WORD-STUDY—ITS VIEW OF POETRY—SOME “OBITER DICTA”—THE WHOLE OF
VERY SLIGHT IMPORTANCE—STIRLING’S “ANACRISIS”—BEN JONSON: HIS
EQUIPMENT—HIS ‘PREFACES,’ ETC.—THE DRUMMOND CONVERSATIONS—THE
‘DISCOVERIES’—FORM OF THE BOOK—ITS DATE—MOSAIC OF OLD AND NEW—
THE FLING AT MONTAIGNE—AT ‘TAMERLANE’—THE SHAKESPEARE PASSAGE—
AND THAT ON BACON—GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE BOOK.
The fortune of England in matters political has often been noticed; and it
has at least deserved to be noticed, hardly less often, in matters literary. One
of the luckiest of these chances came at the time of the Renaissance; when
the necessary changes were effected with the minimum of direct foreign
influence, and so slowly that the natural force of the nation and the
language was able completely, or almost completely, to assimilate the
influences, both foreign and classical, that rained upon it.
ELIZABETHAN CRITICISM.
BACKWARDNESS OF ENGLISH CRITICISM NOT IMPLYING INFERIORITY—ITS CAUSE—
THE INFLUENCE OF RHETORIC AND OTHER MATTERS—HAWES—THE FIRST
TUDOR CRITICS—WILSON: HIS ‘ART OF RHETORIC’; HIS ATTACK ON “INKHORN
TERMS”—HIS DEALING WITH FIGURES—CHEKE: HIS RESOLUTE ANGLICISM AND
ANTI-PRECIOSITY—HIS CRITICISM OF SALLUST—ASCHAM—HIS PATRIOTISM—
HIS HORROR OF ROMANCE, AND OF THE ‘MORTE D’ARTHUR’—HIS GENERAL
CRITICAL ATTITUDE TO PROSE, AND TO POETRY—THE CRAZE FOR CLASSICAL
METRES—SPECIAL WANTS OF ENGLISH PROSODY—ITS KINDS: (1) CHAUCERIAN
—(2) ALLITERATIVE—(3) ITALIANATED—DEFICIENCIES OF ALL THREE—THE
TEMPTATIONS OF CRITICISM IN THIS RESPECT—ITS ADVENTURERS: ASCHAM
HIMSELF—WATSON AND DRANT—GASCOIGNE—HIS ‘NOTES OF INSTRUCTION’—
THEIR CAPITAL VALUE—SPENSER AND HARVEY—THE PURITAN ATTACK ON
POETRY—GOSSON—‘THE SCHOOL OF ABUSE’—LODGE’S ‘REPLY’—SIDNEY’S
‘APOLOGY FOR POETRY’—ABSTRACT OF IT—ITS MINOR SHORTCOMINGS AND
MAJOR HERESIES—THE EXCUSES OF BOTH, AND THEIR AMPLE COMPENSATION
—KING JAMES’S ‘REULIS AND CAUTELIS’—WEBBE’S ‘DISCOURSE’—SLIGHT IN
KNOWLEDGE, BUT ENTHUSIASTIC, IF UNCRITICAL, IN APPRECIATION—
PUTTENHAM’S (?) ‘ART OF ENGLISH POESIE’—ITS ERUDITION—SYSTEMATIC
ARRANGEMENT AND EXUBERANT INDULGENCE IN FIGURES—MINORS:
HARINGTON, MERES, WEBSTER, BOLTON, ETC.—CAMPION AND HIS
‘OBSERVATIONS’—DANIEL AND HIS ‘DEFENCE OF RHYME’—BACON—THE
‘ESSAYS’—THE ‘ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING’—ITS DENUNCIATION OF MERE
WORD-STUDY—ITS VIEW OF POETRY—SOME “OBITER DICTA”—THE WHOLE OF
VERY SLIGHT IMPORTANCE—STIRLING’S “ANACRISIS”—BEN JONSON: HIS
EQUIPMENT—HIS ‘PREFACES,’ ETC.—THE DRUMMOND CONVERSATIONS—THE
‘DISCOVERIES’—FORM OF THE BOOK—ITS DATE—MOSAIC OF OLD AND NEW—
THE FLING AT MONTAIGNE—AT ‘TAMERLANE’—THE SHAKESPEARE PASSAGE—
AND THAT ON BACON—GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE BOOK.
The fortune of England in matters political has often been noticed; and it
has at least deserved to be noticed, hardly less often, in matters literary. One
of the luckiest of these chances came at the time of the Renaissance; when
the necessary changes were effected with the minimum of direct foreign
influence, and so slowly that the natural force of the nation and the
language was able completely, or almost completely, to assimilate the
influences, both foreign and classical, that rained upon it.
Page 166
Nor was this least the case in respect of criticism.[198] The history of this
part of English literary evolution has been, until recently, much neglected;
and it can hardly be said even yet to have received comprehensive attention.
Backwardness of English It is all the more necessary to bestow some time
Criticism not implying
inferiority.
and pains on it here, with at least some fair hope
of correcting an unfair depreciation. The Baron of
Bradwardine (displaying that shrewd appreciation of contrast between
English and Scottish characteristics which belonged, if not to himself, to his
creator) remarked to Colonel Talbot that it was the Colonel’s “humour, as
he [the Baron] had seen in other gentlemen of birth and honour” in the
Colonel’s country, “to derogate from the honour of his burgonet.”
Gentlemen of the most undoubted birth and honour (as such things go in
literature), from Dryden to Matthew Arnold, have displayed this humour in
regard to English criticism. But there has been something too much of it;
and it has been taken far too literally by the ignorant. M. Brunetière has
expressed his opinion that Frenchmen would make un véritable marché de
dupe if they exchanged Boileau, Marmontel, La Harpe, and Co. for Lessing
and some others. I shall not in this place express any opinion on that
question directly. But, if this book does what I shall endeavour to make it
do, it will at least show that to exchange, for any foreign company, our own
critics, from Sidney and Ben Jonson, through Dryden and Addison, Samuel
Johnson and Coleridge, Lamb and Hazlitt, to Mr Arnold himself, would be
“un véritable marché de”—Moses Primrose.
It will have been sufficiently seen in the last volume that the
backwardness of English—a backwardness long exaggerated, but to some
extent real, and to no small extent healthy—was nowhere exhibited more
distinctly than in the department which supplies the materials of this
history. Until the close of the fifteenth century, and for some decades
afterwards, not a single critical treatise on English existed in the English
language, or even in Latin; the nearest approach, even in fragment, to any
utterance of the kind being the naïf and interesting, but only infantinely
critical, remarks of Caxton in his prefaces.[199]
The fact is that, not only until a nation is in command of a single form of
“curial” speech for literary purposes, but until sufficient experiments have
been made in at least a majority of the branches of literature, criticism is
impossible, and would, if possible, be rather mischievous than beneficial.
Its cause. Now England, though it possessed at least one very great
part of English literary evolution has been, until recently, much neglected;
and it can hardly be said even yet to have received comprehensive attention.
Backwardness of English It is all the more necessary to bestow some time
Criticism not implying
inferiority.
and pains on it here, with at least some fair hope
of correcting an unfair depreciation. The Baron of
Bradwardine (displaying that shrewd appreciation of contrast between
English and Scottish characteristics which belonged, if not to himself, to his
creator) remarked to Colonel Talbot that it was the Colonel’s “humour, as
he [the Baron] had seen in other gentlemen of birth and honour” in the
Colonel’s country, “to derogate from the honour of his burgonet.”
Gentlemen of the most undoubted birth and honour (as such things go in
literature), from Dryden to Matthew Arnold, have displayed this humour in
regard to English criticism. But there has been something too much of it;
and it has been taken far too literally by the ignorant. M. Brunetière has
expressed his opinion that Frenchmen would make un véritable marché de
dupe if they exchanged Boileau, Marmontel, La Harpe, and Co. for Lessing
and some others. I shall not in this place express any opinion on that
question directly. But, if this book does what I shall endeavour to make it
do, it will at least show that to exchange, for any foreign company, our own
critics, from Sidney and Ben Jonson, through Dryden and Addison, Samuel
Johnson and Coleridge, Lamb and Hazlitt, to Mr Arnold himself, would be
“un véritable marché de”—Moses Primrose.
It will have been sufficiently seen in the last volume that the
backwardness of English—a backwardness long exaggerated, but to some
extent real, and to no small extent healthy—was nowhere exhibited more
distinctly than in the department which supplies the materials of this
history. Until the close of the fifteenth century, and for some decades
afterwards, not a single critical treatise on English existed in the English
language, or even in Latin; the nearest approach, even in fragment, to any
utterance of the kind being the naïf and interesting, but only infantinely
critical, remarks of Caxton in his prefaces.[199]
The fact is that, not only until a nation is in command of a single form of
“curial” speech for literary purposes, but until sufficient experiments have
been made in at least a majority of the branches of literature, criticism is
impossible, and would, if possible, be rather mischievous than beneficial.
Its cause. Now England, though it possessed at least one very great
Page 167
author, and more than a fair number of respectable seconds to him, was, up
to 1500 at least, in neither case. Till the end of the fourteenth century it had
been practically trilingual; it was bilingual till past the end of the fifteenth,
if not till far into the seventeenth, so far as literature was concerned. Nor,
till the towering eminence of Chaucer had helped to bring the vernacular
into prominence, was there any one settled dialect of primacy in the
vernacular itself. Further, the fifteenth century was nearly at its end before
any bulk of prose, save on religious subjects, was written; and for another
century the proportion of translation over original work in prose was very
large indeed.
At the same time the scholastic Rhetoric—which had always played to
criticism the part of a half-faithless guardian, who keeps his pupil out of the
full enjoyment of his property, yet preserves that property in good condition
to hand over to him perforce at some future time—was still faithfully
The influence of Rhetoric taught.[200] The enlarged and more accurate study
and other matters.
of the classics at the Revival of Learning set
classical criticism once more before students in the originals; the eager
study of those originals by Continental scholars was sure to reflect itself
upon England; and, lastly, religious zeal and other motives combined, here
as elsewhere, to make men determined to get the vernacular into as
complete and useful a condition as possible. Nowhere does the intense
national spirit, which is the glory of the Tudor period, appear more strongly
than in this our scholastic and “umbratile” division of the national life.
Long, indeed, before this scholastic and regular criticism made its
appearance, and during the whole course of the fifteenth century, critical
appreciation, stereotyped and unmethodised it may be, but genuine for all
Hawes that, and stimulating, had made its appearance. The extraordinary
.
quality of Chaucer, the amiable pastime-making of Gower, and, a
little later, the busy polygraphy and painful rhetoric of Lydgate, had, almost
from the moment of Chaucer’s death, attracted and inspired students. The
pretty phrase about Chaucer’s “gold dew-drops of speech,” which justly
drew the approval of a critic so often unjustly severe on ante-Renaissance
work as Mr Arnold, was, as is known even by tyros in the study of English
literature, repeated, expanded, varied by almost every prominent writer for
a century and a quarter at least, till it reaches, not exactly final, but most
definite and noteworthy, expression in the work of Stephen Hawes, that
curious swan-singer of English mediæval poetry. In the to us eccentric, if
to 1500 at least, in neither case. Till the end of the fourteenth century it had
been practically trilingual; it was bilingual till past the end of the fifteenth,
if not till far into the seventeenth, so far as literature was concerned. Nor,
till the towering eminence of Chaucer had helped to bring the vernacular
into prominence, was there any one settled dialect of primacy in the
vernacular itself. Further, the fifteenth century was nearly at its end before
any bulk of prose, save on religious subjects, was written; and for another
century the proportion of translation over original work in prose was very
large indeed.
At the same time the scholastic Rhetoric—which had always played to
criticism the part of a half-faithless guardian, who keeps his pupil out of the
full enjoyment of his property, yet preserves that property in good condition
to hand over to him perforce at some future time—was still faithfully
The influence of Rhetoric taught.[200] The enlarged and more accurate study
and other matters.
of the classics at the Revival of Learning set
classical criticism once more before students in the originals; the eager
study of those originals by Continental scholars was sure to reflect itself
upon England; and, lastly, religious zeal and other motives combined, here
as elsewhere, to make men determined to get the vernacular into as
complete and useful a condition as possible. Nowhere does the intense
national spirit, which is the glory of the Tudor period, appear more strongly
than in this our scholastic and “umbratile” division of the national life.
Long, indeed, before this scholastic and regular criticism made its
appearance, and during the whole course of the fifteenth century, critical
appreciation, stereotyped and unmethodised it may be, but genuine for all
Hawes that, and stimulating, had made its appearance. The extraordinary
.
quality of Chaucer, the amiable pastime-making of Gower, and, a
little later, the busy polygraphy and painful rhetoric of Lydgate, had, almost
from the moment of Chaucer’s death, attracted and inspired students. The
pretty phrase about Chaucer’s “gold dew-drops of speech,” which justly
drew the approval of a critic so often unjustly severe on ante-Renaissance
work as Mr Arnold, was, as is known even by tyros in the study of English
literature, repeated, expanded, varied by almost every prominent writer for
a century and a quarter at least, till it reaches, not exactly final, but most
definite and noteworthy, expression in the work of Stephen Hawes, that
curious swan-singer of English mediæval poetry. In the to us eccentric, if
Page 168
not positively absurd, exposition of the Trivium and Quadrivium which
diversifies the account of the courtship of Grandamour and La Bell Pucell,
[201]
the praise of the Three is led up to by a discussion of Rhetoric and
Poetics so elaborate and minute that it occupies more space than is given to
all the other Arts together, and nearly double that which is given to all the
rest, except a largely extended Astronomy. Rhetoric herself, after being
greeted by and greeting her pupil in the most “aureate” style, divides herself
into five parts, each of which has its chapter, with a “Replication against
ignorant Persons” intervening, and many curious digressions such as the
description of a sort of Earthly Paradise of Literature with four rivers,
“Understanding,” “Closely-Concluding,” “Novelty,” and “Carbuncles,”[202]
and a “Tower of Virgil” in their midst. Lydgate has been already praised for
“versifying the depured rhetoric in English language,” but he comes up
once more for eulogy as “my master” in the peroration, and has in fact
considerably more space than either Gower or Chaucer. Nor, confused and
out of focus as such things must necessarily appear to us, should we forget
that Hawes and his generation were not altogether uncritically endeavouring
at what was “important to them”—the strengthening and enriching, namely,
of English vocabulary, the extension of English literary practice and stock.
Yet their criticism could but be uncritical: and the luck above referred to
appears first in the peculiar scholastic character of the criticism of the first
The first Tudor English school of critics deserving the name. No one of its
critics.
members was exactly a man of genius, and this was
perhaps lucky; for men of genius have rarely been observed to make the
best schoolmasters. All were fully penetrated with the Renaissance
adoration of the classics; and this was lucky again, because the classics
alone could supply the training and the models just then required by English
prose, and even to some extent by English poetry. All were very definitely
set against Gallicising and Italianising; and yet again this was lucky,
because England had been overdosed with French influence for centuries,
while their opposition to Italian did perhaps some good, and certainly little
harm. But all were thoroughly possessed by the idea that English, adjusted
to classical models as far as possible, but not denationalised or
denaturalised, ought to be raised into a sufficient medium of literary, as of
familiar, communication for Englishmen. And—with that intense
Renaissance belief in education, and a high and noble kind of education too,
which puts to shame the chattering and pottering of certain later periods on
diversifies the account of the courtship of Grandamour and La Bell Pucell,
[201]
the praise of the Three is led up to by a discussion of Rhetoric and
Poetics so elaborate and minute that it occupies more space than is given to
all the other Arts together, and nearly double that which is given to all the
rest, except a largely extended Astronomy. Rhetoric herself, after being
greeted by and greeting her pupil in the most “aureate” style, divides herself
into five parts, each of which has its chapter, with a “Replication against
ignorant Persons” intervening, and many curious digressions such as the
description of a sort of Earthly Paradise of Literature with four rivers,
“Understanding,” “Closely-Concluding,” “Novelty,” and “Carbuncles,”[202]
and a “Tower of Virgil” in their midst. Lydgate has been already praised for
“versifying the depured rhetoric in English language,” but he comes up
once more for eulogy as “my master” in the peroration, and has in fact
considerably more space than either Gower or Chaucer. Nor, confused and
out of focus as such things must necessarily appear to us, should we forget
that Hawes and his generation were not altogether uncritically endeavouring
at what was “important to them”—the strengthening and enriching, namely,
of English vocabulary, the extension of English literary practice and stock.
Yet their criticism could but be uncritical: and the luck above referred to
appears first in the peculiar scholastic character of the criticism of the first
The first Tudor English school of critics deserving the name. No one of its
critics.
members was exactly a man of genius, and this was
perhaps lucky; for men of genius have rarely been observed to make the
best schoolmasters. All were fully penetrated with the Renaissance
adoration of the classics; and this was lucky again, because the classics
alone could supply the training and the models just then required by English
prose, and even to some extent by English poetry. All were very definitely
set against Gallicising and Italianising; and yet again this was lucky,
because England had been overdosed with French influence for centuries,
while their opposition to Italian did perhaps some good, and certainly little
harm. But all were thoroughly possessed by the idea that English, adjusted
to classical models as far as possible, but not denationalised or
denaturalised, ought to be raised into a sufficient medium of literary, as of
familiar, communication for Englishmen. And—with that intense
Renaissance belief in education, and a high and noble kind of education too,
which puts to shame the chattering and pottering of certain later periods on
Page 169
this unlucky subject—all were determined, as far as in them lay, to bring
English up to this point. The tendency was spread over a great number of
persons, and a considerable period of time. Its representatives ranged from
healthy and large-souled, if not quite heroic or inspired, scholars like
Ascham to “acrid-quack” pedants like Gabriel Harvey. But the chief of
these representatives were the well-known trio, of whom one has just been
mentioned—Sir[203] Thomas Wilson, Sir John Cheke, and Roger Ascham.
They were all friends, they were all contemporary members (to her glory be
it ungrudgingly said) of one University, the University of Cambridge, and
though the moral character of all, and especially of the first two, had
something of the taints of self-seeking and of sycophancy, which were the
blemishes of the Tudor type of writers, all had the merits of that type as
exhibited in the man of the study rather than of the field—intense curiosity
and industry, a real patriotism, a half-instinctive eagerness to action, a
consciousness how best to adorn the Sparta that had fallen to their lot, and a
business-like faculty of carrying their conceptions out. From various
indications, positive and indirect, it would seem that Cheke, who was the
eldest, was also the most “magnetic,” the most Socratically suggestive and
germinal of the three: but his actual literary work is of much inferior
importance to that of Ascham and Wilson.
Wilson’s Art of Rhetoric[204] is, as the other dates given in the text and
notes will show sufficiently, by no means the first book of the school; nor is
Wilson: his Art it that which has, on the whole, the most interest for us. But
of Rhetoric;
it deserves precedence historically because, as no other
does, it keys, or gears, the new critical tendency on to the old technical
rhetoric. The first edition appeared in 1553, dedicated to Edward VI. Wilson
dates his prologue to the second[205] on the 7th December 1560; but it does
not seem to have been published till 1563. Between the date of the first
edition and the writing of this Prologue, Wilson, an exile at Rome, had
fallen into the claws of the Inquisition as author of the book and of another
on Logic; and, as he recounts with natural palpitation, escaped literally “so
as by fire,” his prison-house being in flames.
His two first Books Wilson faithfully devotes to all the old technicalities
—Invention, Disposition, Amplification, “States,” and the rest. But his third
his attack on Book, “Of Elocution,”[206] announces from the first an
“Inkhorn
terms.”
interest in the matter very different from the jejune
rehashings of the ancients (and chiefly of those ancients
English up to this point. The tendency was spread over a great number of
persons, and a considerable period of time. Its representatives ranged from
healthy and large-souled, if not quite heroic or inspired, scholars like
Ascham to “acrid-quack” pedants like Gabriel Harvey. But the chief of
these representatives were the well-known trio, of whom one has just been
mentioned—Sir[203] Thomas Wilson, Sir John Cheke, and Roger Ascham.
They were all friends, they were all contemporary members (to her glory be
it ungrudgingly said) of one University, the University of Cambridge, and
though the moral character of all, and especially of the first two, had
something of the taints of self-seeking and of sycophancy, which were the
blemishes of the Tudor type of writers, all had the merits of that type as
exhibited in the man of the study rather than of the field—intense curiosity
and industry, a real patriotism, a half-instinctive eagerness to action, a
consciousness how best to adorn the Sparta that had fallen to their lot, and a
business-like faculty of carrying their conceptions out. From various
indications, positive and indirect, it would seem that Cheke, who was the
eldest, was also the most “magnetic,” the most Socratically suggestive and
germinal of the three: but his actual literary work is of much inferior
importance to that of Ascham and Wilson.
Wilson’s Art of Rhetoric[204] is, as the other dates given in the text and
notes will show sufficiently, by no means the first book of the school; nor is
Wilson: his Art it that which has, on the whole, the most interest for us. But
of Rhetoric;
it deserves precedence historically because, as no other
does, it keys, or gears, the new critical tendency on to the old technical
rhetoric. The first edition appeared in 1553, dedicated to Edward VI. Wilson
dates his prologue to the second[205] on the 7th December 1560; but it does
not seem to have been published till 1563. Between the date of the first
edition and the writing of this Prologue, Wilson, an exile at Rome, had
fallen into the claws of the Inquisition as author of the book and of another
on Logic; and, as he recounts with natural palpitation, escaped literally “so
as by fire,” his prison-house being in flames.
His two first Books Wilson faithfully devotes to all the old technicalities
—Invention, Disposition, Amplification, “States,” and the rest. But his third
his attack on Book, “Of Elocution,”[206] announces from the first an
“Inkhorn
terms.”
interest in the matter very different from the jejune
rehashings of the ancients (and chiefly of those ancients
Page 170
least worth rehashing) which the mediæval Rhetorics mostly give us. In
fact, Wilson had shown himself alive to the importance of the subject in the
very opening of the work itself[207] by recounting, with much gusto, how
“Phavorinus the Philosopher (as Gellius telleth the tale) did hit a young man
over the thumbs very handsomely for using over-old and over-strange
words.” And as soon as he has divided the requirements of Elocution under
the four heads of Plainness, Aptness, Composition, and Exornation, he
opens the stop which has been recognised as his characteristic one, by
denouncing “strange inkhorn terms.” He inveighs against the “far-journeyed
gentlemen” who, on their return home, as they love to go in foreign apparel,
so they “powder their talk with oversea language,” one talking French-
English, another “chopping in” with English-Italianated. Professional men,
lawyers and auditors, have their turn of censure, and a real literary
“document” follows in the censure of the “fine courtier who will talk
nothing but Chaucer.” Most copious is he against undue “Latining” of the
tongue, in illustration of which he gives a letter from a Lincolnshire
gentleman which may owe royalty either to the Limousin Scholar of
Rabelais, or even to Master Francis’ own original, Geoffrey Tory himself.
And he points the same moral (very much after the manner of Latimer, for
whom, as elsewhere appears, he had a great admiration) by divers facetious
stories from his experience, “when I was in Cambridge, and student in the
King’s College,” and from other sources. After which he falls in with
Cicero as to the qualifications of words allowable.
“Aptness” follows: and here Sir Thomas, without knowing it, has cut at a
folly of language revived three hundred years and more later than his own
His dealing with time. For he laughs at one who, “seeing a house fair-
Figures.
builded,” said to his fellow, “Good Lord, what a handsome
phrase of building is this!” Wilson’s butt would have been no little thought
of by certain persons at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth. Indeed, one may seem to remember a sentence about the
merits of a “passage” in a marble chimney-piece, which is a mere echo,
conscious or unconscious, of his “phrase.” The same temper appears in the
longer remarks on Composition; but when we come to Exornation, “a
gorgeous beautifying of the tongue with borrowed words and change of
sentence,” Wilson’s lease of originality has run out. He is still in the
bondage of the Figures, which he describes ambitiously as a kind “not
equally sparpled[208] about the whole oration, but so dissevered and parted as
fact, Wilson had shown himself alive to the importance of the subject in the
very opening of the work itself[207] by recounting, with much gusto, how
“Phavorinus the Philosopher (as Gellius telleth the tale) did hit a young man
over the thumbs very handsomely for using over-old and over-strange
words.” And as soon as he has divided the requirements of Elocution under
the four heads of Plainness, Aptness, Composition, and Exornation, he
opens the stop which has been recognised as his characteristic one, by
denouncing “strange inkhorn terms.” He inveighs against the “far-journeyed
gentlemen” who, on their return home, as they love to go in foreign apparel,
so they “powder their talk with oversea language,” one talking French-
English, another “chopping in” with English-Italianated. Professional men,
lawyers and auditors, have their turn of censure, and a real literary
“document” follows in the censure of the “fine courtier who will talk
nothing but Chaucer.” Most copious is he against undue “Latining” of the
tongue, in illustration of which he gives a letter from a Lincolnshire
gentleman which may owe royalty either to the Limousin Scholar of
Rabelais, or even to Master Francis’ own original, Geoffrey Tory himself.
And he points the same moral (very much after the manner of Latimer, for
whom, as elsewhere appears, he had a great admiration) by divers facetious
stories from his experience, “when I was in Cambridge, and student in the
King’s College,” and from other sources. After which he falls in with
Cicero as to the qualifications of words allowable.
“Aptness” follows: and here Sir Thomas, without knowing it, has cut at a
folly of language revived three hundred years and more later than his own
His dealing with time. For he laughs at one who, “seeing a house fair-
Figures.
builded,” said to his fellow, “Good Lord, what a handsome
phrase of building is this!” Wilson’s butt would have been no little thought
of by certain persons at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth. Indeed, one may seem to remember a sentence about the
merits of a “passage” in a marble chimney-piece, which is a mere echo,
conscious or unconscious, of his “phrase.” The same temper appears in the
longer remarks on Composition; but when we come to Exornation, “a
gorgeous beautifying of the tongue with borrowed words and change of
sentence,” Wilson’s lease of originality has run out. He is still in the
bondage of the Figures, which he describes ambitiously as a kind “not
equally sparpled[208] about the whole oration, but so dissevered and parted as
Page 171
stars stand in the firmament, or flowers in a garden, or pretty-devised
antiques in a cloth of Arras.” The enumeration is full of character and
Elizabethan piquancy; but it still has the old fault of beginning at the wrong
end. When a man writes even a good oration, much more that far higher
thing a good piece of prose (which may be an oration, if need serves, or
anything else), he does not say to himself, “Now I shall throw in some
hyperbaton; now we will exhibit a little anadiplosis; this is the occasion
surely for a passage of zeugma.” He writes as the spirit moves him, and as
the way of art leads. One could wish, in reading Wilson, for another Sir
Thomas, to deal with the Figurants as he has dealt with the Chaucerists and
the Lincolnshire Latinisers. But we must not expect too much at once: and
lucky are we if we often, or even sometimes, get so bold a striking out into
new paths for a true end as we find in this Art of Rhetoric.
Cheke has left no considerable English work, and he seems—as it is
perhaps inevitable that at least some of the leaders in every period of
innovation should seem—to have pushed innovation itself to and over the
Cheke: his verge of crotchet. He was a spelling and pronouncing
resolute
Anglicism and
reformer both in Greek and English; and, classical scholar
anti-preciosity. and teacher as he was, he seems to have fallen in with that
curious survival of “Saxon” rendering of words not of
Saxon origin, the great storehouse of which is the work of Reginald Pecock
a century earlier. But he appears to have been one of the main and most
influential sources of the double stream of tendency observable in Wilson
himself, and still more in Ascham—the tendency on the one hand to use the
classics as models and trainers in the formation of a generally useful and
practicable English style, and on the other to insist that neither from
classical nor from any other sources should English be adulterated by
“inkhorn terms,” as Wilson calls them,[209] of any kind—that is to say, by
archaisms, technicalities, preciousnesses, fished up as it were from the
bottom of the ink-pot, instead of simply and naturally taken as they came
from its surface to the pen. What Ascham tells us that he said of Sallust is
the spirit, the centre, the kernel, of the criticism of the whole school—a
dread that is to say, and a dislike and a censure of what he calls the
“uncontented care to write better than he could.”[210] And it must be obvious
that this sharply formulated censure is itself a critical point de repère of the
greatest value. It is well that it was not too much listened to—for the
greatest results of English prose and verse in the great period, beginning a
antiques in a cloth of Arras.” The enumeration is full of character and
Elizabethan piquancy; but it still has the old fault of beginning at the wrong
end. When a man writes even a good oration, much more that far higher
thing a good piece of prose (which may be an oration, if need serves, or
anything else), he does not say to himself, “Now I shall throw in some
hyperbaton; now we will exhibit a little anadiplosis; this is the occasion
surely for a passage of zeugma.” He writes as the spirit moves him, and as
the way of art leads. One could wish, in reading Wilson, for another Sir
Thomas, to deal with the Figurants as he has dealt with the Chaucerists and
the Lincolnshire Latinisers. But we must not expect too much at once: and
lucky are we if we often, or even sometimes, get so bold a striking out into
new paths for a true end as we find in this Art of Rhetoric.
Cheke has left no considerable English work, and he seems—as it is
perhaps inevitable that at least some of the leaders in every period of
innovation should seem—to have pushed innovation itself to and over the
Cheke: his verge of crotchet. He was a spelling and pronouncing
resolute
Anglicism and
reformer both in Greek and English; and, classical scholar
anti-preciosity. and teacher as he was, he seems to have fallen in with that
curious survival of “Saxon” rendering of words not of
Saxon origin, the great storehouse of which is the work of Reginald Pecock
a century earlier. But he appears to have been one of the main and most
influential sources of the double stream of tendency observable in Wilson
himself, and still more in Ascham—the tendency on the one hand to use the
classics as models and trainers in the formation of a generally useful and
practicable English style, and on the other to insist that neither from
classical nor from any other sources should English be adulterated by
“inkhorn terms,” as Wilson calls them,[209] of any kind—that is to say, by
archaisms, technicalities, preciousnesses, fished up as it were from the
bottom of the ink-pot, instead of simply and naturally taken as they came
from its surface to the pen. What Ascham tells us that he said of Sallust is
the spirit, the centre, the kernel, of the criticism of the whole school—a
dread that is to say, and a dislike and a censure of what he calls the
“uncontented care to write better than he could.”[210] And it must be obvious
that this sharply formulated censure is itself a critical point de repère of the
greatest value. It is well that it was not too much listened to—for the
greatest results of English prose and verse in the great period, beginning a
Page 172
few years after Cheke’s death and continuing for an old man’s lifetime,
were the result of this “never contented care,” which still reached
something better than content. But if, at this early period, it had had too
much way given to it, if the vigorous but somewhat sprawling infancy of
Elizabethan English had been bid and let sprawl simply at its pleasure, the
consequences could not but have been disastrous.
This criticism of Sallust, which may be found at length in Ascham’s
His criticism of Schoolmaster,[211] is quite a locus in its kind. It is not of the
Sallust.
justest, for the prepossession of the sentence quoted above
(which stands in the forefront of it) colours it all through. It has funny little
scholastic lapses in logic, such as the attempt to apply the old brocard
Orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus to the disadvantage of Sallust, as
compared not only with Cicero but with Cæsar, on the score of morality. It
would have been pleasant to observe the countenances of Fausta and
Servilia if this had been argued in their joint presence. And the dislike of
Thucydides, to which a disliker of Sallust is almost necessarily driven,
argues a literary palate not of the most refined. But the disposition of the
supposed causes of the faults of Sallust’s style, when, having sown his wild
oats, he took to literature, and borrowed his vocabulary from Cato and
Varro, and his method from Thucydides himself, is an exceedingly
ingenious piece of critical pleading. Even if it will not hold water, it shows
us a stage of criticism advanced, in some directions, beyond anything that
classical or mediæval times can show. The other great “place” of Cheke’s
writing occurs in his letter[212] to Hoby on that learned knight’s translation of
Castiglione, with its solemn judgment (the author, though but in middle age,
was ill, and in fact almost dying), “I am of this opinion, that our own tongue
should be written clean and pure, unmixed and unmangled with borrowing
of other tongues, wherein if we take no heed betimes, ever borrowing and
never paying, she shall be fain to keep house as a bankrupt.” The analogy,
of course, is a false one:—there is no need to pay, nor possibility of
payment, any more than a conquering monarchy needs to fear the
repayment of the tribute it draws from others, or than a sturdy plant need
dread bankruptcy because it owes nourishment to earth, and air, and the rain
of heaven. But once more the position is a definite, and not a wholly
untenable, critical position: and Cheke shows himself here as at once
engineer and captain of it.
were the result of this “never contented care,” which still reached
something better than content. But if, at this early period, it had had too
much way given to it, if the vigorous but somewhat sprawling infancy of
Elizabethan English had been bid and let sprawl simply at its pleasure, the
consequences could not but have been disastrous.
This criticism of Sallust, which may be found at length in Ascham’s
His criticism of Schoolmaster,[211] is quite a locus in its kind. It is not of the
Sallust.
justest, for the prepossession of the sentence quoted above
(which stands in the forefront of it) colours it all through. It has funny little
scholastic lapses in logic, such as the attempt to apply the old brocard
Orator est vir bonus dicendi peritus to the disadvantage of Sallust, as
compared not only with Cicero but with Cæsar, on the score of morality. It
would have been pleasant to observe the countenances of Fausta and
Servilia if this had been argued in their joint presence. And the dislike of
Thucydides, to which a disliker of Sallust is almost necessarily driven,
argues a literary palate not of the most refined. But the disposition of the
supposed causes of the faults of Sallust’s style, when, having sown his wild
oats, he took to literature, and borrowed his vocabulary from Cato and
Varro, and his method from Thucydides himself, is an exceedingly
ingenious piece of critical pleading. Even if it will not hold water, it shows
us a stage of criticism advanced, in some directions, beyond anything that
classical or mediæval times can show. The other great “place” of Cheke’s
writing occurs in his letter[212] to Hoby on that learned knight’s translation of
Castiglione, with its solemn judgment (the author, though but in middle age,
was ill, and in fact almost dying), “I am of this opinion, that our own tongue
should be written clean and pure, unmixed and unmangled with borrowing
of other tongues, wherein if we take no heed betimes, ever borrowing and
never paying, she shall be fain to keep house as a bankrupt.” The analogy,
of course, is a false one:—there is no need to pay, nor possibility of
payment, any more than a conquering monarchy needs to fear the
repayment of the tribute it draws from others, or than a sturdy plant need
dread bankruptcy because it owes nourishment to earth, and air, and the rain
of heaven. But once more the position is a definite, and not a wholly
untenable, critical position: and Cheke shows himself here as at once
engineer and captain of it.
Page 173
The chief representative of this school is, however, beyond question, the
always agreeable, and but seldom other than admirable, author of
Ascham. Toxophilus and The Schoolmaster himself.[213] His positive
achievements in English literature do not here directly concern us; nor does
the debate between those who regard him as a Euphuist before Euphuism,
and those who will have him to be the chief example of the plain style in
early Elizabethan literature. I confess myself to be on the side of the latter;
though I know what the former mean. But it is with what Ascham thought
as a critic, not with what he did as a writer, that we are here busy; and on
this there is no reasonable opening for serious difference of opinion.
Ascham’s critical position and opinions are clear, not only from his two
famous and pleasant little books, but from the constant literary references in
his letters, ranging from elaborate lucubrations on the study of the classics
to an amusing little Cambridge fling at the older university, where, as we
learn from a letter of exactly the middle of the century, taste was in so
shocking a condition that Oxford men actually paid more attention to
Lucian and Apuleius than to Cicero and Xenophon.[214]
His patriotism. The Toxophilus itself is a critical document in parts, both
for the initial manifesto of his desire “to write this English matter in the
English tongue for English men,” and for the more elaborate defence of the
proceeding (a defence repeated in the numerous Latin letters accompanying
the copies of the book he sent to his friends), as well as for one of those hits
at Romance which were characteristic of Renaissance scholars too
generally, and were particularly to be expected in very moral and rather
prosaic persons like Ascham. But we necessarily turn to the Schoolmaster
for a full exposition of Ascham’s critical ethos, and we find it.
A tendency rather to slight poetry, one great heresy concerning it (of
which more presently), and the above-mentioned contempt or even horror
His horror of of romance—these are the worst things to be noted here.
Romance,
All these are connected with a wider critical heresy, which
is prevalent in England to this day, and which emerges most interestingly in
this infancy of English criticism. This heresy is the valuing of examples,
and even of whole kinds, of literary art, not according to their perfection on
their own artistic standards, not according to the quantity or quality of
artistic pleasure which they are fitted to give; but according to certain
principles—patriotic, political, ethical, or theological—which the critic
holds or does not hold, as the case may be. This fallacy being one of those
always agreeable, and but seldom other than admirable, author of
Ascham. Toxophilus and The Schoolmaster himself.[213] His positive
achievements in English literature do not here directly concern us; nor does
the debate between those who regard him as a Euphuist before Euphuism,
and those who will have him to be the chief example of the plain style in
early Elizabethan literature. I confess myself to be on the side of the latter;
though I know what the former mean. But it is with what Ascham thought
as a critic, not with what he did as a writer, that we are here busy; and on
this there is no reasonable opening for serious difference of opinion.
Ascham’s critical position and opinions are clear, not only from his two
famous and pleasant little books, but from the constant literary references in
his letters, ranging from elaborate lucubrations on the study of the classics
to an amusing little Cambridge fling at the older university, where, as we
learn from a letter of exactly the middle of the century, taste was in so
shocking a condition that Oxford men actually paid more attention to
Lucian and Apuleius than to Cicero and Xenophon.[214]
His patriotism. The Toxophilus itself is a critical document in parts, both
for the initial manifesto of his desire “to write this English matter in the
English tongue for English men,” and for the more elaborate defence of the
proceeding (a defence repeated in the numerous Latin letters accompanying
the copies of the book he sent to his friends), as well as for one of those hits
at Romance which were characteristic of Renaissance scholars too
generally, and were particularly to be expected in very moral and rather
prosaic persons like Ascham. But we necessarily turn to the Schoolmaster
for a full exposition of Ascham’s critical ethos, and we find it.
A tendency rather to slight poetry, one great heresy concerning it (of
which more presently), and the above-mentioned contempt or even horror
His horror of of romance—these are the worst things to be noted here.
Romance,
All these are connected with a wider critical heresy, which
is prevalent in England to this day, and which emerges most interestingly in
this infancy of English criticism. This heresy is the valuing of examples,
and even of whole kinds, of literary art, not according to their perfection on
their own artistic standards, not according to the quantity or quality of
artistic pleasure which they are fitted to give; but according to certain
principles—patriotic, political, ethical, or theological—which the critic
holds or does not hold, as the case may be. This fallacy being one of those
Page 174
proper—or, at least, inseparably accidental—to the human intellect, is of
course perceptible enough in antiquity itself. It is, as we have seen, rife in
Plato, and more rife in Plutarch; and there is no doubt that the devotion of
the Renaissance to the greatest of Greek philosophers and prosemen, to the
most entertaining of Greek biographers and moralists, had not a little to do
with its reappearance, though the struggle of the Reformation, and the
national jealousies which this struggle bred or helped, had more. But no one
has given more notable examples of it than Ascham by his attack on “books
of feigned chivalry,” in Toxophilus,[215] and his well-known censure of the
Morte d’Arthur in The Schoolmaster.[216]
Than this book there was, at Ascham’s date, no more exquisite example
of English prose in existence. There is not to this day a book, either in prose
and of the or in verse, which has more of the true Romantic charm.
Morte
d’Arthur.
There are few better instances anywhere of subtly
combined construction of story than are to be found in
some of its parts; and, to a catholic judgment, which busies itself with the
matter and spirit of a book, there are few books which teach a nobler temper
of mind, which inculcate with a more wonderful blending of sternness and
sympathy the great moral that “the doer shall suffer,” that “for all these
things God shall bring us into judgment,” or which display more
accomplished patterns of man and sweeter examples of woman. Yet
Ascham (and he had read the book) saw in it nothing but “open
manslaughter and bold bawdry.”
Apart from this somewhat Philistine prudery—which occupies itself
more reasonably with Italian novelle, and the translations of them into
English—Ascham’s criticism is of a piece with that of the whole school in
all but a very few points. He differed with Wilson, and with most of the
scholars of his time, on the subject of translation, which he rightly enough
regarded as a useful engine of education, but as quite incapable of giving
any literary equivalent for the original. He agreed both with Wilson and
with Cheke as to the impropriety of adulterating English with any foreign
tongue, ancient or modern. He was, all the same, an exceedingly fervent
Ciceronian and devotee of the golden age of Latin. And when we come in
one[217] of his letters to Sturm on the name of Pigna (v. supra, p. 62), the
rival of Cinthio Giraldi, there seems to be established a contact, of the most
interesting, between English and Italian criticism. But (as indeed we might
have expected) no allusion to Pigna’s view of the despised romances is even
course perceptible enough in antiquity itself. It is, as we have seen, rife in
Plato, and more rife in Plutarch; and there is no doubt that the devotion of
the Renaissance to the greatest of Greek philosophers and prosemen, to the
most entertaining of Greek biographers and moralists, had not a little to do
with its reappearance, though the struggle of the Reformation, and the
national jealousies which this struggle bred or helped, had more. But no one
has given more notable examples of it than Ascham by his attack on “books
of feigned chivalry,” in Toxophilus,[215] and his well-known censure of the
Morte d’Arthur in The Schoolmaster.[216]
Than this book there was, at Ascham’s date, no more exquisite example
of English prose in existence. There is not to this day a book, either in prose
and of the or in verse, which has more of the true Romantic charm.
Morte
d’Arthur.
There are few better instances anywhere of subtly
combined construction of story than are to be found in
some of its parts; and, to a catholic judgment, which busies itself with the
matter and spirit of a book, there are few books which teach a nobler temper
of mind, which inculcate with a more wonderful blending of sternness and
sympathy the great moral that “the doer shall suffer,” that “for all these
things God shall bring us into judgment,” or which display more
accomplished patterns of man and sweeter examples of woman. Yet
Ascham (and he had read the book) saw in it nothing but “open
manslaughter and bold bawdry.”
Apart from this somewhat Philistine prudery—which occupies itself
more reasonably with Italian novelle, and the translations of them into
English—Ascham’s criticism is of a piece with that of the whole school in
all but a very few points. He differed with Wilson, and with most of the
scholars of his time, on the subject of translation, which he rightly enough
regarded as a useful engine of education, but as quite incapable of giving
any literary equivalent for the original. He agreed both with Wilson and
with Cheke as to the impropriety of adulterating English with any foreign
tongue, ancient or modern. He was, all the same, an exceedingly fervent
Ciceronian and devotee of the golden age of Latin. And when we come in
one[217] of his letters to Sturm on the name of Pigna (v. supra, p. 62), the
rival of Cinthio Giraldi, there seems to be established a contact, of the most
interesting, between English and Italian criticism. But (as indeed we might
have expected) no allusion to Pigna’s view of the despised romances is even
Page 175
hinted: it is his dealing with the aureolum libellum of Horace that Ascham
has read, his dealings with Aristotle and Sophocles that he wishes to read.
Putting his theory and his practice together, and neglecting for the
moment his moral “craze,” we can perceive in him a tolerably distinct ideal
of English prose, which he has only not illustrated by actual criticism of the
His general reviewing sort, because the material was so scanty. This
critical attitude
to Prose,
prose is to be fashioned with what may be excusably called
a kind of squint—looking partly at Latin and Greek
construction and partly at English vernacular usage. It does not seem that,
great as was his reverence for Cheke, he was bitten by Cheke’s mania for
absolute Teutonism; nor does he appear to have gone to the extreme of
Latimer and Latimer’s admirer, Wilson, in caring to mingle merely familiar
speech with his ordered vernacular. But he went some way in this direction:
he was by no means proof against that Delilah of alliteration which, like a
sort of fetch or ghost of the older alliterative prosody, bewitched the mid-
sixteenth-century verse and prose of England, and had not lost hold on
Spenser himself. And he had belief in certain simple Figures of the
antithetic and parallel kind. But he was, above all, a schoolmaster—as even
being dead he spoke—to English literature; and his example and his
precepts together tended to establish a chastened, moderately classical,
pattern of writing, which in the next generation produced the admirable
English prose of Hooker, and was not without influence on the less
accomplished, but more germinal and protreptic, style of Jonson.
and to Poetry. We must praise him less when we come to poetry. The
history of the craze for classical metre and against rhyme in England, which
practically supplies our earliest subject of purely critical debate, is a very
curious one, and may—perhaps must—be considered from more points of
view than one, before it is rightly and completely understood. At first sight
it looks like mere mid-summer madness—the work of some Puck of
literature—if not even as the incursion into the calm domains of scholarship
and criticism of that popular delirium tremens, which has been often
illustrated in politics. Shifting of the standpoint, and more careful
consideration, will discover some excuses for it, as well as much method in
it. But it must be regarded long, and examined carefully, before the real fact
is discovered—the fact that, mischievous and absurd as it was in itself,
unpardonable as are the attempts to revive it, or something like it, at this
time of day, it was in its own day a kind of beneficent “distemper”—a
has read, his dealings with Aristotle and Sophocles that he wishes to read.
Putting his theory and his practice together, and neglecting for the
moment his moral “craze,” we can perceive in him a tolerably distinct ideal
of English prose, which he has only not illustrated by actual criticism of the
His general reviewing sort, because the material was so scanty. This
critical attitude
to Prose,
prose is to be fashioned with what may be excusably called
a kind of squint—looking partly at Latin and Greek
construction and partly at English vernacular usage. It does not seem that,
great as was his reverence for Cheke, he was bitten by Cheke’s mania for
absolute Teutonism; nor does he appear to have gone to the extreme of
Latimer and Latimer’s admirer, Wilson, in caring to mingle merely familiar
speech with his ordered vernacular. But he went some way in this direction:
he was by no means proof against that Delilah of alliteration which, like a
sort of fetch or ghost of the older alliterative prosody, bewitched the mid-
sixteenth-century verse and prose of England, and had not lost hold on
Spenser himself. And he had belief in certain simple Figures of the
antithetic and parallel kind. But he was, above all, a schoolmaster—as even
being dead he spoke—to English literature; and his example and his
precepts together tended to establish a chastened, moderately classical,
pattern of writing, which in the next generation produced the admirable
English prose of Hooker, and was not without influence on the less
accomplished, but more germinal and protreptic, style of Jonson.
and to Poetry. We must praise him less when we come to poetry. The
history of the craze for classical metre and against rhyme in England, which
practically supplies our earliest subject of purely critical debate, is a very
curious one, and may—perhaps must—be considered from more points of
view than one, before it is rightly and completely understood. At first sight
it looks like mere mid-summer madness—the work of some Puck of
literature—if not even as the incursion into the calm domains of scholarship
and criticism of that popular delirium tremens, which has been often
illustrated in politics. Shifting of the standpoint, and more careful
consideration, will discover some excuses for it, as well as much method in
it. But it must be regarded long, and examined carefully, before the real fact
is discovered—the fact that, mischievous and absurd as it was in itself,
unpardonable as are the attempts to revive it, or something like it, at this
time of day, it was in its own day a kind of beneficent “distemper”—a
Page 176
necessary, if morbid, stage in the development of English prosody and
English criticism.
Inasmuch as the most obvious and indubitable, as well as universal, cause
of the craze was the profound Renaissance admiration for the classics, it
was inevitable that something of the kind should make its appearance in
The craze for most European countries. But other and counteracting
Classical
Metres.
causes prevented it from assuming, in any of them,
anything like the importance that it attained in England.
Unrhymed classical metres, like almost every literary innovation of the
time, had been first attempted in Italy;[218] but the established and
impregnable supremacy of forms like the Sonnet, the Canzone, the ottava
and terza rima, put rhyme out of real danger there. They were attempted in
France.[219] But French had for centuries possessed a perfectly well-defined
system of prosody, adapted and adequate to the needs and nature of the
language. And, moreover, the singularly atonic quality of this language, its
want not only of the remotest approach to quantity but even of any decided
accent, made the experiment not merely ridiculous, as indeed it mostly was
in English, but all but impossible. Spanish was following Italian, and did
not want to follow anything else: and German was not in case to compete.
With English the patient was very much more predisposed to the disease.
Special wants of Not only two, but practically three, different systems of
English
Prosody.
prosody, which were really to some extent opposed to each
other, and might well seem more opposed than they
actually were, disputed, in practice, the not too fertile or flourishing field of
English poetry. There was the true Chaucerian system of blended English
prosody, the legitimate representative of the same composite influences
which have moulded English language, and which had been slowly
developed through the half-chaotic beginnings of Middle English verse, and
then with almost premature suddenness perfected up to a certain stage by
Its kinds: Chaucer himself. This system combined—though not yet in
(1)Chaucerian.
perfect freedom—the strict syllabic foot-division of the
French with the syllabic licence of Anglo-Saxon, so as to produce a system
of syllabic equivalence similar in nature to, if not yet fully in practice freer
than, that of the Greek Iambic trimeter. It admitted a considerable variety of
metres, the base-integers of which were the octosyllable and decasyllable,
with lines of six, twelve, and others occasionally, combined in pairs or
arranged in stanzas of more or less intricate forms. But—by a historic
English criticism.
Inasmuch as the most obvious and indubitable, as well as universal, cause
of the craze was the profound Renaissance admiration for the classics, it
was inevitable that something of the kind should make its appearance in
The craze for most European countries. But other and counteracting
Classical
Metres.
causes prevented it from assuming, in any of them,
anything like the importance that it attained in England.
Unrhymed classical metres, like almost every literary innovation of the
time, had been first attempted in Italy;[218] but the established and
impregnable supremacy of forms like the Sonnet, the Canzone, the ottava
and terza rima, put rhyme out of real danger there. They were attempted in
France.[219] But French had for centuries possessed a perfectly well-defined
system of prosody, adapted and adequate to the needs and nature of the
language. And, moreover, the singularly atonic quality of this language, its
want not only of the remotest approach to quantity but even of any decided
accent, made the experiment not merely ridiculous, as indeed it mostly was
in English, but all but impossible. Spanish was following Italian, and did
not want to follow anything else: and German was not in case to compete.
With English the patient was very much more predisposed to the disease.
Special wants of Not only two, but practically three, different systems of
English
Prosody.
prosody, which were really to some extent opposed to each
other, and might well seem more opposed than they
actually were, disputed, in practice, the not too fertile or flourishing field of
English poetry. There was the true Chaucerian system of blended English
prosody, the legitimate representative of the same composite influences
which have moulded English language, and which had been slowly
developed through the half-chaotic beginnings of Middle English verse, and
then with almost premature suddenness perfected up to a certain stage by
Its kinds: Chaucer himself. This system combined—though not yet in
(1)Chaucerian.
perfect freedom—the strict syllabic foot-division of the
French with the syllabic licence of Anglo-Saxon, so as to produce a system
of syllabic equivalence similar in nature to, if not yet fully in practice freer
than, that of the Greek Iambic trimeter. It admitted a considerable variety of
metres, the base-integers of which were the octosyllable and decasyllable,
with lines of six, twelve, and others occasionally, combined in pairs or
arranged in stanzas of more or less intricate forms. But—by a historic
Page 177
accident which has even yet to be rather taken as found than fully explained
—nobody for more than a hundred years had been able to produce really
good regular[220] poetry in Southern English by this metre, and certain
changes in pronunciation and vocabulary—especially the disuse of the final
vocalised e—were putting greater and greater difficulties in the way of its
practice.
Secondly, there was the revived alliterative metre, either genuine—that is
to say, only roughly syllabic and not rhymed, but rhythmed nearer to the
anapæstic form than to any other—or allied with rhyme, and sometimes
(2) Alliterative. formed into stanzas of very considerable intricacy. This,
which had arisen during the fourteenth century, no one quite knows how or
where, apparently in the North, and which had maintained a vigorous
though rather artificial life during the fifteenth, had not wholly died out,
being represented partly by the ballad metre, by doggerel twelves,
fourteeners, and other long shambling lines, and by a still lively tendency
towards alliteration itself, both in metred verse and in prose. Latterly,
during Ascham’s own youth, a sort of rapprochement between these two
had made the fourteeners and Alexandrines, rather less doggerelised, very
general favourites; but had only managed to communicate to them a sort of
lolloping amble, very grievous and sickening to the delicate ear.
—nobody for more than a hundred years had been able to produce really
good regular[220] poetry in Southern English by this metre, and certain
changes in pronunciation and vocabulary—especially the disuse of the final
vocalised e—were putting greater and greater difficulties in the way of its
practice.
Secondly, there was the revived alliterative metre, either genuine—that is
to say, only roughly syllabic and not rhymed, but rhythmed nearer to the
anapæstic form than to any other—or allied with rhyme, and sometimes
(2) Alliterative. formed into stanzas of very considerable intricacy. This,
which had arisen during the fourteenth century, no one quite knows how or
where, apparently in the North, and which had maintained a vigorous
though rather artificial life during the fifteenth, had not wholly died out,
being represented partly by the ballad metre, by doggerel twelves,
fourteeners, and other long shambling lines, and by a still lively tendency
towards alliteration itself, both in metred verse and in prose. Latterly,
during Ascham’s own youth, a sort of rapprochement between these two
had made the fourteeners and Alexandrines, rather less doggerelised, very
general favourites; but had only managed to communicate to them a sort of
lolloping amble, very grievous and sickening to the delicate ear.
Page 178
(3) Italianated. Thirdly, and in close connection with this combination,
Wyatt, Surrey, and other poets had, by imitating Italian models, especially
in the sonnet, striven to raise, to bind together, to infuse with energy and
stiffen with backbone, the ungainly shambling body of English verse: and
Surrey, again following the Italians, had tried, with some success, the
unrhymed decasyllable soon to be so famous as blank verse.
Now critical observation at the time might survey this field with view as
extensive and intensive as it could apply, and be far from satisfied with the
Deficiencies of crops produced. To represent the first system there was
all three.
nobody but Chaucer, who, great and greatly admired as he
was, was separated from the men of 1550 by a period of time almost as long
as that which separates us from Pope, and by a much greater gulf of
pronunciation and accent. Nobody could write like Chaucer—unless the
Chaucerian Chorizontes are right in attributing The Court of Love to this
time, in which case there was some one who could write very much like
Chaucer indeed. There was no Langland, and nobody who could write in
the least like Langland. In sheer despair, men of talent like Skelton, when
they were not Chaucerising heavily, were indulging (of course with more
dulcet intervals now and then) in mere wild gambades of doggerel.
But it will be said, Was there not the new Italianated style of poets of
such promise as Wyatt and Surrey? There was. Yet it must be remembered
that Wyatt and Surrey themselves are, after all, poets of more promise than
performance; that their promise itself looks much more promising to us,
seeing as we do its fulfilment in Spenser and onward, than it need have
done, or indeed could do, to contemporaries; that stalwart Protestants and
stout Englishmen feared and loathed the Italianation of anything English;
and lastly, that even the prosody of Wyatt and Surrey is, in a very high
degree, experimental, tentative, incomplete. We laugh, or are disgusted, at
the twists and tortures applied by the hexametrists to our poor mother
tongue; but Wyatt at least puts almost as awkward constraints on her.
It is not surprising that in the presence of these unsatisfying things, and in
the nonage of catholic literary criticism, men should have turned for help to
those classics which were the general teachers and helpers of the time.
The temptations There was indeed—already published just as Ascham had
of Criticism in
this respect.
attained his year of discretion—a treatise, by the greatest
man of letters for some fifteen hundred years at least,
which contained the germ of a warning. But it is not likely that Ascham or
Wyatt, Surrey, and other poets had, by imitating Italian models, especially
in the sonnet, striven to raise, to bind together, to infuse with energy and
stiffen with backbone, the ungainly shambling body of English verse: and
Surrey, again following the Italians, had tried, with some success, the
unrhymed decasyllable soon to be so famous as blank verse.
Now critical observation at the time might survey this field with view as
extensive and intensive as it could apply, and be far from satisfied with the
Deficiencies of crops produced. To represent the first system there was
all three.
nobody but Chaucer, who, great and greatly admired as he
was, was separated from the men of 1550 by a period of time almost as long
as that which separates us from Pope, and by a much greater gulf of
pronunciation and accent. Nobody could write like Chaucer—unless the
Chaucerian Chorizontes are right in attributing The Court of Love to this
time, in which case there was some one who could write very much like
Chaucer indeed. There was no Langland, and nobody who could write in
the least like Langland. In sheer despair, men of talent like Skelton, when
they were not Chaucerising heavily, were indulging (of course with more
dulcet intervals now and then) in mere wild gambades of doggerel.
But it will be said, Was there not the new Italianated style of poets of
such promise as Wyatt and Surrey? There was. Yet it must be remembered
that Wyatt and Surrey themselves are, after all, poets of more promise than
performance; that their promise itself looks much more promising to us,
seeing as we do its fulfilment in Spenser and onward, than it need have
done, or indeed could do, to contemporaries; that stalwart Protestants and
stout Englishmen feared and loathed the Italianation of anything English;
and lastly, that even the prosody of Wyatt and Surrey is, in a very high
degree, experimental, tentative, incomplete. We laugh, or are disgusted, at
the twists and tortures applied by the hexametrists to our poor mother
tongue; but Wyatt at least puts almost as awkward constraints on her.
It is not surprising that in the presence of these unsatisfying things, and in
the nonage of catholic literary criticism, men should have turned for help to
those classics which were the general teachers and helpers of the time.
The temptations There was indeed—already published just as Ascham had
of Criticism in
this respect.
attained his year of discretion—a treatise, by the greatest
man of letters for some fifteen hundred years at least,
which contained the germ of a warning. But it is not likely that Ascham or
Page 179
any of his good Cambridge friends had seen Trissino’s translation of the De
Vulgari Eloquio; and, if any had, it would have been a stroke of genius to
carry Dante’s generalisation from the Romance tongues further. To almost
any man of the Renaissance it would have seemed half sacrilege and half
madness to examine ancient and modern literatures on the same plane, and
decide what was germane to each and what common to all. Greek Prosody
had been good enough, with very minor alterations, for Latin; how should
any of these upstart modern tongues refuse what had been good enough for
both? And let it be remembered, too, that they were only half wrong. Greek
and Latin did provide up to a certain point—that of the foot as distinguished
from the metre—examples which, duly guarded, could be quite safely
followed, which indeed could not and cannot be neglected without loss and
danger for English. It was when they went further, and endeavoured to
impose the classical combinations of feet on English, that they fell.
Yet even from the first they had glimpses and glimmerings of truth which
might have warned them; while in their very errors they often display that
combination of independence and practical spirit which is the too often
Its adventurers: undervalued glory of English criticism. Ascham himself—
Ascham himself.
besotted as he is with wrath[221] against “our rude beggarly
rhyming,” confident as he is that the doggerel of his old friend Bishop
Watson of Lincoln—
“All travellers do gladly report great praise of Ulysses,
For that he knew many men’s manners, and saw many cities,”—
exhibits[222] as “right quantitie” of syllables and true order of versifying as
either Greek or Latin—yet saw[223] that “our English tongue doth not well
receive the nature of Carmen Heroicum, because dactylus, the aptest foot
for that verse, is seldom found in English.” Truly it is not; your dactyl is apt
to play the “Waler”—to buck under an English rider, and either throw him
altogether, or force the alteration of the pace to anapæsts. The best apparent
dactylics in English—the verses of Kingsley’s Andromeda—are not really
dactylic-hexameters at all, they are five-foot anapæstics, with a very strong
anacrusis at the beginning, and a weak hypercatalectic syllable at the end.
And with this fatal confession of Ascham (who had not a very poetical
head), that of Campion, an exquisite poet and a keen though warped critic,
Vulgari Eloquio; and, if any had, it would have been a stroke of genius to
carry Dante’s generalisation from the Romance tongues further. To almost
any man of the Renaissance it would have seemed half sacrilege and half
madness to examine ancient and modern literatures on the same plane, and
decide what was germane to each and what common to all. Greek Prosody
had been good enough, with very minor alterations, for Latin; how should
any of these upstart modern tongues refuse what had been good enough for
both? And let it be remembered, too, that they were only half wrong. Greek
and Latin did provide up to a certain point—that of the foot as distinguished
from the metre—examples which, duly guarded, could be quite safely
followed, which indeed could not and cannot be neglected without loss and
danger for English. It was when they went further, and endeavoured to
impose the classical combinations of feet on English, that they fell.
Yet even from the first they had glimpses and glimmerings of truth which
might have warned them; while in their very errors they often display that
combination of independence and practical spirit which is the too often
Its adventurers: undervalued glory of English criticism. Ascham himself—
Ascham himself.
besotted as he is with wrath[221] against “our rude beggarly
rhyming,” confident as he is that the doggerel of his old friend Bishop
Watson of Lincoln—
“All travellers do gladly report great praise of Ulysses,
For that he knew many men’s manners, and saw many cities,”—
exhibits[222] as “right quantitie” of syllables and true order of versifying as
either Greek or Latin—yet saw[223] that “our English tongue doth not well
receive the nature of Carmen Heroicum, because dactylus, the aptest foot
for that verse, is seldom found in English.” Truly it is not; your dactyl is apt
to play the “Waler”—to buck under an English rider, and either throw him
altogether, or force the alteration of the pace to anapæsts. The best apparent
dactylics in English—the verses of Kingsley’s Andromeda—are not really
dactylic-hexameters at all, they are five-foot anapæstics, with a very strong
anacrusis at the beginning, and a weak hypercatalectic syllable at the end.
And with this fatal confession of Ascham (who had not a very poetical
head), that of Campion, an exquisite poet and a keen though warped critic,
Page 180
coincides, as we shall see, a generation later. But the thing had to be done;
and it was done, or at least attempted.
When the craze first took form in England we do not exactly know.
Ascham observes vaguely that “this misliking of rhyming beginneth not
now of any newfangle singularity, but hath been long been misliked, and
Watson and that of men of greatest learning and deepest judgment.”[224]
Drant.
We all think that the persons who agree with us are men of
great learning and deep judgment, so that matter may be passed over. But
apparently the thing was one, and not the best, of the fruits of that study of
the classics, and specially of Greek, which, beginning at Oxford, passed
thence to Cambridge, and was taken up so busily in Ascham’s own college,
St John’s. Thomas Watson,[225] the Bishop of Lincoln, above referred to, was
Master of the College; Ascham himself, it is hardly necessary to say, was a
fellow of it. And still descending in the collegiate hierarchy, it was an
undergraduate of St John’s, Thomas Drant, who somewhat later drew up
rules for Anglo-Classic versifying—rules that occupied Spenser and
Harvey, with the result of producing some interesting letters and some very
deplorable doggerel. Drant seems to have been the “legislator of Parnassus”
to the innovators; but we have little work of his, and that little does not bear
on the special subject.
Mischievous craze as it was, however,[226] it had the merit of turning the
attention of Englishmen to really critical study of poetry, and it appears,
more or less, as the motif of most of the group of critical writings, from
Gascoigne’s Notes of Instruction to Daniel’s Defence of Rhyme, which we
shall now discuss.
In the most interesting little treatise[227] which heads or initials[228] the now
goodly roll of books in English criticism, George Gascoigne, though he was
himself a Cambridge man, does not make any reference to the craze. The
Gascoigne. tract was written at the request of an Italian friend, Eduardo
Donati. It is exceedingly short; but as full of matter, and very good matter,
as need be. In duty bound Gascoigne begins with insistence on fine
invention, without which neither “thundering in rym ram ruff, quoth my
master Chaucer,” nor “rolling in pleasant words,” nor “abounding in apt
vocables,” will suffice. But he passes over this very swiftly, as over trite and
obvious expressions,[229] suitableness of phrase, &c., and attacks the great
literary question of the time, Prosody.
and it was done, or at least attempted.
When the craze first took form in England we do not exactly know.
Ascham observes vaguely that “this misliking of rhyming beginneth not
now of any newfangle singularity, but hath been long been misliked, and
Watson and that of men of greatest learning and deepest judgment.”[224]
Drant.
We all think that the persons who agree with us are men of
great learning and deep judgment, so that matter may be passed over. But
apparently the thing was one, and not the best, of the fruits of that study of
the classics, and specially of Greek, which, beginning at Oxford, passed
thence to Cambridge, and was taken up so busily in Ascham’s own college,
St John’s. Thomas Watson,[225] the Bishop of Lincoln, above referred to, was
Master of the College; Ascham himself, it is hardly necessary to say, was a
fellow of it. And still descending in the collegiate hierarchy, it was an
undergraduate of St John’s, Thomas Drant, who somewhat later drew up
rules for Anglo-Classic versifying—rules that occupied Spenser and
Harvey, with the result of producing some interesting letters and some very
deplorable doggerel. Drant seems to have been the “legislator of Parnassus”
to the innovators; but we have little work of his, and that little does not bear
on the special subject.
Mischievous craze as it was, however,[226] it had the merit of turning the
attention of Englishmen to really critical study of poetry, and it appears,
more or less, as the motif of most of the group of critical writings, from
Gascoigne’s Notes of Instruction to Daniel’s Defence of Rhyme, which we
shall now discuss.
In the most interesting little treatise[227] which heads or initials[228] the now
goodly roll of books in English criticism, George Gascoigne, though he was
himself a Cambridge man, does not make any reference to the craze. The
Gascoigne. tract was written at the request of an Italian friend, Eduardo
Donati. It is exceedingly short; but as full of matter, and very good matter,
as need be. In duty bound Gascoigne begins with insistence on fine
invention, without which neither “thundering in rym ram ruff, quoth my
master Chaucer,” nor “rolling in pleasant words,” nor “abounding in apt
vocables,” will suffice. But he passes over this very swiftly, as over trite and
obvious expressions,[229] suitableness of phrase, &c., and attacks the great
literary question of the time, Prosody.
Page 181
He begins his attack by the modest and half-apologetic request, “This
may seem a presumptuous order,” that, whatever the verse chosen be, it be
regular, and not wobbling backwards and forwards between twelve and
His Notes of fourteen syllables on no principle. Then he enjoins the
Instruction.
maintenance of regular and usual accent or quantity; and in
so doing insists on a standard in regard to which not merely Wyatt and
Surrey earlier, but even Spenser later, were much less scrupulous.
“Treasure,” he says, you must use with the first syllable long and the second
short: you must not make it “treasùre.” And then he makes a very curious
observation:—
“Commonly nowadays in English rhymes, for I dare not call them
English verses, we use none other order but a foot of two syllables,” to wit,
the Iamb. “We have,” he says, “in other times used other kinds of metres,”
as
"No wight | in the world | that wealth | can attain,"[230]
(i.e., anapæsts), while “our Father Chaucer had used the same liberty in feet
and measures that the Latinists do use,” that is to say, syllabic equivalence
of two shorts to a long. And he laments the tyranny of the Iamb; but says,
“we must take the ford as we find it.”
Then, after some particular cautions,—a renewed one as to quantifying
words aright—“understànd,” not “undérstand,” &c., as to using as many
monosyllables as possible (it is amusing to read this and remember the
opposite caution of Pope),—he comes to rhyme, and warns his scholar
against rhyme without reason. Alliteration is to be moderate: you must not
“hunt a letter to death.” Unusual words are to be employed carefully and
with a definite purpose to “draw attentive reading.” Be clear and sensible.
[231]
Keep English order, and invert substantive and adjective seldom and
cautiously. Be moderate in the use also of that “shrewd fellow, poetical
licence,” who actually reads "hea|ven" for "heavn"![232]
As for the pause or Cæsura, Gascoigne is not injudicious. “The pause,”
he says, “will stand best in the middle” of an octosyllable, at the fourth
syllable in a “verse of ten,” at the sixth (or middle again) of an Alexandrine,
and at the eighth in a fourteener. But it is at the discretion of the writer in
Rhythm royal: “it forceth not where the pause be till the end of the line”—
and this liberty will assuredly draw to more.
may seem a presumptuous order,” that, whatever the verse chosen be, it be
regular, and not wobbling backwards and forwards between twelve and
His Notes of fourteen syllables on no principle. Then he enjoins the
Instruction.
maintenance of regular and usual accent or quantity; and in
so doing insists on a standard in regard to which not merely Wyatt and
Surrey earlier, but even Spenser later, were much less scrupulous.
“Treasure,” he says, you must use with the first syllable long and the second
short: you must not make it “treasùre.” And then he makes a very curious
observation:—
“Commonly nowadays in English rhymes, for I dare not call them
English verses, we use none other order but a foot of two syllables,” to wit,
the Iamb. “We have,” he says, “in other times used other kinds of metres,”
as
"No wight | in the world | that wealth | can attain,"[230]
(i.e., anapæsts), while “our Father Chaucer had used the same liberty in feet
and measures that the Latinists do use,” that is to say, syllabic equivalence
of two shorts to a long. And he laments the tyranny of the Iamb; but says,
“we must take the ford as we find it.”
Then, after some particular cautions,—a renewed one as to quantifying
words aright—“understànd,” not “undérstand,” &c., as to using as many
monosyllables as possible (it is amusing to read this and remember the
opposite caution of Pope),—he comes to rhyme, and warns his scholar
against rhyme without reason. Alliteration is to be moderate: you must not
“hunt a letter to death.” Unusual words are to be employed carefully and
with a definite purpose to “draw attentive reading.” Be clear and sensible.
[231]
Keep English order, and invert substantive and adjective seldom and
cautiously. Be moderate in the use also of that “shrewd fellow, poetical
licence,” who actually reads "hea|ven" for "heavn"![232]
As for the pause or Cæsura, Gascoigne is not injudicious. “The pause,”
he says, “will stand best in the middle” of an octosyllable, at the fourth
syllable in a “verse of ten,” at the sixth (or middle again) of an Alexandrine,
and at the eighth in a fourteener. But it is at the discretion of the writer in
Rhythm royal: “it forceth not where the pause be till the end of the line”—
and this liberty will assuredly draw to more.
Page 182
Next he enumerates stanzas:—Rhyme royal itself, ballades, sonnets,
Dizains, and Sixains, Virelays, and the “Poulter’s measure,” of twelve and
fourteen alternately, to which his own contemporaries were so unfortunately
addicted. You must “finish the sentence and meaning at the end of every
staff”: and (by the way) he has “forgotten a notable kind of rhyme called
riding rhyme, which is what our father Chaucer used in his Canterbury
tales, and in divers other delectable and light enterprises.” It is good for “a
merry tale,” Rhyme royal for a “grave discourse,” Ballads and Sonnets for
love-poems, &c., and it would be best, in his judgment, to keep Poulter’s
measure for Psalms and hymns. And so he makes an end, “doubting his own
ignorance.”
The chief points about this really capital booklet are as follows:—
Gascoigne’s recognition of the importance of overhauling English Prosody;
his good sense on the matter of the cæsura, and of Chaucer’s adoption of
the principles of equivalenced scansion; his acknowledgment with regret of
the impoverishment which, in the sterility of the mid-sixteenth century
before Spenser, was a fact, as resulting from the tyranny of the iamb; the
shrewdness of his general remarks; and, last but not least, his entire silence
Their capital about the new versifying, the “Dranting of Verses.” It is
value.
possible (for though he was at Cambridge he seems to
admit that he did not acquire any great scholarship there) that he had not
come into contact with any one who took interest in this: but it is
improbable that it would have appealed to his robust sense of poetry,
unsicklied by Harvey’s pedantry, and not misled by Spenser’s classical
enthusiasm.
At this time, however, or not long after—the Notes must have been
written between 1572 and 1575, and the correspondence of Spenser and
Harvey actually appeared in 1579—these other persons were thinking a
great deal about the classical metres. The Five Letters (“Three” and
“Two”[233]—not to be confused with the Four Letters which Harvey issued
long afterwards about Greene) are full of the subject, and of poetical
criticism generally. They, together with the controversy which arose over
Gosson’s School of Abuse, and which indirectly produced Sidney’s Apology
for Poetry, make the years 1579-1580 as notable in the history of English
criticism as the appearances of Euphues and The Shepherd’s Calendar make
them in that of creative literature.
Dizains, and Sixains, Virelays, and the “Poulter’s measure,” of twelve and
fourteen alternately, to which his own contemporaries were so unfortunately
addicted. You must “finish the sentence and meaning at the end of every
staff”: and (by the way) he has “forgotten a notable kind of rhyme called
riding rhyme, which is what our father Chaucer used in his Canterbury
tales, and in divers other delectable and light enterprises.” It is good for “a
merry tale,” Rhyme royal for a “grave discourse,” Ballads and Sonnets for
love-poems, &c., and it would be best, in his judgment, to keep Poulter’s
measure for Psalms and hymns. And so he makes an end, “doubting his own
ignorance.”
The chief points about this really capital booklet are as follows:—
Gascoigne’s recognition of the importance of overhauling English Prosody;
his good sense on the matter of the cæsura, and of Chaucer’s adoption of
the principles of equivalenced scansion; his acknowledgment with regret of
the impoverishment which, in the sterility of the mid-sixteenth century
before Spenser, was a fact, as resulting from the tyranny of the iamb; the
shrewdness of his general remarks; and, last but not least, his entire silence
Their capital about the new versifying, the “Dranting of Verses.” It is
value.
possible (for though he was at Cambridge he seems to
admit that he did not acquire any great scholarship there) that he had not
come into contact with any one who took interest in this: but it is
improbable that it would have appealed to his robust sense of poetry,
unsicklied by Harvey’s pedantry, and not misled by Spenser’s classical
enthusiasm.
At this time, however, or not long after—the Notes must have been
written between 1572 and 1575, and the correspondence of Spenser and
Harvey actually appeared in 1579—these other persons were thinking a
great deal about the classical metres. The Five Letters (“Three” and
“Two”[233]—not to be confused with the Four Letters which Harvey issued
long afterwards about Greene) are full of the subject, and of poetical
criticism generally. They, together with the controversy which arose over
Gosson’s School of Abuse, and which indirectly produced Sidney’s Apology
for Poetry, make the years 1579-1580 as notable in the history of English
criticism as the appearances of Euphues and The Shepherd’s Calendar make
them in that of creative literature.
Page 183
Spenser’s first letter informs Harvey that “they [Sidney and Dyer] have
proclaimed in their ἀρειωπάγῳ[234] [the literary cénacle of Leicester House]
a general surceasing and silence of bald rhymers, and also of the very best
too: instead whereof they have, by the authority of their whole Senate,
prescribed certain laws and rules of quantities of English syllables for
English verse, having had thereof already great practice, and drawn me to
Spenser and their faction.” And later, “I am more in love with English
Harvey.
versifying than with rhyming, which I should have done
long since if I would have followed your counsel.” He hints, however,
gently, that Harvey’s own verses (these coterie writers always keep the
name “verses” for their hybrid abortions) once or twice “make a breach in
Master Drant’s rules.” Which was, of course, a very dreadful thing, only to
be “condoned tanto poetæ.” He requites Harvey with a few Iambics, which
he “dare warrant precisely perfect for the feet, and varying not one inch
from the Rule.” And then follows the well-known piece beginning—
“Unhappy verse, the witness of my unhappy state,”
where certainly the state must have been bad if it was as infelicitous as the
verse.
Not such was Gabriel Harvey that he might take even a polite correction;
and his reply is a proper donnish setting-down of a clever but presumptuous
youth. He respects the Areopagus—indeed they were persons of worship,
and Harvey was a roturier—more than Spenser can or will suppose, and he
likes the trimeters (indeed, though poor things, they were Spenser’s own
after all, and such as no man but Spenser could have written in their foolish
kind) more than Spenser “can or will easily believe.” But—and then
follows much reviewing in the now stale hole-picking kind, which has long
been abandoned, save by the descendants of Milbourne and Kenrick, and a
lofty protestation that “myself never saw your gorbellied master’s rules, nor
heard of them before.”
The Three Letters which follow[235] are distributed in subject between an
Earthquake (which has long since ceased to quake for us) and the
hexameters. They open with a letter from Spenser, in which he broaches the
main question, “Whether our English accent will endure the Hexameter?”
and doubts. Yet he has a hankering after it, encloses his own—
proclaimed in their ἀρειωπάγῳ[234] [the literary cénacle of Leicester House]
a general surceasing and silence of bald rhymers, and also of the very best
too: instead whereof they have, by the authority of their whole Senate,
prescribed certain laws and rules of quantities of English syllables for
English verse, having had thereof already great practice, and drawn me to
Spenser and their faction.” And later, “I am more in love with English
Harvey.
versifying than with rhyming, which I should have done
long since if I would have followed your counsel.” He hints, however,
gently, that Harvey’s own verses (these coterie writers always keep the
name “verses” for their hybrid abortions) once or twice “make a breach in
Master Drant’s rules.” Which was, of course, a very dreadful thing, only to
be “condoned tanto poetæ.” He requites Harvey with a few Iambics, which
he “dare warrant precisely perfect for the feet, and varying not one inch
from the Rule.” And then follows the well-known piece beginning—
“Unhappy verse, the witness of my unhappy state,”
where certainly the state must have been bad if it was as infelicitous as the
verse.
Not such was Gabriel Harvey that he might take even a polite correction;
and his reply is a proper donnish setting-down of a clever but presumptuous
youth. He respects the Areopagus—indeed they were persons of worship,
and Harvey was a roturier—more than Spenser can or will suppose, and he
likes the trimeters (indeed, though poor things, they were Spenser’s own
after all, and such as no man but Spenser could have written in their foolish
kind) more than Spenser “can or will easily believe.” But—and then
follows much reviewing in the now stale hole-picking kind, which has long
been abandoned, save by the descendants of Milbourne and Kenrick, and a
lofty protestation that “myself never saw your gorbellied master’s rules, nor
heard of them before.”
The Three Letters which follow[235] are distributed in subject between an
Earthquake (which has long since ceased to quake for us) and the
hexameters. They open with a letter from Spenser, in which he broaches the
main question, “Whether our English accent will endure the Hexameter?”
and doubts. Yet he has a hankering after it, encloses his own—
Page 184
“See ye the blindfoldèd pretty god, that feathered archer,” &c.,
and prays that Harvey would either follow the rules of the great Drant,
indorsed by Sidney, or else send his own. Harvey replies in double. The first
part is some very tragical mirth about the earthquake; the second, “A
Gallant Familiar Letter,” tackles the question of versification.
This gallant familiarity might possibly receive from harsh critics the
name of uneasy coxcombry; but it is at any rate clear that the author has set
about the matter very seriously. He expresses delight that Sidney and Dyer,
“the two very diamonds of her Majesty’s Court,” have begun to help
forward “the exchange of barbarous and balductum[236] rhymes with
artificial verses”; thinks their “lively example” will be much better than
Ascham’s “dead advertisement” in the Schoolmaster. He would like (as
should we) to have Drant’s prosody. His own Rules and Precepts will
probably not be very different; but he will take time before drafting them
finally. He thinks (reasonably enough) that before framing a standard
English Grammar or Rhetoric (therein including Prosody), a standard
orthography must first be agreed upon. And he suggests that “we beginners”
(this from the author of these truly “barbarous and balductum” antics to the
author of the Faerie Queene is distinctly precious) have the advantage, like
Homer and Ennius, of setting examples. “A New Year’s Gift to M. George
Bilchaunger,” in very doleful hexameters, follows, and after a little gird at
Spenser’s “See ye the Blindfoldèd,” another sprout of Harvey’s brain in the
same kind, which has been, perhaps, more, and more deservedly, laughed at
than any of these absurdities, except the scarcely sane jargon-doggerel of
Stanyhurst—
“What might I call this tree? a Laurell? o bonny Laurell!
Needs to thy boughs will I bow this knee, and veil my bonetto;”
with yet another—
“Since Galateo[237] came in, and Tuscanism gan usurp.”
He thinks that the author of this last “wanted but some delicate choice
elegant poesy” of Sidney’s or Dyer’s for a good pattern. After some further
experiments of his own, or his brother’s, in hexametring some of Spenser’s
own “emblems” in the Calendar, he turns to Spenser himself, whom, it
and prays that Harvey would either follow the rules of the great Drant,
indorsed by Sidney, or else send his own. Harvey replies in double. The first
part is some very tragical mirth about the earthquake; the second, “A
Gallant Familiar Letter,” tackles the question of versification.
This gallant familiarity might possibly receive from harsh critics the
name of uneasy coxcombry; but it is at any rate clear that the author has set
about the matter very seriously. He expresses delight that Sidney and Dyer,
“the two very diamonds of her Majesty’s Court,” have begun to help
forward “the exchange of barbarous and balductum[236] rhymes with
artificial verses”; thinks their “lively example” will be much better than
Ascham’s “dead advertisement” in the Schoolmaster. He would like (as
should we) to have Drant’s prosody. His own Rules and Precepts will
probably not be very different; but he will take time before drafting them
finally. He thinks (reasonably enough) that before framing a standard
English Grammar or Rhetoric (therein including Prosody), a standard
orthography must first be agreed upon. And he suggests that “we beginners”
(this from the author of these truly “barbarous and balductum” antics to the
author of the Faerie Queene is distinctly precious) have the advantage, like
Homer and Ennius, of setting examples. “A New Year’s Gift to M. George
Bilchaunger,” in very doleful hexameters, follows, and after a little gird at
Spenser’s “See ye the Blindfoldèd,” another sprout of Harvey’s brain in the
same kind, which has been, perhaps, more, and more deservedly, laughed at
than any of these absurdities, except the scarcely sane jargon-doggerel of
Stanyhurst—
“What might I call this tree? a Laurell? o bonny Laurell!
Needs to thy boughs will I bow this knee, and veil my bonetto;”
with yet another—
“Since Galateo[237] came in, and Tuscanism gan usurp.”
He thinks that the author of this last “wanted but some delicate choice
elegant poesy” of Sidney’s or Dyer’s for a good pattern. After some further
experiments of his own, or his brother’s, in hexametring some of Spenser’s
own “emblems” in the Calendar, he turns to Spenser himself, whom, it
Page 185
seems, he ranks next the same “incomparable and miraculous genius in the
catalogue of our very principal English Aristarchi.” He proceeds to speak of
some of that earlier work which, as in The Dying Pelican, is certainly, or in
the Dreams, possibly, lost. After which he writes himself down for all time
in the famous passage about the Faerie Queene, which he had “once again
nigh forgotten,” but which he now sends home “in neither better nor worse
case than he found her.” “As for his judgment,” he is “void of all judgment
if Spenser’s Nine Comedies [also lost] are not nearer Ariosto’s than that
Elvish Queene is to the Orlando, which” Spenser “seems to emulate, and
hopes to overgo.” And so he ends his paragraph with the yet more famous
words, “If so be the Faery Queene be fairer in your eye than the Nine
Muses, and Hobgoblin run away with the garland from Apollo, mark what I
say, and yet I will not say what I thought, but there an end for this once, and
fare you well till God or some good Angel put you in a better mind!” Which
words let all who practise criticism grave in their memories, and recite them
daily, adding, “Here, but for the grace of God——!” if they be modest and
fear Nemesis.
After an interval, however, Harvey returns to actual criticism, and shows
himself in rather better figure by protesting, in spite of “five hundred
Drants,” against the alteration of the quantity of English words by accenting
“Majesty” and “Manfully,” and “Carpenter” on the second syllable. And he
falls in with Gascoigne on the subject of such words as “Heaven.” Nor
could he, even if he had been far less of a pedant and coxcomb, have given
better or sounder doctrine than that with which he winds up. “It is the
vulgar and natural mother Prosody, that alone worketh the feat, as the only
supreme foundress and reformer of Position, Diphthong, Orthography, or
whatsoever else; whose affirmatives are nothing worth if she once conclude
the negative.” And for this sound doctrine, not unsoundly enlarged upon,
and tipped with a pleasant Latin farewell to “mea domina Immerita, mea
bellissima Collina Clouta”, let us leave Gabriel in charity.[238]
The Puritan Meanwhile the strong critical set of the time—so
attack on Poetry.
interesting, if not so satisfying, after the absolute silence of
criticism in English earlier—was being shown in another direction by a
different controversy, to which, as we have seen, Spenser makes allusion.
The points which chiefly interested him at the moment were formal; those
to which we now come were partly of the same class though of another
species, partly transcending form.
catalogue of our very principal English Aristarchi.” He proceeds to speak of
some of that earlier work which, as in The Dying Pelican, is certainly, or in
the Dreams, possibly, lost. After which he writes himself down for all time
in the famous passage about the Faerie Queene, which he had “once again
nigh forgotten,” but which he now sends home “in neither better nor worse
case than he found her.” “As for his judgment,” he is “void of all judgment
if Spenser’s Nine Comedies [also lost] are not nearer Ariosto’s than that
Elvish Queene is to the Orlando, which” Spenser “seems to emulate, and
hopes to overgo.” And so he ends his paragraph with the yet more famous
words, “If so be the Faery Queene be fairer in your eye than the Nine
Muses, and Hobgoblin run away with the garland from Apollo, mark what I
say, and yet I will not say what I thought, but there an end for this once, and
fare you well till God or some good Angel put you in a better mind!” Which
words let all who practise criticism grave in their memories, and recite them
daily, adding, “Here, but for the grace of God——!” if they be modest and
fear Nemesis.
After an interval, however, Harvey returns to actual criticism, and shows
himself in rather better figure by protesting, in spite of “five hundred
Drants,” against the alteration of the quantity of English words by accenting
“Majesty” and “Manfully,” and “Carpenter” on the second syllable. And he
falls in with Gascoigne on the subject of such words as “Heaven.” Nor
could he, even if he had been far less of a pedant and coxcomb, have given
better or sounder doctrine than that with which he winds up. “It is the
vulgar and natural mother Prosody, that alone worketh the feat, as the only
supreme foundress and reformer of Position, Diphthong, Orthography, or
whatsoever else; whose affirmatives are nothing worth if she once conclude
the negative.” And for this sound doctrine, not unsoundly enlarged upon,
and tipped with a pleasant Latin farewell to “mea domina Immerita, mea
bellissima Collina Clouta”, let us leave Gabriel in charity.[238]
The Puritan Meanwhile the strong critical set of the time—so
attack on Poetry.
interesting, if not so satisfying, after the absolute silence of
criticism in English earlier—was being shown in another direction by a
different controversy, to which, as we have seen, Spenser makes allusion.
The points which chiefly interested him at the moment were formal; those
to which we now come were partly of the same class though of another
species, partly transcending form.
Page 186
Stephen Gosson is one of the persons of whom, as is by no means always
the case, it would really be useful to know more than we do know about
Gosson. their private history and character. What disgust, what
disappointment, what tardy development of certain strains of temper and
disposition he underwent, we do not know; but something of the kind there
must have been to make a young man of four-and-twenty, a fair scholar,
already of some note for both dramatic and poetical writing, and obviously
of no mean intellectual powers, swing violently round, and denounce plays,
and poems, and almost literature generally, as the works of the Devil. It is
quite insufficient to ejaculate “Puritanism!” or “Platonism!” for neither of
these was a new thing, and the question is why Gosson was not affected by
them earlier or later.
Let us, however, now as always, abstain from speculation when we have
fact; and here we have at least three very notable facts—Gosson’s School of
Abuse,[239] with its satellite tractates, Lodge’s untitled Reply,[240] and the
famous Defence of Poesy or Apology for Poetry[241] which Sidney (to whom
Gosson had rashly dedicated his book) almost certainly intended as a
counterblast, though either out of scorn, as Spenser hints, or (more probably
from what we know of him) out of amiable and courteous dislike to requite
a compliment with an insult, he takes no direct notice of Gosson at any
time.
The School of Abuse (which is written in such a style as almost to out-
Euphuise the contemporary Euphues itself) is critical wholly from the moral
side, and with reference to the actual, not the necessary or possible, state of
The School of poetry. There are even, the author says, some good plays,
Abuse.
including at least one of his own; but the whole of ancient
poetry (he says little or nothing of modern) is infected by the blasphemy
and immorality of Paganism, and nearly the whole of the modern stage is
infected by the abuses of the theatre—of which Gosson speaks in terms
pretty well identical with those which Puritan teachers had for some years
past been using in sermon and treatise. But outside of the moral and
religious line he does not step: he is solely occupied with the lies and the
licence of poets and players.
Lodge’s reply (the title-page of it has been lost, but it may be the Honest
Excuses to which Gosson refers as having been published against him) is
almost entirely an appeal to authority, seasoned with a little personal
Lodge’s Reply. invective. Lodge strings together all the classical names he
the case, it would really be useful to know more than we do know about
Gosson. their private history and character. What disgust, what
disappointment, what tardy development of certain strains of temper and
disposition he underwent, we do not know; but something of the kind there
must have been to make a young man of four-and-twenty, a fair scholar,
already of some note for both dramatic and poetical writing, and obviously
of no mean intellectual powers, swing violently round, and denounce plays,
and poems, and almost literature generally, as the works of the Devil. It is
quite insufficient to ejaculate “Puritanism!” or “Platonism!” for neither of
these was a new thing, and the question is why Gosson was not affected by
them earlier or later.
Let us, however, now as always, abstain from speculation when we have
fact; and here we have at least three very notable facts—Gosson’s School of
Abuse,[239] with its satellite tractates, Lodge’s untitled Reply,[240] and the
famous Defence of Poesy or Apology for Poetry[241] which Sidney (to whom
Gosson had rashly dedicated his book) almost certainly intended as a
counterblast, though either out of scorn, as Spenser hints, or (more probably
from what we know of him) out of amiable and courteous dislike to requite
a compliment with an insult, he takes no direct notice of Gosson at any
time.
The School of Abuse (which is written in such a style as almost to out-
Euphuise the contemporary Euphues itself) is critical wholly from the moral
side, and with reference to the actual, not the necessary or possible, state of
The School of poetry. There are even, the author says, some good plays,
Abuse.
including at least one of his own; but the whole of ancient
poetry (he says little or nothing of modern) is infected by the blasphemy
and immorality of Paganism, and nearly the whole of the modern stage is
infected by the abuses of the theatre—of which Gosson speaks in terms
pretty well identical with those which Puritan teachers had for some years
past been using in sermon and treatise. But outside of the moral and
religious line he does not step: he is solely occupied with the lies and the
licence of poets and players.
Lodge’s reply (the title-page of it has been lost, but it may be the Honest
Excuses to which Gosson refers as having been published against him) is
almost entirely an appeal to authority, seasoned with a little personal
Lodge’s Reply. invective. Lodge strings together all the classical names he
Page 187
can think of, with a few mediæval, to show that Poetry, Music (which
Gosson had also attacked), and even the theatre, are not bad things. But he
hardly attempts any independent justification of them as good ones,
especially from the purely literary point of view. In fact, his pamphlet—
though interesting as critical work from the associate of great creators in
drama, himself a delightful minor poet and no contemptible pioneer of
English prose fiction—is merely one of the earliest adaptations in English
of an unreal defence to an attack, logically as unreal though actually
dangerous. The charlatan-geniuses of the Renaissance, with Cornelius
Agrippa[242] at their head, had refurbished the Platonic arguments for the
sincere but pestilent reformers of the Puritan type. Lodge and his likes, in
all countries from Italy outwards and from Boccaccio downward, accept the
measure of the shadowy daggers of their opponents, and attempt to meet
them with weapons of similar temper. The only reality of the debate is in its
accidents, not in its main purport. But the assailants, in England at least, had
for the time an unfair advantage, because the defence could point to no
great poet but Chaucer. The real answer was being provided by one of
themselves in the shape of The Faerie Queene.
Sidney’s book, though pervaded by the same delusion, is one of far more
Sidney’s importance. It is not free from faults—in fact, it has often
Apology for
Poetry.
been pointed out that some of Sidney’s doctrines, if they
had been accepted, would have made the best efforts of
Elizabethan literature abortive. But the defects of detail, of which more
presently, are mixed with admirable merits; the critic shows himself able, as
Gosson had not been able, to take a wide and catholic, instead of a peddling
and pettifogging, view of morality. Instead of merely stringing authorities
together like Lodge, he uses authority indeed, but abuses it not; and while
not neglecting form he does not give exclusive attention to it.
His main object, indeed (though he does not know it), is the defence, not
so much of Poetry as of Romance. He follows the ancients in extending the
former term to any prose fiction: but it is quite evident that he would have,
in his mimesis, a quality of imagination which Aristotle nowhere insists
upon, and which is in the best sense Romantic. And of this poetry, or
romance, he makes one of the loftiest conceptions possible. All the
hyperboles of philosophers or of poets, on order, justice, harmony, and the
like, are heaped upon Poetry herself, and all the Platonic objections to her
are retorted or denied.[243]
Gosson had also attacked), and even the theatre, are not bad things. But he
hardly attempts any independent justification of them as good ones,
especially from the purely literary point of view. In fact, his pamphlet—
though interesting as critical work from the associate of great creators in
drama, himself a delightful minor poet and no contemptible pioneer of
English prose fiction—is merely one of the earliest adaptations in English
of an unreal defence to an attack, logically as unreal though actually
dangerous. The charlatan-geniuses of the Renaissance, with Cornelius
Agrippa[242] at their head, had refurbished the Platonic arguments for the
sincere but pestilent reformers of the Puritan type. Lodge and his likes, in
all countries from Italy outwards and from Boccaccio downward, accept the
measure of the shadowy daggers of their opponents, and attempt to meet
them with weapons of similar temper. The only reality of the debate is in its
accidents, not in its main purport. But the assailants, in England at least, had
for the time an unfair advantage, because the defence could point to no
great poet but Chaucer. The real answer was being provided by one of
themselves in the shape of The Faerie Queene.
Sidney’s book, though pervaded by the same delusion, is one of far more
Sidney’s importance. It is not free from faults—in fact, it has often
Apology for
Poetry.
been pointed out that some of Sidney’s doctrines, if they
had been accepted, would have made the best efforts of
Elizabethan literature abortive. But the defects of detail, of which more
presently, are mixed with admirable merits; the critic shows himself able, as
Gosson had not been able, to take a wide and catholic, instead of a peddling
and pettifogging, view of morality. Instead of merely stringing authorities
together like Lodge, he uses authority indeed, but abuses it not; and while
not neglecting form he does not give exclusive attention to it.
His main object, indeed (though he does not know it), is the defence, not
so much of Poetry as of Romance. He follows the ancients in extending the
former term to any prose fiction: but it is quite evident that he would have,
in his mimesis, a quality of imagination which Aristotle nowhere insists
upon, and which is in the best sense Romantic. And of this poetry, or
romance, he makes one of the loftiest conceptions possible. All the
hyperboles of philosophers or of poets, on order, justice, harmony, and the
like, are heaped upon Poetry herself, and all the Platonic objections to her
are retorted or denied.[243]
Page 188
It has been said that there is no direct reference to Gosson in the Apology,
Abstract of it. though the indirect references are fairly clear. Sidney
begins (in the orthodox Platonic or Ciceronian manner) somewhat off his
subject, by telling how the right virtuous Edward Wotton, and he himself,
once at the Emperor’s Court learnt horsemanship of John Pietro Pugliano,
the Imperial Equerry, and recounting with pleasant irony some magnifying
of his office by that officer. Whence, by an equally pleasant rhetorical turn,
he slips into a defence of his office—his “unelected vocation” of poet. Were
not the earliest and greatest authors of all countries, Musæus, Homer,
Hesiod, in Greece (not to mention Orpheus and Linus), Livius Andronicus
and Ennius among the Romans, Dante, Boccaccio, and Petrarch in Italy,
Chaucer and Gower for “our English”—were they not all poets? Even the
philosophers in Greece used poetry, and Plato himself is a poet almost
against his will. Herodotus called his nine books after the Muses; and he
and all historians have stolen or usurped things of poetry. Wales, Ireland,
“the most barbarous and simple Indians,” are cited. Nay, further, did not the
Romans call a poet vates, a “prophet”? and, by presumption, may we not
call David’s psalms a divine poem? Whatever some may think,[244] it is no
profanation to do so. For what is a poet? What do we mean by adopting that
Greek title for him? We mean that he is a maker. All other arts and sciences
limit themselves to nature; the poet alone transcends it, improves it, makes,
nay, brings it (“let it not be deemed too saucy a comparison”) in some sort
into competition with the Creator Himself whom he imitates.
The kinds of this imitation are then surveyed—“Divine,”
“Philosophical,” and that of the third or right sort, who only imitate to
invent and improve, which neither divine nor philosophic poets can do.
These classes are subdivided according to their matter—heroic, tragic,
comic, &c.—or according to the sorts of verses they liked best to write in,
“for, indeed, the greatest part of poets have apparelled their poetical
inventions in that numerous kind of writing which is called verse—indeed
but apparelled, verse being but an ornament and no cause to poetry.” And
again, “it is not rhyming and versing that maketh a poet.” Xenophon and
Heliodorus were both poets in prose.
Now let us “weigh this latter part of poetry first by works and then by
parts,” having regard always to the “Architectonice or mistress-
knowledge,” the knowledge of a man’s self, ethically and politically.
Philosophy, history, law, &c., are then “weighed” against poetry at some
Abstract of it. though the indirect references are fairly clear. Sidney
begins (in the orthodox Platonic or Ciceronian manner) somewhat off his
subject, by telling how the right virtuous Edward Wotton, and he himself,
once at the Emperor’s Court learnt horsemanship of John Pietro Pugliano,
the Imperial Equerry, and recounting with pleasant irony some magnifying
of his office by that officer. Whence, by an equally pleasant rhetorical turn,
he slips into a defence of his office—his “unelected vocation” of poet. Were
not the earliest and greatest authors of all countries, Musæus, Homer,
Hesiod, in Greece (not to mention Orpheus and Linus), Livius Andronicus
and Ennius among the Romans, Dante, Boccaccio, and Petrarch in Italy,
Chaucer and Gower for “our English”—were they not all poets? Even the
philosophers in Greece used poetry, and Plato himself is a poet almost
against his will. Herodotus called his nine books after the Muses; and he
and all historians have stolen or usurped things of poetry. Wales, Ireland,
“the most barbarous and simple Indians,” are cited. Nay, further, did not the
Romans call a poet vates, a “prophet”? and, by presumption, may we not
call David’s psalms a divine poem? Whatever some may think,[244] it is no
profanation to do so. For what is a poet? What do we mean by adopting that
Greek title for him? We mean that he is a maker. All other arts and sciences
limit themselves to nature; the poet alone transcends it, improves it, makes,
nay, brings it (“let it not be deemed too saucy a comparison”) in some sort
into competition with the Creator Himself whom he imitates.
The kinds of this imitation are then surveyed—“Divine,”
“Philosophical,” and that of the third or right sort, who only imitate to
invent and improve, which neither divine nor philosophic poets can do.
These classes are subdivided according to their matter—heroic, tragic,
comic, &c.—or according to the sorts of verses they liked best to write in,
“for, indeed, the greatest part of poets have apparelled their poetical
inventions in that numerous kind of writing which is called verse—indeed
but apparelled, verse being but an ornament and no cause to poetry.” And
again, “it is not rhyming and versing that maketh a poet.” Xenophon and
Heliodorus were both poets in prose.
Now let us “weigh this latter part of poetry first by works and then by
parts,” having regard always to the “Architectonice or mistress-
knowledge,” the knowledge of a man’s self, ethically and politically.
Philosophy, history, law, &c., are then “weighed” against poetry at some
Page 189
length: and the judgment of Aristotle that Poetry is philosophoteron and
spoudaioteron than history, is affirmed chiefly on the odd ground of
poetical justice,—the right always triumphing in poetry though not in fact.
Instances of the moral and political uses of poetry follow. Then for the
parts. Pastoral, comedy, tragedy, &c., are by turns surveyed and defended;
and it is in the eulogy of lyric that the famous sentence about Chevy
Chase[245] occurs. After this, and after a stately vindication of Poetry’s right
to the laurel, he turns to the objections of the objectors. Although repeating
the declaration that “rhyming and versing make not poetry,” he argues that
if they were inseparable,[246] verse is the most excellent kind of writing, far
better than prose. As to the abuses of poetry, they are but abuses, and do not
take away the use, as is proved by a great number of stock examples.
Why, then, has England grown so hard a stepmother to poets? They are
bad enough as a rule, no doubt; though Chaucer did excellently considering
his time. The Mirror for Magistrates is good; so is Surrey; and The
Shepherd’s Calendar “hath much poetry,” though “the old rustic language”
is bad, since neither Theocritus, nor Virgil, nor Sannazar has it. And what is
the reason of our inferiority? The neglect of rule. From this point onwards
Sidney certainly “exposes his legs to the arrows” of those who ignore the
just historic estimate. He pours ridicule on all our tragedies except
Gorboduc, and still more on our mongrel tragi-comedies. We must follow
the Unities, which, as it is, are neglected even in Gorboduc, “how much
more in all the rest?” Whence he proceeds (unconscious how cool the
reductio ad absurdum will leave us) to the famous ridicule of “Asia on the
one side and Africa on the other,” of “three ladies walking to gather
flowers,” and how the same place which was a garden becomes a rock, and
then a cave with a monster, and then a battlefield with two armies—of the
course of two lives in two hours’ space, &c. And he concludes with some
remarks on versification, which we should gladly have seen worked out.
For he does not now seem to be in that antagonistic mood towards rhyme
which Spenser’s letters to Harvey discover in him. On the contrary, he
admits two styles, ancient and modern, the former depending on quantity,
the latter depending on “number,” accent, and rhyme. He indeed thinks
English fit for both sorts, and denies “neither sweetness nor majesty” to
rhyme, but is, like almost all his contemporaries and followers (except
Gascoigne partially), in a fog as to “numbers” and cæsura. The actual end
comes a very little abruptly by an exhortation of some length, half
spoudaioteron than history, is affirmed chiefly on the odd ground of
poetical justice,—the right always triumphing in poetry though not in fact.
Instances of the moral and political uses of poetry follow. Then for the
parts. Pastoral, comedy, tragedy, &c., are by turns surveyed and defended;
and it is in the eulogy of lyric that the famous sentence about Chevy
Chase[245] occurs. After this, and after a stately vindication of Poetry’s right
to the laurel, he turns to the objections of the objectors. Although repeating
the declaration that “rhyming and versing make not poetry,” he argues that
if they were inseparable,[246] verse is the most excellent kind of writing, far
better than prose. As to the abuses of poetry, they are but abuses, and do not
take away the use, as is proved by a great number of stock examples.
Why, then, has England grown so hard a stepmother to poets? They are
bad enough as a rule, no doubt; though Chaucer did excellently considering
his time. The Mirror for Magistrates is good; so is Surrey; and The
Shepherd’s Calendar “hath much poetry,” though “the old rustic language”
is bad, since neither Theocritus, nor Virgil, nor Sannazar has it. And what is
the reason of our inferiority? The neglect of rule. From this point onwards
Sidney certainly “exposes his legs to the arrows” of those who ignore the
just historic estimate. He pours ridicule on all our tragedies except
Gorboduc, and still more on our mongrel tragi-comedies. We must follow
the Unities, which, as it is, are neglected even in Gorboduc, “how much
more in all the rest?” Whence he proceeds (unconscious how cool the
reductio ad absurdum will leave us) to the famous ridicule of “Asia on the
one side and Africa on the other,” of “three ladies walking to gather
flowers,” and how the same place which was a garden becomes a rock, and
then a cave with a monster, and then a battlefield with two armies—of the
course of two lives in two hours’ space, &c. And he concludes with some
remarks on versification, which we should gladly have seen worked out.
For he does not now seem to be in that antagonistic mood towards rhyme
which Spenser’s letters to Harvey discover in him. On the contrary, he
admits two styles, ancient and modern, the former depending on quantity,
the latter depending on “number,” accent, and rhyme. He indeed thinks
English fit for both sorts, and denies “neither sweetness nor majesty” to
rhyme, but is, like almost all his contemporaries and followers (except
Gascoigne partially), in a fog as to “numbers” and cæsura. The actual end
comes a very little abruptly by an exhortation of some length, half
Page 190
humorous, half serious, to all and sundry, to be “no more to jest at the
reverent title of a rhymer.”
The importance of this manifesto, both symptomatically and typically,
Its minor can hardly be exaggerated. It exposes the temper of the
shortcomings
generation which actually produced the first-fruits of the
greatest Elizabethan poetry; it served as a stimulant and encouragement to
all the successive generations of the great age. That Sidney makes mistakes
both in gross and detail—that he even makes some rather serious mistakes
from the mere “point of view of the examiner”—is of course undeniable.
He has a good deal of the merely traditional mode of Renaissance respect
for classical—and for some modern—authority. That, for instance, there is a
good deal to be said, and that not only from the point of view of Ben
Jonson, against Spenser’s half-archaic half-rustic dialect in the Calendar,
few would refuse to grant. But Theocritus did use dialect: it would not in
the least matter whether either he or Virgil did not; and if it did, what has
the modern and partly vernacular name of Sannazar to do with the matter?
It can only be replied that Spenser, by permitting “E. K.'s” annotation, did
much to invite this sort of criticism; and that Englishmen’s reluctance to
rely on the inherent powers of the English language was partly justified (for
hardly any dead poet but Chaucer and no dead prose-writers but Malory and
perhaps Berners deserved the title of “great”), partly came from very
pardonable ignorance.
It has been already observed that Sidney is by no means peremptory
about the “new versifying”; and in particular has absolutely none of the
craze against rhyme as rhyme which animated persons of every degree of
ability, from Milton to Stanyhurst, during more than a century. His remarks
on versification are, however, too scanty to need much comment.
There remain his two major heresies, the declaration that verse is not
inseparable from poetry, and the denunciation of tragi-comedy. In both the
and major authority of the ancients must again bear good part of the
heresies.
blame, but in both he has additional excuses. As to the
“pestilent heresy of prose poetry,” he is at least not unwilling to argue on
the hypothesis that verse were necessary to poetry, though he does not think
it is. He is quite sure that verse is anyhow a nobler medium than prose. As
for the plays, there is still more excuse for him. His classical authorities
were quite clear on the point; and as yet there was nothing to be quoted on
the other side—at least in English. Spanish had indeed already made the
reverent title of a rhymer.”
The importance of this manifesto, both symptomatically and typically,
Its minor can hardly be exaggerated. It exposes the temper of the
shortcomings
generation which actually produced the first-fruits of the
greatest Elizabethan poetry; it served as a stimulant and encouragement to
all the successive generations of the great age. That Sidney makes mistakes
both in gross and detail—that he even makes some rather serious mistakes
from the mere “point of view of the examiner”—is of course undeniable.
He has a good deal of the merely traditional mode of Renaissance respect
for classical—and for some modern—authority. That, for instance, there is a
good deal to be said, and that not only from the point of view of Ben
Jonson, against Spenser’s half-archaic half-rustic dialect in the Calendar,
few would refuse to grant. But Theocritus did use dialect: it would not in
the least matter whether either he or Virgil did not; and if it did, what has
the modern and partly vernacular name of Sannazar to do with the matter?
It can only be replied that Spenser, by permitting “E. K.'s” annotation, did
much to invite this sort of criticism; and that Englishmen’s reluctance to
rely on the inherent powers of the English language was partly justified (for
hardly any dead poet but Chaucer and no dead prose-writers but Malory and
perhaps Berners deserved the title of “great”), partly came from very
pardonable ignorance.
It has been already observed that Sidney is by no means peremptory
about the “new versifying”; and in particular has absolutely none of the
craze against rhyme as rhyme which animated persons of every degree of
ability, from Milton to Stanyhurst, during more than a century. His remarks
on versification are, however, too scanty to need much comment.
There remain his two major heresies, the declaration that verse is not
inseparable from poetry, and the denunciation of tragi-comedy. In both the
and major authority of the ancients must again bear good part of the
heresies.
blame, but in both he has additional excuses. As to the
“pestilent heresy of prose poetry,” he is at least not unwilling to argue on
the hypothesis that verse were necessary to poetry, though he does not think
it is. He is quite sure that verse is anyhow a nobler medium than prose. As
for the plays, there is still more excuse for him. His classical authorities
were quite clear on the point; and as yet there was nothing to be quoted on
the other side—at least in English. Spanish had indeed already made the
Page 191
experiment of tragi-comic and anti-unitarian treatment; but I do not think
any of the best Spanish examples had yet appeared, and there is great
difference between the two theatres. In English itself not one single great or
even good play certainly existed on the model at Sidney’s death; and, from
what we have of what did exist, we can judge how the rough verse, the
clumsy construction, or rather absence of construction, the entire absence of
clear character-projection, and the higgledy-piggledy of huddled horrors
and horseplay, must have shocked a taste delicate in itself and nursed upon
The excuses of classical and Italian literature. And it is noteworthy that
both,
even Gorboduc, with all its regularity and “Senecation,”
does not bribe Sidney to overlook at least some of its defects. He is here, as
elsewhere,—as indeed throughout,—neither blind nor bigoted. He is only in
the position of a man very imperfectly supplied with actual experiments and
observations, confronted with a stage of creative production but just
improving from a very bad state, and relying on old and approved methods
as against new ones which had as yet had no success.
And had his mistakes been thrice what they are, the tone and temper of
and their ample his tractate would make us forgive them three times over.
compensation.
That “moving of his heart as with a trumpet” communicates
itself to his reader even now, and shows us the motion in the heart of the
nation at large that was giving us the Faerie Queene, that was to give us
Hamlet and As You Like It. What though the illustrations sometimes make
us smile? that the praise of the moral and political effects of poetry may
sometimes turn the smile into a laugh or a sigh? Poetry after all, like all
other human things, has a body and a soul. The body must be fashioned by
art—perhaps the body is art; but the soul is something else. The best poetry
will not come without careful consideration of form and subject, of kind
and style; but it will not necessarily come with this consideration. There
must be the inspiration, the enthusiasm, the afflatus, the glow; and they are
here in Sidney’s tractate. Nor must we fail to draw attention, once more, to
the difference of the English critical spirit here shown as regards both
Italian and French.
In the decade which followed,[247] three notable books of English
criticism appeared, none of them exhibiting Sidney’s afflatus, but all
showing the interest felt in the subject, and one exceeding in method, and at
least attempted range, anything that English had known, or was to know, for
more than a century. These were King James the First’s (as yet only “the
any of the best Spanish examples had yet appeared, and there is great
difference between the two theatres. In English itself not one single great or
even good play certainly existed on the model at Sidney’s death; and, from
what we have of what did exist, we can judge how the rough verse, the
clumsy construction, or rather absence of construction, the entire absence of
clear character-projection, and the higgledy-piggledy of huddled horrors
and horseplay, must have shocked a taste delicate in itself and nursed upon
The excuses of classical and Italian literature. And it is noteworthy that
both,
even Gorboduc, with all its regularity and “Senecation,”
does not bribe Sidney to overlook at least some of its defects. He is here, as
elsewhere,—as indeed throughout,—neither blind nor bigoted. He is only in
the position of a man very imperfectly supplied with actual experiments and
observations, confronted with a stage of creative production but just
improving from a very bad state, and relying on old and approved methods
as against new ones which had as yet had no success.
And had his mistakes been thrice what they are, the tone and temper of
and their ample his tractate would make us forgive them three times over.
compensation.
That “moving of his heart as with a trumpet” communicates
itself to his reader even now, and shows us the motion in the heart of the
nation at large that was giving us the Faerie Queene, that was to give us
Hamlet and As You Like It. What though the illustrations sometimes make
us smile? that the praise of the moral and political effects of poetry may
sometimes turn the smile into a laugh or a sigh? Poetry after all, like all
other human things, has a body and a soul. The body must be fashioned by
art—perhaps the body is art; but the soul is something else. The best poetry
will not come without careful consideration of form and subject, of kind
and style; but it will not necessarily come with this consideration. There
must be the inspiration, the enthusiasm, the afflatus, the glow; and they are
here in Sidney’s tractate. Nor must we fail to draw attention, once more, to
the difference of the English critical spirit here shown as regards both
Italian and French.
In the decade which followed,[247] three notable books of English
criticism appeared, none of them exhibiting Sidney’s afflatus, but all
showing the interest felt in the subject, and one exceeding in method, and at
least attempted range, anything that English had known, or was to know, for
more than a century. These were King James the First’s (as yet only “the
Page 192
King James’s Sixth’s”) Reulis and Cautelis to be observit and eschewit in
Reulis and
Cautelis.
Scottis Poesie, 1585; William Webbe’s Discourse of
English Poesie, next year; and the anonymous Arte of
English Poesie, which appeared in 1589, and which (on rather weak
evidence, but with no counter-claimant) is usually attributed to George
Puttenham.[248]
The first is the slightest; but it is interesting for more than its authorship.
It was attached to James’s Essays of a Prentice in the Divine Art, of which it
gives some rules: it shows that Buchanan had taken pains with his pupil;
and it also exhibits that slightly scholastic and “peddling,” but by no means
unreal, shrewdness and acumen which distinguished the British Solomon in
his happier moments. It is characteristic that James is not in the least afraid
of the charge of attending to mint, anise, and cumin. He plunges without
any rhetorical exordium into what he calls “just colours”—do not rhyme on
the same syllable, see that your rhyme is on accented syllables only, do not
let your first or last word exceed two or three syllables at most. This dread
of polysyllables, so curious to us, was very common at the time: it was one
of the things from which Shakespeare’s silent sovereignty delivered us by
such touches of spell-dissolving mastery as
“The multitudinous seas incarnadine.”
Then he passes to feet, of which he practically allows only the iamb; while
he very oddly gives the word “foot” to the syllable, not the combination of
syllables; and lays down the entirely arbitrary rule that the number of
“feet”—i.e., syllables—must be even, not odd. There is to be a sharp
section (“cæsura”) in the middle of every line, long or short; and the
difference of long, short, and “indifferent” (common) feet or syllables is
dwelt upon, with its influence of “flowing,” as the King calls rhythm.
Cautions on diction follow, and some against commonplaces, which look as
if the royal prentice had read Gascoigne, a suggestion confirmed elsewhere.
[249]
Invention is briefly touched; and the tract finishes with a short account
of the kinds of verse: “rhyme”—i.e., the heroic couplet, “quhilk servis
onely for lang historieis”; a heroical stanza of nine lines, rhymed
aabaabbab; ottava rima, which he calls “ballat royal”; rhyme royal, which
he calls “Troilus verse”; “rouncifals,” or “tumbling verse” (doggerel
Reulis and
Cautelis.
Scottis Poesie, 1585; William Webbe’s Discourse of
English Poesie, next year; and the anonymous Arte of
English Poesie, which appeared in 1589, and which (on rather weak
evidence, but with no counter-claimant) is usually attributed to George
Puttenham.[248]
The first is the slightest; but it is interesting for more than its authorship.
It was attached to James’s Essays of a Prentice in the Divine Art, of which it
gives some rules: it shows that Buchanan had taken pains with his pupil;
and it also exhibits that slightly scholastic and “peddling,” but by no means
unreal, shrewdness and acumen which distinguished the British Solomon in
his happier moments. It is characteristic that James is not in the least afraid
of the charge of attending to mint, anise, and cumin. He plunges without
any rhetorical exordium into what he calls “just colours”—do not rhyme on
the same syllable, see that your rhyme is on accented syllables only, do not
let your first or last word exceed two or three syllables at most. This dread
of polysyllables, so curious to us, was very common at the time: it was one
of the things from which Shakespeare’s silent sovereignty delivered us by
such touches of spell-dissolving mastery as
“The multitudinous seas incarnadine.”
Then he passes to feet, of which he practically allows only the iamb; while
he very oddly gives the word “foot” to the syllable, not the combination of
syllables; and lays down the entirely arbitrary rule that the number of
“feet”—i.e., syllables—must be even, not odd. There is to be a sharp
section (“cæsura”) in the middle of every line, long or short; and the
difference of long, short, and “indifferent” (common) feet or syllables is
dwelt upon, with its influence of “flowing,” as the King calls rhythm.
Cautions on diction follow, and some against commonplaces, which look as
if the royal prentice had read Gascoigne, a suggestion confirmed elsewhere.
[249]
Invention is briefly touched; and the tract finishes with a short account
of the kinds of verse: “rhyme”—i.e., the heroic couplet, “quhilk servis
onely for lang historieis”; a heroical stanza of nine lines, rhymed
aabaabbab; ottava rima, which he calls “ballat royal”; rhyme royal, which
he calls “Troilus verse”; “rouncifals,” or “tumbling verse” (doggerel
Page 193
alliterative, with bob and wheel); sonnets; “common” verse (octosyllable
couplets); “all kinds of broken or cuttit verse,” &c.
The tract is, as has been said, interesting, because it is an honest, and by
no means unintelligent, attempt to make an English prosody, with special
reference to a dialect which had done great things in its short day, but which
had been specially affected—not to say specially disorganised—by the
revived and bastard alliteration of the fifteenth century. Probably it was the
study of French (where the iamb had long been the only foot) which, quite
as much as mere following of Gascoigne, induced James to extend that
crippling limitation to English; and the same influence may be seen in his
insistence on the hard-and-fast section. These things (the latter of which at
least rather endeared him to Dr Guest)[250] are, of course, quite wrong; but
they express the genuine and creditable desire of the time to impose some
order on the shambling doggerel of the generation or two immediately
preceding. We find the same tendency even in Spenser, as far as rigid
dissyllabic feet and sections are concerned; and it is certainly no shame for
the Royal prentice to follow, though unknowing, the master and king of
English poetry at the time when he wrote.
One would not, however, in any case have expected from James evidence
Webbe’s of the root of the matter in poetry. There is more of this
Discourse.
root, though less scholarship and also more “craze,” in the
obscure William Webbe, of whom we know practically nothing except that
he was a Cambridge man, a friend of Robert Wilmot (the author of Tancred
and Gismund) and private tutor to the sons of Edward Sulyard of Flemyngs,
an Essex squire. The young Sulyards must have received some rather
dubious instruction in the classics, for Webbe, in his inevitable classical
exordium, thinks that Pindar was older than Homer, and that Horace came
after—apparently a good while after—Ovid, and about the same time as
Juvenal and Persius. He was, however, really and deeply interested in
English verse; and his enthusiasm for Spenser—“the new poet,” “our late
famous poet,” “the mightiest English poet that ever lived,” is, if not in every
case quite according to knowledge, absolutely right on the whole, and very
pleasant and refreshing to read. It is, indeed, the first thing of the kind that
we meet with in English; for the frequent earlier praises of Chaucer are
almost always long after date, always uncritical, and for the most part[251]
much rather expressions of a conventional tradition than of the writer’s
deliberate preference.
couplets); “all kinds of broken or cuttit verse,” &c.
The tract is, as has been said, interesting, because it is an honest, and by
no means unintelligent, attempt to make an English prosody, with special
reference to a dialect which had done great things in its short day, but which
had been specially affected—not to say specially disorganised—by the
revived and bastard alliteration of the fifteenth century. Probably it was the
study of French (where the iamb had long been the only foot) which, quite
as much as mere following of Gascoigne, induced James to extend that
crippling limitation to English; and the same influence may be seen in his
insistence on the hard-and-fast section. These things (the latter of which at
least rather endeared him to Dr Guest)[250] are, of course, quite wrong; but
they express the genuine and creditable desire of the time to impose some
order on the shambling doggerel of the generation or two immediately
preceding. We find the same tendency even in Spenser, as far as rigid
dissyllabic feet and sections are concerned; and it is certainly no shame for
the Royal prentice to follow, though unknowing, the master and king of
English poetry at the time when he wrote.
One would not, however, in any case have expected from James evidence
Webbe’s of the root of the matter in poetry. There is more of this
Discourse.
root, though less scholarship and also more “craze,” in the
obscure William Webbe, of whom we know practically nothing except that
he was a Cambridge man, a friend of Robert Wilmot (the author of Tancred
and Gismund) and private tutor to the sons of Edward Sulyard of Flemyngs,
an Essex squire. The young Sulyards must have received some rather
dubious instruction in the classics, for Webbe, in his inevitable classical
exordium, thinks that Pindar was older than Homer, and that Horace came
after—apparently a good while after—Ovid, and about the same time as
Juvenal and Persius. He was, however, really and deeply interested in
English verse; and his enthusiasm for Spenser—“the new poet,” “our late
famous poet,” “the mightiest English poet that ever lived,” is, if not in every
case quite according to knowledge, absolutely right on the whole, and very
pleasant and refreshing to read. It is, indeed, the first thing of the kind that
we meet with in English; for the frequent earlier praises of Chaucer are
almost always long after date, always uncritical, and for the most part[251]
much rather expressions of a conventional tradition than of the writer’s
deliberate preference.
Page 194
It was Webbe’s misfortune, rather than his fault, that, like his idol (but
without that idol’s resipiscence), and, like most loyal Cambridge men, with
the examples of Watson, Ascham, and Drant before them, he was bitten
Slight in with “the new versifying.” It was rather his fault than his
knowledge,
misfortune that he seems to have taken very little pains to
acquaint himself with the actual performance of English poetry. Even of
Gower he speaks as though he only knew him through the references of
Chaucer and others: though three editions of the Confessio—Caxton’s one
and Berthelette’s two—were in print in his time. His notice of Chaucer
himself is curiously vague, and almost limited to his powers as a satirist,
while he has, what must seem to most judges,[252] the astonishing idea of
discovering “good proportion of verse and meetly current style” in Lydgate,
though he reproves him for dealing with “superstitious and odd matters.”
That he thinks Piers Plowman later than Lydgate is unlucky, but not quite
criminal. He had evidently read it—indeed the book, from its kinship in
parts to the Protestant, not to say the Puritan, spirit, appealed to Elizabethan
tastes, and Crowley had already printed two editions of it, Rogers a third.
But he makes upon it the extraordinary remark, “The first I have seen that
observed the quantity of our verse without the curiosity of rhyme.” What
Webbe here means by “quantity,” or whether he had any clear deliberate
meaning at all, it is impossible to see: it is needless to say that Langland is
absolutely non-quantitative in the ordinary sense, that if “quantity” means
number of syllables he observes none, and that he can be scanned only on
the alliterative-accentual system. For Gascoigne Webbe relies on “E. K.”;
brackets “the divers works of the old Earl of Surrey” with a dozen others; is
copious on Phaer, Golding, &c., and mentions George Whetstone and
Anthony Munday in words which would be adequate for Sackville (who is
not named), and hardly too low for Spenser; while Gabriel Harvey is
deliberately ranked with Spenser himself. Yet these things, rightly valued,
are not great shame to Webbe. If he borrows from “E. K.” some scorn of the
“ragged rout of rakehell rhymers,” and adds more of his own, he specifies
nobody; and his depreciation is only the defect which almost necessarily
accompanies the quality of his enthusiasm.
His piece, though not long, is longer than those of Gascoigne, Sidney,
but enthusiastic, and King James. After a dedication (not more than
excusably laudatory) to his patron Sulyard, there is a curious preface to
“The Noble Poets of England,” who, if they had been inclined to be
without that idol’s resipiscence), and, like most loyal Cambridge men, with
the examples of Watson, Ascham, and Drant before them, he was bitten
Slight in with “the new versifying.” It was rather his fault than his
knowledge,
misfortune that he seems to have taken very little pains to
acquaint himself with the actual performance of English poetry. Even of
Gower he speaks as though he only knew him through the references of
Chaucer and others: though three editions of the Confessio—Caxton’s one
and Berthelette’s two—were in print in his time. His notice of Chaucer
himself is curiously vague, and almost limited to his powers as a satirist,
while he has, what must seem to most judges,[252] the astonishing idea of
discovering “good proportion of verse and meetly current style” in Lydgate,
though he reproves him for dealing with “superstitious and odd matters.”
That he thinks Piers Plowman later than Lydgate is unlucky, but not quite
criminal. He had evidently read it—indeed the book, from its kinship in
parts to the Protestant, not to say the Puritan, spirit, appealed to Elizabethan
tastes, and Crowley had already printed two editions of it, Rogers a third.
But he makes upon it the extraordinary remark, “The first I have seen that
observed the quantity of our verse without the curiosity of rhyme.” What
Webbe here means by “quantity,” or whether he had any clear deliberate
meaning at all, it is impossible to see: it is needless to say that Langland is
absolutely non-quantitative in the ordinary sense, that if “quantity” means
number of syllables he observes none, and that he can be scanned only on
the alliterative-accentual system. For Gascoigne Webbe relies on “E. K.”;
brackets “the divers works of the old Earl of Surrey” with a dozen others; is
copious on Phaer, Golding, &c., and mentions George Whetstone and
Anthony Munday in words which would be adequate for Sackville (who is
not named), and hardly too low for Spenser; while Gabriel Harvey is
deliberately ranked with Spenser himself. Yet these things, rightly valued,
are not great shame to Webbe. If he borrows from “E. K.” some scorn of the
“ragged rout of rakehell rhymers,” and adds more of his own, he specifies
nobody; and his depreciation is only the defect which almost necessarily
accompanies the quality of his enthusiasm.
His piece, though not long, is longer than those of Gascoigne, Sidney,
but enthusiastic, and King James. After a dedication (not more than
excusably laudatory) to his patron Sulyard, there is a curious preface to
“The Noble Poets of England,” who, if they had been inclined to be
Page 195
censorious, might have replied that Master Webbe, while complimenting
them, went about to show that the objects of his compliment did not exist.
“It is,” he says, “to be wondered of all, and is lamented of many, that, while
all other studies are used eagerly, only Poetry has found fewest friends to
amend it.” We have “as sharp and quick wits” in England as ever were
Greeks and Romans: our tongue is neither coarse nor harsh, as she has
already shown. All that is wanted is “some perfect platform or Prosodia of
versifying”: either in imitation of Greeks and Latins, or with necessary
alterations. So, if the Noble Poets would “look so low from their divine
cogitations”, and “run over the simple censure” of Master Webbe’s “weak
brain,” something might, perhaps, be done.
if uncritical, The treatise itself begins with the usual etymological
definition of poetry, as “making,” and the usual comments on the word
“Vates”; but almost immediately digresses into praise of our late famous
English poet who wrote the Shepherd’s Calendar and a wish to see his
“English Poet” (mentioned by E. K.), which, alas! none of us have ever
seen. This is succeeded, first by the classical and then by the English
historical sketches, which have been commented upon. It ends with fresh
laudation of Spenser.
Webbe then turns to the general consideration of poetry (especially from
the allegoric-didactic point of view), subject, kinds, &c.; and it is to be
observed that, though he several times cites Aristotle, he leans much more
on Horace, and on Elyot’s translations from him and other Latins. He then
proceeds to a rather unnecessarily elaborate study of the Æneid, with large
citations both from the original and from Phaer’s translation, after which he
returns once more to Spenser, and holds him up as at least the equal of
Virgil and Theocritus. Indeed the Calendar is practically his theme all
through, though he diverges from and embroiders upon it. Then, after
glancing amiably enough at Tusser, and mentioning a translation of his own
of the Georgics, which has got into the hands of some piratical publisher, he
attacks the great rhyme-question, to which he has, from the Preface
onwards, more than once alluded. Much of what he says is borrowed, or a
little advanced, from Ascham; but Webbe is less certain about the matter
than his master, and again diverges into a consideration of divers English
metres, always illustrated, where possible, from the Calendar. Still harking
back again, he decides that “the true kind of versifying” might have been
effected in English: though (as Campion, with better wits, did after him) he
them, went about to show that the objects of his compliment did not exist.
“It is,” he says, “to be wondered of all, and is lamented of many, that, while
all other studies are used eagerly, only Poetry has found fewest friends to
amend it.” We have “as sharp and quick wits” in England as ever were
Greeks and Romans: our tongue is neither coarse nor harsh, as she has
already shown. All that is wanted is “some perfect platform or Prosodia of
versifying”: either in imitation of Greeks and Latins, or with necessary
alterations. So, if the Noble Poets would “look so low from their divine
cogitations”, and “run over the simple censure” of Master Webbe’s “weak
brain,” something might, perhaps, be done.
if uncritical, The treatise itself begins with the usual etymological
definition of poetry, as “making,” and the usual comments on the word
“Vates”; but almost immediately digresses into praise of our late famous
English poet who wrote the Shepherd’s Calendar and a wish to see his
“English Poet” (mentioned by E. K.), which, alas! none of us have ever
seen. This is succeeded, first by the classical and then by the English
historical sketches, which have been commented upon. It ends with fresh
laudation of Spenser.
Webbe then turns to the general consideration of poetry (especially from
the allegoric-didactic point of view), subject, kinds, &c.; and it is to be
observed that, though he several times cites Aristotle, he leans much more
on Horace, and on Elyot’s translations from him and other Latins. He then
proceeds to a rather unnecessarily elaborate study of the Æneid, with large
citations both from the original and from Phaer’s translation, after which he
returns once more to Spenser, and holds him up as at least the equal of
Virgil and Theocritus. Indeed the Calendar is practically his theme all
through, though he diverges from and embroiders upon it. Then, after
glancing amiably enough at Tusser, and mentioning a translation of his own
of the Georgics, which has got into the hands of some piratical publisher, he
attacks the great rhyme-question, to which he has, from the Preface
onwards, more than once alluded. Much of what he says is borrowed, or a
little advanced, from Ascham; but Webbe is less certain about the matter
than his master, and again diverges into a consideration of divers English
metres, always illustrated, where possible, from the Calendar. Still harking
back again, he decides that “the true kind of versifying” might have been
effected in English: though (as Campion, with better wits, did after him) he
Page 196
questions whether some alteration of the actual Greek and Latin forms is
not required. He gives a list of classical feet (fairly correct, except that he
makes the odd confusion of a trochee and a tribrach), and discusses the
liberties which must be taken with English to adjust it to some of them.
Elegiacs, he thinks, will not do: Hexameters and Sapphics go best. And, to
prove this, he is rash enough to give versions of his own, in the former
metre, of Virgil’s first and second eclogues, in the latter of Spenser’s
beautiful
“Ye dainty nymphs that in this blessed brook.”
It is enough to say that he succeeds in stripping all three of every rag of
poetry. A translation of Fabricius’[253] prose syllabus of Horace’s rules,
gathered not merely out of the Ep. ad Pisones but elsewhere, and an
“epilogue,” modest as to himself, sanguine as to what will happen when
“the rabble of bald rhymes is turned to famous works,” concludes the piece.
in appreciation. On the whole, to use the hackneyed old phrase once
more, we could have better spared a better critic than Webbe, who gives us
—in a fashion invaluable to map-makers of the early exploration of English
criticism—the workings of a mind furnished with no original genius for
poetry, and not much for literature, not very extensively or accurately
erudite, but intensely interested in matters literary, and especially in matters
poetical, generously enthusiastic for such good things as were presented to
it, not without some mother-wit even in its crazes, and encouraged in those
crazes not, as in Harvey’s case, by vanity, pedantry, and bad taste, but by its
very love of letters. Average dispositions of this kind were, as a rule,
diverted either into active life—very much for the good of the nation—or—
not at all for its good—into the acrid disputes of hot-gospelling and
Puritanism. Webbe, to the best of his modest powers, was a devotee of
literature: for which let him have due honour.
Puttenham—or whosoever else it was, if it was not Puttenham[254]—has
some points of advantage, and one great one of disadvantage, in comparison
Puttenham’s (?) with Webbe. In poetical faculty there is very little to choose
Art of English
Poesie.
between them—the abundant specimens of his own
powers, which the author or The Art of English Poesie
gives (and which are eked out by a late copy of one of the works referred to,
Partheniades), deserve the gibes they receive in one of our scanty early
not required. He gives a list of classical feet (fairly correct, except that he
makes the odd confusion of a trochee and a tribrach), and discusses the
liberties which must be taken with English to adjust it to some of them.
Elegiacs, he thinks, will not do: Hexameters and Sapphics go best. And, to
prove this, he is rash enough to give versions of his own, in the former
metre, of Virgil’s first and second eclogues, in the latter of Spenser’s
beautiful
“Ye dainty nymphs that in this blessed brook.”
It is enough to say that he succeeds in stripping all three of every rag of
poetry. A translation of Fabricius’[253] prose syllabus of Horace’s rules,
gathered not merely out of the Ep. ad Pisones but elsewhere, and an
“epilogue,” modest as to himself, sanguine as to what will happen when
“the rabble of bald rhymes is turned to famous works,” concludes the piece.
in appreciation. On the whole, to use the hackneyed old phrase once
more, we could have better spared a better critic than Webbe, who gives us
—in a fashion invaluable to map-makers of the early exploration of English
criticism—the workings of a mind furnished with no original genius for
poetry, and not much for literature, not very extensively or accurately
erudite, but intensely interested in matters literary, and especially in matters
poetical, generously enthusiastic for such good things as were presented to
it, not without some mother-wit even in its crazes, and encouraged in those
crazes not, as in Harvey’s case, by vanity, pedantry, and bad taste, but by its
very love of letters. Average dispositions of this kind were, as a rule,
diverted either into active life—very much for the good of the nation—or—
not at all for its good—into the acrid disputes of hot-gospelling and
Puritanism. Webbe, to the best of his modest powers, was a devotee of
literature: for which let him have due honour.
Puttenham—or whosoever else it was, if it was not Puttenham[254]—has
some points of advantage, and one great one of disadvantage, in comparison
Puttenham’s (?) with Webbe. In poetical faculty there is very little to choose
Art of English
Poesie.
between them—the abundant specimens of his own
powers, which the author or The Art of English Poesie
gives (and which are eked out by a late copy of one of the works referred to,
Partheniades), deserve the gibes they receive in one of our scanty early
Page 197
notices of the book, that by Sir John Harington (v. infra). On the other hand,
Puttenham has very little of that engaging enthusiasm which atones for so
much in his contemporary. But this very want of enthusiasm somewhat
prepares us for, though it need not necessarily accompany, merits which we
do not find in Webbe, considered as a critic. The Art of English Poesy,
which, as has been said, appeared in 1589, three years later than Webbe’s,
but which, from some allusions, may have been written, or at least begun,
before it, and which, from other allusions, must have been the work of a
man well advanced in middle life, is methodically composed, very capable
in range and plan, and supported with a by no means contemptible
erudition, and no inconsiderable supply of judgment and common-sense. It
was unfortunate for Puttenham that he was just a little too old: that having
been—as from a fairly precise statement of his he must have been—born
cir. 1530-35, he belonged to the early and uncertain generation of
Elizabethan men of letters, the Googes and Turbervilles, and Gascoignes,
not to the generation of Sidney and Spenser, much less to that of
Shakespeare and Jonson. But what he had he gave: and it is far from
valueless.
The book is “to-deled” (as the author of the Ancren Riwle would say) into
three books—“Of Poets and Poesie,” “Of Proportion,” and “Of Ornament.”
Its erudition. It begins, as usual, with observations on the words poet and
maker, references to the ancients, &c.; but this exordium, which is fitly
written in a plain but useful and agreeable style, is commendably short. The
writer lays it down, with reasons, that there may be an Art of English as of
Latin and Greek poetry; but cannot refrain from the same sort of “writing at
large” as to poets being the first philosophers, &c., which we have so often
seen.[255] Indeed we must lay our account with the almost certain fact that all
writers of this period had seen Sidney’s Defence at least in MS. or had
heard of it. He comes closer to business with his remarks on the irreption of
rhyme into Greek and Latin poetry; and shows a better knowledge of
leonine and other mediæval Latin verse, not merely than Webbe, but even
than Ascham. A very long section then deals with the question—all-
interesting to a man of the Renaissance—in what reputation poets were with
princes of old, and how they be now contemptible (wherein Puttenham
shows a rather remarkable acquaintance with modern European literature),
and then turns to the subject or matter of poesy and the forms thereof,
handling the latter at great length, and with a fair sprinkle of literary
Puttenham has very little of that engaging enthusiasm which atones for so
much in his contemporary. But this very want of enthusiasm somewhat
prepares us for, though it need not necessarily accompany, merits which we
do not find in Webbe, considered as a critic. The Art of English Poesy,
which, as has been said, appeared in 1589, three years later than Webbe’s,
but which, from some allusions, may have been written, or at least begun,
before it, and which, from other allusions, must have been the work of a
man well advanced in middle life, is methodically composed, very capable
in range and plan, and supported with a by no means contemptible
erudition, and no inconsiderable supply of judgment and common-sense. It
was unfortunate for Puttenham that he was just a little too old: that having
been—as from a fairly precise statement of his he must have been—born
cir. 1530-35, he belonged to the early and uncertain generation of
Elizabethan men of letters, the Googes and Turbervilles, and Gascoignes,
not to the generation of Sidney and Spenser, much less to that of
Shakespeare and Jonson. But what he had he gave: and it is far from
valueless.
The book is “to-deled” (as the author of the Ancren Riwle would say) into
three books—“Of Poets and Poesie,” “Of Proportion,” and “Of Ornament.”
Its erudition. It begins, as usual, with observations on the words poet and
maker, references to the ancients, &c.; but this exordium, which is fitly
written in a plain but useful and agreeable style, is commendably short. The
writer lays it down, with reasons, that there may be an Art of English as of
Latin and Greek poetry; but cannot refrain from the same sort of “writing at
large” as to poets being the first philosophers, &c., which we have so often
seen.[255] Indeed we must lay our account with the almost certain fact that all
writers of this period had seen Sidney’s Defence at least in MS. or had
heard of it. He comes closer to business with his remarks on the irreption of
rhyme into Greek and Latin poetry; and shows a better knowledge of
leonine and other mediæval Latin verse, not merely than Webbe, but even
than Ascham. A very long section then deals with the question—all-
interesting to a man of the Renaissance—in what reputation poets were with
princes of old, and how they be now contemptible (wherein Puttenham
shows a rather remarkable acquaintance with modern European literature),
and then turns to the subject or matter of poesy and the forms thereof,
handling the latter at great length, and with a fair sprinkle of literary
Page 198
anecdote. At last he comes to English poetry; and though, as we might
expect, he does not go behind the late fourteenth century, he shows rather
more knowledge than Webbe and (not without slips here and elsewhere) far
more comparative judgment. It must, however, be admitted that, engaging
as is his description of Sir Walter Raleigh’s “vein most lofty, insolent, and
passionate,” he does not show to advantage in the patronising glance in
passing at “that other gentleman who wrote the late Shepherd’s Calendar,”
contrasted with the description of the Queen our Sovereign lady, “whose
Muse easily surmounteth all the rest in any kind on which it may please her
Majesty to employ her pen.” But here the allowance comes in: the stoutest
Tory of later days can never wholly share, though he may remotely
comprehend, the curious mixture of religious, romantic, patriotic, amatory,
and interested feelings with which the men of the sixteenth century wrote
about Gloriana.
The second book deals with Proportion, in which word Puttenham
includes almost everything belonging to Prosody in its widest sense—staff,
stanza, measure, metres, and feet, “cæsure,” rhyme, accent, cadence,
situation (by which he means the arrangement of the rhymes), and
Systematic proportion in figure. On most of these heads he speaks
arrangement
more or less in accordance with his fellows (though he very
noticeably abstains from extreme commendation or condemnation of
rhyme), save that, for the moment, he seems to neglect the “new
versifying.” It is, however, but for a moment. After his chapters on
“proportion” in figure (the fanciful egg, wheel, lozenge, &c., which he
himself argues for, and which were to make critics of the Addisonian type
half-angry and half-sad), he deals with the subject.
About this “new versifying” he is evidently in two minds. He had
glanced at it before (and refers to the glance now)[256] as “a nice and
scholastic curiosity.” However, “for the information of our young makers,
and pleasure to those who be delighted in novelty, and to the intent that we
may not seem by ignorance or oversight to omit,”[257] he “will now deal with
it.” Which he does at great length; and, at any rate sometimes, with a clearer
perception of the prosodic values than any other, even Spenser, had yet
shown. But he does not seem quite at home in the matter, and glides off to a
discussion of feet—classical feet—in the usual rhymed English verse.
The third book is longer than the first and second put together, and is
evidently that in which the author himself took most pleasure. It is called
expect, he does not go behind the late fourteenth century, he shows rather
more knowledge than Webbe and (not without slips here and elsewhere) far
more comparative judgment. It must, however, be admitted that, engaging
as is his description of Sir Walter Raleigh’s “vein most lofty, insolent, and
passionate,” he does not show to advantage in the patronising glance in
passing at “that other gentleman who wrote the late Shepherd’s Calendar,”
contrasted with the description of the Queen our Sovereign lady, “whose
Muse easily surmounteth all the rest in any kind on which it may please her
Majesty to employ her pen.” But here the allowance comes in: the stoutest
Tory of later days can never wholly share, though he may remotely
comprehend, the curious mixture of religious, romantic, patriotic, amatory,
and interested feelings with which the men of the sixteenth century wrote
about Gloriana.
The second book deals with Proportion, in which word Puttenham
includes almost everything belonging to Prosody in its widest sense—staff,
stanza, measure, metres, and feet, “cæsure,” rhyme, accent, cadence,
situation (by which he means the arrangement of the rhymes), and
Systematic proportion in figure. On most of these heads he speaks
arrangement
more or less in accordance with his fellows (though he very
noticeably abstains from extreme commendation or condemnation of
rhyme), save that, for the moment, he seems to neglect the “new
versifying.” It is, however, but for a moment. After his chapters on
“proportion” in figure (the fanciful egg, wheel, lozenge, &c., which he
himself argues for, and which were to make critics of the Addisonian type
half-angry and half-sad), he deals with the subject.
About this “new versifying” he is evidently in two minds. He had
glanced at it before (and refers to the glance now)[256] as “a nice and
scholastic curiosity.” However, “for the information of our young makers,
and pleasure to those who be delighted in novelty, and to the intent that we
may not seem by ignorance or oversight to omit,”[257] he “will now deal with
it.” Which he does at great length; and, at any rate sometimes, with a clearer
perception of the prosodic values than any other, even Spenser, had yet
shown. But he does not seem quite at home in the matter, and glides off to a
discussion of feet—classical feet—in the usual rhymed English verse.
The third book is longer than the first and second put together, and is
evidently that in which the author himself took most pleasure. It is called
Page 199
and exuberant “Of Ornament,” but practically deals with the whole
indulgence in
Figures.
question of lexis or style, so that it is at least common to
Rhetoric and Poetics. In one respect, too, it belongs more
specially to the former, in that it contains the most elaborate treatment of
rhetorical figures to be found, up to its time, in English literature. Full
eighty pages are occupied with the catalogue of these “Figures Auricular”
wherein Puttenham (sometimes rather badly served by his pen or his
printer) ransacks the Greek rhetoricians, and compiles a list (with
explanations and examples) of over one hundred and twenty. It is preceded
and followed by more general remarks, of which some account must be
given.
Beginning with an exordial defence of ornament in general, Puttenham
proceeds to argue that set speeches, as in Parliament, not merely may but
ought to be couched in something more than a conversational style. This
added grace must be given by (1) Language, (2) Style, (3) Figures. On
diction he has remarks both shrewd and interesting, strongly commending
the language of the Court and of the best citizens, not provincial speech, or
that of seaports, or of universities, or in other ways merely technical. “The
usual speech of the Court and that of London and the shires lying about
London, within ten miles and not much above” is his norm. There is also a
noteworthy and very early reference to English dictionaries, and a cautious
section on neologisms introduced from other tongues to fill wants. Style he
will have reached by “a constant and continual tenor of writing,” and gives
the usual subdivision of high, low, and middle. And so to his Figures.
The details and illustrations of the long catalogue of these invite
comment, but we must abstain therefrom. When the list is finished,
Puttenham returns to his generalities with a discussion of the main principle
of ornament, which he calls Decorum or “Decency,” dividing and
illustrating the kinds of it into choice of subject, diction, delivery, and other
things, not without good craftsmanship, and with a profusion of anecdotes
chiefly of the Helotry kind. He then (rather oddly, but not out of keeping
with his classical models) has a chapter of decorum in behaviour, turns to
the necessity of concealing art, and ends with a highly flattering conclusion
to the Queen.
We have yet to mention some minorities; less briefly, the two champions
—Campion and Daniel, who brought the question of “Rhyme v. 'Verse'” to
final arbitrament of battle; the great name (not so great here as elsewhere)
indulgence in
Figures.
question of lexis or style, so that it is at least common to
Rhetoric and Poetics. In one respect, too, it belongs more
specially to the former, in that it contains the most elaborate treatment of
rhetorical figures to be found, up to its time, in English literature. Full
eighty pages are occupied with the catalogue of these “Figures Auricular”
wherein Puttenham (sometimes rather badly served by his pen or his
printer) ransacks the Greek rhetoricians, and compiles a list (with
explanations and examples) of over one hundred and twenty. It is preceded
and followed by more general remarks, of which some account must be
given.
Beginning with an exordial defence of ornament in general, Puttenham
proceeds to argue that set speeches, as in Parliament, not merely may but
ought to be couched in something more than a conversational style. This
added grace must be given by (1) Language, (2) Style, (3) Figures. On
diction he has remarks both shrewd and interesting, strongly commending
the language of the Court and of the best citizens, not provincial speech, or
that of seaports, or of universities, or in other ways merely technical. “The
usual speech of the Court and that of London and the shires lying about
London, within ten miles and not much above” is his norm. There is also a
noteworthy and very early reference to English dictionaries, and a cautious
section on neologisms introduced from other tongues to fill wants. Style he
will have reached by “a constant and continual tenor of writing,” and gives
the usual subdivision of high, low, and middle. And so to his Figures.
The details and illustrations of the long catalogue of these invite
comment, but we must abstain therefrom. When the list is finished,
Puttenham returns to his generalities with a discussion of the main principle
of ornament, which he calls Decorum or “Decency,” dividing and
illustrating the kinds of it into choice of subject, diction, delivery, and other
things, not without good craftsmanship, and with a profusion of anecdotes
chiefly of the Helotry kind. He then (rather oddly, but not out of keeping
with his classical models) has a chapter of decorum in behaviour, turns to
the necessity of concealing art, and ends with a highly flattering conclusion
to the Queen.
We have yet to mention some minorities; less briefly, the two champions
—Campion and Daniel, who brought the question of “Rhyme v. 'Verse'” to
final arbitrament of battle; the great name (not so great here as elsewhere)
Page 200
of Francis Bacon; and lastly, one who, if representative of a further stage, is
far the greatest of Elizabethan critics, and perhaps the only English critic
who deserves the adjective great before Dryden.
The earliest (1591) of these is Sir John Harington, in the prefatory
matter[258] of his translation of the Orlando, which contains the gibe at
Minors: Puttenham above referred to. It is otherwise much indebted
Harington,
Meres, Webster,
to Sidney, from whom, however, Harington differs in
Bolton, &c. allowing more scope to allegorical interpretation. Then
comes Francis Meres, whose Palladis Tamia[259] (1598) is to
be eternally mentioned with gratitude, because it gives us our one real
document about the order of Shakespeare’s plays, but is quite childish in the
critical characterisation which it not uninterestingly attempts. Webster’s
equally famous, and universally known, epitheting of the work of
Shakespeare and others in the Preface to The White Devil (1612) adds yet
another instance of the short sight of contemporaries; but tempting as it may
be to comment on these, it would not become a Historian of Criticism to do
so in this context. Sir W. Vaughan in The Golden Grove (1600) had earlier
dealt, and Bolton[260] in his Hypercritica (1616), and Peacham in his
Complete Gentleman (1622), were later to deal, with Poetry, but in terms
adding nothing to, and probably borrowed from, the utterances of Sidney,
Webbe, and Puttenham. Their contributions are “sma’ sums,” as Bailie
Nicol Jarvie says, and we must neglect them.
The most interesting literary result of the “new versifying” craze is to be
found, without doubt, in the Observations in the Art of English Poesy of
Thomas Campion[261] and the subsequent Defence of Rhyme of Samuel
Campion and Daniel. The former was issued in 1602, and the latter still
his
Observations.
later:—that is to say more than twenty years after Spenser’s
and Harvey’s letters, and more than thirty after the
appearance—let alone the writing—of Ascham’s Schoolmaster. In the
interval the true system of English prosody had put itself practically beyond
all real danger; but the critical craze had never received its quietus. Nay, it
survived to animate Milton: and there are persons whom we could only
name for the sake of honour, and who do not seem to see that it is dead even
yet. Both the writers mentioned were true poets: and the curious thing is
that the more exquisitely romantic poet of the two was the partisan of
classical prosody. But Campion—who dedicated his book to Lord
Buckhurst, the doyen (except poor old Churchyard) of English poetry at the
far the greatest of Elizabethan critics, and perhaps the only English critic
who deserves the adjective great before Dryden.
The earliest (1591) of these is Sir John Harington, in the prefatory
matter[258] of his translation of the Orlando, which contains the gibe at
Minors: Puttenham above referred to. It is otherwise much indebted
Harington,
Meres, Webster,
to Sidney, from whom, however, Harington differs in
Bolton, &c. allowing more scope to allegorical interpretation. Then
comes Francis Meres, whose Palladis Tamia[259] (1598) is to
be eternally mentioned with gratitude, because it gives us our one real
document about the order of Shakespeare’s plays, but is quite childish in the
critical characterisation which it not uninterestingly attempts. Webster’s
equally famous, and universally known, epitheting of the work of
Shakespeare and others in the Preface to The White Devil (1612) adds yet
another instance of the short sight of contemporaries; but tempting as it may
be to comment on these, it would not become a Historian of Criticism to do
so in this context. Sir W. Vaughan in The Golden Grove (1600) had earlier
dealt, and Bolton[260] in his Hypercritica (1616), and Peacham in his
Complete Gentleman (1622), were later to deal, with Poetry, but in terms
adding nothing to, and probably borrowed from, the utterances of Sidney,
Webbe, and Puttenham. Their contributions are “sma’ sums,” as Bailie
Nicol Jarvie says, and we must neglect them.
The most interesting literary result of the “new versifying” craze is to be
found, without doubt, in the Observations in the Art of English Poesy of
Thomas Campion[261] and the subsequent Defence of Rhyme of Samuel
Campion and Daniel. The former was issued in 1602, and the latter still
his
Observations.
later:—that is to say more than twenty years after Spenser’s
and Harvey’s letters, and more than thirty after the
appearance—let alone the writing—of Ascham’s Schoolmaster. In the
interval the true system of English prosody had put itself practically beyond
all real danger; but the critical craze had never received its quietus. Nay, it
survived to animate Milton: and there are persons whom we could only
name for the sake of honour, and who do not seem to see that it is dead even
yet. Both the writers mentioned were true poets: and the curious thing is
that the more exquisitely romantic poet of the two was the partisan of
classical prosody. But Campion—who dedicated his book to Lord
Buckhurst, the doyen (except poor old Churchyard) of English poetry at the
Page 201
time, and one whose few but noble exercises in it need hardly vail their
crest to any contemporary poetry but Spenser’s and Shakespeare’s—was far
too wise a man, as well as far too good a poet, to champion any longer the
break-neck and break-jaw hexameters of Harvey and Stanyhurst. We have
seen that almost from the first there had been questions of heart among the
partisans of the New Versifying. That English is not tolerant of dactyls—
that the dactyl, do what you will, in English, will tilt itself into an anapæst
with an anacrusis—is a truth which no impartial student of metre with an
ear, and with an eye to cover the history of English poetry, can deny. Some
even of these pioneers had seen this: Campion has the boldness to declare it
in the words, “It [the dactylic hexameter] is an attempt altogether against
the nature of our language.” But though he was bold so far, he was not quite
bold enough. He could not surmount the queer Renaissance objection to
rhyme. That all the arguments against the “barbarism” of this tell equally
against Christianity, chivalry, the English constitution, the existence of
America, gunpowder, glass-windows, coal-fires, and a very large number of
other institutions of some usefulness, never seems to have occurred to any
of these good folk. But no man can escape his time. Campion, not noticing,
or not choosing to notice, the intensely English quality of the anapæst,
limits, or almost limits, our verse to iambs and trochees. It was possible for
him—though it still appears to be difficult for some—to recognise the
tribrach, the mere suggestion of which in English verse threw Dr Guest into
a paroxysm of “!!!!’s,” but which exists as certainly as does the iamb itself.
On the contrary he shows himself in advance of Guest, and of most behind
Guest to his own time, by admitting tribrachs in the third and fifth places.
Nay, he even sees that a trochee may take the place of an iamb (Milton’s
probably borrowed secret) in the first place, though his unerring ear (I think
there is no verse of Campion’s that is unmusical) insists on some other foot
than an iamb following—otherwise, he says, “it would too much drink up
the verse.” But, on the whole, he sets himself to work, a self-condemned
drudge, to make iambic and trochaic verses without rhyme. And on these
two, with certain licences, he arranges schemes of English elegiacs,
anacreontics, and the rest. Some of the examples of these are charming
poems, notably the famous “Rose-Cheeked Laura,” and the beautiful
“Constant to None,” while Campion’s subsequent remarks on English
quantity are among the acutest on the subject. But the whole thing has on it
the curse of “flying in the face of nature.” You have only to take one of
crest to any contemporary poetry but Spenser’s and Shakespeare’s—was far
too wise a man, as well as far too good a poet, to champion any longer the
break-neck and break-jaw hexameters of Harvey and Stanyhurst. We have
seen that almost from the first there had been questions of heart among the
partisans of the New Versifying. That English is not tolerant of dactyls—
that the dactyl, do what you will, in English, will tilt itself into an anapæst
with an anacrusis—is a truth which no impartial student of metre with an
ear, and with an eye to cover the history of English poetry, can deny. Some
even of these pioneers had seen this: Campion has the boldness to declare it
in the words, “It [the dactylic hexameter] is an attempt altogether against
the nature of our language.” But though he was bold so far, he was not quite
bold enough. He could not surmount the queer Renaissance objection to
rhyme. That all the arguments against the “barbarism” of this tell equally
against Christianity, chivalry, the English constitution, the existence of
America, gunpowder, glass-windows, coal-fires, and a very large number of
other institutions of some usefulness, never seems to have occurred to any
of these good folk. But no man can escape his time. Campion, not noticing,
or not choosing to notice, the intensely English quality of the anapæst,
limits, or almost limits, our verse to iambs and trochees. It was possible for
him—though it still appears to be difficult for some—to recognise the
tribrach, the mere suggestion of which in English verse threw Dr Guest into
a paroxysm of “!!!!’s,” but which exists as certainly as does the iamb itself.
On the contrary he shows himself in advance of Guest, and of most behind
Guest to his own time, by admitting tribrachs in the third and fifth places.
Nay, he even sees that a trochee may take the place of an iamb (Milton’s
probably borrowed secret) in the first place, though his unerring ear (I think
there is no verse of Campion’s that is unmusical) insists on some other foot
than an iamb following—otherwise, he says, “it would too much drink up
the verse.” But, on the whole, he sets himself to work, a self-condemned
drudge, to make iambic and trochaic verses without rhyme. And on these
two, with certain licences, he arranges schemes of English elegiacs,
anacreontics, and the rest. Some of the examples of these are charming
poems, notably the famous “Rose-Cheeked Laura,” and the beautiful
“Constant to None,” while Campion’s subsequent remarks on English
quantity are among the acutest on the subject. But the whole thing has on it
the curse of “flying in the face of nature.” You have only to take one of
Page 202
Campion’s own poems (written mostly after the Observations) in natural
rhyme, and the difference will be seen at once. It simply comes to this—that
the good rhymeless poems would be infinitely better with rhyme, and that
the bad ones, while they might sometimes be absolutely saved by the
despised invention of Huns and Vandals, are always made worse by its
absence.
In the preface of Daniel’s answering Defence of Rhyme to all the worthy
lovers and learned professors [thereof] within His Majesty’s dominions,[262]
he says that he wrote it “about a year since,” upon the “great reproach”
given by Campion, and some give it the date of 1603 or even 1602; but Dr
Daniel and his Grosart’s reprint is dated five years later. The learned
Defence of
Rhyme.
gentleman to whom it was specially written was no less a
person than William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, whom
some of us (acknowledging that the matter is no matter) do not yet give up
as “Mr W. H.” The advocate affects, with fair rhetorical excuse (though of
course he must have known that the craze was nearly half a century old, and
had at least not been discouraged by his patron’s uncle nearly a generation
before), to regard the attack on rhyming as something new, as merely
concerned with the “measures” of Campion. Daniel, always a gentleman,
deals handsomely with his antagonist, whom he does not name, but
describes as “this detractor whose commendable rhymes, albeit now an
enemy to rhyme, have given heretofore to the world the best notice of his
worth,” and as a man “of fair parts and good reputation.” And having put
himself on the best ground, in this way, from the point of view of morals
and courtesy, he does the same in matter of argument by refusing to attack
Campion’s “numbers” in themselves (“We could,” he says well, “have
allowed of his numbers, had he not graced his rhymes”), and by seizing the
unassailable position given by custom and nature—“Custom that is before
all law; Nature that is above all art.” In fact, not Jonson himself, and
certainly none else before Jonson, has comprehended, or at least put, the
truth of the matter as Daniel puts it, that arbitrary laws imposed on the
poetry of any nation are absurd—that the verse of a language is such as best
consorts with the nature of that language. This seems a truism enough
perhaps; but it may be very much doubted whether all critics recognise it,
and its consequences, even at the present day. And it is certain that we may
search other early English critics in vain for a frank recognition of it. With
an equally bold and sure foot he strides over the silly stuff about “invention
rhyme, and the difference will be seen at once. It simply comes to this—that
the good rhymeless poems would be infinitely better with rhyme, and that
the bad ones, while they might sometimes be absolutely saved by the
despised invention of Huns and Vandals, are always made worse by its
absence.
In the preface of Daniel’s answering Defence of Rhyme to all the worthy
lovers and learned professors [thereof] within His Majesty’s dominions,[262]
he says that he wrote it “about a year since,” upon the “great reproach”
given by Campion, and some give it the date of 1603 or even 1602; but Dr
Daniel and his Grosart’s reprint is dated five years later. The learned
Defence of
Rhyme.
gentleman to whom it was specially written was no less a
person than William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, whom
some of us (acknowledging that the matter is no matter) do not yet give up
as “Mr W. H.” The advocate affects, with fair rhetorical excuse (though of
course he must have known that the craze was nearly half a century old, and
had at least not been discouraged by his patron’s uncle nearly a generation
before), to regard the attack on rhyming as something new, as merely
concerned with the “measures” of Campion. Daniel, always a gentleman,
deals handsomely with his antagonist, whom he does not name, but
describes as “this detractor whose commendable rhymes, albeit now an
enemy to rhyme, have given heretofore to the world the best notice of his
worth,” and as a man “of fair parts and good reputation.” And having put
himself on the best ground, in this way, from the point of view of morals
and courtesy, he does the same in matter of argument by refusing to attack
Campion’s “numbers” in themselves (“We could,” he says well, “have
allowed of his numbers, had he not graced his rhymes”), and by seizing the
unassailable position given by custom and nature—“Custom that is before
all law; Nature that is above all art.” In fact, not Jonson himself, and
certainly none else before Jonson, has comprehended, or at least put, the
truth of the matter as Daniel puts it, that arbitrary laws imposed on the
poetry of any nation are absurd—that the verse of a language is such as best
consorts with the nature of that language. This seems a truism enough
perhaps; but it may be very much doubted whether all critics recognise it,
and its consequences, even at the present day. And it is certain that we may
search other early English critics in vain for a frank recognition of it. With
an equally bold and sure foot he strides over the silly stuff about “invention
Page 203
of barbarous ages” and the like. Whatever its origin (and about this he
shows a wise carelessness), it is “an excellence added to this work of
measure and harmony, far happier than any proportion quantity could ever
show.” It “gives to the ear an echo of a delightful report,” and to the
memory “a deeper impression of what is delivered.” He is less original (as
well as, some may think, less happy) in distinguishing the accent of English
from the quantity of the classical tongues; but the classicisers before
Campion, if not Campion himself, had made such a mess of quantity, and
had played such havoc with accent, that he may well be excused. The
universality of rhyme is urged, and once more says Daniel (with that happy
audacity in the contemning of vain things which belongs to the born
exploders of crazes), “If the barbarian likes it, it is because it sways the
affections of the barbarian; if civil nations practise it, it works upon their
hearts; if all, then it has a power in nature upon all.” But it will be said, “Ill
customs are to be left.” No doubt: but the question is begged. Who made
this custom “ill”? Rhyme aims at pleasing—and it pleases. Suffer then the
world to enjoy that which it knows and what it likes, for all the tyrannical
rules of rhetoric cannot make it otherwise. Why are we to be a mere servum
pecus, only to imitate the Greeks and Latins? Their way was natural to
them: let ours be so to us. “Why should laboursome curiosity still lay
affliction on our best delights?” Moreover, to a spirit whom nature hath
“fitted for that mystery,” rhyme is no impediment, “but rather giveth wings
to mount.” The necessary historical survey follows, with a surprising and
very welcome justification of the Middle Ages against both Classics and
Renaissance. “Let us,” says this true Daniel come to judgment, “go not
further, but look upon the wonderful architecture of the State of England,
and see whether they were unlearned times that could give it such a form?”
And if politically, why not poetically? Some acute and, in the other sense,
rather sharp criticism of Campion’s details follows, with a few apologetic
remarks for mixture of masculine and feminine rhymes on his own part: and
the whole concludes in an admirable peroration with a great end-note to it.
Not easily shall we find, either in Elizabethan times or in any other, a
happier combination of solid good sense with eager poetic sentiment, of
sound scholarship with wide-glancing intelligence, than in this little tractate
of some thirty or forty ordinary pages, which dispelled the delusions of two
generations, and made the poetical fortune of England sure.
shows a wise carelessness), it is “an excellence added to this work of
measure and harmony, far happier than any proportion quantity could ever
show.” It “gives to the ear an echo of a delightful report,” and to the
memory “a deeper impression of what is delivered.” He is less original (as
well as, some may think, less happy) in distinguishing the accent of English
from the quantity of the classical tongues; but the classicisers before
Campion, if not Campion himself, had made such a mess of quantity, and
had played such havoc with accent, that he may well be excused. The
universality of rhyme is urged, and once more says Daniel (with that happy
audacity in the contemning of vain things which belongs to the born
exploders of crazes), “If the barbarian likes it, it is because it sways the
affections of the barbarian; if civil nations practise it, it works upon their
hearts; if all, then it has a power in nature upon all.” But it will be said, “Ill
customs are to be left.” No doubt: but the question is begged. Who made
this custom “ill”? Rhyme aims at pleasing—and it pleases. Suffer then the
world to enjoy that which it knows and what it likes, for all the tyrannical
rules of rhetoric cannot make it otherwise. Why are we to be a mere servum
pecus, only to imitate the Greeks and Latins? Their way was natural to
them: let ours be so to us. “Why should laboursome curiosity still lay
affliction on our best delights?” Moreover, to a spirit whom nature hath
“fitted for that mystery,” rhyme is no impediment, “but rather giveth wings
to mount.” The necessary historical survey follows, with a surprising and
very welcome justification of the Middle Ages against both Classics and
Renaissance. “Let us,” says this true Daniel come to judgment, “go not
further, but look upon the wonderful architecture of the State of England,
and see whether they were unlearned times that could give it such a form?”
And if politically, why not poetically? Some acute and, in the other sense,
rather sharp criticism of Campion’s details follows, with a few apologetic
remarks for mixture of masculine and feminine rhymes on his own part: and
the whole concludes in an admirable peroration with a great end-note to it.
Not easily shall we find, either in Elizabethan times or in any other, a
happier combination of solid good sense with eager poetic sentiment, of
sound scholarship with wide-glancing intelligence, than in this little tractate
of some thirty or forty ordinary pages, which dispelled the delusions of two
generations, and made the poetical fortune of England sure.
Page 204
The contributions of “large-browed Verulam” to criticism have
sometimes been spoken of with reverence: and it is not uncommon to find,
amid the scanty classics of the subject, which until recently have been
recommended to the notice of inquirers, not merely a place, but a place of
very high honour, assigned to The Advancement of Learning. Actual,
Bacon. unprejudiced, and to some extent expert, reference to the
works, however, will not find very much to justify this estimate: and,
indeed, a little thought, assisted by very moderate knowledge, would suffice
to make it rather surprising that Bacon should give us so much, than
disappointing that he should give us little or nothing. A producer of
literature who at his best has few superiors, and a user of it for purposes of
quotation, who would deserve the name of genius for this use alone if he
had no other title thereto—Bacon was yet by no means inclined by his main
interests and objects, or by his temperament, either towards great exaltation
of letters, or towards accurate and painstaking examination of them. Indeed,
it is in him—almost first of all men, certainly first of all great modern men
—that we find that partisan opposition between literature and science which
has constantly developed since. It is true that his favourite method of
examination into “forms” might seem tempting as applied to literature; and
that it would, incidentally if not directly, have yielded more solid results
than his Will-o'-the-wisp chase of the Form of Heat. But this very craze of
his may suggest that if he had undertaken literary criticism it would have
been on the old road of Kinds and Figures and Qualities, in which we could
expect little but glowing rhetorical generalisation from him.
Nor is the nature of such small critical matter as we actually have from
The Essays. him very different. The Essays practically give us nothing
but the contents of that Of Studies, a piece too well known to need
quotation; too much in the early pregnant style of the author to bear
compression or analysis; and too general to repay it. For the critic and the
man of letters generally it is, in its own phrase, to be not merely tasted, nor
even swallowed, but chewed and digested; yet its teachings have nothing
more to do with the critical function of “study” than with all others.
The Advancement[263] at least excuses the greatness thrust upon it in the
estimates above referred to, not merely by the apparent necessity that the
author should deal with Criticism, but by a certain appearance of his
The actually doing so. Comparatively early in the First Book he
Advancement of
Learning.
tackles the attention to style which sprang up at the
sometimes been spoken of with reverence: and it is not uncommon to find,
amid the scanty classics of the subject, which until recently have been
recommended to the notice of inquirers, not merely a place, but a place of
very high honour, assigned to The Advancement of Learning. Actual,
Bacon. unprejudiced, and to some extent expert, reference to the
works, however, will not find very much to justify this estimate: and,
indeed, a little thought, assisted by very moderate knowledge, would suffice
to make it rather surprising that Bacon should give us so much, than
disappointing that he should give us little or nothing. A producer of
literature who at his best has few superiors, and a user of it for purposes of
quotation, who would deserve the name of genius for this use alone if he
had no other title thereto—Bacon was yet by no means inclined by his main
interests and objects, or by his temperament, either towards great exaltation
of letters, or towards accurate and painstaking examination of them. Indeed,
it is in him—almost first of all men, certainly first of all great modern men
—that we find that partisan opposition between literature and science which
has constantly developed since. It is true that his favourite method of
examination into “forms” might seem tempting as applied to literature; and
that it would, incidentally if not directly, have yielded more solid results
than his Will-o'-the-wisp chase of the Form of Heat. But this very craze of
his may suggest that if he had undertaken literary criticism it would have
been on the old road of Kinds and Figures and Qualities, in which we could
expect little but glowing rhetorical generalisation from him.
Nor is the nature of such small critical matter as we actually have from
The Essays. him very different. The Essays practically give us nothing
but the contents of that Of Studies, a piece too well known to need
quotation; too much in the early pregnant style of the author to bear
compression or analysis; and too general to repay it. For the critic and the
man of letters generally it is, in its own phrase, to be not merely tasted, nor
even swallowed, but chewed and digested; yet its teachings have nothing
more to do with the critical function of “study” than with all others.
The Advancement[263] at least excuses the greatness thrust upon it in the
estimates above referred to, not merely by the apparent necessity that the
author should deal with Criticism, but by a certain appearance of his
The actually doing so. Comparatively early in the First Book he
Advancement of
Learning.
tackles the attention to style which sprang up at the
Page 205
Renaissance, opening his discussion by the ingenious but slightly
unhistorical attribution of it to Martin Luther, who was forced to awake all
antiquity, and call former times to his succour, against the Bishop of Rome.
Not a few names, for the best part of two centuries before the great cause of
Martinus v. Papam was launched, from Petrarch and Boccaccio to Erasmus
and Reuchlin, will put in evidence before the tribunal of chronology against
this singular assertion; and though the Italian Humanists of the fifteenth
century might not (at least in thought) care anything for the Pope except as
a source of donatives and benefices, it is certain that most of them were as
constitutionally disinclined to abet Luther as they were chronologically
disabled from in any way abetting him. Bacon’s argument and further
survey are, however, better than this beginning. To understand the ancients
(he says justly enough) it was necessary to make a careful study of their
language. Further, the opposition of thought to the Schoolmen naturally
brought about a recoil from the barbarisms of Scholastic style, and the
anxiety to win over the general imprinted care and elegance and vigour on
preaching and writing. All this, he adds as justly, turned to excess. Men
Its denunciation began to “hunt more after words than matter; more after the
of mere word-
study.
choiceness of the phrase and the round and clean
composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the
clauses, and the varying and illustration of their words with tropes and
figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of
argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment.” The Ciceronianism of
Osorius, Sturm, “Car of Cambridge,” and even Ascham, receives more or
less condemnation; and Erasmus is, of course, cited for gibes at it. On this
text Bacon proceeds to enlarge in his own stately rhetoric, coolly admitting
that it “is a thing not hastily to be condemned, to clothe and adorn the
obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible and plausible elocution.”
But he very quickly glides off into his usual denunciations of the
schoolmen. Nor have I found anything else in this First Book really
germane to our purpose; for one cannot cite as such the desultory
observations on patronage of literature (among other branches of learning)
which fill a good part of it.
The Second Book is somewhat more fruitful in quantity, if not very
much; but the quality remains not very different. The opening “Address to
the King” contains, in an interesting first draft (as we may call it), the
everlasting grumble of the scientific man, that science is not sufficiently
unhistorical attribution of it to Martin Luther, who was forced to awake all
antiquity, and call former times to his succour, against the Bishop of Rome.
Not a few names, for the best part of two centuries before the great cause of
Martinus v. Papam was launched, from Petrarch and Boccaccio to Erasmus
and Reuchlin, will put in evidence before the tribunal of chronology against
this singular assertion; and though the Italian Humanists of the fifteenth
century might not (at least in thought) care anything for the Pope except as
a source of donatives and benefices, it is certain that most of them were as
constitutionally disinclined to abet Luther as they were chronologically
disabled from in any way abetting him. Bacon’s argument and further
survey are, however, better than this beginning. To understand the ancients
(he says justly enough) it was necessary to make a careful study of their
language. Further, the opposition of thought to the Schoolmen naturally
brought about a recoil from the barbarisms of Scholastic style, and the
anxiety to win over the general imprinted care and elegance and vigour on
preaching and writing. All this, he adds as justly, turned to excess. Men
Its denunciation began to “hunt more after words than matter; more after the
of mere word-
study.
choiceness of the phrase and the round and clean
composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the
clauses, and the varying and illustration of their words with tropes and
figures, than after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of
argument, life of invention, or depth of judgment.” The Ciceronianism of
Osorius, Sturm, “Car of Cambridge,” and even Ascham, receives more or
less condemnation; and Erasmus is, of course, cited for gibes at it. On this
text Bacon proceeds to enlarge in his own stately rhetoric, coolly admitting
that it “is a thing not hastily to be condemned, to clothe and adorn the
obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible and plausible elocution.”
But he very quickly glides off into his usual denunciations of the
schoolmen. Nor have I found anything else in this First Book really
germane to our purpose; for one cannot cite as such the desultory
observations on patronage of literature (among other branches of learning)
which fill a good part of it.
The Second Book is somewhat more fruitful in quantity, if not very
much; but the quality remains not very different. The opening “Address to
the King” contains, in an interesting first draft (as we may call it), the
everlasting grumble of the scientific man, that science is not sufficiently
Page 206
endowed, the further grumble at mere book-learning, the cry for the
promotion—by putting money in its purse—of research. The Second and
Third Chapters contain some plans of books drawn up in Bacon’s warm
imaginative way, especially a great series of Histories, with the History of
England for their centre. And then we come, in the Fourth Chapter, to
Poesy.
But except for Bacon’s majestic style (which, however, by accident or
intention, is rather below itself here) there is absolutely nothing novel. The
Its view of view (which, as we have seen, all the Elizabethan critics
Poetry.
adopted, probably from the Italians)—the view is that
poetry is just a part of learning licensed in imagination; a fanciful history
intended to give satisfaction to the mind of man in things where history is
not; something particularly prevalent and useful in barbarous ages; divisible
into narrative, representative and allusive; useful now and then, but (as
Aristotle would say) not a thing to take very seriously. Yet poetry, a vinum
dæmonum at the worst, a mere illusion anyhow, is still, even as such, a
refuge from, and remedy for, sorrow and toil. Of its form, as distinguished
from its matter, he says,[264] “Poetry is but a character of style, and
belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present.” He
attempts no defence of it as of other parts of learning, because “being as a
plant that cometh of the lust of the earth without a formal seed, it hath
sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind.” And he turns from
it to philosophy, with the more than half-disdainful adieu, “It is not good to
stay too long in the theatre.”
We might almost quit him here with a somewhat similar leave-taking; but
Some obiter for his great reputation some other places shall be handled.
dicta.
At XIV. 11 there are some remarks on the delusive powers
of words; at XVI. 4, 5 some on grammar and rhetoric, including a rather
interesting observation, not sufficiently expanded or worked out, that “in
modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses
as of dances”; in XVIII. a handling of strictly oratorical rhetoric, with a
digression to these “Colours of Good and Evil” which interested Bacon so
much; in XX. another descant on the same art; in XXI. a puff of the
Basilikon Doron; in XXXII. observations on the moral influence of books;
in XXXV. some general observations on literature; and, just before the
close, a well-known and often-quoted eulogy, certainly not undeserved, of
the eloquence of the English pulpit for forty years past.
promotion—by putting money in its purse—of research. The Second and
Third Chapters contain some plans of books drawn up in Bacon’s warm
imaginative way, especially a great series of Histories, with the History of
England for their centre. And then we come, in the Fourth Chapter, to
Poesy.
But except for Bacon’s majestic style (which, however, by accident or
intention, is rather below itself here) there is absolutely nothing novel. The
Its view of view (which, as we have seen, all the Elizabethan critics
Poetry.
adopted, probably from the Italians)—the view is that
poetry is just a part of learning licensed in imagination; a fanciful history
intended to give satisfaction to the mind of man in things where history is
not; something particularly prevalent and useful in barbarous ages; divisible
into narrative, representative and allusive; useful now and then, but (as
Aristotle would say) not a thing to take very seriously. Yet poetry, a vinum
dæmonum at the worst, a mere illusion anyhow, is still, even as such, a
refuge from, and remedy for, sorrow and toil. Of its form, as distinguished
from its matter, he says,[264] “Poetry is but a character of style, and
belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present.” He
attempts no defence of it as of other parts of learning, because “being as a
plant that cometh of the lust of the earth without a formal seed, it hath
sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind.” And he turns from
it to philosophy, with the more than half-disdainful adieu, “It is not good to
stay too long in the theatre.”
We might almost quit him here with a somewhat similar leave-taking; but
Some obiter for his great reputation some other places shall be handled.
dicta.
At XIV. 11 there are some remarks on the delusive powers
of words; at XVI. 4, 5 some on grammar and rhetoric, including a rather
interesting observation, not sufficiently expanded or worked out, that “in
modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses
as of dances”; in XVIII. a handling of strictly oratorical rhetoric, with a
digression to these “Colours of Good and Evil” which interested Bacon so
much; in XX. another descant on the same art; in XXI. a puff of the
Basilikon Doron; in XXXII. observations on the moral influence of books;
in XXXV. some general observations on literature; and, just before the
close, a well-known and often-quoted eulogy, certainly not undeserved, of
the eloquence of the English pulpit for forty years past.
Page 207
If it were not for the singular want of a clear conception of literary
Criticism, which has prevailed so long and so widely, it would hardly be
necessary to take, with any seriousness at all, a man who has no more than
The whole of this to say on the subject.[265] It is most assuredly no slight
very slight
importance.
to Bacon to deny him a place in a regiment where he never
had the least ambition to serve. That he was himself a great
practitioner of literature, and so, necessarily if indirectly, a critic of it in his
own case, is perfectly true; the remarks which have been quoted above on
the Ciceronians show that, when he took the trouble, and found the
opportunity, he could make them justly and soundly. But his purpose, his
interests, his province, his vein, lay far elsewhere. To him, it is pretty clear,
literary expression was, in relation to his favourite studies and dreams, but a
higher kind of pen-and-ink or printing-press. He distrusted the stability of
modern languages, and feared that studies couched in them might some day
or other come to be unintelligible and lost to the world. This famous fear
explains the nature and the limits of his interest in literature. It was a
vehicle or a treasury, a distributing agent or a guard. Its functions and
qualities accorded: it was to be clear, not disagreeable, solidly constructed,
intelligible to as large a number of readers as possible. The psychological
character and morphological definition of poetry interested him
philosophically. But in the art and the beauty of poetry and literature
generally, for their own sakes, he seems to have taken no more interest than
he did in the coloured pattern plots in gardens, which he compared to
“tarts.” To a man so minded, as to those more ancient ones of similar mind
whom we have discussed in the first volume, Criticism proper could, at the
best, be a pastime to be half ashamed of—a “theatre” in which to while
away the hours; it could not possibly be a matter of serious as well as
enthusiastic study.
Between Bacon and Ben may be best noticed the short Anacrisis or
Censure of Poets, Ancient and Modern,[266] by Sir William Alexander, Earl
Stirling’s of Stirling. It has received high praise;[267] but even those
Anacrisis.
who think by no means ill of Aurora, may find some
difficulty in indorsing this. It is simply a sort of “Note,” written, as the
author says, to record his impressions during a reading of the poets, which
he had undertaken as refreshment after great travail both of body and mind.
He thinks Language “but the apparel of poesy,” thereby going even further
than those who would assign that position to verse, and suggesting a system
Criticism, which has prevailed so long and so widely, it would hardly be
necessary to take, with any seriousness at all, a man who has no more than
The whole of this to say on the subject.[265] It is most assuredly no slight
very slight
importance.
to Bacon to deny him a place in a regiment where he never
had the least ambition to serve. That he was himself a great
practitioner of literature, and so, necessarily if indirectly, a critic of it in his
own case, is perfectly true; the remarks which have been quoted above on
the Ciceronians show that, when he took the trouble, and found the
opportunity, he could make them justly and soundly. But his purpose, his
interests, his province, his vein, lay far elsewhere. To him, it is pretty clear,
literary expression was, in relation to his favourite studies and dreams, but a
higher kind of pen-and-ink or printing-press. He distrusted the stability of
modern languages, and feared that studies couched in them might some day
or other come to be unintelligible and lost to the world. This famous fear
explains the nature and the limits of his interest in literature. It was a
vehicle or a treasury, a distributing agent or a guard. Its functions and
qualities accorded: it was to be clear, not disagreeable, solidly constructed,
intelligible to as large a number of readers as possible. The psychological
character and morphological definition of poetry interested him
philosophically. But in the art and the beauty of poetry and literature
generally, for their own sakes, he seems to have taken no more interest than
he did in the coloured pattern plots in gardens, which he compared to
“tarts.” To a man so minded, as to those more ancient ones of similar mind
whom we have discussed in the first volume, Criticism proper could, at the
best, be a pastime to be half ashamed of—a “theatre” in which to while
away the hours; it could not possibly be a matter of serious as well as
enthusiastic study.
Between Bacon and Ben may be best noticed the short Anacrisis or
Censure of Poets, Ancient and Modern,[266] by Sir William Alexander, Earl
Stirling’s of Stirling. It has received high praise;[267] but even those
Anacrisis.
who think by no means ill of Aurora, may find some
difficulty in indorsing this. It is simply a sort of “Note,” written, as the
author says, to record his impressions during a reading of the poets, which
he had undertaken as refreshment after great travail both of body and mind.
He thinks Language “but the apparel of poesy,” thereby going even further
than those who would assign that position to verse, and suggesting a system
Page 208
of “Inarticulate Poetics,” which he would have been rather put to it to body
forth. He only means, however, that he judges in the orthodox Aristotelian
way, by “the fable and contexture.” A subsequent comparison of a poem to
a garden suggests Vauquelin de la Fresnaye (v. supra, p. 129), whom he
may have read. Alexander is a sort of general lover in poetry; he likes this
in Virgil, that in Ovid, that other in Horace; defends Lucan against Scaliger,
even to the point of blaming the conclusion of the Æneid; finds “no man
that doth satisfy him more than that notable Italian, Torquato Tasso”; admits
the historical as well as the fictitious poetic subject; but thinks that “the
treasures of poetry cannot be better bestowed than upon the apparelling of
Truth; and Truth cannot be better apparelled to please young lovers than
with the excellences of poetry.” Disrespectful language neither need nor
should be used of so slight a thing, which is, and pretends to be, nothing
more than a sort of table-book entry by a gentleman of learning as well as
quality. But, if it has any “importance” at all, it is surely that of being yet
another proof of the rapid diffusion of critical taste and practice, not of
stating “theory and methods considerably in advance of the age.” If we
could take extensively his protest against those who “would bound the
boundless liberty of the poet,” such language might indeed be justified; but
the context strictly limits it to the very minor, though then, and for long
before and after, commonly debated, question of Fiction v. History in
subject.
Save perhaps in one single respect (where the defect was not wholly his
fault), Ben Jonson might be described as a critic armed at all points. His
Ben Jonson: his knowledge of literature was extremely wide, being at the
equipment.
same time solid and thorough. While he had an
understanding above all things strong and masculine, he was particularly
addicted, though in no dilettante fashion, to points of form. His whole
energies, and they were little short of Titanic, were given to literature. And,
lastly, if he had not the supremest poetic genius, he had such a talent that
only the neighbourhood of supremacy dwarfs it. Where he came short was
not in a certain hardness of temper and scholasticism of attitude: for these,
if kept within bounds, and tempered by that enthusiasm for letters which he
possessed, are not bad equipments for the critic. It was rather in the fact that
he still came too early for it to be possible for him, except by the help of a
miracle, to understand the achievements and value of the vernaculars. By
his latest days, indeed,[268] the positive performance of these was already
forth. He only means, however, that he judges in the orthodox Aristotelian
way, by “the fable and contexture.” A subsequent comparison of a poem to
a garden suggests Vauquelin de la Fresnaye (v. supra, p. 129), whom he
may have read. Alexander is a sort of general lover in poetry; he likes this
in Virgil, that in Ovid, that other in Horace; defends Lucan against Scaliger,
even to the point of blaming the conclusion of the Æneid; finds “no man
that doth satisfy him more than that notable Italian, Torquato Tasso”; admits
the historical as well as the fictitious poetic subject; but thinks that “the
treasures of poetry cannot be better bestowed than upon the apparelling of
Truth; and Truth cannot be better apparelled to please young lovers than
with the excellences of poetry.” Disrespectful language neither need nor
should be used of so slight a thing, which is, and pretends to be, nothing
more than a sort of table-book entry by a gentleman of learning as well as
quality. But, if it has any “importance” at all, it is surely that of being yet
another proof of the rapid diffusion of critical taste and practice, not of
stating “theory and methods considerably in advance of the age.” If we
could take extensively his protest against those who “would bound the
boundless liberty of the poet,” such language might indeed be justified; but
the context strictly limits it to the very minor, though then, and for long
before and after, commonly debated, question of Fiction v. History in
subject.
Save perhaps in one single respect (where the defect was not wholly his
fault), Ben Jonson might be described as a critic armed at all points. His
Ben Jonson: his knowledge of literature was extremely wide, being at the
equipment.
same time solid and thorough. While he had an
understanding above all things strong and masculine, he was particularly
addicted, though in no dilettante fashion, to points of form. His whole
energies, and they were little short of Titanic, were given to literature. And,
lastly, if he had not the supremest poetic genius, he had such a talent that
only the neighbourhood of supremacy dwarfs it. Where he came short was
not in a certain hardness of temper and scholasticism of attitude: for these,
if kept within bounds, and tempered by that enthusiasm for letters which he
possessed, are not bad equipments for the critic. It was rather in the fact that
he still came too early for it to be possible for him, except by the help of a
miracle, to understand the achievements and value of the vernaculars. By
his latest days, indeed,[268] the positive performance of these was already
Page 209
very great. Spain has hardly added anything since, and Italy not very much,
to her share of European literature; France was already in the first flush of
her “classical” period, after a long and glorious earlier history: and what
Ben’s own contemporaries in England had done, all men know. But
mediæval literature was shut from him, as from all, till far later; he does not
seem to have been much drawn to Continental letters, and, perhaps in their
case, as certainly in English, he was too near—too much a part of the
movement—to get it into firm perspective.
In a sense the critical temper in Jonson is all-pervading. It breaks out side
by side with, and sometimes even within, his sweetest lyrics; it interposes
what may be called parabases in the most unexpected passages[269] of his
His Prefaces, plays. The Poetaster is almost as much criticism dramatised
&c.
as The Frogs. But there are three “places,” or groups of
places, which it inspires, not in mere suggestion, but with propriety—the
occasional Prefaces, or observations, to and on the plays themselves, the
Conversations with Drummond, and, above all, the at last fairly (though not
yet sufficiently) known Discoveries or Timber.
To piece together, with any elaboration, the more scattered critical
passages would be fitter for a monograph on Jonson than for a History of
Criticism. The “Address to the Readers” of Sejanus, which contains a
reference to the author’s lost Observations on Horace, his Art of Poetry (not
the least of such losses) is a fair specimen of them: the dedication of
Volpone to “the most noble and most equal sisters, Oxford and Cambridge,”
a better. In both, and in numerous other passages of prose and verse, we
find the real and solid, though somewhat partial, knowledge, the strong
sense, the methodic scholarship of Ben, side by side with his stately, not
Euphuistic, but rather too close-packed style, his not ill-founded, but
slightly excessive, self-confidence, and that rough knock-down manner of
assertion and characterisation which reappeared in its most unguarded form
in the Conversations with Drummond.
The critical utterances of these Conversations are far too interesting to be
The Drummond passed over here, though we cannot discuss them in full.
Conversations.
They tell us that Ben thought all (other) rhymes inferior to
couplets, and had written a treatise (which, again, would we had!) both
against Campion and Daniel (see ante). His objection to “stanzas and cross
rhymes” was that “as the purpose might lead beyond them, they were all
forced.” Sidney “made every one speak as well as himself,” and so did not
to her share of European literature; France was already in the first flush of
her “classical” period, after a long and glorious earlier history: and what
Ben’s own contemporaries in England had done, all men know. But
mediæval literature was shut from him, as from all, till far later; he does not
seem to have been much drawn to Continental letters, and, perhaps in their
case, as certainly in English, he was too near—too much a part of the
movement—to get it into firm perspective.
In a sense the critical temper in Jonson is all-pervading. It breaks out side
by side with, and sometimes even within, his sweetest lyrics; it interposes
what may be called parabases in the most unexpected passages[269] of his
His Prefaces, plays. The Poetaster is almost as much criticism dramatised
&c.
as The Frogs. But there are three “places,” or groups of
places, which it inspires, not in mere suggestion, but with propriety—the
occasional Prefaces, or observations, to and on the plays themselves, the
Conversations with Drummond, and, above all, the at last fairly (though not
yet sufficiently) known Discoveries or Timber.
To piece together, with any elaboration, the more scattered critical
passages would be fitter for a monograph on Jonson than for a History of
Criticism. The “Address to the Readers” of Sejanus, which contains a
reference to the author’s lost Observations on Horace, his Art of Poetry (not
the least of such losses) is a fair specimen of them: the dedication of
Volpone to “the most noble and most equal sisters, Oxford and Cambridge,”
a better. In both, and in numerous other passages of prose and verse, we
find the real and solid, though somewhat partial, knowledge, the strong
sense, the methodic scholarship of Ben, side by side with his stately, not
Euphuistic, but rather too close-packed style, his not ill-founded, but
slightly excessive, self-confidence, and that rough knock-down manner of
assertion and characterisation which reappeared in its most unguarded form
in the Conversations with Drummond.
The critical utterances of these Conversations are far too interesting to be
The Drummond passed over here, though we cannot discuss them in full.
Conversations.
They tell us that Ben thought all (other) rhymes inferior to
couplets, and had written a treatise (which, again, would we had!) both
against Campion and Daniel (see ante). His objection to “stanzas and cross
rhymes” was that “as the purpose might lead beyond them, they were all
forced.” Sidney “made every one speak as well as himself,” and so did not
Page 210
keep “decorum” (cf. Puttenham above). Spenser’s stanzas and matter did
not please him. Daniel was no poet. He did not like Drayton’s “long
verses,” nor Sylvester’s and Fairfax’s translations. He thought the
translations of Homer (Chapman’s) and Virgil (Phaer’s) into “long
Alexandrines” (i.e., fourteeners) were but prose: yet elsewhere we hear that
he “had some of Chapman by heart.” Harington’s Ariosto was the worst of
all translations. Donne was sometimes “profane,” and “for not keeping of
accent deserved hanging”; but elsewhere he was “the first poet of the world
in some things,” though, “through not being understood, he would
perish.”[270] Shakespeare “wanted art”: and “Abram Francis (Abraham
Fraunce) in his English Hexameters was a fool.” “Bartas was not a poet, but
a verser, because he wrote not fiction.” He cursed Petrarch for redacting
verses to sonnets, “which were like Procrustes’ bed.” Guarini incurred the
same blame as Sir Philip: and Lucan was good in parts only. “The best
pieces of Ronsard were his Odes.” Drummond’s own verses “were all good,
but smelled too much of the schools.” The “silver” Latins, as we should
expect, pleased him best. “To have written Southwell’s ‘Burning Babe,’ he
would have been content to destroy many of his.”
These are the chief really critical items, though there are others (putting
personal gossip aside) of interest; but it may be added, as a curiosity, that he
told Drummond that he himself “writ all first in prose” at Camden’s
suggestion, and held that “verses stood all by sense, without colours or
accent” (poetic diction or metre), “which yet at other times he denied,” says
the reporter, a sentence ever to be remembered in connection with these
jottings. Remembering it, there is nothing shocking in any of these
observations, nor anything really inconsistent. A true critic never holds the
neat, positive, “reduced-to-its-lowest-terms” estimate of authors, in which a
criticaster delights. His view is always facetted, conditioned. But he may, in
a friendly chat, or a conversation for victory, exaggerate this facet or
condition, while altogether suppressing others; and this clearly is what Ben
did.
For gloss on the Conversations, for reduction to something like system of
the critical remarks scattered through the works, and for the nearest
approach we can have to a formal presentment of Ben’s critical views, we
must go to the Discoveries.[271]
not please him. Daniel was no poet. He did not like Drayton’s “long
verses,” nor Sylvester’s and Fairfax’s translations. He thought the
translations of Homer (Chapman’s) and Virgil (Phaer’s) into “long
Alexandrines” (i.e., fourteeners) were but prose: yet elsewhere we hear that
he “had some of Chapman by heart.” Harington’s Ariosto was the worst of
all translations. Donne was sometimes “profane,” and “for not keeping of
accent deserved hanging”; but elsewhere he was “the first poet of the world
in some things,” though, “through not being understood, he would
perish.”[270] Shakespeare “wanted art”: and “Abram Francis (Abraham
Fraunce) in his English Hexameters was a fool.” “Bartas was not a poet, but
a verser, because he wrote not fiction.” He cursed Petrarch for redacting
verses to sonnets, “which were like Procrustes’ bed.” Guarini incurred the
same blame as Sir Philip: and Lucan was good in parts only. “The best
pieces of Ronsard were his Odes.” Drummond’s own verses “were all good,
but smelled too much of the schools.” The “silver” Latins, as we should
expect, pleased him best. “To have written Southwell’s ‘Burning Babe,’ he
would have been content to destroy many of his.”
These are the chief really critical items, though there are others (putting
personal gossip aside) of interest; but it may be added, as a curiosity, that he
told Drummond that he himself “writ all first in prose” at Camden’s
suggestion, and held that “verses stood all by sense, without colours or
accent” (poetic diction or metre), “which yet at other times he denied,” says
the reporter, a sentence ever to be remembered in connection with these
jottings. Remembering it, there is nothing shocking in any of these
observations, nor anything really inconsistent. A true critic never holds the
neat, positive, “reduced-to-its-lowest-terms” estimate of authors, in which a
criticaster delights. His view is always facetted, conditioned. But he may, in
a friendly chat, or a conversation for victory, exaggerate this facet or
condition, while altogether suppressing others; and this clearly is what Ben
did.
For gloss on the Conversations, for reduction to something like system of
the critical remarks scattered through the works, and for the nearest
approach we can have to a formal presentment of Ben’s critical views, we
must go to the Discoveries.[271]
Page 211
The fact that we find no less than four titles for the book—Timber,
Explorata, Discoveries, and Sylva—with others of its peculiarities, is
The Discoveries. explained by the second fact that Jonson never published it.
It never appeared in print till the folio of 1641, years after its author’s death.
The Discoveries are described as being made “upon men and matter as they
have flowed out of his daily reading, or had their reflux to his peculiar
notions of the times.” They are, in fact, notes unnumbered and unclassified
(though batches of more or fewer sometimes run on the same subject), each
with its Latin heading, and varying in length from a few lines to that of his
friend (and partly master) Bacon’s shorter Essays. The influence of those
“silver” Latins whom he loved so much is prominent: large passages are
simply translated from Quintilian, and for some time[272] the tenor is ethical
rather than literary. A note on Perspicuitas—elegantia (p. 7) breaks these,
but has nothing noteworthy about it, and Bellum scribentium (p. 10) is only
a satiric exclamation on the folly of “writers committed together by the ears
for ceremonies, syllables, points,” &c. The longer Nil gratius protervo libro
(pp. 11, 12) seems a retort for some personal injury, combined with the old
complaint of the decadence and degradation of poetry.[273] There is just but
rather general stricture in Eloquentia (p. 16) on the difference between the
arguments of the study and of the world. “I would no more choose a
rhetorician for reigning in a school,” says Ben, “than I would choose a pilot
for rowing in a pond.”[274] Memoria (p. 18) includes a gird at Euphuism. At
last we come to business. Censura de poetis (p. 21), introduced by a fresh
fling at Euphuism, in De vere argutis, opens with a tolerably confident note,
“Nothing in our age is more preposterous than the running judgments upon
poetry and poets,” with much more to the same effect, the whole being
pointed by the fling, “If it were a question of the water-rhymer’s[275] works
against Spenser’s, I doubt not but they would find more suffrages.” The
famous passage on Shakespeare follows: and the development of Ben’s
view, “would he had blotted a thousand,” leads to a more general
disquisition on the differences of wits, which includes the sentence already
referred to. “Such [i.e., haphazard and inconsistent] are all the Essayists,
even their master Montaigne.” The notes now keep close to literature
throughout in substance, though their titles (e.g., Ignorantia animæ), and so
forth, may seem wider. A heading, De Claris Oratoribus (p. 26), leads to
yet another of the purple passages of the book—that on Bacon, in which is
intercalated a curious Scriptorum catalogus, limited, for the most part,
Explorata, Discoveries, and Sylva—with others of its peculiarities, is
The Discoveries. explained by the second fact that Jonson never published it.
It never appeared in print till the folio of 1641, years after its author’s death.
The Discoveries are described as being made “upon men and matter as they
have flowed out of his daily reading, or had their reflux to his peculiar
notions of the times.” They are, in fact, notes unnumbered and unclassified
(though batches of more or fewer sometimes run on the same subject), each
with its Latin heading, and varying in length from a few lines to that of his
friend (and partly master) Bacon’s shorter Essays. The influence of those
“silver” Latins whom he loved so much is prominent: large passages are
simply translated from Quintilian, and for some time[272] the tenor is ethical
rather than literary. A note on Perspicuitas—elegantia (p. 7) breaks these,
but has nothing noteworthy about it, and Bellum scribentium (p. 10) is only
a satiric exclamation on the folly of “writers committed together by the ears
for ceremonies, syllables, points,” &c. The longer Nil gratius protervo libro
(pp. 11, 12) seems a retort for some personal injury, combined with the old
complaint of the decadence and degradation of poetry.[273] There is just but
rather general stricture in Eloquentia (p. 16) on the difference between the
arguments of the study and of the world. “I would no more choose a
rhetorician for reigning in a school,” says Ben, “than I would choose a pilot
for rowing in a pond.”[274] Memoria (p. 18) includes a gird at Euphuism. At
last we come to business. Censura de poetis (p. 21), introduced by a fresh
fling at Euphuism, in De vere argutis, opens with a tolerably confident note,
“Nothing in our age is more preposterous than the running judgments upon
poetry and poets,” with much more to the same effect, the whole being
pointed by the fling, “If it were a question of the water-rhymer’s[275] works
against Spenser’s, I doubt not but they would find more suffrages.” The
famous passage on Shakespeare follows: and the development of Ben’s
view, “would he had blotted a thousand,” leads to a more general
disquisition on the differences of wits, which includes the sentence already
referred to. “Such [i.e., haphazard and inconsistent] are all the Essayists,
even their master Montaigne.” The notes now keep close to literature
throughout in substance, though their titles (e.g., Ignorantia animæ), and so
forth, may seem wider. A heading, De Claris Oratoribus (p. 26), leads to
yet another of the purple passages of the book—that on Bacon, in which is
intercalated a curious Scriptorum catalogus, limited, for the most part,
Page 212
though Surrey and Wyatt are mentioned, to prose writers. And then for
some time ethics, politics, and other subjects, again have Ben’s chief
attention.[276]
We return to literature, after some interval (but with a parenthetic glance
at the poesis et pictura notion at p. 49), on p. 52, in a curious unheaded
letter to an unnamed Lordship on Education, much of which is translated
directly from Ben Jonson’s favourite Quintilian; and then directly accost it
again with a tractatule De stilo et optimo scribendi genere, p. 54, hardly
parting company thereafter. Ben’s prescription is threefold: read the best
authors, observe the best speakers, and exercise your own style much. But
he is well aware that no “precepts will profit a fool,” and he adapts old
advice to English ingeniously, in bidding men read, not only Livy before
Sallust, but also Sidney before Donne, and to beware of Chaucer or Gower
at first. Here occurs the well-known dictum, that Spenser “in affecting the
ancients writ no language; yet I would have him read for his matter.” A fine
general head opens with the excellent version of Quintilian, “We should not
protect our sloth with the patronage of Difficulty,” and this is followed by
some shrewd remarks on diction—the shrewdest being that, after all, the
best custom makes, and ever will continue to make, the best speech—with a
sharp stroke at Lucretius for “scabrousness,” and at Chaucerisms. Brevity
of style, Tacitean and other, is cautiously commended. In the phrase (Oratio
imago animi), p. 64, “language most shows a man,” Ben seems to anticipate
Buffon, as he later does Wordsworth and Coleridge, by insisting that style is
not merely the dress, but the body of thought.[277] All this discussion, which
enters into considerable detail, is of the first importance, and it occupies
nearly a quarter of the whole book. It is continued, the continuation
reaching till the end, by a separate discussion of poetry.
It is interesting, but less so than what comes before. A somewhat acid,
though personally guarded, description of the present state of the Art
introduces the stock definition of “making,” and its corollary that a poet is
not one who writes in measure, but one who feigns—all as we have found it
before, but (as we should expect of Ben) in succincter and more scholarly
form. Yet the first requisite of the poet is ingenium—goodness of natural
wit; the next exercise of his parts—“bringing all to the forge and file”
(sculpte, lime, cisèle!); the third Imitation—to which Ben gives a turn (not
exactly new, for we have met it from Vida downwards), which is not an
improvement, by keeping its modern meaning, and understanding by it the
some time ethics, politics, and other subjects, again have Ben’s chief
attention.[276]
We return to literature, after some interval (but with a parenthetic glance
at the poesis et pictura notion at p. 49), on p. 52, in a curious unheaded
letter to an unnamed Lordship on Education, much of which is translated
directly from Ben Jonson’s favourite Quintilian; and then directly accost it
again with a tractatule De stilo et optimo scribendi genere, p. 54, hardly
parting company thereafter. Ben’s prescription is threefold: read the best
authors, observe the best speakers, and exercise your own style much. But
he is well aware that no “precepts will profit a fool,” and he adapts old
advice to English ingeniously, in bidding men read, not only Livy before
Sallust, but also Sidney before Donne, and to beware of Chaucer or Gower
at first. Here occurs the well-known dictum, that Spenser “in affecting the
ancients writ no language; yet I would have him read for his matter.” A fine
general head opens with the excellent version of Quintilian, “We should not
protect our sloth with the patronage of Difficulty,” and this is followed by
some shrewd remarks on diction—the shrewdest being that, after all, the
best custom makes, and ever will continue to make, the best speech—with a
sharp stroke at Lucretius for “scabrousness,” and at Chaucerisms. Brevity
of style, Tacitean and other, is cautiously commended. In the phrase (Oratio
imago animi), p. 64, “language most shows a man,” Ben seems to anticipate
Buffon, as he later does Wordsworth and Coleridge, by insisting that style is
not merely the dress, but the body of thought.[277] All this discussion, which
enters into considerable detail, is of the first importance, and it occupies
nearly a quarter of the whole book. It is continued, the continuation
reaching till the end, by a separate discussion of poetry.
It is interesting, but less so than what comes before. A somewhat acid,
though personally guarded, description of the present state of the Art
introduces the stock definition of “making,” and its corollary that a poet is
not one who writes in measure, but one who feigns—all as we have found it
before, but (as we should expect of Ben) in succincter and more scholarly
form. Yet the first requisite of the poet is ingenium—goodness of natural
wit; the next exercise of his parts—“bringing all to the forge and file”
(sculpte, lime, cisèle!); the third Imitation—to which Ben gives a turn (not
exactly new, for we have met it from Vida downwards), which is not an
improvement, by keeping its modern meaning, and understanding by it the
Page 213
following of the classics. “But that which we especially require in him is an
exactness of study and multiplicity of reading.” Yet his liberty is not to be
so narrowly circumscribed as some would have it. This leads to some
interesting remarks on the ancient critics, which the author had evidently
meant to extend: as it is, they break off short.[278] We turn to the Parts of
comedy and tragedy, where Ben is strictly regular—the fable is the
imitation of one entire and perfect action, &c. But this also breaks off, after
a discussion of fable itself and episode, with an evidently quite
disconnected fling at “hobbling poems which run like a brewer’s cart on the
stones.”
These Discoveries have to be considered with a little general care before
Form of the we examine them more particularly. They were, it has been
book.
said, never issued by the author himself, and we do not
know whether he ever would have issued them in their present form. On the
one hand, they are very carefully written, and not mere jottings. In form
(though more modern in style) they resemble the earlier essays of that
Bacon whom they so magnificently celebrate, in their deliberate
conciseness and pregnancy. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to
doubt that some at least were intended for expansion; it is difficult not to
think that there was plenty more stuff of the same kind in the solidly
constructed and well-stored treasuries of Ben’s intelligence and erudition. It
is most difficult of all not to see that, in some cases, the thoughts are co-
ordinated into regular tractates, in others left loose, as if for future treatment
of the same kind.
Secondly, we should like to know rather more than we do of the time of
Its date. their composition. Some of them—such as the retrospect of
Bacon, and to a less degree that of Shakespeare—must be late; there is a
strong probability that all date from the period between the fire in Ben’s
study, which destroyed so much, and his death—say between 1620 and
1637. But at the same time there is nothing to prevent his having
remembered and recopied observations of earlier date.
Thirdly, it is most important that we rightly understand the composition
Mosaic of old of the book. It has sometimes been discovered[279] in these
and new.
Discoveries, with pride, or surprise, or even scorn, that Ben
borrowed in them very largely from the ancients. Of course he did, as well
as something, though less, from the Italian critics of the age immediately
before his own.[280] But in neither case could he have hoped for a moment—
exactness of study and multiplicity of reading.” Yet his liberty is not to be
so narrowly circumscribed as some would have it. This leads to some
interesting remarks on the ancient critics, which the author had evidently
meant to extend: as it is, they break off short.[278] We turn to the Parts of
comedy and tragedy, where Ben is strictly regular—the fable is the
imitation of one entire and perfect action, &c. But this also breaks off, after
a discussion of fable itself and episode, with an evidently quite
disconnected fling at “hobbling poems which run like a brewer’s cart on the
stones.”
These Discoveries have to be considered with a little general care before
Form of the we examine them more particularly. They were, it has been
book.
said, never issued by the author himself, and we do not
know whether he ever would have issued them in their present form. On the
one hand, they are very carefully written, and not mere jottings. In form
(though more modern in style) they resemble the earlier essays of that
Bacon whom they so magnificently celebrate, in their deliberate
conciseness and pregnancy. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to
doubt that some at least were intended for expansion; it is difficult not to
think that there was plenty more stuff of the same kind in the solidly
constructed and well-stored treasuries of Ben’s intelligence and erudition. It
is most difficult of all not to see that, in some cases, the thoughts are co-
ordinated into regular tractates, in others left loose, as if for future treatment
of the same kind.
Secondly, we should like to know rather more than we do of the time of
Its date. their composition. Some of them—such as the retrospect of
Bacon, and to a less degree that of Shakespeare—must be late; there is a
strong probability that all date from the period between the fire in Ben’s
study, which destroyed so much, and his death—say between 1620 and
1637. But at the same time there is nothing to prevent his having
remembered and recopied observations of earlier date.
Thirdly, it is most important that we rightly understand the composition
Mosaic of old of the book. It has sometimes been discovered[279] in these
and new.
Discoveries, with pride, or surprise, or even scorn, that Ben
borrowed in them very largely from the ancients. Of course he did, as well
as something, though less, from the Italian critics of the age immediately
before his own.[280] But in neither case could he have hoped for a moment—
Page 214
and in neither is there the slightest reason to suppose that he would have
wished if he could have hoped—to disguise his borrowings from a learned
age. When a man—such as, for instance, Sterne—wishes to steal and
escape, he goes to what nobody reads, not to what everybody is reading.
And the Latins of the Silver Age, the two Senecas, Petronius, Quintilian,
Pliny, were specially favourites with the Jacobean time. In what is going to
be said no difference will be made between Ben’s borrowings and his
original remarks: nor will the fact of the borrowing be referred to unless
there is some special critical reason. Even the literal translations, which are
not uncommon, are made his own by the nervous idiosyncrasy of the
phrase, and its thorough adjustment to the context and to his own vigorous
and massive temperament.
Of real “book-criticism” there are four chief passages, the brief flings at
Montaigne and at “Tamerlanes and Tamerchams,” and the longer notices of
Shakespeare and Bacon.
The flirt at “all the Essayists, even their master Montaigne,” is especially
interesting, because of the high opinion which Jonson elsewhere expresses
of Bacon, the chief, if not the first, English Essayist of his time, and
because of the fact that not a few of these very Discoveries are “Essays,” if
The fling at any things ever were. Nor would it be very easy to make
Montaigne;
out a clear distinction, in anything but name, between some
of Ben’s most favourite ancient writers and these despised persons. It is,
however, somewhat easier to understand the reason of the condemnation.
Jonson’s classically ordered mind probably disliked the ostentatious
desultoriness and incompleteness of the Essay, the refusal, as it were out of
mere insolence, to undertake an orderly treatise. Nor is it quite impossible
that he failed fully to understand Montaigne, and was to some extent the
dupe of that great writer’s fanfaronade of promiscuousness.
The “Tamerlane and Tamercham”[281] fling is not even at first sight
at Tamerlane, surprising. It was quite certain that Ben would seriously
despise what Shakespeare only laughed at—the confusion, the bombast, the
want of order and scheme in the “University Wits”—and it is not probable
that he was well enough acquainted with the even now obscure
development of the earliest Elizabethan drama to appreciate the enormous
improvement which they wrought. Nay, the nearer approach even of such a
dull thing as Gorboduc to “the height of Seneca his style,” might have a
wished if he could have hoped—to disguise his borrowings from a learned
age. When a man—such as, for instance, Sterne—wishes to steal and
escape, he goes to what nobody reads, not to what everybody is reading.
And the Latins of the Silver Age, the two Senecas, Petronius, Quintilian,
Pliny, were specially favourites with the Jacobean time. In what is going to
be said no difference will be made between Ben’s borrowings and his
original remarks: nor will the fact of the borrowing be referred to unless
there is some special critical reason. Even the literal translations, which are
not uncommon, are made his own by the nervous idiosyncrasy of the
phrase, and its thorough adjustment to the context and to his own vigorous
and massive temperament.
Of real “book-criticism” there are four chief passages, the brief flings at
Montaigne and at “Tamerlanes and Tamerchams,” and the longer notices of
Shakespeare and Bacon.
The flirt at “all the Essayists, even their master Montaigne,” is especially
interesting, because of the high opinion which Jonson elsewhere expresses
of Bacon, the chief, if not the first, English Essayist of his time, and
because of the fact that not a few of these very Discoveries are “Essays,” if
The fling at any things ever were. Nor would it be very easy to make
Montaigne;
out a clear distinction, in anything but name, between some
of Ben’s most favourite ancient writers and these despised persons. It is,
however, somewhat easier to understand the reason of the condemnation.
Jonson’s classically ordered mind probably disliked the ostentatious
desultoriness and incompleteness of the Essay, the refusal, as it were out of
mere insolence, to undertake an orderly treatise. Nor is it quite impossible
that he failed fully to understand Montaigne, and was to some extent the
dupe of that great writer’s fanfaronade of promiscuousness.
The “Tamerlane and Tamercham”[281] fling is not even at first sight
at Tamerlane, surprising. It was quite certain that Ben would seriously
despise what Shakespeare only laughed at—the confusion, the bombast, the
want of order and scheme in the “University Wits”—and it is not probable
that he was well enough acquainted with the even now obscure
development of the earliest Elizabethan drama to appreciate the enormous
improvement which they wrought. Nay, the nearer approach even of such a
dull thing as Gorboduc to “the height of Seneca his style,” might have a
Page 215
little bribed him as it bribed Sidney. He is true to his side—to his division
of the critical creed—in this also.
The train of thought—censure of the vulgar preference—runs clear from
this to the best known passage of the whole, the section De Shakespeare
the Shakespeare Nostrat. It cannot be necessary to quote it, or to point out
Passage,
that Ben’s eulogy, splendid as it is, acquires tenfold force
from the fact that it is avowedly given by a man whose general literary
theory is different from that of the subject, while the censure accompanying
it loses force in exactly the same proportion. What Ben here blames, any
ancient critic (perhaps even Longinus) would have blamed too: what Ben
praises, it is not certain that any ancient critic, except Longinus, would have
seen. Nor is the captious censure of “Cæsar did never wrong but with just
cause” the least interesting part of the whole. The paradox is not in our
present texts: and there have, of course, not been wanting commentators to
accuse Jonson of garbling or of forgetfulness. This is quite
commentatorially gratuitous and puerile. It is very like Shakespeare to have
written what Ben says: very like Ben to object to the paradox (which, pace
tanti viri, is not “ridiculous” at all, but a deliberate and effective hyperbole);
very like the players to have changed the text; and most of all like the
commentators to make a fuss about the matter.
What may seem the more unstinted eulogy of Bacon is not less
and that on interesting. For here it is obvious that Ben is speaking with
Bacon.
fullest sympathy, and with all but a full acknowledgment of
having met an ideal. Except the slight stroke, “when he could spare or pass
by a jest,” and the gentle insinuation that Strength, the gift of God, was
what Bacon’s friends had to implore for him, there is no admixture
whatever in the eulogy of “him who hath filled up all numbers,[282] and
performed that in our tongue which may be compared or preferred to
insolent Greece or haughty Rome.” Indeed it could not have been—even if
Ben Jonson had not been a friend, and, in a way, follower of Bacon—but
that he should regard the Chancellor as his chief of literary men. Bacon,
unluckily for himself, lacked the “unwedgeable and gnarled” strength of the
dramatist, and also was without his poetic fire, just as Ben could never have
soared to the vast, if vague, conceptions of Bacon’s materialist-Idealism.
But they were both soaked in “literature,” as then understood; they were the
two greatest masters of the closely packed style that says twenty things in
ten words: and yet both could, on occasion, be almost as rhetorically
of the critical creed—in this also.
The train of thought—censure of the vulgar preference—runs clear from
this to the best known passage of the whole, the section De Shakespeare
the Shakespeare Nostrat. It cannot be necessary to quote it, or to point out
Passage,
that Ben’s eulogy, splendid as it is, acquires tenfold force
from the fact that it is avowedly given by a man whose general literary
theory is different from that of the subject, while the censure accompanying
it loses force in exactly the same proportion. What Ben here blames, any
ancient critic (perhaps even Longinus) would have blamed too: what Ben
praises, it is not certain that any ancient critic, except Longinus, would have
seen. Nor is the captious censure of “Cæsar did never wrong but with just
cause” the least interesting part of the whole. The paradox is not in our
present texts: and there have, of course, not been wanting commentators to
accuse Jonson of garbling or of forgetfulness. This is quite
commentatorially gratuitous and puerile. It is very like Shakespeare to have
written what Ben says: very like Ben to object to the paradox (which, pace
tanti viri, is not “ridiculous” at all, but a deliberate and effective hyperbole);
very like the players to have changed the text; and most of all like the
commentators to make a fuss about the matter.
What may seem the more unstinted eulogy of Bacon is not less
and that on interesting. For here it is obvious that Ben is speaking with
Bacon.
fullest sympathy, and with all but a full acknowledgment of
having met an ideal. Except the slight stroke, “when he could spare or pass
by a jest,” and the gentle insinuation that Strength, the gift of God, was
what Bacon’s friends had to implore for him, there is no admixture
whatever in the eulogy of “him who hath filled up all numbers,[282] and
performed that in our tongue which may be compared or preferred to
insolent Greece or haughty Rome.” Indeed it could not have been—even if
Ben Jonson had not been a friend, and, in a way, follower of Bacon—but
that he should regard the Chancellor as his chief of literary men. Bacon,
unluckily for himself, lacked the “unwedgeable and gnarled” strength of the
dramatist, and also was without his poetic fire, just as Ben could never have
soared to the vast, if vague, conceptions of Bacon’s materialist-Idealism.
But they were both soaked in “literature,” as then understood; they were the
two greatest masters of the closely packed style that says twenty things in
ten words: and yet both could, on occasion, be almost as rhetorically
Page 216
imaginative as Donne or Greville. It is doubtful whether Bacon’s own
scientific scorn for words without matter surpassed Jonson’s more literary
contempt of the same phenomenon. Everywhere, or almost everywhere,
there was between them the idem velle et idem nolle.
A limited précis, however, and a few remarks on special points, cannot do
the Discoveries justice. The fragmentary character of the notes that
compose it, the pregnant and deliberately “astringed” style in which these
notes are written, so that they are themselves the bones, as it were, of a
much larger treatise, defy such treatment. Yet it is full of value, as it gives
us more than glimpses
“Of what a critic was in Jonson lost,”
or but piecemeal shown. We shall return, in the next chapter, to his relative
position; but something should be said here of his intrinsic character.
He does not, as must have been clearly seen, escape the “classical”
General limitation. With some ignorance, doubtless, and doubtless
character of the
book.
also some contempt, of the actual achievements of prose
romance, and with that stubborn distrust of the modern
tongues for miscellaneous prose purposes, which lasted till far into the
seventeenth century, if it did not actually survive into the eighteenth, he still
clings to the old mistakes about the identity of poetry and “fiction,” about
the supremacy of oratory in prose. We hear nothing about the “new
versifying,” though no doubt this would have been fully treated in his
handling of Campion and Daniel: but had he had any approval for it, that
approval must have been glanced at. His preference for the (stopped)
couplet[283] foreshadowed that which, with beneficial effects in some ways,
if by no means in all, was to influence the whole of English poetry, with the
rarest exceptions, for nearly two centuries. The personal arrogance which,
as in Wordsworth’s case, affected all Ben’s judgment of contemporaries,
and which is almost too fully reflected in the Drummond Conversations,
would probably have made even his more deliberate judgments of these—
his judgments “for publication”—inadequate. But it is fair to remember that
Ben’s theory (if not entirely his practice, especially in his exquisite lyrics
and almost equally exquisite masques) constrained him to be severe to those
contemporaries, from Spenser, Shakespeare, and Donne downwards. The
scientific scorn for words without matter surpassed Jonson’s more literary
contempt of the same phenomenon. Everywhere, or almost everywhere,
there was between them the idem velle et idem nolle.
A limited précis, however, and a few remarks on special points, cannot do
the Discoveries justice. The fragmentary character of the notes that
compose it, the pregnant and deliberately “astringed” style in which these
notes are written, so that they are themselves the bones, as it were, of a
much larger treatise, defy such treatment. Yet it is full of value, as it gives
us more than glimpses
“Of what a critic was in Jonson lost,”
or but piecemeal shown. We shall return, in the next chapter, to his relative
position; but something should be said here of his intrinsic character.
He does not, as must have been clearly seen, escape the “classical”
General limitation. With some ignorance, doubtless, and doubtless
character of the
book.
also some contempt, of the actual achievements of prose
romance, and with that stubborn distrust of the modern
tongues for miscellaneous prose purposes, which lasted till far into the
seventeenth century, if it did not actually survive into the eighteenth, he still
clings to the old mistakes about the identity of poetry and “fiction,” about
the supremacy of oratory in prose. We hear nothing about the “new
versifying,” though no doubt this would have been fully treated in his
handling of Campion and Daniel: but had he had any approval for it, that
approval must have been glanced at. His preference for the (stopped)
couplet[283] foreshadowed that which, with beneficial effects in some ways,
if by no means in all, was to influence the whole of English poetry, with the
rarest exceptions, for nearly two centuries. The personal arrogance which,
as in Wordsworth’s case, affected all Ben’s judgment of contemporaries,
and which is almost too fully reflected in the Drummond Conversations,
would probably have made even his more deliberate judgments of these—
his judgments “for publication”—inadequate. But it is fair to remember that
Ben’s theory (if not entirely his practice, especially in his exquisite lyrics
and almost equally exquisite masques) constrained him to be severe to those
contemporaries, from Spenser, Shakespeare, and Donne downwards. The
Page 217
mission of the generation may be summed up in the three words, Liberty,
Variety, Romance. Jonson’s tastes were for Order, Uniformity, Classicism.
He is thus doubly interesting—interesting as putting both with sounder
scholarship and more original wit what men from Ascham to Puttenham,
and later, had been trying to say before him, in the sense of adapting
classical precepts to English: and far more interesting as adumbrating,
beforehand, the creed of Dryden, and Pope, and Samuel Johnson. Many of
his individual judgments are as shrewd as they are one-sided; they are
always well, and sometimes admirably, expressed, in a style which unites
something of Elizabethan colour, and much of Jacobean weight, with not a
little of Augustan simplicity and proportion. He does not head the line of
English critics; but he heads, and worthily, that of English critics who have
been great both in criticism and in creation.[284]
198. The two chief monographs on this are Spingarn, op. cit., in the
division appurtenant (pp. 253-310), and Professor F. E. Schelling, Poetic
and Verse Criticism of the Reign of Elizabeth, Philadelphia, 1891.
Haslewood reprinted most of the texts together in Ancient Critical Essays, 2
vols., London, 1811-15, and Mr Arber the most important separately in his
English Reprints. Mr Gregory Smith is now editing, for the Clarendon
Press, the fullest collection yet issued.
199. Such as those on the “fair language of France,” and the strictures
passed by Margaret of England and Burgundy on the “default in mine
English” (History of Troy); on the “right good and fair English” of Lord
Rivers (Dicts and Sayings of the Philosophers).
200. There has been some disposition to deny this, and to argue that
despite the constant use of the word Rhetoric in the fifteenth century, the
teaching of the thing had declined. I do not think there is much evidence of
this as regards England; and the long and curious passage of Hawes, to be
presently discussed, is strong evidence against it. Rhetoric has no less than
eight chapters of the Pastime of Pleasure, as against one apiece for
Grammar and Logic.
201. The Pastime of Pleasure, ed. Wright (Percy Society, London, 1845),
pp. 27-56.
Variety, Romance. Jonson’s tastes were for Order, Uniformity, Classicism.
He is thus doubly interesting—interesting as putting both with sounder
scholarship and more original wit what men from Ascham to Puttenham,
and later, had been trying to say before him, in the sense of adapting
classical precepts to English: and far more interesting as adumbrating,
beforehand, the creed of Dryden, and Pope, and Samuel Johnson. Many of
his individual judgments are as shrewd as they are one-sided; they are
always well, and sometimes admirably, expressed, in a style which unites
something of Elizabethan colour, and much of Jacobean weight, with not a
little of Augustan simplicity and proportion. He does not head the line of
English critics; but he heads, and worthily, that of English critics who have
been great both in criticism and in creation.[284]
198. The two chief monographs on this are Spingarn, op. cit., in the
division appurtenant (pp. 253-310), and Professor F. E. Schelling, Poetic
and Verse Criticism of the Reign of Elizabeth, Philadelphia, 1891.
Haslewood reprinted most of the texts together in Ancient Critical Essays, 2
vols., London, 1811-15, and Mr Arber the most important separately in his
English Reprints. Mr Gregory Smith is now editing, for the Clarendon
Press, the fullest collection yet issued.
199. Such as those on the “fair language of France,” and the strictures
passed by Margaret of England and Burgundy on the “default in mine
English” (History of Troy); on the “right good and fair English” of Lord
Rivers (Dicts and Sayings of the Philosophers).
200. There has been some disposition to deny this, and to argue that
despite the constant use of the word Rhetoric in the fifteenth century, the
teaching of the thing had declined. I do not think there is much evidence of
this as regards England; and the long and curious passage of Hawes, to be
presently discussed, is strong evidence against it. Rhetoric has no less than
eight chapters of the Pastime of Pleasure, as against one apiece for
Grammar and Logic.
201. The Pastime of Pleasure, ed. Wright (Percy Society, London, 1845),
pp. 27-56.
Page 218
202. This Fourth River will appear a less startling “novelty” when the
illuminating power attributed to the stone is remembered.
203. Wilson has usually been dignified in this way: but some authorities,
including the Dict. Nat. Biog., deny him knighthood.
204. It was not actually the first in English, Leonard Coxe having
preceded him “about 1524” with an English adaptation, apparently, of
Melanchthon. But this is of no critical importance.
205. My copy is of this, which is the fuller.
206. Fol. 82.
207. Fol. 1, verso, at bottom.
208. One may regret “sparple” and “disparple,” which are good and
picturesque Englishings of e(s)parpiller. The forms “sparkle” and
“disparkle,” which seem to have been commoner, are no loss, as being
equivocal.
209. Not that the phrase is of his invention. It seems to have been a
catchword of the time, and occurs in Bale (1543), in Peter Ashton’s version
of Jovius (1546), &c.
210. Of course Cheke had in his mind the passage of Quintilian
concerning Julius Florus (v. supra, i. 313).
211. Ed. Arber, pp. 154-159.
212. This may be found in Arber’s Introduction to the book just cited, p.
5; or in Professor Raleigh’s ed. of Hoby (London, 1900), pp. 12, 13.
213. For these two books Mr Arber’s excellent reprints can hardly be
bettered. But for our purposes the Letters are also needed; and these, with
other things, will be found in Giles’s edition of the Works, 3 vols. in 4,
London, 1864-65.
illuminating power attributed to the stone is remembered.
203. Wilson has usually been dignified in this way: but some authorities,
including the Dict. Nat. Biog., deny him knighthood.
204. It was not actually the first in English, Leonard Coxe having
preceded him “about 1524” with an English adaptation, apparently, of
Melanchthon. But this is of no critical importance.
205. My copy is of this, which is the fuller.
206. Fol. 82.
207. Fol. 1, verso, at bottom.
208. One may regret “sparple” and “disparple,” which are good and
picturesque Englishings of e(s)parpiller. The forms “sparkle” and
“disparkle,” which seem to have been commoner, are no loss, as being
equivocal.
209. Not that the phrase is of his invention. It seems to have been a
catchword of the time, and occurs in Bale (1543), in Peter Ashton’s version
of Jovius (1546), &c.
210. Of course Cheke had in his mind the passage of Quintilian
concerning Julius Florus (v. supra, i. 313).
211. Ed. Arber, pp. 154-159.
212. This may be found in Arber’s Introduction to the book just cited, p.
5; or in Professor Raleigh’s ed. of Hoby (London, 1900), pp. 12, 13.
213. For these two books Mr Arber’s excellent reprints can hardly be
bettered. But for our purposes the Letters are also needed; and these, with
other things, will be found in Giles’s edition of the Works, 3 vols. in 4,
London, 1864-65.
Page 219
214. Quid omnes Oxonienses sequuntur plane nescio, sed ante aliquot
menses in Aula incidi in quendam illius Academiæ, qui nimium præferendo
Lucianum, Plutarchum et Herodianum, Senecam, A. Gellium, et Apuleium
utramque linguam in nimis senescentem et effœtam ætatem compingere
mihi videbatur—Giles, i. 190. The whole letter (to Sturm) is worth reading.
215. P. 19, ed. Arber. The passage contains a stroke at monasticism.
216. P. 80, ed. Arber.
217. Thought to be his last, and written in Dec. 1568; ed. Giles, ii. 189.
The correspondence with Sturm is, as we should expect, particularly
literary.
218. V. supra, p. 46.
219. V. supra, p. 127.
220. There had, of course, been some charming jets of folk-song in
ballad, carol, and what not.
221. It is curious that, in this very début of English criticism, the
incivility with which critics are constantly and too justly charged makes its
appearance. Ascham would seem to have been a good-natured soul enough.
Yet he abuses rhyme and its partisans in the true “Père Duchêne” style
which some critics still affect. “To follow the Goths in rhyming instead of
the Greeks in versifying” is “to eat acorns with swine, when we may eat
wheat bread among men.” Rhymers are “a rude multitude,” “rash, ignorant
heads,” “wandering blindly in their foul wrong way,” &c.
222. Schoolmaster, ed. cit., p. 73. Ascham actually quotes the Greek and
the Latin of Homer and Horace, and declares Watson’s stuff to be made as
“naturally” as the one and as “aptly” as the other!
223. Ibid., p. 145.
224. P. 147. The extraordinary confusion of mind of the time is illustrated
by Ascham’s sheltering himself behind Quintilian!
menses in Aula incidi in quendam illius Academiæ, qui nimium præferendo
Lucianum, Plutarchum et Herodianum, Senecam, A. Gellium, et Apuleium
utramque linguam in nimis senescentem et effœtam ætatem compingere
mihi videbatur—Giles, i. 190. The whole letter (to Sturm) is worth reading.
215. P. 19, ed. Arber. The passage contains a stroke at monasticism.
216. P. 80, ed. Arber.
217. Thought to be his last, and written in Dec. 1568; ed. Giles, ii. 189.
The correspondence with Sturm is, as we should expect, particularly
literary.
218. V. supra, p. 46.
219. V. supra, p. 127.
220. There had, of course, been some charming jets of folk-song in
ballad, carol, and what not.
221. It is curious that, in this very début of English criticism, the
incivility with which critics are constantly and too justly charged makes its
appearance. Ascham would seem to have been a good-natured soul enough.
Yet he abuses rhyme and its partisans in the true “Père Duchêne” style
which some critics still affect. “To follow the Goths in rhyming instead of
the Greeks in versifying” is “to eat acorns with swine, when we may eat
wheat bread among men.” Rhymers are “a rude multitude,” “rash, ignorant
heads,” “wandering blindly in their foul wrong way,” &c.
222. Schoolmaster, ed. cit., p. 73. Ascham actually quotes the Greek and
the Latin of Homer and Horace, and declares Watson’s stuff to be made as
“naturally” as the one and as “aptly” as the other!
223. Ibid., p. 145.
224. P. 147. The extraordinary confusion of mind of the time is illustrated
by Ascham’s sheltering himself behind Quintilian!
Page 220
225. Not to be confounded with Thomas Watson, the author of the
Hecatompathia, who came later, and was an Oxford man.
226. Some authorities have been much too mild towards it. For instance,
the late Mr Henry Morley, who says, “Thomas Drant, of course, did not
suppose that his rules were sufficient.” This is charitable, but outside, or
rather against, the evidence.
227. Certain Notes of Instruction concerning the making of verse or
rhyme in English, ed. Arber (with The Steel Glass, &c.), pp. 31-41, London,
1868. Originally in the 4to edition of Gascoigne’s Poems (London, 1575).
Mr Spingarn sees indebtedness in it to Ronsard.
228. The observations of Ascham, Wilson, and the others being incidental
merely.
229. “If I should undertake to write in praise of a gentlewoman, I would
neither praise her crystal eye nor her cherry lip.”
230. Gascoigne does not use this division, or ¯ and ˘ but ´ and ` for long
and short, ~ (circumflex) for common, and indented lines (
and ) for dissyllabic and trisyllabic foot arrangements.
231. “For the haughty obscure verse doth not much delight, and the verse
that is too easy is like a tale of a roasted horse.”
232. See Mitford, Harmony of Language, p. 105, who thinks the licence
just the other way, and indeed roundly pronounces the pronunciation in one
syllable “impossible.” A little later, again, Guest thinks the dis-syllable
“uncouth and vulgar.” A most documentary disagreement!
233. See Grosart’s Works of Gabriel Harvey, vol. i. pp. 6-150. Parts will
be found in the Globe edition of Spenser, pp. 706-710.
234. I am not responsible for the eccentricities of this form.
235. In order of composition, not of publication.
Hecatompathia, who came later, and was an Oxford man.
226. Some authorities have been much too mild towards it. For instance,
the late Mr Henry Morley, who says, “Thomas Drant, of course, did not
suppose that his rules were sufficient.” This is charitable, but outside, or
rather against, the evidence.
227. Certain Notes of Instruction concerning the making of verse or
rhyme in English, ed. Arber (with The Steel Glass, &c.), pp. 31-41, London,
1868. Originally in the 4to edition of Gascoigne’s Poems (London, 1575).
Mr Spingarn sees indebtedness in it to Ronsard.
228. The observations of Ascham, Wilson, and the others being incidental
merely.
229. “If I should undertake to write in praise of a gentlewoman, I would
neither praise her crystal eye nor her cherry lip.”
230. Gascoigne does not use this division, or ¯ and ˘ but ´ and ` for long
and short, ~ (circumflex) for common, and indented lines (
and ) for dissyllabic and trisyllabic foot arrangements.
231. “For the haughty obscure verse doth not much delight, and the verse
that is too easy is like a tale of a roasted horse.”
232. See Mitford, Harmony of Language, p. 105, who thinks the licence
just the other way, and indeed roundly pronounces the pronunciation in one
syllable “impossible.” A little later, again, Guest thinks the dis-syllable
“uncouth and vulgar.” A most documentary disagreement!
233. See Grosart’s Works of Gabriel Harvey, vol. i. pp. 6-150. Parts will
be found in the Globe edition of Spenser, pp. 706-710.
234. I am not responsible for the eccentricities of this form.
235. In order of composition, not of publication.
Page 221
236. This word, which is certainly a cousin of “balderdash,” is a good
example of the slang and jargon so often mixed with their preciousness by
the Elizabethans. Nash borrowed it from Harvey to use against him; and the
eccentric Stanyhurst even employs it in his Virgil. Stanyhurst’s hexameters,
by the way (vide Mr Arber’s Reprint in the English Scholars Library, No.
10, London, 1880), are, thanks partly to their astounding lingo, among the
maddest things in English literature; but his prose prefatory matter, equally
odd in phrase, has some method in its madness.
237. La Casa’s book of etiquette and behaviour.
238. The further letters to Spenser, which Dr Grosart has borrowed from
the Camden Society’s Letter-book of Gabriel Harvey, touch literary matters
not seldom, but with no new important deliverances. In the later (1592)
Four Letters, the embroidery of railing at the dead Greene and the living
Nash has almost entirely hidden the literary canvas.
239. Reprinted by Mr Arber, with its almost immediately subsequent
Apology. I wish he had added the Ephemerides of Phialo which
accompanied the Apology, and the Plays Confuted of three years later; for
these books—very small and very difficult of access—add something to the
controversy.
240. Several times reprinted; most recently by the present writer in
Elizabethan and Jacobean Pamphlets (London, 1892).
241. Also frequently (indeed oftener) reprinted as by Arber, London,
1868; Shuckburgh, Cambridge, 1891; Cook, Boston (U.S.A.), 1890.
242. V. supra, p. 28.
243. Our two chief English-writing authorities, Mr Symonds and Mr
Spingarn, are at odds as to Sidney’s indebtedness to the Italians. He quotes
them but sparingly—Petrarch, Boccaccio, Landino, among the older
writers, Fracastoro and Scaliger alone, I think, of the moderns—and Mr
Symonds thought that he owed them little or nothing. Mr Spingarn, on the
other hand, represents him as following them all in general, and Minturno
in particular. As usual, it is a case of the gold and silver shield. My own
example of the slang and jargon so often mixed with their preciousness by
the Elizabethans. Nash borrowed it from Harvey to use against him; and the
eccentric Stanyhurst even employs it in his Virgil. Stanyhurst’s hexameters,
by the way (vide Mr Arber’s Reprint in the English Scholars Library, No.
10, London, 1880), are, thanks partly to their astounding lingo, among the
maddest things in English literature; but his prose prefatory matter, equally
odd in phrase, has some method in its madness.
237. La Casa’s book of etiquette and behaviour.
238. The further letters to Spenser, which Dr Grosart has borrowed from
the Camden Society’s Letter-book of Gabriel Harvey, touch literary matters
not seldom, but with no new important deliverances. In the later (1592)
Four Letters, the embroidery of railing at the dead Greene and the living
Nash has almost entirely hidden the literary canvas.
239. Reprinted by Mr Arber, with its almost immediately subsequent
Apology. I wish he had added the Ephemerides of Phialo which
accompanied the Apology, and the Plays Confuted of three years later; for
these books—very small and very difficult of access—add something to the
controversy.
240. Several times reprinted; most recently by the present writer in
Elizabethan and Jacobean Pamphlets (London, 1892).
241. Also frequently (indeed oftener) reprinted as by Arber, London,
1868; Shuckburgh, Cambridge, 1891; Cook, Boston (U.S.A.), 1890.
242. V. supra, p. 28.
243. Our two chief English-writing authorities, Mr Symonds and Mr
Spingarn, are at odds as to Sidney’s indebtedness to the Italians. He quotes
them but sparingly—Petrarch, Boccaccio, Landino, among the older
writers, Fracastoro and Scaliger alone, I think, of the moderns—and Mr
Symonds thought that he owed them little or nothing. Mr Spingarn, on the
other hand, represents him as following them all in general, and Minturno
in particular. As usual, it is a case of the gold and silver shield. My own
Page 222
reading of the Italian writers of 1530-80 leaves me in no doubt that Sidney
knew them, or some of them, pretty well. But his attitude is very different
from theirs as a whole, and already significant of some specially English
characteristics in criticism.
244. Savonarola, v. sup., p. 20.
245. “I must confess my own barbarousness: I never heard the old song
of Percy and Douglas that I found not my heart moved more than with a
trumpet.”
246. “As indeed it seemeth Scaliger judgeth.”
247. It may be desirable to note that Sidney’s book, though very well
known, as was the wont then, in MS., to all who cared to know, was never
printed till 1595, nearly ten years after the author’s death.
248. All three are included in Mr. Arber’s Reprints, where the desirable,
or desired, biographical and bibliographical apparatus will be duly found.
249. It is, however, excessive to represent James as a mere copyist of
Gascoigne.
250. Who also caught at James’s “tumbling verse” as a convenient
stigmatisation for the true English equivalenced liberty.
251. Occleve—no genius, but a true man enough—deserves exception
perhaps best.
252. The Germans—in this, as in other matters, more hopelessly to seek
in English now than, teste Porson, they were a century ago in Greek—have
followed Webbe, as indeed Warton had strangely done; and of course some
Englishmen have followed the Germans. Lydgate himself knew better,
though some of the shorter poems attributed to him are metrically, as well
as in other ways, not contemptible.
253. V. infra, p. 354.
knew them, or some of them, pretty well. But his attitude is very different
from theirs as a whole, and already significant of some specially English
characteristics in criticism.
244. Savonarola, v. sup., p. 20.
245. “I must confess my own barbarousness: I never heard the old song
of Percy and Douglas that I found not my heart moved more than with a
trumpet.”
246. “As indeed it seemeth Scaliger judgeth.”
247. It may be desirable to note that Sidney’s book, though very well
known, as was the wont then, in MS., to all who cared to know, was never
printed till 1595, nearly ten years after the author’s death.
248. All three are included in Mr. Arber’s Reprints, where the desirable,
or desired, biographical and bibliographical apparatus will be duly found.
249. It is, however, excessive to represent James as a mere copyist of
Gascoigne.
250. Who also caught at James’s “tumbling verse” as a convenient
stigmatisation for the true English equivalenced liberty.
251. Occleve—no genius, but a true man enough—deserves exception
perhaps best.
252. The Germans—in this, as in other matters, more hopelessly to seek
in English now than, teste Porson, they were a century ago in Greek—have
followed Webbe, as indeed Warton had strangely done; and of course some
Englishmen have followed the Germans. Lydgate himself knew better,
though some of the shorter poems attributed to him are metrically, as well
as in other ways, not contemptible.
253. V. infra, p. 354.
Page 223
254. The whole of the documents in the case will be found, clearly put, in
Mr Arber’s Introduction. The first attribution is in Bolton (v. infra) some
fifteen years later than the date of the book, and not quite positive (“as the
Fame is”). But there is no other claimant who has anything to put in: and
the almost diseased aversion of “persons of quality” (Puttenham was
possibly a nephew of Sir Thomas Elyot’s, and a Gentleman-Pensioner of the
Queen’s) to avowing authorship is well known.
255. Harington, a person of humour, and a typical Englishman,
perstringes this as well as other things in his fling at the Art.
256. Here as elsewhere we may note evidences of possible revision in the
book. That there was some such revision is certain; for instance, Ben
Jonson’s copy (the existence of which is not uninteresting) contains a large
cancel of four leaves, not found in other copies known. For this and other
points of the same kind, see Mr Arber’s edition.
257. “Reviewing” was as yet in its infancy—a curiously lively one
though, with Nash and others coming on. Puttenham seems to have
understood its little ways rather well.
258. Reprinted by Haslewood. Whetstone’s Preface to Promos and
Cassandra (1578) and A. Fraunce’s Arcadian Rhetoric (1588) are earlier
still. The former anticipates Sidney in objecting to the irregularity of
English plays: the latter is a strong partisan of classical metres, his practice
in which is sufficiently roughly treated by Ben Jonson in his Conversations,
v. infra, p. 199.
259. Reprinted (in its critical section) by Mr Arber, English Garner, ii. 94
sq.
Mr Arber’s Introduction. The first attribution is in Bolton (v. infra) some
fifteen years later than the date of the book, and not quite positive (“as the
Fame is”). But there is no other claimant who has anything to put in: and
the almost diseased aversion of “persons of quality” (Puttenham was
possibly a nephew of Sir Thomas Elyot’s, and a Gentleman-Pensioner of the
Queen’s) to avowing authorship is well known.
255. Harington, a person of humour, and a typical Englishman,
perstringes this as well as other things in his fling at the Art.
256. Here as elsewhere we may note evidences of possible revision in the
book. That there was some such revision is certain; for instance, Ben
Jonson’s copy (the existence of which is not uninteresting) contains a large
cancel of four leaves, not found in other copies known. For this and other
points of the same kind, see Mr Arber’s edition.
257. “Reviewing” was as yet in its infancy—a curiously lively one
though, with Nash and others coming on. Puttenham seems to have
understood its little ways rather well.
258. Reprinted by Haslewood. Whetstone’s Preface to Promos and
Cassandra (1578) and A. Fraunce’s Arcadian Rhetoric (1588) are earlier
still. The former anticipates Sidney in objecting to the irregularity of
English plays: the latter is a strong partisan of classical metres, his practice
in which is sufficiently roughly treated by Ben Jonson in his Conversations,
v. infra, p. 199.
259. Reprinted (in its critical section) by Mr Arber, English Garner, ii. 94
sq.
Page 224
260. Bolton’s criticism of his contemporaries is extracted in Warton (iv.
204 sq., ed. Hazlitt). The writer, who is dealing with History, and speaking
directly of language, disallows most of Spenser (excepting the Hymns) and
all Chaucer, Lydgate, Langland, and Skelton, can “endure” Gascoigne,
praises Elizabeth and James (of course), Chapman, Daniel, Drayton,
Constable, Southwell, Sackville, Surrey, Wyatt, Raleigh, Donne, and
Greville, but gives the palm for “vital, judicious, and practicable” language
to Jonson.
261. Ed. Bullen, Works of Dr Thomas Campion, London, 1889.
262. Chalmers’s Poets, iii. 551-560; Grosart’s Works of Samuel Daniel,
iv. 29-67.
263. It ought to be, but from certain signs perhaps is not, unnecessary to
say that the De Augmentis is itself no mere Latin version of the
Advancement, but a large expansion of it. There seems, however, no
necessity here to deal with both.
264. Advancement of Learning, Bk. II. iv.
265. I have more than once said that controversy or polemic in detail
with other writers is forbidden here. But those who wish to see what has
been said for Bacon will find most of the references in Messrs Gayley and
Scott’s invaluable book. The panegyrists—from my honoured friend and
predecessor, Professor Masson, to Mr Worsfold—all rely on the description
of poetry above referred to, as “Feigned History,” with what follows on its
advantages and on poetical justice, &c. All this seems to me, however
admirably expressed, to be obvious and rudimentary to the xth and the nth.
266. To be most readily found in Rogers’s Memorials of the Earl of
Stirling (vol. ii. pp. 205-210; Edinburgh, 1877), where, however, it appears
merely as one of the Appendices to a book of more or less pure genealogy,
without the slightest editorial information as to date or provenance. It seems
to be taken from the 1711 folio of Drummond’s Works: and to have been
written in 1634, between Bacon’s death and Ben’s.
204 sq., ed. Hazlitt). The writer, who is dealing with History, and speaking
directly of language, disallows most of Spenser (excepting the Hymns) and
all Chaucer, Lydgate, Langland, and Skelton, can “endure” Gascoigne,
praises Elizabeth and James (of course), Chapman, Daniel, Drayton,
Constable, Southwell, Sackville, Surrey, Wyatt, Raleigh, Donne, and
Greville, but gives the palm for “vital, judicious, and practicable” language
to Jonson.
261. Ed. Bullen, Works of Dr Thomas Campion, London, 1889.
262. Chalmers’s Poets, iii. 551-560; Grosart’s Works of Samuel Daniel,
iv. 29-67.
263. It ought to be, but from certain signs perhaps is not, unnecessary to
say that the De Augmentis is itself no mere Latin version of the
Advancement, but a large expansion of it. There seems, however, no
necessity here to deal with both.
264. Advancement of Learning, Bk. II. iv.
265. I have more than once said that controversy or polemic in detail
with other writers is forbidden here. But those who wish to see what has
been said for Bacon will find most of the references in Messrs Gayley and
Scott’s invaluable book. The panegyrists—from my honoured friend and
predecessor, Professor Masson, to Mr Worsfold—all rely on the description
of poetry above referred to, as “Feigned History,” with what follows on its
advantages and on poetical justice, &c. All this seems to me, however
admirably expressed, to be obvious and rudimentary to the xth and the nth.
266. To be most readily found in Rogers’s Memorials of the Earl of
Stirling (vol. ii. pp. 205-210; Edinburgh, 1877), where, however, it appears
merely as one of the Appendices to a book of more or less pure genealogy,
without the slightest editorial information as to date or provenance. It seems
to be taken from the 1711 folio of Drummond’s Works: and to have been
written in 1634, between Bacon’s death and Ben’s.
Page 225
267. From Park, and from Messrs Gayley and Scott. I did not always
agree with my late friend Dr Grosart: but I think he was better advised
when he called it “disappointing.”
268. It may be well to point out that these days carried him far beyond
the point at which we have stopped for Italian and for French. His solidarity
with the Elizabethans proper, however, makes his inclusion here imperative:
and the fact must be taken into consideration in judging the relative lengths
of this and the preceding chapters.
269. Take as one of a hundred, and from the less read pieces, that
interesting passage in the masque of The New World Discovered in the
Moon, which Gifford has made more interesting by a further discovery in
Theobald’s copy:—
Chro. Is he a man’s poet or a woman’s poet, I pray you?
2nd Her. Is there any such difference?
Fact. Many, as betwixt your man’s tailor and your woman’s tailor.
1st Her. How, may we beseech you?
Fact. I’ll show you: your man’s poet may break out strong and deep i' the
mouth, ... but your woman’s poet must flow, and stroke the ear, and as one
of them said of himself sweetly—
“Must write a verse as smooth and calm as cream,
In which there is no torrent, nor scarce stream.”
Whereon the injured “Tibbalds”: “Woman’s Poet, his soft versification—Mr
P——.”
The Induction to Every Man out of His Humour, a very large part of
Cynthia’s Revels, with its principal character of Crites, and its audacious
self-praise in the Epilogue, not a little of The Silent Woman, and scores of
other places in play and poem, might be added.
270. These dicta, thus juxtaposed, should make all argument about
apparently one-sided judgments superfluous. If Drummond had omitted the
first or the last, we should have been utterly wrong in arguing from the
remainder.
271. The best separate edition is that of Prof. Schelling of Philadelphia
(Boston, U.S.A., 1892). I give the pp. of this, as well as the Latin Headings
agree with my late friend Dr Grosart: but I think he was better advised
when he called it “disappointing.”
268. It may be well to point out that these days carried him far beyond
the point at which we have stopped for Italian and for French. His solidarity
with the Elizabethans proper, however, makes his inclusion here imperative:
and the fact must be taken into consideration in judging the relative lengths
of this and the preceding chapters.
269. Take as one of a hundred, and from the less read pieces, that
interesting passage in the masque of The New World Discovered in the
Moon, which Gifford has made more interesting by a further discovery in
Theobald’s copy:—
Chro. Is he a man’s poet or a woman’s poet, I pray you?
2nd Her. Is there any such difference?
Fact. Many, as betwixt your man’s tailor and your woman’s tailor.
1st Her. How, may we beseech you?
Fact. I’ll show you: your man’s poet may break out strong and deep i' the
mouth, ... but your woman’s poet must flow, and stroke the ear, and as one
of them said of himself sweetly—
“Must write a verse as smooth and calm as cream,
In which there is no torrent, nor scarce stream.”
Whereon the injured “Tibbalds”: “Woman’s Poet, his soft versification—Mr
P——.”
The Induction to Every Man out of His Humour, a very large part of
Cynthia’s Revels, with its principal character of Crites, and its audacious
self-praise in the Epilogue, not a little of The Silent Woman, and scores of
other places in play and poem, might be added.
270. These dicta, thus juxtaposed, should make all argument about
apparently one-sided judgments superfluous. If Drummond had omitted the
first or the last, we should have been utterly wrong in arguing from the
remainder.
271. The best separate edition is that of Prof. Schelling of Philadelphia
(Boston, U.S.A., 1892). I give the pp. of this, as well as the Latin Headings
Page 226
of sections, which will enable any one to trace the passage in complete
editions of the Works such as Cunningham’s Gifford. It is strange that no
one has numbered these sections for convenience of reference.
272. It may be observed that the shorter aphorisms rise to the top—at
least the beginning.
273. “He is upbraidingly called a poet.... The professors, indeed, have
made the learning cheap.”
274. It is here that Ben borrows from Petronius not merely the sentiment
but the phrase, “umbratical doctor” (see vol. i. p. 244 note).
275. “Taylor the Water-Poet,” certainly bad enough as a poet—though
not as a man. But the selection of Spenser as the other pole is an invaluable
correction to the sweeping attack in the Conversations.
276. Perhaps, indeed, an exception should be made in favour of the
section De malignitate Studentium, p. 34, which reiterates the necessity of
“the exact knowledge of all virtues and their contraries” on the part of the
poet.
277. He may have taken this from the Italians.
278. This is one of the most lacrimable of the gaps. Ben must have
known other authorities besides Quintilian well: he even quotes, though
only in part, the great passage of Simylus (vol. i. p. 25 note).
279. I am most anxious not to be thought to reflect on Professor
Schelling in this remark. Dr Schelling’s indagations of Ben’s debts are most
interesting, and always made in the right spirit, while, like a good farmer
and sportsman, he has left plenty for those who come after him to glean and
bag. For instance, the very curious passage, taken verbatim from the elder
Seneca, about the Platonic Apology (cf. vol. i. p. 237).
280. Yet in re-reading Jonson, just after a pretty elaborate overhauling of
the Italians, I find very little certain indebtedness of detail. Mr Spingarn
seems to me to go too far in tracing, p. 88, “small Latin and less Greek” to
editions of the Works such as Cunningham’s Gifford. It is strange that no
one has numbered these sections for convenience of reference.
272. It may be observed that the shorter aphorisms rise to the top—at
least the beginning.
273. “He is upbraidingly called a poet.... The professors, indeed, have
made the learning cheap.”
274. It is here that Ben borrows from Petronius not merely the sentiment
but the phrase, “umbratical doctor” (see vol. i. p. 244 note).
275. “Taylor the Water-Poet,” certainly bad enough as a poet—though
not as a man. But the selection of Spenser as the other pole is an invaluable
correction to the sweeping attack in the Conversations.
276. Perhaps, indeed, an exception should be made in favour of the
section De malignitate Studentium, p. 34, which reiterates the necessity of
“the exact knowledge of all virtues and their contraries” on the part of the
poet.
277. He may have taken this from the Italians.
278. This is one of the most lacrimable of the gaps. Ben must have
known other authorities besides Quintilian well: he even quotes, though
only in part, the great passage of Simylus (vol. i. p. 25 note).
279. I am most anxious not to be thought to reflect on Professor
Schelling in this remark. Dr Schelling’s indagations of Ben’s debts are most
interesting, and always made in the right spirit, while, like a good farmer
and sportsman, he has left plenty for those who come after him to glean and
bag. For instance, the very curious passage, taken verbatim from the elder
Seneca, about the Platonic Apology (cf. vol. i. p. 237).
280. Yet in re-reading Jonson, just after a pretty elaborate overhauling of
the Italians, I find very little certain indebtedness of detail. Mr Spingarn
seems to me to go too far in tracing, p. 88, “small Latin and less Greek” to
Page 227
Minturno’s “small Latin and very small Greek,” and the distinction of
poeta, poema, poesis to Scaliger or Maggi. Fifty people might have
independently thought of the first; and the second is an application of a
“common form” nearly as old as rhetoric.
281. P. 27. “The Tamerlanes and Tamerchams of the late age, which had
nothing in them but the scenical strutting and furious vociferation to
warrant them.” It is just worth noting that Jonson thought there was more
than this in Marlowe; and that the early edd. of Tamburlaine are
anonymous.
282. One cannot but remember—with pity or glee, according to mood
and temperament—how the Bacon-Shakespeare-maniacs have actually
taken this in the sense of poetic “numbers.” But in truth their study is not
likely to be much in haughty Rome and its language, or to have led them
either to Petronius and his omnium nume[ro]rum, or to Seneca and his
insolenti Græciæ.
283. Daniel had frankly defended enjambement.
284. It seemed unnecessary to enlarge the space given to the men of Eliza
and our James, by including the merer grammarians and pedagogues, from
Mulcaster to that fervid Scot, Mr Hume, who, in 1617, extolled the
“Orthography and Congruity” of his native speech (ed. Wheatley, E.E.T.S.,
1865). Of Mulcaster, however, it deserves to be mentioned that, not so
much in his Positions (1581: ed. Quick, London, 1887), which have been,
as in his Elementarie, which should be, reprinted, he displays a more than
Pléiade enthusiasm for the vernacular. Unluckily this last is not easy of
access, even the B.M. copy being a “Grenville” book, and hedged round
with forms and fears.
poeta, poema, poesis to Scaliger or Maggi. Fifty people might have
independently thought of the first; and the second is an application of a
“common form” nearly as old as rhetoric.
281. P. 27. “The Tamerlanes and Tamerchams of the late age, which had
nothing in them but the scenical strutting and furious vociferation to
warrant them.” It is just worth noting that Jonson thought there was more
than this in Marlowe; and that the early edd. of Tamburlaine are
anonymous.
282. One cannot but remember—with pity or glee, according to mood
and temperament—how the Bacon-Shakespeare-maniacs have actually
taken this in the sense of poetic “numbers.” But in truth their study is not
likely to be much in haughty Rome and its language, or to have led them
either to Petronius and his omnium nume[ro]rum, or to Seneca and his
insolenti Græciæ.
283. Daniel had frankly defended enjambement.
284. It seemed unnecessary to enlarge the space given to the men of Eliza
and our James, by including the merer grammarians and pedagogues, from
Mulcaster to that fervid Scot, Mr Hume, who, in 1617, extolled the
“Orthography and Congruity” of his native speech (ed. Wheatley, E.E.T.S.,
1865). Of Mulcaster, however, it deserves to be mentioned that, not so
much in his Positions (1581: ed. Quick, London, 1887), which have been,
as in his Elementarie, which should be, reprinted, he displays a more than
Pléiade enthusiasm for the vernacular. Unluckily this last is not easy of
access, even the B.M. copy being a “Grenville” book, and hedged round
with forms and fears.
Page 228
INTERCHAPTER IV.
The proper appreciation of the period surveyed in the foregoing Book is
of perhaps greater importance than that of any other part of this History. We
have seen, in the three preceding Interchapters, what it was that prevented
Greek, Roman, and Mediæval criticism respectively from attaining
completeness, and how the preventives worked. We saw further, in the last
pages of the First Volume, in what condition literature, and at least the
possibilities of the criticism of literature, were left at the beginning of the
Renaissance. And now we have seen what additions the Renaissance made
—not, indeed, in detail, to literature itself, for that belongs to another story
than ours, but what additions it made—to the criticism of literature. In mere
bulk these additions were very considerable. The extant critical writing of
these hundred years (or rather of the last seventy of them), excluding mere
rhetorical schoolbooks, probably exceeds, and very largely exceeds, the
total of classical and mediæval work on the subject which we possess, even
inclusive of schoolbooks. For the very first time Criticism, not as a sort of
half accidental and more than half shame-faced extension of Rhetoric, but
in and for itself, received a really large share of the intellectual attention of
the period.
Moreover, the advantages possessed by Renaissance critics (as we partly
also saw in the place referred to) were likewise very great. Men were
beginning really to know and really to understand antiquity; they had the
whole body of mediæval literature complete, finished, ready for their
appreciation; and they or their contemporaries were daily and yearly
building up great literatures in all the principal countries of Europe, except
Germany, and not wholly despicable literatures there and elsewhere. The
excuse of the want of comparison, which had been valid for Greece, less
valid but still partly so for Rome, and valid again, though for different
reasons, in the Middle Ages, was dwindling and disappearing every day.
There was no want of interest in the subject; there was no want of
examples, both encouraging and warning, of method.
The proper appreciation of the period surveyed in the foregoing Book is
of perhaps greater importance than that of any other part of this History. We
have seen, in the three preceding Interchapters, what it was that prevented
Greek, Roman, and Mediæval criticism respectively from attaining
completeness, and how the preventives worked. We saw further, in the last
pages of the First Volume, in what condition literature, and at least the
possibilities of the criticism of literature, were left at the beginning of the
Renaissance. And now we have seen what additions the Renaissance made
—not, indeed, in detail, to literature itself, for that belongs to another story
than ours, but what additions it made—to the criticism of literature. In mere
bulk these additions were very considerable. The extant critical writing of
these hundred years (or rather of the last seventy of them), excluding mere
rhetorical schoolbooks, probably exceeds, and very largely exceeds, the
total of classical and mediæval work on the subject which we possess, even
inclusive of schoolbooks. For the very first time Criticism, not as a sort of
half accidental and more than half shame-faced extension of Rhetoric, but
in and for itself, received a really large share of the intellectual attention of
the period.
Moreover, the advantages possessed by Renaissance critics (as we partly
also saw in the place referred to) were likewise very great. Men were
beginning really to know and really to understand antiquity; they had the
whole body of mediæval literature complete, finished, ready for their
appreciation; and they or their contemporaries were daily and yearly
building up great literatures in all the principal countries of Europe, except
Germany, and not wholly despicable literatures there and elsewhere. The
excuse of the want of comparison, which had been valid for Greece, less
valid but still partly so for Rome, and valid again, though for different
reasons, in the Middle Ages, was dwindling and disappearing every day.
There was no want of interest in the subject; there was no want of
examples, both encouraging and warning, of method.
Page 229
Nor is it possible to deny that the actual accomplishment of the time was
very considerable likewise. When a century finds a certain department of
intellectual activity almost uncultivated; when it leaves that subject in a
state of active cultivation; and when, further, two following centuries are
content to opine almost wholly in the sense to which it has generally
inclined,—that century can hardly be said to have wasted its years.
Accomplishment—very remarkable and solid accomplishment—it can
certainly boast. It must be the business of this Interchapter to examine the
nature and (partly at least) the value of that accomplishment, now that we
have fully surveyed its items, and frankly admitted a certain general result.
In considering the critical achievement of Italy, the earliest in time, the
most abundant in result, the most influential—in fact an abridgment, and no
mean abridgment, of that of Europe—we cannot but see at once that there
was a certain disadvantage accompanying the inevitableness and the general
propriety of this Italian prerogative. No other country had so much learning;
but, for this very reason, no other country was so certain rather to over- than
to under-value the importance of ancient doctrine. No country had so
perfect a literature, though other countries had literatures older, richer, and
more vigorous; but this very perfection, while it might seem to provide a
fertile field for criticism, had two dangers. The Italians were likely to look
down upon, or simply to ignore, other literatures; and, from the failing,
though slowly and not conspicuously failing, force of their creative power,
they were likely to turn to logomachies and debating-society wrangles. Nay,
there was a third peril. No country had so little properly mediæval literature
as Italy; and none therefore was more certain to set the fashion of ignoring
or slighting that mediæval performance which is so invaluable as a check
and balance-redresser. And perhaps we might even add a fourth—that while
French and English had got practically beyond the reach of mere dialect-
jealousy, Italian had not; and that too much of the abundant interest in
literature was throughout turned upon mere grammar and mere linguistics.
Perhaps for these reasons, perhaps for others, perhaps for none assignable
except by superfluous guess-work, Italian criticism, active and voluminous
as it was, settled very early into certain well-marked limits and channels,
and almost wholly confined itself within them, though these channels
underwent no infrequent intersection or confluence.
The main texts and patterns of the critics of the Italian Renaissance were
three—the Ars Poetica of Horace, the Poetics of Aristotle, and the various
very considerable likewise. When a century finds a certain department of
intellectual activity almost uncultivated; when it leaves that subject in a
state of active cultivation; and when, further, two following centuries are
content to opine almost wholly in the sense to which it has generally
inclined,—that century can hardly be said to have wasted its years.
Accomplishment—very remarkable and solid accomplishment—it can
certainly boast. It must be the business of this Interchapter to examine the
nature and (partly at least) the value of that accomplishment, now that we
have fully surveyed its items, and frankly admitted a certain general result.
In considering the critical achievement of Italy, the earliest in time, the
most abundant in result, the most influential—in fact an abridgment, and no
mean abridgment, of that of Europe—we cannot but see at once that there
was a certain disadvantage accompanying the inevitableness and the general
propriety of this Italian prerogative. No other country had so much learning;
but, for this very reason, no other country was so certain rather to over- than
to under-value the importance of ancient doctrine. No country had so
perfect a literature, though other countries had literatures older, richer, and
more vigorous; but this very perfection, while it might seem to provide a
fertile field for criticism, had two dangers. The Italians were likely to look
down upon, or simply to ignore, other literatures; and, from the failing,
though slowly and not conspicuously failing, force of their creative power,
they were likely to turn to logomachies and debating-society wrangles. Nay,
there was a third peril. No country had so little properly mediæval literature
as Italy; and none therefore was more certain to set the fashion of ignoring
or slighting that mediæval performance which is so invaluable as a check
and balance-redresser. And perhaps we might even add a fourth—that while
French and English had got practically beyond the reach of mere dialect-
jealousy, Italian had not; and that too much of the abundant interest in
literature was throughout turned upon mere grammar and mere linguistics.
Perhaps for these reasons, perhaps for others, perhaps for none assignable
except by superfluous guess-work, Italian criticism, active and voluminous
as it was, settled very early into certain well-marked limits and channels,
and almost wholly confined itself within them, though these channels
underwent no infrequent intersection or confluence.
The main texts and patterns of the critics of the Italian Renaissance were
three—the Ars Poetica of Horace, the Poetics of Aristotle, and the various
Page 230
Platonic places dealing with poetry. These latter had, as we have seen,
begun to affect Italian thought, directly or by transmission through this or
that medium, before the close of the fourteenth century; and the
maintenance of the Platonic ban, the refutation of it, or the more or less
ingenious acceptance and evasion of it, with the help of the Platonic
blessing, had been a tolerably familiar exercise from the time of Boccaccio
to the time of Savonarola. But Horace and Aristotle gave rules and patterns
of much more definiteness. Of the writers of the abundant critical literature
which has been partly surveyed, some directly comment these texts; others
follow them with more or less selection or combination; many take up
separate questions suggested by them; very few, if any, face the subject
without some prepossession derived from them.
The very earliest regular criticism, as in Vida and the first books of
Trissino, is either strictly grammatical and formal or else tends to expatiate
further in the Horatian path of rather desultory practical hints for
composition, these latter usually tending towards a more or less slavish
“Follow the ancients.” But, from the time of Daniello onwards, more
abstract views and questionings, especially in the direction of a sort of
Eirenicon between Aristotle and Plato, begin to engage the attention of
critics, sometimes as a prelude to study of formal Poetics, sometimes to the
exclusion of this. The most thoroughgoing as well as about the ablest
example of this latter kind is probably the Naugerius of Fracastoro, where
this distinguished physician and physicist, himself a skilled versifier and
even something of a poet, scarcely touches poets and poetry in the concrete
more than he might in a dialogue on physics or metaphysics, and is entirely
occupied with questions of the extremest “metapoetic,” or metacriticism.
This kind of discussion, which is prominent in the whole body of critics
from Daniello to Summo, is, with its extensions in the direction of the
Theory of the Drama, the Theory of the Heroic Poem, &c., no doubt the
most characteristic, and perhaps even the constitutive, feature of Italian
criticism. It seems to have been that which most attracted foreign scholars,
and stirred them up to emulation; it is very rarely omitted altogether by
anybody, save the merest grammarians. In fact, it so impressed itself, during
this period, upon the imagination, the memory, the intellectual habit, not
merely of Italy but of Europe, that to this day critics who neglect it are
looked at askance by many, if not by most, of their fellows.
begun to affect Italian thought, directly or by transmission through this or
that medium, before the close of the fourteenth century; and the
maintenance of the Platonic ban, the refutation of it, or the more or less
ingenious acceptance and evasion of it, with the help of the Platonic
blessing, had been a tolerably familiar exercise from the time of Boccaccio
to the time of Savonarola. But Horace and Aristotle gave rules and patterns
of much more definiteness. Of the writers of the abundant critical literature
which has been partly surveyed, some directly comment these texts; others
follow them with more or less selection or combination; many take up
separate questions suggested by them; very few, if any, face the subject
without some prepossession derived from them.
The very earliest regular criticism, as in Vida and the first books of
Trissino, is either strictly grammatical and formal or else tends to expatiate
further in the Horatian path of rather desultory practical hints for
composition, these latter usually tending towards a more or less slavish
“Follow the ancients.” But, from the time of Daniello onwards, more
abstract views and questionings, especially in the direction of a sort of
Eirenicon between Aristotle and Plato, begin to engage the attention of
critics, sometimes as a prelude to study of formal Poetics, sometimes to the
exclusion of this. The most thoroughgoing as well as about the ablest
example of this latter kind is probably the Naugerius of Fracastoro, where
this distinguished physician and physicist, himself a skilled versifier and
even something of a poet, scarcely touches poets and poetry in the concrete
more than he might in a dialogue on physics or metaphysics, and is entirely
occupied with questions of the extremest “metapoetic,” or metacriticism.
This kind of discussion, which is prominent in the whole body of critics
from Daniello to Summo, is, with its extensions in the direction of the
Theory of the Drama, the Theory of the Heroic Poem, &c., no doubt the
most characteristic, and perhaps even the constitutive, feature of Italian
criticism. It seems to have been that which most attracted foreign scholars,
and stirred them up to emulation; it is very rarely omitted altogether by
anybody, save the merest grammarians. In fact, it so impressed itself, during
this period, upon the imagination, the memory, the intellectual habit, not
merely of Italy but of Europe, that to this day critics who neglect it are
looked at askance by many, if not by most, of their fellows.
Page 231
Questions, however, more practical than these, yet not of quite such
extreme practicality as the mere questions of grammar and dialect, of metric
and composition, did actually occupy the Italians. About the middle of the
century the lucubrations of Cinthio and Pigna on the question of the
Romances and their relation to Epic and to the Aristotelian system, opened
up the most promising prospect by far that had ever yet been disclosed to
criticism. Had these inquiries been followed up—had they been extended
from the Romance to the novella, which had already become such a feature
of Italian vernacular literature—had Italy provided something not less
vigorous, but more polished, than the English Interlude and romantic
mystery of the Mary Magdalene type, or the French farce and sotie, so that
a similar investigation might have been further extended to drama—there is
no saying what might not have been achieved. But this was not permitted.
As a matter of fact, the times were not ready, nor the circumstances. The
profitable promise of the discussion on the romanzi dwindled off into the
mere logomachies or personalities of the Gerusalemme controversy, and
into endless formula-making for the abstract Heroic Poem. But little trace
of it is seen on the vigorous and independent mind of Castelvetro; less on
the equally vigorous, still more independent, but perhaps rather more
scholastic, mind of Patrizzi. For the former, Aristotle is still the special
though not quite the exclusive battleground, or canvas, or whatever
metaphor may be preferred; and he labours—as all these Italians do, in
strange apparent, though perhaps not real, contrast to the vagueness and far-
reaching sweep of their more abstract inquiries—under a difficulty, under a
seeming impossibility, of getting beyond disjointed observations and
comments on Aristotle, Homer, Dante, Petrarch, into a fruitful and
satisfying critical study of any poem or poet. Scaliger drills the whole mob
of formal and theoretical particulars into an orderly regiment, indulges in
plentiful criticism of the verbal and occasional kind, attempts to take a (for
him) complete historic survey, and achieves at least a quasi-tiebeam, a
bastard unity, for his work by his all-pervading, uncompromising Virgil-
worship, which gives a test for everything, an answer for everything, a
standard always at hand. Patrizzi seems, with his double method of
historical survey and argumentative inquiry, to have at last unbarred the
very gates of the true path. But he does not proceed far along it; and
astonishingly sound as well as original as are many of his conclusions, he
hardly attempts to apply them to modern poetry, except in the Trimerone,
extreme practicality as the mere questions of grammar and dialect, of metric
and composition, did actually occupy the Italians. About the middle of the
century the lucubrations of Cinthio and Pigna on the question of the
Romances and their relation to Epic and to the Aristotelian system, opened
up the most promising prospect by far that had ever yet been disclosed to
criticism. Had these inquiries been followed up—had they been extended
from the Romance to the novella, which had already become such a feature
of Italian vernacular literature—had Italy provided something not less
vigorous, but more polished, than the English Interlude and romantic
mystery of the Mary Magdalene type, or the French farce and sotie, so that
a similar investigation might have been further extended to drama—there is
no saying what might not have been achieved. But this was not permitted.
As a matter of fact, the times were not ready, nor the circumstances. The
profitable promise of the discussion on the romanzi dwindled off into the
mere logomachies or personalities of the Gerusalemme controversy, and
into endless formula-making for the abstract Heroic Poem. But little trace
of it is seen on the vigorous and independent mind of Castelvetro; less on
the equally vigorous, still more independent, but perhaps rather more
scholastic, mind of Patrizzi. For the former, Aristotle is still the special
though not quite the exclusive battleground, or canvas, or whatever
metaphor may be preferred; and he labours—as all these Italians do, in
strange apparent, though perhaps not real, contrast to the vagueness and far-
reaching sweep of their more abstract inquiries—under a difficulty, under a
seeming impossibility, of getting beyond disjointed observations and
comments on Aristotle, Homer, Dante, Petrarch, into a fruitful and
satisfying critical study of any poem or poet. Scaliger drills the whole mob
of formal and theoretical particulars into an orderly regiment, indulges in
plentiful criticism of the verbal and occasional kind, attempts to take a (for
him) complete historic survey, and achieves at least a quasi-tiebeam, a
bastard unity, for his work by his all-pervading, uncompromising Virgil-
worship, which gives a test for everything, an answer for everything, a
standard always at hand. Patrizzi seems, with his double method of
historical survey and argumentative inquiry, to have at last unbarred the
very gates of the true path. But he does not proceed far along it; and
astonishingly sound as well as original as are many of his conclusions, he
hardly attempts to apply them to modern poetry, except in the Trimerone,
Page 232
where he is too much entangled in the special quibbles and squabbles of the
controversy to which it belongs. All the rest—even interesting people like
Minturno—sometimes peep over the wall, yet confine their actual walk
within it.
Between all the schools, and from among the welter of the individuals,
there arises, in the mysterious way in which such things do arise, and which
defies all but shallow and superficial explanation, a sort of general critical
creed, every particular article of which would probably have been signed by
no two particular persons—perhaps by no one—but which is ready to
become, and in the next century does become, orthodox and accepted as a
whole. And this creed runs somewhat as follows:—
On the higher and more abstract questions of poetry (which are by no
means to be neglected) Aristotle is the guide; but the meaning of Aristotle is
not always self-evident even so far as it goes, and it sometimes requires
supplementing. Poetry is the imitation of nature: but this imitation may be
carried on either by copying nature as it is or by inventing things which do
not actually exist, and have never actually existed, but which conduct
themselves according to the laws of nature and reason. The poet is not a
public nuisance, but quite the contrary. He must, however, both delight and
instruct.
As for the Kinds of poetry, they are not mere working classifications of
the practice of poets, but have technically constituting definitions from
which they might be independently developed, and according to which they
ought to be composed. The general laws of Tragedy are given by Aristotle;
but it is necessary to extend his prescription of Unity so as to enjoin three
species—of Action, Time, and Place. Tragedy must be written in verse,
which, though not exactly the constituting form of poetry generally, is
almost or quite inseparable from it. The illegitimacy of prose in Comedy is
less positive. Certain extensions of the rules of the older Epic may be
admitted, so as to constitute a new Epic or Heroic Poem; but it is
questionable whether this may have the full liberty of Romance, and it is
subject to Unity, though not to the dramatic Unity. Other Kinds are inferior
to these.
In practising them, and in practising all, the poet is to look first, midmost,
and last to the practice of the ancients. “The ancients” may even
controversy to which it belongs. All the rest—even interesting people like
Minturno—sometimes peep over the wall, yet confine their actual walk
within it.
Between all the schools, and from among the welter of the individuals,
there arises, in the mysterious way in which such things do arise, and which
defies all but shallow and superficial explanation, a sort of general critical
creed, every particular article of which would probably have been signed by
no two particular persons—perhaps by no one—but which is ready to
become, and in the next century does become, orthodox and accepted as a
whole. And this creed runs somewhat as follows:—
On the higher and more abstract questions of poetry (which are by no
means to be neglected) Aristotle is the guide; but the meaning of Aristotle is
not always self-evident even so far as it goes, and it sometimes requires
supplementing. Poetry is the imitation of nature: but this imitation may be
carried on either by copying nature as it is or by inventing things which do
not actually exist, and have never actually existed, but which conduct
themselves according to the laws of nature and reason. The poet is not a
public nuisance, but quite the contrary. He must, however, both delight and
instruct.
As for the Kinds of poetry, they are not mere working classifications of
the practice of poets, but have technically constituting definitions from
which they might be independently developed, and according to which they
ought to be composed. The general laws of Tragedy are given by Aristotle;
but it is necessary to extend his prescription of Unity so as to enjoin three
species—of Action, Time, and Place. Tragedy must be written in verse,
which, though not exactly the constituting form of poetry generally, is
almost or quite inseparable from it. The illegitimacy of prose in Comedy is
less positive. Certain extensions of the rules of the older Epic may be
admitted, so as to constitute a new Epic or Heroic Poem; but it is
questionable whether this may have the full liberty of Romance, and it is
subject to Unity, though not to the dramatic Unity. Other Kinds are inferior
to these.
In practising them, and in practising all, the poet is to look first, midmost,
and last to the practice of the ancients. “The ancients” may even
Page 233
occasionally be contracted to little more than Virgil; they may be extended
to take in Homer, or may be construed much more widely. But taking things
on the whole, “the ancients” have anticipated almost everything, and in
everything that they have anticipated have done so well that the best chance
of success is simply to imitate them. The detailed precepts of Horace are
never to be neglected; if supplemented, they must be supplemented in the
same sense.
It is less the business of the historian, after drawing up this creed, to
criticise it favourably or unfavourably, than to point out that it had actually,
by the year 1600, come very near to formulated existence. We shall find it
in actual formulation in the ensuing book; we have already seen it in more
than adumbration, governing the pronouncements of a scholar and a man of
genius like Ben Jonson thirty years later than the close of the sixteenth
century. A full estimate of its merits and demerits must be postponed to the
close of this volume. But it may be observed at once that it is, prima facie,
not a perfect creed by any means. It has (and this, I think, has been too
seldom noticed) a fault, almost, if not quite, as great on the a priori side as
that which it confessedly has on the a posteriori. It does not face the facts;
it blinks all mediæval and a great deal of existing modern literature. But,
then, to do it justice, it does not pretend to do other than blink them. The
fault in its own more special province is much more glaring, though, as has
been said, it has, by a sort of sympathy, been much more ignored. There is
no real connection between the higher and the lower principles of Neo-
Classicism. There is not merely one crevasse, not easily to be crossed, in
this glacier of Correctness; there are two or three. Let us, for argument’s
sake, concede all the points in Fracastoro’s Naugerius, the Aconcagua or
Everest of the school. Let us allow that to the real lover of poetry it skills
not much whether he grants or denies all its propositions. But how are we to
pass from these to the further group—to allow that Reason, Common-
Sense, Nature, will govern the poet’s mediate and lower necessities? How
from this, again, to the still other group of dramatic, heroic, miscellaneous
requirements of the Correct? How from any of them to the entirely arbitrary
warning clause that the ancients have actually or virtually anticipated
everything?
On the more obvious faults of Italian criticism in detail—its extravagant
Virgil-worship; its refusal (except in such rare and practically isolated cases
to take in Homer, or may be construed much more widely. But taking things
on the whole, “the ancients” have anticipated almost everything, and in
everything that they have anticipated have done so well that the best chance
of success is simply to imitate them. The detailed precepts of Horace are
never to be neglected; if supplemented, they must be supplemented in the
same sense.
It is less the business of the historian, after drawing up this creed, to
criticise it favourably or unfavourably, than to point out that it had actually,
by the year 1600, come very near to formulated existence. We shall find it
in actual formulation in the ensuing book; we have already seen it in more
than adumbration, governing the pronouncements of a scholar and a man of
genius like Ben Jonson thirty years later than the close of the sixteenth
century. A full estimate of its merits and demerits must be postponed to the
close of this volume. But it may be observed at once that it is, prima facie,
not a perfect creed by any means. It has (and this, I think, has been too
seldom noticed) a fault, almost, if not quite, as great on the a priori side as
that which it confessedly has on the a posteriori. It does not face the facts;
it blinks all mediæval and a great deal of existing modern literature. But,
then, to do it justice, it does not pretend to do other than blink them. The
fault in its own more special province is much more glaring, though, as has
been said, it has, by a sort of sympathy, been much more ignored. There is
no real connection between the higher and the lower principles of Neo-
Classicism. There is not merely one crevasse, not easily to be crossed, in
this glacier of Correctness; there are two or three. Let us, for argument’s
sake, concede all the points in Fracastoro’s Naugerius, the Aconcagua or
Everest of the school. Let us allow that to the real lover of poetry it skills
not much whether he grants or denies all its propositions. But how are we to
pass from these to the further group—to allow that Reason, Common-
Sense, Nature, will govern the poet’s mediate and lower necessities? How
from this, again, to the still other group of dramatic, heroic, miscellaneous
requirements of the Correct? How from any of them to the entirely arbitrary
warning clause that the ancients have actually or virtually anticipated
everything?
On the more obvious faults of Italian criticism in detail—its extravagant
Virgil-worship; its refusal (except in such rare and practically isolated cases
Page 234
as Lilius Giraldus’ knowledge of Chaucer and Wyatt, Patrizzi’s of Fauchet
and his Old French subjects) to take any account of foreign modern
literature; its coterie-squabbling and the rest, it would not be profitable to
dwell much. But it is curious and instructive to notice how little
appreciative criticism of contemporaries this active critical period gives. If
you start a controversy of an ancient against a modern or a modern against a
modern—of Homer against Ariosto, or of Ariosto against Tasso—there will
be plenty of persons to take a hand. For a really appreciative study of any
writer, modern or ancient, I do not know where to look. Men are so
besotted, on the one hand, with their inquiries into general principles; on the
other, with their sporadic annotations, that they cannot attempt anything of
the kind.
Yet it would be an act of the grossest injustice and ingratitude to refuse or
to stint recognition of the immense services that the Italians rendered to
criticism at this time. It was, in their own stately word, a veritable case of
risorgimento; and of resurrection in a body far better organised, far more
gifted, than that which had gone to sleep a thousand years before.
In the year 1500 we may look over Europe and find criticism really alive
and awake nusquam et nullibi—at best fast asleep, and dreaming a little
with the dreams of Gavin Douglas or (had he lived a couple of years longer)
of Savonarola, or of such more infantine persons as Augustine Käsenbrot.
In 1600 criticism is a classed and recognised department of literature;
Faustino Summo, in the very year, can quote authority after authority, refer
—as to a sort of common law of the subject—to dicta and obiter dicta of
nearly three generations of distinguished judges. And Italian criticism has
colonised: its colonies, with the virtues of that kind, are showing
characteristics sometimes quite different, though derived from those of the
mother country, and are carrying the critical torch round the world. No
matter for the moment whether the more perfect way has been reached, or
the less perfect way declined upon. The time of “liking grossly,” of
composing anyhow, has passed: that of critical study of the old, and critical
reception of the new, has begun.
Never, therefore, shall I join in the anathema in which De Quincey[285] has
coupled Italian critics with Greek rhetoricians. In fact, the Italians suffer far
more unjustly than the Greeks. Castelvetro and Patrizzi alone would be
enough to clear their company handsomely: Capriano, Cinthio Giraldi,
Minturno could put in quite sufficient bail on their own recognisances: yet
and his Old French subjects) to take any account of foreign modern
literature; its coterie-squabbling and the rest, it would not be profitable to
dwell much. But it is curious and instructive to notice how little
appreciative criticism of contemporaries this active critical period gives. If
you start a controversy of an ancient against a modern or a modern against a
modern—of Homer against Ariosto, or of Ariosto against Tasso—there will
be plenty of persons to take a hand. For a really appreciative study of any
writer, modern or ancient, I do not know where to look. Men are so
besotted, on the one hand, with their inquiries into general principles; on the
other, with their sporadic annotations, that they cannot attempt anything of
the kind.
Yet it would be an act of the grossest injustice and ingratitude to refuse or
to stint recognition of the immense services that the Italians rendered to
criticism at this time. It was, in their own stately word, a veritable case of
risorgimento; and of resurrection in a body far better organised, far more
gifted, than that which had gone to sleep a thousand years before.
In the year 1500 we may look over Europe and find criticism really alive
and awake nusquam et nullibi—at best fast asleep, and dreaming a little
with the dreams of Gavin Douglas or (had he lived a couple of years longer)
of Savonarola, or of such more infantine persons as Augustine Käsenbrot.
In 1600 criticism is a classed and recognised department of literature;
Faustino Summo, in the very year, can quote authority after authority, refer
—as to a sort of common law of the subject—to dicta and obiter dicta of
nearly three generations of distinguished judges. And Italian criticism has
colonised: its colonies, with the virtues of that kind, are showing
characteristics sometimes quite different, though derived from those of the
mother country, and are carrying the critical torch round the world. No
matter for the moment whether the more perfect way has been reached, or
the less perfect way declined upon. The time of “liking grossly,” of
composing anyhow, has passed: that of critical study of the old, and critical
reception of the new, has begun.
Never, therefore, shall I join in the anathema in which De Quincey[285] has
coupled Italian critics with Greek rhetoricians. In fact, the Italians suffer far
more unjustly than the Greeks. Castelvetro and Patrizzi alone would be
enough to clear their company handsomely: Capriano, Cinthio Giraldi,
Minturno could put in quite sufficient bail on their own recognisances: yet
Page 235
others would leave the court more than recommended to mercy.[286] I
disagree with many of the principles of most of them; I wish that even those
with whom I agree had opened their eyes wider, kept them more steadily on
the object, and cared less about fighting abstract prizes, and more about
appreciating the goods which the gods had given them in concrete
literature. It was also a misfortune, no doubt, that no man of very distinct
genius and whole-hearted devotion gave himself up to the business. Vida
was a good kind of pedant, and Trissino at heart a philologist; Daniello,
Capriano, and most of the rest, including even Minturno, down to Denores
and Summo, persons of respectable talent merely; Fracastoro, a man of
science; Cinthio, a novelist and miscellanist; Scaliger, a not quite so good
kind of more deeply-dyed pedant; Castelvetro, a scholar, with the scholar’s
quarrelsomeness; Patrizzi, a philosopher primarily; Torquato Tasso himself,
a great poet, with, for a poet, a sensible and logical but curiously timid and
hesitating mind. Not a few of them did great things for Criticism; all
together they did a really mighty thing for her and for Literature: but they
were not her sworn servants, as Lessing and Hazlitt, as Sainte-Beuve and
Arnold, were later.
Let there be to them not the less but almost the more glory! It is
something—nay, it is very much—to have created a Kind. Up to their time
Criticism had been a mere Cinderella in the literary household. Aristotle
had taken her up as he had taken all Arts and Sciences. The Rhetoricians
had found her a useful handmaid to Rhetoric. Roman dilettanti had dallied
with her. The solid good sense and good feeling of Quintilian had decided
that she must be “no casual mistress but a wife” (perhaps on rather
polygamic principles) to the student of oratory. Longinus had suddenly
fixed her colours on his helmet, and had ridden in her honour the most
astonishing little chevauchée in the annals of adventurous literature. The
second greatest poet of the world had done her at once yeoman’s service
and stately courtesy. And yet she was, in the general literary view, not so
much déclassée as not classed at all—not “out,” not accorded the entrées.
This was now all over. The country which gave the literary tone and set
the literary fashions of Europe had adopted Criticism in the most
unmistakable manner—whether in the manner wisest or most perfect is not
for the present essential. Rank thus given is never lost; at any rate, there is
no recorded instance of a literary attainder for Kinds, whatever there may
be for persons.
disagree with many of the principles of most of them; I wish that even those
with whom I agree had opened their eyes wider, kept them more steadily on
the object, and cared less about fighting abstract prizes, and more about
appreciating the goods which the gods had given them in concrete
literature. It was also a misfortune, no doubt, that no man of very distinct
genius and whole-hearted devotion gave himself up to the business. Vida
was a good kind of pedant, and Trissino at heart a philologist; Daniello,
Capriano, and most of the rest, including even Minturno, down to Denores
and Summo, persons of respectable talent merely; Fracastoro, a man of
science; Cinthio, a novelist and miscellanist; Scaliger, a not quite so good
kind of more deeply-dyed pedant; Castelvetro, a scholar, with the scholar’s
quarrelsomeness; Patrizzi, a philosopher primarily; Torquato Tasso himself,
a great poet, with, for a poet, a sensible and logical but curiously timid and
hesitating mind. Not a few of them did great things for Criticism; all
together they did a really mighty thing for her and for Literature: but they
were not her sworn servants, as Lessing and Hazlitt, as Sainte-Beuve and
Arnold, were later.
Let there be to them not the less but almost the more glory! It is
something—nay, it is very much—to have created a Kind. Up to their time
Criticism had been a mere Cinderella in the literary household. Aristotle
had taken her up as he had taken all Arts and Sciences. The Rhetoricians
had found her a useful handmaid to Rhetoric. Roman dilettanti had dallied
with her. The solid good sense and good feeling of Quintilian had decided
that she must be “no casual mistress but a wife” (perhaps on rather
polygamic principles) to the student of oratory. Longinus had suddenly
fixed her colours on his helmet, and had ridden in her honour the most
astonishing little chevauchée in the annals of adventurous literature. The
second greatest poet of the world had done her at once yeoman’s service
and stately courtesy. And yet she was, in the general literary view, not so
much déclassée as not classed at all—not “out,” not accorded the entrées.
This was now all over. The country which gave the literary tone and set
the literary fashions of Europe had adopted Criticism in the most
unmistakable manner—whether in the manner wisest or most perfect is not
for the present essential. Rank thus given is never lost; at any rate, there is
no recorded instance of a literary attainder for Kinds, whatever there may
be for persons.
Page 236
When this criticism passes the Alps, and we pass them with it, a curious
difference is to be perceived. We leave the abstract side of the matter almost
wholly behind us—the most abstract side perhaps wholly. A little of the
Platonic generalities, relieved from the Platonic detraction, may be indulged
in pro forma, and Vauquelin (in that odd familiarity with Deity which the
French have always displayed) may image God as a gardener ordering the
garden of Poesy with trim walks, and neatly planted beds, and hedges,
which must not be trespassed on, or from, or through. But the French
attention almost wholly deserts such things for the mediate generalities of
kind and form; and is constantly tempted to desert these also for the still
lower and more particular questions of language, prosody, and style. The
fact is, that the circumstances have entirely changed. The Italians, though
they may not know it, are in a state of declining vitality and creative force
as regards actual literature; even Tasso is an “old man’s child” among their
greatest. Besides, to do them justice, there is very little left for them to do
with their mere means of language and the like. It is quite different with
French and Frenchmen. If they are rashly neglectful (and Fauchet, Pasquier,
and others are soon on the spot to vindicate them to some extent from this
neglect) of their further past, there is some excuse for impatience of the past
that is nearer; and it is even natural and human, though far from
praiseworthy, that they should scorn the once charming formal devices
which latterly, in most hands, have been so destitute of charm. But make
allowance as we may for the causes, the facts remain. French criticism is
much the least important of the three divisions which we have considered in
the foregoing book. Not only does it begin late; not only does it fail to be
very fertile; but its individual documents require a certain kindness to speak
very highly of their virtues, and a good deal of blindness to conceal their
shortcomings. I have protested above against a too low estimate of the
critical value of the Défense et Illustration. Its critical interest is really
great, and its critical importance really high; but this greatness and this
importance are scarcely absolute. They belong to it as to one of our very
first pieces of revolutionary criticism—one of the first in which the newly
hatched and fledged critical spirit of Europe shows itself of falcon breed,
and sets out to fight and destroy as well as to build nests and hatch young in
its turn. The censure of the Défense is very mainly unjust, and its positive
doctrine, though generous, and, in the circumstances, not insalutary, is
vague, not very far-sighted, and, at the very best, extremely incomplete.
difference is to be perceived. We leave the abstract side of the matter almost
wholly behind us—the most abstract side perhaps wholly. A little of the
Platonic generalities, relieved from the Platonic detraction, may be indulged
in pro forma, and Vauquelin (in that odd familiarity with Deity which the
French have always displayed) may image God as a gardener ordering the
garden of Poesy with trim walks, and neatly planted beds, and hedges,
which must not be trespassed on, or from, or through. But the French
attention almost wholly deserts such things for the mediate generalities of
kind and form; and is constantly tempted to desert these also for the still
lower and more particular questions of language, prosody, and style. The
fact is, that the circumstances have entirely changed. The Italians, though
they may not know it, are in a state of declining vitality and creative force
as regards actual literature; even Tasso is an “old man’s child” among their
greatest. Besides, to do them justice, there is very little left for them to do
with their mere means of language and the like. It is quite different with
French and Frenchmen. If they are rashly neglectful (and Fauchet, Pasquier,
and others are soon on the spot to vindicate them to some extent from this
neglect) of their further past, there is some excuse for impatience of the past
that is nearer; and it is even natural and human, though far from
praiseworthy, that they should scorn the once charming formal devices
which latterly, in most hands, have been so destitute of charm. But make
allowance as we may for the causes, the facts remain. French criticism is
much the least important of the three divisions which we have considered in
the foregoing book. Not only does it begin late; not only does it fail to be
very fertile; but its individual documents require a certain kindness to speak
very highly of their virtues, and a good deal of blindness to conceal their
shortcomings. I have protested above against a too low estimate of the
critical value of the Défense et Illustration. Its critical interest is really
great, and its critical importance really high; but this greatness and this
importance are scarcely absolute. They belong to it as to one of our very
first pieces of revolutionary criticism—one of the first in which the newly
hatched and fledged critical spirit of Europe shows itself of falcon breed,
and sets out to fight and destroy as well as to build nests and hatch young in
its turn. The censure of the Défense is very mainly unjust, and its positive
doctrine, though generous, and, in the circumstances, not insalutary, is
vague, not very far-sighted, and, at the very best, extremely incomplete.
Page 237
What saves it is, first, the abundant and conclusive evidence that it gives of
the critic being actually abroad in earnest, of the time of mere acquiescence
and tradition having ceased, of there being writers who are determined to
attack some kinds of writing and encourage others with their very best will
and power; and, secondly, the generous and uncompromising championship
of the vernacular, which is the greatest glory of the Pléiade, and which,
followed in other countries, gave us the great modern literatures. Du Bellay
has the credit of bringing criticism, if we may so speak, nearer to her true
object than almost any Italian critic of his own century had done, though he
does not himself either practise or prescribe the best way of getting at that
object.
The criticism of his colleague, or master, Ronsard, is, as we have seen,
injured by its small bulk, by its rather fragmentary character, by the fact that
the most considerable piece of it has passed through another hand, and that
we have only that hand’s own testimony for the faithfulness of the
rehandling, and by not a little decided inconsistency. But it has the same
militant, practical spirit as Du Bellay’s in quality, and more of it in
proportional quantity. Moreover, it is extremely germinal. Those[287] who
contend that the classical French criticism of the seventeenth century was
only the Pléiade criticism of the sixteenth, denying its masters, omitting
some, if not always the worst, parts of their creed, narrowed in range, and
perfected in apparent system, have a great deal to say for themselves. Nor
can there be reasonable doubt that, though Du Bellay was the first to speak
critically, the teaching was the teaching of Ronsard throughout. Of this
teaching, the injunction to enrich the language by archaism, and dialect, and
word-coining (even by reading the forgotten romances of Arthur), was the
very best part, and the first to be discarded by the ingratitude of the
rebellious disciples, Malherbe and those about him. The worst part, which
was not discarded but retained, was the adoption of the Italian doctrines
about the hybrid kind of “Heroic” or “Long” Poem. But in most points the
criticism of Ronsard justifies itself by a real adherence, conscious or
unconscious, to the practical ideals of the French.
These characteristics recur (to much greater advantage, because of its far
greater bulk, and in spite of its flagrant desultoriness) in the work of
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye. Here we have, put certainly not with much
method, but with plenty of talent, and at no unsuitable length, the whole of
the Italian teaching, in small points and in large, that had commended itself
the critic being actually abroad in earnest, of the time of mere acquiescence
and tradition having ceased, of there being writers who are determined to
attack some kinds of writing and encourage others with their very best will
and power; and, secondly, the generous and uncompromising championship
of the vernacular, which is the greatest glory of the Pléiade, and which,
followed in other countries, gave us the great modern literatures. Du Bellay
has the credit of bringing criticism, if we may so speak, nearer to her true
object than almost any Italian critic of his own century had done, though he
does not himself either practise or prescribe the best way of getting at that
object.
The criticism of his colleague, or master, Ronsard, is, as we have seen,
injured by its small bulk, by its rather fragmentary character, by the fact that
the most considerable piece of it has passed through another hand, and that
we have only that hand’s own testimony for the faithfulness of the
rehandling, and by not a little decided inconsistency. But it has the same
militant, practical spirit as Du Bellay’s in quality, and more of it in
proportional quantity. Moreover, it is extremely germinal. Those[287] who
contend that the classical French criticism of the seventeenth century was
only the Pléiade criticism of the sixteenth, denying its masters, omitting
some, if not always the worst, parts of their creed, narrowed in range, and
perfected in apparent system, have a great deal to say for themselves. Nor
can there be reasonable doubt that, though Du Bellay was the first to speak
critically, the teaching was the teaching of Ronsard throughout. Of this
teaching, the injunction to enrich the language by archaism, and dialect, and
word-coining (even by reading the forgotten romances of Arthur), was the
very best part, and the first to be discarded by the ingratitude of the
rebellious disciples, Malherbe and those about him. The worst part, which
was not discarded but retained, was the adoption of the Italian doctrines
about the hybrid kind of “Heroic” or “Long” Poem. But in most points the
criticism of Ronsard justifies itself by a real adherence, conscious or
unconscious, to the practical ideals of the French.
These characteristics recur (to much greater advantage, because of its far
greater bulk, and in spite of its flagrant desultoriness) in the work of
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye. Here we have, put certainly not with much
method, but with plenty of talent, and at no unsuitable length, the whole of
the Italian teaching, in small points and in large, that had commended itself
Page 238
to the French mind up to this time, with such additions, adaptations, and
corrections as vernacular needs had induced, or vernacular genius insisted
on. We see in it, very decidedly, the obsession of the “long poem,” which
France was not to outgrow for two centuries. We see the tendency to burden
criticism with innumerable petty “rules” (or with attentions to “licence”
nearly as burdensome), which was also to beset the nation. And in general
we see also what it may not be improper (in connection with a school so
fond of neologism and word-imitation) to call the “pottering” tendency,
which was the worse side of Pléiade criticism. Vauquelin has really a great
deal to say, and much of what he has to say is sensible. He escapes many
errors of his forerunners, more of his successors, and it is comparatively
seldom that one feels inclined to put an absolute black mark against any of
his suggestions or cautions. But the whole is not only formless, but also
invertebrate. Vauquelin does not, like some of the Italians, confine himself
to grave and lofty generalisations on the highest questions affecting Poetry.
He does not, like others, or these same at other moments, take an orderly
survey of detail according to a coherent scheme. He simply has, as the cant
phrase goes, “a few remarks to offer” on much more than a few points.
It has been already said that this provisional, tentative, and somewhat
ineffectual character is characteristic, and prophetically characteristic, of the
school. The Pléiade did not, like Ronsard’s slightly younger contemporary
Spenser and his followers in England, set French poetry once for all on the
path on which, with whatever minor changes, it was henceforth to go. Some
thirty or forty years of never wholly successful experiment were succeeded
by an unjust supplanting, and by another thirty or forty of random
tentatives, corresponding in some ways to those of England nearly a century
earlier. Only then did France fall into a way, not by any means of
perfection, but sufficiently suited to her genius to enable her to travel fast
and far in it. It is a serious thing for Pléiade criticism that we have from it
no thorough examination of any part of French literature. No doubt such
examinations are not the strong point of Renaissance Criticism. But
generally there is more approach to them in Italian, with the scattered
remarks of the critics on Dante and Petrarch, with the controversies about
the romanzi in general and the Orlando and Gerusalemme in particular;
there is more even in English, with the surveys, imperfect as they are, of the
earlier Elizabethans over the past of poetry, with the literature of the
“classical metres” quarrel, with the (no doubt later) remarks of Ben on
corrections as vernacular needs had induced, or vernacular genius insisted
on. We see in it, very decidedly, the obsession of the “long poem,” which
France was not to outgrow for two centuries. We see the tendency to burden
criticism with innumerable petty “rules” (or with attentions to “licence”
nearly as burdensome), which was also to beset the nation. And in general
we see also what it may not be improper (in connection with a school so
fond of neologism and word-imitation) to call the “pottering” tendency,
which was the worse side of Pléiade criticism. Vauquelin has really a great
deal to say, and much of what he has to say is sensible. He escapes many
errors of his forerunners, more of his successors, and it is comparatively
seldom that one feels inclined to put an absolute black mark against any of
his suggestions or cautions. But the whole is not only formless, but also
invertebrate. Vauquelin does not, like some of the Italians, confine himself
to grave and lofty generalisations on the highest questions affecting Poetry.
He does not, like others, or these same at other moments, take an orderly
survey of detail according to a coherent scheme. He simply has, as the cant
phrase goes, “a few remarks to offer” on much more than a few points.
It has been already said that this provisional, tentative, and somewhat
ineffectual character is characteristic, and prophetically characteristic, of the
school. The Pléiade did not, like Ronsard’s slightly younger contemporary
Spenser and his followers in England, set French poetry once for all on the
path on which, with whatever minor changes, it was henceforth to go. Some
thirty or forty years of never wholly successful experiment were succeeded
by an unjust supplanting, and by another thirty or forty of random
tentatives, corresponding in some ways to those of England nearly a century
earlier. Only then did France fall into a way, not by any means of
perfection, but sufficiently suited to her genius to enable her to travel fast
and far in it. It is a serious thing for Pléiade criticism that we have from it
no thorough examination of any part of French literature. No doubt such
examinations are not the strong point of Renaissance Criticism. But
generally there is more approach to them in Italian, with the scattered
remarks of the critics on Dante and Petrarch, with the controversies about
the romanzi in general and the Orlando and Gerusalemme in particular;
there is more even in English, with the surveys, imperfect as they are, of the
earlier Elizabethans over the past of poetry, with the literature of the
“classical metres” quarrel, with the (no doubt later) remarks of Ben on
Page 239
Shakespeare and others. The fault of Pléiade Criticism, in short, is that it is
at once too particularist and too little particular.[288]
Crossing the Channel, as we lately crossed the Alps, we do not find a
simple transmission of indebtedness. It would have been surprising,
considering the strong intellectual interests of the Colet group, and the early
presence in England of such a critical force as Erasmus, if this country had
waited to receive a current merely transmitted through France from Italy. It
is possible that, later, Gascoigne may have derived something from
Ronsard, and it is quite certain that “E. K.'s” notes on the Calendar show
symptoms of Pléiade influence, even in the bad point of contempt, or at
least want of respect, for Marot. But it is exceedingly improbable that
Ascham derived any impulsion from Du Bellay: it is certain, as we have
seen, that he knew Italian critics like Pigna directly; and it is equally certain
that, either by his own studies or through Cheke, his critical impulses must
have been excited humanistically long before the French had got beyond the
merely rhétoriqueur standard of Sibilet.
Hence, as well as for other reasons, English criticism develops itself, if
not with entire independence, yet with sufficient conformity to its own
needs. That practical bent which we have noticed in the French shows itself
here also; but it is conditioned differently. We had, as they had in France, to
fashion a new poetic diction; but it cannot be said that the critics did much
for this: Spenser, as much as Coriolanus, might have said, “Alone I did it.”
They did more in re metrica, and it so happened that they had, quite in their
own sphere, to fight an all-important battle, the battle of the classical
metres, which was of nothing like the same importance in French or in
Italian. In dealing with these and other matters they fall into certain
generations or successive groups.
In Ascham and his contemporaries the critical attitude was induced, but
not altogether favourably conditioned, by certain forces, partly common to
them with their Continental contemporaries, partly not. They all felt, in a
degree most creditable to themselves (and contrasting most favourably with
the rather opposite feeling of men so much greater and so much later as
Bacon and Hobbes), that they must adorn their Sparta, that it was their
business to get the vernacular into as good working order, both for prose
and verse, as they possibly could. And what is more, they had some shrewd
at once too particularist and too little particular.[288]
Crossing the Channel, as we lately crossed the Alps, we do not find a
simple transmission of indebtedness. It would have been surprising,
considering the strong intellectual interests of the Colet group, and the early
presence in England of such a critical force as Erasmus, if this country had
waited to receive a current merely transmitted through France from Italy. It
is possible that, later, Gascoigne may have derived something from
Ronsard, and it is quite certain that “E. K.'s” notes on the Calendar show
symptoms of Pléiade influence, even in the bad point of contempt, or at
least want of respect, for Marot. But it is exceedingly improbable that
Ascham derived any impulsion from Du Bellay: it is certain, as we have
seen, that he knew Italian critics like Pigna directly; and it is equally certain
that, either by his own studies or through Cheke, his critical impulses must
have been excited humanistically long before the French had got beyond the
merely rhétoriqueur standard of Sibilet.
Hence, as well as for other reasons, English criticism develops itself, if
not with entire independence, yet with sufficient conformity to its own
needs. That practical bent which we have noticed in the French shows itself
here also; but it is conditioned differently. We had, as they had in France, to
fashion a new poetic diction; but it cannot be said that the critics did much
for this: Spenser, as much as Coriolanus, might have said, “Alone I did it.”
They did more in re metrica, and it so happened that they had, quite in their
own sphere, to fight an all-important battle, the battle of the classical
metres, which was of nothing like the same importance in French or in
Italian. In dealing with these and other matters they fall into certain
generations or successive groups.
In Ascham and his contemporaries the critical attitude was induced, but
not altogether favourably conditioned, by certain forces, partly common to
them with their Continental contemporaries, partly not. They all felt, in a
degree most creditable to themselves (and contrasting most favourably with
the rather opposite feeling of men so much greater and so much later as
Bacon and Hobbes), that they must adorn their Sparta, that it was their
business to get the vernacular into as good working order, both for prose
and verse, as they possibly could. And what is more, they had some shrewd
Page 240
notions about the best way of doing this. The exaggerated rhetoric and
“aureateness” of the fifteenth century had inspired them, to a man, with a
horror of “inkhorn terms,” and, if mainly wrong, they were also partly right
in feeling that the just and deserved popularity of the early printed editions
of the whole of Chaucer threatened English with an undue dose of
archaism.
Further, they were provided by the New Learning, not merely with a very
large stock of finished examples of literature, but also with a not
inconsiderable library of regular criticism. They did their best to utilise
these; but, in thus endeavouring, they fell into two opposite, yet in a manner
complementary, errors. In the first place, they failed altogether to recognise
the continuity, and in a certain sense the equipollence, of literature—the fact
that to blot out a thousand years of literary history, as they tried to do, is
unnatural and destructive. In the second place, though their instinct told
them rightly that Greek and Latin had invaluable lessons and models for
English, their reason failed to tell them that these lessons must be applied,
these models used, with special reference to the nature, the history, the
development of English itself. Hence they fell, as regards verse, into the
egregious and fortunately self-correcting error of the classical metres, as
regards prose, into a fashion of style, by no means insalutary, as a corrective
and reaction from the rhetorical bombast and clumsiness of the transition,
but inadequate of itself, and needing to be counterdosed by the fustian and
the familiarity which are the worse sides of Euphuism, in order to bring
about the next stage. Lastly, these men looked too much to the future, and
not enough to the past: they did not so much as condescend to examine the
literary manner and nature even of Chaucer himself, still less of others.
In the next generation, which gives us Gascoigne, Webbe, Puttenham,
and Sidney, the same tendencies are perceived; but the Euphuist movement
comes in to differentiate them on one side, and the influence of Italian
criticism on the other. The classical metre craze has not yet been blown to
pieces by the failure of even such a poet as Spenser to do any good with it,
the fortunate recalcitrance of the healthy English spirit, and at last the
crushing broadside of Daniel’s Defence of Rhyme. But it does no very great
practical harm: and prose style is sensibly beautified and heightened. Some
attempts are made, from Gascoigne downwards, to examine the actual
wealth of English, to appraise writers, to analyse methods—attempts,
however, not very well sustained, and still conditioned by the apparent
“aureateness” of the fifteenth century had inspired them, to a man, with a
horror of “inkhorn terms,” and, if mainly wrong, they were also partly right
in feeling that the just and deserved popularity of the early printed editions
of the whole of Chaucer threatened English with an undue dose of
archaism.
Further, they were provided by the New Learning, not merely with a very
large stock of finished examples of literature, but also with a not
inconsiderable library of regular criticism. They did their best to utilise
these; but, in thus endeavouring, they fell into two opposite, yet in a manner
complementary, errors. In the first place, they failed altogether to recognise
the continuity, and in a certain sense the equipollence, of literature—the fact
that to blot out a thousand years of literary history, as they tried to do, is
unnatural and destructive. In the second place, though their instinct told
them rightly that Greek and Latin had invaluable lessons and models for
English, their reason failed to tell them that these lessons must be applied,
these models used, with special reference to the nature, the history, the
development of English itself. Hence they fell, as regards verse, into the
egregious and fortunately self-correcting error of the classical metres, as
regards prose, into a fashion of style, by no means insalutary, as a corrective
and reaction from the rhetorical bombast and clumsiness of the transition,
but inadequate of itself, and needing to be counterdosed by the fustian and
the familiarity which are the worse sides of Euphuism, in order to bring
about the next stage. Lastly, these men looked too much to the future, and
not enough to the past: they did not so much as condescend to examine the
literary manner and nature even of Chaucer himself, still less of others.
In the next generation, which gives us Gascoigne, Webbe, Puttenham,
and Sidney, the same tendencies are perceived; but the Euphuist movement
comes in to differentiate them on one side, and the influence of Italian
criticism on the other. The classical metre craze has not yet been blown to
pieces by the failure of even such a poet as Spenser to do any good with it,
the fortunate recalcitrance of the healthy English spirit, and at last the
crushing broadside of Daniel’s Defence of Rhyme. But it does no very great
practical harm: and prose style is sensibly beautified and heightened. Some
attempts are made, from Gascoigne downwards, to examine the actual
wealth of English, to appraise writers, to analyse methods—attempts,
however, not very well sustained, and still conditioned by the apparent
Page 241
ignorance of the writers that there was anything behind Chaucer, though
Anglo-Saxon was actually studied at the time under Archbishop Parker’s
influence. Further, the example of the Italian critics deflects the energy of
our writers from the right way, and sends them off into pretty Platonisings
about the proud place due to poetry, the stately status of the singer, and
other agreeable but unpractical aberrations. This tendency is much
strengthened by the Puritan onslaught on poetry generally and dramatic
poetry in particular. In all this there is a great deal of interest, and many
scattered aperçus of great value. Gascoigne’s little treatise is almost
priceless, as showing us how English prosody was drifting on the shallows
of a hard-and-fast syllabic arrangement, when the dramatists came to its
rescue. Sidney, wrong as he is about the drama, catches hold of one of the
very life-buoys of English poetry in his praise of the ballad. Daniel’s
Defence puts the root of the rhyme-matter in the most admirable fashion.
But we see that the classics are exercising on all the men of the time
influences both bad and good, and in criticism, perhaps, rather bad than
good; that the obsession of Latin in particular is heavy on them; and that the
practice, both Latin and Greek, of what we have called beginning at the
wrong end lies heaviest of all.
Nothing will show this more curiously than the words in which Sidney
anticipated (and perhaps suggested) Ben’s censure of Spenser’s diction as to
the Shepherd’s Calendar, especially if we remember that this was said by a
personal friend and by an ardent lover of poetry. That there is something to
be said against the dialect of the Calendar all reasonable critics will allow.
As a poetic language it is, at its best, but a preliminary exercise for the
glorious medium of The Faerie Queene; it is awkwardly and in some cases
incorrectly blended; and, above all, the mere rusticity—the “hey-ho” and
the rest—is a dangerous and doubtful expedient. But observe that Sidney
says nothing of this kind. He “looks merely at the stop-watch.” Theocritus
did not do it; Virgil did not do it; Sannazar did not do it; therefore Spenser
must not do it. That his own elevation of a mere modern like Sannazar to
this position of a lawgiver of the most tyrannic kind—of an authority not
merely whose will is law, not merely whose prohibition is final, but whose
bare abstention from something taboos that something from the use of all
mankind for ever and ever,—that this did not strike Sidney as preposterous
in itself, and as throwing doubt on the whole method, is wonderful. But
even if he had stopped at Theocritus and Virgil, he would have been wrong
Anglo-Saxon was actually studied at the time under Archbishop Parker’s
influence. Further, the example of the Italian critics deflects the energy of
our writers from the right way, and sends them off into pretty Platonisings
about the proud place due to poetry, the stately status of the singer, and
other agreeable but unpractical aberrations. This tendency is much
strengthened by the Puritan onslaught on poetry generally and dramatic
poetry in particular. In all this there is a great deal of interest, and many
scattered aperçus of great value. Gascoigne’s little treatise is almost
priceless, as showing us how English prosody was drifting on the shallows
of a hard-and-fast syllabic arrangement, when the dramatists came to its
rescue. Sidney, wrong as he is about the drama, catches hold of one of the
very life-buoys of English poetry in his praise of the ballad. Daniel’s
Defence puts the root of the rhyme-matter in the most admirable fashion.
But we see that the classics are exercising on all the men of the time
influences both bad and good, and in criticism, perhaps, rather bad than
good; that the obsession of Latin in particular is heavy on them; and that the
practice, both Latin and Greek, of what we have called beginning at the
wrong end lies heaviest of all.
Nothing will show this more curiously than the words in which Sidney
anticipated (and perhaps suggested) Ben’s censure of Spenser’s diction as to
the Shepherd’s Calendar, especially if we remember that this was said by a
personal friend and by an ardent lover of poetry. That there is something to
be said against the dialect of the Calendar all reasonable critics will allow.
As a poetic language it is, at its best, but a preliminary exercise for the
glorious medium of The Faerie Queene; it is awkwardly and in some cases
incorrectly blended; and, above all, the mere rusticity—the “hey-ho” and
the rest—is a dangerous and doubtful expedient. But observe that Sidney
says nothing of this kind. He “looks merely at the stop-watch.” Theocritus
did not do it; Virgil did not do it; Sannazar did not do it; therefore Spenser
must not do it. That his own elevation of a mere modern like Sannazar to
this position of a lawgiver of the most tyrannic kind—of an authority not
merely whose will is law, not merely whose prohibition is final, but whose
bare abstention from something taboos that something from the use of all
mankind for ever and ever,—that this did not strike Sidney as preposterous
in itself, and as throwing doubt on the whole method, is wonderful. But
even if he had stopped at Theocritus and Virgil, he would have been wrong
Page 242
enough. Here once more is the False Mimesis, the prava imitatio. Not only
is the good poet to be followed in what he does, but what he does not do
serves as a bar to posterity in all time from doing it.
There is another point in which Sidney and Ben are alike, and in which
they may even seem to anticipate that general adoption of “Reason,” of
“Good Sense” as the criterion, which the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries claimed as their own, and which some recent critics have rather
kindly allowed them. Sidney’s raillery of the romantic life-drama, Ben’s
reported strictures on the sea-coast of Bohemia, and his certain ones on
“Cæsar did never wrong,” &c., express the very spirit of this cheap
rationalism, which was later to defray a little even of Dryden’s criticism,
almost the whole of Boileau’s, and far too much of Pope’s. The ancients, to
do them justice, are not entirely to be blamed for this. There is very little of
it in Aristotle, who quite understands that the laws of poetry are not the laws
of history or of science.[289] But there is a great deal of it in Horace: and, as
we shall see, the authority of the great Greek was, during the three centuries
which form the subject of this volume, more and more used as a mere cloak
for the opinions of the clever Roman. Meanwhile, such books as those of
Webbe and Puttenham, such an ordeal by battle as that fought out by
Campion and Daniel, even such critical jaculata as those of Meres and
Bolton,[290] were all in different ways doing work, mistaken sometimes in
kind, but always useful in general effect.
On the general Elizabethan position, as we have seen, Jonson himself
made no great advance: in fact, he threw fresh intrenchments around it and
fresh forces into its garrison. We may even, contrary to our wont in such
cases, be rather glad that he did not enter upon a more extensive
examination of his own contemporaries, because it is quite clear that he was
not at the right point of view for making it. But it does not follow from this
that he was not a critic, and a great critic. No one who was not this could
have written the Shakespeare and the Bacon passages—in fact, in the
former case, only a great magnanimity and a true sense of critical truth
could have mixed so generous an acknowledgment with the candid avowal
of so much disapproval. And, as we have said above, even where Ben was
wrong, or at least insufficient, his critical gospel was the thing needed for
the time to come, if not for the actual time. By a few years after his own
death—by the middle of the century, that is to say—seventy years and more
of such a harvest as no other country has ever had, had filled the barns of
is the good poet to be followed in what he does, but what he does not do
serves as a bar to posterity in all time from doing it.
There is another point in which Sidney and Ben are alike, and in which
they may even seem to anticipate that general adoption of “Reason,” of
“Good Sense” as the criterion, which the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries claimed as their own, and which some recent critics have rather
kindly allowed them. Sidney’s raillery of the romantic life-drama, Ben’s
reported strictures on the sea-coast of Bohemia, and his certain ones on
“Cæsar did never wrong,” &c., express the very spirit of this cheap
rationalism, which was later to defray a little even of Dryden’s criticism,
almost the whole of Boileau’s, and far too much of Pope’s. The ancients, to
do them justice, are not entirely to be blamed for this. There is very little of
it in Aristotle, who quite understands that the laws of poetry are not the laws
of history or of science.[289] But there is a great deal of it in Horace: and, as
we shall see, the authority of the great Greek was, during the three centuries
which form the subject of this volume, more and more used as a mere cloak
for the opinions of the clever Roman. Meanwhile, such books as those of
Webbe and Puttenham, such an ordeal by battle as that fought out by
Campion and Daniel, even such critical jaculata as those of Meres and
Bolton,[290] were all in different ways doing work, mistaken sometimes in
kind, but always useful in general effect.
On the general Elizabethan position, as we have seen, Jonson himself
made no great advance: in fact, he threw fresh intrenchments around it and
fresh forces into its garrison. We may even, contrary to our wont in such
cases, be rather glad that he did not enter upon a more extensive
examination of his own contemporaries, because it is quite clear that he was
not at the right point of view for making it. But it does not follow from this
that he was not a critic, and a great critic. No one who was not this could
have written the Shakespeare and the Bacon passages—in fact, in the
former case, only a great magnanimity and a true sense of critical truth
could have mixed so generous an acknowledgment with the candid avowal
of so much disapproval. And, as we have said above, even where Ben was
wrong, or at least insufficient, his critical gospel was the thing needed for
the time to come, if not for the actual time. By a few years after his own
death—by the middle of the century, that is to say—seventy years and more
of such a harvest as no other country has ever had, had filled the barns of
Page 243
English to bursting with the ripest crops of romantic luxuriance—its
treasure-houses with the gold and the ivory and the spices—if sometimes
also with the apes and the peacocks—of Romantic exploration and
discovery. There was no need to invite further acquisition—the national
genius, in Ben’s own quotation, sufflaminandus erat. It was his task to
begin the sufflamination: and he did it, not perhaps with a full apprehension
of the circumstances, and certainly with nothing like a full appreciation of
what the age, from its “Tamerlanes and Tamerchams” onwards, had done;
but still did it. In his most remarkable book we see the last word of
Elizabethan criticism, not merely in point of time, but in the other sense.
Ben is beyond even Sidney, much more Webbe and Puttenham, not to
mention Ascham and Wilson, in grasp; while, if we compare him with the
Continental critics of his own time, he shows a greater sense of real
literature than almost any of them. But, at the same time, he has not
occupied the true standing-ground of the critic; he has not even set his foot
on it, as Dryden, born before his death, was to do. In him, as in all these
Renaissance critics, we find, not so much positive errors as an inability to
perceive clearly where they are and what their work is.
Passing from the performances of the several countries[291] to the general
critical upshot of the century, as we passed to those performances from the
survey of individual works, we have already secured one perception of
result. Criticism is once more constituted; it is constituted indeed much
more fully, if by no means more methodically, than has ever been the case
before. By the time of our last Italian writer, Faustino Summo (Vauquelin is
accidentally, and Ben Jonson not so accidentally, later in the other countries,
but neither represents a stage so really advanced), Criticism has, besides its
ancient books of the Law, quite a library of modern prophets,
commentators, scribes. The strings of authorities, so specially dear to the
coming century, can be produced without any difficulty whatsoever: and
however much these authorities may differ on minor points, their general
drift is unmistakable. Isolated dissenters like Patrizzi may make good their
own fastnesses; but the general army hardly troubles itself to besiege or
even to mask them, it goes on its way to conquer and occupy the land. Of
the constitution established, or shortly to be established, in the conquered
districts, some sketch has been given, but a caution should here once more
be interposed against taking the word “established” too literally. Still, all the
dogmas of the Neo-Classic creed, its appeal to the ancients and its appeal to
treasure-houses with the gold and the ivory and the spices—if sometimes
also with the apes and the peacocks—of Romantic exploration and
discovery. There was no need to invite further acquisition—the national
genius, in Ben’s own quotation, sufflaminandus erat. It was his task to
begin the sufflamination: and he did it, not perhaps with a full apprehension
of the circumstances, and certainly with nothing like a full appreciation of
what the age, from its “Tamerlanes and Tamerchams” onwards, had done;
but still did it. In his most remarkable book we see the last word of
Elizabethan criticism, not merely in point of time, but in the other sense.
Ben is beyond even Sidney, much more Webbe and Puttenham, not to
mention Ascham and Wilson, in grasp; while, if we compare him with the
Continental critics of his own time, he shows a greater sense of real
literature than almost any of them. But, at the same time, he has not
occupied the true standing-ground of the critic; he has not even set his foot
on it, as Dryden, born before his death, was to do. In him, as in all these
Renaissance critics, we find, not so much positive errors as an inability to
perceive clearly where they are and what their work is.
Passing from the performances of the several countries[291] to the general
critical upshot of the century, as we passed to those performances from the
survey of individual works, we have already secured one perception of
result. Criticism is once more constituted; it is constituted indeed much
more fully, if by no means more methodically, than has ever been the case
before. By the time of our last Italian writer, Faustino Summo (Vauquelin is
accidentally, and Ben Jonson not so accidentally, later in the other countries,
but neither represents a stage so really advanced), Criticism has, besides its
ancient books of the Law, quite a library of modern prophets,
commentators, scribes. The strings of authorities, so specially dear to the
coming century, can be produced without any difficulty whatsoever: and
however much these authorities may differ on minor points, their general
drift is unmistakable. Isolated dissenters like Patrizzi may make good their
own fastnesses; but the general army hardly troubles itself to besiege or
even to mask them, it goes on its way to conquer and occupy the land. Of
the constitution established, or shortly to be established, in the conquered
districts, some sketch has been given, but a caution should here once more
be interposed against taking the word “established” too literally. Still, all the
dogmas of the Neo-Classic creed, its appeal to the ancients and its appeal to
Page 244
Reason or Nature or Sense, its strict view of Kinds, its conception of
Licence and Rule, its Unities, are more or less clearly evolved. And fresh
particulars—such as its sharp reaction from the allowance and even
recommendation of terms of art, archaisms, &c., which had been partly
adopted by some Italians and warmly championed by the Pléiade—are at
hand. Indeed, the business of the seventeenth century is, according to the
title which we have ventured to take for the next book, much more to
crystallise what is already passing out of the states of digestion and solution
—to codify precedent case-law—than to do anything new.
There is not only this important advance in at least poetical theory to be
considered, but also an advance still more important, though as yet not
formally marshalled and regimented, in the direction of critical practice—of
the application directly, to books old and new, of the critical principles so
arrived at. We have seen that, for good and sufficient reasons, there was not
so very much of this in classical times proper, and that there was so little of
it as to be almost nothing in the Middle Ages. It did not seem necessary, in
the concluding chapters of the first volume, to multiply proofs of this, as
they could have been multiplied, merely to display acquaintance with
mediæval literature. To take two fresh ones here, each famous for other
reasons, the well-known reference of Wolfram von Eschenbach at the end
of the Parzival to the “unrightness” of Chrestien de Troyes’ version, and the
godly wrath which made “Kyot” set things in better order, contains no
literary criticism at all; the matter, according to the usual mediæval habit, is
looked upon as a question of truth or falsehood, not of good or bad literary
presentment. And when the equally well-known but anonymous scribe
wrote jubilantly on the Cursor Mundi,
“This is the best book of all,”
it is as certain as anything can be that he was not thinking, as he might
fairly have thought, of the not small skill in compilation and narration
displayed in that mighty miscellany, but merely that it contained a great
deal of useful instruction and pleasant history. In the notices of books and
writers which accumulate during our present period this is more and more
ceasing to be the case; it has in fact ceased to be so from almost the
beginning.
Licence and Rule, its Unities, are more or less clearly evolved. And fresh
particulars—such as its sharp reaction from the allowance and even
recommendation of terms of art, archaisms, &c., which had been partly
adopted by some Italians and warmly championed by the Pléiade—are at
hand. Indeed, the business of the seventeenth century is, according to the
title which we have ventured to take for the next book, much more to
crystallise what is already passing out of the states of digestion and solution
—to codify precedent case-law—than to do anything new.
There is not only this important advance in at least poetical theory to be
considered, but also an advance still more important, though as yet not
formally marshalled and regimented, in the direction of critical practice—of
the application directly, to books old and new, of the critical principles so
arrived at. We have seen that, for good and sufficient reasons, there was not
so very much of this in classical times proper, and that there was so little of
it as to be almost nothing in the Middle Ages. It did not seem necessary, in
the concluding chapters of the first volume, to multiply proofs of this, as
they could have been multiplied, merely to display acquaintance with
mediæval literature. To take two fresh ones here, each famous for other
reasons, the well-known reference of Wolfram von Eschenbach at the end
of the Parzival to the “unrightness” of Chrestien de Troyes’ version, and the
godly wrath which made “Kyot” set things in better order, contains no
literary criticism at all; the matter, according to the usual mediæval habit, is
looked upon as a question of truth or falsehood, not of good or bad literary
presentment. And when the equally well-known but anonymous scribe
wrote jubilantly on the Cursor Mundi,
“This is the best book of all,”
it is as certain as anything can be that he was not thinking, as he might
fairly have thought, of the not small skill in compilation and narration
displayed in that mighty miscellany, but merely that it contained a great
deal of useful instruction and pleasant history. In the notices of books and
writers which accumulate during our present period this is more and more
ceasing to be the case; it has in fact ceased to be so from almost the
beginning.
Page 245
Such an estimate as that given by Ascham as Cheke’s of Sallust simply
could not have suggested itself to any mediæval mind; the Humanist
practice of the fifteenth century had—quite early in the sixteenth—made it
natural enough, at least as regards ancient writers. And it was constantly
becoming more and more common as to moderns. The Italians, in a limited
and scholastic fashion, had begun it long before as to Dante; they continued
it in regard to Boccaccio and Petrarch; they were spurred on to practise it
more and more, first by the immense popularity of the Orlando, and then by
the rival (and deliberately urged as rival) charms of the Gerusalemme.
Compare for one moment the survey of books and authors which we quoted
or summarised from the Labyrinthus in the last volume with that which we
have analysed from Lilius Giraldus in this—the whole point of view, the
whole method of handling, is altered. In France and England more
specially, attempts, clumsy, limited, subject to whatever epithet of
qualification any one pleases to apply, as they may be, are made to take a
backward historical view of poetry at least; and when great work such as
Ronsard’s or Spenser’s is produced, there is a real, if rudimentary, attempt
made to judge it critically. By the time that we reach Ben Jonson—who no
doubt has a strong tinge of the seventeenth century superinduced, by nature
as well as time, on his sixteenth-century nativity—such aperçus almost of
the highest critical kind in their species, as those on Bacon and
Shakespeare, are possible to at least the higher intellects,—it needs but a
step to the very highest kind, such as that of Dryden on the same
Shakespeare. That what we have called the crystallisation of a critical creed
affects these estimates not always for the best is not of real importance—the
point is that we have at last got them.
These are great things, but, still postponing criticism on this criticism as a
whole, we may point out one or two drawbacks in it which already appear,
and which are quite independent of individual inclination on the vexed
questions of Classic or Romantic, Practice or Rule, Subject or Expression.
The first is that, to some extent unavoidably, but to a greater extent than
that excuse will cover, the criticism which we have reviewed is criticism of
poetry only. Most of it is quite openly and avowedly so. Poetica, Poetice,
De Poetica, Della Poetica, Della Vera Poetica, Art Poétique, Art of Poetry,
Apology for Poetry—these are the very titles of the books we have been
discussing. When prose comes in at all, except on rare and mostly late
occasions, it is only on questions more abstract or less abstract connected
could not have suggested itself to any mediæval mind; the Humanist
practice of the fifteenth century had—quite early in the sixteenth—made it
natural enough, at least as regards ancient writers. And it was constantly
becoming more and more common as to moderns. The Italians, in a limited
and scholastic fashion, had begun it long before as to Dante; they continued
it in regard to Boccaccio and Petrarch; they were spurred on to practise it
more and more, first by the immense popularity of the Orlando, and then by
the rival (and deliberately urged as rival) charms of the Gerusalemme.
Compare for one moment the survey of books and authors which we quoted
or summarised from the Labyrinthus in the last volume with that which we
have analysed from Lilius Giraldus in this—the whole point of view, the
whole method of handling, is altered. In France and England more
specially, attempts, clumsy, limited, subject to whatever epithet of
qualification any one pleases to apply, as they may be, are made to take a
backward historical view of poetry at least; and when great work such as
Ronsard’s or Spenser’s is produced, there is a real, if rudimentary, attempt
made to judge it critically. By the time that we reach Ben Jonson—who no
doubt has a strong tinge of the seventeenth century superinduced, by nature
as well as time, on his sixteenth-century nativity—such aperçus almost of
the highest critical kind in their species, as those on Bacon and
Shakespeare, are possible to at least the higher intellects,—it needs but a
step to the very highest kind, such as that of Dryden on the same
Shakespeare. That what we have called the crystallisation of a critical creed
affects these estimates not always for the best is not of real importance—the
point is that we have at last got them.
These are great things, but, still postponing criticism on this criticism as a
whole, we may point out one or two drawbacks in it which already appear,
and which are quite independent of individual inclination on the vexed
questions of Classic or Romantic, Practice or Rule, Subject or Expression.
The first is that, to some extent unavoidably, but to a greater extent than
that excuse will cover, the criticism which we have reviewed is criticism of
poetry only. Most of it is quite openly and avowedly so. Poetica, Poetice,
De Poetica, Della Poetica, Della Vera Poetica, Art Poétique, Art of Poetry,
Apology for Poetry—these are the very titles of the books we have been
discussing. When prose comes in at all, except on rare and mostly late
occasions, it is only on questions more abstract or less abstract connected
Page 246
with poetry—“Whether Tragedy and Comedy may be written in Prose,”
“Whether Verse is necessary to Poetry,” and the like. If poetry in ancient
days was, though it received plenty of attention, sometimes injuriously
postponed to oratory, it certainly now has its revenge. Oratory itself, though
occasionally handled, obviously is so as a sort of legacy from the ancients
themselves, from a sort of feeling that it would not be decent to say nothing
about a subject on which Aristotle, and Cicero, and Quintilian have said so
much. The formal Letter, being rather a favourite Italian institution, is not
quite neglected; it receives some attention among ourselves from Ben.
Whether History can or must give subjects for poetry is keenly debated; but
the question is approached entirely from the side of interest in Poetry, not in
History. At the very close of our period, we find so great a prose writer as
Bacon doubting the solvency of vernacular prose; a little earlier we find
Montaigne taking note of it chiefly, if at all, in regard to matter, Pasquier
hardly taking notice of it at all.
This is unfortunate, because it tends further to perpetuate the mischievous
absorption in Kinds, and to postpone the attainment of the position from
which, though the difference between prose and poetry may be seen more
sharply than ever, the common literary qualities of both, and the way in
which they affect the delight of the receiver, are at last perceived. It is
unfortunate, further, because it tends to prevent the enjoyment of the full
advantages which the modern literatures are gradually giving to the critic in
the very departments—the prose romance, the essay, and others—where
ancient criticism suffered most from the absence of material.
Another drawback which it may seem captious, or ungenerous, or even
childish, to urge, but which really has a great deal to do with the matter, is
that, active as the period was in criticism, it did not produce a single very
great critic practising on a great scale. Its four or five critics of greatest
literary genius were (I exclude Bacon for reasons given, and Spenser hardly
comes in) Ronsard, Du Bellay, Tasso, Sidney, and Ben Jonson. The two
Frenchmen dealt with but a small part of the subject, and from but a special
point of view; Tasso was mainly “fighting a prize,” and his own prize;
Sidney’s was a very little tractate of general, if generous, protest, and
entered into no applications; Ben’s critical remains are un-co-ordinated
notes. On the other hand, of the specially critical writers, Scaliger on the
strictly erudite and strictly classical side, Castelvetro in a sort of middle
station, and Patrizzi as a voice crying in the wilderness, are perhaps the only
“Whether Verse is necessary to Poetry,” and the like. If poetry in ancient
days was, though it received plenty of attention, sometimes injuriously
postponed to oratory, it certainly now has its revenge. Oratory itself, though
occasionally handled, obviously is so as a sort of legacy from the ancients
themselves, from a sort of feeling that it would not be decent to say nothing
about a subject on which Aristotle, and Cicero, and Quintilian have said so
much. The formal Letter, being rather a favourite Italian institution, is not
quite neglected; it receives some attention among ourselves from Ben.
Whether History can or must give subjects for poetry is keenly debated; but
the question is approached entirely from the side of interest in Poetry, not in
History. At the very close of our period, we find so great a prose writer as
Bacon doubting the solvency of vernacular prose; a little earlier we find
Montaigne taking note of it chiefly, if at all, in regard to matter, Pasquier
hardly taking notice of it at all.
This is unfortunate, because it tends further to perpetuate the mischievous
absorption in Kinds, and to postpone the attainment of the position from
which, though the difference between prose and poetry may be seen more
sharply than ever, the common literary qualities of both, and the way in
which they affect the delight of the receiver, are at last perceived. It is
unfortunate, further, because it tends to prevent the enjoyment of the full
advantages which the modern literatures are gradually giving to the critic in
the very departments—the prose romance, the essay, and others—where
ancient criticism suffered most from the absence of material.
Another drawback which it may seem captious, or ungenerous, or even
childish, to urge, but which really has a great deal to do with the matter, is
that, active as the period was in criticism, it did not produce a single very
great critic practising on a great scale. Its four or five critics of greatest
literary genius were (I exclude Bacon for reasons given, and Spenser hardly
comes in) Ronsard, Du Bellay, Tasso, Sidney, and Ben Jonson. The two
Frenchmen dealt with but a small part of the subject, and from but a special
point of view; Tasso was mainly “fighting a prize,” and his own prize;
Sidney’s was a very little tractate of general, if generous, protest, and
entered into no applications; Ben’s critical remains are un-co-ordinated
notes. On the other hand, of the specially critical writers, Scaliger on the
strictly erudite and strictly classical side, Castelvetro in a sort of middle
station, and Patrizzi as a voice crying in the wilderness, are perhaps the only
Page 247
three who rise distinctly above mediocrity. And, as has been pointed out
already, Scaliger is too much of a pedant, Castelvetro is a mere
commentator, and Patrizzi a philosopher militant, who carries on one of his
campaigns in the province of criticism.
The disadvantages of this are twofold. Not merely do we get no brilliant
and, at least in appearance and claim, authoritative exposition of the
subject, like that of Boileau or that of Pope later on the dogmatic side, like
those of Dryden and Johnson on the illustrative and exemplifying; but the
whole critical system comes into existence by a process of haphazard
accretion—by (to repeat a metaphor already used) an accumulation of
individual judgments at common law. No doubt this gives a certain strength,
a certain naturalness, to the creed when it is formed. It has not been foisted
on the communis sensus—that sensus has been inured and trained to it. The
extraordinary toughness and vitality of the resultant is very likely due to
this. But it caused also some of that inconsistency and apparent irrationality
which a system of common law almost necessarily contracts as it grows:
and it was more and more driven to throw over these inconsistencies and
irrationalities that cloak of factitious Reason, or Sense, or Nature which, by
the eighteenth century, becomes the mere threadbare disguise of a decrepit
Duessa.
If, and when, we arrive at the close of that century, after a somewhat
shorter halt and survey at the termination of the seventeenth, when the
deaths of Boileau and Dryden made a real break—we shall have to
complete this necessarily partial view of the whole Neo-Classic
dispensation. We have seen it here in its Period of Origins, and, without
endeavouring to add too many strokes to the picture, we may point to the
fresh illustration of that principle which has been adumbrated (I fear, from
some remarks of good critics, with insufficient perspicuity) at the close of
the last volume. We saw that the tendency of Greek criticism was good,
because, whether it was perfect criticism in itself or not, it was exactly the
criticism needed yet further to perfect the perfections of Greek literature;
and that much the same was the case in Latin. We saw that the quiescence
of Criticism in Mediæval times permitted the gracious wilding of mediæval
art to flourish unchecked and fill the waste places of the field. But here we
see a new thing, hinted at before, the opposition, that is to say, of criticism
to at least the best creation. Sidney’s dramatic criticism simply would, if it
could, sweep Shakespeare from rerum natura, and he looks half askance at
already, Scaliger is too much of a pedant, Castelvetro is a mere
commentator, and Patrizzi a philosopher militant, who carries on one of his
campaigns in the province of criticism.
The disadvantages of this are twofold. Not merely do we get no brilliant
and, at least in appearance and claim, authoritative exposition of the
subject, like that of Boileau or that of Pope later on the dogmatic side, like
those of Dryden and Johnson on the illustrative and exemplifying; but the
whole critical system comes into existence by a process of haphazard
accretion—by (to repeat a metaphor already used) an accumulation of
individual judgments at common law. No doubt this gives a certain strength,
a certain naturalness, to the creed when it is formed. It has not been foisted
on the communis sensus—that sensus has been inured and trained to it. The
extraordinary toughness and vitality of the resultant is very likely due to
this. But it caused also some of that inconsistency and apparent irrationality
which a system of common law almost necessarily contracts as it grows:
and it was more and more driven to throw over these inconsistencies and
irrationalities that cloak of factitious Reason, or Sense, or Nature which, by
the eighteenth century, becomes the mere threadbare disguise of a decrepit
Duessa.
If, and when, we arrive at the close of that century, after a somewhat
shorter halt and survey at the termination of the seventeenth, when the
deaths of Boileau and Dryden made a real break—we shall have to
complete this necessarily partial view of the whole Neo-Classic
dispensation. We have seen it here in its Period of Origins, and, without
endeavouring to add too many strokes to the picture, we may point to the
fresh illustration of that principle which has been adumbrated (I fear, from
some remarks of good critics, with insufficient perspicuity) at the close of
the last volume. We saw that the tendency of Greek criticism was good,
because, whether it was perfect criticism in itself or not, it was exactly the
criticism needed yet further to perfect the perfections of Greek literature;
and that much the same was the case in Latin. We saw that the quiescence
of Criticism in Mediæval times permitted the gracious wilding of mediæval
art to flourish unchecked and fill the waste places of the field. But here we
see a new thing, hinted at before, the opposition, that is to say, of criticism
to at least the best creation. Sidney’s dramatic criticism simply would, if it
could, sweep Shakespeare from rerum natura, and he looks half askance at
Page 248
the work of his own familiar friend Spenser. Ben would put the
“Tamerlanes and Tamerchams” in the dustbin. To that untamable Romantic
luxuriance which makes the glory of English literature at the time, which
gives French most of its actual strength, and which, in failing measure, still
supports the pride of Italy, the general tendency of Renaissance criticism
opposes a perpetual “Thou shalt not.” It is not too much heeded—that
would have been disastrous; but it is heeded to some extent, and that is
salutary. A kind of check is put on the too wild curvetings, the too meteoric
flights, of Pegasus. There was always the danger that Jeronimo at the
beginning and Cleveland at the end might have too truly expressed our own
great age; that the odd word-coinage of the Pléiade, and the tasteless rococo
stuff of French literature about 1640, might have done the same for France.
Against this the critics raised unceasing voices; and, though the voices were
sometimes those of geese, they really did something to save the Capitol.
285. See vol. i. p. 321 note.
286. Fracastoro and Scaliger could at once obtain a writ of ease, as De
Quincey is evidently speaking of “Italian” critics in the vernacular. I hope
he was not thinking of Tasso here, or of Gravina later: but the seventeenth
and eighteenth century men are certainly in more danger of his judgment.
287. M. Pellissier and others have taken this line.
288. Some exception ought, perhaps, to be made for Pasquier: but not
much.
289. Yet even he does condescend to it too much in his notices of
“objections” towards the end of the Poetics.
290. These judgments might of course be reinforced enormously by
extracts from letters and poems commendatory, as well as from substantive
examples, of Elizabethan literature, prose or verse. But this is just one of
the points in which the constantly increasing pressure of material makes
abstinence, or at least rigid temperance, necessary as we come downwards.
Some very notable passages in creative works—Shakespeare’s remarks on
drama among the more, and Ben’s on “men’s and women’s poets” among
“Tamerlanes and Tamerchams” in the dustbin. To that untamable Romantic
luxuriance which makes the glory of English literature at the time, which
gives French most of its actual strength, and which, in failing measure, still
supports the pride of Italy, the general tendency of Renaissance criticism
opposes a perpetual “Thou shalt not.” It is not too much heeded—that
would have been disastrous; but it is heeded to some extent, and that is
salutary. A kind of check is put on the too wild curvetings, the too meteoric
flights, of Pegasus. There was always the danger that Jeronimo at the
beginning and Cleveland at the end might have too truly expressed our own
great age; that the odd word-coinage of the Pléiade, and the tasteless rococo
stuff of French literature about 1640, might have done the same for France.
Against this the critics raised unceasing voices; and, though the voices were
sometimes those of geese, they really did something to save the Capitol.
285. See vol. i. p. 321 note.
286. Fracastoro and Scaliger could at once obtain a writ of ease, as De
Quincey is evidently speaking of “Italian” critics in the vernacular. I hope
he was not thinking of Tasso here, or of Gravina later: but the seventeenth
and eighteenth century men are certainly in more danger of his judgment.
287. M. Pellissier and others have taken this line.
288. Some exception ought, perhaps, to be made for Pasquier: but not
much.
289. Yet even he does condescend to it too much in his notices of
“objections” towards the end of the Poetics.
290. These judgments might of course be reinforced enormously by
extracts from letters and poems commendatory, as well as from substantive
examples, of Elizabethan literature, prose or verse. But this is just one of
the points in which the constantly increasing pressure of material makes
abstinence, or at least rigid temperance, necessary as we come downwards.
Some very notable passages in creative works—Shakespeare’s remarks on
drama among the more, and Ben’s on “men’s and women’s poets” among
Page 249
the less—are glanced at elsewhere: Webster’s famous “catalogue
déraisonné” (yet not wholly so) of his great companions, and his odd
confession of inability to manage “the passionate and weighty nuntius,”
tempts fuller notice. But one must refrain.
291. It has seemed better to reserve Sturm, Fabricius, and the few other
critics of sixteenth-century Germany, till the next Book, for reasons there to
be exposed. The reasons for similarly putting off the Spaniards have already
been touched upon: and the minor nations do not press.
déraisonné” (yet not wholly so) of his great companions, and his odd
confession of inability to manage “the passionate and weighty nuntius,”
tempts fuller notice. But one must refrain.
291. It has seemed better to reserve Sturm, Fabricius, and the few other
critics of sixteenth-century Germany, till the next Book, for reasons there to
be exposed. The reasons for similarly putting off the Spaniards have already
been touched upon: and the minor nations do not press.
Page 250
BOOK V
THE CRYSTALLISING OF
THE NEO-CLASSIC CREED
“It is not enough that Aristotle has said so, for Aristotle drew his models of tragedy from
Sophocles and Euripides; and, if he had seen ours, might have changed his mind.”—Dryden.
THE CRYSTALLISING OF
THE NEO-CLASSIC CREED
“It is not enough that Aristotle has said so, for Aristotle drew his models of tragedy from
Sophocles and Euripides; and, if he had seen ours, might have changed his mind.”—Dryden.
Page 251
CHAPTER I.
FROM MALHERBE TO BOILEAU.
THE SUPPLANTING OF ITALY BY FRANCE—BRILLIANCY OF THE FRENCH
REPRESENTATIVES—MALHERBE—THE ‘COMMENTARY ON DESPORTES’—WHAT
CAN BE SAID FOR HIS CRITICISM—ITS DEFECTS STIGMATISED AT ONCE BY
REGNIER—HIS ‘NINTH SATIRE’—THE CONTRAST OF THE TWO A LASTING ONE—
THE DIFFUSION OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRITICISM—VAUGELAS—BALZAC
—HIS LETTERS—HIS CRITICAL DISSERTATIONS—OGIER AND THE PREFACE TO
‘TYR ET SIDON’—CHAPELAIN: THE HOPELESSNESS OF HIS VERSE—THE
INTEREST OF HIS CRITICISM—THE ‘SENTIMENTS DE L’ACADÉMIE SUR LE CID’—
PREFACES—‘SUR LES VIEUX ROMANS’—LETTERS, ETC.—CORNEILLE—THE
THREE ‘DISCOURSES’—THE ‘EXAMENS’—LA MESNARDIÈRE—SARRASIN—
SCUDÉRY—MAMBRUN—SAINT-EVREMOND—HIS CRITICAL QUALITY AND
ACCOMPLISHMENT—HIS VIEWS ON CORNEILLE—ON CHRISTIAN SUBJECTS,
ETC.—ON ANCIENTS AND MODERNS—GUI PATIN: HIS JUDGMENT OF BROWNE—
TALLEMANT, PELLISSON, MÉNAGE, MADAME DE SÉVIGNÉ—THE ‘ANA’ OTHER
THAN MÉNAGE’S, ESPECIALLY THE
‘HUETIANA’—'VALESIANA'—‘SCALIGERANA’—AND ‘PARRHASIANA’—PATRU,
DESMARETS, AND OTHERS—MALEBRANCHE—THE HISTORY OF BOILEAU’S
REPUTATION—THE ‘ART POÉTIQUE’—ITS FALSE LITERARY HISTORY—
ABSTRACT OF IT—CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF IT—WANT OF ORIGINALITY—
FAULTS OF METHOD—OBSESSION OF GOOD SENSE—ARBITRARY
PROSCRIPTIONS—BOILEAU’S OTHER WORKS—THE ‘SATIRES’—THE ‘EPIGRAMS’
AND ‘EPISTLES’—PROSE: THE ‘HÉROS DE ROMAN’; THE ‘RÉFLEXIONS SUR
LONGIN’—THE “DISSERTATION ON 'JOCONDE'”—A “SOLIFIDIAN OF GOOD
SENSE”—THE PLEA FOR HIS PRACTICAL SERVICES—HISTORICAL EXAMINATION
OF THIS—CONCLUDING REMARKS ON HIM—LA BRUYÈRE AND FÉNELON—THE
“DES OUVRAGES DE L’ESPRIT”—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS—JUDGMENTS OF
AUTHORS—FÉNELON: THE ‘DIALOGUES SUR L’ELOQUENCE’—'SUR LES
OCCUPATIONS DE L’ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE'—AND ITS CHALLENGE TO
CORRECTNESS—THE ABBÉ D’AUBIGNAC—HIS ‘PRATIQUE DU THÉÂTRE’—RAPIN
—HIS METHOD PARTLY GOOD—HIS PARTICULAR ABSURDITIES AS TO HOMER IN
BLAME—AS TO VIRGIL IN PRAISE—AS TO OTHERS—THE READING OF HIS
RIDDLE—LE BOSSU AND THE ABSTRACT EPIC—BOUHOURS—ENCYCLOPÆDIAS
AND NEWSPAPERS—BAYLE—BAILLET—THE ETHOS OF A CRITICAL PEDANT—
GIBERT—THE ANCIENT AND MODERN QUARREL—ITS SMALL CRITICAL VALUE.
FROM MALHERBE TO BOILEAU.
THE SUPPLANTING OF ITALY BY FRANCE—BRILLIANCY OF THE FRENCH
REPRESENTATIVES—MALHERBE—THE ‘COMMENTARY ON DESPORTES’—WHAT
CAN BE SAID FOR HIS CRITICISM—ITS DEFECTS STIGMATISED AT ONCE BY
REGNIER—HIS ‘NINTH SATIRE’—THE CONTRAST OF THE TWO A LASTING ONE—
THE DIFFUSION OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRITICISM—VAUGELAS—BALZAC
—HIS LETTERS—HIS CRITICAL DISSERTATIONS—OGIER AND THE PREFACE TO
‘TYR ET SIDON’—CHAPELAIN: THE HOPELESSNESS OF HIS VERSE—THE
INTEREST OF HIS CRITICISM—THE ‘SENTIMENTS DE L’ACADÉMIE SUR LE CID’—
PREFACES—‘SUR LES VIEUX ROMANS’—LETTERS, ETC.—CORNEILLE—THE
THREE ‘DISCOURSES’—THE ‘EXAMENS’—LA MESNARDIÈRE—SARRASIN—
SCUDÉRY—MAMBRUN—SAINT-EVREMOND—HIS CRITICAL QUALITY AND
ACCOMPLISHMENT—HIS VIEWS ON CORNEILLE—ON CHRISTIAN SUBJECTS,
ETC.—ON ANCIENTS AND MODERNS—GUI PATIN: HIS JUDGMENT OF BROWNE—
TALLEMANT, PELLISSON, MÉNAGE, MADAME DE SÉVIGNÉ—THE ‘ANA’ OTHER
THAN MÉNAGE’S, ESPECIALLY THE
‘HUETIANA’—'VALESIANA'—‘SCALIGERANA’—AND ‘PARRHASIANA’—PATRU,
DESMARETS, AND OTHERS—MALEBRANCHE—THE HISTORY OF BOILEAU’S
REPUTATION—THE ‘ART POÉTIQUE’—ITS FALSE LITERARY HISTORY—
ABSTRACT OF IT—CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF IT—WANT OF ORIGINALITY—
FAULTS OF METHOD—OBSESSION OF GOOD SENSE—ARBITRARY
PROSCRIPTIONS—BOILEAU’S OTHER WORKS—THE ‘SATIRES’—THE ‘EPIGRAMS’
AND ‘EPISTLES’—PROSE: THE ‘HÉROS DE ROMAN’; THE ‘RÉFLEXIONS SUR
LONGIN’—THE “DISSERTATION ON 'JOCONDE'”—A “SOLIFIDIAN OF GOOD
SENSE”—THE PLEA FOR HIS PRACTICAL SERVICES—HISTORICAL EXAMINATION
OF THIS—CONCLUDING REMARKS ON HIM—LA BRUYÈRE AND FÉNELON—THE
“DES OUVRAGES DE L’ESPRIT”—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS—JUDGMENTS OF
AUTHORS—FÉNELON: THE ‘DIALOGUES SUR L’ELOQUENCE’—'SUR LES
OCCUPATIONS DE L’ACADÉMIE FRANÇAISE'—AND ITS CHALLENGE TO
CORRECTNESS—THE ABBÉ D’AUBIGNAC—HIS ‘PRATIQUE DU THÉÂTRE’—RAPIN
—HIS METHOD PARTLY GOOD—HIS PARTICULAR ABSURDITIES AS TO HOMER IN
BLAME—AS TO VIRGIL IN PRAISE—AS TO OTHERS—THE READING OF HIS
RIDDLE—LE BOSSU AND THE ABSTRACT EPIC—BOUHOURS—ENCYCLOPÆDIAS
AND NEWSPAPERS—BAYLE—BAILLET—THE ETHOS OF A CRITICAL PEDANT—
GIBERT—THE ANCIENT AND MODERN QUARREL—ITS SMALL CRITICAL VALUE.
Page 252
The causes of the transference of the course of critical empire,
northwards as well as westwards, from Italy to France, in the seventeenth
century, lie (except in so far as they will body themselves forth in the plain
tale of this course which follows) somewhat outside the plan which has
The supplanting been traced for our History. They belong, in part at least, to
of Italy by
France.
that “metacritic” and guesswork which we endeavour to
exclude. Indeed, as usually, and more than as usually, in
such case, the old puzzle of “the egg from the Owl, or the Owl from the
egg?” besets us specially in this division of the History of that Art for which
some have had it that the bird of Pallas is a specially suitable symbol. We
can see the importance of the establishment of the French Academy, when
only the first third of the century had passed, of the extraordinary influence
of coteries like that of the Hotel Rambouillet, of the coincidence of the
towering ambition of a youthful king and the concentrated force of his at
least partially reunited kingdom, with the existence of a remarkable knot of
great men of letters, including one critic of the most masterful, if not quite
the most masterly, type. But can there possibly be any causation in this
latter coincidence? Can we say why Conrart’s Academy, instead of lasting
for a time and then breaking up, became a national institution? why the
Rambouillet blue-stockings were more influential than those who haunted
Mrs Montagu’s peacock-room, or put rubbish into the Bath-Easton vase?
Only by guessing, or by arguing in stately circle about national
temperaments. And we endeavour to avoid both these things here.[292]
What is certain is, that while on the one hand Italy is scarcely less
Brilliancy of the French addicted to criticism, and scarcely less fruitful of
representatives.
critics, in the seventeenth century than in the
sixteenth, and while the authority of Scaliger, Castelvetro, Minturno,
Piccolomini, is felt[293] all over Europe, the contemporary practitioners of
the art exercise no such authority, and are of almost the least importance. A
page for every score that we gave them in the last Book will nearly suffice
in this. In France, on the other hand, no part of the century is not full of the
critical labour, and no part is without critics to whom, whether we grant the
epithets “good” or “great” or not, we cannot possibly refuse those of
“important,” “influential”—in more than one or two cases even “epoch-
making.” In the first generation we have the half-revolution, half-reaction
of Malherbe, who, for good or for ill, determined the main course of French
poetry for two whole centuries, and great part of that course for three. In the
northwards as well as westwards, from Italy to France, in the seventeenth
century, lie (except in so far as they will body themselves forth in the plain
tale of this course which follows) somewhat outside the plan which has
The supplanting been traced for our History. They belong, in part at least, to
of Italy by
France.
that “metacritic” and guesswork which we endeavour to
exclude. Indeed, as usually, and more than as usually, in
such case, the old puzzle of “the egg from the Owl, or the Owl from the
egg?” besets us specially in this division of the History of that Art for which
some have had it that the bird of Pallas is a specially suitable symbol. We
can see the importance of the establishment of the French Academy, when
only the first third of the century had passed, of the extraordinary influence
of coteries like that of the Hotel Rambouillet, of the coincidence of the
towering ambition of a youthful king and the concentrated force of his at
least partially reunited kingdom, with the existence of a remarkable knot of
great men of letters, including one critic of the most masterful, if not quite
the most masterly, type. But can there possibly be any causation in this
latter coincidence? Can we say why Conrart’s Academy, instead of lasting
for a time and then breaking up, became a national institution? why the
Rambouillet blue-stockings were more influential than those who haunted
Mrs Montagu’s peacock-room, or put rubbish into the Bath-Easton vase?
Only by guessing, or by arguing in stately circle about national
temperaments. And we endeavour to avoid both these things here.[292]
What is certain is, that while on the one hand Italy is scarcely less
Brilliancy of the French addicted to criticism, and scarcely less fruitful of
representatives.
critics, in the seventeenth century than in the
sixteenth, and while the authority of Scaliger, Castelvetro, Minturno,
Piccolomini, is felt[293] all over Europe, the contemporary practitioners of
the art exercise no such authority, and are of almost the least importance. A
page for every score that we gave them in the last Book will nearly suffice
in this. In France, on the other hand, no part of the century is not full of the
critical labour, and no part is without critics to whom, whether we grant the
epithets “good” or “great” or not, we cannot possibly refuse those of
“important,” “influential”—in more than one or two cases even “epoch-
making.” In the first generation we have the half-revolution, half-reaction
of Malherbe, who, for good or for ill, determined the main course of French
poetry for two whole centuries, and great part of that course for three. In the
Page 253
second we have the similar work in prose, of Balzac by counsel and
example, by example of Descartes and Pascal; the contest over the Cid, and
the purblind but still intentionally business-like investigations of Hédelin-
d’Aubignac; the constant debates of the Academy: and, perhaps most
important of all, the general engouement for literary discussion of pedant
and fine gentleman, of prude and coquette alike. From the third come the
ambitious code-making of Boileau; the squabble, tedious and desultory, but
in intention at least wholly critical, of the Ancients and Moderns; the
immense collections of Baillet and others; the work, not bulky but full of
germ and promise, of Saint-Evremond, Madame de Sévigné, Boileau, La
Bruyère, Fénelon. What century earlier (some may say, what century later)
will give us, in any country, a critical galaxy like this, where the stars dart,
in at least most cases, so many other rays besides those of criticism?
It is possible—as the historian of such a subject as this could wish that it
were possible oftener—to do justice to Malherbe’s undoubtedly prominent
position in the history of criticism without wasting much space on him. The
Malherbe. universally known phrase of Boileau,[294] though containing
an innuendo of the grossest critical injustice, and led up to by a passage of
astounding historical ignorance or falsification, is yet substantially true. The
stage of French poetry which Malherbe started was a new stage; it was a
stage not at once, but before long, acquiesced and persevered in by all but
the whole population of the French Parnassus; and it cannot be said that
seventy years of almost unceasing effort have done more than partially
substitute a fresh one. Further, it is undoubtedly in favour of Malherbe,
though the compliment may seem a left-handed one, that he was not a man
of commanding genius in any way; that he left no important critical work;
that his creative work is very scanty, far from consummate as a rule, and by
no means all in the style he himself approved; and that even the secondhand
accounts which we have of his doctrines are scrappy, vague, and indirect.
For it is quite clear that a man who exercises such influence, and exercises
it practically at once, in such circumstances, must have hit upon the right
string, must have coincided strangely with the general feeling, temper,
aspirations, taste of his countrymen. Our documents for these doctrines are
an extensive, but fragmentary, commentary on Desportes (the still more
destructive and characteristic handling of Ronsard seems either to be a myth
or never to have been preserved on paper), the Life by Racan,[295] some
example, by example of Descartes and Pascal; the contest over the Cid, and
the purblind but still intentionally business-like investigations of Hédelin-
d’Aubignac; the constant debates of the Academy: and, perhaps most
important of all, the general engouement for literary discussion of pedant
and fine gentleman, of prude and coquette alike. From the third come the
ambitious code-making of Boileau; the squabble, tedious and desultory, but
in intention at least wholly critical, of the Ancients and Moderns; the
immense collections of Baillet and others; the work, not bulky but full of
germ and promise, of Saint-Evremond, Madame de Sévigné, Boileau, La
Bruyère, Fénelon. What century earlier (some may say, what century later)
will give us, in any country, a critical galaxy like this, where the stars dart,
in at least most cases, so many other rays besides those of criticism?
It is possible—as the historian of such a subject as this could wish that it
were possible oftener—to do justice to Malherbe’s undoubtedly prominent
position in the history of criticism without wasting much space on him. The
Malherbe. universally known phrase of Boileau,[294] though containing
an innuendo of the grossest critical injustice, and led up to by a passage of
astounding historical ignorance or falsification, is yet substantially true. The
stage of French poetry which Malherbe started was a new stage; it was a
stage not at once, but before long, acquiesced and persevered in by all but
the whole population of the French Parnassus; and it cannot be said that
seventy years of almost unceasing effort have done more than partially
substitute a fresh one. Further, it is undoubtedly in favour of Malherbe,
though the compliment may seem a left-handed one, that he was not a man
of commanding genius in any way; that he left no important critical work;
that his creative work is very scanty, far from consummate as a rule, and by
no means all in the style he himself approved; and that even the secondhand
accounts which we have of his doctrines are scrappy, vague, and indirect.
For it is quite clear that a man who exercises such influence, and exercises
it practically at once, in such circumstances, must have hit upon the right
string, must have coincided strangely with the general feeling, temper,
aspirations, taste of his countrymen. Our documents for these doctrines are
an extensive, but fragmentary, commentary on Desportes (the still more
destructive and characteristic handling of Ronsard seems either to be a myth
or never to have been preserved on paper), the Life by Racan,[295] some
Page 254
phrases in the Letters, the vivid and admirable attack of Regnier,[296] and the
remarks of writers in his own and the next generation.
All concur in showing Malherbe to us as, on the one hand, mainly a
verbal critic, and on the other, as verbal critics usually, but by no means
always or necessarily are, singularly unable to rise above the word, or its
nearest neighbour, the mere sense. Both these things made him the natural
enemy (though, for his earlier years at least, he was a more or less disloyal
follower) of the Pléiade. Their abundant word-coinages and word-
borrowings shocked him; he did not want, and could not feel,[297] the poetic
souffle which they managed to give by means, or in despite, of their
vocabulary. Racan, a rather simple but absolutely honest creature, confesses
that his master n’aimait du tout les Grecs, regarded Pindar especially as a
maker of galimatias, liked Statius and Seneca best of the Latins,[298] and (it
was generous) classed the Italians with the Greeks. On the other hand, in
French, he had at least the merit of knowing exactly what he wanted, and
exactly how to get it. He it was who first invented those rigid laws of
rhyme, which even French classicism never quite adopted—the proscription
of the different use of a and e in such rhymes as ance and ence, ent and ant;
the rule against simples and compounds of them, and even words which
commonly go together, out of verse, as père and mère. He was equally rigid
on the cæsura: and Racan is not to be suspected of catering for laughers,
though Tallemant might be, when he tells us that, while actually in the
death-struggle, Malherbe revived himself to tell his nurse that she had used
a word qui n'ètoit pas bien Français.
It is, however, in the Commentary on Desportes,[299] and there only, that
The we have the real Malherbe at first hand for our purpose. It
Commentary on
Desportes.
is a very remarkable piece, and the first of the kind in
modern times;[300] though Gellius and Macrobius no doubt
set a certain pattern for it in ancient. Nor am I acquainted with anything
more thorough in the particular species; the modern Zoilus, as a rule, is
equally inferior to Malherbe in thoroughness, acuteness, and learning. More
than 200 pages—a large page and a small type—are occupied in M.
Lalanne’s edition (the only one) with the citations and remarks, the former
being rigidly confined to the line or two (rarely more) that Malherbe
annotated. It would be almost worth while to reprint[301] the original volume
as it exists scored by the critic’s hand, and I do not know that it would be at
remarks of writers in his own and the next generation.
All concur in showing Malherbe to us as, on the one hand, mainly a
verbal critic, and on the other, as verbal critics usually, but by no means
always or necessarily are, singularly unable to rise above the word, or its
nearest neighbour, the mere sense. Both these things made him the natural
enemy (though, for his earlier years at least, he was a more or less disloyal
follower) of the Pléiade. Their abundant word-coinages and word-
borrowings shocked him; he did not want, and could not feel,[297] the poetic
souffle which they managed to give by means, or in despite, of their
vocabulary. Racan, a rather simple but absolutely honest creature, confesses
that his master n’aimait du tout les Grecs, regarded Pindar especially as a
maker of galimatias, liked Statius and Seneca best of the Latins,[298] and (it
was generous) classed the Italians with the Greeks. On the other hand, in
French, he had at least the merit of knowing exactly what he wanted, and
exactly how to get it. He it was who first invented those rigid laws of
rhyme, which even French classicism never quite adopted—the proscription
of the different use of a and e in such rhymes as ance and ence, ent and ant;
the rule against simples and compounds of them, and even words which
commonly go together, out of verse, as père and mère. He was equally rigid
on the cæsura: and Racan is not to be suspected of catering for laughers,
though Tallemant might be, when he tells us that, while actually in the
death-struggle, Malherbe revived himself to tell his nurse that she had used
a word qui n'ètoit pas bien Français.
It is, however, in the Commentary on Desportes,[299] and there only, that
The we have the real Malherbe at first hand for our purpose. It
Commentary on
Desportes.
is a very remarkable piece, and the first of the kind in
modern times;[300] though Gellius and Macrobius no doubt
set a certain pattern for it in ancient. Nor am I acquainted with anything
more thorough in the particular species; the modern Zoilus, as a rule, is
equally inferior to Malherbe in thoroughness, acuteness, and learning. More
than 200 pages—a large page and a small type—are occupied in M.
Lalanne’s edition (the only one) with the citations and remarks, the former
being rigidly confined to the line or two (rarely more) that Malherbe
annotated. It would be almost worth while to reprint[301] the original volume
as it exists scored by the critic’s hand, and I do not know that it would be at
Page 255
all unfair to Desportes; for it is not the author who comes worst out of the
exposure.
Whatever may be said against Malherbe, he cannot be accused of
verbiage. He constantly contents himself with a single word—bourre
(“padding”), cheville (“expletive”), or simply note or nota, which expresses,
much more forcibly, the “Will the reader believe,” or “It will hardly be
credited” of our less succinct Aristarchs. It is curious how sensitive
Malherbe’s ear is to certain suggestions of real or fancied cacophony, or
absurdity, in juxtaposition of different words. There is no doubt that the
French habit of delivering verse in a sort of recitative or singsong, running
the syllables very much together, putting strong emphasis on certain vowels
and slurring others, makes things like the famous “vaincu Loth” and “vingt
culottes,” “vieillard stupide” and “vieil as de pique” less of mere
childishness with them than with us. Malherbe seems to have a perfect
obsession of this kind, especially in the direction of alliterated syllables.
Thus he annotates the harmless line—
“Si la foi plus certaine en une âme non feinte”—
n’en, nu, n’a;
and, still more in the style of the two later jokes—
“Mais vous, belle tyranne, aux Nérons comparable”—
Tira nos nez!
Indeed, he never loses an opportunity of blackmarking this collocation of
letters in different words, a point to which the later Latin rhetoricians had
perhaps made the French specially attentive, but notice of which, except in
the rarest cases, would be thought unworthy of anybody but a schoolboy (or
a comic journalist of not the highest class) in England.
It was perhaps a little dangerous for Malherbe to be so prodigal of the
words “pedantry” and “stupidity” as he is; while time and use have
sometimes made his peremptory judgments look rather foolish. For
instance, Desportes had used poumons in the plural, as we have practically
always used “lungs” in English. “On ne dit,” says our usher, with an almost
audible bang of the ferule on the desk,—“On ne dit point qu’un homme ait
des poumons: et ne m’allègue pas qu’il y a plusieurs lobes au poumon, car
tu serais un sot.” Poor posterity! It has been (in France) tolerably docile to
exposure.
Whatever may be said against Malherbe, he cannot be accused of
verbiage. He constantly contents himself with a single word—bourre
(“padding”), cheville (“expletive”), or simply note or nota, which expresses,
much more forcibly, the “Will the reader believe,” or “It will hardly be
credited” of our less succinct Aristarchs. It is curious how sensitive
Malherbe’s ear is to certain suggestions of real or fancied cacophony, or
absurdity, in juxtaposition of different words. There is no doubt that the
French habit of delivering verse in a sort of recitative or singsong, running
the syllables very much together, putting strong emphasis on certain vowels
and slurring others, makes things like the famous “vaincu Loth” and “vingt
culottes,” “vieillard stupide” and “vieil as de pique” less of mere
childishness with them than with us. Malherbe seems to have a perfect
obsession of this kind, especially in the direction of alliterated syllables.
Thus he annotates the harmless line—
“Si la foi plus certaine en une âme non feinte”—
n’en, nu, n’a;
and, still more in the style of the two later jokes—
“Mais vous, belle tyranne, aux Nérons comparable”—
Tira nos nez!
Indeed, he never loses an opportunity of blackmarking this collocation of
letters in different words, a point to which the later Latin rhetoricians had
perhaps made the French specially attentive, but notice of which, except in
the rarest cases, would be thought unworthy of anybody but a schoolboy (or
a comic journalist of not the highest class) in England.
It was perhaps a little dangerous for Malherbe to be so prodigal of the
words “pedantry” and “stupidity” as he is; while time and use have
sometimes made his peremptory judgments look rather foolish. For
instance, Desportes had used poumons in the plural, as we have practically
always used “lungs” in English. “On ne dit,” says our usher, with an almost
audible bang of the ferule on the desk,—“On ne dit point qu’un homme ait
des poumons: et ne m’allègue pas qu’il y a plusieurs lobes au poumon, car
tu serais un sot.” Poor posterity! It has been (in France) tolerably docile to
Page 256
Malherbe, but it has in this respect undoubtedly written itself down an ass—
or perhaps him. For no Frenchman now would hesitate to use the word in
the plural. He is constantly objecting to consommer in the sense of
consumer; he ejaculates (with the sort of indignant bark which we hear so
often from him and from critics of his kind) on
“Et pensant de mes faits l'étrange frénésie”
“Je ne sais si c’est allemand ou anglais: mais je sais bien que ce n’est pas
français”; stigmatises (surely with injustice?) trop injuste Amour as a
mauvais vocatif, and shows his own want of poetic imagination and poetic
sympathy by scouting as bad the beautiful epithet amoureuse in
“Enflammant l’air d’amoureuse clarté,”
for which some of us would excuse Desportes many worse things than he
has actually done. On the other hand, the mere grammarian comes out in his
note on
“Où de tant de beauté ton œil eut jouissance
Que le seul souvenir chasse au loin ma souffrance,”—
“Le seul souvenir de quoi?”
I should rather like to give more of this; but the reader will no doubt say
What can be Sat prata. We must not be too hard on it. In the first place,
said for his
criticism.
it is (as criticism of the Zoilus kind is by no means always)
transparently honest criticism. Malherbe does not garble;
he does not foist his own misconception, not to say his own stupidity, on his
author, and then condemn him for it; he does not, like Boileau, fling
offensive and contemptuous epithets broadcast without anything to support
them. Further, there can be not the very slightest doubt that such an office
as his could, at the time, be very usefully filled. The French sixteenth
century, like our own, had poured, and the early French seventeenth century
had, also like our own, begun to pour, a vast and rather indiscriminately
selected reinforcement of word and phrase and image into the language. All
this wanted sorting, arranging—in some cases, though no doubt not in so
many as Malherbe thought, rejecting and clearing out. The mere French
grammar, which Vaugelas was soon to write, had not been written; and the
or perhaps him. For no Frenchman now would hesitate to use the word in
the plural. He is constantly objecting to consommer in the sense of
consumer; he ejaculates (with the sort of indignant bark which we hear so
often from him and from critics of his kind) on
“Et pensant de mes faits l'étrange frénésie”
“Je ne sais si c’est allemand ou anglais: mais je sais bien que ce n’est pas
français”; stigmatises (surely with injustice?) trop injuste Amour as a
mauvais vocatif, and shows his own want of poetic imagination and poetic
sympathy by scouting as bad the beautiful epithet amoureuse in
“Enflammant l’air d’amoureuse clarté,”
for which some of us would excuse Desportes many worse things than he
has actually done. On the other hand, the mere grammarian comes out in his
note on
“Où de tant de beauté ton œil eut jouissance
Que le seul souvenir chasse au loin ma souffrance,”—
“Le seul souvenir de quoi?”
I should rather like to give more of this; but the reader will no doubt say
What can be Sat prata. We must not be too hard on it. In the first place,
said for his
criticism.
it is (as criticism of the Zoilus kind is by no means always)
transparently honest criticism. Malherbe does not garble;
he does not foist his own misconception, not to say his own stupidity, on his
author, and then condemn him for it; he does not, like Boileau, fling
offensive and contemptuous epithets broadcast without anything to support
them. Further, there can be not the very slightest doubt that such an office
as his could, at the time, be very usefully filled. The French sixteenth
century, like our own, had poured, and the early French seventeenth century
had, also like our own, begun to pour, a vast and rather indiscriminately
selected reinforcement of word and phrase and image into the language. All
this wanted sorting, arranging—in some cases, though no doubt not in so
many as Malherbe thought, rejecting and clearing out. The mere French
grammar, which Vaugelas was soon to write, had not been written; and the
Page 257
Arts Poetic in existence were, as we have already seen, either technical and
higgledy-piggledy, or like that of Vauquelin (which appeared just as
Malherbe was beginning his crusade, and of which it would not be
uninteresting to have a copy annotated by him as he annotated Desportes),
almost as higgledy-piggledy, and much vaguer, on all technical points
except some of the crotchets of the Pléiade. Indeed, the best justification for
Malherbe is the French poetical history of the next thirty or forty years. He
may claim some, though but little, of the merit of such different poets as
Corneille and Voiture; the defects, where they really existed, of Boileau’s
victims can seldom or never be charged upon him, and might sometimes
have been avoided by listening to his precepts.
This, I think, is fairly generous as well as just; generosity may now make
her bow and leave justice unfettered; but justice herself need not go beyond
that admirable pronouncement of Regnier, which has been already referred
Its defects to. The great satirist, the passionate poet, could hardly have
stigmatised at
once by Regnier.
needed a personal grievance to spur him on to the
composition of his Ninth Satire, though the generosity of
his character might have induced silence had not Malherbe broken their
friendship. The address to “Rapin[302] le favori d’Apollon et des Muses”[303]
begins by graceful compliments, but turns soon and sharply on
“Ces resveurs dont la Muse insolente
Censurant les plus vieux, arrogamment se vante
De reformer les vers.”
If we have given Malherbe the credit of being the first modern critic to
play the awful Aristarch with a contemporary in the true and full
Aristarchian manner, Regnier must deserve that of being the first poet of
genius in modern times to undertake a real chevauchée in the interests of
His Ninth the true criticism against the false. The Satire is not
Satire.
faultless; there is some divagation, and an attempt (giving
some countenance to the deplorable excesses, in the opposite direction of
insulting poverty, which Boileau and Pope permit themselves) to set the
profits and prosperity of Desportes against the comparative neediness of
Malherbe. But this neediness was only comparative; and Regnier has the
good taste never to name his adversary, and to let the arrows find their mark
without vulgar personal abuse. The spirit of the piece is delightful; its
higgledy-piggledy, or like that of Vauquelin (which appeared just as
Malherbe was beginning his crusade, and of which it would not be
uninteresting to have a copy annotated by him as he annotated Desportes),
almost as higgledy-piggledy, and much vaguer, on all technical points
except some of the crotchets of the Pléiade. Indeed, the best justification for
Malherbe is the French poetical history of the next thirty or forty years. He
may claim some, though but little, of the merit of such different poets as
Corneille and Voiture; the defects, where they really existed, of Boileau’s
victims can seldom or never be charged upon him, and might sometimes
have been avoided by listening to his precepts.
This, I think, is fairly generous as well as just; generosity may now make
her bow and leave justice unfettered; but justice herself need not go beyond
that admirable pronouncement of Regnier, which has been already referred
Its defects to. The great satirist, the passionate poet, could hardly have
stigmatised at
once by Regnier.
needed a personal grievance to spur him on to the
composition of his Ninth Satire, though the generosity of
his character might have induced silence had not Malherbe broken their
friendship. The address to “Rapin[302] le favori d’Apollon et des Muses”[303]
begins by graceful compliments, but turns soon and sharply on
“Ces resveurs dont la Muse insolente
Censurant les plus vieux, arrogamment se vante
De reformer les vers.”
If we have given Malherbe the credit of being the first modern critic to
play the awful Aristarch with a contemporary in the true and full
Aristarchian manner, Regnier must deserve that of being the first poet of
genius in modern times to undertake a real chevauchée in the interests of
His Ninth the true criticism against the false. The Satire is not
Satire.
faultless; there is some divagation, and an attempt (giving
some countenance to the deplorable excesses, in the opposite direction of
insulting poverty, which Boileau and Pope permit themselves) to set the
profits and prosperity of Desportes against the comparative neediness of
Malherbe. But this neediness was only comparative; and Regnier has the
good taste never to name his adversary, and to let the arrows find their mark
without vulgar personal abuse. The spirit of the piece is delightful; its
Page 258
straight hitting never baulks the game; and the verse is often of the very
first quality. Read—I only wish I had room to quote—the passage, which
only Juvenal and Dryden have equalled, on Malherbe’s contempt alike of
the Greeks and the Pléiade (20-27); that on his elevation of the mere
vernacular, as the test of language, which follows; the denunciation of his
arrogant assumption of knowledge as being his own peculiar, which follows
that; and the famous diatribe of forty verses long, and with every other
verse a triumph, which scoffs at the anxiety—
“Prendre garde qu’un qui ne heurte une diphtongue,”
which labels the whole proceeding—
“C’est proser de la rime et rimer de la prose;”
compares it to the tricks of rouging and dressing up in women, and
contrasts the natural beauties of poetry with all this powder and pomatum.
The first hundred lines are the best part of the satire, and the remainder
is, to a certain extent, amplification and repetition. Yet it is good art, and
good sense, not merely in the scattered phrases—
“Sans juger nous jugeons,”
and
“Votre raison vous trompe, aussi bien que vos yeux,”
and
“O débile raison! où est ores ta bride,”
which hit at once the foible and the forte of the criticism of the century; but
in the final sting—
“Mais, Rapin, à leur gout si les vieux sont profanes,—
Si Virgile, le Tasse, et Ronsard sont des ânes—
Sans perdre en ces discours les temps que nous perdons,
Allons comme eux aux champs, et mangeons des chardons!”
first quality. Read—I only wish I had room to quote—the passage, which
only Juvenal and Dryden have equalled, on Malherbe’s contempt alike of
the Greeks and the Pléiade (20-27); that on his elevation of the mere
vernacular, as the test of language, which follows; the denunciation of his
arrogant assumption of knowledge as being his own peculiar, which follows
that; and the famous diatribe of forty verses long, and with every other
verse a triumph, which scoffs at the anxiety—
“Prendre garde qu’un qui ne heurte une diphtongue,”
which labels the whole proceeding—
“C’est proser de la rime et rimer de la prose;”
compares it to the tricks of rouging and dressing up in women, and
contrasts the natural beauties of poetry with all this powder and pomatum.
The first hundred lines are the best part of the satire, and the remainder
is, to a certain extent, amplification and repetition. Yet it is good art, and
good sense, not merely in the scattered phrases—
“Sans juger nous jugeons,”
and
“Votre raison vous trompe, aussi bien que vos yeux,”
and
“O débile raison! où est ores ta bride,”
which hit at once the foible and the forte of the criticism of the century; but
in the final sting—
“Mais, Rapin, à leur gout si les vieux sont profanes,—
Si Virgile, le Tasse, et Ronsard sont des ânes—
Sans perdre en ces discours les temps que nous perdons,
Allons comme eux aux champs, et mangeons des chardons!”
Page 259
One might write a whole essay on these wonderfully prophetic and (no
doubt to the writer half-unconsciously) many-sided[304] lines. After two
centuries Europe did “go to the fields”—and she found something better to
eat there than thistles.
For the moment, as we have seen before in other cases, the voice crying
The contrast of in the wilderness found only a wilderness to cry in. Men
the two a lasting
one.
could not mistake the vigour and verve of Regnier’s verse,
but they either disregarded his doctrine or misunderstood it.
Malherbe was their music-maker then; they understood him.[305] In the
contrast of these two we have practically a contrast which subsists to the
present day, and which we do not find by any means so sharply accentuated
in ancient criticism—that of the critic who looks only at the stop-watch, and
of the critic who looks beyond it; of the critic of form and the critic of spirit.
But the curious thing is that for the last three centuries the antagonists have
behaved exactly like Hamlet and Laertes, or even like that puzzling pair in
the lower circles of the Inferno. They take from time to time each other’s
parts, each other’s weapons, and renew the contest with changed persons, or
at least rapiers. At first sight it may seem as if Malherbe and, after him,
Boileau were simply insisting on form and expression; as if Regnier, and
those who at longer intervals have followed him, were those who say that
“all depends upon the subject.” But a more accurate acquaintance with the
History which is to follow will show us that this is far from being the case.
Malherbe had so little opportunity of shaping, or took such little trouble to
shape, his critical ideas that it is perhaps the safer way not to draw up any
complete creed for him, as M. Brunot and Mr Spingarn have done. But in
Boileau, as we shall see, there is a distinct attempt, which has been
practically followed by all of his side since, to prescribe expression, subject,
spirit, and everything—to insist not merely that the work shall be good, but
that it shall be good according to sealed patterns, in choice of subject as
well as in method, in method as well as in form, in form as well as in
language.
There can be very little doubt that the private discussions which, as we
know from Racan, Malherbe used, for years before his death, to hold with
Racan himself and others, and the letters which he also exchanged with
younger men, had a very great deal to do with the wide development of
The diffusion of criticism in the second third of the century. The fact of this
seventeenth
development is certain; it is vouched for by the appearance
doubt to the writer half-unconsciously) many-sided[304] lines. After two
centuries Europe did “go to the fields”—and she found something better to
eat there than thistles.
For the moment, as we have seen before in other cases, the voice crying
The contrast of in the wilderness found only a wilderness to cry in. Men
the two a lasting
one.
could not mistake the vigour and verve of Regnier’s verse,
but they either disregarded his doctrine or misunderstood it.
Malherbe was their music-maker then; they understood him.[305] In the
contrast of these two we have practically a contrast which subsists to the
present day, and which we do not find by any means so sharply accentuated
in ancient criticism—that of the critic who looks only at the stop-watch, and
of the critic who looks beyond it; of the critic of form and the critic of spirit.
But the curious thing is that for the last three centuries the antagonists have
behaved exactly like Hamlet and Laertes, or even like that puzzling pair in
the lower circles of the Inferno. They take from time to time each other’s
parts, each other’s weapons, and renew the contest with changed persons, or
at least rapiers. At first sight it may seem as if Malherbe and, after him,
Boileau were simply insisting on form and expression; as if Regnier, and
those who at longer intervals have followed him, were those who say that
“all depends upon the subject.” But a more accurate acquaintance with the
History which is to follow will show us that this is far from being the case.
Malherbe had so little opportunity of shaping, or took such little trouble to
shape, his critical ideas that it is perhaps the safer way not to draw up any
complete creed for him, as M. Brunot and Mr Spingarn have done. But in
Boileau, as we shall see, there is a distinct attempt, which has been
practically followed by all of his side since, to prescribe expression, subject,
spirit, and everything—to insist not merely that the work shall be good, but
that it shall be good according to sealed patterns, in choice of subject as
well as in method, in method as well as in form, in form as well as in
language.
There can be very little doubt that the private discussions which, as we
know from Racan, Malherbe used, for years before his death, to hold with
Racan himself and others, and the letters which he also exchanged with
younger men, had a very great deal to do with the wide development of
The diffusion of criticism in the second third of the century. The fact of this
seventeenth
development is certain; it is vouched for by the appearance
Page 260
century of literary subjects in the Ana, and in Tallemant’s
criticism.
Historiettes, by the foundation of the Academy, by the Cid
quarrel, practically by almost everything we know of the time that concerns
literature. But we must deal, according to our wont, with the matter par
personnages. Of such personages we have, in the first place, Vaugelas,
Balzac, Ogier, and Chapelain, to whom we may join Ménage, Gui Patin,
Tallemant himself, and the far greater names of Saint-Evremond and
Corneille. Then we can take Boileau—at least in reputation one of the
culminating points or personages of our history—and the less exclusively
critical deliverances of La Bruyère, of Fénelon, and of Malebranche; can
give some account of the Quarrel—tenacious of life, if scarcely vivacious—
of the Ancients and Moderns; diverge to the scholastic and somewhat
dismal but important performances of La Mesnardière and others, of
Hédelin and Le Bossu, Rapin and Bouhours, and end by some account of
the miscellaneous compilations and observations of journalists and savants.
The matter is abundant in all conscience; it is at least sufficiently varied,
and the real greatness of some at least of the persons concerned should save
it from being insipid.
We may all the better pass directly from Malherbe to Vaugelas[306]
because this is about the last place in this History where we can give special
Vaugelas. attention to merely verbal and grammatical criticism. In this
Malherbe had at least the absolute, and almost admirable, courage of his
opinions. On the one hand he transfers the prudery of the Ciceronians (v.
supra, p. 12) to French, and will not allow even an analogue such as accroît
on the strength of surcroît. On the other he bars all the delightful Pléiade
diminutives, likes not technical terms, is so horrified at any indelicate
suggestion that his countrymen really need not have ridiculed our
“sho[c]king,” and has a whole black list of “plebeian” expressions.
Everything is to be “according to rule,” and the rule is to be drawn with as
few exceptions as possible—and with as few inclusions.
It is no wonder that Regnier opened the full broadside of his magnificent
poetical rhetoric against this system; and it is only a pity that nobody less
fantastic than Mlle. de Gournay—Montaigne’s fille d’alliance, and almost
the first as almost the oddest of blue-stockings—took up the parable more
practically against it. But the set of the tide, as we have said, was with him.
La Mothe le Vayer, a little later, in his Considérations sur l’Eloquence
Française de ce temps “transacts,” though he is on the whole on the side of
criticism.
Historiettes, by the foundation of the Academy, by the Cid
quarrel, practically by almost everything we know of the time that concerns
literature. But we must deal, according to our wont, with the matter par
personnages. Of such personages we have, in the first place, Vaugelas,
Balzac, Ogier, and Chapelain, to whom we may join Ménage, Gui Patin,
Tallemant himself, and the far greater names of Saint-Evremond and
Corneille. Then we can take Boileau—at least in reputation one of the
culminating points or personages of our history—and the less exclusively
critical deliverances of La Bruyère, of Fénelon, and of Malebranche; can
give some account of the Quarrel—tenacious of life, if scarcely vivacious—
of the Ancients and Moderns; diverge to the scholastic and somewhat
dismal but important performances of La Mesnardière and others, of
Hédelin and Le Bossu, Rapin and Bouhours, and end by some account of
the miscellaneous compilations and observations of journalists and savants.
The matter is abundant in all conscience; it is at least sufficiently varied,
and the real greatness of some at least of the persons concerned should save
it from being insipid.
We may all the better pass directly from Malherbe to Vaugelas[306]
because this is about the last place in this History where we can give special
Vaugelas. attention to merely verbal and grammatical criticism. In this
Malherbe had at least the absolute, and almost admirable, courage of his
opinions. On the one hand he transfers the prudery of the Ciceronians (v.
supra, p. 12) to French, and will not allow even an analogue such as accroît
on the strength of surcroît. On the other he bars all the delightful Pléiade
diminutives, likes not technical terms, is so horrified at any indelicate
suggestion that his countrymen really need not have ridiculed our
“sho[c]king,” and has a whole black list of “plebeian” expressions.
Everything is to be “according to rule,” and the rule is to be drawn with as
few exceptions as possible—and with as few inclusions.
It is no wonder that Regnier opened the full broadside of his magnificent
poetical rhetoric against this system; and it is only a pity that nobody less
fantastic than Mlle. de Gournay—Montaigne’s fille d’alliance, and almost
the first as almost the oddest of blue-stockings—took up the parable more
practically against it. But the set of the tide, as we have said, was with him.
La Mothe le Vayer, a little later, in his Considérations sur l’Eloquence
Française de ce temps “transacts,” though he is on the whole on the side of
Page 261
liberty. And enfin Vaugelas vint, the Savoyard[307] who was to teach France
French. His famous Remarques did not appear till 1647, when he was fifty-
two, and only three years before his death, but the book expresses work
much older.[308]
Vaugelas, to do him justice, has not the “pistolling ways” of Malherbe.
Usage is his standard, but, as in the old jest, the coin is no sooner in the
child’s pocket than he is told not to spend it. It is good usage only that you
must follow; and the goodness of course is penes nos. It would be neither
interesting nor proper here to discuss Vaugelas’ merely grammatical
precepts, but it is permissible to point out that he, first of all moderns—or at
any rate more than any early modern—contributed to bring about the
disastrous idea that grammar exists independently, instead of being a
generalisation, partly from the usage which even great writers cannot
violate, partly from their own. But it is worth observing that, according to
him, you must not use technical words, popular words, improper words (it
is dreadful to say “breast,” for do we not talk of a “breast of mutton or
veal”?), poetical words in prose, archaisms, neologisms, which last he hates
more than anything else. And when he comes to style, Purity, Clearness,
Sobriety, and so forth are of course his cardinal virtues.
Jean Guez de Balzac, who, in the rather idle nomenclature of traditional
literary history, has usually been styled “the Malherbe of French prose,” is
on the whole more important in the history of French style than in that of
Balzac. French criticism. He was not, as we have seen from the
phrase quoted above, by any means an indiscriminate admirer of his
correspondent—in fact, though not exactly a Gascon,[309] he was enough of
a Southerner to feel nettled at the Northern arrogance which undertook
dégasconner la France. But he was himself an ardent disciple of “purity,”
and the principal objection that even posterity has made to his Socrate
Chrétien, his Aristippe, his Prince, and most of his elaborate Letters, all of
which were fanatically admired by contemporaries, is that they are scarcely
more than pieces of epideictic, with very little substance in them.
These same letters, moreover, contain numerous critical passages; while a
His Letters. whole division of his Works[310] is critical. The interest,
however, of the most literary part of the Letters, those to Chapelain, as a
whole, is not so much on Balzac’s side as on Chapelain’s; and the subjects
of them will, at any rate in part, be best treated when we come to discuss
that (in the latter part of his own lifetime and since) much-enduring writer.
French. His famous Remarques did not appear till 1647, when he was fifty-
two, and only three years before his death, but the book expresses work
much older.[308]
Vaugelas, to do him justice, has not the “pistolling ways” of Malherbe.
Usage is his standard, but, as in the old jest, the coin is no sooner in the
child’s pocket than he is told not to spend it. It is good usage only that you
must follow; and the goodness of course is penes nos. It would be neither
interesting nor proper here to discuss Vaugelas’ merely grammatical
precepts, but it is permissible to point out that he, first of all moderns—or at
any rate more than any early modern—contributed to bring about the
disastrous idea that grammar exists independently, instead of being a
generalisation, partly from the usage which even great writers cannot
violate, partly from their own. But it is worth observing that, according to
him, you must not use technical words, popular words, improper words (it
is dreadful to say “breast,” for do we not talk of a “breast of mutton or
veal”?), poetical words in prose, archaisms, neologisms, which last he hates
more than anything else. And when he comes to style, Purity, Clearness,
Sobriety, and so forth are of course his cardinal virtues.
Jean Guez de Balzac, who, in the rather idle nomenclature of traditional
literary history, has usually been styled “the Malherbe of French prose,” is
on the whole more important in the history of French style than in that of
Balzac. French criticism. He was not, as we have seen from the
phrase quoted above, by any means an indiscriminate admirer of his
correspondent—in fact, though not exactly a Gascon,[309] he was enough of
a Southerner to feel nettled at the Northern arrogance which undertook
dégasconner la France. But he was himself an ardent disciple of “purity,”
and the principal objection that even posterity has made to his Socrate
Chrétien, his Aristippe, his Prince, and most of his elaborate Letters, all of
which were fanatically admired by contemporaries, is that they are scarcely
more than pieces of epideictic, with very little substance in them.
These same letters, moreover, contain numerous critical passages; while a
His Letters. whole division of his Works[310] is critical. The interest,
however, of the most literary part of the Letters, those to Chapelain, as a
whole, is not so much on Balzac’s side as on Chapelain’s; and the subjects
of them will, at any rate in part, be best treated when we come to discuss
that (in the latter part of his own lifetime and since) much-enduring writer.
Page 262
To Bois-Robert Balzac confides (III. 7) that he only cares for verses as he
does for melons—both must be in absolute perfection if they are to please
him; also that the philosopher’s stone will be found as soon as the sort of
eloquence that he values. The thousand pages of the Letters are sprinkled
with finery of this sort; but better matter is not very common. The
somewhat hollow elegance which the French allow to be the chief merit of
Balzac does not lend itself well to real criticism: nor, to do him justice, does
he much attempt this, even to men of letters like Conrart, Heinsius,
Descartes, or to Chapelain himself. Sometimes he drops into verbal
criticism, as in VI. 57, where he consents to call Mlle. de Gournay herself
traductrice and rhétoricienne, but not poétesse or philosophesse. The letter
to Scudéry in reference to his attacks on The Cid is very sensible and in
good taste; but (as Balzac indeed generally is) much more ethical and
“gentlemanly” than æsthetic (XII. 20). Even when he writes directly to
Corneille (XVI. 9) about Cinna he cannot get much beyond elegant
generalities as to this Rome being the Rome de Tite Live. So that it is not
surprising, when we come to the Chapelain Letters themselves (of which,
besides a few stray ones earlier, there are six entire Books, XVII.-XXII.)
that although most of them touch literature, and many contain critical
remarks or judgments,[311] there is little of much interest. Only now and then
do we come across such a refreshment as: “Why, sir, what prodigy do you
tell me of? Is it possible that any one with a drop of common-sense in him
can prefer the Spanish poets to the Italians? and take the visions of a certain
Lope de Vega for reasonable compositions?” (XX. 127). His remarks on
Ronsard and Malherbe, “the Martyr and the Tyrant” (XXII. 20), are fair, and
with room one might extend the anthology. But on the whole, though
Balzac was a very handsome letter-writer, and could, and did, give all the
Frank Churchills of Europe lessons in that art, he was not very much of a
critic.
His Critical His set Critical Dissertations quite confirm this verdict.
Dissertations.
He opens them with a great deal about Discipline, Justesse,
Bienséance, the Mean, and the like. He tells us (vol. ii. p. 537) that any one
who likes Ariosto would prefer a Siren to a beautiful woman—the answer
to which challenge may be justly suspended by the true critic till he has a
Siren produced before him. There might be much to be said for her. He has
some not unpleasant remarks on the obligatory subject of the great sonnet-
duel between Voiture’s “Uranie” and Benserade’s “Job”: but he has not, so
does for melons—both must be in absolute perfection if they are to please
him; also that the philosopher’s stone will be found as soon as the sort of
eloquence that he values. The thousand pages of the Letters are sprinkled
with finery of this sort; but better matter is not very common. The
somewhat hollow elegance which the French allow to be the chief merit of
Balzac does not lend itself well to real criticism: nor, to do him justice, does
he much attempt this, even to men of letters like Conrart, Heinsius,
Descartes, or to Chapelain himself. Sometimes he drops into verbal
criticism, as in VI. 57, where he consents to call Mlle. de Gournay herself
traductrice and rhétoricienne, but not poétesse or philosophesse. The letter
to Scudéry in reference to his attacks on The Cid is very sensible and in
good taste; but (as Balzac indeed generally is) much more ethical and
“gentlemanly” than æsthetic (XII. 20). Even when he writes directly to
Corneille (XVI. 9) about Cinna he cannot get much beyond elegant
generalities as to this Rome being the Rome de Tite Live. So that it is not
surprising, when we come to the Chapelain Letters themselves (of which,
besides a few stray ones earlier, there are six entire Books, XVII.-XXII.)
that although most of them touch literature, and many contain critical
remarks or judgments,[311] there is little of much interest. Only now and then
do we come across such a refreshment as: “Why, sir, what prodigy do you
tell me of? Is it possible that any one with a drop of common-sense in him
can prefer the Spanish poets to the Italians? and take the visions of a certain
Lope de Vega for reasonable compositions?” (XX. 127). His remarks on
Ronsard and Malherbe, “the Martyr and the Tyrant” (XXII. 20), are fair, and
with room one might extend the anthology. But on the whole, though
Balzac was a very handsome letter-writer, and could, and did, give all the
Frank Churchills of Europe lessons in that art, he was not very much of a
critic.
His Critical His set Critical Dissertations quite confirm this verdict.
Dissertations.
He opens them with a great deal about Discipline, Justesse,
Bienséance, the Mean, and the like. He tells us (vol. ii. p. 537) that any one
who likes Ariosto would prefer a Siren to a beautiful woman—the answer
to which challenge may be justly suspended by the true critic till he has a
Siren produced before him. There might be much to be said for her. He has
some not unpleasant remarks on the obligatory subject of the great sonnet-
duel between Voiture’s “Uranie” and Benserade’s “Job”: but he has not, so
Page 263
far as I remember, discovered the critical truth that their beauty lies in the
singular charm of the first line of the one and the last of the other. He is in
one place (ii. 597) almost savage with Montaigne, of whom he says that,
though he be adopted father to Mlle. de Gournay, esteemed by Father Paul,
and “allégué par le Chancelier Baccon” (sic), he can see nothing in his
Essays but equivoques and mistakes of judgment. This, however, is said
chiefly in reference to Montaigne’s Latinity and knowledge of Latin: and
elsewhere (pp. 657-662) there is a set judgment much more favourable,
though still smacking of the double prejudice against a prophet of his own
country and a man of the last generation. But his Dissertation on or against
the Burlesque[312] style, when one remembers the excesses in which, from
Scarron down to Dassoucy, men were about to indulge, is not contemptible:
and there are amusing things in his Barbon, a sort of elaborate
Theophrastian portrait of a young pedant, from which Scriblerus may have
borrowed.
Vaugelas, as we have seen, did not finally elaborate his work till some
twenty years after Malherbe’s death, and Balzac, though a correspondent of
the Norman poet, outlived him by more than a quarter of a century. But in
Ogier and the the very year (1628) of that death appeared a document on
Preface to Tyr et
Sidon.
the other side, and taking that side in flank at the point
where it was, with the majority, to be most victorious. This
was the Preface of François Ogier to the second edition of the Tyr et Sidon
of Daniel d’Anchères, or rather (for this is a mere anagram) Jean de
Schélandre.[313] The play is almost the only worthy representative, in
French, of that English-Spanish drama which set the Unities at defiance;[314]
the Preface, written twenty years after the first appearance of the play, but
seven before the author’s death, is a brief but extraordinarily remarkable
vindication, in principle, of Schélandre’s practice. Until M. Asselineau, in
1854, published an article on the subject, and the Bibliothèque Elzévirienne,
two years later, included both play and preface in the eighth volume of the
invaluable Ancien Théâtre Français, both were practically unknown. Even
then notice of them was for a long time confined to literary historians; and
of late an attempt has been made to put the Preface aside as the mere freak
of a student, in opposition to the taste of the time and the necessities of the
stage. That the general course of literature in France followed for a time the
line which Ogier argued against, and to which Schélandre ran counter, is
perfectly true. But this is quite indifferent (except as a matter to be
singular charm of the first line of the one and the last of the other. He is in
one place (ii. 597) almost savage with Montaigne, of whom he says that,
though he be adopted father to Mlle. de Gournay, esteemed by Father Paul,
and “allégué par le Chancelier Baccon” (sic), he can see nothing in his
Essays but equivoques and mistakes of judgment. This, however, is said
chiefly in reference to Montaigne’s Latinity and knowledge of Latin: and
elsewhere (pp. 657-662) there is a set judgment much more favourable,
though still smacking of the double prejudice against a prophet of his own
country and a man of the last generation. But his Dissertation on or against
the Burlesque[312] style, when one remembers the excesses in which, from
Scarron down to Dassoucy, men were about to indulge, is not contemptible:
and there are amusing things in his Barbon, a sort of elaborate
Theophrastian portrait of a young pedant, from which Scriblerus may have
borrowed.
Vaugelas, as we have seen, did not finally elaborate his work till some
twenty years after Malherbe’s death, and Balzac, though a correspondent of
the Norman poet, outlived him by more than a quarter of a century. But in
Ogier and the the very year (1628) of that death appeared a document on
Preface to Tyr et
Sidon.
the other side, and taking that side in flank at the point
where it was, with the majority, to be most victorious. This
was the Preface of François Ogier to the second edition of the Tyr et Sidon
of Daniel d’Anchères, or rather (for this is a mere anagram) Jean de
Schélandre.[313] The play is almost the only worthy representative, in
French, of that English-Spanish drama which set the Unities at defiance;[314]
the Preface, written twenty years after the first appearance of the play, but
seven before the author’s death, is a brief but extraordinarily remarkable
vindication, in principle, of Schélandre’s practice. Until M. Asselineau, in
1854, published an article on the subject, and the Bibliothèque Elzévirienne,
two years later, included both play and preface in the eighth volume of the
invaluable Ancien Théâtre Français, both were practically unknown. Even
then notice of them was for a long time confined to literary historians; and
of late an attempt has been made to put the Preface aside as the mere freak
of a student, in opposition to the taste of the time and the necessities of the
stage. That the general course of literature in France followed for a time the
line which Ogier argued against, and to which Schélandre ran counter, is
perfectly true. But this is quite indifferent (except as a matter to be
Page 264
registered) to history, which knows perfectly well that Athanasius and his
world are always changing places and principles. Moreover, it is quite a
mistake to think that Ogier writes merely from the study, and with no
consideration of the stage. Like Cinthio, like Patrizzi, like Castelvetro
himself, he is no mere study-theorist. On the contrary he carries the war into
the enemy’s camp with a refreshing audacity and no small force. It is the
classical arrangement, he says, which offense le judicieux spectateur, with
its improbable and unnatural coincidences and tallyings. How, he asks, in a
passage interesting to compare with Sidney’s satirical description of the
opposite style, do the identifying rings, the shepherd-fosterers, the good old
nurses, always turn up comme par art de magie exactly at the right
moment? How is it that Creon, and the old attendant of Laius, and the
Corinthian who picked Œdipus up, all rendezvous at Athens in the nick of
time? Is verisimilitude observed even in the Agamemnon? Is there anything
dramatic at all—anything more than sheer narration—in the Persæ? Can the
extreme defenders of the Unity of Time work out the Antigone on their
lines? or the Heautontimoroumenos? Then he proceeds to account (not at all
badly) for the practice of the ancients, and then to revert to the only sound
argument—that of Cinthio and Pigna in the matter of the Romanzi, of Il
Lasca in reference to Italian comedy—that Athens and Rome, and the lives
and customs of both, are not modern countries and their lives and customs,
that the practice of the one can give no final and prohibitive rule to the
practice of the other.[315]
We are not in the least concerned to argue for this Preface. It is enough to
point out its bold and independent spirit, and to lay special stress on the fact
that Ogier fully admits that he is defending, if not a heresy, an orthodoxy
which is not popular, offers to explain “pourquoi nous nous sommes jetez à
quartier du chemin ordinaire,” speaks of the Unity of Time as “cette règle
que nos critiques veulent nous faire garder si religieusement à cette heure,”
indirectly condemns the Unity of Place in his arguments, and vindicates the
full tragi-comic blending of Actions. Now, this was in 1628, eight years
before the Cid and the Sentiments de l’Académie, even a year before
Mairet’s Sophonisbe earned the reputation of being the first French piece
that was absolutely “correct.” This is of itself enough to show how
erroneous is the idea, once common and still repeated, that the discussion
over the Cid, with Scudéry for mover, was in the nature of a surprise, and
world are always changing places and principles. Moreover, it is quite a
mistake to think that Ogier writes merely from the study, and with no
consideration of the stage. Like Cinthio, like Patrizzi, like Castelvetro
himself, he is no mere study-theorist. On the contrary he carries the war into
the enemy’s camp with a refreshing audacity and no small force. It is the
classical arrangement, he says, which offense le judicieux spectateur, with
its improbable and unnatural coincidences and tallyings. How, he asks, in a
passage interesting to compare with Sidney’s satirical description of the
opposite style, do the identifying rings, the shepherd-fosterers, the good old
nurses, always turn up comme par art de magie exactly at the right
moment? How is it that Creon, and the old attendant of Laius, and the
Corinthian who picked Œdipus up, all rendezvous at Athens in the nick of
time? Is verisimilitude observed even in the Agamemnon? Is there anything
dramatic at all—anything more than sheer narration—in the Persæ? Can the
extreme defenders of the Unity of Time work out the Antigone on their
lines? or the Heautontimoroumenos? Then he proceeds to account (not at all
badly) for the practice of the ancients, and then to revert to the only sound
argument—that of Cinthio and Pigna in the matter of the Romanzi, of Il
Lasca in reference to Italian comedy—that Athens and Rome, and the lives
and customs of both, are not modern countries and their lives and customs,
that the practice of the one can give no final and prohibitive rule to the
practice of the other.[315]
We are not in the least concerned to argue for this Preface. It is enough to
point out its bold and independent spirit, and to lay special stress on the fact
that Ogier fully admits that he is defending, if not a heresy, an orthodoxy
which is not popular, offers to explain “pourquoi nous nous sommes jetez à
quartier du chemin ordinaire,” speaks of the Unity of Time as “cette règle
que nos critiques veulent nous faire garder si religieusement à cette heure,”
indirectly condemns the Unity of Place in his arguments, and vindicates the
full tragi-comic blending of Actions. Now, this was in 1628, eight years
before the Cid and the Sentiments de l’Académie, even a year before
Mairet’s Sophonisbe earned the reputation of being the first French piece
that was absolutely “correct.” This is of itself enough to show how
erroneous is the idea, once common and still repeated, that the discussion
over the Cid, with Scudéry for mover, was in the nature of a surprise, and
Page 265
that Chapelain, if he most certainly did not invent the Unities, introduced
them into France.
Although M. Bourgoin, and one or two others, have done something of
late years to relieve Chapelain himself of the weight—not so much of
obloquy as of contemptuous ignoring—which rested on him for nearly two
centuries, even they have for the most part lain under that curious fear of
Chapelain: the Boileau which we shall have to notice so often. Sainte-
hopelessness of
his verse.
Beuve (who knew his French seventeenth century as no
other man ever has known, or probably ever will know it,
and who had in his own possession the MS. Letters which do Chapelain not
a little credit) takes a kind of apologetic tone on the subject, and seems
never to have made up his mind to treat Chapelain as a whole. It is, indeed,
only on the prose side that he can be approached without fear of disaster.
There are good things even in the Pucelle, but they are ill to win. You may
read Le Moyne, Desmarets, Saint-Amant, not without satisfaction of the
true poetic sort, especially in the first case. I think I once got through some
part of Scudéry’s Alaric. But the Pucelle has a double touch-me-not-ishness
—of niaiserie, and of what Boileau (for once justly) calls “hardness”; there
is something really impregnable about her. And the minor pieces—fine as is
the Richelieu Ode in parts—hardly save their captainess.
Chapelain as a critic is quite another person. He still writes somewhat
heavily: and (among his other faithfulnesses to the Pléiade[316]) goes in the
teeth of Malherbe and Vaugelas by his use of classicised words. But he
The interest of almost deserves the name of the first properly equipped
his criticism.
critic of France in point of knowledge: and (shocking as the
statement may appear) I am not sure that he was not the last, till almost
within the memory of an aged man. Not only did he know Italian literature
thoroughly—that was not in his time uncommon for Frenchmen—and
Spanish—that also was not far to seek—but he was accurately drilled in the
theory and practice of Italian criticism. He is constantly referring to it in his
correspondence with Balzac; he (that is to say, the transparently identical
author of the main part at least of the Censure of the Cid) not merely rests
his objections on these critics, but refers to the controversies over the
Gerusalemme and the Pastor Fido, as he does elsewhere to that between
Castelvetro and Caro. Above all, he, almost alone of his time, knew old
French literature. It has not been noticed, I think, either by M. Feillet, who
published, or by M. Bourgoin, who discusses, his most interesting and
them into France.
Although M. Bourgoin, and one or two others, have done something of
late years to relieve Chapelain himself of the weight—not so much of
obloquy as of contemptuous ignoring—which rested on him for nearly two
centuries, even they have for the most part lain under that curious fear of
Chapelain: the Boileau which we shall have to notice so often. Sainte-
hopelessness of
his verse.
Beuve (who knew his French seventeenth century as no
other man ever has known, or probably ever will know it,
and who had in his own possession the MS. Letters which do Chapelain not
a little credit) takes a kind of apologetic tone on the subject, and seems
never to have made up his mind to treat Chapelain as a whole. It is, indeed,
only on the prose side that he can be approached without fear of disaster.
There are good things even in the Pucelle, but they are ill to win. You may
read Le Moyne, Desmarets, Saint-Amant, not without satisfaction of the
true poetic sort, especially in the first case. I think I once got through some
part of Scudéry’s Alaric. But the Pucelle has a double touch-me-not-ishness
—of niaiserie, and of what Boileau (for once justly) calls “hardness”; there
is something really impregnable about her. And the minor pieces—fine as is
the Richelieu Ode in parts—hardly save their captainess.
Chapelain as a critic is quite another person. He still writes somewhat
heavily: and (among his other faithfulnesses to the Pléiade[316]) goes in the
teeth of Malherbe and Vaugelas by his use of classicised words. But he
The interest of almost deserves the name of the first properly equipped
his criticism.
critic of France in point of knowledge: and (shocking as the
statement may appear) I am not sure that he was not the last, till almost
within the memory of an aged man. Not only did he know Italian literature
thoroughly—that was not in his time uncommon for Frenchmen—and
Spanish—that also was not far to seek—but he was accurately drilled in the
theory and practice of Italian criticism. He is constantly referring to it in his
correspondence with Balzac; he (that is to say, the transparently identical
author of the main part at least of the Censure of the Cid) not merely rests
his objections on these critics, but refers to the controversies over the
Gerusalemme and the Pastor Fido, as he does elsewhere to that between
Castelvetro and Caro. Above all, he, almost alone of his time, knew old
French literature. It has not been noticed, I think, either by M. Feillet, who
published, or by M. Bourgoin, who discusses, his most interesting and
Page 266
remarkable dialogue, Sur la Lecture des Vieux Romans, that his devotion to
Lancelot was almost certainly one of his debts to Ronsard. For the Prince of
Poets, as we saw, expressly enjoined the reading of Lancelot and the other
romances in order to enrich the vocabulary.
The blot on Chapelain’s critical record in the general estimation is, of
The Sentiments course, his[317] Censure of the Cid above referred to. Even
de l’Académie
sur le Cid.
those who admit that critical like other thought is free, and
that a critic is not to be sentenced to Malebolge because he
is unfortunate enough not to like the great work of a great man, must
acknowledge a certain striking poetical justice in the spectacle of the censor
of the Cid, for want of correctness, being pitilessly flogged thirty years later
by a correcter than he. Nor, nowadays, do we admit much excuse in the
undoubted fact that this censure was practically forced on the Academy, and
on Chapelain, by the sordid jealousy of Richelieu.
But even in this censure it is possible, even for one who frankly puts
Corneille at the head of all French Tragedy, to acknowledge some critical
merits. The first (not perhaps quite the least) of these is that it is strictly
civil; the second is that, meticulous, purblind, peddling, prudish—a score of
similar epithets if you please—as it is, it does adopt an intelligible code of
critical judgment, and does apply that code with legal propriety. Moreover,
as we have seen, it is quite a mistake to represent this code as being
invented for the occasion—suddenly foisted upon France to gratify the envy
of Scudéry and Mairet, or the less excusable malignity of Richelieu. The
code had been growing for more than a century; it had been gaining wider
and wider acquiescence every day; the protests against it, however gallantly
made, had fallen practically unheard. Eight years before we have Ogier
explicitly admitting it as the code of nos critiques—as the accepted opinion.
We may be fully entitled—some of us intend, for us and for our house, to
do so, whether entitled or not—to hold the Unities things vainly invented in
two cases, and mischievous, if exclusively and universally enforced, in the
third.[318] We may think the objections to Corneille’s diction hypercritical,
and the objection to Chimène’s conduct utterly absurd.[319] But Chapelain,
and those about Chapelain, were also quite entitled to think differently, and
there is no reason to believe their opinion feigned, though they might not
have put it so forcibly save to curry favour with the Cardinal. After all,
Corneille hardly disputed their verdict except in detail; and, whether luckily
or unluckily, tried to do as they told him afterwards.
Lancelot was almost certainly one of his debts to Ronsard. For the Prince of
Poets, as we saw, expressly enjoined the reading of Lancelot and the other
romances in order to enrich the vocabulary.
The blot on Chapelain’s critical record in the general estimation is, of
The Sentiments course, his[317] Censure of the Cid above referred to. Even
de l’Académie
sur le Cid.
those who admit that critical like other thought is free, and
that a critic is not to be sentenced to Malebolge because he
is unfortunate enough not to like the great work of a great man, must
acknowledge a certain striking poetical justice in the spectacle of the censor
of the Cid, for want of correctness, being pitilessly flogged thirty years later
by a correcter than he. Nor, nowadays, do we admit much excuse in the
undoubted fact that this censure was practically forced on the Academy, and
on Chapelain, by the sordid jealousy of Richelieu.
But even in this censure it is possible, even for one who frankly puts
Corneille at the head of all French Tragedy, to acknowledge some critical
merits. The first (not perhaps quite the least) of these is that it is strictly
civil; the second is that, meticulous, purblind, peddling, prudish—a score of
similar epithets if you please—as it is, it does adopt an intelligible code of
critical judgment, and does apply that code with legal propriety. Moreover,
as we have seen, it is quite a mistake to represent this code as being
invented for the occasion—suddenly foisted upon France to gratify the envy
of Scudéry and Mairet, or the less excusable malignity of Richelieu. The
code had been growing for more than a century; it had been gaining wider
and wider acquiescence every day; the protests against it, however gallantly
made, had fallen practically unheard. Eight years before we have Ogier
explicitly admitting it as the code of nos critiques—as the accepted opinion.
We may be fully entitled—some of us intend, for us and for our house, to
do so, whether entitled or not—to hold the Unities things vainly invented in
two cases, and mischievous, if exclusively and universally enforced, in the
third.[318] We may think the objections to Corneille’s diction hypercritical,
and the objection to Chimène’s conduct utterly absurd.[319] But Chapelain,
and those about Chapelain, were also quite entitled to think differently, and
there is no reason to believe their opinion feigned, though they might not
have put it so forcibly save to curry favour with the Cardinal. After all,
Corneille hardly disputed their verdict except in detail; and, whether luckily
or unluckily, tried to do as they told him afterwards.
Page 267
Chapelain’s other critical exercises are numerous: they are quite
interesting, and there ought to be some accessible collection of them, for at
present they have to be hunted up in half-a-dozen different books or
Prefaces. collections, some of them very hard to get at. It is probable,
though disputed, that he wrote the Introduction to a translation of Guzman
d’Alfarache, which may have been done in his twentieth year, and in which
the author (according to the Pléiade view) by no means magnifies his office
as translator. He certainly wrote, some years later, the prefatory panegyric
to Marini’s Adone, where he practises, in a fashion familiar to students of
Italian criticism, an elaborate scholastic division of kinds and qualities, with
Sur les Vieux definitions and connections of them. We need not trouble
Romans.
ourselves with his Academic discourse, against Love and
for Glory, which is full of précieuse personification, but pass to his most
interesting works, the Dialogue on the Romances and the critical Letters. In
the first[320] he maintains the case of the Arthurian romances against Ménage
and Sarrasin, not with a thorough-going championship (that would be
wholly anachronistic), but with singular sense, knowledge, and even, as far
as it goes, appreciation. He does not affect to admire the composition or the
style in Lancelot. But he knows something of the origin (it is extraordinary
that he allows it to be, in part at least, English). He will not allow that,
barring style and expression, there is any necessary gulf between Lancelot
and Homer (wherein he is a hundred years ahead in sense of Blair, who was
a hundred years ahead of him in time), delights (taught to do so, as we said,
by Ronsard) in the vocabulary, and feels and rejoices in the point of honour
(“la crainte perpetuelle qu’ils ont de rien faire et de rien dire dont leur
reputation puisse souffrir la moindre tache”),[321] their jealousy of their
word, their devotion (so different from “our galanterie”) to their ladies.
Quia multum amavit! Moreover, the document is connected in a rather
fascinating manner with another,[322] in which the same interlocutors, with
others, appear, which refers to it, and in which not only does Sarrasin
confess that he had been brought by Chapelain to a state of mind different
from that which is to be seen in his Discours noticed below, but Chapelain
himself reinforces his argument with a long citation from, and discussion
of, an episode in Perceforest—that huge and interesting romance which is
almost inaccessible to modern readers, in consequence of the depraved
persistence of modern scholars and Societies in reprinting the same text in
interesting, and there ought to be some accessible collection of them, for at
present they have to be hunted up in half-a-dozen different books or
Prefaces. collections, some of them very hard to get at. It is probable,
though disputed, that he wrote the Introduction to a translation of Guzman
d’Alfarache, which may have been done in his twentieth year, and in which
the author (according to the Pléiade view) by no means magnifies his office
as translator. He certainly wrote, some years later, the prefatory panegyric
to Marini’s Adone, where he practises, in a fashion familiar to students of
Italian criticism, an elaborate scholastic division of kinds and qualities, with
Sur les Vieux definitions and connections of them. We need not trouble
Romans.
ourselves with his Academic discourse, against Love and
for Glory, which is full of précieuse personification, but pass to his most
interesting works, the Dialogue on the Romances and the critical Letters. In
the first[320] he maintains the case of the Arthurian romances against Ménage
and Sarrasin, not with a thorough-going championship (that would be
wholly anachronistic), but with singular sense, knowledge, and even, as far
as it goes, appreciation. He does not affect to admire the composition or the
style in Lancelot. But he knows something of the origin (it is extraordinary
that he allows it to be, in part at least, English). He will not allow that,
barring style and expression, there is any necessary gulf between Lancelot
and Homer (wherein he is a hundred years ahead in sense of Blair, who was
a hundred years ahead of him in time), delights (taught to do so, as we said,
by Ronsard) in the vocabulary, and feels and rejoices in the point of honour
(“la crainte perpetuelle qu’ils ont de rien faire et de rien dire dont leur
reputation puisse souffrir la moindre tache”),[321] their jealousy of their
word, their devotion (so different from “our galanterie”) to their ladies.
Quia multum amavit! Moreover, the document is connected in a rather
fascinating manner with another,[322] in which the same interlocutors, with
others, appear, which refers to it, and in which not only does Sarrasin
confess that he had been brought by Chapelain to a state of mind different
from that which is to be seen in his Discours noticed below, but Chapelain
himself reinforces his argument with a long citation from, and discussion
of, an episode in Perceforest—that huge and interesting romance which is
almost inaccessible to modern readers, in consequence of the depraved
persistence of modern scholars and Societies in reprinting the same text in
Page 268
idle emulation of each other, instead of giving what are practically
anecdota.
The Letters (published, with some omissions, by M. Tamizey de la Roque
in 1880, and supplemented fourteen years later by some more in the
Transactions of a learned Society[323]) are crammed with references to
Letters, &c. books, and contain not a little real criticism. And lastly, the
[324]
famous list of characterisations of French men of letters which
Chapelain drew up for Colbert’s use in allotting pensions, though it has
been laughed at in parts, is for its date (some of its subjects, including
Molière, had not yet done anything like their best work) as sound, as
sensible, and, at the same time, as benevolent a hand-list of the kind as you
shall discover in the records of the centuries.
On the whole we may say that Chapelain only wanted the proverbial
“That!” to make a good and perhaps a really great critic. Not all, though a
good deal, of the deficiency must be put down to the transition character of
time, taste, literary diction, and everything, in midst of which he found
himself. The point of critical genius, the ability to grasp and focus and
methodise, must have been wanting too. But he had knowledge, both of
literature and of criticism; he had obviously catholic, if not unerring,
sympathies; he had acuteness and penetration, if not quite combination and
the architectonic; and he was entirely free from that ill-nature which, while
it may seem to assist the critic, really disables him. Critique manqué,
perhaps, on the whole; but still on his day a critic and no mean one.
“Il faut observer l’Unité d’action, de lieu et de jour. Personne n’en
doute.” But, out of France at least, and perhaps in it, it is possible that few
people may know, or even doubt, whence this saying comes. It would be an
Corneille. insult to a Frenchman of letters to tell him that it comes
from Pierre Corneille; long, it is true, after the debate over the Cid, but
nearly a quarter of a century before the close of his glorious, if not too
happy, life. It may be gathered—rather from a long and large induction than
from any single utterance of a person of importance—that the French do not
think very much of Corneille as a critic; it may be further gathered from this
that a man should never submit his genius. Tu contra audentior ito is the
counsel of wisdom. He has written much the best things that have been
written in favour of the “correct” theory; but its partisans (and small blame
to them) suspect him. They see the eyes of Chimène behind the mask, and
they distrust them—wisely also after their kind.
anecdota.
The Letters (published, with some omissions, by M. Tamizey de la Roque
in 1880, and supplemented fourteen years later by some more in the
Transactions of a learned Society[323]) are crammed with references to
Letters, &c. books, and contain not a little real criticism. And lastly, the
[324]
famous list of characterisations of French men of letters which
Chapelain drew up for Colbert’s use in allotting pensions, though it has
been laughed at in parts, is for its date (some of its subjects, including
Molière, had not yet done anything like their best work) as sound, as
sensible, and, at the same time, as benevolent a hand-list of the kind as you
shall discover in the records of the centuries.
On the whole we may say that Chapelain only wanted the proverbial
“That!” to make a good and perhaps a really great critic. Not all, though a
good deal, of the deficiency must be put down to the transition character of
time, taste, literary diction, and everything, in midst of which he found
himself. The point of critical genius, the ability to grasp and focus and
methodise, must have been wanting too. But he had knowledge, both of
literature and of criticism; he had obviously catholic, if not unerring,
sympathies; he had acuteness and penetration, if not quite combination and
the architectonic; and he was entirely free from that ill-nature which, while
it may seem to assist the critic, really disables him. Critique manqué,
perhaps, on the whole; but still on his day a critic and no mean one.
“Il faut observer l’Unité d’action, de lieu et de jour. Personne n’en
doute.” But, out of France at least, and perhaps in it, it is possible that few
people may know, or even doubt, whence this saying comes. It would be an
Corneille. insult to a Frenchman of letters to tell him that it comes
from Pierre Corneille; long, it is true, after the debate over the Cid, but
nearly a quarter of a century before the close of his glorious, if not too
happy, life. It may be gathered—rather from a long and large induction than
from any single utterance of a person of importance—that the French do not
think very much of Corneille as a critic; it may be further gathered from this
that a man should never submit his genius. Tu contra audentior ito is the
counsel of wisdom. He has written much the best things that have been
written in favour of the “correct” theory; but its partisans (and small blame
to them) suspect him. They see the eyes of Chimène behind the mask, and
they distrust them—wisely also after their kind.
Page 269
But we must not rhapsodise here on the admirable poetry of this great
poet, and the way in which the critics not merely, as somebody said in his
own day, ont tari sa veine, but made him in a way false to it. We have only
to do with his actual criticism; and whatever view we take of the general
question, it must be here pronounced great criticism of its kind. The three
Discours, and the series of Examens which appeared first in 1660, present
an almost unique, an extremely touching, and (to men of English birth) a
rather incomprehensible instance of a man of supreme genius crouching and
curbing himself to obey the tendency of the time and the dictates of “the
wits.”[325] We are not kneaded of this dough. We cannot even conceive
Shakespeare taking a copy of Sidney or going to Ben, and afterwards
constructing dramas as regularly as he could, or apologising for their
irregularity; Milton adjusting Paradise Lost to Dryden’s views of rhyme;
nay, even Dryden himself (who is in some ways, as we shall see, very close
to Corneille) “looking first at the stop-watch” in any way. But “things are as
they are,” and (a great saying from which sometimes the wrong inference
has been drawn) “their consequences will be what they will be.”
The three Discourses, “De l’Utilité et des parties du Poëme Dramatique,”
“De la Tragédie,” and “Des Trois Unités,” and the Examens of the different
The Three plays, are the result of this submission.[326] Let us say at
Discourses.
once that it is in no sense the mere submission of a man
who recants, either with tongue in cheek or simply under fear of rack and
gallows and fire. Corneille (and this is the interesting point of the French
temperament as contrasted with the English) is really affected by authority,
and by the Zeitgeist. He has been honestly converted; indeed he asserts (and
we may believe him to a great extent) that he never needed conversion—it
was only his green unknowing age that made him go wrong. In the three
Discourses he examines the question with plentiful quotations from
Aristotle, with some knowledge of Italians like Castelvetro and Beni and
Pazzi (Pacius) as well as of Heinsius. He is quite aware of the weak points
of the ancients; he repeats, though he does not much dwell upon, the earlier
comments on the singular rapidity with which Agamemnon[327] follows the
beacon-fires, the astonishing patness of the turning up of the Corinthian in
the Œdipus. And to any one who thinks little of Corneille as a critic I
should like to prescribe the reading, marking, and inwardly digesting of his
remarks in the Discours des Trois Unités on the separation of acts and
scenes, and the relation of the chorus to orchestral interludes. Elsewhere we
poet, and the way in which the critics not merely, as somebody said in his
own day, ont tari sa veine, but made him in a way false to it. We have only
to do with his actual criticism; and whatever view we take of the general
question, it must be here pronounced great criticism of its kind. The three
Discours, and the series of Examens which appeared first in 1660, present
an almost unique, an extremely touching, and (to men of English birth) a
rather incomprehensible instance of a man of supreme genius crouching and
curbing himself to obey the tendency of the time and the dictates of “the
wits.”[325] We are not kneaded of this dough. We cannot even conceive
Shakespeare taking a copy of Sidney or going to Ben, and afterwards
constructing dramas as regularly as he could, or apologising for their
irregularity; Milton adjusting Paradise Lost to Dryden’s views of rhyme;
nay, even Dryden himself (who is in some ways, as we shall see, very close
to Corneille) “looking first at the stop-watch” in any way. But “things are as
they are,” and (a great saying from which sometimes the wrong inference
has been drawn) “their consequences will be what they will be.”
The three Discourses, “De l’Utilité et des parties du Poëme Dramatique,”
“De la Tragédie,” and “Des Trois Unités,” and the Examens of the different
The Three plays, are the result of this submission.[326] Let us say at
Discourses.
once that it is in no sense the mere submission of a man
who recants, either with tongue in cheek or simply under fear of rack and
gallows and fire. Corneille (and this is the interesting point of the French
temperament as contrasted with the English) is really affected by authority,
and by the Zeitgeist. He has been honestly converted; indeed he asserts (and
we may believe him to a great extent) that he never needed conversion—it
was only his green unknowing age that made him go wrong. In the three
Discourses he examines the question with plentiful quotations from
Aristotle, with some knowledge of Italians like Castelvetro and Beni and
Pazzi (Pacius) as well as of Heinsius. He is quite aware of the weak points
of the ancients; he repeats, though he does not much dwell upon, the earlier
comments on the singular rapidity with which Agamemnon[327] follows the
beacon-fires, the astonishing patness of the turning up of the Corinthian in
the Œdipus. And to any one who thinks little of Corneille as a critic I
should like to prescribe the reading, marking, and inwardly digesting of his
remarks in the Discours des Trois Unités on the separation of acts and
scenes, and the relation of the chorus to orchestral interludes. Elsewhere we
Page 270
may find the mark of the chain: as where the poet, pretending indifference,
is evidently rather unhappy because he cannot tell exactly what the wicked
Queen in Rodogune (which some have thought his best play next to the Cid)
was doing when she was not on the stage. This inquiry is of itself almost
sufficient to show the sheer idiocy to which this kind of criticism is always
on the point of descending. But on the whole, and since Giant Unity has
long ceased even to gnash at the pilgrims, we can tolerate it.
The Examens are of still greater importance; for we have had plenty of
inquiries in general into the qualities and requirements of Kinds, though
The Examens. few from persons like Corneille. The system of elaborate
critical reviews—for that is what it comes to—of his past work, by a great
poet who has taken pains to acquaint himself with critical method, and is
almost too respectful of its utterances, is practically a new one. There is a
certain flavour of it in Spenser and Ronsard, much more than a flavour in
Tasso; but it was not till the seventeenth century, when the critic was abroad
in earnest, that it could be done on such a scale as this. For Corneille,
though he never issued any Examens till 1660, applied them to all but his
very latest plays. To the mere general reader they may be rendered
distasteful by the elaborate and most pathetic pains which Corneille takes to
adjust himself to the theories which his reason docilely accepted, but to
which his faith was always secretly recalcitrant. To the student of him, and
to the student of criticism, they must always have a great attraction.
But for the latter, if he have but a little of the “rascally comparative”
spirit, they have an attraction greater still. There is no doubt at all that they
served as pattern, at a very brief interval, to the critical exercises of Dryden,
and thereby opened a way which criticism is treading still. And there is
more in them besides this accidental and extrinsic attraction. Corneille,
though he really shows extraordinary impartiality as well as great acumen
in his examinations, was by the mere force of nature driven to stick close to
his actual work, to observe it narrowly, if only so as to put the best face on
it. And, as we have seen, the great fault both of ancient and of mediæval
criticism was the omission or the refusal to consider individual works of art
minutely and exactly—the constant breaking off and escape to the type. The
natural partiality of authors for their own work has not always been
fortunate in its results. Here it was so.
Although we have had, and shall have, to question the exact importance
assigned by some to the Cid quarrel, there can be no doubt that it had a very
is evidently rather unhappy because he cannot tell exactly what the wicked
Queen in Rodogune (which some have thought his best play next to the Cid)
was doing when she was not on the stage. This inquiry is of itself almost
sufficient to show the sheer idiocy to which this kind of criticism is always
on the point of descending. But on the whole, and since Giant Unity has
long ceased even to gnash at the pilgrims, we can tolerate it.
The Examens are of still greater importance; for we have had plenty of
inquiries in general into the qualities and requirements of Kinds, though
The Examens. few from persons like Corneille. The system of elaborate
critical reviews—for that is what it comes to—of his past work, by a great
poet who has taken pains to acquaint himself with critical method, and is
almost too respectful of its utterances, is practically a new one. There is a
certain flavour of it in Spenser and Ronsard, much more than a flavour in
Tasso; but it was not till the seventeenth century, when the critic was abroad
in earnest, that it could be done on such a scale as this. For Corneille,
though he never issued any Examens till 1660, applied them to all but his
very latest plays. To the mere general reader they may be rendered
distasteful by the elaborate and most pathetic pains which Corneille takes to
adjust himself to the theories which his reason docilely accepted, but to
which his faith was always secretly recalcitrant. To the student of him, and
to the student of criticism, they must always have a great attraction.
But for the latter, if he have but a little of the “rascally comparative”
spirit, they have an attraction greater still. There is no doubt at all that they
served as pattern, at a very brief interval, to the critical exercises of Dryden,
and thereby opened a way which criticism is treading still. And there is
more in them besides this accidental and extrinsic attraction. Corneille,
though he really shows extraordinary impartiality as well as great acumen
in his examinations, was by the mere force of nature driven to stick close to
his actual work, to observe it narrowly, if only so as to put the best face on
it. And, as we have seen, the great fault both of ancient and of mediæval
criticism was the omission or the refusal to consider individual works of art
minutely and exactly—the constant breaking off and escape to the type. The
natural partiality of authors for their own work has not always been
fortunate in its results. Here it was so.
Although we have had, and shall have, to question the exact importance
assigned by some to the Cid quarrel, there can be no doubt that it had a very
Page 271
important influence, extending far beyond the chief parties concerned, and
helping, very particularly, that popularisation of criticism which is
undoubtedly the work of France in general, and of the French Academy in
La Mesnardière particular. In the years almost immediately succeeding it
—Sarrasin—
Scudéry.
we have, for 1639, the Discours de la Tragédie of the
ingenious and ill-fated Sarrasin, for 1640 the formal Art
Poétique of La Mesnardière, a treatise specially dealing with tragedy,
strongly, almost idolatrously, Aristotelian in tone, and characterised by a
lively polemic against the Spanish and Italian influences which had been so
powerful for a generation in France. Scudéry followed up the pamphlets
which had actually given occasion to the Cid dispute, almost at the same
period, with the Preface to Ibrahim, as well as years afterwards in that to
Alaric. Nay, it was at this very time (about 1640) that the world was at least
threatened with the birth of the dullest critical treatise of the century, that of
Hédelin, though a respite of seventeen years was actually granted.
La Mesnardière had evidently made a careful study of the Italian critics.
His very format—a handsome small quarto—reminds one of their favourite
shape, and contrasts curiously with the tiny duodecimos of the sixteenth-
century French critics. And he puts forth his whole strength in arguing for
the Stagirite against the blasphemies of Castelvetro, whom, however, he
declares that he honours hors des intérêts d’Aristote—an odd, but very
characteristic, way of putting it. La Mesnardière, who follows out all the
Aristotelian divisions, even to Music (with engraved airs), is equally odd
and equally representative in identifying, or at least associating in his first
Chapter, Politesse with “Imagination.” Mere Understanding will make a
Philosopher—the Poet must be polished up into an Imaginative condition.
He does not neglect language and diction: and though he devotes himself to
drama, illustrates copiously from non-dramatic poetry, and criticises his
illustrations in the way which was becoming so common and is so
important. But a specimen passage in a footnote[328] will explain, better than
pages of discussion, the fatally parasitic character of most of his criticism.
The Sarrasin and Scudéry documents are complementary as well as
complimentary of this and of each other. For Sarrasin’s Discours[329] is
devoted to Scudéry’s Amour Tyrannique, which is so perfect that Aristotle
would have put it in the Poetics, instead of or beside the Œdipus, if he had
only known it. And La Mesnardière is just going (see dates given) to write
“divinely” on that art of poetry which those great men, Ronsard and Du
helping, very particularly, that popularisation of criticism which is
undoubtedly the work of France in general, and of the French Academy in
La Mesnardière particular. In the years almost immediately succeeding it
—Sarrasin—
Scudéry.
we have, for 1639, the Discours de la Tragédie of the
ingenious and ill-fated Sarrasin, for 1640 the formal Art
Poétique of La Mesnardière, a treatise specially dealing with tragedy,
strongly, almost idolatrously, Aristotelian in tone, and characterised by a
lively polemic against the Spanish and Italian influences which had been so
powerful for a generation in France. Scudéry followed up the pamphlets
which had actually given occasion to the Cid dispute, almost at the same
period, with the Preface to Ibrahim, as well as years afterwards in that to
Alaric. Nay, it was at this very time (about 1640) that the world was at least
threatened with the birth of the dullest critical treatise of the century, that of
Hédelin, though a respite of seventeen years was actually granted.
La Mesnardière had evidently made a careful study of the Italian critics.
His very format—a handsome small quarto—reminds one of their favourite
shape, and contrasts curiously with the tiny duodecimos of the sixteenth-
century French critics. And he puts forth his whole strength in arguing for
the Stagirite against the blasphemies of Castelvetro, whom, however, he
declares that he honours hors des intérêts d’Aristote—an odd, but very
characteristic, way of putting it. La Mesnardière, who follows out all the
Aristotelian divisions, even to Music (with engraved airs), is equally odd
and equally representative in identifying, or at least associating in his first
Chapter, Politesse with “Imagination.” Mere Understanding will make a
Philosopher—the Poet must be polished up into an Imaginative condition.
He does not neglect language and diction: and though he devotes himself to
drama, illustrates copiously from non-dramatic poetry, and criticises his
illustrations in the way which was becoming so common and is so
important. But a specimen passage in a footnote[328] will explain, better than
pages of discussion, the fatally parasitic character of most of his criticism.
The Sarrasin and Scudéry documents are complementary as well as
complimentary of this and of each other. For Sarrasin’s Discours[329] is
devoted to Scudéry’s Amour Tyrannique, which is so perfect that Aristotle
would have put it in the Poetics, instead of or beside the Œdipus, if he had
only known it. And La Mesnardière is just going (see dates given) to write
“divinely” on that art of poetry which those great men, Ronsard and Du
Page 272
Bellay, did not know, and therefore recommended the study of Romances.
[330]
Finally, “Armand” [Richelieu, of course] is le Dieu tutélaire des lettres.
As for the great Georges de Scudéry himself, his Prefaces to Ibrahim and
Alaric are quite worthy of the “Commander of the Fort of Notre Dame de
La Garde and Kept-Captain to the King,” whose portrait guards the
entrance of the stately folio of Alaric. That is to say, they are an odd
mixture of bombast (he leads off that to this book with a list of critics and
poets, all of whom he has read), crotchet, and real wits. Both are worth
comparing with Davenant’s to Gondibert (v. infra, p. 367), which came
between them.[331]
Some years later the uncompromising Aristotelianism of La Mesnardière
as to the Drama was continued and straitened yet further, in reference to the
Epic, by Pierre Mambrun,[332] who was, like so many others of these French
Mambrun. seventeenth-century critics, a Jesuit. His principles (which
he illustrated later by a Constantinus sive De Idolatria debellata) exhibit the
French detestation of compromise in the most agreeable light: whether his
practice does not also illustrate the non-epic character of the French head is
another matter. Aristotle, and the whole Aristotle, so far as the Poetics go, is
Mambrun’s motto; if he cannot add “nothing but Aristotle,” that is merely
because his text is admittedly meagre as to Epic. But he does what he can.
He has read Scaliger and Voss, and has a proper respect for them as learned
men, but he is shocked at both for their worshipping of idols—at Scaliger
for wasting time on diction and metre, as well as for falling foul of Homer,
at Voss for making the persons instead of the action the centre of Epic. On
the other hand, the too famous Petronian passage is to him a kind of
inspired postscript to the Poetics. In his handling of Poetry, which for him is
first of all Epic Poetry, he is scholastic as to the frame. The Material cause
is Action; the Formal cause the Fable; the Efficient cause a combination of
Prudentia and Furor Poeticus; the Final Cause not pleasure but the making
of statesmen. In all these respects Homer and Virgil are perfect—Statius,
Lucan, Ariosto, Tasso, sinners. The former always observe the Unity, the
Integrity, the Magnitude of the Action. Mambrun has satisfied himself that
the Action of the Odyssey only includes fifty-five days—on which principle
one would cheerfully undertake to write an Arthuriad, to include the whole
of Malory and more, on an “action” of the time between Agravaine’s
detection of Lancelot with the Queen and the last fight in Lyonnesse. He
thinks that a woman may be a heroine of tragedy but cannot be of Epic
[330]
Finally, “Armand” [Richelieu, of course] is le Dieu tutélaire des lettres.
As for the great Georges de Scudéry himself, his Prefaces to Ibrahim and
Alaric are quite worthy of the “Commander of the Fort of Notre Dame de
La Garde and Kept-Captain to the King,” whose portrait guards the
entrance of the stately folio of Alaric. That is to say, they are an odd
mixture of bombast (he leads off that to this book with a list of critics and
poets, all of whom he has read), crotchet, and real wits. Both are worth
comparing with Davenant’s to Gondibert (v. infra, p. 367), which came
between them.[331]
Some years later the uncompromising Aristotelianism of La Mesnardière
as to the Drama was continued and straitened yet further, in reference to the
Epic, by Pierre Mambrun,[332] who was, like so many others of these French
Mambrun. seventeenth-century critics, a Jesuit. His principles (which
he illustrated later by a Constantinus sive De Idolatria debellata) exhibit the
French detestation of compromise in the most agreeable light: whether his
practice does not also illustrate the non-epic character of the French head is
another matter. Aristotle, and the whole Aristotle, so far as the Poetics go, is
Mambrun’s motto; if he cannot add “nothing but Aristotle,” that is merely
because his text is admittedly meagre as to Epic. But he does what he can.
He has read Scaliger and Voss, and has a proper respect for them as learned
men, but he is shocked at both for their worshipping of idols—at Scaliger
for wasting time on diction and metre, as well as for falling foul of Homer,
at Voss for making the persons instead of the action the centre of Epic. On
the other hand, the too famous Petronian passage is to him a kind of
inspired postscript to the Poetics. In his handling of Poetry, which for him is
first of all Epic Poetry, he is scholastic as to the frame. The Material cause
is Action; the Formal cause the Fable; the Efficient cause a combination of
Prudentia and Furor Poeticus; the Final Cause not pleasure but the making
of statesmen. In all these respects Homer and Virgil are perfect—Statius,
Lucan, Ariosto, Tasso, sinners. The former always observe the Unity, the
Integrity, the Magnitude of the Action. Mambrun has satisfied himself that
the Action of the Odyssey only includes fifty-five days—on which principle
one would cheerfully undertake to write an Arthuriad, to include the whole
of Malory and more, on an “action” of the time between Agravaine’s
detection of Lancelot with the Queen and the last fight in Lyonnesse. He
thinks that a woman may be a heroine of tragedy but cannot be of Epic
Page 273
(which seems unkind to Chapelain). He admits that to distinguish between
the Action and the Fable is not easy; that even in Aristotle the two are
sometimes identical. But properly the Fable is actio culta et ornata, and he
has an ingenious receipt for stripping the matter of episodes and names.
Epic is not Art, not Logic, not History; it is “Prudentia.” But Furor
Poeticus? Mambrun’s section of Furor Poeticus is by far the most
interesting in his book. He distinguishes first the Kinds of Fury. Then he
points out that the Epic Poet must not be furious in constituting his fable.
Very much the reverse. “But in episodes and descriptions and speeches I
shall not deny that a little fury may be sprinkled in”[333]—the fury-dredger,
or poetic cruet, being thus authoritatively established as an implement of
the Bard. Nor does he conceal the process. The poet thinks very hard about
an episode, a description, &c. Then the black bile warms itself, flies up,
inflames the brain, and the poet is poetically furious. But in another
memorable passage, “being strong in black bile will not necessarily make
you a poet.”[334] [Alas! it will not.] There must be discipline, &c. In short,
the book is a precious one.
There are few critics—not such by profession, and not precisely of the
very highest rank—who, from the very first, and with an unbroken record,
have enjoyed such a reputation as has been constantly maintained by Saint-
Saint- Evremond.[335] Nor is there, perhaps, a single one who has
Evremond.
better deserved this constancy on the part of the great
inconstants, Time and Fortune. He was commended to his own time
scarcely more by birth and station as a fine gentleman and soldier, or by his
singular political and personal history, than by the admirable quality of his
writing; to the eighteenth century by his touches of scepticism and
libertinage; to the Romantic revival by his championship of Corneille
against Racine, and by the frondeur spirit which made him resist the
tyranny of the classical creed. But it is also true that he has purely critical
qualities of a very uncommon kind. It is perhaps a testimony to that spice of
universal in him which has been noticed, that the particular stamp to be put
on these qualities—the particular class to which Saint-Evremond is to be
referred—is not quite matter of agreement among those who fully agree as
to his general merits. To M. Bourgoin, for instance, his critical spirit seems
to be nearer to that of Boileau and the critics of rule than to that of Fénelon,
or even La Bruyère, and the critics of impression and sens propre. To me
the approximation seems to be in the other direction.
the Action and the Fable is not easy; that even in Aristotle the two are
sometimes identical. But properly the Fable is actio culta et ornata, and he
has an ingenious receipt for stripping the matter of episodes and names.
Epic is not Art, not Logic, not History; it is “Prudentia.” But Furor
Poeticus? Mambrun’s section of Furor Poeticus is by far the most
interesting in his book. He distinguishes first the Kinds of Fury. Then he
points out that the Epic Poet must not be furious in constituting his fable.
Very much the reverse. “But in episodes and descriptions and speeches I
shall not deny that a little fury may be sprinkled in”[333]—the fury-dredger,
or poetic cruet, being thus authoritatively established as an implement of
the Bard. Nor does he conceal the process. The poet thinks very hard about
an episode, a description, &c. Then the black bile warms itself, flies up,
inflames the brain, and the poet is poetically furious. But in another
memorable passage, “being strong in black bile will not necessarily make
you a poet.”[334] [Alas! it will not.] There must be discipline, &c. In short,
the book is a precious one.
There are few critics—not such by profession, and not precisely of the
very highest rank—who, from the very first, and with an unbroken record,
have enjoyed such a reputation as has been constantly maintained by Saint-
Saint- Evremond.[335] Nor is there, perhaps, a single one who has
Evremond.
better deserved this constancy on the part of the great
inconstants, Time and Fortune. He was commended to his own time
scarcely more by birth and station as a fine gentleman and soldier, or by his
singular political and personal history, than by the admirable quality of his
writing; to the eighteenth century by his touches of scepticism and
libertinage; to the Romantic revival by his championship of Corneille
against Racine, and by the frondeur spirit which made him resist the
tyranny of the classical creed. But it is also true that he has purely critical
qualities of a very uncommon kind. It is perhaps a testimony to that spice of
universal in him which has been noticed, that the particular stamp to be put
on these qualities—the particular class to which Saint-Evremond is to be
referred—is not quite matter of agreement among those who fully agree as
to his general merits. To M. Bourgoin, for instance, his critical spirit seems
to be nearer to that of Boileau and the critics of rule than to that of Fénelon,
or even La Bruyère, and the critics of impression and sens propre. To me
the approximation seems to be in the other direction.
Page 274
The acute and learned author of Les Maîtres de la Critique has, I think,
been a little deceived by superficial characteristics of form and method. A
His critical young man of twenty at the date of the Cid, and the battle
quality and
accomplishment.
over it, Saint-Evremond, fine gentleman as he was, no
more forgot the forms of the quarrel than the attractions of
the play. He has something a little scholastic, something of the earlier
century, in his manner. Perhaps the best piece of criticism which he has left
us—the Dissertation sur le mot “vaste”—recalls the known or alleged
subjects of the earlier conversations of Malherbe and Racan, and their
fellows, the later of Vaugelas and Chapelain and the young Academy. We
have a formal Jugement sur Senèque, Plutarque, et Pétrone, a quite
academic study of Alexandre le Grand, discussions of the character of
tragedy generally, and the like. But the accomplished, agile, and
independent spirit of the author is perpetually escaping from the restraints
of his forms and models, and taking its own way according to its own taste.
Perhaps, indeed, the fatal equivocation or ambiguity which seems to beset
so many critical terms has worked here also: for to the present day the word
“Taste” seems to excite quite dissimilar ideas in different minds. To some
(as to Boileau and his followers it certainly did) it seems to suggest an
antecedent law, a bar to which subjects are to be brought, something to
which it is almost improper to apply the terms “good” or “bad,” because
there is only one taste, and anything else is not taste at all but untaste. In
this sense, though he might not have allowed it, I do not think that Saint-
Evremond ever judged by “taste.” In the other—where taste means the
approbation and satisfaction of a competent judge, well-gifted, well-tried,
and taking pains to keep his palate clean—I think he always judged by it.
That he often gave reasons for his judgment is nothing; one should almost
always do that. But one should always also remember that these reasons
may be totally inapplicable to the next instance.
Saint-Evremond, we have said, was a great admirer of Corneille, and a
steady champion of him against Racine. His admiration has been set down
to the mere “fallacy of first love,” as we may call it—the fact that the youth
His views on of the poet and the youth of the critic had coincided. This is
Corneille.
not fair. Inviolable constancy to first loves is not precisely
the chief thing in an Epicurean temperament. Saint-Evremond, in his
various utterances on the subject, makes it perfectly clear why he preferred
the older to the younger poet; and Cornelians and Racinians alike must
been a little deceived by superficial characteristics of form and method. A
His critical young man of twenty at the date of the Cid, and the battle
quality and
accomplishment.
over it, Saint-Evremond, fine gentleman as he was, no
more forgot the forms of the quarrel than the attractions of
the play. He has something a little scholastic, something of the earlier
century, in his manner. Perhaps the best piece of criticism which he has left
us—the Dissertation sur le mot “vaste”—recalls the known or alleged
subjects of the earlier conversations of Malherbe and Racan, and their
fellows, the later of Vaugelas and Chapelain and the young Academy. We
have a formal Jugement sur Senèque, Plutarque, et Pétrone, a quite
academic study of Alexandre le Grand, discussions of the character of
tragedy generally, and the like. But the accomplished, agile, and
independent spirit of the author is perpetually escaping from the restraints
of his forms and models, and taking its own way according to its own taste.
Perhaps, indeed, the fatal equivocation or ambiguity which seems to beset
so many critical terms has worked here also: for to the present day the word
“Taste” seems to excite quite dissimilar ideas in different minds. To some
(as to Boileau and his followers it certainly did) it seems to suggest an
antecedent law, a bar to which subjects are to be brought, something to
which it is almost improper to apply the terms “good” or “bad,” because
there is only one taste, and anything else is not taste at all but untaste. In
this sense, though he might not have allowed it, I do not think that Saint-
Evremond ever judged by “taste.” In the other—where taste means the
approbation and satisfaction of a competent judge, well-gifted, well-tried,
and taking pains to keep his palate clean—I think he always judged by it.
That he often gave reasons for his judgment is nothing; one should almost
always do that. But one should always also remember that these reasons
may be totally inapplicable to the next instance.
Saint-Evremond, we have said, was a great admirer of Corneille, and a
steady champion of him against Racine. His admiration has been set down
to the mere “fallacy of first love,” as we may call it—the fact that the youth
His views on of the poet and the youth of the critic had coincided. This is
Corneille.
not fair. Inviolable constancy to first loves is not precisely
the chief thing in an Epicurean temperament. Saint-Evremond, in his
various utterances on the subject, makes it perfectly clear why he preferred
the older to the younger poet; and Cornelians and Racinians alike must
Page 275
agree that, whether his conclusions were right or wrong, his considerations
were at any rate genuine and adequate. The variety and vigour of the one as
opposed to the somewhat monotonous mould and soft (or, as some said,
“creeping”) sentiment of the other, form a real difference: and so
throughout.
On what was then a burning subject—one which cannot be said to have
been quite put out, though its ashes only smoulder—the suitableness of
religious and especially Christian subjects for epic and drama, &c., Saint-
Evremond’s opinion is a little tainted by his undoubted “philosophy,” to use
the word which had already become fashionable for the various shades of
On Christian unbelief. But either from this cause, or from a general
subjects, &c.
critical spirit, he escapes the inconsistency (in which
Boileau for instance is entangled) of contending that the deorum ministeria
are capital things in ancient, and very bad things in modern, poetry. His
remarks on the theory of Purgation are a little irreverent but by no means
irrational; and he makes strong play for the contention (of which, if he did
not invent it, he was one of the strongest and most original champions) that
“Admiration is a tragic passion” worthy of being seated beside Pity and
Terror, and necessary to be kept in sight even when we deal with Love.
In respect of the Ancient and Modern dispute—of all three stages of
which, v. infra, his long life made him a contemporary, while he actually
took a sort of skirmishing part in the two earlier—his position is distinctly
On Ancients and that of a true critic. From what has been said already it will
Moderns.
be clear that he could not be an out-and-out Ancient; but he
is as little a Modern of the Perrault type. One sees that the Moderns gave
him most pleasure, and in the Ancients whom he really likes, such as
Petronius (supposing no merely unworthy motives to have entered into the
preference), it is easy to discern the modern element. But in neither case
does he “like grossly” and in the lump; he has his reasons and his affinities,
and can state both easily. He is even not very far from that “horizontal”
view of literature, without deceptive foreshortenings and distances, which
is, up to his time, so rare. Nothing is more striking than his remarks on
English literature—at least the English drama. Perhaps he did not himself
know much English; and something of the kind seems to be insinuated in
Dryden’s remarks[336] on the matter, though Dryden was naturally hurt at the
selection of Shadwell for commendation. But if so he apprehended what
Waller and others said to him about Ben Jonson’s comedy with almost
were at any rate genuine and adequate. The variety and vigour of the one as
opposed to the somewhat monotonous mould and soft (or, as some said,
“creeping”) sentiment of the other, form a real difference: and so
throughout.
On what was then a burning subject—one which cannot be said to have
been quite put out, though its ashes only smoulder—the suitableness of
religious and especially Christian subjects for epic and drama, &c., Saint-
Evremond’s opinion is a little tainted by his undoubted “philosophy,” to use
the word which had already become fashionable for the various shades of
On Christian unbelief. But either from this cause, or from a general
subjects, &c.
critical spirit, he escapes the inconsistency (in which
Boileau for instance is entangled) of contending that the deorum ministeria
are capital things in ancient, and very bad things in modern, poetry. His
remarks on the theory of Purgation are a little irreverent but by no means
irrational; and he makes strong play for the contention (of which, if he did
not invent it, he was one of the strongest and most original champions) that
“Admiration is a tragic passion” worthy of being seated beside Pity and
Terror, and necessary to be kept in sight even when we deal with Love.
In respect of the Ancient and Modern dispute—of all three stages of
which, v. infra, his long life made him a contemporary, while he actually
took a sort of skirmishing part in the two earlier—his position is distinctly
On Ancients and that of a true critic. From what has been said already it will
Moderns.
be clear that he could not be an out-and-out Ancient; but he
is as little a Modern of the Perrault type. One sees that the Moderns gave
him most pleasure, and in the Ancients whom he really likes, such as
Petronius (supposing no merely unworthy motives to have entered into the
preference), it is easy to discern the modern element. But in neither case
does he “like grossly” and in the lump; he has his reasons and his affinities,
and can state both easily. He is even not very far from that “horizontal”
view of literature, without deceptive foreshortenings and distances, which
is, up to his time, so rare. Nothing is more striking than his remarks on
English literature—at least the English drama. Perhaps he did not himself
know much English; and something of the kind seems to be insinuated in
Dryden’s remarks[336] on the matter, though Dryden was naturally hurt at the
selection of Shadwell for commendation. But if so he apprehended what
Waller and others said to him about Ben Jonson’s comedy with almost
Page 276
miraculous divination, and reflects in his account of our tragedy rather less
than the current mistakes on the subject among Englishmen of the
Restoration period themselves. And here also, as in his remarks on Spanish
and Italian, is noticeable this same horizontal and comparative spirit.
On his treatment of Opera I may be permitted to repeat what I wrote
more than twenty years ago, that it really contains the substance of
everything that has been said since on the literary side of the matter. As for
the “Vaste” dissertation the best thing to say is Tolle, lege. I do not think it
possible to have a better example of that rarest of things, literary philology,
in the true and not the distorted sense of the substantive. The Academy
opined—in fact had opined already (whence much of the salt of the piece)
—against Saint-Evremond. But his Dissertation is, like all his criticism
more or less, a really extraordinary example of the combination of all that
was best in the French academic spirit with freedom from most of its faults.
This union of freedom and delicacy, of precision and independent play, is
Saint-Evremond’s glory as a critic, and it distinguishes him, not merely
from Boileau, but from most others between 1660 and 1800. Addison had
(and no doubt directly borrowed) something of the same touch; Fénelon, in
a different spirit, had a great deal: we shall find something of it in Gravina.
But it is very rare in the period, and it is precisely the absence of it as a
“compensation balance” which vitiates neo-classic criticism as a whole.
It is common, if not universal, to glance at the redoubtable and satiric
doctor, Gui Patin, as at least an outlier among French seventeenth-century
critics; but the reader who, as Matthew Arnold says, “wants criticism” will
Gui Patin—his not find much of it in his very amusing Letters.[337] An
judgment of
Browne.
English reader may be specially disappointed because he is
most likely to know the surprising, the repeated, the, to all
appearance, fully genuine, and the very felicitous remarks[338] of Patin on
the Religio Medici. A Frenchman who can appreciate Browne, who can see
in the Religio a book not merely tout gentil et curieux but fort délicat et tout
mystique, who can perceive its étranges et ravissantes pensées, who can
pronounce il n’y a guère encore de livre de la sorte (alas! we may drop the
guère and continue the encore), who can describe the author as a
mélancolique agréable en ses pensées, who can say of his stupid
commentators ce livre n’a pas besoin de tels écoliers, and even desire
ardently to be acquainted with Sir Kenelm Digby’s reply—may seem to
have handed in his credentials as a critic once and for all. But one soon
than the current mistakes on the subject among Englishmen of the
Restoration period themselves. And here also, as in his remarks on Spanish
and Italian, is noticeable this same horizontal and comparative spirit.
On his treatment of Opera I may be permitted to repeat what I wrote
more than twenty years ago, that it really contains the substance of
everything that has been said since on the literary side of the matter. As for
the “Vaste” dissertation the best thing to say is Tolle, lege. I do not think it
possible to have a better example of that rarest of things, literary philology,
in the true and not the distorted sense of the substantive. The Academy
opined—in fact had opined already (whence much of the salt of the piece)
—against Saint-Evremond. But his Dissertation is, like all his criticism
more or less, a really extraordinary example of the combination of all that
was best in the French academic spirit with freedom from most of its faults.
This union of freedom and delicacy, of precision and independent play, is
Saint-Evremond’s glory as a critic, and it distinguishes him, not merely
from Boileau, but from most others between 1660 and 1800. Addison had
(and no doubt directly borrowed) something of the same touch; Fénelon, in
a different spirit, had a great deal: we shall find something of it in Gravina.
But it is very rare in the period, and it is precisely the absence of it as a
“compensation balance” which vitiates neo-classic criticism as a whole.
It is common, if not universal, to glance at the redoubtable and satiric
doctor, Gui Patin, as at least an outlier among French seventeenth-century
critics; but the reader who, as Matthew Arnold says, “wants criticism” will
Gui Patin—his not find much of it in his very amusing Letters.[337] An
judgment of
Browne.
English reader may be specially disappointed because he is
most likely to know the surprising, the repeated, the, to all
appearance, fully genuine, and the very felicitous remarks[338] of Patin on
the Religio Medici. A Frenchman who can appreciate Browne, who can see
in the Religio a book not merely tout gentil et curieux but fort délicat et tout
mystique, who can perceive its étranges et ravissantes pensées, who can
pronounce il n’y a guère encore de livre de la sorte (alas! we may drop the
guère and continue the encore), who can describe the author as a
mélancolique agréable en ses pensées, who can say of his stupid
commentators ce livre n’a pas besoin de tels écoliers, and even desire
ardently to be acquainted with Sir Kenelm Digby’s reply—may seem to
have handed in his credentials as a critic once and for all. But one soon
Page 277
finds that Patin’s interest in Browne was, first of all, esprit de corps (which
was perhaps stronger in the Faculty of that time than in any profession of
any other), and secondly, a certain coincidence of true but unconventional
piety, different as were its forms in the two. Elsewhere Patin is a collector,
an eager student of new books, a scholar even, with a conviction that
Scaliger and Casaubon were “the two first men of their time,” and that
Salmasius was a “grand héros des belles lettres”; but not a critic, and with a
distinctly limited idea of belles lettres themselves. He speaks
contemptuously of Descartes, he barely mentions Corneille. He was, in fact,
generally too angry with antimony, opium, quinine, the English, and
Mazarin, or else too much rapt in ecstasy at the divine powers of bleeding
and purging,[339] to have time to think of poetry, or even of prose.
Nor can we afford much space to the main body of the Academicians, of
the frequenters of “the” Hotel (par excellence), of the abbés, and marquis,
and even marquises who crowd the middle of the seventeenth-century
Tallemant, history of France, not disagreeably for posterity. They must
Pellisson,
Ménage,
be sought in Tallemant (himself, as citations will have
Madame de shown, interested in the matter, and not inept at it) as a
Sévigné. main and single preserver, in a hundred other places,
original and second-hand, from the contemporary records to the essays of
Sainte-Beuve and his followers. We could fill this volume with them
without the slightest difficulty; but, as in all true history, they must “speak
by their foremen,” and even these foremen cannot have much place. The
modest and amiable Pellisson, the historian of the Academy, whose
personal ugliness Boileau had the insolent vulgarity to satirise,[340] but who
had a “soul of gold,” was by no means a bad though a too amiable critic,
and had the sense and courage not to deny Ronsard when the fashion turned
against him, just as he clove to Fouquet when it was positively, and even
extremely, dangerous to do so. Ménage, to whom his own unguardedness
and the satire of Molière[341] have given something of a ridiculous position
in literary history, had the wit to see the merit of Molière himself quite
early, possessed very wide reading, and could make judicious reflections on
it, had studied the Italian critics,[342] and could now and then (as in the brief
obituary notice of Scarron[343]) hit off his stroke extremely well. As for
Marie de Sévigné, adorable to all, and especially adored by these two, she is
generally right, and always illustrates the saying of La Bruyère, which is
quoted below, whether she is right or not. But her critical position is so
was perhaps stronger in the Faculty of that time than in any profession of
any other), and secondly, a certain coincidence of true but unconventional
piety, different as were its forms in the two. Elsewhere Patin is a collector,
an eager student of new books, a scholar even, with a conviction that
Scaliger and Casaubon were “the two first men of their time,” and that
Salmasius was a “grand héros des belles lettres”; but not a critic, and with a
distinctly limited idea of belles lettres themselves. He speaks
contemptuously of Descartes, he barely mentions Corneille. He was, in fact,
generally too angry with antimony, opium, quinine, the English, and
Mazarin, or else too much rapt in ecstasy at the divine powers of bleeding
and purging,[339] to have time to think of poetry, or even of prose.
Nor can we afford much space to the main body of the Academicians, of
the frequenters of “the” Hotel (par excellence), of the abbés, and marquis,
and even marquises who crowd the middle of the seventeenth-century
Tallemant, history of France, not disagreeably for posterity. They must
Pellisson,
Ménage,
be sought in Tallemant (himself, as citations will have
Madame de shown, interested in the matter, and not inept at it) as a
Sévigné. main and single preserver, in a hundred other places,
original and second-hand, from the contemporary records to the essays of
Sainte-Beuve and his followers. We could fill this volume with them
without the slightest difficulty; but, as in all true history, they must “speak
by their foremen,” and even these foremen cannot have much place. The
modest and amiable Pellisson, the historian of the Academy, whose
personal ugliness Boileau had the insolent vulgarity to satirise,[340] but who
had a “soul of gold,” was by no means a bad though a too amiable critic,
and had the sense and courage not to deny Ronsard when the fashion turned
against him, just as he clove to Fouquet when it was positively, and even
extremely, dangerous to do so. Ménage, to whom his own unguardedness
and the satire of Molière[341] have given something of a ridiculous position
in literary history, had the wit to see the merit of Molière himself quite
early, possessed very wide reading, and could make judicious reflections on
it, had studied the Italian critics,[342] and could now and then (as in the brief
obituary notice of Scarron[343]) hit off his stroke extremely well. As for
Marie de Sévigné, adorable to all, and especially adored by these two, she is
generally right, and always illustrates the saying of La Bruyère, which is
quoted below, whether she is right or not. But her critical position is so
Page 278
close to that of Saint-Evremond that what we have said of him is almost
equally applicable to her, though she invests the critical attitude with her
own peculiar charm.
With one remarkable exception as almost a whole, and a certain number
of scattered passages in some of them,[344] the most noteworthy thing in the
other Ana, which has relation to Criticism, is the almost invariable
The Ana other connotation of the word in them. Vigneul-Marville,[345]
than Ménage’s,
especially
noticing a book, says that there are in it deux remarques de
critique, one that Myconos is not so far from Delos as
Ferrari says, being only two leagues instead of seven, and the other, that
somebody else is wrong in saying that it belongs to the Venetians since it is
in the power of the Turks. Of course in a sense these are “critical”
observations; but one is a little reminded of Hegel and philosophical
instruments. More unmistakable is the clear definition given by the author
of the book above excepted. Huet (p. 232 ed. cit.) says explicitly that
Critique is “that part of grammar which busies itself with re-establishing the
text of ancient authors in its first integrity, and purging out changes due to
ignorance,” &c. This, he goes on to say, is the art which Aristotle is said to
have invented; and yet, further, he frankly declares that he himself has
always looked on it as “a mean business.”[346] Yet, not merely in the well-
known De l’Origine des Romans, which is not unfrequently found in
connection with the Huetiana, but in these themselves, he shows that he had
no mean conception of the higher and nobler branches of the Art. His
remarks on the Quarrel[347] are among the most sensible that we have, as was
to be expected from a man who was at once an excellent scholar in ancient,
and a warm admirer of modern, literature. If he is less wise on rhyme,[348] let
us remember that this is parcius objiciendum to a contemporary, although a
younger contemporary, of Milton; and if he is responsible for the
astonishing statement[349] that Greek poetry “a toujours décliné depuis
Homère,” let us simply decline the attempt to construct any critical
theodolite which will show us this line of constant declension through
Sappho and Pindar, Æschylus and Aristophanes, Theocritus and the best of
the Huetiana. the Anthologists. On the other hand, the assertion advanced
in the Origine des Romans, and defended in the Ana, to the effect that a
good judge of poetry is even rarer than a good poet, is too double-edged, in
its apparent flattery of our own office, for us to make any difficulty in
applauding it, while the defence itself is singularly good. The everlasting
equally applicable to her, though she invests the critical attitude with her
own peculiar charm.
With one remarkable exception as almost a whole, and a certain number
of scattered passages in some of them,[344] the most noteworthy thing in the
other Ana, which has relation to Criticism, is the almost invariable
The Ana other connotation of the word in them. Vigneul-Marville,[345]
than Ménage’s,
especially
noticing a book, says that there are in it deux remarques de
critique, one that Myconos is not so far from Delos as
Ferrari says, being only two leagues instead of seven, and the other, that
somebody else is wrong in saying that it belongs to the Venetians since it is
in the power of the Turks. Of course in a sense these are “critical”
observations; but one is a little reminded of Hegel and philosophical
instruments. More unmistakable is the clear definition given by the author
of the book above excepted. Huet (p. 232 ed. cit.) says explicitly that
Critique is “that part of grammar which busies itself with re-establishing the
text of ancient authors in its first integrity, and purging out changes due to
ignorance,” &c. This, he goes on to say, is the art which Aristotle is said to
have invented; and yet, further, he frankly declares that he himself has
always looked on it as “a mean business.”[346] Yet, not merely in the well-
known De l’Origine des Romans, which is not unfrequently found in
connection with the Huetiana, but in these themselves, he shows that he had
no mean conception of the higher and nobler branches of the Art. His
remarks on the Quarrel[347] are among the most sensible that we have, as was
to be expected from a man who was at once an excellent scholar in ancient,
and a warm admirer of modern, literature. If he is less wise on rhyme,[348] let
us remember that this is parcius objiciendum to a contemporary, although a
younger contemporary, of Milton; and if he is responsible for the
astonishing statement[349] that Greek poetry “a toujours décliné depuis
Homère,” let us simply decline the attempt to construct any critical
theodolite which will show us this line of constant declension through
Sappho and Pindar, Æschylus and Aristophanes, Theocritus and the best of
the Huetiana. the Anthologists. On the other hand, the assertion advanced
in the Origine des Romans, and defended in the Ana, to the effect that a
good judge of poetry is even rarer than a good poet, is too double-edged, in
its apparent flattery of our own office, for us to make any difficulty in
applauding it, while the defence itself is singularly good. The everlasting
Page 279
comparison of Virgil to Theocritus and Homer has seldom been better
handled than by Huet. Indeed the whole book is worth reading for the
critical passages it contains. The Traité des Romans is a little discursively
and promiscuously erudite, and Huet is thinking too much of the bastard
romance of his own time, too little of the true-bred romances of old: but he
knows something even of these, and he is well acquainted with the attempts
of Cinthio and Pigna in the previous century to make good at least the
Italian form of the kind.
Valesiana, In the Valesiana—amid much that is merely antiquarian
or linguistic, and a fair though not excessive portion of the mere gossip and
gabble which first made these things read and afterwards brought them into
disrepute—there will be found a curious passage on the Latin hymns and
their prosody, showing how dead the ear falls at certain times to the music
of others, and the more curious selection of Palingenius and his Zodiacus
Vitæ as a poem and a poet worth the pains of reading. Nor will the
reputation for robustness of seventeenth-century erudition suffer from the
patronising commendation of Baillet’s Jugements des Savants as a book
which would be useful light reading for the giddy youth of the day who
Scaligerana, declined serious study. Yet Scaliger himself (J. J., not J. C.),
according to the collection[350] standing in his name (a quaint mosaic or
macaronic of French and Latin), thought that nobody save Casaubon (and
“another that shall be nameless,” no doubt) was really learned as men had
been a hundred years earlier. He is himself nearly as untrustworthy on really
critical points as his father, and had, I think, less true critical spirit. But he
makes some amends for Julius Cæsar’s truculent assault on the
Ciceronianus by confessing that Longolius (the main object of the Erasmian
satire) could not really be said to write in Ciceronian style when he simply
fitted Ciceronian phrases together.
Another member of the group to be noted very especially is the so-called
Parrhasiana,[351] in the title of which “Théodore Parrhase” stands for a nom
and de guerre of the industrious pressman Jean Le Clerc. It has
Parrhasiana.
very little in common with its class, being in part a
reasoned treatise on general points of criticism, in part a defence of the
author’s own works against the injurious remarks of Meibomius and others.
The latter we can neglect; the former contains a really interesting exposition
of general critical views by one of the most experienced of the new class of
professional critics and reviewers at the junction of the seventeenth and
handled than by Huet. Indeed the whole book is worth reading for the
critical passages it contains. The Traité des Romans is a little discursively
and promiscuously erudite, and Huet is thinking too much of the bastard
romance of his own time, too little of the true-bred romances of old: but he
knows something even of these, and he is well acquainted with the attempts
of Cinthio and Pigna in the previous century to make good at least the
Italian form of the kind.
Valesiana, In the Valesiana—amid much that is merely antiquarian
or linguistic, and a fair though not excessive portion of the mere gossip and
gabble which first made these things read and afterwards brought them into
disrepute—there will be found a curious passage on the Latin hymns and
their prosody, showing how dead the ear falls at certain times to the music
of others, and the more curious selection of Palingenius and his Zodiacus
Vitæ as a poem and a poet worth the pains of reading. Nor will the
reputation for robustness of seventeenth-century erudition suffer from the
patronising commendation of Baillet’s Jugements des Savants as a book
which would be useful light reading for the giddy youth of the day who
Scaligerana, declined serious study. Yet Scaliger himself (J. J., not J. C.),
according to the collection[350] standing in his name (a quaint mosaic or
macaronic of French and Latin), thought that nobody save Casaubon (and
“another that shall be nameless,” no doubt) was really learned as men had
been a hundred years earlier. He is himself nearly as untrustworthy on really
critical points as his father, and had, I think, less true critical spirit. But he
makes some amends for Julius Cæsar’s truculent assault on the
Ciceronianus by confessing that Longolius (the main object of the Erasmian
satire) could not really be said to write in Ciceronian style when he simply
fitted Ciceronian phrases together.
Another member of the group to be noted very especially is the so-called
Parrhasiana,[351] in the title of which “Théodore Parrhase” stands for a nom
and de guerre of the industrious pressman Jean Le Clerc. It has
Parrhasiana.
very little in common with its class, being in part a
reasoned treatise on general points of criticism, in part a defence of the
author’s own works against the injurious remarks of Meibomius and others.
The latter we can neglect; the former contains a really interesting exposition
of general critical views by one of the most experienced of the new class of
professional critics and reviewers at the junction of the seventeenth and
Page 280
eighteenth centuries. The distinction of the Parrhasiana is that it has so
little distinction—that it is so thoroughly normal. Le Clerc is a thorough
believer in the Ancients; but he wears his rue with this difference, that he
does not believe in moderns who write Greek and Latin Verses, and that he
is quite handsome and encouraging to those who do write in their mother
tongue. They may be quite, or almost, as useful, he thinks—but as for
reading for mere amusement, that is not a serious occupation. And Le Clerc
is uncompromising in the prosaism of his views on poetry. In fact, I am not
sure that there is anywhere else so naïf a confession of belief in the Lower
Reason only. He finds improbabilities and absurdities, not merely in Homer,
but in Virgil himself; he holds æternum servans sub pectore vulnus, which
some not very fervid Maronites would admit as a great and poetic phrase, to
be a mere surplusage; and he actually condoles with poets on the unlucky
necessity under which they lie of inversions, metaphors, and so forth, metri
gratia. I do not know whether Mr Arnold knew the Parrhasiana, and indeed
should doubt it; but he certainly might have found chapter and verse for his
strictures on the age of “prose and sense” almost anywhere in it.
Yet other groups or individuals in this abounding period might receive
notice if this history were to be in twelve volumes instead of in three. There
Patru, is Patru, not merely in his time the glory of the French bar,
Desmarets, and
others.
but extolled, by Boileau and by his enemies alike, as a sort
of Quintilian and Quintilius in one[352]—as a standard at
once of style and of judgment. Yet his long life and his constant occupation
with literature, in talk and in reading, seem to have left us hardly anything
in the shape of written criticism. There is Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin, a less
belauded but more interesting and perhaps more genuine man of letters. Not
merely did Desmarets compose the epics ridiculed by Boileau, not merely
was he the author of the excellent Visionnaires (the best comedy in French
before Molière except Corneille’s Le Menteur), not merely was he a
“visionary” himself in his latter days, and a versifier, if not a poet, always,
but he was a not inconsiderable critic. Those who choose to read his
Défense du Poème Héroique[353] will find in it by no means the imbecility
that they may expect, either in the dialogues defending the Christian poem,
or in the somewhat meticulous, but sharp and not ill-deserved, “cutting-up”
of Boileau which follows. But these, and much more the Conrarts and the
Costars, the Maucroix, and the rest[354] must here be as silencieux as the first
in his stock epithet. And one may confess even to doubts whether, with the
little distinction—that it is so thoroughly normal. Le Clerc is a thorough
believer in the Ancients; but he wears his rue with this difference, that he
does not believe in moderns who write Greek and Latin Verses, and that he
is quite handsome and encouraging to those who do write in their mother
tongue. They may be quite, or almost, as useful, he thinks—but as for
reading for mere amusement, that is not a serious occupation. And Le Clerc
is uncompromising in the prosaism of his views on poetry. In fact, I am not
sure that there is anywhere else so naïf a confession of belief in the Lower
Reason only. He finds improbabilities and absurdities, not merely in Homer,
but in Virgil himself; he holds æternum servans sub pectore vulnus, which
some not very fervid Maronites would admit as a great and poetic phrase, to
be a mere surplusage; and he actually condoles with poets on the unlucky
necessity under which they lie of inversions, metaphors, and so forth, metri
gratia. I do not know whether Mr Arnold knew the Parrhasiana, and indeed
should doubt it; but he certainly might have found chapter and verse for his
strictures on the age of “prose and sense” almost anywhere in it.
Yet other groups or individuals in this abounding period might receive
notice if this history were to be in twelve volumes instead of in three. There
Patru, is Patru, not merely in his time the glory of the French bar,
Desmarets, and
others.
but extolled, by Boileau and by his enemies alike, as a sort
of Quintilian and Quintilius in one[352]—as a standard at
once of style and of judgment. Yet his long life and his constant occupation
with literature, in talk and in reading, seem to have left us hardly anything
in the shape of written criticism. There is Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin, a less
belauded but more interesting and perhaps more genuine man of letters. Not
merely did Desmarets compose the epics ridiculed by Boileau, not merely
was he the author of the excellent Visionnaires (the best comedy in French
before Molière except Corneille’s Le Menteur), not merely was he a
“visionary” himself in his latter days, and a versifier, if not a poet, always,
but he was a not inconsiderable critic. Those who choose to read his
Défense du Poème Héroique[353] will find in it by no means the imbecility
that they may expect, either in the dialogues defending the Christian poem,
or in the somewhat meticulous, but sharp and not ill-deserved, “cutting-up”
of Boileau which follows. But these, and much more the Conrarts and the
Costars, the Maucroix, and the rest[354] must here be as silencieux as the first
in his stock epithet. And one may confess even to doubts whether, with the
Page 281
amplest room and verge, they ought to have much space in a general
History of Criticism as distinguished from one of special countries and
periods. Hardly any of them is more than one of a numerus; hardly any has
himself actual distinction, as persons of much inferior talents may have at
other times. The Historian of Climate must have much to say about the
delightful variety of that phenomenon which the British Isles display, about
its causes, its phases, and the like, in general; but he would be lost, and
would lose his readers in more than one sense, if he were to attempt to
describe every shower or even every wet season.[355]
The attempts, not merely to make out a regular Æsthetic for Descartes,
but to key this on to the great critical movement of the century, will be best
dealt with later; but the greatest of the Cartesians must have a word.
Malebranche need not occupy us long; indeed, this great philosopher and
admirable master of French has to be dealt with by us, at least in some part,
Malebranche. because he has been dealt with by others. The invitation to
do so, if we may say it without illiberality, seems to have consisted rather in
the titles than in the contents of his work. The Second Book of the
Recherche de la Vérité is, indeed, “De l’Imagination”; the Second Part of
this Second Book has much to do with les personnes d'étude; and the Third,
Fourth, and Fifth chapters of the Third Part deal with “the imagination of
certain authors,” especially Tertullian, Seneca, and Montaigne. But we have
seen, and shall see, how treacherous the word Imagination is, and how
people will misunderstand it, however frankly they are dealt with.
Malebranche, as he always is, is quite frank and quite clear; he tells us
definitely that imagination for him is “a little more and a little less than
sense,” that it only consists in the power possessed by the soul of forming
images of objects for itself. His quarrel with the “persons of study” is that
they will read, write, and argue about the ancients, instead of recurring to
primary truths; and when he deals with his three selected authors, it is not to
criticise them from the literary point of view (though he finds fault with
“irregular movements” in Tertullian’s figures), but to object to the
paralogism of the De Pallio, the ill-regulated imagination and feeble
reasoning of Seneca, the treacherous “cavalier” manner, the “criminal
attraction born of concupiscence,” the disguised pedantry, the vanity, in
Montaigne. Phrases here and there, in his own perfect style[356] (I doubt
whether any prose writer of the grand siècle can give points to
Malebranche), show what a critic was lost in him; but the critic—as indeed
History of Criticism as distinguished from one of special countries and
periods. Hardly any of them is more than one of a numerus; hardly any has
himself actual distinction, as persons of much inferior talents may have at
other times. The Historian of Climate must have much to say about the
delightful variety of that phenomenon which the British Isles display, about
its causes, its phases, and the like, in general; but he would be lost, and
would lose his readers in more than one sense, if he were to attempt to
describe every shower or even every wet season.[355]
The attempts, not merely to make out a regular Æsthetic for Descartes,
but to key this on to the great critical movement of the century, will be best
dealt with later; but the greatest of the Cartesians must have a word.
Malebranche need not occupy us long; indeed, this great philosopher and
admirable master of French has to be dealt with by us, at least in some part,
Malebranche. because he has been dealt with by others. The invitation to
do so, if we may say it without illiberality, seems to have consisted rather in
the titles than in the contents of his work. The Second Book of the
Recherche de la Vérité is, indeed, “De l’Imagination”; the Second Part of
this Second Book has much to do with les personnes d'étude; and the Third,
Fourth, and Fifth chapters of the Third Part deal with “the imagination of
certain authors,” especially Tertullian, Seneca, and Montaigne. But we have
seen, and shall see, how treacherous the word Imagination is, and how
people will misunderstand it, however frankly they are dealt with.
Malebranche, as he always is, is quite frank and quite clear; he tells us
definitely that imagination for him is “a little more and a little less than
sense,” that it only consists in the power possessed by the soul of forming
images of objects for itself. His quarrel with the “persons of study” is that
they will read, write, and argue about the ancients, instead of recurring to
primary truths; and when he deals with his three selected authors, it is not to
criticise them from the literary point of view (though he finds fault with
“irregular movements” in Tertullian’s figures), but to object to the
paralogism of the De Pallio, the ill-regulated imagination and feeble
reasoning of Seneca, the treacherous “cavalier” manner, the “criminal
attraction born of concupiscence,” the disguised pedantry, the vanity, in
Montaigne. Phrases here and there, in his own perfect style[356] (I doubt
whether any prose writer of the grand siècle can give points to
Malebranche), show what a critic was lost in him; but the critic—as indeed
Page 282
we should expect, and as is quite proper—is lost in the philosopher, the
theologian, and the moralist.[357]
And so to Boileau.
It is desirable that we should examine Boileau’s critical work[358] with
The history of more than ordinary care. The history of his reputation has,
Boileau’s
reputation.
until recently, been on the whole not very different from
that of many other eminent men of letters—that is to say, it
has oscillated between extravagant reverence (during the entire eighteenth
century, with rare exceptions, both in France and elsewhere) and a violent
reaction (when the Romantic movement set in). Pope and Voltaire may
stand as spokesmen of the former period; Keats and the men of 1830 of the
latter. But of late years, and in England as well as in France, the cant of
criticism (which is as protean, and as immortal, as most such Duessas) has
devised another thing. Even in the extreme Romantic time, true critics,
especially Sainte-Beuve, had recognised how germane, in wrong as in right,
the taste and temper of Boileau were to the taste and temper of literary
France generally, and to some extent of the Latin peoples old and new. But
latterly, under the powerful influence of M. Ferdinand Brunetière—whom,
though I often disagree with him, I always name for the sake of most
unaffected honour, and as a critic of whom any country and time might
have been proud—this tendency has gone much further, and we are even
asked to accept Monsieur Nicolas as an adequate representative of the
French literary genius. Let us remember what “adequate” means; it means
to a great, at least, if not to the very fullest, extent commensurate,
coextensive, and complete. And in England also there has been not wanting
an affectation of deference to this estimate—of arguing that we ought to let
the French know best in such points—that it is wicked, rude, uncritical, to
intrude English judgment into such matters.
So be it, for the moment, and for the sake of argument. Let us then, as we
do always, as from this point of view it is more specially necessary that we
should do, inquire what the actual criticism of this “adequate”
The Art representative of the French genius is. And in doing this let
Poétique.
us begin with the Art Poétique, that elaborately arranged
code of neo-classic correctness, the composition of which occupied half the
central decade[359] of its author’s life when he was in the full vigour of ripe
age, which summed up all the doctrine of his earlier satires, and is
practically repeated by most of his later.
theologian, and the moralist.[357]
And so to Boileau.
It is desirable that we should examine Boileau’s critical work[358] with
The history of more than ordinary care. The history of his reputation has,
Boileau’s
reputation.
until recently, been on the whole not very different from
that of many other eminent men of letters—that is to say, it
has oscillated between extravagant reverence (during the entire eighteenth
century, with rare exceptions, both in France and elsewhere) and a violent
reaction (when the Romantic movement set in). Pope and Voltaire may
stand as spokesmen of the former period; Keats and the men of 1830 of the
latter. But of late years, and in England as well as in France, the cant of
criticism (which is as protean, and as immortal, as most such Duessas) has
devised another thing. Even in the extreme Romantic time, true critics,
especially Sainte-Beuve, had recognised how germane, in wrong as in right,
the taste and temper of Boileau were to the taste and temper of literary
France generally, and to some extent of the Latin peoples old and new. But
latterly, under the powerful influence of M. Ferdinand Brunetière—whom,
though I often disagree with him, I always name for the sake of most
unaffected honour, and as a critic of whom any country and time might
have been proud—this tendency has gone much further, and we are even
asked to accept Monsieur Nicolas as an adequate representative of the
French literary genius. Let us remember what “adequate” means; it means
to a great, at least, if not to the very fullest, extent commensurate,
coextensive, and complete. And in England also there has been not wanting
an affectation of deference to this estimate—of arguing that we ought to let
the French know best in such points—that it is wicked, rude, uncritical, to
intrude English judgment into such matters.
So be it, for the moment, and for the sake of argument. Let us then, as we
do always, as from this point of view it is more specially necessary that we
should do, inquire what the actual criticism of this “adequate”
The Art representative of the French genius is. And in doing this let
Poétique.
us begin with the Art Poétique, that elaborately arranged
code of neo-classic correctness, the composition of which occupied half the
central decade[359] of its author’s life when he was in the full vigour of ripe
age, which summed up all the doctrine of his earlier satires, and is
practically repeated by most of his later.
Page 283
In making the examination we shall (not without considerable generosity)
abstain from bearing too hardly upon the flagrant ignorance of literary
history, even in his own country, which Boileau here displays. His modern
Its false literary defenders (not, it must be confessed, till those who do not
history.
defend him had made uncompromising championship on
this point impossible) practically confess and avoid it, pass it with a half-
petulant “Agreed!” They cannot well do otherwise: for in the famous lines
(I. 113-130) from
“Durant les premiers ans du Parnasse Français,”
to
“Rendit plus retenus Desportes et Bertaut,”
an amount of crass ignorance, or of impudent falsification, is amassed
which is really curious, and almost creditable, at least to the audacity of the
author’s party-spirit, or the serenity of his indifference. Even in the oldest
French poetry that we possess, much more in the Roman de la Rose (which
he adduces in a note, having obviously never read it), the “words” were not
“arranged without measure”; there were “strict numbers”; and there was
even a pretty strict cæsura. Villon did not do anything to “the art of the old
romancers,” but wrote in precisely the same measures as men had written in
for a hundred and fifty years before him. Marot simply adopted ballades,
wrote no triolets, did nothing new to rondeaux, while we are only unable to
convict Boileau of error as to mascarades, because nobody has yet
discovered what, exactly, a mascarade is. The description of Ronsard’s
action is rubbish: while it is quite certain that both Desportes and Bertaut
went to their graves without the slightest doubt that he was Prince of French
poets, and were not in the least “restrained” in following him. And the
history of the French Drama in Canto Three only deserves less reprehension
because it was really not very easy at the time for a man to know much
about it.
But let this suffice. And let us also exercise our perhaps undeserved
generosity on another point, that wholesale and unblushing imitation of
Horace which made the Abbé Cotin, one of Boileau’s victims, retort with as
much truth as wit, in the very form of one of Despréaux' own insolences—
abstain from bearing too hardly upon the flagrant ignorance of literary
history, even in his own country, which Boileau here displays. His modern
Its false literary defenders (not, it must be confessed, till those who do not
history.
defend him had made uncompromising championship on
this point impossible) practically confess and avoid it, pass it with a half-
petulant “Agreed!” They cannot well do otherwise: for in the famous lines
(I. 113-130) from
“Durant les premiers ans du Parnasse Français,”
to
“Rendit plus retenus Desportes et Bertaut,”
an amount of crass ignorance, or of impudent falsification, is amassed
which is really curious, and almost creditable, at least to the audacity of the
author’s party-spirit, or the serenity of his indifference. Even in the oldest
French poetry that we possess, much more in the Roman de la Rose (which
he adduces in a note, having obviously never read it), the “words” were not
“arranged without measure”; there were “strict numbers”; and there was
even a pretty strict cæsura. Villon did not do anything to “the art of the old
romancers,” but wrote in precisely the same measures as men had written in
for a hundred and fifty years before him. Marot simply adopted ballades,
wrote no triolets, did nothing new to rondeaux, while we are only unable to
convict Boileau of error as to mascarades, because nobody has yet
discovered what, exactly, a mascarade is. The description of Ronsard’s
action is rubbish: while it is quite certain that both Desportes and Bertaut
went to their graves without the slightest doubt that he was Prince of French
poets, and were not in the least “restrained” in following him. And the
history of the French Drama in Canto Three only deserves less reprehension
because it was really not very easy at the time for a man to know much
about it.
But let this suffice. And let us also exercise our perhaps undeserved
generosity on another point, that wholesale and unblushing imitation of
Horace which made the Abbé Cotin, one of Boileau’s victims, retort with as
much truth as wit, in the very form of one of Despréaux' own insolences—
Page 284
“J’appelle Horace Horace—et Boileau traducteur.”[360]
After all, though a paradox, it is not an impossibility, that a man should
be a great critic and yet most untrustworthy on literary history, and apt to
make his own work, in great part, a mere mosaic of the work of others.
Let us then take the Art Poétique simply as criticism—not as a series of
statements of fact, not as an original or a borrowed argument—and see how
Abstract of it. it looks this way. The first Canto begins (in the teasing
[361]
inverted style which was one of Boileau’s worst legacies to French
poetry, and which itself was a “corrupt following” of Latin) with a
declaration of the necessity of genius, which has been counted to him for
much righteousness. Everybody has not the genius for everything, and it
does not follow that because you have a genius for convivial songs you
have one for Epic. But good sense and reason are as necessary as genius.
Indeed we are soon told that writing depends on these alone for its value: so
that genius is like those tickets of admission which are quite useless till they
are countersigned by somebody other than the issuer. Never try high flights
or conceits. Do not describe your subjects or objects too minutely. Cultivate
variety, but never be “low,” burlesque, or bombastic. Whatever you do,
mind cæsura and avoid hiatus. Then follows the pseudo-history referred to
above, capped by its phrase of Malherbe, in whose steps you are to walk.
Clearness of expression is of the greatest value; but as a fact it depends on
clearness of thought. Smart things will not ransom faults. If you fear
criticism, anticipate it by yourself and your friends; but beware of flatteries,
and, above all, do not take the part of your own faults simply because your
friends have noticed them. The First Canto ends with the really excellent
line, in Boileau’s true vein (for, whatsoe’er the failings on his part as a
critic, he was a satirist born and bred)—
“Un sot trouve toujours un plus sot qui l’admire.”
The Second Canto begins, apropos of nothing (indeed Boileau was
frankly troubled about his “transitions”), with a discussion, partly
metaphorical, of the Idyll, Eclogue, and Pastoral, followed by a similar
account of other kinds of shorter pieces—Elegy, Ode, Sonnet, Epigram, and
others, down to Vaudeville—the Fable being absent, to the discomfort and
laborious excuse-making of the disciples. The Idyll must be neither too
After all, though a paradox, it is not an impossibility, that a man should
be a great critic and yet most untrustworthy on literary history, and apt to
make his own work, in great part, a mere mosaic of the work of others.
Let us then take the Art Poétique simply as criticism—not as a series of
statements of fact, not as an original or a borrowed argument—and see how
Abstract of it. it looks this way. The first Canto begins (in the teasing
[361]
inverted style which was one of Boileau’s worst legacies to French
poetry, and which itself was a “corrupt following” of Latin) with a
declaration of the necessity of genius, which has been counted to him for
much righteousness. Everybody has not the genius for everything, and it
does not follow that because you have a genius for convivial songs you
have one for Epic. But good sense and reason are as necessary as genius.
Indeed we are soon told that writing depends on these alone for its value: so
that genius is like those tickets of admission which are quite useless till they
are countersigned by somebody other than the issuer. Never try high flights
or conceits. Do not describe your subjects or objects too minutely. Cultivate
variety, but never be “low,” burlesque, or bombastic. Whatever you do,
mind cæsura and avoid hiatus. Then follows the pseudo-history referred to
above, capped by its phrase of Malherbe, in whose steps you are to walk.
Clearness of expression is of the greatest value; but as a fact it depends on
clearness of thought. Smart things will not ransom faults. If you fear
criticism, anticipate it by yourself and your friends; but beware of flatteries,
and, above all, do not take the part of your own faults simply because your
friends have noticed them. The First Canto ends with the really excellent
line, in Boileau’s true vein (for, whatsoe’er the failings on his part as a
critic, he was a satirist born and bred)—
“Un sot trouve toujours un plus sot qui l’admire.”
The Second Canto begins, apropos of nothing (indeed Boileau was
frankly troubled about his “transitions”), with a discussion, partly
metaphorical, of the Idyll, Eclogue, and Pastoral, followed by a similar
account of other kinds of shorter pieces—Elegy, Ode, Sonnet, Epigram, and
others, down to Vaudeville—the Fable being absent, to the discomfort and
laborious excuse-making of the disciples. The Idyll must be neither too
Page 285
pompous nor too trivial: follow Theocritus and Virgil and all will be right.
Elegy is proper for Death and Love; but you must not, in regard to the latter,
be frigid and hackneyed. Imitate Tibullus and Ovid, and again all will be
right. The ode is worthy of Achilles or Louis; but do not be too historical—
which indeed would be difficult in regard to Achilles, and might be
inconvenient in regard to Louis. Sonnets are very difficult, but a sonnet
without fault is by itself worth an Epic.[362] The epigram may have pointes,
which are elsewhere to be utterly rejected. The other kinds are lightly
treated till the Satire, descending to the vaudeville, has a longer discussion.
Satire, the apologist pro domo declares, is the voice of Truth. Lucilius,
Horace, Juvenal, are characterised. Regnier is our best man; but his style is
antiquated, and his subjects and language are really shocking.[363] Then “the
Frenchman, né malin,” made the Vaudeville. It is only fair to Boileau to say
that, could he have foreseen the tedious abuse of this mot, he would
certainly either have forborne it, or have given us a capital line or couplet to
tie to the tail of the culprits. Canto Three passes, with no less abruptness, to
the drama, which occupies the first half, the latter part being given to the
Epic. Boileau is at first vague. In fact, he does not seem at all thoroughly to
have appreciated the Aristotelian doctrine, which in the main he runs up as
his flag. Dramatic art in teaching must please and touch, which it may do by
exciting pity and terror. Do not make a long and obscure introduction; keep
the Unities as you value your dramatic salvation; never be incredible; and
let everything contribute to the development of your story.
The Historic Muse reappears, but in such case, as hinted above, that we
shall magnanimously abstain from further vengeance on her. If only Boileau
had omitted the unhappy note which says that leurs pièces (those of his
imaginary pélerins) sont imprimées, thereby suggesting that he had read
them! You must have Love: but do not be doucereux; keep the stock
characters; do not modernise the ancients; and if you invent a personage let
him be constant to himself. The theatre really is very difficult. But Epic is
still more so. It depends entirely upon action, upon fable; and in order to
make it noble you put in the deorum ministerium.[364] Æneas’ voyage would
have been quite an ordinary thing without Juno, and Neptune, and Æolus:—
“C’est là ce qui surprend, frappe, saisit, attache.”[365]
Elegy is proper for Death and Love; but you must not, in regard to the latter,
be frigid and hackneyed. Imitate Tibullus and Ovid, and again all will be
right. The ode is worthy of Achilles or Louis; but do not be too historical—
which indeed would be difficult in regard to Achilles, and might be
inconvenient in regard to Louis. Sonnets are very difficult, but a sonnet
without fault is by itself worth an Epic.[362] The epigram may have pointes,
which are elsewhere to be utterly rejected. The other kinds are lightly
treated till the Satire, descending to the vaudeville, has a longer discussion.
Satire, the apologist pro domo declares, is the voice of Truth. Lucilius,
Horace, Juvenal, are characterised. Regnier is our best man; but his style is
antiquated, and his subjects and language are really shocking.[363] Then “the
Frenchman, né malin,” made the Vaudeville. It is only fair to Boileau to say
that, could he have foreseen the tedious abuse of this mot, he would
certainly either have forborne it, or have given us a capital line or couplet to
tie to the tail of the culprits. Canto Three passes, with no less abruptness, to
the drama, which occupies the first half, the latter part being given to the
Epic. Boileau is at first vague. In fact, he does not seem at all thoroughly to
have appreciated the Aristotelian doctrine, which in the main he runs up as
his flag. Dramatic art in teaching must please and touch, which it may do by
exciting pity and terror. Do not make a long and obscure introduction; keep
the Unities as you value your dramatic salvation; never be incredible; and
let everything contribute to the development of your story.
The Historic Muse reappears, but in such case, as hinted above, that we
shall magnanimously abstain from further vengeance on her. If only Boileau
had omitted the unhappy note which says that leurs pièces (those of his
imaginary pélerins) sont imprimées, thereby suggesting that he had read
them! You must have Love: but do not be doucereux; keep the stock
characters; do not modernise the ancients; and if you invent a personage let
him be constant to himself. The theatre really is very difficult. But Epic is
still more so. It depends entirely upon action, upon fable; and in order to
make it noble you put in the deorum ministerium.[364] Æneas’ voyage would
have been quite an ordinary thing without Juno, and Neptune, and Æolus:—
“C’est là ce qui surprend, frappe, saisit, attache.”[365]
Page 286
But the modern deity will not do at all; and devils and angels are worse.
Do let us keep our Tritons, our Parcæ, our Pan, and our Charon! If not, in a
short time we shall not be able to tie a bandage on the eyes of Themis, or
put a balance in her hand![366] Further, be very careful of your names. There
was a person once who actually called his hero Childebrand! Minor receipts
for handling follow; and then we find ourselves back on the stage with
Comedy, as to which Boileau extols Nature, and tells us that Molière would
have been the best of comic dramatists—if he had been other than he was.
The Fourth Canto returns to the generalities of the first, and, taking
advantage of this wider scope, begins an attack, not unamusing but in very
bad taste, on Claude Perrault, architect, doctor, and, like his more celebrated
brother Charles, and a third not so well known as either, a champion on the
modern side (v. infra). It ends, in accordance with the habits of the age, in
an elaborate and rather well-declaimed panegyric of the king, wherein the
adroit historiographer supplies an epilogue to the perhaps not quite so adroit
critic.
For some lines in the middle Boileau, though constantly returning to the
crutch of Horace, does occupy himself with literature. His precepts may be
thus summarised. Whatever you are, be not a bad writer, and if you must be,
be rather bombastic than cold; but, on the whole, degrees of mediocrity do
not much matter. Here the satirist once more comes to the rescue and
dictates the (in application insolent,[367] but) intrinsically good couplet—
“Un fou du moins fait rire et peut nous égayer,
Mais un froid écrivain ne sait rien qu’ennuyer.”
Do not pay attention to flatterers (we had heard this before), do not excuse
your verses, but keep an open ear for every comment: though you must be
careful to separate foolish from wise criticisms. Join the solid and useful to
the pleasant. Let your morality be of the very first water. You may introduce
love; but respect principle and the young person. Do not be jealous of your
rivals; do not put literature above its proper place; for heaven’s sake do not
endeavour to make profit out of your writings [except by pensions].[368] Be
not avaricious, but attend to Reason. If you do, Louis will give you
pensions; and you will not have to tremble, like Colletet,[369] for your dinner,
which depends on the success of a sonnet. Of this last ignoble gibe (too
much imitated, alas! by our own Pope) we need take no further notice; and
Do let us keep our Tritons, our Parcæ, our Pan, and our Charon! If not, in a
short time we shall not be able to tie a bandage on the eyes of Themis, or
put a balance in her hand![366] Further, be very careful of your names. There
was a person once who actually called his hero Childebrand! Minor receipts
for handling follow; and then we find ourselves back on the stage with
Comedy, as to which Boileau extols Nature, and tells us that Molière would
have been the best of comic dramatists—if he had been other than he was.
The Fourth Canto returns to the generalities of the first, and, taking
advantage of this wider scope, begins an attack, not unamusing but in very
bad taste, on Claude Perrault, architect, doctor, and, like his more celebrated
brother Charles, and a third not so well known as either, a champion on the
modern side (v. infra). It ends, in accordance with the habits of the age, in
an elaborate and rather well-declaimed panegyric of the king, wherein the
adroit historiographer supplies an epilogue to the perhaps not quite so adroit
critic.
For some lines in the middle Boileau, though constantly returning to the
crutch of Horace, does occupy himself with literature. His precepts may be
thus summarised. Whatever you are, be not a bad writer, and if you must be,
be rather bombastic than cold; but, on the whole, degrees of mediocrity do
not much matter. Here the satirist once more comes to the rescue and
dictates the (in application insolent,[367] but) intrinsically good couplet—
“Un fou du moins fait rire et peut nous égayer,
Mais un froid écrivain ne sait rien qu’ennuyer.”
Do not pay attention to flatterers (we had heard this before), do not excuse
your verses, but keep an open ear for every comment: though you must be
careful to separate foolish from wise criticisms. Join the solid and useful to
the pleasant. Let your morality be of the very first water. You may introduce
love; but respect principle and the young person. Do not be jealous of your
rivals; do not put literature above its proper place; for heaven’s sake do not
endeavour to make profit out of your writings [except by pensions].[368] Be
not avaricious, but attend to Reason. If you do, Louis will give you
pensions; and you will not have to tremble, like Colletet,[369] for your dinner,
which depends on the success of a sonnet. Of this last ignoble gibe (too
much imitated, alas! by our own Pope) we need take no further notice; and
Page 287
we shall say nothing more on any of the other points in Boileau which
invite unfavourable comment, but are not strictly critical. Let us judge him
as a critic only, and first on this piece.
Is it good criticism?
This of course is far too large a question to answer off-hand. We must
Critical hunt the answer to it by the way of minor questions, such
examination of
it.
as, Is it original? (the least important but of some
importance). If it is not, What does it add to, and how
ingeniously and usefully does it apply, the original from which it borrows?
What methods does it use? To what extent and in what fashion would a poet
adopting it as a manual be qualified for his art? And lastly (though perhaps
some minor questions may crop up in our passage), What incidental
excellences does it contain? What is the merit of the critical estimates which
the author makes, in passing or with deliberation, of the authors, great and
small, of the past and the present?
Let us take these questions in order, and see what answers the Art
Poétique, examined without prejudice, but without fear[370] or favour, can
give to them.
As to the first question there is, to a certain extent, no difference of
Want of opinion. The injured Cotin undoubtedly had truth on his
originality.
side, in the parody quoted above, as to a large part of the
Art Poétique. But what has not been quite sufficiently recognised is that this
is the best part. Take away the almost (sometimes quite) literal translations
from Horace, and you will take away Boileau’s backbone; take away the
Horatian suggestions, and you will go far to deprive his criticism of its
skeleton altogether, and leave it a mere jumble of promiscuous
observations. It would be interesting and by no means otiose—if one only
had the money and the time—to print the Art Poétique with the direct
Horatian borrowment in rubric, the suggested passages in black italic, and
the mere personalities, illustrations, flatteries, lampoons, and the like, in,
say, blue. But I fear the remains in ordinary print would be wofully small,
and still more wofully unimportant. This, however, would not matter so
very much if Boileau had been strikingly original in what he adds, or had
applied the Horatian doctrine with striking appropriateness to the altered
condition of literature. One would think it impossible, if distinguished
instances to the contrary were not known, for any one to maintain that he
has done either. By far the greater part of the achievements of modern, and
invite unfavourable comment, but are not strictly critical. Let us judge him
as a critic only, and first on this piece.
Is it good criticism?
This of course is far too large a question to answer off-hand. We must
Critical hunt the answer to it by the way of minor questions, such
examination of
it.
as, Is it original? (the least important but of some
importance). If it is not, What does it add to, and how
ingeniously and usefully does it apply, the original from which it borrows?
What methods does it use? To what extent and in what fashion would a poet
adopting it as a manual be qualified for his art? And lastly (though perhaps
some minor questions may crop up in our passage), What incidental
excellences does it contain? What is the merit of the critical estimates which
the author makes, in passing or with deliberation, of the authors, great and
small, of the past and the present?
Let us take these questions in order, and see what answers the Art
Poétique, examined without prejudice, but without fear[370] or favour, can
give to them.
As to the first question there is, to a certain extent, no difference of
Want of opinion. The injured Cotin undoubtedly had truth on his
originality.
side, in the parody quoted above, as to a large part of the
Art Poétique. But what has not been quite sufficiently recognised is that this
is the best part. Take away the almost (sometimes quite) literal translations
from Horace, and you will take away Boileau’s backbone; take away the
Horatian suggestions, and you will go far to deprive his criticism of its
skeleton altogether, and leave it a mere jumble of promiscuous
observations. It would be interesting and by no means otiose—if one only
had the money and the time—to print the Art Poétique with the direct
Horatian borrowment in rubric, the suggested passages in black italic, and
the mere personalities, illustrations, flatteries, lampoons, and the like, in,
say, blue. But I fear the remains in ordinary print would be wofully small,
and still more wofully unimportant. This, however, would not matter so
very much if Boileau had been strikingly original in what he adds, or had
applied the Horatian doctrine with striking appropriateness to the altered
condition of literature. One would think it impossible, if distinguished
instances to the contrary were not known, for any one to maintain that he
has done either. By far the greater part of the achievements of modern, and
Page 288
practically the whole of the achievements of mediæval, literature up to his
time, are simply ignored, or, where referred to, ridiculously misdescribed.
Nay more, Horatian parallels are got in by inventing a history of what never
existed.
Nor could anything else possibly happen, considering the methods which
Faults of Boileau chose to adopt. These methods are, First, the
method.
construction of a Horatian-Aristotelian bed to which
everything has to be adjusted in point of principle; and of this it is not
necessary to say more. Secondly, the suggestion as models, at every turn, of
Latin and (much less often) Greek poets, utterly regardless of the change of
circumstances. Thirdly, the method of criticism by Kinds—of laying down
the rules for, and discussing the ends of, the abstract Pastoral, the abstract
Elegy, the abstract Sonnet, Ode, and so forth, with only a few perfunctory
eulogies of actual examples. In regard to the first and second it is enough to
quote the critic’s own words against him, and ask him how Ovid or Tibullus
can be a sufficient, can be even a safe, guide to a French love-poet, and how
the marvels of ancient mythology can become the “machinery” of a modern
epic? In regard to the third, the old battering-ram must be once more
applied. Pastoral, Elegy, Ode, and the rest (except “Sonnet,” which is a
form) are not unequivocal names applied to abstractly existing things, but
mere tickets. Give me a poem, and I will tell you whether I think it a good
or a bad poem, and why. You may, after that, if you have the time and care
to take the trouble, classify it as epic or elegy, epigram or ode. But the box
in which you choose to deposit it does not really matter in the least; and if it
should so happen that there is no box ready, you must either make, or do
without, one. Is the poem good or bad as poetry?—that is the articulus
stantis vel cadentis criticismi.
But the most surprising thing in Boileau’s method, and the most fatal, is
the thing on which he prides himself most, and which has been most
commended in him—the perpetual appeal to Good Sense and Reason.[371] It
Obsession of is surprising, because Longinus, whom he strangely
good sense.
assumed to be a prophet after his own heart, had warned
him amply, and one might think irresistibly, some fifteen hundred years
before. “Heights of eloquence or of poetry, but especially of poetry,” that
mighty critic had said, “do not lead to persuasion but to ecstasy.” Now it is
with Persuasion only—in the Greek sense, which includes intellectual
conviction and practical influence—that Good Sense and Reason, in
time, are simply ignored, or, where referred to, ridiculously misdescribed.
Nay more, Horatian parallels are got in by inventing a history of what never
existed.
Nor could anything else possibly happen, considering the methods which
Faults of Boileau chose to adopt. These methods are, First, the
method.
construction of a Horatian-Aristotelian bed to which
everything has to be adjusted in point of principle; and of this it is not
necessary to say more. Secondly, the suggestion as models, at every turn, of
Latin and (much less often) Greek poets, utterly regardless of the change of
circumstances. Thirdly, the method of criticism by Kinds—of laying down
the rules for, and discussing the ends of, the abstract Pastoral, the abstract
Elegy, the abstract Sonnet, Ode, and so forth, with only a few perfunctory
eulogies of actual examples. In regard to the first and second it is enough to
quote the critic’s own words against him, and ask him how Ovid or Tibullus
can be a sufficient, can be even a safe, guide to a French love-poet, and how
the marvels of ancient mythology can become the “machinery” of a modern
epic? In regard to the third, the old battering-ram must be once more
applied. Pastoral, Elegy, Ode, and the rest (except “Sonnet,” which is a
form) are not unequivocal names applied to abstractly existing things, but
mere tickets. Give me a poem, and I will tell you whether I think it a good
or a bad poem, and why. You may, after that, if you have the time and care
to take the trouble, classify it as epic or elegy, epigram or ode. But the box
in which you choose to deposit it does not really matter in the least; and if it
should so happen that there is no box ready, you must either make, or do
without, one. Is the poem good or bad as poetry?—that is the articulus
stantis vel cadentis criticismi.
But the most surprising thing in Boileau’s method, and the most fatal, is
the thing on which he prides himself most, and which has been most
commended in him—the perpetual appeal to Good Sense and Reason.[371] It
Obsession of is surprising, because Longinus, whom he strangely
good sense.
assumed to be a prophet after his own heart, had warned
him amply, and one might think irresistibly, some fifteen hundred years
before. “Heights of eloquence or of poetry, but especially of poetry,” that
mighty critic had said, “do not lead to persuasion but to ecstasy.” Now it is
with Persuasion only—in the Greek sense, which includes intellectual
conviction and practical influence—that Good Sense and Reason, in
Page 289
Boileau’s sense, can deal. It is true that very glaring offences against them
may sometimes (by no means always) interfere with Ecstasy; but the most
heroic doses of either or both will never cause it. Generally speaking—the
saying has of course the danger of the double edge, but it is true for all that
—when Good Sense comes in at the door Ecstasy flies out of the window,
and when Ecstasy flies in at the window, Good Sense and (the lower)
Reason retire prudishly by the door. At any rate, if they remain, it will be
necessary for them to keep themselves very much in the background, and
wait till they are called for. They may very well act as detectives and
catchpolls when False Ecstasy usurps the place of true; but like other
police-officers they have rather an awkward habit of mistaking their men.
Every respect is of course to be paid to them; their assistance is sometimes
very welcome and valuable even to the poet, while the prose-writer can
seldom dispense with their constant surveillance. But even the latter may
sometimes be hindered of his finest effects by looking first to them; while
the Poet who does so will never rise beyond the lower-middle slopes of
Parnassus, if he even reaches these.
Now, unless these considerations can be got out of the way, the answer to
yet a further question, What help does Boileau give the Poet? will be a most
meagre and disappointing one. Some of the positive helps which he offers
—the rule of Good Sense, and the empty forms of Kinds—are likely to be,
in the first case positively mischievous, in the second rather hindering than
helpful. His historical doctrine is usually wrong, and, where not wrong,
inadequate. His constant prescription of “the ancients”—not merely as
general guides in literature—nobody need ask for better—but as immediate
and particular models for all kinds of literary exercise, will in its most
rigorous observation make a mere translating anachronist, and even if more
freely construed, will again hinder much more than it helps.
But the majority of Boileau’s counsels are not positive at all, they are
simply negative: and negative counsels in art, when the pupil is once out of
schoolboyhood, never did much good yet, and have often done a great deal
Arbitrary of harm. Why should his risus ineptus at the name
proscriptions.
“Childebrand” proscribe that name, which is euphonious
enough to unprejudiced ears? What “sensible and reasonable” (we may
thank him for these words) criterion of sound makes “Philis” preferable to
“Toinon” or, prettier still, Toinette? It is true, doubtless, that, for a
continuance, the long Alexandrine divides best at the middle; but what
may sometimes (by no means always) interfere with Ecstasy; but the most
heroic doses of either or both will never cause it. Generally speaking—the
saying has of course the danger of the double edge, but it is true for all that
—when Good Sense comes in at the door Ecstasy flies out of the window,
and when Ecstasy flies in at the window, Good Sense and (the lower)
Reason retire prudishly by the door. At any rate, if they remain, it will be
necessary for them to keep themselves very much in the background, and
wait till they are called for. They may very well act as detectives and
catchpolls when False Ecstasy usurps the place of true; but like other
police-officers they have rather an awkward habit of mistaking their men.
Every respect is of course to be paid to them; their assistance is sometimes
very welcome and valuable even to the poet, while the prose-writer can
seldom dispense with their constant surveillance. But even the latter may
sometimes be hindered of his finest effects by looking first to them; while
the Poet who does so will never rise beyond the lower-middle slopes of
Parnassus, if he even reaches these.
Now, unless these considerations can be got out of the way, the answer to
yet a further question, What help does Boileau give the Poet? will be a most
meagre and disappointing one. Some of the positive helps which he offers
—the rule of Good Sense, and the empty forms of Kinds—are likely to be,
in the first case positively mischievous, in the second rather hindering than
helpful. His historical doctrine is usually wrong, and, where not wrong,
inadequate. His constant prescription of “the ancients”—not merely as
general guides in literature—nobody need ask for better—but as immediate
and particular models for all kinds of literary exercise, will in its most
rigorous observation make a mere translating anachronist, and even if more
freely construed, will again hinder much more than it helps.
But the majority of Boileau’s counsels are not positive at all, they are
simply negative: and negative counsels in art, when the pupil is once out of
schoolboyhood, never did much good yet, and have often done a great deal
Arbitrary of harm. Why should his risus ineptus at the name
proscriptions.
“Childebrand” proscribe that name, which is euphonious
enough to unprejudiced ears? What “sensible and reasonable” (we may
thank him for these words) criterion of sound makes “Philis” preferable to
“Toinon” or, prettier still, Toinette? It is true, doubtless, that, for a
continuance, the long Alexandrine divides best at the middle; but what
Page 290
reason, what sense is there in the absolute proscription of a penthemimeral
or hephthemimeral cæsura? In what does the welcoming of Pan and
Charon, and the banishing of Ashtaroth and Beelzebub, differ from the
immortal decision that “blue uniforms are only good for the artillery and the
Blue Horse”? And so throughout.
But, it will be said, the Art Poétique is not Boileau’s sole critical
Boileau’s other deliverance. It is most true; in fact, though his work is for a
works.
man who went safely beyond the three score years and ten
and half-way to the four score,[372] a rather scanty work, it is pervaded with
literature and with criticism. By a curious contrast to those Roman satirists,
of whom we spoke erstwhile, his criticism of life is always turning to
literature. The admirable heroi-comic satire of the Lutrin itself gravitates
somehow or other to the battle in the book-shop, which enables the poet to
gibbet his victims once more; not to mention that the whole fun of this very
Lutrin is (though Boileau did not in the least know it) a sort of reductio ad
absurdum of his own critical doctrines in the Art. Most of the other pieces
are either directly critical of a kind, or the expression of brief and rather
reluctantly obeyed avocations from criticism. Let us examine them,—
though with somewhat less minuteness.
The dominance of the literary subject in the Satires is well known,
though it is equally notorious that illiberal personality too often takes the
The Satires. place of liberal criticism. Colletet’s poverty and parasitism;
Saint-Amant’s death from fever, brought on by his ill-success (he would
have died of hunger anyhow, says the satirist good-naturedly)—these are
the subjects that interest him in the First. In the Second to Molière, with
oblique censure of, or at least surprise at the easy versification of the
dramatist, he bewails (being evidently proud of it) his own studious
“difficulty”[373] in rhyming, jests at the stock phrases and chevilles of others
from Ménage to Scudéry. Even in the Third—the old bad-dinner satire of
Horace and Regnier—he brings in a literary quarrel about Théophile and
Ronsard and Quinault. The Fifth, to Dangeau, is one of the few which have
hardly any literary touches. But he will drag the luckless Abbé de Pure into
the Sixth on the noises and nuisances of Paris, while the Seventh is wholly
literary, and is one of the earliest (1663) of his explosions at bad poets, and
the Eighth, on the follies of humanity, naturally takes shots at the old target.
All these, however, much more the awkward Tenth, on Women, and the
very inferior Eleventh, must give place to the Ninth, an imitation of Horace,
or hephthemimeral cæsura? In what does the welcoming of Pan and
Charon, and the banishing of Ashtaroth and Beelzebub, differ from the
immortal decision that “blue uniforms are only good for the artillery and the
Blue Horse”? And so throughout.
But, it will be said, the Art Poétique is not Boileau’s sole critical
Boileau’s other deliverance. It is most true; in fact, though his work is for a
works.
man who went safely beyond the three score years and ten
and half-way to the four score,[372] a rather scanty work, it is pervaded with
literature and with criticism. By a curious contrast to those Roman satirists,
of whom we spoke erstwhile, his criticism of life is always turning to
literature. The admirable heroi-comic satire of the Lutrin itself gravitates
somehow or other to the battle in the book-shop, which enables the poet to
gibbet his victims once more; not to mention that the whole fun of this very
Lutrin is (though Boileau did not in the least know it) a sort of reductio ad
absurdum of his own critical doctrines in the Art. Most of the other pieces
are either directly critical of a kind, or the expression of brief and rather
reluctantly obeyed avocations from criticism. Let us examine them,—
though with somewhat less minuteness.
The dominance of the literary subject in the Satires is well known,
though it is equally notorious that illiberal personality too often takes the
The Satires. place of liberal criticism. Colletet’s poverty and parasitism;
Saint-Amant’s death from fever, brought on by his ill-success (he would
have died of hunger anyhow, says the satirist good-naturedly)—these are
the subjects that interest him in the First. In the Second to Molière, with
oblique censure of, or at least surprise at the easy versification of the
dramatist, he bewails (being evidently proud of it) his own studious
“difficulty”[373] in rhyming, jests at the stock phrases and chevilles of others
from Ménage to Scudéry. Even in the Third—the old bad-dinner satire of
Horace and Regnier—he brings in a literary quarrel about Théophile and
Ronsard and Quinault. The Fifth, to Dangeau, is one of the few which have
hardly any literary touches. But he will drag the luckless Abbé de Pure into
the Sixth on the noises and nuisances of Paris, while the Seventh is wholly
literary, and is one of the earliest (1663) of his explosions at bad poets, and
the Eighth, on the follies of humanity, naturally takes shots at the old target.
All these, however, much more the awkward Tenth, on Women, and the
very inferior Eleventh, must give place to the Ninth, an imitation of Horace,
Page 291
II. vii., written in the author’s fortieth or forty-first year, nominally to
defend himself for his former attacks on his compeers, but really, of course,
to renew them. Once more his favourite equivalents (only mentioned
infamiæ causa) for Gyas and Cloanthus—Colletet, Pelletier, Quinault, and
the rest—appear. Once more Racan receives partial, and Théophile almost
total, insult. Here is the famous contrast of le clinquant du Tasse and l’or de
Virgile; and here the still more famous lines on the Cid, embedded in—and
plainly owing their complimentary tone to the fact that they are embedded
in—an onslaught on Chapelain. Again and again the luckless Cotin is
“horsed” and justified: while the almost equally luckless Pelletier[374] serves
as a foil to “d’Ablancourt et Patru.” The singular posthumous piece Sur
l'Équivoque, appended usually as the Twelfth satire, is a sort of attempt to
generalise and amplify the author’s horror of conceit and obscurity.
To dwell on the minor pieces of verse, which are often literary, would be
here impossible; it is enough to say that they include the two epigrams on
Corneille’s Agésilas and Attila, and numerous assaults on Perrault. The
The Epigrams Epistles are not nearly so full of our matter as the Satires;
and Epistles.
but the Seventh (to Racine on the success of the opposition
Phèdre by the hated Pradon) and the Tenth (on his own verses) belong to us.
The first of these has been very highly, and in part quite deservedly, praised.
The reference to the death and the almost dishonoured grave of Molière,
though slightly theatrical, is both vigorous and really touching; the eulogy
of Racine himself is, in the circumstances, but allowably excessive; and the
half-flattering, half-boasting mention of his own enjoyment of the favour of
the “great,” from Louis to La Rochefoucauld, would be tolerable if it were
not mainly a vehicle for fresh abuse of Linière and Tallemant, of Perrin and
Pradon himself.
Prose—The The prose is equally saturated with criticism. The
Héros de
Roman; the
dialogue on Les Héros de Roman, which Fontenelle could
Réflexions sur have done admirably, Boileau has not done very well; but
Longin. his satire on the extraordinary bastard kind of romance with
which France at this time deluged Europe is not ill-founded, though rather
ill-informed.[375] The Letters are full enough of criticism. But the two chief
prose documents from which (at least from their titles) something really
important may be expected, are the Dissertation on the story of Giocondo,
as told by its inventor and by La Fontaine, and the Réflexions sur Longin.
These last, however, the reader need hardly trouble himself with: they may
defend himself for his former attacks on his compeers, but really, of course,
to renew them. Once more his favourite equivalents (only mentioned
infamiæ causa) for Gyas and Cloanthus—Colletet, Pelletier, Quinault, and
the rest—appear. Once more Racan receives partial, and Théophile almost
total, insult. Here is the famous contrast of le clinquant du Tasse and l’or de
Virgile; and here the still more famous lines on the Cid, embedded in—and
plainly owing their complimentary tone to the fact that they are embedded
in—an onslaught on Chapelain. Again and again the luckless Cotin is
“horsed” and justified: while the almost equally luckless Pelletier[374] serves
as a foil to “d’Ablancourt et Patru.” The singular posthumous piece Sur
l'Équivoque, appended usually as the Twelfth satire, is a sort of attempt to
generalise and amplify the author’s horror of conceit and obscurity.
To dwell on the minor pieces of verse, which are often literary, would be
here impossible; it is enough to say that they include the two epigrams on
Corneille’s Agésilas and Attila, and numerous assaults on Perrault. The
The Epigrams Epistles are not nearly so full of our matter as the Satires;
and Epistles.
but the Seventh (to Racine on the success of the opposition
Phèdre by the hated Pradon) and the Tenth (on his own verses) belong to us.
The first of these has been very highly, and in part quite deservedly, praised.
The reference to the death and the almost dishonoured grave of Molière,
though slightly theatrical, is both vigorous and really touching; the eulogy
of Racine himself is, in the circumstances, but allowably excessive; and the
half-flattering, half-boasting mention of his own enjoyment of the favour of
the “great,” from Louis to La Rochefoucauld, would be tolerable if it were
not mainly a vehicle for fresh abuse of Linière and Tallemant, of Perrin and
Pradon himself.
Prose—The The prose is equally saturated with criticism. The
Héros de
Roman; the
dialogue on Les Héros de Roman, which Fontenelle could
Réflexions sur have done admirably, Boileau has not done very well; but
Longin. his satire on the extraordinary bastard kind of romance with
which France at this time deluged Europe is not ill-founded, though rather
ill-informed.[375] The Letters are full enough of criticism. But the two chief
prose documents from which (at least from their titles) something really
important may be expected, are the Dissertation on the story of Giocondo,
as told by its inventor and by La Fontaine, and the Réflexions sur Longin.
These last, however, the reader need hardly trouble himself with: they may
Page 292
even be classed among the impieties of criticism. Boileau, little as he could
have appreciated, did at least know the Great Unknown. He translated him;
he calls him very truly le plus grand, and more questionably le plus sévère,
of ancient critics. But these Réflexions on Longinus are in fact reflections
on Charles Perrault, a very clever person, but not in the least like Longinus:
and the texts from the Περὶ Ὕψους, which are put at the head of each
chapter, often have nothing to do with the subject at all, and in almost every
case might almost as well have been selected from the first book he picked
up. In the particular dispute I am with him, and not with Perrault; but the
first exclamation of any real lover of the real classics who reads the piece
must be Non tali auxilio! Boileau, as always, is arrogant and rude; as
sometimes elsewhere his scholarship is not beyond suspicion, though it had
an easy triumph over the almost total absence of the same quality in his
adversary; but, as he is very seldom, he is confused, desultory, heavy. To
those who think that criticism is the art of scolding, the Réflexions sur
Longin may seem to be a creditable exercise in it: hardly to others.
Almost the only critical essay of the proper kind that we have from this
famous critic is the other piece mentioned above—the “Dissertation on the
The “Dissertation on Joconde.” The occasion was not unpromising. A
Joconde.”
certain M. de Saint-Gilles, seriously or otherwise,
had preferred the version of Ariosto’s tale by one Bouillon to that of La
Fontaine, and the question (which had taken the form of a bet between
Saint-Gilles and La Mothe le Vayer de Bretigny) was referred to Boileau for
decision. I confess that I have never taken the trouble to look up the works
of M. de Bouillon: the specimens that Boileau gives are quite enough, and
he exercises his ferule like the vigorous and (within limits) accurate and
useful pedagogue that he is. But, unluckily, he thinks it necessary not
merely to prefer La Fontaine to Bouillon, but to belittle Ariosto[376] in favour
of La Fontaine. I defy anybody—Frenchman or non-Frenchman—to have,
within certain limits, a greater admiration for La Fontaine than I have; and I
am heretical enough to like the Contes even better than the Fables. But why
this miserable setting of two great things against each other? Why not like
both? This is what critics of the Boileau type cannot do: they must have
their rat-pit of false comparison, their setting-by-the-ears, their belittling in
order to exalt. It must be said that Boileau is justly punished. His usual
critical censures are so vague and general—he is so apt to tell us that So-
and-so is a bad poet without showing us how he is bad—that he escapes
have appreciated, did at least know the Great Unknown. He translated him;
he calls him very truly le plus grand, and more questionably le plus sévère,
of ancient critics. But these Réflexions on Longinus are in fact reflections
on Charles Perrault, a very clever person, but not in the least like Longinus:
and the texts from the Περὶ Ὕψους, which are put at the head of each
chapter, often have nothing to do with the subject at all, and in almost every
case might almost as well have been selected from the first book he picked
up. In the particular dispute I am with him, and not with Perrault; but the
first exclamation of any real lover of the real classics who reads the piece
must be Non tali auxilio! Boileau, as always, is arrogant and rude; as
sometimes elsewhere his scholarship is not beyond suspicion, though it had
an easy triumph over the almost total absence of the same quality in his
adversary; but, as he is very seldom, he is confused, desultory, heavy. To
those who think that criticism is the art of scolding, the Réflexions sur
Longin may seem to be a creditable exercise in it: hardly to others.
Almost the only critical essay of the proper kind that we have from this
famous critic is the other piece mentioned above—the “Dissertation on the
The “Dissertation on Joconde.” The occasion was not unpromising. A
Joconde.”
certain M. de Saint-Gilles, seriously or otherwise,
had preferred the version of Ariosto’s tale by one Bouillon to that of La
Fontaine, and the question (which had taken the form of a bet between
Saint-Gilles and La Mothe le Vayer de Bretigny) was referred to Boileau for
decision. I confess that I have never taken the trouble to look up the works
of M. de Bouillon: the specimens that Boileau gives are quite enough, and
he exercises his ferule like the vigorous and (within limits) accurate and
useful pedagogue that he is. But, unluckily, he thinks it necessary not
merely to prefer La Fontaine to Bouillon, but to belittle Ariosto[376] in favour
of La Fontaine. I defy anybody—Frenchman or non-Frenchman—to have,
within certain limits, a greater admiration for La Fontaine than I have; and I
am heretical enough to like the Contes even better than the Fables. But why
this miserable setting of two great things against each other? Why not like
both? This is what critics of the Boileau type cannot do: they must have
their rat-pit of false comparison, their setting-by-the-ears, their belittling in
order to exalt. It must be said that Boileau is justly punished. His usual
critical censures are so vague and general—he is so apt to tell us that So-
and-so is a bad poet without showing us how he is bad—that he escapes
Page 293
confutation. Not so here. In the first place he shows, as perhaps we might
have anticipated, that worst of critical defects, an inability to “take” his
author. He is very angry with the famous grave beginning of the tavern-
keeper’s much less than grave story—the stately Astolfo, re de' Longobardi,
and the rest. He thinks that “le bon messer Ludovico” had forgotten, or
rather did not care for, the precept of his Horace, “Versibus exponi tragicis
res comica non vult.”
Undoubtedly Messer Ludovico did not care one of his favourite turnips
for it! And, according to the key of humour in which he was writing—a key
struck before him, but never so well as by him, in Italian, familiar in
English, but unknown in French till recently—he was quite right in this
negligence. Boileau proceeds to give rules for “telling an absurd thing in
such a manner as to intimate to the reader that you do not yourself believe
it.” Very good; that is the Lutrin way—a capital way too; but not the only
one. And Ariosto is at least entitled to try this other, in which he succeeds so
admirably to all who have eyes or ears and will use them. The critic, again,
is very angry with Ariosto for making Giocondo abstain from poniarding
his wife because of the love he bore her. “Il n’y a point de passion plus
tragique et plus violente que la jalousie qui naît d’un extrème amour.” Let
us not remark too unkindly that Despréaux' knowledge of un extrème amour
was, by all accounts, including his own, the reverse of experimental. His
error is more widespreading. It is part of that unlucky arrangement of
“typed” kinds—not less of character and passion than of writing—which
the neo-classic system insists upon. Your passions, like your poetic forms,
are all pigeon-holed, and their conduct prescribed to them. You must “keep
the type” once more. Pour le bonheur du genre humain, Ariosto knew
better.
We must not, tempting as it is, dwell on the plea that Giocondo’s honest
agony, “a quelque chose de tragique qui ne vaut rien dans un conte à rire,”
while La Fontaine’s easy-going wittol is quite a cheerful object; on the
inestimable cry of outraged verisimilitude, “Où est-ce que Joconde trouve si
vite une hostie sacrée pour faire jurer le roi?” or on the extraordinary
casuistry as to the time occupied, in the two versions, by the climax of the
triple arrangement of Fiammetta. In this, as in the remarkable letter of
reconciliation to Perrault,[377] one is at first inclined to suspect irony; but in
neither case will the hypothesis work out. Here Boileau presents what looks
like a caricature of the “classical” criticism; yet it exactly coincides with his
have anticipated, that worst of critical defects, an inability to “take” his
author. He is very angry with the famous grave beginning of the tavern-
keeper’s much less than grave story—the stately Astolfo, re de' Longobardi,
and the rest. He thinks that “le bon messer Ludovico” had forgotten, or
rather did not care for, the precept of his Horace, “Versibus exponi tragicis
res comica non vult.”
Undoubtedly Messer Ludovico did not care one of his favourite turnips
for it! And, according to the key of humour in which he was writing—a key
struck before him, but never so well as by him, in Italian, familiar in
English, but unknown in French till recently—he was quite right in this
negligence. Boileau proceeds to give rules for “telling an absurd thing in
such a manner as to intimate to the reader that you do not yourself believe
it.” Very good; that is the Lutrin way—a capital way too; but not the only
one. And Ariosto is at least entitled to try this other, in which he succeeds so
admirably to all who have eyes or ears and will use them. The critic, again,
is very angry with Ariosto for making Giocondo abstain from poniarding
his wife because of the love he bore her. “Il n’y a point de passion plus
tragique et plus violente que la jalousie qui naît d’un extrème amour.” Let
us not remark too unkindly that Despréaux' knowledge of un extrème amour
was, by all accounts, including his own, the reverse of experimental. His
error is more widespreading. It is part of that unlucky arrangement of
“typed” kinds—not less of character and passion than of writing—which
the neo-classic system insists upon. Your passions, like your poetic forms,
are all pigeon-holed, and their conduct prescribed to them. You must “keep
the type” once more. Pour le bonheur du genre humain, Ariosto knew
better.
We must not, tempting as it is, dwell on the plea that Giocondo’s honest
agony, “a quelque chose de tragique qui ne vaut rien dans un conte à rire,”
while La Fontaine’s easy-going wittol is quite a cheerful object; on the
inestimable cry of outraged verisimilitude, “Où est-ce que Joconde trouve si
vite une hostie sacrée pour faire jurer le roi?” or on the extraordinary
casuistry as to the time occupied, in the two versions, by the climax of the
triple arrangement of Fiammetta. In this, as in the remarkable letter of
reconciliation to Perrault,[377] one is at first inclined to suspect irony; but in
neither case will the hypothesis work out. Here Boileau presents what looks
like a caricature of the “classical” criticism; yet it exactly coincides with his
Page 294
general precepts elsewhere. There he gives away almost, not quite, the
whole of the Ancient case by admitting the superiority of the moderns after
a fashion which, if we took it to be ironical, would reflect upon his own
familiar friends and patterns—Molière, La Fontaine, and Racine.
In fact, recent and repeated reading of Boileau has made me doubt
whether he had any critical principle, except that of Good Sense. He almost
A “Solifidian of says so in so many words in the Art Poétique; his general
Good Sense.”
or particular sayings elsewhere say it over again with mere
change of name and instance. If he loved the classics, it was because the
classics he knew best—the Latins of the Augustan age—do probably
observe this “good-sense” standard more than any other great writers of any
time but his own. And if he was unjust to the great writers of the time just
before his own, and savage to the small among his contemporaries, it was
because the prevailing fashion, for two or three generations, had set in a
direction which Good Sense alone must constantly disapprove. Now Good
Sense is not a high tribunal, but a very low one,—we were better off with
our old friend Furor Poeticus, though he did sometimes talk, and encourage
the talking of, nonsense. The mere “Solifidian” of Good Sense knows
nothing, and can know nothing, about poetry.
Nay more, one may ask without real impertinence, Is Boileau’s Art
Poétique in any vital and important sense an Art of Poetry at all, any more
than it is an Art of Pig-breeding, or of Pottery-making, or of Pyrotechnics?
In all these useful and agreeable pursuits—for the matter of that in all other
arts, trades, professions, employments, and vocations—it is desirable to
know what you are about, to proceed cautiously and sensibly, to choose the
right materials, to combine them in the right way, not to go beyond your
powers and means, to vary your appeals to the public, to take good advice,
to observe the practice of proved success in the particular department, to
study its kinds and species carefully, not to launch out too far nor restrain
your operations too much, and to observe the laws of morality and propriety
throughout. But what is there specially poetical in all this? Or what does
Boileau add to this to make his treatise specially poetical? A few—
decidedly few—technical cautions of the lower kind, not all of them
unquestionable; some general or mediate rules, mostly borrowed from
Horace, and not a few of them more questionable still; some literary history
which, as we have seen, is utterly worthless; and a seasoning of mostly
spiteful hits at poets he dislikes.
whole of the Ancient case by admitting the superiority of the moderns after
a fashion which, if we took it to be ironical, would reflect upon his own
familiar friends and patterns—Molière, La Fontaine, and Racine.
In fact, recent and repeated reading of Boileau has made me doubt
whether he had any critical principle, except that of Good Sense. He almost
A “Solifidian of says so in so many words in the Art Poétique; his general
Good Sense.”
or particular sayings elsewhere say it over again with mere
change of name and instance. If he loved the classics, it was because the
classics he knew best—the Latins of the Augustan age—do probably
observe this “good-sense” standard more than any other great writers of any
time but his own. And if he was unjust to the great writers of the time just
before his own, and savage to the small among his contemporaries, it was
because the prevailing fashion, for two or three generations, had set in a
direction which Good Sense alone must constantly disapprove. Now Good
Sense is not a high tribunal, but a very low one,—we were better off with
our old friend Furor Poeticus, though he did sometimes talk, and encourage
the talking of, nonsense. The mere “Solifidian” of Good Sense knows
nothing, and can know nothing, about poetry.
Nay more, one may ask without real impertinence, Is Boileau’s Art
Poétique in any vital and important sense an Art of Poetry at all, any more
than it is an Art of Pig-breeding, or of Pottery-making, or of Pyrotechnics?
In all these useful and agreeable pursuits—for the matter of that in all other
arts, trades, professions, employments, and vocations—it is desirable to
know what you are about, to proceed cautiously and sensibly, to choose the
right materials, to combine them in the right way, not to go beyond your
powers and means, to vary your appeals to the public, to take good advice,
to observe the practice of proved success in the particular department, to
study its kinds and species carefully, not to launch out too far nor restrain
your operations too much, and to observe the laws of morality and propriety
throughout. But what is there specially poetical in all this? Or what does
Boileau add to this to make his treatise specially poetical? A few—
decidedly few—technical cautions of the lower kind, not all of them
unquestionable; some general or mediate rules, mostly borrowed from
Horace, and not a few of them more questionable still; some literary history
which, as we have seen, is utterly worthless; and a seasoning of mostly
spiteful hits at poets he dislikes.
Page 295
But, they say—and this is practically the stronghold to which they all
retire—“Look at his practical services to French literature and French
The plea for his poetry. Look at the badness of the styles he attacked, and
practical
services.
the completeness with which he cleared them away. What a
reformer! What a Hercules purging the poetic country of
monsters and malefactors! Can you possibly deny this merit?”
Let nothing be denied—or, for the matter of that, affirmed—before
Historical everything has been considered. What are the facts?
examination of
this.
Boileau came at the end—at the very end—of a stage of
French poetry which had been rather a long one, and
unquestionably one of very chequered and not very highly distinguished
performance. The somewhat hasty theories, and the often splendid, but
nearly always unequal, practice of the Pléiade, had given place to a sort of
rococo individualism, to the bastard and easily ignoble kinds of parody and
burlesque, or to corrupt followings of Spanish and Italian practice. Many
charming, and some fine, things (including that stately passage of
Chapelain’s which many classical critics, who scoff at his name, have
admired when all but literally translated in The Deserted Village) had been
written; but the writers had constantly dropped from them to the trivial and
the bombastic. But when Boileau began seriously to write in 1663-64,[378]
this period was in its very last stage. It could not have lasted much, or any,
longer if there had been no Boileau at all. Of his actual victims some were
long dead; others were very old men; the younger were persons of no
importance, ephemera, whether critical or poetical, which would have died
with the day. The smoky torch of Théophile—a true poetic torch for all its
smoke—had flickered out nearly forty years before. Cyrano, to whom
Boileau gives contemptuous blessing in part, only that he may ban him and
others more effectively, had slept in peace for eight years. Saint-Amant,
who had real poetic gift, and who, if he was no scholar in the ancient
tongues, knew the modern in a fashion which puts Boileau’s ignorance of
their literatures to shame, had met the end described so feelingly by his
critic some three years earlier. Chapelain was a man of sixty-seven; Cotin
one of sixty. It is by attacking not the dead and decrepit, but the young and
rising, that a man shows himself a great warrior and a useful citizen in
criticism. In fact, the principles of correctness which Boileau espoused had,
as we have seen, been practically taken up long before, even by poor
retire—“Look at his practical services to French literature and French
The plea for his poetry. Look at the badness of the styles he attacked, and
practical
services.
the completeness with which he cleared them away. What a
reformer! What a Hercules purging the poetic country of
monsters and malefactors! Can you possibly deny this merit?”
Let nothing be denied—or, for the matter of that, affirmed—before
Historical everything has been considered. What are the facts?
examination of
this.
Boileau came at the end—at the very end—of a stage of
French poetry which had been rather a long one, and
unquestionably one of very chequered and not very highly distinguished
performance. The somewhat hasty theories, and the often splendid, but
nearly always unequal, practice of the Pléiade, had given place to a sort of
rococo individualism, to the bastard and easily ignoble kinds of parody and
burlesque, or to corrupt followings of Spanish and Italian practice. Many
charming, and some fine, things (including that stately passage of
Chapelain’s which many classical critics, who scoff at his name, have
admired when all but literally translated in The Deserted Village) had been
written; but the writers had constantly dropped from them to the trivial and
the bombastic. But when Boileau began seriously to write in 1663-64,[378]
this period was in its very last stage. It could not have lasted much, or any,
longer if there had been no Boileau at all. Of his actual victims some were
long dead; others were very old men; the younger were persons of no
importance, ephemera, whether critical or poetical, which would have died
with the day. The smoky torch of Théophile—a true poetic torch for all its
smoke—had flickered out nearly forty years before. Cyrano, to whom
Boileau gives contemptuous blessing in part, only that he may ban him and
others more effectively, had slept in peace for eight years. Saint-Amant,
who had real poetic gift, and who, if he was no scholar in the ancient
tongues, knew the modern in a fashion which puts Boileau’s ignorance of
their literatures to shame, had met the end described so feelingly by his
critic some three years earlier. Chapelain was a man of sixty-seven; Cotin
one of sixty. It is by attacking not the dead and decrepit, but the young and
rising, that a man shows himself a great warrior and a useful citizen in
criticism. In fact, the principles of correctness which Boileau espoused had,
as we have seen, been practically taken up long before, even by poor
Page 296
creatures like the Abbé d’Aubignac, in certain departments, and Chapelain
himself had smitten in this sense before he felt the wounds.
Still less can Boileau be allowed any credit for the great achievements
which undoubtedly took place during his own middle life. The glories of
French literature in verse (and, as far as the three first go, in poetry), about
1664, are Corneille, Racine, La Fontaine, Molière. Corneille had been
writing before Boileau was born: the only piece of his which Boileau
praises generously was produced in the year of the critic’s birth; and that
critic is silent about most of the Master’s work, and sneers ignobly at its
later examples. The magnificent genius of Molière owed nothing to Boileau
in its beginnings, and accepted little, if anything, from his criticism in its
perfection; while not all of its results were cordially welcomed by the critic,
personal friends as they were. La Fontaine, an older man than Boileau by
fifteen years, was still more independent of him at the beginning, shows
extremely little mark of any influence from him at any time, and, for all
their friendship, experienced from him the almost unaccountable omission
of his favourite kind, the Fable (unlike the Conte, a perfectly
“unobjectionable” one), in the Art Poétique itself. There remains Racine,
and, if the schooling and training of Racine seem to any one so great a thing
that his schoolmaster and trainer becomes, ipso facto, one of the Di majores
of criticism, there is not much more to be said. But there is something: and
it is this. In the first place, to assume that Racine’s genius could not have
made its own way without Boileau’s mentorship, is to pay a far worse
compliment to that genius than some not very fervent Racinians can allow;
and, in the second, the spirit, if not the letter, of his criticism is against that
of Racine’s very best work. If I cared to do so, I think I could show that
Phèdre herself comes within the Bolæan[379] maledictions. As for Athalie,
the very admirers of Boileau have asked how, after his unsparing censure of
the religious epic, he could tolerate the religious drama?
Have we done? Not quite. After such a reformation, after such labours of
Hercules as we have held up to us, we are entitled to expect a new crop, a
new breed of poets rising everywhere from the purged and heartened land.
Is the poetic product of the last quarter of the seventeenth century in France
so admirable, so refreshing, such a contrast to the period of Chapelain and
Saint-Amant? I have some small acquaintance with French literature, but I
am unable to supply the names of the “Poets like Shakespeare, Beautiful
souls,” who, formed by the precepts of the Art Poétique, rush in crowds
himself had smitten in this sense before he felt the wounds.
Still less can Boileau be allowed any credit for the great achievements
which undoubtedly took place during his own middle life. The glories of
French literature in verse (and, as far as the three first go, in poetry), about
1664, are Corneille, Racine, La Fontaine, Molière. Corneille had been
writing before Boileau was born: the only piece of his which Boileau
praises generously was produced in the year of the critic’s birth; and that
critic is silent about most of the Master’s work, and sneers ignobly at its
later examples. The magnificent genius of Molière owed nothing to Boileau
in its beginnings, and accepted little, if anything, from his criticism in its
perfection; while not all of its results were cordially welcomed by the critic,
personal friends as they were. La Fontaine, an older man than Boileau by
fifteen years, was still more independent of him at the beginning, shows
extremely little mark of any influence from him at any time, and, for all
their friendship, experienced from him the almost unaccountable omission
of his favourite kind, the Fable (unlike the Conte, a perfectly
“unobjectionable” one), in the Art Poétique itself. There remains Racine,
and, if the schooling and training of Racine seem to any one so great a thing
that his schoolmaster and trainer becomes, ipso facto, one of the Di majores
of criticism, there is not much more to be said. But there is something: and
it is this. In the first place, to assume that Racine’s genius could not have
made its own way without Boileau’s mentorship, is to pay a far worse
compliment to that genius than some not very fervent Racinians can allow;
and, in the second, the spirit, if not the letter, of his criticism is against that
of Racine’s very best work. If I cared to do so, I think I could show that
Phèdre herself comes within the Bolæan[379] maledictions. As for Athalie,
the very admirers of Boileau have asked how, after his unsparing censure of
the religious epic, he could tolerate the religious drama?
Have we done? Not quite. After such a reformation, after such labours of
Hercules as we have held up to us, we are entitled to expect a new crop, a
new breed of poets rising everywhere from the purged and heartened land.
Is the poetic product of the last quarter of the seventeenth century in France
so admirable, so refreshing, such a contrast to the period of Chapelain and
Saint-Amant? I have some small acquaintance with French literature, but I
am unable to supply the names of the “Poets like Shakespeare, Beautiful
souls,” who, formed by the precepts of the Art Poétique, rush in crowds
Page 297
upon the sight during that period. But, it will be said, time must be given—
the French poetry of the eighteenth century is the work of Boileau through
his disciples. It is: and by these fruits may he and they be justly judged. He
cannot, indeed, claim the admirable light work of Piron and the rest: some
of it very nearly, or quite, incurs his anathemas, and all is composed more
or less outside his precepts, and in accordance with the practice of La
Fontaine rather than with his. But he can claim the Henriade, and, in part,
the odes of J. B. Rousseau—he may be permitted even to assume the laurels
of Delille and of Le Brun—Pindare. Perhaps, despite the sacred adage, the
growth of the thorn does indicate the strength and genuineness of the vine,
and, perhaps, it can only be a fig which is so fertile in such stately thistles.
But the real weakness of Boileau’s criticism does not fully appear till we
Concluding come to examine him on the true ground. What are his
remarks on him.
actual critical deliverances, on concrete critical points,
worth? We have seen something of the answer to this already. A certain
amount of his condemning censure—though nearly always expressed
without urbaneness, without humanity, with the hectoring and bullying tone
of an ill-conditioned schoolmaster, or the venom of a spiteful rival—must
be validated; there is no lack of bad writers at any time, and Boileau’s
provided a plentiful crop of them. But in most instances these writers were
unimportant weeds, who would have been cast into the oven on the morrow
of their flourishing, if Boileau had never written a line. On the other hand,
in regard to the two greatest writers, in verse or drama, of his own day and
country, Corneille and Molière, he loses no opportunity of censuring the
one, and accords, till after his death, but faint and limited praise to the other.
Even his misbeloved ancients he cannot praise with the mingled enthusiasm
and acuteness that mark Longinus, or even Dionysius. The great merit of
Virgil, in his eyes, is that Virgil manages mythological “machines” so
deftly: and, if we look elsewhere at what he says of writers so different as
Æschylus and Ovid, we shall find a flat generality, with no attempt even at
the mot propre. Only on the satirists, at least on Horace and Juvenal, is he
better. For Boileau, as we have said, was a satirist to the core, to the finger-
tips, and here he speaks as he feels. If we want his opinion on great modern
foreign poets, we have it explicitly on Tasso and Ariosto, implicitly in his
silence about almost everybody else.
I am not conscious of any unfairness or omission, though I do not pretend
to a mere colourless impartiality, in this survey; and after it I think we may
the French poetry of the eighteenth century is the work of Boileau through
his disciples. It is: and by these fruits may he and they be justly judged. He
cannot, indeed, claim the admirable light work of Piron and the rest: some
of it very nearly, or quite, incurs his anathemas, and all is composed more
or less outside his precepts, and in accordance with the practice of La
Fontaine rather than with his. But he can claim the Henriade, and, in part,
the odes of J. B. Rousseau—he may be permitted even to assume the laurels
of Delille and of Le Brun—Pindare. Perhaps, despite the sacred adage, the
growth of the thorn does indicate the strength and genuineness of the vine,
and, perhaps, it can only be a fig which is so fertile in such stately thistles.
But the real weakness of Boileau’s criticism does not fully appear till we
Concluding come to examine him on the true ground. What are his
remarks on him.
actual critical deliverances, on concrete critical points,
worth? We have seen something of the answer to this already. A certain
amount of his condemning censure—though nearly always expressed
without urbaneness, without humanity, with the hectoring and bullying tone
of an ill-conditioned schoolmaster, or the venom of a spiteful rival—must
be validated; there is no lack of bad writers at any time, and Boileau’s
provided a plentiful crop of them. But in most instances these writers were
unimportant weeds, who would have been cast into the oven on the morrow
of their flourishing, if Boileau had never written a line. On the other hand,
in regard to the two greatest writers, in verse or drama, of his own day and
country, Corneille and Molière, he loses no opportunity of censuring the
one, and accords, till after his death, but faint and limited praise to the other.
Even his misbeloved ancients he cannot praise with the mingled enthusiasm
and acuteness that mark Longinus, or even Dionysius. The great merit of
Virgil, in his eyes, is that Virgil manages mythological “machines” so
deftly: and, if we look elsewhere at what he says of writers so different as
Æschylus and Ovid, we shall find a flat generality, with no attempt even at
the mot propre. Only on the satirists, at least on Horace and Juvenal, is he
better. For Boileau, as we have said, was a satirist to the core, to the finger-
tips, and here he speaks as he feels. If we want his opinion on great modern
foreign poets, we have it explicitly on Tasso and Ariosto, implicitly in his
silence about almost everybody else.
I am not conscious of any unfairness or omission, though I do not pretend
to a mere colourless impartiality, in this survey; and after it I think we may
Page 298
go back to the general question, may ask, Is this a great or even a good
critic? and may answer it in the negative. That Boileau was important to his
own time may be granted; that he was no ill scavenger of certain sorts of
literary rubbish may be granted; that he gave help to those who chose to
tread in the limited path to which France was confining herself, so that they
might tread it with somewhat more grace, with much more of firmness and
confidence than they would otherwise have done—that, in short, he did for
France something of the same kind as that which Dryden did for England,
may be granted. This is not exactly a small thing. But before we call it a
great one we must look at the other side. Boileau did not, like Dryden, leave
escapes and safety-valves to the spirit that was too mighty for the narrower
channels of poetic style; he exhibited none of his contemporary’s catholicity
of mind and taste; he had none of his noble enthusiasms, none of his
constructive power and progressive flexibility in positive critical estimate.
The good that he did is terribly chequered by the consideration that, in
sharpening certain edges of the French mind, he blunted and distorted
others in a fashion which, after two hundred years, has not been fully
remedied. A great man of letters, perhaps; a craftsmanlike “finisher of the
law,” and no ill pedagogue in literature certainly: but a great critic?
Scarcely, I think.
Two writers at least, whom few would call lesser men of letters than
Boileau, and in whom some may see greater qualifications for criticism,
must be much more briefly dealt with, partly because in their case no
controversy is needed, partly because their actual contributions to criticism
form but a very small part of their work, and partly also because neither
aimed at for himself, or has received from posterity and tradition, any very
La Bruyère and prominent place as a critic. These are La Bruyère and
Fénelon.
Fénelon. It would not be correct to say that either is in
deliberate or conscious opposition to the législateur du Parnasse. Their
general conscious principles are much the same as his; they are, like him,
uncompromising defenders of the Ancients, and though Fénelon has a
private crotchet about poetic prose, yet the non-essentiality of verse to
poetry had been a general, if not a universal, tenet with antiquity. But
whether in consequence of that impatience of despotism which those who
love to mix literary and political history have seen in the second generation
of the siècle de Louis XIV., as compared with the first; or from the fact that,
as compared with Boileau, they were much more of Greek,[380] and less of
critic? and may answer it in the negative. That Boileau was important to his
own time may be granted; that he was no ill scavenger of certain sorts of
literary rubbish may be granted; that he gave help to those who chose to
tread in the limited path to which France was confining herself, so that they
might tread it with somewhat more grace, with much more of firmness and
confidence than they would otherwise have done—that, in short, he did for
France something of the same kind as that which Dryden did for England,
may be granted. This is not exactly a small thing. But before we call it a
great one we must look at the other side. Boileau did not, like Dryden, leave
escapes and safety-valves to the spirit that was too mighty for the narrower
channels of poetic style; he exhibited none of his contemporary’s catholicity
of mind and taste; he had none of his noble enthusiasms, none of his
constructive power and progressive flexibility in positive critical estimate.
The good that he did is terribly chequered by the consideration that, in
sharpening certain edges of the French mind, he blunted and distorted
others in a fashion which, after two hundred years, has not been fully
remedied. A great man of letters, perhaps; a craftsmanlike “finisher of the
law,” and no ill pedagogue in literature certainly: but a great critic?
Scarcely, I think.
Two writers at least, whom few would call lesser men of letters than
Boileau, and in whom some may see greater qualifications for criticism,
must be much more briefly dealt with, partly because in their case no
controversy is needed, partly because their actual contributions to criticism
form but a very small part of their work, and partly also because neither
aimed at for himself, or has received from posterity and tradition, any very
La Bruyère and prominent place as a critic. These are La Bruyère and
Fénelon.
Fénelon. It would not be correct to say that either is in
deliberate or conscious opposition to the législateur du Parnasse. Their
general conscious principles are much the same as his; they are, like him,
uncompromising defenders of the Ancients, and though Fénelon has a
private crotchet about poetic prose, yet the non-essentiality of verse to
poetry had been a general, if not a universal, tenet with antiquity. But
whether in consequence of that impatience of despotism which those who
love to mix literary and political history have seen in the second generation
of the siècle de Louis XIV., as compared with the first; or from the fact that,
as compared with Boileau, they were much more of Greek,[380] and less of
Page 299
purely Latin students; or simply as a result of what has been justly
attributed to both,[381] the predominance of the sens propre over mere
observation of the communis sensus—it is certain that both, and especially
Fénelon, display much more individualism, and at the same time much
more catholicity. It may be added that they know more, and are to some
extent (though to no large one) free from that hopeless ignoring of older
French literature which was Boileau’s greatest fault.
La Bruyère’s[382] contribution is contained in the opening section, “Des
The “Des Ouvrages de l’Esprit,” of his famous Caractères. It is not
Ouvrages de
l’Esprit.”
very long; it is—according to the plan of the work it is not
merely entitled but obliged to be—studiously desultory;
and it is not perhaps improved by the other necessity of throwing much of it
into portraits of imaginary persons, who are sometimes no doubt very close
copies of real ones. But it contains some open and undisguised judgments
of the great writers of the past, and a number of astonishingly original,
pregnant, and monumentally phrased observations of a general character. In
fact I should not hesitate to say that La Bruyère is, after Dryden, who had
preceded him by twenty years, the first very great man of letters in modern
times who gave himself to Criticism with a comparatively unshackled mind,
and who has put matter of permanent value in her treasuries without being a
General professional rhetorician or commentator. We need not dwell
observations.
on the famous overture Tout est dit, for it is merely a
brilliant example of the kind of paradox-shell or rocket, half truth, half
falsehood, which a writer of the kind explodes at the beginning of his
entertainment, to attract the attention of his readers, and let them see the
brilliancy of the stars that drop from it. But how astonishing is it, in the 17th
section, to find, two hundred years and more ago, the full Flaubertian
doctrine of the “single word” laid down with confidence, and without an
apparent sense that the writer is saying anything new![383] No matter that
soon after, in 20, we find an old fallacy, ever new, put in the words, “Le
plaisir de la critique nous ôte celui d'être vivement touchés de très-belles
choses.” If criticism does this it is the wrong criticism—the criticism à la
Boileau, and not the criticism after the manner of Longinus. A man may
have spent a lifetime in reading “overthwart and endlong” (as the Morte
d’Arthur says) in every direction of literature, in reading always critically,
and in reading for long years as professional reviewer, and yet feel as
attributed to both,[381] the predominance of the sens propre over mere
observation of the communis sensus—it is certain that both, and especially
Fénelon, display much more individualism, and at the same time much
more catholicity. It may be added that they know more, and are to some
extent (though to no large one) free from that hopeless ignoring of older
French literature which was Boileau’s greatest fault.
La Bruyère’s[382] contribution is contained in the opening section, “Des
The “Des Ouvrages de l’Esprit,” of his famous Caractères. It is not
Ouvrages de
l’Esprit.”
very long; it is—according to the plan of the work it is not
merely entitled but obliged to be—studiously desultory;
and it is not perhaps improved by the other necessity of throwing much of it
into portraits of imaginary persons, who are sometimes no doubt very close
copies of real ones. But it contains some open and undisguised judgments
of the great writers of the past, and a number of astonishingly original,
pregnant, and monumentally phrased observations of a general character. In
fact I should not hesitate to say that La Bruyère is, after Dryden, who had
preceded him by twenty years, the first very great man of letters in modern
times who gave himself to Criticism with a comparatively unshackled mind,
and who has put matter of permanent value in her treasuries without being a
General professional rhetorician or commentator. We need not dwell
observations.
on the famous overture Tout est dit, for it is merely a
brilliant example of the kind of paradox-shell or rocket, half truth, half
falsehood, which a writer of the kind explodes at the beginning of his
entertainment, to attract the attention of his readers, and let them see the
brilliancy of the stars that drop from it. But how astonishing is it, in the 17th
section, to find, two hundred years and more ago, the full Flaubertian
doctrine of the “single word” laid down with confidence, and without an
apparent sense that the writer is saying anything new![383] No matter that
soon after, in 20, we find an old fallacy, ever new, put in the words, “Le
plaisir de la critique nous ôte celui d'être vivement touchés de très-belles
choses.” If criticism does this it is the wrong criticism—the criticism à la
Boileau, and not the criticism after the manner of Longinus. A man may
have spent a lifetime in reading “overthwart and endlong” (as the Morte
d’Arthur says) in every direction of literature, in reading always critically,
and in reading for long years as professional reviewer, and yet feel as
Page 300
keenly as ever the literary charm which age cannot wither nor custom stale,
—the “strong pleasure” of the beautiful word.
But how well he recovers himself, among other things, with the remarks
on the Cid, and the difference between the fine and the faultless at 30! with
the declaration of independence immediately following in 31, and
practically drawing a cancel through the whole critical teaching of Boileau!
“Quand une lecture vous élève l’esprit, ... ne cherchez pas une autre règle
pour juger; il est bon.” How delicate his remarks in 37 on the delicacy of
touch, the illogical but impeccable concatenation, the justice of phrase, of
the best feminine writing! Not a few of his observations are paraphrases or,
as it were, echoes of Longinus himself, whom he has assimilated as
Longinus’ translator never could have done. And if some further remarks on
criticism in 63 seem to regard rather the abuse than the nature of the art—if
the famous “Un homme né Chrétien et Français se trouve contraint dans la
satire; les grands sujets lui sont défendus,” is half a political grumble and
half a paralogism, which was to be accepted with fatal results in the next
century—both this and other things are redeemed throughout by the general
independence and freshness of the judgment, the vigour and decision of the
phrase. In the judgments of authors above referred to (which begin at 38
and continue for some eight or nine numbers, to be resumed with special
reference to dramatists and dramas a little later), it is especially possible to
appreciate La Bruyère’s idiosyncrasy as a critic, the vivacity and power of
his natural endowments in this direction, and his drawback, arising partly
from sheer acceptance of prevailing opinion, and partly from the fact that he
is merely coasting the subject on his way to others.
In the joint or contrasted judgment of Terence and Molière the modern
man, according to his kind, may find something either to laugh or to be
Judgments of irritated at. Some would as soon think of comparing the
authors.
dribbling tap of a jar of distilled water to the Falls of
Schaffhausen. But La Bruyère practically shows himself as conscious of the
truth as his time would let him be when, allowing Terence purity, exactness
to rule, polish, elegance, character (i.e., type-character), he ruins all by
admitting that “il n’a manqué à lui que d'être moins froid.” And if (as many
did then, and some do now) he takes that wrong view of style and language
which permits them to accuse Molière of “jargon,” of barbarism, he gives
him fire, naïveté, a fount of real pleasantry, exact representation
(“imitation”) of manners, imagery, and “the scourge of ridicule.” “What a
—the “strong pleasure” of the beautiful word.
But how well he recovers himself, among other things, with the remarks
on the Cid, and the difference between the fine and the faultless at 30! with
the declaration of independence immediately following in 31, and
practically drawing a cancel through the whole critical teaching of Boileau!
“Quand une lecture vous élève l’esprit, ... ne cherchez pas une autre règle
pour juger; il est bon.” How delicate his remarks in 37 on the delicacy of
touch, the illogical but impeccable concatenation, the justice of phrase, of
the best feminine writing! Not a few of his observations are paraphrases or,
as it were, echoes of Longinus himself, whom he has assimilated as
Longinus’ translator never could have done. And if some further remarks on
criticism in 63 seem to regard rather the abuse than the nature of the art—if
the famous “Un homme né Chrétien et Français se trouve contraint dans la
satire; les grands sujets lui sont défendus,” is half a political grumble and
half a paralogism, which was to be accepted with fatal results in the next
century—both this and other things are redeemed throughout by the general
independence and freshness of the judgment, the vigour and decision of the
phrase. In the judgments of authors above referred to (which begin at 38
and continue for some eight or nine numbers, to be resumed with special
reference to dramatists and dramas a little later), it is especially possible to
appreciate La Bruyère’s idiosyncrasy as a critic, the vivacity and power of
his natural endowments in this direction, and his drawback, arising partly
from sheer acceptance of prevailing opinion, and partly from the fact that he
is merely coasting the subject on his way to others.
In the joint or contrasted judgment of Terence and Molière the modern
man, according to his kind, may find something either to laugh or to be
Judgments of irritated at. Some would as soon think of comparing the
authors.
dribbling tap of a jar of distilled water to the Falls of
Schaffhausen. But La Bruyère practically shows himself as conscious of the
truth as his time would let him be when, allowing Terence purity, exactness
to rule, polish, elegance, character (i.e., type-character), he ruins all by
admitting that “il n’a manqué à lui que d'être moins froid.” And if (as many
did then, and some do now) he takes that wrong view of style and language
which permits them to accuse Molière of “jargon,” of barbarism, he gives
him fire, naïveté, a fount of real pleasantry, exact representation
(“imitation”) of manners, imagery, and “the scourge of ridicule.” “What a
Page 301
man,” he says, “you could have made of these two!” though how you can
join fire and froid, and what would have been left of Terence’s old-maidish
neatness when joined to such a husband, Heaven and Apollo only know!
But we can see very well that La Bruyère admires Molière because he does
admire him, and Terence because he is told to do so.
The conjunction, even in contrast, of Malherbe and Théophile has
puzzled some folk; but, as M. Servois points out, it is a mere matter of
chronology, and Boileau had done it before. And it is very noteworthy that
La Bruyère does not bear hardly on Théophile. The remark that Marot
seems more modern than Ronsard is perfectly well founded. And if there is
some oddity in his surprise that Marot, “natural and easy as he is, did not
make of Ronsard, so full of verve and fire, a poet better than either of them
actually is,” it is much less odd, and much more acute, than it looks at first
sight. The judgment of Rabelais, a famous one, if not wholly wide-eyed,
keeps its eyes singularly wide open for so artificial an age: and there is a
whole volume in the double defence of Montaigne against opposite
criticisms, to the effect that he is too full of thought for some men, and too
natural in his mode of thinking for others.
It is by no means certain that the unnamed author aimed at in 52 is
Molière, and the most fervent of “Cornelians” can hardly quarrel with the
judgment that Corneille is unequalled where he is good, but more often
unequal to himself. La Bruyère seems, though rather furtively, to set the
awful Unities at nought in this great dramatist’s favour; and he is both just
and happy in praising the variety of Corneille as compared to the monotony
of Racine. The whole article, which is a long one, is distinctly on the
Cornelian side, though far from unjust to Racine; and one can well
understand the disconcerting effect which it seems to have produced on
Voltaire.
On the whole, the only reasons for not ranking La Bruyère’s criticism
very high indeed are that there is so little of it, and that it is obviously the
work of a man to whom it is more a casual pastime than a business—who
has not thought himself out all along the line in it, but has emitted a few
observations. Still, those which express his deliberate opinions are almost
always sound, and only some of those which he has adopted without
examination are wholly or partially false.
The critical utterances of Fénelon[384] are much more voluminous, though
in part, at least, not quite so disinterested, and they are of a very high
join fire and froid, and what would have been left of Terence’s old-maidish
neatness when joined to such a husband, Heaven and Apollo only know!
But we can see very well that La Bruyère admires Molière because he does
admire him, and Terence because he is told to do so.
The conjunction, even in contrast, of Malherbe and Théophile has
puzzled some folk; but, as M. Servois points out, it is a mere matter of
chronology, and Boileau had done it before. And it is very noteworthy that
La Bruyère does not bear hardly on Théophile. The remark that Marot
seems more modern than Ronsard is perfectly well founded. And if there is
some oddity in his surprise that Marot, “natural and easy as he is, did not
make of Ronsard, so full of verve and fire, a poet better than either of them
actually is,” it is much less odd, and much more acute, than it looks at first
sight. The judgment of Rabelais, a famous one, if not wholly wide-eyed,
keeps its eyes singularly wide open for so artificial an age: and there is a
whole volume in the double defence of Montaigne against opposite
criticisms, to the effect that he is too full of thought for some men, and too
natural in his mode of thinking for others.
It is by no means certain that the unnamed author aimed at in 52 is
Molière, and the most fervent of “Cornelians” can hardly quarrel with the
judgment that Corneille is unequalled where he is good, but more often
unequal to himself. La Bruyère seems, though rather furtively, to set the
awful Unities at nought in this great dramatist’s favour; and he is both just
and happy in praising the variety of Corneille as compared to the monotony
of Racine. The whole article, which is a long one, is distinctly on the
Cornelian side, though far from unjust to Racine; and one can well
understand the disconcerting effect which it seems to have produced on
Voltaire.
On the whole, the only reasons for not ranking La Bruyère’s criticism
very high indeed are that there is so little of it, and that it is obviously the
work of a man to whom it is more a casual pastime than a business—who
has not thought himself out all along the line in it, but has emitted a few
observations. Still, those which express his deliberate opinions are almost
always sound, and only some of those which he has adopted without
examination are wholly or partially false.
The critical utterances of Fénelon[384] are much more voluminous, though
in part, at least, not quite so disinterested, and they are of a very high
Page 302
Fénelon. The critical interest and value. They are contained in two
Dialogues sur
l’Eloquence.
documents, the Dialogues sur l’Eloquence (which, though
not known, is believed to be a work of his early manhood,
but was only published after his death by the Chevalier Ramsay) and one of
his very latest pieces, the Mémoire sur les Occupations de l’Académie
Française, sent in, to obey a resolution of that body, in November 1713,
with the much longer explanatory letter of the next year thereon to Dacier.
The first is conditioned—unfavourably it may seem for our purpose—by
its avowed limitation to sacred eloquence. A young aspirant to the cloth has
fallen in love with a fashionable preacher, wishes a cooler friend to share
his enthusiasm, and, being rebuffed, elicits from that friend by degrees a
complete criticism of the rhetoric of the pulpit, and the rules that should
govern it. Since we have found discussions, even of profane oratory,
surprisingly barren in pure literary criticism of old, this of sacred may seem
still less promising. But though Fénelon’s interest in the soul-curing part of
the matter is constant and intense, he does not allow it either to obscure or
to adulterate his literary censure. At first, in particular, the arguments of his
“A” (the critical friend who, no doubt, is Fénelon himself) not merely have
nothing more to do with the pulpit than with the bar or the Senate, but have
little if anything more to do with spoken than with written literature. The
disdainful description (at p. 5 ed. cit.) of that epigrammatic or enigmatic
style, which is always with us, as des tours de passe-passe; the excellent
passage (ibid., 7-9) on Demosthenes, Isocrates, Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
and Longinus himself—on whom Fénelon speaks with far more
appreciation than Boileau, and probably with more knowledge than Dryden;
the bold attitude taken up at p. 18 on the question of the perfect hero; the
exaltation (perhaps the most noteworthy thing in the whole) of “painting,”
of bringing the visual image home to the reader, at p. 35; the scorn of mere
verbal fault-finding at p. 47; the ardent panegyric of the literary greatness of
the Bible at p. 69; and of the Fathers at p. 86 sq.—all these passages, which
are almost pure gold of criticism, have nothing special to do with the mere
métier of the preacher. That Fénelon was neither perfect nor wholly beyond
his time is quite true. He has here a deplorable assault on Gothic
Architecture (which he repeats at greater length in the Academic letter, and
for which, if he had not been so good and great a man, one could wish the
stones of his cathedral to have fallen upon him), and his contempt extends
Dialogues sur
l’Eloquence.
documents, the Dialogues sur l’Eloquence (which, though
not known, is believed to be a work of his early manhood,
but was only published after his death by the Chevalier Ramsay) and one of
his very latest pieces, the Mémoire sur les Occupations de l’Académie
Française, sent in, to obey a resolution of that body, in November 1713,
with the much longer explanatory letter of the next year thereon to Dacier.
The first is conditioned—unfavourably it may seem for our purpose—by
its avowed limitation to sacred eloquence. A young aspirant to the cloth has
fallen in love with a fashionable preacher, wishes a cooler friend to share
his enthusiasm, and, being rebuffed, elicits from that friend by degrees a
complete criticism of the rhetoric of the pulpit, and the rules that should
govern it. Since we have found discussions, even of profane oratory,
surprisingly barren in pure literary criticism of old, this of sacred may seem
still less promising. But though Fénelon’s interest in the soul-curing part of
the matter is constant and intense, he does not allow it either to obscure or
to adulterate his literary censure. At first, in particular, the arguments of his
“A” (the critical friend who, no doubt, is Fénelon himself) not merely have
nothing more to do with the pulpit than with the bar or the Senate, but have
little if anything more to do with spoken than with written literature. The
disdainful description (at p. 5 ed. cit.) of that epigrammatic or enigmatic
style, which is always with us, as des tours de passe-passe; the excellent
passage (ibid., 7-9) on Demosthenes, Isocrates, Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
and Longinus himself—on whom Fénelon speaks with far more
appreciation than Boileau, and probably with more knowledge than Dryden;
the bold attitude taken up at p. 18 on the question of the perfect hero; the
exaltation (perhaps the most noteworthy thing in the whole) of “painting,”
of bringing the visual image home to the reader, at p. 35; the scorn of mere
verbal fault-finding at p. 47; the ardent panegyric of the literary greatness of
the Bible at p. 69; and of the Fathers at p. 86 sq.—all these passages, which
are almost pure gold of criticism, have nothing special to do with the mere
métier of the preacher. That Fénelon was neither perfect nor wholly beyond
his time is quite true. He has here a deplorable assault on Gothic
Architecture (which he repeats at greater length in the Academic letter, and
for which, if he had not been so good and great a man, one could wish the
stones of his cathedral to have fallen upon him), and his contempt extends
Page 303
to mediæval literature. But the same doom is on the best of archbishops and
the most beautiful of girls: they can but give what they have.
And Fénelon gives very much. The Memoir and Letter above referred to
were elicited by a demand on Academicians for proposals in regard to the
Sur les reorganising of the work of the Academy. Here, therefore,
Occupations de
l’Académie
as in the other case, the immediate purpose is special; but
Française. the general literary interests of the critic again prevent it
from being specialised in the dismal and deadly modern
sense. He does not fail to deal with the daily dreadful line of the Dictionary;
but he proposes, as supplements, divers things—a new Poetic, a new
Rhetoric, Chrestomathies from the Ancients on both heads (things needed to
this day), and above all, a complete Academic edition of the great classics
of France, with really critical introduction and annotations, or at least a
corpus of critical observations on them.
But, as usual, it is in the incidental remarks that the value of the piece
lies; and these make it, I do not hesitate to say, the most valuable single
piece of criticism that France had yet produced. Fénelon shows his
acquaintance with other modern languages; and pays a particular
compliment to Prior, who, it must be remembered, was about this time
occupying his rather uneasy post of Ambassador. He may be too hasty in
saying that the Italians and Spaniards will perhaps never make good
tragedies or epigrams, nor the French good epics and sonnets, as he most
certainly is too ignorant in saying that “after our ancient poets” [a very few,
mostly undistinguished persons, in the latter part of the sixteenth century]
had tried classical metres and failed, “we” [the French of course] “had to
invent measures suitable to our words.” But he is astonishingly bold in his
recurrence to Pléiade principles, and in actually urging English as a good
example on the point of taking from neighbours any word found
convenient. He says plumply “de telles usurpations sont permises” (p. 103
ed. cit.) Alas! in England itself, and after two centuries, one uses this just
liberty at personal risk. His Rhetoric section partly repeats the Dialogues,
and is altogether more technical or professional than literary. But his
And its Poetical section is full of interest. It is marred by that not
challenge to
correctness.
quite single-minded fancy for prose poetry which has
already been glanced at, and to which we shall have to
return. But the attack on rhyme is partly excused, and the, at first sight,
bewildering remark (p. 123) that “rhyme is of itself more difficult than all
the most beautiful of girls: they can but give what they have.
And Fénelon gives very much. The Memoir and Letter above referred to
were elicited by a demand on Academicians for proposals in regard to the
Sur les reorganising of the work of the Academy. Here, therefore,
Occupations de
l’Académie
as in the other case, the immediate purpose is special; but
Française. the general literary interests of the critic again prevent it
from being specialised in the dismal and deadly modern
sense. He does not fail to deal with the daily dreadful line of the Dictionary;
but he proposes, as supplements, divers things—a new Poetic, a new
Rhetoric, Chrestomathies from the Ancients on both heads (things needed to
this day), and above all, a complete Academic edition of the great classics
of France, with really critical introduction and annotations, or at least a
corpus of critical observations on them.
But, as usual, it is in the incidental remarks that the value of the piece
lies; and these make it, I do not hesitate to say, the most valuable single
piece of criticism that France had yet produced. Fénelon shows his
acquaintance with other modern languages; and pays a particular
compliment to Prior, who, it must be remembered, was about this time
occupying his rather uneasy post of Ambassador. He may be too hasty in
saying that the Italians and Spaniards will perhaps never make good
tragedies or epigrams, nor the French good epics and sonnets, as he most
certainly is too ignorant in saying that “after our ancient poets” [a very few,
mostly undistinguished persons, in the latter part of the sixteenth century]
had tried classical metres and failed, “we” [the French of course] “had to
invent measures suitable to our words.” But he is astonishingly bold in his
recurrence to Pléiade principles, and in actually urging English as a good
example on the point of taking from neighbours any word found
convenient. He says plumply “de telles usurpations sont permises” (p. 103
ed. cit.) Alas! in England itself, and after two centuries, one uses this just
liberty at personal risk. His Rhetoric section partly repeats the Dialogues,
and is altogether more technical or professional than literary. But his
And its Poetical section is full of interest. It is marred by that not
challenge to
correctness.
quite single-minded fancy for prose poetry which has
already been glanced at, and to which we shall have to
return. But the attack on rhyme is partly excused, and the, at first sight,
bewildering remark (p. 123) that “rhyme is of itself more difficult than all
Page 304
the rules of Greek and Latin prosody” is rendered intelligible, by a
remembrance of the extremely arbitrary rules which had by this time been
imposed on the French rhymer. The paragraph on Ronsard,[385] the best
known piece of the whole, is admirable in its tempering of sympathy with
censure; and the acknowledgment of the “opposite extreme” into which
French for more than a century had fallen,[386] is one of the great epoch-
making sentences of criticism. Of course it was not attended to; but for a
hundred years and more French literature bore ever-increasing testimony to
its truth.
The censure of French drama is injured, partly by certain prejudices of
the moralist and the theologian, and partly by less accountable crotchets. On
Molière in particular, though he cannot help admiring the greatest of his
contemporary countrymen, he is something from which we had best turn
our faces, putting likewise into the wallet at our backs (and Time’s) the
complaints of la basse plaisanterie de Plaute, and the statement that on se
passe volontiers d’Aristophane. The point is the quantity of opinion which
is not for Oblivion’s alms-bag. And, abundant as this is in Fénelon, the
quality of it is more remarkable even than the quantity. He always prefers
the study of author, and book, and piece, and phrase, to the study of Kind
and the manufacture of Rule. Though he is in no sense an Anarchist, and
may even have sometimes his cloth rather too much in his remembrance,
yet he remembers likewise, and transfers to profane things, the sacred
precept, “Prove all things: hold fast that which is good.” The fatal fault of
the extremest kind of neo-classic criticism—the weak point in all of it—is
the usual refusal to “prove” the work, even to see whether it is good or not,
if it fails to answer at first blush to certain arbitrary specifications. Fénelon
is free from this: he has escaped from the House of Bondage.
We have for some time been occupied with the critical work of great men
of letters; we must now turn to that of four men who, if they had not been
critics, would hardly have been heard of in their own day, and would
certainly not be remembered by posterity out of their own country—or
perhaps in it. As it was, all the four exercised immense influence, not
merely in France but elsewhere, and three of them saw their work promptly
translated into English, and received with almost touching deference in the
country which had Dryden to look to for criticism, nay, by Dryden himself.
The order in which we may take them shall be determined by that of the
appearance of their principal critical works. The Pratique du Théâtre of
remembrance of the extremely arbitrary rules which had by this time been
imposed on the French rhymer. The paragraph on Ronsard,[385] the best
known piece of the whole, is admirable in its tempering of sympathy with
censure; and the acknowledgment of the “opposite extreme” into which
French for more than a century had fallen,[386] is one of the great epoch-
making sentences of criticism. Of course it was not attended to; but for a
hundred years and more French literature bore ever-increasing testimony to
its truth.
The censure of French drama is injured, partly by certain prejudices of
the moralist and the theologian, and partly by less accountable crotchets. On
Molière in particular, though he cannot help admiring the greatest of his
contemporary countrymen, he is something from which we had best turn
our faces, putting likewise into the wallet at our backs (and Time’s) the
complaints of la basse plaisanterie de Plaute, and the statement that on se
passe volontiers d’Aristophane. The point is the quantity of opinion which
is not for Oblivion’s alms-bag. And, abundant as this is in Fénelon, the
quality of it is more remarkable even than the quantity. He always prefers
the study of author, and book, and piece, and phrase, to the study of Kind
and the manufacture of Rule. Though he is in no sense an Anarchist, and
may even have sometimes his cloth rather too much in his remembrance,
yet he remembers likewise, and transfers to profane things, the sacred
precept, “Prove all things: hold fast that which is good.” The fatal fault of
the extremest kind of neo-classic criticism—the weak point in all of it—is
the usual refusal to “prove” the work, even to see whether it is good or not,
if it fails to answer at first blush to certain arbitrary specifications. Fénelon
is free from this: he has escaped from the House of Bondage.
We have for some time been occupied with the critical work of great men
of letters; we must now turn to that of four men who, if they had not been
critics, would hardly have been heard of in their own day, and would
certainly not be remembered by posterity out of their own country—or
perhaps in it. As it was, all the four exercised immense influence, not
merely in France but elsewhere, and three of them saw their work promptly
translated into English, and received with almost touching deference in the
country which had Dryden to look to for criticism, nay, by Dryden himself.
The order in which we may take them shall be determined by that of the
appearance of their principal critical works. The Pratique du Théâtre of
Page 305
François Hédelin, Abbé d’Aubignac, appeared in 1657; the first Réflexions
of Rapin in 1668; the Entretiens d’Ariste of Bouhours in 1671; and the
Traité du Poème Epique of Le Bossu in 1675. All four, it is to be observed,
were clerics of one sort or another, while Rapin and Bouhours were
schoolmasters, and Hédelin was at least a private tutor. Taken together, they
exhibit the hand-book and school-book side of the criticism of which
Boileau is the contemporary satiric expositor to the world; and their
criticism cannot properly be dissociated from his. As dates sufficiently
show, they do not in any sense derive from him; nor, to do him justice, does
he from them. The whole quintet, with others of less importance, are all the
more valuable exponents of the strong contemporary set of the tide in the
direction of hard-and-fast “classical” legislation for literature.
It is among the few and peculiar laurels of the Abbé D’Aubignac to have
The Abbé failed in more kinds of literature than most men try. His
D’Aubignac.
tragedy of Zénobie (1647) was the occasion of a well-
known epigram from the great Condé, which is not the less good for its
obviousness, and which, with equal ease and justice,[387] can be adjusted to
his criticism. He is more of an Aristotelian “know-nothing” than La
Mesnardière, and has very much less talent. Not content with the Pratique
(which, as has been said, was really a belated contribution to the cabal
against Corneille), he attacked two of the great tragedian’s later plays,
Sophonisbe and Sertorius, in his Dissertations en forme de Remarques
(1663), and he had many years earlier attempted to justify Terence against
the strictures of Ménage. The historian of criticism would have been
grateful to him had he confined himself to writing tractates “On the nature
of Satyrs, Brutes, Monsters, and Demons,”[388] Relations du Royaume de
Coquetterie, and novels like the rather well-named Macarise, or the Queen
of the Fortunate Isles. For these we could simply have neglected.
The Pratique, unfortunately, we cannot neglect wholly, because of its
His Pratique du position as a symptom and an influence. In reading it,[389]
Théâtre.
the generous mind oscillates between a sense of intolerable
boredom, and a certain ruth at the obviously honest purpose and industry
that underlie the heaps of misapplied learning, and season the gabble of
foolish authority-citing. He begins by a demonstration that all great
statesmen have always patronised stately games, of which scenic
representation is one. Vulgar minds have nothing to do with it (this was a
slap at Castelvetro and his horrible doctrine of pleasing the multitude,
of Rapin in 1668; the Entretiens d’Ariste of Bouhours in 1671; and the
Traité du Poème Epique of Le Bossu in 1675. All four, it is to be observed,
were clerics of one sort or another, while Rapin and Bouhours were
schoolmasters, and Hédelin was at least a private tutor. Taken together, they
exhibit the hand-book and school-book side of the criticism of which
Boileau is the contemporary satiric expositor to the world; and their
criticism cannot properly be dissociated from his. As dates sufficiently
show, they do not in any sense derive from him; nor, to do him justice, does
he from them. The whole quintet, with others of less importance, are all the
more valuable exponents of the strong contemporary set of the tide in the
direction of hard-and-fast “classical” legislation for literature.
It is among the few and peculiar laurels of the Abbé D’Aubignac to have
The Abbé failed in more kinds of literature than most men try. His
D’Aubignac.
tragedy of Zénobie (1647) was the occasion of a well-
known epigram from the great Condé, which is not the less good for its
obviousness, and which, with equal ease and justice,[387] can be adjusted to
his criticism. He is more of an Aristotelian “know-nothing” than La
Mesnardière, and has very much less talent. Not content with the Pratique
(which, as has been said, was really a belated contribution to the cabal
against Corneille), he attacked two of the great tragedian’s later plays,
Sophonisbe and Sertorius, in his Dissertations en forme de Remarques
(1663), and he had many years earlier attempted to justify Terence against
the strictures of Ménage. The historian of criticism would have been
grateful to him had he confined himself to writing tractates “On the nature
of Satyrs, Brutes, Monsters, and Demons,”[388] Relations du Royaume de
Coquetterie, and novels like the rather well-named Macarise, or the Queen
of the Fortunate Isles. For these we could simply have neglected.
The Pratique, unfortunately, we cannot neglect wholly, because of its
His Pratique du position as a symptom and an influence. In reading it,[389]
Théâtre.
the generous mind oscillates between a sense of intolerable
boredom, and a certain ruth at the obviously honest purpose and industry
that underlie the heaps of misapplied learning, and season the gabble of
foolish authority-citing. He begins by a demonstration that all great
statesmen have always patronised stately games, of which scenic
representation is one. Vulgar minds have nothing to do with it (this was a
slap at Castelvetro and his horrible doctrine of pleasing the multitude,
Page 306
which is a real lethalis arundo in the sides of all these Frenchmen). He is,
we are rather surprised to hear, not going to theorise. All the theory has
been done, and done once for all, by the ancients. What he wants to do is to
apply this theory to all the practical contingencies. And this he does through
Unities and Episodes, through Acts and Scenes, through Narration,
Discourse, Deliberation, everything, with sleuth-hound patience on his own
part, and requiring Job’s variety on that of his readers. He is sometimes
quite fair even to Corneille, he seems to be quite well-meaning; but he
cannot help his nativity of dulness, and at his very best he is a critic of
dramaturgy, not of drama.
René Rapin, hardly as one sometimes feels inclined to think and speak of
Rapin. him, was a person of an entirely different order. In fact, it is
very much more on isolated and particular points than on generals that he
lays himself open to reproach, though it may be retorted that the generals,
which lead logically (as they usually do) to such absurd particulars, are
thereby utterly condemned themselves. It was specially unfortunate for
Rapin that his principles and precepts were at once caught up in England by
a man like Rymer,[390] and expounded in coarse and blunted form to a people
His method still green and unknowing in critical matters. There is even
partly good.
much in his method which deserves high praise. It is very
noteworthy that, before he presumed to draw up (or at least to give to the
world) his Réflexions on the Poetics and on Poetry, on Eloquence, on
History, and on Philosophy, he had preluded by elaborate examinations of
the actual documents in the shape of “Comparisons”—“Of Homer and
Virgil,” “Of Cicero and Demosthenes,” “Of Thucydides and Livy,” “Of
Plato and Aristotle.” And though this sort of “cock-fight comparison” (as
the more vernacular writers of his own time in English might have said) is
“muchwhat” (as his translator Rymer actually does say) of a mistake, unless
pursued with the greatest possible care—though it was already hackneyed
in itself and constantly in need of extending, supplementing, blending—yet
it is at any rate infinitely superior to the examination in vacuo, the rattling
of dry bones and abstract kinds and qualities, to which too many of his
contemporaries confined themselves.
Unfortunately Rapin himself was always, consciously or unconsciously,
tending towards this other method; and even in his comparisons—much
more in the extended survey of ancient and modern writers which he
subjoins to the Réflexions—he is still more constantly seduced by that
we are rather surprised to hear, not going to theorise. All the theory has
been done, and done once for all, by the ancients. What he wants to do is to
apply this theory to all the practical contingencies. And this he does through
Unities and Episodes, through Acts and Scenes, through Narration,
Discourse, Deliberation, everything, with sleuth-hound patience on his own
part, and requiring Job’s variety on that of his readers. He is sometimes
quite fair even to Corneille, he seems to be quite well-meaning; but he
cannot help his nativity of dulness, and at his very best he is a critic of
dramaturgy, not of drama.
René Rapin, hardly as one sometimes feels inclined to think and speak of
Rapin. him, was a person of an entirely different order. In fact, it is
very much more on isolated and particular points than on generals that he
lays himself open to reproach, though it may be retorted that the generals,
which lead logically (as they usually do) to such absurd particulars, are
thereby utterly condemned themselves. It was specially unfortunate for
Rapin that his principles and precepts were at once caught up in England by
a man like Rymer,[390] and expounded in coarse and blunted form to a people
His method still green and unknowing in critical matters. There is even
partly good.
much in his method which deserves high praise. It is very
noteworthy that, before he presumed to draw up (or at least to give to the
world) his Réflexions on the Poetics and on Poetry, on Eloquence, on
History, and on Philosophy, he had preluded by elaborate examinations of
the actual documents in the shape of “Comparisons”—“Of Homer and
Virgil,” “Of Cicero and Demosthenes,” “Of Thucydides and Livy,” “Of
Plato and Aristotle.” And though this sort of “cock-fight comparison” (as
the more vernacular writers of his own time in English might have said) is
“muchwhat” (as his translator Rymer actually does say) of a mistake, unless
pursued with the greatest possible care—though it was already hackneyed
in itself and constantly in need of extending, supplementing, blending—yet
it is at any rate infinitely superior to the examination in vacuo, the rattling
of dry bones and abstract kinds and qualities, to which too many of his
contemporaries confined themselves.
Unfortunately Rapin himself was always, consciously or unconsciously,
tending towards this other method; and even in his comparisons—much
more in the extended survey of ancient and modern writers which he
subjoins to the Réflexions—he is still more constantly seduced by that
Page 307
labelling criticism which we have traced long ago to the “canonising” way
of the Alexandrians, and for which we have said hard things of Fronto and
His particular others. Yet further, both his general style of criticism, and
absurdities as to
Homer in blame.
his prepossessions of this or that kind, constantly draw him
into pitfalls only less absurd than those in which Rymer
himself wallows. I do not remember that Rapin ever lays it down that a hero
must not be a black man; probably the French had not been afflicted—for I
suppose they did not make Syphax black—with any poet daring enough to
start the question. But he does other things which, though less
conspicuously, are quite as really silly. In the moral section[391] of his
comparison between Homer and Virgil he has too much of the Jesuit
schoolmaster, with his reverence towards boys, to mention that terrible
scene between Zeus and Hera which had already distressed the compatriots
of Aristophanes and Martial, and which remains one of the earliest
examples of absolutely perfect poetry in a particular kind. But he makes up
for it. We have, of course, the “wine-heavy, dog-eyed, hare-hearted” line to
mourn over. How undignified of Homer to make Achilles anxious about the
preservation of the body of Patroclus from corruption! How could Ulysses,
with such an excellent wife and such an amiable son, waste time with
Calypso and dangle after Circe, to whom the pudibund Rapin applies
epithets which our Decorum prevents us from repeating, and for which he
deserved to be both shipwrecked and turned into a Gryll. Was it quite nice
of Priam, as a father, to wish all his children dead so Hector were alive?
Nausicaa is too shocking. A Princess’s face should not show grace, the
Jesuit thinks,[392] to men in Ulysses’ condition.
Whereas with Virgil it is quite different. Everybody, including the Gods,
As to Virgil in behaves “like persons of Quality.” Even in the case of Dido
praise.
dux et Trojanus there is no violation of modesty,[393] which
certainly seems either a little Escobarish towards them, or a little severe to
Circe and Calypso. Indeed, we sometimes find ourselves rather lost with
Rapin’s morality. For, in another passage (Chap. XIII.), he actually
discovers un artifice des plus délicats et des plus fins in Virgil’s taking
away Dido’s character, though History had made her a Lady of very good
repute.[394] For he did it to bring into contempt the Carthaginians who were
afterwards to become odious to Rome. “A nice marality!” indeed, as my
Lord Foppington observed of another matter, not so very long after Rapin
wrote this.
of the Alexandrians, and for which we have said hard things of Fronto and
His particular others. Yet further, both his general style of criticism, and
absurdities as to
Homer in blame.
his prepossessions of this or that kind, constantly draw him
into pitfalls only less absurd than those in which Rymer
himself wallows. I do not remember that Rapin ever lays it down that a hero
must not be a black man; probably the French had not been afflicted—for I
suppose they did not make Syphax black—with any poet daring enough to
start the question. But he does other things which, though less
conspicuously, are quite as really silly. In the moral section[391] of his
comparison between Homer and Virgil he has too much of the Jesuit
schoolmaster, with his reverence towards boys, to mention that terrible
scene between Zeus and Hera which had already distressed the compatriots
of Aristophanes and Martial, and which remains one of the earliest
examples of absolutely perfect poetry in a particular kind. But he makes up
for it. We have, of course, the “wine-heavy, dog-eyed, hare-hearted” line to
mourn over. How undignified of Homer to make Achilles anxious about the
preservation of the body of Patroclus from corruption! How could Ulysses,
with such an excellent wife and such an amiable son, waste time with
Calypso and dangle after Circe, to whom the pudibund Rapin applies
epithets which our Decorum prevents us from repeating, and for which he
deserved to be both shipwrecked and turned into a Gryll. Was it quite nice
of Priam, as a father, to wish all his children dead so Hector were alive?
Nausicaa is too shocking. A Princess’s face should not show grace, the
Jesuit thinks,[392] to men in Ulysses’ condition.
Whereas with Virgil it is quite different. Everybody, including the Gods,
As to Virgil in behaves “like persons of Quality.” Even in the case of Dido
praise.
dux et Trojanus there is no violation of modesty,[393] which
certainly seems either a little Escobarish towards them, or a little severe to
Circe and Calypso. Indeed, we sometimes find ourselves rather lost with
Rapin’s morality. For, in another passage (Chap. XIII.), he actually
discovers un artifice des plus délicats et des plus fins in Virgil’s taking
away Dido’s character, though History had made her a Lady of very good
repute.[394] For he did it to bring into contempt the Carthaginians who were
afterwards to become odious to Rome. “A nice marality!” indeed, as my
Lord Foppington observed of another matter, not so very long after Rapin
wrote this.
Page 308
Yet even here it is fair to observe that Rapin is at least trying to make the
two ends of his “reason” and his “reflection” meet: and so it is always:—
two ends of his “reason” and his “reflection” meet: and so it is always:—
Page 309
“His reason rooted in unreason stands,
And sense insensate makes him idly wise.”
The consequences are patent on every page, and a chapter might be not
As to others. disagreeably filled with them. Pegasus is admirable, but the
Hippogriff is the vain imagination of a sick brain: Camilla touching, but
Bradamante absurd. Achilles retires from the Grecian army because he is
discontented; Æneas goes to Italy because he is pious; and Medea kills her
children because she is revengeful—a passage in which it is agreeable to
perceive the obvious first draught of “I love my love with an A.” As for the
moderns, Du Bartas and Ronsard had all the genius their age was capable of
—a text for a sermon as long as this Book. “Scarce aught can be
understood” of the Agamemnon! In fact, quotations[395] simply leap to the
eye as one reads the page.
It is more important, if less amusing, to inquire how a man, obviously of
much ability, extremely well informed, freer, it would seem, from mere
prejudice than most of his fellows, came in this way to be constantly
stumbling over blocks that the veriest blockhead might, one would think,
have avoided, and running against blank walls, of which a blind man might,
The reading of it should seem, have been aware. Rapin is, perhaps, the
his riddle.
main and appointed Helot of the neo-classic system. That
system, instead of assembling all the great works of literary art, and giving
an impartial hearing to each, takes one or two ancient treatises, themselves
necessarily based upon but a partial examination, spins out of them a
universal code, fills in that code, where it is wanting, with analogies and
with perilous makeshifts of “decorum,” uniformity, and the like, and then
proceeds to apply the result back to the actual works of art. It is no wonder
that, even of the ancient division of these, hardly one escapes scot-free,
except those which were originally composed by men of great, but not the
greatest, genius, on a somewhat similar scheme. Elsewhere the unfortunate
critic is constantly catching himself in those bushes which he has himself
planted, and bruising himself against obstacles which he has elaborately set
up. In a general way he grants that Homer is the greatest of poets; but the
Fetiches of “Design” and “Decorum” extort from him the sacrifice of this in
detail, and the acknowledgment that Homer is frequently most indecorous,
and that large parts of him are out of drawing. And so of all.
And sense insensate makes him idly wise.”
The consequences are patent on every page, and a chapter might be not
As to others. disagreeably filled with them. Pegasus is admirable, but the
Hippogriff is the vain imagination of a sick brain: Camilla touching, but
Bradamante absurd. Achilles retires from the Grecian army because he is
discontented; Æneas goes to Italy because he is pious; and Medea kills her
children because she is revengeful—a passage in which it is agreeable to
perceive the obvious first draught of “I love my love with an A.” As for the
moderns, Du Bartas and Ronsard had all the genius their age was capable of
—a text for a sermon as long as this Book. “Scarce aught can be
understood” of the Agamemnon! In fact, quotations[395] simply leap to the
eye as one reads the page.
It is more important, if less amusing, to inquire how a man, obviously of
much ability, extremely well informed, freer, it would seem, from mere
prejudice than most of his fellows, came in this way to be constantly
stumbling over blocks that the veriest blockhead might, one would think,
have avoided, and running against blank walls, of which a blind man might,
The reading of it should seem, have been aware. Rapin is, perhaps, the
his riddle.
main and appointed Helot of the neo-classic system. That
system, instead of assembling all the great works of literary art, and giving
an impartial hearing to each, takes one or two ancient treatises, themselves
necessarily based upon but a partial examination, spins out of them a
universal code, fills in that code, where it is wanting, with analogies and
with perilous makeshifts of “decorum,” uniformity, and the like, and then
proceeds to apply the result back to the actual works of art. It is no wonder
that, even of the ancient division of these, hardly one escapes scot-free,
except those which were originally composed by men of great, but not the
greatest, genius, on a somewhat similar scheme. Elsewhere the unfortunate
critic is constantly catching himself in those bushes which he has himself
planted, and bruising himself against obstacles which he has elaborately set
up. In a general way he grants that Homer is the greatest of poets; but the
Fetiches of “Design” and “Decorum” extort from him the sacrifice of this in
detail, and the acknowledgment that Homer is frequently most indecorous,
and that large parts of him are out of drawing. And so of all.
Page 310
Le Bossu (to whom the English sometimes give a superfluous final t,
whom they generally defraud of his rightful “Le,” and whom in the main
they know only from the locus classicus of Sterne)[396] reapproximates to the
Le Bossu and Aubignacian level. But it is fair to say that his dulness
the Abstract
Epic.
arises from a different cause. He is not, like Hédelin, a
stupid man—he is distinctly the reverse—nor is he spiteful.
He is merely the hardiest and most thoroughgoing devotee of a certain kind
of abstract criticism. He does, of course, give us chapters on some actual
illustrations of Heroic or Epic; but they are scarcely more necessary to his
book than the picture-illuminations of a poem or a novel. Being a writer of
some esprit, he sometimes exercises it in rather dangerous fictions—for
instance, his imagined epic of Meridarpax, where all the mouse-stories
(mouse and lion, town and country mouse, &c.) are worked in, would be
most sprightly, if it did not look sprightlier still as an exercise in laughing at
his own side. But by far the greater bulk, and the whole vertebration and
solid substance, of his argument are devoted to Epic in the Abstract. Design,
definition, and parts; good fables and bad fables; episodes; the biology, so
to speak, of the Action, the narration, the manners and characters, not
forgetting the Machines, and at last something on the Thoughts and
Expression—which have about one-ninth of the whole. In short, if we have
not exactly Epic in vacuo, we have it as a dried preparation. The
complexity, anti-sensuousness, and dispassionate character of it are almost
abashing; one feels at the end that, to hanker after an actual poem, be it
Iliad or Orlando, has something sinful—something of the lust of the flesh.
We have said that Le Bossu is rather a sprightly person of a hyper-
Bouhours. scholastic kind. His brother Father, Bouhours, is still more
so; indeed, his famous inquiry, “Si un Allemand peut-être bel-esprit?”[397]
has got him rather into trouble with a prevailing party, in and out of
Germany. Beginning with the Entretiens d’Ariste et d’Eugène (1671), a
collection of chiefly verbal criticism on French writers, he continued it with
other works in belles lettres and theology, the most important of which, to
us, is La Manière de Bien Penser dans les Ouvrages d’Esprit (1687).[398]
The book, which is not short, consists of four Dialogues between Eudoxe
and Philanthe, “deux hommes de lettres (as the author remarks in a phrase
to which Time has given a piquant new meaning) que la science n’a point
gâtés.” Eudoxe, as the name indicates, is the author’s mouthpiece—a
judicious admirer of the Ancients, who can yet tolerate such moderns as
whom they generally defraud of his rightful “Le,” and whom in the main
they know only from the locus classicus of Sterne)[396] reapproximates to the
Le Bossu and Aubignacian level. But it is fair to say that his dulness
the Abstract
Epic.
arises from a different cause. He is not, like Hédelin, a
stupid man—he is distinctly the reverse—nor is he spiteful.
He is merely the hardiest and most thoroughgoing devotee of a certain kind
of abstract criticism. He does, of course, give us chapters on some actual
illustrations of Heroic or Epic; but they are scarcely more necessary to his
book than the picture-illuminations of a poem or a novel. Being a writer of
some esprit, he sometimes exercises it in rather dangerous fictions—for
instance, his imagined epic of Meridarpax, where all the mouse-stories
(mouse and lion, town and country mouse, &c.) are worked in, would be
most sprightly, if it did not look sprightlier still as an exercise in laughing at
his own side. But by far the greater bulk, and the whole vertebration and
solid substance, of his argument are devoted to Epic in the Abstract. Design,
definition, and parts; good fables and bad fables; episodes; the biology, so
to speak, of the Action, the narration, the manners and characters, not
forgetting the Machines, and at last something on the Thoughts and
Expression—which have about one-ninth of the whole. In short, if we have
not exactly Epic in vacuo, we have it as a dried preparation. The
complexity, anti-sensuousness, and dispassionate character of it are almost
abashing; one feels at the end that, to hanker after an actual poem, be it
Iliad or Orlando, has something sinful—something of the lust of the flesh.
We have said that Le Bossu is rather a sprightly person of a hyper-
Bouhours. scholastic kind. His brother Father, Bouhours, is still more
so; indeed, his famous inquiry, “Si un Allemand peut-être bel-esprit?”[397]
has got him rather into trouble with a prevailing party, in and out of
Germany. Beginning with the Entretiens d’Ariste et d’Eugène (1671), a
collection of chiefly verbal criticism on French writers, he continued it with
other works in belles lettres and theology, the most important of which, to
us, is La Manière de Bien Penser dans les Ouvrages d’Esprit (1687).[398]
The book, which is not short, consists of four Dialogues between Eudoxe
and Philanthe, “deux hommes de lettres (as the author remarks in a phrase
to which Time has given a piquant new meaning) que la science n’a point
gâtés.” Eudoxe, as the name indicates, is the author’s mouthpiece—a
judicious admirer of the Ancients, who can yet tolerate such moderns as
Page 311
Voiture. Philanthe (also a speaking name) is a partisan of florid modernity,
who is, however, so little of a “stalwart” that he gives up Ariosto, and
intrenches himself behind Tasso and Lope. In the First dialogue Eudoxe
censures (with abundant citation, as throughout the book) Equivoques,
Hyperboles, pointes, concetti, and, generally, thoughts that are “not true.”
The Second and Third, starting from Longinus and Hermogenes, discuss the
true and the false in Sublimity and Wit: and the Fourth is mainly devoted to
Obscurity. Bouhours (whose influence on subsequent critics, especially on
Addison, was very great) writes agreeably, is free from rudeness and
pedantry, and is altogether rather a favourable example of the school of
Good Sense, quand même. But, as favourable examples of bad schools
generally do, he damages his cause more than less favourable ones, because
its drawbacks are more obvious and intrinsic. On his principles you must
ostracise the best, the noblest, the most charming, the most poetic things in
poetry. Et c’est tout dire.
As we approach the close of the chapter, we come upon classes and
masses of work which is at once impossible to examine in particular and, as
Encyclopædias a whole, elusive. In 1687 appeared the Jugements des
and Newspapers.
Savants[399] of Baillet, and ten years later the still more
famous Dictionnaire Historique et Critique of Bayle, who had preluded it,
from a time antecedent to that of Baillet’s publication, by Nouvelles de la
République de Lettres, a regular literary review. Long before this latter the
Journal des Savants[400] and the Mercure Galant[401] in France had provided
criticism, good, bad, and indifferent, with regular outlets for itself. And in
both kinds—that of the dictionary or encyclopædia, and that of the
periodical—the flood has never ceased, but has always increased since.
Fortunately for us the impossibility of treating all this is compensated by
the fact that such treatment, if possible, would be superfluous. But of Bayle
and Baillet at least something must be said particularly, and something also
of a remarkable and much less known continuator of the latter.
Bayle perhaps needed nothing but better taste, greater freedom from
prejudice, and a more exclusive bent towards purely literary criticism, to be
Bayle. one of the great literary critics of the world. But, unluckily for
himself, he had contracted, through corrupt following doubtless of the
Latins (even such respectable persons as Pliny) and of the scholars of the
Renaissance, a sort of perpetual itch and hankering after the indecent,
which, to say nothing else, is as teasing and as tedious in the long-run as an
who is, however, so little of a “stalwart” that he gives up Ariosto, and
intrenches himself behind Tasso and Lope. In the First dialogue Eudoxe
censures (with abundant citation, as throughout the book) Equivoques,
Hyperboles, pointes, concetti, and, generally, thoughts that are “not true.”
The Second and Third, starting from Longinus and Hermogenes, discuss the
true and the false in Sublimity and Wit: and the Fourth is mainly devoted to
Obscurity. Bouhours (whose influence on subsequent critics, especially on
Addison, was very great) writes agreeably, is free from rudeness and
pedantry, and is altogether rather a favourable example of the school of
Good Sense, quand même. But, as favourable examples of bad schools
generally do, he damages his cause more than less favourable ones, because
its drawbacks are more obvious and intrinsic. On his principles you must
ostracise the best, the noblest, the most charming, the most poetic things in
poetry. Et c’est tout dire.
As we approach the close of the chapter, we come upon classes and
masses of work which is at once impossible to examine in particular and, as
Encyclopædias a whole, elusive. In 1687 appeared the Jugements des
and Newspapers.
Savants[399] of Baillet, and ten years later the still more
famous Dictionnaire Historique et Critique of Bayle, who had preluded it,
from a time antecedent to that of Baillet’s publication, by Nouvelles de la
République de Lettres, a regular literary review. Long before this latter the
Journal des Savants[400] and the Mercure Galant[401] in France had provided
criticism, good, bad, and indifferent, with regular outlets for itself. And in
both kinds—that of the dictionary or encyclopædia, and that of the
periodical—the flood has never ceased, but has always increased since.
Fortunately for us the impossibility of treating all this is compensated by
the fact that such treatment, if possible, would be superfluous. But of Bayle
and Baillet at least something must be said particularly, and something also
of a remarkable and much less known continuator of the latter.
Bayle perhaps needed nothing but better taste, greater freedom from
prejudice, and a more exclusive bent towards purely literary criticism, to be
Bayle. one of the great literary critics of the world. But, unluckily for
himself, he had contracted, through corrupt following doubtless of the
Latins (even such respectable persons as Pliny) and of the scholars of the
Renaissance, a sort of perpetual itch and hankering after the indecent,
which, to say nothing else, is as teasing and as tedious in the long-run as an
Page 312
itch for sermonising and a hankering after instruction. Equally tedious, and
in much worse taste, is the perpetual undercurrent—not seldom becoming a
very obvious top-flood—of sceptical girding and nagging at the Bible and
at religion generally. In both these respects Bayle was followed by Voltaire.
But Voltaire, though his own literary sympathies were perhaps not his
strongest, had some. Of purely literary sympathies Bayle seldom shows
much trace—by which it is not in the least meant that he is not a man of
letters himself, for he is an excellent one, and the reproaches which have
been addressed to his style are not of much importance. But it is not
literature that he really loves: it is “philosophy” of a kind, and gossip of
almost all kinds. His wits are always bright and alert, and his learning,
though associated with so many qualities opposed to those of the mere
pedant, and not impeccable, is pretty sound. He has the curiosity, the
acuteness, the erudition, the industry of the true critic, but he has neither the
enthusiasm, nor the disinterestedness, nor the grasp.
In both these respects, as in others, Baillet is very much a diminutive of
Baillet. him. In fact, brightness of wit has almost disappeared; and
though Ménage—himself no infallible guide—has been both ill-mannered
and hypercritical in the strictures of the Anti-Baillet, there is no doubt that
the Jugements des Savants is a book not to be used without verification on
particular points. But this is almost a property, or, at worst, an inseparable
accident, of these Collectanea; and a fair-minded reader cannot help
admiring the extraordinary industry with which Baillet executed his task,
while appreciating the significance of this record of a division of literature
which, as we saw at the close of the last volume, had, scarcely two centuries
before, the most meagre representation of all.[402]
Curiously enough the want of judgment with which Baillet has been, and
to some extent may justly be, reproached shows itself exactly in the most
The ethos of a unlikely place. His opening volume on the nature,
Critical Pedant.
legitimacy, and so forth of Criticism, though too prolix,
collects an extraordinary number of just and valuable things, and adds to
them at least something of the author’s own. His Character of a Pedantic,
Chicaning, Malicious Critic (partly borrowed from Le Bon, partly
elaborated by himself) will be found at vol. i. p. 52., and has been justified
by some seven generations of the persons it describes. It is Pedantry “to
pick low and little faults, and to excite yourself over matters which are of
no importance.” It is Pedantry “to steal from an author and insult him at the
in much worse taste, is the perpetual undercurrent—not seldom becoming a
very obvious top-flood—of sceptical girding and nagging at the Bible and
at religion generally. In both these respects Bayle was followed by Voltaire.
But Voltaire, though his own literary sympathies were perhaps not his
strongest, had some. Of purely literary sympathies Bayle seldom shows
much trace—by which it is not in the least meant that he is not a man of
letters himself, for he is an excellent one, and the reproaches which have
been addressed to his style are not of much importance. But it is not
literature that he really loves: it is “philosophy” of a kind, and gossip of
almost all kinds. His wits are always bright and alert, and his learning,
though associated with so many qualities opposed to those of the mere
pedant, and not impeccable, is pretty sound. He has the curiosity, the
acuteness, the erudition, the industry of the true critic, but he has neither the
enthusiasm, nor the disinterestedness, nor the grasp.
In both these respects, as in others, Baillet is very much a diminutive of
Baillet. him. In fact, brightness of wit has almost disappeared; and
though Ménage—himself no infallible guide—has been both ill-mannered
and hypercritical in the strictures of the Anti-Baillet, there is no doubt that
the Jugements des Savants is a book not to be used without verification on
particular points. But this is almost a property, or, at worst, an inseparable
accident, of these Collectanea; and a fair-minded reader cannot help
admiring the extraordinary industry with which Baillet executed his task,
while appreciating the significance of this record of a division of literature
which, as we saw at the close of the last volume, had, scarcely two centuries
before, the most meagre representation of all.[402]
Curiously enough the want of judgment with which Baillet has been, and
to some extent may justly be, reproached shows itself exactly in the most
The ethos of a unlikely place. His opening volume on the nature,
Critical Pedant.
legitimacy, and so forth of Criticism, though too prolix,
collects an extraordinary number of just and valuable things, and adds to
them at least something of the author’s own. His Character of a Pedantic,
Chicaning, Malicious Critic (partly borrowed from Le Bon, partly
elaborated by himself) will be found at vol. i. p. 52., and has been justified
by some seven generations of the persons it describes. It is Pedantry “to
pick low and little faults, and to excite yourself over matters which are of
no importance.” It is Pedantry “to steal from an author and insult him at the
Page 313
same time; to tear outrageously those who differ with you in opinion.” It is
Pedantry “to endeavour to raise the whole world against some one who
does not think enough of Cicero.” It is Pedantry “to take occasion by an
author’s mistake to endeavour to humiliate him and ruin his reputation.” It
is Pedantry “to send your author back in a haughty manner to the lowest
class, and to menace him with whip and ferule for an error in chronology.”
It is not merely Pedantry but Chicanery “to separate phrases in order to give
them another sense,” to “impute printers’ errors,” to “neglect or change
punctuation.” We need not go on to Baillet’s signs of “Malignity”: the cap is
already a good cap, a very good cap, and one need not go far to find some
one to wear it.
A boiling down of this volume—which, so far as I know, has never been
executed—would be far superior to most general works on the subject with
which I am acquainted. Nor is Baillet’s distribution of his scheme altogether
a bad one. It is in the detailed carrying out (where one would suppose that
for a man of such industry the least part of the difficulty lay) that he is most
unsatisfactory. He neglects—in a manner surprising from one of that still
scholastically educated generation of ecclesiastics, who were wont
positively to abuse division and subdivision—the most obvious and
mechanical assistances of method. His first sketch of subdivisions, though
wanting succinctness, is not ill; but he never really carries it out, and stuffs
in its stead long collections on “Precocious Persons,” “Authors in
Disguise,” and “Les Anti” (books of a polemic character with titles so
beginning), which belong only to the curiosities of Criticism. Further, he
never seems to have set out, in any of the divisions, with a preliminary list
of the authors he meant to handle, so that his omissions and inclusions are
equally surprising. And, lastly, he never seems to have worked out any
preliminary calculus of the amount of space which such authors as he does
admit proportionately deserve. But the extent of his knowledge is
astounding, and the way in which he communicates it not disagreeable.
Baillet’s unmethodical prosecution of his task was in this fortunate for us
that it induced a somewhat younger contemporary, Balthasar Gibert, to take
up the rhetorical-critical side of his work, and continue it in a book[403] not
Gibert. very much known but of great value. In strict date it belongs to
the next century, and therefore to the next Book, but we have always taken,
and shall always take, liberty of protracting or foreshortening our views as
may be desirable; and this is avowedly a supplement to Baillet, though
Pedantry “to endeavour to raise the whole world against some one who
does not think enough of Cicero.” It is Pedantry “to take occasion by an
author’s mistake to endeavour to humiliate him and ruin his reputation.” It
is Pedantry “to send your author back in a haughty manner to the lowest
class, and to menace him with whip and ferule for an error in chronology.”
It is not merely Pedantry but Chicanery “to separate phrases in order to give
them another sense,” to “impute printers’ errors,” to “neglect or change
punctuation.” We need not go on to Baillet’s signs of “Malignity”: the cap is
already a good cap, a very good cap, and one need not go far to find some
one to wear it.
A boiling down of this volume—which, so far as I know, has never been
executed—would be far superior to most general works on the subject with
which I am acquainted. Nor is Baillet’s distribution of his scheme altogether
a bad one. It is in the detailed carrying out (where one would suppose that
for a man of such industry the least part of the difficulty lay) that he is most
unsatisfactory. He neglects—in a manner surprising from one of that still
scholastically educated generation of ecclesiastics, who were wont
positively to abuse division and subdivision—the most obvious and
mechanical assistances of method. His first sketch of subdivisions, though
wanting succinctness, is not ill; but he never really carries it out, and stuffs
in its stead long collections on “Precocious Persons,” “Authors in
Disguise,” and “Les Anti” (books of a polemic character with titles so
beginning), which belong only to the curiosities of Criticism. Further, he
never seems to have set out, in any of the divisions, with a preliminary list
of the authors he meant to handle, so that his omissions and inclusions are
equally surprising. And, lastly, he never seems to have worked out any
preliminary calculus of the amount of space which such authors as he does
admit proportionately deserve. But the extent of his knowledge is
astounding, and the way in which he communicates it not disagreeable.
Baillet’s unmethodical prosecution of his task was in this fortunate for us
that it induced a somewhat younger contemporary, Balthasar Gibert, to take
up the rhetorical-critical side of his work, and continue it in a book[403] not
Gibert. very much known but of great value. In strict date it belongs to
the next century, and therefore to the next Book, but we have always taken,
and shall always take, liberty of protracting or foreshortening our views as
may be desirable; and this is avowedly a supplement to Baillet, though
Page 314
limited in subject, allowing, in consequence, fuller treatment of individuals,
and displaying a good deal more originality and judgment. Gibert
excellently supplies Baillet’s admitted insufficiency as to Longinus; he is
very copious on Hermogenes, who had been coming, from Sturm
downwards, into more and more estimation; and if in his accounts of the
Italians he shows a traditional rather than an adequately comparative
estimate,[404] he is sufficiently modern to give a quite considerable abstract
of “M. Mackenze” (sic), i.e., Sir George Mackenzie’s Idea Eloquentiæ
Forensis Hodiernæ. That he “but yaws neither” between Rhetoric and
Criticism is a point of no importance against him; and it is a valuable
document for the gradual transformation of the one into the other.
We have to terminate this chapter, as we shall have to begin the
corresponding one in the next Book, by saying something on the famous—
the much too famous—Battle of the Ancients and the Moderns; but the
space which we shall give it on both occasions will appear strangely, and
The Ancient and perhaps scandalously, short to some readers. Neither
Modern
Quarrel.
idleness nor caprice, however, can be justly charged against
the contraction. In the first place, things generally known
may be justifiably passed with slighter notice in a continuous history, which
has to deal with much that is very little known. From all sides, and in all
ways, the Battle of the Ancients and Moderns is very well known indeed. It
enjoys, and for more than a generation has enjoyed, the advantage of
occupying one of the best monographs ever written. It engaged, on repeated
occasions, the attention of the best equipped and the most readable of all
French, if not of all, critics—Sainte-Beuve. It was arranged—not ill if not
wholly well—for popular English consumption by the expert skill of
Macaulay. As a result partly of Swift’s genuine literary sympathies, partly
of his more or less accidental connections, the commentators of one of the
greatest writers not only of England, but of the world, have been driven to
expound it: as have, for more essential reasons, those of more than two or
three great or interesting writers in France—Boileau, Perrault, Fontenelle,
and others. From all this almost everybody must have learnt something
about it, and to some of all this almost everybody can fairly be referred if he
wishes to learn more.
For the matter is not really of so much importance in the History of
Its small critical Criticism as it may at first sight appear to possess. These
value.
quarrels rarely do much critical good; for the critical issues
and displaying a good deal more originality and judgment. Gibert
excellently supplies Baillet’s admitted insufficiency as to Longinus; he is
very copious on Hermogenes, who had been coming, from Sturm
downwards, into more and more estimation; and if in his accounts of the
Italians he shows a traditional rather than an adequately comparative
estimate,[404] he is sufficiently modern to give a quite considerable abstract
of “M. Mackenze” (sic), i.e., Sir George Mackenzie’s Idea Eloquentiæ
Forensis Hodiernæ. That he “but yaws neither” between Rhetoric and
Criticism is a point of no importance against him; and it is a valuable
document for the gradual transformation of the one into the other.
We have to terminate this chapter, as we shall have to begin the
corresponding one in the next Book, by saying something on the famous—
the much too famous—Battle of the Ancients and the Moderns; but the
space which we shall give it on both occasions will appear strangely, and
The Ancient and perhaps scandalously, short to some readers. Neither
Modern
Quarrel.
idleness nor caprice, however, can be justly charged against
the contraction. In the first place, things generally known
may be justifiably passed with slighter notice in a continuous history, which
has to deal with much that is very little known. From all sides, and in all
ways, the Battle of the Ancients and Moderns is very well known indeed. It
enjoys, and for more than a generation has enjoyed, the advantage of
occupying one of the best monographs ever written. It engaged, on repeated
occasions, the attention of the best equipped and the most readable of all
French, if not of all, critics—Sainte-Beuve. It was arranged—not ill if not
wholly well—for popular English consumption by the expert skill of
Macaulay. As a result partly of Swift’s genuine literary sympathies, partly
of his more or less accidental connections, the commentators of one of the
greatest writers not only of England, but of the world, have been driven to
expound it: as have, for more essential reasons, those of more than two or
three great or interesting writers in France—Boileau, Perrault, Fontenelle,
and others. From all this almost everybody must have learnt something
about it, and to some of all this almost everybody can fairly be referred if he
wishes to learn more.
For the matter is not really of so much importance in the History of
Its small critical Criticism as it may at first sight appear to possess. These
value.
quarrels rarely do much critical good; for the critical issues
Page 315
are almost always obscured in them, first by the animus and prejudice of the
combatants, and then by the mere dust of the fighting. But this particular
combat did perhaps the least good of all; and could have done the least
good. It was indeed sufficiently inevitable: for the sort of deification with
which the whole of the sixteenth century, and most orthodox authority in
the earlier seventeenth, had regarded antiquity, was sure to breed revolt. But
it led to no conclusion; it evolved no truth. Truth is not the daughter of
Ignorance; and it is really hard to say which party shows most ignorance in
this matter. The defenders of the Ancients knew, as a rule, next to nothing of
the Moderns; and the defenders of the moderns knew a great deal too little
of the ancients. La Motte knew no Greek if Perrault[405] knew any; and with
Boileau not only to all appearance was English literature a blank sheet, but
almost the whole sheet of French literature before his own time was either
blank or inscribed with fantastic fallacies. Still, this is not a condition
entirely or commonly unknown in squabbles of this kind. The signal
distinction and disqualification of the advocates in this famous cause is that,
as a rule, neither any of the leaders, nor any of the juniors, had taken more
than the slightest trouble to get up, or at least to understand, his own brief.
The Ancients are here in a little better case than the Moderns; but they were
not in so very much better case. Most of them knew the Latin classics fairly
well; and some of them (though by no means all, or even many) had a fair,
while a few had a good, acquaintance with Greek.[406] But, with rarest, if
with any exceptions, they persisted in exaggerating, if not in contemplating
solely, that side of Classical Literature which has been and must be
admitted to be its principal side, but which is not the only one. They would
not see—or if they saw, they expressed positive distaste for—the vaguer,
more imaginative, more “Romantic” beauty of Greek, and in a less degree
of Latin. They never dreamt of turning the tables on their antagonists, as
they might have done to no inconsiderable extent, from this point of view.
And by holding up Design, Order, Decorum, and the rest, as paramount
conditions of literary excellence, they laid themselves open to the most
inconvenient retorts from well-equipped adversaries, and even received
some on the score of Homer, badly as their adversaries were equipped as a
rule.
On the other hand, the Moderns were, for the most part, like men who
have Toledos by their sides and choose to fight with cabbage-plants. The
French ignored the English and sneered at the Italians and Spaniards since
combatants, and then by the mere dust of the fighting. But this particular
combat did perhaps the least good of all; and could have done the least
good. It was indeed sufficiently inevitable: for the sort of deification with
which the whole of the sixteenth century, and most orthodox authority in
the earlier seventeenth, had regarded antiquity, was sure to breed revolt. But
it led to no conclusion; it evolved no truth. Truth is not the daughter of
Ignorance; and it is really hard to say which party shows most ignorance in
this matter. The defenders of the Ancients knew, as a rule, next to nothing of
the Moderns; and the defenders of the moderns knew a great deal too little
of the ancients. La Motte knew no Greek if Perrault[405] knew any; and with
Boileau not only to all appearance was English literature a blank sheet, but
almost the whole sheet of French literature before his own time was either
blank or inscribed with fantastic fallacies. Still, this is not a condition
entirely or commonly unknown in squabbles of this kind. The signal
distinction and disqualification of the advocates in this famous cause is that,
as a rule, neither any of the leaders, nor any of the juniors, had taken more
than the slightest trouble to get up, or at least to understand, his own brief.
The Ancients are here in a little better case than the Moderns; but they were
not in so very much better case. Most of them knew the Latin classics fairly
well; and some of them (though by no means all, or even many) had a fair,
while a few had a good, acquaintance with Greek.[406] But, with rarest, if
with any exceptions, they persisted in exaggerating, if not in contemplating
solely, that side of Classical Literature which has been and must be
admitted to be its principal side, but which is not the only one. They would
not see—or if they saw, they expressed positive distaste for—the vaguer,
more imaginative, more “Romantic” beauty of Greek, and in a less degree
of Latin. They never dreamt of turning the tables on their antagonists, as
they might have done to no inconsiderable extent, from this point of view.
And by holding up Design, Order, Decorum, and the rest, as paramount
conditions of literary excellence, they laid themselves open to the most
inconvenient retorts from well-equipped adversaries, and even received
some on the score of Homer, badly as their adversaries were equipped as a
rule.
On the other hand, the Moderns were, for the most part, like men who
have Toledos by their sides and choose to fight with cabbage-plants. The
French ignored the English and sneered at the Italians and Spaniards since
Page 316
the Renaissance, indulging the while in placid but contemptuous ignorance
or misrepresentation of everything before it out of Italy. The English were
prepared to admit that nobody had achieved sweetness in English numbers
before Mr Waller, apologised (except Dryden and Dryden only in a few
moments) for Shakespeare, and thought Chaucer a good funny old savage.
Out of such a welter of blundering little good could come, and no good
came save one. It is, I believe, absolutely impossible to trace, in so much as
one single filament, the extension and deepening of critical appreciation
which began in the next century to the Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns. But that quarrel did excite and feed the critical spirit and appetite,
and did give signs of an as yet half-blind craving for the possession of
critical knowledge.[407]
292. I am not aware of any History of the subject of this Book as a
whole: nor even of any devoted to French seventeenth-century Criticism
extensively but exclusively. The nearest thing to this latter is M. Bourgoin’s
excellent Les Maîtres de la Critique au 17ème Siècle (Paris, 1889), giving
studies of Malherbe, Chapelain, Saint-Evremond, Boileau, and La Bruyère.
For the inevitable, though tedious, quarrel of Ancients and Moderns, H.
Rigault’s book on the subject (Paris, 1859) is, and is likely to remain, a
standard. Monographs are, of course, innumerable; and the very large
proportionate space given in the usual French literary histories to this
period, makes these specially pertinent. Two of the largest volumes of M.
Petit de Julleville’s book, for instance—with ample bibliographies—contain
the seventeenth century only.
293. Felt rather than acknowledged, it is true. We by no means
uncommonly find hard words used of Scaliger, whose Homerophobia
shocked orthodox French critics of this time more than his Virgiliomania
conciliated them. Yet they owed him almost everything.
294. Enfin Malherbe vint. The edition in the Grands Ecrivains, by M.
Ludovic Lalanne (5 vols., Paris, 1862-69), is not only by far the best, but in
our case indispensable, as giving the full commentary on Desportes.
295. The Historiette of Tallemant (ed. Monmerqué, i. 236-278) is
apparently based upon a fuller version of Racan, and must be compared.
or misrepresentation of everything before it out of Italy. The English were
prepared to admit that nobody had achieved sweetness in English numbers
before Mr Waller, apologised (except Dryden and Dryden only in a few
moments) for Shakespeare, and thought Chaucer a good funny old savage.
Out of such a welter of blundering little good could come, and no good
came save one. It is, I believe, absolutely impossible to trace, in so much as
one single filament, the extension and deepening of critical appreciation
which began in the next century to the Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns. But that quarrel did excite and feed the critical spirit and appetite,
and did give signs of an as yet half-blind craving for the possession of
critical knowledge.[407]
292. I am not aware of any History of the subject of this Book as a
whole: nor even of any devoted to French seventeenth-century Criticism
extensively but exclusively. The nearest thing to this latter is M. Bourgoin’s
excellent Les Maîtres de la Critique au 17ème Siècle (Paris, 1889), giving
studies of Malherbe, Chapelain, Saint-Evremond, Boileau, and La Bruyère.
For the inevitable, though tedious, quarrel of Ancients and Moderns, H.
Rigault’s book on the subject (Paris, 1859) is, and is likely to remain, a
standard. Monographs are, of course, innumerable; and the very large
proportionate space given in the usual French literary histories to this
period, makes these specially pertinent. Two of the largest volumes of M.
Petit de Julleville’s book, for instance—with ample bibliographies—contain
the seventeenth century only.
293. Felt rather than acknowledged, it is true. We by no means
uncommonly find hard words used of Scaliger, whose Homerophobia
shocked orthodox French critics of this time more than his Virgiliomania
conciliated them. Yet they owed him almost everything.
294. Enfin Malherbe vint. The edition in the Grands Ecrivains, by M.
Ludovic Lalanne (5 vols., Paris, 1862-69), is not only by far the best, but in
our case indispensable, as giving the full commentary on Desportes.
295. The Historiette of Tallemant (ed. Monmerqué, i. 236-278) is
apparently based upon a fuller version of Racan, and must be compared.
Page 317
296. In the Ninth Satire (v. infra). Regnier was Desportes’ nephew, and is
said by the anecdotists (see last note) to have been incensed against
Malherbe, not merely by the latter’s literary opposition to his uncle, but by
a piece of gross rudeness of Malherbe’s to Desportes in the latter’s own
house, where Regnier himself had introduced him.
297. The French critics, however, have perhaps taken too literally his
reported blasphemy, that he did not value a good poet above a good player
at ninepins. Malherbe was a Norman—that is to say, a parcel-Englishman—
and may well have had something of that English humour of disparaging
his own matters which is so incomprehensible to the French.
298. The version in Tallemant adds that he disliked Virgil. He also
scoffed at the idea of “number” (rhythm) in prose.
299. Ed. Lalanne, iv. 249-473. There is an elaborate and standard
monograph on this by M. Brunot, La Doctrine de Malherbe (Paris, 1891);
but, as in other cases, I am obliged to postpone the comment to the text.
300. There are things of Castelvetro’s in the Opere Varie not wholly
dissimilar; but these were then unpublished.
301. I have sometimes wondered whether the fact that, according to the
Racan-Tallemant anecdote, Malherbe only “struck through” his copy of
Ronsard without annotating it, is not an involuntary testimony to the Prince
of Poets. Malherbe, for all his rancour and narrowness, was no fool; and he
must in his mind have anticipated a famous later sentence about the eagle
floating
“Beyond the arrows, shouts, and views of men.”
Desportes is not exactly an eagle, and Malherbe has better game with him,
but still not the best of the game.
302. Not to be confounded with the critic and versifier, René Rapin, who
was not born till after Regnier’s death, and whom to call “favourite, &c.,”
would indeed have been a dreadful thing to do; still less with the historian
Rapin de Thoyras, who was a generation later again. This Rapin was
Nicolas, part author of the glorious Satire Menippée, victor in the burlesque
said by the anecdotists (see last note) to have been incensed against
Malherbe, not merely by the latter’s literary opposition to his uncle, but by
a piece of gross rudeness of Malherbe’s to Desportes in the latter’s own
house, where Regnier himself had introduced him.
297. The French critics, however, have perhaps taken too literally his
reported blasphemy, that he did not value a good poet above a good player
at ninepins. Malherbe was a Norman—that is to say, a parcel-Englishman—
and may well have had something of that English humour of disparaging
his own matters which is so incomprehensible to the French.
298. The version in Tallemant adds that he disliked Virgil. He also
scoffed at the idea of “number” (rhythm) in prose.
299. Ed. Lalanne, iv. 249-473. There is an elaborate and standard
monograph on this by M. Brunot, La Doctrine de Malherbe (Paris, 1891);
but, as in other cases, I am obliged to postpone the comment to the text.
300. There are things of Castelvetro’s in the Opere Varie not wholly
dissimilar; but these were then unpublished.
301. I have sometimes wondered whether the fact that, according to the
Racan-Tallemant anecdote, Malherbe only “struck through” his copy of
Ronsard without annotating it, is not an involuntary testimony to the Prince
of Poets. Malherbe, for all his rancour and narrowness, was no fool; and he
must in his mind have anticipated a famous later sentence about the eagle
floating
“Beyond the arrows, shouts, and views of men.”
Desportes is not exactly an eagle, and Malherbe has better game with him,
but still not the best of the game.
302. Not to be confounded with the critic and versifier, René Rapin, who
was not born till after Regnier’s death, and whom to call “favourite, &c.,”
would indeed have been a dreadful thing to do; still less with the historian
Rapin de Thoyras, who was a generation later again. This Rapin was
Nicolas, part author of the glorious Satire Menippée, victor in the burlesque
Page 318
contest of the Flea (see Southey’s Doctor), a good versifier in Latin, and no
ill one in French, though he was of the (in France not very numerous)
partisans of classical metres. He died in 1608, not long after the date of this
satire.
303. I read my Regnier in two editions, both very desirable as books, and
of different merits otherwise. The one, that of Prosper Poitevin (Paris,
1860), is very compact; and, besides other matter, has the old commentary
of Brossette, which is extremely interesting as expressing the views of a
disciple of Boileau on a poet whom, to do him justice, Boileau could not
but admire, though he characteristically belittled him. The other, that of E.
Courbet (Paris, 1875), has a text adjusted in the scrupulous modern manner,
and some important additions to the biography.
304. For instance, the yoking of Virgil, Tasso, and Ronsard. This Pisgah-
sight of literature was what the Renaissance, and the whole neo-classic
period, almost invariably failed to attain.
305. There was, however, a remnant. Even Balzac called him “Le tyran
des mots et des syllabes;” even Chapelain recognised (acutely enough) the
fact that his methods were rhetorical rather than poetical; even Tallemant
practically summed him up, once and for all, in the words, “Il n’avait pas
beaucoup de génie: la méditation et l’art l’ont fait poëte.” But the majority
and the hour were with him.
306. Those who wish for something more on this subject, without
attacking Vaugelas for themselves, may be strongly recommended to the
full and excellent article of M. Brunot in Petit de Julleville (vi. 674-690),
one of the very best papers in the book.
307. He is often called this, but not quite fairly, for he was born in
Bresse.
308. For other grammarian-rhetoricians of 1610-1660 see M. Brunot as
above. On the Art Poétique of P. de Deimier (1610), compare also
Rücktaschel ubi sup.
309. He was born in Angoulême.
ill one in French, though he was of the (in France not very numerous)
partisans of classical metres. He died in 1608, not long after the date of this
satire.
303. I read my Regnier in two editions, both very desirable as books, and
of different merits otherwise. The one, that of Prosper Poitevin (Paris,
1860), is very compact; and, besides other matter, has the old commentary
of Brossette, which is extremely interesting as expressing the views of a
disciple of Boileau on a poet whom, to do him justice, Boileau could not
but admire, though he characteristically belittled him. The other, that of E.
Courbet (Paris, 1875), has a text adjusted in the scrupulous modern manner,
and some important additions to the biography.
304. For instance, the yoking of Virgil, Tasso, and Ronsard. This Pisgah-
sight of literature was what the Renaissance, and the whole neo-classic
period, almost invariably failed to attain.
305. There was, however, a remnant. Even Balzac called him “Le tyran
des mots et des syllabes;” even Chapelain recognised (acutely enough) the
fact that his methods were rhetorical rather than poetical; even Tallemant
practically summed him up, once and for all, in the words, “Il n’avait pas
beaucoup de génie: la méditation et l’art l’ont fait poëte.” But the majority
and the hour were with him.
306. Those who wish for something more on this subject, without
attacking Vaugelas for themselves, may be strongly recommended to the
full and excellent article of M. Brunot in Petit de Julleville (vi. 674-690),
one of the very best papers in the book.
307. He is often called this, but not quite fairly, for he was born in
Bresse.
308. For other grammarian-rhetoricians of 1610-1660 see M. Brunot as
above. On the Art Poétique of P. de Deimier (1610), compare also
Rücktaschel ubi sup.
309. He was born in Angoulême.
Page 319
310. Pp. 509-689 of the second of two stately folios (Paris, 1665). The
Letters are in the first.
311. Balzac himself rather mincingly deprecates this word. “Je ne donne”
he says to Chapelain (XX. 25) “jamais de jugement; mais je dis quelquefois
mon avis.”
312. With this it is interesting to compare the disquisition written to
Balzac, and apparently at his request, De Ludicra Dictione (opening his
Opera, fol., Amst., 1709) by François Vavasseur, a Jesuit Professor, who
also wrote not a bad book on Epigrams and some other literary work,
besides sermons and theological treatises. Vavasseur is at once refreshingly
logical and audacious. The Greeks (he is bold enough even to face the retort
of “Aristophanes”?) did not use ludicra dictio or burlesque language. Nor
did the Romans: for Lucilius desideratur (scarcely so much as to warrant
the conclusion to those who know the fragments well), and as for Petronius
and Apuleius, decent people never mention them. Secondly, the ancient
critics give no precepts for it. Thirdly, there is no reason for using it.
Fourthly, there are many reasons for not using it. So that is settled. One may
like Vavasseur.
313. Some authorities give this as the anagram, the other as the name.
But it does not in the least matter.
314. The Pleiad tragedies (v. supra, p. 127) had been Senecan, but not
quite “regular”; and though Hardy broke loose from Time and Place, it was
not always very violently.
315. Ogier, like his Italian predecessors, is firm on the pleasure-giving
quality of dramatic art. His manner is well illustrated by his remark that the
constant arrival of messengers is more suitable to a good inn than to a good
tragedy. One wonders whether he knew the Spaniards (v. inf. ch. 2).
316. His mother was deeply devoted to this school, and had in her youth
known Ronsard personally. The gibing part of the anecdote about the author
of the Pucelle being “bred a poet” was never very funny, and is now more
than very stale. The historical part remains and flourishes.
Letters are in the first.
311. Balzac himself rather mincingly deprecates this word. “Je ne donne”
he says to Chapelain (XX. 25) “jamais de jugement; mais je dis quelquefois
mon avis.”
312. With this it is interesting to compare the disquisition written to
Balzac, and apparently at his request, De Ludicra Dictione (opening his
Opera, fol., Amst., 1709) by François Vavasseur, a Jesuit Professor, who
also wrote not a bad book on Epigrams and some other literary work,
besides sermons and theological treatises. Vavasseur is at once refreshingly
logical and audacious. The Greeks (he is bold enough even to face the retort
of “Aristophanes”?) did not use ludicra dictio or burlesque language. Nor
did the Romans: for Lucilius desideratur (scarcely so much as to warrant
the conclusion to those who know the fragments well), and as for Petronius
and Apuleius, decent people never mention them. Secondly, the ancient
critics give no precepts for it. Thirdly, there is no reason for using it.
Fourthly, there are many reasons for not using it. So that is settled. One may
like Vavasseur.
313. Some authorities give this as the anagram, the other as the name.
But it does not in the least matter.
314. The Pleiad tragedies (v. supra, p. 127) had been Senecan, but not
quite “regular”; and though Hardy broke loose from Time and Place, it was
not always very violently.
315. Ogier, like his Italian predecessors, is firm on the pleasure-giving
quality of dramatic art. His manner is well illustrated by his remark that the
constant arrival of messengers is more suitable to a good inn than to a good
tragedy. One wonders whether he knew the Spaniards (v. inf. ch. 2).
316. His mother was deeply devoted to this school, and had in her youth
known Ronsard personally. The gibing part of the anecdote about the author
of the Pucelle being “bred a poet” was never very funny, and is now more
than very stale. The historical part remains and flourishes.
Page 320
317. It is formally the Academy’s and not his. But there is no real doubt
that nearly all of it expresses his sentiments, and that much of it is actually
his in language. The whole history of the Cid dispute is minute and
complicated, and may be found in many books. The persons chiefly
responsible for it, besides Richelieu and Chapelain, were Georges de
Scudéry, an eccentric failure of a genius, Mairet, a playwright of talent, and
Claveret, one of none. In all cases, it is to be feared, the extraordinary
success of the piece was the exciting cause.
318. Of course there is much to be said for them, rightly understood,
from the point of view of mere theatrical arrangement: while mediocre
writers are more safely to be trusted with than without them. But we are
speaking of literature, not the theatre; and in literature the weak brother is
rather a nuisance to be extirpated, than a person to be provided for, or
conceded to.
319. M. Jules Lemaître’s article on the subject in Petit de Julleville (iv.
273 sq.) most ingenuously cites the virtuous authority of M. Dumas fils in
support of Chapelain, and is not far from opining in the same sense. It is
always difficult for a Frenchman to pardon an honest love. If Chimène had
been married and Rodrigue her gallant, it would have been quite different.
She might have overlooked the blood of 20,000 fathers.
320. De la lecture des Vieux Romans, ed. Feillet, Paris, 1870.
Unfortunately printed in very small numbers, but still obtainable for less
than half its weight in silver.
321. It is really refreshing to find Mr. Burke saying ditto to M. Chapelain
some 150 years afterwards, in a sentence as well known to all the world as
that in the text is unknown to all but a few.
322. S’il faut qu’un Jeune Homme soit Amoureux. Sarrasin, Œuvres, ed.
cit. inf., 139-235.
323. Mémoires de la Société de l’Histoire, vol. xxi., Paris, 1894.
324. This, with other things, will be found in Chapelain’s Mélanges de
Littérature (Paris, 1726).
that nearly all of it expresses his sentiments, and that much of it is actually
his in language. The whole history of the Cid dispute is minute and
complicated, and may be found in many books. The persons chiefly
responsible for it, besides Richelieu and Chapelain, were Georges de
Scudéry, an eccentric failure of a genius, Mairet, a playwright of talent, and
Claveret, one of none. In all cases, it is to be feared, the extraordinary
success of the piece was the exciting cause.
318. Of course there is much to be said for them, rightly understood,
from the point of view of mere theatrical arrangement: while mediocre
writers are more safely to be trusted with than without them. But we are
speaking of literature, not the theatre; and in literature the weak brother is
rather a nuisance to be extirpated, than a person to be provided for, or
conceded to.
319. M. Jules Lemaître’s article on the subject in Petit de Julleville (iv.
273 sq.) most ingenuously cites the virtuous authority of M. Dumas fils in
support of Chapelain, and is not far from opining in the same sense. It is
always difficult for a Frenchman to pardon an honest love. If Chimène had
been married and Rodrigue her gallant, it would have been quite different.
She might have overlooked the blood of 20,000 fathers.
320. De la lecture des Vieux Romans, ed. Feillet, Paris, 1870.
Unfortunately printed in very small numbers, but still obtainable for less
than half its weight in silver.
321. It is really refreshing to find Mr. Burke saying ditto to M. Chapelain
some 150 years afterwards, in a sentence as well known to all the world as
that in the text is unknown to all but a few.
322. S’il faut qu’un Jeune Homme soit Amoureux. Sarrasin, Œuvres, ed.
cit. inf., 139-235.
323. Mémoires de la Société de l’Histoire, vol. xxi., Paris, 1894.
324. This, with other things, will be found in Chapelain’s Mélanges de
Littérature (Paris, 1726).
Page 321
325. Tennyson paid almost greater heed to his critics in detail; but he
never made any formal or general concession.
326. They will be found in all good editions. I always use the best, that of
M. Marty-Laveaux, where the Discours appear conveniently, if
chronologically out of place, in Vol. I, and the Examens, each at the head of
its own play.
327. Let me, for one has always to guard these things, observe that no
charge is here brought against the Agamemnon, which is perhaps the
greatest tragedy in the world out of Shakespeare, and almost worthy to be
ranked with Shakespeare’s best. It is of the folly of the commentators that
Corneille was, and that I (quam longo intervallo post Cornelium!) am
thinking.
328. Art Poét., p. 233. “Si toutefois la Fable est telle que le Poëte n’ait
pas lieu d’y recompenser la Vertu, il doit pour le moins faire en sorte que les
Personnes vertueuses soient louées publiquement.”
329. In his Œuvres (Paris, 1694), pp. 301-344.
330. This is very interesting in connection with Sarrasin’s appearance in
Chapelain’s dialogue and his own other work (v. supra, p. 260).
331. Scudéry thinks Four things necessary to Epic—the authority of
History, the observance of received Religion, the exercise of Poetic Licence
in Fiction, and the provision of Great Events. He is not uninteresting for his
connection with his sister’s prose Romances in which he had some, if not
much, share, and which he never forgets. Also, he clings to the Pléiade
technicalities to some extent—kindly, however, explaining such words as
Hune, Quille (which, he says rather quaintly, is un bois courbé qui est au
plus bas d’un vaisseau), and Calfater. The Ibrahim preface, thirteen years
earlier, exhibits the same obliging explanation of technicalities, and the
same virtuous adherence to The Rules. “Provided,” he says, “that an
Architect takes his measures right, he is assured of the beauty of his
building,” which would seem to dissuade any one from advancing beyond
the packing-case style of architecture. And he is sure that a Romance, like
an Epic, should never go beyond one year in time.
never made any formal or general concession.
326. They will be found in all good editions. I always use the best, that of
M. Marty-Laveaux, where the Discours appear conveniently, if
chronologically out of place, in Vol. I, and the Examens, each at the head of
its own play.
327. Let me, for one has always to guard these things, observe that no
charge is here brought against the Agamemnon, which is perhaps the
greatest tragedy in the world out of Shakespeare, and almost worthy to be
ranked with Shakespeare’s best. It is of the folly of the commentators that
Corneille was, and that I (quam longo intervallo post Cornelium!) am
thinking.
328. Art Poét., p. 233. “Si toutefois la Fable est telle que le Poëte n’ait
pas lieu d’y recompenser la Vertu, il doit pour le moins faire en sorte que les
Personnes vertueuses soient louées publiquement.”
329. In his Œuvres (Paris, 1694), pp. 301-344.
330. This is very interesting in connection with Sarrasin’s appearance in
Chapelain’s dialogue and his own other work (v. supra, p. 260).
331. Scudéry thinks Four things necessary to Epic—the authority of
History, the observance of received Religion, the exercise of Poetic Licence
in Fiction, and the provision of Great Events. He is not uninteresting for his
connection with his sister’s prose Romances in which he had some, if not
much, share, and which he never forgets. Also, he clings to the Pléiade
technicalities to some extent—kindly, however, explaining such words as
Hune, Quille (which, he says rather quaintly, is un bois courbé qui est au
plus bas d’un vaisseau), and Calfater. The Ibrahim preface, thirteen years
earlier, exhibits the same obliging explanation of technicalities, and the
same virtuous adherence to The Rules. “Provided,” he says, “that an
Architect takes his measures right, he is assured of the beauty of his
building,” which would seem to dissuade any one from advancing beyond
the packing-case style of architecture. And he is sure that a Romance, like
an Epic, should never go beyond one year in time.
Page 322
332. De Poemate Epico. Paris, 4to, 1652.
333. Aliquantum furoris aspergi non negaverim.—De Poem. Ep., p. 269.
334. Neque, tamen si quis atra polleat bile ... continuo is in poetis
censendus est, nisi accesserit disciplina, &c.—Ibid., post.
335. There is no absolutely complete and authentic edition—that of
Desmaiseaux (frequently reprinted in the fifty years after the author’s death,
from 3 vols. 4to at London, 1705, to 12 vols. 12mo at Paris, 1753) was at
least authorised. The critical matter will be found well arranged in the 2nd
vol. of Giraud’s Œuvres Mêlées de Saint-E. (3 vols., Paris, 1865). I may
refer to an essay of mine, first published in the Fortnightly Review for July
1879, and reprinted in Miscellaneous Essays (2nd ed., London, 1895).
336. V. inf., p. 385 note.
337. Ed. Réveillé, Paris, 3 vols. (Paris and London, 1846).
338. Ed. cit., i. 340, 354; ii. 35, 321.
339. “Certainement il faut en louer Dieu,” says his editor, himself a
doctor, with a kind of shudder, in reference to Patin’s pious gratitude for the
recovery of a colleague whom he had bled thirty-two times. His exploits in
the direction of ensuita purgare are too appalling to particularise.
340. In the 8th satire. He had the extremely small grace, however, to drop
the name in later editions, and it does not now appear.
341. If the “Vadius” of the Femmes Savantes is Ménage. He himself
denied it rather cleverly; but there is not much doubt.
342. See what he says on Castelvetro in the Ménagiana (ed. La
Monnoye, Amsterdam, 1713), ii. 86.
343. Ibid., ii. 174.
344. See, for instance, in the otherwise trivial Chevræana, a rather
amusing string (p. 157) of criticisms passed on the great authors of
333. Aliquantum furoris aspergi non negaverim.—De Poem. Ep., p. 269.
334. Neque, tamen si quis atra polleat bile ... continuo is in poetis
censendus est, nisi accesserit disciplina, &c.—Ibid., post.
335. There is no absolutely complete and authentic edition—that of
Desmaiseaux (frequently reprinted in the fifty years after the author’s death,
from 3 vols. 4to at London, 1705, to 12 vols. 12mo at Paris, 1753) was at
least authorised. The critical matter will be found well arranged in the 2nd
vol. of Giraud’s Œuvres Mêlées de Saint-E. (3 vols., Paris, 1865). I may
refer to an essay of mine, first published in the Fortnightly Review for July
1879, and reprinted in Miscellaneous Essays (2nd ed., London, 1895).
336. V. inf., p. 385 note.
337. Ed. Réveillé, Paris, 3 vols. (Paris and London, 1846).
338. Ed. cit., i. 340, 354; ii. 35, 321.
339. “Certainement il faut en louer Dieu,” says his editor, himself a
doctor, with a kind of shudder, in reference to Patin’s pious gratitude for the
recovery of a colleague whom he had bled thirty-two times. His exploits in
the direction of ensuita purgare are too appalling to particularise.
340. In the 8th satire. He had the extremely small grace, however, to drop
the name in later editions, and it does not now appear.
341. If the “Vadius” of the Femmes Savantes is Ménage. He himself
denied it rather cleverly; but there is not much doubt.
342. See what he says on Castelvetro in the Ménagiana (ed. La
Monnoye, Amsterdam, 1713), ii. 86.
343. Ibid., ii. 174.
344. See, for instance, in the otherwise trivial Chevræana, a rather
amusing string (p. 157) of criticisms passed on the great authors of
Page 323
antiquity; in the Fureteriana (p. 13), an acute and most just remark on the
folly of versifying scientific treatises and other things not in the least
suitable for the process; and not a few in Vigneul-Marville—the absence of
notes and justificatory citations in ancient historians (ii. 116); the praise of
Amyot (ib. 132); the question of fully or partially formed verse in prose (ib.
188 sq.); remarks on Sforza Pallavicini’s Trattato dello stilo (ib. 260); on
“rhyme and reason” (ib. 330). (The references in this note and in the above
paragraphs of the text, except where otherwise indicated, are to the
collection of Ana in ten vols. Amsterdam and Paris, An vii.)
345. Ed. cit., ii. 87.
346. P. 234, “Ce travail m’a toujours paru bas, et peu digne de l’estime
qu’il s’est attirée, et de l’application d’un esprit noble et élevé.”
347. P. 20 and passim.
348. P. 33.
349. P. 31.
350. Not in the general edition above cited. My copy is that of Cologne,
1695, with no printer’s name, but with a nice red and black title-page, an
agreeable frontispiece (representing Joseph Justus, in a chair and a long
beard, addressing attentive standing periwig-pated persons), and (as a MS.
note of a former possessor informs me) a great deal of matter not in any
other ed.
351. Also not in the collection. My copy is the Amsterdam edition, 2
vols., 1699.
352. The suggestion of this, though not the exact phrase, will be found in
Sainte-Beuve’s essay (Causeries du Lundi, v. 275).
353. Paris, 1675.
354. On all these, see Tallemant, Bayle, and others down to Sainte-
Beuve. For a typical literary and critical quarrel, beginning politely and
folly of versifying scientific treatises and other things not in the least
suitable for the process; and not a few in Vigneul-Marville—the absence of
notes and justificatory citations in ancient historians (ii. 116); the praise of
Amyot (ib. 132); the question of fully or partially formed verse in prose (ib.
188 sq.); remarks on Sforza Pallavicini’s Trattato dello stilo (ib. 260); on
“rhyme and reason” (ib. 330). (The references in this note and in the above
paragraphs of the text, except where otherwise indicated, are to the
collection of Ana in ten vols. Amsterdam and Paris, An vii.)
345. Ed. cit., ii. 87.
346. P. 234, “Ce travail m’a toujours paru bas, et peu digne de l’estime
qu’il s’est attirée, et de l’application d’un esprit noble et élevé.”
347. P. 20 and passim.
348. P. 33.
349. P. 31.
350. Not in the general edition above cited. My copy is that of Cologne,
1695, with no printer’s name, but with a nice red and black title-page, an
agreeable frontispiece (representing Joseph Justus, in a chair and a long
beard, addressing attentive standing periwig-pated persons), and (as a MS.
note of a former possessor informs me) a great deal of matter not in any
other ed.
351. Also not in the collection. My copy is the Amsterdam edition, 2
vols., 1699.
352. The suggestion of this, though not the exact phrase, will be found in
Sainte-Beuve’s essay (Causeries du Lundi, v. 275).
353. Paris, 1675.
354. On all these, see Tallemant, Bayle, and others down to Sainte-
Beuve. For a typical literary and critical quarrel, beginning politely and
Page 324
ending in something like Billingsgate, nothing can be better than that battle
of Costar and M. de Girac, first over the dead body of Voiture and the live
one of Balzac, and then over both these departed, which Sainte-Beuve tells
in his liveliest manner at pp. 210-231 of the 12th vol. of the Causeries.
355. To those who are acquainted with the most interesting handling of
Desmarets in M. Rigault’s so often cited book (Querelle des Anc. et Mod.,
pp. 80-103), my reference to him may seem too low and little. As a matter
of fact, I think rather better of Desmarets than M. Rigault did. But the
latter’s purpose of enlarging—I do not say exaggerating—his portraits of
everybody who had to do with the “quarrel” sometimes, I think, throws
them a little out of proportion, if not of focus, for a general critical history.
His chapter, however, is excellent, if not quite just; and it should have by
itself sufficed to save those who will not read originals from a blunder into
which some writers have fallen—that of crediting Desmarets with the first
vindication of the Christian epic, and the first denunciation of heathen
mythology as a poetic stuff. The mere name of Tasso ought to suffice as a
reminder of the falsity of this; the work of Gambara (v. supra, p. 107 note),
though I cannot speak of it at first hand, must be got out of the way by
them; and Vauquelin de la Fresnaye (v. supra, p. 131) had in France itself
made the way plain, for the author of Clovis. But he certainly drew a good
bow in this not too happy battle; and if he takes any pleasure in the
progeniture, he may probably claim John Dennis (v. infra, p. 436) as his
son. That Boileau’s treatment of him was quite unfair M. Rigault himself
fully admits; but to whom and to what (including those talents of his own
which he by turns prostitutes and cripples) is Boileau not unfair?
356. As this of the very authors he censures, “Leurs paroles, toutes
mortes qu’elles sont, ont plus de vigueur que la raison de certaines gens.”
II. 300, Ed. J. Simon, Paris, 1871.
357. The literary Pensées of Pascal are still fewer, and in dealing with
Montaigne he is even further from the literary point of view than
Malebranche. His chief utterance is a piece of characteristic scorn at
poetical clichés like bel astre, fatal laurier, &c.
358. Of the immense number (estimated years ago at nearly five
hundred) of editions of the Works in whole or part, that of Berriat de Saint-
of Costar and M. de Girac, first over the dead body of Voiture and the live
one of Balzac, and then over both these departed, which Sainte-Beuve tells
in his liveliest manner at pp. 210-231 of the 12th vol. of the Causeries.
355. To those who are acquainted with the most interesting handling of
Desmarets in M. Rigault’s so often cited book (Querelle des Anc. et Mod.,
pp. 80-103), my reference to him may seem too low and little. As a matter
of fact, I think rather better of Desmarets than M. Rigault did. But the
latter’s purpose of enlarging—I do not say exaggerating—his portraits of
everybody who had to do with the “quarrel” sometimes, I think, throws
them a little out of proportion, if not of focus, for a general critical history.
His chapter, however, is excellent, if not quite just; and it should have by
itself sufficed to save those who will not read originals from a blunder into
which some writers have fallen—that of crediting Desmarets with the first
vindication of the Christian epic, and the first denunciation of heathen
mythology as a poetic stuff. The mere name of Tasso ought to suffice as a
reminder of the falsity of this; the work of Gambara (v. supra, p. 107 note),
though I cannot speak of it at first hand, must be got out of the way by
them; and Vauquelin de la Fresnaye (v. supra, p. 131) had in France itself
made the way plain, for the author of Clovis. But he certainly drew a good
bow in this not too happy battle; and if he takes any pleasure in the
progeniture, he may probably claim John Dennis (v. infra, p. 436) as his
son. That Boileau’s treatment of him was quite unfair M. Rigault himself
fully admits; but to whom and to what (including those talents of his own
which he by turns prostitutes and cripples) is Boileau not unfair?
356. As this of the very authors he censures, “Leurs paroles, toutes
mortes qu’elles sont, ont plus de vigueur que la raison de certaines gens.”
II. 300, Ed. J. Simon, Paris, 1871.
357. The literary Pensées of Pascal are still fewer, and in dealing with
Montaigne he is even further from the literary point of view than
Malebranche. His chief utterance is a piece of characteristic scorn at
poetical clichés like bel astre, fatal laurier, &c.
358. Of the immense number (estimated years ago at nearly five
hundred) of editions of the Works in whole or part, that of Berriat de Saint-
Page 325
Prix in 4 vols., 1830-34, is, I believe, as nearly the standard as any. There is,
however, a magnificent modern edition of the Œuvres Poétiques, edited by
M. Brunetière (Paris, 1889), which I am glad to possess. The ordinary
“Collection” editions, such as that of Garnier, though complete enough on
the verse side, are apt to omit what they think the less interesting pieces of
prose.
359. He was thirty-three when he began it, and thirty-eight when it was
finished. A very excellent separate edition of it is that of the Cambridge
University Press, by Mr D. Nichol Smith (1898).
360. Boileau did not merely “convey” from the ancients. He had the
specially ugly, though not so specially uncommon, trick of insulting a man
and stealing from him at the same time. (Cf. Théophile Gautier’s article, in
Les Grotesques, on his namesake.)
361.
“C’est en vain qu’au Parnasse un témeraire auteur,
Pense de l’art des vers attendre la hauteur.”
362. It may be sometimes forgotten in the quotation of this famous line,
that long poem was a technical term in French criticism, from the days of
the Pléiade downwards, and means definitely an Epic, or Heroic Poem, not
a long piece of verse. It is characteristic of Boileau to hit backwards at the
modern epic, of which he was no admirer, in this rather treacherous praise
of the sonnet, towards which he was equally lukewarm.
363. As it takes ten lines (171-180) in the French to explain our single
epithet, they need not make fun of it.
364. See on the Petronian passage, vol. i. p. 245, and on its mischievous
influence the present chapter, passim.
365. I like to vary Boileau’s stale criticism with his admirably fresh and
vigorous verse.
however, a magnificent modern edition of the Œuvres Poétiques, edited by
M. Brunetière (Paris, 1889), which I am glad to possess. The ordinary
“Collection” editions, such as that of Garnier, though complete enough on
the verse side, are apt to omit what they think the less interesting pieces of
prose.
359. He was thirty-three when he began it, and thirty-eight when it was
finished. A very excellent separate edition of it is that of the Cambridge
University Press, by Mr D. Nichol Smith (1898).
360. Boileau did not merely “convey” from the ancients. He had the
specially ugly, though not so specially uncommon, trick of insulting a man
and stealing from him at the same time. (Cf. Théophile Gautier’s article, in
Les Grotesques, on his namesake.)
361.
“C’est en vain qu’au Parnasse un témeraire auteur,
Pense de l’art des vers attendre la hauteur.”
362. It may be sometimes forgotten in the quotation of this famous line,
that long poem was a technical term in French criticism, from the days of
the Pléiade downwards, and means definitely an Epic, or Heroic Poem, not
a long piece of verse. It is characteristic of Boileau to hit backwards at the
modern epic, of which he was no admirer, in this rather treacherous praise
of the sonnet, towards which he was equally lukewarm.
363. As it takes ten lines (171-180) in the French to explain our single
epithet, they need not make fun of it.
364. See on the Petronian passage, vol. i. p. 245, and on its mischievous
influence the present chapter, passim.
365. I like to vary Boileau’s stale criticism with his admirably fresh and
vigorous verse.
Page 326
366. “She can do without them,” as L. Arruntius most excellently
remarked on a parallel occasion. Vide i. 238.
367. As usual Boileau gives the actual names of half a score inhabitants
of the French Grub Street, of whom Cyrano de Bergerac (he was long dead,
and Boileau was safe) has the consolation prize of being merely fou.
368. They were probably the tribut légitime which a noble esprit might
derive from his work.
369. This refers to the son, François (1628-1680), of a more poetic pair—
Guillaume (1598-1659) and Claudine Colletet. The former of these was also
a critic in his way, and left, besides an Art Poétique (1658) of no great
value, a Histoire des Poètes Français which, strangely enough, was never
printed, and the MS. of which was burnt by the Vandals of the Commune in
1871.
370. A humourist might maintain the two opposite theses, “That Boileau
has genuine authority,” and “That the French are always craving for a
tyrant,” on the strength of a curious catena of evidence from Voltaire’s “Ça
porte malheur” to Marmontel, who had presumed to speak lightly of
Despréaux, down to M. Bourgoin’s “On a difficilement raison contre
Boileau.” But to those who “bear an English heart” these terrors are idle.
371. It is interesting and significant that Boileau’s defenders generally
drop “Good Sense,” and use, whenever they can, the more ambiguous and
high-sounding “Reason.” It is sufficient to say that their author repeats
“Good Sense” again and again, and obviously uses Reason as a mere
synonym for it.
372. If I have seemed, or may seem, too bitter in any remarks on Boileau,
let me here observe that few things in literary history are more pathetic than
these last years of his, when, ultimus suorum, amid the ruins of the political
glories which he had celebrated, and in a transition period between the great
literature of the seventeenth century and that of the eighteenth, with no one
but his foolish Boswell-Eckermann, Brossette, to comfort him, and no one
at all to whom to look as his successor, he held—unconquered and
remarked on a parallel occasion. Vide i. 238.
367. As usual Boileau gives the actual names of half a score inhabitants
of the French Grub Street, of whom Cyrano de Bergerac (he was long dead,
and Boileau was safe) has the consolation prize of being merely fou.
368. They were probably the tribut légitime which a noble esprit might
derive from his work.
369. This refers to the son, François (1628-1680), of a more poetic pair—
Guillaume (1598-1659) and Claudine Colletet. The former of these was also
a critic in his way, and left, besides an Art Poétique (1658) of no great
value, a Histoire des Poètes Français which, strangely enough, was never
printed, and the MS. of which was burnt by the Vandals of the Commune in
1871.
370. A humourist might maintain the two opposite theses, “That Boileau
has genuine authority,” and “That the French are always craving for a
tyrant,” on the strength of a curious catena of evidence from Voltaire’s “Ça
porte malheur” to Marmontel, who had presumed to speak lightly of
Despréaux, down to M. Bourgoin’s “On a difficilement raison contre
Boileau.” But to those who “bear an English heart” these terrors are idle.
371. It is interesting and significant that Boileau’s defenders generally
drop “Good Sense,” and use, whenever they can, the more ambiguous and
high-sounding “Reason.” It is sufficient to say that their author repeats
“Good Sense” again and again, and obviously uses Reason as a mere
synonym for it.
372. If I have seemed, or may seem, too bitter in any remarks on Boileau,
let me here observe that few things in literary history are more pathetic than
these last years of his, when, ultimus suorum, amid the ruins of the political
glories which he had celebrated, and in a transition period between the great
literature of the seventeenth century and that of the eighteenth, with no one
but his foolish Boswell-Eckermann, Brossette, to comfort him, and no one
at all to whom to look as his successor, he held—unconquered and
Page 327
unconquerable—to his principles, and died, as one of the poets to whom he
was so unjust had said,
“Sans bouger, debout et dans son rang.”
373. That he had taught Racine rimer difficilement is the well-known
boast in that uncomplimentary comparison of his pupil with Corneille, by
which he appears to have administered a sort of private unction to his soul
to atone for his public injustice.
374. Not of course Boileau’s worthy predecessor in Art-Poetic writing (v.
supra, pp. 117, 118), but an advocate of the mid-seventeenth century, who
was unfortunate enough to commit sonnets, and to be disliked by the
satirist.
375. Even his admirers admit his strange ignoring of the fact that
Madeleine de Scudéry intended her personages to be modern—that they
were mere disguises of Condé and others, not attempts to re-create
antiquity. This of course does not exempt them from blame; but it requires a
different sort of blame.
376. The condescending praise of “Arioste et ses fables comiques,” in A.
P., iii. 291, can hardly be regarded as a set-off, especially as just before (l.
218) he had stigmatised him, emphasising the stigma by a note, as
“follement idolâtre et païen.”
377. Written in 1700 and published next year. Letter vi. of the ordinary
collection.
378. The First and Sixth Satires are a little, and some smaller pieces
much, earlier than this, but they are indecisive and unimportant.
379. Cf. Bolæana. On the other hand, the Rev. J. Garbett, whom anti-
Tractarian feeling made Professor of Poetry at Oxford when Isaac Williams
was a candidate, has “Bollevian” (De Re Critica Prælectiones, Oxford,
1847, Præl. iv. i.) I am not bigoted on the point.
was so unjust had said,
“Sans bouger, debout et dans son rang.”
373. That he had taught Racine rimer difficilement is the well-known
boast in that uncomplimentary comparison of his pupil with Corneille, by
which he appears to have administered a sort of private unction to his soul
to atone for his public injustice.
374. Not of course Boileau’s worthy predecessor in Art-Poetic writing (v.
supra, pp. 117, 118), but an advocate of the mid-seventeenth century, who
was unfortunate enough to commit sonnets, and to be disliked by the
satirist.
375. Even his admirers admit his strange ignoring of the fact that
Madeleine de Scudéry intended her personages to be modern—that they
were mere disguises of Condé and others, not attempts to re-create
antiquity. This of course does not exempt them from blame; but it requires a
different sort of blame.
376. The condescending praise of “Arioste et ses fables comiques,” in A.
P., iii. 291, can hardly be regarded as a set-off, especially as just before (l.
218) he had stigmatised him, emphasising the stigma by a note, as
“follement idolâtre et païen.”
377. Written in 1700 and published next year. Letter vi. of the ordinary
collection.
378. The First and Sixth Satires are a little, and some smaller pieces
much, earlier than this, but they are indecisive and unimportant.
379. Cf. Bolæana. On the other hand, the Rev. J. Garbett, whom anti-
Tractarian feeling made Professor of Poetry at Oxford when Isaac Williams
was a candidate, has “Bollevian” (De Re Critica Prælectiones, Oxford,
1847, Præl. iv. i.) I am not bigoted on the point.
Page 328
380. “Greek, the Alpha and Omega of all knowledge,” as Dr Folliott calls
it, is certainly not less so in criticism than elsewhere.
381. By M. Bourgoin in the interesting book cited above.
382. Editions again innumerable; but none, I think, can compare with that
of M. Servois in the Grands Écrivains de la France (Paris, 1865-1882).
383. “Entre toutes les différentes expressions qui peuvent rendre une
seule de nos pensées il n’y en a qu’une qui soit la bonne,” &c.—Ed. cit., i.
118.
384. It is a pity that in the best modern account known to me, that of M.
Bourgoin, the question of Fénelon’s character and of his relations with
Bossuet is brought in. It is really quite extraneous to the matter. Very
favourable reference can be made to the notice by the Cardinal de Bausset,
prefixed to the most accessible edition of Fénelon’s critical work (in
Œuvres Choisies, Paris, Garnier, n.d.) Bausset, who wrote, besides an
extensive life of Fénelon, one of Bossuet, and died in 1824, came before the
Renaissance of criticism in France: but he was no perruque.
385. P. 125 ed. cit.
386. “L’excès choquant de Ronsard nous a un peu jetés dans l’extrémité
opposée; on a appauvri, desséché et gâté notre langue.” And he proceeds,
with much humour and more truth, to stigmatise the prim following of
grammar, the “substantive hand in hand with its adjective,” the verb
“walking behind with an adverb at its heels, and an accusative in a place
unalterable.” “C’est ce,” this great locus continues, “qui exclut toute
suspension d’esprit, toute surprise, toute variété, et souvent toute
magnifique cadence.” 1830 could say no more; and often said it with less
authority.
387. Zénobie boasted herself to be impeccably “regular.” The Prince
observed that he was much obliged to the Abbé for paying such attention to
Aristotle, but that he could not excuse Aristotle for making the Abbé write
such a tragedy. This famous mot, like others, is of disputed attribution. It is
sometimes given to the Prince de Rohan-Guémené.
it, is certainly not less so in criticism than elsewhere.
381. By M. Bourgoin in the interesting book cited above.
382. Editions again innumerable; but none, I think, can compare with that
of M. Servois in the Grands Écrivains de la France (Paris, 1865-1882).
383. “Entre toutes les différentes expressions qui peuvent rendre une
seule de nos pensées il n’y en a qu’une qui soit la bonne,” &c.—Ed. cit., i.
118.
384. It is a pity that in the best modern account known to me, that of M.
Bourgoin, the question of Fénelon’s character and of his relations with
Bossuet is brought in. It is really quite extraneous to the matter. Very
favourable reference can be made to the notice by the Cardinal de Bausset,
prefixed to the most accessible edition of Fénelon’s critical work (in
Œuvres Choisies, Paris, Garnier, n.d.) Bausset, who wrote, besides an
extensive life of Fénelon, one of Bossuet, and died in 1824, came before the
Renaissance of criticism in France: but he was no perruque.
385. P. 125 ed. cit.
386. “L’excès choquant de Ronsard nous a un peu jetés dans l’extrémité
opposée; on a appauvri, desséché et gâté notre langue.” And he proceeds,
with much humour and more truth, to stigmatise the prim following of
grammar, the “substantive hand in hand with its adjective,” the verb
“walking behind with an adverb at its heels, and an accusative in a place
unalterable.” “C’est ce,” this great locus continues, “qui exclut toute
suspension d’esprit, toute surprise, toute variété, et souvent toute
magnifique cadence.” 1830 could say no more; and often said it with less
authority.
387. Zénobie boasted herself to be impeccably “regular.” The Prince
observed that he was much obliged to the Abbé for paying such attention to
Aristotle, but that he could not excuse Aristotle for making the Abbé write
such a tragedy. This famous mot, like others, is of disputed attribution. It is
sometimes given to the Prince de Rohan-Guémené.
Page 329
388. A work of youth which appeared as early as 1627. Hédelin was
never elected to the Academy; and in 1664 endeavoured to start a new one
of his own from a coterie which he, in imitation of Conrart, had formed. But
“Trajan was” not “content,” wisely enough: and France was spared a skim-
milk Forty.
389. It forms the first volume of the Amsterdam edition, in 3 vols.
(1715), of Hédelin’s critical work. The second and third, which are together
about the size of the first, include the extensive and dismal lucubrations on
Terence, &c.
390. Who translated (with a preface not virulently Rymerical, v. infra, p.
392) Rapin’s Reflections upon Poetry almost as soon as it appeared. Rapin
was a copious theologian, an elegant and fertile Latin versifier. Of his
critical works in French, the Comparaisons noted above were produced
annually between 1668 and 1671, except the “Thucydides and Livy,” which
appeared ten years later. The Réflexions sur l’Eloquence date from 1672:
those, more famous, on Poetics and Poets, from 1674. His critical Works
were early collected, and the complete collection appeared in English, by
various hands, including Rymer’s, in 2 vols. (London, 1706). The
Amsterdam ed. of the original (3 vols., 1709-10) contains, in addition, a
small treatise, Du Grand et du Sublime, which must not be neglected, and
some others, together with the Comparaison de Pindare et d’Horace of the
architect Blondel.
391. Chap. vii. In the preceding chapter there is one of those sentences
which ruin this kind of criticism, by and of themselves. “Games are of the
number of those actions which may occur in the lives of heroes.” Most
certainly: but one feels that Rapin said it simply because there are games in
Homer and Virgil, and that, if there had not been, he would probably have
said, “Games are not,” &c.
392. “Cette Princesse oublie sa pudeur pour écouter sa compassion....” In
the rest of the clause the English translator softens the crudity of the French
curiosité. But it is still more pleasant to oppose to the nasty niceness of the
French Jesuit the words of the author of The Christian Year: “Nausicaa—
cujus persona nihil usquam aut venustius habet aut pudentius veterum
Poesis” (Præl. xii. vol. i. p. 195, Oxford, 1844).
never elected to the Academy; and in 1664 endeavoured to start a new one
of his own from a coterie which he, in imitation of Conrart, had formed. But
“Trajan was” not “content,” wisely enough: and France was spared a skim-
milk Forty.
389. It forms the first volume of the Amsterdam edition, in 3 vols.
(1715), of Hédelin’s critical work. The second and third, which are together
about the size of the first, include the extensive and dismal lucubrations on
Terence, &c.
390. Who translated (with a preface not virulently Rymerical, v. infra, p.
392) Rapin’s Reflections upon Poetry almost as soon as it appeared. Rapin
was a copious theologian, an elegant and fertile Latin versifier. Of his
critical works in French, the Comparaisons noted above were produced
annually between 1668 and 1671, except the “Thucydides and Livy,” which
appeared ten years later. The Réflexions sur l’Eloquence date from 1672:
those, more famous, on Poetics and Poets, from 1674. His critical Works
were early collected, and the complete collection appeared in English, by
various hands, including Rymer’s, in 2 vols. (London, 1706). The
Amsterdam ed. of the original (3 vols., 1709-10) contains, in addition, a
small treatise, Du Grand et du Sublime, which must not be neglected, and
some others, together with the Comparaison de Pindare et d’Horace of the
architect Blondel.
391. Chap. vii. In the preceding chapter there is one of those sentences
which ruin this kind of criticism, by and of themselves. “Games are of the
number of those actions which may occur in the lives of heroes.” Most
certainly: but one feels that Rapin said it simply because there are games in
Homer and Virgil, and that, if there had not been, he would probably have
said, “Games are not,” &c.
392. “Cette Princesse oublie sa pudeur pour écouter sa compassion....” In
the rest of the clause the English translator softens the crudity of the French
curiosité. But it is still more pleasant to oppose to the nasty niceness of the
French Jesuit the words of the author of The Christian Year: “Nausicaa—
cujus persona nihil usquam aut venustius habet aut pudentius veterum
Poesis” (Præl. xii. vol. i. p. 195, Oxford, 1844).
Page 330
393. Mais la pudeur ni toutes les bienséances extérieures n’y sont point
blessées.
394. So the English: Fr. “femme de bien.” I like to read Rapin in both
versions, contemporary as they are, and antiphonal of the sentiment of the
time, in its two chief languages.
395. These latter are mostly from the Réflexions sur la Poétique (Œuvres,
ii. 175 sq.) It is quite at the beginning of these that the unlucky charge
against Dante of “wanting fire” (see i. 175 note) occurs; it is followed later,
and perhaps to some extent explained, if not excused, by the further
criticism that he has “l’air trop profond,” “une ordonnance triste et morne.”
396. Tristram Shandy, iii. 12. He was not always unknown among us.
Dryden, whether out of modesty, fashion, or humour, takes leave to call him
“the best of modern critics,” and he was translated in 1695. The mistakes
referred to above are all the worse because there was actually a French
writer named Bossut, a mathematician of distinction in the eighteenth
century.
397. Not, as it is constantly quoted, peut avoir de l’esprit. It will be
observed that the difference is considerable.
398. My copy is the 2nd ed. of next year in 12mo.
399. The standard edition is that of La Monnoye (7 vols. 4to, Paris, 1722,
with an 8th containing Ménage’s Anti-Baillet &c.)
400. Jan. 1665—first weekly, then monthly. It became a government
publication in 1701. Gui Patin, in the March after its appearance, is very
angry (Let. DCLXV. iii. 517, ed. cit. sup.) with it, and says with voice
prophetic of many injured ones to come, “nous verrons si ces prétendus
censeurs, sine suffragio populi et Quiritium, auront le crédit et l’autorité de
critiquer ainsi tous ceux qui n'écriront pas à leur goût.”
401. 1672-1820. Donneau de Visé was its first editor, and Thomas
Corneille its most distinguished writer.
blessées.
394. So the English: Fr. “femme de bien.” I like to read Rapin in both
versions, contemporary as they are, and antiphonal of the sentiment of the
time, in its two chief languages.
395. These latter are mostly from the Réflexions sur la Poétique (Œuvres,
ii. 175 sq.) It is quite at the beginning of these that the unlucky charge
against Dante of “wanting fire” (see i. 175 note) occurs; it is followed later,
and perhaps to some extent explained, if not excused, by the further
criticism that he has “l’air trop profond,” “une ordonnance triste et morne.”
396. Tristram Shandy, iii. 12. He was not always unknown among us.
Dryden, whether out of modesty, fashion, or humour, takes leave to call him
“the best of modern critics,” and he was translated in 1695. The mistakes
referred to above are all the worse because there was actually a French
writer named Bossut, a mathematician of distinction in the eighteenth
century.
397. Not, as it is constantly quoted, peut avoir de l’esprit. It will be
observed that the difference is considerable.
398. My copy is the 2nd ed. of next year in 12mo.
399. The standard edition is that of La Monnoye (7 vols. 4to, Paris, 1722,
with an 8th containing Ménage’s Anti-Baillet &c.)
400. Jan. 1665—first weekly, then monthly. It became a government
publication in 1701. Gui Patin, in the March after its appearance, is very
angry (Let. DCLXV. iii. 517, ed. cit. sup.) with it, and says with voice
prophetic of many injured ones to come, “nous verrons si ces prétendus
censeurs, sine suffragio populi et Quiritium, auront le crédit et l’autorité de
critiquer ainsi tous ceux qui n'écriront pas à leur goût.”
401. 1672-1820. Donneau de Visé was its first editor, and Thomas
Corneille its most distinguished writer.
Page 331
402. It can scarcely be necessary to give bricks of so large and rambling a
house. “Mr Borrichius témoigne aussi que le style [of Ovid’s Heroides] est
fort pur” is, and has to be, the kind of thing. Perhaps such a glut of
authorities may have insensibly nauseated men of authority, and so Baillet
may have worked both ways. He is good enough to admit (v. 461) that “one
cannot say this nation [the English] is inferior even for Poetry to several
others of the North,” and he has heard of “Abraham Cowley, John Downe
ou Jean Donne, Cleveland, Edmond, [sic] Waller, Jean Denham, George
Herbert, le Chancelier Bacon, Shakespeare, Fletcher, Beaumont, Ben,
Johnson, Suckling, Jean Milton,” &c. It is open to Shaconians to contend
that as the comma at “Edmond” is undoubtedly superfluous, so is that at
“Bacon,” and that Baillet—the learned Baillet—meant to rank “le
Chancelier Bacon-Shakespeare” among poets.
403. Jugements des Savants sur les auteurs qui ont traité de la
Rhétorique (3 vols., Paris, 1703-16). M. Bourgoin, I think, refers to Gibert,
but the book was first brought seriously to my notice by a very kind private
communication from Professor Scott of the University of Michigan.
Luckily it is in the British Museum; but it does not seem easy to obtain a
copy for oneself. Gibert taught for some half-century in the Collége
Mazarin, and was repeatedly rector of the University of Paris. He wrote
other books,—a formal “Rhetoric” juxta Aristotelis doctrinam, strictures on
Rollin, &c. Gibert is, it seems, appended to some edd. of Baillet.
404. See, for instance, his reference to Patrizzi, who is evidently to him
rather magni nominis umbra than anything tangible.
405. His Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes (1688-98) is most
disappointing, even to fervent opponents of “the sect of the Nicolaitans”
and fervent lovers of the Contes de ma Mère l’Oye. That he knew little and
that his case was bad does not matter; but I at least cannot find the esprit
which apologists plead.
406. J. Warton (Adventurer, No. 49) asserts, on the authority of Ménage,
that even Rapin was “totally ignorant” of Greek. M. does not quite say this:
but he does say that R. got his Greek quotations from Tanneguy-Lefèvre,
Madame Dacier’s father (Ménagiana, i. 175 of the collected ed.)
house. “Mr Borrichius témoigne aussi que le style [of Ovid’s Heroides] est
fort pur” is, and has to be, the kind of thing. Perhaps such a glut of
authorities may have insensibly nauseated men of authority, and so Baillet
may have worked both ways. He is good enough to admit (v. 461) that “one
cannot say this nation [the English] is inferior even for Poetry to several
others of the North,” and he has heard of “Abraham Cowley, John Downe
ou Jean Donne, Cleveland, Edmond, [sic] Waller, Jean Denham, George
Herbert, le Chancelier Bacon, Shakespeare, Fletcher, Beaumont, Ben,
Johnson, Suckling, Jean Milton,” &c. It is open to Shaconians to contend
that as the comma at “Edmond” is undoubtedly superfluous, so is that at
“Bacon,” and that Baillet—the learned Baillet—meant to rank “le
Chancelier Bacon-Shakespeare” among poets.
403. Jugements des Savants sur les auteurs qui ont traité de la
Rhétorique (3 vols., Paris, 1703-16). M. Bourgoin, I think, refers to Gibert,
but the book was first brought seriously to my notice by a very kind private
communication from Professor Scott of the University of Michigan.
Luckily it is in the British Museum; but it does not seem easy to obtain a
copy for oneself. Gibert taught for some half-century in the Collége
Mazarin, and was repeatedly rector of the University of Paris. He wrote
other books,—a formal “Rhetoric” juxta Aristotelis doctrinam, strictures on
Rollin, &c. Gibert is, it seems, appended to some edd. of Baillet.
404. See, for instance, his reference to Patrizzi, who is evidently to him
rather magni nominis umbra than anything tangible.
405. His Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes (1688-98) is most
disappointing, even to fervent opponents of “the sect of the Nicolaitans”
and fervent lovers of the Contes de ma Mère l’Oye. That he knew little and
that his case was bad does not matter; but I at least cannot find the esprit
which apologists plead.
406. J. Warton (Adventurer, No. 49) asserts, on the authority of Ménage,
that even Rapin was “totally ignorant” of Greek. M. does not quite say this:
but he does say that R. got his Greek quotations from Tanneguy-Lefèvre,
Madame Dacier’s father (Ménagiana, i. 175 of the collected ed.)
Page 332
407. Perhaps it is still desirable, though almost for the last time, to
observe that the omission of casual criticism in non-critical work is
intentional and necessary. Nowhere could more interesting examples of it,
from Molière downwards, be produced; but this is only a temptation, not a
reason.
observe that the omission of casual criticism in non-critical work is
intentional and necessary. Nowhere could more interesting examples of it,
from Molière downwards, be produced; but this is only a temptation, not a
reason.
Page 333
CHAPTER II.
THE ITALIAN DECADENCE AND THE SPANIARDS.
DECADENCE OF ITALIAN CRITICISM—PAOLO BENI—POSSEVINO: HIS ‘BIBLIOTHECA
SELECTA’—TASSONI: HIS ‘PENSIERI DIVERSI’—AROMATARI—HIS ‘DEGLI AUTORI
DEL BEN PARLARE’—BOCCALINI AND MINORS—INFLUENCE OF THE
RAGGUAGLI—THE SET OF SEICENTIST TASTE—SPANISH CRITICISM: HIGHLY
RANKED BY DRYDEN?—THE ORIGINS: VILLENA—SANTILLANA—ENCINA—
VALDÉS—THE BEGINNING OF REGULAR CRITICISM: HUMANIST RHETORICIANS
—POETICS: RENGIFO—PINCIANO—LA CUEVA—CARVALLO—GONZALES DE
SALAS—THE ‘CIGARRALES’ OF TIRSO DE MOLINA—LOPE’S ‘ARTE NUEVO,’ ETC.
—HIS ASSAILANTS AND DEFENDERS—THE FIGHT OVER THE SPANISH DRAMA—
CERVANTES AND CALDERON—GONGORISM, CULTERANISM, ETC.—QUEVEDO—
GRACIAN—THE LIMITATIONS OF SPANISH CRITICISM.
That the Italians, who had some half of the last Book to themselves, will
not have a tithe of the present, is due, on the part of the historian, neither to
laziness, nor to love of contrast, nor to that rather illogical and illegitimate
generosity which decrees that “the other citizen shall have his turn.” The
Decadence of disproportion simply corresponds to the facts. Italy, indeed,
Italian
Criticism.
continued to devote herself with something like enthusiasm
—or at least with the engouement of dilettantism and the
doggedness of pedantry—to critical studies. Some at least of the earlier
writers of the century—aftercrops of the sixteenth—still exercised
considerable influence: and for nearly the whole of the time the great
Italians of the former age—Scaliger, Castelvetro, and others—maintained
an authority which did not pass to France till the eighteenth itself was
approaching. But little was really added to the critical canon of the central
Peninsula. Paradoxers like Beni, eccentrics of different kinds like Tassoni
and Boccalini, respectable compilers like Possevino and Aromatari, must
occupy us and receive their due. But all these belong more or less to the
first quarter of the century. The second, third, and fourth are much less
fertile, and it is not till another meeting of the ages that we shall come to
another really remarkable group, consisting of two at least painful literary
THE ITALIAN DECADENCE AND THE SPANIARDS.
DECADENCE OF ITALIAN CRITICISM—PAOLO BENI—POSSEVINO: HIS ‘BIBLIOTHECA
SELECTA’—TASSONI: HIS ‘PENSIERI DIVERSI’—AROMATARI—HIS ‘DEGLI AUTORI
DEL BEN PARLARE’—BOCCALINI AND MINORS—INFLUENCE OF THE
RAGGUAGLI—THE SET OF SEICENTIST TASTE—SPANISH CRITICISM: HIGHLY
RANKED BY DRYDEN?—THE ORIGINS: VILLENA—SANTILLANA—ENCINA—
VALDÉS—THE BEGINNING OF REGULAR CRITICISM: HUMANIST RHETORICIANS
—POETICS: RENGIFO—PINCIANO—LA CUEVA—CARVALLO—GONZALES DE
SALAS—THE ‘CIGARRALES’ OF TIRSO DE MOLINA—LOPE’S ‘ARTE NUEVO,’ ETC.
—HIS ASSAILANTS AND DEFENDERS—THE FIGHT OVER THE SPANISH DRAMA—
CERVANTES AND CALDERON—GONGORISM, CULTERANISM, ETC.—QUEVEDO—
GRACIAN—THE LIMITATIONS OF SPANISH CRITICISM.
That the Italians, who had some half of the last Book to themselves, will
not have a tithe of the present, is due, on the part of the historian, neither to
laziness, nor to love of contrast, nor to that rather illogical and illegitimate
generosity which decrees that “the other citizen shall have his turn.” The
Decadence of disproportion simply corresponds to the facts. Italy, indeed,
Italian
Criticism.
continued to devote herself with something like enthusiasm
—or at least with the engouement of dilettantism and the
doggedness of pedantry—to critical studies. Some at least of the earlier
writers of the century—aftercrops of the sixteenth—still exercised
considerable influence: and for nearly the whole of the time the great
Italians of the former age—Scaliger, Castelvetro, and others—maintained
an authority which did not pass to France till the eighteenth itself was
approaching. But little was really added to the critical canon of the central
Peninsula. Paradoxers like Beni, eccentrics of different kinds like Tassoni
and Boccalini, respectable compilers like Possevino and Aromatari, must
occupy us and receive their due. But all these belong more or less to the
first quarter of the century. The second, third, and fourth are much less
fertile, and it is not till another meeting of the ages that we shall come to
another really remarkable group, consisting of two at least painful literary
Page 334
historians, among the earliest of their kind, in Crescimbeni and Quadrio, of
a real though limited critic in Gravina, and of a remarkable combination of
erudition and insight in Muratori. And these will properly be treated in the
next Book, not in this.
Paolo Beni, who has been spoken of in the last Book,[408] and who was a
man of nearly fifty when the sixteenth century closed, had nevertheless
nearly half his literary life to spend in the seventeenth, and published the
Paolo Beni. most noteworthy of his works at this time. We saw that he
was a strong “Torquatist,” and an innovator in respect of recommending
prose for tragedy as well as for comedy. As he grew older the iconoclastic
tendency so developed in him that he may almost be called the leader of
Rebellion in the matter of the Ancient and Modern Quarrel; for questa lite,
as a contemporary of Beni’s calls it, had been fought out in Italy long before
it became a burning one in France and England. Beni was a “modern” of the
extravagant kind: and his two chief critical manifestoes, after the
Dissertation on Prose Drama, were a Comparatione di Homero Virgilio e
Torquato,[409] where the author of the Gerusalemme (which Beni prefers to
call by its other title, Goffredo) is exalted far above both the ancient Poets;
and an Anti-Crusca,[410] in which, with the futile courage of his opinions, he
gives no more quarter to Dante and Petrarch than to Homer and Virgil on
the score of language at least, and would apparently turn “modernity”
almost into “hodiernity.” This does not argue any great critical spirit: and
we find little in Beni—only the sort of Old Bailey advocacy, or attack,
which was rapidly coming to be the disgrace of criticism. There is not “the
real integrity and perfection of the fable” in the Odyssey. Even Virgil cannot
approach Tasso in regularity, nice derangement of episodes, &c., &c. The
most amusing thing about Beni is the way in which he turns the batteries of
the classics on themselves. He does not attempt to make a new Poetic for
Romances, nor does he take his favourite poem on its own merits and extol
it for them. The “parts,” the “qualities,” the “rules” are practically adopted:
and it is shown—or at least asserted—that Tasso exhibits them all in greater
perfection than the ancients. This is the line afterwards taken by Addison
with Paradise Lost.
The Bibliotheca Selecta of Antonio Possevino, Jesuit negotiator and
teacher, is a good example of the kind of compiling work which the great
development of Criticism was imposing on at least some critics. From some
points of view it also may seem to belong rather to the last Book, for
a real though limited critic in Gravina, and of a remarkable combination of
erudition and insight in Muratori. And these will properly be treated in the
next Book, not in this.
Paolo Beni, who has been spoken of in the last Book,[408] and who was a
man of nearly fifty when the sixteenth century closed, had nevertheless
nearly half his literary life to spend in the seventeenth, and published the
Paolo Beni. most noteworthy of his works at this time. We saw that he
was a strong “Torquatist,” and an innovator in respect of recommending
prose for tragedy as well as for comedy. As he grew older the iconoclastic
tendency so developed in him that he may almost be called the leader of
Rebellion in the matter of the Ancient and Modern Quarrel; for questa lite,
as a contemporary of Beni’s calls it, had been fought out in Italy long before
it became a burning one in France and England. Beni was a “modern” of the
extravagant kind: and his two chief critical manifestoes, after the
Dissertation on Prose Drama, were a Comparatione di Homero Virgilio e
Torquato,[409] where the author of the Gerusalemme (which Beni prefers to
call by its other title, Goffredo) is exalted far above both the ancient Poets;
and an Anti-Crusca,[410] in which, with the futile courage of his opinions, he
gives no more quarter to Dante and Petrarch than to Homer and Virgil on
the score of language at least, and would apparently turn “modernity”
almost into “hodiernity.” This does not argue any great critical spirit: and
we find little in Beni—only the sort of Old Bailey advocacy, or attack,
which was rapidly coming to be the disgrace of criticism. There is not “the
real integrity and perfection of the fable” in the Odyssey. Even Virgil cannot
approach Tasso in regularity, nice derangement of episodes, &c., &c. The
most amusing thing about Beni is the way in which he turns the batteries of
the classics on themselves. He does not attempt to make a new Poetic for
Romances, nor does he take his favourite poem on its own merits and extol
it for them. The “parts,” the “qualities,” the “rules” are practically adopted:
and it is shown—or at least asserted—that Tasso exhibits them all in greater
perfection than the ancients. This is the line afterwards taken by Addison
with Paradise Lost.
The Bibliotheca Selecta of Antonio Possevino, Jesuit negotiator and
teacher, is a good example of the kind of compiling work which the great
development of Criticism was imposing on at least some critics. From some
points of view it also may seem to belong rather to the last Book, for
Page 335
Possevino. His Possevino, who retired from active work in many countries
Bibliotheca
Selecta.
to his native land and an old age of study in 1586, brought
it out first at Rome in 1593. But he made alterations and
rearrangements in it afterwards, and the edition I have used[411] was
published, with his own approval and assistance, a few years before his
death, and well within the seventeenth century. It is a mighty folio (or rather
two in one) dealing with something like the whole range of studies, and
intended, it would seem, rather for teachers than learners; but the First
Book[412] has something, and the three last much, to do with our subject. In
these three Possevino successively discusses History at enormous length[413]
and with considerable bibliographical information, Poetry[414] at somewhat
less, and finally the Art of Letter Writing, under the special title of
“Cicero,” but with reference also to Libanius and others. Possevino, as was
in fact inevitable from his profession and his purpose, is very much
cumbered about orthodoxy and morality, especially in the poetical
department; but he does not allow himself to be wholly guided by these
considerations. Scaliger’s Poetic he calls spissum sane opus—a happy but
rather ambiguous epithet; quotes Gambara, Minturno, Cinthio, Pigna, and
Patrizzi as main authorities, and though he says that he will not quote
Castelvetro, as being on the Index, evidently means that he should be read,
though he duly prescribes Caro as an antidote. He has a good selection of
extracts, mighty lists of books and authorities, and an inserted tract (two in
fact) by Macarius Mutius on Poetry and Christian Poetry, by which he sets
much store, but in which little will be found but rhetoric.
Some of the most interesting and suggestive, if not the most regular,
criticism in this part of Italian literature is to be found in the Pensieri
Tassoni. His Diversi of Alessandro Tassoni.[415] The author of the
Pensieri Diversi.
Secchia Rapita was not likely to be dull in anything that he
undertook: and his undertakings were of a sufficiently various kind.[416] In
his Considerazioni[417] on Petrarch he treated that revered sonneteer and his
sonnets as cavalierly as he was to treat the sacred Heroic Poem in the
Secchia: but this kind of frondeur spirit was nothing new in Italy. The
Pensieri, in which their author was candidly prepared to find people
discovering “extravagance and capriciousness,” are modelled on Aristotle’s
Problems, and Plutarch’s Symposiacs and Roman Questions. They deal with
curious matters “such as are wont to come into the discourse of Gentlemen
and Professors of Literature,” a phrase where the “and” is half
Bibliotheca
Selecta.
to his native land and an old age of study in 1586, brought
it out first at Rome in 1593. But he made alterations and
rearrangements in it afterwards, and the edition I have used[411] was
published, with his own approval and assistance, a few years before his
death, and well within the seventeenth century. It is a mighty folio (or rather
two in one) dealing with something like the whole range of studies, and
intended, it would seem, rather for teachers than learners; but the First
Book[412] has something, and the three last much, to do with our subject. In
these three Possevino successively discusses History at enormous length[413]
and with considerable bibliographical information, Poetry[414] at somewhat
less, and finally the Art of Letter Writing, under the special title of
“Cicero,” but with reference also to Libanius and others. Possevino, as was
in fact inevitable from his profession and his purpose, is very much
cumbered about orthodoxy and morality, especially in the poetical
department; but he does not allow himself to be wholly guided by these
considerations. Scaliger’s Poetic he calls spissum sane opus—a happy but
rather ambiguous epithet; quotes Gambara, Minturno, Cinthio, Pigna, and
Patrizzi as main authorities, and though he says that he will not quote
Castelvetro, as being on the Index, evidently means that he should be read,
though he duly prescribes Caro as an antidote. He has a good selection of
extracts, mighty lists of books and authorities, and an inserted tract (two in
fact) by Macarius Mutius on Poetry and Christian Poetry, by which he sets
much store, but in which little will be found but rhetoric.
Some of the most interesting and suggestive, if not the most regular,
criticism in this part of Italian literature is to be found in the Pensieri
Tassoni. His Diversi of Alessandro Tassoni.[415] The author of the
Pensieri Diversi.
Secchia Rapita was not likely to be dull in anything that he
undertook: and his undertakings were of a sufficiently various kind.[416] In
his Considerazioni[417] on Petrarch he treated that revered sonneteer and his
sonnets as cavalierly as he was to treat the sacred Heroic Poem in the
Secchia: but this kind of frondeur spirit was nothing new in Italy. The
Pensieri, in which their author was candidly prepared to find people
discovering “extravagance and capriciousness,” are modelled on Aristotle’s
Problems, and Plutarch’s Symposiacs and Roman Questions. They deal with
curious matters “such as are wont to come into the discourse of Gentlemen
and Professors of Literature,” a phrase where the “and” is half
Page 336
complimentary and half the reverse. On perusing the contents we find that
gentlemen and professors of literature talk about the radical humours, and
the reason of the spots on the moon, and why it is that ugly ladies are loved,
and a very great many other interesting things. They do it, moreover (at
least Tassoni does it for them), in a very interesting manner—that peculiar
early seventeenth-century mixture of learning, fancy, and humour which, in
still greater measure, gives Burton and Browne their quintessenced charm.
If Tassoni had pushed that question about the donne brutte home, he might
have rediscovered, against his own age, the great secret of criticism; but of
this we may treat more properly in the Interchapter. It is not till the Tenth
Book of the Pensieri that he attacks literature, save by incidence and
tangent; and then he plunges full into the Battle of the Ancients and
Moderns, devoting twenty-seven out of twenty-eight chapters to an
elaborate comparison of the two periods, in every class of art, science, and
literature itself. But he preserves his invincible quaintness by going off in
the twenty-eighth to a very elaborate study of the Hangman (Il Boia), which
readers of Joseph de Maistre should not fail to compare with the Soirées de
Saint-Pétersbourg.
Tassoni deals with the general question in the same curious indirect and
ironical fashion in which he handles the charms of bruttezza, and the reason
why it was specially rude (let us say, though he does not) of Spenser to call
the husband of Hellenore Malbecco. He begins by advancing, and even
seeming to countenance, the “Modern” argument for Progress, as being the
law of nature and so decisive of questa lite. But he very soon turns round,
and gives reasons and instances for the much sounder doctrine of
Fluctuation—not merely in general, but in regard to particular Arts.
Therefore it is necessary to examine these Arts; and then he does this. Once
more he becomes a “Modern” in awarding to his countrymen the palm of
grammatico-critical studies. In Logic and Philosophy generally, he thinks
they can match the Latins, and though they yield to the Greeks, may make
some fight even with them. He will pit Guicciardini, Comines, and Giovio
against any of the ancients, which is a little rash; putting Machiavelli with
others in a second rank. And on the modern side of Oratory he urges, with
his unconquerable unexpectedness, Peter the Hermit and John of Munster!
But on the Poets this unexpectedness of his turns to the disappointing. He
gives us a very unnecessary classification of Kinds, obviously in order that
he may quote his own Secchia as a new kind, the Heroi-comic. But it is
gentlemen and professors of literature talk about the radical humours, and
the reason of the spots on the moon, and why it is that ugly ladies are loved,
and a very great many other interesting things. They do it, moreover (at
least Tassoni does it for them), in a very interesting manner—that peculiar
early seventeenth-century mixture of learning, fancy, and humour which, in
still greater measure, gives Burton and Browne their quintessenced charm.
If Tassoni had pushed that question about the donne brutte home, he might
have rediscovered, against his own age, the great secret of criticism; but of
this we may treat more properly in the Interchapter. It is not till the Tenth
Book of the Pensieri that he attacks literature, save by incidence and
tangent; and then he plunges full into the Battle of the Ancients and
Moderns, devoting twenty-seven out of twenty-eight chapters to an
elaborate comparison of the two periods, in every class of art, science, and
literature itself. But he preserves his invincible quaintness by going off in
the twenty-eighth to a very elaborate study of the Hangman (Il Boia), which
readers of Joseph de Maistre should not fail to compare with the Soirées de
Saint-Pétersbourg.
Tassoni deals with the general question in the same curious indirect and
ironical fashion in which he handles the charms of bruttezza, and the reason
why it was specially rude (let us say, though he does not) of Spenser to call
the husband of Hellenore Malbecco. He begins by advancing, and even
seeming to countenance, the “Modern” argument for Progress, as being the
law of nature and so decisive of questa lite. But he very soon turns round,
and gives reasons and instances for the much sounder doctrine of
Fluctuation—not merely in general, but in regard to particular Arts.
Therefore it is necessary to examine these Arts; and then he does this. Once
more he becomes a “Modern” in awarding to his countrymen the palm of
grammatico-critical studies. In Logic and Philosophy generally, he thinks
they can match the Latins, and though they yield to the Greeks, may make
some fight even with them. He will pit Guicciardini, Comines, and Giovio
against any of the ancients, which is a little rash; putting Machiavelli with
others in a second rank. And on the modern side of Oratory he urges, with
his unconquerable unexpectedness, Peter the Hermit and John of Munster!
But on the Poets this unexpectedness of his turns to the disappointing. He
gives us a very unnecessary classification of Kinds, obviously in order that
he may quote his own Secchia as a new kind, the Heroi-comic. But it is
Page 337
interesting to find him dividing the Commedia into “Heroi-satiric” for the
Inferno, Heroic mixed with Hymnic for the Paradiso, and a division (not, as
in the Inferno, a blend) of Heroic and Satiric for the Purgatory. Except on
this head of questa lite, in which he is a notable forerunner of later
disputants, Tassoni has little that is positively critical. And if he shows on
the one hand a singularly active and inquiring spirit, such as may any day
discover fresh and promising outlooks, he shows us also the risk of mere
fantastic “problem”-raising, to which a century of active criticism was
leading a century of Academies.[418]
Tassoni’s Petrarch-blasphemies brought him into collision with Giuseppe
Aromatari, of whose original work, including his part in this battle,[419] I do
Aromatari. not know much. But Aromatari was responsible, many
years later, for a remarkable encyclopædia or corpus, which may very well
follow the Pensieri Diversi as a pendant to Possevino’s work already
mentioned, and as illustrating the learned and scholastic side. It is entitled
Degli Autori del Ben Parlare,[420] and, if its grammatical and Rhetorical
divisions had been succeeded by a similar collection of Poetics, it would
have gone far to cover, in a certain peculiar and limited way, the entire field
of criticism. As it is, not a few of its documents extend in the poetic
direction. Its first volume gives the promise of an almost unique thesaurus,
starting with illustrative and comparative extracts from Hesiod, Lucian,
Cicero, Xenophon, &c., then giving the whole of Dante’s De Vulgari
Eloquentia in the Italian, and following this with Trissino’s Castellano,
Tolomei’s Cesano, a discourse of Varchi, and “Opinions” from Mutio, Doni,
Dolce, Citadini, and others, all on the subject of the Vulgar Tongue. Other
treatises, including Bembo’s, with less famous ones by Alunno, Delminio,
and others, follow; while two whole parts are given up to Salviati’s
Avvertimenti della Lingua on Boccaccio. Not seldom the grammatical
matter touches points very important indeed to criticism, as for instance in
vol. vi., where Buonmattei enters on the question (made a burning one in
France by Malherbe) whether popular or literary usage is to be the standard
of correctness.
The Rhetorical part has the additional interest of combining ancient and
modern matter—of being, in short, a kind of compressed Rhetorici Græci et
His Degli Autori Latini with modern additions. Sometimes the texts are
del Ben Parlare.
given simply in whole or part—Aristotle, Longinus,
Hermogenes being thus treated—while an Introduction to Hermogenes by
Inferno, Heroic mixed with Hymnic for the Paradiso, and a division (not, as
in the Inferno, a blend) of Heroic and Satiric for the Purgatory. Except on
this head of questa lite, in which he is a notable forerunner of later
disputants, Tassoni has little that is positively critical. And if he shows on
the one hand a singularly active and inquiring spirit, such as may any day
discover fresh and promising outlooks, he shows us also the risk of mere
fantastic “problem”-raising, to which a century of active criticism was
leading a century of Academies.[418]
Tassoni’s Petrarch-blasphemies brought him into collision with Giuseppe
Aromatari, of whose original work, including his part in this battle,[419] I do
Aromatari. not know much. But Aromatari was responsible, many
years later, for a remarkable encyclopædia or corpus, which may very well
follow the Pensieri Diversi as a pendant to Possevino’s work already
mentioned, and as illustrating the learned and scholastic side. It is entitled
Degli Autori del Ben Parlare,[420] and, if its grammatical and Rhetorical
divisions had been succeeded by a similar collection of Poetics, it would
have gone far to cover, in a certain peculiar and limited way, the entire field
of criticism. As it is, not a few of its documents extend in the poetic
direction. Its first volume gives the promise of an almost unique thesaurus,
starting with illustrative and comparative extracts from Hesiod, Lucian,
Cicero, Xenophon, &c., then giving the whole of Dante’s De Vulgari
Eloquentia in the Italian, and following this with Trissino’s Castellano,
Tolomei’s Cesano, a discourse of Varchi, and “Opinions” from Mutio, Doni,
Dolce, Citadini, and others, all on the subject of the Vulgar Tongue. Other
treatises, including Bembo’s, with less famous ones by Alunno, Delminio,
and others, follow; while two whole parts are given up to Salviati’s
Avvertimenti della Lingua on Boccaccio. Not seldom the grammatical
matter touches points very important indeed to criticism, as for instance in
vol. vi., where Buonmattei enters on the question (made a burning one in
France by Malherbe) whether popular or literary usage is to be the standard
of correctness.
The Rhetorical part has the additional interest of combining ancient and
modern matter—of being, in short, a kind of compressed Rhetorici Græci et
His Degli Autori Latini with modern additions. Sometimes the texts are
del Ben Parlare.
given simply in whole or part—Aristotle, Longinus,
Hermogenes being thus treated—while an Introduction to Hermogenes by
Page 338
Giulio Camillo Delminio shows how strongly the authority of that master
was working, and how much it had to do with the insistence on criticism by
Kinds and Qualities. Sometimes a catena of authorities on particular
matters is given—as in the case of Tropes and Figures, where the chain
stretches from Quintilian to Mazzoni. Only specialists, probably, will care
to investigate profoundly the huge commentary-paraphrase of Panigarola on
Demetrius Phalereus, readjusted to the purposes of sacred Oratory, though
the book had a great vogue in its day. But one turns with more interest to
the work of Patrizzi on Rhetoric, much less known as it is than his Della
Poetica and Della Storia. It has, however, hardly any of the interest of the
Poetica, being almost entirely devoted to the subjects of the orator, and
philosophical rather than literary in its handling. But this great medley of
Aromatari’s shows us, better perhaps than any single book except Baillet’s,
and nearly fifty years before it, the bulk and importance of the position
which the critical consideration of literature was taking among literary
studies.
The literary side of Boccalini’s Ragguagli di Parnasso[421] is less than the
Boccalini and political. But the list of seventeenth-century treatises in
Minors.
Italian on critical subjects is long.[422] Some of them are
difficult to procure out of Italy, and I doubt whether many are worth the
trouble of hunting down. I am sorry that the work of Chiodino da Monte-
Melone[423] has hitherto escaped me, because of the extreme beauty of the
name, which would seem to qualify its author for the post of Chief
Rhetorician to Queen Pintiquinestra. Pellegrino, Fioretti, Zani, Querengo,
Menzini have not been or shall not be forgotten. But I have experienced,
and fear again, the sort of disappointment which occurs when, for instance,
[424]
one is told, of Carlo Rinaldini,[425] that the third part of his Philosophia
Rationalis “contains a tolerable Poetic.” One attacks the mighty double-
columned folio, and finds a purely scholastic treatise of the familiar kind,
beginning with Poetice, Poeta, Poesis, Poema as of old. It is impossible to
say Non debes quadrillare in this fashion—the company is too ancient and
venerable; but it is permissible to decline to play, on the strength of having
had enough of the game already. There is a certain established conformity
of propriety between times and books. At no time can a frank commentary
on Aristotle be out of date or out of place; at this time the Poetics of Le
Bossu and Bouhours, faulty as they are, were at any rate responsive to the
form and pressure of the day. But such work as Rinaldini’s, however
was working, and how much it had to do with the insistence on criticism by
Kinds and Qualities. Sometimes a catena of authorities on particular
matters is given—as in the case of Tropes and Figures, where the chain
stretches from Quintilian to Mazzoni. Only specialists, probably, will care
to investigate profoundly the huge commentary-paraphrase of Panigarola on
Demetrius Phalereus, readjusted to the purposes of sacred Oratory, though
the book had a great vogue in its day. But one turns with more interest to
the work of Patrizzi on Rhetoric, much less known as it is than his Della
Poetica and Della Storia. It has, however, hardly any of the interest of the
Poetica, being almost entirely devoted to the subjects of the orator, and
philosophical rather than literary in its handling. But this great medley of
Aromatari’s shows us, better perhaps than any single book except Baillet’s,
and nearly fifty years before it, the bulk and importance of the position
which the critical consideration of literature was taking among literary
studies.
The literary side of Boccalini’s Ragguagli di Parnasso[421] is less than the
Boccalini and political. But the list of seventeenth-century treatises in
Minors.
Italian on critical subjects is long.[422] Some of them are
difficult to procure out of Italy, and I doubt whether many are worth the
trouble of hunting down. I am sorry that the work of Chiodino da Monte-
Melone[423] has hitherto escaped me, because of the extreme beauty of the
name, which would seem to qualify its author for the post of Chief
Rhetorician to Queen Pintiquinestra. Pellegrino, Fioretti, Zani, Querengo,
Menzini have not been or shall not be forgotten. But I have experienced,
and fear again, the sort of disappointment which occurs when, for instance,
[424]
one is told, of Carlo Rinaldini,[425] that the third part of his Philosophia
Rationalis “contains a tolerable Poetic.” One attacks the mighty double-
columned folio, and finds a purely scholastic treatise of the familiar kind,
beginning with Poetice, Poeta, Poesis, Poema as of old. It is impossible to
say Non debes quadrillare in this fashion—the company is too ancient and
venerable; but it is permissible to decline to play, on the strength of having
had enough of the game already. There is a certain established conformity
of propriety between times and books. At no time can a frank commentary
on Aristotle be out of date or out of place; at this time the Poetics of Le
Bossu and Bouhours, faulty as they are, were at any rate responsive to the
form and pressure of the day. But such work as Rinaldini’s, however
Page 339
respectable, has neither the intrinsic excellence which conquers time, nor
the fleeting but real grace of temporal congruity.
The Ragguagli di Parnasso themselves are of less importance to us for
their actual critical utterances (which, as has been said, were not Boccalini’s
first object) than for the extraordinary influence which they exercised on the
form of criticism throughout Europe for more than a century. Suggested
Influence of the more or less directly by Lucian (whose enormous effect on
Ragguagli.
modern European literature, though of course never missed
entirely by any competent person, has never yet been fully allowed for) they
hit the taste of the day straight and full. Not merely did they start the whole
fleet of “Sessions of the Poets” and the like in England, but they had a great
influence on the English prose Essayists of the early eighteenth century;[426]
while in France even the severe Boileau paid them unacknowledged royalty.
It is no uncommon experience to find that books which in this way create a
kind of “rage” at one time, become chiefly sources of boredom at another;
but Boccalini certainly illustrates the fact, in his literary portions at any rate.
He deserves some credit for having made current, if he did not invent, the
famous story of the choice between Guicciardini and the galleys. There is
some critical appropriateness in the fable of Tasso being refused admission
by Castelvetro on the alleged strength of Aristotle’s rules, of the reprimand
bestowed by Apollo on the philosopher, and of his excuse that he never
meant his observations for “rules” at all. To this the age might have paid
more attention than it did. But one finds thinness in the fun of Justus
Lipsius attacking Tacitus for impiety, and of Thrasea and Priscus being
warned, as they value their stoical characters, not to go and see Vittoria
Colonna and Veronica Gambara too often.
In the History of Taste as distinguished from that of Criticism the
important point of the Seicento is of course that development of floridity—
of Marinism—which is associated in literary history with the very term. But
The set of this development was common to Italy with all Europe; and
Seicentist taste.
though the country still exercised a sort of prerogative
influence, “Marinism” is not so much the mother as the elder, and not by so
very much the elder, sister of Gongorism in Spain, of the extravagances of
the age before Boileau in France, of the “metaphysical” fashion in England.
It will be better to treat these in the Interchapter, both in themselves and as
fastening “correctness,” by way of reaction, upon Europe.
the fleeting but real grace of temporal congruity.
The Ragguagli di Parnasso themselves are of less importance to us for
their actual critical utterances (which, as has been said, were not Boccalini’s
first object) than for the extraordinary influence which they exercised on the
form of criticism throughout Europe for more than a century. Suggested
Influence of the more or less directly by Lucian (whose enormous effect on
Ragguagli.
modern European literature, though of course never missed
entirely by any competent person, has never yet been fully allowed for) they
hit the taste of the day straight and full. Not merely did they start the whole
fleet of “Sessions of the Poets” and the like in England, but they had a great
influence on the English prose Essayists of the early eighteenth century;[426]
while in France even the severe Boileau paid them unacknowledged royalty.
It is no uncommon experience to find that books which in this way create a
kind of “rage” at one time, become chiefly sources of boredom at another;
but Boccalini certainly illustrates the fact, in his literary portions at any rate.
He deserves some credit for having made current, if he did not invent, the
famous story of the choice between Guicciardini and the galleys. There is
some critical appropriateness in the fable of Tasso being refused admission
by Castelvetro on the alleged strength of Aristotle’s rules, of the reprimand
bestowed by Apollo on the philosopher, and of his excuse that he never
meant his observations for “rules” at all. To this the age might have paid
more attention than it did. But one finds thinness in the fun of Justus
Lipsius attacking Tacitus for impiety, and of Thrasea and Priscus being
warned, as they value their stoical characters, not to go and see Vittoria
Colonna and Veronica Gambara too often.
In the History of Taste as distinguished from that of Criticism the
important point of the Seicento is of course that development of floridity—
of Marinism—which is associated in literary history with the very term. But
The set of this development was common to Italy with all Europe; and
Seicentist taste.
though the country still exercised a sort of prerogative
influence, “Marinism” is not so much the mother as the elder, and not by so
very much the elder, sister of Gongorism in Spain, of the extravagances of
the age before Boileau in France, of the “metaphysical” fashion in England.
It will be better to treat these in the Interchapter, both in themselves and as
fastening “correctness,” by way of reaction, upon Europe.
Page 340
Spain has never ranked very high in the general estimate as a contributor
to European criticism: and though this estimate has not been too solidly
founded, the communis sensus seems here to have exercised that mysterious
power of appeal to the world-spirit which so often keeps it from going
Spanish hopelessly wrong.[427] There is, however, one remarkable
criticism—
Highly ranked
piece of testimony which, if it were a little better
by Dryden? authenticated, would give Spanish critics a very high
position as teachers. We shall see in a future chapter that
Dryden (as has indeed been generally, though, until recent times, but
vaguely, allowed) is himself one of the great turning-points of the critical
story of Europe. Now Spence says that Bolingbroke told him that Dryden
had assured him that “he got more from the Spanish critics alone than from
the Italian and French and all others together.” Unfortunately Spence speaks
at second-hand; and Bolingbroke, even if he really did say this, is always a
Bardolphian security. Moreover, Dryden, who was not at all in the habit of
concealing his indebtedness, but, on the contrary, seems to have “felt an
innocent warmth” of pleasure in mustering and marshalling his authorities,
quotes no Spanish authors. And the references (which are fairly numerous)
to Spanish plays in the Essay of Dramatic Poesy neither quote, nor
necessarily show knowledge of, Spanish critics at all. It has been thought
that Dryden may have read Tirso de Molina’s Cigarrales (v. infra); and it
has occurred to me that something in his attitude may have been derived
from Lope’s Arte Nuevo de hacer Comedias. But I do not believe this to be
at all certain, or even very probable.[428]
Intrinsically, however, Spanish criticism before the eighteenth century,
though not extraordinarily rich nor furnishing any documents of extreme
importance, is interesting, and in one point almost supremely so, for
The Origins— circumstances if not for contents. The trail begins fairly
Villena.
early, though the scent is scattered at uncommonly long
intervals. A glance was made towards the close of the first volume of this
book at the actual beginnings. They were due to two persons of the greatest
distinction in the early fifteenth century—Enrique, Marquis(?)[429] de
Villena and Master of Calatrava, of the blood royal both of Aragon and
Castille, and Iñigo Lopez de Mendoza, Marquis of Santillana. The Arte de
Trobar[430] of the former, a treatise on the Gay Science, was sent by him, a
year before his death, in 1434, to the latter; and Santillana himself touched
criticism, or at least Poetics, both in the Preface to his Proverbs, and still
to European criticism: and though this estimate has not been too solidly
founded, the communis sensus seems here to have exercised that mysterious
power of appeal to the world-spirit which so often keeps it from going
Spanish hopelessly wrong.[427] There is, however, one remarkable
criticism—
Highly ranked
piece of testimony which, if it were a little better
by Dryden? authenticated, would give Spanish critics a very high
position as teachers. We shall see in a future chapter that
Dryden (as has indeed been generally, though, until recent times, but
vaguely, allowed) is himself one of the great turning-points of the critical
story of Europe. Now Spence says that Bolingbroke told him that Dryden
had assured him that “he got more from the Spanish critics alone than from
the Italian and French and all others together.” Unfortunately Spence speaks
at second-hand; and Bolingbroke, even if he really did say this, is always a
Bardolphian security. Moreover, Dryden, who was not at all in the habit of
concealing his indebtedness, but, on the contrary, seems to have “felt an
innocent warmth” of pleasure in mustering and marshalling his authorities,
quotes no Spanish authors. And the references (which are fairly numerous)
to Spanish plays in the Essay of Dramatic Poesy neither quote, nor
necessarily show knowledge of, Spanish critics at all. It has been thought
that Dryden may have read Tirso de Molina’s Cigarrales (v. infra); and it
has occurred to me that something in his attitude may have been derived
from Lope’s Arte Nuevo de hacer Comedias. But I do not believe this to be
at all certain, or even very probable.[428]
Intrinsically, however, Spanish criticism before the eighteenth century,
though not extraordinarily rich nor furnishing any documents of extreme
importance, is interesting, and in one point almost supremely so, for
The Origins— circumstances if not for contents. The trail begins fairly
Villena.
early, though the scent is scattered at uncommonly long
intervals. A glance was made towards the close of the first volume of this
book at the actual beginnings. They were due to two persons of the greatest
distinction in the early fifteenth century—Enrique, Marquis(?)[429] de
Villena and Master of Calatrava, of the blood royal both of Aragon and
Castille, and Iñigo Lopez de Mendoza, Marquis of Santillana. The Arte de
Trobar[430] of the former, a treatise on the Gay Science, was sent by him, a
year before his death, in 1434, to the latter; and Santillana himself touched
criticism, or at least Poetics, both in the Preface to his Proverbs, and still
Page 341
more in a letter to the Constable (Dom Pedro) of Portugal, written about
1455, not long before his own death, and containing observations not
merely on Poetry in general, but on early Spanish poets up to his own times.
This document was fortunately, and most wisely, prefixed by Sanchez to his
collection of the older Spanish poets, and is easily accessible in the re-
edition of Ochoa,[431] or in the Appendix to Señor Menéndez' History, vol. ii.
The Marquis begins, after compliments, by the usual generalities about
poetry containing “useful things covered with a very pretty coverlet,
composed, distinguished, and scanned in certain number, weight, and
Santillana. measure.” So “as fructiferous gardens abound and give
convenient fruits,” &c., &c., with Tully to give security. But for all his own
very pretty coverlet of rhetoric, the Marquis talks very good sense. He is
sure that verse is above prose, basing himself soundly on Isidore of Seville
and his proofs from Hebrew literature, with the Greeks to follow, and
Cassiodorus to back up Isidore. Then he comes to modern times—to
Petrarch and Robert of Naples, to Boccaccio and John of Cyprus, quoting
the De Genealogia itself, and therefore, in a very interesting way, gearing
on Spanish criticism, even in these its rudiments, to Italian, then not much
less rudimentary. He divides styles properly into “sublime,” “middle,” and
“low,” liberally placing all those who write in Greek or Latin in the first
class. The middle contains those who write in any vulgar tongue; the low
those who merely botch up romances and songs for the common people,
without order or rule. Dante wrote the Commedia “elegantemente,” and
Boccaccio composed proses of grand eloquencia in the manner of Boethius.
Santillana then shows himself well read in Provençal, French, and Catalan,
as well as Italian. He refers to the Roman de la Rose and its authors, to
“Michaute” (Machault), Otho de “Crantzon” (Granson), “Alen Charrotier,”
whom, naturally, he much admires. He thinks the Italians surpass the
French in genius, the French the Italians in art. Then he turns to Spain, and
beginning with those who have written in the Provençal style, comes to
Gallegan, Castilian, &c., later, mentions the chief poets, gives the metres in
which they have written, and ends with a (mis)quotation of Horace[432] and a
shower of classical allusions—among others to aquellas dueñas que en
torno de la fuente Elicon incesantemente danzan. For even then the modern
confusion of the Mount and the Fount had begun. The piece is, if not very
advanced criticism, at any rate an early and interesting critical glance over
European poetry in the Romance tongues.
1455, not long before his own death, and containing observations not
merely on Poetry in general, but on early Spanish poets up to his own times.
This document was fortunately, and most wisely, prefixed by Sanchez to his
collection of the older Spanish poets, and is easily accessible in the re-
edition of Ochoa,[431] or in the Appendix to Señor Menéndez' History, vol. ii.
The Marquis begins, after compliments, by the usual generalities about
poetry containing “useful things covered with a very pretty coverlet,
composed, distinguished, and scanned in certain number, weight, and
Santillana. measure.” So “as fructiferous gardens abound and give
convenient fruits,” &c., &c., with Tully to give security. But for all his own
very pretty coverlet of rhetoric, the Marquis talks very good sense. He is
sure that verse is above prose, basing himself soundly on Isidore of Seville
and his proofs from Hebrew literature, with the Greeks to follow, and
Cassiodorus to back up Isidore. Then he comes to modern times—to
Petrarch and Robert of Naples, to Boccaccio and John of Cyprus, quoting
the De Genealogia itself, and therefore, in a very interesting way, gearing
on Spanish criticism, even in these its rudiments, to Italian, then not much
less rudimentary. He divides styles properly into “sublime,” “middle,” and
“low,” liberally placing all those who write in Greek or Latin in the first
class. The middle contains those who write in any vulgar tongue; the low
those who merely botch up romances and songs for the common people,
without order or rule. Dante wrote the Commedia “elegantemente,” and
Boccaccio composed proses of grand eloquencia in the manner of Boethius.
Santillana then shows himself well read in Provençal, French, and Catalan,
as well as Italian. He refers to the Roman de la Rose and its authors, to
“Michaute” (Machault), Otho de “Crantzon” (Granson), “Alen Charrotier,”
whom, naturally, he much admires. He thinks the Italians surpass the
French in genius, the French the Italians in art. Then he turns to Spain, and
beginning with those who have written in the Provençal style, comes to
Gallegan, Castilian, &c., later, mentions the chief poets, gives the metres in
which they have written, and ends with a (mis)quotation of Horace[432] and a
shower of classical allusions—among others to aquellas dueñas que en
torno de la fuente Elicon incesantemente danzan. For even then the modern
confusion of the Mount and the Fount had begun. The piece is, if not very
advanced criticism, at any rate an early and interesting critical glance over
European poetry in the Romance tongues.
Page 342
Villena, as his title shows, and Santillana to some extent, had been
considering Catalan and Galician as the chief poetic media for Spaniards; it
is different with Juan del Encina, who, in 1496,[433] prefixed an Arte to his
Cancionero nearly half a century after Santillana wrote, and almost as long
after an earlier Cancionero, that of Baena, the compiler of which does not
Encina. seem to have been tempted to criticism. The nine chapters
of this deal with the origin of Castilian poetry, the distinction between the
art of poetry and the arte de trobar, while both have an art; the necessities
of the trobador, feet, consonance and assonance, verses and couplets, poetic
“colours,” &c., and a general conclusion on writing and reading poetry. The
book shows a certain Italian influence which distinguishes it from earlier
work; but which, when that Italian influence had been repeated in stronger
dose, seemed to later generations insufficient and out of date. Still, it is
interesting, and earlier than anything of the kind in vernacular Italian.
Another half-way house may be found in the interesting Diálogo de La
Lengua or de Las Lenguas[434] of Juan de Valdés, which has even been
Valdés. called “an important monument of literary criticism.” It is
rather, however, linguistic than literary, though the author deserves to rank
with other national heroes of the time for his strenuous support of the
vernacular, which he thought a more “corrupted” representative of Latin
than Italian, and respecting which he held the odd but characteristically
Renaissance notion that Greek, not Basque, was its remoter ancestor. He
mentions the romances and the Celestina.
But the regular course of technical and elaborate Spanish criticism does
not begin, after these long preliminary stages, till quite the close of the
The beginning sixteenth century. The earlier course of that century has
of regular
Criticism.
indeed supplied Señor Menéndez with a tolerably fair herd
Humanist of humanist rhetoricians to fill the ninety pages of his ninth
Rhetoricians. chapter. The list is headed by Antonio de Nebrija
(Nebrissensis), De Artis Rhetoricæ compendiosa coaptatione ex Aristotele
Cicerone et Quintiliano, in 1529. But the only names of much interest that
appear in it are those of the famous Luis Vives, disciple of Erasmus and of
Oxford, with his anti-Ciceronianism, and with at least some admission (the
passage is quoted by Señor Menéndez at vol. iii. on p. 226 from the De
causis Corruptarum Artium), that it does not matter in what language a man
writes in so far as faults and impurities of diction and the duty of avoiding
them are concerned; and of the equally famous preacher Luis de Granada,
considering Catalan and Galician as the chief poetic media for Spaniards; it
is different with Juan del Encina, who, in 1496,[433] prefixed an Arte to his
Cancionero nearly half a century after Santillana wrote, and almost as long
after an earlier Cancionero, that of Baena, the compiler of which does not
Encina. seem to have been tempted to criticism. The nine chapters
of this deal with the origin of Castilian poetry, the distinction between the
art of poetry and the arte de trobar, while both have an art; the necessities
of the trobador, feet, consonance and assonance, verses and couplets, poetic
“colours,” &c., and a general conclusion on writing and reading poetry. The
book shows a certain Italian influence which distinguishes it from earlier
work; but which, when that Italian influence had been repeated in stronger
dose, seemed to later generations insufficient and out of date. Still, it is
interesting, and earlier than anything of the kind in vernacular Italian.
Another half-way house may be found in the interesting Diálogo de La
Lengua or de Las Lenguas[434] of Juan de Valdés, which has even been
Valdés. called “an important monument of literary criticism.” It is
rather, however, linguistic than literary, though the author deserves to rank
with other national heroes of the time for his strenuous support of the
vernacular, which he thought a more “corrupted” representative of Latin
than Italian, and respecting which he held the odd but characteristically
Renaissance notion that Greek, not Basque, was its remoter ancestor. He
mentions the romances and the Celestina.
But the regular course of technical and elaborate Spanish criticism does
not begin, after these long preliminary stages, till quite the close of the
The beginning sixteenth century. The earlier course of that century has
of regular
Criticism.
indeed supplied Señor Menéndez with a tolerably fair herd
Humanist of humanist rhetoricians to fill the ninety pages of his ninth
Rhetoricians. chapter. The list is headed by Antonio de Nebrija
(Nebrissensis), De Artis Rhetoricæ compendiosa coaptatione ex Aristotele
Cicerone et Quintiliano, in 1529. But the only names of much interest that
appear in it are those of the famous Luis Vives, disciple of Erasmus and of
Oxford, with his anti-Ciceronianism, and with at least some admission (the
passage is quoted by Señor Menéndez at vol. iii. on p. 226 from the De
causis Corruptarum Artium), that it does not matter in what language a man
writes in so far as faults and impurities of diction and the duty of avoiding
them are concerned; and of the equally famous preacher Luis de Granada,
Page 343
with his Rhetorica Ecclesiastica, a good deal later. Still, the metrical
Rhetoric (1569) of Arias Montano, that “Lope of Latin verse,” a piece of
didactic much more spirited and really poetical than Vida’s Poetic, on
which no doubt it is modelled; and the vigorous if mistaken scholasticism
of Francesco Sanchez (“El Brocense”), in his attempt to subject Rhetoric
entirely to Logic, deserve some notice. So, perhaps, does Alfonso Garcia
Matamoros, who, though Señor Menéndez conscientiously suspects him of
not being very original, stumbled upon a remarkable anticipation of Buffon
in the definition Est stylus habitus orationis, a cujusque hominis natura
fluens. This is a slight but distinct advance on the earlier one of Fox
Morcillo, De Imitatione (1544), which gives it as something quæ vel pro
ingenio cujusquam, vel rei, quæ in questionem vocatur, ratione varietur.
These writers, however, seem (except El Brocense, who dealt on more than
one occasion with the Horatian Art) to have given little or no attention to
Poetics, and in fact to have allowed themselves to drift a good deal to
leeward of the purely literary side of Rhetoric altogether. When the ship
bore up again for this side, the Spaniards, like everybody else in Europe
without exception, took the Italians for their schoolmasters; and they might
seem all the more certain to be docile pupils in that their poetical practice—
their practice indeed in all sorts of regular writing—had long been under the
same influence. Boscan had more or less deliberately Italianated Spanish
poetry[435] half a century before Rengifo,[436] and Pinciano, and La Cueva, in
the last decade of the sixteenth century and the first of the seventeenth,
began to theorise. At the same time there was a very important point of
difference between Spain and all other European nations, except to some
extent England. In the contents of the Cancioneros—perhaps not in actual
form very old, but stretching back by tradition and association to the very
blending-time of Goth, and Cantabrian, and Latin—and in the drama which
had been so rapidly maturing from Naharro to Lope de Vega, the Spaniards
had two mighty, popular, and intensely anti-"regular" forms of literary
composition. The critical “dependence” therefore—the point to be fought
out—was, “Which was to prevail?”
Mr Spingarn’s thesis, that translation of the Epistle to the Pisos is the
invariable prelude of original critical work, completes its proofs, as far as
the Latin races are concerned, by the version of Espinel which appeared in
1591, and was followed in the very next year by Rengifo’s Arte Poética
Poetics. Rengifo. Española. Of the former there is little to say, for though
Rhetoric (1569) of Arias Montano, that “Lope of Latin verse,” a piece of
didactic much more spirited and really poetical than Vida’s Poetic, on
which no doubt it is modelled; and the vigorous if mistaken scholasticism
of Francesco Sanchez (“El Brocense”), in his attempt to subject Rhetoric
entirely to Logic, deserve some notice. So, perhaps, does Alfonso Garcia
Matamoros, who, though Señor Menéndez conscientiously suspects him of
not being very original, stumbled upon a remarkable anticipation of Buffon
in the definition Est stylus habitus orationis, a cujusque hominis natura
fluens. This is a slight but distinct advance on the earlier one of Fox
Morcillo, De Imitatione (1544), which gives it as something quæ vel pro
ingenio cujusquam, vel rei, quæ in questionem vocatur, ratione varietur.
These writers, however, seem (except El Brocense, who dealt on more than
one occasion with the Horatian Art) to have given little or no attention to
Poetics, and in fact to have allowed themselves to drift a good deal to
leeward of the purely literary side of Rhetoric altogether. When the ship
bore up again for this side, the Spaniards, like everybody else in Europe
without exception, took the Italians for their schoolmasters; and they might
seem all the more certain to be docile pupils in that their poetical practice—
their practice indeed in all sorts of regular writing—had long been under the
same influence. Boscan had more or less deliberately Italianated Spanish
poetry[435] half a century before Rengifo,[436] and Pinciano, and La Cueva, in
the last decade of the sixteenth century and the first of the seventeenth,
began to theorise. At the same time there was a very important point of
difference between Spain and all other European nations, except to some
extent England. In the contents of the Cancioneros—perhaps not in actual
form very old, but stretching back by tradition and association to the very
blending-time of Goth, and Cantabrian, and Latin—and in the drama which
had been so rapidly maturing from Naharro to Lope de Vega, the Spaniards
had two mighty, popular, and intensely anti-"regular" forms of literary
composition. The critical “dependence” therefore—the point to be fought
out—was, “Which was to prevail?”
Mr Spingarn’s thesis, that translation of the Epistle to the Pisos is the
invariable prelude of original critical work, completes its proofs, as far as
the Latin races are concerned, by the version of Espinel which appeared in
1591, and was followed in the very next year by Rengifo’s Arte Poética
Poetics. Rengifo. Española. Of the former there is little to say, for though
Page 344
Espinel was a man of literary gift (he was the author, it may be excusable to
remind the reader, of Marcos de Obregón, and so a slight, though only a
slight, creditor of Le Sage), he did not add anything original to his
translation. The latter has been sometimes rather unkindly spoken of by
those who do not like formal Arts of Poetry. Those, on the other hand, who
have weak places in their hearts for such things may give Rengifo shelter
therein. He reminds one at very first sight of his Italian originals in the
comely small quarto of his format—the book-size of all others which
retains a certain dignity without entirely forfeiting the benefit of the
Archpriest of Hita’s celebration of dueñas pequeñas: he has a beautiful
folding plate of a Labyrinto—one of the artificial forms which are dear
because they maddened the eighteenth century—and he gives a large Sylva
or rhyming dictionary. I do not know that there is much else to be said for
him, but he is a symptom.[437] So, some twenty years later is, on the other
side, the severe Cascales,[438] who in his Tablas Poéticas[439] lays it down
that “if any part of a fable can be changed without loss, this fable is not well
managed.” There was a contemporary of Cascales in a country which loved
not Spain, neither was loved of her, who would have changed you every
part of every one of his fables, and left the versions so that you could not
tell which was the better.
Some years after Rengifo came Pinciano, and ten years later the Spanish
attempt to rival Vida and Vauquelin in the Ejemplar Poético of Juan de La
Pinciano. Cueva. The two are opposed on the point which was
rapidly becoming the burning question of Spanish literary criticism, but
which was never thoroughly faced in Spain. The great national drama—in
main part, if not in every respect, Romantic to the core—was making
progress every day; but so was the theory that you were to follow the
ancients. Alfonso Lopez, otherwise “El Pinciano,” did the latter diligently in
his Filosofía Antigua Poética,[440] which, besides the authorities indicated in
the title, owed much to the Italian school.
Pinciano[441] is set extraordinarily high by the Historian of Spanish
criticism, who thinks him “the only humanist of the sixteenth century who
presents a complete literary system,” contrasts him (I own that this gives me
pause) with the “intolerable pedantries” of Castelvetro, and calls him
plumply “an excellent critic.” The quotations advanced, though, according
to Señor Menéndez' admirable custom with authors difficult of access, they
are plentifully given, will perhaps hardly justify this praise. Pinciano thinks
remind the reader, of Marcos de Obregón, and so a slight, though only a
slight, creditor of Le Sage), he did not add anything original to his
translation. The latter has been sometimes rather unkindly spoken of by
those who do not like formal Arts of Poetry. Those, on the other hand, who
have weak places in their hearts for such things may give Rengifo shelter
therein. He reminds one at very first sight of his Italian originals in the
comely small quarto of his format—the book-size of all others which
retains a certain dignity without entirely forfeiting the benefit of the
Archpriest of Hita’s celebration of dueñas pequeñas: he has a beautiful
folding plate of a Labyrinto—one of the artificial forms which are dear
because they maddened the eighteenth century—and he gives a large Sylva
or rhyming dictionary. I do not know that there is much else to be said for
him, but he is a symptom.[437] So, some twenty years later is, on the other
side, the severe Cascales,[438] who in his Tablas Poéticas[439] lays it down
that “if any part of a fable can be changed without loss, this fable is not well
managed.” There was a contemporary of Cascales in a country which loved
not Spain, neither was loved of her, who would have changed you every
part of every one of his fables, and left the versions so that you could not
tell which was the better.
Some years after Rengifo came Pinciano, and ten years later the Spanish
attempt to rival Vida and Vauquelin in the Ejemplar Poético of Juan de La
Pinciano. Cueva. The two are opposed on the point which was
rapidly becoming the burning question of Spanish literary criticism, but
which was never thoroughly faced in Spain. The great national drama—in
main part, if not in every respect, Romantic to the core—was making
progress every day; but so was the theory that you were to follow the
ancients. Alfonso Lopez, otherwise “El Pinciano,” did the latter diligently in
his Filosofía Antigua Poética,[440] which, besides the authorities indicated in
the title, owed much to the Italian school.
Pinciano[441] is set extraordinarily high by the Historian of Spanish
criticism, who thinks him “the only humanist of the sixteenth century who
presents a complete literary system,” contrasts him (I own that this gives me
pause) with the “intolerable pedantries” of Castelvetro, and calls him
plumply “an excellent critic.” The quotations advanced, though, according
to Señor Menéndez' admirable custom with authors difficult of access, they
are plentifully given, will perhaps hardly justify this praise. Pinciano thinks
Page 345
that “the soul of poetry is the fable”; that metre is not necessary, though it
“perfects imitation”; that imitation itself must have verisimilitude; that
poetry is superior to metaphysic; that it ranges over all the arts and sciences;
that it gives things in a new form, makes them new to the world; that a
perfectly organised fable is like a perfectly organised animal; that it is
absurd for a hero to be born, grow up, become bearded, marry, &c., all in
one piece. He prefers the probable-impossible to the improbable-possible,
disapproves of classical metres, and so forth—all of which we have, I think,
heard before. Señor Menéndez attributes to him altísimo entendimiento
crítico for rejecting the common (and certainly absurd enough) division of
comedy and tragedy by the happy or unhappy ending, and vesting the comic
element in Ridicule. And he winds up by constituting Pinciano, with
Cascales and Gonzales de Salas, “the luminous triad of our preceptists of
the good age.”
Recurrence to, and study of, the book itself as given by Señor Peña will
not, I think, remove the doubts about this high estimate of the Filosofía
which even Señor Menéndez' own quotations may have started. It is a book
of much learning, ingenuity, and labour, the somewhat non-natural form of
which (the recounting in letters to a certain Don Gabriel by El Pinciano[442]
of conversations between himself and two friends, Hugo and Fadrique)
may, like much else in it, be due to Italian influence. That of such writers as
Fracastoro is obvious in the philosophical aloofness of the first Epistle-
dialogue, De la Felicidad Humana, in which the nature of virtue, the
character of the Pagan divinities, and many other solemn things are
discussed, with some curious ones, such as whether nobleza can be
predicated of Lais either for her beauty or her eminence in an oficio
deshonesto. It is Don Gabriel’s answer which deflects the subject with some
sharpness into una Arte Poética en romance, and this, beginning in the next
letter, occupies the rest of the book. The divisions are pretty usual: first, the
general qualities of, and objections to, Poetry; then its nature, its different
kinds, the Fable, Poetic diction, metre, tragedy, and comedy; dithyrambic,
epic, minor poetry; and lastly, “Actors.” Pinciano calls these divisions
modestly enough Fragmentos, but no just exception can be taken to them
on the ground of scrappiness. The book is methodical enough; its aperçus
(as, for instance, on furor poeticus and poetic diction) are often acute, and
its expression not seldom has the quaint raciness of Spanish.[443] But it still
“sticks in generals”; it still holds those generals to have been settled once
“perfects imitation”; that imitation itself must have verisimilitude; that
poetry is superior to metaphysic; that it ranges over all the arts and sciences;
that it gives things in a new form, makes them new to the world; that a
perfectly organised fable is like a perfectly organised animal; that it is
absurd for a hero to be born, grow up, become bearded, marry, &c., all in
one piece. He prefers the probable-impossible to the improbable-possible,
disapproves of classical metres, and so forth—all of which we have, I think,
heard before. Señor Menéndez attributes to him altísimo entendimiento
crítico for rejecting the common (and certainly absurd enough) division of
comedy and tragedy by the happy or unhappy ending, and vesting the comic
element in Ridicule. And he winds up by constituting Pinciano, with
Cascales and Gonzales de Salas, “the luminous triad of our preceptists of
the good age.”
Recurrence to, and study of, the book itself as given by Señor Peña will
not, I think, remove the doubts about this high estimate of the Filosofía
which even Señor Menéndez' own quotations may have started. It is a book
of much learning, ingenuity, and labour, the somewhat non-natural form of
which (the recounting in letters to a certain Don Gabriel by El Pinciano[442]
of conversations between himself and two friends, Hugo and Fadrique)
may, like much else in it, be due to Italian influence. That of such writers as
Fracastoro is obvious in the philosophical aloofness of the first Epistle-
dialogue, De la Felicidad Humana, in which the nature of virtue, the
character of the Pagan divinities, and many other solemn things are
discussed, with some curious ones, such as whether nobleza can be
predicated of Lais either for her beauty or her eminence in an oficio
deshonesto. It is Don Gabriel’s answer which deflects the subject with some
sharpness into una Arte Poética en romance, and this, beginning in the next
letter, occupies the rest of the book. The divisions are pretty usual: first, the
general qualities of, and objections to, Poetry; then its nature, its different
kinds, the Fable, Poetic diction, metre, tragedy, and comedy; dithyrambic,
epic, minor poetry; and lastly, “Actors.” Pinciano calls these divisions
modestly enough Fragmentos, but no just exception can be taken to them
on the ground of scrappiness. The book is methodical enough; its aperçus
(as, for instance, on furor poeticus and poetic diction) are often acute, and
its expression not seldom has the quaint raciness of Spanish.[443] But it still
“sticks in generals”; it still holds those generals to have been settled once
Page 346
for all of old; and it still gives no sign of any catholic examination of actual
poetry.
On the other hand, La Cueva,[444] though meticulous enough, and citing
with high reverence[445] not merely Aristotle and Horace, but Scaliger
himself, Vida, Minturno, Viperano, and others, is, on the drama at least, and
especially on comedy, an utter contemner of the ancient doctrine. My friend
La Cueva. Mr Hannay’s pithy statement[446] of this Spanish point of
view has already commended itself to good judges,[447] and it seems to sum
up the whole matter. “The theatre was to imitate nature and to please.
Poetry was to imitate the Italians, and satisfy the orthodox but minute
critic.” There had been something of this in Castelvetro; there was more in
the Spaniards, and it was fatal to them as critics.
Carvallo. Of the authors of this group with whom I am myself
acquainted, none seems to me to stand higher than Gonzales de Salas on the
Aristotelian-Senecan side; while few exhibit rehashings of the common
stuff to be found in all the Italian books more strikingly than Carvallo in his
Cisne de Apolo.[448]
Gonzales de Salas,[449] on the contrary, strikes me as having shown
Gonzales de distinct and original critical power. A foreigner is not likely
Salas.
to be greatly disturbed, even if he be a better Spanish
scholar than I am, by the “palpable” darkness,[450] the “accumulation of
obscurity and troublesomeness” in style, with which Señor Menéndez
reproaches Salas. It is an odd thing, but might be paralleled elsewhere, that
the foreigner, who does not know what the man ought to have said in order
to convey his meaning properly, can, in nearly all languages, arrive at that
meaning more easily than the native, who is “put off” by eccentricity and
barbarisms. Words, for instance, like lucifugas and parasangas, which Don
Marcelino holds up to special reproach, are to an Englishman, with his
Virgil and his Xenophon in his head, perhaps easier reading than some of
the bluest-blooded words of pure Spanish. The critic is further enraged by
Salas’s devotion to Seneca, whose Troades he actually translated, with
observations and exercitations thereon. But (as students of English at least
should know) there is much Romantic virtue in your Seneca along with his
Classical vice. The curious thing about Gonzales is that—fervent
Aristotelian as he is in theory, and devotee of the ancient theatre down to
the Tragic Boot—he has singular “pluckings of apples by the banks of
Ulai,” strange glimpses of the truths which his countrymen were the best
poetry.
On the other hand, La Cueva,[444] though meticulous enough, and citing
with high reverence[445] not merely Aristotle and Horace, but Scaliger
himself, Vida, Minturno, Viperano, and others, is, on the drama at least, and
especially on comedy, an utter contemner of the ancient doctrine. My friend
La Cueva. Mr Hannay’s pithy statement[446] of this Spanish point of
view has already commended itself to good judges,[447] and it seems to sum
up the whole matter. “The theatre was to imitate nature and to please.
Poetry was to imitate the Italians, and satisfy the orthodox but minute
critic.” There had been something of this in Castelvetro; there was more in
the Spaniards, and it was fatal to them as critics.
Carvallo. Of the authors of this group with whom I am myself
acquainted, none seems to me to stand higher than Gonzales de Salas on the
Aristotelian-Senecan side; while few exhibit rehashings of the common
stuff to be found in all the Italian books more strikingly than Carvallo in his
Cisne de Apolo.[448]
Gonzales de Salas,[449] on the contrary, strikes me as having shown
Gonzales de distinct and original critical power. A foreigner is not likely
Salas.
to be greatly disturbed, even if he be a better Spanish
scholar than I am, by the “palpable” darkness,[450] the “accumulation of
obscurity and troublesomeness” in style, with which Señor Menéndez
reproaches Salas. It is an odd thing, but might be paralleled elsewhere, that
the foreigner, who does not know what the man ought to have said in order
to convey his meaning properly, can, in nearly all languages, arrive at that
meaning more easily than the native, who is “put off” by eccentricity and
barbarisms. Words, for instance, like lucifugas and parasangas, which Don
Marcelino holds up to special reproach, are to an Englishman, with his
Virgil and his Xenophon in his head, perhaps easier reading than some of
the bluest-blooded words of pure Spanish. The critic is further enraged by
Salas’s devotion to Seneca, whose Troades he actually translated, with
observations and exercitations thereon. But (as students of English at least
should know) there is much Romantic virtue in your Seneca along with his
Classical vice. The curious thing about Gonzales is that—fervent
Aristotelian as he is in theory, and devotee of the ancient theatre down to
the Tragic Boot—he has singular “pluckings of apples by the banks of
Ulai,” strange glimpses of the truths which his countrymen were the best
Page 347
situated of all men in Europe (with hardly the exception of Englishmen) for
seeing, but which as a rule they would not see. Both Pinciano and Cascales
had eulogised Nature or Naturaleza; but as the foundress or foundation of
Laws which Cascales at any rate would have as those of the Medes and
Persians. Gonzales, Aristotelian as he is, on the other hand, says in so many
words,[451] “You are not bound to follow the ancients,” “Time and taste may
improve and alter art.” Señor Menéndez thinks this liberty a Spanish trait;
but we find it in some Italians, though not many, and we certainly do not
find it in all or many Spaniards, who are much rather inclined to divide their
attentions, or, as the impudent old Greek definition has it, “to keep the wife
for convenience and decency, the mistress for pleasure.” Gonzales, I think,
saw a higher law.
These authors, however, and others who succeeded them, though worthy
wights and good workers in labouring the lea of Spanish criticism, in no
case possess the interest which attaches in all literatures to those who are at
once eminent in creation and careful in criticism. The place of Corneille in
French, of Jonson and Dryden in English, is taken, earlier than any of these,
by one of the great and three of the greatest writers of Spain—Tirso de
Molina, Lope, Cervantes, and Calderon.
The contribution of the “creator of Don Juan” to criticism is not large,
and it comes in an odd place, but it is of importance. In the curious medley
called Cigarrales [say "tales of a country-house"] de Toledo,[452] Tirso has
included a play of his own, El Vergonzoso en Palacio, and has given us a
The Cigarrales discussion of it by the company at p. 184 of the book. A
of Tirso de
Molina.
“presumptuous person” attacks the poet for “licentiously
deserting” the limits and laws of comedy. He has stated the
strict Unities, and is contrasting the action of the play with them, when he is
interrupted by a certain Don Alejo, who carries the war into the enemy’s
quarters bravely. Comedy must be ended in twenty-four hours, must it? It is
quite decent and probable, is it not, that a gallant shall fall in love with a
lady, court her, treat her, win her, and marry her all in a day? Where are all
the delightful accidents of love—the hopes and the despairs—to go? A real
lover must be proved by days and months and years of constancy. Why may
not comedy present to the eye what history presents to the understanding—
much time in little? The ingenuity of the playwright consists [I abbreviate
here a good deal] in making things probable as they are related. The very
difference of nature from art is that the one, from its creation, cannot vary—
seeing, but which as a rule they would not see. Both Pinciano and Cascales
had eulogised Nature or Naturaleza; but as the foundress or foundation of
Laws which Cascales at any rate would have as those of the Medes and
Persians. Gonzales, Aristotelian as he is, on the other hand, says in so many
words,[451] “You are not bound to follow the ancients,” “Time and taste may
improve and alter art.” Señor Menéndez thinks this liberty a Spanish trait;
but we find it in some Italians, though not many, and we certainly do not
find it in all or many Spaniards, who are much rather inclined to divide their
attentions, or, as the impudent old Greek definition has it, “to keep the wife
for convenience and decency, the mistress for pleasure.” Gonzales, I think,
saw a higher law.
These authors, however, and others who succeeded them, though worthy
wights and good workers in labouring the lea of Spanish criticism, in no
case possess the interest which attaches in all literatures to those who are at
once eminent in creation and careful in criticism. The place of Corneille in
French, of Jonson and Dryden in English, is taken, earlier than any of these,
by one of the great and three of the greatest writers of Spain—Tirso de
Molina, Lope, Cervantes, and Calderon.
The contribution of the “creator of Don Juan” to criticism is not large,
and it comes in an odd place, but it is of importance. In the curious medley
called Cigarrales [say "tales of a country-house"] de Toledo,[452] Tirso has
included a play of his own, El Vergonzoso en Palacio, and has given us a
The Cigarrales discussion of it by the company at p. 184 of the book. A
of Tirso de
Molina.
“presumptuous person” attacks the poet for “licentiously
deserting” the limits and laws of comedy. He has stated the
strict Unities, and is contrasting the action of the play with them, when he is
interrupted by a certain Don Alejo, who carries the war into the enemy’s
quarters bravely. Comedy must be ended in twenty-four hours, must it? It is
quite decent and probable, is it not, that a gallant shall fall in love with a
lady, court her, treat her, win her, and marry her all in a day? Where are all
the delightful accidents of love—the hopes and the despairs—to go? A real
lover must be proved by days and months and years of constancy. Why may
not comedy present to the eye what history presents to the understanding—
much time in little? The ingenuity of the playwright consists [I abbreviate
here a good deal] in making things probable as they are related. The very
difference of nature from art is that the one, from its creation, cannot vary—
Page 348
a pear-tree always producing pears, an ilex its own acorns, influenced only
by soil, climate, &c. But drama varies its own laws, and grafts tragedy on
comedy. And he then boldly sets Lope, to whom he gives the title of
reformador de la comedia nueva, as an example of modern art against
Æschylus and Euripides and Seneca and Terence, explaining the dramatist’s
declaration, v. infra, that he had deserted the ancients to please the Popular
taste, as due only to his natural modesty. This is real plain speaking: and the
speech is worthy of the author of the Burlador de Sevilla and the striking
Condenado por Desconfiado.
Tirso’s apology for his great craftsfellow was not more superfluous than
Lope’s Arte his defence of him was bold and well framed. Not merely
Nuevo, &c.
in the verse Arte Nuevo de hacer Comedias,[453] but
elsewhere, does Lope make the somewhat undignified and pusillanimous,
but, as we have said, widely entertained, excuse referred to. Señor
Menéndez himself can only plead (a little obviously, perhaps) that “there
were two men in Lope,” the great popular Spanish poet, and the educated
versesmith, full of academic tradition. Very much the same mixture is seen
in Dryden, from whom, as we shall see, inconsistencies quite as great as
Lope’s, and much more numerous, can be quoted. But the contrast, I think,
brings out the characteristic weakness of the Spanish critical spirit. Its
historian admits frankly that there is a good deal in Lope that is “infantine.”
I should add that he seems to me never to have taken any side of criticism
with seriousness, whereas Dryden successively took many. Both had to
confess that they had been sometimes traitors to their own best ideals of
poetry, to please the multitude; but Dryden, at least, never committed the
blasphemy of condemning his own best things as Lope did, and thanking
God that he himself knew the precious “precepts,” according to which he
did not write them. The simple fact seems to be that a man of Lope’s
extraordinary facility and fecundity could not be critical. In the time that
Dryden took to write Alexander’s Feast the Spanish poet would have done
you an Epic, half-a-dozen plays, and minor poems enough to fill a volume.
Señor Menéndez himself avows that he cannot pretend to be acquainted
with all the critical remarks interspersed in Lope’s enormous and never yet
collected work: and who shall venture to rival his extensive knowledge?
But we shall probably not be rash in thinking that any real doctrine, except
on details of craft, would be hard to extract from them. The man was a
genius, but not a critical genius: and it certainly was within the resources of
by soil, climate, &c. But drama varies its own laws, and grafts tragedy on
comedy. And he then boldly sets Lope, to whom he gives the title of
reformador de la comedia nueva, as an example of modern art against
Æschylus and Euripides and Seneca and Terence, explaining the dramatist’s
declaration, v. infra, that he had deserted the ancients to please the Popular
taste, as due only to his natural modesty. This is real plain speaking: and the
speech is worthy of the author of the Burlador de Sevilla and the striking
Condenado por Desconfiado.
Tirso’s apology for his great craftsfellow was not more superfluous than
Lope’s Arte his defence of him was bold and well framed. Not merely
Nuevo, &c.
in the verse Arte Nuevo de hacer Comedias,[453] but
elsewhere, does Lope make the somewhat undignified and pusillanimous,
but, as we have said, widely entertained, excuse referred to. Señor
Menéndez himself can only plead (a little obviously, perhaps) that “there
were two men in Lope,” the great popular Spanish poet, and the educated
versesmith, full of academic tradition. Very much the same mixture is seen
in Dryden, from whom, as we shall see, inconsistencies quite as great as
Lope’s, and much more numerous, can be quoted. But the contrast, I think,
brings out the characteristic weakness of the Spanish critical spirit. Its
historian admits frankly that there is a good deal in Lope that is “infantine.”
I should add that he seems to me never to have taken any side of criticism
with seriousness, whereas Dryden successively took many. Both had to
confess that they had been sometimes traitors to their own best ideals of
poetry, to please the multitude; but Dryden, at least, never committed the
blasphemy of condemning his own best things as Lope did, and thanking
God that he himself knew the precious “precepts,” according to which he
did not write them. The simple fact seems to be that a man of Lope’s
extraordinary facility and fecundity could not be critical. In the time that
Dryden took to write Alexander’s Feast the Spanish poet would have done
you an Epic, half-a-dozen plays, and minor poems enough to fill a volume.
Señor Menéndez himself avows that he cannot pretend to be acquainted
with all the critical remarks interspersed in Lope’s enormous and never yet
collected work: and who shall venture to rival his extensive knowledge?
But we shall probably not be rash in thinking that any real doctrine, except
on details of craft, would be hard to extract from them. The man was a
genius, but not a critical genius: and it certainly was within the resources of
Page 349
a very humble critical faculty to note, as it is his chief critical glory to have
noted, in theory, as he expressed it in practice, the fact that “Points of
honour move all people mightily” on the [Spanish] stage.[454]
The tractate consists of not quite 400 hendecasyllabic lines, arranged in
irregular stanzas from five to fifty lines long, and blank except for the last
two lines of each stanza, which form a rhymed couplet. It has a rather
erudite air at first sight; but M. Morel-Fatio has ruthlessly shown that
almost all, if not all, the passages which give it this appearance are
translated literally from Robortello[455] or from Donatus. It begins by a
complimentary address to the Academy of Madrid, which had, it seems,
asked the poet for the treatise, and then passes into the slightly ignoble
apology-boast, already referred to, as to his own knowledge of the
preceptos and the barbarism, the rudeza, of the established and popular
notion of drama. He defines comedy as imitating actions and manners of
men—not royal and lofty actions like tragedy, but humble and plebeian—
gives an exceedingly perfunctory sketch of Spanish, and a much fuller one
of ancient, drama, and then relapses into his exercises and denunciations of
“La vil chimera deste monstruo cómico,”
with a promise to “gild” the error of the vulgar, and discover, if possible, a
sort of via media. But one is not surprised to find that he has almost directly
to blaspheme one of the very chief of his revered preceptos by admitting
that
“Buen exemplo nos da naturaleza”
of the mixing of the tragic and the comic. So, too, like a new Naaman, he
bows in the House of Rimmon by admitting that the Unity of Time must be
broken, though you are to hide the breach if you can. Minor details of
dramaturgy fill a large part of the piece, with an especial recommendation
of keeping the interest of the audience on the tenterhooks. But he cannot
finish (the finale includes a boast of having written 483 comedies
“Con una que he acabado esta semána”)
without another ungracious fling at the “vulgarity” and the “barbarism” of
the Muse he serves, and a confession, in which some have seen humour,
noted, in theory, as he expressed it in practice, the fact that “Points of
honour move all people mightily” on the [Spanish] stage.[454]
The tractate consists of not quite 400 hendecasyllabic lines, arranged in
irregular stanzas from five to fifty lines long, and blank except for the last
two lines of each stanza, which form a rhymed couplet. It has a rather
erudite air at first sight; but M. Morel-Fatio has ruthlessly shown that
almost all, if not all, the passages which give it this appearance are
translated literally from Robortello[455] or from Donatus. It begins by a
complimentary address to the Academy of Madrid, which had, it seems,
asked the poet for the treatise, and then passes into the slightly ignoble
apology-boast, already referred to, as to his own knowledge of the
preceptos and the barbarism, the rudeza, of the established and popular
notion of drama. He defines comedy as imitating actions and manners of
men—not royal and lofty actions like tragedy, but humble and plebeian—
gives an exceedingly perfunctory sketch of Spanish, and a much fuller one
of ancient, drama, and then relapses into his exercises and denunciations of
“La vil chimera deste monstruo cómico,”
with a promise to “gild” the error of the vulgar, and discover, if possible, a
sort of via media. But one is not surprised to find that he has almost directly
to blaspheme one of the very chief of his revered preceptos by admitting
that
“Buen exemplo nos da naturaleza”
of the mixing of the tragic and the comic. So, too, like a new Naaman, he
bows in the House of Rimmon by admitting that the Unity of Time must be
broken, though you are to hide the breach if you can. Minor details of
dramaturgy fill a large part of the piece, with an especial recommendation
of keeping the interest of the audience on the tenterhooks. But he cannot
finish (the finale includes a boast of having written 483 comedies
“Con una que he acabado esta semána”)
without another ungracious fling at the “vulgarity” and the “barbarism” of
the Muse he serves, and a confession, in which some have seen humour,
Page 350
that all the 483, “except six,” sin gravely against true art. Certainly humour
is not an unknown quality with Spaniards; but it cannot be said that, if Lope
uses it here, he uses it gracefully.
Still Lope, if not very critical himself, was the cause of some noteworthy
His assailants criticism from others. From the lively controversy which
and defenders.
arose over the character of his work, Señor Menéndez has
extracted some documents, so exceedingly rare, that in one instance, at any
rate, they consist of a unique copy of a reply to a libel, the original of which
has perished altogether. This is the Expostulatio Spongiæ (1618) (the
original and lost attack on Lope having been called Spongia), by a Julius
Columbarius, who seems to have been the shadow of several gentlemen at
once, the chief of them Lope’s friend, Francesco López de Aguilar.
Appended to this is a dissertation by Alfonso Sanchez, professor of Hebrew
at Alcalá, in which the clear method and universally intelligible Latin of the
schools are utilised to put part of the Romantic case, as it was seldom put
before the end of the eighteenth century. “Nature,” says Sanchez, “gives
laws; she does not accept them.” Spaniards are men, and, for the matter of
that, Roman citizens as well. And times change: and, for all our worship of
Cicero, he would be a dinner-bell[456] if he orated in the Theatre of Alcalá.
Let poetry follow the requirements of its time. Another of these documents
is the Apology for Spanish drama, prefixed to a collection of plays by
Valencian authors in 1616, and signed by Ricardo de[l] Turia, a nom de
guerre not yet certainly identified, which is a special defence of Spanish
comedy (i.e., “drama”) as such.
In face of these remarkable utterances (which could be multiplied greatly,
and the answers to them supplied) it may seem hard, if not altogether
unjustifiable, to limit the importance of Spanish criticism, as has been done
The fight over above. But it has to be observed that all this was a merely
the Spanish
drama.
passing, and in great part a merely personal, literary
dispute, which had no real effect. While the great Spanish
dramatists lasted, the drama was popular, and men invented reasons to
defend it. But they founded no school, either acceptedly orthodox or strong-
reasoned in its heterodoxy: and, when the great age passed, instead of a
sounder criticism, as in Dryden’s case, founding itself upon the results, the
formal and petrifying neo-classicism of Luzán froze all these reasonings up,
just as Boileau had earlier frozen those of the Ogiers and the Saint-Sorlins
in France. If we could validate that connection between Dryden himself and
is not an unknown quality with Spaniards; but it cannot be said that, if Lope
uses it here, he uses it gracefully.
Still Lope, if not very critical himself, was the cause of some noteworthy
His assailants criticism from others. From the lively controversy which
and defenders.
arose over the character of his work, Señor Menéndez has
extracted some documents, so exceedingly rare, that in one instance, at any
rate, they consist of a unique copy of a reply to a libel, the original of which
has perished altogether. This is the Expostulatio Spongiæ (1618) (the
original and lost attack on Lope having been called Spongia), by a Julius
Columbarius, who seems to have been the shadow of several gentlemen at
once, the chief of them Lope’s friend, Francesco López de Aguilar.
Appended to this is a dissertation by Alfonso Sanchez, professor of Hebrew
at Alcalá, in which the clear method and universally intelligible Latin of the
schools are utilised to put part of the Romantic case, as it was seldom put
before the end of the eighteenth century. “Nature,” says Sanchez, “gives
laws; she does not accept them.” Spaniards are men, and, for the matter of
that, Roman citizens as well. And times change: and, for all our worship of
Cicero, he would be a dinner-bell[456] if he orated in the Theatre of Alcalá.
Let poetry follow the requirements of its time. Another of these documents
is the Apology for Spanish drama, prefixed to a collection of plays by
Valencian authors in 1616, and signed by Ricardo de[l] Turia, a nom de
guerre not yet certainly identified, which is a special defence of Spanish
comedy (i.e., “drama”) as such.
In face of these remarkable utterances (which could be multiplied greatly,
and the answers to them supplied) it may seem hard, if not altogether
unjustifiable, to limit the importance of Spanish criticism, as has been done
The fight over above. But it has to be observed that all this was a merely
the Spanish
drama.
passing, and in great part a merely personal, literary
dispute, which had no real effect. While the great Spanish
dramatists lasted, the drama was popular, and men invented reasons to
defend it. But they founded no school, either acceptedly orthodox or strong-
reasoned in its heterodoxy: and, when the great age passed, instead of a
sounder criticism, as in Dryden’s case, founding itself upon the results, the
formal and petrifying neo-classicism of Luzán froze all these reasonings up,
just as Boileau had earlier frozen those of the Ogiers and the Saint-Sorlins
in France. If we could validate that connection between Dryden himself and
Page 351
the Spanish critics, it would be something like a Missing Link: but we
cannot.
The author of Don Quixote and the author of the Vida es Sueño contribute
Cervantes and more irregularly to our matter. The chief critical documents
Calderon.
furnished by the former are the long poem of the Viaje del
Parnaso, and not so much the world-famous passage of the burning of the
romances of chivalry in Don Quixote, as the whole problem and purpose of
that immortal book itself.[457] The Viaje,[458] putting aside the debated
question of its literary value, is rather a disappointing book, in its allegory
of the poetic ship, with glosses for portholes, and tercets for sweeps, and its
endless, but rather pointless, citation, generally flattering, but sometimes the
reverse, of poets and poetic kinds. Both praise and blame appear to be
distributed very much on the principle of Miss Edgeworth’s Frank, when he
proposed to give the odd piece of tart to good Henry, who had mended his
bat, or to kind Edward, who had lent him his ball. As for the burning
question of the libros de caballerías, Cervantes was beyond all question
right in preferring Amadis and Palmerin; but it must be a very matter-of-
fact reader who does not see that in fact he loved them all, however he
might laugh at them. Indeed, the scene itself (D. Q., I. i. 6), though it ends
in almost the whole library being left to the untender mercies of the
housekeeper and the niece, makes constant exceptions both in favour of the
romances themselves (including even such a dubious example as Tirante
the White) and of other pieces in verse and prose from the Diana to the
Araucana. And when the subject is taken up again much farther on (I. iv.
21) by the Canon of Toledo, his severe strictures on the Romances as they
are change suddenly into a splendid panegyric of what they might be. This
latter passage indeed shifts into one of the most remarkable of Cervantes’
critical deliverances, the attack (in rougher language than Lope’s own) on
“irregular” plays, and the famous and very curious passage in which,
immediately afterwards, the curate condemns the improbabilities of the
chronicle-drama in words almost precisely similar to those which Sir Philip
Sidney had used twenty years and more earlier, and adopts the whole
“preceptist” view, with a special reference to Lope’s own compromises and
a demand for rigid licensing of plots and romances alike, according to the
principles of taste and learning, of Tully (secundum Donatum) and
“eloquence.” One may entertain a passing doubt whether the chances of
Don Quixote itself would have been altogether happy under such a
cannot.
The author of Don Quixote and the author of the Vida es Sueño contribute
Cervantes and more irregularly to our matter. The chief critical documents
Calderon.
furnished by the former are the long poem of the Viaje del
Parnaso, and not so much the world-famous passage of the burning of the
romances of chivalry in Don Quixote, as the whole problem and purpose of
that immortal book itself.[457] The Viaje,[458] putting aside the debated
question of its literary value, is rather a disappointing book, in its allegory
of the poetic ship, with glosses for portholes, and tercets for sweeps, and its
endless, but rather pointless, citation, generally flattering, but sometimes the
reverse, of poets and poetic kinds. Both praise and blame appear to be
distributed very much on the principle of Miss Edgeworth’s Frank, when he
proposed to give the odd piece of tart to good Henry, who had mended his
bat, or to kind Edward, who had lent him his ball. As for the burning
question of the libros de caballerías, Cervantes was beyond all question
right in preferring Amadis and Palmerin; but it must be a very matter-of-
fact reader who does not see that in fact he loved them all, however he
might laugh at them. Indeed, the scene itself (D. Q., I. i. 6), though it ends
in almost the whole library being left to the untender mercies of the
housekeeper and the niece, makes constant exceptions both in favour of the
romances themselves (including even such a dubious example as Tirante
the White) and of other pieces in verse and prose from the Diana to the
Araucana. And when the subject is taken up again much farther on (I. iv.
21) by the Canon of Toledo, his severe strictures on the Romances as they
are change suddenly into a splendid panegyric of what they might be. This
latter passage indeed shifts into one of the most remarkable of Cervantes’
critical deliverances, the attack (in rougher language than Lope’s own) on
“irregular” plays, and the famous and very curious passage in which,
immediately afterwards, the curate condemns the improbabilities of the
chronicle-drama in words almost precisely similar to those which Sir Philip
Sidney had used twenty years and more earlier, and adopts the whole
“preceptist” view, with a special reference to Lope’s own compromises and
a demand for rigid licensing of plots and romances alike, according to the
principles of taste and learning, of Tully (secundum Donatum) and
“eloquence.” One may entertain a passing doubt whether the chances of
Don Quixote itself would have been altogether happy under such a
Page 352
censorship; and in this there is probably more following of the Italians[459]
than deliberate critical preference. It, however, and other things (the famous
contention that epics may be written in prose as well as in verse, though
important from its actual illustration in the Don and its effect on Fielding, is
in no sense original, and as an opinion hardly more than an echo of
Scaliger) no doubt give Cervantes a certain status. But Calderon can hardly
be said to give us anything except the odd inconsistency (to be paralleled,
though in a different kind, with Lope’s) of his alternate ridicule and
patronage of the Gongorist style.
This last name introduces us to another controversy, which, though
connected in the most intimate way with our subject, is a sort of appendix to
it, and one of those appendices which, in some cases, one must ruthlessly
Gongorism, cut short. The quarrels over Lope (whom, by the way,
Culteranism,
&c.
Góngora himself savagely attacked) were succeeded by the
battle of culteranismo, again distinguished by that curious
see-sawing which, as we have seen, marks the Spaniards on almost all
critical points. Quevedo, for instance, and the above-mentioned Gonzales
de Salas, behave like those capricious knights of Spenser’s, who were
always changing sides in the battle, and running tilt at the very champions
Quevedo. by whose side they had lately charged. Quevedo in
particular has a most extraordinary record in this matter. I do not think that,
in my limited reading of Spanish, I have ever laughed more over anything
than over his Cuento de Cuentos,[460] and his Catechism to help to translate
the jargonizing ladies, where he addresses himself Al caro, diáfano,
transparente e mediano Lector, gives instructions in the best manner of
precious speech, and advises that a wife should call her husband mi
quotidio, and he her su sempiterna, while neither will dream of speaking of
a “gota de agua,” but will, of course, denominate it a podagra. Yet Quevedo
at other times did more than condescend to cultism, or culteranism, as it
seems to be indifferently called.
than deliberate critical preference. It, however, and other things (the famous
contention that epics may be written in prose as well as in verse, though
important from its actual illustration in the Don and its effect on Fielding, is
in no sense original, and as an opinion hardly more than an echo of
Scaliger) no doubt give Cervantes a certain status. But Calderon can hardly
be said to give us anything except the odd inconsistency (to be paralleled,
though in a different kind, with Lope’s) of his alternate ridicule and
patronage of the Gongorist style.
This last name introduces us to another controversy, which, though
connected in the most intimate way with our subject, is a sort of appendix to
it, and one of those appendices which, in some cases, one must ruthlessly
Gongorism, cut short. The quarrels over Lope (whom, by the way,
Culteranism,
&c.
Góngora himself savagely attacked) were succeeded by the
battle of culteranismo, again distinguished by that curious
see-sawing which, as we have seen, marks the Spaniards on almost all
critical points. Quevedo, for instance, and the above-mentioned Gonzales
de Salas, behave like those capricious knights of Spenser’s, who were
always changing sides in the battle, and running tilt at the very champions
Quevedo. by whose side they had lately charged. Quevedo in
particular has a most extraordinary record in this matter. I do not think that,
in my limited reading of Spanish, I have ever laughed more over anything
than over his Cuento de Cuentos,[460] and his Catechism to help to translate
the jargonizing ladies, where he addresses himself Al caro, diáfano,
transparente e mediano Lector, gives instructions in the best manner of
precious speech, and advises that a wife should call her husband mi
quotidio, and he her su sempiterna, while neither will dream of speaking of
a “gota de agua,” but will, of course, denominate it a podagra. Yet Quevedo
at other times did more than condescend to cultism, or culteranism, as it
seems to be indifferently called.
Page 353
Gracián. The great prose apostle of the cult, as Góngora was its
poet, was Balthasar Gracián, who has not a little for us in his famous
Agudeza y arte de ingenio,[461] the Bible of preciosity, with its motto, En
Nada Vulgar, and its doctrine (II. 49), that La semejança es origen de una
immensidad conceptuosa tirar principio de agudeza sin limite. His name
gives an opportunity of illustrating the difficulty of treating cosas de
The limitations España. I am not aware of any living English authorities on
of Spanish
criticism.
Spanish literature who can be placed above Mr David
Hannay and Mr Fitzmaurice Kelly. Of these, the first
[462]
says that it was Gracián’s “chosen function to be the critic, prophet, and
populariser of Gongorism”; the second,[463] that “No man ever wrote ... with
more scorn of Gongorism and all its work.” Who shall decide when doctors
of this degree disagree to this extent? I am, so far as my very poor and
imperfect knowledge of the texts goes, with Mr Hannay: but that is not to
the point.
What, I think, is to the point, and what I may say with some general
knowledge of criticism, if with little particular knowledge of Spanish, is
that the very nature of the subject invites, excuses, necessitates such
differences. The Spaniards, if I may be pardoned a rough and ugly
metaphor, never “digested themselves,” never either kept creation and
criticism separate, or waited for the one till the other had ceased.
Naturaleza and Agudeza jostle each other constantly in them, with a result
of truceless war. One may even wonder whether cultismo, culteranismo,
conceptismo,[464] coming as they did after the great period of natural
freedom, in Lope, and Tirso, and Cervantes at his best, did not do far more
than the harm that the much-abused “Metaphysicals” did in English. The
practice of Góngora and Gracián, even of Calderon, not seldom belied the
arguments of Tirso and of the shadowy Turia and Sanchez. When a Luzán
comes in such cases it is too fatally easy for him to say, “Well! whatever the
ancients did, they did not do this! There is at any rate no jerigonza in
Aristotle or in Horace!” And the Spaniards had no Milton, no Shakespeare
to carry them through, as ours carried us through the worst times. Their
Cervantes in his great work was of an “off” kind, as yet not fully
recognised; their Lope was too fluent, facile, voluminous, unconvincing;
their Calderon, with all his marvellous poetical and specially lyrical power,
too unequal and perhaps too rhetorical.
poet, was Balthasar Gracián, who has not a little for us in his famous
Agudeza y arte de ingenio,[461] the Bible of preciosity, with its motto, En
Nada Vulgar, and its doctrine (II. 49), that La semejança es origen de una
immensidad conceptuosa tirar principio de agudeza sin limite. His name
gives an opportunity of illustrating the difficulty of treating cosas de
The limitations España. I am not aware of any living English authorities on
of Spanish
criticism.
Spanish literature who can be placed above Mr David
Hannay and Mr Fitzmaurice Kelly. Of these, the first
[462]
says that it was Gracián’s “chosen function to be the critic, prophet, and
populariser of Gongorism”; the second,[463] that “No man ever wrote ... with
more scorn of Gongorism and all its work.” Who shall decide when doctors
of this degree disagree to this extent? I am, so far as my very poor and
imperfect knowledge of the texts goes, with Mr Hannay: but that is not to
the point.
What, I think, is to the point, and what I may say with some general
knowledge of criticism, if with little particular knowledge of Spanish, is
that the very nature of the subject invites, excuses, necessitates such
differences. The Spaniards, if I may be pardoned a rough and ugly
metaphor, never “digested themselves,” never either kept creation and
criticism separate, or waited for the one till the other had ceased.
Naturaleza and Agudeza jostle each other constantly in them, with a result
of truceless war. One may even wonder whether cultismo, culteranismo,
conceptismo,[464] coming as they did after the great period of natural
freedom, in Lope, and Tirso, and Cervantes at his best, did not do far more
than the harm that the much-abused “Metaphysicals” did in English. The
practice of Góngora and Gracián, even of Calderon, not seldom belied the
arguments of Tirso and of the shadowy Turia and Sanchez. When a Luzán
comes in such cases it is too fatally easy for him to say, “Well! whatever the
ancients did, they did not do this! There is at any rate no jerigonza in
Aristotle or in Horace!” And the Spaniards had no Milton, no Shakespeare
to carry them through, as ours carried us through the worst times. Their
Cervantes in his great work was of an “off” kind, as yet not fully
recognised; their Lope was too fluent, facile, voluminous, unconvincing;
their Calderon, with all his marvellous poetical and specially lyrical power,
too unequal and perhaps too rhetorical.
Page 354
Above all, they had the misfortune to have no critic of real authority. The
Arte Nuevo is partly clever enough “technical education,” partly bookwork,
partly ignoble or inartistic compromise: and if we compare Tasso and Lope,
at no such great distance of time, we can only be struck by the enormous
advantage of the Italian in serious critical weight. The others, the Pincianos,
the Gonzales de Salas, and the rest, were persons, if not exactly of no mark
or likelihood, at any rate of no commanding and authoritative importance,
like Ben Jonson and Dryden in England, like Boileau in France. Even such
comparatively slight examination of the actual texts as I have been able to
give has shown me that many most interesting and independently striking
aperçus, passages, phrases may be taken from the Spanish critics. But I
cannot say that, even after duly perusing and perpending the admirably
competent and loving examination of Señor Menéndez, I have been able to
form any high opinion of Spanish seventeenth-century criticism as a whole.
408. V. supra, p. 107.
409. Padua, 1607.
410. Padua, 1612.
411. 2 vols. fol., Cologne, 1607.
412. De Cultura Ingeniorum.
413. Lib. xvi., 150 folio pp.
414. “De Poesi et Pictura” is the title to which he calls attention, but to
which he does not fully work up.
415. 4to, Venice, 1646. There are earlier and later editions. Tassoni, who
published this first, I believe, at Rome [Carpi?] in 1620, had preluded it
(Modena, 1608) with a smaller volume of Quisiti.
416. He meddled boldly with politics, and I have a little modern edition
of his Filippiche contra gli Spagnuoli, &c. (Ferrara: Le Monnier, n.d.)
Arte Nuevo is partly clever enough “technical education,” partly bookwork,
partly ignoble or inartistic compromise: and if we compare Tasso and Lope,
at no such great distance of time, we can only be struck by the enormous
advantage of the Italian in serious critical weight. The others, the Pincianos,
the Gonzales de Salas, and the rest, were persons, if not exactly of no mark
or likelihood, at any rate of no commanding and authoritative importance,
like Ben Jonson and Dryden in England, like Boileau in France. Even such
comparatively slight examination of the actual texts as I have been able to
give has shown me that many most interesting and independently striking
aperçus, passages, phrases may be taken from the Spanish critics. But I
cannot say that, even after duly perusing and perpending the admirably
competent and loving examination of Señor Menéndez, I have been able to
form any high opinion of Spanish seventeenth-century criticism as a whole.
408. V. supra, p. 107.
409. Padua, 1607.
410. Padua, 1612.
411. 2 vols. fol., Cologne, 1607.
412. De Cultura Ingeniorum.
413. Lib. xvi., 150 folio pp.
414. “De Poesi et Pictura” is the title to which he calls attention, but to
which he does not fully work up.
415. 4to, Venice, 1646. There are earlier and later editions. Tassoni, who
published this first, I believe, at Rome [Carpi?] in 1620, had preluded it
(Modena, 1608) with a smaller volume of Quisiti.
416. He meddled boldly with politics, and I have a little modern edition
of his Filippiche contra gli Spagnuoli, &c. (Ferrara: Le Monnier, n.d.)
Page 355
417. Modena, 1609. I have not yet met with this.
418. Attention was first recalled to Tassoni in recent times by M.
Hippolyte Rigault in his Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. But I was
not myself introduced to the Pensieri by that excellent book, and the things
in them which seem to me most interesting are not quite those which struck
M. Rigault.
419. This is referred to, in the extract from Leone Allacci prefixed to the
1646 ed. of Tassoni, as libellus Patavii editus. Tassoni seems to have replied
under a pseudonym and pretty savagely (magis aculeatis dentibus).
420. Eight volumes, in 16 parts, of a not small quarto (Venice, 1643).
This is one of the many books for the opportunity of studying which,
without burdening shelves and lightening purse, I am indebted to the
Library of the Faculty of Advocates.
421. Venice, 1612-13.
422. See Professors Gayley and Scott’s invaluable book so often cited, p.
447, a passage based on Blankenburg’s older Zusätze (3 vols., Leipsic,
1796-98).
423. Venice, 1613.
424. Blankenburg is the sinner here.
425. Padua, 1681, pp. 1025-1088.
426. Henry Cary, Earl of Monmouth, translated the book in 1656.
427. Spain can boast, however, perhaps the very best History of its
criticism as a whole that any European language has—if not as yet the only
good one—in the Historia de las Ideas Estéticas en España of Don
Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo (Ed. 2, 9 vols., Madrid, 1890-1896). This is
fortunate for me, inasmuch as I do not pretend to any extensive familiarity
with Spanish literature beyond the early poets, and indeed do not read the
language with very great facility. Besides Señor Menéndez I have relied
418. Attention was first recalled to Tassoni in recent times by M.
Hippolyte Rigault in his Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. But I was
not myself introduced to the Pensieri by that excellent book, and the things
in them which seem to me most interesting are not quite those which struck
M. Rigault.
419. This is referred to, in the extract from Leone Allacci prefixed to the
1646 ed. of Tassoni, as libellus Patavii editus. Tassoni seems to have replied
under a pseudonym and pretty savagely (magis aculeatis dentibus).
420. Eight volumes, in 16 parts, of a not small quarto (Venice, 1643).
This is one of the many books for the opportunity of studying which,
without burdening shelves and lightening purse, I am indebted to the
Library of the Faculty of Advocates.
421. Venice, 1612-13.
422. See Professors Gayley and Scott’s invaluable book so often cited, p.
447, a passage based on Blankenburg’s older Zusätze (3 vols., Leipsic,
1796-98).
423. Venice, 1613.
424. Blankenburg is the sinner here.
425. Padua, 1681, pp. 1025-1088.
426. Henry Cary, Earl of Monmouth, translated the book in 1656.
427. Spain can boast, however, perhaps the very best History of its
criticism as a whole that any European language has—if not as yet the only
good one—in the Historia de las Ideas Estéticas en España of Don
Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo (Ed. 2, 9 vols., Madrid, 1890-1896). This is
fortunate for me, inasmuch as I do not pretend to any extensive familiarity
with Spanish literature beyond the early poets, and indeed do not read the
language with very great facility. Besides Señor Menéndez I have relied
Page 356
chiefly on the texts and comments recently furnished (v. inf.) by M. Morel-
Fatio (who will, I hope, continue in so good a road), on Ticknor, on the
short but valuable notices of this period in Mr Spingarn, op. cit., on those in
my friend Mr Hannay’s The Later Renaissance (Edinburgh and London,
1898), and on Mr James Fitzmaurice Kelly’s History of Spanish Literature
(London, 1898). I am particularly obliged to Mr Kelly for a copy of the
recent (undated) Spanish translation of his book, with a few corrections, and
a preface by Señor Menéndez himself. The Spanish critic combines, with a
just praise of the book, a mild remonstrance as to the small space which Mr
Fitzmaurice Kelly has given to this very critical subject—a fact in which I
own I myself had felt some comfort. The silence of the specialist is the
shield of the expatiator. I have not failed, wherever I could, to verify all the
critical deliverances in the text, and examine almost all, if not all, the books
mentioned; but I do not know the circumference of them as I do elsewhere.
And as I began this History on the principle of going to the sources, I think
myself bound to warn the reader of any case in which I have been obliged
to modify that principle.
428. This was written before M. Morel-Fatio had expressed the same
view in his Les Défenseurs de la Comedia (Bulletin Hispanique, ubi cit.
inf.) See also on the point Mr Ker’s Essays of Dryden, i. lxvi, and the
references in his index to Dryden’s mention of Spanish plays. Of course the
main interest of the matter lies in the much stronger resemblances that exist
between the great English and Spanish dramas than between any other two
national branches of the European theatre.
429. They say now that he was not only not (as used to be said) the
premier and only Marquis of Spain, but not a Marquis at all. Non moror:
non sum invidus—especially as the next monographer will probably restore
the Marquisate.
430. I have duly looked this up in what appears to be the only accessible
place (a place valuable for other documents), the Orígenes de La Lengua
Española, Madrid, 1737, of Mayáns y Siscar. It is merely a tissue of
troubadours’ names, scholastic citations, and minute details of
pronunciation and versification. Señor Menéndez has reprinted part of it in
the Appendix to his second volume.
Fatio (who will, I hope, continue in so good a road), on Ticknor, on the
short but valuable notices of this period in Mr Spingarn, op. cit., on those in
my friend Mr Hannay’s The Later Renaissance (Edinburgh and London,
1898), and on Mr James Fitzmaurice Kelly’s History of Spanish Literature
(London, 1898). I am particularly obliged to Mr Kelly for a copy of the
recent (undated) Spanish translation of his book, with a few corrections, and
a preface by Señor Menéndez himself. The Spanish critic combines, with a
just praise of the book, a mild remonstrance as to the small space which Mr
Fitzmaurice Kelly has given to this very critical subject—a fact in which I
own I myself had felt some comfort. The silence of the specialist is the
shield of the expatiator. I have not failed, wherever I could, to verify all the
critical deliverances in the text, and examine almost all, if not all, the books
mentioned; but I do not know the circumference of them as I do elsewhere.
And as I began this History on the principle of going to the sources, I think
myself bound to warn the reader of any case in which I have been obliged
to modify that principle.
428. This was written before M. Morel-Fatio had expressed the same
view in his Les Défenseurs de la Comedia (Bulletin Hispanique, ubi cit.
inf.) See also on the point Mr Ker’s Essays of Dryden, i. lxvi, and the
references in his index to Dryden’s mention of Spanish plays. Of course the
main interest of the matter lies in the much stronger resemblances that exist
between the great English and Spanish dramas than between any other two
national branches of the European theatre.
429. They say now that he was not only not (as used to be said) the
premier and only Marquis of Spain, but not a Marquis at all. Non moror:
non sum invidus—especially as the next monographer will probably restore
the Marquisate.
430. I have duly looked this up in what appears to be the only accessible
place (a place valuable for other documents), the Orígenes de La Lengua
Española, Madrid, 1737, of Mayáns y Siscar. It is merely a tissue of
troubadours’ names, scholastic citations, and minute details of
pronunciation and versification. Señor Menéndez has reprinted part of it in
the Appendix to his second volume.
Page 357
431. Poesias Castellanas anteriores al siglo xv. (Paris, 1842) pp. 13-17.
432. Quem nova concepit olla servabit odorem. It may be observed that,
on the principles of Low Latin scansion from Commodian downwards, the
first four words will do well enough.
433. I have used the somewhat later Grenville copy in the British
Museum Salamanca, 1509, fol.; and Señor Menéndez' reprint in the
Appendix to his second volume, which also contains one or two other early
documents.
434. The plural was used in the version of Mayans y Siscar (Origenes, v.
supra), which was long the only one accessible. In 1860 a better text
appeared at Madrid with the singular, which Ticknor and Mr Kelly approve.
For any one who professes no Spanish scholarship to set himself against
these authorities may seem absurd. But in the book itself sub finem the
author writes “habiendo considerado estas tres lenguas,” and the changes
are rung on Latin, Tuscan, and Spanish throughout.
435. After a conversation with Navagero which he has reported, and
which is, in its way, also a critical document.
436. Señor Menéndez refers to two Poetics anterior to Rengifo, neither of
which I have seen. The first, by Miguel Sanchez de Lima (sometimes called
de Viana), Alcala, 1580, has a slight interest in the wording of its title, “El
Arte Poética en romance castillano.” The second—which from its date
(1593) would seem to be a little later than Rengifo, though the historian
mentions it first—is Hierónymo de Mondragon’s Arte para componer en
metro castillano (Saragossa, 1593).
437. The above paragraph was written from notes taken while reading
Rengifo at the British Museum. In subsequently reading Señor Menéndez
on him I was surprised to find the learned historian protesting against the
Labyrinth, and other such things, as having been foisted in cir. 1700-1720,
and referring to the editions of 1592 and 1606 as alone genuine. But the
British Museum copy is that of 1606! Let it by us even be said to Rengifo’s
credit that, like Sidney, he felt the charm of old romance. See M. y P., p.
320.
432. Quem nova concepit olla servabit odorem. It may be observed that,
on the principles of Low Latin scansion from Commodian downwards, the
first four words will do well enough.
433. I have used the somewhat later Grenville copy in the British
Museum Salamanca, 1509, fol.; and Señor Menéndez' reprint in the
Appendix to his second volume, which also contains one or two other early
documents.
434. The plural was used in the version of Mayans y Siscar (Origenes, v.
supra), which was long the only one accessible. In 1860 a better text
appeared at Madrid with the singular, which Ticknor and Mr Kelly approve.
For any one who professes no Spanish scholarship to set himself against
these authorities may seem absurd. But in the book itself sub finem the
author writes “habiendo considerado estas tres lenguas,” and the changes
are rung on Latin, Tuscan, and Spanish throughout.
435. After a conversation with Navagero which he has reported, and
which is, in its way, also a critical document.
436. Señor Menéndez refers to two Poetics anterior to Rengifo, neither of
which I have seen. The first, by Miguel Sanchez de Lima (sometimes called
de Viana), Alcala, 1580, has a slight interest in the wording of its title, “El
Arte Poética en romance castillano.” The second—which from its date
(1593) would seem to be a little later than Rengifo, though the historian
mentions it first—is Hierónymo de Mondragon’s Arte para componer en
metro castillano (Saragossa, 1593).
437. The above paragraph was written from notes taken while reading
Rengifo at the British Museum. In subsequently reading Señor Menéndez
on him I was surprised to find the learned historian protesting against the
Labyrinth, and other such things, as having been foisted in cir. 1700-1720,
and referring to the editions of 1592 and 1606 as alone genuine. But the
British Museum copy is that of 1606! Let it by us even be said to Rengifo’s
credit that, like Sidney, he felt the charm of old romance. See M. y P., p.
320.
Page 358
438. “The inexorable Cascales,” as Señor Menéndez calls him in a
passage which I had not read when I wrote the text. Of Cascales, as of
Pinciano (v. infra), the Señor thinks far more highly than I do. Both seem to
me (though Cascales more than Pinciano) to be simply uncompromising
Aristotelians who borrowed from the Italians; but, like most borrowers and
imitators, hardened and emphasised what they borrowed. Both were forced
to allow little “easements” in regard to the drama; but only such as are
consistent with Aristotle’s text, though not with some glosses on him. And
Pinciano simply translates the Aristotelian definition of tragedy, while
Cascales, doubtless with reference to the different heresies of Castelvetro
and Giraldi, is quite Athanasian in his doctrine that poetic verities are
absolutely unchangeable, and independent of custom and time.
439. The book appeared in 1616; but I have had to use the reprint of
1779. I have not seen Mesa’s Compendio de la Poética (Madrid, 1607) or
Carillo’s Libro de Erudicion poética.
440. Madrid, 1596.
441. The Filosofía Antigua is extremely rare, and does not appear to be in
the British Museum either under “Pinciano” or under Lopez, his real name.
Fortunately there is a recent reprint (Valladolid, 1894), ed. by Professor
Don Pedro Muñoz Peña, which I duly possess. It may be observed that
bibliographers and librarians are particularly hard on the laity in the Spanish
department. It is surely needless to make one hunt in vain for an author of
world-wide reputation under his world-name till one runs him to earth as
Gómez de Quevedo [y] Villegas.
442. Señor Peña, himself a professor (catedrático) of Valladolid in
Rhetoric and Poetry, explains that this surname was taken by distinguished
alumni of that University, and derived from the Roman city (Pincia)
supposed to have existed on the site. Few definite dates or facts seem to be
known about Alfonso Lopez, except that he was physician to Mary of
Austria, daughter of Charles V. and widow of Maximilian II. during her life
at Madrid from 1576 to 1603, and that he wrote, besides the Filosofía and
other things, a poem on Pelayo, languide nec eleganter, one regrets to hear.
passage which I had not read when I wrote the text. Of Cascales, as of
Pinciano (v. infra), the Señor thinks far more highly than I do. Both seem to
me (though Cascales more than Pinciano) to be simply uncompromising
Aristotelians who borrowed from the Italians; but, like most borrowers and
imitators, hardened and emphasised what they borrowed. Both were forced
to allow little “easements” in regard to the drama; but only such as are
consistent with Aristotle’s text, though not with some glosses on him. And
Pinciano simply translates the Aristotelian definition of tragedy, while
Cascales, doubtless with reference to the different heresies of Castelvetro
and Giraldi, is quite Athanasian in his doctrine that poetic verities are
absolutely unchangeable, and independent of custom and time.
439. The book appeared in 1616; but I have had to use the reprint of
1779. I have not seen Mesa’s Compendio de la Poética (Madrid, 1607) or
Carillo’s Libro de Erudicion poética.
440. Madrid, 1596.
441. The Filosofía Antigua is extremely rare, and does not appear to be in
the British Museum either under “Pinciano” or under Lopez, his real name.
Fortunately there is a recent reprint (Valladolid, 1894), ed. by Professor
Don Pedro Muñoz Peña, which I duly possess. It may be observed that
bibliographers and librarians are particularly hard on the laity in the Spanish
department. It is surely needless to make one hunt in vain for an author of
world-wide reputation under his world-name till one runs him to earth as
Gómez de Quevedo [y] Villegas.
442. Señor Peña, himself a professor (catedrático) of Valladolid in
Rhetoric and Poetry, explains that this surname was taken by distinguished
alumni of that University, and derived from the Roman city (Pincia)
supposed to have existed on the site. Few definite dates or facts seem to be
known about Alfonso Lopez, except that he was physician to Mary of
Austria, daughter of Charles V. and widow of Maximilian II. during her life
at Madrid from 1576 to 1603, and that he wrote, besides the Filosofía and
other things, a poem on Pelayo, languide nec eleganter, one regrets to hear.
Page 359
443. As where Fadrique substitutes, for the stately old image of the honey
on the edge of a bitter cup, the familiar come quien dora una píldora, “as
one who gilds a pill,” ed. cit., p. 120.
444. Ejemplar Poético, first printed, and, I think, still only to be found, in
the Parnaso Español, Madrid, 1774, vol. viii.
445. See Spingarn, p. 146, who gives the passage.
446. The Later Renaissance, p. 39.
447. Cf. Spingarn, p. 233.
448. (With a much longer title), Medina del Campo, 1602. The quaint
title is connected with a quainter fancy, that the poet is noble as such—a
“Knight of the Swan.” Señor Menéndez makes some use of Carvallo, but
admits that he is pedagogo adocenado, “a common dominie.”
449. Nueva Idea de la Tragedia Antigua, &c. Madrid, 1633.
450. La misma lobreguez y el mismo desconsuelo, M. y P., iii. 364.
451. In the passage quoted by M. y P., iii. 366, 367.
452. Madrid, 1624. Noted by Señor Menéndez (who has given the whole
passage, iii. 457-60) as a specially rare book. Fortunately the British
Museum, according to a wise habit of its own in such cases (cf. Capriano),
has two copies, and M. Morel-Fatio has included the piece which concerns
us in an invaluable collection (also including Lope’s Arte Nuevo and other
things) of Spanish critical documents, which he is issuing in the Bulletin
Hispanique of the Faculty of Letters of Bordeaux, and republishing
separately (Paris, Fontemoing; Bordeaux, Feret, 1901-1902). The man who
gives a text attains merit which mere commentators and historians can
never hope to have imputed to them.
453. Also reprinted by M. Morel-Fatio in the issue noticed above.
454. Los casos de la honra son mejores, Porque mueven con fuerça a
toda gente—A.N., 327, 328. At least one of Lope’s innumerable works, the
on the edge of a bitter cup, the familiar come quien dora una píldora, “as
one who gilds a pill,” ed. cit., p. 120.
444. Ejemplar Poético, first printed, and, I think, still only to be found, in
the Parnaso Español, Madrid, 1774, vol. viii.
445. See Spingarn, p. 146, who gives the passage.
446. The Later Renaissance, p. 39.
447. Cf. Spingarn, p. 233.
448. (With a much longer title), Medina del Campo, 1602. The quaint
title is connected with a quainter fancy, that the poet is noble as such—a
“Knight of the Swan.” Señor Menéndez makes some use of Carvallo, but
admits that he is pedagogo adocenado, “a common dominie.”
449. Nueva Idea de la Tragedia Antigua, &c. Madrid, 1633.
450. La misma lobreguez y el mismo desconsuelo, M. y P., iii. 364.
451. In the passage quoted by M. y P., iii. 366, 367.
452. Madrid, 1624. Noted by Señor Menéndez (who has given the whole
passage, iii. 457-60) as a specially rare book. Fortunately the British
Museum, according to a wise habit of its own in such cases (cf. Capriano),
has two copies, and M. Morel-Fatio has included the piece which concerns
us in an invaluable collection (also including Lope’s Arte Nuevo and other
things) of Spanish critical documents, which he is issuing in the Bulletin
Hispanique of the Faculty of Letters of Bordeaux, and republishing
separately (Paris, Fontemoing; Bordeaux, Feret, 1901-1902). The man who
gives a text attains merit which mere commentators and historians can
never hope to have imputed to them.
453. Also reprinted by M. Morel-Fatio in the issue noticed above.
454. Los casos de la honra son mejores, Porque mueven con fuerça a
toda gente—A.N., 327, 328. At least one of Lope’s innumerable works, the
Page 360
Laurel de Apolo, written late in his life (1630), is busied with the poets of
his time in the fashion of Caporali and Cervantes, but, it would seem, in a
spirit of wholly uncritical panegyric.
455. V. sup., pp. 49, 50 note. It is fair to say that Lope quotes Robortello.
456. Omnes dilaberentur. Señor Menéndez (iii. 444) gives all the
important parts, both in Latin and Spanish. R. de[l] Turia, infra, has been
reprinted, but the marrow of him also will be found in the Historia, as well
as much else: for instance, an interesting Invectiva y Apologia, by
Francesco de la Barreda in 1622, which is dignified by the words: “There
was no greater dramatic-poetic written in the seventeenth century”—a large
statement. But Barreda is certainly a staunch anti-Unitarian, and has well
reached the important doctrine that “Art is merely a careful observation of
classified [graduados] examples.” The whole dispute, in which the more or
less great names of the Argensolas, Artieda, Cristóbal de Mesa, and others,
figure, together with the subsequent one on culteranism, will be found
exhaustively treated in the tenth chapter of the Historia, and more
summarily, but still usefully, in Ticknor. Since most of the text was written
M. Morel-Fatio, in his Défenseurs de la Comedia (v. sup., p. 343), has
subjoined Turia to Tirso, and a certain Carlos Boyl to both, adding a notice
of the Frenchman Ogier (v. sup., pp. 256, 257), who is already familiar to
readers of these pages. Boyl, one of the Valencian group above referred to,
wrote in “romance” form rules of the comedia nueva.
457. Let it be remembered that the curious passage on which Pope dwells
(Ess. Crit., 267 sq.) is not Cervantic, but from the spurious and intrusive
work of the mysterious Avellaneda.
458. Enthusiastically Englished, with much apparatus, by the late James
Y. Gibson (London, 1883). It is closely modelled on the Viaggio di
Parnasso of Cesare Caporali (1531-1601).
459. Or of their Spanish followers, such as Pinciano and Cascales. This
opinion, formed independently from reading of Don Quixote, agrees with
one of much more importance, that of Señor Menéndez himself. Nay, Mr
Fitzmaurice Kelly (op. cit., p. 237) roundly pronounces Cervantes “the least
critical of men.”
his time in the fashion of Caporali and Cervantes, but, it would seem, in a
spirit of wholly uncritical panegyric.
455. V. sup., pp. 49, 50 note. It is fair to say that Lope quotes Robortello.
456. Omnes dilaberentur. Señor Menéndez (iii. 444) gives all the
important parts, both in Latin and Spanish. R. de[l] Turia, infra, has been
reprinted, but the marrow of him also will be found in the Historia, as well
as much else: for instance, an interesting Invectiva y Apologia, by
Francesco de la Barreda in 1622, which is dignified by the words: “There
was no greater dramatic-poetic written in the seventeenth century”—a large
statement. But Barreda is certainly a staunch anti-Unitarian, and has well
reached the important doctrine that “Art is merely a careful observation of
classified [graduados] examples.” The whole dispute, in which the more or
less great names of the Argensolas, Artieda, Cristóbal de Mesa, and others,
figure, together with the subsequent one on culteranism, will be found
exhaustively treated in the tenth chapter of the Historia, and more
summarily, but still usefully, in Ticknor. Since most of the text was written
M. Morel-Fatio, in his Défenseurs de la Comedia (v. sup., p. 343), has
subjoined Turia to Tirso, and a certain Carlos Boyl to both, adding a notice
of the Frenchman Ogier (v. sup., pp. 256, 257), who is already familiar to
readers of these pages. Boyl, one of the Valencian group above referred to,
wrote in “romance” form rules of the comedia nueva.
457. Let it be remembered that the curious passage on which Pope dwells
(Ess. Crit., 267 sq.) is not Cervantic, but from the spurious and intrusive
work of the mysterious Avellaneda.
458. Enthusiastically Englished, with much apparatus, by the late James
Y. Gibson (London, 1883). It is closely modelled on the Viaggio di
Parnasso of Cesare Caporali (1531-1601).
459. Or of their Spanish followers, such as Pinciano and Cascales. This
opinion, formed independently from reading of Don Quixote, agrees with
one of much more importance, that of Señor Menéndez himself. Nay, Mr
Fitzmaurice Kelly (op. cit., p. 237) roundly pronounces Cervantes “the least
critical of men.”
Page 361
460. In his Works. Bibl. de Ribadeneyra.
461. In his Works. 2 vols., Barcelona, 1748.
462. Later Renaissance, p. 172.
463. Hist. Spanish Lit., p. 340.
464. I am very well aware that culteranismo and conceptismo are perhaps
not identical, and have been asserted to be quite different. But both alike
belong to the “better-bread-than-is-made-of-wheat” division of writing.
461. In his Works. 2 vols., Barcelona, 1748.
462. Later Renaissance, p. 172.
463. Hist. Spanish Lit., p. 340.
464. I am very well aware that culteranismo and conceptismo are perhaps
not identical, and have been asserted to be quite different. But both alike
belong to the “better-bread-than-is-made-of-wheat” division of writing.
Page 362
CHAPTER III.
GERMAN AND DUTCH CRITICISM.
THE HINDMOST OF ALL—ORIGINS—STURM—FABRICIUS—VERSION A.—VERSION B.
—JAC. PONTANUS—HEINSIUS: THE ‘DE TRAGŒDIÆ CONSTITUTIONE’—VOSS—
HIS ‘RHETORIC’—HIS ‘POETICS’—OPITZ—THE ‘BUCH DER DEUTSCHEN
POETEREI.’
It is not necessary to add much to what has been said in the first chapter
of the last Book on the subject of Erasmus, in order to indicate the reasons
why the growth of criticism in Germany, High and Low,[465] was far more
tardy, and for a long time far scantier, than even in England; and why, when
it came, it displayed a one-eyed character which is not visible in any other
The hindmost of of the great European countries.[466] Want of unity, religious
all.
and political troubles, Grobianism and its opposite or
companion Pedantry—all had to do with this; but the principal hindrance
was the non-existence of any considerable German vernacular literature,
and the consequent inveteracy of the habit of writing in Latin. So long as
this lasted the Germans and Dutch might be and were commentators,
scholars, grammarians—but they could hardly be critics, because they still
lacked the comparative stimulus. And it is not a little noteworthy that the
earlier development of Criticism in the Low Countries as compared with
Germany, during our present period, at least coincided with a greater
development of Dutch vernacular literature, though this is a matter which
lies out of our direct route.
There may easily be differences of opinion as to the persons, not mere
Humanists, who shall be selected as representing the beginning of German
criticism in modern times, in so far at least as the section of Poetics is
Origins. concerned. The choice may lie between the famous Johann
Sturm, who touches on literary matters in his letters, who wrote on
Rhetoric, and whose pupil, late in his life, drew up a commentary on the
Epistle to the Pisos in 1576; Georgius Fabricius, of Chemnitz, the first form
GERMAN AND DUTCH CRITICISM.
THE HINDMOST OF ALL—ORIGINS—STURM—FABRICIUS—VERSION A.—VERSION B.
—JAC. PONTANUS—HEINSIUS: THE ‘DE TRAGŒDIÆ CONSTITUTIONE’—VOSS—
HIS ‘RHETORIC’—HIS ‘POETICS’—OPITZ—THE ‘BUCH DER DEUTSCHEN
POETEREI.’
It is not necessary to add much to what has been said in the first chapter
of the last Book on the subject of Erasmus, in order to indicate the reasons
why the growth of criticism in Germany, High and Low,[465] was far more
tardy, and for a long time far scantier, than even in England; and why, when
it came, it displayed a one-eyed character which is not visible in any other
The hindmost of of the great European countries.[466] Want of unity, religious
all.
and political troubles, Grobianism and its opposite or
companion Pedantry—all had to do with this; but the principal hindrance
was the non-existence of any considerable German vernacular literature,
and the consequent inveteracy of the habit of writing in Latin. So long as
this lasted the Germans and Dutch might be and were commentators,
scholars, grammarians—but they could hardly be critics, because they still
lacked the comparative stimulus. And it is not a little noteworthy that the
earlier development of Criticism in the Low Countries as compared with
Germany, during our present period, at least coincided with a greater
development of Dutch vernacular literature, though this is a matter which
lies out of our direct route.
There may easily be differences of opinion as to the persons, not mere
Humanists, who shall be selected as representing the beginning of German
criticism in modern times, in so far at least as the section of Poetics is
Origins. concerned. The choice may lie between the famous Johann
Sturm, who touches on literary matters in his letters, who wrote on
Rhetoric, and whose pupil, late in his life, drew up a commentary on the
Epistle to the Pisos in 1576; Georgius Fabricius, of Chemnitz, the first form
Page 363
of whose De Re Poetica appeared in 1565; and Jacobus Pontanus, whose
real name was Spanmüller, whose book on the subject was published thirty
years later, but who, as he was then a man of over fifty, and had long been a
professor, had probably dealt with the subject, if only in lectures, much
earlier.[467]
Sturm’s interests were more in pædagogy than in poetry, and he does not
rank high as a critic: though there is no doubt that he helped to spread
Sturm. devotion to books. It is not in his favour that, in the teeth of
both external and internal evidence, he fights[468] for the name De Arte
Poetica, on the special ground that the work of Horace is an Ars Perfecta
(which, put its merits as high as you please, it most certainly is not), and
that it has all the six parts of poetry—fable, character, dianoia, lexis,
melopœia, and “sight.” For the rest he has few general remarks, and is
almost wholly commentatorial. His Rhetorical writing yields little really
critical: nor in his Letters have I yet found half so much criticism as is
extant in that single letter of Ascham to him, which has been noticed above.
[469]
The other two were both men of very wide influence as teachers of
Poetics: and both underwent the process—complimentary but disfiguring,
and specially usual in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—of
Fabricius. having their work watered out, or boiled down, by others. I
do not know, and I have not considered it tanti to spend much time or
labour in the attempt to discover, the exact process by which the small four
books of the first edition of Fabricius’ De Re Poetica[470] became the fat
volume of seven, which presents itself under the same title thirty years later.
[471]
Version A. It seemed better to give this time and labour to the
reading of the books themselves. Version A (as we may call that of 1565) is
an early example of the kind of gradus which was particularly popular
among the northern nations, though, as we have seen from the work of
Mazzone da Miglionico,[472] it was by no means unknown in Italy. In his
first book Fabricius discusses quantity, metre, and diction in general, with
plentiful examples. Book II. is an elaborate table of locutions from the Latin
poets, listed under heads as thus:—
Amor tangit. Matrimonium promittere.
” versat. ” ” inire.
” torquet. ” ” fallere.
” dat vulnus. ” ” odisse.
” mordet.
real name was Spanmüller, whose book on the subject was published thirty
years later, but who, as he was then a man of over fifty, and had long been a
professor, had probably dealt with the subject, if only in lectures, much
earlier.[467]
Sturm’s interests were more in pædagogy than in poetry, and he does not
rank high as a critic: though there is no doubt that he helped to spread
Sturm. devotion to books. It is not in his favour that, in the teeth of
both external and internal evidence, he fights[468] for the name De Arte
Poetica, on the special ground that the work of Horace is an Ars Perfecta
(which, put its merits as high as you please, it most certainly is not), and
that it has all the six parts of poetry—fable, character, dianoia, lexis,
melopœia, and “sight.” For the rest he has few general remarks, and is
almost wholly commentatorial. His Rhetorical writing yields little really
critical: nor in his Letters have I yet found half so much criticism as is
extant in that single letter of Ascham to him, which has been noticed above.
[469]
The other two were both men of very wide influence as teachers of
Poetics: and both underwent the process—complimentary but disfiguring,
and specially usual in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—of
Fabricius. having their work watered out, or boiled down, by others. I
do not know, and I have not considered it tanti to spend much time or
labour in the attempt to discover, the exact process by which the small four
books of the first edition of Fabricius’ De Re Poetica[470] became the fat
volume of seven, which presents itself under the same title thirty years later.
[471]
Version A. It seemed better to give this time and labour to the
reading of the books themselves. Version A (as we may call that of 1565) is
an early example of the kind of gradus which was particularly popular
among the northern nations, though, as we have seen from the work of
Mazzone da Miglionico,[472] it was by no means unknown in Italy. In his
first book Fabricius discusses quantity, metre, and diction in general, with
plentiful examples. Book II. is an elaborate table of locutions from the Latin
poets, listed under heads as thus:—
Amor tangit. Matrimonium promittere.
” versat. ” ” inire.
” torquet. ” ” fallere.
” dat vulnus. ” ” odisse.
” mordet.
Page 364
” torret.
Book III. provides the dull-witted versifier with store of clichés of the same
kind, but a little more elaborate; there being, for instance, dozens of phrases
for embracing. And IV. is a sort of common place-book of short copies of
verses on everything in Heaven and Earth.
Version B (which is dated long after Fabricius’ death in 1571) is not only
Version B. much enlarged but differently arranged. Book I. deals as
before with Quantity and Feet; Book II. with the subject of A, Book III.;
and the rest follow the same schemes,—III. B with tags on Ages, Seasons,
Heavenly Bodies, &c.; IV. with epithets suitable to proper names; V. with
ditto to common; VI. with a pot-pourri of poetical faults and beauties, &c.;
while VII. gives a sort of appendix on prosody and diction generally.
There is no need to say much on the inevitable critical result, the obvious
critical value or valuelessness, of this. There is in A a reference to Scaliger’s
Poetic, which had appeared a little before. As a matter of fact Scaliger and
Fabricius between them provided the average late sixteenth-century man—
sometimes even when he was a professed critic or poet, constantly when he
was merely a person of ordinary culture—with a sort of joint poetical
Thesaurus,—Scaliger doing the historical, critical, and (of its kind)
philosophical business for him, and Fabricius keeping a general marine-
store of materials, with precepts for their use.
The Institutiones Poeticæ of Spanmüller [Pontanus] appeared first in
Jac. Pontanus. 1594. Its author is quoted, among other prophets of
criticism, by the Spaniard Juan de La Cueva a dozen years later, and,
independently of its original form, the book acquired, early in the
seventeenth century, a large currency by being arranged (concinnata) in the
Sacrarum Profanarumque Phraseum Thesaurus of J. Buehler,[473] where it
serves as theoretic handbook to another Gradus. Indeed Pontanus’ own
work has all the characteristics of a decoction or abstract of Scaliger
himself. And once more the same reflection applies. It is impossible not to
see how powerful and (beyond mere school-work, in which they were no
doubt invaluable[474]) how maleficent must have been the influence of such
works on the critical temper of the generations influenced by them. La
Bruyère’s Tout est dit—an ironical fling in its author’s mouth partly, no
doubt, though perhaps not quite so even there—tended to become matter of
breviary. Everything had been said and done; all the Kinds found out; all
the phrases set down; all the poetry raised from shaft and vein and seam.
Book III. provides the dull-witted versifier with store of clichés of the same
kind, but a little more elaborate; there being, for instance, dozens of phrases
for embracing. And IV. is a sort of common place-book of short copies of
verses on everything in Heaven and Earth.
Version B (which is dated long after Fabricius’ death in 1571) is not only
Version B. much enlarged but differently arranged. Book I. deals as
before with Quantity and Feet; Book II. with the subject of A, Book III.;
and the rest follow the same schemes,—III. B with tags on Ages, Seasons,
Heavenly Bodies, &c.; IV. with epithets suitable to proper names; V. with
ditto to common; VI. with a pot-pourri of poetical faults and beauties, &c.;
while VII. gives a sort of appendix on prosody and diction generally.
There is no need to say much on the inevitable critical result, the obvious
critical value or valuelessness, of this. There is in A a reference to Scaliger’s
Poetic, which had appeared a little before. As a matter of fact Scaliger and
Fabricius between them provided the average late sixteenth-century man—
sometimes even when he was a professed critic or poet, constantly when he
was merely a person of ordinary culture—with a sort of joint poetical
Thesaurus,—Scaliger doing the historical, critical, and (of its kind)
philosophical business for him, and Fabricius keeping a general marine-
store of materials, with precepts for their use.
The Institutiones Poeticæ of Spanmüller [Pontanus] appeared first in
Jac. Pontanus. 1594. Its author is quoted, among other prophets of
criticism, by the Spaniard Juan de La Cueva a dozen years later, and,
independently of its original form, the book acquired, early in the
seventeenth century, a large currency by being arranged (concinnata) in the
Sacrarum Profanarumque Phraseum Thesaurus of J. Buehler,[473] where it
serves as theoretic handbook to another Gradus. Indeed Pontanus’ own
work has all the characteristics of a decoction or abstract of Scaliger
himself. And once more the same reflection applies. It is impossible not to
see how powerful and (beyond mere school-work, in which they were no
doubt invaluable[474]) how maleficent must have been the influence of such
works on the critical temper of the generations influenced by them. La
Bruyère’s Tout est dit—an ironical fling in its author’s mouth partly, no
doubt, though perhaps not quite so even there—tended to become matter of
breviary. Everything had been said and done; all the Kinds found out; all
the phrases set down; all the poetry raised from shaft and vein and seam.
Page 365
You simply rearranged it like a child’s house of wooden bricks, according to
patterns provided on the lid. The “Causes of Corrupted Arts” into which
Vives inquired, “The Lost System of Speaking” which Sturm deplored,
were all to be found, and found sufficiently, in the Ancients.
The solid qualities of the German race have not commonly distinguished
themselves in pure criticism, and to this day Lessing and Goethe are rather
captains without companies, and with at best a staff of Schlegels, and
suchlike, for lieutenants and ancients. Germans were, however, to do
something better, in this century of erudition, than the mere preparation of
fourth-form handbooks. Daniel Heinsius and Gerard Voss may be regarded
with some reason as the Jachin and the Boaz of the temple of seventeenth-
century Poetics. The De Tragœdiæ Constitutione of the first, which
appeared at Leyden in 1611,[475] is the succinctest and best argued statement
of the neo- and to a great extent pseudo-Aristotelian view of Drama. The
new Institutes of Oratory,[476] and the much later Poetical Institutes[477] of
the second, construct, with a great deal of learning and a very considerable
amount of good sense, an entire neo-classical Rhetoric and Poetic. To both
we must give some attention.
The De Tragœdiæ Constitutione is beyond all doubt a very remarkable
Heinsius. The book. It is quite short; only some 250 very small pages of
De Tragœdiæ
Constitutione.
very large print, so that there are scarcely more than a
hundred words in a page. But Heinsius writes as one having
authority; and we can read but little of him before it becomes perfectly clear
why that authority was accepted, for the rest of the century at least, with
more docility and less cavil than that of almost any other critic. He takes the
Poetics—as many, indeed most men for more than half a century, had taken
them—for gospel. But he neither translates them on the one hand, nor
wanders in the wilderness of scrappy and desultory commentary on the
other. Not merely does he confine himself to that part of the book which
concerns his actual subject, but he renders this part in a fashion which may
best be described as a very rare, and very masterly, kind of lecturing. He
neither slavishly keeps nor prudishly avoids the actual words of his author;
his paraphrases are brief but lucid; he adds to Aristotle what he thinks
necessary[478] in the way of illustrations from the Greek tragedians, citation
from Horace, examples (by no means always laudatory) from Seneca, and
the like; but in such a fashion as never to overload, or water down, the milk
of the Aristotelian word. That he always gives that milk quite “sincere” we
patterns provided on the lid. The “Causes of Corrupted Arts” into which
Vives inquired, “The Lost System of Speaking” which Sturm deplored,
were all to be found, and found sufficiently, in the Ancients.
The solid qualities of the German race have not commonly distinguished
themselves in pure criticism, and to this day Lessing and Goethe are rather
captains without companies, and with at best a staff of Schlegels, and
suchlike, for lieutenants and ancients. Germans were, however, to do
something better, in this century of erudition, than the mere preparation of
fourth-form handbooks. Daniel Heinsius and Gerard Voss may be regarded
with some reason as the Jachin and the Boaz of the temple of seventeenth-
century Poetics. The De Tragœdiæ Constitutione of the first, which
appeared at Leyden in 1611,[475] is the succinctest and best argued statement
of the neo- and to a great extent pseudo-Aristotelian view of Drama. The
new Institutes of Oratory,[476] and the much later Poetical Institutes[477] of
the second, construct, with a great deal of learning and a very considerable
amount of good sense, an entire neo-classical Rhetoric and Poetic. To both
we must give some attention.
The De Tragœdiæ Constitutione is beyond all doubt a very remarkable
Heinsius. The book. It is quite short; only some 250 very small pages of
De Tragœdiæ
Constitutione.
very large print, so that there are scarcely more than a
hundred words in a page. But Heinsius writes as one having
authority; and we can read but little of him before it becomes perfectly clear
why that authority was accepted, for the rest of the century at least, with
more docility and less cavil than that of almost any other critic. He takes the
Poetics—as many, indeed most men for more than half a century, had taken
them—for gospel. But he neither translates them on the one hand, nor
wanders in the wilderness of scrappy and desultory commentary on the
other. Not merely does he confine himself to that part of the book which
concerns his actual subject, but he renders this part in a fashion which may
best be described as a very rare, and very masterly, kind of lecturing. He
neither slavishly keeps nor prudishly avoids the actual words of his author;
his paraphrases are brief but lucid; he adds to Aristotle what he thinks
necessary[478] in the way of illustrations from the Greek tragedians, citation
from Horace, examples (by no means always laudatory) from Seneca, and
the like; but in such a fashion as never to overload, or water down, the milk
of the Aristotelian word. That he always gives that milk quite “sincere” we
Page 366
cannot say; he emphasises the “single revolution of the sun” more than he
has any right to do, though he does not do the same for the still more
pestilent and apocryphal Unity of Place. He may sometimes, or often in the
disputable places (as of “purgation” and so forth), miss the full meaning of
Aristotle according to the view of some judges, or impute a wrong one
according to others. But nobody, let it be repeated, can read him impartially
without seeing that he has soaked himself with the spirit of his author, has
equipped himself pretty thoroughly with the literature of his subject, and, as
a result, is speaking, as we said, with authority. There is no clearer or more
workmanlike exposition of the neo-classic, and not too neo-classic,
dramatic ideal than his.
Heinsius, like his successor Hédelin in France, and like Hédelin’s
successors Rymer and Dennis in England, was rash enough to forget that
though a critic is (thank Heaven!) not bound to write good poetry, he is
Voss. bound not to publish bad. And he ventured on a tragedy,
Herodes Infanticida, and other things which did not meet much quarter
even from those who agreed with him in critical principles. Voss was wiser,
and confined himself to the pure erudition and comment of which the two
books referred to above are far from being the worst examples. Indeed his
unboastful scholarship, his immense reading, and his untiring industry
would seem to have fitted him quite exceptionally for the duty; and he has
actually given us in these two books, or rather collections of books, the
completest Rhetoric and Poetic of modern, if not of any, times. Only two
things more were needed to put these books in a place even more unique;
but Nature refused the one to Voss personally, and the other was a thing
almost unreasonable to require from a Dutch savant of the seventeenth
century. The first was positive critical genius; and the second was an
impartial appreciation of ancient and modern literature.
His Rhetoric. The Rhetoric, which the author put out in its first form in
1606, revising and enlarging it for at least thirty years, till it forms a quarto
of a thousand closely printed pages, has some seventy more of minute
index, but lacks the Table of Contents, or displayed syllabus of section
headings, for which we have so often had to be thankful in Italian work.
Voss evidently had the practice of the Roman Law constantly before him,
and he thus follows the method of the Latin treatises in a way which makes
it for the most part superfluous for us to follow him, though he has plenty of
modern instances and applications. From the Fourth Book onwards,
has any right to do, though he does not do the same for the still more
pestilent and apocryphal Unity of Place. He may sometimes, or often in the
disputable places (as of “purgation” and so forth), miss the full meaning of
Aristotle according to the view of some judges, or impute a wrong one
according to others. But nobody, let it be repeated, can read him impartially
without seeing that he has soaked himself with the spirit of his author, has
equipped himself pretty thoroughly with the literature of his subject, and, as
a result, is speaking, as we said, with authority. There is no clearer or more
workmanlike exposition of the neo-classic, and not too neo-classic,
dramatic ideal than his.
Heinsius, like his successor Hédelin in France, and like Hédelin’s
successors Rymer and Dennis in England, was rash enough to forget that
though a critic is (thank Heaven!) not bound to write good poetry, he is
Voss. bound not to publish bad. And he ventured on a tragedy,
Herodes Infanticida, and other things which did not meet much quarter
even from those who agreed with him in critical principles. Voss was wiser,
and confined himself to the pure erudition and comment of which the two
books referred to above are far from being the worst examples. Indeed his
unboastful scholarship, his immense reading, and his untiring industry
would seem to have fitted him quite exceptionally for the duty; and he has
actually given us in these two books, or rather collections of books, the
completest Rhetoric and Poetic of modern, if not of any, times. Only two
things more were needed to put these books in a place even more unique;
but Nature refused the one to Voss personally, and the other was a thing
almost unreasonable to require from a Dutch savant of the seventeenth
century. The first was positive critical genius; and the second was an
impartial appreciation of ancient and modern literature.
His Rhetoric. The Rhetoric, which the author put out in its first form in
1606, revising and enlarging it for at least thirty years, till it forms a quarto
of a thousand closely printed pages, has some seventy more of minute
index, but lacks the Table of Contents, or displayed syllabus of section
headings, for which we have so often had to be thankful in Italian work.
Voss evidently had the practice of the Roman Law constantly before him,
and he thus follows the method of the Latin treatises in a way which makes
it for the most part superfluous for us to follow him, though he has plenty of
modern instances and applications. From the Fourth Book onwards,
Page 367
however, he deals with Elocution and Style, chiefly of course by the way of
Figures, yet, according to his lights, in the most careful and exhaustive
fashion. But what is at once noteworthy and rather tell-tale is his
unqualified admiration for the Scaligers,—father and son. “That divine
man,” “that man, ad unguem factus,” that “emperor of the literary world,”
that “prince of the senate of criticism”; without some phrase of this kind he
seems unable to name them. And in fact the whole book is rather a huge
commentatorial digest of what they and others, from Aristotle downwards,
have said than anything more.
The Poetical Institutions are somewhat more original, and they had much
His Poetics. greater influence. The book consists really of three separate
works, a brief De Arte Poetica of less than ninety pages, of which Grotius,
in a commendatory epigram prefixed to some editions, says—
“non magnus dat tibi cuncta liber;”
of the Institutiones proper in about four hundred; and of a De Imitatione
which is rather shorter than the Ars. The first, as reason and its title both
import, is a purely general tractate, which, after pointing out that Poetry has
much in common with Oratory, and that therefore much which concerns it
has been said in the earlier book, discusses all the old generalities about the
origin, nature, moral character, and so forth, of poetry, with expositions of
most of the cruces and technical catchwords from Ψιλὸς λόγος down to
furor poeticus. Voss is here also very generally Scaligerian; he adheres to
the “natural” origin of poetry, love-songs, cradle-songs, &c., as against the
religious and the deliberately “imitative”; gives very wide scope of subject
to the poet, and defends him handsomely against his enemies and detractors
from Plato downwards, but is properly indignant with naughty poets.[479]
The Institutions deal more directly with the question of Poetic Art, and
proceed by a series of section-headings in the form of Propositions, which
are then explained, commented, and defended. The first of the Three Books
deals with the matter common to all kinds of poetry; the Second with the
Drama; the Third with the Epic and the minor Kinds. All this is old stuff
rehandled. There is somewhat more originality in the De Imitatione, which
does not exactly correspond to any of the older books, or parts of books, on
that subject. Voss generally supposes the question, “How is the poet to set
about his work?” “How is he to apply all these rules that we have given
Figures, yet, according to his lights, in the most careful and exhaustive
fashion. But what is at once noteworthy and rather tell-tale is his
unqualified admiration for the Scaligers,—father and son. “That divine
man,” “that man, ad unguem factus,” that “emperor of the literary world,”
that “prince of the senate of criticism”; without some phrase of this kind he
seems unable to name them. And in fact the whole book is rather a huge
commentatorial digest of what they and others, from Aristotle downwards,
have said than anything more.
The Poetical Institutions are somewhat more original, and they had much
His Poetics. greater influence. The book consists really of three separate
works, a brief De Arte Poetica of less than ninety pages, of which Grotius,
in a commendatory epigram prefixed to some editions, says—
“non magnus dat tibi cuncta liber;”
of the Institutiones proper in about four hundred; and of a De Imitatione
which is rather shorter than the Ars. The first, as reason and its title both
import, is a purely general tractate, which, after pointing out that Poetry has
much in common with Oratory, and that therefore much which concerns it
has been said in the earlier book, discusses all the old generalities about the
origin, nature, moral character, and so forth, of poetry, with expositions of
most of the cruces and technical catchwords from Ψιλὸς λόγος down to
furor poeticus. Voss is here also very generally Scaligerian; he adheres to
the “natural” origin of poetry, love-songs, cradle-songs, &c., as against the
religious and the deliberately “imitative”; gives very wide scope of subject
to the poet, and defends him handsomely against his enemies and detractors
from Plato downwards, but is properly indignant with naughty poets.[479]
The Institutions deal more directly with the question of Poetic Art, and
proceed by a series of section-headings in the form of Propositions, which
are then explained, commented, and defended. The first of the Three Books
deals with the matter common to all kinds of poetry; the Second with the
Drama; the Third with the Epic and the minor Kinds. All this is old stuff
rehandled. There is somewhat more originality in the De Imitatione, which
does not exactly correspond to any of the older books, or parts of books, on
that subject. Voss generally supposes the question, “How is the poet to set
about his work?” “How is he to apply all these rules that we have given
Page 368
him?” and before very long we see that he is really thinking of the wrong
Imitation no less than Vida was. He devotes himself (no doubt under the
happier inspiration of Quintilian) to discussing how we are to imitate, how
to read. But he very soon slips into the inquiry, practical indeed but a little
undignified, “How are we to escape plagiarism?” to which one is tempted to
reply, “By not imitating in this sense at all.” That is not his opinion. He
thinks, if we may vary a well-known proverb, that the safe way is to take all
your eggs out of one basket. But you are never to imitate bad words and
thoughts; you must plan your work carefully beforehand, correct carefully,
invite criticism, but distinguish between what is good and what is not. It is
all very just in this way; but that way has led us far from furor poeticus. We
feel at the end of Voss’s laborious and erudite book that we are indeed in the
century of the Gradus. And here, as in his other volume, we also feel that he
has, for good or for evil, caught up and uttered the gospel of Neo-
Classicism.
So far we have dealt only with Latin authors. The work of Heinsius is
mentioned, both in the text by the author, and by the introducer, Augustinus
Iskra, of the Buch von der Deutschen Poeterei[480] of Martin Opitz. This
Opitz. interesting and agreeable little book, though not exactly (as it has
sometimes been incorrectly called) the first[481] piece of German poetic in
the vernacular, is entitled, with the usual reserves, to the place of origin in
modern German Poetics. It cannot be called prolix, for it only occupies
sixty pages in the recent reprint; but it is equally modest and business-like,
and helps to redeem from the utter absurdity of most of such appellations
(though it still remains absurd) the title of German Dryden which somebody
or other has given to Opitz. Augustine Iskra does not exaggerate when he
says—
“Altius scandes patria canendo
Barbyto, quam si Latium peritæ
Atticæ jungas, Syriæque Peithus
Noveris artem.”
And it is the peculiar glory of the Silesian poet that he not only sang himself
on the lyre of his country, but did his best to enable others to do so. The
spirit of genuine patriotism breathes in his dedication of the booklet to the
magistrates of his native town, Buntzlau; and that of a modest scholarship
Imitation no less than Vida was. He devotes himself (no doubt under the
happier inspiration of Quintilian) to discussing how we are to imitate, how
to read. But he very soon slips into the inquiry, practical indeed but a little
undignified, “How are we to escape plagiarism?” to which one is tempted to
reply, “By not imitating in this sense at all.” That is not his opinion. He
thinks, if we may vary a well-known proverb, that the safe way is to take all
your eggs out of one basket. But you are never to imitate bad words and
thoughts; you must plan your work carefully beforehand, correct carefully,
invite criticism, but distinguish between what is good and what is not. It is
all very just in this way; but that way has led us far from furor poeticus. We
feel at the end of Voss’s laborious and erudite book that we are indeed in the
century of the Gradus. And here, as in his other volume, we also feel that he
has, for good or for evil, caught up and uttered the gospel of Neo-
Classicism.
So far we have dealt only with Latin authors. The work of Heinsius is
mentioned, both in the text by the author, and by the introducer, Augustinus
Iskra, of the Buch von der Deutschen Poeterei[480] of Martin Opitz. This
Opitz. interesting and agreeable little book, though not exactly (as it has
sometimes been incorrectly called) the first[481] piece of German poetic in
the vernacular, is entitled, with the usual reserves, to the place of origin in
modern German Poetics. It cannot be called prolix, for it only occupies
sixty pages in the recent reprint; but it is equally modest and business-like,
and helps to redeem from the utter absurdity of most of such appellations
(though it still remains absurd) the title of German Dryden which somebody
or other has given to Opitz. Augustine Iskra does not exaggerate when he
says—
“Altius scandes patria canendo
Barbyto, quam si Latium peritæ
Atticæ jungas, Syriæque Peithus
Noveris artem.”
And it is the peculiar glory of the Silesian poet that he not only sang himself
on the lyre of his country, but did his best to enable others to do so. The
spirit of genuine patriotism breathes in his dedication of the booklet to the
magistrates of his native town, Buntzlau; and that of a modest scholarship
Page 369
(an adjective and substantive which make such an agreeable couple that it is
pity they should live so much apart) in the opening of the book itself. He
has not the least idea, he says, that you can make a poet by rules and laws;
nor has he any intention of doing over again the work which Aristotle,
The Buch der Horace, Vida, and Scaliger have done. But he arrays
Deustchen
Poeterei.
himself (to speak ecclesiastically) in a “decent tippet” of
the old stuff about Linus and Orpheus, with the Strabo
passage all complete, and a train of citations as to the nobility of the poet’s
office and the like. He comes in his fourth chapter to business. He actually
quotes Walther von der Vogelweide; and I do not think that he can be fairly
charged with that ὕβρις towards the ancient poetry of his country which too
frequently marks others in other countries. But he is evidently set on the
work of Reform—of substituting “smoothness of numbers” for the “wild
sweetness” of the folk-song. Wherein no doubt he was wrong. Not that way
did the counsels of perfection lie for the Higher Dutch; and they have
always had to come back to the woodnotes and the wood-Muses to find
poetic luck. But Opitz was entitled—was in his day almost bound—to think
differently. The interesting thing—much more interesting to us than the
details to which it led him, such as the patronage of the Alexandrine, the
alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes, &c.—is the particular source
to which he turned for inspiration and guidance. He knew, as has been said,
the Italian critics, at least those in Latin, and he probably knew the Italian
poets (he cites Petrarch). But it is to France, and specially to Ronsard, that
he fondly turns. Now it need hardly be said that in 1624 the influence of the
Pléiade in its own country, though not quite dead, was moribund; the
correctness of Malherbe, on the one hand, was doing its best deliberately to
throttle it, and the Italianated and Spaniolated extravagances which were
fashionable were choking it in another way. This is no doubt not the only
instance of a literary influence which is dead or dying in its own country
showing full vitality in another, but it is one of the most remarkable. For,
beyond question, the French influence—in successive forms, but still
French—reigned in Germany for some hundred and fifty years; and it was
Opitz who first brought it to bear.
His details, as has been said, are less interesting: yet they do not lack
interest. He begins by stickling for pure High German: and certainly no one
who, for his sins, has been condemned to read much of late fifteenth- and
early sixteenth-century German—one of the ugliest and most mongrel
pity they should live so much apart) in the opening of the book itself. He
has not the least idea, he says, that you can make a poet by rules and laws;
nor has he any intention of doing over again the work which Aristotle,
The Buch der Horace, Vida, and Scaliger have done. But he arrays
Deustchen
Poeterei.
himself (to speak ecclesiastically) in a “decent tippet” of
the old stuff about Linus and Orpheus, with the Strabo
passage all complete, and a train of citations as to the nobility of the poet’s
office and the like. He comes in his fourth chapter to business. He actually
quotes Walther von der Vogelweide; and I do not think that he can be fairly
charged with that ὕβρις towards the ancient poetry of his country which too
frequently marks others in other countries. But he is evidently set on the
work of Reform—of substituting “smoothness of numbers” for the “wild
sweetness” of the folk-song. Wherein no doubt he was wrong. Not that way
did the counsels of perfection lie for the Higher Dutch; and they have
always had to come back to the woodnotes and the wood-Muses to find
poetic luck. But Opitz was entitled—was in his day almost bound—to think
differently. The interesting thing—much more interesting to us than the
details to which it led him, such as the patronage of the Alexandrine, the
alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes, &c.—is the particular source
to which he turned for inspiration and guidance. He knew, as has been said,
the Italian critics, at least those in Latin, and he probably knew the Italian
poets (he cites Petrarch). But it is to France, and specially to Ronsard, that
he fondly turns. Now it need hardly be said that in 1624 the influence of the
Pléiade in its own country, though not quite dead, was moribund; the
correctness of Malherbe, on the one hand, was doing its best deliberately to
throttle it, and the Italianated and Spaniolated extravagances which were
fashionable were choking it in another way. This is no doubt not the only
instance of a literary influence which is dead or dying in its own country
showing full vitality in another, but it is one of the most remarkable. For,
beyond question, the French influence—in successive forms, but still
French—reigned in Germany for some hundred and fifty years; and it was
Opitz who first brought it to bear.
His details, as has been said, are less interesting: yet they do not lack
interest. He begins by stickling for pure High German: and certainly no one
who, for his sins, has been condemned to read much of late fifteenth- and
early sixteenth-century German—one of the ugliest and most mongrel
Page 370
speeches in history, and quite astounding after the musical sweetness of the
best Mittelhochdeutsch—will owe him a grudge for this. He protests against
the mingle-mangle of foreign words which was flooding the language, and
even against the famous -iren by which, to the present day to some extent,
Germans give a sort of spurious naturalisation to such foreigners. He would
have limits set (though he does not forbid it altogether) to that odd custom
of declining classical names in German speech, which is also maintained to
some extent, but which sometimes made a mere Macaronic of sixteenth-
century German. On the other hand, it is curious to find him urging on
Germans, who by right were, and by practice long have been, among the
busiest and most successful of word-compounders, the sonderliche
anmuthigkeit of compounds: and actually quoting the French as, next the
Greeks, the masters of such things.[482] Of course the historical student, even
if citations from Ronsard were not on the same page, would know at once
whence this comes. Still, there still remains the oddity of alleging the
undoubtedly awkward and exotic-sounding chasse-nue, ébranle-rocher, and
irrite-mer as warrants and patterns for words like wolkentreiber,
felsenstürmer, and meeraufreitzer, which simply seem to us natural-born,
and to require no warranty but their own sound and appearance.
But Opitz (of whom if any critic speaks disrespectfully, I fear that it
argues him uncritical) wrote not merely on the eve, but in the actual stormy
morning, of the Thirty Years’ War: and Germany had something else to do
for a long time besides listening to him. When matters settled down again,
the advice to attend to the French was rather unfortunately “carried over” to
a state of things in which French influence was still less the influence for
Germany. But this imitation, whether right or wrong, found no important
critical expression, and it would be losing labour and space to devote either
to German criticism in the last half of the seventeenth century.
It is more remarkable that the real activity and accomplishment of Dutch
during the early part of the century did not lead to some development of
vernacular criticism. But to the best of my information[483] it did not. The
Dutch and the Germans, however, of course still continued to write in Latin,
to edit, to comment, to carry on that division of critical work which,
according to the laying out of our subject, lies, except at particular seasons
and for special ends, beyond the scope of this book. Moreover, both
Holland and some of the German Free-towns, but especially the former
country, became the adopted, as they were almost the natural, homes of
best Mittelhochdeutsch—will owe him a grudge for this. He protests against
the mingle-mangle of foreign words which was flooding the language, and
even against the famous -iren by which, to the present day to some extent,
Germans give a sort of spurious naturalisation to such foreigners. He would
have limits set (though he does not forbid it altogether) to that odd custom
of declining classical names in German speech, which is also maintained to
some extent, but which sometimes made a mere Macaronic of sixteenth-
century German. On the other hand, it is curious to find him urging on
Germans, who by right were, and by practice long have been, among the
busiest and most successful of word-compounders, the sonderliche
anmuthigkeit of compounds: and actually quoting the French as, next the
Greeks, the masters of such things.[482] Of course the historical student, even
if citations from Ronsard were not on the same page, would know at once
whence this comes. Still, there still remains the oddity of alleging the
undoubtedly awkward and exotic-sounding chasse-nue, ébranle-rocher, and
irrite-mer as warrants and patterns for words like wolkentreiber,
felsenstürmer, and meeraufreitzer, which simply seem to us natural-born,
and to require no warranty but their own sound and appearance.
But Opitz (of whom if any critic speaks disrespectfully, I fear that it
argues him uncritical) wrote not merely on the eve, but in the actual stormy
morning, of the Thirty Years’ War: and Germany had something else to do
for a long time besides listening to him. When matters settled down again,
the advice to attend to the French was rather unfortunately “carried over” to
a state of things in which French influence was still less the influence for
Germany. But this imitation, whether right or wrong, found no important
critical expression, and it would be losing labour and space to devote either
to German criticism in the last half of the seventeenth century.
It is more remarkable that the real activity and accomplishment of Dutch
during the early part of the century did not lead to some development of
vernacular criticism. But to the best of my information[483] it did not. The
Dutch and the Germans, however, of course still continued to write in Latin,
to edit, to comment, to carry on that division of critical work which,
according to the laying out of our subject, lies, except at particular seasons
and for special ends, beyond the scope of this book. Moreover, both
Holland and some of the German Free-towns, but especially the former
country, became the adopted, as they were almost the natural, homes of
Page 371
those beginners of judicial criticism, who have been noticed in part at the
conclusion of the French chapter of this Book. Bayle’s Nouvelles de la
République de Lettres were Hollandish by domicile, as was the
Bibliothèque Universelle of Le Clerc, while at Leipsic the Acta Eruditorum
maintained the same principle of critical annals for nearly a century. Bayle,
as has been said before, was too much of a partisan, and perhaps of a wit,
for anything of his to have a judicial, however much in some senses of the
word it might have a critical, character: but the less mercurial talents of
Jean Le Clerc, which have been characterised under the head of the Ana (v.
sup., p. 276), were very well suited to the conduct of a critical record.
465. I do not know any general-special books on the subject of this
chapter, except those of Blankenburg, and Gayley and Scott, cit. sup.
466. Of course Olmucensis (v. supra, p. 27) and Cornelius Agrippa (p.
28) in strictness belong to the subject, as does Erasmus himself. But the last
is too cosmopolitan, and the two first too unimportant, to make the
abstraction of them from this place a great wrong to the Teutsche Nation.
Ulrich von Hutten wrote on versification, but not importantly.
467. The Disputationes de Tragœdia of Schosser (1559) are earlier than
any of these; but they seem to be pure commentary on Aristotle. I have not
been able to see them.
468. Commentarii in Art. Poet. Horat. (Strasburg, 1576). The compiler
was Johann Lobart. Sturm’s Rhetorical works are rather numerous, and
range from the De amissa dicendi ratione (ibid., 1538) onwards.
469. P. 155.
470. De Re Poetica, Lib. iv. (Antwerp, 1565).
471. Ibid., Lib. vii. (Leipsic, 1595).
472. V. sup., p. 107.
473. S. l. 1633, and continually reprinted.
conclusion of the French chapter of this Book. Bayle’s Nouvelles de la
République de Lettres were Hollandish by domicile, as was the
Bibliothèque Universelle of Le Clerc, while at Leipsic the Acta Eruditorum
maintained the same principle of critical annals for nearly a century. Bayle,
as has been said before, was too much of a partisan, and perhaps of a wit,
for anything of his to have a judicial, however much in some senses of the
word it might have a critical, character: but the less mercurial talents of
Jean Le Clerc, which have been characterised under the head of the Ana (v.
sup., p. 276), were very well suited to the conduct of a critical record.
465. I do not know any general-special books on the subject of this
chapter, except those of Blankenburg, and Gayley and Scott, cit. sup.
466. Of course Olmucensis (v. supra, p. 27) and Cornelius Agrippa (p.
28) in strictness belong to the subject, as does Erasmus himself. But the last
is too cosmopolitan, and the two first too unimportant, to make the
abstraction of them from this place a great wrong to the Teutsche Nation.
Ulrich von Hutten wrote on versification, but not importantly.
467. The Disputationes de Tragœdia of Schosser (1559) are earlier than
any of these; but they seem to be pure commentary on Aristotle. I have not
been able to see them.
468. Commentarii in Art. Poet. Horat. (Strasburg, 1576). The compiler
was Johann Lobart. Sturm’s Rhetorical works are rather numerous, and
range from the De amissa dicendi ratione (ibid., 1538) onwards.
469. P. 155.
470. De Re Poetica, Lib. iv. (Antwerp, 1565).
471. Ibid., Lib. vii. (Leipsic, 1595).
472. V. sup., p. 107.
473. S. l. 1633, and continually reprinted.
Page 372
474. Let me not be supposed for one moment to depreciate Latin verse-
making. I hardly know (speaking from actual experience as a school-
master) a single study which is better for boys; and the intelligent use of the
gradus is a better discipline in observation, critical selection, and method,
than smatterings of a hundred so-called “sciences.” But there is a time to
put away childish things as well as a time to use them.
475. The copy of this which belongs to the University of Edinburgh has
the additional interest of having belonged to, and of having been given by,
Drummond of Hawthornden, and so of having been, not improbably, in the
hands of Ben Jonson.
476. Commentariorum Rhetoricorum sive Oratoriarum Institutionum
Libri Sex, 8vo, Dordrecht, 1609. But this was greatly enlarged in the 4to of
Leyden, 1643, which I use.
477. De Artis Poeticæ Natura ac Constitutione, 4to, Amsterdam, 1647.
478. He has no room for much historical illustration, but what he says is
generally sound, though it is odd that in mentioning the Christus Patiens
(which, of course, he attributes to Gregory Nazianzen) he should not have
noticed its cento character, and though his remarks on Muretus and
Buchanan smack a little of the rival author of Herodes Infanticida.
479. Our whole history has shown us the obsession of the pius poeta, the
vir bonus; but I think the uncompromising submission to it of the later
seventeenth and eighteenth century is as much due to the influence of Voss
as to that of any single mediate person.
480. Printed at Brieg and published at Breslau in 1624; reprinted as the
first number of Niemeyer’s Neudrucke des xviten und xviiten Jahrhunderts, at
Halle in 1886. The title of Prosodia Germanica, which the later editions
bore, does not seem to be the author’s own.
481. For instance, the very interesting Grundlicher Bericht des
Deutschen Meistergesangs of Adam Puschmann, edited by Herr Jonas for
the same collection as No. 73 (Halle, 1888), is more than half a century
older than Opitz’s book, having appeared at Görlitz in 1571. But
making. I hardly know (speaking from actual experience as a school-
master) a single study which is better for boys; and the intelligent use of the
gradus is a better discipline in observation, critical selection, and method,
than smatterings of a hundred so-called “sciences.” But there is a time to
put away childish things as well as a time to use them.
475. The copy of this which belongs to the University of Edinburgh has
the additional interest of having belonged to, and of having been given by,
Drummond of Hawthornden, and so of having been, not improbably, in the
hands of Ben Jonson.
476. Commentariorum Rhetoricorum sive Oratoriarum Institutionum
Libri Sex, 8vo, Dordrecht, 1609. But this was greatly enlarged in the 4to of
Leyden, 1643, which I use.
477. De Artis Poeticæ Natura ac Constitutione, 4to, Amsterdam, 1647.
478. He has no room for much historical illustration, but what he says is
generally sound, though it is odd that in mentioning the Christus Patiens
(which, of course, he attributes to Gregory Nazianzen) he should not have
noticed its cento character, and though his remarks on Muretus and
Buchanan smack a little of the rival author of Herodes Infanticida.
479. Our whole history has shown us the obsession of the pius poeta, the
vir bonus; but I think the uncompromising submission to it of the later
seventeenth and eighteenth century is as much due to the influence of Voss
as to that of any single mediate person.
480. Printed at Brieg and published at Breslau in 1624; reprinted as the
first number of Niemeyer’s Neudrucke des xviten und xviiten Jahrhunderts, at
Halle in 1886. The title of Prosodia Germanica, which the later editions
bore, does not seem to be the author’s own.
481. For instance, the very interesting Grundlicher Bericht des
Deutschen Meistergesangs of Adam Puschmann, edited by Herr Jonas for
the same collection as No. 73 (Halle, 1888), is more than half a century
older than Opitz’s book, having appeared at Görlitz in 1571. But
Page 373
Puschmann, a pupil of Hans Sachs himself, and active in the Masterschool,
is only looking back on that school, the rules and regulations of which he
lays down in the most approved fashion. “The face” of Opitz “meets the
morning’s breath.”
482. Buch der Poet., ed. cit., p. 29.
483. I must here repeat, with additional emphasis, the caution and
apology which I put in as to Spanish. I do not know anything of this
language. I have been content to apply to Low Dutch the precept of a great
High Dutchman, Entbehren sollst du. But for our purpose I believe it will
be generally admitted that the renunciation is not fatal, important Dutch
critics having, almost to a man, written in Latin.
is only looking back on that school, the rules and regulations of which he
lays down in the most approved fashion. “The face” of Opitz “meets the
morning’s breath.”
482. Buch der Poet., ed. cit., p. 29.
483. I must here repeat, with additional emphasis, the caution and
apology which I put in as to Spanish. I do not know anything of this
language. I have been content to apply to Low Dutch the precept of a great
High Dutchman, Entbehren sollst du. But for our purpose I believe it will
be generally admitted that the renunciation is not fatal, important Dutch
critics having, almost to a man, written in Latin.
Page 374
CHAPTER IV.
DRYDEN AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES.
DEAD WATER IN ENGLISH CRITICISM—MILTON—COWLEY—THE PREFATORY MATTER
OF ‘GONDIBERT’—THE “HEROIC POEM”—DAVENANT’S ‘EXAMEN’—HOBBES’S
ANSWER—DRYDEN—HIS ADVANTAGES—THE EARLY PREFACES—THE ‘ESSAY OF
DRAMATIC POESY’—ITS SETTING AND OVERTURE—CRITES FOR THE ANCIENTS
—EUGENIUS FOR THE “LAST AGE”—LISIDEIUS FOR THE FRENCH—DRYDEN FOR
ENGLAND AND LIBERTY—‘CODA’ ON RHYMED PLAYS, AND CONCLUSION—
CONSPICUOUS MERITS OF THE PIECE—THE MIDDLE PREFACES—THE ‘ESSAY ON
SATIRE’ AND THE ‘DEDICATION OF THE ÆNEIS’—THE PARALLEL OF POETRY AND
PAINTING—THE ‘PREFACE TO THE FABLES’—DRYDEN’S GENERAL CRITICAL
POSITION—HIS SPECIAL CRITICAL METHOD—DRYDEN AND BOILEAU—RYMER—
THE ‘PREFACE TO RAPIN’—THE ‘TRAGEDIES OF THE LAST AGE’—THE ‘SHORT
VIEW OF TRAGEDY’—THE RULE OF TOM THE SECOND—SPRAT—EDWARD
PHILLIPS—HIS ‘THEATRUM POETARUM’—WINSTANLEY’S ‘LIVES’—
LANGBAINE’S ‘DRAMATIC POETS’—TEMPLE—BENTLEY—COLLIER’S ‘SHORT
VIEW’—SIR T. P. BLOUNT—PERIODICALS: THE ‘ATHENIAN MERCURY,’ ETC.
The middle third, if not the whole first half, of the seventeenth century in
England was too much occupied with civil and religious broils to devote
Dead water in attention to such a subject literary criticism. Between the
English
Criticism.
probable date of Jonson’s Timber (1625-37) and the certain
one of Dryden’s Essay of Dramatic Poesy (1668) we have
practically nothing substantive save the interesting prefatory matter to
Milton Gondibert (1650). Milton, the greatest man of letters
wholly of the time, must indeed during this time have conceived, or at least
matured, that cross-grained prejudice against rhyme, which is more
surprising in him than even in Campion, and which was itself even more
open to Daniel’s strictures. For not only is Milton himself in his own
practice a greater and more triumphant vindicator of rhyme than Campion,
but Daniel’s strongest and soundest argument, “Why condemn this thing in
order to establish that?” applies far more strongly to blank verse than to
Campion’s artificial metres. Custom and Nature, those greater Cæsars to
whom Daniel so triumphantly appealed, had already settled it, as they were
DRYDEN AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES.
DEAD WATER IN ENGLISH CRITICISM—MILTON—COWLEY—THE PREFATORY MATTER
OF ‘GONDIBERT’—THE “HEROIC POEM”—DAVENANT’S ‘EXAMEN’—HOBBES’S
ANSWER—DRYDEN—HIS ADVANTAGES—THE EARLY PREFACES—THE ‘ESSAY OF
DRAMATIC POESY’—ITS SETTING AND OVERTURE—CRITES FOR THE ANCIENTS
—EUGENIUS FOR THE “LAST AGE”—LISIDEIUS FOR THE FRENCH—DRYDEN FOR
ENGLAND AND LIBERTY—‘CODA’ ON RHYMED PLAYS, AND CONCLUSION—
CONSPICUOUS MERITS OF THE PIECE—THE MIDDLE PREFACES—THE ‘ESSAY ON
SATIRE’ AND THE ‘DEDICATION OF THE ÆNEIS’—THE PARALLEL OF POETRY AND
PAINTING—THE ‘PREFACE TO THE FABLES’—DRYDEN’S GENERAL CRITICAL
POSITION—HIS SPECIAL CRITICAL METHOD—DRYDEN AND BOILEAU—RYMER—
THE ‘PREFACE TO RAPIN’—THE ‘TRAGEDIES OF THE LAST AGE’—THE ‘SHORT
VIEW OF TRAGEDY’—THE RULE OF TOM THE SECOND—SPRAT—EDWARD
PHILLIPS—HIS ‘THEATRUM POETARUM’—WINSTANLEY’S ‘LIVES’—
LANGBAINE’S ‘DRAMATIC POETS’—TEMPLE—BENTLEY—COLLIER’S ‘SHORT
VIEW’—SIR T. P. BLOUNT—PERIODICALS: THE ‘ATHENIAN MERCURY,’ ETC.
The middle third, if not the whole first half, of the seventeenth century in
England was too much occupied with civil and religious broils to devote
Dead water in attention to such a subject literary criticism. Between the
English
Criticism.
probable date of Jonson’s Timber (1625-37) and the certain
one of Dryden’s Essay of Dramatic Poesy (1668) we have
practically nothing substantive save the interesting prefatory matter to
Milton Gondibert (1650). Milton, the greatest man of letters
wholly of the time, must indeed during this time have conceived, or at least
matured, that cross-grained prejudice against rhyme, which is more
surprising in him than even in Campion, and which was itself even more
open to Daniel’s strictures. For not only is Milton himself in his own
practice a greater and more triumphant vindicator of rhyme than Campion,
but Daniel’s strongest and soundest argument, “Why condemn this thing in
order to establish that?” applies far more strongly to blank verse than to
Campion’s artificial metres. Custom and Nature, those greater Cæsars to
whom Daniel so triumphantly appealed, had already settled it, as they were
Page 375
to confirm it later, that rhymed and unrhymed verse, each obeying the
natural evolution of English prosody, should be the twin horses to draw its
car. But Milton never developed his antipathy to rhyme (which in all
probability arose, mainly if not merely, from the fact that nearly all the most
exquisite rhymers of his time, except himself, were Cavaliers) in any
critical fashion, contenting himself with occasional flings and obiter dicta.
[484]
Another poet of the time, Cowley, ought to have given us criticism of real
Cowley. importance. He had the paramount, if not exclusive, literary
interests which are necessary to a great critic; he had the knowledge; and he
was perhaps the first man in England to possess the best kind of critical
style—lighter than Daniel’s, and less pregnant, involved, and scholastic
than Jonson’s—the style of well-bred conversational argument.[485] But he
was a little bitten with the scientific as opposed to the literary mania, and, in
his own person, he was perhaps too much of a Janus as regards literary
tastes to be able to give—or indeed to take—a clear and single view. There
were, as in Lope, two poets in Cowley, and each of these was wont to get in
the way of the other. The one was a “metaphysical” of the high flight, who
at least would, if he could, have been as intensely fantastic as Donne, and as
gracefully fantastic as Suckling. The other was a classical, “sensible,”
couplet-poet, who was working out Ben Jonson’s theories with even less
admixture of Romanticism than that which tinged Ben Jonson’s practice.
The entanglement of these was sufficiently detrimental to his poetry; but it
would have been absolutely fatal to his criticism, which must either have
perpetually contradicted itself or else have wandered in a maze, perplexing
as perplexed.
It is with Davenant’s Preface to Gondibert, in the form of a Letter to
Hobbes, and with Hobbes’s answer to it,[486] that England strikes once more
The Prefatory into the main path of European critical development. And it
matter of
Gondibert.
is of capital importance that, both the writers being exiled
royalists, these documents were written at Paris in the year
1650. There was much interest there in English affairs, while, as we have
seen, the habit of literary discussion had, for more than a generation,
become ingrained in Frenchmen. When Davenant set himself to write
Gondibert, he was doing exactly what Chapelain and Desmarets and the
rest were doing; and when he and his greater friend exchanged their
epistles, they were doing exactly what all the French literary world had
natural evolution of English prosody, should be the twin horses to draw its
car. But Milton never developed his antipathy to rhyme (which in all
probability arose, mainly if not merely, from the fact that nearly all the most
exquisite rhymers of his time, except himself, were Cavaliers) in any
critical fashion, contenting himself with occasional flings and obiter dicta.
[484]
Another poet of the time, Cowley, ought to have given us criticism of real
Cowley. importance. He had the paramount, if not exclusive, literary
interests which are necessary to a great critic; he had the knowledge; and he
was perhaps the first man in England to possess the best kind of critical
style—lighter than Daniel’s, and less pregnant, involved, and scholastic
than Jonson’s—the style of well-bred conversational argument.[485] But he
was a little bitten with the scientific as opposed to the literary mania, and, in
his own person, he was perhaps too much of a Janus as regards literary
tastes to be able to give—or indeed to take—a clear and single view. There
were, as in Lope, two poets in Cowley, and each of these was wont to get in
the way of the other. The one was a “metaphysical” of the high flight, who
at least would, if he could, have been as intensely fantastic as Donne, and as
gracefully fantastic as Suckling. The other was a classical, “sensible,”
couplet-poet, who was working out Ben Jonson’s theories with even less
admixture of Romanticism than that which tinged Ben Jonson’s practice.
The entanglement of these was sufficiently detrimental to his poetry; but it
would have been absolutely fatal to his criticism, which must either have
perpetually contradicted itself or else have wandered in a maze, perplexing
as perplexed.
It is with Davenant’s Preface to Gondibert, in the form of a Letter to
Hobbes, and with Hobbes’s answer to it,[486] that England strikes once more
The Prefatory into the main path of European critical development. And it
matter of
Gondibert.
is of capital importance that, both the writers being exiled
royalists, these documents were written at Paris in the year
1650. There was much interest there in English affairs, while, as we have
seen, the habit of literary discussion had, for more than a generation,
become ingrained in Frenchmen. When Davenant set himself to write
Gondibert, he was doing exactly what Chapelain and Desmarets and the
rest were doing; and when he and his greater friend exchanged their
epistles, they were doing exactly what all the French literary world had
Page 376
been doing, not merely, as is commonly thought, from the time of the Cid
dispute, but from one much earlier. Taking all things together, it was natural
that the subject should be the Heroic Poem, which had been a favourite of
Italian and French critics for some seventy years and more, but had been
little touched in England, though the conclusion of Ben’s Discoveries
shapes a course for it. Hints have been given before in this History that in
the opinion of its writer the “Heroic Poem” had much in common with that
entity which was long without a literary name, but which an admirable
humourist has now enabled us to describe scientifically as a Boojum[487]—
that is to say, it was not only something undiscoverable, but something
which had a malign and, indeed, destructive influence on those who thought
they had discovered it.
The “Heroic Poem” was to be neither pure Romance nor pure Epic, but a
The “Heroic sort of medley between the two. Or, rather, it was to be a
Poem.”
thing of shreds and patches, strictly epic (or at least
Virgilian-epical) in theory and rules, but borrowing from Romance
whatever it could, as our Elizabethans would say, “convey cleanly” enough
in the way of additional attractions. The shreds and patches, too, were not
purely poetical: they were not taken simply from Homer and Virgil, nor
even from Horace, Virgil, Lucan, Statius, and the rest down to that Musæus
whom Scaliger thought so superior to the Chian. A great deal of ancient
critical dictum was brought in, and as Aristotle and Horace had said less
about Epic than about Drama, they were to be supplemented from others,
especially by that treacherous and somewhat obscure passage of Petronius
which has been commented on in its place. In fact the whole of this Heroic-
Poem matter is a sort of satire on criticism by Kinds, in its attempt—and
failure—to discover a kind. If the founders of the novel (who, indeed, in
some notable cases were by no means free from the obsession) had
persisted in constructing it on the lines of the Heroic Poem, it would indeed
have been all up with Fiction. To read Tasso (who, as we might expect, is
not the least reasonable) and others, from Ronsard and Du Bellay down to
Desmarets and Le Bossu (both of whom, let it be remembered, wrote some
time after Davenant)—to find even Dryden a Martha of “machinery,” and
comforting himself with a bright new idea of getting the deorum ministeria
out of the limited intelligences of angels, so that you might not know at
once which side was going to win, as you do in the ordinary Christian
dispute, but from one much earlier. Taking all things together, it was natural
that the subject should be the Heroic Poem, which had been a favourite of
Italian and French critics for some seventy years and more, but had been
little touched in England, though the conclusion of Ben’s Discoveries
shapes a course for it. Hints have been given before in this History that in
the opinion of its writer the “Heroic Poem” had much in common with that
entity which was long without a literary name, but which an admirable
humourist has now enabled us to describe scientifically as a Boojum[487]—
that is to say, it was not only something undiscoverable, but something
which had a malign and, indeed, destructive influence on those who thought
they had discovered it.
The “Heroic Poem” was to be neither pure Romance nor pure Epic, but a
The “Heroic sort of medley between the two. Or, rather, it was to be a
Poem.”
thing of shreds and patches, strictly epic (or at least
Virgilian-epical) in theory and rules, but borrowing from Romance
whatever it could, as our Elizabethans would say, “convey cleanly” enough
in the way of additional attractions. The shreds and patches, too, were not
purely poetical: they were not taken simply from Homer and Virgil, nor
even from Horace, Virgil, Lucan, Statius, and the rest down to that Musæus
whom Scaliger thought so superior to the Chian. A great deal of ancient
critical dictum was brought in, and as Aristotle and Horace had said less
about Epic than about Drama, they were to be supplemented from others,
especially by that treacherous and somewhat obscure passage of Petronius
which has been commented on in its place. In fact the whole of this Heroic-
Poem matter is a sort of satire on criticism by Kinds, in its attempt—and
failure—to discover a kind. If the founders of the novel (who, indeed, in
some notable cases were by no means free from the obsession) had
persisted in constructing it on the lines of the Heroic Poem, it would indeed
have been all up with Fiction. To read Tasso (who, as we might expect, is
not the least reasonable) and others, from Ronsard and Du Bellay down to
Desmarets and Le Bossu (both of whom, let it be remembered, wrote some
time after Davenant)—to find even Dryden a Martha of “machinery,” and
comforting himself with a bright new idea of getting the deorum ministeria
out of the limited intelligences of angels, so that you might not know at
once which side was going to win, as you do in the ordinary Christian
Page 377
Epic[488]—is curious. Nay, it is more—humorous, with that touch of “the
pity of it” which humour nearly always has.
The ingenious knight, in explaining his performance and its principles to
his friend the philosopher, takes a very high tone. Homer, Virgil, Lucan, and
Statius are passed successively in review, and receive each his appropriate
compliment, put with dignified reserves, especially in the two latter cases.
Davenant’s Only two moderns are admitted—Tasso of the Italians
Examen.
—“for I will yield to their opinion who permit not Ariosto
—no, not Du Bartas—in this eminent rank of the heroicks, rather than to
make way by their admission for Dante, Marino, and others”[489]—and
Spenser of our own men. But Tasso is roundly taken to task for his fairy-
tale element, Spenser for his allegory and his archaism. And the faults of all
from Homer downwards are charged against “the natural humour of
imitation.”[490]
After a by no means despicable, but somewhat rhapsodical, digression on
this—it is to be observed that Davenant uses “Imitation” in the frank
modern sense—and an apology for it as “the dangerous fit of a hot writer,”
he gives reasons, partly no doubt drawn from Italian and French sources,
why he has made his subject (1) Christian, (2) antique but not historical, (3)
foreign, (4) courtly and martial, (5) displaying the distempers of love and
ambition. Then he expounds in turn his arrangement of five books (to
correspond to acts), with cantos to answer to scenes,[491] his arguments, his
quatrain-stanza. He asserts that “the substance is wit,” and discusses that
matter at some length, and with a noteworthy hit at conceits, which reminds
us that Davenant was à cheval between the First and the Second Caroline
period. He indulges in not unpardonable loquacity about his poetic
aspirations, with a fresh glance at the great poets of old, and brings in
thereby, with some ingenuity but at too great length as a finale, the old
prefatory matter of the Arts Poetic about the importance and dignity of
poetry in the world, concluding exactly where most begin, with Plato and
that “divine anger” of his which some have turned to the “unjust scandal of
Poesie.” And so a pleasant echo of Sir Philip blends agreeably with the
more prosaic tone, and time, and temper of Sir William.
Hobbes, as we should expect, is much briefer; and those bronze sentences
of his (though he had not at this time quite brought them to their full ring
Hobbes’s and perfect circumscription) give no uncertain sound. He is
Answer.
not, he says, a poet (which is true), and when he assigns to
pity of it” which humour nearly always has.
The ingenious knight, in explaining his performance and its principles to
his friend the philosopher, takes a very high tone. Homer, Virgil, Lucan, and
Statius are passed successively in review, and receive each his appropriate
compliment, put with dignified reserves, especially in the two latter cases.
Davenant’s Only two moderns are admitted—Tasso of the Italians
Examen.
—“for I will yield to their opinion who permit not Ariosto
—no, not Du Bartas—in this eminent rank of the heroicks, rather than to
make way by their admission for Dante, Marino, and others”[489]—and
Spenser of our own men. But Tasso is roundly taken to task for his fairy-
tale element, Spenser for his allegory and his archaism. And the faults of all
from Homer downwards are charged against “the natural humour of
imitation.”[490]
After a by no means despicable, but somewhat rhapsodical, digression on
this—it is to be observed that Davenant uses “Imitation” in the frank
modern sense—and an apology for it as “the dangerous fit of a hot writer,”
he gives reasons, partly no doubt drawn from Italian and French sources,
why he has made his subject (1) Christian, (2) antique but not historical, (3)
foreign, (4) courtly and martial, (5) displaying the distempers of love and
ambition. Then he expounds in turn his arrangement of five books (to
correspond to acts), with cantos to answer to scenes,[491] his arguments, his
quatrain-stanza. He asserts that “the substance is wit,” and discusses that
matter at some length, and with a noteworthy hit at conceits, which reminds
us that Davenant was à cheval between the First and the Second Caroline
period. He indulges in not unpardonable loquacity about his poetic
aspirations, with a fresh glance at the great poets of old, and brings in
thereby, with some ingenuity but at too great length as a finale, the old
prefatory matter of the Arts Poetic about the importance and dignity of
poetry in the world, concluding exactly where most begin, with Plato and
that “divine anger” of his which some have turned to the “unjust scandal of
Poesie.” And so a pleasant echo of Sir Philip blends agreeably with the
more prosaic tone, and time, and temper of Sir William.
Hobbes, as we should expect, is much briefer; and those bronze sentences
of his (though he had not at this time quite brought them to their full ring
Hobbes’s and perfect circumscription) give no uncertain sound. He is
Answer.
not, he says, a poet (which is true), and when he assigns to
Page 378
Gondibert “various experience, ready memory, clear judgment, swift and
well-governed fancy,” it is obvious enough that all these might be there and
yet poetry be absent. He divides the kinds of poetry “swiftly” enough, and
ranges himself with his customary decision against those who “take for
poesy whatsoever is writ in verse,” cutting out not merely didactic poetry,
but sonnets, epigrams, and eclogues, and laying it down that “the subject of
a poem is the manners of men.” “They that give entrance to fictions writ in
prose err not so much,” but they err. And accordingly he begins the
discussion of verse. He does not quarrel with Davenant, as Vida would have
done, for deliberately eschewing Invocation; and rapidly comments on the
plot, characters, description, &c., of the poem. On the head of diction he
would not be Hobbes if he could or did spare a sneer at words of no sense,
words “contunded by the schools,” and so forth. And since he is Hobbes,
there is piquancy in finding him at one with Walton in the objection to
“strong lines.” He is rather striking on a subject which has been much dwelt
on of late, the blunting of poetic phrase by use. And when he says that he
“never yet saw poem that had so much shape of art, health of morality, and
vigour of beauty and expression” as Gondibert—when, in the odd
timorousness he had caught from Bacon, he adds, that it is only the
perishableness of the modern tongues which will prevent it from lasting as
long as the Æneid or the Iliad—let us remember that, though criticism is
one thing and compliment another, they sometimes live in a rather illicit
contubernium. At any rate, there is criticism, and real criticism, in the two
pieces; and they are about the first substantial documents of it in English of
which as much can be said for many years.[492]
Thus, although two of these four were of the greatest of our writers, the
third an interesting failure of greatness, and the fourth far from
contemptible, they were in all cases prevented, by this or that
disqualification, from doing much in criticism.
Dryden, on the contrary, started with every advantage, except those of a
body of English criticism behind him, and of a thorough knowledge of the
Dryden. whole of English literature. He was a poet nearly, if not quite, of
the first class: and though his poetry had a strong Romantic spirit in virtue
of its perennial quality, it took the form and pressure of the time so
thoroughly and so kindly that there was no internal conflict. Further, he had
what by no means all poets of the first class have had, a strong, clear,
common-sense judgment, and a very remarkable faculty of arguing the
well-governed fancy,” it is obvious enough that all these might be there and
yet poetry be absent. He divides the kinds of poetry “swiftly” enough, and
ranges himself with his customary decision against those who “take for
poesy whatsoever is writ in verse,” cutting out not merely didactic poetry,
but sonnets, epigrams, and eclogues, and laying it down that “the subject of
a poem is the manners of men.” “They that give entrance to fictions writ in
prose err not so much,” but they err. And accordingly he begins the
discussion of verse. He does not quarrel with Davenant, as Vida would have
done, for deliberately eschewing Invocation; and rapidly comments on the
plot, characters, description, &c., of the poem. On the head of diction he
would not be Hobbes if he could or did spare a sneer at words of no sense,
words “contunded by the schools,” and so forth. And since he is Hobbes,
there is piquancy in finding him at one with Walton in the objection to
“strong lines.” He is rather striking on a subject which has been much dwelt
on of late, the blunting of poetic phrase by use. And when he says that he
“never yet saw poem that had so much shape of art, health of morality, and
vigour of beauty and expression” as Gondibert—when, in the odd
timorousness he had caught from Bacon, he adds, that it is only the
perishableness of the modern tongues which will prevent it from lasting as
long as the Æneid or the Iliad—let us remember that, though criticism is
one thing and compliment another, they sometimes live in a rather illicit
contubernium. At any rate, there is criticism, and real criticism, in the two
pieces; and they are about the first substantial documents of it in English of
which as much can be said for many years.[492]
Thus, although two of these four were of the greatest of our writers, the
third an interesting failure of greatness, and the fourth far from
contemptible, they were in all cases prevented, by this or that
disqualification, from doing much in criticism.
Dryden, on the contrary, started with every advantage, except those of a
body of English criticism behind him, and of a thorough knowledge of the
Dryden. whole of English literature. He was a poet nearly, if not quite, of
the first class: and though his poetry had a strong Romantic spirit in virtue
of its perennial quality, it took the form and pressure of the time so
thoroughly and so kindly that there was no internal conflict. Further, he had
what by no means all poets of the first class have had, a strong, clear,
common-sense judgment, and a very remarkable faculty of arguing the
Page 379
point. And, finally, if he had few predecessors in English, and perhaps did
not know much of those few except of Jonson, he was fairly, if not exactly
as a scholar, acquainted with the ancients, and he had profited, and was to
profit, by the best doctrine of the moderns.
His advantages. Moreover, from a certain not unimportant point of view,
he occupies a position which is only shared in the history of criticism by
Dante and (in some estimations, though not in all) by Goethe,—the position
of the greatest man of letters in his own country, if not also in Europe, who
is at the same time the greatest critic, and who is favoured by Fortune with
a concentration of advantages as to time and circumstance. His critical
excellence has indeed never been wholly overlooked, and, except by the
unjuster partisanship of the early Romantic movement in England,
generally admitted with cheerfulness.[493] The want, however, of that
synoptic study of the subject, which it is the humble purpose of this book to
facilitate, has too often prevented his full pre-eminence from being
recognised. It may even be said that it is in criticism that Dryden best shows
that original faculty which has often been denied him elsewhere. He
borrows, indeed, as freely as everywhere: he copies, with a half ludicrous
deference, the stock opinions of the critics and the criticasters in vogue; he
gives us pages on pages of their pedantic trivialities instead of his own
shrewd and racy judgments. But, despite of all this, there is in him (and
with good luck we may perhaps not fail to disengage it) a vein and style in
“judging of Authours” which goes straight back to Longinus, if it is not
even independent of that great ancestry.[494]
This vein is perceptible[495] even in the slight critical essays which
precede the Essay of Dramatic Poesy, though of course it is much more
The Early evident in the Essay itself. In the preface to the Rival
Prefaces.
Ladies (written, not indeed when Dryden was a very young
man, but when, except for Juvenilia, he had produced extremely little) we
find his critical path clearly traced, and still more in the three years later
Preface to Annus Mirabilis. The principles of this path-making are as
follows: Dryden takes—without perhaps a very laborious study of them,
but, as has been said already, with an almost touching docility in
appearance—the current theories and verdicts of the French, Italian (and
Spanish?) critics whom we should by this time have sufficiently surveyed.
He does not—he never did to the date of the glorious Preface to the Fables
itself—dispute the general doctrines of the sages from Aristotle downwards.
not know much of those few except of Jonson, he was fairly, if not exactly
as a scholar, acquainted with the ancients, and he had profited, and was to
profit, by the best doctrine of the moderns.
His advantages. Moreover, from a certain not unimportant point of view,
he occupies a position which is only shared in the history of criticism by
Dante and (in some estimations, though not in all) by Goethe,—the position
of the greatest man of letters in his own country, if not also in Europe, who
is at the same time the greatest critic, and who is favoured by Fortune with
a concentration of advantages as to time and circumstance. His critical
excellence has indeed never been wholly overlooked, and, except by the
unjuster partisanship of the early Romantic movement in England,
generally admitted with cheerfulness.[493] The want, however, of that
synoptic study of the subject, which it is the humble purpose of this book to
facilitate, has too often prevented his full pre-eminence from being
recognised. It may even be said that it is in criticism that Dryden best shows
that original faculty which has often been denied him elsewhere. He
borrows, indeed, as freely as everywhere: he copies, with a half ludicrous
deference, the stock opinions of the critics and the criticasters in vogue; he
gives us pages on pages of their pedantic trivialities instead of his own
shrewd and racy judgments. But, despite of all this, there is in him (and
with good luck we may perhaps not fail to disengage it) a vein and style in
“judging of Authours” which goes straight back to Longinus, if it is not
even independent of that great ancestry.[494]
This vein is perceptible[495] even in the slight critical essays which
precede the Essay of Dramatic Poesy, though of course it is much more
The Early evident in the Essay itself. In the preface to the Rival
Prefaces.
Ladies (written, not indeed when Dryden was a very young
man, but when, except for Juvenilia, he had produced extremely little) we
find his critical path clearly traced, and still more in the three years later
Preface to Annus Mirabilis. The principles of this path-making are as
follows: Dryden takes—without perhaps a very laborious study of them,
but, as has been said already, with an almost touching docility in
appearance—the current theories and verdicts of the French, Italian (and
Spanish?) critics whom we should by this time have sufficiently surveyed.
He does not—he never did to the date of the glorious Preface to the Fables
itself—dispute the general doctrines of the sages from Aristotle downwards.
Page 380
But (and this is where the Longinian resemblance comes in) he never can
help considering the individual works of literature almost without regard to
these principles, and simply on the broad, the sound, the unshakable ground
of the impression they make on him. Secondly (and this is where the
resemblance to Dante comes in), he is perfectly well aware that questions of
diction, metre, and the like are not mere catchpenny or claptrap
afterthoughts, as ancient criticism was too apt to think them, but at the root
of the pleasure which literature gives. Thirdly (and this is where, though
Aristotle did not deny the fact, the whole criticism of antiquity, except that
of Longinus, and most of that of modern times, swerves timorously from
the truth), he knows that this delight, this transport, counts first as a
criterion. Literature in general, poetry in particular, should, of course,
instruct: but it must delight.[496]
The “blundering, half-witted people,” as in one of his rare bursts of not
absolutely cool contempt[497] he calls his own critics, who charged him with
plagiarising from foreign authors, entirely missed these differences, which
distinguish him from every foreign critic of his day, and of most days for
long afterwards. He may quote—partly out of that genuine humility and
generosity combined which make his literary character so agreeable; partly
from an innocent parade of learning. But he never pays for what he borrows
the slavish rent, or royalty, of surrendering his actual and private judgment.
In the Preface to the Rival Ladies the poet-critic takes (as indeed he
afterwards himself fully acknowledged) a wrong line—the defence of what
he calls “verse” (that is to say, rhymed heroic couplets, not blank verse) for
play-writing. This was his mistress of the time; he rejoiced in her caresses,
he wore her colours, he fought for her beauty—the enjoyment authorising
the argument. But as he has nothing to say that has not been better said in
the Essay, we may postpone the consideration of this. There is one of the
slips of fact which can be readily excused to (and by) all but bad critics,—
and which bad critics are chiefly bound to avoid, because accuracy of fact is
their only title to existence—in his mention of “Queen” Gorboduc and his
addition that the dialogue in that play is rhymed; there is an interesting sigh
for an Academy (Dryden, let it be remembered, was one of the earliest
members of the Royal Society); and there is the well-known and very
amiable, though rather dangerous, delusion that the excellence and dignity
of rhyme were never known till Mr Waller taught it, and that John
Denham’s Cooper’s Hill not only is, but ever will be, the exact standard of
help considering the individual works of literature almost without regard to
these principles, and simply on the broad, the sound, the unshakable ground
of the impression they make on him. Secondly (and this is where the
resemblance to Dante comes in), he is perfectly well aware that questions of
diction, metre, and the like are not mere catchpenny or claptrap
afterthoughts, as ancient criticism was too apt to think them, but at the root
of the pleasure which literature gives. Thirdly (and this is where, though
Aristotle did not deny the fact, the whole criticism of antiquity, except that
of Longinus, and most of that of modern times, swerves timorously from
the truth), he knows that this delight, this transport, counts first as a
criterion. Literature in general, poetry in particular, should, of course,
instruct: but it must delight.[496]
The “blundering, half-witted people,” as in one of his rare bursts of not
absolutely cool contempt[497] he calls his own critics, who charged him with
plagiarising from foreign authors, entirely missed these differences, which
distinguish him from every foreign critic of his day, and of most days for
long afterwards. He may quote—partly out of that genuine humility and
generosity combined which make his literary character so agreeable; partly
from an innocent parade of learning. But he never pays for what he borrows
the slavish rent, or royalty, of surrendering his actual and private judgment.
In the Preface to the Rival Ladies the poet-critic takes (as indeed he
afterwards himself fully acknowledged) a wrong line—the defence of what
he calls “verse” (that is to say, rhymed heroic couplets, not blank verse) for
play-writing. This was his mistress of the time; he rejoiced in her caresses,
he wore her colours, he fought for her beauty—the enjoyment authorising
the argument. But as he has nothing to say that has not been better said in
the Essay, we may postpone the consideration of this. There is one of the
slips of fact which can be readily excused to (and by) all but bad critics,—
and which bad critics are chiefly bound to avoid, because accuracy of fact is
their only title to existence—in his mention of “Queen” Gorboduc and his
addition that the dialogue in that play is rhymed; there is an interesting sigh
for an Academy (Dryden, let it be remembered, was one of the earliest
members of the Royal Society); and there is the well-known and very
amiable, though rather dangerous, delusion that the excellence and dignity
of rhyme were never known till Mr Waller taught it, and that John
Denham’s Cooper’s Hill not only is, but ever will be, the exact standard of
Page 381
good writing. But he knows Sidney and he knows Scaliger, and he knows
already that Shakespeare “had a larger soul of poesy than any of our
nation.” And a man who knows these three things in 1664 will go far.
The Preface to Annus Mirabilis[498] is again submissive in form,
independent in spirit. Dryden obediently accepts the prescription for epic or
“Heroic” poetry, and though he makes another slip of fact (or at least of
term) by saying that Chapman’s Homer is written in “Alexandrines or
verses of six feet” instead of (as far as the Iliad is concerned) in the
fourteener, he is beautifully scholastic on the differences between Virgil and
Ovid, the Heroic and the Burlesque, “Wit Writing” and “Wit Written.” But
he does it with unconquerable originality, the utterance of his own
impression, his own judgment, breaking through all this school-stuff at
every moment; and also with a valuable (though still inadequate) account of
“the Poet’s imagination.”[499]
Yet another point of interest is the avowed intention (carried out in the
poem, to the disgust or at least distaste of Dr Johnson) of using technical
terms. This, one of the neoclassic devices for attaining propriety, was, as we
have seen, excogitated in Italy, and warmly championed by the Pléiade; but
it had been by this time mostly abandoned, as it was later by Dryden
himself.
The Essay of The Essay of Dramatic Poesy is much better known than
Dramatic Poesy.
it was only a couple of decades ago,[500] and it is perhaps
superfluous to say that it is a dialogue in form, and that the interlocutors are
Dryden himself (Neander), his brother-in-law Sir Robert Howard (Crites),
Sir Charles Sedley (Lisideius), and Lord Buckhurst (Eugenius). The two
last, though at the time the wildest of scapegraces, were men of distinct
poetic gift and varied literary faculty. And Howard, though no great poet,
and possessing something of the prig, the coxcomb, and the pedant in his
composition, was a man of some ability, of real learning of a kind, and of
very distinct devotion to literature.
The Essay was first published in 1668, but had been written, according to
Dryden’s statement in his Preface to Lord Buckhurst, “in the country” (at
his father-in-law Lord Berkshire’s seat of Charlton near Malmesbury), when
the author was driven out of London by the Great Plague three years before.
Its setting and He had, he says, altered some of his opinions; but it did not
overture.
much matter in an Essay “where all I have said is
problematical.” The “Address to the Reader” promises a second part
already that Shakespeare “had a larger soul of poesy than any of our
nation.” And a man who knows these three things in 1664 will go far.
The Preface to Annus Mirabilis[498] is again submissive in form,
independent in spirit. Dryden obediently accepts the prescription for epic or
“Heroic” poetry, and though he makes another slip of fact (or at least of
term) by saying that Chapman’s Homer is written in “Alexandrines or
verses of six feet” instead of (as far as the Iliad is concerned) in the
fourteener, he is beautifully scholastic on the differences between Virgil and
Ovid, the Heroic and the Burlesque, “Wit Writing” and “Wit Written.” But
he does it with unconquerable originality, the utterance of his own
impression, his own judgment, breaking through all this school-stuff at
every moment; and also with a valuable (though still inadequate) account of
“the Poet’s imagination.”[499]
Yet another point of interest is the avowed intention (carried out in the
poem, to the disgust or at least distaste of Dr Johnson) of using technical
terms. This, one of the neoclassic devices for attaining propriety, was, as we
have seen, excogitated in Italy, and warmly championed by the Pléiade; but
it had been by this time mostly abandoned, as it was later by Dryden
himself.
The Essay of The Essay of Dramatic Poesy is much better known than
Dramatic Poesy.
it was only a couple of decades ago,[500] and it is perhaps
superfluous to say that it is a dialogue in form, and that the interlocutors are
Dryden himself (Neander), his brother-in-law Sir Robert Howard (Crites),
Sir Charles Sedley (Lisideius), and Lord Buckhurst (Eugenius). The two
last, though at the time the wildest of scapegraces, were men of distinct
poetic gift and varied literary faculty. And Howard, though no great poet,
and possessing something of the prig, the coxcomb, and the pedant in his
composition, was a man of some ability, of real learning of a kind, and of
very distinct devotion to literature.
The Essay was first published in 1668, but had been written, according to
Dryden’s statement in his Preface to Lord Buckhurst, “in the country” (at
his father-in-law Lord Berkshire’s seat of Charlton near Malmesbury), when
the author was driven out of London by the Great Plague three years before.
Its setting and He had, he says, altered some of his opinions; but it did not
overture.
much matter in an Essay “where all I have said is
problematical.” The “Address to the Reader” promises a second part
Page 382
dealing with Epic and Lyric, which never appeared, and of which only the
Epic part is represented by later works. This is a pity, for while we have
treatises on Drama and Epic ad nauseam, their elder and lovelier sister has
been, “poor girl! neglected.” It begins with a picturesque setting, which
represents the four interlocutors as having taken boat and shot the bridge,
attracted by the reverberation of the great battle with the Dutch in the early
part of June 1665, when Admiral Opdam’s flag-ship was blown up.
Eugenius augurs victory from the gradual dying away of the noise; and
Crites observes (in character) that he should like this victory better if he did
not know how many bad verses he should have to read on it. Lisideius adds
that he knows some poets who have got epinikia and funeral elegies all
ready for either event, and the dialogue proceeds for some time in the same
way of literary banter, especial set being made at two poets (one of whom is
certainly Wild, while the other may be Flecknoe) with incidental sneers at
Wither(s) and Cleveland. At last Crites brings it to something like the
quarrel of Ancient v. Modern. Eugenius picks up the glove, but consents, at
Crites’ suggestion, to limit the discussion to dramatic poetry,[501] and so the
“dependence” is settled.
Eugenius thinks that though modern plays are better than Greek or
Roman, yet those of “the last age” (1600-1660) are better than “ours.” As
Crites for the for epic and lyric, the last age must yield. And all the
Ancients.
quartette agree that “the sweetness of English verse was
never understanded or practised” by our fathers, and that some writers yet
living first taught us to mould our thoughts into easy and significant words,
to retrench the superfluities of expression, and to make our rhyme so
properly a part of the verse that it should never mislead the sense. Lisideius
having (with the consent of the company, subject to a slight scholastic
objection from Crites) defined or described a play as “A just and lively
image of human nature, representing its passions and humours, and the
changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of
mankind,” Crites takes up his brief for the ancients. His speech is a set one,
extolling the classical conception of drama, and especially the modern-
classical Unities,
but rather a panegyric than an argument, and particularly weak in this—
that it takes no critical account of the modern drama at all. Except Ben
Jonson, “the greatest man of the last age,” not a single modern dramatic
writer of any country is so much as named.
Epic part is represented by later works. This is a pity, for while we have
treatises on Drama and Epic ad nauseam, their elder and lovelier sister has
been, “poor girl! neglected.” It begins with a picturesque setting, which
represents the four interlocutors as having taken boat and shot the bridge,
attracted by the reverberation of the great battle with the Dutch in the early
part of June 1665, when Admiral Opdam’s flag-ship was blown up.
Eugenius augurs victory from the gradual dying away of the noise; and
Crites observes (in character) that he should like this victory better if he did
not know how many bad verses he should have to read on it. Lisideius adds
that he knows some poets who have got epinikia and funeral elegies all
ready for either event, and the dialogue proceeds for some time in the same
way of literary banter, especial set being made at two poets (one of whom is
certainly Wild, while the other may be Flecknoe) with incidental sneers at
Wither(s) and Cleveland. At last Crites brings it to something like the
quarrel of Ancient v. Modern. Eugenius picks up the glove, but consents, at
Crites’ suggestion, to limit the discussion to dramatic poetry,[501] and so the
“dependence” is settled.
Eugenius thinks that though modern plays are better than Greek or
Roman, yet those of “the last age” (1600-1660) are better than “ours.” As
Crites for the for epic and lyric, the last age must yield. And all the
Ancients.
quartette agree that “the sweetness of English verse was
never understanded or practised” by our fathers, and that some writers yet
living first taught us to mould our thoughts into easy and significant words,
to retrench the superfluities of expression, and to make our rhyme so
properly a part of the verse that it should never mislead the sense. Lisideius
having (with the consent of the company, subject to a slight scholastic
objection from Crites) defined or described a play as “A just and lively
image of human nature, representing its passions and humours, and the
changes of fortune to which it is subject, for the delight and instruction of
mankind,” Crites takes up his brief for the ancients. His speech is a set one,
extolling the classical conception of drama, and especially the modern-
classical Unities,
but rather a panegyric than an argument, and particularly weak in this—
that it takes no critical account of the modern drama at all. Except Ben
Jonson, “the greatest man of the last age,” not a single modern dramatic
writer of any country is so much as named.
Page 383
Eugenius, though his discourse is livelier, falls into something the same
Eugenius for the fault, or at least the counterpart of it. He rallies the ancients
“last age.”
unmercifully, and has very good game of the stock plots
and characters in Terence; but his commendation of the moderns has a
disappointing generality, and he lays himself rather open to the good-
humoured but forcible interruption of Crites that he and Eugenius are never
likely to come to an agreement, because the one regards change as in itself
an improvement, and the other does not.
Still, Lisideius gives a new turn to the discussion by asking Eugenius
why he puts English plays above those of other nations, and whether we
ought not to submit our stage to the exactness of our next neighbours.
Lisideius for the Eugenius in reply commits the further and especial defence
French.
of the English to Neander, and Lisideius begins his part as
eulogist of the French. For some forty years, he says, we have not had
leisure to be good poets. The French have: and, by Richelieu’s patronage
and Corneille’s example, have raised their theatre till it now surpasses ours,
and the rest of Europe. Who have kept the Unities so well? Who have
avoided “that absurd thing,” the English tragi-comedy, so completely? In
tragedy they take well-known stories, and only manageable parts of them,
while Shakespeare crams the business of thirty or forty years into two hours
and a half. They make only one person prominent, they do as much as
possible behind the scenes, keep dying off the stage altogether, and never
end their plays with a conversion, or simple change of will. Nobody, with
them, appears on the stage, unless he has some business there: and as for
the beauty of their rhyme, why, that is “already partly received by us,” and
it will, no doubt, when we write better plays, “exceedingly beautify them.”
To him, Neander—that is to say—Dryden himself.
There is a reminder (though the matter is quite different) of Daniel, and a
comforting augury for English criticism, in the swift directness with which
“the new critic” (as a Webbe of his own day might have called him) strikes
Dryden for at the heart of the question. The French are more regular, he
England and
Liberty.
grants, and our irregularities are, in some cases, justly
taxed. But, nevertheless, he is of opinion that neither our
faults nor their virtues are sufficient to place them above us. For Lisideius
himself has defined a play as a lively imitation of nature. And these beauties
of the French stage are beauties, not natural, but thoroughly artificial.
Before Molière, where are the humours of French comedy, save, perhaps, in
Eugenius for the fault, or at least the counterpart of it. He rallies the ancients
“last age.”
unmercifully, and has very good game of the stock plots
and characters in Terence; but his commendation of the moderns has a
disappointing generality, and he lays himself rather open to the good-
humoured but forcible interruption of Crites that he and Eugenius are never
likely to come to an agreement, because the one regards change as in itself
an improvement, and the other does not.
Still, Lisideius gives a new turn to the discussion by asking Eugenius
why he puts English plays above those of other nations, and whether we
ought not to submit our stage to the exactness of our next neighbours.
Lisideius for the Eugenius in reply commits the further and especial defence
French.
of the English to Neander, and Lisideius begins his part as
eulogist of the French. For some forty years, he says, we have not had
leisure to be good poets. The French have: and, by Richelieu’s patronage
and Corneille’s example, have raised their theatre till it now surpasses ours,
and the rest of Europe. Who have kept the Unities so well? Who have
avoided “that absurd thing,” the English tragi-comedy, so completely? In
tragedy they take well-known stories, and only manageable parts of them,
while Shakespeare crams the business of thirty or forty years into two hours
and a half. They make only one person prominent, they do as much as
possible behind the scenes, keep dying off the stage altogether, and never
end their plays with a conversion, or simple change of will. Nobody, with
them, appears on the stage, unless he has some business there: and as for
the beauty of their rhyme, why, that is “already partly received by us,” and
it will, no doubt, when we write better plays, “exceedingly beautify them.”
To him, Neander—that is to say—Dryden himself.
There is a reminder (though the matter is quite different) of Daniel, and a
comforting augury for English criticism, in the swift directness with which
“the new critic” (as a Webbe of his own day might have called him) strikes
Dryden for at the heart of the question. The French are more regular, he
England and
Liberty.
grants, and our irregularities are, in some cases, justly
taxed. But, nevertheless, he is of opinion that neither our
faults nor their virtues are sufficient to place them above us. For Lisideius
himself has defined a play as a lively imitation of nature. And these beauties
of the French stage are beauties, not natural, but thoroughly artificial.
Before Molière, where are the humours of French comedy, save, perhaps, in
Page 384
Le Menteur and a few others? Elsewhere they work in comedy only by the
old way of quarrels and reconciliations, or by the conventions of Spanish
intrigue-drama. “On which lines there is not above one play to be writ: they
are too much alike to please often.”
Then, as to tragi-comedy. What is the harm of this? why should Lisideius
“imagine the soul of man more heavy than his senses?” The eye can pass,
and pass with relief, from an unpleasant to a pleasant object, in far less time
than is required on the stage. He must have stronger arguments before he
concludes that compassion and mirth destroy each other: and in the
meantime he will hold that tragi-comedy is a more pleasant way than was
known to the ancients, or any moderns who have eschewed it.
Next, and closely connected, as to single-plot v. plot + underplot. Why is
the former to be preferred to the latter? Because it gives a greater advantage
to the expression of passion? Dryden can only say that he thinks “their”
verse the “coldest” he has ever read, and he supports this by a close and
pleasant beating-up-the-quarters of Cinna and Pompey, “not so properly to
be called plays as long discourses on reason of state”; of Polyeucte, “as
solemn as the long stops on an organ,” of their mighty tirades and récits.
“Whereas in tragedy it is unnatural for any one either to speak or listen
long, and in comedy quick repartee is the chiefest grace.” Yet again “they”
are praised for making only one person considerable. Why? If variety is not
mere confusion, is it not always pleasing?[502]
The question of narrative against represented action is treated with less
boldness, and, therefore, with less success: but he comes to the sound, if not
very improving, conclusion that, if we show too much action, the French
show too little. He has an interesting rebuke, however, here to Ben Jonson,
for reprehending “the incomparable Shakespeare.”[503] And he rises again,
and makes a capital point, by citing Corneille’s own confession of the
cramping effect of the Unities, enlarging whereon himself, he has an
admirable exposure of the utterly unnatural conditions which observance of
these Unities brings about. Then, after some remarks on prosody and the
earlier use of rhyme in English—remarks partly true, partly vitiated by
imperfect knowledge—he undertakes to produce plays as regular as theirs
and with more variety, instancing The Silent Woman. Of this he is
proceeding to a regular examen when Eugenius requests a character of the
author: and Neander, after a little mannerly excuse, not only complies with
this request, but prefixes similar characters of Shakespeare and Fletcher.
old way of quarrels and reconciliations, or by the conventions of Spanish
intrigue-drama. “On which lines there is not above one play to be writ: they
are too much alike to please often.”
Then, as to tragi-comedy. What is the harm of this? why should Lisideius
“imagine the soul of man more heavy than his senses?” The eye can pass,
and pass with relief, from an unpleasant to a pleasant object, in far less time
than is required on the stage. He must have stronger arguments before he
concludes that compassion and mirth destroy each other: and in the
meantime he will hold that tragi-comedy is a more pleasant way than was
known to the ancients, or any moderns who have eschewed it.
Next, and closely connected, as to single-plot v. plot + underplot. Why is
the former to be preferred to the latter? Because it gives a greater advantage
to the expression of passion? Dryden can only say that he thinks “their”
verse the “coldest” he has ever read, and he supports this by a close and
pleasant beating-up-the-quarters of Cinna and Pompey, “not so properly to
be called plays as long discourses on reason of state”; of Polyeucte, “as
solemn as the long stops on an organ,” of their mighty tirades and récits.
“Whereas in tragedy it is unnatural for any one either to speak or listen
long, and in comedy quick repartee is the chiefest grace.” Yet again “they”
are praised for making only one person considerable. Why? If variety is not
mere confusion, is it not always pleasing?[502]
The question of narrative against represented action is treated with less
boldness, and, therefore, with less success: but he comes to the sound, if not
very improving, conclusion that, if we show too much action, the French
show too little. He has an interesting rebuke, however, here to Ben Jonson,
for reprehending “the incomparable Shakespeare.”[503] And he rises again,
and makes a capital point, by citing Corneille’s own confession of the
cramping effect of the Unities, enlarging whereon himself, he has an
admirable exposure of the utterly unnatural conditions which observance of
these Unities brings about. Then, after some remarks on prosody and the
earlier use of rhyme in English—remarks partly true, partly vitiated by
imperfect knowledge—he undertakes to produce plays as regular as theirs
and with more variety, instancing The Silent Woman. Of this he is
proceeding to a regular examen when Eugenius requests a character of the
author: and Neander, after a little mannerly excuse, not only complies with
this request, but prefixes similar characters of Shakespeare and Fletcher.
Page 385
The first of these is universally, the second and third should be pretty
Coda on rhymed well known. It must be sufficient to say here that nothing
plays, and
conclusion.
like even the worst of the three (that of Beaumont and
Fletcher, which wants the adequacy and close grip of the
other two) had previously been seen in English, and not many things in any
other language, while to this day, with all faults, the character of
Shakespeare is one of the apices of universal criticism. The characters are
followed by the examen—also admirable and quite new in English, though
with more pattern elsewhere. And he ends with a short peroration, the
keynote of which is, “I ask no favour from the French.” Lisideius is going
to reply; but Crites interrupting, diverts the discussion to a particular point
already glanced at—the use of rhyme in plays. He (sensibly enough)
declines to investigate very carefully whether this was a revival of the old
English custom or an imitation of the French, but attacks its legitimacy with
the usual, obvious, and fairly sound argument that since no man without
premeditation speaks in rhyme, he ought not to do it on the stage,
anticipating the retort, “neither does he speak blank verse” by urging that
this at any rate is “nearest nature” or less unnatural. Neander, taking up the
glove for “his new-loved mistress,” practically admits the weakness of his
case by first advancing the very argument as to blank verse which Crites
has disallowed by anticipation. The rest of his answer is a mixture of true
and not so true, of imperfect knowledge and ingenious argument, constantly
open to reply, but always interesting as a specimen of critical advocacy. He
represents himself as pursuing the discourse so eagerly that Eugenius had to
remind him that “the boat stood still,” and that they had come to their
destination at Somerset stairs. And with a pleasant final patch of description
the dialogue closes.
In reading it we should keep in mind what he says a quarter of a century
later to the same correspondent,[504] that he was at this time seeking his way
“in a vast ocean” of criticism without other help than the pole-star of the
ancients and the rules of the French stage amongst the moderns. He has
Conspicuous given the reading of the pole-star to Crites, and has pointed
merits of the
piece.
out the dangers of mere dead-reckoning by it. He has put
into the mouth of Sedley (with a touch of malice which that
ingenious good-for-nothing must have noticed, and which it is to his credit
that he did not resent) a similar reading of the bearings of the different
French lights, and has shown how little they assisted the English mariner—
Coda on rhymed well known. It must be sufficient to say here that nothing
plays, and
conclusion.
like even the worst of the three (that of Beaumont and
Fletcher, which wants the adequacy and close grip of the
other two) had previously been seen in English, and not many things in any
other language, while to this day, with all faults, the character of
Shakespeare is one of the apices of universal criticism. The characters are
followed by the examen—also admirable and quite new in English, though
with more pattern elsewhere. And he ends with a short peroration, the
keynote of which is, “I ask no favour from the French.” Lisideius is going
to reply; but Crites interrupting, diverts the discussion to a particular point
already glanced at—the use of rhyme in plays. He (sensibly enough)
declines to investigate very carefully whether this was a revival of the old
English custom or an imitation of the French, but attacks its legitimacy with
the usual, obvious, and fairly sound argument that since no man without
premeditation speaks in rhyme, he ought not to do it on the stage,
anticipating the retort, “neither does he speak blank verse” by urging that
this at any rate is “nearest nature” or less unnatural. Neander, taking up the
glove for “his new-loved mistress,” practically admits the weakness of his
case by first advancing the very argument as to blank verse which Crites
has disallowed by anticipation. The rest of his answer is a mixture of true
and not so true, of imperfect knowledge and ingenious argument, constantly
open to reply, but always interesting as a specimen of critical advocacy. He
represents himself as pursuing the discourse so eagerly that Eugenius had to
remind him that “the boat stood still,” and that they had come to their
destination at Somerset stairs. And with a pleasant final patch of description
the dialogue closes.
In reading it we should keep in mind what he says a quarter of a century
later to the same correspondent,[504] that he was at this time seeking his way
“in a vast ocean” of criticism without other help than the pole-star of the
ancients and the rules of the French stage amongst the moderns. He has
Conspicuous given the reading of the pole-star to Crites, and has pointed
merits of the
piece.
out the dangers of mere dead-reckoning by it. He has put
into the mouth of Sedley (with a touch of malice which that
ingenious good-for-nothing must have noticed, and which it is to his credit
that he did not resent) a similar reading of the bearings of the different
French lights, and has shown how little they assisted the English mariner—
Page 386
indeed, how some of them actually led to rocks and quicksands, instead of
warning off from them. In the mouth of Buckhurst, and in his own, he has
put the patriotic apology, inclining it in the former case towards laudation of
the past, and in the latter to defence of the present: and he has allowed
divers excursions from the immediate subject—especially that on “verse,”
or rhymed heroics, as a dramatic medium. One of the chief of the many
merits of the piece is precisely this, that at the time Dryden had read less
than at a later, and was less tempted to add quotations or comments. He was
following chiefly a very safe guide—Corneille—and he bettered his guide’s
instruction. It may be said boldly that, up to the date, nothing in the way of
set appreciation—no, not in Longinus himself—had appeared equal to the
three characters of Shakespeare, Jonson, and Fletcher; while almost greater
still is the constant application of the “leaden rule,” the taking of book,
author, kind, as it is, and judging it accordingly, instead of attempting to
force everything into agreement or disagreement with a prearranged
schedule of rules.
After the publication of the Essay of Dramatic Poesy, Dryden (English
literature can hardly give too many thanks for it) had more than thirty well-
filled years of life allowed him; and to the very last, and at the very last,
The Middle criticism had its full share of his labours. The “Prefaces of
Prefaces.
Dryden” never fail to give valuable matter; and we shall
have to notice most, if not all of them, though the notices may be of varying
length. The immediate successor and, in fact, appendix to the Essay, the
Defence thereof, was only printed in one edition, the second, of The Indian
Emperor, and is very far from being of the best. Sir Robert Howard was, as
has been said, a man conceited and testy, as Shadwell’s nickname for him in
The Sullen Lovers, Sir Positive Atall, hints. He seems to have been nettled
by his part of Crites, and replied with some heat in a Preface to his own
play, The Duke of Lerma. Dryden, who never quite learned the wisdom of
Bacon’s dictum, “Qui replicat multiplicat,” and who at this time had not yet
learnt the easy disdain of his later manner, riposted (1668) with more sense
but with not much more temper. The piece (which was practically
withdrawn later) contained, besides not too liberal asperities on Sir Robert’s
own work, a further “defence of Rhyme,” not like Daniel’s, where it should
be, but where it should not. It is redeemed by an occasional admission, in
Dryden’s usual and invaluable manner, that he is quite aware of the other
warning off from them. In the mouth of Buckhurst, and in his own, he has
put the patriotic apology, inclining it in the former case towards laudation of
the past, and in the latter to defence of the present: and he has allowed
divers excursions from the immediate subject—especially that on “verse,”
or rhymed heroics, as a dramatic medium. One of the chief of the many
merits of the piece is precisely this, that at the time Dryden had read less
than at a later, and was less tempted to add quotations or comments. He was
following chiefly a very safe guide—Corneille—and he bettered his guide’s
instruction. It may be said boldly that, up to the date, nothing in the way of
set appreciation—no, not in Longinus himself—had appeared equal to the
three characters of Shakespeare, Jonson, and Fletcher; while almost greater
still is the constant application of the “leaden rule,” the taking of book,
author, kind, as it is, and judging it accordingly, instead of attempting to
force everything into agreement or disagreement with a prearranged
schedule of rules.
After the publication of the Essay of Dramatic Poesy, Dryden (English
literature can hardly give too many thanks for it) had more than thirty well-
filled years of life allowed him; and to the very last, and at the very last,
The Middle criticism had its full share of his labours. The “Prefaces of
Prefaces.
Dryden” never fail to give valuable matter; and we shall
have to notice most, if not all of them, though the notices may be of varying
length. The immediate successor and, in fact, appendix to the Essay, the
Defence thereof, was only printed in one edition, the second, of The Indian
Emperor, and is very far from being of the best. Sir Robert Howard was, as
has been said, a man conceited and testy, as Shadwell’s nickname for him in
The Sullen Lovers, Sir Positive Atall, hints. He seems to have been nettled
by his part of Crites, and replied with some heat in a Preface to his own
play, The Duke of Lerma. Dryden, who never quite learned the wisdom of
Bacon’s dictum, “Qui replicat multiplicat,” and who at this time had not yet
learnt the easy disdain of his later manner, riposted (1668) with more sense
but with not much more temper. The piece (which was practically
withdrawn later) contained, besides not too liberal asperities on Sir Robert’s
own work, a further “defence of Rhyme,” not like Daniel’s, where it should
be, but where it should not. It is redeemed by an occasional admission, in
Dryden’s usual and invaluable manner, that he is quite aware of the other
Page 387
side, and by an unhesitating assertion of the primacy of Delight among the
Objects of Poetry.
In none of the next three or four of the pieces do we find him quite at his
best. For some few years, indeed, the popularity of his splendid, if
sometimes a little fustianish, heroics, the profits of his connection with the
theatre (which, added to other sources of revenue, made him almost a rich
man in his way), and his association with the best society, seem to have
slightly intoxicated him. He saw his error, like other wise men, all in good
time, and even the error itself was not more than human and pardonable.
The Preface to An Evening’s Love promises, but for the time postpones,
an extension of the criticism of “the last age,” and intersperses some
valuable remarks on the difference between Comedy and Farce, between
Wit and Humour, with a good deal of egotism and some downright
arrogance.[505] The Essay of Heroic Plays prefixed to The Conquest of
Granada (1672) is as yet unconverted as to rhyme on the stage; but contains
some interesting criticism of Davenant’s essays in the kind, and a curious
defence (recurred to later) of supernatural “machinery.” The main gist of the
Preface, besides its defence of the extravagances of Almanzor, is an
elaborate adjustment of the Heroic Play to the rules of the much-talked-of
Heroic Poem. But though there is a good deal of self-sufficiency here, it is
as nothing to the drift of the Epilogue to the second part of the play, and of
an elaborate Prose “Defence” of this Epilogue. Here Dryden takes up the
position that in “the last age,” when men were dull and conversation low,
Shakespeare and Fletcher had not, while Jonson did not avail himself of,
access to that higher society which delighted to honour him, Dryden. Divers
flings at the “solecisms,” “flaws in sense,” “mean writing,” “lame plots,”
“carelessness,” “luxuriance,” “pedantry” of these poor creatures lead up to a
statement that “Gentlemen will now be entertained with the foibles of each
other.” Never again do we find Dryden writing like this; and for his having
done it at all Rochester’s “Black Will with a cudgel” exacted sufficient, as
suitable, atonement in the Rose Alley ambuscade, even from the lowest
point of view. From a higher, he himself made an ample apology to
Shakespeare in the Prologue to Aurungzebe, and practically never repeated
the offence.
The curious State of Innocence (1677) (a much better thing than rigid
Miltonists admit) is preceded by an equally curious Apology of Heroic
Poetry, in which, yet once more, we find the insufficient sense in which
Objects of Poetry.
In none of the next three or four of the pieces do we find him quite at his
best. For some few years, indeed, the popularity of his splendid, if
sometimes a little fustianish, heroics, the profits of his connection with the
theatre (which, added to other sources of revenue, made him almost a rich
man in his way), and his association with the best society, seem to have
slightly intoxicated him. He saw his error, like other wise men, all in good
time, and even the error itself was not more than human and pardonable.
The Preface to An Evening’s Love promises, but for the time postpones,
an extension of the criticism of “the last age,” and intersperses some
valuable remarks on the difference between Comedy and Farce, between
Wit and Humour, with a good deal of egotism and some downright
arrogance.[505] The Essay of Heroic Plays prefixed to The Conquest of
Granada (1672) is as yet unconverted as to rhyme on the stage; but contains
some interesting criticism of Davenant’s essays in the kind, and a curious
defence (recurred to later) of supernatural “machinery.” The main gist of the
Preface, besides its defence of the extravagances of Almanzor, is an
elaborate adjustment of the Heroic Play to the rules of the much-talked-of
Heroic Poem. But though there is a good deal of self-sufficiency here, it is
as nothing to the drift of the Epilogue to the second part of the play, and of
an elaborate Prose “Defence” of this Epilogue. Here Dryden takes up the
position that in “the last age,” when men were dull and conversation low,
Shakespeare and Fletcher had not, while Jonson did not avail himself of,
access to that higher society which delighted to honour him, Dryden. Divers
flings at the “solecisms,” “flaws in sense,” “mean writing,” “lame plots,”
“carelessness,” “luxuriance,” “pedantry” of these poor creatures lead up to a
statement that “Gentlemen will now be entertained with the foibles of each
other.” Never again do we find Dryden writing like this; and for his having
done it at all Rochester’s “Black Will with a cudgel” exacted sufficient, as
suitable, atonement in the Rose Alley ambuscade, even from the lowest
point of view. From a higher, he himself made an ample apology to
Shakespeare in the Prologue to Aurungzebe, and practically never repeated
the offence.
The curious State of Innocence (1677) (a much better thing than rigid
Miltonists admit) is preceded by an equally curious Apology of Heroic
Poetry, in which, yet once more, we find the insufficient sense in which
Page 388
Imagination (here expressly limited to “Imaging”) was used; while the
Preface to All for Love (1678) is a very little ill-tempered towards an
anonymous lampooner, who was, in fact, Rochester. Troilus and Cressida
(1679) was ushered by a set preliminary Discourse on the Grounds of
Criticism in Tragedy. No piece illustrates more remarkably that mixed
mode of criticism in Dryden, to bring out which is our chief design. On a
canvas, not it must be confessed of much interest, woven out of critical
commonplaces from Aristotle and Longinus down to Rymer and Le Bossu,
he has embroidered a great number of most valuable observations of his
own, chiefly on Shakespeare and Fletcher, which culminate in a set
description of Fletcher as “a limb of Shakespeare”—a thing happy in itself
and productive of happy imitations since. The Preface to the translation of
Ovid’s Epistles (1680) chiefly consists of a fresh defence of that ingenious
writer (for whom Dryden had no small fancy), and the Dedication to Lord
Haughton of The Spanish Friar (1681) is mainly notable for an interesting
confession of Dryden’s changes of opinion about Chapman and Du Bartas
(Sylvester rather), and a sort of apology for his own dallying with these
Delilahs of the theatre in the rants of Almanzor and Maximin.
But that to the Second Miscellany, five years later, after a period chiefly
occupied with the great political satires, ranges with the Essay, and not far
below the Fables Preface, among Dryden’s critical masterpieces. The thing
is not long—less than twenty pages. But it gives a coherent and defensible,
if also disputable, theory of translation, a singularly acute, and, it would
appear, original contrast of the faire of Ovid and of Claudian, more detailed
studies of Virgil, Lucretius (singularly good), Horace, and Theocritus, and
the best critical stricture in English on “Pindaric” verse. After it the note of
the same year on Opera, which ushered Albion and Albanius, is of slight
importance.
The Dedication of the Third Miscellany (specially named Examen
Poeticum, as the second had been sub-titled Sylvæ) contains some
interesting protests against indiscriminate critical abuse, the final
formulation of a saying sketched before (“the corruption of a poet is the
generation of a critic”), illustrated from Scaliger in the past and (not
obscurely though not nominatim) from Rymer in the present; and, among
other things, some remarks on prosody which might well have been fuller.
Between this and the Fables, besides some lesser things,[506] there
appeared two of the longest and most ambitious in appearance of Dryden’s
Preface to All for Love (1678) is a very little ill-tempered towards an
anonymous lampooner, who was, in fact, Rochester. Troilus and Cressida
(1679) was ushered by a set preliminary Discourse on the Grounds of
Criticism in Tragedy. No piece illustrates more remarkably that mixed
mode of criticism in Dryden, to bring out which is our chief design. On a
canvas, not it must be confessed of much interest, woven out of critical
commonplaces from Aristotle and Longinus down to Rymer and Le Bossu,
he has embroidered a great number of most valuable observations of his
own, chiefly on Shakespeare and Fletcher, which culminate in a set
description of Fletcher as “a limb of Shakespeare”—a thing happy in itself
and productive of happy imitations since. The Preface to the translation of
Ovid’s Epistles (1680) chiefly consists of a fresh defence of that ingenious
writer (for whom Dryden had no small fancy), and the Dedication to Lord
Haughton of The Spanish Friar (1681) is mainly notable for an interesting
confession of Dryden’s changes of opinion about Chapman and Du Bartas
(Sylvester rather), and a sort of apology for his own dallying with these
Delilahs of the theatre in the rants of Almanzor and Maximin.
But that to the Second Miscellany, five years later, after a period chiefly
occupied with the great political satires, ranges with the Essay, and not far
below the Fables Preface, among Dryden’s critical masterpieces. The thing
is not long—less than twenty pages. But it gives a coherent and defensible,
if also disputable, theory of translation, a singularly acute, and, it would
appear, original contrast of the faire of Ovid and of Claudian, more detailed
studies of Virgil, Lucretius (singularly good), Horace, and Theocritus, and
the best critical stricture in English on “Pindaric” verse. After it the note of
the same year on Opera, which ushered Albion and Albanius, is of slight
importance.
The Dedication of the Third Miscellany (specially named Examen
Poeticum, as the second had been sub-titled Sylvæ) contains some
interesting protests against indiscriminate critical abuse, the final
formulation of a saying sketched before (“the corruption of a poet is the
generation of a critic”), illustrated from Scaliger in the past and (not
obscurely though not nominatim) from Rymer in the present; and, among
other things, some remarks on prosody which might well have been fuller.
Between this and the Fables, besides some lesser things,[506] there
appeared two of the longest and most ambitious in appearance of Dryden’s
Page 389
critical writings, the Essay [strictly Discourse] on Satire prefixed to the
Juvenal, and the Dedication of the Æneis, with, between them, the first
writing at any length by a very distinguished Englishman of letters, on the
subject of pictorial art, in the shape of the Parallel of Poetry and Painting
prefixed to the translation of Du Fresnoy De Arte Graphica. All, being
The Essay on Satire and the Dryden’s, are, and could not but be, admirably
Dedication of the Æneis.
written and full of interest. But the Juvenal and
Virgil Prefaces are, in respect of permanent value, both intrinsically and
representively injured by an excess of critical erudition. The time was
perhaps not yet ripe for an honest and candid address straight to the English
reader. The translator was bound to recommend himself to classical scholars
by attention to the paraphernalia of what then regarded itself as scholarship
(“other brides, other paraphernalia” no doubt), and to propitiate wits, and
Templars, and the gentlemen of the Universities, with original or borrowed
discourses on literary history and principle. Dryden fell in with the practice,
and obliged his readers with large decoctions of Rigaltius and Casaubon,
Dacier and Segrais, which are at any rate more palatable than the learned
originals, but which make us feel, rather ruefully, that boiling down such
things was not the work for which the author of Absalom and Achitophel
and of The Essay on Dramatic Poesy was born.
As for the Parallel, it is of course interesting as being nearly our first
Essay, and that by a master hand, in a kind of criticism which has later
The Parallel of given excellent results. But Dryden, as he most frankly
Poetry and
Painting.
admits, did not know very much about the matter, and his
work resolves itself very mainly into a discussion of the
principles of Imitation in general, applied in an idealist manner to the two
arts in particular. Again we may say, “Not here, O Apollo!”
We have nothing left but the Preface to the Fables, the extraordinary
merit of which has been missed by no competent critic from Johnson to Mr
The Preface to Ker. The wonderful ease and urbanity of it, the artfully
the Fables.
varied forms of reply to the onslaughts of Collier and
others, are not more generally agreeable than are, in a special division, the
enthusiastic eulogy of Chaucer (all the more entertaining because of its lack
of mere pedantic accuracy in places), and the interesting, if again not
always rigidly accurate, scraps of literary history. It winds up, as the Essay
had practically begun, a volume of critical writing which, if not for pure,
Juvenal, and the Dedication of the Æneis, with, between them, the first
writing at any length by a very distinguished Englishman of letters, on the
subject of pictorial art, in the shape of the Parallel of Poetry and Painting
prefixed to the translation of Du Fresnoy De Arte Graphica. All, being
The Essay on Satire and the Dryden’s, are, and could not but be, admirably
Dedication of the Æneis.
written and full of interest. But the Juvenal and
Virgil Prefaces are, in respect of permanent value, both intrinsically and
representively injured by an excess of critical erudition. The time was
perhaps not yet ripe for an honest and candid address straight to the English
reader. The translator was bound to recommend himself to classical scholars
by attention to the paraphernalia of what then regarded itself as scholarship
(“other brides, other paraphernalia” no doubt), and to propitiate wits, and
Templars, and the gentlemen of the Universities, with original or borrowed
discourses on literary history and principle. Dryden fell in with the practice,
and obliged his readers with large decoctions of Rigaltius and Casaubon,
Dacier and Segrais, which are at any rate more palatable than the learned
originals, but which make us feel, rather ruefully, that boiling down such
things was not the work for which the author of Absalom and Achitophel
and of The Essay on Dramatic Poesy was born.
As for the Parallel, it is of course interesting as being nearly our first
Essay, and that by a master hand, in a kind of criticism which has later
The Parallel of given excellent results. But Dryden, as he most frankly
Poetry and
Painting.
admits, did not know very much about the matter, and his
work resolves itself very mainly into a discussion of the
principles of Imitation in general, applied in an idealist manner to the two
arts in particular. Again we may say, “Not here, O Apollo!”
We have nothing left but the Preface to the Fables, the extraordinary
merit of which has been missed by no competent critic from Johnson to Mr
The Preface to Ker. The wonderful ease and urbanity of it, the artfully
the Fables.
varied forms of reply to the onslaughts of Collier and
others, are not more generally agreeable than are, in a special division, the
enthusiastic eulogy of Chaucer (all the more entertaining because of its lack
of mere pedantic accuracy in places), and the interesting, if again not
always rigidly accurate, scraps of literary history. It winds up, as the Essay
had practically begun, a volume of critical writing which, if not for pure,
Page 390
yet for applied, mixed, and sweetened criticism, deserves to be put on the
shelf—no capacious one—reserved for the best criticism of the world.
We have seen, over and over again, in individual example; have already
partially summed more than once; and shall have to re-sum with more
extensive view later, the character and the faults of the critical method
which had been forming itself for some hundred and fifty years when
Dryden’s Dryden began his critical work. It would be absurd to
general critical
position.
pretend that he was entirely superior to this “Spirit of the
Age”—which was also that of the age behind him, and
(with rare exceptions) of the age to come for nearly a hundred years. But,
although it may be paradoxical, it is not absurd at all, to express satisfaction
that he was not so entirely superior. He was enabled by his partial—and, in
so far as his consciousness went, quite sincere—orthodoxy, to obtain an
access to the general hearing in England, and even to influence, long after
his death, important literary authorities, as he never could have done if he
had set up for an iconoclast. Furthermore, it was not yet time to break these
idols. Apollo winked at the neo-classical ignorance and heresy because it
was useful. We are so apt—so generously and excusably apt—to look at the
Miltons without considering the Clevelands, that we forget how absolutely
ungoverned, and in some cases how near to puerility, the latest Elizabethan
school was. We forget the slough of shambling verse in which true poets,
men like Suckling in drama, men like Lovelace in lyric, complacently
wallowed. The strait waistcoat was almost necessary, even after the fine
madness, much more after the madness not so fine, of mid-seventeenth-
century verse, and, in a less degree, prose. And so, when we find Dryden
belittling the rhymes of Comus and Lycidas,[507] shaking his head over
Shakespeare’s carelessness, unable with Chapman, as Ben had been with
Marlowe, to see the fire for the smoke, we need not in the least excite
ourselves, any more than when we find him dallying with the Dowsabels of
Renaissance school-criticism. In the first place, the thing had to be done;
and in the second place, his manner of doing it went very far to supply
antidote to all the bane, as well as to administer the “corsives,” as they said
then, in the mildest and most innocuous way possible.
His special Dryden’s moly, an herb so powerful that—herein
critical method.
excelling its original—it not only prevented men like
Addison from becoming beasts like Rymer, but had the virtue of turning
beasts into men,—of replacing the neo-classic jargon by the pure language
shelf—no capacious one—reserved for the best criticism of the world.
We have seen, over and over again, in individual example; have already
partially summed more than once; and shall have to re-sum with more
extensive view later, the character and the faults of the critical method
which had been forming itself for some hundred and fifty years when
Dryden’s Dryden began his critical work. It would be absurd to
general critical
position.
pretend that he was entirely superior to this “Spirit of the
Age”—which was also that of the age behind him, and
(with rare exceptions) of the age to come for nearly a hundred years. But,
although it may be paradoxical, it is not absurd at all, to express satisfaction
that he was not so entirely superior. He was enabled by his partial—and, in
so far as his consciousness went, quite sincere—orthodoxy, to obtain an
access to the general hearing in England, and even to influence, long after
his death, important literary authorities, as he never could have done if he
had set up for an iconoclast. Furthermore, it was not yet time to break these
idols. Apollo winked at the neo-classical ignorance and heresy because it
was useful. We are so apt—so generously and excusably apt—to look at the
Miltons without considering the Clevelands, that we forget how absolutely
ungoverned, and in some cases how near to puerility, the latest Elizabethan
school was. We forget the slough of shambling verse in which true poets,
men like Suckling in drama, men like Lovelace in lyric, complacently
wallowed. The strait waistcoat was almost necessary, even after the fine
madness, much more after the madness not so fine, of mid-seventeenth-
century verse, and, in a less degree, prose. And so, when we find Dryden
belittling the rhymes of Comus and Lycidas,[507] shaking his head over
Shakespeare’s carelessness, unable with Chapman, as Ben had been with
Marlowe, to see the fire for the smoke, we need not in the least excite
ourselves, any more than when we find him dallying with the Dowsabels of
Renaissance school-criticism. In the first place, the thing had to be done;
and in the second place, his manner of doing it went very far to supply
antidote to all the bane, as well as to administer the “corsives,” as they said
then, in the mildest and most innocuous way possible.
His special Dryden’s moly, an herb so powerful that—herein
critical method.
excelling its original—it not only prevented men like
Addison from becoming beasts like Rymer, but had the virtue of turning
beasts into men,—of replacing the neo-classic jargon by the pure language
Page 391
of criticism,—was that plan of actual comparison and examination of actual
literature which is not merely the via prima but the via sola of safety for the
critic. By his time there was assembled a really magnificent body of modern
letters, in addition to classical and mediæval. But nobody in the late
seventeenth century, except Dryden, really utilised it. Italy and Spain were
sinking into premature senility. The French[508] despised or ignored all
modern literatures but their own, and despised and ignored almost equally
their own rich and splendid mediæval stores.
Dryden’s freedom from this worst and most hopeless vice is all the more
interesting because, from some of his utterances, we might have expected
him not to be free from it.[509] That theory of his as to Mr Waller; that
disastrous idea that Shakespeare and Fletcher were low people who had not
the felicity to associate with gentlemen,—might seem likely to produce the
most fatal results. But not so. He accepts Chaucer at once, rejoices in him,
extols him, just as if Chaucer had taken lessons from Mr Waller, and had
been familiar with my Lord Dorset. Back his own side as he may in the duel
of the theatres, he speaks of the great lights of the last age in such a fashion
that no one has outgone him since. He cannot really take an author in hand,
be he Greek or Latin, Italian or French or English, without his superiority to
rules and systems and classifications appearing at once, however he may, to
please fashion and fools, drag these in as an afterthought, or rather (for
Dryden never “drags” in anything save the indecency in his comedies) draw
them into the conversation with his usual adroitness. And he is constantly
taking authors in hand in this way,—we are as certain that this, and not
twaddling about unities and machines, was what he liked doing, as we are
that he wrote comedies for money, and satires and criticism itself for love.
Now this,—the critical reading without theory, or with theory postponed, of
masses of different literatures, and the formation and expression of genuine
judgment as to what the critic liked and disliked in them, not what he
thought he ought to like and dislike,—this was what was wanted, and what
nobody had yet done. Dryden did it—did it with such mastery of expression
as would almost have commended a Rymer, but with such genuine critical
power and sympathy as would almost have carried off the absence of merits
of expression altogether. He established (let us hope for all time) the
English fashion of criticising, as Shakespeare did the English fashion of
dramatising,—the fashion of aiming at delight, at truth, at justice, at nature,
at poetry, and letting the rules take care of themselves.
literature which is not merely the via prima but the via sola of safety for the
critic. By his time there was assembled a really magnificent body of modern
letters, in addition to classical and mediæval. But nobody in the late
seventeenth century, except Dryden, really utilised it. Italy and Spain were
sinking into premature senility. The French[508] despised or ignored all
modern literatures but their own, and despised and ignored almost equally
their own rich and splendid mediæval stores.
Dryden’s freedom from this worst and most hopeless vice is all the more
interesting because, from some of his utterances, we might have expected
him not to be free from it.[509] That theory of his as to Mr Waller; that
disastrous idea that Shakespeare and Fletcher were low people who had not
the felicity to associate with gentlemen,—might seem likely to produce the
most fatal results. But not so. He accepts Chaucer at once, rejoices in him,
extols him, just as if Chaucer had taken lessons from Mr Waller, and had
been familiar with my Lord Dorset. Back his own side as he may in the duel
of the theatres, he speaks of the great lights of the last age in such a fashion
that no one has outgone him since. He cannot really take an author in hand,
be he Greek or Latin, Italian or French or English, without his superiority to
rules and systems and classifications appearing at once, however he may, to
please fashion and fools, drag these in as an afterthought, or rather (for
Dryden never “drags” in anything save the indecency in his comedies) draw
them into the conversation with his usual adroitness. And he is constantly
taking authors in hand in this way,—we are as certain that this, and not
twaddling about unities and machines, was what he liked doing, as we are
that he wrote comedies for money, and satires and criticism itself for love.
Now this,—the critical reading without theory, or with theory postponed, of
masses of different literatures, and the formation and expression of genuine
judgment as to what the critic liked and disliked in them, not what he
thought he ought to like and dislike,—this was what was wanted, and what
nobody had yet done. Dryden did it—did it with such mastery of expression
as would almost have commended a Rymer, but with such genuine critical
power and sympathy as would almost have carried off the absence of merits
of expression altogether. He established (let us hope for all time) the
English fashion of criticising, as Shakespeare did the English fashion of
dramatising,—the fashion of aiming at delight, at truth, at justice, at nature,
at poetry, and letting the rules take care of themselves.
Page 392
Perhaps in no single instance of critical authorship and authority does the
great method of comparison assist us so well as in the case of Dryden and
Dryden and Boileau. This comparison is absolutely fair. The two were
Boileau.
almost exact contemporaries; they represented—so far at
least as their expressed and, in both cases, no doubt conscientious, literary
creed went—the same sect. Enfin Malherbe vint is an exact parallel,
whether as a wonderful discovery or a partly mischievous delusion, to the
exploits on our numbers by Mr Waller. Both were extremely powerful
satirists. Both, though not comparable in intrinsic merit, were among the
chief men of letters of their respective countries. Both had a real, and not
merely a professional or affected, devotion to literature. Both applied, with
whatever difference of exclusiveness and animus, a peculiar literary
discipline, new to the country of each. And in the case of both—it has been
decided by a consensus of the best judges, with all the facts before them up
to the present time—there was an insufficient looking before and after, a
pretension to limit literature to certain special developments.
We have seen what, in carrying out the scheme which was in effect the
scheme of both, were the defects of Boileau. Let us see what, in contra-
position to them, are the merits of Dryden.
That, though he makes mistakes enough in literary history, these mistakes
are slight in comparison with Boileau’s, matters not very much; that, though
his satiric touch was more withering even than the Frenchman’s, he has no
love of lashing merely for the sport, and never indulges in insolent flings at
harmless dulness, suffering poverty, or irregular genius; that, though quite
prone enough to flatter, he declined to bow the knee to William of Orange,
while Boileau persistently grovelled at the feet of William’s enemy,—these
things matter even less to us. The fact, the critical fact, remains that the
faults of his time and his theory did the least harm to Dryden of all men
whom we know, while they did the most to Boileau. And the reason of the
fact is more valuable than the fact itself. Boileau, as we have seen, has not
left us a single impartial and appreciative criticism of a single author,
ancient or modern. Dryden simply cannot find himself in presence of a man
of real genius, whether he belongs to his own school or another, without
having his critical lips at once touched by Apollo and Pallas. He was sadly
ignorant about Chaucer,—a board-school child might take him to task; but
he has written about Chaucer with far more real light and sympathy than
some at least of the authors of the books from which the board-school child
great method of comparison assist us so well as in the case of Dryden and
Dryden and Boileau. This comparison is absolutely fair. The two were
Boileau.
almost exact contemporaries; they represented—so far at
least as their expressed and, in both cases, no doubt conscientious, literary
creed went—the same sect. Enfin Malherbe vint is an exact parallel,
whether as a wonderful discovery or a partly mischievous delusion, to the
exploits on our numbers by Mr Waller. Both were extremely powerful
satirists. Both, though not comparable in intrinsic merit, were among the
chief men of letters of their respective countries. Both had a real, and not
merely a professional or affected, devotion to literature. Both applied, with
whatever difference of exclusiveness and animus, a peculiar literary
discipline, new to the country of each. And in the case of both—it has been
decided by a consensus of the best judges, with all the facts before them up
to the present time—there was an insufficient looking before and after, a
pretension to limit literature to certain special developments.
We have seen what, in carrying out the scheme which was in effect the
scheme of both, were the defects of Boileau. Let us see what, in contra-
position to them, are the merits of Dryden.
That, though he makes mistakes enough in literary history, these mistakes
are slight in comparison with Boileau’s, matters not very much; that, though
his satiric touch was more withering even than the Frenchman’s, he has no
love of lashing merely for the sport, and never indulges in insolent flings at
harmless dulness, suffering poverty, or irregular genius; that, though quite
prone enough to flatter, he declined to bow the knee to William of Orange,
while Boileau persistently grovelled at the feet of William’s enemy,—these
things matter even less to us. The fact, the critical fact, remains that the
faults of his time and his theory did the least harm to Dryden of all men
whom we know, while they did the most to Boileau. And the reason of the
fact is more valuable than the fact itself. Boileau, as we have seen, has not
left us a single impartial and appreciative criticism of a single author,
ancient or modern. Dryden simply cannot find himself in presence of a man
of real genius, whether he belongs to his own school or another, without
having his critical lips at once touched by Apollo and Pallas. He was sadly
ignorant about Chaucer,—a board-school child might take him to task; but
he has written about Chaucer with far more real light and sympathy than
some at least of the authors of the books from which the board-school child
Page 393
derives its knowledge have shown. His theory about Shakespeare, Fletcher,
and Jonson was defective; but he has left us criticisms of all three than
which we have, and are likely to have, no better. About the ancients he
borrows from both ancients and moderns; but it is remarkable that while
Boileau’s borrowings are his best, Dryden’s are infinitely his worst part. So
the consequence is that while Boileau is merely a point de repère, a
historical document which men simply strive to bring to some relation with
the present and the future, Dryden is and will remain at once a source and a
model for ever. And he is these because he had the wisdom to ask himself
the question, “Do I think this good or bad?” and the wit to answer it, instead
of asking and answering the other, “Is it good or bad according to this or
that scheme and schedule?”
We have, in short, in Dryden the first very considerable example in
England, if not anywhere, of the critic who, while possessing fairly wide
knowledge of literature, attributes no arbitrary or conventional eminence to
certain parts of it, but at least endeavours to consider it as a whole; of the
critic who is never afraid to say “Why?”; of the critic who asks, not whether
he ought to like such and such a thing, but whether he does like it, and why
he likes it, and whether there is any real reason why he should not like it; of
the critic, finally, who tries, without prepossession or convention, to get a
general grasp of the book or author, and then to set forth that grasp in
luminous language, and with a fair display of supporting analysis and
argument. Dryden, of course, is far—very far—from being a faultless
monster of criticism. The application of his own process to his own theory
will discover in it many mistakes, independent of the imperfect knowledge
which has been already admitted, of the inconsistencies which are more of a
virtue than of a defect, and of the concessions to tradition and fashion
which are almost wholly unfortunate. Nay, more, it may be granted that
Dryden did not escape the dangers of the process itself, the dangers of
vagueness, of desultoriness, of dilettantism. But he has the root of the
matter in him. He knows that art exists to give pleasure, and when he says
“I am pleased with this,” he insists on strong reasons being given to show
that he ought not to be so. He admits also—nay, insists on—nature, variety,
individuality. He will “connoisseur no man out of his senses,”[510] and
refuses to be so connoisseured by any, while he will give good reasons for
his own and others’ pleasure. These are the marks of the true and catholic
criticism; and Dryden has them.
and Jonson was defective; but he has left us criticisms of all three than
which we have, and are likely to have, no better. About the ancients he
borrows from both ancients and moderns; but it is remarkable that while
Boileau’s borrowings are his best, Dryden’s are infinitely his worst part. So
the consequence is that while Boileau is merely a point de repère, a
historical document which men simply strive to bring to some relation with
the present and the future, Dryden is and will remain at once a source and a
model for ever. And he is these because he had the wisdom to ask himself
the question, “Do I think this good or bad?” and the wit to answer it, instead
of asking and answering the other, “Is it good or bad according to this or
that scheme and schedule?”
We have, in short, in Dryden the first very considerable example in
England, if not anywhere, of the critic who, while possessing fairly wide
knowledge of literature, attributes no arbitrary or conventional eminence to
certain parts of it, but at least endeavours to consider it as a whole; of the
critic who is never afraid to say “Why?”; of the critic who asks, not whether
he ought to like such and such a thing, but whether he does like it, and why
he likes it, and whether there is any real reason why he should not like it; of
the critic, finally, who tries, without prepossession or convention, to get a
general grasp of the book or author, and then to set forth that grasp in
luminous language, and with a fair display of supporting analysis and
argument. Dryden, of course, is far—very far—from being a faultless
monster of criticism. The application of his own process to his own theory
will discover in it many mistakes, independent of the imperfect knowledge
which has been already admitted, of the inconsistencies which are more of a
virtue than of a defect, and of the concessions to tradition and fashion
which are almost wholly unfortunate. Nay, more, it may be granted that
Dryden did not escape the dangers of the process itself, the dangers of
vagueness, of desultoriness, of dilettantism. But he has the root of the
matter in him. He knows that art exists to give pleasure, and when he says
“I am pleased with this,” he insists on strong reasons being given to show
that he ought not to be so. He admits also—nay, insists on—nature, variety,
individuality. He will “connoisseur no man out of his senses,”[510] and
refuses to be so connoisseured by any, while he will give good reasons for
his own and others’ pleasure. These are the marks of the true and catholic
criticism; and Dryden has them.
Page 394
Let us pass from him directly to one who has them not. There are few
English critics who require to be dealt with at once more carefully and more
Rymer. faithfully than does Thomas Rymer. He has become a name, and
to become a name is to be at least on the way to becoming a legend, if not a
myth. Moreover, as his legend is (for good reasons) far from a favourable
one, it has been made more legendary by those generous or wayward
revolts against it which are not uncommon. It has even been held proper, for
some time, to shake the head of deprecation over Macaulay’s “the worst
critic that ever lived.” Moreover, Rymer is by no means very accessible—in
his critical works, of course, for we speak not here of the Fœdera. Whether
these were originally published in very small numbers; whether the
common-sense of mankind rose against them and subjected them in unusual
proportions to the “martyrdom of pies”; or whether (by one of Time’s
humorous revenges) the copies have been absorbed into special collections
relating to that altissimo poeta whom Rymer blasphemed, I cannot say. But
it is certain that very good libraries often possess either none or only a part
of them, and that on the rare occasions on which they appear in catalogues
they are priced at about as many pounds as they are intrinsically worth
farthings. I think I have seen notices of Rymer which evidently confused
The Tragedies of the Last Age (1678) with A Short View of Tragedy (1693).
[511]
Besides these two, Rymer, independently of smaller things and reissues,
had produced, earlier than the earlier, in 1674, a preface to his own
translation of Rapin’s Reflections, which completes the trinity of his
important criticism. No one of the three is long; in fact, The Tragedies of
the Last Age is a very tiny book, which, short as it is, seems to have
exhausted the author before he could carry out half his scheme.
A careful and comparative reading of all three has given me a settled, and
I think a just, conception of Rymer as of a man of remarkable learning for
his age and country, but intensely stupid to begin with, and Puck-led by the
The Preface to Zeitgeist into a charcoal-burner’s faith in “the rules.” In the
Rapin.
Preface[512] he is less crabbed than in the two booklets; and,
though he already uses the would-be humorous hail-fellow-well-met
colloquialism characteristic of the lower Restoration style, and employed
even by such a man of letters as L’Estrange and such scholars as Collier and
Bentley, he does not push it to the same lengths of clumsy ass-play as later.
He thinks that “poets would grow negligent if Critics had not a strict eye on
their miscarriages,” yet he admits that this eye sometimes squints, and
English critics who require to be dealt with at once more carefully and more
Rymer. faithfully than does Thomas Rymer. He has become a name, and
to become a name is to be at least on the way to becoming a legend, if not a
myth. Moreover, as his legend is (for good reasons) far from a favourable
one, it has been made more legendary by those generous or wayward
revolts against it which are not uncommon. It has even been held proper, for
some time, to shake the head of deprecation over Macaulay’s “the worst
critic that ever lived.” Moreover, Rymer is by no means very accessible—in
his critical works, of course, for we speak not here of the Fœdera. Whether
these were originally published in very small numbers; whether the
common-sense of mankind rose against them and subjected them in unusual
proportions to the “martyrdom of pies”; or whether (by one of Time’s
humorous revenges) the copies have been absorbed into special collections
relating to that altissimo poeta whom Rymer blasphemed, I cannot say. But
it is certain that very good libraries often possess either none or only a part
of them, and that on the rare occasions on which they appear in catalogues
they are priced at about as many pounds as they are intrinsically worth
farthings. I think I have seen notices of Rymer which evidently confused
The Tragedies of the Last Age (1678) with A Short View of Tragedy (1693).
[511]
Besides these two, Rymer, independently of smaller things and reissues,
had produced, earlier than the earlier, in 1674, a preface to his own
translation of Rapin’s Reflections, which completes the trinity of his
important criticism. No one of the three is long; in fact, The Tragedies of
the Last Age is a very tiny book, which, short as it is, seems to have
exhausted the author before he could carry out half his scheme.
A careful and comparative reading of all three has given me a settled, and
I think a just, conception of Rymer as of a man of remarkable learning for
his age and country, but intensely stupid to begin with, and Puck-led by the
The Preface to Zeitgeist into a charcoal-burner’s faith in “the rules.” In the
Rapin.
Preface[512] he is less crabbed than in the two booklets; and,
though he already uses the would-be humorous hail-fellow-well-met
colloquialism characteristic of the lower Restoration style, and employed
even by such a man of letters as L’Estrange and such scholars as Collier and
Bentley, he does not push it to the same lengths of clumsy ass-play as later.
He thinks that “poets would grow negligent if Critics had not a strict eye on
their miscarriages,” yet he admits that this eye sometimes squints, and
Page 395
compares some critics to “Wasps that rather annoy the Bees than terrify the
drones.” Then he skims the past, noticing Castelvetro, Malherbe, and
others, but thinks that till lately “England was as free from Critics as from
Wolves,” Ben Jonson having all the critical learning to himself. After praise
of Aristotle and a short notice of his actual author, he then proceeds to
consider the history of English poetry independently. As for Chaucer, “our
language was not then capable of any heroic character,” nor indeed was the
most polite wit of Europe “sufficient for a great design.” Spenser had “a
large spirit, a sharp judgment, and a genius for Heroic poetry perhaps above
any that ever wrote since Virgil,” but “wanted a true idea,” and was misled
by Ariosto. “They who can love Ariosto will be ravished with Spenser, but
men of juster thoughts,” &c. His stanza is “nowise proper for our
language.”
Davenant and Cowley are criticised with politeness, but not very
favourably; the faults of both, as well as their designs, were what Rymer
was capable of understanding, and neither provokes him to any rudeness on
the one hand or stupidity on the other, though there is an occasional ripple
betraying an undercurrent of asperity. Then, after some more general
remarks, he takes the accepted test of the Description of Night, and applies
it with mixed commendation to Apollonius Rhodius, with rather
independent criticism to Virgil, slightingly to Ariosto, and rather cavillingly
to Tasso, with a good deal of censure to Marino, and with more to
Chapelain, with about as much to Père Le Moyne, and then with very
considerable praise to that passage of Dryden’s in the Conquest of Mexico
to which Wordsworth was afterwards nearly as unjust as Rymer himself to
far greater things.[513] And with this rather patronising “Well done our side!”
he stops.
Had Rymer done nothing more than this in criticism it would indeed be
absurd to call him our best critic, but it would be still more absurd to call
him our worst. There is fair knowledge, there is fair common-sense
judgment; the remarks on Chaucer are merely what might be expected, and
on Spenser rather better than might be expected; the detailed censure is
correct enough; and though there cannot be said to be any great
appreciation of poetry, there is interest in it. Above all, if the piece stood
alone, we should hardly think of detecting in it even a murmur of the
pedantic snarl which is the one unpardonable sin of a critic.
drones.” Then he skims the past, noticing Castelvetro, Malherbe, and
others, but thinks that till lately “England was as free from Critics as from
Wolves,” Ben Jonson having all the critical learning to himself. After praise
of Aristotle and a short notice of his actual author, he then proceeds to
consider the history of English poetry independently. As for Chaucer, “our
language was not then capable of any heroic character,” nor indeed was the
most polite wit of Europe “sufficient for a great design.” Spenser had “a
large spirit, a sharp judgment, and a genius for Heroic poetry perhaps above
any that ever wrote since Virgil,” but “wanted a true idea,” and was misled
by Ariosto. “They who can love Ariosto will be ravished with Spenser, but
men of juster thoughts,” &c. His stanza is “nowise proper for our
language.”
Davenant and Cowley are criticised with politeness, but not very
favourably; the faults of both, as well as their designs, were what Rymer
was capable of understanding, and neither provokes him to any rudeness on
the one hand or stupidity on the other, though there is an occasional ripple
betraying an undercurrent of asperity. Then, after some more general
remarks, he takes the accepted test of the Description of Night, and applies
it with mixed commendation to Apollonius Rhodius, with rather
independent criticism to Virgil, slightingly to Ariosto, and rather cavillingly
to Tasso, with a good deal of censure to Marino, and with more to
Chapelain, with about as much to Père Le Moyne, and then with very
considerable praise to that passage of Dryden’s in the Conquest of Mexico
to which Wordsworth was afterwards nearly as unjust as Rymer himself to
far greater things.[513] And with this rather patronising “Well done our side!”
he stops.
Had Rymer done nothing more than this in criticism it would indeed be
absurd to call him our best critic, but it would be still more absurd to call
him our worst. There is fair knowledge, there is fair common-sense
judgment; the remarks on Chaucer are merely what might be expected, and
on Spenser rather better than might be expected; the detailed censure is
correct enough; and though there cannot be said to be any great
appreciation of poetry, there is interest in it. Above all, if the piece stood
alone, we should hardly think of detecting in it even a murmur of the
pedantic snarl which is the one unpardonable sin of a critic.
Page 396
The Tragedies In The Tragedies of the Last Age Rymer ruit in pejus. He
of the Last Age.
had in the interval received some praise, which is always
bad for an ill-conditioned man and dangerous for a stupid one; he had
conceived the idea of being bee as well as wasp; and he undertook to show
Beaumont and Fletcher, Shakespeare and Jonson, their errors, though as
matter of fact he lost his wind in belabouring the twins, and had to leave the
others till he had taken fifteen years’ breath. He shows himself at once in a
mood of facetious truculence and self-importance. He is not going to
emulate “the Remarks and eternal triflings of French Grammaticasters.” But
he is going to set the “quibble-catching” of his countrymen right, and to put
an end to “the Stage-quacks and Empirics in poetry” who despise the rules.
“Fancy leaps and frisks, and away she’s gone; while Reason rattles the
chain, and follows after,” in which flight Rymer, as often, does not seem to
perceive that he is not exactly giving Reason and himself the beau rôle.
Then he sets to work on three plays of Beaumont and Fletcher. In Rollo
there is nothing to move pity and terror, nothing to delight, nothing to
instruct.[514] In A King and No King Panthea actually suggests kissing![515]
Arbaces is so bad that he really made Rymer think of Cassius—a withering
observation which foretells what the critic was going to say about
Shakespeare, though on this occasion he was too exhausted to say it.
He said it fifteen years later with no uncertain voice. The one redeeming
feature of the Short View is its remarkable, if not quite impeccable, learning.
The Short View Rymer really knows something about “Provencial” poetry,
of Tragedy.
though he confuses it (and thereby made Dryden confuse it)
with old French, and actually regards Philippe Mouskès—not even a
Frenchman but a Fleming—as a “troubadour.” Still, his knowledge is to be
praised, and his ignorance forgiven. Less forgivable, but still not fatal, are
the singular want of method with which he flings the result of his learning,
pell-mell with his own remarks, on the reader, and (in a yet further degree
of culpability) the vulgar jeering of his style. But all this might still pass.
His mistakes are much less, and his knowledge much greater, than those of
any critic of his age. Others have lacked method; and Bentley was quite,
Collier very nearly, as coarsely rude. On some general points, such as the
utility of the chorus in keeping playwrights to the rules, he is not
unintelligent. He is a great admirer of dumb-show, and thinks that many of
the tragical scenes, not merely in Shakespeare, but in Jonson, would go
better without words.
of the Last Age.
had in the interval received some praise, which is always
bad for an ill-conditioned man and dangerous for a stupid one; he had
conceived the idea of being bee as well as wasp; and he undertook to show
Beaumont and Fletcher, Shakespeare and Jonson, their errors, though as
matter of fact he lost his wind in belabouring the twins, and had to leave the
others till he had taken fifteen years’ breath. He shows himself at once in a
mood of facetious truculence and self-importance. He is not going to
emulate “the Remarks and eternal triflings of French Grammaticasters.” But
he is going to set the “quibble-catching” of his countrymen right, and to put
an end to “the Stage-quacks and Empirics in poetry” who despise the rules.
“Fancy leaps and frisks, and away she’s gone; while Reason rattles the
chain, and follows after,” in which flight Rymer, as often, does not seem to
perceive that he is not exactly giving Reason and himself the beau rôle.
Then he sets to work on three plays of Beaumont and Fletcher. In Rollo
there is nothing to move pity and terror, nothing to delight, nothing to
instruct.[514] In A King and No King Panthea actually suggests kissing![515]
Arbaces is so bad that he really made Rymer think of Cassius—a withering
observation which foretells what the critic was going to say about
Shakespeare, though on this occasion he was too exhausted to say it.
He said it fifteen years later with no uncertain voice. The one redeeming
feature of the Short View is its remarkable, if not quite impeccable, learning.
The Short View Rymer really knows something about “Provencial” poetry,
of Tragedy.
though he confuses it (and thereby made Dryden confuse it)
with old French, and actually regards Philippe Mouskès—not even a
Frenchman but a Fleming—as a “troubadour.” Still, his knowledge is to be
praised, and his ignorance forgiven. Less forgivable, but still not fatal, are
the singular want of method with which he flings the result of his learning,
pell-mell with his own remarks, on the reader, and (in a yet further degree
of culpability) the vulgar jeering of his style. But all this might still pass.
His mistakes are much less, and his knowledge much greater, than those of
any critic of his age. Others have lacked method; and Bentley was quite,
Collier very nearly, as coarsely rude. On some general points, such as the
utility of the chorus in keeping playwrights to the rules, he is not
unintelligent. He is a great admirer of dumb-show, and thinks that many of
the tragical scenes, not merely in Shakespeare, but in Jonson, would go
better without words.
Page 397
More than half the little book[516] is occupied with a display of his
learning—first in some general remarks on the drama, and then in a history
of it which is, with all its mistakes, better informed than anything of the
kind earlier. And then Rymer falls on Othello. He grants it “a phantom of a
fable.” But it is a very bad phantom. Ridiculous that Desdemona should
love a blackamoor at all; more ridiculous that she should be attracted by his
stories of adventure; most that Othello should be made a Venetian general—
and so on throughout. But the characters are worse. Rymer simply cannot
away with Iago; and this on grounds exquisitely characteristic, not merely
of him but of the whole system, of which he is the reductio ad absurdum. It
is not nearly so much Iago’s theriotes by which Rymer is shocked, as his
violation of the type and the general law. “He would pass upon us a close,
dissembling, false, insinuating rascal instead of an open-hearted, frank,
plain-dealing soldier—a character constantly worn by them for some
thousand years in the world.”[517] Again, “Philosophy tells us it is a principle
in the nature of Man to be grateful.... Philosophy must be [the poet’s]
guide,”[518] therefore Iago is a poetical impossibility. Rymer knows that
historically all men are not grateful: but never mind. The Type! the Type!
the Type![519] One need hardly go farther, but in going we cannot, in one
sense, fare worse.[520] “Godlike Romans” (as Mr Dryden had already called
them) are, in Julius Cæsar, “put in fools’ coats and made jack-puddings of,”
which, says Tom justly, “is a sacriledge.” Brutus and Cassius “play a prize,
a tryal of skill in huffing and swaggering like two drunken Hectors.” In
Tragedy Shakespeare “appears quite out of his element; his brains are
turned; he raves and rambles without any coherence, any spark of reason, or
any rule to control him, and set bounds to his frenzy.” Nor does Ben fare
much better. He indeed “knew to distinguish men and manners at another
rate.” In Catiline “we find ourselves in Europe, we are no longer in the land
of Savages,” sighs Rymer with relief. Still Ben, too, “gropes in the dark,
and jumbles things together without head and tail;” he, though not “in the
gang of the strolling fraternity,” like Shakespeare, “must lie a miserable
heap of ruins for want of architecture;” he “sins against the clearest light
and conviction” by “interlarding fiddle-faddle comedy and apocryphal
matters.” And so forth.
That Rymer was utterly deaf to the poetry of Othello and of Julius
Cæsar, that he thinks “the neighing of a horse or the howling of a mastiff
possesses more meaning” than Shakespeare’s verse, merely demonstrates
learning—first in some general remarks on the drama, and then in a history
of it which is, with all its mistakes, better informed than anything of the
kind earlier. And then Rymer falls on Othello. He grants it “a phantom of a
fable.” But it is a very bad phantom. Ridiculous that Desdemona should
love a blackamoor at all; more ridiculous that she should be attracted by his
stories of adventure; most that Othello should be made a Venetian general—
and so on throughout. But the characters are worse. Rymer simply cannot
away with Iago; and this on grounds exquisitely characteristic, not merely
of him but of the whole system, of which he is the reductio ad absurdum. It
is not nearly so much Iago’s theriotes by which Rymer is shocked, as his
violation of the type and the general law. “He would pass upon us a close,
dissembling, false, insinuating rascal instead of an open-hearted, frank,
plain-dealing soldier—a character constantly worn by them for some
thousand years in the world.”[517] Again, “Philosophy tells us it is a principle
in the nature of Man to be grateful.... Philosophy must be [the poet’s]
guide,”[518] therefore Iago is a poetical impossibility. Rymer knows that
historically all men are not grateful: but never mind. The Type! the Type!
the Type![519] One need hardly go farther, but in going we cannot, in one
sense, fare worse.[520] “Godlike Romans” (as Mr Dryden had already called
them) are, in Julius Cæsar, “put in fools’ coats and made jack-puddings of,”
which, says Tom justly, “is a sacriledge.” Brutus and Cassius “play a prize,
a tryal of skill in huffing and swaggering like two drunken Hectors.” In
Tragedy Shakespeare “appears quite out of his element; his brains are
turned; he raves and rambles without any coherence, any spark of reason, or
any rule to control him, and set bounds to his frenzy.” Nor does Ben fare
much better. He indeed “knew to distinguish men and manners at another
rate.” In Catiline “we find ourselves in Europe, we are no longer in the land
of Savages,” sighs Rymer with relief. Still Ben, too, “gropes in the dark,
and jumbles things together without head and tail;” he, though not “in the
gang of the strolling fraternity,” like Shakespeare, “must lie a miserable
heap of ruins for want of architecture;” he “sins against the clearest light
and conviction” by “interlarding fiddle-faddle comedy and apocryphal
matters.” And so forth.
That Rymer was utterly deaf to the poetry of Othello and of Julius
Cæsar, that he thinks “the neighing of a horse or the howling of a mastiff
possesses more meaning” than Shakespeare’s verse, merely demonstrates
Page 398
that he understood the language of the beasts and did not understand that of
The Rule of Tom the man. It disqualifies him for his business, no doubt,
the Second.
hopelessly and of itself. But in the nature of the case we
cannot quarrel with him for this Judgment of God; and, on his own theory,
mere poetry is of so little consequence that it does not much matter. But
where he is cast hopelessly on his own pleadings, where he shows himself
(as he has been called) utterly stupid, is in his inability to understand the
fable, the characters themselves. He cannot see that the very points which
he blunderingly picks out are the adunata pithana of his own law-giver—
the improbabilities or impossibilities made plausible by the poet’s art; and
that the excess of this or that quality in Iago, in Desdemona, in Othello, is
utterly lost in, or is unerringly adjusted to, their perfect humanity. He is not
bound to feel “the pity of it”—which he quotes, much as the pig might
grunt at the pearl. But he is bound, on Aristotelian, no less than on the most
extreme Romantic, principles, to feel that universality which Dryden had
ascribed a quarter of a century before, and for all time to come. Therefore,
for once, though no Macaulayan, I venture to indorse my unimportant name
on a dictum of Macaulay’s. I have read several critics—I trust this book
may show sufficiently that this is no idle boast. I have known several bad
critics from Fulgentius to the Abbé d’Aubignac, and from Zoilus to persons
of our own day, whom it is unnecessary to mention. But I never came
across a worse critic than Thomas Rymer.[521]
Between its King and its Helot, our Sparta of the last forty years of the
seventeenth century does not offer many persons for exornation, with crown
or with stripe, as the case may be. Sprat in the famous passage of his
History of the Royal Society; Phillips and Winstanley and Langbaine in their
attempts at literary history; Sir Thomas Pope Blount in his other attempt at
a critical summary of literature; Collier in his moral chevauchées against
the ethical corruption of the Drama,—these we may legitimately notice, but
at no great length. Dennis, Gildon, and Bysshe will come better in the next
Book; and it is hoped that no reader will be so insatiable as to demand the
inclusion of Milbourn or of Hickeringill.
The Sprat passage[522] is of the very first importance in the History of
Sprat. English Literature, and has at last been recognised as being so. In
it the gorgeous, floriated, conceited style of the earlier century is solemnly
denounced, and a “naked natural style of writing” enjoined. But Sprat is
careful to point out that this was for the purposes of the Society—for the
The Rule of Tom the man. It disqualifies him for his business, no doubt,
the Second.
hopelessly and of itself. But in the nature of the case we
cannot quarrel with him for this Judgment of God; and, on his own theory,
mere poetry is of so little consequence that it does not much matter. But
where he is cast hopelessly on his own pleadings, where he shows himself
(as he has been called) utterly stupid, is in his inability to understand the
fable, the characters themselves. He cannot see that the very points which
he blunderingly picks out are the adunata pithana of his own law-giver—
the improbabilities or impossibilities made plausible by the poet’s art; and
that the excess of this or that quality in Iago, in Desdemona, in Othello, is
utterly lost in, or is unerringly adjusted to, their perfect humanity. He is not
bound to feel “the pity of it”—which he quotes, much as the pig might
grunt at the pearl. But he is bound, on Aristotelian, no less than on the most
extreme Romantic, principles, to feel that universality which Dryden had
ascribed a quarter of a century before, and for all time to come. Therefore,
for once, though no Macaulayan, I venture to indorse my unimportant name
on a dictum of Macaulay’s. I have read several critics—I trust this book
may show sufficiently that this is no idle boast. I have known several bad
critics from Fulgentius to the Abbé d’Aubignac, and from Zoilus to persons
of our own day, whom it is unnecessary to mention. But I never came
across a worse critic than Thomas Rymer.[521]
Between its King and its Helot, our Sparta of the last forty years of the
seventeenth century does not offer many persons for exornation, with crown
or with stripe, as the case may be. Sprat in the famous passage of his
History of the Royal Society; Phillips and Winstanley and Langbaine in their
attempts at literary history; Sir Thomas Pope Blount in his other attempt at
a critical summary of literature; Collier in his moral chevauchées against
the ethical corruption of the Drama,—these we may legitimately notice, but
at no great length. Dennis, Gildon, and Bysshe will come better in the next
Book; and it is hoped that no reader will be so insatiable as to demand the
inclusion of Milbourn or of Hickeringill.
The Sprat passage[522] is of the very first importance in the History of
Sprat. English Literature, and has at last been recognised as being so. In
it the gorgeous, floriated, conceited style of the earlier century is solemnly
denounced, and a “naked natural style of writing” enjoined. But Sprat is
careful to point out that this was for the purposes of the Society—for the
Page 399
improvement not of literature but of science; and he does not attempt to
argue it out at all from the literary side. The pronouncement expresses the
whole sense of the time; it is epoch-making in the history of literary taste;
but it does not give itself out as literary criticism, though the spirit of it may
be seen in half the literary criticism that follows for nearly a hundred and
fifty years.
The infant historians[523] also may be pretty briefly despatched. Edward
Edward Phillips. Phillips, Milton’s nephew, was by all accounts a most
respectable person; and considering the prevalence of Royalist opinions
(especially as he shared them), he says quite as much about his uncle as
could be expected. Besides, it is just possible that Milton was no more
engaging as an uncle and schoolmaster than he was as a husband and father.
He was not alive when Theatrum Poetarum[524] appeared in the winter of
1674-75, but the dignity of the opening “Discourse of the Poets and Poetry
in general” has made some think that he had had a hand in it. I am not so
sure of this. That it is addressed to Thomas Stanley and Sir Edward
Sherburne (each, for all the learning of the former and the literary merits of
both, among those “rhyming amorists” and Cavaliers whom Milton
certainly disliked, and at least affected to disdain) need not much matter.
But the style, though often ambitious, does not seem to me above the reach
of a man of some learning and moderate ability, who had been about Milton
in his youth for years, and at intervals afterwards. Such a man would
naturally take the noble-sentiment view of Poetry, talk of the melior natura
and “that noble thing education,” and the like; nor would he be at a loss for
Miltonic precedents of another kind when he felt inclined to speak of
“every single-sheeted pie-corner poet who comes squirting out an Elegy.”
His Theatrum The piece is creditable as a whole, and ends with a
Poetarum.
hesitating attribution of poetic merit to Spenser and
Shakespeare, in spite of the “rustic obsolete words,” the “rough-hewn
clowterly verse” of the one, and the “unfiled expressions, the rambling and
undigested fancies” of the other. The body of the book—an alphabetical
dictionary, first of ancient then of modern poets, and lastly of poetesses,
alphabetically arranged in a singularly awkward fashion by their
prænomina or Christian names when Phillips knows these, and by others
when he does not—is much less important. Here again the nephew has been
robbed to give to the uncle the notices of Marlowe and Shakespeare, in both
of which the most noticeable expressions, “Clean and unsophisticated wit”
argue it out at all from the literary side. The pronouncement expresses the
whole sense of the time; it is epoch-making in the history of literary taste;
but it does not give itself out as literary criticism, though the spirit of it may
be seen in half the literary criticism that follows for nearly a hundred and
fifty years.
The infant historians[523] also may be pretty briefly despatched. Edward
Edward Phillips. Phillips, Milton’s nephew, was by all accounts a most
respectable person; and considering the prevalence of Royalist opinions
(especially as he shared them), he says quite as much about his uncle as
could be expected. Besides, it is just possible that Milton was no more
engaging as an uncle and schoolmaster than he was as a husband and father.
He was not alive when Theatrum Poetarum[524] appeared in the winter of
1674-75, but the dignity of the opening “Discourse of the Poets and Poetry
in general” has made some think that he had had a hand in it. I am not so
sure of this. That it is addressed to Thomas Stanley and Sir Edward
Sherburne (each, for all the learning of the former and the literary merits of
both, among those “rhyming amorists” and Cavaliers whom Milton
certainly disliked, and at least affected to disdain) need not much matter.
But the style, though often ambitious, does not seem to me above the reach
of a man of some learning and moderate ability, who had been about Milton
in his youth for years, and at intervals afterwards. Such a man would
naturally take the noble-sentiment view of Poetry, talk of the melior natura
and “that noble thing education,” and the like; nor would he be at a loss for
Miltonic precedents of another kind when he felt inclined to speak of
“every single-sheeted pie-corner poet who comes squirting out an Elegy.”
His Theatrum The piece is creditable as a whole, and ends with a
Poetarum.
hesitating attribution of poetic merit to Spenser and
Shakespeare, in spite of the “rustic obsolete words,” the “rough-hewn
clowterly verse” of the one, and the “unfiled expressions, the rambling and
undigested fancies” of the other. The body of the book—an alphabetical
dictionary, first of ancient then of modern poets, and lastly of poetesses,
alphabetically arranged in a singularly awkward fashion by their
prænomina or Christian names when Phillips knows these, and by others
when he does not—is much less important. Here again the nephew has been
robbed to give to the uncle the notices of Marlowe and Shakespeare, in both
of which the most noticeable expressions, “Clean and unsophisticated wit”
Page 400
and “unvulgar style,” apply to Shakespeare himself. Phillips has undoubted
credit for appreciation of Drummond (whom he had partially edited from
the papers of Scot of Scotstarvit many years earlier) and for singling out
from the work of Wither (which was then a by-word with Cavalier critics)
The Shepherd’s Hunting for admiration. But he is much more of a list-maker
than of a critic.
William Winstanley (who brought out his Lives of the Most Famous
English Poets[525] some dozen years later, and levied contributions on
Phillips himself in the most nonchalant manner) was a mere bookmaker, to
whom is assigned the post of manufacturer for years of “Poor Robin’s
Winstanley’s Almanack,” and who did other hack-work. His book is
Lives.
chiefly an unmethodical compilation of anecdotes; and as
the lives of men of letters have always had more attraction than their works,
Winstanley has been found readable. His place here is simply due to the fact
that, putting archaics like Bale and Pits aside, he is the second English
Historian of Poets, if not of Poetry.
In connection with Phillips and Winstanley (whom he avowedly follows
and acridly comments, accusing them at the same time of having stolen his
thunder from a previously published Catalogue) it may be well to notice
Gerard Langbaine, the somewhat famous author of the Account of the
Langbaine’s English Dramatic Poets.[526] Of real criticism there is hardly
Dramatic Poets.
even as much in Langbaine as in his two Esaus or Jacobs,
taking it which way you please. But he is the spiritual ancestor of too many
later critics; and there are still too many people who confuse his method
with that of criticism for him to be quite left out. That he had a particular
animosity to Dryden[527] is less to his discredit than to that of the class to
which he belongs. This kind of parasite usually fastens on the fattest and
fairest bodies presented to it. Langbaine is first of all a Quellenforscher.
Having some reading and a good memory, he discovers that poets do not as
a rule invent their matter, and it seems to him a kind of victory over them to
point out where they got it. As a mere point of literary history there is of
course nothing to object to in this: it is sometimes interesting, and need
never be offensive. But, as a matter of fact, it too often is made so, and is
always made so in Langbaine. “I must take the freedom to tell our author
that most part of the language is stolen.” “Had Mr W. put on his spectacles
he would have found it printed thus,” &c., &c. This hole-picking generally
turns to hole-forging; and one is not surprised to find Langbaine, after
credit for appreciation of Drummond (whom he had partially edited from
the papers of Scot of Scotstarvit many years earlier) and for singling out
from the work of Wither (which was then a by-word with Cavalier critics)
The Shepherd’s Hunting for admiration. But he is much more of a list-maker
than of a critic.
William Winstanley (who brought out his Lives of the Most Famous
English Poets[525] some dozen years later, and levied contributions on
Phillips himself in the most nonchalant manner) was a mere bookmaker, to
whom is assigned the post of manufacturer for years of “Poor Robin’s
Winstanley’s Almanack,” and who did other hack-work. His book is
Lives.
chiefly an unmethodical compilation of anecdotes; and as
the lives of men of letters have always had more attraction than their works,
Winstanley has been found readable. His place here is simply due to the fact
that, putting archaics like Bale and Pits aside, he is the second English
Historian of Poets, if not of Poetry.
In connection with Phillips and Winstanley (whom he avowedly follows
and acridly comments, accusing them at the same time of having stolen his
thunder from a previously published Catalogue) it may be well to notice
Gerard Langbaine, the somewhat famous author of the Account of the
Langbaine’s English Dramatic Poets.[526] Of real criticism there is hardly
Dramatic Poets.
even as much in Langbaine as in his two Esaus or Jacobs,
taking it which way you please. But he is the spiritual ancestor of too many
later critics; and there are still too many people who confuse his method
with that of criticism for him to be quite left out. That he had a particular
animosity to Dryden[527] is less to his discredit than to that of the class to
which he belongs. This kind of parasite usually fastens on the fattest and
fairest bodies presented to it. Langbaine is first of all a Quellenforscher.
Having some reading and a good memory, he discovers that poets do not as
a rule invent their matter, and it seems to him a kind of victory over them to
point out where they got it. As a mere point of literary history there is of
course nothing to object to in this: it is sometimes interesting, and need
never be offensive. But, as a matter of fact, it too often is made so, and is
always made so in Langbaine. “I must take the freedom to tell our author
that most part of the language is stolen.” “Had Mr W. put on his spectacles
he would have found it printed thus,” &c., &c. This hole-picking generally
turns to hole-forging; and one is not surprised to find Langbaine, after
Page 401
quoting at great length Dryden’s cavillings at the men of the last age,
huddling off as “some praises” the magnificent and immortal eulogies[528]
which atone for them. I am afraid that Dante, if he had known Langbaine,
would have arranged a special bolgia for him; and it would not have lacked
later inhabitants.
The only too notable quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns produced some
deservedly famous literature of the critical kind in England, but its greatest
result in that way, The Battle of the Books, will be best noticed, together
with its author’s other works, and in the order rather of its own publication
Temple. than of its composition. Nor need the earlier protagonists,
Temple and Bentley, occupy us much; though the latter will give an
opportunity of paying at least respects to a kind of Criticism of which we
have perforce said little. Temple, a charming writer, and the author, at the
close of his critical Essay on Poetry, of one of the most exquisite sentences
in English, is simply a critic pour rire. The hundred pages of his Works[529]
which are devoted to literature, invited the exercise of Macaulay’s favourite
methods by the enormity of their ignorance, the complacency of their
dogmatism, and the blandness of their superficiality. Temple has
glimmerings—he intimates pretty plainly some contempt of at least the
French “rules”; but he will still be talking of what he has given himself
hardly the slightest pains to know.
This could not be said of Bentley, and the Phalaris Dissertation has been
not undeservedly ranked as one of the representative pieces of critical
Bentley. literature. It is only unfortunate that Bentley has meddled
so little with the purely literary side of the matter; and the sense of this
misfortune may be tempered by remembrance of his dealings with Milton.
He is, however, perfectly right in at least hinting[530] that the Pseudo-Phalaris
might have been convicted on literary counts, as well as on linguistic and
chronological, and that, on grounds of style, the theory of those half-
sceptics who attributed the Letters to Lucian was almost worse than the
error of the true believers. That Lucian could have written a line of this
skimble-skamble stuff is simply impossible; and it must always remain an
instance of the slight sense of style possessed by the Humanists that a really
great man of letters, like Politian, should have given countenance to the
absurdity.
From any point of critical consideration Collier’s famous book[531] must
be a most important document in the History of Criticism; and though from
huddling off as “some praises” the magnificent and immortal eulogies[528]
which atone for them. I am afraid that Dante, if he had known Langbaine,
would have arranged a special bolgia for him; and it would not have lacked
later inhabitants.
The only too notable quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns produced some
deservedly famous literature of the critical kind in England, but its greatest
result in that way, The Battle of the Books, will be best noticed, together
with its author’s other works, and in the order rather of its own publication
Temple. than of its composition. Nor need the earlier protagonists,
Temple and Bentley, occupy us much; though the latter will give an
opportunity of paying at least respects to a kind of Criticism of which we
have perforce said little. Temple, a charming writer, and the author, at the
close of his critical Essay on Poetry, of one of the most exquisite sentences
in English, is simply a critic pour rire. The hundred pages of his Works[529]
which are devoted to literature, invited the exercise of Macaulay’s favourite
methods by the enormity of their ignorance, the complacency of their
dogmatism, and the blandness of their superficiality. Temple has
glimmerings—he intimates pretty plainly some contempt of at least the
French “rules”; but he will still be talking of what he has given himself
hardly the slightest pains to know.
This could not be said of Bentley, and the Phalaris Dissertation has been
not undeservedly ranked as one of the representative pieces of critical
Bentley. literature. It is only unfortunate that Bentley has meddled
so little with the purely literary side of the matter; and the sense of this
misfortune may be tempered by remembrance of his dealings with Milton.
He is, however, perfectly right in at least hinting[530] that the Pseudo-Phalaris
might have been convicted on literary counts, as well as on linguistic and
chronological, and that, on grounds of style, the theory of those half-
sceptics who attributed the Letters to Lucian was almost worse than the
error of the true believers. That Lucian could have written a line of this
skimble-skamble stuff is simply impossible; and it must always remain an
instance of the slight sense of style possessed by the Humanists that a really
great man of letters, like Politian, should have given countenance to the
absurdity.
From any point of critical consideration Collier’s famous book[531] must
be a most important document in the History of Criticism; and though from
Page 402
some such points it may be of even greater importance than it is to us, we
Collier’s Short can in no wise omit it. For it is probably the earliest
View.
instance in our history where a piece of criticism has
apparently changed, to a very great extent, the face of an important
department of literature, and has really had no small part in bringing about
this change. It is, however, indirectly rather than directly that it concerns us;
for it is only here and there that Collier takes the literary way of attack, and
in that way he is not always, though he is sometimes, happy. Curiously
enough, one of his felicities in this kind has been imputed to him for
foolishness by his great panegyrist. It is not necessary to feel that sympathy
with his opinions on ecclesiastical and political affairs which Macaulay
naturally disclaimed, and which some others may cheerfully avow, in order
to see that the Tory critic was quite right, and the Whig critic quite wrong,
in regard to the dissertations on the Greek and Latin Drama. What may be
thought of their technical scholarship does not matter. But Macaulay’s
undoubted familiarity with the classics must have had a gap in it, and his
wide knowledge of modern literature several much greater gaps, if he did
not know—first, that Collier had ancient criticism on his side, and secondly,
that the allegation of ancient authority and practice where favourable, the
arguing-off of it where inconvenient, were exactly the things to influence
his generation. When everybody was looking back on the Vossian precept,
“Imitate the Ancients, but imitate them only in what is good,” and drawing
forward to the Popian axiom,
Collier’s Short can in no wise omit it. For it is probably the earliest
View.
instance in our history where a piece of criticism has
apparently changed, to a very great extent, the face of an important
department of literature, and has really had no small part in bringing about
this change. It is, however, indirectly rather than directly that it concerns us;
for it is only here and there that Collier takes the literary way of attack, and
in that way he is not always, though he is sometimes, happy. Curiously
enough, one of his felicities in this kind has been imputed to him for
foolishness by his great panegyrist. It is not necessary to feel that sympathy
with his opinions on ecclesiastical and political affairs which Macaulay
naturally disclaimed, and which some others may cheerfully avow, in order
to see that the Tory critic was quite right, and the Whig critic quite wrong,
in regard to the dissertations on the Greek and Latin Drama. What may be
thought of their technical scholarship does not matter. But Macaulay’s
undoubted familiarity with the classics must have had a gap in it, and his
wide knowledge of modern literature several much greater gaps, if he did
not know—first, that Collier had ancient criticism on his side, and secondly,
that the allegation of ancient authority and practice where favourable, the
arguing-off of it where inconvenient, were exactly the things to influence
his generation. When everybody was looking back on the Vossian precept,
“Imitate the Ancients, but imitate them only in what is good,” and drawing
forward to the Popian axiom,
Page 403
“To copy Nature is to copy them,”
“dissertations on the Greek and Latin Drama” were not otiose at all, they
were absolutely necessary.
But for the most part, as is notorious, Collier is as ethical as Plutarch or
Plato. It was desirable that he should be so, and nobody but a paradoxer will
ever defend the style of play-writing which produced such things as
Limberham, and The Old Bachelor, and even The Relapse—though the first
be Dryden’s, and contain some good things in the characters of Prudence
and Brainsick, though the second show us the dawn of Congreve’s wit, and
though the third contain handfuls of the sprightliest things in the English
language. It is in reference to this last, by the way, that Collier chiefly quits
the path of ethical criticism, and takes to that of literary, or at least dramatic.
There is hardly a sharper and more well-deserved beating-up of the quarters
of a ragged dramatic regiment anywhere than that (at p. 212 sq.) on the
glaring improbabilities of Vanbrugh’s plot, the absolute want of connection
between the title part of it and the real fable—Tom Fashion’s cheating his
brother of Hoyden—and the way in which the characters are constantly out
of character in order that the author may say clever things. But Collier has
serious matters on his mind too much to give us a great deal of this; and the
other definitely literary points which I have noted, in a very careful re-
reading of the piece for this book, are not numerous. I wish he had not
called Love’s Labour’s Lost (p. 125) “a very silly play”; but how many
people were there then living who would have thought differently? I wish
he had worked out his statement (rather rash from his own point of view) at
p. 148, “Poets are not always exactly in rule.” He might have developed his
views on the Chorus (p. 150) interestingly. I have some other places; but
they are not important. The sum is, that though Collier evidently knew most
critical authorities, from Aristotle and Horace, through Heinsius and
Jonson, to Rapin, and Rymer, and Dryden himself, very well; though he
could (pp. 228, 229) state the Unities, and even argue for them—this was
not his present purpose, which was simply to cleanse the stage. His interest
in other matters in fact blunted what might have been a keen interest in
literature proper. And this is thoroughly confirmed by study of his
interesting and characteristic Essays,[532] where, out of more than five
“dissertations on the Greek and Latin Drama” were not otiose at all, they
were absolutely necessary.
But for the most part, as is notorious, Collier is as ethical as Plutarch or
Plato. It was desirable that he should be so, and nobody but a paradoxer will
ever defend the style of play-writing which produced such things as
Limberham, and The Old Bachelor, and even The Relapse—though the first
be Dryden’s, and contain some good things in the characters of Prudence
and Brainsick, though the second show us the dawn of Congreve’s wit, and
though the third contain handfuls of the sprightliest things in the English
language. It is in reference to this last, by the way, that Collier chiefly quits
the path of ethical criticism, and takes to that of literary, or at least dramatic.
There is hardly a sharper and more well-deserved beating-up of the quarters
of a ragged dramatic regiment anywhere than that (at p. 212 sq.) on the
glaring improbabilities of Vanbrugh’s plot, the absolute want of connection
between the title part of it and the real fable—Tom Fashion’s cheating his
brother of Hoyden—and the way in which the characters are constantly out
of character in order that the author may say clever things. But Collier has
serious matters on his mind too much to give us a great deal of this; and the
other definitely literary points which I have noted, in a very careful re-
reading of the piece for this book, are not numerous. I wish he had not
called Love’s Labour’s Lost (p. 125) “a very silly play”; but how many
people were there then living who would have thought differently? I wish
he had worked out his statement (rather rash from his own point of view) at
p. 148, “Poets are not always exactly in rule.” He might have developed his
views on the Chorus (p. 150) interestingly. I have some other places; but
they are not important. The sum is, that though Collier evidently knew most
critical authorities, from Aristotle and Horace, through Heinsius and
Jonson, to Rapin, and Rymer, and Dryden himself, very well; though he
could (pp. 228, 229) state the Unities, and even argue for them—this was
not his present purpose, which was simply to cleanse the stage. His interest
in other matters in fact blunted what might have been a keen interest in
literature proper. And this is thoroughly confirmed by study of his
interesting and characteristic Essays,[532] where, out of more than five
Page 404
hundred pages, exactly four are devoted to literature, and these give us
nothing but generalities.
That Collier’s victory was very mainly due to the fact that he struck in at
the right moment, as spokesman of an already formed popular opinion,
would be a matter of reasonable certainty in any case; but the certainty is
Sir T. P. Blount. here historical. One of many proofs at hand is in the
curious lighterfull of critical lumber which Sir Thomas Pope Blount
launched four (or eight?) years before Collier let his fireship drive into the
fleet of the naughty playwrights. In this book,[533] dedicated to Mulgrave,
that noble poet himself, Roscommon, Cowley, and the lately published and
immensely influential Whole Duty of Man, are quoted to support the
argument that “A poet may write upon the subject of Love, but he must
avoid obscenity.”[534]
Sir Thomas, however, comes within the inner, and not merely the outer,
circle of criticism for his aims and his collections, though certainly not for
any critical genius that he displays. His “Remarks upon Poetry,” no less
than the “Characters and Censures” which make up the other part of his
work, are the purest compilation: and though we are certainly not without
compilers in these days (what indeed can a Historian of Criticism do but
compile to a great extent?), there are very few of us who are at once honest
enough and artless enough to follow the method of Blount. Whether he is
arguing that good humour is essentially necessary to a poet (how about the
genus irritabile?) or that a poet should not be addicted to flattery, or
discussing the “Eglogue, Bucholic [sic], or Pastoral,” whether he is
following Phillips and Winstanley and borrowing from both, in compiling a
dictionary of poets, he simply empties out his common place-book.
“Dryden remarks,” “Rapin observes,” “Mr Cowley tells us,” “Mr Rymer
can nowise allow” (this is happy, for it was habitual with Mr Rymer
“nowise to allow”), such are the usherings of his paragraphs. He is not
uninteresting when he is original (cf. his remarks on Waller); but one is
almost more grateful to him for his collections, which put briefly, and
together, the critical dicta of a vast number of people. Here we may read,
with minimum of trouble, how Julius Scaliger could not see anything in
Catullus but what is common and ordinary; how Dr Sprat said that till the
time of Henry the Eighth there was nothing wrote in the English language
except Chaucer that a man would care to read twice; how Scaliger once
more, and Petrus Crinitus, and Johannes Ludovicus Vives, and Eustatius
nothing but generalities.
That Collier’s victory was very mainly due to the fact that he struck in at
the right moment, as spokesman of an already formed popular opinion,
would be a matter of reasonable certainty in any case; but the certainty is
Sir T. P. Blount. here historical. One of many proofs at hand is in the
curious lighterfull of critical lumber which Sir Thomas Pope Blount
launched four (or eight?) years before Collier let his fireship drive into the
fleet of the naughty playwrights. In this book,[533] dedicated to Mulgrave,
that noble poet himself, Roscommon, Cowley, and the lately published and
immensely influential Whole Duty of Man, are quoted to support the
argument that “A poet may write upon the subject of Love, but he must
avoid obscenity.”[534]
Sir Thomas, however, comes within the inner, and not merely the outer,
circle of criticism for his aims and his collections, though certainly not for
any critical genius that he displays. His “Remarks upon Poetry,” no less
than the “Characters and Censures” which make up the other part of his
work, are the purest compilation: and though we are certainly not without
compilers in these days (what indeed can a Historian of Criticism do but
compile to a great extent?), there are very few of us who are at once honest
enough and artless enough to follow the method of Blount. Whether he is
arguing that good humour is essentially necessary to a poet (how about the
genus irritabile?) or that a poet should not be addicted to flattery, or
discussing the “Eglogue, Bucholic [sic], or Pastoral,” whether he is
following Phillips and Winstanley and borrowing from both, in compiling a
dictionary of poets, he simply empties out his common place-book.
“Dryden remarks,” “Rapin observes,” “Mr Cowley tells us,” “Mr Rymer
can nowise allow” (this is happy, for it was habitual with Mr Rymer
“nowise to allow”), such are the usherings of his paragraphs. He is not
uninteresting when he is original (cf. his remarks on Waller); but one is
almost more grateful to him for his collections, which put briefly, and
together, the critical dicta of a vast number of people. Here we may read,
with minimum of trouble, how Julius Scaliger could not see anything in
Catullus but what is common and ordinary; how Dr Sprat said that till the
time of Henry the Eighth there was nothing wrote in the English language
except Chaucer that a man would care to read twice; how Scaliger once
more, and Petrus Crinitus, and Johannes Ludovicus Vives, and Eustatius
Page 405
Swartius, thought Claudian quite in the first rank of poets; how Tanneguy le
Fèvre shook his head over Pindar as having “something too much the air of
the Dithyrambick”; and how Cœlius Rhodiginus was good enough to find
that same Dantes Aligerus, who displeased others, a “poet not
contemptible.”[535] These things are infinitely pleasant to read, and give one
a positive affection for Sir Thomas Pope Blount as one turns them in the big
black print of his handy quarto; yet perhaps it would be excessive to call
him a great critic. What he does, besides providing this gazophylacium for
the connoisseur, is to show how wide the interest in criticism was.
A further turn, and the last in this walk, may be furnished to us by one of
his own quotations (p. 137 of the Characters and Censures) of an answer to
the question, “Whether Milton and Waller were not the best English poets,
and which was the better of the two?” from The Athenian Mercury, vol. v.,
Periodicals: The No. 4. For this curious and interesting medley of Dunton’s,
Athenian
Mercury, &c.
and Samuel Wesley’s, and others’, was almost the first to
provide something in English answering, or that might have
answered, to the Journal des Savants and the Mercure Galant. Actually, the
Mercury was not very literary. I do not pretend to have examined the
original volumes with any very great care. But in the three copious books
which were either directly compiled out of it, or composed in imitation—
the Athenian Oracle,[536] Athenian Sport, and The British Apollo—literature
holds no very large place. The Oracle does indeed give at p. 438 a very
elaborate answer to the question, “Whether the Dramatic Poets of the Last
Age exceeded those of this?” and the Apollo, besides a versification of the
identical query and answer which Blount had quoted, contains a long
descant on the Origin of Poetry, and a remarkably shrewd answer to the
question, “Which is the best poet—Boileau, Molière, or La Fontaine?” But
the time of literary periodicals in England was not yet, though this was the
very eve of it: and they must therefore be postponed.[537]
484. The chief critical loci in Milton are all among the best known
passages of his work. They are the peremptory anathema on rhyme in the
prose note added to Paradise Lost, in what Professor Masson has settled to
be the “Fifth Form of the First Edition”; the short Defence of Tragedy,
wholly on Italian principles but adapted to Puritan understandings, prefixed
to Samson Agonistes; the first description of his own studies in The Reason
Fèvre shook his head over Pindar as having “something too much the air of
the Dithyrambick”; and how Cœlius Rhodiginus was good enough to find
that same Dantes Aligerus, who displeased others, a “poet not
contemptible.”[535] These things are infinitely pleasant to read, and give one
a positive affection for Sir Thomas Pope Blount as one turns them in the big
black print of his handy quarto; yet perhaps it would be excessive to call
him a great critic. What he does, besides providing this gazophylacium for
the connoisseur, is to show how wide the interest in criticism was.
A further turn, and the last in this walk, may be furnished to us by one of
his own quotations (p. 137 of the Characters and Censures) of an answer to
the question, “Whether Milton and Waller were not the best English poets,
and which was the better of the two?” from The Athenian Mercury, vol. v.,
Periodicals: The No. 4. For this curious and interesting medley of Dunton’s,
Athenian
Mercury, &c.
and Samuel Wesley’s, and others’, was almost the first to
provide something in English answering, or that might have
answered, to the Journal des Savants and the Mercure Galant. Actually, the
Mercury was not very literary. I do not pretend to have examined the
original volumes with any very great care. But in the three copious books
which were either directly compiled out of it, or composed in imitation—
the Athenian Oracle,[536] Athenian Sport, and The British Apollo—literature
holds no very large place. The Oracle does indeed give at p. 438 a very
elaborate answer to the question, “Whether the Dramatic Poets of the Last
Age exceeded those of this?” and the Apollo, besides a versification of the
identical query and answer which Blount had quoted, contains a long
descant on the Origin of Poetry, and a remarkably shrewd answer to the
question, “Which is the best poet—Boileau, Molière, or La Fontaine?” But
the time of literary periodicals in England was not yet, though this was the
very eve of it: and they must therefore be postponed.[537]
484. The chief critical loci in Milton are all among the best known
passages of his work. They are the peremptory anathema on rhyme in the
prose note added to Paradise Lost, in what Professor Masson has settled to
be the “Fifth Form of the First Edition”; the short Defence of Tragedy,
wholly on Italian principles but adapted to Puritan understandings, prefixed
to Samson Agonistes; the first description of his own studies in The Reason
Page 406
of Church Government; the more elaborate return upon that subject—a
singular mixture of exquisite phrasing and literary appreciation with
insolent abuse—in the Apology for Smectymnuus (which is not, as some
have thought, the same thing as The [Platonic] Apology) and divers clauses
in the Tractate of Education, especially the reference to “Castelvetro, Tasso,
and Mazzoni,” whom he credits with “sublime art,” and puts on a level with
Aristotle and Horace. We might add a few casual girds, such as that at the
supposed cacophony of Hall’s “Teach each” in the Apology for
Smectymnuus, which has been compared to Malherbe’s vellications of
Desportes (cf. sup., p. 245). A complete critical treatise from him (if only he
could have been prevailed upon to write in a good temper) would have been
of supreme interest: it is not so certain that it would have been of supreme
value, even if he had been in that temper.
485. He has practically given us nothing but a slight apology for sacred
verse (common in his time and natural from the author of the Davideis);
with a slighter seasoning of the also familiar defence of poetry from being
mere “lying,” in the Preface to the folio edition of his Poems; some still
slighter remarks on Comedy in that to Cutter of Coleman Street; and hardly
more than a glance at literary education in his Proposition for the
Advancement of Experimental Philosophy. In this last we may feel a sort of
gust of the same spirit which appears in his disciple Sprat’s History of the
Royal Society (v. infra).
486. Both these will be found in Chalmers’ Poets, vi. 349-372. Hobbes’s
Answer is also in Molesworth’s ed. of the Works, iv. 443-458. It is there
followed by a short literary letter to Edward Howard of the British Princes,
the most egregious of Dryden’s egregious leash of brothers-in-law. To these
may be added the brief literary passage in the chapter of “Intellectual
Virtues” in the First Part of Leviathan (ibid., iii. 58) and the “Brief” of the
Rhetoric (referred to supra, vol. i. p. 40); ibid., vi. 416-510. I have a copy of
the first edition of this, anonymous and undated, but assigned to 1655-57 by
bibliographers. It does not contain the shorter Art of Rhetoric, which
follows in Molesworth.
487. This Boojum, I fear, will disturb some of my friends. But I put him
under the protection of the Powder of Pimperlimpimp, and of the
singular mixture of exquisite phrasing and literary appreciation with
insolent abuse—in the Apology for Smectymnuus (which is not, as some
have thought, the same thing as The [Platonic] Apology) and divers clauses
in the Tractate of Education, especially the reference to “Castelvetro, Tasso,
and Mazzoni,” whom he credits with “sublime art,” and puts on a level with
Aristotle and Horace. We might add a few casual girds, such as that at the
supposed cacophony of Hall’s “Teach each” in the Apology for
Smectymnuus, which has been compared to Malherbe’s vellications of
Desportes (cf. sup., p. 245). A complete critical treatise from him (if only he
could have been prevailed upon to write in a good temper) would have been
of supreme interest: it is not so certain that it would have been of supreme
value, even if he had been in that temper.
485. He has practically given us nothing but a slight apology for sacred
verse (common in his time and natural from the author of the Davideis);
with a slighter seasoning of the also familiar defence of poetry from being
mere “lying,” in the Preface to the folio edition of his Poems; some still
slighter remarks on Comedy in that to Cutter of Coleman Street; and hardly
more than a glance at literary education in his Proposition for the
Advancement of Experimental Philosophy. In this last we may feel a sort of
gust of the same spirit which appears in his disciple Sprat’s History of the
Royal Society (v. infra).
486. Both these will be found in Chalmers’ Poets, vi. 349-372. Hobbes’s
Answer is also in Molesworth’s ed. of the Works, iv. 443-458. It is there
followed by a short literary letter to Edward Howard of the British Princes,
the most egregious of Dryden’s egregious leash of brothers-in-law. To these
may be added the brief literary passage in the chapter of “Intellectual
Virtues” in the First Part of Leviathan (ibid., iii. 58) and the “Brief” of the
Rhetoric (referred to supra, vol. i. p. 40); ibid., vi. 416-510. I have a copy of
the first edition of this, anonymous and undated, but assigned to 1655-57 by
bibliographers. It does not contain the shorter Art of Rhetoric, which
follows in Molesworth.
487. This Boojum, I fear, will disturb some of my friends. But I put him
under the protection of the Powder of Pimperlimpimp, and of the
Page 407
Equinoctials of Queubus.
488. See the Discourse on Satire—Scott (in the edition revised by the
present writer) (London, 1882-93), xiii. 24 sq., or Ker (ed. cit. post), ii. 33
sq.
489. I do not smile so much as some may over “no, not Du Bartas.” But
though oases are far from rare in what may seem, to those who know it not,
this thirsty land of criticism, I hardly know a more delightful “diamond of
the desert” than the refusal to admit somebody else lest you should have to
admit Dante, and the subsequent “Dante, Marino, and others.” When the
eye is weary of italic print, or of a too closely packed quarto page, or of
François Hédelin, Abbé d’Aubignac, in any type or format, it is pleasant
half to shut it, and let the dream of these “others” wave before one. I see
that they must have written in Italian; but other common measure, other link
to bind them both to the Commedia and to the Adone, is yet to seek for me.
490. Lest the last note should lead any one to think that I wish to make
inept and ignoble game of Davenant, let me observe that he can write
admirable things, worthy a son, in double sense, of Oxford. Could anything
be happier than this of Spenser: “His noble and most artful hands”? The
mere selection of the epithets is good, the combination of them famously
so.
491. This attempt to get Epic as close as possible to Drama—to work all
the kinds of Imitation back into one arch-kind—appears more or less
fitfully in the whole Neo-Classic school. And we shall never quite
understand the much discussed “Heroic Play,” till we take it in conjunction
with the “Heroic Poem.”
492. There is, of course, critical matter in Howell’s Letters, and in a score
or scores of other places; but it is of the kind that we must now neglect, or
select from with the most jealous hand.
493. Of the great critical men of letters of 1800-1850 only Leigh Hunt—
the least of them—was just to Dryden; even Hazlitt is inadequate on him.
Among our preceptistas of the same or a little later date, Keble (Præl. v.)
mildly perstringes Dryden’s inconsistency (“male sibi constat D.”), but
488. See the Discourse on Satire—Scott (in the edition revised by the
present writer) (London, 1882-93), xiii. 24 sq., or Ker (ed. cit. post), ii. 33
sq.
489. I do not smile so much as some may over “no, not Du Bartas.” But
though oases are far from rare in what may seem, to those who know it not,
this thirsty land of criticism, I hardly know a more delightful “diamond of
the desert” than the refusal to admit somebody else lest you should have to
admit Dante, and the subsequent “Dante, Marino, and others.” When the
eye is weary of italic print, or of a too closely packed quarto page, or of
François Hédelin, Abbé d’Aubignac, in any type or format, it is pleasant
half to shut it, and let the dream of these “others” wave before one. I see
that they must have written in Italian; but other common measure, other link
to bind them both to the Commedia and to the Adone, is yet to seek for me.
490. Lest the last note should lead any one to think that I wish to make
inept and ignoble game of Davenant, let me observe that he can write
admirable things, worthy a son, in double sense, of Oxford. Could anything
be happier than this of Spenser: “His noble and most artful hands”? The
mere selection of the epithets is good, the combination of them famously
so.
491. This attempt to get Epic as close as possible to Drama—to work all
the kinds of Imitation back into one arch-kind—appears more or less
fitfully in the whole Neo-Classic school. And we shall never quite
understand the much discussed “Heroic Play,” till we take it in conjunction
with the “Heroic Poem.”
492. There is, of course, critical matter in Howell’s Letters, and in a score
or scores of other places; but it is of the kind that we must now neglect, or
select from with the most jealous hand.
493. Of the great critical men of letters of 1800-1850 only Leigh Hunt—
the least of them—was just to Dryden; even Hazlitt is inadequate on him.
Among our preceptistas of the same or a little later date, Keble (Præl. v.)
mildly perstringes Dryden’s inconsistency (“male sibi constat D.”), but
Page 408
rather as poet than as critic. Garbett, his successor and opponent, a great
admirer of Dryden’s style, and one who expresses just regret at the want of
common knowledge of it, is very severe (Præl. x.) on his want of
philosophical profundity and sincerity. But the reverend Professor had
found nearly as much fault on this score with Longinus.
494. Dryden made no mistake about Longinus. He calls him, in the
Apology prefixed to The State of Innocence, “the greatest critic among the
Greeks after Aristotle,” cites him often, and parades and uses a long passage
of the Περὶ Ὕψους in the Preface to Troilus and Cressida. The references
are conveniently collected in Mr Ker’s index (v. inf.)
495. Dryden’s critical work, which until recently was accessible with
ease only in Scott’s elaborate edition of his works, or in Malone’s less
bulky, but still bulky and not excessively common, edition of the Prose, has
recently been given, with quite admirable editorial matter, by Professor Ker
(2 vols., Oxford, 1900). I wish he had included one or two more things,
especially the Heads of an answer to Rymer; but it must be admitted that the
authenticity of these, though I think not doubtful, is not absolutely certain,
and the correct text still less so. See note on Rymer infra, and my edition of
Scott, xv. 378 sq., for text and history.
496. Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy. Scott, ed. cit., xi. 295: Ker,
i. 113.
497. Preface to Miscellanies, ii.; Scott, ed. cit., xii. 295; Ker, i. 263. I
wish that Dryden were alive for many reasons: not least because he would
certainly pay the debt that he owes to my friend Mr Ker magnificentissime.
No one has vindicated him better against the half-witted blunderers. But I
am not quite so much inclined as even Mr Ker is to father his critical style
on Chapelain and La Mesnardière, Sarrasin and Scudéry, or on Corneille
himself. It is not till Saint-Evremond, perhaps even till Fénelon, that I can
find in French the indescribable omne tulit punctum as in him. And both, are
his inferiors.
498. I have not thought it necessary to encumber the page with references
in the case of the shorter Essays, where any one can discover the passages
cited, whether he uses Scott, Malone, the originals, or Mr Ker’s special
admirer of Dryden’s style, and one who expresses just regret at the want of
common knowledge of it, is very severe (Præl. x.) on his want of
philosophical profundity and sincerity. But the reverend Professor had
found nearly as much fault on this score with Longinus.
494. Dryden made no mistake about Longinus. He calls him, in the
Apology prefixed to The State of Innocence, “the greatest critic among the
Greeks after Aristotle,” cites him often, and parades and uses a long passage
of the Περὶ Ὕψους in the Preface to Troilus and Cressida. The references
are conveniently collected in Mr Ker’s index (v. inf.)
495. Dryden’s critical work, which until recently was accessible with
ease only in Scott’s elaborate edition of his works, or in Malone’s less
bulky, but still bulky and not excessively common, edition of the Prose, has
recently been given, with quite admirable editorial matter, by Professor Ker
(2 vols., Oxford, 1900). I wish he had included one or two more things,
especially the Heads of an answer to Rymer; but it must be admitted that the
authenticity of these, though I think not doubtful, is not absolutely certain,
and the correct text still less so. See note on Rymer infra, and my edition of
Scott, xv. 378 sq., for text and history.
496. Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy. Scott, ed. cit., xi. 295: Ker,
i. 113.
497. Preface to Miscellanies, ii.; Scott, ed. cit., xii. 295; Ker, i. 263. I
wish that Dryden were alive for many reasons: not least because he would
certainly pay the debt that he owes to my friend Mr Ker magnificentissime.
No one has vindicated him better against the half-witted blunderers. But I
am not quite so much inclined as even Mr Ker is to father his critical style
on Chapelain and La Mesnardière, Sarrasin and Scudéry, or on Corneille
himself. It is not till Saint-Evremond, perhaps even till Fénelon, that I can
find in French the indescribable omne tulit punctum as in him. And both, are
his inferiors.
498. I have not thought it necessary to encumber the page with references
in the case of the shorter Essays, where any one can discover the passages
cited, whether he uses Scott, Malone, the originals, or Mr Ker’s special
Page 409
collection, with no more labour than is good for him and deserved by them.
In the case of the longer pieces the references will be given at least
sufficiently often to make the locating of the others easy, without turning
the lower part of the page into a kind of arithmetical table.
499. As including Invention, Fancy, and Elocution, but in itself merely
considered as synonymous with “Wit.” It was probably from this that
Addison (see below) started that Imagination theory of his which has been
so much overrated.
500. When the present writer began his revision of Scott’s Dryden in the
year 1881 there were no separate editions of the Essay since the originals.
There are now, of annotated issues of it, either by itself or with more or less
of its author’s related work, no less than five known to me,—those of Mr
Thomas Arnold (Oxford, 1886), Mr Strunk (New York, 1898), Mr Low
(London, n. d.), Mr Nichol Smith (Glasgow, 1900), and Professor Ker’s.
The study of English literature in schools and colleges has been much
abused, very foolishly talked about by some of its advocates, and no doubt
not always wisely directed. But it is at least something to be said for it that
it has made such a masterpiece as this known to probably a hundred persons
for every one who knew it twenty years ago.
501. One of the very earliest evidences of the interest in dramatic
criticism felt in England, immediately after the Restoration, must be Pepys’
note that on September 1, 1660, when he was dining at the Bullhead, there
“rose ... a dispute between Mr Moore and Dr Clerke—the former affirming
that it was essential to a tragedy to have the argument of it true, which the
Doctor denied.” The question, on the very English terms of another dinner
and a bet, was to be settled by Pepys himself three days later. He does not
tell us whether he read up for it; but on the 4th he decided for the Doctor
(Diary, ed. Wheatley, i. 233).
502. Here, to glance at the matter of Dryden and the Spaniards (v. sup., p.
332, and inf., on Spence), is a possible reminiscence of Lope’s Arte Nuevo,
178-180—
Que aquesta variedad deleyta mucho:
Buen exemplo nos da naturaleza,
In the case of the longer pieces the references will be given at least
sufficiently often to make the locating of the others easy, without turning
the lower part of the page into a kind of arithmetical table.
499. As including Invention, Fancy, and Elocution, but in itself merely
considered as synonymous with “Wit.” It was probably from this that
Addison (see below) started that Imagination theory of his which has been
so much overrated.
500. When the present writer began his revision of Scott’s Dryden in the
year 1881 there were no separate editions of the Essay since the originals.
There are now, of annotated issues of it, either by itself or with more or less
of its author’s related work, no less than five known to me,—those of Mr
Thomas Arnold (Oxford, 1886), Mr Strunk (New York, 1898), Mr Low
(London, n. d.), Mr Nichol Smith (Glasgow, 1900), and Professor Ker’s.
The study of English literature in schools and colleges has been much
abused, very foolishly talked about by some of its advocates, and no doubt
not always wisely directed. But it is at least something to be said for it that
it has made such a masterpiece as this known to probably a hundred persons
for every one who knew it twenty years ago.
501. One of the very earliest evidences of the interest in dramatic
criticism felt in England, immediately after the Restoration, must be Pepys’
note that on September 1, 1660, when he was dining at the Bullhead, there
“rose ... a dispute between Mr Moore and Dr Clerke—the former affirming
that it was essential to a tragedy to have the argument of it true, which the
Doctor denied.” The question, on the very English terms of another dinner
and a bet, was to be settled by Pepys himself three days later. He does not
tell us whether he read up for it; but on the 4th he decided for the Doctor
(Diary, ed. Wheatley, i. 233).
502. Here, to glance at the matter of Dryden and the Spaniards (v. sup., p.
332, and inf., on Spence), is a possible reminiscence of Lope’s Arte Nuevo,
178-180—
Que aquesta variedad deleyta mucho:
Buen exemplo nos da naturaleza,
Page 410
Que por tal variedad tiene belleza.
503. Scott, xv. 337; Ker, i. 75.
504. In the Discourse on Satire. Scott, xiii. 3; Ker, ii. 17.
505. “I have further to add that I seldom use the wit and language of any
romance or play which I undertake to alter; because my own invention, as
bad as it is, can furnish me with nothing so dull as what is there.” These
invocations of Nemesis are seldom unheard by the acute ears of that satiric
Goddess.
506. Lesser, but far from negligible; for the Character of Saint-Evremond
is both personally and critically interesting, and the critical biographies of
Lucian and Plutarch lead straight to Johnson.
507. “In his Juvenilia ... his rhyme is always constrained or forced.”—
Discourse on Satire.
508. Chapelain might like the early romances (v. supra, p. 260). But here
Boileau was the spokesman of France.
509. They have deceived the very elect, e.g., M. Rigault, who in not
altogether unnatural amazement at the dictum, “Spenser wanted only to
have read the rules of Bossu,” classes (Q. des A. et des M., p. 311) Dryden
as an ancien enragé. But M. Rigault is at a wrong angle in most of the
English part of his book,—so much so as to strike a chill into any one who
has to criticise a foreign literature, lest, lacking the grace of the Muses, he
too go astray.
510. A phrase of Blake’s.
511. The fact is that the two are parts of the same book; and that a second
edition of the first appeared in 1692, just before the first of the second next
year.
512. Vol. ii. pp. 107-130 of the 1706 edition of Rapin in English. At p.
113 Rymer says that he will not here examine the various qualities which
503. Scott, xv. 337; Ker, i. 75.
504. In the Discourse on Satire. Scott, xiii. 3; Ker, ii. 17.
505. “I have further to add that I seldom use the wit and language of any
romance or play which I undertake to alter; because my own invention, as
bad as it is, can furnish me with nothing so dull as what is there.” These
invocations of Nemesis are seldom unheard by the acute ears of that satiric
Goddess.
506. Lesser, but far from negligible; for the Character of Saint-Evremond
is both personally and critically interesting, and the critical biographies of
Lucian and Plutarch lead straight to Johnson.
507. “In his Juvenilia ... his rhyme is always constrained or forced.”—
Discourse on Satire.
508. Chapelain might like the early romances (v. supra, p. 260). But here
Boileau was the spokesman of France.
509. They have deceived the very elect, e.g., M. Rigault, who in not
altogether unnatural amazement at the dictum, “Spenser wanted only to
have read the rules of Bossu,” classes (Q. des A. et des M., p. 311) Dryden
as an ancien enragé. But M. Rigault is at a wrong angle in most of the
English part of his book,—so much so as to strike a chill into any one who
has to criticise a foreign literature, lest, lacking the grace of the Muses, he
too go astray.
510. A phrase of Blake’s.
511. The fact is that the two are parts of the same book; and that a second
edition of the first appeared in 1692, just before the first of the second next
year.
512. Vol. ii. pp. 107-130 of the 1706 edition of Rapin in English. At p.
113 Rymer says that he will not here examine the various qualities which
Page 411
make English fit above all other languages for Heroic Poesy, “the world
expecting these matters learnedly and largely discussed in a particular
treatise on that subject.” This apparently important announcement is
marginally annotated “Sheringham.” I suppose this was Robert S., a
Norfolk man (as his name imports), of Caius College, and Proctor at
Cambridge just before the Commonwealth ejection. He is described (see
Dict. Nat. Biog.) as an “excellent linguist,” but seems to have been more of
an antiquary than of a man of letters. As the D. N. B. says nothing of any
such work as Rymer glances at, I suppose the world was disappointed of it
by his sudden death in May 1678, four years after Rymer wrote.
513. I do not think that Rymer ever intended to be rude to Dryden,
though his clumsy allusions to “Bays” in the Short View naturally rubbed
the discrowned Laureate the wrong way for a time.
514. Rymer’s elaborate directions for removing the Romantic offence of
this play, and adjusting it to Classical correctness and decorum, are among
the most involuntarily funny things in criticism (pp. 19-24).
515. Rymer knew something of Old French. How horrified he would
have been if he had come across the lines in Floriant et Florete (2904,
2905)—
“Si samble qu' enfes voit disant
'Baise, baise, je voil baisier!”
516. It has (excluding an appended extract from the Registers of the
Parliament of Paris about Mysteries) only 168 pages of perhaps 200 words
each; and much of it is quotation. But it is far longer than The Tragedies of
the Last Age.
517. Short View, p. 94.
518. Ibid., p. 144.
519. It is curious to read the deliberately stupid misunderstanding of
Aristotle by which this is justified.
expecting these matters learnedly and largely discussed in a particular
treatise on that subject.” This apparently important announcement is
marginally annotated “Sheringham.” I suppose this was Robert S., a
Norfolk man (as his name imports), of Caius College, and Proctor at
Cambridge just before the Commonwealth ejection. He is described (see
Dict. Nat. Biog.) as an “excellent linguist,” but seems to have been more of
an antiquary than of a man of letters. As the D. N. B. says nothing of any
such work as Rymer glances at, I suppose the world was disappointed of it
by his sudden death in May 1678, four years after Rymer wrote.
513. I do not think that Rymer ever intended to be rude to Dryden,
though his clumsy allusions to “Bays” in the Short View naturally rubbed
the discrowned Laureate the wrong way for a time.
514. Rymer’s elaborate directions for removing the Romantic offence of
this play, and adjusting it to Classical correctness and decorum, are among
the most involuntarily funny things in criticism (pp. 19-24).
515. Rymer knew something of Old French. How horrified he would
have been if he had come across the lines in Floriant et Florete (2904,
2905)—
“Si samble qu' enfes voit disant
'Baise, baise, je voil baisier!”
516. It has (excluding an appended extract from the Registers of the
Parliament of Paris about Mysteries) only 168 pages of perhaps 200 words
each; and much of it is quotation. But it is far longer than The Tragedies of
the Last Age.
517. Short View, p. 94.
518. Ibid., p. 144.
519. It is curious to read the deliberately stupid misunderstanding of
Aristotle by which this is justified.
Page 412
520. It may be not unamusing to give an instance or two of the way in
which Nemesis has made poor Tom speak truth unconsciously,—
“They who like this author’s writing will not be offended to find so much
repeated from him” [Shakespeare].—P. 108.
“Never in the world had any pagan Poet his brains turned at this
monstrous rate.”—P. 111.
“No Pagan poet but would have found some machine for her
deliverance.”—P. 134.
“Portia is ... scarce one remove from a Natural. She is the own cousin-
german ... with Desdemona.”—P. 156.
521. His best deed was to elicit from Dryden, in Heads of an Answer to
Rymer (Works, xv. 390), the memorable observation that "if Aristotle had
seen ours [i.e., "our plays"] he might have changed his mind." One may add
that, if Dryden had worked these “Heads” out, he might have solved the
whole mystery of criticism as far as in all probability it ever can be solved,
or at the very least as far as it could be solved with the knowledge of
literature at his disposal.
522. History of the Royal Society, 4to, London, 1667, p. 111 sq. It may
be found conveniently extracted at vol. iii. pp. 271, 272 of Sir Henry
Craik’s English Prose Selections (London, 1894).
523. It is well known that Thomas Heywood, the dramatist, had planned,
if he did not actually execute, a Lives of the Poets very much earlier, and
some sanguine souls have hoped that it may yet turn up. But the famous
passage about poets’ nicknames, as well as the whole cast of Heywood’s
work, suggests that, though biography may have lost something, criticism
has not lost much.
524. London 12mo.
525. 8vo, London, 1686.
526. 1691: but pirated earlier.
527. I do not know whether this was cause or consequence of his being a
friend of Shadwell. But I am bound to note, though with much surprise, that
which Nemesis has made poor Tom speak truth unconsciously,—
“They who like this author’s writing will not be offended to find so much
repeated from him” [Shakespeare].—P. 108.
“Never in the world had any pagan Poet his brains turned at this
monstrous rate.”—P. 111.
“No Pagan poet but would have found some machine for her
deliverance.”—P. 134.
“Portia is ... scarce one remove from a Natural. She is the own cousin-
german ... with Desdemona.”—P. 156.
521. His best deed was to elicit from Dryden, in Heads of an Answer to
Rymer (Works, xv. 390), the memorable observation that "if Aristotle had
seen ours [i.e., "our plays"] he might have changed his mind." One may add
that, if Dryden had worked these “Heads” out, he might have solved the
whole mystery of criticism as far as in all probability it ever can be solved,
or at the very least as far as it could be solved with the knowledge of
literature at his disposal.
522. History of the Royal Society, 4to, London, 1667, p. 111 sq. It may
be found conveniently extracted at vol. iii. pp. 271, 272 of Sir Henry
Craik’s English Prose Selections (London, 1894).
523. It is well known that Thomas Heywood, the dramatist, had planned,
if he did not actually execute, a Lives of the Poets very much earlier, and
some sanguine souls have hoped that it may yet turn up. But the famous
passage about poets’ nicknames, as well as the whole cast of Heywood’s
work, suggests that, though biography may have lost something, criticism
has not lost much.
524. London 12mo.
525. 8vo, London, 1686.
526. 1691: but pirated earlier.
527. I do not know whether this was cause or consequence of his being a
friend of Shadwell. But I am bound to note, though with much surprise, that
Page 413
my friend Mr Sidney Lee finds (D. N. B.) “no malice” in Langbaine.
528. This is the odder, and the more discreditable, because one of the few
things to be counted to Langbaine for righteousness is a distinct admiration
of Shakespeare.
529. Ed. 1757, vol. iii., pp. 394-501, containing the Poetry, the Ancient
and Modern Learning, and the Thoughts upon Reviewing that Essay. Some
have charitably found in Temple better knowledge of the Moderns, whom
he scorned, than of the Ancients, whom he championed, on the strength of
his references to “Runes” and “Gothic Dithyrambics.” I cannot be so
amiable. It is all a mere parade of pretentious sciolism varnished by style.
530. Diss., § xvi. My copy is the London ed. of 1817.
531. A Short View of the Profaneness and Immorality of the English
Stage. London, 1698. The great popularity of the book caused it to be
quickly reprinted: my copy, though of the first year, is the third edition.
Collier’s rejoinder to his victims next year contains good things, but is of
less importance. And it does not matter much to us whether he originally
drew anything from the Prince de Conti’s pietist Traité Sur la Comédie
(1667). The Ancients, and the Fathers, and the Puritans were in any case
quite sufficient sources.
532. Essays upon Several Moral Subjects (3rd ed., 2 vols., London,
1698). Nor can one make out an entirely good case (though something may
be done) for Collier in the matter of that description of Shakespeare, which
Mr Browning has maliciously chosen, as a motto for Ferishtah’s Fancies,
from the Historical Dictionary: “His genius was jocular, but, when
disposed, he could be very serious.”
533. De Re Poetica, or Remarks upon Poetry, &c., 4to, London, 1694. It
is even said to have first appeared in 1690.
534. Both Roscommon and Mulgrave were critics in their way, and the
former’s Essay on Translated Verse is one of those numerous documents
which would have been of the utmost service to us in the last volume, but
which cannot receive detailed treatment in this.
528. This is the odder, and the more discreditable, because one of the few
things to be counted to Langbaine for righteousness is a distinct admiration
of Shakespeare.
529. Ed. 1757, vol. iii., pp. 394-501, containing the Poetry, the Ancient
and Modern Learning, and the Thoughts upon Reviewing that Essay. Some
have charitably found in Temple better knowledge of the Moderns, whom
he scorned, than of the Ancients, whom he championed, on the strength of
his references to “Runes” and “Gothic Dithyrambics.” I cannot be so
amiable. It is all a mere parade of pretentious sciolism varnished by style.
530. Diss., § xvi. My copy is the London ed. of 1817.
531. A Short View of the Profaneness and Immorality of the English
Stage. London, 1698. The great popularity of the book caused it to be
quickly reprinted: my copy, though of the first year, is the third edition.
Collier’s rejoinder to his victims next year contains good things, but is of
less importance. And it does not matter much to us whether he originally
drew anything from the Prince de Conti’s pietist Traité Sur la Comédie
(1667). The Ancients, and the Fathers, and the Puritans were in any case
quite sufficient sources.
532. Essays upon Several Moral Subjects (3rd ed., 2 vols., London,
1698). Nor can one make out an entirely good case (though something may
be done) for Collier in the matter of that description of Shakespeare, which
Mr Browning has maliciously chosen, as a motto for Ferishtah’s Fancies,
from the Historical Dictionary: “His genius was jocular, but, when
disposed, he could be very serious.”
533. De Re Poetica, or Remarks upon Poetry, &c., 4to, London, 1694. It
is even said to have first appeared in 1690.
534. Both Roscommon and Mulgrave were critics in their way, and the
former’s Essay on Translated Verse is one of those numerous documents
which would have been of the utmost service to us in the last volume, but
which cannot receive detailed treatment in this.
Page 414
535. The remark may with more proportion be made of Cœlius himself, a
very worthy Humanist, whom Lilius Giraldus pronounces to be multifariam
eruditus, parum tamen in pangendis versibus versatus.
536. The Athenian Mercury (1690-97) ran to twenty volumes. The
Oracle, from which the late Mr Underhill made his interesting selection
(London, n. d.), was issued in four. I have one (London, 1703), which calls
itself an “Entire Collection,” as well as Athenian Sport (London, 1707), and
The British Apollo, (3rd ed., London, 1718).
537. An exception may perhaps be made in favour of J. [Cornand] de La
Croze’s Works of the Learned, which, translated wholly or mainly by its
author from the French, began to appear monthly in August 1691, and was
collected before long in a thin quarto volume. Its contents are real reviews
in almost every point—down to some sharp remarks by the editor-reviewer
on plagiarisms by the Athenian Mercury, and complaints of the absence of
indices to lessen the labour of reviewing. The books reviewed are, as a rule,
of no great interest; but the summaries of their contents are generally good,
and the views advanced are at least sometimes made the subject of passably
argumentative discussion.
very worthy Humanist, whom Lilius Giraldus pronounces to be multifariam
eruditus, parum tamen in pangendis versibus versatus.
536. The Athenian Mercury (1690-97) ran to twenty volumes. The
Oracle, from which the late Mr Underhill made his interesting selection
(London, n. d.), was issued in four. I have one (London, 1703), which calls
itself an “Entire Collection,” as well as Athenian Sport (London, 1707), and
The British Apollo, (3rd ed., London, 1718).
537. An exception may perhaps be made in favour of J. [Cornand] de La
Croze’s Works of the Learned, which, translated wholly or mainly by its
author from the French, began to appear monthly in August 1691, and was
collected before long in a thin quarto volume. Its contents are real reviews
in almost every point—down to some sharp remarks by the editor-reviewer
on plagiarisms by the Athenian Mercury, and complaints of the absence of
indices to lessen the labour of reviewing. The books reviewed are, as a rule,
of no great interest; but the summaries of their contents are generally good,
and the views advanced are at least sometimes made the subject of passably
argumentative discussion.
Page 415
INTERCHAPTER V.
In the present Interchapter we come to a sort of Omphalos of the whole
projected History. Here and here only, up to the present day, do we find a
Catholic Faith of criticism, not merely at last constituted, but practically
accepted over the whole literary world. In ancient times, though it is not
difficult to discern a creed of a not wholly dissimilar character, yet that
creed was arrived at in roundabout fashion, and was never applied
universally to poetry and prose as literature. In the Middle Ages there was
no such creed at all. In the century which—or rather a certain aspect of it—
will furnish us with the subject of the last Book of the present volume, the
catholic faith still maintains, and even, as is the wont of such things, rather
tightens, its hold as received orthodoxy; but there are grumblings, and
threatenings, and upheavals on the one hand, and on the other the tendency
to a dangerous latitudinarianism. In that which, with the permission of the
fates, will, with the Dissidents of the Eighteenth, give the subject of the
next volume, there is no parallel consensus even of a prevailing party. Take
a dozen critics of any distinction, at different times and in different
countries of the seventeenth century in Europe, and ask them to enunciate
some general laws and principles of literary criticism. The results, if not
slavishly identical, would be practically the same, putting aside particular
and half unreal squabbles of Ancient and Modern and the like. Do the same
at any time for the last hundred—certainly for the last seventy or eighty—
years, and the result would be a Babel. If any two of the utterances did not
betray direct contradiction, it would probably be because the speakers
began at entirely different facets of the subject.
Whether this literary unanimity—which resembles the ecclesiastical
unanimity, on the ruins of which it grew, not least in being a little unreal—
was a good thing or a bad thing in itself, is one of those larger questions
which we do not purpose to argue out here. The point for us is that it
existed. It was compatible, as in the other case, with a good deal of minor
In the present Interchapter we come to a sort of Omphalos of the whole
projected History. Here and here only, up to the present day, do we find a
Catholic Faith of criticism, not merely at last constituted, but practically
accepted over the whole literary world. In ancient times, though it is not
difficult to discern a creed of a not wholly dissimilar character, yet that
creed was arrived at in roundabout fashion, and was never applied
universally to poetry and prose as literature. In the Middle Ages there was
no such creed at all. In the century which—or rather a certain aspect of it—
will furnish us with the subject of the last Book of the present volume, the
catholic faith still maintains, and even, as is the wont of such things, rather
tightens, its hold as received orthodoxy; but there are grumblings, and
threatenings, and upheavals on the one hand, and on the other the tendency
to a dangerous latitudinarianism. In that which, with the permission of the
fates, will, with the Dissidents of the Eighteenth, give the subject of the
next volume, there is no parallel consensus even of a prevailing party. Take
a dozen critics of any distinction, at different times and in different
countries of the seventeenth century in Europe, and ask them to enunciate
some general laws and principles of literary criticism. The results, if not
slavishly identical, would be practically the same, putting aside particular
and half unreal squabbles of Ancient and Modern and the like. Do the same
at any time for the last hundred—certainly for the last seventy or eighty—
years, and the result would be a Babel. If any two of the utterances did not
betray direct contradiction, it would probably be because the speakers
began at entirely different facets of the subject.
Whether this literary unanimity—which resembles the ecclesiastical
unanimity, on the ruins of which it grew, not least in being a little unreal—
was a good thing or a bad thing in itself, is one of those larger questions
which we do not purpose to argue out here. The point for us is that it
existed. It was compatible, as in the other case, with a good deal of minor
Page 416
difference: there might be literary Scotists and Thomists; there might even
(as in the Ancient and Modern case) be a Great Schism of the most
apparently important kind. But this was as a rule mere jangling; and the
more serious of the Moderns generally tried to make out little more than
that their favourites could claim as much, or more, of the graces which both
esteemed, as the other people’s favourites possessed.
We have seen in the last Interchapter how something like this creed had
been achieved—though not without a good deal of opposition, and hardly,
in any case, with the result of authoritative and complete statement—in
Italy, and to some extent borrowed thence, in other countries, before the end
of the sixteenth century itself. The seventeenth did little more than
crystallise it, lay stress on particular points, fill up some gaps, arrange,
codify, illustrate. The absence of dissidence, except on the minor points, is
most remarkable. In regard to Aristotle, in particular, there are no Patrizzis
and hardly any Castelvetros. Men tack on a considerable body of
Apocrypha to the canonical books of the Stagirite, and misinterpret not a
little that he actually said. But they never take his general authority in
question, seldom the authority of any ancient, and that of Horace least of
all. The two great artificial conceptions of the elaborate “Unities” drama,
with Acts and Scenes taking the place of the choric divisions, and of the still
more artificial “Heroic Poem,” with its Fable, its Epic Unity, its Machines,
and so forth, acquire in theory—if luckily, as, for instance, in England, by
no means in practice—greater and greater dignity. It becomes a sort of
truism that the drama is the most beautiful and ingenious, the heroic poem
the noblest, thing on which the human mind can exercise itself. But they are
difficult things, sir! very difficult things. Each is sharply isolated as a Kind:
and the other Kinds are ranged around and below them. You never criticise
any thing first in itself, but with immediate reference to its Kind. If it does
not fulfil the specifications of that Kind, it is either cast out at once or
regarded with the deepest suspicion.
Further, all the Kinds in particular, as well as Poetry itself in general,
possess, and are distinguished by, Qualities which are, in the same way,
rigidly demanded and inquired into. It is generally, if not quite universally,
admitted that a poem must please: though critics are not quite agreed
whether you are bound to please only so as to instruct. But you must please
in the Kind, by the Quality, according to the Rule. There is no room for
nondescripts; or, if they are admitted at all, they must cease to be
(as in the Ancient and Modern case) be a Great Schism of the most
apparently important kind. But this was as a rule mere jangling; and the
more serious of the Moderns generally tried to make out little more than
that their favourites could claim as much, or more, of the graces which both
esteemed, as the other people’s favourites possessed.
We have seen in the last Interchapter how something like this creed had
been achieved—though not without a good deal of opposition, and hardly,
in any case, with the result of authoritative and complete statement—in
Italy, and to some extent borrowed thence, in other countries, before the end
of the sixteenth century itself. The seventeenth did little more than
crystallise it, lay stress on particular points, fill up some gaps, arrange,
codify, illustrate. The absence of dissidence, except on the minor points, is
most remarkable. In regard to Aristotle, in particular, there are no Patrizzis
and hardly any Castelvetros. Men tack on a considerable body of
Apocrypha to the canonical books of the Stagirite, and misinterpret not a
little that he actually said. But they never take his general authority in
question, seldom the authority of any ancient, and that of Horace least of
all. The two great artificial conceptions of the elaborate “Unities” drama,
with Acts and Scenes taking the place of the choric divisions, and of the still
more artificial “Heroic Poem,” with its Fable, its Epic Unity, its Machines,
and so forth, acquire in theory—if luckily, as, for instance, in England, by
no means in practice—greater and greater dignity. It becomes a sort of
truism that the drama is the most beautiful and ingenious, the heroic poem
the noblest, thing on which the human mind can exercise itself. But they are
difficult things, sir! very difficult things. Each is sharply isolated as a Kind:
and the other Kinds are ranged around and below them. You never criticise
any thing first in itself, but with immediate reference to its Kind. If it does
not fulfil the specifications of that Kind, it is either cast out at once or
regarded with the deepest suspicion.
Further, all the Kinds in particular, as well as Poetry itself in general,
possess, and are distinguished by, Qualities which are, in the same way,
rigidly demanded and inquired into. It is generally, if not quite universally,
admitted that a poem must please: though critics are not quite agreed
whether you are bound to please only so as to instruct. But you must please
in the Kind, by the Quality, according to the Rule. There is no room for
nondescripts; or, if they are admitted at all, they must cease to be
Page 417
nondescripts, and become Heroi-comic, Heroi-satiric, “Tragical-comical-
historical-pastoral,”[538] or what not.
This general view may seem unorthodox to those who put faith in the
notion—to be found in some books of worth, as well as of worship—that
there was a “Romantic revolt” in the beginning of the seventeenth century
—that there was even a kind of irruption or recrudescence of mediæval
barbarism, and that the pronounced and hardened classicism of the later
century was a fresh reaction—a case of Boileau à la rescousse! The texts,
and the facts, and the dates, do not, to my thinking, justify this view of
history, in so far, at least, as criticism is concerned. The crystallising of the
classical creed goes on regardless of Euphuism, earlier and later, in
England, of Marinism in Italy, of Culteranism and Conceptism in Spain, of
the irregular outburst of similar tastes in France, which marks the reign of
Louis XIII. As we have seen, Ogier, in the last named country, at the very
moment of striking a blow for Romantic drama, admits that the critics are
against him; and we have also seen how they were. In England, Sidney, at
the beginning of the great Elizabethan period, holds out hands to Jonson at
the end. The very Spanish Romantics, when they come to consider the
matter critically, make an unblushing transaction between conscientious
theory and popular practice: and such an Italian iconoclast as Beni is
classical, in the very act and process of belittling the classics.
At the same time, this accepted faith of Criticism, when we come to
examine it, is a very peculiar Catholicity. Uncompromisingly Aristotelian in
profession, its Aristotelianism, as has been recognised by an increasing
number of experts from the time of Lessing downwards, is hopelessly
adulterated. Many of the insertions and accretions are purely arbitrary:
others come from a combination of inability to forget, and obstinate refusal
frankly to recognise, the fact that the case is quite a different case from that
which Aristotle was diagnosing. But, by the time at least when the creed
became triumphant, a new Pope, a new Court of Appeal, has been foisted
in, styling itself Good Sense, Reason, or even (though quite Antiphysic)
Nature. That this anti-Pope, this Antiphysis, was partly created by the
excesses of the Euphuist-Gongorist movements, need not be denied; but this
is comparatively irrelevant. We have traced above, in almost all their
principal exponents, the curious, and sometimes very ludicrous, attempt to
conciliate that furor poeticus which the ancients had never denied, with
those dictates of good sense which the ancients were presumed to have
historical-pastoral,”[538] or what not.
This general view may seem unorthodox to those who put faith in the
notion—to be found in some books of worth, as well as of worship—that
there was a “Romantic revolt” in the beginning of the seventeenth century
—that there was even a kind of irruption or recrudescence of mediæval
barbarism, and that the pronounced and hardened classicism of the later
century was a fresh reaction—a case of Boileau à la rescousse! The texts,
and the facts, and the dates, do not, to my thinking, justify this view of
history, in so far, at least, as criticism is concerned. The crystallising of the
classical creed goes on regardless of Euphuism, earlier and later, in
England, of Marinism in Italy, of Culteranism and Conceptism in Spain, of
the irregular outburst of similar tastes in France, which marks the reign of
Louis XIII. As we have seen, Ogier, in the last named country, at the very
moment of striking a blow for Romantic drama, admits that the critics are
against him; and we have also seen how they were. In England, Sidney, at
the beginning of the great Elizabethan period, holds out hands to Jonson at
the end. The very Spanish Romantics, when they come to consider the
matter critically, make an unblushing transaction between conscientious
theory and popular practice: and such an Italian iconoclast as Beni is
classical, in the very act and process of belittling the classics.
At the same time, this accepted faith of Criticism, when we come to
examine it, is a very peculiar Catholicity. Uncompromisingly Aristotelian in
profession, its Aristotelianism, as has been recognised by an increasing
number of experts from the time of Lessing downwards, is hopelessly
adulterated. Many of the insertions and accretions are purely arbitrary:
others come from a combination of inability to forget, and obstinate refusal
frankly to recognise, the fact that the case is quite a different case from that
which Aristotle was diagnosing. But, by the time at least when the creed
became triumphant, a new Pope, a new Court of Appeal, has been foisted
in, styling itself Good Sense, Reason, or even (though quite Antiphysic)
Nature. That this anti-Pope, this Antiphysis, was partly created by the
excesses of the Euphuist-Gongorist movements, need not be denied; but this
is comparatively irrelevant. We have traced above, in almost all their
principal exponents, the curious, and sometimes very ludicrous, attempt to
conciliate that furor poeticus which the ancients had never denied, with
those dictates of good sense which the ancients were presumed to have
Page 418
accepted and embodied. A professed satirist could evolve, in his happiest
moments, nothing more comic than the eirenicon of Mambrun,[539] or, rather,
than his clinical examination of the poet in fury, and his observation of the
poet in his right mind.
The survey of the development of this phenomenon, or group of
phenomena, in different countries, requires less minuteness than was
needed in the last Interchapter, because the central stage of the movement is
both of less importance and of less complexity than the beginnings of it: but
it is essential to the scheme of these Interchapters, and to that of the whole
book, that some such survey should be given.
In Italy, as we have seen, the results of the period were almost
insignificant—a fact no doubt connected with, though in no sense
necessarily caused by, the declension of the Italian creative genius after
Tasso. We have, it may be hoped, established, by the slow but irresistible
process of reciting the actual history, the truth that no constant ratio exists
between periods of creation and periods of criticism—that they may go
hand in hand, or that one may follow the other, or that both may fail to put
in any important appearance, as Fate and metaphysical aid may determine.
This, for Italy, was a period of the last kind, though not one of its very worst
examples. The Italians continued both to play at criticism in their
Academies, and to accumulate solid though second-hand work in such
laboratories as those of Aromatari. They fought out the half-mock battle of
the Ancients and Moderns, as became them, before other nations meddled
with it: and they still maintained, for long, though not for the whole time,
that position of supremacy, as masters in title to Europe, which the great
achievements of the preceding century had given them. But they added
nothing to their claims, and by degrees the supremacy passed from them.[540]
That it passed to France is an accepted truth, and like most, though not
all, accepted truths, this has so much of the real quality that it is idle to cavil
at it. That it has been abused there can be little doubt—or could be little if
people would take the small trouble necessary to ascertain the facts. I do not
know who first invented the term “Gallo-Classic,” which, to judge by those
Röntgen rays which the reader of examination-papers can apply, has sunk
deep into the youthful mind of this country. It is a bad word. I have taken
leave to call it “question-begging, clumsy, and incomplete,” before now;
and I repeat those epithets with a fresh emphasis here. It begs the question
whether “Italo-Classic” would not, in its own kind, be the properer term: it
moments, nothing more comic than the eirenicon of Mambrun,[539] or, rather,
than his clinical examination of the poet in fury, and his observation of the
poet in his right mind.
The survey of the development of this phenomenon, or group of
phenomena, in different countries, requires less minuteness than was
needed in the last Interchapter, because the central stage of the movement is
both of less importance and of less complexity than the beginnings of it: but
it is essential to the scheme of these Interchapters, and to that of the whole
book, that some such survey should be given.
In Italy, as we have seen, the results of the period were almost
insignificant—a fact no doubt connected with, though in no sense
necessarily caused by, the declension of the Italian creative genius after
Tasso. We have, it may be hoped, established, by the slow but irresistible
process of reciting the actual history, the truth that no constant ratio exists
between periods of creation and periods of criticism—that they may go
hand in hand, or that one may follow the other, or that both may fail to put
in any important appearance, as Fate and metaphysical aid may determine.
This, for Italy, was a period of the last kind, though not one of its very worst
examples. The Italians continued both to play at criticism in their
Academies, and to accumulate solid though second-hand work in such
laboratories as those of Aromatari. They fought out the half-mock battle of
the Ancients and Moderns, as became them, before other nations meddled
with it: and they still maintained, for long, though not for the whole time,
that position of supremacy, as masters in title to Europe, which the great
achievements of the preceding century had given them. But they added
nothing to their claims, and by degrees the supremacy passed from them.[540]
That it passed to France is an accepted truth, and like most, though not
all, accepted truths, this has so much of the real quality that it is idle to cavil
at it. That it has been abused there can be little doubt—or could be little if
people would take the small trouble necessary to ascertain the facts. I do not
know who first invented the term “Gallo-Classic,” which, to judge by those
Röntgen rays which the reader of examination-papers can apply, has sunk
deep into the youthful mind of this country. It is a bad word. I have taken
leave to call it “question-begging, clumsy, and incomplete,” before now;
and I repeat those epithets with a fresh emphasis here. It begs the question
whether “Italo-Classic” would not, in its own kind, be the properer term: it
Page 419
is clumsy because the two parts of it are not used in the same sense; and it is
incomplete because it does not intimate that much beside French influence,
and that a very peculiar and sophisticated kind of Classical influence, went
to the making of the thing. But there was French influence: and for some
three-quarters of a century France was the head manufactory in which
Italian, Classical, and other ideas were torn up and remade into a sort of
critical shoddy with which (as with other French shoddy in that and other
times) Europe was rather too eager to clothe itself. Some pains have been
taken in the foregoing Book to put the reader in a position to appreciate the
real rise, progress, and history of French criticism of the Neo-classic[541]
type. The survey, whatever difference may exist as to its justice in matter of
opinion, will not, I think, be found erring in matters of fact: and it will show
that the position usually accorded to Boileau requires some reconsideration.
But Boileau was undoubtedly the greatest man of letters who, holding these
views, devoted himself specially and definitely to the expression of them;
and, for good or for ill, his name is associated with the movement. I agree
with Keats,[542] who here, as in so many other matters, came right by genius.
Those of us who do not possess this royal key can, at any rate, if we choose
to take the trouble, come right by knowledge.
The Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns—though we have spoken hard
words of it—might look like revolt against the tyranny of Despréaux, and it
undoubtedly spread seeds of the more successful revolution which
followed; but the more one studies it, the more one sees that the revolt was
in the main unconscious. As we have partly shown, and as might be shown
much more fully, the Moderns were, as a rule, just as “classical” in their
ideas as the Ancients. They were as incapable of catholic judgment; they
were even more ignorant of literature as a whole: they were at least as apt to
introduce non-literary criteria; they were as much under the obsession of the
Kind, the Rule (cast-iron, not leaden), the sweeping generalisation. Too
commonly the thing comes to this—that the man who can conjugate tupto
will not hear of anything which lessens the importance of that gift, and that
the man who cannot conjugate tupto will not hear of any virtue attaching to
it.
Most other countries require little notice here. The Germans make
practically no figure; the Dutch confine themselves to classical study and
the popularisation of reviewing; and the Spaniards, with characteristic
indolence, refuse to work out the interesting problem presented to them by
incomplete because it does not intimate that much beside French influence,
and that a very peculiar and sophisticated kind of Classical influence, went
to the making of the thing. But there was French influence: and for some
three-quarters of a century France was the head manufactory in which
Italian, Classical, and other ideas were torn up and remade into a sort of
critical shoddy with which (as with other French shoddy in that and other
times) Europe was rather too eager to clothe itself. Some pains have been
taken in the foregoing Book to put the reader in a position to appreciate the
real rise, progress, and history of French criticism of the Neo-classic[541]
type. The survey, whatever difference may exist as to its justice in matter of
opinion, will not, I think, be found erring in matters of fact: and it will show
that the position usually accorded to Boileau requires some reconsideration.
But Boileau was undoubtedly the greatest man of letters who, holding these
views, devoted himself specially and definitely to the expression of them;
and, for good or for ill, his name is associated with the movement. I agree
with Keats,[542] who here, as in so many other matters, came right by genius.
Those of us who do not possess this royal key can, at any rate, if we choose
to take the trouble, come right by knowledge.
The Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns—though we have spoken hard
words of it—might look like revolt against the tyranny of Despréaux, and it
undoubtedly spread seeds of the more successful revolution which
followed; but the more one studies it, the more one sees that the revolt was
in the main unconscious. As we have partly shown, and as might be shown
much more fully, the Moderns were, as a rule, just as “classical” in their
ideas as the Ancients. They were as incapable of catholic judgment; they
were even more ignorant of literature as a whole: they were at least as apt to
introduce non-literary criteria; they were as much under the obsession of the
Kind, the Rule (cast-iron, not leaden), the sweeping generalisation. Too
commonly the thing comes to this—that the man who can conjugate tupto
will not hear of anything which lessens the importance of that gift, and that
the man who cannot conjugate tupto will not hear of any virtue attaching to
it.
Most other countries require little notice here. The Germans make
practically no figure; the Dutch confine themselves to classical study and
the popularisation of reviewing; and the Spaniards, with characteristic
indolence, refuse to work out the interesting problem presented to them by
Page 420
the recalcitrance of their national drama to the consecrated ideas of the
general creed. England is of more importance. I have tried to show that it is
of very much more; but this importance belongs entirely to one man. This
one man in his time played many parts: and as the main aim of literature is
to give pleasure, and to produce original sources thereof, we cannot perhaps
say that his critical part was the greatest. But we may almost say that it was
the most important. We can imagine English literature without the poetry of
Dryden: it would be wofully impoverished, but somebody would take up
the burden, probably before Pope. Certainly Pope would take it up, though
with much more to do. But English criticism, and, what is more, European
criticism of the best and most fruitful kind, would have had, if Dryden had
been absent, to seek some totally new source: and it is impossible to tell
where that source would have been found. There is no precedent—Lilius
Giraldus and Patrizzi between them might have produced one in Italy, but it
is of the highest significance that they did not—for Dryden’s peculiar way
of shaking different literatures and different examples of literature together,
of indicating the things that please him in all, and of at least attempting to
find out why they please him. It is this, not his parade of Rules, and his
gleanings from the books, that makes his critical glory: and it is this in
which, among critics up to his own time, he is alone.
Yet even he does parade “rules”; even he does belaud Rapin, and Le
Bossu, and even Rymer; even he would have been, no doubt, quite as ready
to take the oath to Boileau as he was nobly determined not to take it to
William. His genius is recalcitrant to the orthodoxy of the time; but
something else in him accepts it. It is not for nothing that he never
published that word of power which dissolves all the spells of Duessa
—“Had Aristotle seen our plays he might have changed his mind.”
That, however, there was, at any rate in the earlier part of the time, much
blind, and even a little conscious revolt against classicism, independent of
the Ancient and Modern quarrel, is not to be wholly denied. I have hinted
doubts as to the correctness of regarding the Euphuist-Metaphysical
extravagances in England, Marinism in Italy, Gongorism in Spain, and the
fantastic and “precious” fancies which mark the reign of Louis XIII. and the
Fronde in France, as either deliberate reactions against classicism, or
abortive births and false dawns of Romance. They are in almost every case
direct results of the Romantic or mediæval side of the earlier Renaissance—
last things, not first. But, by the end of the century, they were almost
general creed. England is of more importance. I have tried to show that it is
of very much more; but this importance belongs entirely to one man. This
one man in his time played many parts: and as the main aim of literature is
to give pleasure, and to produce original sources thereof, we cannot perhaps
say that his critical part was the greatest. But we may almost say that it was
the most important. We can imagine English literature without the poetry of
Dryden: it would be wofully impoverished, but somebody would take up
the burden, probably before Pope. Certainly Pope would take it up, though
with much more to do. But English criticism, and, what is more, European
criticism of the best and most fruitful kind, would have had, if Dryden had
been absent, to seek some totally new source: and it is impossible to tell
where that source would have been found. There is no precedent—Lilius
Giraldus and Patrizzi between them might have produced one in Italy, but it
is of the highest significance that they did not—for Dryden’s peculiar way
of shaking different literatures and different examples of literature together,
of indicating the things that please him in all, and of at least attempting to
find out why they please him. It is this, not his parade of Rules, and his
gleanings from the books, that makes his critical glory: and it is this in
which, among critics up to his own time, he is alone.
Yet even he does parade “rules”; even he does belaud Rapin, and Le
Bossu, and even Rymer; even he would have been, no doubt, quite as ready
to take the oath to Boileau as he was nobly determined not to take it to
William. His genius is recalcitrant to the orthodoxy of the time; but
something else in him accepts it. It is not for nothing that he never
published that word of power which dissolves all the spells of Duessa
—“Had Aristotle seen our plays he might have changed his mind.”
That, however, there was, at any rate in the earlier part of the time, much
blind, and even a little conscious revolt against classicism, independent of
the Ancient and Modern quarrel, is not to be wholly denied. I have hinted
doubts as to the correctness of regarding the Euphuist-Metaphysical
extravagances in England, Marinism in Italy, Gongorism in Spain, and the
fantastic and “precious” fancies which mark the reign of Louis XIII. and the
Fronde in France, as either deliberate reactions against classicism, or
abortive births and false dawns of Romance. They are in almost every case
direct results of the Romantic or mediæval side of the earlier Renaissance—
last things, not first. But, by the end of the century, they were almost
Page 421
everywhere got well under; though in Spain, their greatest stronghold, it
was not till the eighteenth century itself was some way advanced that Luzán
administered the critical miséricorde, or, if we must use the language of the
country, played despeñador to them. Any other interpretation of the
phenomena seems to me to distort them and make them unintelligible,
while the procession of the Metaphysical from the Spenserian stage, of
Marinism from Tasso, of Gongorism from the great Spanish age, and of the
French extravagants from the Spaniards and Marino, working not a little on
the Pléiade itself, is natural, historical, and consistent with logic. But these
very facts prepare and lead up to the triumph of Neo-Classicism.
By dint, however, of these actions and interactions, there was actually
evolved, towards the end of the century, a sort of false Florimel or Duessa,
who was called Taste. She was rather a Protean Goddess, and reflected the
knowledge or the want of it, the real taste or the want of it, possessed by her
priests and worshippers. The Taste of Dryden and the Taste of Rymer are
two totally different things; there is even a very considerable difference
between the taste of Hédelin and the taste of Bouhours. But in all save the
very happiest minds the Taste of this time, as far as Poetry is concerned
almost wholly, and to a great extent as regards prose, is vitiated by all
manner of mistaken assumptions, polluted by all manner of foolish and
hurtful idolatries. There is the Idol of the Kind which has been noticed; the
Idol of the Quality; the Idol of Good Sense, the most devouring of all.[543] It
is agreed, and agreed very pardonably, that it is not well to write
“And periwig with snow the baldpate woods.”
But the baser folk go on from this—and all but the very noblest have some
difficulty in preventing themselves from going on—to think that a man
should not write
“The multitudinous seas incarnadine.”
There is a sense, and a very proper sense, that, in a certain general way,
style must suit subjects: that you ought not to write to a Child of Quality,
aged five, as you would do to Queen Anne, aged fifty.[544] But this topples
over into the most absurd limitations, so that, a little later than our actual
time, we shall find Pope taking modest credit to himself with Spence for
that, though Virgil in his Pastorals “has sometimes six or eight lines
was not till the eighteenth century itself was some way advanced that Luzán
administered the critical miséricorde, or, if we must use the language of the
country, played despeñador to them. Any other interpretation of the
phenomena seems to me to distort them and make them unintelligible,
while the procession of the Metaphysical from the Spenserian stage, of
Marinism from Tasso, of Gongorism from the great Spanish age, and of the
French extravagants from the Spaniards and Marino, working not a little on
the Pléiade itself, is natural, historical, and consistent with logic. But these
very facts prepare and lead up to the triumph of Neo-Classicism.
By dint, however, of these actions and interactions, there was actually
evolved, towards the end of the century, a sort of false Florimel or Duessa,
who was called Taste. She was rather a Protean Goddess, and reflected the
knowledge or the want of it, the real taste or the want of it, possessed by her
priests and worshippers. The Taste of Dryden and the Taste of Rymer are
two totally different things; there is even a very considerable difference
between the taste of Hédelin and the taste of Bouhours. But in all save the
very happiest minds the Taste of this time, as far as Poetry is concerned
almost wholly, and to a great extent as regards prose, is vitiated by all
manner of mistaken assumptions, polluted by all manner of foolish and
hurtful idolatries. There is the Idol of the Kind which has been noticed; the
Idol of the Quality; the Idol of Good Sense, the most devouring of all.[543] It
is agreed, and agreed very pardonably, that it is not well to write
“And periwig with snow the baldpate woods.”
But the baser folk go on from this—and all but the very noblest have some
difficulty in preventing themselves from going on—to think that a man
should not write
“The multitudinous seas incarnadine.”
There is a sense, and a very proper sense, that, in a certain general way,
style must suit subjects: that you ought not to write to a Child of Quality,
aged five, as you would do to Queen Anne, aged fifty.[544] But this topples
over into the most absurd limitations, so that, a little later than our actual
time, we shall find Pope taking modest credit to himself with Spence for
that, though Virgil in his Pastorals “has sometimes six or eight lines
Page 422
together that are epic,” he had been so scrupulous as “scarce ever to have
two together, even in the Messiah.” Indeed it is hardly possible to find a
better reductio ad absurdum of Neo-Classicism than this. You lay down (as
we saw long ago that Servius did lay it down), from a general induction of
the practice of a particular poet, such and such a rule about Virgil’s styles in
his various works. Then you turn this individual observation into a general
rule. And then you go near to find fault with the very poet from whom you
have derived it because he does not always observe it—as if his
unquestionable exceptions had not as much authority as his supposed rules.
Nor is there any doubt that this fallacy derives colour and support from the
false Good Sense, the Pseudo-Reason. The induction from practice is
hitched on to Reason so as to become a deduction and a demonstration, and
once established as that, you deduce from it anything you like. Meanwhile
Good Sense, as complaisant to the critic as stern to the victim of his
criticism, will approve or disapprove anything that you choose to approve
or disapprove, will set her seal to any arbitrary decision, any unjust or
purblind whim, and can only be trusted with certainty to set her face
invariably against the highest poetry, and often against certain kinds not so
high.[545]
The result of all this is that, with the exception of Dryden and somewhat
later Fontenelle (see next Book), hardly any critics of the time achieve, with
any success, the highest function of the true critic of literature, the
discovery and celebration of beautiful literary things. It is not their business,
or their wish, to set free the “lovely prisoned soul of Eucharis.” If Eucharis
will get a ticket from the patronesses of the contemporary Almack’s, and
dress herself in the prescribed uniform, and come up for judgment with the
proper courtesy, they will do her such justice as Minerva has enabled them
to do; but if not, not. Sometimes (as in the case of the immortal Person of
Quality who took the trouble to get Spenser into order[546]) they will good-
naturedly endeavour to give her a better chance, poor thing! But they will
never kiss the Daughter of Hippocrates on the mouth, and receive the
reward thereto appropriated.[547]
That, on the other hand, there is observable, throughout the century, a
certain interpenetration of the older and more Romantic spirit—in the
creative work chiefly, but even there dying down, in the critical
overmastered from the first, and less and less perceptible,—this opinion
will meet with no contradiction here, but, on the contrary, with the strongest
two together, even in the Messiah.” Indeed it is hardly possible to find a
better reductio ad absurdum of Neo-Classicism than this. You lay down (as
we saw long ago that Servius did lay it down), from a general induction of
the practice of a particular poet, such and such a rule about Virgil’s styles in
his various works. Then you turn this individual observation into a general
rule. And then you go near to find fault with the very poet from whom you
have derived it because he does not always observe it—as if his
unquestionable exceptions had not as much authority as his supposed rules.
Nor is there any doubt that this fallacy derives colour and support from the
false Good Sense, the Pseudo-Reason. The induction from practice is
hitched on to Reason so as to become a deduction and a demonstration, and
once established as that, you deduce from it anything you like. Meanwhile
Good Sense, as complaisant to the critic as stern to the victim of his
criticism, will approve or disapprove anything that you choose to approve
or disapprove, will set her seal to any arbitrary decision, any unjust or
purblind whim, and can only be trusted with certainty to set her face
invariably against the highest poetry, and often against certain kinds not so
high.[545]
The result of all this is that, with the exception of Dryden and somewhat
later Fontenelle (see next Book), hardly any critics of the time achieve, with
any success, the highest function of the true critic of literature, the
discovery and celebration of beautiful literary things. It is not their business,
or their wish, to set free the “lovely prisoned soul of Eucharis.” If Eucharis
will get a ticket from the patronesses of the contemporary Almack’s, and
dress herself in the prescribed uniform, and come up for judgment with the
proper courtesy, they will do her such justice as Minerva has enabled them
to do; but if not, not. Sometimes (as in the case of the immortal Person of
Quality who took the trouble to get Spenser into order[546]) they will good-
naturedly endeavour to give her a better chance, poor thing! But they will
never kiss the Daughter of Hippocrates on the mouth, and receive the
reward thereto appropriated.[547]
That, on the other hand, there is observable, throughout the century, a
certain interpenetration of the older and more Romantic spirit—in the
creative work chiefly, but even there dying down, in the critical
overmastered from the first, and less and less perceptible,—this opinion
will meet with no contradiction here, but, on the contrary, with the strongest
Page 423
support. All the eccentric phenomena, as they may be called, which have
been noticed from Euphuism to Gongorism, are symptoms of this on the
larger scale; and other things—the fancy of Chapelain himself for the
Romances, the lingering attraction which Gongorism exercises even on
such a man as Bouhours—confirm it. Yet even this was, as has been said,
steadily dying down; and by the end of the century the old Phœnix was
nearly in ashes, though the new bird was to take slow rebirth from them. I
am myself inclined to think that the signs of Romantic leaning in Dryden
belong to the new, not to the old, chapter of symptoms; and that in this way
England, the last, save perhaps Spain, to give up, was the first to feel again
for, the standard of Romanticism. But in this Dryden was in advance, not
merely of all his countrymen, but of all Europe; and he did not himself
definitely raise any flag of revolt. On the contrary, he always supposed
himself to be, and sometimes was, arguing for a reasonable and liberal
Classicism.
It was not in flippancy, but in logical connection with the present subject,
that attention was drawn above[548] to a certain aporia of Tassoni’s on the
admitted lovesomeness, body and soul, of le donne brutte, and on the tricks
which bruttezza and bellezza play to each other. If that ingenious poet and
polemic had but pushed his inquiries a little further, and extended them in
purview as well as lineally, he might have come to great things in criticism.
It might, for instance, have struck him whether the accepted notions of
literary beauty were not peculiarly like those of physical beauty, which were
also those of his century. These laws laid it down that “from the chin to the
pit betwixt the collar-bones there must be two lengths of the nose,” that the
whole figure must be “ten faces high,” and that “the inside of the arm, from
the place where the muscle disappears to the middle, is four noses”; while
the careful calculators noted all the while with dismay that both the Apollo
Belvidere and the Medicean Venus set these proportions at the most godlike
defiance.[549] He would (or he might) have observed that, just as when you
have settled exactly what a bella donna must not have, there is apt to sail, or
slip, into the room somebody with that particular characteristic to whom
you become a hopeless slave, so, when you have settled the qualifications
of the drama with the infallibility of Hédelin, and those of the Epic with the
finality of Le Bossu, there comes you out some impudent production which
is an admirable poem, while the obedient begettings of your rules are
worthless rubbish. Tassoni, I say, might have done this; he seems to have
been noticed from Euphuism to Gongorism, are symptoms of this on the
larger scale; and other things—the fancy of Chapelain himself for the
Romances, the lingering attraction which Gongorism exercises even on
such a man as Bouhours—confirm it. Yet even this was, as has been said,
steadily dying down; and by the end of the century the old Phœnix was
nearly in ashes, though the new bird was to take slow rebirth from them. I
am myself inclined to think that the signs of Romantic leaning in Dryden
belong to the new, not to the old, chapter of symptoms; and that in this way
England, the last, save perhaps Spain, to give up, was the first to feel again
for, the standard of Romanticism. But in this Dryden was in advance, not
merely of all his countrymen, but of all Europe; and he did not himself
definitely raise any flag of revolt. On the contrary, he always supposed
himself to be, and sometimes was, arguing for a reasonable and liberal
Classicism.
It was not in flippancy, but in logical connection with the present subject,
that attention was drawn above[548] to a certain aporia of Tassoni’s on the
admitted lovesomeness, body and soul, of le donne brutte, and on the tricks
which bruttezza and bellezza play to each other. If that ingenious poet and
polemic had but pushed his inquiries a little further, and extended them in
purview as well as lineally, he might have come to great things in criticism.
It might, for instance, have struck him whether the accepted notions of
literary beauty were not peculiarly like those of physical beauty, which were
also those of his century. These laws laid it down that “from the chin to the
pit betwixt the collar-bones there must be two lengths of the nose,” that the
whole figure must be “ten faces high,” and that “the inside of the arm, from
the place where the muscle disappears to the middle, is four noses”; while
the careful calculators noted all the while with dismay that both the Apollo
Belvidere and the Medicean Venus set these proportions at the most godlike
defiance.[549] He would (or he might) have observed that, just as when you
have settled exactly what a bella donna must not have, there is apt to sail, or
slip, into the room somebody with that particular characteristic to whom
you become a hopeless slave, so, when you have settled the qualifications
of the drama with the infallibility of Hédelin, and those of the Epic with the
finality of Le Bossu, there comes you out some impudent production which
is an admirable poem, while the obedient begettings of your rules are
worthless rubbish. Tassoni, I say, might have done this; he seems to have
Page 424
had quite the temper to do it; but he did it not. It was doubtless with him, as
with others, a case of Di terrent et Jupiter hostis—the gods of their world
and their time forbade them.
But the angry gods were not wholly able to maintain their anger; and at
the other end of the century, in that Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns
which, for all its irritating ignorationes elenchi, did certainly assist in the
discussion of general æsthetic problems, we find, among other glimpses, an
advance, though only a partial advance, on this suggestion of the Pensieri.
Perrault, who doubtless knew Tassoni (one of his brothers had translated the
Secchia), has a curious passage on the diversity of the forms of feminine
beauty. He had,[550] he says, visited the gallery of a connoisseur who had
collected portraits of the most famous beauties of Europe for a century past.
There were not two of the same type of loveliness; and of the spectators
there were not two who fixed on the same portrait as the most beautiful. But
Perrault, though he has had this glimpse of the true path opened up to him,
does not dare pursue it. He is as convinced as the rest of them that you can
reduce ideas of beauty to a minimum which is always invariable, though
you may add others which vary; and he is perfectly arbitrary in his
admissions and exclusions of these latter. He hates Gothic architecture; it
may be strongly suspected that he would fall far short of Chapelain in
appreciating Romance, for all his fairy tales. His criticisms of the Ancients
belie his theory itself; for he will not open his eyes to see the beauty of their
peculiarity. His remarks on Homer are pitiable. My always estimable and
not seldom admirable predecessor, Blair, was no doubt sadly “left to
himself” when he selected,[551] as the awful example of a man of bad taste,
the person who said that Homer was no better than “some old tale of
chivalry.” But Perrault, I fear, is a more terrible spectacle when he says that
none of the Three Tragedians will bear comparison with Corneille (and I
think I may claim the merit of not undervaluing Corneille), that nobody but
professed scholars can read Aristophanes, and that Ovid is the inferior of
Benserade. When we read these things—and except in Fontenelle, the
eternal exception, they are to be found in every espouser of the Modern
side, just as the corresponding absurdities are to be found in every defender
of the Ancients—there is nothing to say but “This is all out of focus. Both
of you see men as trees walking.”
A summary of the whole merits and defects of neo-classicism must again
be postponed; though with no further prorogation than to the end of the next
with others, a case of Di terrent et Jupiter hostis—the gods of their world
and their time forbade them.
But the angry gods were not wholly able to maintain their anger; and at
the other end of the century, in that Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns
which, for all its irritating ignorationes elenchi, did certainly assist in the
discussion of general æsthetic problems, we find, among other glimpses, an
advance, though only a partial advance, on this suggestion of the Pensieri.
Perrault, who doubtless knew Tassoni (one of his brothers had translated the
Secchia), has a curious passage on the diversity of the forms of feminine
beauty. He had,[550] he says, visited the gallery of a connoisseur who had
collected portraits of the most famous beauties of Europe for a century past.
There were not two of the same type of loveliness; and of the spectators
there were not two who fixed on the same portrait as the most beautiful. But
Perrault, though he has had this glimpse of the true path opened up to him,
does not dare pursue it. He is as convinced as the rest of them that you can
reduce ideas of beauty to a minimum which is always invariable, though
you may add others which vary; and he is perfectly arbitrary in his
admissions and exclusions of these latter. He hates Gothic architecture; it
may be strongly suspected that he would fall far short of Chapelain in
appreciating Romance, for all his fairy tales. His criticisms of the Ancients
belie his theory itself; for he will not open his eyes to see the beauty of their
peculiarity. His remarks on Homer are pitiable. My always estimable and
not seldom admirable predecessor, Blair, was no doubt sadly “left to
himself” when he selected,[551] as the awful example of a man of bad taste,
the person who said that Homer was no better than “some old tale of
chivalry.” But Perrault, I fear, is a more terrible spectacle when he says that
none of the Three Tragedians will bear comparison with Corneille (and I
think I may claim the merit of not undervaluing Corneille), that nobody but
professed scholars can read Aristophanes, and that Ovid is the inferior of
Benserade. When we read these things—and except in Fontenelle, the
eternal exception, they are to be found in every espouser of the Modern
side, just as the corresponding absurdities are to be found in every defender
of the Ancients—there is nothing to say but “This is all out of focus. Both
of you see men as trees walking.”
A summary of the whole merits and defects of neo-classicism must again
be postponed; though with no further prorogation than to the end of the next
Page 425
Book and the present volume. As for the special defects of this special
period we have said enough; and we may conclude this Interchapter with a
glance at its special merits. They are partly of a negative kind, but they
certainly exist. In the Middle Ages, as we have seen, there was no code of
criticism at all; in the sixteenth century only a growing approach to one,
though the approach had become very near at the last. Some outbreaks of
heterodoxy—the last stand of Romance for the time—had, as usually
happens, drawn the orthodox together, had made them sign a definite, or
almost definite, instrument or confession. Just or unjust, adequate or
inadequate, even consistent or inconsistent, as it may be, from the point of
view of a very searching and all-inspecting logic, the neo-classicism of the
late seventeenth century was a thing about which there could be no mistake.
It knew its own mind about everything which it chose to consider, and
valiantly shut its eyes to everything which it chose to ignore. For a time—a
short time only, of course, for the triumph of a religion is always the signal
for the appearance of a heresy—the majority of people had not much more
doubt about what was the proper thing to believe in and admire in literature,
than they had about the multiplication table. It became possible—and it was
done, as we shall see, first in Italy, then elsewhere—to write real literary
histories: it became still more easily possible to criticise new books on a
certain basis of accepted postulates. And it is by no means certain that this
provisional orthodoxy was not a necessary condition of the growth of the
new study of Æsthetic, which, though it has done criticism harm as well as
good, has certainly done it good as well as harm.
Nor is it possible to deny that there was something to admire in the creed
itself. It was weakest—it was in fact exceedingly weak—on the poetical
side; but the world happened to have accumulated a remarkably good stock
of poetry in the last two centuries or so, and a fallow, or a cessation of
manufacture, was not undesirable. Prose, on the other hand, had never been
got into proper order in the vernaculars; and it was urgently desirable that it
should be so got. The very precepts of the classical creed which were most
mischievous in poetry were sovereign for prose. Here also they might
hinder the development of eccentric excellence; but it was not eccentric
excellence that was wanted. Unjust things have been said about the poetry
of the Augustan ages; just things may be said against the criticism which
mainly controlled that poetry. But it is hardly excessive to say that every
precept—not purely metrical—contained in the Arts of Boileau and of
period we have said enough; and we may conclude this Interchapter with a
glance at its special merits. They are partly of a negative kind, but they
certainly exist. In the Middle Ages, as we have seen, there was no code of
criticism at all; in the sixteenth century only a growing approach to one,
though the approach had become very near at the last. Some outbreaks of
heterodoxy—the last stand of Romance for the time—had, as usually
happens, drawn the orthodox together, had made them sign a definite, or
almost definite, instrument or confession. Just or unjust, adequate or
inadequate, even consistent or inconsistent, as it may be, from the point of
view of a very searching and all-inspecting logic, the neo-classicism of the
late seventeenth century was a thing about which there could be no mistake.
It knew its own mind about everything which it chose to consider, and
valiantly shut its eyes to everything which it chose to ignore. For a time—a
short time only, of course, for the triumph of a religion is always the signal
for the appearance of a heresy—the majority of people had not much more
doubt about what was the proper thing to believe in and admire in literature,
than they had about the multiplication table. It became possible—and it was
done, as we shall see, first in Italy, then elsewhere—to write real literary
histories: it became still more easily possible to criticise new books on a
certain basis of accepted postulates. And it is by no means certain that this
provisional orthodoxy was not a necessary condition of the growth of the
new study of Æsthetic, which, though it has done criticism harm as well as
good, has certainly done it good as well as harm.
Nor is it possible to deny that there was something to admire in the creed
itself. It was weakest—it was in fact exceedingly weak—on the poetical
side; but the world happened to have accumulated a remarkably good stock
of poetry in the last two centuries or so, and a fallow, or a cessation of
manufacture, was not undesirable. Prose, on the other hand, had never been
got into proper order in the vernaculars; and it was urgently desirable that it
should be so got. The very precepts of the classical creed which were most
mischievous in poetry were sovereign for prose. Here also they might
hinder the development of eccentric excellence; but it was not eccentric
excellence that was wanted. Unjust things have been said about the poetry
of the Augustan ages; just things may be said against the criticism which
mainly controlled that poetry. But it is hardly excessive to say that every
precept—not purely metrical—contained in the Arts of Boileau and of
Page 426
Pope, is just and true for Prose. You may fly in the face of almost every one
of these precepts and be the better poet for it; fly in the face of almost any
one of them in prose, and you must have extraordinary genius if you do not
rue it.
Even as to poetry itself some defence may be made. This poetry needed
these rules; or rather, to speak more critically, these rules expressed the
spirit of this poetry. The later and weaker metaphysicals in England, and
fantasts in France, the Marinists and Gongorists in Spain and Italy, had
shown what happens when Furor [vere] Poeticus ceases to ply the oars, and
Good Sense has not come to take the helm. It is pretty certain that if this
criticism had not ruled we should not have had good or great Romantic
poetry; we should at best have had (to take England) a few more Dyers and
Lady Winchelseas. But if it had not ruled we should have had a less perfect
Pope and less presentable minorities of this kind, and have been by no
means consoled by a supply of eighteenth-century Clevelands. Once more,
the period has the criticism that it wants, the criticism that will enable it to
give us its own good things at their own best, and to keep off things which
must almost certainly have been bad.
538. It may be doubted whether there is anything more wonderful in
Shakespeare than the way in which this Polonian speech, at one slight side-
blow, impales sixteenth-seventeenth-century criticism, with the due pin, on
the due piece of cork, for ever.
539. V. supra, p. 268.
540. The attitude of Milton and Dryden respectively illustrates this well.
There was scarcely more than twenty years between the two poets. But
Milton looks to the Italians first, if not also last, among the moderns, for
criticism. Dryden, though he knows and cites them, does not.
541. “Neo-classic” itself is not a very “blessed” word; but it has been
long recognised, and the objections to it are mainly formal.
542. In the well-known and early lines on “Sleep and Poetry.”
of these precepts and be the better poet for it; fly in the face of almost any
one of them in prose, and you must have extraordinary genius if you do not
rue it.
Even as to poetry itself some defence may be made. This poetry needed
these rules; or rather, to speak more critically, these rules expressed the
spirit of this poetry. The later and weaker metaphysicals in England, and
fantasts in France, the Marinists and Gongorists in Spain and Italy, had
shown what happens when Furor [vere] Poeticus ceases to ply the oars, and
Good Sense has not come to take the helm. It is pretty certain that if this
criticism had not ruled we should not have had good or great Romantic
poetry; we should at best have had (to take England) a few more Dyers and
Lady Winchelseas. But if it had not ruled we should have had a less perfect
Pope and less presentable minorities of this kind, and have been by no
means consoled by a supply of eighteenth-century Clevelands. Once more,
the period has the criticism that it wants, the criticism that will enable it to
give us its own good things at their own best, and to keep off things which
must almost certainly have been bad.
538. It may be doubted whether there is anything more wonderful in
Shakespeare than the way in which this Polonian speech, at one slight side-
blow, impales sixteenth-seventeenth-century criticism, with the due pin, on
the due piece of cork, for ever.
539. V. supra, p. 268.
540. The attitude of Milton and Dryden respectively illustrates this well.
There was scarcely more than twenty years between the two poets. But
Milton looks to the Italians first, if not also last, among the moderns, for
criticism. Dryden, though he knows and cites them, does not.
541. “Neo-classic” itself is not a very “blessed” word; but it has been
long recognised, and the objections to it are mainly formal.
542. In the well-known and early lines on “Sleep and Poetry.”
Page 427
543. Perhaps there is not a more unhappy gibe in literature (which has
many such) than that in The Rehearsal on Bayes, who is made to say that
“Spirits must not be confined to talk sense.” They certainly must not; even
Addison (Sp., 419) admits that “their sense ought to be a little discoloured.”
There is much virtue in this “discolour.”
544. It may be said that this was later. But Prior was a man of thirty-six
in 1700.
545. Yet it is not for the twentieth century to throw stones at the
seventeenth, till we leave off laying down rules of our own manufacture for
still earlier ages, and reproving Marlowe and the youthful Shakespeare for
being “too lyrical” in tragedy.
546. See Spenser Redivivus. London, 1686-87. The Person of Quality
“delivers” Spenser “in Heroick numbers,” as per sample—
“Then to the lady gallant Arthur said,
All grief repeated is more grievous made.”
This is “what Spenser ought to have been instead of what is to be found in
himself.”
547. Dryden and Fontenelle themselves are of course not quite sinless.
The latter (v. infra, p. 505) proposes emendations in the magnificent couplet
which he cites from Saint-Louis; and Dryden, let us say, does not improve
Shakespeare and Chaucer. But it was on Shakespeare and Chaucer as they
were, not as he travestied them for popular use, that Dryden passed the
immortal eulogies; and Fontenelle thought that the couplet even as it stood
“might easily not have been found by distinguished poets,” which is from
him equivalent to a blare of superlatives from our modern critics.
548. P. 325.
549. See the whole absurd scheme in the appendix-matter to Dryden’s
Translation of Du Fresnoy (ed. cit. sup., xvii. 429).
550. Parallèle, ii. 45; cf. Rigault, p. 187.
many such) than that in The Rehearsal on Bayes, who is made to say that
“Spirits must not be confined to talk sense.” They certainly must not; even
Addison (Sp., 419) admits that “their sense ought to be a little discoloured.”
There is much virtue in this “discolour.”
544. It may be said that this was later. But Prior was a man of thirty-six
in 1700.
545. Yet it is not for the twentieth century to throw stones at the
seventeenth, till we leave off laying down rules of our own manufacture for
still earlier ages, and reproving Marlowe and the youthful Shakespeare for
being “too lyrical” in tragedy.
546. See Spenser Redivivus. London, 1686-87. The Person of Quality
“delivers” Spenser “in Heroick numbers,” as per sample—
“Then to the lady gallant Arthur said,
All grief repeated is more grievous made.”
This is “what Spenser ought to have been instead of what is to be found in
himself.”
547. Dryden and Fontenelle themselves are of course not quite sinless.
The latter (v. infra, p. 505) proposes emendations in the magnificent couplet
which he cites from Saint-Louis; and Dryden, let us say, does not improve
Shakespeare and Chaucer. But it was on Shakespeare and Chaucer as they
were, not as he travestied them for popular use, that Dryden passed the
immortal eulogies; and Fontenelle thought that the couplet even as it stood
“might easily not have been found by distinguished poets,” which is from
him equivalent to a blare of superlatives from our modern critics.
548. P. 325.
549. See the whole absurd scheme in the appendix-matter to Dryden’s
Translation of Du Fresnoy (ed. cit. sup., xvii. 429).
550. Parallèle, ii. 45; cf. Rigault, p. 187.
Page 428
551. V. infra, p. 463.
Page 429
BOOK VI
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ORTHODOXY
“Voilà un tableau poétique aussi neuf, et produit par
un enthousiasme aussi vif qu’il soit possible.... Il étoit
bien aisé, même à de grands poëtes, de ne le pas
trouver.”—Fontenelle.
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ORTHODOXY
“Voilà un tableau poétique aussi neuf, et produit par
un enthousiasme aussi vif qu’il soit possible.... Il étoit
bien aisé, même à de grands poëtes, de ne le pas
trouver.”—Fontenelle.
Page 430
CHAPTER I.
FROM ADDISON TO JOHNSON.
CRITICISM AT DRYDEN’S DEATH—BYSSHE’S ‘ART OF ENGLISH POETRY’—GILDON—
WELSTED—DENNIS—ON RYMER—ON SHAKESPEARE—ON “MACHINES”—HIS
GENERAL THEORY OF POETRY—ADDISON—THE ‘ACCOUNT OF THE BEST
KNOWN ENGLISH POETS’—THE ‘SPECTATOR’ CRITICISMS—ON TRUE AND FALSE
WIT—ON TRAGEDY—ON MILTON—THE “PLEASURES OF THE IMAGINATION”—
HIS GENERAL CRITICAL VALUE—STEELE—ATTERBURY—SWIFT—‘THE BATTLE
OF THE BOOKS’—THE ‘TALE OF A TUB’—MINOR WORKS—POPE—THE
‘LETTERS’—THE SHAKESPEARE PREFACE—SPENCE’S ‘ANECDOTES’—THE
‘ESSAY ON CRITICISM’—THE ‘EPISTLE TO AUGUSTUS’—REMARKS ON POPE AS A
CRITIC, AND THE CRITICAL ATTITUDE OF HIS GROUP—PHILOSOPHICAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CRITICS—TRAPP—BLAIR—THE ‘LECTURES ON RHETORIC’—THE
‘DISSERTATION ON OSSIAN’—KAMES—THE ‘ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM’—
CAMPBELL—THE ‘PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC’—HARRIS—THE ‘PHILOLOGICAL
ENQUIRIES’—“ESTIMATE” BROWN: HIS ‘HISTORY OF POETRY’—JOHNSON: HIS
PREPARATION FOR CRITICISM—‘THE RAMBLER’ ON MILTON—ON SPENSER—ON
HISTORY AND LETTER-WRITING—ON TRAGI-COMEDY—“DICK
MINIM”—‘RASSELAS’—THE SHAKESPEARE PREFACE—THE ‘LIVES OF THE
POETS’—THEIR GENERAL MERITS—THE ‘COWLEY’—THE ‘MILTON’—THE
‘DRYDEN’ AND ‘POPE’—THE ‘COLLINS’ AND ‘GRAY’—THE CRITICAL GREATNESS
OF THE ‘LIVES’ AND OF JOHNSON—MINOR CRITICISM: PERIODICAL AND OTHER
—GOLDSMITH—VICESIMUS KNOX—SCOTT OF AMWELL.
The death of Dryden punctuates, with an exactness not often attainable in
literary history, the division between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Criticism at literature in England.[552] In general letters it is succeeded—
Dryden’s death.
not at all immediately—by the great school of Queen Anne
men. In criticism[553] one of the greatest of these, a special pupil of Dryden,
takes up the running at this interval, and others a little later; but the
succession is steadily maintained. Dennis, an unhappily belated person,
continues his exercitations; but has very much the worse fortune, critical as
well as pecuniary, in his later days. And in the very year of the death there
appears an egregious work—extremely popular, maleficently powerful
beyond all doubt throughout the eighteenth century, and now chiefly known
to non-experts in our days by the humorous contradiction which gave its
FROM ADDISON TO JOHNSON.
CRITICISM AT DRYDEN’S DEATH—BYSSHE’S ‘ART OF ENGLISH POETRY’—GILDON—
WELSTED—DENNIS—ON RYMER—ON SHAKESPEARE—ON “MACHINES”—HIS
GENERAL THEORY OF POETRY—ADDISON—THE ‘ACCOUNT OF THE BEST
KNOWN ENGLISH POETS’—THE ‘SPECTATOR’ CRITICISMS—ON TRUE AND FALSE
WIT—ON TRAGEDY—ON MILTON—THE “PLEASURES OF THE IMAGINATION”—
HIS GENERAL CRITICAL VALUE—STEELE—ATTERBURY—SWIFT—‘THE BATTLE
OF THE BOOKS’—THE ‘TALE OF A TUB’—MINOR WORKS—POPE—THE
‘LETTERS’—THE SHAKESPEARE PREFACE—SPENCE’S ‘ANECDOTES’—THE
‘ESSAY ON CRITICISM’—THE ‘EPISTLE TO AUGUSTUS’—REMARKS ON POPE AS A
CRITIC, AND THE CRITICAL ATTITUDE OF HIS GROUP—PHILOSOPHICAL AND
PROFESSIONAL CRITICS—TRAPP—BLAIR—THE ‘LECTURES ON RHETORIC’—THE
‘DISSERTATION ON OSSIAN’—KAMES—THE ‘ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM’—
CAMPBELL—THE ‘PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC’—HARRIS—THE ‘PHILOLOGICAL
ENQUIRIES’—“ESTIMATE” BROWN: HIS ‘HISTORY OF POETRY’—JOHNSON: HIS
PREPARATION FOR CRITICISM—‘THE RAMBLER’ ON MILTON—ON SPENSER—ON
HISTORY AND LETTER-WRITING—ON TRAGI-COMEDY—“DICK
MINIM”—‘RASSELAS’—THE SHAKESPEARE PREFACE—THE ‘LIVES OF THE
POETS’—THEIR GENERAL MERITS—THE ‘COWLEY’—THE ‘MILTON’—THE
‘DRYDEN’ AND ‘POPE’—THE ‘COLLINS’ AND ‘GRAY’—THE CRITICAL GREATNESS
OF THE ‘LIVES’ AND OF JOHNSON—MINOR CRITICISM: PERIODICAL AND OTHER
—GOLDSMITH—VICESIMUS KNOX—SCOTT OF AMWELL.
The death of Dryden punctuates, with an exactness not often attainable in
literary history, the division between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Criticism at literature in England.[552] In general letters it is succeeded—
Dryden’s death.
not at all immediately—by the great school of Queen Anne
men. In criticism[553] one of the greatest of these, a special pupil of Dryden,
takes up the running at this interval, and others a little later; but the
succession is steadily maintained. Dennis, an unhappily belated person,
continues his exercitations; but has very much the worse fortune, critical as
well as pecuniary, in his later days. And in the very year of the death there
appears an egregious work—extremely popular, maleficently powerful
beyond all doubt throughout the eighteenth century, and now chiefly known
to non-experts in our days by the humorous contradiction which gave its
Page 431
author’s name to Shelley, and by the chance which made a literary
connection, towards the very end of its period of influence, between three
such extraordinarily assorted persons as Afra Behn, Bysshe himself, and
William Blake.[554]
Edward Bysshe’s Art of English Poetry[555] puts the eighteenth-century
theory of this art with a rigour and completeness which can only be
attributed either to something like genius, or to a wonderful and complete
Bysshe’s Art of absence of it. His Rules for Making English Verse are the
English Poetry.
first part of the book in order, but much the least in bulk.
Then follow, first a collection of “the most natural and sublime thoughts of
the best English poets,” or, in other words, an anthology, reasoned under
headings, from poets of the seventeenth century, extending to about four
hundred and fifty pages; and last a Dictionary of Rhymes. The “best
English poets” may be useful to give in a note.[556] The Dictionary is
preceded by a few prefatory remarks, including one important historically,
“Rhyme is by all allowed to be the chief ornament of versification in the
modern languages.” The killing frost which had fallen on the flowers of
Elizabethan poetry had killed one weed at any rate—the craze against
rhyme.
The Rules are preceded by a partly apologetic Preface, which disclaims
any wish to furnish tools to poetasters, and puts the work “under the awful
guard of the immortal Shakespeare, Milton [note that this was before
Addison’s critique], Dryden, &c.” The keynote is struck, in the very first
sentence of the text, with that uncompromisingness which makes one rather
admire Bysshe. “The Structure of our verses, whether blank or in rhyme,
consists in a certain number of syllables; not in feet composed of long and
short syllables, as the verse of the Greeks and Romans.” And he adds that,
though some ingenious persons formerly puzzled themselves in prescribing
rules for the quantity of English syllables, and composed verses by the
measure of dactyls and spondees, yet that design is now wholly exploded.
In other words, he cannot conceive classical feet without classical
arrangement of feet.
“Our poetry admits, for the most part, of but three sorts of verses, those
of 10, 8, and 7 syllables. Those of 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, and 14 are generally
employed in masks and operas.” But 12 and 14 may be used in Heroic verse
with grace. Accent must be observed; and the Pause must be at or near the
middle, though in Heroics it may be at the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th syllable,
connection, towards the very end of its period of influence, between three
such extraordinarily assorted persons as Afra Behn, Bysshe himself, and
William Blake.[554]
Edward Bysshe’s Art of English Poetry[555] puts the eighteenth-century
theory of this art with a rigour and completeness which can only be
attributed either to something like genius, or to a wonderful and complete
Bysshe’s Art of absence of it. His Rules for Making English Verse are the
English Poetry.
first part of the book in order, but much the least in bulk.
Then follow, first a collection of “the most natural and sublime thoughts of
the best English poets,” or, in other words, an anthology, reasoned under
headings, from poets of the seventeenth century, extending to about four
hundred and fifty pages; and last a Dictionary of Rhymes. The “best
English poets” may be useful to give in a note.[556] The Dictionary is
preceded by a few prefatory remarks, including one important historically,
“Rhyme is by all allowed to be the chief ornament of versification in the
modern languages.” The killing frost which had fallen on the flowers of
Elizabethan poetry had killed one weed at any rate—the craze against
rhyme.
The Rules are preceded by a partly apologetic Preface, which disclaims
any wish to furnish tools to poetasters, and puts the work “under the awful
guard of the immortal Shakespeare, Milton [note that this was before
Addison’s critique], Dryden, &c.” The keynote is struck, in the very first
sentence of the text, with that uncompromisingness which makes one rather
admire Bysshe. “The Structure of our verses, whether blank or in rhyme,
consists in a certain number of syllables; not in feet composed of long and
short syllables, as the verse of the Greeks and Romans.” And he adds that,
though some ingenious persons formerly puzzled themselves in prescribing
rules for the quantity of English syllables, and composed verses by the
measure of dactyls and spondees, yet that design is now wholly exploded.
In other words, he cannot conceive classical feet without classical
arrangement of feet.
“Our poetry admits, for the most part, of but three sorts of verses, those
of 10, 8, and 7 syllables. Those of 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, and 14 are generally
employed in masks and operas.” But 12 and 14 may be used in Heroic verse
with grace. Accent must be observed; and the Pause must be at or near the
middle, though in Heroics it may be at the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th syllable,
Page 432
determined by the seat of the accent. Still, pauses at the 3rd and 7th must be
used sparingly. The 2nd and 8th “can produce no true harmony”; and he
seems to have refused to contemplate anything so awful as a pause at the
1st or 9th. After decasyllables, octosyllables are commonest. As for lines of
9 and 11 syllables, “with the accent on the last [i.e., anapæstic measures],
the disagreeableness of their measure has wholly excluded them from
serious subjects.” The refining effected since the days of Chaucer, Spenser,
and other ancient poets consists especially in the avoidance of the
concourse of vowels and in the rigid elision of the article, the contraction of
preterperfect tenses (“amaz’d,” not “amazed”), the rejection of alliteration
(an instance in Dryden is apologised for), of splitting words closely
connected at the end of a verse, and of polysyllables.
And a very large number of minute rules follow, the one guiding
principle of which is to reduce every line to its syllabic minimum, never
allowing trisyllabic substitution.
The book, base and mechanical as it may seem, is of the first historical
importance. It will be seen, even from these few extracts, that the excellent
Bysshe has no doubts, no half-lights. The idea, which we have seen
crystallising for a century and a half, that English poetry is as strictly and
inexorably syllabic as French, and much more so than Greek or Latin, is
here put in its baldest crudity. Bysshe will have no feet at all: and no other
division within the line but at the pause, which is to be as centripetal as
possible, like the French cæsura. It follows from this that, except the
feminine or double ending, which is allowed ostensibly as a grace to
rhymes, though also in blank verse, nothing extra to the ten, the eight, or
whatever the line-norm may be, is permitted on any account. Articles,
prepositions that will stand it, pronouns, are to be rigidly elided; weak or
short syllables in the interior of words must be slurred out. There is (only
that Bysshe will not have even the name of foot) no room for a trisyllabic
foot anywhere, in what he equally refuses to call iambic or trochaic verse.
But what is more startling still is that trisyllabic feet disappear, not
merely from the octosyllable and the heroic, but from English prosody, or
are admitted only to “Compositions for Musick and the lowest sort of
burlesque.” Dryden might have written, “After the pangs of a desperate
lover”; Prior might be writing “Dear Chloe, how blubbered is that pretty
face”: but Bysshe sternly averts his face from them.
used sparingly. The 2nd and 8th “can produce no true harmony”; and he
seems to have refused to contemplate anything so awful as a pause at the
1st or 9th. After decasyllables, octosyllables are commonest. As for lines of
9 and 11 syllables, “with the accent on the last [i.e., anapæstic measures],
the disagreeableness of their measure has wholly excluded them from
serious subjects.” The refining effected since the days of Chaucer, Spenser,
and other ancient poets consists especially in the avoidance of the
concourse of vowels and in the rigid elision of the article, the contraction of
preterperfect tenses (“amaz’d,” not “amazed”), the rejection of alliteration
(an instance in Dryden is apologised for), of splitting words closely
connected at the end of a verse, and of polysyllables.
And a very large number of minute rules follow, the one guiding
principle of which is to reduce every line to its syllabic minimum, never
allowing trisyllabic substitution.
The book, base and mechanical as it may seem, is of the first historical
importance. It will be seen, even from these few extracts, that the excellent
Bysshe has no doubts, no half-lights. The idea, which we have seen
crystallising for a century and a half, that English poetry is as strictly and
inexorably syllabic as French, and much more so than Greek or Latin, is
here put in its baldest crudity. Bysshe will have no feet at all: and no other
division within the line but at the pause, which is to be as centripetal as
possible, like the French cæsura. It follows from this that, except the
feminine or double ending, which is allowed ostensibly as a grace to
rhymes, though also in blank verse, nothing extra to the ten, the eight, or
whatever the line-norm may be, is permitted on any account. Articles,
prepositions that will stand it, pronouns, are to be rigidly elided; weak or
short syllables in the interior of words must be slurred out. There is (only
that Bysshe will not have even the name of foot) no room for a trisyllabic
foot anywhere, in what he equally refuses to call iambic or trochaic verse.
But what is more startling still is that trisyllabic feet disappear, not
merely from the octosyllable and the heroic, but from English prosody, or
are admitted only to “Compositions for Musick and the lowest sort of
burlesque.” Dryden might have written, “After the pangs of a desperate
lover”; Prior might be writing “Dear Chloe, how blubbered is that pretty
face”: but Bysshe sternly averts his face from them.
Page 433
Now, if this astonishing impoverishment of English poetry had been the
isolated crotchet of a pedant or a poetaster, it would at most deserve notice
in a note. But it was nothing of the kind. “He,” this insignificant person,
“said it”: they went and did it. It expressed the actual poetic practice of
serious poets from Pope to Goldsmith: and it expressed the deliberate
theoretic creed of such a critic as Johnson. The contrary practice of the great
old poets was at best a “licence,” at worst a “fault.” What had actually
happened to French—that it had been reduced to the iamb—what
Gascoigne had lamented and protested against, long before, was here
threatened—or rather, with bland ignoring, even of threat, laid down—as
the unquestioned and unquestionable law of English. The whole eighteenth
century did not, indeed, go the entire length of Bysshe. Prior—it is his
everlasting glory in English poetical history—took care of that, and not
only saved anapæstic cadence for us, but made it more popular than ever.
But the eighteenth century continued, charmingly as it wrote them, to be a
little ashamed of its anapæsts, to write them affectedly as a relaxation, if not
even a derogation—to indulge in them (just as it might indulge in leap-frog
with wig and long-skirted coat laid aside) avowedly for a frolic. And about
the decasyllable—not quite so rigidly about the octosyllable—it accepted
Bysshe almost without a protest. All the infinite variety of true English
prosody, all the gliding or melting trochees, all the passion and throb which
trisyllabic feet give to iambic verse, were sacrificed, all freedom of pause
was relinquished, and the decasyllable tramped, the octosyllable tripped, as
regularly and as monotonously as a High Dutch grenadier or a Low Dutch
clock.
Bysshe had been frankly formal; it is not a small merit in him that he
knew what he had to do and did it: but persons who were little if at all
above him in taste or in intellect affected to despise him for this, and Mr
Charles Gildon in his Complete Art of Poetry,[557] published a few years
Gildon. later, is very high and mighty with Bysshe. As for himself
he does not think that Poetry consists even in “colouring,” but in Design:
and he hashes up his French originals into some would-be modish
dialogues, in which ladies of fashion attack and defend poetry on the old
lines, before he comes to minuter recommendations. These differ chiefly
from Bysshe’s in that they are wordier, less peremptory, and given to
substitute the vagueness of the journalist for the precision of the
schoolmaster. Nor was this by any means Gildon’s only contribution to
isolated crotchet of a pedant or a poetaster, it would at most deserve notice
in a note. But it was nothing of the kind. “He,” this insignificant person,
“said it”: they went and did it. It expressed the actual poetic practice of
serious poets from Pope to Goldsmith: and it expressed the deliberate
theoretic creed of such a critic as Johnson. The contrary practice of the great
old poets was at best a “licence,” at worst a “fault.” What had actually
happened to French—that it had been reduced to the iamb—what
Gascoigne had lamented and protested against, long before, was here
threatened—or rather, with bland ignoring, even of threat, laid down—as
the unquestioned and unquestionable law of English. The whole eighteenth
century did not, indeed, go the entire length of Bysshe. Prior—it is his
everlasting glory in English poetical history—took care of that, and not
only saved anapæstic cadence for us, but made it more popular than ever.
But the eighteenth century continued, charmingly as it wrote them, to be a
little ashamed of its anapæsts, to write them affectedly as a relaxation, if not
even a derogation—to indulge in them (just as it might indulge in leap-frog
with wig and long-skirted coat laid aside) avowedly for a frolic. And about
the decasyllable—not quite so rigidly about the octosyllable—it accepted
Bysshe almost without a protest. All the infinite variety of true English
prosody, all the gliding or melting trochees, all the passion and throb which
trisyllabic feet give to iambic verse, were sacrificed, all freedom of pause
was relinquished, and the decasyllable tramped, the octosyllable tripped, as
regularly and as monotonously as a High Dutch grenadier or a Low Dutch
clock.
Bysshe had been frankly formal; it is not a small merit in him that he
knew what he had to do and did it: but persons who were little if at all
above him in taste or in intellect affected to despise him for this, and Mr
Charles Gildon in his Complete Art of Poetry,[557] published a few years
Gildon. later, is very high and mighty with Bysshe. As for himself
he does not think that Poetry consists even in “colouring,” but in Design:
and he hashes up his French originals into some would-be modish
dialogues, in which ladies of fashion attack and defend poetry on the old
lines, before he comes to minuter recommendations. These differ chiefly
from Bysshe’s in that they are wordier, less peremptory, and given to
substitute the vagueness of the journalist for the precision of the
schoolmaster. Nor was this by any means Gildon’s only contribution to
Page 434
criticism. Among the others perhaps the most interesting is an anonymous
and undated, but apparently not doubtful, rifacimento of Langbaine,[558]
which is curious as an example of peine du talion. Gildon (who has
employed his own or some other “careful hand” to give himself an
ingeniously, because not extravagantly, complimentary notice in the
Appendix) serves Langbaine in Langbaine’s own fashion; and, not
contented with reversing his judgments, indulges freely in such phrases as
“Mr Langbain mistakes,” “those scurrilous and digressory remarks with
which Mr Langbain has bespattered him [Dryden],” &c. The book is in the
main bibliographic and biographic rather than critical.
A name which has something to do with criticism, and which associates
itself naturally with those of Dennis and Gildon in the regiment of Pope’s
victims, is that of Leonard Welsted, who in 1712 published a translation of
Welsted. Longinus, “with some remarks on the English Poets.”
Welsted’s translation, whether made directly from the Greek or not,[559] is
readable enough, and his alternative title, “A treatise on the Sovereign
Perfection of Writing,” is not unhappy. Neither are his Preface and his
appended “Remarks” contemptible. He can appreciate not merely Milton
but Spenser; is (how unlike Rymer!) transported with Othello, and
especially with its conclusion; and if he is not superior to others in scorning
“Latin rhymes,” at least has sufficient independence to be very irreverent to
Buchanan.
But there was a contemporary of Bysshe’s, more famous than either
Gildon or Welsted, whose soul was equally above mere prosodic precept,
and to whom, as it happens, Gildon himself pays a compliment, as to a
denizen of Grub Street, of whom Grub Street could not but feel that he did
it some honour by herding with its more native and genuine population. Of
him we must say something—not, as we might almost have said it, in
juxtaposition with the great poet and critic whom he had earlier admired,
but before coming to the lesser, but still great, successors of Dryden, with
whom he came into collision in his evil days.
If John Dennis had been acquainted with the poetry of Tennyson (at
which he would probably have railed in his best manner, in which he would
certainly have detected plagiarisms from the classics), he too might have
applied to himself the words of Ulysses, “I am become a name.” Everybody
Dennis. who has the very slightest knowledge of English literature
knows, if only in connection with Dryden, Addison, and Pope, the surly,
and undated, but apparently not doubtful, rifacimento of Langbaine,[558]
which is curious as an example of peine du talion. Gildon (who has
employed his own or some other “careful hand” to give himself an
ingeniously, because not extravagantly, complimentary notice in the
Appendix) serves Langbaine in Langbaine’s own fashion; and, not
contented with reversing his judgments, indulges freely in such phrases as
“Mr Langbain mistakes,” “those scurrilous and digressory remarks with
which Mr Langbain has bespattered him [Dryden],” &c. The book is in the
main bibliographic and biographic rather than critical.
A name which has something to do with criticism, and which associates
itself naturally with those of Dennis and Gildon in the regiment of Pope’s
victims, is that of Leonard Welsted, who in 1712 published a translation of
Welsted. Longinus, “with some remarks on the English Poets.”
Welsted’s translation, whether made directly from the Greek or not,[559] is
readable enough, and his alternative title, “A treatise on the Sovereign
Perfection of Writing,” is not unhappy. Neither are his Preface and his
appended “Remarks” contemptible. He can appreciate not merely Milton
but Spenser; is (how unlike Rymer!) transported with Othello, and
especially with its conclusion; and if he is not superior to others in scorning
“Latin rhymes,” at least has sufficient independence to be very irreverent to
Buchanan.
But there was a contemporary of Bysshe’s, more famous than either
Gildon or Welsted, whose soul was equally above mere prosodic precept,
and to whom, as it happens, Gildon himself pays a compliment, as to a
denizen of Grub Street, of whom Grub Street could not but feel that he did
it some honour by herding with its more native and genuine population. Of
him we must say something—not, as we might almost have said it, in
juxtaposition with the great poet and critic whom he had earlier admired,
but before coming to the lesser, but still great, successors of Dryden, with
whom he came into collision in his evil days.
If John Dennis had been acquainted with the poetry of Tennyson (at
which he would probably have railed in his best manner, in which he would
certainly have detected plagiarisms from the classics), he too might have
applied to himself the words of Ulysses, “I am become a name.” Everybody
Dennis. who has the very slightest knowledge of English literature
knows, if only in connection with Dryden, Addison, and Pope, the surly,
Page 435
narrow, but not quite ignorant or incompetent critic, who in his younger and
more genial days admired the first, and in his soured old age attacked the
second and third. But it may be doubted whether very many persons have
an acquaintance, at all extensive, with his works. They were never
collected; the Select Works of John Dennis[560] mainly consist of his utterly
worthless verse. Much of the criticism is hidden away in prefaces which
were seldom reprinted, and the original editions of which have become very
rare. Even good libraries frequently contain only two or three out of more
than a dozen or a score of separate documents: and though the British
Museum itself is well furnished, it is necessary to range through a large
number of publications to obtain a complete view of Dennis as a critic.
That view, when obtained, may perhaps differ not a little from those
which have, in a certain general way, succeeded each other in current
literary judgment. During the reign of Pope and Addison, the scurrilous
assailant of the first, and the more courteous but in part severe censor of the
second, was naturally regarded as at best a grumbling pedant, at worst a
worthless Zoilus. The critics of the Romantic school were not likely to be
much attracted by Dennis. More recently, something of a reaction has taken
place in his favour; and it has become not unusual to discover in him, if not
exactly a Longinus or a Coleridge, yet a serious and well-equipped critic,
who actually anticipated not a little that after-criticism has had to say.[561]
That this more charitable view is not entirely without foundation may be
On Rymer. at once admitted. As compared with Rymer, in whose
company he too often finds himself in modern appreciation, Dennis shows,
indeed, pretty well. He very seldom—perhaps nowhere—exhibits that crass
insensibility to poetry which distinguishes “the worst critic who ever lived.”
One of his earliest and not his worst pieces, The Impartial Critic of 1693, is
an answer to Rymer himself, points out with acuteness and vigour that
“Tom the Second” would ruin the English stage if he had his way, and even
approaches the sole causeway of criticism across the deep by advancing the
argument that the circumstances of the Greek drama were perfectly
different from those of the English.[562] Yet already there are danger-signals.
That the piece (which includes a Letter to a Friend and some dialogues)
contains a great deal of clumsy jocularity, does not much matter. But when
we find Dennis devoting some of this jocularity to Antigone’s lamentation
over her death unwedded, we feel sadly that the man who can write thus is
scarcely to be trusted on the spirit of poetry. And the admission that
more genial days admired the first, and in his soured old age attacked the
second and third. But it may be doubted whether very many persons have
an acquaintance, at all extensive, with his works. They were never
collected; the Select Works of John Dennis[560] mainly consist of his utterly
worthless verse. Much of the criticism is hidden away in prefaces which
were seldom reprinted, and the original editions of which have become very
rare. Even good libraries frequently contain only two or three out of more
than a dozen or a score of separate documents: and though the British
Museum itself is well furnished, it is necessary to range through a large
number of publications to obtain a complete view of Dennis as a critic.
That view, when obtained, may perhaps differ not a little from those
which have, in a certain general way, succeeded each other in current
literary judgment. During the reign of Pope and Addison, the scurrilous
assailant of the first, and the more courteous but in part severe censor of the
second, was naturally regarded as at best a grumbling pedant, at worst a
worthless Zoilus. The critics of the Romantic school were not likely to be
much attracted by Dennis. More recently, something of a reaction has taken
place in his favour; and it has become not unusual to discover in him, if not
exactly a Longinus or a Coleridge, yet a serious and well-equipped critic,
who actually anticipated not a little that after-criticism has had to say.[561]
That this more charitable view is not entirely without foundation may be
On Rymer. at once admitted. As compared with Rymer, in whose
company he too often finds himself in modern appreciation, Dennis shows,
indeed, pretty well. He very seldom—perhaps nowhere—exhibits that crass
insensibility to poetry which distinguishes “the worst critic who ever lived.”
One of his earliest and not his worst pieces, The Impartial Critic of 1693, is
an answer to Rymer himself, points out with acuteness and vigour that
“Tom the Second” would ruin the English stage if he had his way, and even
approaches the sole causeway of criticism across the deep by advancing the
argument that the circumstances of the Greek drama were perfectly
different from those of the English.[562] Yet already there are danger-signals.
That the piece (which includes a Letter to a Friend and some dialogues)
contains a great deal of clumsy jocularity, does not much matter. But when
we find Dennis devoting some of this jocularity to Antigone’s lamentation
over her death unwedded, we feel sadly that the man who can write thus is
scarcely to be trusted on the spirit of poetry. And the admission that
Page 436
Rymer’s censures of Shakespeare are “in most of the particulars very
sensible and just” is practically ruinous.[563]
Dennis’s answer to Collier is a little later,[564] but still earlier than most of
his better known work; and it is very characteristic of his manner, which has
not often, I think, been exactly described. As elsewhere, so in this tract,
which is entitled The Usefulness of the Stage to the Happiness of Mankind,
to Government and to Religion, Dennis is uncompromisingly ethical; but he
had here the excuse that Collier, to whom he was replying, had taken the
same line. There is less, either here or elsewhere, for his method. This is to
make a loud clatter of assertions, arranged in a kind of pseudological order,
which seems to have really deceived the author, and may possibly have
deceived some of his readers, into believing it syllogistic and conclusive.
Dennis is very great at the word “must.” “As Poetry is an Art it must be an
imitation of nature”[565] and so forth; seldom shall you find so many “musts”
anywhere as in Dennis, save perhaps in some of his modern analogues. Like
all who argue in this fashion, he becomes unable to distinguish fact and his
own opinion. Collier, for instance, had quoted (quite correctly) Seneca’s
denunciation of the Stage. To which Dennis replies, “It is not likely that
Seneca should condemn the drama, ... since ... he wrote plays himself.” That
the identity of the philosopher and the dramatist is not certain does not
matter: the characteristic thing is the setting of probability against fact. But
with Dennis hectoring assertion is everything. “It cannot possibly be
conceived that so reasonable a diversion as the drama can encourage or
incline men to so unreasonable a one as gaming or so brutal a one as
drunkenness.” With a man who thinks this an argument, argument is
impossible.
The fact is that, though he has, as has been admitted, a certain advantage
over Rymer, Lord Derby’s observation that “He never knew whether it was
John or Thomas who answered the bell” will too often apply here. Rymer
On Shakespeare. himself was not ignorant; Dennis, especially in regard to
ancient criticism, was still better instructed: and though both were bad
dramatists, with, in consequence, a conscious or unconscious bias on
dramatic matters, Dennis was not so bad as Rymer. His devotion to Dryden
does him credit, though we may suspect that it was not the best part of
Dryden that he liked: and, amid the almost frantic spite and scurrility of his
later attacks on Pope, he not unfrequently hits a weak place in the “young
squab short gentleman’s” bright but not invulnerable armour. Yet Dennis
sensible and just” is practically ruinous.[563]
Dennis’s answer to Collier is a little later,[564] but still earlier than most of
his better known work; and it is very characteristic of his manner, which has
not often, I think, been exactly described. As elsewhere, so in this tract,
which is entitled The Usefulness of the Stage to the Happiness of Mankind,
to Government and to Religion, Dennis is uncompromisingly ethical; but he
had here the excuse that Collier, to whom he was replying, had taken the
same line. There is less, either here or elsewhere, for his method. This is to
make a loud clatter of assertions, arranged in a kind of pseudological order,
which seems to have really deceived the author, and may possibly have
deceived some of his readers, into believing it syllogistic and conclusive.
Dennis is very great at the word “must.” “As Poetry is an Art it must be an
imitation of nature”[565] and so forth; seldom shall you find so many “musts”
anywhere as in Dennis, save perhaps in some of his modern analogues. Like
all who argue in this fashion, he becomes unable to distinguish fact and his
own opinion. Collier, for instance, had quoted (quite correctly) Seneca’s
denunciation of the Stage. To which Dennis replies, “It is not likely that
Seneca should condemn the drama, ... since ... he wrote plays himself.” That
the identity of the philosopher and the dramatist is not certain does not
matter: the characteristic thing is the setting of probability against fact. But
with Dennis hectoring assertion is everything. “It cannot possibly be
conceived that so reasonable a diversion as the drama can encourage or
incline men to so unreasonable a one as gaming or so brutal a one as
drunkenness.” With a man who thinks this an argument, argument is
impossible.
The fact is that, though he has, as has been admitted, a certain advantage
over Rymer, Lord Derby’s observation that “He never knew whether it was
John or Thomas who answered the bell” will too often apply here. Rymer
On Shakespeare. himself was not ignorant; Dennis, especially in regard to
ancient criticism, was still better instructed: and though both were bad
dramatists, with, in consequence, a conscious or unconscious bias on
dramatic matters, Dennis was not so bad as Rymer. His devotion to Dryden
does him credit, though we may suspect that it was not the best part of
Dryden that he liked: and, amid the almost frantic spite and scurrility of his
later attacks on Pope, he not unfrequently hits a weak place in the “young
squab short gentleman’s” bright but not invulnerable armour. Yet Dennis
Page 437
displays, as no really good critic could do, the weaknesses of his time and
school both in generals and particulars. It is perfectly fair to compare him
(giving weight for genius of course) with Johnson, a critic whose general
views (except on port and claret) did not materially differ from his own.
And, if we do so, we shall find that while Johnson is generally, if not
invariably, “too good for such a breed,” Dennis almost as constantly shows
its worst features. He altered The Merry Wives of Windsor into The Comical
Gallant[566]—a most illaudable action certainly, yet great Dryden’s self had
done such things before. But he aggravated the crime by a preface, in which
he finds fault with the original as having “no less than three actions” [would
there were thirty-three!] by remarking that, in the second part of Henry the
Fourth, Falstaff “does nothing but talk” [would he had talked so for five
hundred acts instead of five!] and by laying down ex cathedra such
generalities as that “Humour, not wit, is the business of comedy,” a
statement as false as would be its converse. In his Essay on the Genius of
Shakespeare[567] he is not so very far from Rymer himself in the drivelling
arbitrariness of his criticism. Shakespeare has actually made Aufidius, the
general of the Volscians, a base and profligate villain! Even Coriolanus
himself is allowed to be called a traitor by Aufidius, and nobody
contradicts! The rabble in Julius Cæsar and other such things “show want
of Art,” and there is a painful disregard of Poetical Justice. The same
hopeless wrong-headedness and (if I may so say) wrong-mindedness appear
in a very different work, the Remarks on the Rape of the Lock.[568] I do not
refer to Dennis’s mere scurrilities about “Ap—e” and the like. But part of
On “Machines.” the piece is quite serious criticism. Few of us in modern
times care much for the “machinery” of this brilliantly artificial poem; but
fewer would think of objecting to it on Dennis’s grounds. Machines, it
seems, must be—
i. Taken from the religion of the Poet’s country.
ii. Allegorical in their application.
iii. Corresponding though opposed to each other.
iv. Justly subordinated and proportioned.
And Pope’s machines, we are told, fail in all these respects.
Now, putting the fourth ground aside as being a mere matter of opinion
(and some who are not fervent Papists think the machines of the Rape very
prettily and cleverly arranged in their puppet-show way), one may ask
Dennis “Who on earth told you so?” in respect of all the others. And if he
school both in generals and particulars. It is perfectly fair to compare him
(giving weight for genius of course) with Johnson, a critic whose general
views (except on port and claret) did not materially differ from his own.
And, if we do so, we shall find that while Johnson is generally, if not
invariably, “too good for such a breed,” Dennis almost as constantly shows
its worst features. He altered The Merry Wives of Windsor into The Comical
Gallant[566]—a most illaudable action certainly, yet great Dryden’s self had
done such things before. But he aggravated the crime by a preface, in which
he finds fault with the original as having “no less than three actions” [would
there were thirty-three!] by remarking that, in the second part of Henry the
Fourth, Falstaff “does nothing but talk” [would he had talked so for five
hundred acts instead of five!] and by laying down ex cathedra such
generalities as that “Humour, not wit, is the business of comedy,” a
statement as false as would be its converse. In his Essay on the Genius of
Shakespeare[567] he is not so very far from Rymer himself in the drivelling
arbitrariness of his criticism. Shakespeare has actually made Aufidius, the
general of the Volscians, a base and profligate villain! Even Coriolanus
himself is allowed to be called a traitor by Aufidius, and nobody
contradicts! The rabble in Julius Cæsar and other such things “show want
of Art,” and there is a painful disregard of Poetical Justice. The same
hopeless wrong-headedness and (if I may so say) wrong-mindedness appear
in a very different work, the Remarks on the Rape of the Lock.[568] I do not
refer to Dennis’s mere scurrilities about “Ap—e” and the like. But part of
On “Machines.” the piece is quite serious criticism. Few of us in modern
times care much for the “machinery” of this brilliantly artificial poem; but
fewer would think of objecting to it on Dennis’s grounds. Machines, it
seems, must be—
i. Taken from the religion of the Poet’s country.
ii. Allegorical in their application.
iii. Corresponding though opposed to each other.
iv. Justly subordinated and proportioned.
And Pope’s machines, we are told, fail in all these respects.
Now, putting the fourth ground aside as being a mere matter of opinion
(and some who are not fervent Papists think the machines of the Rape very
prettily and cleverly arranged in their puppet-show way), one may ask
Dennis “Who on earth told you so?” in respect of all the others. And if he
Page 438
alleged (as he might) this or that sixteenth or seventeenth century authority,
“And who on earth told him so? and what authority had the authority? Why
should machines be taken only from the religion of the country? Why
should they be allegorical? Why should Machine Dick on the one side
invariably nod to Machine Harry on the other?” And even if some sort of
answer be forthcoming, “Why should the poet not do as he please if he
succeeds thereby in giving the poetic pleasure?” To which last query of
course neither Dennis nor any of his school could return any answer, except
of the kind that requires bell, book, and candle.
Nor would he have hesitated to use this, for he is a rule-critic of the very
His general straitest kind, a “Tantivy” of poetic Divine Right. In his
theory of Poetry.
three chief books of abstract criticism[569] he endeavours to
elaborate, with Longinus in part for code, and with Milton for example, a
noble, indeed, and creditable, but utterly arbitrary and hopelessly narrow
theory of poetry as necessarily religious, and as having for its sole real end
the reformation of the mind, by a sort of enlarged Aristotelian katharsis as
to spirit, and by attention to the strict laws of the art in form. Poetical
Justice was a sort of mediate divinity to Dennis: as we have seen, he
upbraided Shakespeare for the want of it; he remonstrated, in the Spectator,
No. 548, and elsewhere, with Addison for taking too little account of it; part
at least of his enthusiasm for Milton comes from Milton’s avowed intention
to make his poem a theodicy.
A noble error! let it be repeated, with no hint or shadow of sarcasm or of
irreverence; but a fatal error as well. That Poetry, like all things human,
lives and moves and has its being in God, the present writer believes as
fervently and unhesitatingly as any Platonic philosopher or any Patristic
theologian; and he would cheerfully incur the wrath of Savonarola by
applying the epithet “divine,” in its fullest meaning, not merely to tragedy
and epic and hymn, but to song of wine and of love. But this is not what
Dennis meant at all. He meant that Poetry is to have a definitely religious,
definitely moral purpose—not that it is and tends of itself necessarily ad
majorem Dei gloriam, but that we are to shape it according to what our
theological and ethical ideas of the glory of God are. This way easily comes
bad poetry, not at all easily good; and it excludes poetic varieties which
may be as good as the best written in obedience to it, and better. Moreover,
putting Dennis’s notion of the end of Poetry together with his notion of its
method or art (which latter is to be adjusted to some at least of the straitest
“And who on earth told him so? and what authority had the authority? Why
should machines be taken only from the religion of the country? Why
should they be allegorical? Why should Machine Dick on the one side
invariably nod to Machine Harry on the other?” And even if some sort of
answer be forthcoming, “Why should the poet not do as he please if he
succeeds thereby in giving the poetic pleasure?” To which last query of
course neither Dennis nor any of his school could return any answer, except
of the kind that requires bell, book, and candle.
Nor would he have hesitated to use this, for he is a rule-critic of the very
His general straitest kind, a “Tantivy” of poetic Divine Right. In his
theory of Poetry.
three chief books of abstract criticism[569] he endeavours to
elaborate, with Longinus in part for code, and with Milton for example, a
noble, indeed, and creditable, but utterly arbitrary and hopelessly narrow
theory of poetry as necessarily religious, and as having for its sole real end
the reformation of the mind, by a sort of enlarged Aristotelian katharsis as
to spirit, and by attention to the strict laws of the art in form. Poetical
Justice was a sort of mediate divinity to Dennis: as we have seen, he
upbraided Shakespeare for the want of it; he remonstrated, in the Spectator,
No. 548, and elsewhere, with Addison for taking too little account of it; part
at least of his enthusiasm for Milton comes from Milton’s avowed intention
to make his poem a theodicy.
A noble error! let it be repeated, with no hint or shadow of sarcasm or of
irreverence; but a fatal error as well. That Poetry, like all things human,
lives and moves and has its being in God, the present writer believes as
fervently and unhesitatingly as any Platonic philosopher or any Patristic
theologian; and he would cheerfully incur the wrath of Savonarola by
applying the epithet “divine,” in its fullest meaning, not merely to tragedy
and epic and hymn, but to song of wine and of love. But this is not what
Dennis meant at all. He meant that Poetry is to have a definitely religious,
definitely moral purpose—not that it is and tends of itself necessarily ad
majorem Dei gloriam, but that we are to shape it according to what our
theological and ethical ideas of the glory of God are. This way easily comes
bad poetry, not at all easily good; and it excludes poetic varieties which
may be as good as the best written in obedience to it, and better. Moreover,
putting Dennis’s notion of the end of Poetry together with his notion of its
method or art (which latter is to be adjusted to some at least of the straitest
Page 439
classical precepts), we can easily comprehend, and could easily have
anticipated, the narrow intolerance and the hectoring pedantry which he
shows towards all who follow not him. In a new sense—not so very
different from the old mediæval one, though put with no mediæval glamour,
and by an exponent full of eighteenth-century prosaism, yet destitute of
eighteenth-century neatness and concinnity—Poetry becomes a part of
theology; and the mere irritableness of the man of letters is aggravated into
the odium theologicum. Bad poets (that is to say, bad according to Dennis)
are not merely faulty artists but wicked men; of this Dennis is sure. “And
when a man is sure,” as he himself somewhere naïvely observes, “’tis his
duty to speak with a modest assurance.” We know, from examples more
recent than poor Dennis, that, when a man is thus minded, his assurance is
very apt to eat up his modesty, taking his charity, his good manners, and
some other things, as condiments to the meal.
Dennis and Addison, though the latter did not escape the absolute
impartiality of the former’s carping, were on terms of mutual respect which,
Addison. considering all things, were creditable to both. During the
latter part of his rather short lifetime Addison, it is hardly necessary to say,
enjoyed a sort of mild dictatorship in Criticism as in other departments of
literature; and his right to it was scarcely disputed till near the close of the
century, though Johnson knew that he was not deep, and tells us that, in his
own last days, it was almost a fashion to look down on Addisonian
criticism. If, like others, he was displaced by the Romantic revival, he
received more lenient treatment than some, in virtue partly of his own
general moderation, partly of his championship of Milton. Yet while his
original literary gifts recovered high place during the nineteenth century, his
criticism has often been considered to possess scarcely more than historic
interest, and has sometimes been rather roughly handled—for instance, by
Mr Matthew Arnold. But a recent writer,[570] by arguing that Addison’s
treatment of the Imagination, as a separate faculty, introduced a new
principle into criticism, has at any rate claimed for him a position which, if
it could be granted, would seat him among the very greatest masters of the
art, with Aristotle and Longinus among his own forerunners. As usual let us,
before discussing these various estimates, see what Addison actually did as
a critic.[571]
His début as such was not fortunate. He was, it is true, only three-and-
twenty when at “dearest Harry’s” request (that is to say Mr Harry
anticipated, the narrow intolerance and the hectoring pedantry which he
shows towards all who follow not him. In a new sense—not so very
different from the old mediæval one, though put with no mediæval glamour,
and by an exponent full of eighteenth-century prosaism, yet destitute of
eighteenth-century neatness and concinnity—Poetry becomes a part of
theology; and the mere irritableness of the man of letters is aggravated into
the odium theologicum. Bad poets (that is to say, bad according to Dennis)
are not merely faulty artists but wicked men; of this Dennis is sure. “And
when a man is sure,” as he himself somewhere naïvely observes, “’tis his
duty to speak with a modest assurance.” We know, from examples more
recent than poor Dennis, that, when a man is thus minded, his assurance is
very apt to eat up his modesty, taking his charity, his good manners, and
some other things, as condiments to the meal.
Dennis and Addison, though the latter did not escape the absolute
impartiality of the former’s carping, were on terms of mutual respect which,
Addison. considering all things, were creditable to both. During the
latter part of his rather short lifetime Addison, it is hardly necessary to say,
enjoyed a sort of mild dictatorship in Criticism as in other departments of
literature; and his right to it was scarcely disputed till near the close of the
century, though Johnson knew that he was not deep, and tells us that, in his
own last days, it was almost a fashion to look down on Addisonian
criticism. If, like others, he was displaced by the Romantic revival, he
received more lenient treatment than some, in virtue partly of his own
general moderation, partly of his championship of Milton. Yet while his
original literary gifts recovered high place during the nineteenth century, his
criticism has often been considered to possess scarcely more than historic
interest, and has sometimes been rather roughly handled—for instance, by
Mr Matthew Arnold. But a recent writer,[570] by arguing that Addison’s
treatment of the Imagination, as a separate faculty, introduced a new
principle into criticism, has at any rate claimed for him a position which, if
it could be granted, would seat him among the very greatest masters of the
art, with Aristotle and Longinus among his own forerunners. As usual let us,
before discussing these various estimates, see what Addison actually did as
a critic.[571]
His début as such was not fortunate. He was, it is true, only three-and-
twenty when at “dearest Harry’s” request (that is to say Mr Harry
Page 440
Sacheverell’s) he undertook an Account of the greatest English Poets.[572] In
The Account of 1694 nobody, except Dryden, could be expected to write
the Best known
English Poets.
very good verse, so that the poetical qualities of this verse-
essay need not be hardly dwelt upon, or indeed considered
at all. We may take it, as if it were prose, for the matter only. And thus
considered, it must surely be thought one of the worst examples of the pert
and tasteless ignorance of its school. Before Cowley nobody but Chaucer
and Spenser is mentioned at all, and the mentions of these are simply
grotesque. The lines convict Addison, almost beyond appeal, of being at the
time utterly ignorant of English literary history up to 1600, and of having
read Chaucer and Spenser themselves, if he had read them at all, with his
eyes shut. The Chaucer section reads as if it were describing A C. Merry
Tales or the Jests of George Peele. Where Dryden, if he did not understand
Chaucer’s versification, and missed some of his poetry, could see much
even of that, and almost all the humour, the grace, the sweetness, the “God’s
plenty” of life and character that Chaucer has, Addison sees nothing but a
merry-andrew of the day before yesterday.[573] So, too, the consummate art
of Spenser, his exquisite versification, his great ethical purpose, and yet his
voluptuous beauty, are quite hidden from Addison. He sees nothing but a
tedious allegory of improbable adventures, and objects to the “dull moral”
which “lies too plain below,” much as Temple had done before him.[574]
Cowley, Milton, and Waller are mentioned next, in at least asserted
chronological order. Cowley is “a mighty genius” full of beauties and faults,
“Who more had pleased us had he pleased us less,”
but who is a perfect “milky way” of brilliancy, and has made Pindar himself
“take a nobler flight.” Milton alternately strikes Addison with awe, rapture,
and shock at his politics. He
“Betrays a bottom odious to the sight.”
So we turn to Waller, who is not only “courtly” but “moves our passion,”
(what a pity that he died too soon to "rehearse Maria’s charms"!) to
Roscommon, who “makes even rules a noble poetry,” and Denham, whose
Cooper’s Hill “we must,” of course, not “forget.” “Great Dryden” is then,
not unhappily, though not quite adequately, celebrated, and the line on his
Muse—
The Account of 1694 nobody, except Dryden, could be expected to write
the Best known
English Poets.
very good verse, so that the poetical qualities of this verse-
essay need not be hardly dwelt upon, or indeed considered
at all. We may take it, as if it were prose, for the matter only. And thus
considered, it must surely be thought one of the worst examples of the pert
and tasteless ignorance of its school. Before Cowley nobody but Chaucer
and Spenser is mentioned at all, and the mentions of these are simply
grotesque. The lines convict Addison, almost beyond appeal, of being at the
time utterly ignorant of English literary history up to 1600, and of having
read Chaucer and Spenser themselves, if he had read them at all, with his
eyes shut. The Chaucer section reads as if it were describing A C. Merry
Tales or the Jests of George Peele. Where Dryden, if he did not understand
Chaucer’s versification, and missed some of his poetry, could see much
even of that, and almost all the humour, the grace, the sweetness, the “God’s
plenty” of life and character that Chaucer has, Addison sees nothing but a
merry-andrew of the day before yesterday.[573] So, too, the consummate art
of Spenser, his exquisite versification, his great ethical purpose, and yet his
voluptuous beauty, are quite hidden from Addison. He sees nothing but a
tedious allegory of improbable adventures, and objects to the “dull moral”
which “lies too plain below,” much as Temple had done before him.[574]
Cowley, Milton, and Waller are mentioned next, in at least asserted
chronological order. Cowley is “a mighty genius” full of beauties and faults,
“Who more had pleased us had he pleased us less,”
but who is a perfect “milky way” of brilliancy, and has made Pindar himself
“take a nobler flight.” Milton alternately strikes Addison with awe, rapture,
and shock at his politics. He
“Betrays a bottom odious to the sight.”
So we turn to Waller, who is not only “courtly” but “moves our passion,”
(what a pity that he died too soon to "rehearse Maria’s charms"!) to
Roscommon, who “makes even rules a noble poetry,” and Denham, whose
Cooper’s Hill “we must,” of course, not “forget.” “Great Dryden” is then,
not unhappily, though not quite adequately, celebrated, and the line on his
Muse—
Page 441
“She wears all dresses, and she charms in all,”
is not only neat, but very largely true. When Dryden shall decay, luckily
there is harmonious Congreve: and, if Addison were not tired with rhyming,
he would praise (he does so at some length) noble Montague, who directs
his artful muse to Dorset,
“In numbers such as Dorset’s self might use,”—
as to which all that can be said is that, if so, either the verses of Montague
or the verses of Dorset referred to are not those that have come down to us
under the names of the respective authors.
To dwell at all severely on this luckless production of a young University
wit would be not only unkind but uncritical. It shows that at this time
Addison knew next to nothing[575] about the English literature not of his own
day, and judged very badly of what he pretended to know.
The prose works of his middle period, the Discourse on Medals and the
Remarks on Italy, are very fully illustrated from the Latin poets—the
division of literature that Addison knew best—but indulge hardly at all in
literary criticism. It was not till the launching of the Tatler, by Steele and
Swift, provided him with his natural medium of utterance, that Addison
became critical. This periodical itself, and the less known ones that
followed the Spectator, all contain exercises in this character: but it is to the
Spectator that men look, and look rightly, for Addison’s credentials in the
The Spectator character of a critic. The Tatler Essays, such as the rather
criticisms.
well known papers on Tom Folio and Ned Softly, those in
the Guardian, the good-natured puff of Tom D’Urfey, &c., are not so much
serious and deliberate literary criticisms, as applications, to subjects more
or less literary, of the peculiar method of gently malicious censorship, of
laughing castigation in manners and morals, which Addison carried to such
perfection in all the middle relations of life. Not only are the Spectator
articles far more numerous and far more weighty, but we have his own
authority for regarding them as, in some measure at least, written on a
deliberate system, and divisible into three groups. The first of these groups
consists of the early papers on True and False Wit, and of essays on the
stage. The second contains the famous and elaborate criticism of Milton
with other things; and the third, the still later, still more serious, and still
is not only neat, but very largely true. When Dryden shall decay, luckily
there is harmonious Congreve: and, if Addison were not tired with rhyming,
he would praise (he does so at some length) noble Montague, who directs
his artful muse to Dorset,
“In numbers such as Dorset’s self might use,”—
as to which all that can be said is that, if so, either the verses of Montague
or the verses of Dorset referred to are not those that have come down to us
under the names of the respective authors.
To dwell at all severely on this luckless production of a young University
wit would be not only unkind but uncritical. It shows that at this time
Addison knew next to nothing[575] about the English literature not of his own
day, and judged very badly of what he pretended to know.
The prose works of his middle period, the Discourse on Medals and the
Remarks on Italy, are very fully illustrated from the Latin poets—the
division of literature that Addison knew best—but indulge hardly at all in
literary criticism. It was not till the launching of the Tatler, by Steele and
Swift, provided him with his natural medium of utterance, that Addison
became critical. This periodical itself, and the less known ones that
followed the Spectator, all contain exercises in this character: but it is to the
Spectator that men look, and look rightly, for Addison’s credentials in the
The Spectator character of a critic. The Tatler Essays, such as the rather
criticisms.
well known papers on Tom Folio and Ned Softly, those in
the Guardian, the good-natured puff of Tom D’Urfey, &c., are not so much
serious and deliberate literary criticisms, as applications, to subjects more
or less literary, of the peculiar method of gently malicious censorship, of
laughing castigation in manners and morals, which Addison carried to such
perfection in all the middle relations of life. Not only are the Spectator
articles far more numerous and far more weighty, but we have his own
authority for regarding them as, in some measure at least, written on a
deliberate system, and divisible into three groups. The first of these groups
consists of the early papers on True and False Wit, and of essays on the
stage. The second contains the famous and elaborate criticism of Milton
with other things; and the third, the still later, still more serious, and still
Page 442
more ambitious, series on the Pleasures of the Imagination. Addison is
looking back from the beginning of this last when he gives the general
description,[576] and it is quite possible that the complete trilogy was not in
his mind when he began the first group. But there is regular development in
it, and whether we agree or not with Mr Worsfold’s extremely high estimate
of the third division, it is quite certain that the whole collection—of some
thirty or forty essays—does clearly exhibit that increasing sense of what
criticism means, which is to be observed in almost all good critics. For
criticism is, on the one hand, an art in which there are so few manuals or
trustworthy short summaries—it is one which depends so much more on
reading and knowledge than any creative art—and, above all, it is necessary
to make so many mistakes in it before one comes right, that, probably, not
one single example can be found of a critic of importance who was not a
much better critic when he left off than when he began.
In Group One[577] Addison is still animated by the slightly desultory spirit
of moral satire, which has been referred to above; and, though fifteen or
sixteen years have passed since the Account, he does not seem to be so
entirely free as we might wish from the crude sciolism, if not the sheer
On True and ignorance, of the earliest period. He is often admirable: his
False Wit.
own humour, his taste, almost perfect within its own
narrow limits, and his good sense, made that certain beforehand. But he has
rather overloaded it with somewhat artificial allegory, the ethical temper
rather overpowers the literary, and there is not a little of that arbitrary
“blackmarking” of certain literary things which is one of the worst faults of
neo-classic criticism. The Temple of Dulness is built (of course) “after the
Gothic manner,” and the image of the god is dressed “after the habit of a
monk.” Among the idolatrous rites and implements are not merely rebuses,
anagrams, verses arranged in artificial forms, and other things a little
childish, though perfectly harmless, but acrostics—trifles, perhaps, yet
trifles which can be made exquisitely graceful, and satisfying that desire for
mixing passion with playfulness which is not the worst affection of the
human heart.
He had led up to this batch, a few weeks earlier, by some cursory remarks
on Comedy, which form the tail of a more elaborate examination of
On Tragedy. Tragedy, filling four or five numbers.[578] Readers who have
already mastered the general drift of the criticism of the time before him,
will scarcely need any long précis of his views, which, moreover, are in
looking back from the beginning of this last when he gives the general
description,[576] and it is quite possible that the complete trilogy was not in
his mind when he began the first group. But there is regular development in
it, and whether we agree or not with Mr Worsfold’s extremely high estimate
of the third division, it is quite certain that the whole collection—of some
thirty or forty essays—does clearly exhibit that increasing sense of what
criticism means, which is to be observed in almost all good critics. For
criticism is, on the one hand, an art in which there are so few manuals or
trustworthy short summaries—it is one which depends so much more on
reading and knowledge than any creative art—and, above all, it is necessary
to make so many mistakes in it before one comes right, that, probably, not
one single example can be found of a critic of importance who was not a
much better critic when he left off than when he began.
In Group One[577] Addison is still animated by the slightly desultory spirit
of moral satire, which has been referred to above; and, though fifteen or
sixteen years have passed since the Account, he does not seem to be so
entirely free as we might wish from the crude sciolism, if not the sheer
On True and ignorance, of the earliest period. He is often admirable: his
False Wit.
own humour, his taste, almost perfect within its own
narrow limits, and his good sense, made that certain beforehand. But he has
rather overloaded it with somewhat artificial allegory, the ethical temper
rather overpowers the literary, and there is not a little of that arbitrary
“blackmarking” of certain literary things which is one of the worst faults of
neo-classic criticism. The Temple of Dulness is built (of course) “after the
Gothic manner,” and the image of the god is dressed “after the habit of a
monk.” Among the idolatrous rites and implements are not merely rebuses,
anagrams, verses arranged in artificial forms, and other things a little
childish, though perfectly harmless, but acrostics—trifles, perhaps, yet
trifles which can be made exquisitely graceful, and satisfying that desire for
mixing passion with playfulness which is not the worst affection of the
human heart.
He had led up to this batch, a few weeks earlier, by some cursory remarks
on Comedy, which form the tail of a more elaborate examination of
On Tragedy. Tragedy, filling four or five numbers.[578] Readers who have
already mastered the general drift of the criticism of the time before him,
will scarcely need any long précis of his views, which, moreover, are in
Page 443
everybody’s reach, and could not possibly be put more readably. Modern
tragedies, he thinks, excel those of Greece and Rome in the intricacy and
disposition of the fable, but fall short in the moral. He objects to rhyme
(except an end-couplet or two), and, though he thinks the style of our
tragedies superior to the sentiment, finds the former, especially in
Shakespeare, defaced by “sounding phrases, hard metaphors, and forced
expressions.” This is still more the case in Lee. Otway is very “tender”: but
it is a sad thing that the characters in Venice Preserved should be traitors
and rebels. Poetic justice (this was what shocked Dennis), as generally
understood, is rather absurd, and quite unnecessary. And the tragi-comedy,
which is the product of the English theatre, is “one of the most monstrous
inventions that ever entered into a poet’s thought.” You “might as well
weave the adventures of Æneas and Hudibras into one poem” [and, indeed,
one might find some relief in this, as far as the adventures of Æneas are
concerned]. Tragedies are not even to have a double plot. Rants, and
especially impious rants, are bad. Darkened stages, elaborate scenery and
dresses, troops of supers, &c., are as bad: bells, ghosts, thunder, and
lightning still worse. “Of all our methods of moving pity and terror, there is
none so absurd and barbarous as the dreadful butchering of one another,”
though all deaths on the stage are not to be forbidden.
Now, it is not difficult to characterise the criticism which appears in this
first group, strengthened, if anybody cares, by a few isolated examples. It
contains a great deal of common sense and good ordinary taste; many of the
things that it reprehends are really wrong, and most of what it praises is
good in a way. But the critic has as yet no guiding theory, except what he
thinks he has gathered from Aristotle, and has certainly gathered from
Horace, plus Common Sense itself, with, as is the case with all English
critics of this age, a good deal from his French predecessors, especially Le
Bossu and Bouhours. Which borrowing, while it leads him into numerous
minor errors, leads him into two great ones—his denunciations of tragi-
comedy, and of the double plot. He is, moreover, essentially arbitrary: his
criticism will seldom stand the application of the “Why?” the “Après?” and
a harsh judge might, in some places, say that it is not more arbitrary than
ignorant.
The Second Group,[579] or Miltonic batch, with which may be taken its
“moon,” the partly playful but more largely serious examen of Chevy
Chase, is much the best known, and has been generally ranked as the most
tragedies, he thinks, excel those of Greece and Rome in the intricacy and
disposition of the fable, but fall short in the moral. He objects to rhyme
(except an end-couplet or two), and, though he thinks the style of our
tragedies superior to the sentiment, finds the former, especially in
Shakespeare, defaced by “sounding phrases, hard metaphors, and forced
expressions.” This is still more the case in Lee. Otway is very “tender”: but
it is a sad thing that the characters in Venice Preserved should be traitors
and rebels. Poetic justice (this was what shocked Dennis), as generally
understood, is rather absurd, and quite unnecessary. And the tragi-comedy,
which is the product of the English theatre, is “one of the most monstrous
inventions that ever entered into a poet’s thought.” You “might as well
weave the adventures of Æneas and Hudibras into one poem” [and, indeed,
one might find some relief in this, as far as the adventures of Æneas are
concerned]. Tragedies are not even to have a double plot. Rants, and
especially impious rants, are bad. Darkened stages, elaborate scenery and
dresses, troops of supers, &c., are as bad: bells, ghosts, thunder, and
lightning still worse. “Of all our methods of moving pity and terror, there is
none so absurd and barbarous as the dreadful butchering of one another,”
though all deaths on the stage are not to be forbidden.
Now, it is not difficult to characterise the criticism which appears in this
first group, strengthened, if anybody cares, by a few isolated examples. It
contains a great deal of common sense and good ordinary taste; many of the
things that it reprehends are really wrong, and most of what it praises is
good in a way. But the critic has as yet no guiding theory, except what he
thinks he has gathered from Aristotle, and has certainly gathered from
Horace, plus Common Sense itself, with, as is the case with all English
critics of this age, a good deal from his French predecessors, especially Le
Bossu and Bouhours. Which borrowing, while it leads him into numerous
minor errors, leads him into two great ones—his denunciations of tragi-
comedy, and of the double plot. He is, moreover, essentially arbitrary: his
criticism will seldom stand the application of the “Why?” the “Après?” and
a harsh judge might, in some places, say that it is not more arbitrary than
ignorant.
The Second Group,[579] or Miltonic batch, with which may be taken its
“moon,” the partly playful but more largely serious examen of Chevy
Chase, is much the best known, and has been generally ranked as the most
Page 444
On Milton. important exhibition of Addison’s critical powers. It is not,
however, out of paradox or desire to be singular that it will be somewhat
briefly discussed here. By the student of Addison it cannot be too carefully
studied; for the historian of criticism it has indeed high importance, but
importance which can be very briefly summed up, and which requires no
extensive analysis of the eighteen distinct essays that compose the Miltonic
group, or the two on Chevy Chase. The critic here takes for granted—and
knows or assumes that his readers will grant—two general positions:—
1. The Aristotelian-Horatian view of poetry, with a few of the more
commonplace utterances of Longinus, supplies the orthodox theory of
Poetics.
2. The ancients, especially Homer and Virgil, supply the most perfect
examples of the orthodox practice of poetry.
These things posed, he proceeds to examine Chevy Chase at some,
Paradise Lost at great, length by their aid; and discovers in the ballad not a
few, and in the epic very great and very numerous, excellences. As Homer
does this, so Milton does that: such a passage in Virgil is a more or less
exact analogue to such another in Paradise Lost. Aristotle says this, Horace
that, Longinus the third thing; and you will find the dicta capitally
exemplified in such and such a place of Milton’s works. To men who
accepted the principle—as most, if not all, men did—the demonstration was
no doubt both interesting and satisfactory; and though it certainly did not
start general admiration of Milton, it stamped that admiration with a
comfortable seal of official orthodoxy. But it is actually more antiquated
than Dryden, in assuming that the question whether Milton wrote according
to Aristotle is coextensive with the question whether he wrote good poetry.
The next batch is far more important.
What are the Pleasures of the Imagination? It is of the first moment to
The “Pleasures observe Addison’s exact definition.[580] Sight is the “sense
of the
Imagination.”
which furnishes the imagination with its ideas; so that by
the ‘Pleasures of the Imagination’ or Fancy, which I shall
use promiscuously, I here mean such as arise from visible objects, either
when we have them actually in our view, or when we call up their ideas into
our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions, or any the like occasion.” We
can have no images not thus furnished, though they may be altered and
compounded by imagination itself. To make this quite sure, he repeats that
he means only such pleasures as thus arise. He then proceeds, at some
however, out of paradox or desire to be singular that it will be somewhat
briefly discussed here. By the student of Addison it cannot be too carefully
studied; for the historian of criticism it has indeed high importance, but
importance which can be very briefly summed up, and which requires no
extensive analysis of the eighteen distinct essays that compose the Miltonic
group, or the two on Chevy Chase. The critic here takes for granted—and
knows or assumes that his readers will grant—two general positions:—
1. The Aristotelian-Horatian view of poetry, with a few of the more
commonplace utterances of Longinus, supplies the orthodox theory of
Poetics.
2. The ancients, especially Homer and Virgil, supply the most perfect
examples of the orthodox practice of poetry.
These things posed, he proceeds to examine Chevy Chase at some,
Paradise Lost at great, length by their aid; and discovers in the ballad not a
few, and in the epic very great and very numerous, excellences. As Homer
does this, so Milton does that: such a passage in Virgil is a more or less
exact analogue to such another in Paradise Lost. Aristotle says this, Horace
that, Longinus the third thing; and you will find the dicta capitally
exemplified in such and such a place of Milton’s works. To men who
accepted the principle—as most, if not all, men did—the demonstration was
no doubt both interesting and satisfactory; and though it certainly did not
start general admiration of Milton, it stamped that admiration with a
comfortable seal of official orthodoxy. But it is actually more antiquated
than Dryden, in assuming that the question whether Milton wrote according
to Aristotle is coextensive with the question whether he wrote good poetry.
The next batch is far more important.
What are the Pleasures of the Imagination? It is of the first moment to
The “Pleasures observe Addison’s exact definition.[580] Sight is the “sense
of the
Imagination.”
which furnishes the imagination with its ideas; so that by
the ‘Pleasures of the Imagination’ or Fancy, which I shall
use promiscuously, I here mean such as arise from visible objects, either
when we have them actually in our view, or when we call up their ideas into
our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions, or any the like occasion.” We
can have no images not thus furnished, though they may be altered and
compounded by imagination itself. To make this quite sure, he repeats that
he means only such pleasures as thus arise. He then proceeds, at some
Page 445
length, to argue for the innocence and refinement of such pleasures, their
usefulness, and so on; and further, to discuss the causes or origins of
pleasure in sight, which he finds to be three—greatness, uncommonness,
and beauty. The pleasantness of these is assigned to such and such wise and
good purposes of the Creator, with a reference to the great modern
discoveries of Mr Locke’s essay.
Addison then goes on to consider the sources of entertainment to the
imagination, and decides that, for the purpose, art is very inferior to nature,
though both rise in value as each borrows from the other. He adduces, in
illustration, an odd rococo mixture of scene-painting and reflection of actual
objects which he once saw (p. 404). Italian and French gardens are next
praised, in opposition to the old formal English style, and naturally trained
trees to the productions of the ars topiaria; while a very long digression is
made to greatness in Architecture, illustrated by this remark (p. 409), “Let
any one reflect on the disposition of mind in which he finds himself at his
first entrance into the Pantheon at Rome, ... and consider how little in
proportion he is affected with the inside of a Gothic cathedral, though it be
five times larger than the other,” the reason being “the greatness of the
manner in the one, and the meanness in the other.”
So the “secondary” pleasures of the imagination—i.e., those compounded
and manufactured by memory—are illustrated by the arts of sculpture and
painting, with a good passage on description generally, whence he turns to
the Cartesian doctrine of the association of ideas, and shows very
ingeniously how the poet may avail himself of this. Next comes a curious
and often just analysis of the reasons of pleasure in description—how, for
instance, he likes Milton’s Paradise better than his Hell, because brimstone
and sulphur are not so refreshing to the imagination as beds of flowers and
wildernesses of sweets. Or we may like things because they “raise a secret
ferment in the mind,” either directly, or so as to arouse a feeling of relief by
comparison, as when we read of tortures, wounds, and deaths. Moreover,
the poet may improve Nature. Let oranges grow wild, and roses,
woodbines, and jessamines flower at the same time. As for “the fairy way of
writing”[581]—that is to say, the supernatural—it requires a very odd turn of
mind. We do it better than most other nations, because of our gloominess
and melancholy of temper. Shakespeare excels everybody else in touching
“this weak superstitious part” of his reader’s imagination. The glorifying of
the imagination, however, is by no means confined to the poet. In good
usefulness, and so on; and further, to discuss the causes or origins of
pleasure in sight, which he finds to be three—greatness, uncommonness,
and beauty. The pleasantness of these is assigned to such and such wise and
good purposes of the Creator, with a reference to the great modern
discoveries of Mr Locke’s essay.
Addison then goes on to consider the sources of entertainment to the
imagination, and decides that, for the purpose, art is very inferior to nature,
though both rise in value as each borrows from the other. He adduces, in
illustration, an odd rococo mixture of scene-painting and reflection of actual
objects which he once saw (p. 404). Italian and French gardens are next
praised, in opposition to the old formal English style, and naturally trained
trees to the productions of the ars topiaria; while a very long digression is
made to greatness in Architecture, illustrated by this remark (p. 409), “Let
any one reflect on the disposition of mind in which he finds himself at his
first entrance into the Pantheon at Rome, ... and consider how little in
proportion he is affected with the inside of a Gothic cathedral, though it be
five times larger than the other,” the reason being “the greatness of the
manner in the one, and the meanness in the other.”
So the “secondary” pleasures of the imagination—i.e., those compounded
and manufactured by memory—are illustrated by the arts of sculpture and
painting, with a good passage on description generally, whence he turns to
the Cartesian doctrine of the association of ideas, and shows very
ingeniously how the poet may avail himself of this. Next comes a curious
and often just analysis of the reasons of pleasure in description—how, for
instance, he likes Milton’s Paradise better than his Hell, because brimstone
and sulphur are not so refreshing to the imagination as beds of flowers and
wildernesses of sweets. Or we may like things because they “raise a secret
ferment in the mind,” either directly, or so as to arouse a feeling of relief by
comparison, as when we read of tortures, wounds, and deaths. Moreover,
the poet may improve Nature. Let oranges grow wild, and roses,
woodbines, and jessamines flower at the same time. As for “the fairy way of
writing”[581]—that is to say, the supernatural—it requires a very odd turn of
mind. We do it better than most other nations, because of our gloominess
and melancholy of temper. Shakespeare excels everybody else in touching
“this weak superstitious part” of his reader’s imagination. The glorifying of
the imagination, however, is by no means confined to the poet. In good
Page 446
historians we “see” everything. None more gratify the imagination than the
authors of the new philosophy, astronomers, microscopists. This (No. 420)
is one of Addison’s most ambitious passages of writing, and the whole ends
(421) with a peroration excellently hit off.
It is upon these papers mainly that Mr Worsfold[582] bases his high
eulogium of Addison as “the first genuine critic,” the first “who added
something to the last word of Hellenism,” the bringer of criticism “into line
with modern thought,” the establisher of “a new principle of poetic appeal.”
Let us, as uncontroversially as possible, and without laying any undue stress
on the fact that Mr Worsfold practically omits Longinus altogether,[583] stick,
in our humdrum way, to the facts.
In the first place, supposing for the moment that Addison uses
“imagination” in our full modern sense, and supposing, secondly, for the
moment also, that he assigns the appeal to the imagination as the special
engine of the poet, is this an original discovery of his? By no means: there
are many loci of former writers to negative this—there is one that is fatal.
And this is no more recondite a thing than the famous Shakespearian
description of
“The lunatic, the lover, and the poet,”
as
“Of imagination all compact,”
with what follows. But this is a mere question of property, plagiarism,
suggestion; and such questions are at best the exercises of literary holiday-
makers, at the worst the business of pedants and of fools.
A more important as well as a more dangerous question is this. Does
Addison make “the appeal to the imagination” the test of poetry? It can only
be answered that, by his own explicit words, he does nothing of the kind. If
he advances anything, it is that the appeal to the imagination is the appeal of
art generally—of prose (even of scientific) literary art as well as of poetry,
of painting, sculpture, architecture, as well as of literature. In doing this he
does a good thing: he does something notable in the history of general
æsthetics; but in so far as literature, and especially poetry, is concerned, he
scarcely goes as far as Longinus in the well-known passage,[584] though he
authors of the new philosophy, astronomers, microscopists. This (No. 420)
is one of Addison’s most ambitious passages of writing, and the whole ends
(421) with a peroration excellently hit off.
It is upon these papers mainly that Mr Worsfold[582] bases his high
eulogium of Addison as “the first genuine critic,” the first “who added
something to the last word of Hellenism,” the bringer of criticism “into line
with modern thought,” the establisher of “a new principle of poetic appeal.”
Let us, as uncontroversially as possible, and without laying any undue stress
on the fact that Mr Worsfold practically omits Longinus altogether,[583] stick,
in our humdrum way, to the facts.
In the first place, supposing for the moment that Addison uses
“imagination” in our full modern sense, and supposing, secondly, for the
moment also, that he assigns the appeal to the imagination as the special
engine of the poet, is this an original discovery of his? By no means: there
are many loci of former writers to negative this—there is one that is fatal.
And this is no more recondite a thing than the famous Shakespearian
description of
“The lunatic, the lover, and the poet,”
as
“Of imagination all compact,”
with what follows. But this is a mere question of property, plagiarism,
suggestion; and such questions are at best the exercises of literary holiday-
makers, at the worst the business of pedants and of fools.
A more important as well as a more dangerous question is this. Does
Addison make “the appeal to the imagination” the test of poetry? It can only
be answered that, by his own explicit words, he does nothing of the kind. If
he advances anything, it is that the appeal to the imagination is the appeal of
art generally—of prose (even of scientific) literary art as well as of poetry,
of painting, sculpture, architecture, as well as of literature. In doing this he
does a good thing: he does something notable in the history of general
æsthetics; but in so far as literature, and especially poetry, is concerned, he
scarcely goes as far as Longinus in the well-known passage,[584] though he
Page 447
works out his doctrine at much greater length, and with assistance from
Descartes and Locke.
But the most important and the most damaging question of all is this,
“Are not Addison and his panegyrist using words in equivocal senses? Does
Imagination in Addison’s mouth bear the meaning which we, chiefly since
Coleridge’s day, attach to the word? Does it even mean what it meant to
Longinus, much more what it meant to Shakespeare?”
I have no hesitation in answering the two latter questions with an
absolute and unhesitating “No!”
It seems indeed extraordinary that, in face of Addison’s most careful and
explicit limitations, any one should delude himself into thinking that even
the Shakespearian and Addisonian Imaginations are identical—much more
that Addison’s Imagination is the supreme faculty, creative, transcending
Fancy,[585] superior to fact, not merely compounding and refining upon, but
altogether superseding and almost scorning, ideas of sensation, which we
mean by the word, and which Philostratus or Apollonius[586] partly
glimpsed. Addison tells us—tells us over and over again—that all the ideas
and pleasures of the imagination are pleasures of sense, and, what is more,
that they are all pleasures of one sense—Sight. Why he should have limited
himself in this singular manner it is hard to say; except that he was
evidently full of Locke when he wrote, and, indeed, almost entirely under
the influence of the Essay. That he had a contempt for music is elsewhere
pretty evident; and this probably explains his otherwise inexplicable
omission of the supplies and assistance given to Imagination by Hearing.
His morality, as well as old convention, excluded Touch, Taste, and Smell
as low and gross, though no candid philosophy could help acknowledging
the immense influence exercised upon Imagination by at least the first and
the last—Taste, because the most definite, being perhaps the least
imaginative of all. But the fact that he does exclude even these senses, and
still more rigidly excludes everything but Sense, is insuperable,
irremovable, ruthless. Addison may have been the first modern critic to
work out the appeal of art to the pleasures and ideas furnished by the sense
of sight. He is certainly nothing more.
But is he therefore to be ignored, or treated lightly, because of this
His general critical value. strange overvaluation of him? Certainly not.
Though by no means a very great critic, he is a useful, an interesting, and a
representative one. He represents the classical attitude tempered, not merely
Descartes and Locke.
But the most important and the most damaging question of all is this,
“Are not Addison and his panegyrist using words in equivocal senses? Does
Imagination in Addison’s mouth bear the meaning which we, chiefly since
Coleridge’s day, attach to the word? Does it even mean what it meant to
Longinus, much more what it meant to Shakespeare?”
I have no hesitation in answering the two latter questions with an
absolute and unhesitating “No!”
It seems indeed extraordinary that, in face of Addison’s most careful and
explicit limitations, any one should delude himself into thinking that even
the Shakespearian and Addisonian Imaginations are identical—much more
that Addison’s Imagination is the supreme faculty, creative, transcending
Fancy,[585] superior to fact, not merely compounding and refining upon, but
altogether superseding and almost scorning, ideas of sensation, which we
mean by the word, and which Philostratus or Apollonius[586] partly
glimpsed. Addison tells us—tells us over and over again—that all the ideas
and pleasures of the imagination are pleasures of sense, and, what is more,
that they are all pleasures of one sense—Sight. Why he should have limited
himself in this singular manner it is hard to say; except that he was
evidently full of Locke when he wrote, and, indeed, almost entirely under
the influence of the Essay. That he had a contempt for music is elsewhere
pretty evident; and this probably explains his otherwise inexplicable
omission of the supplies and assistance given to Imagination by Hearing.
His morality, as well as old convention, excluded Touch, Taste, and Smell
as low and gross, though no candid philosophy could help acknowledging
the immense influence exercised upon Imagination by at least the first and
the last—Taste, because the most definite, being perhaps the least
imaginative of all. But the fact that he does exclude even these senses, and
still more rigidly excludes everything but Sense, is insuperable,
irremovable, ruthless. Addison may have been the first modern critic to
work out the appeal of art to the pleasures and ideas furnished by the sense
of sight. He is certainly nothing more.
But is he therefore to be ignored, or treated lightly, because of this
His general critical value. strange overvaluation of him? Certainly not.
Though by no means a very great critic, he is a useful, an interesting, and a
representative one. He represents the classical attitude tempered, not merely
Page 448
by good sense almost in quintessence, but by a large share of tolerance and
positive good taste, by freedom from the more utterly ridiculous pseudo-
Aristotelianisms, and by a wish to extend a concordat to everything good
even if it be not “faultless.” In his Account he is evidently too crude to be
very censurable: in his first group of essays much of his censure is just. The
elaborate vindication of Milton, though now and for a long time past merely
a curiosity, is again full of good sense, displays (if not altogether according
to knowledge) a real liking for real poetic goodness, and had an inestimable
effect in keeping at least one poet of the better time privileged and popular
with readers throughout the Eighteenth Century. As for the essay on the
Pleasures of the Imagination, the fact that it has been wrongly praised need
not in the least interfere with a cordial estimate of its real merits. It is not an
epoch-making contribution to literary criticism; it is rather one-sided, and
strangely limited in range. But it is about the first attempt at a general
theory of æsthetics in English; it is a most interesting, and a very early,
example of that application of common-sense philosophy to abstract
subjects which Locke taught to the English eighteenth century; and many of
its remarks are valuable and correct. Moreover, it did actually serve, for
those who could not, or who did not, read Longinus, as a corrective to pure
form-criticism, to Bysshe with his rigid ten syllables, to bare good sense
and conventional rule. Its Imagination was still only that which supplies
Images, and was strangely cramped besides; but it was better than mere
correctness, mere decency, mere stop-watch.
Between Addison and Pope, Steele, Atterbury, and Swift call for notice.
Steele. Steele has little for us.[587] There are few things more curious than
the almost entire abstinence from any expression, in the slightest degree
really critical, to be found in the eulogy of Spenser, which he generously
enough inserted in Sp. 540 to express “his passion for that charming
author.” The numerous friends whom he has so justly won for himself may
perhaps insist that there is criticism of the best in this very phrase; and that
the rather rash encomium on the poet’s “old words” as being “all truly
English” is balanced by the justice of the reference to his “exquisite
numbers.” But the fact is that Steele had neither the knowledge, nor the
patience, nor the coolness for critical work.
Atterbury gives rather more. He was himself a man of great intellectual
power, a scholar, an eloquent and delicate writer, and possessed
independent taste enough to admire Milton fervently at a time when
positive good taste, by freedom from the more utterly ridiculous pseudo-
Aristotelianisms, and by a wish to extend a concordat to everything good
even if it be not “faultless.” In his Account he is evidently too crude to be
very censurable: in his first group of essays much of his censure is just. The
elaborate vindication of Milton, though now and for a long time past merely
a curiosity, is again full of good sense, displays (if not altogether according
to knowledge) a real liking for real poetic goodness, and had an inestimable
effect in keeping at least one poet of the better time privileged and popular
with readers throughout the Eighteenth Century. As for the essay on the
Pleasures of the Imagination, the fact that it has been wrongly praised need
not in the least interfere with a cordial estimate of its real merits. It is not an
epoch-making contribution to literary criticism; it is rather one-sided, and
strangely limited in range. But it is about the first attempt at a general
theory of æsthetics in English; it is a most interesting, and a very early,
example of that application of common-sense philosophy to abstract
subjects which Locke taught to the English eighteenth century; and many of
its remarks are valuable and correct. Moreover, it did actually serve, for
those who could not, or who did not, read Longinus, as a corrective to pure
form-criticism, to Bysshe with his rigid ten syllables, to bare good sense
and conventional rule. Its Imagination was still only that which supplies
Images, and was strangely cramped besides; but it was better than mere
correctness, mere decency, mere stop-watch.
Between Addison and Pope, Steele, Atterbury, and Swift call for notice.
Steele. Steele has little for us.[587] There are few things more curious than
the almost entire abstinence from any expression, in the slightest degree
really critical, to be found in the eulogy of Spenser, which he generously
enough inserted in Sp. 540 to express “his passion for that charming
author.” The numerous friends whom he has so justly won for himself may
perhaps insist that there is criticism of the best in this very phrase; and that
the rather rash encomium on the poet’s “old words” as being “all truly
English” is balanced by the justice of the reference to his “exquisite
numbers.” But the fact is that Steele had neither the knowledge, nor the
patience, nor the coolness for critical work.
Atterbury gives rather more. He was himself a man of great intellectual
power, a scholar, an eloquent and delicate writer, and possessed
independent taste enough to admire Milton fervently at a time when
Page 449
Addison had not yet made it wholly orthodox to admire that poet at all, and
Atterbury. when most Tories detested him. But his observations on
[588]
Waller are the very quintessence of pseudodoxy, as to that respectable
person; and, by a curious combination, though Waller is a rhymer confirmed
and complete, Atterbury joins with his admiration for him an antipathy to
rhyme—“this jingling kind of poetry,” “this troublesome bondage, as Mr
Milton well calls it.” As for this we need say little; the danger lay not there.
But it lay in the direction of such remarks as that “English came into
Waller’s hands like a rough diamond; he polished it first,” that, “for aught I
know, he stands last as well as first in the list of refiners” [imagine the
excellent Waller as be-all and end-all of English!], that “verse before Waller
was downright prose tagged with rhyme,” &c., &c. Once more let our
impatience of this talk not be ignorant—as is the impatience of those who
nowadays cannot see music in Dryden, poetry in Pope, “cry” and clangour
now and then even in persons like Langhorne and Mickle. He expressed an
opinion; but in expressing it he showed this same ignorance from which we
should abstain. Instead of pointing out that Waller introduced a different
kind of music, he insisted that Waller substituted music for discord: instead
of saying that he introduced a new fashion of cutting the diamond, he would
have it that the diamond was merely rough before. This was the culpa, the
maxima culpa of eighteenth-century criticism, and Atterbury illustrates and
shares it.[589]
The critical work of Swift[590] is much more important, and though a good
deal of it is inextricably mixed up with the work of Pope and of Arbuthnot,
Swift. the lion’s claw is generally perceptible enough. The famous
Tatler of September 28, 1710, on the conceptions of English style and
writing, ought to hold place in every history and course of lectures on the
subject, next to Sprat’s passage in the History of the Royal Society forty
years before, as the manifesto of a fresh stage in English style-criticism; and
it practically precedes everything that Addison, Steele, and Pope published
on, or in connection with, the subject. But long before this, in the wonderful
volume which first (1704) revealed his genius to the world, Swift had
shown how critical the Gods had made him.
The Battle of the Books is one of the most eccentric documents in the
The Battle of whole History of our subject. Directly, and on its face, it
the Books.
may be said to be of the first critical importance; because it
shows how very little subject, intention, accuracy to fact, verisimilitude,
Atterbury. when most Tories detested him. But his observations on
[588]
Waller are the very quintessence of pseudodoxy, as to that respectable
person; and, by a curious combination, though Waller is a rhymer confirmed
and complete, Atterbury joins with his admiration for him an antipathy to
rhyme—“this jingling kind of poetry,” “this troublesome bondage, as Mr
Milton well calls it.” As for this we need say little; the danger lay not there.
But it lay in the direction of such remarks as that “English came into
Waller’s hands like a rough diamond; he polished it first,” that, “for aught I
know, he stands last as well as first in the list of refiners” [imagine the
excellent Waller as be-all and end-all of English!], that “verse before Waller
was downright prose tagged with rhyme,” &c., &c. Once more let our
impatience of this talk not be ignorant—as is the impatience of those who
nowadays cannot see music in Dryden, poetry in Pope, “cry” and clangour
now and then even in persons like Langhorne and Mickle. He expressed an
opinion; but in expressing it he showed this same ignorance from which we
should abstain. Instead of pointing out that Waller introduced a different
kind of music, he insisted that Waller substituted music for discord: instead
of saying that he introduced a new fashion of cutting the diamond, he would
have it that the diamond was merely rough before. This was the culpa, the
maxima culpa of eighteenth-century criticism, and Atterbury illustrates and
shares it.[589]
The critical work of Swift[590] is much more important, and though a good
deal of it is inextricably mixed up with the work of Pope and of Arbuthnot,
Swift. the lion’s claw is generally perceptible enough. The famous
Tatler of September 28, 1710, on the conceptions of English style and
writing, ought to hold place in every history and course of lectures on the
subject, next to Sprat’s passage in the History of the Royal Society forty
years before, as the manifesto of a fresh stage in English style-criticism; and
it practically precedes everything that Addison, Steele, and Pope published
on, or in connection with, the subject. But long before this, in the wonderful
volume which first (1704) revealed his genius to the world, Swift had
shown how critical the Gods had made him.
The Battle of the Books is one of the most eccentric documents in the
The Battle of whole History of our subject. Directly, and on its face, it
the Books.
may be said to be of the first critical importance; because it
shows how very little subject, intention, accuracy to fact, verisimilitude,
Page 450
and half-a-dozen other indispensables according to certain theories, have to
do with the goodness of a book. The general characteristics of The Battle of
the Books in all these named respects, and some of the unnamed ones, are
deplorable. In a tedious and idle quarrel which, at least as it was actually
debated, never need have been debated at all, Swift takes the side which, if
not the intrinsically wrong one, is the wrong one as he takes it. To represent
Bentley, or even Wotton, as enemies of the Ancients might seem
preposterous, if it were not outdone by the preposterousness of selecting
Temple as their champion. The details are often absurd—from that ranking
of “Despréaux” side by side with Cowley as a Modern brigadier, which is
probably a slip (perhaps for “Desportes”) of pen or press, to the spiteful
injustices on Dryden. The idea of the piece was probably taken from
Callières.[591] Its composition, from the rigid “Ancient” point of view, is
sadly lax; and the two most brilliant episodes—the “Sweetness and Light”
quarrel of the Spider and the Bee, and the “machine” of the Goddess of
Criticism—have little or nothing to do with the action. But yet it is—and
one knows it is—a masterpiece; and it is pretty certain from it that in certain
kinds of destructive criticism, and even in certain kinds of what may be
called destructive-constructive, the author will be able to accomplish almost
anything that he is likely to try.
Though the Tale of the Tub is less ostensibly bookish, it shows even
greater purely critical power: for the power of the Battle is mainly that of a
consummate craftsman, who can accomplish by sheer craftsmanship
The Tale of a whatsoever his hand findeth to do. In the Tale the crusade
Tub.
against bad writing and bad writers, which Swift carried on
more or less for the whole of his middle and later years, and in which he
enlisted Addison and Pope, Arbuthnot and Gay, is all but formally
proclaimed, and is most vigorously waged with or without proclamation. In
the “Dedication to Somers” the sword is being something more than
loosened in the sheath; it flashes out in “The Bookseller to the Reader”; it is
doing sanguinary work in the great “Epistle to Prince Posterity;” and it has
only momentary rests in the “Preface” and the “Induction”: while there is
hardly a section of the main text in which the quarters of Grub Street are not
beaten up, and the Conclusion is even as the preludes and the main body.
A shrewd judge could hardly fail to perceive, from these famous twin-
books, that a new genius of thoroughly critical character had arisen: but
such a judge might well have doubted how far its exercise could be
do with the goodness of a book. The general characteristics of The Battle of
the Books in all these named respects, and some of the unnamed ones, are
deplorable. In a tedious and idle quarrel which, at least as it was actually
debated, never need have been debated at all, Swift takes the side which, if
not the intrinsically wrong one, is the wrong one as he takes it. To represent
Bentley, or even Wotton, as enemies of the Ancients might seem
preposterous, if it were not outdone by the preposterousness of selecting
Temple as their champion. The details are often absurd—from that ranking
of “Despréaux” side by side with Cowley as a Modern brigadier, which is
probably a slip (perhaps for “Desportes”) of pen or press, to the spiteful
injustices on Dryden. The idea of the piece was probably taken from
Callières.[591] Its composition, from the rigid “Ancient” point of view, is
sadly lax; and the two most brilliant episodes—the “Sweetness and Light”
quarrel of the Spider and the Bee, and the “machine” of the Goddess of
Criticism—have little or nothing to do with the action. But yet it is—and
one knows it is—a masterpiece; and it is pretty certain from it that in certain
kinds of destructive criticism, and even in certain kinds of what may be
called destructive-constructive, the author will be able to accomplish almost
anything that he is likely to try.
Though the Tale of the Tub is less ostensibly bookish, it shows even
greater purely critical power: for the power of the Battle is mainly that of a
consummate craftsman, who can accomplish by sheer craftsmanship
The Tale of a whatsoever his hand findeth to do. In the Tale the crusade
Tub.
against bad writing and bad writers, which Swift carried on
more or less for the whole of his middle and later years, and in which he
enlisted Addison and Pope, Arbuthnot and Gay, is all but formally
proclaimed, and is most vigorously waged with or without proclamation. In
the “Dedication to Somers” the sword is being something more than
loosened in the sheath; it flashes out in “The Bookseller to the Reader”; it is
doing sanguinary work in the great “Epistle to Prince Posterity;” and it has
only momentary rests in the “Preface” and the “Induction”: while there is
hardly a section of the main text in which the quarters of Grub Street are not
beaten up, and the Conclusion is even as the preludes and the main body.
A shrewd judge could hardly fail to perceive, from these famous twin-
books, that a new genius of thoroughly critical character had arisen: but
such a judge might well have doubted how far its exercise could be
Page 451
Minor works. anything but negative. His doubts, as we have already
hinted, were to be justified. Indirectly, indeed, not merely in the Tatler
paper above referred to and elsewhere, but by that almost uncanny
influence which he seems to have exerted in so many ways on men only
less than himself, Swift had very much to do with the rescuing of Style, by
the hands of Addison and the rest, from the vulgarisation which it was
undergoing at the close of the seventeenth century, not merely in common
writers, not merely in the hands of an eccentric like L’Estrange, but in those
of scholars like Collier and Bentley. But even this was a task of destruction
rather than of positive construction, and he was always most at home in
such tasks. The Meditation on a Broomstick and the Tritical Essay, though
every good reviewer should know them by heart, and will have but too
many opportunities of using his knowledge, are delivered with the
backward, not the forward, speech of the critic; the Proposal for correcting
the English Tongue, which falls in with the Tatler paper, aims at a sort of
stationary state of language and literature alike, at proscriptions and
ostracisings; the Letter to a Young Clergyman and the Essay on Modern
Education, though both touch on literature, are exceedingly general in their
precepts; and though all persons with a true English appreciation of
shameless puns and utter nonsense must delight in The Antiquity of the
English Tongue, it cannot be called serious criticism. There is more in the
Advice to a Young Poet: but even here Swift is rather “running humours” on
his subject than discussing it in the grave and chaste manner.
We shall therefore hardly be wrong if, after excepting the literary
directions of the universal satiric douche in the Tale of a Tub, and the useful
but somewhat rudimentary warnings of the Tatler paper, we see the most
characteristic critical work of Swift in Martinus Scriblerus and the Peri
Bathous, especially in the latter, which, though it be principally attributed to
Arbuthnot and Pope, is as surely Swiftian in suggestion as if the Dean had
written and published it alone. Often as it has been imitated, and largely as
its methods have been drawn upon, it has never been surpassed as an Art of
General and Particular “Slating”: and the sections on the Figures, with the
immortal receipt for making an epic poem (the full beauty of which is lost
on those who do not know how appallingly close it is to the approved
prescriptions of the best neo-classic critics), cannot be too highly praised.
But, once more, the critic is here at hangman’s work only: he allows himself
neither to admire nor to love.
hinted, were to be justified. Indirectly, indeed, not merely in the Tatler
paper above referred to and elsewhere, but by that almost uncanny
influence which he seems to have exerted in so many ways on men only
less than himself, Swift had very much to do with the rescuing of Style, by
the hands of Addison and the rest, from the vulgarisation which it was
undergoing at the close of the seventeenth century, not merely in common
writers, not merely in the hands of an eccentric like L’Estrange, but in those
of scholars like Collier and Bentley. But even this was a task of destruction
rather than of positive construction, and he was always most at home in
such tasks. The Meditation on a Broomstick and the Tritical Essay, though
every good reviewer should know them by heart, and will have but too
many opportunities of using his knowledge, are delivered with the
backward, not the forward, speech of the critic; the Proposal for correcting
the English Tongue, which falls in with the Tatler paper, aims at a sort of
stationary state of language and literature alike, at proscriptions and
ostracisings; the Letter to a Young Clergyman and the Essay on Modern
Education, though both touch on literature, are exceedingly general in their
precepts; and though all persons with a true English appreciation of
shameless puns and utter nonsense must delight in The Antiquity of the
English Tongue, it cannot be called serious criticism. There is more in the
Advice to a Young Poet: but even here Swift is rather “running humours” on
his subject than discussing it in the grave and chaste manner.
We shall therefore hardly be wrong if, after excepting the literary
directions of the universal satiric douche in the Tale of a Tub, and the useful
but somewhat rudimentary warnings of the Tatler paper, we see the most
characteristic critical work of Swift in Martinus Scriblerus and the Peri
Bathous, especially in the latter, which, though it be principally attributed to
Arbuthnot and Pope, is as surely Swiftian in suggestion as if the Dean had
written and published it alone. Often as it has been imitated, and largely as
its methods have been drawn upon, it has never been surpassed as an Art of
General and Particular “Slating”: and the sections on the Figures, with the
immortal receipt for making an epic poem (the full beauty of which is lost
on those who do not know how appallingly close it is to the approved
prescriptions of the best neo-classic critics), cannot be too highly praised.
But, once more, the critic is here at hangman’s work only: he allows himself
neither to admire nor to love.
Page 452
These principles, put in various ways by writers of more or less genius
for half a century, found what seemed to more than two generations (always
with a few dissidents) something like consummate expression in certain
Pope. well-known utterances of Pope. As expression these utterances
may still receive a very high degree of admiration: as anything else it is
difficult to believe that any turn of fashion, unless it brings with it oblivion
for large districts of noble literature, can restore them to much authority.
Pope, though better read than he seems in his poems, was by no means a
learned man; and it is now pretty generally admitted that his intellect was
acute rather than powerful. The obstinate superficiality—the reduction of
everything, even the most recondite problems of philosophy, even the most
far-ranging questions of erudition, to a jury of “common-sense” persons,
decorated with a little of the fashion of the town—which had set in, found
in him an exponent as competent to give it exquisite expression as he was
indisposed, and probably incompetent, to deepen or extend its scope. He
attained early to nearly his full powers, and it does not much matter whether
the Essay on Criticism was written at the age of twenty or at that of twenty-
two. He could have improved it a little in form, but would hardly have
altered it at all in matter, if he had written it thirty years later. The Imitation
of the Epistle of Horace to Augustus, which was actually written about that
time, is, though superior as verse, almost inferior as criticism, and more
“out” in fact. The two together give a sufficient view of Pope as he wished
The Letters. to be taken critically. But to be perfectly fair we must add
the critical utterances in his Letters,[592] his Preface to Shakespeare, and
(with caution of course) the remarks attributed to him by Spence. The
Preface has received much praise; and has deserved some even from those
who follow not Pope generally. It would be unfair to blame him for
adopting the mixed “beauty and fault” system which had the patronage of
great names in antiquity, and found hardly even questioners in his own
time. And it is something that he recognises Shakespeare’s power over the
passions, the individuality of his characters, his intuitive knowledge of the
world and of nature. He is moderate and sensible on the relations of
Shakespeare and Jonson; he has practically said all that is to be said, in an
The endless and tiresome controversy, by writing, “To judge
Shakespeare
Preface.
Shakespeare by Aristotle’s rules is like trying a man by the
laws of one country who acted under those of another.”
And for such utterances we may excuse, or at least pass over with little or
for half a century, found what seemed to more than two generations (always
with a few dissidents) something like consummate expression in certain
Pope. well-known utterances of Pope. As expression these utterances
may still receive a very high degree of admiration: as anything else it is
difficult to believe that any turn of fashion, unless it brings with it oblivion
for large districts of noble literature, can restore them to much authority.
Pope, though better read than he seems in his poems, was by no means a
learned man; and it is now pretty generally admitted that his intellect was
acute rather than powerful. The obstinate superficiality—the reduction of
everything, even the most recondite problems of philosophy, even the most
far-ranging questions of erudition, to a jury of “common-sense” persons,
decorated with a little of the fashion of the town—which had set in, found
in him an exponent as competent to give it exquisite expression as he was
indisposed, and probably incompetent, to deepen or extend its scope. He
attained early to nearly his full powers, and it does not much matter whether
the Essay on Criticism was written at the age of twenty or at that of twenty-
two. He could have improved it a little in form, but would hardly have
altered it at all in matter, if he had written it thirty years later. The Imitation
of the Epistle of Horace to Augustus, which was actually written about that
time, is, though superior as verse, almost inferior as criticism, and more
“out” in fact. The two together give a sufficient view of Pope as he wished
The Letters. to be taken critically. But to be perfectly fair we must add
the critical utterances in his Letters,[592] his Preface to Shakespeare, and
(with caution of course) the remarks attributed to him by Spence. The
Preface has received much praise; and has deserved some even from those
who follow not Pope generally. It would be unfair to blame him for
adopting the mixed “beauty and fault” system which had the patronage of
great names in antiquity, and found hardly even questioners in his own
time. And it is something that he recognises Shakespeare’s power over the
passions, the individuality of his characters, his intuitive knowledge of the
world and of nature. He is moderate and sensible on the relations of
Shakespeare and Jonson; he has practically said all that is to be said, in an
The endless and tiresome controversy, by writing, “To judge
Shakespeare
Preface.
Shakespeare by Aristotle’s rules is like trying a man by the
laws of one country who acted under those of another.”
And for such utterances we may excuse, or at least pass over with little or
Page 453
no comment, the remarks that Shakespeare kept bad company, that he wrote
to please the populace, that he resembles “an ancient majestic piece of
Gothic architecture [so far, so good], where many of the details are childish,
ill-placed, and unequal to its grandeur.” The littleness of this patchy, yea-
nay criticism beside the great and everlasting appreciation of his master
Dryden speaks for itself; it is only fair to remember that the very existence
of Dryden’s for once really marmoreal inscription almost inevitably
belittled and hampered Pope. He was obliged to be different; and internal as
well as external influences made it certain that if he were different he would
be less.
The Popiana of Spence[593] add more to our idea of Pope’s critical faculty,
or at least of its exercises; in fact, it is possible to take a much better
estimate of Pope’s “literature” from the Anecdotes than from the Works.
Spence’s Although the Boswellian spirit was, fortunately enough for
Anecdotes.
posterity, very strong in the eighteenth century, there was
no particular reason why Spence should toady Pope—especially as he
published nothing to obtain pence or popularity from the toadying. That
rather remarkable collection, or re-collection, of Italian-Latin poetry of the
Renaissance,[594] of which not much notice has been taken by Pope’s
biographers, would, of itself, show critical interest in a part, and no
unnoteworthy part, of literature: and a few of the Spencean salvages bear
directly upon this. He need not have been ashamed of his special liking for
Politian’s Ambra: and he was right in thinking Bembo “stiff and
unpoetical,” though hardly in joining Sadolet with him in this
condemnation. We know perfectly well why he did not like Rabelais, for
which Swift very properly scolded him: indeed, he tells us himself, twice
over, that “there were so many things” in Master Francis, “in which he
could not see any manner of meaning driven at,” that he could not read him
with any patience. This is really more tale-telling than the constantly quoted
passage about Walsh and correctness. For, after all, everybody aspires to be
correct: only everybody has his own notions of what is correctness. It is not
everybody—and, as we see, it was not the great Mr Pope—who could, or
can, appreciate nonsense, and see how much more sensible than sense the
best of it is. It would skill but little to go through his isolated judgments: but
there are one or two which are eloquent.
Still, it is to the Essay and the Epistle that we must turn for his deliberate
theory of criticism, announced in youth, indorsed and emphasised in age.
to please the populace, that he resembles “an ancient majestic piece of
Gothic architecture [so far, so good], where many of the details are childish,
ill-placed, and unequal to its grandeur.” The littleness of this patchy, yea-
nay criticism beside the great and everlasting appreciation of his master
Dryden speaks for itself; it is only fair to remember that the very existence
of Dryden’s for once really marmoreal inscription almost inevitably
belittled and hampered Pope. He was obliged to be different; and internal as
well as external influences made it certain that if he were different he would
be less.
The Popiana of Spence[593] add more to our idea of Pope’s critical faculty,
or at least of its exercises; in fact, it is possible to take a much better
estimate of Pope’s “literature” from the Anecdotes than from the Works.
Spence’s Although the Boswellian spirit was, fortunately enough for
Anecdotes.
posterity, very strong in the eighteenth century, there was
no particular reason why Spence should toady Pope—especially as he
published nothing to obtain pence or popularity from the toadying. That
rather remarkable collection, or re-collection, of Italian-Latin poetry of the
Renaissance,[594] of which not much notice has been taken by Pope’s
biographers, would, of itself, show critical interest in a part, and no
unnoteworthy part, of literature: and a few of the Spencean salvages bear
directly upon this. He need not have been ashamed of his special liking for
Politian’s Ambra: and he was right in thinking Bembo “stiff and
unpoetical,” though hardly in joining Sadolet with him in this
condemnation. We know perfectly well why he did not like Rabelais, for
which Swift very properly scolded him: indeed, he tells us himself, twice
over, that “there were so many things” in Master Francis, “in which he
could not see any manner of meaning driven at,” that he could not read him
with any patience. This is really more tale-telling than the constantly quoted
passage about Walsh and correctness. For, after all, everybody aspires to be
correct: only everybody has his own notions of what is correctness. It is not
everybody—and, as we see, it was not the great Mr Pope—who could, or
can, appreciate nonsense, and see how much more sensible than sense the
best of it is. It would skill but little to go through his isolated judgments: but
there are one or two which are eloquent.
Still, it is to the Essay and the Epistle that we must turn for his deliberate
theory of criticism, announced in youth, indorsed and emphasised in age.
Page 454
The Essay on And we meet at once with a difficulty. The possessor of
Criticism.
such a theory ought, at least, to have something like a
connected knowledge, at least a connected view, of literature as a whole,
and to be able to square the two. All Pope seems to have done is to take the
Arts of Horace, Vida, and Boileau, to adopt as many of their principles as he
understood, and as would go into his sharp antithetic couplet, to drag their
historical illustrations head and shoulders into his scheme without caring
for the facts, and to fill in and embroider with criticisms, observations, and
precepts, sometimes very shrewd, almost always perfectly expressed, but
far too often arbitrary, conventional, and limited. He is most unfortunate of
all in the historical part, where Boileau had been sufficiently unfortunate
before him. The Frenchman’s observations on Villon and Ronsard had been
ignorant enough, and forced enough: but Pope managed to go a little
beyond them in the Essay, and a great distance further still in the Epistle.
The history of the famous passage,
“We conquered France, but felt our captive’s charms,”[595]
is like nothing on earth but the history-poetry of the despised monkish ages,
in which Alexander has twelve peers, and Arthur, early in the sixth century,
overruns Europe with a British force, and fights with a Roman Emperor
named Lucius. And the sketch of European literature in the Essay, if it
contains no single statement so glaringly absurd, is as much a “tissue of
gaps” as the Irishman’s coat.
Attempts have been made (including some by persons deserving all
respect, and thoroughly acquainted with the subject) to give Pope a high
place, on the score of his charges to “follow nature.” Unfortunately this is
mere translation of Boileau, of Vida, and of Horace, in the first place: and,
still more unfortunately, the poet’s own arguments on his doctrine show that
what he meant by “following nature,” and what we mean by it, are two
quite different things. He, usually at least, means “stick to the usual, the
ordinary, the commonplace.” Just so the legendary King of Siam, had he
written an Art of Poetry, would have said “Follow nature, and do not talk
about such unnatural things as ice and snow.”
Regarded merely as a manual of the art of Pope’s own poetry, without
prejudice to any other, and as a satire on the faults of other kinds, without
prejudice to the weaknesses of his own, the Essay is not merely an
Criticism.
such a theory ought, at least, to have something like a
connected knowledge, at least a connected view, of literature as a whole,
and to be able to square the two. All Pope seems to have done is to take the
Arts of Horace, Vida, and Boileau, to adopt as many of their principles as he
understood, and as would go into his sharp antithetic couplet, to drag their
historical illustrations head and shoulders into his scheme without caring
for the facts, and to fill in and embroider with criticisms, observations, and
precepts, sometimes very shrewd, almost always perfectly expressed, but
far too often arbitrary, conventional, and limited. He is most unfortunate of
all in the historical part, where Boileau had been sufficiently unfortunate
before him. The Frenchman’s observations on Villon and Ronsard had been
ignorant enough, and forced enough: but Pope managed to go a little
beyond them in the Essay, and a great distance further still in the Epistle.
The history of the famous passage,
“We conquered France, but felt our captive’s charms,”[595]
is like nothing on earth but the history-poetry of the despised monkish ages,
in which Alexander has twelve peers, and Arthur, early in the sixth century,
overruns Europe with a British force, and fights with a Roman Emperor
named Lucius. And the sketch of European literature in the Essay, if it
contains no single statement so glaringly absurd, is as much a “tissue of
gaps” as the Irishman’s coat.
Attempts have been made (including some by persons deserving all
respect, and thoroughly acquainted with the subject) to give Pope a high
place, on the score of his charges to “follow nature.” Unfortunately this is
mere translation of Boileau, of Vida, and of Horace, in the first place: and,
still more unfortunately, the poet’s own arguments on his doctrine show that
what he meant by “following nature,” and what we mean by it, are two
quite different things. He, usually at least, means “stick to the usual, the
ordinary, the commonplace.” Just so the legendary King of Siam, had he
written an Art of Poetry, would have said “Follow nature, and do not talk
about such unnatural things as ice and snow.”
Regarded merely as a manual of the art of Pope’s own poetry, without
prejudice to any other, and as a satire on the faults of other kinds, without
prejudice to the weaknesses of his own, the Essay is not merely an
Page 455
interesting document, but a really valuable one. Its cautions against
desertion of nature in the directions of excess, of the unduly fantastic, are
sound to this day: and its eulogies of ancient writers, though perhaps neither
based on very extensive and accurate first-hand knowledge, nor specially
appropriate to the matter in hand, contain much that is just in itself. One of
the weakest parts, as might have been expected, is the treatment of rules,
licences, and faults. The poet-critic practically confesses the otiosity of the
whole system by admitting that a lucky licence is a rule, and that it is
possible, as one of his own most famous and happiest lines says,
“To snatch a grace beyond the reach of art.”
And when he paraphrases Quintilian to the effect that you must criticise
“With the same spirit that the author writ,”
and judge the whole, not the parts, he again goes perilously near to jettison
his whole system.
In the same way consistency is the last thing that can be claimed for his
chapters, as they may be called, on conceit, on language, “numbers” (the
most famous and the most ingenious passage of the Essay), extremes,
“turns,” the Ancient and Modern quarrel, &c. The passage on Critics is
among the best—for here sheer good sense (even in the temporary, much
more in the universal, meaning) tells—and the historical sketch of them,
though not too accurate, is vigorous.
The much later Epistle is far more desultory, and inevitably tinged by
those personal feelings which many years of literary squabble had helped
The Epistle to ill-health and natural disposition to arouse in Pope. But its
Augustus.
general critical attitude is not different. He is angry with the
revival of old literature which Watson and Allan Ramsay in Scotland, Oldys
and others in England, were beginning, hints sneers even at Milton and the
“weeds on Avon’s bank,” is at least as hackneyed as he is neat in his
individual criticisms on poets nearer his own day, and defends poetry and
literature generally in a patronising and half-apologetic strain. In fact, what
he has really at heart is to be politely rude to George II.; not to give any
critical account of English literature.
But the Essay on Criticism is too important a thing not to require a little
more notice here. It is extremely desultory; but so is the Epistola ad
desertion of nature in the directions of excess, of the unduly fantastic, are
sound to this day: and its eulogies of ancient writers, though perhaps neither
based on very extensive and accurate first-hand knowledge, nor specially
appropriate to the matter in hand, contain much that is just in itself. One of
the weakest parts, as might have been expected, is the treatment of rules,
licences, and faults. The poet-critic practically confesses the otiosity of the
whole system by admitting that a lucky licence is a rule, and that it is
possible, as one of his own most famous and happiest lines says,
“To snatch a grace beyond the reach of art.”
And when he paraphrases Quintilian to the effect that you must criticise
“With the same spirit that the author writ,”
and judge the whole, not the parts, he again goes perilously near to jettison
his whole system.
In the same way consistency is the last thing that can be claimed for his
chapters, as they may be called, on conceit, on language, “numbers” (the
most famous and the most ingenious passage of the Essay), extremes,
“turns,” the Ancient and Modern quarrel, &c. The passage on Critics is
among the best—for here sheer good sense (even in the temporary, much
more in the universal, meaning) tells—and the historical sketch of them,
though not too accurate, is vigorous.
The much later Epistle is far more desultory, and inevitably tinged by
those personal feelings which many years of literary squabble had helped
The Epistle to ill-health and natural disposition to arouse in Pope. But its
Augustus.
general critical attitude is not different. He is angry with the
revival of old literature which Watson and Allan Ramsay in Scotland, Oldys
and others in England, were beginning, hints sneers even at Milton and the
“weeds on Avon’s bank,” is at least as hackneyed as he is neat in his
individual criticisms on poets nearer his own day, and defends poetry and
literature generally in a patronising and half-apologetic strain. In fact, what
he has really at heart is to be politely rude to George II.; not to give any
critical account of English literature.
But the Essay on Criticism is too important a thing not to require a little
more notice here. It is extremely desultory; but so is the Epistola ad
Page 456
Remarks on Pisones, and it is by no means certain that Pope was not
Pope as a critic,
wise in falling back upon the Roman method, instead of
emulating the appearance of system in the Art Poétique. This latter
emphasises faults; Pope’s causerie veils promiscuousness in the elegant
chit-chat of conversation. A bad critic is a more dangerous person than a
bad poet; and true taste is as uncommon as true genius. Bad education is
responsible for bad taste, and we must be very careful about our own.
Nature is the guide; the “rules” are but methodised nature. We derive them,
however, not from nature but from the ancient poets, whom we must study.
Even in licences we must follow them. Bad critics are made by various
causes, from ignorance and party spirit to personal animus. A good critic is
candid, modest, well-bred, and sincere. The sort of history of criticism
which concludes the piece makes it specially surprising that Johnson should
have been so much kinder to Pope’s learning than he was to Dryden’s; but
the author of the actual Essay on Criticism, and the author of the unhappily
but projected History of it, were too thoroughly in agreement about poetry,
and even about criticism itself, to make the latter quite an impartial judge of
the former.
When we pass from generals to particulars Pope’s cleverness at least
appears more than ever. The sharply separated, neatly flying, and neatly
ringing couplets deliver “one, two” in the most fascinating cut-and-thrust
style, not without a brilliant parry now and then to presumed (and never
very formidable) objections. The man’s perfect skill in the execution of his
own special style of poetry raises, and in this case not delusively, the
expectation that he will know his theory as well as his practice. The “good
sense,” the “reason,” are really and not merely nominally present. A great
deal of what is said is quite undoubtedly true and very useful, not merely
for reproof and correction in point of critical and poetical sin, but actually
for instruction in critical and poetical righteousness.
But on further examination there is too often something wanting; nay,
there is too often no real root of the matter present. The preliminary
flourishes are well enough. And certainly no school will quarrel—though
each school may take the privilege of understanding the words in its own
way—with the doctrine “Follow Nature.” But
“One science only will one genius fit”
Pope as a critic,
wise in falling back upon the Roman method, instead of
emulating the appearance of system in the Art Poétique. This latter
emphasises faults; Pope’s causerie veils promiscuousness in the elegant
chit-chat of conversation. A bad critic is a more dangerous person than a
bad poet; and true taste is as uncommon as true genius. Bad education is
responsible for bad taste, and we must be very careful about our own.
Nature is the guide; the “rules” are but methodised nature. We derive them,
however, not from nature but from the ancient poets, whom we must study.
Even in licences we must follow them. Bad critics are made by various
causes, from ignorance and party spirit to personal animus. A good critic is
candid, modest, well-bred, and sincere. The sort of history of criticism
which concludes the piece makes it specially surprising that Johnson should
have been so much kinder to Pope’s learning than he was to Dryden’s; but
the author of the actual Essay on Criticism, and the author of the unhappily
but projected History of it, were too thoroughly in agreement about poetry,
and even about criticism itself, to make the latter quite an impartial judge of
the former.
When we pass from generals to particulars Pope’s cleverness at least
appears more than ever. The sharply separated, neatly flying, and neatly
ringing couplets deliver “one, two” in the most fascinating cut-and-thrust
style, not without a brilliant parry now and then to presumed (and never
very formidable) objections. The man’s perfect skill in the execution of his
own special style of poetry raises, and in this case not delusively, the
expectation that he will know his theory as well as his practice. The “good
sense,” the “reason,” are really and not merely nominally present. A great
deal of what is said is quite undoubtedly true and very useful, not merely
for reproof and correction in point of critical and poetical sin, but actually
for instruction in critical and poetical righteousness.
But on further examination there is too often something wanting; nay,
there is too often no real root of the matter present. The preliminary
flourishes are well enough. And certainly no school will quarrel—though
each school may take the privilege of understanding the words in its own
way—with the doctrine “Follow Nature.” But
“One science only will one genius fit”
Page 457
is notoriously false to nature, and if intended as a hint to the critic, can only
result in too common mistakes and injustices. So, too, when we pass from
the glowing eulogy of Nature, and of her union with Art, to the Rules, there
is a most deplorable gap. Those Rules, “discovered not devised,” are
“nature methodised.” Very good. This means, if it means anything, a very
true thing—that the Rules are extracted from observed works of genius. But
how, a most fervent admirer of the Greeks may ask, did it happen that the
Greeks discovered all these rules? How, especially, did it happen that they
did so, when some kinds of literature itself were notoriously neither
discovered nor devised? And when we get a little further, and are bidden to
“Know well each Ancient’s proper character,”
we may, or rather must, reply, “It is most necessary; but you will neglect the
Moderns at your peril.”
In short, here as elsewhere, Pope’s dazzling elocution, winged with a
distinct if narrow conception of his general purpose, flies right enough in
the inane, but makes painfully little progress when it lights on the prosaic
ground. The picture of “young Maro,” with a sort of ciphering book before
him, “totting up” Homer, Nature, and the Stagirite, and finding them all
exactly equivalent, is really far more ludicrous than those flights of
metaphysical fancy at which critics of Pope’s school delight to gird; while
the very climax of another kind of absurdity is reached by the accordance to
the Ancients, not merely of the prerogative of laying down the rule always
to be followed, but of the privilege of making the not-to-be-imitated
exception. So again, fine as is the Alps passage, the famous doctrine of a
“little learning” is an ingenious fallacy. It is not the little learning acquired,
but the vast amount of ignorance left, that is dangerous. The admirable
couplet,
“True Wit is nature to advantage drest;
What oft was thought, but ne’er so well expressed,”
though in itself the best thing in the whole poem, is unluckily placed,
because this sensation of familiarity beneath novelty is constantly given by
those very “conceits” which Pope is denouncing. On “Language” and
“Numbers” he is too notoriously speaking to a particular brief. And as for
his more general cautions throughout, they are excellent sense for the most
result in too common mistakes and injustices. So, too, when we pass from
the glowing eulogy of Nature, and of her union with Art, to the Rules, there
is a most deplorable gap. Those Rules, “discovered not devised,” are
“nature methodised.” Very good. This means, if it means anything, a very
true thing—that the Rules are extracted from observed works of genius. But
how, a most fervent admirer of the Greeks may ask, did it happen that the
Greeks discovered all these rules? How, especially, did it happen that they
did so, when some kinds of literature itself were notoriously neither
discovered nor devised? And when we get a little further, and are bidden to
“Know well each Ancient’s proper character,”
we may, or rather must, reply, “It is most necessary; but you will neglect the
Moderns at your peril.”
In short, here as elsewhere, Pope’s dazzling elocution, winged with a
distinct if narrow conception of his general purpose, flies right enough in
the inane, but makes painfully little progress when it lights on the prosaic
ground. The picture of “young Maro,” with a sort of ciphering book before
him, “totting up” Homer, Nature, and the Stagirite, and finding them all
exactly equivalent, is really far more ludicrous than those flights of
metaphysical fancy at which critics of Pope’s school delight to gird; while
the very climax of another kind of absurdity is reached by the accordance to
the Ancients, not merely of the prerogative of laying down the rule always
to be followed, but of the privilege of making the not-to-be-imitated
exception. So again, fine as is the Alps passage, the famous doctrine of a
“little learning” is an ingenious fallacy. It is not the little learning acquired,
but the vast amount of ignorance left, that is dangerous. The admirable
couplet,
“True Wit is nature to advantage drest;
What oft was thought, but ne’er so well expressed,”
though in itself the best thing in the whole poem, is unluckily placed,
because this sensation of familiarity beneath novelty is constantly given by
those very “conceits” which Pope is denouncing. On “Language” and
“Numbers” he is too notoriously speaking to a particular brief. And as for
his more general cautions throughout, they are excellent sense for the most
Page 458
part, but have very little more to do with criticism than with any other
function of life. A banker or a fishmonger, an architect, artist, or plain man,
will no doubt be the better for avoiding extremes, partisanship, singularity,
fashion, mere jealousy (personal or other), ignorance, pedantry, vice. And if
he turns critic he will find these avoidances still useful to him, but not more
specially useful than in his former profession.
What then was the critical attitude which was expressed so brilliantly,
and which gave Pope a prerogative influence over all the orthodox criticism
of his own century in England and even elsewhere? It can be sketched very
and the critical attitude of fairly as being a sort of compromise between a
his group.
supposed following of the ancients, and a real
application, to literature in general and to poetry in particular, of the general
taste and cast of thought of the time. The following of the Ancients—it has
been often pointed out already—was, as the Articles of the Church of
England have it, a “corrupt following”: those who said Aristotle meant now
nobody more ancient than Boileau, now no one more ancient than Vida,
scarcely ever any one more ancient than Horace. The classics as a whole
were very little studied, at least by those who busied themselves most with
modern literature; and it had entered into the heads of few that, after all, the
standards of one literature might, or rather must, require very considerable
alteration before they could apply to another.[596] But Greek and Roman
literature presented a body of poetry and of most other kinds, considerable,
admittedly excellent, and mostly composed under the influence of distinct
and identical critical principles. Very few men had a complete knowledge of
even a single modern literature; hardly a man in France knew Old French as
a whole, hardly a man in England, except mere antiquaries, knew Old
English even as a part. There was probably not a man in Europe till Gray
(and Gray was still young at Pope’s death) who had any wide reading at
once in classical literature and in the mediæval and modern literatures of
different countries. Accordingly the principles of ancient criticism, not even
in their purity fully adequate to modern works, and usually presented, not in
their purity but in garbled and bastardised form, were all that they had to
stand by.
This classical, or pseudo-classical, doctrine was further affected, in the
case of literature generally, by the ethos of the time, and, in the case of
poetry, by the curious delusion as to hard and fast syllabic prosody which
has been noticed in connection with Bysshe. Classicism, in any pure sense,
function of life. A banker or a fishmonger, an architect, artist, or plain man,
will no doubt be the better for avoiding extremes, partisanship, singularity,
fashion, mere jealousy (personal or other), ignorance, pedantry, vice. And if
he turns critic he will find these avoidances still useful to him, but not more
specially useful than in his former profession.
What then was the critical attitude which was expressed so brilliantly,
and which gave Pope a prerogative influence over all the orthodox criticism
of his own century in England and even elsewhere? It can be sketched very
and the critical attitude of fairly as being a sort of compromise between a
his group.
supposed following of the ancients, and a real
application, to literature in general and to poetry in particular, of the general
taste and cast of thought of the time. The following of the Ancients—it has
been often pointed out already—was, as the Articles of the Church of
England have it, a “corrupt following”: those who said Aristotle meant now
nobody more ancient than Boileau, now no one more ancient than Vida,
scarcely ever any one more ancient than Horace. The classics as a whole
were very little studied, at least by those who busied themselves most with
modern literature; and it had entered into the heads of few that, after all, the
standards of one literature might, or rather must, require very considerable
alteration before they could apply to another.[596] But Greek and Roman
literature presented a body of poetry and of most other kinds, considerable,
admittedly excellent, and mostly composed under the influence of distinct
and identical critical principles. Very few men had a complete knowledge of
even a single modern literature; hardly a man in France knew Old French as
a whole, hardly a man in England, except mere antiquaries, knew Old
English even as a part. There was probably not a man in Europe till Gray
(and Gray was still young at Pope’s death) who had any wide reading at
once in classical literature and in the mediæval and modern literatures of
different countries. Accordingly the principles of ancient criticism, not even
in their purity fully adequate to modern works, and usually presented, not in
their purity but in garbled and bastardised form, were all that they had to
stand by.
This classical, or pseudo-classical, doctrine was further affected, in the
case of literature generally, by the ethos of the time, and, in the case of
poetry, by the curious delusion as to hard and fast syllabic prosody which
has been noticed in connection with Bysshe. Classicism, in any pure sense,
Page 459
was certainly not to blame for this, for everybody with the slightest tinge of
education knew that the chief Latin metre admitted the substitution of
trisyllabic for dissyllabic feet in every place but one, and most knew that
this substitution was even more widely permitted by Greek in a standard
metre, approaching the English still nearer. But it had, as we have seen,
been a gradually growing delusion, for a hundred and fifty years, in almost
every kind of non-dramatic poetry.
As for the general tendency, the lines of that are clear—though the
arbitrary extension and stiffening of them remain a little incomprehensible.
Nature was to be the test; but an artificialised Nature, arranged according to
the fashion of a town-haunting society—a Nature which submitted herself
to a system of convention and generalisation. In so far as there was any real
general principle it was that you were to be like everybody else—that
singularity, except in doing the usual thing best, was to be carefully
avoided. Pope, being a man of genius, could not help transcending this
general conception constantly by his execution, not seldom by his thought,
and sometimes in his critical precepts. But it remains the conception of his
time and of himself.
The writers whom we have been discussing, since we parted with Dennis,
have all been considerable men of letters, who in more or less degree busied
Philosophical themselves with criticism. We must now pass to those who,
and Professional
Critics.
without exactly deserving the former description,
undertook the subject either, as part of those
“philosophical” inquiries which, however loosely understood, were so
eagerly and usefully pursued by the eighteenth century, or as direct matter
of professional duty. The first division supplies Lord Kames in Scotland and
“Hermes” Harris in England. Whether we are right in reserving Shaftesbury,
Hume, Adam Smith, &c., from it, so as to deal with them from the Æsthetic
side in the next volume, may be matter of opinion.
Trapp. To the second belong Trapp, Blair, and Campbell. Trapp
need not detain us very long; but as first occupant of the first literary chair
in England, and so the author of a volume of Prælections respectable in
themselves, and starting a line of similar work which, to the present day,
has contributed admirable critical documents, he cannot be omitted. He was
the author of one of the wittiest epigrams[597] on record, but he did not allow
himself much sparkle in his lectures.[598] Perhaps, indeed, he was right not to
do so.
education knew that the chief Latin metre admitted the substitution of
trisyllabic for dissyllabic feet in every place but one, and most knew that
this substitution was even more widely permitted by Greek in a standard
metre, approaching the English still nearer. But it had, as we have seen,
been a gradually growing delusion, for a hundred and fifty years, in almost
every kind of non-dramatic poetry.
As for the general tendency, the lines of that are clear—though the
arbitrary extension and stiffening of them remain a little incomprehensible.
Nature was to be the test; but an artificialised Nature, arranged according to
the fashion of a town-haunting society—a Nature which submitted herself
to a system of convention and generalisation. In so far as there was any real
general principle it was that you were to be like everybody else—that
singularity, except in doing the usual thing best, was to be carefully
avoided. Pope, being a man of genius, could not help transcending this
general conception constantly by his execution, not seldom by his thought,
and sometimes in his critical precepts. But it remains the conception of his
time and of himself.
The writers whom we have been discussing, since we parted with Dennis,
have all been considerable men of letters, who in more or less degree busied
Philosophical themselves with criticism. We must now pass to those who,
and Professional
Critics.
without exactly deserving the former description,
undertook the subject either, as part of those
“philosophical” inquiries which, however loosely understood, were so
eagerly and usefully pursued by the eighteenth century, or as direct matter
of professional duty. The first division supplies Lord Kames in Scotland and
“Hermes” Harris in England. Whether we are right in reserving Shaftesbury,
Hume, Adam Smith, &c., from it, so as to deal with them from the Æsthetic
side in the next volume, may be matter of opinion.
Trapp. To the second belong Trapp, Blair, and Campbell. Trapp
need not detain us very long; but as first occupant of the first literary chair
in England, and so the author of a volume of Prælections respectable in
themselves, and starting a line of similar work which, to the present day,
has contributed admirable critical documents, he cannot be omitted. He was
the author of one of the wittiest epigrams[597] on record, but he did not allow
himself much sparkle in his lectures.[598] Perhaps, indeed, he was right not to
do so.
Page 460
Hugh Blair, half a century later than Trapp, in 1759, started, like him, the
Blair. teaching of modern literature in his own country. He had
the advantage, as far as securing a popular audience goes, of lecturing in
English, and he was undoubtedly a man of talent. The Lectures on Rhetoric
and Belles Lettres,[599] which were delivered with great éclat for nearly a
quarter of a century from the Chair of their subject, are very far, indeed,
from being devoid of merit. They provide a very solid, if a somewhat
mannered and artificial instruction, both by precept and example, in what
may be called the “full-dress plain style” which was popular in the
eighteenth century. They are as original as could be expected. The critical
examination of Addison’s style, if somewhat meticulous, is mostly sound,
and has, like Johnson’s criticisms of Dryden and Pope, the advantage of
thorough sympathy, of freedom from the drawback—so common in such
examinations—that author and critic are standing on different platforms,
looking in different directions, speaking, one may almost say, in mutually
incomprehensible tongues. The survey of Belles Lettres is, on its own
scheme, ingenious and correct: there are everywhere evidences of love of
Literature (as the lover understands her), of good education and reading, of
sound sense. Blair is to be very particularly commended for accepting to the
full the important truth that “Rhetoric” in modern times really means
“Criticism”; and for doing all he can to destroy the notion, authorised too
far by ancient critics, and encouraged by those of the Renaissance, that
Tropes and Figures are not possibly useful classifications and names, but
fill a real arsenal of weapons, a real cabinet of reagents, by the employment
of which the practitioner can refute, or convince, or delight, as the case may
be.
But with this, and with the further praise due to judicious borrowings
The Lectures on from the ancients, the encomium must cease. In Blair’s
Rhetoric.
general critical view of literature the eighteenth-century
blinkers are drawn as close as possible. From no writer, even in French, can
more “awful examples” be extracted, not merely of perverse critical
assumption, but of positive historical ignorance. Quite early in the second
Lecture, and after some remarks (a little arbitrary, but not valueless) on
delicacy and correctness in taste, we find, within a short distance of each
other, the statements that “in the reign of Charles II. such writers as
Suckling and Etheridge were held in esteem for dramatic composition,” and
later, “If a man shall assert that Homer has no beauties whatever, that he
Blair. teaching of modern literature in his own country. He had
the advantage, as far as securing a popular audience goes, of lecturing in
English, and he was undoubtedly a man of talent. The Lectures on Rhetoric
and Belles Lettres,[599] which were delivered with great éclat for nearly a
quarter of a century from the Chair of their subject, are very far, indeed,
from being devoid of merit. They provide a very solid, if a somewhat
mannered and artificial instruction, both by precept and example, in what
may be called the “full-dress plain style” which was popular in the
eighteenth century. They are as original as could be expected. The critical
examination of Addison’s style, if somewhat meticulous, is mostly sound,
and has, like Johnson’s criticisms of Dryden and Pope, the advantage of
thorough sympathy, of freedom from the drawback—so common in such
examinations—that author and critic are standing on different platforms,
looking in different directions, speaking, one may almost say, in mutually
incomprehensible tongues. The survey of Belles Lettres is, on its own
scheme, ingenious and correct: there are everywhere evidences of love of
Literature (as the lover understands her), of good education and reading, of
sound sense. Blair is to be very particularly commended for accepting to the
full the important truth that “Rhetoric” in modern times really means
“Criticism”; and for doing all he can to destroy the notion, authorised too
far by ancient critics, and encouraged by those of the Renaissance, that
Tropes and Figures are not possibly useful classifications and names, but
fill a real arsenal of weapons, a real cabinet of reagents, by the employment
of which the practitioner can refute, or convince, or delight, as the case may
be.
But with this, and with the further praise due to judicious borrowings
The Lectures on from the ancients, the encomium must cease. In Blair’s
Rhetoric.
general critical view of literature the eighteenth-century
blinkers are drawn as close as possible. From no writer, even in French, can
more “awful examples” be extracted, not merely of perverse critical
assumption, but of positive historical ignorance. Quite early in the second
Lecture, and after some remarks (a little arbitrary, but not valueless) on
delicacy and correctness in taste, we find, within a short distance of each
other, the statements that “in the reign of Charles II. such writers as
Suckling and Etheridge were held in esteem for dramatic composition,” and
later, “If a man shall assert that Homer has no beauties whatever, that he
Page 461
holds him to be a dull and spiritless writer, and that he would as soon
peruse any legend of old knight-errantry as the Iliad, then I exclaim that my
antagonist is either void of all taste,” &c. Here, on the one hand, the
lumping of Suckling and Etherege together, and the implied assumption that
not merely Suckling, but Etherege, is a worthless dramatist, gives us one
“light,” just as the similar implication that “an old legend of knight-
errantry” is necessarily an example of dulness, spiritlessness, and absence
of beauty, gives us another. That Blair lays down, even more peremptorily
than Johnson, and as peremptorily as Bysshe, that the pause in an English
line may fall after the 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th syllable, and no other, is not
surprising; and his observations on Shakespeare are too much in the usual
“faults-saved-by-beauties” style to need quotation. But that he cites, with
approval, a classification of the great literary periods of the world which
excludes the Elizabethan Age altogether, is not to be omitted. It stamps the
attitude.
These same qualities appear in the once famous but now little read
The Dissertation on Ossian.[600] That, in the sense of the word
Dissertation on
Ossian.
on which least stress is laid in these volumes, this “Critical
Dissertation” is absolutely uncritical does not much matter.
Blair does not even attempt to examine the evidence for and against the
genuineness of the work he is discussing. He does not himself know Gaelic;
friends (like Hector M’Intyre) have told him that they heard Gaelic songs
very like Ossian sung in their youth; there are said to be manuscripts; that is
enough for him. Even when he cites and compares parallel passages—the
ghost-passage and that from the book of Job, Fingal’s “I have no son” and
Othello—which derive their whole beauty from exact coincidence with the
Bible or Shakespeare, he will allow no kind of suspicion to cross his mind.
But this we might let pass. It is in the manner in which he seeks to explain
the “amazing degree of regularity and art,” which he amazingly ascribes to
Macpherson’s redaction, the “rapid and animated style,” the “strong
colouring of imagination,” the “glowing sensibility of heart,” that the most
surprising thing appears. His citations are as copious as his praises of them
are hard to indorse. But his critical argument rests almost (not quite) wholly
on showing that Fingal and Temora are worked out quite properly on
Aristotelian principles by way of central action and episode, and that there
are constant parallels to Homer, the only poet whom he will allow to be
Ossian’s superior. In short, he simply applies to Ossian Addison’s procedure
peruse any legend of old knight-errantry as the Iliad, then I exclaim that my
antagonist is either void of all taste,” &c. Here, on the one hand, the
lumping of Suckling and Etherege together, and the implied assumption that
not merely Suckling, but Etherege, is a worthless dramatist, gives us one
“light,” just as the similar implication that “an old legend of knight-
errantry” is necessarily an example of dulness, spiritlessness, and absence
of beauty, gives us another. That Blair lays down, even more peremptorily
than Johnson, and as peremptorily as Bysshe, that the pause in an English
line may fall after the 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th syllable, and no other, is not
surprising; and his observations on Shakespeare are too much in the usual
“faults-saved-by-beauties” style to need quotation. But that he cites, with
approval, a classification of the great literary periods of the world which
excludes the Elizabethan Age altogether, is not to be omitted. It stamps the
attitude.
These same qualities appear in the once famous but now little read
The Dissertation on Ossian.[600] That, in the sense of the word
Dissertation on
Ossian.
on which least stress is laid in these volumes, this “Critical
Dissertation” is absolutely uncritical does not much matter.
Blair does not even attempt to examine the evidence for and against the
genuineness of the work he is discussing. He does not himself know Gaelic;
friends (like Hector M’Intyre) have told him that they heard Gaelic songs
very like Ossian sung in their youth; there are said to be manuscripts; that is
enough for him. Even when he cites and compares parallel passages—the
ghost-passage and that from the book of Job, Fingal’s “I have no son” and
Othello—which derive their whole beauty from exact coincidence with the
Bible or Shakespeare, he will allow no kind of suspicion to cross his mind.
But this we might let pass. It is in the manner in which he seeks to explain
the “amazing degree of regularity and art,” which he amazingly ascribes to
Macpherson’s redaction, the “rapid and animated style,” the “strong
colouring of imagination,” the “glowing sensibility of heart,” that the most
surprising thing appears. His citations are as copious as his praises of them
are hard to indorse. But his critical argument rests almost (not quite) wholly
on showing that Fingal and Temora are worked out quite properly on
Aristotelian principles by way of central action and episode, and that there
are constant parallels to Homer, the only poet whom he will allow to be
Ossian’s superior. In short, he simply applies to Ossian Addison’s procedure
Page 462
with Paradise Lost. The critical piquancy of this is double. For we know
that Ossian was powerful—almost incredibly powerful—all over Europe in
a sense quite opposite to Blair’s; and we suspect, if we do not know, that Mr
James Macpherson was quite clever enough purposely to give it something
of the turn which Blair discovers.
The charge which may justly be brought against Blair—that he is both
too exclusively and too purblindly “belletristic”—cannot be extended to
Kames. Henry Home, Lord Kames. Johnson, whom Kames disliked
violently, and who returned the dislike with rather good-natured if slightly
contemptuous patronage, dismissed the Elements of Criticism, 1761,[601] as
“a pretty Essay, which deserves to be held in some estimation, though much
of it is chimerical.”[602] The sting of this lies, as usual, in the fact that it is
substantially true, though by no means all the truth. The Elements of
Criticism is a pretty book, and an estimable one, and, what is more, one of
very considerable originality. Its subtlety and ingenuity are often beyond
Johnson’s own reach; it shows a really wide knowledge of literature,
modern as well as ancient; and it is surprisingly, though not uniformly, free
from the special “classical” purblindness of which Johnson and Blair are
opposed, but in their different ways equal, examples. Yet a very great deal
of it is “chimerical,” and, what is worse, a very great deal more is, whether
chimerical or not in itself, irrelevant. It presents a philosophical treatise,
vaguely and tentatively æsthetic rather than critical, yoked in the loosest
possible manner to a bundle of quasi-professorial exercises in Lower and
Higher Rhetoric. The second part might not improperly be termed “Critical
Illustrations of Rhetoric.” The first could only be properly entitled “Literary
Illustrations of Morals.”
Of course this excellent Scots lawyer and ingenious “Scotch
metaphysician” had strong precedents to urge for making a muddle of
The Elements of Moral Philosophy and Literary Criticism. It has been
Criticism.
pointed out that Aristotle himself is not a little exposed to
the same imputation. But Kames embroils matters to an extent never
surpassed, except by those, to be found in every day, who are incapable of
taking the literary point of view at all, and who simply treat literature as
something expressing agreement or disagreement with their moral, political,
religious, or other views. He seems himself to have had, at least once, a
slight qualm. “A treatise of ethics is not my province: I carry my view no
farther than to the elements of criticism, in order to show that the fine arts
that Ossian was powerful—almost incredibly powerful—all over Europe in
a sense quite opposite to Blair’s; and we suspect, if we do not know, that Mr
James Macpherson was quite clever enough purposely to give it something
of the turn which Blair discovers.
The charge which may justly be brought against Blair—that he is both
too exclusively and too purblindly “belletristic”—cannot be extended to
Kames. Henry Home, Lord Kames. Johnson, whom Kames disliked
violently, and who returned the dislike with rather good-natured if slightly
contemptuous patronage, dismissed the Elements of Criticism, 1761,[601] as
“a pretty Essay, which deserves to be held in some estimation, though much
of it is chimerical.”[602] The sting of this lies, as usual, in the fact that it is
substantially true, though by no means all the truth. The Elements of
Criticism is a pretty book, and an estimable one, and, what is more, one of
very considerable originality. Its subtlety and ingenuity are often beyond
Johnson’s own reach; it shows a really wide knowledge of literature,
modern as well as ancient; and it is surprisingly, though not uniformly, free
from the special “classical” purblindness of which Johnson and Blair are
opposed, but in their different ways equal, examples. Yet a very great deal
of it is “chimerical,” and, what is worse, a very great deal more is, whether
chimerical or not in itself, irrelevant. It presents a philosophical treatise,
vaguely and tentatively æsthetic rather than critical, yoked in the loosest
possible manner to a bundle of quasi-professorial exercises in Lower and
Higher Rhetoric. The second part might not improperly be termed “Critical
Illustrations of Rhetoric.” The first could only be properly entitled “Literary
Illustrations of Morals.”
Of course this excellent Scots lawyer and ingenious “Scotch
metaphysician” had strong precedents to urge for making a muddle of
The Elements of Moral Philosophy and Literary Criticism. It has been
Criticism.
pointed out that Aristotle himself is not a little exposed to
the same imputation. But Kames embroils matters to an extent never
surpassed, except by those, to be found in every day, who are incapable of
taking the literary point of view at all, and who simply treat literature as
something expressing agreement or disagreement with their moral, political,
religious, or other views. He seems himself to have had, at least once, a
slight qualm. “A treatise of ethics is not my province: I carry my view no
farther than to the elements of criticism, in order to show that the fine arts
Page 463
are a subject of reasoning as well as of taste.”[603] If this was his rule he
certainly gives himself the most liberal indulgence in applying it. His First
Chapter is devoted to “Perceptions and Ideas in a Train”; the second (an
immensely long one, containing a good third of the first volume) to
“Emotions and Passions”; while the whole of the rest till the end of the
seventeenth chapter is really occupied by the same class of subject. Kames
excels in that constantly ingenious, and often acute, dissection of human
nature which was the pride and pleasure of his century and his country, but
which is a little apt to pay itself with clever generalisations as if they were
veræ causæ. In one place we find a distribution of all the pleasures of the
senses into pain of want, desire, and satisfaction. In another[604] the
philosopher solemnly informs us, “I love my daughter less after she is
married, and my mother less after a second marriage; the marriage of my
son or my father diminishes not my affection so remarkably.” An almost
burlesque illustration of the procedure of the school is given in the dictum,
[605]
“Where the course of nature is joined with Elevation the effect must be
delightful; and hence the singular beauty of smoke ascending in a calm
morning.” When one remembers this, and comes later[606] to the admirable
remark, “Thus, to account for an effect of which there is no doubt, any
cause, however foolish, is made welcome,” it is impossible not to say
“Thou sayest it”; as also in another case, where he lays it down that “Were
corporeal pleasures dignified over and above [i.e., beside the natural
propensity which incites us to them] with a place in a high class, they would
infallibly disturb the balance of the mind by outweighing the social
affections. This is a satisfactory final cause for refusing to these pleasures
any degree of dignity.”[607] I am tempted to quote Kames’s philosophy of the
use of tobacco[608] also, but the stuff and method of his first volume must be
sufficiently intelligible already.
The second, much more to the purpose, is considerably less interesting. A
very long chapter deals with Beauty of Language with respect to Sound,
Signification, Resemblance between Sound and Signification, and Metre. It
is abundantly stocked with well-chosen examples from a wide range of
literature, and full of remarks, generally ingenious and sometimes both new
and bold, as where at the outset Kames has the audacity to contradict
Aristotle, by implication at least, and lay it down that “of all the fine arts,
painting and sculpture only are in their nature imitative.”[609] But it is not
free from the influence of the idols of its time. Of such, in one kind, may be
certainly gives himself the most liberal indulgence in applying it. His First
Chapter is devoted to “Perceptions and Ideas in a Train”; the second (an
immensely long one, containing a good third of the first volume) to
“Emotions and Passions”; while the whole of the rest till the end of the
seventeenth chapter is really occupied by the same class of subject. Kames
excels in that constantly ingenious, and often acute, dissection of human
nature which was the pride and pleasure of his century and his country, but
which is a little apt to pay itself with clever generalisations as if they were
veræ causæ. In one place we find a distribution of all the pleasures of the
senses into pain of want, desire, and satisfaction. In another[604] the
philosopher solemnly informs us, “I love my daughter less after she is
married, and my mother less after a second marriage; the marriage of my
son or my father diminishes not my affection so remarkably.” An almost
burlesque illustration of the procedure of the school is given in the dictum,
[605]
“Where the course of nature is joined with Elevation the effect must be
delightful; and hence the singular beauty of smoke ascending in a calm
morning.” When one remembers this, and comes later[606] to the admirable
remark, “Thus, to account for an effect of which there is no doubt, any
cause, however foolish, is made welcome,” it is impossible not to say
“Thou sayest it”; as also in another case, where he lays it down that “Were
corporeal pleasures dignified over and above [i.e., beside the natural
propensity which incites us to them] with a place in a high class, they would
infallibly disturb the balance of the mind by outweighing the social
affections. This is a satisfactory final cause for refusing to these pleasures
any degree of dignity.”[607] I am tempted to quote Kames’s philosophy of the
use of tobacco[608] also, but the stuff and method of his first volume must be
sufficiently intelligible already.
The second, much more to the purpose, is considerably less interesting. A
very long chapter deals with Beauty of Language with respect to Sound,
Signification, Resemblance between Sound and Signification, and Metre. It
is abundantly stocked with well-chosen examples from a wide range of
literature, and full of remarks, generally ingenious and sometimes both new
and bold, as where at the outset Kames has the audacity to contradict
Aristotle, by implication at least, and lay it down that “of all the fine arts,
painting and sculpture only are in their nature imitative.”[609] But it is not
free from the influence of the idols of its time. Of such, in one kind, may be
Page 464
cited the attribution to Milton of “many careless lines”;[610] for if there is one
thing certain in the risky and speculative range of literary dogmatism, it is
that Milton never wrote a “careless” line in his life. If his lines are ever bad
(and perhaps they are sometimes), they are bad deliberately and of malice.
In another and more serious kind may be ranged the predominating
determination to confuse the sensual with the intellectual side of poetry.
This, of course, is Kames’s root-idea; but that it is a root of evil may be
shown sufficiently by the following passage in his discussion of the pause
—in relation to which subject he is as wrong as nearly all his
contemporaries. He is talking of a pause between adjective and substantive.
[611]
What occurs to him is that “a quality cannot exist independent of a
subject, nor are they separable even in imagination, because they make part
of the same idea, and for that reason, with respect to melody as well as to
sense, it must be disagreeable to bestow upon the adjective a sort of
independent existence by interjecting a pause between it and its
substantive.” His examples are no doubt vitiated by the obsession of the
obligatory “middle” pause, which makes him imagine one between
adjective and substantive in
“The rest, his many-coloured robe concealed,”
where the only real pause, poetic as well as grammatical, is at “rest.” But
his principle is clear, and it is as clearly a wrong principle. It ignores the
great fact glanced at above, that the pleasure of poetry is double—
intellectual and sensual—and that the two parts are in a manner
independent of each other. And in the second place, even on its own theory,
it credits the mere intellect with too sluggish faculties. In the first line
which Kames suggests as “harsh and unpleasant” for this reason,
“Of thousand bright inhabitants of air,”
the pause at “bright” is so slight a one that some might deny its existence.
But if it be held necessary, can we refuse to the subtilitas intellectus the
power of halting, for the second of a second, to conceive the joint idea of
number and brightness, before it moves further to enrich this by the notion
of “inhabitants of air”? The mere and literal Lockist may do so; but no other
will. The Figures enjoy a space which, without being surprised at it, one
grudges; and the Unities are handled rather oddly, while a digression of
thing certain in the risky and speculative range of literary dogmatism, it is
that Milton never wrote a “careless” line in his life. If his lines are ever bad
(and perhaps they are sometimes), they are bad deliberately and of malice.
In another and more serious kind may be ranged the predominating
determination to confuse the sensual with the intellectual side of poetry.
This, of course, is Kames’s root-idea; but that it is a root of evil may be
shown sufficiently by the following passage in his discussion of the pause
—in relation to which subject he is as wrong as nearly all his
contemporaries. He is talking of a pause between adjective and substantive.
[611]
What occurs to him is that “a quality cannot exist independent of a
subject, nor are they separable even in imagination, because they make part
of the same idea, and for that reason, with respect to melody as well as to
sense, it must be disagreeable to bestow upon the adjective a sort of
independent existence by interjecting a pause between it and its
substantive.” His examples are no doubt vitiated by the obsession of the
obligatory “middle” pause, which makes him imagine one between
adjective and substantive in
“The rest, his many-coloured robe concealed,”
where the only real pause, poetic as well as grammatical, is at “rest.” But
his principle is clear, and it is as clearly a wrong principle. It ignores the
great fact glanced at above, that the pleasure of poetry is double—
intellectual and sensual—and that the two parts are in a manner
independent of each other. And in the second place, even on its own theory,
it credits the mere intellect with too sluggish faculties. In the first line
which Kames suggests as “harsh and unpleasant” for this reason,
“Of thousand bright inhabitants of air,”
the pause at “bright” is so slight a one that some might deny its existence.
But if it be held necessary, can we refuse to the subtilitas intellectus the
power of halting, for the second of a second, to conceive the joint idea of
number and brightness, before it moves further to enrich this by the notion
of “inhabitants of air”? The mere and literal Lockist may do so; but no other
will. The Figures enjoy a space which, without being surprised at it, one
grudges; and the Unities are handled rather oddly, while a digression of
Page 465
some fifty pages on Gardening and Architecture speaks for itself. The
conclusion on the Standard of Taste is singularly inconclusive; and an
interesting appendix on “terms defined and explained” presents the
singularity that not, I think, one of the terms so dealt with has anything
specially to do with literature or art at all.
Nevertheless, though it is easy to be smart upon Kames, and not very
difficult to expose serious inadequacies and errors both in the general
scheme and the particular execution, the Elements of Criticism is a book of
very great interest and importance, and worthy of much more attention than
it has for a long time past received. To begin with, his presentation, at the
very outset of his book, of Criticism as “the most agreeable of all
amusements”[612] was one of those apparently new and pleasant shocks to
the general which are, in reality, only the expression of an idea for some
time germinating and maturing in the public mind. Even Addison, even
Pope, while praising and preaching Criticism, had half-flouted and half-
apologised for it. Swift, a great critic on his own day, had flouted it almost
or altogether in others. The general idea of the critic had been at worst of a
malignant, at best of a harmless, pedant. Kames presented him as something
quite different,—as a man no doubt of learning, but also of position and of
the world, “amusing,” as well as exercising himself, and bringing the
fashionable philosophy to the support of his amusement.
But he did more than this. His appreciation of Shakespeare is, taking it
together (and his references to the subject are numerous and important), the
best of his age. His citations show a remarkable relish for the Shakespearian
humour, and though he cannot clear his mind entirely from the “blemish-
and-beauty” cant, which is ingrained in the Classical theory, and which, as
we saw, infected even such a critic as Longinus, he is far freer from it than
either Johnson or Blair. In his chapter on the Unities he comes very near to
Hurd[613] (to whom, as the Elements of Criticism preceded the Letters on
Chivalry in time, he may have given a hint) in recognising the true
Romantic Unity of Action which admits plurality so far as the different
interests work together, or contrast advantageously. He has a most lucid and
sensible exposure of the difference between the conditions of the Greek
theatre and ours. In short, he would stand very high if he were not
possessed with the pseudological mania which makes him calmly and
gravely write[614]—“Though a cube is more agreeable in itself than a
parallelopipedon,[615] yet a large parallelopipedon set on its smaller base is
conclusion on the Standard of Taste is singularly inconclusive; and an
interesting appendix on “terms defined and explained” presents the
singularity that not, I think, one of the terms so dealt with has anything
specially to do with literature or art at all.
Nevertheless, though it is easy to be smart upon Kames, and not very
difficult to expose serious inadequacies and errors both in the general
scheme and the particular execution, the Elements of Criticism is a book of
very great interest and importance, and worthy of much more attention than
it has for a long time past received. To begin with, his presentation, at the
very outset of his book, of Criticism as “the most agreeable of all
amusements”[612] was one of those apparently new and pleasant shocks to
the general which are, in reality, only the expression of an idea for some
time germinating and maturing in the public mind. Even Addison, even
Pope, while praising and preaching Criticism, had half-flouted and half-
apologised for it. Swift, a great critic on his own day, had flouted it almost
or altogether in others. The general idea of the critic had been at worst of a
malignant, at best of a harmless, pedant. Kames presented him as something
quite different,—as a man no doubt of learning, but also of position and of
the world, “amusing,” as well as exercising himself, and bringing the
fashionable philosophy to the support of his amusement.
But he did more than this. His appreciation of Shakespeare is, taking it
together (and his references to the subject are numerous and important), the
best of his age. His citations show a remarkable relish for the Shakespearian
humour, and though he cannot clear his mind entirely from the “blemish-
and-beauty” cant, which is ingrained in the Classical theory, and which, as
we saw, infected even such a critic as Longinus, he is far freer from it than
either Johnson or Blair. In his chapter on the Unities he comes very near to
Hurd[613] (to whom, as the Elements of Criticism preceded the Letters on
Chivalry in time, he may have given a hint) in recognising the true
Romantic Unity of Action which admits plurality so far as the different
interests work together, or contrast advantageously. He has a most lucid and
sensible exposure of the difference between the conditions of the Greek
theatre and ours. In short, he would stand very high if he were not
possessed with the pseudological mania which makes him calmly and
gravely write[614]—“Though a cube is more agreeable in itself than a
parallelopipedon,[615] yet a large parallelopipedon set on its smaller base is
Page 466
by its elevation more agreeable, and hence the beauty of a Gothic tower.”
But this amabilis insania is in itself more amiable than insane. He wants to
admit the Gothic tower, and that is the principal thing. Magdalen, and
Merton, and Mechlin may well, in consideration of his slighting in their
favour the more intrinsic charms of a cube, afford to let a smile flicker
round their venerable skylines at his methodical insistence on justifying
admiration of them by calling them large parallelopipeda set on their
smaller ends. And the cube can console herself with his admission of her
superior intrinsic loveliness.
The faults of Blair and of Kames are both, for the most part, absent,
while much more than the merit of either, in method and closeness to the
aim, is present, in the very remarkable Philosophy of Rhetoric[616] which Dr
George Campbell began, and, to some extent, composed, as early as 1750;
though he did not finish and publish it till nearly thirty years later (1777). It
Campbell. may indeed be admitted that this piecemeal composition is
not without its effect on the book, which contains some digressions
(especially one on Wit, Humour, and Ridicule, and another on the cause of
the pleasure received from the exhibition of painful objects) more
excrescent than properly episodic. It is, moreover, somewhat weighted by
the author’s strictly professional and educational design, in retaining as
much of the mere business part of the ancient Rhetoric as would or might
be useful to future preachers, advocates, or members of Parliament.
Campbell, too, is a less “elegant” writer than Blair; and his acuteness has a
less vivacious play than that of Kames. But here concessions are exhausted;
and the book, however much we may disagree with occasional expressions
in it, remains the most important treatise on the New Rhetoric that the
eighteenth century produced. Indeed, strange as it may seem, Whately’s, its
principal formal successor in the nineteenth, is distinctly retrograde in
comparison.
The New Rhetoric—the Art of Criticism—this is what Campbell really
The Philosophy attempts. He is rather chary of acknowledging his own
of Rhetoric.
position, and, in fact, save in his title, seldom employs the
term Rhetoric, no doubt partly from that unlucky contempt of scholastic
appellations which shows itself in his well-known attack on Logic. But his
definition of “Eloquence”—the term which he employs as a preferred
synonym of Rhetoric itself—is very important, and practically novel. The
word “Eloquence, in its greatest latitude, denotes that art or talent by which
But this amabilis insania is in itself more amiable than insane. He wants to
admit the Gothic tower, and that is the principal thing. Magdalen, and
Merton, and Mechlin may well, in consideration of his slighting in their
favour the more intrinsic charms of a cube, afford to let a smile flicker
round their venerable skylines at his methodical insistence on justifying
admiration of them by calling them large parallelopipeda set on their
smaller ends. And the cube can console herself with his admission of her
superior intrinsic loveliness.
The faults of Blair and of Kames are both, for the most part, absent,
while much more than the merit of either, in method and closeness to the
aim, is present, in the very remarkable Philosophy of Rhetoric[616] which Dr
George Campbell began, and, to some extent, composed, as early as 1750;
though he did not finish and publish it till nearly thirty years later (1777). It
Campbell. may indeed be admitted that this piecemeal composition is
not without its effect on the book, which contains some digressions
(especially one on Wit, Humour, and Ridicule, and another on the cause of
the pleasure received from the exhibition of painful objects) more
excrescent than properly episodic. It is, moreover, somewhat weighted by
the author’s strictly professional and educational design, in retaining as
much of the mere business part of the ancient Rhetoric as would or might
be useful to future preachers, advocates, or members of Parliament.
Campbell, too, is a less “elegant” writer than Blair; and his acuteness has a
less vivacious play than that of Kames. But here concessions are exhausted;
and the book, however much we may disagree with occasional expressions
in it, remains the most important treatise on the New Rhetoric that the
eighteenth century produced. Indeed, strange as it may seem, Whately’s, its
principal formal successor in the nineteenth, is distinctly retrograde in
comparison.
The New Rhetoric—the Art of Criticism—this is what Campbell really
The Philosophy attempts. He is rather chary of acknowledging his own
of Rhetoric.
position, and, in fact, save in his title, seldom employs the
term Rhetoric, no doubt partly from that unlucky contempt of scholastic
appellations which shows itself in his well-known attack on Logic. But his
definition of “Eloquence”—the term which he employs as a preferred
synonym of Rhetoric itself—is very important, and practically novel. The
word “Eloquence, in its greatest latitude, denotes that art or talent by which
Page 467
the discourse is adapted to its end.” Now this, though he modestly shelters it
under Quintilian’s scientia bene dicendi and dicere secundum virtutem
orationis, asserting also its exact correspondence with Cicero’s description
of the best orator as he who dicendo animos delectat audientium et docet et
permovet, is manifestly far more extensive than the latter of these, and
much less vague than the former. In fact Rhetoric, new dubbed as
Eloquence, becomes the Art of Literature, or in other words Criticism.
It has been allowed that this bold and admirable challenge of the whole
province—for “discourse” is soon seen to include “writing”—is not always
so well supported. After an interesting introduction (vindicating the
challenge, and noting Kames more especially as one who, though in a
different way, had made it before him), Campbell for a time, either because
he is rather afraid of his own boldness, or to conciliate received opinions on
the matter (or, it has been suggested, because the book was written at
different times, and with perhaps slightly different ends), proceeds to
discuss various matters which have very little to do with his general subject.
Sometimes, as in the Chapter, before referred to, on “The Nature and Use of
the Scholastic Art of Syllogising,” he wrecks himself in a galley which he
had not the slightest need to enter. The longer discourse on Evidence which
precedes this is, of course, fully justified on the old conception of Rhetoric,
but digressory, or at least excursory, on his own. The above-mentioned
sections on Ridicule, and on the æsthetic pleasure derivable from painful
subjects, are excursions into the debatable kinds between literature and
Ethics, though much less extravagant than those of Kames, and perhaps, as
excursions, not absolutely to be barred or banned; while chapters vii.-x.,
which deal with the “Consideration of Hearers,” &c., &c., are once more
Aristotelian relapses, pardonable if not strictly necessary. But not quite a
third part of the whole treatise is occupied by this First Book of the three
into which it is divided; and not a little of this third is, strictly or by a little
allowance, to the point. The remaining two-thirds are to that point without
exception or digression of any kind, so that the Aristotelian distribution is
exactly reversed.
The titles of the two Books, “The Foundations and Essential Properties of
Elocution,” and “The Discriminating Properties of Elocution,” must be
taken with due regard to Campbell’s use of the last word.[617] But they
require hardly any other proviso or allowance. He first, with that mixture of
boldness and straight-hitting which is his great merit, attacks the general
under Quintilian’s scientia bene dicendi and dicere secundum virtutem
orationis, asserting also its exact correspondence with Cicero’s description
of the best orator as he who dicendo animos delectat audientium et docet et
permovet, is manifestly far more extensive than the latter of these, and
much less vague than the former. In fact Rhetoric, new dubbed as
Eloquence, becomes the Art of Literature, or in other words Criticism.
It has been allowed that this bold and admirable challenge of the whole
province—for “discourse” is soon seen to include “writing”—is not always
so well supported. After an interesting introduction (vindicating the
challenge, and noting Kames more especially as one who, though in a
different way, had made it before him), Campbell for a time, either because
he is rather afraid of his own boldness, or to conciliate received opinions on
the matter (or, it has been suggested, because the book was written at
different times, and with perhaps slightly different ends), proceeds to
discuss various matters which have very little to do with his general subject.
Sometimes, as in the Chapter, before referred to, on “The Nature and Use of
the Scholastic Art of Syllogising,” he wrecks himself in a galley which he
had not the slightest need to enter. The longer discourse on Evidence which
precedes this is, of course, fully justified on the old conception of Rhetoric,
but digressory, or at least excursory, on his own. The above-mentioned
sections on Ridicule, and on the æsthetic pleasure derivable from painful
subjects, are excursions into the debatable kinds between literature and
Ethics, though much less extravagant than those of Kames, and perhaps, as
excursions, not absolutely to be barred or banned; while chapters vii.-x.,
which deal with the “Consideration of Hearers,” &c., &c., are once more
Aristotelian relapses, pardonable if not strictly necessary. But not quite a
third part of the whole treatise is occupied by this First Book of the three
into which it is divided; and not a little of this third is, strictly or by a little
allowance, to the point. The remaining two-thirds are to that point without
exception or digression of any kind, so that the Aristotelian distribution is
exactly reversed.
The titles of the two Books, “The Foundations and Essential Properties of
Elocution,” and “The Discriminating Properties of Elocution,” must be
taken with due regard to Campbell’s use of the last word.[617] But they
require hardly any other proviso or allowance. He first, with that mixture of
boldness and straight-hitting which is his great merit, attacks the general
Page 468
principles of the use of Language, and proceeds to lay down nine Canons of
Verbal Criticism, which are in the main so sound and so acute that they are
not obsolete to the present day. There is more that is arbitrary elsewhere,
and Campbell seems sometimes to retrograde over the line which separates
Rhetoric and Composition. But it must be remembered that this line has
never been very exactly drawn, and has, both in Scotland and in America, if
not also in England, been often treated as almost non-existent up to the
present day. In his subsequent distinction of five rhetorical Qualities of
Style—Perspicuity, Vivacity, Elegance, Animation, and Music—Campbell
may be thought to be not wholly happy. For the three middle qualities are
practically one, and it is even questionable whether Music would not be
best included with them in some general term, designating whatever is
added by style proper to Perspicuity, or the sufficient but unadorned
conveyance of meaning. As, however, is very common, if not universal,
with him, his treatment is in advance of his nomenclature, for the rest of the
book—nearly a full half of it—is in fact devoted to the two heads of
Perspicuity and Vivacity, the latter tacitly subsuming all the three minor
qualities. And there is new and good method in the treatment of Vivacity, as
shown first by the choice of words, secondly by their number, and thirdly
by their arrangement, while a section under the first head on “words
considered as sounds” comes very near to the truth. That there should be a
considerable section on Tropes was to be expected, and, as Campbell treats
it, it is in no way objectionable. His iconoclasm as to logical Forms
becomes much more in place, and much more effective, in regard to
rhetorical Figures.
One, however, of the best features of the work has hardly yet been
noticed; and that is the abundance of examples, and the thorough way in
which they are discussed. To a reader turning the book over without much
care it may seem inferior as a thesaurus to Kames, because the passages
quoted are as a rule embedded in the text, and not given separately, in the
fashion which makes of large parts of the Elements of Criticism a sort of
anthology, a collection of beauties or deformities, as the case may be. But
this is in accordance with the singularly businesslike character of
Campbell’s work throughout. And if it also seem that he does not launch out
enough in appreciation of books or authors as wholes, let it be remembered
that English criticism was still in a rather rudimentary condition, and that
the state of taste in academic circles was not very satisfactory. It would not,
Verbal Criticism, which are in the main so sound and so acute that they are
not obsolete to the present day. There is more that is arbitrary elsewhere,
and Campbell seems sometimes to retrograde over the line which separates
Rhetoric and Composition. But it must be remembered that this line has
never been very exactly drawn, and has, both in Scotland and in America, if
not also in England, been often treated as almost non-existent up to the
present day. In his subsequent distinction of five rhetorical Qualities of
Style—Perspicuity, Vivacity, Elegance, Animation, and Music—Campbell
may be thought to be not wholly happy. For the three middle qualities are
practically one, and it is even questionable whether Music would not be
best included with them in some general term, designating whatever is
added by style proper to Perspicuity, or the sufficient but unadorned
conveyance of meaning. As, however, is very common, if not universal,
with him, his treatment is in advance of his nomenclature, for the rest of the
book—nearly a full half of it—is in fact devoted to the two heads of
Perspicuity and Vivacity, the latter tacitly subsuming all the three minor
qualities. And there is new and good method in the treatment of Vivacity, as
shown first by the choice of words, secondly by their number, and thirdly
by their arrangement, while a section under the first head on “words
considered as sounds” comes very near to the truth. That there should be a
considerable section on Tropes was to be expected, and, as Campbell treats
it, it is in no way objectionable. His iconoclasm as to logical Forms
becomes much more in place, and much more effective, in regard to
rhetorical Figures.
One, however, of the best features of the work has hardly yet been
noticed; and that is the abundance of examples, and the thorough way in
which they are discussed. To a reader turning the book over without much
care it may seem inferior as a thesaurus to Kames, because the passages
quoted are as a rule embedded in the text, and not given separately, in the
fashion which makes of large parts of the Elements of Criticism a sort of
anthology, a collection of beauties or deformities, as the case may be. But
this is in accordance with the singularly businesslike character of
Campbell’s work throughout. And if it also seem that he does not launch out
enough in appreciation of books or authors as wholes, let it be remembered
that English criticism was still in a rather rudimentary condition, and that
the state of taste in academic circles was not very satisfactory. It would not,
Page 469
of course, be impossible to produce from him examples of those obsessions
of the time which we have noticed in his two compatriots, as we shall notice
them in the far greater Johnson. But he could not well escape these
obsessions, and he suffers from them in a very mild form.
James Harris,[618] author of Hermes (and of the house of Malmesbury,
which was ennobled in the next generation), is perhaps the chief writer
whom England, in the narrower sense, has to set against Blair, Kames, and
Harris. Campbell in mid-eighteenth century. But he is disappointing. It
would not be reasonable to quarrel with the Hermes itself for not being
literary, because it does not pretend to be anything but grammatical; and the
Philosophical Arrangements, though they do sometimes approach literature,
may plead benefit of title for not doing so oftener. But the Discourse on
Music, Painting, and Poetry, and the Philological Enquiries—in which
Philology is expressly intimated to mean “love of letters” in the higher
sense—hold out some prospects. The performance is but little. Readers of
Boswell will remember that Johnson, though the author of Hermes was very
polite to him, both personally and with the pen, used, to his henchman’s
surprise and grief, to speak very roughly of Harris, applying to him on one
occasion the famous and damning phrase, “a prig, and a bad prig,” and
elsewhere hinting doubts as to his competency in Greek. That the reproach
of priggishness was deserved (whether with the aggravation or not) nobody
can read half-a-dozen pages of Harris without allowing,—his would-be
complimentary observation on Fielding[619] would determine by itself. But
the principal note of Harris, as a critic, is not so much priggishness as
confused superficiality. These qualities are less visible in the Dialogue
(which is an extremely short, not contemptible, but also not unimportant,
exercitation in the direction of Æsthetic proper) than in the Enquiries,
which were written late in life, and which, no doubt, owe something of their
extraordinary garrulity to “the irreparable outrage.”
This book begins, with almost the highest possible promise for us, in a
Discussion of the Rise of Criticism, its various species, Philosophical,
The Philological Historical, and Corrective, &c. It goes on hardly less
Enquiries.
promisingly, if the mere chapter-headings are taken, with
discourses on Numbers, Composition, Quantity, Alliteration, &c.; the
Drama, its Fable and its Manners, Diction, and, at the end of the second
part, an impassioned defence of Rules. But the Third, which promises a
discussion of “the taste and literature of the Middle Age,” raises the
of the time which we have noticed in his two compatriots, as we shall notice
them in the far greater Johnson. But he could not well escape these
obsessions, and he suffers from them in a very mild form.
James Harris,[618] author of Hermes (and of the house of Malmesbury,
which was ennobled in the next generation), is perhaps the chief writer
whom England, in the narrower sense, has to set against Blair, Kames, and
Harris. Campbell in mid-eighteenth century. But he is disappointing. It
would not be reasonable to quarrel with the Hermes itself for not being
literary, because it does not pretend to be anything but grammatical; and the
Philosophical Arrangements, though they do sometimes approach literature,
may plead benefit of title for not doing so oftener. But the Discourse on
Music, Painting, and Poetry, and the Philological Enquiries—in which
Philology is expressly intimated to mean “love of letters” in the higher
sense—hold out some prospects. The performance is but little. Readers of
Boswell will remember that Johnson, though the author of Hermes was very
polite to him, both personally and with the pen, used, to his henchman’s
surprise and grief, to speak very roughly of Harris, applying to him on one
occasion the famous and damning phrase, “a prig, and a bad prig,” and
elsewhere hinting doubts as to his competency in Greek. That the reproach
of priggishness was deserved (whether with the aggravation or not) nobody
can read half-a-dozen pages of Harris without allowing,—his would-be
complimentary observation on Fielding[619] would determine by itself. But
the principal note of Harris, as a critic, is not so much priggishness as
confused superficiality. These qualities are less visible in the Dialogue
(which is an extremely short, not contemptible, but also not unimportant,
exercitation in the direction of Æsthetic proper) than in the Enquiries,
which were written late in life, and which, no doubt, owe something of their
extraordinary garrulity to “the irreparable outrage.”
This book begins, with almost the highest possible promise for us, in a
Discussion of the Rise of Criticism, its various species, Philosophical,
The Philological Historical, and Corrective, &c. It goes on hardly less
Enquiries.
promisingly, if the mere chapter-headings are taken, with
discourses on Numbers, Composition, Quantity, Alliteration, &c.; the
Drama, its Fable and its Manners, Diction, and, at the end of the second
part, an impassioned defence of Rules. But the Third, which promises a
discussion of “the taste and literature of the Middle Age,” raises the
Page 470
expectation almost to agony-point. Here is what we have been waiting for
so long: here is the great gap going to be filled. At last a critic not merely
takes a philosophic-historic view of criticism, but actually proposes to
supplement it with an inquiry into those regions of literature on which his
predecessors have turned an obstinately blind eye. As is the exaltation of the
promise, so is the aggravation of the disappointment. Harris’s first part,
though by no means ill-planned, is very insufficiently carried out, and the
hope of goodness in the third is cruelly dashed beforehand by the sentence,
“At length, after a long and barbarous period, when the shades of monkery
began to retire,” &c. The writer’s mere enumeration of Renaissance critics
is very haphazard, and his remarks, both on them and their successors,
perfunctory in the extreme. He hardly dilates on anybody or anything
except—following the tradition from Pope and Swift—on Bentley and his
mania for correction and conjecture.
In the second part he gives himself more room, and is better worth
reading, but the sense of disappointment continues. In fact, Harris is
positively irritating. He lays it down, for instance, that “nothing excellent in
a literary way happens merely by chance,” a thesis from the discussion of
which much might come. But he simply goes off into a loose discussion of
the effects and causes of literary pleasure, with a good many examples in
which the excellence of his precept, “seek the cause,” is more apparent than
the success of his own researches. The rest is extremely discursive, and
seldom very satisfactory, being occupied in great part with such tenth-rate
stuff as Lillo’s Fatal Curiosity. As for Harris’s defence of the Rules, he does
not, in fact, defend them at all; but, as is so common with controversialists,
frames an indictment, which no sensible antagonist would ever bring, in
order to refute it. He says that “he never knew any genius cramped by rules,
and had known great geniuses miserably err by neglecting them.” A single
example of this last would have been worth the whole treatise. But Harris
does not give it. Finally, “the Taste and Literature of the Middle Age” seem
to him to be satisfactorily discussed by ridiculing the Judgment of God,
talking at some length about Byzantine writers, giving a rather long account
of Greek philosophy in its ancient stages, quoting freely from travellers to
Athens and Constantinople, introducing “the Arabians,” with anecdotes of
divers caliphs, saying something of the Schoolmen, a little about the
Provençal poets, something (to do him justice) of the rise of accentual
prosody,[620] and a very, very little about Chaucer, Petrarch, Mandeville,
so long: here is the great gap going to be filled. At last a critic not merely
takes a philosophic-historic view of criticism, but actually proposes to
supplement it with an inquiry into those regions of literature on which his
predecessors have turned an obstinately blind eye. As is the exaltation of the
promise, so is the aggravation of the disappointment. Harris’s first part,
though by no means ill-planned, is very insufficiently carried out, and the
hope of goodness in the third is cruelly dashed beforehand by the sentence,
“At length, after a long and barbarous period, when the shades of monkery
began to retire,” &c. The writer’s mere enumeration of Renaissance critics
is very haphazard, and his remarks, both on them and their successors,
perfunctory in the extreme. He hardly dilates on anybody or anything
except—following the tradition from Pope and Swift—on Bentley and his
mania for correction and conjecture.
In the second part he gives himself more room, and is better worth
reading, but the sense of disappointment continues. In fact, Harris is
positively irritating. He lays it down, for instance, that “nothing excellent in
a literary way happens merely by chance,” a thesis from the discussion of
which much might come. But he simply goes off into a loose discussion of
the effects and causes of literary pleasure, with a good many examples in
which the excellence of his precept, “seek the cause,” is more apparent than
the success of his own researches. The rest is extremely discursive, and
seldom very satisfactory, being occupied in great part with such tenth-rate
stuff as Lillo’s Fatal Curiosity. As for Harris’s defence of the Rules, he does
not, in fact, defend them at all; but, as is so common with controversialists,
frames an indictment, which no sensible antagonist would ever bring, in
order to refute it. He says that “he never knew any genius cramped by rules,
and had known great geniuses miserably err by neglecting them.” A single
example of this last would have been worth the whole treatise. But Harris
does not give it. Finally, “the Taste and Literature of the Middle Age” seem
to him to be satisfactorily discussed by ridiculing the Judgment of God,
talking at some length about Byzantine writers, giving a rather long account
of Greek philosophy in its ancient stages, quoting freely from travellers to
Athens and Constantinople, introducing “the Arabians,” with anecdotes of
divers caliphs, saying something of the Schoolmen, a little about the
Provençal poets, something (to do him justice) of the rise of accentual
prosody,[620] and a very, very little about Chaucer, Petrarch, Mandeville,
Page 471
Marco Polo, Sir John Fortescue, and—Sannazar! “And now having done
with the Middle Age,” he concludes—having, that is to say, shown that,
except a pot-pourri of mainly historical anecdote, he knew nothing
whatever about it; or, if this seem harsh, that his knowledge was not of any
kind that could possibly condition his judgment of literature favourably. In
fact, no one shows that curious eighteenth-century confusion of mind,
which we shall notice frequently in other countries, better than Harris. He
is, as we have seen, a fervent devotee of the Rules—he believes[621] that,
before any examples of poetry, there was an abstract schedule of Epic,
Tragedy, and everything else down to Epigram, which you cannot follow
but to your good, and cannot neglect but to your peril. Yet, on the one hand,
he feels the philosophic impulse, and on the other, the literary and historical
curiosity, before which these rules were bound to vanish.
“Estimate” A few allusions,[622] in contemporaries of abiding fame,
Brown: his
History of
have kept half alive the name—though very few, save
Poetry. specialists, are likely to be otherwise than accidentally
acquainted with the work—of John Brown of Newcastle,
author of the once famous Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the
Times,[623] and afterwards, when he had gained reputation by this, of a
Dissertation on the Rise of Poetry and Music,[624] later still slightly altered,
and re-christened History of the Rise and Progress of Poetry.[625] The
Estimate itself is one of those possibly half-unconscious pieces of quackery
which from time to time put (in a manner which somehow or other tickles
the longer ears among their contemporaries) the old cry that everything is
rotten in the state of Denmark. There is not much in it that is directly
literary; the chief point of the kind is an attack on the Universities: it may
be noted that quacks generally do attack Universities. The Dissertation-
History is a much less claptrap piece, but far more amusing to read. Brown
is one of those rash but frank persons who attempt creation as well as
criticism; and those who will may hear how
“Peace on Nature’s lap reposes [why not vice versa?]
Pleasure strews her guiltless roses,”
and so forth. The difference of the two forms is not important. In the
second, Brown simply left out Music, so far as he could, as appealing to a
special public only. He believes in Ossian, then quite new. He thinks it
with the Middle Age,” he concludes—having, that is to say, shown that,
except a pot-pourri of mainly historical anecdote, he knew nothing
whatever about it; or, if this seem harsh, that his knowledge was not of any
kind that could possibly condition his judgment of literature favourably. In
fact, no one shows that curious eighteenth-century confusion of mind,
which we shall notice frequently in other countries, better than Harris. He
is, as we have seen, a fervent devotee of the Rules—he believes[621] that,
before any examples of poetry, there was an abstract schedule of Epic,
Tragedy, and everything else down to Epigram, which you cannot follow
but to your good, and cannot neglect but to your peril. Yet, on the one hand,
he feels the philosophic impulse, and on the other, the literary and historical
curiosity, before which these rules were bound to vanish.
“Estimate” A few allusions,[622] in contemporaries of abiding fame,
Brown: his
History of
have kept half alive the name—though very few, save
Poetry. specialists, are likely to be otherwise than accidentally
acquainted with the work—of John Brown of Newcastle,
author of the once famous Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the
Times,[623] and afterwards, when he had gained reputation by this, of a
Dissertation on the Rise of Poetry and Music,[624] later still slightly altered,
and re-christened History of the Rise and Progress of Poetry.[625] The
Estimate itself is one of those possibly half-unconscious pieces of quackery
which from time to time put (in a manner which somehow or other tickles
the longer ears among their contemporaries) the old cry that everything is
rotten in the state of Denmark. There is not much in it that is directly
literary; the chief point of the kind is an attack on the Universities: it may
be noted that quacks generally do attack Universities. The Dissertation-
History is a much less claptrap piece, but far more amusing to read. Brown
is one of those rash but frank persons who attempt creation as well as
criticism; and those who will may hear how
“Peace on Nature’s lap reposes [why not vice versa?]
Pleasure strews her guiltless roses,”
and so forth. The difference of the two forms is not important. In the
second, Brown simply left out Music, so far as he could, as appealing to a
special public only. He believes in Ossian, then quite new. He thinks it
Page 472
contains “Pictures which no civilised modern could ever imbibe in their
strength, nor consequently could ever throw out”—an image so excessively
Georgian (putting aside the difficulty of imbibing a picture) that one has to
abbreviate comment on it. For the rest, Brown rejoices and wallows in the
naturalistic generalisation of his century. He begins, of course, with the
Savage State, lays it down that, at religious and other festivals, men danced
and sang, that then organised professional effort supplemented unorganised,
and so poets arose. Then comes about a sort of Established Choir, whence
the various kinds are developed. And we have the Chinese—the inevitable
Chinese—Fow-hi, and Chao-hao, and all their trumpery. Negligible as an
authority, Brown perhaps deserves to rank as a symptom.
But we must leave minorities, and come to him who is here ὁ μέγας.
There is no reason to doubt that Johnson’s critical opinions were formed
quite early in life, and by that mixture of natural bent and influence of
Johnson: his environment which, as a rule, forms all such opinions.
preparation for
criticism.
There has been a tendency to regard, as the highest mental
attitude, that of considering everything as an open question,
of being ready to reverse any opinion at a moment’s notice. As a matter of
fact, we have record of not many men who have proceeded in this way; and
it may be doubted whether among them is a single person of first-rate
genius, or even talent. Generally speaking, the men whose genius or talent
has a “stalk of carle hemp” in it find, in certain of the great primeval creeds
of the world, political, ecclesiastical, literary, or other, something which
suits their bent. The bent of their time may assist them in fastening on to
this by attraction or repulsion—it really does not much matter which it is. In
either case they will insensibly, from an early period, choose their line and
shape their course accordingly. They will give a certain independence to it;
they will rarely be found merely “swallowing formulas.” It is the other class
which does this, with leave reserved to get rid of the said formulas by a
mental emetic and swallow another set, which will very likely be subjected
to the same fate. But the hero will be in the main Qualis ab incepto.
Johnson was in most things a Tory by nature, his Toryism being
conditioned, first by that very strong bent towards a sort of transcendental
scepticism which many great Tories have shown; secondly, by the usual
peculiarities of social circumstance and mental constitution; and lastly, by
the state of England in his time—a state to discuss which were here
impertinent, but which, it may be humbly suggested, will not be quite
strength, nor consequently could ever throw out”—an image so excessively
Georgian (putting aside the difficulty of imbibing a picture) that one has to
abbreviate comment on it. For the rest, Brown rejoices and wallows in the
naturalistic generalisation of his century. He begins, of course, with the
Savage State, lays it down that, at religious and other festivals, men danced
and sang, that then organised professional effort supplemented unorganised,
and so poets arose. Then comes about a sort of Established Choir, whence
the various kinds are developed. And we have the Chinese—the inevitable
Chinese—Fow-hi, and Chao-hao, and all their trumpery. Negligible as an
authority, Brown perhaps deserves to rank as a symptom.
But we must leave minorities, and come to him who is here ὁ μέγας.
There is no reason to doubt that Johnson’s critical opinions were formed
quite early in life, and by that mixture of natural bent and influence of
Johnson: his environment which, as a rule, forms all such opinions.
preparation for
criticism.
There has been a tendency to regard, as the highest mental
attitude, that of considering everything as an open question,
of being ready to reverse any opinion at a moment’s notice. As a matter of
fact, we have record of not many men who have proceeded in this way; and
it may be doubted whether among them is a single person of first-rate
genius, or even talent. Generally speaking, the men whose genius or talent
has a “stalk of carle hemp” in it find, in certain of the great primeval creeds
of the world, political, ecclesiastical, literary, or other, something which
suits their bent. The bent of their time may assist them in fastening on to
this by attraction or repulsion—it really does not much matter which it is. In
either case they will insensibly, from an early period, choose their line and
shape their course accordingly. They will give a certain independence to it;
they will rarely be found merely “swallowing formulas.” It is the other class
which does this, with leave reserved to get rid of the said formulas by a
mental emetic and swallow another set, which will very likely be subjected
to the same fate. But the hero will be in the main Qualis ab incepto.
Johnson was in most things a Tory by nature, his Toryism being
conditioned, first by that very strong bent towards a sort of transcendental
scepticism which many great Tories have shown; secondly, by the usual
peculiarities of social circumstance and mental constitution; and lastly, by
the state of England in his time—a state to discuss which were here
impertinent, but which, it may be humbly suggested, will not be quite
Page 473
appreciated by accepting any, or all, of the more ordinary views of the
eighteenth century.
His view of literature was in part determined by these general influences,
in part—perhaps chiefly—by special impinging currents. His mere birth-
time had not very much to do with it—Thomson, Dyer, Lady Winchelsea,
who consciously or unconsciously worked against it, were older, in the
lady’s case much older, than he was; Gray and Shenstone, who consciously
worked against it in different degrees, were not much younger.[626] The view
was determined in his case, mainly no doubt by that natural bent which is
quite inexplicable, but also by other things explicable enough. Johnson,
partly though probably not wholly in consequence of his near sight, was
entirely insensible to the beauties of nature; he made fun of “prospects”; he
held that “one blade of grass is like another” (which it most certainly is not,
even in itself, let alone its surroundings); he liked human society in its most
artificial form—that provided by towns, clubs, parties. In the second place,
his ear was only less deficient than his eye. That he did not care for music,
in the scientific sense, is not of much importance; but it is quite clear that,
in poetry, only an extremely regular and almost mathematical beat of verse
had any chance with him. Thirdly, he was widely read in the Latin Classics,
less widely in Greek, still more widely in the artificial revived Latin of the
Renaissance and the seventeenth century.[627] Fourthly, he was, for a man so
much given to reading—for one who ranged from Macrobius in youth to
Parismus and Parismenus in age, and from Travels in Abyssinia to Prince
Titi—not very widely read either in mediæval Latin or in the earlier
divisions of the modern languages; indeed, of these last he probably knew
little or nothing. Fifthly, the greatest poet in English immediately before his
time, and the greatest poet in English during his youth and early manhood,
had been exponents, the one mainly, the other wholly, of a certain limited
theory of English verse. Sixthly, the critical school in which he had been
brought up was strictly neo-classic. Seventhly, and to conclude, such rebels
to convention as appeared in his time were chiefly men whom he regarded
with unfriendly dislike, or with friendly contempt. Nor can it be said that
any one of the contemporary partisans of “the Gothick” was likely to
convince a sturdy adversary. Walpole was a spiteful fribble with a thin vein
of genius; Gray a sort of Mr Facing-Both-Ways in literature, who had
“classical” mannerisms worse than any of Johnson’s own, and whose
dilettante shyness and scanty production invited ridicule. Both were
eighteenth century.
His view of literature was in part determined by these general influences,
in part—perhaps chiefly—by special impinging currents. His mere birth-
time had not very much to do with it—Thomson, Dyer, Lady Winchelsea,
who consciously or unconsciously worked against it, were older, in the
lady’s case much older, than he was; Gray and Shenstone, who consciously
worked against it in different degrees, were not much younger.[626] The view
was determined in his case, mainly no doubt by that natural bent which is
quite inexplicable, but also by other things explicable enough. Johnson,
partly though probably not wholly in consequence of his near sight, was
entirely insensible to the beauties of nature; he made fun of “prospects”; he
held that “one blade of grass is like another” (which it most certainly is not,
even in itself, let alone its surroundings); he liked human society in its most
artificial form—that provided by towns, clubs, parties. In the second place,
his ear was only less deficient than his eye. That he did not care for music,
in the scientific sense, is not of much importance; but it is quite clear that,
in poetry, only an extremely regular and almost mathematical beat of verse
had any chance with him. Thirdly, he was widely read in the Latin Classics,
less widely in Greek, still more widely in the artificial revived Latin of the
Renaissance and the seventeenth century.[627] Fourthly, he was, for a man so
much given to reading—for one who ranged from Macrobius in youth to
Parismus and Parismenus in age, and from Travels in Abyssinia to Prince
Titi—not very widely read either in mediæval Latin or in the earlier
divisions of the modern languages; indeed, of these last he probably knew
little or nothing. Fifthly, the greatest poet in English immediately before his
time, and the greatest poet in English during his youth and early manhood,
had been exponents, the one mainly, the other wholly, of a certain limited
theory of English verse. Sixthly, the critical school in which he had been
brought up was strictly neo-classic. Seventhly, and to conclude, such rebels
to convention as appeared in his time were chiefly men whom he regarded
with unfriendly dislike, or with friendly contempt. Nor can it be said that
any one of the contemporary partisans of “the Gothick” was likely to
convince a sturdy adversary. Walpole was a spiteful fribble with a thin vein
of genius; Gray a sort of Mr Facing-Both-Ways in literature, who had
“classical” mannerisms worse than any of Johnson’s own, and whose
dilettante shyness and scanty production invited ridicule. Both were
Page 474
Cambridge men (and Johnson did not love Cambridge men, nor they him),
and both were Whigs. Percy and Warton were certainly not very strong as
originals, and had foibles enough even as scholars. But whether these
reasons go far enough, or do not so go, Johnson’s general critical attitude
never varies in the least.[628] It was, as has been said, probably formed quite
early; it no doubt appeared in those but dimly known contributions to
periodical literature which defrayed so ill the expense of his still more
dimly known first twenty years in London. We have from him no single
treatise, as in the cases of Dante and Longinus, no pair of treatises, as in the
case of Aristotle, to go upon. But in the four great documents of The
Rambler, Rasselas, the Shakespeare Preface, and the Lives, we see it in the
two first rigid, peremptory, in the Preface, curiously and representatively
uncertain, in the last conditioned by differences which allow it somewhat
freer play, and at some times making a few concessions, but at others more
pugnacious and arbitrary than before.
The critical element in The Rambler is necessarily large; but a great deal
The Rambler on of it is general and out of our way.[629] Directly concerning
Milton.
us are the papers on the aspects (chiefly formal) of Milton’s
poetry—especially versification—on which Addison had not spoken, with
some smaller papers on lesser subjects. The Miltonic examen begins at No.
86. Johnson is as uncompromising as the great Bysshe himself on the nature
of English prosody. “The heroick measures of the English language may be
properly considered as pure or mixed.” They are pure when “the accent
rests on every second syllable through the whole line.” In other words,
“purity” is refused to anything but the strict iambic decasyllable. Nay, he
goes further; this is not only “purity” and “the completest harmony
possible,” but it ought to be “exactly kept in distichs” and in the last line of
a (verse) paragraph.
Nevertheless, for variety’s sake, the “mixed” measure is allowed;
“though it always injures the harmony of the line considered by itself,” it
makes us appreciate the “harmonious” lines better. And we soon perceive
that even this exceedingly grudging, and in strictness illogical, licence is
limited merely to substitution of other dissyllabic feet for the pure iamb. In
“Thus at their shady lodge arrived, both stood,
Both turned,”
and both were Whigs. Percy and Warton were certainly not very strong as
originals, and had foibles enough even as scholars. But whether these
reasons go far enough, or do not so go, Johnson’s general critical attitude
never varies in the least.[628] It was, as has been said, probably formed quite
early; it no doubt appeared in those but dimly known contributions to
periodical literature which defrayed so ill the expense of his still more
dimly known first twenty years in London. We have from him no single
treatise, as in the cases of Dante and Longinus, no pair of treatises, as in the
case of Aristotle, to go upon. But in the four great documents of The
Rambler, Rasselas, the Shakespeare Preface, and the Lives, we see it in the
two first rigid, peremptory, in the Preface, curiously and representatively
uncertain, in the last conditioned by differences which allow it somewhat
freer play, and at some times making a few concessions, but at others more
pugnacious and arbitrary than before.
The critical element in The Rambler is necessarily large; but a great deal
The Rambler on of it is general and out of our way.[629] Directly concerning
Milton.
us are the papers on the aspects (chiefly formal) of Milton’s
poetry—especially versification—on which Addison had not spoken, with
some smaller papers on lesser subjects. The Miltonic examen begins at No.
86. Johnson is as uncompromising as the great Bysshe himself on the nature
of English prosody. “The heroick measures of the English language may be
properly considered as pure or mixed.” They are pure when “the accent
rests on every second syllable through the whole line.” In other words,
“purity” is refused to anything but the strict iambic decasyllable. Nay, he
goes further; this is not only “purity” and “the completest harmony
possible,” but it ought to be “exactly kept in distichs” and in the last line of
a (verse) paragraph.
Nevertheless, for variety’s sake, the “mixed” measure is allowed;
“though it always injures the harmony of the line considered by itself,” it
makes us appreciate the “harmonious” lines better. And we soon perceive
that even this exceedingly grudging, and in strictness illogical, licence is
limited merely to substitution of other dissyllabic feet for the pure iamb. In
“Thus at their shady lodge arrived, both stood,
Both turned,”
Page 475
the rigid Johnson insists on the spondaic character, “the accent is on two
syllables together and both strong”; while he would seem to regard “And
when,” in the line
“And when we seek as now the gift of sleep,”
as a pyrrhic (“both syllables are weak”). A trochee (“deviation or inversion
of accent”) is allowed as a “mixture” in the first place, but elsewhere is
“remarkably inharmonious,” as, for instance, in Cowley’s beautiful line,
“And the soft wings of peace cover him round.”
The next paper (88) passes, after touching other matters, to “elision,” by
which he means (evidently not even taking tri-syllabic possibility into
consideration) such a case as
“Wisdom to folly as nourishment to wind.”
This licence, he says, is now disused in English poetry; and adds some
severe remarks on those who would revive or commend it. He even objects
to the redundant ending in heroic poetry.
In the third paper (90) he comes to Pauses; and once more plays the
rigour of the game. The English poet, in connecting one line with another, is
never to make a full pause at less than three syllables from the beginning or
end of a verse; and in all lines pause at the fourth or sixth syllable is best.
He gives a whole paper to Milton’s accommodation of the sound to the
sense, and winds up his Miltonic exercitations, after a very considerable
interval, with a set critique (139) of Samson Agonistes, partly on its general
character as an Aristotelian tragedy (he decides that it has a beginning and
end, but no middle, poor thing!) and partly on details. These papers show no
animus against Milton. There are even expressions of admiration for him,
which may be called enthusiastic. But they do show that the critic was not
in range with his author. Almost every one of his axioms and postulates is
questionable.
Of the remaining critical papers in the Rambler it is very important to
notice No. 121, “On the Dangers of Imitation, and the Impropriety of
On Spenser. imitating Spenser.” Johnson’s acuteness was not at fault in
distrusting, from his point of view, the consequences of such things as the
syllables together and both strong”; while he would seem to regard “And
when,” in the line
“And when we seek as now the gift of sleep,”
as a pyrrhic (“both syllables are weak”). A trochee (“deviation or inversion
of accent”) is allowed as a “mixture” in the first place, but elsewhere is
“remarkably inharmonious,” as, for instance, in Cowley’s beautiful line,
“And the soft wings of peace cover him round.”
The next paper (88) passes, after touching other matters, to “elision,” by
which he means (evidently not even taking tri-syllabic possibility into
consideration) such a case as
“Wisdom to folly as nourishment to wind.”
This licence, he says, is now disused in English poetry; and adds some
severe remarks on those who would revive or commend it. He even objects
to the redundant ending in heroic poetry.
In the third paper (90) he comes to Pauses; and once more plays the
rigour of the game. The English poet, in connecting one line with another, is
never to make a full pause at less than three syllables from the beginning or
end of a verse; and in all lines pause at the fourth or sixth syllable is best.
He gives a whole paper to Milton’s accommodation of the sound to the
sense, and winds up his Miltonic exercitations, after a very considerable
interval, with a set critique (139) of Samson Agonistes, partly on its general
character as an Aristotelian tragedy (he decides that it has a beginning and
end, but no middle, poor thing!) and partly on details. These papers show no
animus against Milton. There are even expressions of admiration for him,
which may be called enthusiastic. But they do show that the critic was not
in range with his author. Almost every one of his axioms and postulates is
questionable.
Of the remaining critical papers in the Rambler it is very important to
notice No. 121, “On the Dangers of Imitation, and the Impropriety of
On Spenser. imitating Spenser.” Johnson’s acuteness was not at fault in
distrusting, from his point of view, the consequences of such things as the
Page 476
Castle of Indolence or even the Schoolmistress; and he addresses a direct
rebuke to “the men of learning and genius” who have introduced the
fashion.[630] In so far as his condemnation of “echoes” goes he is
undoubtedly not wrong, and he speaks of the idol of Neo-Classicism, Virgil,
with an irreverent parrhesia[631] which, like many other things in him, shows
his true critical power. But on Spenser himself the other idols—the idola
specus rather than fori—blind him. In following his namesake in the
condemnation of Spenser’s language he is, we may think, wrong; yet this at
least is an arguable point. But in regard to the Spenserian stanza things are
different. Johnson calls it “at once difficult and unpleasing; tiresome to the
ear from its uniformity, and to the attention by its length,” while he
subsequently goes off into the usual error about imitating the Italians. No
truce is here possible. That the Spenserian is not easy may be granted at
once, but Johnson was certainly scholar enough to anticipate the riposte
that, not here only, it is “hard to be good.” As for “unpleasing,” so much the
worse for the ear which is not pleased by the most exquisite harmonic
symphony in the long and glorious list of stanza-combinations. As for
monotony, it is just as monotonous as flowing water. While as for the Italian
parallel, nothing can probably be more to the glory of Spenser than this; just
as nothing can be more different than the pretty, but cloying, rhyme even of
Tasso, nay, sometimes even of Ariosto, and the endless unlaboured beauty
of Spenser’s rhyme-sound. It is no valid retort that this is simply a
difference of taste. If a man, as some men have done, says that Spenser is
pleasing and Dryden and Pope are not, then the retort is valid. When the
position is taken that both rhythms are pleasing, both really poetical, but
poetical in a different way, the defender of it may laugh at all assailants.
The criticism of the English historians which immediately follows has an
interest chiefly of curiosity, because it was written just at the opening of the
On History and great age of the department with which it deals. Prejudices
Letter-writing.
of different kinds would always have prevented Johnson
from doing full justice to Robertson, to Hume, and, most of all, to Gibbon;
but, as it is, he deals with nobody later than Clarendon, and merely throws
back to Raleigh and Knolles. Very much the same drawback attends the
criticism on Epistolary writing: for here also it was the lot of Johnson’s own
contemporaries, in work mostly not written, and hardly in a single case
published, at the date of the Rambler, to remove the reproach of England.
But the paper on Tragi-Comedy (156) is much more important.
rebuke to “the men of learning and genius” who have introduced the
fashion.[630] In so far as his condemnation of “echoes” goes he is
undoubtedly not wrong, and he speaks of the idol of Neo-Classicism, Virgil,
with an irreverent parrhesia[631] which, like many other things in him, shows
his true critical power. But on Spenser himself the other idols—the idola
specus rather than fori—blind him. In following his namesake in the
condemnation of Spenser’s language he is, we may think, wrong; yet this at
least is an arguable point. But in regard to the Spenserian stanza things are
different. Johnson calls it “at once difficult and unpleasing; tiresome to the
ear from its uniformity, and to the attention by its length,” while he
subsequently goes off into the usual error about imitating the Italians. No
truce is here possible. That the Spenserian is not easy may be granted at
once, but Johnson was certainly scholar enough to anticipate the riposte
that, not here only, it is “hard to be good.” As for “unpleasing,” so much the
worse for the ear which is not pleased by the most exquisite harmonic
symphony in the long and glorious list of stanza-combinations. As for
monotony, it is just as monotonous as flowing water. While as for the Italian
parallel, nothing can probably be more to the glory of Spenser than this; just
as nothing can be more different than the pretty, but cloying, rhyme even of
Tasso, nay, sometimes even of Ariosto, and the endless unlaboured beauty
of Spenser’s rhyme-sound. It is no valid retort that this is simply a
difference of taste. If a man, as some men have done, says that Spenser is
pleasing and Dryden and Pope are not, then the retort is valid. When the
position is taken that both rhythms are pleasing, both really poetical, but
poetical in a different way, the defender of it may laugh at all assailants.
The criticism of the English historians which immediately follows has an
interest chiefly of curiosity, because it was written just at the opening of the
On History and great age of the department with which it deals. Prejudices
Letter-writing.
of different kinds would always have prevented Johnson
from doing full justice to Robertson, to Hume, and, most of all, to Gibbon;
but, as it is, he deals with nobody later than Clarendon, and merely throws
back to Raleigh and Knolles. Very much the same drawback attends the
criticism on Epistolary writing: for here also it was the lot of Johnson’s own
contemporaries, in work mostly not written, and hardly in a single case
published, at the date of the Rambler, to remove the reproach of England.
But the paper on Tragi-Comedy (156) is much more important.
Page 477
For here, as in other places, we see that Johnson, but for the combination
of influences above referred to, might have taken high, if not the highest,
On Tragi- degrees in a very different school of criticism. He puts the
comedy.
great rule Nec quarta loqui into the dustbin, with a
nonchalance exhibiting some slight shortness of sight; for the very
argument he uses will sweep with this a good many other rules to which he
still adheres. “We violate it,” he says coolly, “without scruple and without
inconvenience.” He is equally iconoclastic about the Five Acts, about the
Unity of Time, while he blows rather hot and cold about tragi-comedy in
the sense of the mixing of tragic and comic scenes. But the close of the
paper is the most remarkable, for it is in effect the death-knell of the neo-
classic system, sounded by its last really great prophet. “It ought to be the
first endeavour of a writer to distinguish nature from custom, or that which
is established because it is right from that which is right only because it is
established; that he may neither violate essential principles by a desire of
novelty, nor debar himself from the attainment of beauties within his view
by a needless fear of breaking rules which no literary dictator had authority
to enact.”
“Oh! the lands of Milnwood, the bonny lands of Milnwood, that have
been in the name of Morton twa hundred years; they are barking and
fleeing, infield and outfield, haugh and holme!” With this utterance, this
single utterance, all the ruling doctrines of sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth century criticism receive notice to quit.[632]
The well-known “Dick Minim” papers in the Idler (60, 61) are excellent
fun, and perhaps Johnson’s chief accomplishment in the direction of
“Dick Minim.” humour. The growth of criticism in Dick, his gradual
proficiency in all the critical commonplaces of his day (it is to be observed
that Johnson, like all true humourists, does not spare himself, and makes
one of Minim’s secrets de Polichinelle a censure of Spenser’s stanza), his
addiction to Johnson’s pet aversion, “suiting the sound to the sense,” and
his idolatry of Milton, are all capitally done. Indeed, like all good
caricatures, the piece is a standing piece to consult for the fashions and
creeds which it caricatures. But it neither contains nor suggests any points
of critical doctrine that we cannot find elsewhere, and it is only indirectly
serious.[633]
The Dissertation upon Poetry of Imlac in Rasselas (chap. x.) may be less
Rasselas. amusing; but it is of course much more serious. There can
of influences above referred to, might have taken high, if not the highest,
On Tragi- degrees in a very different school of criticism. He puts the
comedy.
great rule Nec quarta loqui into the dustbin, with a
nonchalance exhibiting some slight shortness of sight; for the very
argument he uses will sweep with this a good many other rules to which he
still adheres. “We violate it,” he says coolly, “without scruple and without
inconvenience.” He is equally iconoclastic about the Five Acts, about the
Unity of Time, while he blows rather hot and cold about tragi-comedy in
the sense of the mixing of tragic and comic scenes. But the close of the
paper is the most remarkable, for it is in effect the death-knell of the neo-
classic system, sounded by its last really great prophet. “It ought to be the
first endeavour of a writer to distinguish nature from custom, or that which
is established because it is right from that which is right only because it is
established; that he may neither violate essential principles by a desire of
novelty, nor debar himself from the attainment of beauties within his view
by a needless fear of breaking rules which no literary dictator had authority
to enact.”
“Oh! the lands of Milnwood, the bonny lands of Milnwood, that have
been in the name of Morton twa hundred years; they are barking and
fleeing, infield and outfield, haugh and holme!” With this utterance, this
single utterance, all the ruling doctrines of sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth century criticism receive notice to quit.[632]
The well-known “Dick Minim” papers in the Idler (60, 61) are excellent
fun, and perhaps Johnson’s chief accomplishment in the direction of
“Dick Minim.” humour. The growth of criticism in Dick, his gradual
proficiency in all the critical commonplaces of his day (it is to be observed
that Johnson, like all true humourists, does not spare himself, and makes
one of Minim’s secrets de Polichinelle a censure of Spenser’s stanza), his
addiction to Johnson’s pet aversion, “suiting the sound to the sense,” and
his idolatry of Milton, are all capitally done. Indeed, like all good
caricatures, the piece is a standing piece to consult for the fashions and
creeds which it caricatures. But it neither contains nor suggests any points
of critical doctrine that we cannot find elsewhere, and it is only indirectly
serious.[633]
The Dissertation upon Poetry of Imlac in Rasselas (chap. x.) may be less
Rasselas. amusing; but it is of course much more serious. There can
Page 478
be no reasonable doubt that Imlac gives as much of Johnson’s self as he
chose to put, and could put, in character: while it is at least possible that his
sentiments are determined in some degree by the menacing appearances of
Romanticism. Imlac finds “with wonder that in almost all countries the
most ancient poets are reputed the best”; that “early writers are in
possession of nature and their successors of art”; that “no man was ever
great by imitation”; that he must observe everything and observe for
himself, but that he must do it on the principle of examining, “not the
individual, but the species.” He is to remark “general properties and large
appearances. He does not number the streaks of the tulip or describe the
different shapes in the verdure of the forest,” but must “exhibit prominent
and striking features,” neglecting “minuter discriminations.” In the same
way his criticism of life must be abstracted and generalised; he must be “a
being superior to time and place”; must know many languages and sciences;
must by incessant practice of style “familiarise to himself every delicacy of
speech and grace of harmony.”
Surely a high calling and election! yet with some questionable points in
it. If the poet must not count the streaks of the tulip, if he must merely
generalise and sweep; if he must consult the laziness and dulness of his
readers by merely portraying prominent and striking features,
characteristics alike obvious to vigilance and carelessness—then even
Dryden will not do, for he is too recondite and conceited. Pope alone must
bear the bell. Lady Winchelsea’s horse in twilight, the best part of a century
earlier; Tennyson’s ashbuds in the front of March, the best part of a century
later, are equally “streaks of the tulip,” superfluous if not even bad.
Habington’s picture of the pitiless northern sunshine on the ice-bound pilot,
and Keats’s of the perilous seas through the magic casements, must be
rejected, as too unfamiliar and individual. The poetic strangeness and height
are barred en bloc. Convention, familiarity, generalisation—these are the
keys to the poetical kingdom of heaven. The tenant of Milnwood has a fresh
enfeoffment!
The Shakespeare Preface is a specially interesting document, because of
its illustration, not merely of Johnson’s native critical vigour, not merely of
his imbibed eighteenth-century prejudices, but of that peculiar position of
compromise and reservation which, as we have said and shall say, is at once
the condemnation and the salvation of the English critical position at this
time. Of the first there are many instances, though perhaps none in the
chose to put, and could put, in character: while it is at least possible that his
sentiments are determined in some degree by the menacing appearances of
Romanticism. Imlac finds “with wonder that in almost all countries the
most ancient poets are reputed the best”; that “early writers are in
possession of nature and their successors of art”; that “no man was ever
great by imitation”; that he must observe everything and observe for
himself, but that he must do it on the principle of examining, “not the
individual, but the species.” He is to remark “general properties and large
appearances. He does not number the streaks of the tulip or describe the
different shapes in the verdure of the forest,” but must “exhibit prominent
and striking features,” neglecting “minuter discriminations.” In the same
way his criticism of life must be abstracted and generalised; he must be “a
being superior to time and place”; must know many languages and sciences;
must by incessant practice of style “familiarise to himself every delicacy of
speech and grace of harmony.”
Surely a high calling and election! yet with some questionable points in
it. If the poet must not count the streaks of the tulip, if he must merely
generalise and sweep; if he must consult the laziness and dulness of his
readers by merely portraying prominent and striking features,
characteristics alike obvious to vigilance and carelessness—then even
Dryden will not do, for he is too recondite and conceited. Pope alone must
bear the bell. Lady Winchelsea’s horse in twilight, the best part of a century
earlier; Tennyson’s ashbuds in the front of March, the best part of a century
later, are equally “streaks of the tulip,” superfluous if not even bad.
Habington’s picture of the pitiless northern sunshine on the ice-bound pilot,
and Keats’s of the perilous seas through the magic casements, must be
rejected, as too unfamiliar and individual. The poetic strangeness and height
are barred en bloc. Convention, familiarity, generalisation—these are the
keys to the poetical kingdom of heaven. The tenant of Milnwood has a fresh
enfeoffment!
The Shakespeare Preface is a specially interesting document, because of
its illustration, not merely of Johnson’s native critical vigour, not merely of
his imbibed eighteenth-century prejudices, but of that peculiar position of
compromise and reservation which, as we have said and shall say, is at once
the condemnation and the salvation of the English critical position at this
time. Of the first there are many instances, though perhaps none in the
Page 479
The Preface itself quite equal to the famous note on the
Shakespeare
Preface.
character of Polonius, which has been generally and justly
taken as showing what a triumph this failure of an edition
might have been. Yet even here there is not a little which follows in the
wake of Dryden’s great eulogy, and some scattered observations of the
highest acuteness, more particularly two famous sentences which, though
Johnson’s quotation is directed to a minor matter—Shakespeare’s learning
—settle beforehand, with the prophetic tendency of genius, the whole
monstrous absurdity of the Bacon-Shakespeare theory.[634] The rest,
however, is, if not exactly a zigzag of contradiction, at least the contrasted
utterance of two distinct voices. Shakespeare has this and that merit of
nature, of passion; but “his set speeches are commonly cold and weak.”
“What he does best he soon ceases to do.” Johnson, here also, has no
superstitious reverence for the Unities, and even speaks slightly of dramatic
rules; nay, he suggests “the recall of the principles of the drama to a new
examination,” the very examination which Lessing was to give it. But he
apologises for the period when “The Death of Arthur was the favourite
volume,” and hints a doubt whether much of our and his own praise of
Shakespeare is not “given by custom and veneration.” “He has corrupted
language by every mode of depravation,” yet Johnson echoes Dryden
“when he describes anything you more than see it, you feel it too.” A
singular triumph of “depraved language.” In short, throughout the piece it is
now Johnson himself who is speaking, now some one with a certain bundle
of principles or prejudices which Johnson chooses to adopt for the time.
It was with these opinions on the formal and substantial nature of poetry
and of criticism that Johnson, late in life, sat down to the Lives of the Poets,
[635]
The Lives of the one of the most fortunate books in English literature. In
Poets.
very few cases have task and artist been so happily
associated. For almost all his authors, he had biographical knowledge such
as no other living man had, and the access to which has long been closed.
If, now and then, his criticism was not in touch with his subjects, this was
rare: and the fact gave a certain value even to the assertions that result—for
we, do what we will, cannot see Milton quite as Johnson saw him, and so
his view is valuable as a corrective. By far the greater part of these subjects
belonged to one school and system of English poetry, a school and system
with which the critic was at once thoroughly familiar and thoroughly in
sympathy. And, lastly, the form of the work, with its subdivision into a large
Shakespeare
Preface.
character of Polonius, which has been generally and justly
taken as showing what a triumph this failure of an edition
might have been. Yet even here there is not a little which follows in the
wake of Dryden’s great eulogy, and some scattered observations of the
highest acuteness, more particularly two famous sentences which, though
Johnson’s quotation is directed to a minor matter—Shakespeare’s learning
—settle beforehand, with the prophetic tendency of genius, the whole
monstrous absurdity of the Bacon-Shakespeare theory.[634] The rest,
however, is, if not exactly a zigzag of contradiction, at least the contrasted
utterance of two distinct voices. Shakespeare has this and that merit of
nature, of passion; but “his set speeches are commonly cold and weak.”
“What he does best he soon ceases to do.” Johnson, here also, has no
superstitious reverence for the Unities, and even speaks slightly of dramatic
rules; nay, he suggests “the recall of the principles of the drama to a new
examination,” the very examination which Lessing was to give it. But he
apologises for the period when “The Death of Arthur was the favourite
volume,” and hints a doubt whether much of our and his own praise of
Shakespeare is not “given by custom and veneration.” “He has corrupted
language by every mode of depravation,” yet Johnson echoes Dryden
“when he describes anything you more than see it, you feel it too.” A
singular triumph of “depraved language.” In short, throughout the piece it is
now Johnson himself who is speaking, now some one with a certain bundle
of principles or prejudices which Johnson chooses to adopt for the time.
It was with these opinions on the formal and substantial nature of poetry
and of criticism that Johnson, late in life, sat down to the Lives of the Poets,
[635]
The Lives of the one of the most fortunate books in English literature. In
Poets.
very few cases have task and artist been so happily
associated. For almost all his authors, he had biographical knowledge such
as no other living man had, and the access to which has long been closed.
If, now and then, his criticism was not in touch with his subjects, this was
rare: and the fact gave a certain value even to the assertions that result—for
we, do what we will, cannot see Milton quite as Johnson saw him, and so
his view is valuable as a corrective. By far the greater part of these subjects
belonged to one school and system of English poetry, a school and system
with which the critic was at once thoroughly familiar and thoroughly in
sympathy. And, lastly, the form of the work, with its subdivision into a large
Page 480
number of practically independent and not individually burdensome
sections, was well suited to coax a man who suffered from constitutional
indolence, and who for many years had been relieved from that pressure of
necessity which had conquered his indolence occasionally, and only
occasionally, earlier. No other man, it is true, has had quite such a chance:
but he must indeed have a sublime confidence, both in the strength of his
principles and in the competence of his talents, who thinks that, if he had
the chance, he could do the task better than Johnson did his.
The work, of course, is by no means equal throughout: and it could not
Their general be expected to be. Some was merely old work, dating from
merits.
a much less mature period of the writer’s genius, and made
to serve again. Some was on subjects so trivial that good nature, or simple
indolence, or, if any one pleases, an artistic reluctance to break butterflies
on so huge a wheel, made the criticisms almost as insignificant as the
criticised. Here and there extra-literary prejudice—political-ecclesiastical,
as in the case of Milton; partly moral, partly religious, and, it is to be feared,
a little personal, as in that of Swift—distorted the presentation. And it is
quite possible that a similar distortion, due to the same causes or others, was
in the case of Gray intensified by a half-unconscious conviction that Gray’s
aims and spirit, if not his actual poetical accomplishments, were fatal to the
school of poetry to which the critic himself held.
But make allowance for all this, and with how great a thing do the Lives
still provide us! In that combination of biography and criticism, which is so
natural that it is wonderful it should be so late,[636] they are all but the
originals, and are still almost the standard. They are full of anecdote,
agreeably and crisply told, yet they never descend to mere gossip: their
criticism of life is almost always just and sound, grave without being
precise, animated by the same melancholy as that of the Vanity of Human
Wishes, but in milder mood and with touches of brightness. Their criticism
of literature is all the more valuable for being the criticism of their time.
When we read Johnson’s remarks on Milton’s minor poems it is foolish to
rave, and it is ignoble to sneer. The wise will rejoice in the opportunity to
understand. So when Johnson bestows what seems to us extraordinary and
unintelligible praise on John Pomfret’s Choice,[637] he is really praising a
moral tract couched in verse not unpleasing in itself, and specially pleasing
to his ear. When he speaks less favourably of Grongar Hill, he is speaking
of a piece of nature-poetry, not arranged on his principle of neglecting the
sections, was well suited to coax a man who suffered from constitutional
indolence, and who for many years had been relieved from that pressure of
necessity which had conquered his indolence occasionally, and only
occasionally, earlier. No other man, it is true, has had quite such a chance:
but he must indeed have a sublime confidence, both in the strength of his
principles and in the competence of his talents, who thinks that, if he had
the chance, he could do the task better than Johnson did his.
The work, of course, is by no means equal throughout: and it could not
Their general be expected to be. Some was merely old work, dating from
merits.
a much less mature period of the writer’s genius, and made
to serve again. Some was on subjects so trivial that good nature, or simple
indolence, or, if any one pleases, an artistic reluctance to break butterflies
on so huge a wheel, made the criticisms almost as insignificant as the
criticised. Here and there extra-literary prejudice—political-ecclesiastical,
as in the case of Milton; partly moral, partly religious, and, it is to be feared,
a little personal, as in that of Swift—distorted the presentation. And it is
quite possible that a similar distortion, due to the same causes or others, was
in the case of Gray intensified by a half-unconscious conviction that Gray’s
aims and spirit, if not his actual poetical accomplishments, were fatal to the
school of poetry to which the critic himself held.
But make allowance for all this, and with how great a thing do the Lives
still provide us! In that combination of biography and criticism, which is so
natural that it is wonderful it should be so late,[636] they are all but the
originals, and are still almost the standard. They are full of anecdote,
agreeably and crisply told, yet they never descend to mere gossip: their
criticism of life is almost always just and sound, grave without being
precise, animated by the same melancholy as that of the Vanity of Human
Wishes, but in milder mood and with touches of brightness. Their criticism
of literature is all the more valuable for being the criticism of their time.
When we read Johnson’s remarks on Milton’s minor poems it is foolish to
rave, and it is ignoble to sneer. The wise will rejoice in the opportunity to
understand. So when Johnson bestows what seems to us extraordinary and
unintelligible praise on John Pomfret’s Choice,[637] he is really praising a
moral tract couched in verse not unpleasing in itself, and specially pleasing
to his ear. When he speaks less favourably of Grongar Hill, he is speaking
of a piece of nature-poetry, not arranged on his principle of neglecting the
Page 481
streak of the tulip, and availing itself of those Miltonic licences of prosody
which he disapproved. But we shall never find that, when the poetry is of
the stamp which he recognises, he makes any mistake about its relative
excellence: and we shall find that, in not a few cases, he is able to recognise
excellence which belongs to classes and schools not exactly such as he
approves. And, lastly, it has to be added that for diffused brilliancy of
critical expression, subject to the allowances and conditions just given, the
Lives are hardly to be excelled in any language. It is not safe to neglect one
of them, though no doubt there are some six or seven which, for this reason
or that, take precedence of the rest.
The “Cowley” has especial interest, because it is Johnson’s only
considerable attempt at that very important part of criticism, the historical
summary of the characteristics of a poetical period or school. And, though
The Cowley. far from faultless, it is so important and so interesting in its
kind that it ranks with his greatest Essays. Only that singular impatience of
literary history, as such, which characterised the late Mr Matthew Arnold,
and which not infrequently marred his own critical work, can have
prevented him from including, in his Johnsonian points de repère, the Essay
which launched, and endeavoured to make watertight, the famous definition
of the “Metaphysical” School—of the school represented earlier by Donne,
and later by Cowley himself.
The phrase itself[638] has been both too readily adopted and too
indiscriminately attacked. Taken with the ordinary meaning of
“metaphysical,” it may indeed seem partly meaningless and partly
misleading. Taken as Johnson meant it, it has a meaning defensible at least
from the point of view of the framer, and very important in critical history.
Johnson (it is too often forgotten) was a scholar; and he used
“metaphysical” in its proper sense—of that which “comes after” the
physical or natural. Now, it was, as we have seen, the whole principle of his
school of criticism—their whole critical contention—that they were
“following nature.” The main objection to the poetry of what Dryden calls
the “last Age”—what we call, loosely but conveniently, “Elizabethan”
poetry—was that its ideas, and still more its expressions, went beyond and
behind nature, substituted afterthoughts and unreal refinements for fact. It
would be delightful to the present writer to defend the Metaphysicals here
—but it would not be to the question.
which he disapproved. But we shall never find that, when the poetry is of
the stamp which he recognises, he makes any mistake about its relative
excellence: and we shall find that, in not a few cases, he is able to recognise
excellence which belongs to classes and schools not exactly such as he
approves. And, lastly, it has to be added that for diffused brilliancy of
critical expression, subject to the allowances and conditions just given, the
Lives are hardly to be excelled in any language. It is not safe to neglect one
of them, though no doubt there are some six or seven which, for this reason
or that, take precedence of the rest.
The “Cowley” has especial interest, because it is Johnson’s only
considerable attempt at that very important part of criticism, the historical
summary of the characteristics of a poetical period or school. And, though
The Cowley. far from faultless, it is so important and so interesting in its
kind that it ranks with his greatest Essays. Only that singular impatience of
literary history, as such, which characterised the late Mr Matthew Arnold,
and which not infrequently marred his own critical work, can have
prevented him from including, in his Johnsonian points de repère, the Essay
which launched, and endeavoured to make watertight, the famous definition
of the “Metaphysical” School—of the school represented earlier by Donne,
and later by Cowley himself.
The phrase itself[638] has been both too readily adopted and too
indiscriminately attacked. Taken with the ordinary meaning of
“metaphysical,” it may indeed seem partly meaningless and partly
misleading. Taken as Johnson meant it, it has a meaning defensible at least
from the point of view of the framer, and very important in critical history.
Johnson (it is too often forgotten) was a scholar; and he used
“metaphysical” in its proper sense—of that which “comes after” the
physical or natural. Now, it was, as we have seen, the whole principle of his
school of criticism—their whole critical contention—that they were
“following nature.” The main objection to the poetry of what Dryden calls
the “last Age”—what we call, loosely but conveniently, “Elizabethan”
poetry—was that its ideas, and still more its expressions, went beyond and
behind nature, substituted afterthoughts and unreal refinements for fact. It
would be delightful to the present writer to defend the Metaphysicals here
—but it would not be to the question.
Page 482
Political and religious prejudice accounts, as has been said, for much in
The Milton. the Milton. But it will not fully account for the facts. The at
first sight astonishing, and already often referred to, criticisms on the minor
poems show a perfectly honest and genuine dislike to the form as well as to
the matter, to the manner as well as to the man. If Johnson calls Lycidas
“harsh,” it is because he simply does not hear its music; he can even call the
songs in Comus “not very musical in their numbers.” When of the, no doubt
unequal but often splendid, sonnets he can write, “of the best it can only be
said that they are not bad,” he gives us the real value of his criticism
immediately afterwards by laying it down that “the fabric of a sonnet,
however adapted to the Italian language, has never succeeded in ours.” And
when he has earlier stated that “all that short compositions can commonly
attain is sweetness and elegance,” we see in this the whole thing. Milton is
condemned under statute (though the statute is hopelessly unconstitutional
and unjust) on certain counts; on others his judge, though capable and
perfectly honest, does not know the part of the code which justifies the
accused. Johnson is listening for couplet-music or stanzas with regular
recurrence of rhyme, for lines constituted entirely on a dissyllabic, or
entirely on a trisyllabic, basis. He does not find these things: and he has no
organ to judge what he does find.
With the lives of Dryden and Pope we are clear of all difficulties, and the
critic is in his element. The poets whom he is criticising occupy the same
platform as he does; they have in fact been themselves the architects of that
The Dryden and platform. There is no fear of the initial incompatibilities
Pope.
which, when aggravated by accident, lead to the apparent
enormities of the Milton Essay, and which, even when not so aggravated,
condition the usefulness, though they may positively increase the interest,
of the Cowley. But there is more than this. In no instance, perhaps, was
Johnson so well in case to apply his biographical and critical treatment as in
regard to Dryden and Pope. With the latter he had himself been
contemporary; and when he first came to London the traditions even of the
former were still fresh, while there were many still living (Southerne the
chief of them) who had known glorious John well. Further, Johnson’s
peculiar habits of living, his delight in conversation and society, his
excellent memory, and his propensity to the study of human nature, as well
as of letters, furnished him abundantly with opportunities. Yet, again, his
sympathy with both, on general literary sides, was not unhappily mixed and
The Milton. the Milton. But it will not fully account for the facts. The at
first sight astonishing, and already often referred to, criticisms on the minor
poems show a perfectly honest and genuine dislike to the form as well as to
the matter, to the manner as well as to the man. If Johnson calls Lycidas
“harsh,” it is because he simply does not hear its music; he can even call the
songs in Comus “not very musical in their numbers.” When of the, no doubt
unequal but often splendid, sonnets he can write, “of the best it can only be
said that they are not bad,” he gives us the real value of his criticism
immediately afterwards by laying it down that “the fabric of a sonnet,
however adapted to the Italian language, has never succeeded in ours.” And
when he has earlier stated that “all that short compositions can commonly
attain is sweetness and elegance,” we see in this the whole thing. Milton is
condemned under statute (though the statute is hopelessly unconstitutional
and unjust) on certain counts; on others his judge, though capable and
perfectly honest, does not know the part of the code which justifies the
accused. Johnson is listening for couplet-music or stanzas with regular
recurrence of rhyme, for lines constituted entirely on a dissyllabic, or
entirely on a trisyllabic, basis. He does not find these things: and he has no
organ to judge what he does find.
With the lives of Dryden and Pope we are clear of all difficulties, and the
critic is in his element. The poets whom he is criticising occupy the same
platform as he does; they have in fact been themselves the architects of that
The Dryden and platform. There is no fear of the initial incompatibilities
Pope.
which, when aggravated by accident, lead to the apparent
enormities of the Milton Essay, and which, even when not so aggravated,
condition the usefulness, though they may positively increase the interest,
of the Cowley. But there is more than this. In no instance, perhaps, was
Johnson so well in case to apply his biographical and critical treatment as in
regard to Dryden and Pope. With the latter he had himself been
contemporary; and when he first came to London the traditions even of the
former were still fresh, while there were many still living (Southerne the
chief of them) who had known glorious John well. Further, Johnson’s
peculiar habits of living, his delight in conversation and society, his
excellent memory, and his propensity to the study of human nature, as well
as of letters, furnished him abundantly with opportunities. Yet, again, his
sympathy with both, on general literary sides, was not unhappily mixed and
Page 483
tempered by a slight, but not uncharitable or Puritanic, disapproval of their
moral characters, by regret at Dryden’s desertion of the Anglican Church,
and at the half-Romanist half-freethinking attitude of Pope to religion.
The result of all this is a pair of the best critical Essays in the English
language. Individual expressions will of course renew for us the sense of
difference in the point of view. We shall not agree that Dryden “found
English poetry brick and left it marble,” and we shall be only too apt to take
up the challenge, “If Pope be not a poet, where is poetry to be found?” even
if we think the implied denial, to which the challenge was a reply, an
absurdity. And we may find special interest as well as special difference in
the condemnation even of these masters for attempting Pindarics, because
Pindarics “want the essential constituent of metrical compositions, the
stated recurrence of settled numbers,” seeing in it a fresh instance of that
Procrustean tyranny of suiting the form to the bed, not the bed to the form,
which distinguishes all neo-classic criticism. But these points occur rarely.
The criticism, as a whole, is not merely perfectly just on its own scheme,
but requires very little allowance on others; nor, in the difficult and
dangerous art of comparative censorship, will any example be found much
surpassing Johnson’s parallel of the two poets.
In the Milton and the Cowley we find Johnson dealing with schools of
poetry which he regards as out of date and imperfect; in the Dryden and the
Pope, with subjects which are not to him subjects of any general
controversy, but which he can afford to treat almost entirely on their merits.
The Collins and In the Collins and the Gray we find a new relation between
Gray.
poet and critic—the relation of decided, though not yet
wholly declared, innovation on the part of the poets, and of conscious,
though not yet quite wide-eyed and irreconcilable, hostility on the part of
the critic. The expression of this is further differentiated by the fact that
Johnson regarded Collins with the affection of a personal friend, and the
generous sympathy of one who, with all his roughness, had a mind as nearly
touched by mortal sorrows as that of any sentimentalist; while it is pretty
clear, though we have no positive evidence for it, that he reciprocated the
personal and political dislike which Gray certainly felt for him.
The result was, in the case of Collins, a criticism rather inadequate than
unjust, and not seldom acute in its indication of faults, if somewhat blind to
merits; in that of Gray, one which cannot be quite so favourably spoken of,
though the censure which has been heaped upon it—notably by Lord
moral characters, by regret at Dryden’s desertion of the Anglican Church,
and at the half-Romanist half-freethinking attitude of Pope to religion.
The result of all this is a pair of the best critical Essays in the English
language. Individual expressions will of course renew for us the sense of
difference in the point of view. We shall not agree that Dryden “found
English poetry brick and left it marble,” and we shall be only too apt to take
up the challenge, “If Pope be not a poet, where is poetry to be found?” even
if we think the implied denial, to which the challenge was a reply, an
absurdity. And we may find special interest as well as special difference in
the condemnation even of these masters for attempting Pindarics, because
Pindarics “want the essential constituent of metrical compositions, the
stated recurrence of settled numbers,” seeing in it a fresh instance of that
Procrustean tyranny of suiting the form to the bed, not the bed to the form,
which distinguishes all neo-classic criticism. But these points occur rarely.
The criticism, as a whole, is not merely perfectly just on its own scheme,
but requires very little allowance on others; nor, in the difficult and
dangerous art of comparative censorship, will any example be found much
surpassing Johnson’s parallel of the two poets.
In the Milton and the Cowley we find Johnson dealing with schools of
poetry which he regards as out of date and imperfect; in the Dryden and the
Pope, with subjects which are not to him subjects of any general
controversy, but which he can afford to treat almost entirely on their merits.
The Collins and In the Collins and the Gray we find a new relation between
Gray.
poet and critic—the relation of decided, though not yet
wholly declared, innovation on the part of the poets, and of conscious,
though not yet quite wide-eyed and irreconcilable, hostility on the part of
the critic. The expression of this is further differentiated by the fact that
Johnson regarded Collins with the affection of a personal friend, and the
generous sympathy of one who, with all his roughness, had a mind as nearly
touched by mortal sorrows as that of any sentimentalist; while it is pretty
clear, though we have no positive evidence for it, that he reciprocated the
personal and political dislike which Gray certainly felt for him.
The result was, in the case of Collins, a criticism rather inadequate than
unjust, and not seldom acute in its indication of faults, if somewhat blind to
merits; in that of Gray, one which cannot be quite so favourably spoken of,
though the censure which has been heaped upon it—notably by Lord
Page 484
Macaulay and Mr Arnold—seems to me very far to surpass its own
injustice. Johnson’s general summing up—that Gray’s “mind had a large
grasp; his curiosity[639] was unlimited, and his judgment cultivated; he was
likely to love much where he loved at all, but fastidious and hard to
please”—is acute, just, and far from ungenerous. That on the Elegy—“The
four stanzas beginning, ‘Yet even these bones,’ are to me original; I have
never seen the notions in any other place. Yet he that reads them here
persuades himself that he has always felt them. Had Gray written often
thus, it had been vain to blame and useless to praise him”—is a magnificent
and monumental compliment, said as simply as “Good morning.” He is
absolutely right when he says that in all Gray’s Odes “there is a kind of
cumbrous splendour that we wish away,” for there never was such an abuser
of “poetic diction” (to be a poet) as Gray was. Yet undoubtedly the Essay is
not satisfactory; it has not merely, as the Collins has, blindness, but, what
the Collins has not, that obvious denigration, that determination to pick
holes, which always vitiates a critique, no matter what learning and genius
be bestowed on it. And the probable reasons of this are interesting. It has
been said that they were possibly personal in part. We know that Gray
spoke rudely of Johnson; and there were many reasons why Johnson might
rather despise Gray, though he certainly should not have called him “dull.”
On the whole, however, I have little doubt—and it is this which gives the
essay its real interest for me—that one main reason of Johnson’s antipathy
to Gray’s poetry was the same as that for which we like it. He suspected, if
he did not fully perceive, the romantic snake in Gray’s classically waving
grass. And he had on his own grounds good reason for suspecting it. Gray
might use Greek and Latin tags almost extravagantly. But he sedulously
eschewed the couplet; and, while preferring lyric, he chose lyrical forms
which, though Johnson was too much of a scholar to dare to call them
irregular, violated his own theories of the prompt and orderly recurrence of
rhyme, and the duty of maintaining a length of line as even as possible. The
sense of nature, the love of the despised “prospect,” was everywhere; even
the forbidden “streak of the tulip” might be detected. And, lastly, Gray had
too obvious leanings to classes of subject and literature which lay outside of
the consecrated range—early English and French, Welsh, Norse, and the
like. It is no real evidence of critical incapacity, but of something quite the
reverse, that Johnson should have disliked Gray. He spied the great
injustice. Johnson’s general summing up—that Gray’s “mind had a large
grasp; his curiosity[639] was unlimited, and his judgment cultivated; he was
likely to love much where he loved at all, but fastidious and hard to
please”—is acute, just, and far from ungenerous. That on the Elegy—“The
four stanzas beginning, ‘Yet even these bones,’ are to me original; I have
never seen the notions in any other place. Yet he that reads them here
persuades himself that he has always felt them. Had Gray written often
thus, it had been vain to blame and useless to praise him”—is a magnificent
and monumental compliment, said as simply as “Good morning.” He is
absolutely right when he says that in all Gray’s Odes “there is a kind of
cumbrous splendour that we wish away,” for there never was such an abuser
of “poetic diction” (to be a poet) as Gray was. Yet undoubtedly the Essay is
not satisfactory; it has not merely, as the Collins has, blindness, but, what
the Collins has not, that obvious denigration, that determination to pick
holes, which always vitiates a critique, no matter what learning and genius
be bestowed on it. And the probable reasons of this are interesting. It has
been said that they were possibly personal in part. We know that Gray
spoke rudely of Johnson; and there were many reasons why Johnson might
rather despise Gray, though he certainly should not have called him “dull.”
On the whole, however, I have little doubt—and it is this which gives the
essay its real interest for me—that one main reason of Johnson’s antipathy
to Gray’s poetry was the same as that for which we like it. He suspected, if
he did not fully perceive, the romantic snake in Gray’s classically waving
grass. And he had on his own grounds good reason for suspecting it. Gray
might use Greek and Latin tags almost extravagantly. But he sedulously
eschewed the couplet; and, while preferring lyric, he chose lyrical forms
which, though Johnson was too much of a scholar to dare to call them
irregular, violated his own theories of the prompt and orderly recurrence of
rhyme, and the duty of maintaining a length of line as even as possible. The
sense of nature, the love of the despised “prospect,” was everywhere; even
the forbidden “streak of the tulip” might be detected. And, lastly, Gray had
too obvious leanings to classes of subject and literature which lay outside of
the consecrated range—early English and French, Welsh, Norse, and the
like. It is no real evidence of critical incapacity, but of something quite the
reverse, that Johnson should have disliked Gray. He spied the great
Page 485
Romantic beard under the Pindaric and Horatian muffler—and he did not
like it.
On the whole, it may be safely said that, however widely a man may
differ from Johnson’s critical theory, he will, provided that he possesses
some real tincture of the critical spirit himself, think more and more highly
of the Lives of the Poets the more he reads them, and the more he compares
The critical them with the greater classics of critical literature. As a
greatness of the
Lives and of
book, they have not missed their due meed of praise; as a
Johnson. critical book, one may think that they have. The peculiarity
of their position as a body of direct critical appraisement of
the poetical work of England for a long period should escape no one. But
the discussion of them, which possesses, and is long likely to possess,
prerogative authority as coming from one who was both himself a master of
the craft and a master of English, admirable and delightful as it is and
always will be, is not, critically speaking, quite satisfactory. Mr Arnold
speaks of the Six Lives which he selected in very high terms: but he rather
pooh-poohs the others, and, even in regard to the chosen Six, he puts upon
himself—and in his amiable, but for all that exceedingly peremptory, way,
insists in putting on his readers—a huge pair of blinkers. We are to regard
the late seventeenth and the whole of the eighteenth century as an Age of
Prose: and we are to regard Johnson, whether he was speaking of the poets
of this age or of others, as the spokesman of an age of prose. Far be it from
me to deny that there is an element of truth in this: but it is not the whole
truth, and the critic must strive, though he may not boast, to “find the
whole.”
The whole truth, as it seems to me, about Johnson is that he was very
much more than the critic of an age of prose, though he was not (who has
been? even Longinus? even Coleridge?)
like it.
On the whole, it may be safely said that, however widely a man may
differ from Johnson’s critical theory, he will, provided that he possesses
some real tincture of the critical spirit himself, think more and more highly
of the Lives of the Poets the more he reads them, and the more he compares
The critical them with the greater classics of critical literature. As a
greatness of the
Lives and of
book, they have not missed their due meed of praise; as a
Johnson. critical book, one may think that they have. The peculiarity
of their position as a body of direct critical appraisement of
the poetical work of England for a long period should escape no one. But
the discussion of them, which possesses, and is long likely to possess,
prerogative authority as coming from one who was both himself a master of
the craft and a master of English, admirable and delightful as it is and
always will be, is not, critically speaking, quite satisfactory. Mr Arnold
speaks of the Six Lives which he selected in very high terms: but he rather
pooh-poohs the others, and, even in regard to the chosen Six, he puts upon
himself—and in his amiable, but for all that exceedingly peremptory, way,
insists in putting on his readers—a huge pair of blinkers. We are to regard
the late seventeenth and the whole of the eighteenth century as an Age of
Prose: and we are to regard Johnson, whether he was speaking of the poets
of this age or of others, as the spokesman of an age of prose. Far be it from
me to deny that there is an element of truth in this: but it is not the whole
truth, and the critic must strive, though he may not boast, to “find the
whole.”
The whole truth, as it seems to me, about Johnson is that he was very
much more than the critic of an age of prose, though he was not (who has
been? even Longinus? even Coleridge?)
Page 486
“The King who ruled, as he thought fit,
The universal monarchy of wit”
as regards poetic criticism. He saw far beyond prose, as in those few words
of the concluding and reconciling eulogy of Gray which have been quoted
above. It is poetry and not prose which has the gift of putting new things so
that the man who reads them ingenuously thinks that they are merely a neat
statement of what he has always thought. And Johnson was far more than
merely a critic of the eighteenth-century Neo-Classic theory, though he was
this. A most noteworthy passage in the Rambler (No. 156), which I have
purposely kept for comment in this place, though it is delivered on the
wrong side, shows us, as the great critics always do show us, what a range
of sight the writer had. In this he expresses a doubt whether we ought “to
judge genius merely by the event,” and, applying this to Shakespeare, takes
the odd, but for an eighteenth-century critic most tell-tale and interesting,
line that if genius succeeds by means which are wrong according to rule, we
may think higher of the genius but less highly of the work. It is hardly
necessary to point out that this is, though in no way a discreditable, a
transparent evasion of the difficulty which is pressing on the defenders of
the Rules. “Show me,” one may without irreverence retort, “thy genius
without thy works; and I will show thee my genius by my works.” If
Shakespeare shows genius in neglecting the Rules, the inexorable voice of
Logic, greater than Fortune, greater than all other things save Fate, will
point out that the Rules are evidently not necessary, and, with something
like the Lucretian Te sequar, will add, “Then for what are they necessary?”
But Johnson’s power is only a little soured and not at all quenched by this.
He has seen what others refused—perhaps were unable—to see, and what
some flatly denied,—that a process of literary judgment “by the event” is
possible, and that its verdicts, in some respects at any rate, cannot be
challenged or reversed. These great critical aperçus, though sometimes
delivered half unwillingly or on the wrong side, establish Johnson’s claim
to a place not often to be given to critics; but they do not establish it more
certainly than his surveys of his actual subjects. It was an unfortunate
consequence of Mr Arnold’s generous impatience of all but “the chief and
principal things,” and of his curious dislike to literary history as such, that
he should have swept away the minor Lives. One may not care for Stepney
The universal monarchy of wit”
as regards poetic criticism. He saw far beyond prose, as in those few words
of the concluding and reconciling eulogy of Gray which have been quoted
above. It is poetry and not prose which has the gift of putting new things so
that the man who reads them ingenuously thinks that they are merely a neat
statement of what he has always thought. And Johnson was far more than
merely a critic of the eighteenth-century Neo-Classic theory, though he was
this. A most noteworthy passage in the Rambler (No. 156), which I have
purposely kept for comment in this place, though it is delivered on the
wrong side, shows us, as the great critics always do show us, what a range
of sight the writer had. In this he expresses a doubt whether we ought “to
judge genius merely by the event,” and, applying this to Shakespeare, takes
the odd, but for an eighteenth-century critic most tell-tale and interesting,
line that if genius succeeds by means which are wrong according to rule, we
may think higher of the genius but less highly of the work. It is hardly
necessary to point out that this is, though in no way a discreditable, a
transparent evasion of the difficulty which is pressing on the defenders of
the Rules. “Show me,” one may without irreverence retort, “thy genius
without thy works; and I will show thee my genius by my works.” If
Shakespeare shows genius in neglecting the Rules, the inexorable voice of
Logic, greater than Fortune, greater than all other things save Fate, will
point out that the Rules are evidently not necessary, and, with something
like the Lucretian Te sequar, will add, “Then for what are they necessary?”
But Johnson’s power is only a little soured and not at all quenched by this.
He has seen what others refused—perhaps were unable—to see, and what
some flatly denied,—that a process of literary judgment “by the event” is
possible, and that its verdicts, in some respects at any rate, cannot be
challenged or reversed. These great critical aperçus, though sometimes
delivered half unwillingly or on the wrong side, establish Johnson’s claim
to a place not often to be given to critics; but they do not establish it more
certainly than his surveys of his actual subjects. It was an unfortunate
consequence of Mr Arnold’s generous impatience of all but “the chief and
principal things,” and of his curious dislike to literary history as such, that
he should have swept away the minor Lives. One may not care for Stepney
Page 487
or Yalden, Duke or King, much more, or at all more, than he did. But with a
really great member of the craft his admissions and omissions, his
paradoxes, his extravagances, his very mistakes pure and simple, are all
critically edifying. How does he apply his own critical theory? is what we
must ask: and, with Johnson, I think we shall never ask it in vain.
His idea of English poetry was the application to certain classes of
subjects, not rigidly limited to, but mainly arranged by, the canons of the
classical writers—of what seemed to him and his generation the supreme
form of English language and metre, brought in by Mr Waller and perfected
by Mr Pope, yet not so as to exclude from admiration the Allegro of Milton
and the Elegy of Gray. We may trace his applications of this, if we have a
real love of literature and a real sense of criticism, nearly as profitably and
pleasantly in relation to John Pomfret as in relation to Alexander Pope. We
may trace his failures (as we are pleased, quite rightly in a way, to call
them), the failures arising from the inadequacy, not of his genius, but of his
scheme, not less agreeably in relation to Dyer than in relation to Dryden.
We are not less informed by his passing the Castle of Indolence almost sub
silentio than we are by that at first sight astounding criticism of Lycidas.
This Cæsar never does wrong but with just cause—to use the phrase which
was too much for the equanimity or the intelligence of his great namesake
Ben, in the work of one whom both admired yet could not quite stomach.
Now, this it is which makes the greatness of a critic. That Johnson might
have been greater still at other times need not necessarily be denied; though
it is at least open to doubt whether any other time would have suited his
whole disposition better. But, as he is, he is great. The critics who deserve
that name are not those who, like, for instance, Christopher North and Mr
Ruskin, are at the mercy of different kinds of caprice—with whom you
must be always on the qui vive to be certain what particular watchword they
have adopted, what special side they are taking. It may even be doubted
whether such a critic as Lamb, though infinitely delightful, is exactly
“great” because of the singular gaps and arbitrariness of his likes and
dislikes. Nay, Hazlitt, one of the greatest critics of the world on the whole,
goes near to forfeit his right to the title by the occasional outbursts of
almost insane prejudice that cloud his vision. Johnson is quite as
prejudiced; but his prejudice is not in the least insane. His critical calculus
is perfectly sound on its own postulates and axioms; and you have only to
apply checks and correctives (which are easily ascertained, and kept ready)
really great member of the craft his admissions and omissions, his
paradoxes, his extravagances, his very mistakes pure and simple, are all
critically edifying. How does he apply his own critical theory? is what we
must ask: and, with Johnson, I think we shall never ask it in vain.
His idea of English poetry was the application to certain classes of
subjects, not rigidly limited to, but mainly arranged by, the canons of the
classical writers—of what seemed to him and his generation the supreme
form of English language and metre, brought in by Mr Waller and perfected
by Mr Pope, yet not so as to exclude from admiration the Allegro of Milton
and the Elegy of Gray. We may trace his applications of this, if we have a
real love of literature and a real sense of criticism, nearly as profitably and
pleasantly in relation to John Pomfret as in relation to Alexander Pope. We
may trace his failures (as we are pleased, quite rightly in a way, to call
them), the failures arising from the inadequacy, not of his genius, but of his
scheme, not less agreeably in relation to Dyer than in relation to Dryden.
We are not less informed by his passing the Castle of Indolence almost sub
silentio than we are by that at first sight astounding criticism of Lycidas.
This Cæsar never does wrong but with just cause—to use the phrase which
was too much for the equanimity or the intelligence of his great namesake
Ben, in the work of one whom both admired yet could not quite stomach.
Now, this it is which makes the greatness of a critic. That Johnson might
have been greater still at other times need not necessarily be denied; though
it is at least open to doubt whether any other time would have suited his
whole disposition better. But, as he is, he is great. The critics who deserve
that name are not those who, like, for instance, Christopher North and Mr
Ruskin, are at the mercy of different kinds of caprice—with whom you
must be always on the qui vive to be certain what particular watchword they
have adopted, what special side they are taking. It may even be doubted
whether such a critic as Lamb, though infinitely delightful, is exactly
“great” because of the singular gaps and arbitrariness of his likes and
dislikes. Nay, Hazlitt, one of the greatest critics of the world on the whole,
goes near to forfeit his right to the title by the occasional outbursts of
almost insane prejudice that cloud his vision. Johnson is quite as
prejudiced; but his prejudice is not in the least insane. His critical calculus
is perfectly sound on its own postulates and axioms; and you have only to
apply checks and correctives (which are easily ascertained, and kept ready)
Page 488
to adjust it to absolute critical truth. And, what is more, he has not merely
flourished and vapoured critical abstractions, but has left us a solid
reasoned body of critical judgment; he has not judged literature in the
exhausted receiver of mere art, and yet has never neglected the artistic
criterion; he has kept in constant touch with life, and yet has never
descended to mere gossip. We may freely disagree with his judgments, but
we can never justly disable his judgment; and this is the real criterion of a
great critic.
Johnson is so much the eighteenth-century orthodox critic in
quintessence (though, as I have tried to show, in transcendence also) that he
will dispense us from saying very much more about the rank and file, the
Minor Criticism: ordinary or inferior examples, of the kind. If we were able
Periodical and
other.
to devote this Book, or even this volume, to the subject of
the present chapter, there would be no lack of material.
Critical exercitations of a kind formed now, of course, a regular part of the
work of literature, and a very large part of its hack-work. The Gentleman’s
Magazine devoted much attention to the subject; and for a great part of the
century two regular Reviews, the Critical and the Monthly,[640] were
recognised organs of literary censorship, and employed some really eminent
hands, notably Smollett and Goldsmith. The periodicals which, now in
single spies, now (about the middle of the century) in battalions,
endeavoured to renew the success of the Tatler and Spectator, were critical
by kind; and dozens, scores, hundreds probably, of separate critical
publications, large and small, issued from the press.[641] But, with the rarest
exceptions, they must take the non-benefit of the warning which was laid
down in the Preface to the First Volume. Something we must say of
Goldsmith; then we may take two contrasted examples, Knox and Scott of
Amwell, of the critic in Johnson’s last days who inclined undoubtingly to
the classical, and of the critic of the same time who had qualms and
stirrings of Romanticism, but was hardly yet a heretic. And then, reserving
summary, we may close the record.
Of Goldsmith as a critic little need be said, though his pen was not much
less prolific in this than in other departments. But the angel is too often
Goldsmith. absent, and Poor Poll distressingly in evidence. The Inquiry
into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe is simply “prodigious.”
It is admirably written—Macaulay owes something to its style, which he
only hardened and brazened. The author apes the fashionable
flourished and vapoured critical abstractions, but has left us a solid
reasoned body of critical judgment; he has not judged literature in the
exhausted receiver of mere art, and yet has never neglected the artistic
criterion; he has kept in constant touch with life, and yet has never
descended to mere gossip. We may freely disagree with his judgments, but
we can never justly disable his judgment; and this is the real criterion of a
great critic.
Johnson is so much the eighteenth-century orthodox critic in
quintessence (though, as I have tried to show, in transcendence also) that he
will dispense us from saying very much more about the rank and file, the
Minor Criticism: ordinary or inferior examples, of the kind. If we were able
Periodical and
other.
to devote this Book, or even this volume, to the subject of
the present chapter, there would be no lack of material.
Critical exercitations of a kind formed now, of course, a regular part of the
work of literature, and a very large part of its hack-work. The Gentleman’s
Magazine devoted much attention to the subject; and for a great part of the
century two regular Reviews, the Critical and the Monthly,[640] were
recognised organs of literary censorship, and employed some really eminent
hands, notably Smollett and Goldsmith. The periodicals which, now in
single spies, now (about the middle of the century) in battalions,
endeavoured to renew the success of the Tatler and Spectator, were critical
by kind; and dozens, scores, hundreds probably, of separate critical
publications, large and small, issued from the press.[641] But, with the rarest
exceptions, they must take the non-benefit of the warning which was laid
down in the Preface to the First Volume. Something we must say of
Goldsmith; then we may take two contrasted examples, Knox and Scott of
Amwell, of the critic in Johnson’s last days who inclined undoubtingly to
the classical, and of the critic of the same time who had qualms and
stirrings of Romanticism, but was hardly yet a heretic. And then, reserving
summary, we may close the record.
Of Goldsmith as a critic little need be said, though his pen was not much
less prolific in this than in other departments. But the angel is too often
Goldsmith. absent, and Poor Poll distressingly in evidence. The Inquiry
into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe is simply “prodigious.”
It is admirably written—Macaulay owes something to its style, which he
only hardened and brazened. The author apes the fashionable
Page 489
philosophastering of the time, and throws in cheap sciolism like the prince
of journalists that he was. It is almost always interesting; it is, where it
touches life, not literature, sometimes excellently acute; but there is
scarcely a critical dictum in it which is other than ridiculous. So in the
Citizen of the World the Author’s Club is of course delightful; but why
should a sneer at Drayton have been put in the mouth of Lien Chi Altangi?
And the miscellaneous Essays, including the Bee, which contain so much of
Goldsmith’s best work, are perhaps the best evidences of his nullity here.
When one thinks how little it would cost anybody of Goldsmith’s genius (to
find such an one I confess would cost more) to write a literary parallel to
the magnificent Reverie, which would be even finer, it is enough to draw
iron tears down the critic’s cheek. Goldsmith on Taste, Poetry, Metaphor,
&c.,[642] is still the Goldsmith of the Inquiry. His “Account of the Augustan
Age,”[643] though much better, and (unless I mistake) resorted to by some
recent critics as a source of criticism different from that mostly prevalent in
the nineteenth century, has all the limitations of its own period. And the
Essay on Versification,[644] though it contains expressions which, taken by
themselves, might seem to show that Goldsmith had actually emancipated
himself from the tyranny of the fixed number of syllables, contains others
totally irreconcilable with these, supports English hexameters and sapphics,
[645]
and as a whole forces on us once more the reluctant belief that he
simply had no clear ideas, no accurate knowledge, on the subject.
Vicesimus Knox[646] is a useful figure in this critical Transition Period. A
Vicesimus Knox. scholar and a schoolmaster, he had some of the advantages
of the first state and some of the defects of the less gracious second,
accentuated in both cases by the dying influences of a “classical” tradition
which had not the slightest idea that it was moribund. He carries his
admiration for Pope to such a point as to assure us somewhere that Pope
was a man of exemplary piety and goodness, while Gay was
“uncontaminated with the vices of the world,” which is really more than
somewhat blind, and more than a little kind, even if we admit that it is
wrong to call Pope a bad man, and that Gay had only tolerable vices. He
thinks, in his Fourteenth Essay on the “Fluctuations of Taste,” that the
Augustans “arrived at that standard of perfection which,” &c.; that the
imitators of Ariosto, Spenser, and the smaller poems of Milton are
“pleasingly uncouth” [compare Scott, infra, on the metrical renaissance of
Dyer], depreciates Gray, and dismisses the Elegy as “a confused heap of
of journalists that he was. It is almost always interesting; it is, where it
touches life, not literature, sometimes excellently acute; but there is
scarcely a critical dictum in it which is other than ridiculous. So in the
Citizen of the World the Author’s Club is of course delightful; but why
should a sneer at Drayton have been put in the mouth of Lien Chi Altangi?
And the miscellaneous Essays, including the Bee, which contain so much of
Goldsmith’s best work, are perhaps the best evidences of his nullity here.
When one thinks how little it would cost anybody of Goldsmith’s genius (to
find such an one I confess would cost more) to write a literary parallel to
the magnificent Reverie, which would be even finer, it is enough to draw
iron tears down the critic’s cheek. Goldsmith on Taste, Poetry, Metaphor,
&c.,[642] is still the Goldsmith of the Inquiry. His “Account of the Augustan
Age,”[643] though much better, and (unless I mistake) resorted to by some
recent critics as a source of criticism different from that mostly prevalent in
the nineteenth century, has all the limitations of its own period. And the
Essay on Versification,[644] though it contains expressions which, taken by
themselves, might seem to show that Goldsmith had actually emancipated
himself from the tyranny of the fixed number of syllables, contains others
totally irreconcilable with these, supports English hexameters and sapphics,
[645]
and as a whole forces on us once more the reluctant belief that he
simply had no clear ideas, no accurate knowledge, on the subject.
Vicesimus Knox[646] is a useful figure in this critical Transition Period. A
Vicesimus Knox. scholar and a schoolmaster, he had some of the advantages
of the first state and some of the defects of the less gracious second,
accentuated in both cases by the dying influences of a “classical” tradition
which had not the slightest idea that it was moribund. He carries his
admiration for Pope to such a point as to assure us somewhere that Pope
was a man of exemplary piety and goodness, while Gay was
“uncontaminated with the vices of the world,” which is really more than
somewhat blind, and more than a little kind, even if we admit that it is
wrong to call Pope a bad man, and that Gay had only tolerable vices. He
thinks, in his Fourteenth Essay on the “Fluctuations of Taste,” that the
Augustans “arrived at that standard of perfection which,” &c.; that the
imitators of Ariosto, Spenser, and the smaller poems of Milton are
“pleasingly uncouth” [compare Scott, infra, on the metrical renaissance of
Dyer], depreciates Gray, and dismisses the Elegy as “a confused heap of
Page 490
splendid ideas”; is certain that Milton’s sonnets “bear no mark of his
genius,” and in discussing the versions of “the sensible[647] Sappho” decides
that Catullus is much inferior to—Philips! “The Old English Poets [Essay
Thirty-Nine] are deservedly forgotten.” Chaucer, Gower, Lydgate, and
Occleve “seem to have thought that rhyme was poetry, and even this
constituent they applied with extreme negligence”—the one charge which is
unfair against even Occleve, and which, in reference to Chaucer, is proof of
utter ignorance. Patriotism probably made him more favourable to Dunbar,
Douglas, and Lyndsay, though he groans over the necessity of a glossary in
their case also. In fact, Knox is but a Johnson without the genius. Let it,
however, be counted to him for righteousness that he defended classical
education, including verse-writing, against its enemies, who even then
imagined vain things.
John Scott of Amwell, once praised by good wits, now much forgotten,
Scott of Amwell. was a very respectable critic and a poet of “glimmerings.”
In fact, I am not at all sure that he does not deserve to be promoted and
postponed to the next volume, as a representative of the rising, not the
falling, tide. His Essays on poetry[648] exhibit in a most interesting way the
“know-not-what-to-think-of-it” state of public opinion about the later years
of Johnson. He defends Lycidas against the Dictator; yet he finds fault with
the “daystar” for acting both as a person and an orb of radiance, and admits
the “incorrectness” of the poem, without giving us a hint of the nature or
authority of “correctness.” He boldly attacks the consecrated Cooper’s Hill,
and sets the rival eminence of Grongar against it, pronouncing Dyer “a
sublime but strangely neglected poet,” yet picking very niggling holes in
this poet himself. He often anticipates, and oftener seems to be going to
anticipate, Wordsworth, who no doubt owed him a good deal; yet he thinks
Pope’s famous epigram on Wit “the most concise and just definition of
Poetry.” In Grongar Hill itself he thinks the “admixture of metre [its
second, certainly, if not its first great charm] rather displeasing to a nice
ear”; and though he defends Gray against Knox, he is altogether yea-nay
about Windsor Forest, and attacks Thomson’s personifications, without
remembering that Gray is at least an equal sinner, and without giving the
author of the Seasons, and still more of the Castle of Indolence, any just
compensation for his enthusiasm of nature. In fact, Scott is a man walking
in twilight, who actually sees the line of dawn, but dares not step out into it.
genius,” and in discussing the versions of “the sensible[647] Sappho” decides
that Catullus is much inferior to—Philips! “The Old English Poets [Essay
Thirty-Nine] are deservedly forgotten.” Chaucer, Gower, Lydgate, and
Occleve “seem to have thought that rhyme was poetry, and even this
constituent they applied with extreme negligence”—the one charge which is
unfair against even Occleve, and which, in reference to Chaucer, is proof of
utter ignorance. Patriotism probably made him more favourable to Dunbar,
Douglas, and Lyndsay, though he groans over the necessity of a glossary in
their case also. In fact, Knox is but a Johnson without the genius. Let it,
however, be counted to him for righteousness that he defended classical
education, including verse-writing, against its enemies, who even then
imagined vain things.
John Scott of Amwell, once praised by good wits, now much forgotten,
Scott of Amwell. was a very respectable critic and a poet of “glimmerings.”
In fact, I am not at all sure that he does not deserve to be promoted and
postponed to the next volume, as a representative of the rising, not the
falling, tide. His Essays on poetry[648] exhibit in a most interesting way the
“know-not-what-to-think-of-it” state of public opinion about the later years
of Johnson. He defends Lycidas against the Dictator; yet he finds fault with
the “daystar” for acting both as a person and an orb of radiance, and admits
the “incorrectness” of the poem, without giving us a hint of the nature or
authority of “correctness.” He boldly attacks the consecrated Cooper’s Hill,
and sets the rival eminence of Grongar against it, pronouncing Dyer “a
sublime but strangely neglected poet,” yet picking very niggling holes in
this poet himself. He often anticipates, and oftener seems to be going to
anticipate, Wordsworth, who no doubt owed him a good deal; yet he thinks
Pope’s famous epigram on Wit “the most concise and just definition of
Poetry.” In Grongar Hill itself he thinks the “admixture of metre [its
second, certainly, if not its first great charm] rather displeasing to a nice
ear”; and though he defends Gray against Knox, he is altogether yea-nay
about Windsor Forest, and attacks Thomson’s personifications, without
remembering that Gray is at least an equal sinner, and without giving the
author of the Seasons, and still more of the Castle of Indolence, any just
compensation for his enthusiasm of nature. In fact, Scott is a man walking
in twilight, who actually sees the line of dawn, but dares not step out into it.
Page 491
552. An interesting monograph on our subject, before and after 1700, is
Herr Paul Hamelius’s Die Kritik in der Engl. Literatur des 17 und 18
Jahrhunderts (Leipsic, 1897). I was able, as I always prefer to do, to
postpone the reading of this till I had finished the English part of this
volume, and I do not think I owe Herr Hamelius much. I am all the more
glad to find that we agree on the Romantic element in Dryden (though not
as to that in Dennis), and as to reducing the importance of French influence
in England.
553. The excessively rare Parliament of Critics (London, 1702), a copy
of which has been kindly lent me by Mr Gregory Smith, is more of what it
calls itself, a “banter,” than of a serious composition. But it connects itself
not obscurely with the Collier quarrel.
554. See Mr Swinburne’s William Blake, p. 130 note, for the sortes
Bysshianæ of Blake and his wife.
555. My copy is the Third Edition, “with large improvements,” London,
1708. Some put the first at 1702, not 1700. Before Bysshe, Joshua Poole, a
schoolmaster, had given posthumously (1657: I have ed. 2, London, 1677),
with a short dedication and a curious verse proem of his own, and an
Institution signed J. D., The English Parnassus. This contains a double
gradus of epithets and passages (the authors named only in a general list),
an “Alphabet of [Rhyming] Monosyllables,” and some “Forms of
Compliment,” &c. The Institution stoutly defends “Rhythm” [i.e., rhyme],
notices Sidney, Daniel, Puttenham, &c., shortly defines Kinds, objects to
excessive enjambment (note the time, 1657) and to polysyllables, but is
sensible if rather general and scrappy.
556. Addison, Atterbury, Beaumont and Fletcher, Afra Behn, Blackmore,
Tom Brown, Buckingham, Cleveland, Congreve, Cowley, Creech,
Davenant (2), Denham, Dennis, Dorset, Dryden, Duke, Garth, Halifax,
Harvey, Sir R. Howard, Hudibras, Jonson, Lee, Milton, Mulgrave, Oldham,
Otway, Prior, Ratcliff, Rochester, Roscommon, Rowe, Sedley, Shakespeare,
Southern, Sprat, Stafford, Stepney, Suckling, Tate, Walsh, Waller,
Wycherley, and Yalden. Observe that no non-dramatic poet earlier than
Cowley is admitted.
Herr Paul Hamelius’s Die Kritik in der Engl. Literatur des 17 und 18
Jahrhunderts (Leipsic, 1897). I was able, as I always prefer to do, to
postpone the reading of this till I had finished the English part of this
volume, and I do not think I owe Herr Hamelius much. I am all the more
glad to find that we agree on the Romantic element in Dryden (though not
as to that in Dennis), and as to reducing the importance of French influence
in England.
553. The excessively rare Parliament of Critics (London, 1702), a copy
of which has been kindly lent me by Mr Gregory Smith, is more of what it
calls itself, a “banter,” than of a serious composition. But it connects itself
not obscurely with the Collier quarrel.
554. See Mr Swinburne’s William Blake, p. 130 note, for the sortes
Bysshianæ of Blake and his wife.
555. My copy is the Third Edition, “with large improvements,” London,
1708. Some put the first at 1702, not 1700. Before Bysshe, Joshua Poole, a
schoolmaster, had given posthumously (1657: I have ed. 2, London, 1677),
with a short dedication and a curious verse proem of his own, and an
Institution signed J. D., The English Parnassus. This contains a double
gradus of epithets and passages (the authors named only in a general list),
an “Alphabet of [Rhyming] Monosyllables,” and some “Forms of
Compliment,” &c. The Institution stoutly defends “Rhythm” [i.e., rhyme],
notices Sidney, Daniel, Puttenham, &c., shortly defines Kinds, objects to
excessive enjambment (note the time, 1657) and to polysyllables, but is
sensible if rather general and scrappy.
556. Addison, Atterbury, Beaumont and Fletcher, Afra Behn, Blackmore,
Tom Brown, Buckingham, Cleveland, Congreve, Cowley, Creech,
Davenant (2), Denham, Dennis, Dorset, Dryden, Duke, Garth, Halifax,
Harvey, Sir R. Howard, Hudibras, Jonson, Lee, Milton, Mulgrave, Oldham,
Otway, Prior, Ratcliff, Rochester, Roscommon, Rowe, Sedley, Shakespeare,
Southern, Sprat, Stafford, Stepney, Suckling, Tate, Walsh, Waller,
Wycherley, and Yalden. Observe that no non-dramatic poet earlier than
Cowley is admitted.
Page 492
557. London, 1718.
558. The Lives and Characters of the English Dramatic Poets, &c., First
begun by Mr Langbain, improved and continued down to this time by a
Careful Hand (London, printed for Tho. Leigh, &c. No date in my copy, but
the Dict. Nat. Biog. gives 1699).
559. I hope the passing suspicion is not illiberal. But why should he call
the Palmyrene “Zenobie” in English? Cela sent furieusement son Français.
(For the critical work of yet another who felt the lash of Pope—James
Ralph—v. inf., p. 554 note.)
560. 2 vols., London, 1718.
561. See, among others, Herr Hamelius, op. cit. Yet it is interesting to
find that the passage of Dennis to which his panegyrist gives the single and
signal honour of extract in an appendix is purely ethical: it is all on “the
previous question.”
562. Had Dryden let his Cambridge admirer see the Heads? (v. supra, pp.
373, 397 notes.)
563. Although Dennis’s fun is heavy enough, there are some interesting
touches, as this: “Port [then a novelty in England, remember] is not so well
tasted as Claret: and intoxicates sooner.”
564. It appeared in the very year of the Short View (1698). I have a
reprint of it, issued many years later (1725), but long before Dennis’s death,
together with The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry and the
tragedy of Rinaldo and Armida, all separately titled, but continuously
paged.
565. This is from the Advancement and Reformation, which contains its
author’s full definition of Poetry itself—not the worst of such definitions.
“Poetry is an Imitation of Nature by a pathetic and numerous speech.”
566. London, 1702.
558. The Lives and Characters of the English Dramatic Poets, &c., First
begun by Mr Langbain, improved and continued down to this time by a
Careful Hand (London, printed for Tho. Leigh, &c. No date in my copy, but
the Dict. Nat. Biog. gives 1699).
559. I hope the passing suspicion is not illiberal. But why should he call
the Palmyrene “Zenobie” in English? Cela sent furieusement son Français.
(For the critical work of yet another who felt the lash of Pope—James
Ralph—v. inf., p. 554 note.)
560. 2 vols., London, 1718.
561. See, among others, Herr Hamelius, op. cit. Yet it is interesting to
find that the passage of Dennis to which his panegyrist gives the single and
signal honour of extract in an appendix is purely ethical: it is all on “the
previous question.”
562. Had Dryden let his Cambridge admirer see the Heads? (v. supra, pp.
373, 397 notes.)
563. Although Dennis’s fun is heavy enough, there are some interesting
touches, as this: “Port [then a novelty in England, remember] is not so well
tasted as Claret: and intoxicates sooner.”
564. It appeared in the very year of the Short View (1698). I have a
reprint of it, issued many years later (1725), but long before Dennis’s death,
together with The Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry and the
tragedy of Rinaldo and Armida, all separately titled, but continuously
paged.
565. This is from the Advancement and Reformation, which contains its
author’s full definition of Poetry itself—not the worst of such definitions.
“Poetry is an Imitation of Nature by a pathetic and numerous speech.”
566. London, 1702.
Page 493
567. London, 1712.
568. London, 1728.
569. The Advancement and Reformation of Poetry, 1701; A Large
Account of the Taste in Poetry, next year; and Grounds of Criticism in
Poetry, 1704.
570. Mr W. Basil Worsfold in his Principles of Criticism (London, 1897).
I hope that nothing which, in a politely controversial tone, I may have to
say here, will be taken as disparagement of a very interesting and valuable
essay.
571. The most convenient edition of Addison’s Works is that of Bohn,
with Hurd’s editorial matter and a good deal more (London, 6 vols., 1862).
572. It is fair to say that he never published this, and that, as Pope told
Spence, he used himself to call it “a poor thing,” and admitted that he spoke
of some of the poets only “on hearsay.” Now when Pope speaks to
Addison’s credit it is not as “what the soldier said.” It is evidence, and of
the strongest.
573.
“In vain he jests in his unpolished strain,
And tries to make his readers laugh in vain.”
574. “His moral lay so bare that it lost the effect” (Ess. on Po., iii. 420,
ed. cit. sup.) Indeed it has been suggested that Addison’s debt to Temple
here is not confined to this.
575. He proposes to give an account of “all the Muse possessed” between
Chaucer and Dryden; and, as a matter of fact, mentions nobody but Spenser
between Chaucer and Cowley.
576. In the last paragraph of Sp. 409. The whole paper has been occupied
by thoughts on Taste and Criticism: it contains the excellent comparison of
568. London, 1728.
569. The Advancement and Reformation of Poetry, 1701; A Large
Account of the Taste in Poetry, next year; and Grounds of Criticism in
Poetry, 1704.
570. Mr W. Basil Worsfold in his Principles of Criticism (London, 1897).
I hope that nothing which, in a politely controversial tone, I may have to
say here, will be taken as disparagement of a very interesting and valuable
essay.
571. The most convenient edition of Addison’s Works is that of Bohn,
with Hurd’s editorial matter and a good deal more (London, 6 vols., 1862).
572. It is fair to say that he never published this, and that, as Pope told
Spence, he used himself to call it “a poor thing,” and admitted that he spoke
of some of the poets only “on hearsay.” Now when Pope speaks to
Addison’s credit it is not as “what the soldier said.” It is evidence, and of
the strongest.
573.
“In vain he jests in his unpolished strain,
And tries to make his readers laugh in vain.”
574. “His moral lay so bare that it lost the effect” (Ess. on Po., iii. 420,
ed. cit. sup.) Indeed it has been suggested that Addison’s debt to Temple
here is not confined to this.
575. He proposes to give an account of “all the Muse possessed” between
Chaucer and Dryden; and, as a matter of fact, mentions nobody but Spenser
between Chaucer and Cowley.
576. In the last paragraph of Sp. 409. The whole paper has been occupied
by thoughts on Taste and Criticism: it contains the excellent comparison of
Page 494
a critic to a tea-taster, and it ends with this retrospect, and the promise of the
“Imagination” Essays (v. ed. cit., iii. 393).
577. Sp. 58-63.
578. Sp. 39, 40, 42, 44, 45.
579. These began in Sp. 267, and were the regular Saturday feature of the
paper for many weeks. References to Milton outside of them will be found
in the excellent index of the ed. cit. or in that of Mr Gregory Smith’s exact
and elegant reproduction of the Spectator (8 vols., London, 1897).
580. Sp. 411, ed. cit., iii. 394.
581. This phrase is originally Dryden’s (dedication to King Arthur, viii.
136, ed. cit.), who, however, has “kind” for “way”.
582. Op. cit., pp. 93-107, and more largely pp. 55-93.
583. Students of the Stagirite may be almost equally surprised to find
Aristotle regarded as mainly, if not wholly, a critic of Form as opposed to
Thought.
584. See vol. i. p. 165 sq.
585. It would be unfair to lay too much stress on his identification of
Imagination and Fancy; but there is something tell-tale in it.
586. See vol. i. p. 118 sq.
587. Herr Hamelius, op. cit. sup., p. 103, and elsewhere, thinks much
more highly of Steele than I do, and even makes him a “Romantic before
Romanticism.” Steele’s temperament was undoubtedly Romantic, and both
in essays and plays he displayed it; but he was not really critical.
588. In his Preface to the Second Part of the Poems (1690).
589. Of course he might, to some extent, have sheltered himself under
Dryden’s own authority for all this.
“Imagination” Essays (v. ed. cit., iii. 393).
577. Sp. 58-63.
578. Sp. 39, 40, 42, 44, 45.
579. These began in Sp. 267, and were the regular Saturday feature of the
paper for many weeks. References to Milton outside of them will be found
in the excellent index of the ed. cit. or in that of Mr Gregory Smith’s exact
and elegant reproduction of the Spectator (8 vols., London, 1897).
580. Sp. 411, ed. cit., iii. 394.
581. This phrase is originally Dryden’s (dedication to King Arthur, viii.
136, ed. cit.), who, however, has “kind” for “way”.
582. Op. cit., pp. 93-107, and more largely pp. 55-93.
583. Students of the Stagirite may be almost equally surprised to find
Aristotle regarded as mainly, if not wholly, a critic of Form as opposed to
Thought.
584. See vol. i. p. 165 sq.
585. It would be unfair to lay too much stress on his identification of
Imagination and Fancy; but there is something tell-tale in it.
586. See vol. i. p. 118 sq.
587. Herr Hamelius, op. cit. sup., p. 103, and elsewhere, thinks much
more highly of Steele than I do, and even makes him a “Romantic before
Romanticism.” Steele’s temperament was undoubtedly Romantic, and both
in essays and plays he displayed it; but he was not really critical.
588. In his Preface to the Second Part of the Poems (1690).
589. Of course he might, to some extent, have sheltered himself under
Dryden’s own authority for all this.
Page 495
590. I have thought it useless to give references to particular editions of
the better known writings of Swift and Pope, as they are so numerous. Of
their whole works there is, in the former case, no real standard, Scott’s
being much inferior to his Dryden; but in the latter that of the late Mr Elwin
and Mr Courthope is not likely soon to be superseded.
591. V. inf., p. 553 note.
592. The most important of these is the sentence on Crashaw (with whom
Pope has some points of sympathy), that he is wanting in “design, form,
fable, which is the soul of poetry,” and “exactness or consent of parts,
which is the body,” while he grants him “pretty conceptions, fine
metaphors, glittering expressions, and something of a neat cast of verse,
which are properly the dress, gems, or loose ornaments” of it. See my friend
Mr Courthope (in his Life, ed. cit. of the Works, v. 63), with whom, for
once, I am in irreconcilable disagreement.
593. Spence (whose Anecdotes were printed partly by Malone, and
completely by Singer in 1820, reprinted from the latter edition in 1858, and
re-selected by Mr Underhill (London, n. d.) in the last decade of the
nineteenth century) has sometimes received praise as a critic himself. His
Polymetis usefully brought together classical art and letters, and the
Anecdotes themselves are not without taste. But his elaborate criticism of
Pope’s Odyssey, published in 1726, is of little value, neither praising nor
blaming its subject for the right things, and characterised as a whole by a
pottering and peddling kind of censorship.
594. Selecta Poemata Italorum qui Latine Scripserunt. Cura cujusdam
Anonymi anno 1684 congesta, iterum in lucem data, una cum aliorum
Italorum operibus. Acccurante A. Pope. 2 vols., London, 1740. The title-
page contains absolutely all the ostensible editorial matter, and, as I have
not got hold of the work of the Anonymus, I do not know how much Pope
added. But his collection, as I can testify from some little knowledge of the
subject, is good.
595. Ep. to Aug., l. 263.
the better known writings of Swift and Pope, as they are so numerous. Of
their whole works there is, in the former case, no real standard, Scott’s
being much inferior to his Dryden; but in the latter that of the late Mr Elwin
and Mr Courthope is not likely soon to be superseded.
591. V. inf., p. 553 note.
592. The most important of these is the sentence on Crashaw (with whom
Pope has some points of sympathy), that he is wanting in “design, form,
fable, which is the soul of poetry,” and “exactness or consent of parts,
which is the body,” while he grants him “pretty conceptions, fine
metaphors, glittering expressions, and something of a neat cast of verse,
which are properly the dress, gems, or loose ornaments” of it. See my friend
Mr Courthope (in his Life, ed. cit. of the Works, v. 63), with whom, for
once, I am in irreconcilable disagreement.
593. Spence (whose Anecdotes were printed partly by Malone, and
completely by Singer in 1820, reprinted from the latter edition in 1858, and
re-selected by Mr Underhill (London, n. d.) in the last decade of the
nineteenth century) has sometimes received praise as a critic himself. His
Polymetis usefully brought together classical art and letters, and the
Anecdotes themselves are not without taste. But his elaborate criticism of
Pope’s Odyssey, published in 1726, is of little value, neither praising nor
blaming its subject for the right things, and characterised as a whole by a
pottering and peddling kind of censorship.
594. Selecta Poemata Italorum qui Latine Scripserunt. Cura cujusdam
Anonymi anno 1684 congesta, iterum in lucem data, una cum aliorum
Italorum operibus. Acccurante A. Pope. 2 vols., London, 1740. The title-
page contains absolutely all the ostensible editorial matter, and, as I have
not got hold of the work of the Anonymus, I do not know how much Pope
added. But his collection, as I can testify from some little knowledge of the
subject, is good.
595. Ep. to Aug., l. 263.
Page 496
596. Pope, v. supra, p. 454, actually admitted this as regards Aristotle and
Shakespeare; yet the admission practically revokes most of the Essay.
597. Individual preference, in the case of the famous pair of epigrams on
the books and the troop of horse sent by George I. to Cambridge and to
Oxford respectively, may be biassed by academical and by political
partisanship. But while it is matter of opinion whether “Tories own no
argument but force,” and whether, in certain circumstances, a University
may not justifiably “want loyalty,” no one can ever maintain that it is not
disgraceful to a university to “want learning.” This it is which gives the
superior wing and sting to Trapp’s javelin.
598. Prælectiones Poeticæ, London, 3rd ed., 1736. The first of the first
batch was printed as early as 1711, and an English translation (not by the
author) was published in 1742. I hope to give in the next volume, as a
prelude to notice of Mr Arnold’s work in the Oxford Chair, a survey of all
the more noteworthy of his predecessors.
599. The first ed. is that of Edinburgh, 1783: mine is that of London,
1823.
600. I have it with The Poems of Ossian, 2 vols., London, 1796. Blair had
taken Macpherson under his wing as early as 1760.
601. It had reached its eighth edition in 1807, the date of my copy.
Perhaps some may think that Kames, as being mainly an æsthetician, ought
to be postponed with Shaftesbury, Hume, &c. My reason for not postponing
is the large amount of positive literary criticism in his book.
602. Boswell, Globe ed., p. 132. He was elsewhere more, and less, kind.
603. Vol. i. chap. iii., on “Beauty”; i. 195 ed. cit.
604. i. 77.
605. i. 26.
Shakespeare; yet the admission practically revokes most of the Essay.
597. Individual preference, in the case of the famous pair of epigrams on
the books and the troop of horse sent by George I. to Cambridge and to
Oxford respectively, may be biassed by academical and by political
partisanship. But while it is matter of opinion whether “Tories own no
argument but force,” and whether, in certain circumstances, a University
may not justifiably “want loyalty,” no one can ever maintain that it is not
disgraceful to a university to “want learning.” This it is which gives the
superior wing and sting to Trapp’s javelin.
598. Prælectiones Poeticæ, London, 3rd ed., 1736. The first of the first
batch was printed as early as 1711, and an English translation (not by the
author) was published in 1742. I hope to give in the next volume, as a
prelude to notice of Mr Arnold’s work in the Oxford Chair, a survey of all
the more noteworthy of his predecessors.
599. The first ed. is that of Edinburgh, 1783: mine is that of London,
1823.
600. I have it with The Poems of Ossian, 2 vols., London, 1796. Blair had
taken Macpherson under his wing as early as 1760.
601. It had reached its eighth edition in 1807, the date of my copy.
Perhaps some may think that Kames, as being mainly an æsthetician, ought
to be postponed with Shaftesbury, Hume, &c. My reason for not postponing
is the large amount of positive literary criticism in his book.
602. Boswell, Globe ed., p. 132. He was elsewhere more, and less, kind.
603. Vol. i. chap. iii., on “Beauty”; i. 195 ed. cit.
604. i. 77.
605. i. 26.
Page 497
606. i. 288, note. Kames had just before, in his chapter on “Motion and
Force” (i. 250-255), referred complacently to his own indulgence in this
foible, and had accumulated others of the same kind.
607. i. 359.
608. i. 405, 410, 411, 416, 417.
609. ii. 3.
610. ii. 163.
611. ii. 129.
612. i. 33.
613. Hurd is reserved for the next volume.
614. ii. 457.
615. Kames has this spelling, which is indeed so universal that any other
may seem pedantic. Yet it is needless to say that the word so spelt is a vox
nihili, and should be “parallelepipedon.”
616. I use the Tegg edition, London, 1850.
617. He had, of course, good authority for it, including that of Dryden;
but it is obviously better to limit it in the modern sense than to use it
equivocally. Mason (not Gray’s friend, but an interesting and little-known
person to whom I hope to recur in the next volume) had already seen this,
and expressly referred to it.
618. Works, Oxford, 1841.
619. Note to Pt. II. chap. vii. of the Enquiries, p. 433, ed. cit.
620. Harris deserves a good word for his prosodic studies, which may
entitle him to reappear in the next volume.
Force” (i. 250-255), referred complacently to his own indulgence in this
foible, and had accumulated others of the same kind.
607. i. 359.
608. i. 405, 410, 411, 416, 417.
609. ii. 3.
610. ii. 163.
611. ii. 129.
612. i. 33.
613. Hurd is reserved for the next volume.
614. ii. 457.
615. Kames has this spelling, which is indeed so universal that any other
may seem pedantic. Yet it is needless to say that the word so spelt is a vox
nihili, and should be “parallelepipedon.”
616. I use the Tegg edition, London, 1850.
617. He had, of course, good authority for it, including that of Dryden;
but it is obviously better to limit it in the modern sense than to use it
equivocally. Mason (not Gray’s friend, but an interesting and little-known
person to whom I hope to recur in the next volume) had already seen this,
and expressly referred to it.
618. Works, Oxford, 1841.
619. Note to Pt. II. chap. vii. of the Enquiries, p. 433, ed. cit.
620. Harris deserves a good word for his prosodic studies, which may
entitle him to reappear in the next volume.
Page 498
621. “There never was a time when rules did not exist; they always made
a part of that immutable truth,” &c.—P. 450.
622. The best known is Cowper’s, in Table Talk, ll. 384, 385—
“The inestimable Estimate of Brown
Rose like a paper-kite and charmed the town.”
See also Chesterfield, to the Bishop of Waterford, April 14, 1758.
Chesterfield was no Bottom, but, being melancholy at the time, he was
tickled.
623. London, 1757, 8vo.
624. London, 1763, 4to.
625. Newcastle, 1764, 8vo.
626. His birth-year was 1709; Thomson’s 1700; Dyer’s perhaps the same;
Shenstone’s 1714; Gray’s 1716. Lady Winchelsea had been born as far back
as 1660.
627. He was perhaps the last man of very great power who entertained
the Renaissance superstition of Latin. He was horrified at the notion of an
English epitaph; and in the first agony of his stroke in 1783 he rallied and
racked his half-paralysed brains to make Latin verses as the best test of his
sanity.
628. Let it be noted, however, that in Johnson, as in most strong men,
there were certain leanings to the other side, certain evidences of the
“identity of contradictories.” His sense of mystery, his religiosity, his strong
passions, his tendency to violence in taste and opinions—were all rather
Romantic than Classical.
629. The Allegory on Criticism (daughter of Labour and Truth, who gives
up her task to Time, but is temporarily personated by Flattery and
Malevolence) in No. 3 almost speaks itself in the parenthetical description
just given. Cf. also 4, on Ancient and Modern Romances; 22, another
a part of that immutable truth,” &c.—P. 450.
622. The best known is Cowper’s, in Table Talk, ll. 384, 385—
“The inestimable Estimate of Brown
Rose like a paper-kite and charmed the town.”
See also Chesterfield, to the Bishop of Waterford, April 14, 1758.
Chesterfield was no Bottom, but, being melancholy at the time, he was
tickled.
623. London, 1757, 8vo.
624. London, 1763, 4to.
625. Newcastle, 1764, 8vo.
626. His birth-year was 1709; Thomson’s 1700; Dyer’s perhaps the same;
Shenstone’s 1714; Gray’s 1716. Lady Winchelsea had been born as far back
as 1660.
627. He was perhaps the last man of very great power who entertained
the Renaissance superstition of Latin. He was horrified at the notion of an
English epitaph; and in the first agony of his stroke in 1783 he rallied and
racked his half-paralysed brains to make Latin verses as the best test of his
sanity.
628. Let it be noted, however, that in Johnson, as in most strong men,
there were certain leanings to the other side, certain evidences of the
“identity of contradictories.” His sense of mystery, his religiosity, his strong
passions, his tendency to violence in taste and opinions—were all rather
Romantic than Classical.
629. The Allegory on Criticism (daughter of Labour and Truth, who gives
up her task to Time, but is temporarily personated by Flattery and
Malevolence) in No. 3 almost speaks itself in the parenthetical description
just given. Cf. also 4, on Ancient and Modern Romances; 22, another
Page 499
Allegory on Wit and Learning; 23, on the Contrariety of Criticism; and 36,
37, on “Pastoral Poetry.”
630. He was no doubt thinking also of Gilbert West, in his Life of whom
he introduces a caveat against West’s Imitations of Spenser as “successful”
indeed and “amusing” but “only pretty.”
631. “The warmest admirers of the great Mantuan poet can extol him for
little more than the skill with which he has ... united the beauties of the Iliad
and Odyssey,” and he adds a longish exposure of the way in which Virgil,
determined to imitate at all costs, has put in his borrowed matter without
regard to keeping.
632. The chief remaining critical loci in the Rambler are the unlucky
strictures in No. 168 on “dun,” “knife,” and “blanket” in Macbeth as “low”;
and the remarks on unfriendly criticism in 176.
633. There are, of course, other passages in the Idler touching on
Criticism,—59 on the Causes of Neglect of Books, 68, 69 on Translation,
77 on “Essay Writing,” 85 on Compilations. But they contain nothing of
exceptional importance.
634. “Jonson, ... who besides that he had no imaginable temptation to
falsehood, wrote at a time when the character and acquisitions of
Shakespeare were known to multitudes. His evidence ought therefore to
decide the controversy, unless some testimony of equal force could be
opposed.”
635. With Johnson, as with some other writers, I have not thought it
necessary to specify editions. I must, however, mention Mr J. H. Millar’s
issue of the Lives (London, 1896) for the sake of the excellent Introduction
on Johnson’s criticism.
636. There are blind attempts at it even in antiquity; but Dryden’s Lives
of Lucian and Plutarch are, like other things of his elsewhere, the real
originals here.
37, on “Pastoral Poetry.”
630. He was no doubt thinking also of Gilbert West, in his Life of whom
he introduces a caveat against West’s Imitations of Spenser as “successful”
indeed and “amusing” but “only pretty.”
631. “The warmest admirers of the great Mantuan poet can extol him for
little more than the skill with which he has ... united the beauties of the Iliad
and Odyssey,” and he adds a longish exposure of the way in which Virgil,
determined to imitate at all costs, has put in his borrowed matter without
regard to keeping.
632. The chief remaining critical loci in the Rambler are the unlucky
strictures in No. 168 on “dun,” “knife,” and “blanket” in Macbeth as “low”;
and the remarks on unfriendly criticism in 176.
633. There are, of course, other passages in the Idler touching on
Criticism,—59 on the Causes of Neglect of Books, 68, 69 on Translation,
77 on “Essay Writing,” 85 on Compilations. But they contain nothing of
exceptional importance.
634. “Jonson, ... who besides that he had no imaginable temptation to
falsehood, wrote at a time when the character and acquisitions of
Shakespeare were known to multitudes. His evidence ought therefore to
decide the controversy, unless some testimony of equal force could be
opposed.”
635. With Johnson, as with some other writers, I have not thought it
necessary to specify editions. I must, however, mention Mr J. H. Millar’s
issue of the Lives (London, 1896) for the sake of the excellent Introduction
on Johnson’s criticism.
636. There are blind attempts at it even in antiquity; but Dryden’s Lives
of Lucian and Plutarch are, like other things of his elsewhere, the real
originals here.
Page 500
637. Let me draw special attention to “John.” I once, unwittingly or
carelessly, called him “Thomas,” and I am afraid that I even neglected to
correct the error in a second edition of the guilty book. A man who writes
“Thomas” for “John,” in the case of a minor poet, can, I am aware, possess
no virtues, and must expect no pardon. But I shall always henceforth
remember to call him “Pomfret, Mr John.” “Let this expiate,” as was
remarked in another case of perhaps not less mortal sin.
638. It was of course probably suggested by Dryden (Essay on Satire,
“Donne ... affects the metaphysics”), but in Johnson’s hands is much altered
and extended.
639. It must be remembered that this word had no unfavourable
connotation with Johnson. It meant intelligent and scholarly interest.
640. Johnson’s relative estimates of the two (Boswell, Globe ed., pp. 186,
364) are well known; as is his apology for the Critical Reviewers’ habit [he
had been one himself] of not reading the books through, as the “duller”
Monthly fellows were glad to do. Later generations have perhaps contrived
to be dull and not to read.
641. For instance, here is one which I have hunted for years—Essay on
the New Species of Writing founded by Fielding, with a word or two on
Modern Criticism (London? 1751). The better-known Canons of Criticism
of Thomas Edwards (4th ed., London, 1750) may serve as a specimen of
another kind. It is an attack on Warburton’s Shakespeare, uncommonly
shrewd in all senses of the word, but, as Johnson (Boswell, Globe ed., p. 87
note) justly enough said, of the gad-fly kind mainly. A curious little book,
which I do not remember to have seen cited anywhere, is the Essay upon
Poetry and Painting of Charles Lamotte (Dudlin (sic), 1742). La Motte,
who was an F.S.A., a D.D., and chaplain to the Duke of Montagu, and who
has the still rarer honour of not appearing in the Dict. Nat. Biog., never, I
think, refers to his namesake, but quotes Voltaire and Du Bos frequently. He
is very anxious for “propriety” in all senses, and seems a little more
interested in Painting than in Poetry. As to the latter, he is a good example
of the devouring appetite for sense and fact which had seized on the critics
of this time (save a few rebels) throughout Europe. The improbabilities of
Tasso and of “Camoenus, the Homer and Virgil of the Portuguese,” afflict
carelessly, called him “Thomas,” and I am afraid that I even neglected to
correct the error in a second edition of the guilty book. A man who writes
“Thomas” for “John,” in the case of a minor poet, can, I am aware, possess
no virtues, and must expect no pardon. But I shall always henceforth
remember to call him “Pomfret, Mr John.” “Let this expiate,” as was
remarked in another case of perhaps not less mortal sin.
638. It was of course probably suggested by Dryden (Essay on Satire,
“Donne ... affects the metaphysics”), but in Johnson’s hands is much altered
and extended.
639. It must be remembered that this word had no unfavourable
connotation with Johnson. It meant intelligent and scholarly interest.
640. Johnson’s relative estimates of the two (Boswell, Globe ed., pp. 186,
364) are well known; as is his apology for the Critical Reviewers’ habit [he
had been one himself] of not reading the books through, as the “duller”
Monthly fellows were glad to do. Later generations have perhaps contrived
to be dull and not to read.
641. For instance, here is one which I have hunted for years—Essay on
the New Species of Writing founded by Fielding, with a word or two on
Modern Criticism (London? 1751). The better-known Canons of Criticism
of Thomas Edwards (4th ed., London, 1750) may serve as a specimen of
another kind. It is an attack on Warburton’s Shakespeare, uncommonly
shrewd in all senses of the word, but, as Johnson (Boswell, Globe ed., p. 87
note) justly enough said, of the gad-fly kind mainly. A curious little book,
which I do not remember to have seen cited anywhere, is the Essay upon
Poetry and Painting of Charles Lamotte (Dudlin (sic), 1742). La Motte,
who was an F.S.A., a D.D., and chaplain to the Duke of Montagu, and who
has the still rarer honour of not appearing in the Dict. Nat. Biog., never, I
think, refers to his namesake, but quotes Voltaire and Du Bos frequently. He
is very anxious for “propriety” in all senses, and seems a little more
interested in Painting than in Poetry. As to the latter, he is a good example
of the devouring appetite for sense and fact which had seized on the critics
of this time (save a few rebels) throughout Europe. The improbabilities of
Tasso and of “Camoenus, the Homer and Virgil of the Portuguese,” afflict
Page 501
him more, because they amuse him less, than they do in Voltaire’s own
case, and to any liberty with real or supposed history he is simply
Rhadamanthine. “That which jars with probability—that which shocks
Sense and Reason—can never be excused in Poetry.” Mrs Barbauld and The
Ancient Mariner sixty years before date!
642. Essays, xii.-xvii.
643. The Bee, viii.
644. Essay xviii.
645. It is perhaps only fair to hope that this fancy, as later with Southey
and others, was a blind motion for freedom. Yet Goldsmith commits himself
to the hemistich theory of decasyllables.
646. Essays, Moral and Literary, 2nd ed., London, 1774, 8vo.
647. This is perhaps the most delightful instance in (English) existence of
the change which has come over the meaning of the word.
648. Critical Essays, London, 1785, 8vo.
case, and to any liberty with real or supposed history he is simply
Rhadamanthine. “That which jars with probability—that which shocks
Sense and Reason—can never be excused in Poetry.” Mrs Barbauld and The
Ancient Mariner sixty years before date!
642. Essays, xii.-xvii.
643. The Bee, viii.
644. Essay xviii.
645. It is perhaps only fair to hope that this fancy, as later with Southey
and others, was a blind motion for freedom. Yet Goldsmith commits himself
to the hemistich theory of decasyllables.
646. Essays, Moral and Literary, 2nd ed., London, 1774, 8vo.
647. This is perhaps the most delightful instance in (English) existence of
the change which has come over the meaning of the word.
648. Critical Essays, London, 1785, 8vo.
Page 502
CHAPTER II.
THE CONTEMPORARIES OF VOLTAIRE.
CLOSE CONNECTION OF FRENCH SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
CRITICISM: FONTENELLE—EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER OF HIS CRITICISM—HIS
ATTITUDE TO THE “ANCIENT AND MODERN” QUARREL—THE ‘DIALOGUES DES
MORTS’—OTHER CRITICAL WORK—LA MOTTE—HIS “UNITY OF INTEREST”—
ROLLIN—BRUMOY—RÉMOND DE SAINT-MARD—L. RACINE—DU BOS—
STIMULATING BUT DESULTORY CHARACTER OF HIS ‘RÉFLEXIONS’—
MONTESQUIEU—VOLTAIRE: DISAPPOINTMENT OF HIS CRITICISM—EXAMPLES
OF IT—CAUSES OF HIS FAILURE—OTHERS: BUFFON—“STYLE AND THE MAN”—
VAUVENARGUES—BATTEUX—HIS ADJUSTMENT OF RULES AND TASTE—HIS
INCOMPLETENESS—MARMONTEL—ODDITIES AND QUALITIES OF HIS CRITICISM
—OTHERS: THOMAS, SUARD, ETC.—LA HARPE—HIS ‘COURS DE LITTÉRATURE’—
HIS CRITICAL POSITION AS “ULTIMUS SUORUM”—THE ACADEMIC ESSAY—
RIVAROL.
The later seventeenth and at least the earlier eighteenth century in France
are perhaps more closely connected than any other literary periods, if,
indeed, they are not practically one, like the two halves of our own so-
Close connection of French called “Elizabethan” time. And this connection
seventeenth and eighteenth
century criticism.
we can duly demonstrate, as far as criticism is
Fontenelle. concerned. Boileau himself outlived the junction
of the centuries by more than a decade: and the
birth of Voltaire preceded it by more than a lustrum. The Quarrel of
Ancients and Moderns—a very poor thing certainly—revived in the new
century, as if on purpose to show the connection with the old. And, lastly,
the prolonged life of one remarkable and representative critic was almost
equally distributed over the two. Fontenelle is one of the most interesting, if
not exactly one of the most important, figures in our whole long gallery;
and if he has never yet held quite his proper place in literary history, this is
due to the facts, first, that he was a critic more than he was anything else;
and, secondly, that he forgot the great “Thou shalt not” which Criticism lays
upon her sons, and would lay (if she had any) on her daughters. No critic is
in the least bound to produce good work, or any work, of the constructive
THE CONTEMPORARIES OF VOLTAIRE.
CLOSE CONNECTION OF FRENCH SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
CRITICISM: FONTENELLE—EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER OF HIS CRITICISM—HIS
ATTITUDE TO THE “ANCIENT AND MODERN” QUARREL—THE ‘DIALOGUES DES
MORTS’—OTHER CRITICAL WORK—LA MOTTE—HIS “UNITY OF INTEREST”—
ROLLIN—BRUMOY—RÉMOND DE SAINT-MARD—L. RACINE—DU BOS—
STIMULATING BUT DESULTORY CHARACTER OF HIS ‘RÉFLEXIONS’—
MONTESQUIEU—VOLTAIRE: DISAPPOINTMENT OF HIS CRITICISM—EXAMPLES
OF IT—CAUSES OF HIS FAILURE—OTHERS: BUFFON—“STYLE AND THE MAN”—
VAUVENARGUES—BATTEUX—HIS ADJUSTMENT OF RULES AND TASTE—HIS
INCOMPLETENESS—MARMONTEL—ODDITIES AND QUALITIES OF HIS CRITICISM
—OTHERS: THOMAS, SUARD, ETC.—LA HARPE—HIS ‘COURS DE LITTÉRATURE’—
HIS CRITICAL POSITION AS “ULTIMUS SUORUM”—THE ACADEMIC ESSAY—
RIVAROL.
The later seventeenth and at least the earlier eighteenth century in France
are perhaps more closely connected than any other literary periods, if,
indeed, they are not practically one, like the two halves of our own so-
Close connection of French called “Elizabethan” time. And this connection
seventeenth and eighteenth
century criticism.
we can duly demonstrate, as far as criticism is
Fontenelle. concerned. Boileau himself outlived the junction
of the centuries by more than a decade: and the
birth of Voltaire preceded it by more than a lustrum. The Quarrel of
Ancients and Moderns—a very poor thing certainly—revived in the new
century, as if on purpose to show the connection with the old. And, lastly,
the prolonged life of one remarkable and representative critic was almost
equally distributed over the two. Fontenelle is one of the most interesting, if
not exactly one of the most important, figures in our whole long gallery;
and if he has never yet held quite his proper place in literary history, this is
due to the facts, first, that he was a critic more than he was anything else;
and, secondly, that he forgot the great “Thou shalt not” which Criticism lays
upon her sons, and would lay (if she had any) on her daughters. No critic is
in the least bound to produce good work, or any work, of the constructive
Page 503
kind: but he is bound not to produce that which is not good. The author of
Aspar and the Lettres du Chevalier d’Her ... forgot this, and paid the
penalty.[649]
Yet his attractions are so great that few people who have paid him much
attention have failed to be smitten with them. M. Rigault,[650] who does not
Exceptional approve of him generally, is a conspicuous example of this.
character of his
criticism.
But what we must look to is what he has actually written
himself. His utterances are almost too tempting. In such a
book as this the expatiation which they invite must be perforce denied them.
Yet one may break proportion a little in order to do something like justice to
a critic whose like, for suggestiveness, delicacy, and range, we shall hardly
meet in the French eighteenth century. It is indeed curious that of the three
men of his own earliest years from whom Voltaire inherits—Saint-
Evremond, Hamilton, and Fontenelle—every one should have surpassed
him in the finer traits, while all fall short of him in force and, as he himself
said, diable au corps. Saint-Evremond we have dealt with; Hamilton[651]
does not come into our story. Fontenelle is for the moment ours.
It must be confessed that he is an elusive if an agreeable possession.
From wisdom, from worldly-wisdom, from whim, or from what not, he
seems to have wished to be an enigma; and—to borrow one of Scott’s great
sentences—“the wish of his heart was granted to his loss, and the hope of
his pride has destroyed him”—at least has certainly made him rank lower
than he would otherwise have ranked. However délié—to use a word of his
own language for which we have no single English equivalent—however
watchful, mercurial, sensitive the reader’s spirit may be, he will, over and
over again in Fontenelle, meet passages where he cannot be sure whether
his author is writing merely with tongue in cheek, or applying an all-
dissolving irony, hardly inferior to Swift’s in power, and almost superior in
quietness and subtlety. Moreover, his critical position is a very peculiar one,
and constantly liable to be misunderstood—if, indeed, it be not safer to say
that it is almost always difficult to apprehend with any certainty of escaping
misprision. The good folk who magisterially rebuke Dryden as to
Gorboduc, because he made mistakes about the form of the verse and the
sex of the person—even those (one regrets to say this includes M. Rigault
himself) who are shocked at that great critic’s laudatory citations of, and
allusions to, Le Bossu—need never hope to understand Fontenelle.
Aspar and the Lettres du Chevalier d’Her ... forgot this, and paid the
penalty.[649]
Yet his attractions are so great that few people who have paid him much
attention have failed to be smitten with them. M. Rigault,[650] who does not
Exceptional approve of him generally, is a conspicuous example of this.
character of his
criticism.
But what we must look to is what he has actually written
himself. His utterances are almost too tempting. In such a
book as this the expatiation which they invite must be perforce denied them.
Yet one may break proportion a little in order to do something like justice to
a critic whose like, for suggestiveness, delicacy, and range, we shall hardly
meet in the French eighteenth century. It is indeed curious that of the three
men of his own earliest years from whom Voltaire inherits—Saint-
Evremond, Hamilton, and Fontenelle—every one should have surpassed
him in the finer traits, while all fall short of him in force and, as he himself
said, diable au corps. Saint-Evremond we have dealt with; Hamilton[651]
does not come into our story. Fontenelle is for the moment ours.
It must be confessed that he is an elusive if an agreeable possession.
From wisdom, from worldly-wisdom, from whim, or from what not, he
seems to have wished to be an enigma; and—to borrow one of Scott’s great
sentences—“the wish of his heart was granted to his loss, and the hope of
his pride has destroyed him”—at least has certainly made him rank lower
than he would otherwise have ranked. However délié—to use a word of his
own language for which we have no single English equivalent—however
watchful, mercurial, sensitive the reader’s spirit may be, he will, over and
over again in Fontenelle, meet passages where he cannot be sure whether
his author is writing merely with tongue in cheek, or applying an all-
dissolving irony, hardly inferior to Swift’s in power, and almost superior in
quietness and subtlety. Moreover, his critical position is a very peculiar one,
and constantly liable to be misunderstood—if, indeed, it be not safer to say
that it is almost always difficult to apprehend with any certainty of escaping
misprision. The good folk who magisterially rebuke Dryden as to
Gorboduc, because he made mistakes about the form of the verse and the
sex of the person—even those (one regrets to say this includes M. Rigault
himself) who are shocked at that great critic’s laudatory citations of, and
allusions to, Le Bossu—need never hope to understand Fontenelle.
Page 504
Few things (except that he was the author of that Plurality of Worlds
which happily does not concern us) are better known concerning him than
His attitude to that he was a champion of the Moderns. Yet, when we
the “Ancient
and Modern”
come to examine his numerous and elusive writings on the
Quarrel. subject, the one principle of his that does emerge is a
principle which, if it chastises the Ancients with whips,
chastises the Moderns with scorpions. A man writing, as M. Rigault wrote,
in 1856, would have been a wonderful person if he had not been misled by
the great idol of Progress. But Fontenelle was at least as far from the
delusion as he was from the date. His argument is just the contrary—that as
human wisdoms and human follies, human powers and human weaknesses,
are always the same, it is absurd to suppose that any one period can have
general and intrinsic superiority over any other.
The Dialogues Assuredly no “modern,” whether of his days or of our
des Morts.
own, can find aught but confusion of face in the quiet
axiom of Laura at the end of her controversy with Sappho,[652] “Croyez moi,
après qu’on a bien raisonné ou sur l’amour, ou sur telle autre matière qu’on
voudra, on trouve au bout du compte que les choses sont bien comme elles
sont, et que la réforme qu’on prétendroit y apporter gâterait tout.” Pulveris
exigui jactus! but one with a fatally magical effect in the quarrels of
criticism as of other things. And the same is the lesson of the dialogue
which follows immediately—the best of the whole, and almost a sovereign
document of our library,—that between Socrates and Montaigne. Not only
is there no example in the literature of the dialogue, from Plato to Mr Traill,
much more apt than the “maieutic” feat of Socrates, by which he induces
Montaigne to commit himself to the dogma, “Partout où il y a des hommes,
il y a des sottises, et les mêmes sottises”; but the rest of the piece is as
powerfully, though as quietly, worked out as this crisis of it. There is no
Progress; there is no Degeneration. The distribution may vary: the sum will
not. Erasistratus maintains the same thesis on a different matter a little later
in his dialogue with Harvey,[653] laying down the doctrine, outrageous to all
the Royal Societies of the world (though they were glad to welcome
Fontenelle as populariser, and have perhaps never had such an one since,
except Mr Huxley), that “the things which are not necessary perhaps do get
discovered in the course of ages, the others not.” And Charles V. preaches
no very different sermon when he “makes a hare” of Erasmus by pointing
which happily does not concern us) are better known concerning him than
His attitude to that he was a champion of the Moderns. Yet, when we
the “Ancient
and Modern”
come to examine his numerous and elusive writings on the
Quarrel. subject, the one principle of his that does emerge is a
principle which, if it chastises the Ancients with whips,
chastises the Moderns with scorpions. A man writing, as M. Rigault wrote,
in 1856, would have been a wonderful person if he had not been misled by
the great idol of Progress. But Fontenelle was at least as far from the
delusion as he was from the date. His argument is just the contrary—that as
human wisdoms and human follies, human powers and human weaknesses,
are always the same, it is absurd to suppose that any one period can have
general and intrinsic superiority over any other.
The Dialogues Assuredly no “modern,” whether of his days or of our
des Morts.
own, can find aught but confusion of face in the quiet
axiom of Laura at the end of her controversy with Sappho,[652] “Croyez moi,
après qu’on a bien raisonné ou sur l’amour, ou sur telle autre matière qu’on
voudra, on trouve au bout du compte que les choses sont bien comme elles
sont, et que la réforme qu’on prétendroit y apporter gâterait tout.” Pulveris
exigui jactus! but one with a fatally magical effect in the quarrels of
criticism as of other things. And the same is the lesson of the dialogue
which follows immediately—the best of the whole, and almost a sovereign
document of our library,—that between Socrates and Montaigne. Not only
is there no example in the literature of the dialogue, from Plato to Mr Traill,
much more apt than the “maieutic” feat of Socrates, by which he induces
Montaigne to commit himself to the dogma, “Partout où il y a des hommes,
il y a des sottises, et les mêmes sottises”; but the rest of the piece is as
powerfully, though as quietly, worked out as this crisis of it. There is no
Progress; there is no Degeneration. The distribution may vary: the sum will
not. Erasistratus maintains the same thesis on a different matter a little later
in his dialogue with Harvey,[653] laying down the doctrine, outrageous to all
the Royal Societies of the world (though they were glad to welcome
Fontenelle as populariser, and have perhaps never had such an one since,
except Mr Huxley), that “the things which are not necessary perhaps do get
discovered in the course of ages, the others not.” And Charles V. preaches
no very different sermon when he “makes a hare” of Erasmus by pointing
Page 505
out to that dilettante republican that les biens de l’esprit are just as much
things of time and chance as crown and sceptre.[654]
It is, however, in Fontenelle’s actual concrete deliverances of criticism
Other critical that the resemblance to Dryden comes in most. Those who
work.
insist that such deliverances shall be Medic-Persian,
unalterable, mathematical, true without relation and adjustment, will not
like him. To take his utterances down in a notebook, and reproduce them at
the next examination (to provide for which process seems to be held the be-
all and end-all of modern criticism), would not do at all. When Fontenelle
praises Corneille at the expense of Racine, you have to think whether he is
speaking what he thinks or merely as le neveu de son oncle; when he says
other things, whether he is a “Modern” at the time and to the extent of
saying something which he knows will cause the “Ancients” grinding
torments; when he sketches[655] a theory of poetic criticism of the most
sweeping a priori kind from Principles of Beauty down through Kinds to
Rules, whether he really means this, or is conciliating somebody, or
laughing in his sleeve at somebody, or the like. But this—at least for some
tastes—only adds piquancy to his observations, and they have now and then
surprising justice, freshness, freedom from the prejudices of time, country,
and circumstance. The Histoire du Théâtre Français, for instance, which he
has prefixed to his Vie de Corneille, may be based on second-hand
information, and, with our fuller knowledge, it may not be very hard to pick
holes in it. But it is an extraordinary production for a representative man of
letters at a time when hardly any such man, in any country of Europe, was
free from ignorant contempt of the early vernaculars. The brief eleven-
articled “parallel between Racine and Corneille” is of course somewhat
partisan; but it will give the partisans on the other side some trouble to
prove it unjust. The “Remarks on Aristophanes,” and on the Greek theatre
generally, are obviously “modern” and intended to tease; but they are
uncommonly shrewd, and so are the Réflexions sur la Poétique and those on
“Poetry in General.” It is wonderful that even an antagonist of Boileau, and
a sworn paradoxer, should, at this time, have been able to see the beauty of
the Père Le Moyne’s splendid couplet on the Sicilian Vespers,—
“Quand du Gibel ardent les noires Euménides
Sonneront de leur cor ces Vêpres homicides,”—
things of time and chance as crown and sceptre.[654]
It is, however, in Fontenelle’s actual concrete deliverances of criticism
Other critical that the resemblance to Dryden comes in most. Those who
work.
insist that such deliverances shall be Medic-Persian,
unalterable, mathematical, true without relation and adjustment, will not
like him. To take his utterances down in a notebook, and reproduce them at
the next examination (to provide for which process seems to be held the be-
all and end-all of modern criticism), would not do at all. When Fontenelle
praises Corneille at the expense of Racine, you have to think whether he is
speaking what he thinks or merely as le neveu de son oncle; when he says
other things, whether he is a “Modern” at the time and to the extent of
saying something which he knows will cause the “Ancients” grinding
torments; when he sketches[655] a theory of poetic criticism of the most
sweeping a priori kind from Principles of Beauty down through Kinds to
Rules, whether he really means this, or is conciliating somebody, or
laughing in his sleeve at somebody, or the like. But this—at least for some
tastes—only adds piquancy to his observations, and they have now and then
surprising justice, freshness, freedom from the prejudices of time, country,
and circumstance. The Histoire du Théâtre Français, for instance, which he
has prefixed to his Vie de Corneille, may be based on second-hand
information, and, with our fuller knowledge, it may not be very hard to pick
holes in it. But it is an extraordinary production for a representative man of
letters at a time when hardly any such man, in any country of Europe, was
free from ignorant contempt of the early vernaculars. The brief eleven-
articled “parallel between Racine and Corneille” is of course somewhat
partisan; but it will give the partisans on the other side some trouble to
prove it unjust. The “Remarks on Aristophanes,” and on the Greek theatre
generally, are obviously “modern” and intended to tease; but they are
uncommonly shrewd, and so are the Réflexions sur la Poétique and those on
“Poetry in General.” It is wonderful that even an antagonist of Boileau, and
a sworn paradoxer, should, at this time, have been able to see the beauty of
the Père Le Moyne’s splendid couplet on the Sicilian Vespers,—
“Quand du Gibel ardent les noires Euménides
Sonneront de leur cor ces Vêpres homicides,”—
Page 506
where we are more than half-way from Du Bartas and Aubigné to Victor
Hugo. The mere image—this new “vision of the guarded mount,” with the
black Furies silhouetted against the flaming cone, and the explosions of the
volcano deepening the bugle-call to massacre—is fine: the means taken to
make it poetical are finer. The use of the proper names, and the cunning
arrangement of epithet and noun in noires Euménides and Vêpres
homicides, and the sharp blasts of the long and short o's in the second line,
are more than Hugonian, they are positively Miltonic: and the couplet will
serve to keep a man in Mr Arnold’s “torpid and dismal” stage of later
middle life cheerful for an evening, and whensoever he remembers it
afterwards. True, Fontenelle admits demurely that he knows “vespers” and
“Eumenides” are something of an anachronism in conjunction, and
proposes a slight alteration to suit this objection of “correctness.” But this is
his way; and the wonderful thing is that he should have admired it at all—
should have actually tasted this heady wine of poetry. As he finishes the
paragraph in his own quaint style,[656] “Il était bien aisé, même à de grands
poètes, de ne pas trouver” this couplet: and in his time it would have been
still easier even for great critics not to do justice to it, and not to see that it
is to these things “so easy for the poet not to find” that it is the critic’s
business to look.
The general remarks on Comedy which he prefixed to a collection of his
efforts in that kind are not negligible; but in those on Eclogue,[657] and still
more in the Digression sur Les Anciens et Les Modernes, the curse, or at
least the gainsaying, of the Quarrel is upon him, and the main drift is not
merely digressive but aggressive and excessive. In the Digression he
anticipates (as he did in so many things) the materialist-rationalist
explanations of the later eighteenth century by climate, fibres of the brain,
&c. Here he becomes scientific, and therefore necessarily ceases to be of
importance in literature.
But he always regains that importance before long—in his Discourse of
the Origin of Fable, in his Academic Discourses and Replies, in many a
fragment and isolated remark. Even in his Eloges—mostly devoted (there
are nearly two volumes of them) to scientific personages from Leibniz and
Newton downwards—the unconquerable critical power of the man shows
itself, subject to the limitations noted. The world is sometimes not allowed
to know anything of its greatest critics, and Fontenelle is an example of this.
But those who have won something of that knowledge of criticism which it
Hugo. The mere image—this new “vision of the guarded mount,” with the
black Furies silhouetted against the flaming cone, and the explosions of the
volcano deepening the bugle-call to massacre—is fine: the means taken to
make it poetical are finer. The use of the proper names, and the cunning
arrangement of epithet and noun in noires Euménides and Vêpres
homicides, and the sharp blasts of the long and short o's in the second line,
are more than Hugonian, they are positively Miltonic: and the couplet will
serve to keep a man in Mr Arnold’s “torpid and dismal” stage of later
middle life cheerful for an evening, and whensoever he remembers it
afterwards. True, Fontenelle admits demurely that he knows “vespers” and
“Eumenides” are something of an anachronism in conjunction, and
proposes a slight alteration to suit this objection of “correctness.” But this is
his way; and the wonderful thing is that he should have admired it at all—
should have actually tasted this heady wine of poetry. As he finishes the
paragraph in his own quaint style,[656] “Il était bien aisé, même à de grands
poètes, de ne pas trouver” this couplet: and in his time it would have been
still easier even for great critics not to do justice to it, and not to see that it
is to these things “so easy for the poet not to find” that it is the critic’s
business to look.
The general remarks on Comedy which he prefixed to a collection of his
efforts in that kind are not negligible; but in those on Eclogue,[657] and still
more in the Digression sur Les Anciens et Les Modernes, the curse, or at
least the gainsaying, of the Quarrel is upon him, and the main drift is not
merely digressive but aggressive and excessive. In the Digression he
anticipates (as he did in so many things) the materialist-rationalist
explanations of the later eighteenth century by climate, fibres of the brain,
&c. Here he becomes scientific, and therefore necessarily ceases to be of
importance in literature.
But he always regains that importance before long—in his Discourse of
the Origin of Fable, in his Academic Discourses and Replies, in many a
fragment and isolated remark. Even in his Eloges—mostly devoted (there
are nearly two volumes of them) to scientific personages from Leibniz and
Newton downwards—the unconquerable critical power of the man shows
itself, subject to the limitations noted. The world is sometimes not allowed
to know anything of its greatest critics, and Fontenelle is an example of this.
But those who have won something of that knowledge of criticism which it
Page 507
is the humble purpose of this book to facilitate, will not slight the man who,
at the junction of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, could flirt in the
face of Ancients and Moderns alike the suggestion (which Mr Rigmarole
doubtless borrowed from him) that all times are “pretty much like our
own,” and could see and hear the sable sisters sounding the tocsin on the
flaming crest of Mongibel.
Fontenelle is elusive, but comprehensible by the imagination. La Motte,
[658]
his inseparable companion in the renewed sacrilege of the Moderns,
seems an easier, but is really a harder, personage to lay hold of. It is indeed
La Motte. not extremely difficult to explain his attitude to the
Ancients by the fact that he knew no Greek; and his exaltation of prose by a
consciousness (wherein he has left a family by no means extinct) that his
own verses were worth very little. But it is so easy not to write verses if you
cannot; and not to write about Greek if you do not know it! And the
problem is further complicated by the facts that at least some judges, who
are not exactly the first comers, such as Fontenelle himself and Voltaire,
maintained that La Motte could write verses,—and that, so far from being
“a fellow who had failed,” he had obtained the greatest scenic success of
the early eighteenth century with Inès de Castro, and, what is more, had
deserved it. But for once, as also again in Pope’s case, the dangerous
explanation of physical defects and constitutional weakness seems to have
some validity. The invulnerable nonchalance of his friend Fontenelle had
met the damnation of Aspar by a cool tearing up of the piece, and an
undismayed advance upon the fate of the plusquam semel damnatus; La
Motte, at twenty or at little more, felt the similar misfortune of Les
Originaux so severely that he actually went to La Trappe for a time. Before
middle life he was blind and a cripple. The irritability which did not show
itself in his temper (for he was the most amiable of men) would seem to
have transferred itself to his literary attitude, not affecting his politeness of
expression, but inducing a sort of “rash” of paradox.
To trace the vagaries of this might not be unamusing, but would certainly
His “Unity of be excessive here. La Motte, it seems to me, had
Interest.”
considerably less natural literary taste than Fontenelle; and
of the controversy[659] (it was not his antagonist’s fault if it was not a very
acrimonious one) between him and Madame Dacier one cannot say much
more than that the lady is very aggressive, very erudite, and very
unintelligent; the gentleman very suave, rather ignorant, and of an
at the junction of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, could flirt in the
face of Ancients and Moderns alike the suggestion (which Mr Rigmarole
doubtless borrowed from him) that all times are “pretty much like our
own,” and could see and hear the sable sisters sounding the tocsin on the
flaming crest of Mongibel.
Fontenelle is elusive, but comprehensible by the imagination. La Motte,
[658]
his inseparable companion in the renewed sacrilege of the Moderns,
seems an easier, but is really a harder, personage to lay hold of. It is indeed
La Motte. not extremely difficult to explain his attitude to the
Ancients by the fact that he knew no Greek; and his exaltation of prose by a
consciousness (wherein he has left a family by no means extinct) that his
own verses were worth very little. But it is so easy not to write verses if you
cannot; and not to write about Greek if you do not know it! And the
problem is further complicated by the facts that at least some judges, who
are not exactly the first comers, such as Fontenelle himself and Voltaire,
maintained that La Motte could write verses,—and that, so far from being
“a fellow who had failed,” he had obtained the greatest scenic success of
the early eighteenth century with Inès de Castro, and, what is more, had
deserved it. But for once, as also again in Pope’s case, the dangerous
explanation of physical defects and constitutional weakness seems to have
some validity. The invulnerable nonchalance of his friend Fontenelle had
met the damnation of Aspar by a cool tearing up of the piece, and an
undismayed advance upon the fate of the plusquam semel damnatus; La
Motte, at twenty or at little more, felt the similar misfortune of Les
Originaux so severely that he actually went to La Trappe for a time. Before
middle life he was blind and a cripple. The irritability which did not show
itself in his temper (for he was the most amiable of men) would seem to
have transferred itself to his literary attitude, not affecting his politeness of
expression, but inducing a sort of “rash” of paradox.
To trace the vagaries of this might not be unamusing, but would certainly
His “Unity of be excessive here. La Motte, it seems to me, had
Interest.”
considerably less natural literary taste than Fontenelle; and
of the controversy[659] (it was not his antagonist’s fault if it was not a very
acrimonious one) between him and Madame Dacier one cannot say much
more than that the lady is very aggressive, very erudite, and very
unintelligent; the gentleman very suave, rather ignorant, and of an
Page 508
intelligence better, but not much better, directed; while both are sufficiently
distant from any true critical point of view. Yet once, as was not unnatural
in the case of a very clever man who was at least endeavouring to form
independent conclusions, La Motte did hit upon a great critical truth when,
[660]
discussing the Three Unities, he laid it down that there is after all only
one Unity which is of real importance, and that this is the “Unity of
Interest,” to which all the others are subsidiary, and but as means to an end.
“Self-evident,” some one may say; but in how many critics have we found
the fact acknowledged hitherto? and by how many has it been frankly
acknowledged since? That the aim of the poet is to please, to satisfy the
thirst for pleasure—that is to say, to interest—all but the extremest ethical
prudery will admit. But critics, especially classical and neo-classical critics,
have always been in the mood of Christophero Sly when he railed at the
woman of the house and threatened her with presentation at the leet,
“Because she brought stone jugs and no sealed quarts.”
Without the “sealed quart” of the Unity—of the Rule generally—these
critics will not slake, nor let others slake, their thirst. But the affirmation of
the Unity of Interest, in La Motte’s way, does inevitably bring with it
licence to use the stone jug or anything else, so only that the good wine of
poetry be made to do its good office.
The Quarrel left its traces for a long time on criticism, and seems to have
partly determined the composition, as late as 1730, of two books of some
note, the Traité des Études of the excellent Rollin, and the elaborate Théâtre
Rollin. des Grecs of the Père Brumoy. Of neither need we say very
much. The first-named[661] had considerable influence at home and abroad,
especially in Germany; but Rollin’s successor, Batteux, was justified in the
good-humoured malice of his observation,[662] “Je trouve à l’article de la
Poésie un discours fort sensé sur son origine et sa destination, qui doit être
toute au profit de la vertu. On y cite les beaux endroits d’Homère; on y
donne la plus juste idée de la sublime Poésie des Livres Saints; mais c'était
une définition que je demandais.” Alas! we have experienced the same
disappointment many times; nor is it Batteux himself who will cure us of it.
Brumoy’s imposing quartos[663] have at least the advantage (how great a
one the same experience has shown us) of tackling a definite subject in a
Brumoy. business-like way. His book consists of actual translations
distant from any true critical point of view. Yet once, as was not unnatural
in the case of a very clever man who was at least endeavouring to form
independent conclusions, La Motte did hit upon a great critical truth when,
[660]
discussing the Three Unities, he laid it down that there is after all only
one Unity which is of real importance, and that this is the “Unity of
Interest,” to which all the others are subsidiary, and but as means to an end.
“Self-evident,” some one may say; but in how many critics have we found
the fact acknowledged hitherto? and by how many has it been frankly
acknowledged since? That the aim of the poet is to please, to satisfy the
thirst for pleasure—that is to say, to interest—all but the extremest ethical
prudery will admit. But critics, especially classical and neo-classical critics,
have always been in the mood of Christophero Sly when he railed at the
woman of the house and threatened her with presentation at the leet,
“Because she brought stone jugs and no sealed quarts.”
Without the “sealed quart” of the Unity—of the Rule generally—these
critics will not slake, nor let others slake, their thirst. But the affirmation of
the Unity of Interest, in La Motte’s way, does inevitably bring with it
licence to use the stone jug or anything else, so only that the good wine of
poetry be made to do its good office.
The Quarrel left its traces for a long time on criticism, and seems to have
partly determined the composition, as late as 1730, of two books of some
note, the Traité des Études of the excellent Rollin, and the elaborate Théâtre
Rollin. des Grecs of the Père Brumoy. Of neither need we say very
much. The first-named[661] had considerable influence at home and abroad,
especially in Germany; but Rollin’s successor, Batteux, was justified in the
good-humoured malice of his observation,[662] “Je trouve à l’article de la
Poésie un discours fort sensé sur son origine et sa destination, qui doit être
toute au profit de la vertu. On y cite les beaux endroits d’Homère; on y
donne la plus juste idée de la sublime Poésie des Livres Saints; mais c'était
une définition que je demandais.” Alas! we have experienced the same
disappointment many times; nor is it Batteux himself who will cure us of it.
Brumoy’s imposing quartos[663] have at least the advantage (how great a
one the same experience has shown us) of tackling a definite subject in a
Brumoy. business-like way. His book consists of actual translations
Page 509
of a certain number of Greek pieces, of analyses of all the rest that we have,
and of divers discourses. He leads off with a forcible and well-founded
complaint of the extreme ignorance of Greek tragedy and drama generally
which the Quarrel had shown; his observations on individual writers and
pieces are often very sensible; and his “Discourse on the Parallel between
the Theatres” has a bearing which he probably did not suspect, and might
not have relished. He dwells with vigour and knowledge on the differences
between them in order to show that not merely preference, as in the Quarrel,
but even strict comparison, is impossible between things so different. It
could not be but that sooner or later it would dawn, on some readers at least,
that it was even more ridiculous to try to make the two obey the same laws.
As has been already shown in the last book, literary criticism had, even
by the middle of the seventeenth century, established so firm a hold on
French taste that the representative system becomes more and more
imperative upon the historian thereof. To represent the later days of
Fontenelle and those when Voltaire, though attaining, had not entirely
attained his almost European dictatorship of letters, three names will serve
very well; one perhaps new to many (if there be many) readers of these
pages, another one of the conscript names of literary history, respected if
not read, and the third a classic of the world—in plainer words, Rémond de
Saint-Mard, the Abbé Du Bos, and Montesquieu.
Saint-Mard has been rather badly treated by the books,—for instance,
Vapereau’s Dictionnaire des Littératures, often no despicable compilation,
not only dismisses him as médiocre, but misspells his name Saint-Marc. He
Rémond de had, however, some influence in his own day, especially on
Saint-Mard.
the Germans;[664] and there is an extremely pretty little
edition[665] of his works, most of which had been issued separately earlier.
To some extent he is a follower of Fontenelle, writes Dialogues of Gods,
&c., Lettres Galantes et Philosophiques, and the like, to please the town
and the ladies, but with a constant turning to criticism. In the “Discourse,”
which precedes his Dialogues in the collected edition, there is a very odd
and, as it seems to me, a very noteworthy passage, in which, though there
may be some would-be fine-gentleman nonchalance, there is also a dawning
of that sense of the unnaturalness and inconvenience of “the rules” which is
constantly showing itself in the early eighteenth century. He admits[666] that
he has not followed his own rules; for the orthodox dialogue ought to have
one subject, led up to for some time, announced at last. But somehow or
and of divers discourses. He leads off with a forcible and well-founded
complaint of the extreme ignorance of Greek tragedy and drama generally
which the Quarrel had shown; his observations on individual writers and
pieces are often very sensible; and his “Discourse on the Parallel between
the Theatres” has a bearing which he probably did not suspect, and might
not have relished. He dwells with vigour and knowledge on the differences
between them in order to show that not merely preference, as in the Quarrel,
but even strict comparison, is impossible between things so different. It
could not be but that sooner or later it would dawn, on some readers at least,
that it was even more ridiculous to try to make the two obey the same laws.
As has been already shown in the last book, literary criticism had, even
by the middle of the seventeenth century, established so firm a hold on
French taste that the representative system becomes more and more
imperative upon the historian thereof. To represent the later days of
Fontenelle and those when Voltaire, though attaining, had not entirely
attained his almost European dictatorship of letters, three names will serve
very well; one perhaps new to many (if there be many) readers of these
pages, another one of the conscript names of literary history, respected if
not read, and the third a classic of the world—in plainer words, Rémond de
Saint-Mard, the Abbé Du Bos, and Montesquieu.
Saint-Mard has been rather badly treated by the books,—for instance,
Vapereau’s Dictionnaire des Littératures, often no despicable compilation,
not only dismisses him as médiocre, but misspells his name Saint-Marc. He
Rémond de had, however, some influence in his own day, especially on
Saint-Mard.
the Germans;[664] and there is an extremely pretty little
edition[665] of his works, most of which had been issued separately earlier.
To some extent he is a follower of Fontenelle, writes Dialogues of Gods,
&c., Lettres Galantes et Philosophiques, and the like, to please the town
and the ladies, but with a constant turning to criticism. In the “Discourse,”
which precedes his Dialogues in the collected edition, there is a very odd
and, as it seems to me, a very noteworthy passage, in which, though there
may be some would-be fine-gentleman nonchalance, there is also a dawning
of that sense of the unnaturalness and inconvenience of “the rules” which is
constantly showing itself in the early eighteenth century. He admits[666] that
he has not followed his own rules; for the orthodox dialogue ought to have
one subject, led up to for some time, announced at last. But somehow or
Page 510
other most of his dialogues have more. So few ideas are fertile enough for a
whole Dialogue!—a sentence which obviously cuts away the theory of the
rule, and not merely its practice.
Nor are his other works by any means destitute of original ideas worthily
put. In one of his definition-descriptions of poetry,[667] if there is something
of eighteenth-century sensualism, there is much also of the acute and
L. practical psychology of the period. The words do account—
Racine.
whether in “low” or “high” fashion—for the poetic delight, as
“Philosophy teaching by example” and other arid abstractions do not. His
theory elsewhere, that Custom communicates the charm of versification (he
does not quote usus concinnat, but inevitably suggests it), has probably a
great deal of truth in it, if it is not the whole truth; and though we know that
his explanation of the origin of Poetry—that it came because Prose was too
common—is historically inaccurate, it is evidently only a false deduction,
uncorrected by actual historic knowledge, from the real fact that the
“discommoning of the common” is a main source of the poetic pleasure. In
points such as these Rémond de Saint-Mard rises commendably above the
estimable dulness of his contemporary Louis Racine,[668] with his admiration
oddly distributed between Milton and his own papa, and in the former case
more oddly conditioned by respect for Addison and Voltaire; his laborious
rearrangement of most of the old commonplaces about poetry and poets;
and his obliging explanation that “Ces images de magiciennes et de
sorcières de Laponie ne paraissaient pas extravagantes aux Anglais dans le
temps que Milton écrivit.”
By this time “Æsthetics” were breaking the shell everywhere; but in
many cases, as we have seen, they did not consciously affect the critical
Du Bos. principles of writers. Du Bos, a solid inquirer, and a man of
considerable ability in that striking out of wide generalisations which
delighted his time, could hardly have avoided them. His Réflexions
Critiques sur la Poésie et sur la Peinture[669] have sometimes been credited
with considerable precursorship on the literary side. It is certain that he lays
some stress (Part II., § 14 sq.) on the effect of Climate upon Art, and if this
“seem such dear delight, Beyond all other,” he must have the credit due
therefor from those to whom it so seems. To those who reflect on the
climatic authorship, say of Romeo and Juliet and the sonnets of La Casa,
doubts may occur. Du Bos is certainly an interesting and stimulating writer;
but his very excursions into generality seem to have precluded him from
whole Dialogue!—a sentence which obviously cuts away the theory of the
rule, and not merely its practice.
Nor are his other works by any means destitute of original ideas worthily
put. In one of his definition-descriptions of poetry,[667] if there is something
of eighteenth-century sensualism, there is much also of the acute and
L. practical psychology of the period. The words do account—
Racine.
whether in “low” or “high” fashion—for the poetic delight, as
“Philosophy teaching by example” and other arid abstractions do not. His
theory elsewhere, that Custom communicates the charm of versification (he
does not quote usus concinnat, but inevitably suggests it), has probably a
great deal of truth in it, if it is not the whole truth; and though we know that
his explanation of the origin of Poetry—that it came because Prose was too
common—is historically inaccurate, it is evidently only a false deduction,
uncorrected by actual historic knowledge, from the real fact that the
“discommoning of the common” is a main source of the poetic pleasure. In
points such as these Rémond de Saint-Mard rises commendably above the
estimable dulness of his contemporary Louis Racine,[668] with his admiration
oddly distributed between Milton and his own papa, and in the former case
more oddly conditioned by respect for Addison and Voltaire; his laborious
rearrangement of most of the old commonplaces about poetry and poets;
and his obliging explanation that “Ces images de magiciennes et de
sorcières de Laponie ne paraissaient pas extravagantes aux Anglais dans le
temps que Milton écrivit.”
By this time “Æsthetics” were breaking the shell everywhere; but in
many cases, as we have seen, they did not consciously affect the critical
Du Bos. principles of writers. Du Bos, a solid inquirer, and a man of
considerable ability in that striking out of wide generalisations which
delighted his time, could hardly have avoided them. His Réflexions
Critiques sur la Poésie et sur la Peinture[669] have sometimes been credited
with considerable precursorship on the literary side. It is certain that he lays
some stress (Part II., § 14 sq.) on the effect of Climate upon Art, and if this
“seem such dear delight, Beyond all other,” he must have the credit due
therefor from those to whom it so seems. To those who reflect on the
climatic authorship, say of Romeo and Juliet and the sonnets of La Casa,
doubts may occur. Du Bos is certainly an interesting and stimulating writer;
but his very excursions into generality seem to have precluded him from
Page 511
studying any particular author carefully; and the crotchet and paradox
which appear in his more famous and later Histoire de la Monarchie
Française are not absent from the Réflexions. These take, moreover, a
distinctly “classic” bent. Dr Johnson would have loved, and very possibly
did love, him for arguing in a masterly manner that French poetry simply
cannot equal Latin, either in style or in cadence and harmony of verse; nor
perhaps would Mr Matthew Arnold on this occasion have disdained to say
ditto to Dr Johnson. Latin words are more beautiful than French. Harmony
is easier to attain in Latin than in French. The rules are less troublesome in
Latin than in French, and their observance results in more beauties in the
mother than in the daughter. This is “Thorough” with a vengeance.[670]
On the great question of katharsis Du Bos holds the view that art
operates by imitating the things which would have excited strong passions
in us if real, but which, as not being real, only excite weak ones; and makes
Stimulating but fair fight for it (Part I., § 3). He thinks that while execution
desultory
character of his
is everything in painting it is not everything in poetry, but
Réflexions. still much. He quotes English critics, especially Addison,
pretty freely, and is not far from holding with them that
French drama deals too much with love. He has some really acute remarks
on what he calls poetry of style, distinguishing this style from mere diction
and versification, and connecting this directly with his Latin-French
paradox. He even ventures close to the sin unpardonable, in the eyes of
Classicism, by arguing that the beauty of the parts of a poem contributes
more to its effect than the justness and regularity of the plan, and that a
poem may be “regular” to the nth and yet quite a bad poem. He has respect
for the popular judgment—a respect suggesting a not impossible
acquaintance with Gravina (v. infra, p. 538), who had written a good many
years before him: and he distinctly postulates, after the manner of the
century, an Æsthetic Sense existing in almost all, and capable of deciding
on points of taste (Part II., § 22). He has some direct and more indirect
observations in reference to the Quarrel, speaking with trenchant, but not
too trenchant, disapproval (Part II., § 36) of those who endeavour to judge
works of art by translations and criticisms. On the main question he is
pretty sound. He is good on genius, and on what he calls the artisan, the
craftsman without genius. Taking him altogether, Du Bos may be allowed
the praise of a really fertile and original writer,[671] who says many things
which are well worth attention and which seldom received it before him, in
which appear in his more famous and later Histoire de la Monarchie
Française are not absent from the Réflexions. These take, moreover, a
distinctly “classic” bent. Dr Johnson would have loved, and very possibly
did love, him for arguing in a masterly manner that French poetry simply
cannot equal Latin, either in style or in cadence and harmony of verse; nor
perhaps would Mr Matthew Arnold on this occasion have disdained to say
ditto to Dr Johnson. Latin words are more beautiful than French. Harmony
is easier to attain in Latin than in French. The rules are less troublesome in
Latin than in French, and their observance results in more beauties in the
mother than in the daughter. This is “Thorough” with a vengeance.[670]
On the great question of katharsis Du Bos holds the view that art
operates by imitating the things which would have excited strong passions
in us if real, but which, as not being real, only excite weak ones; and makes
Stimulating but fair fight for it (Part I., § 3). He thinks that while execution
desultory
character of his
is everything in painting it is not everything in poetry, but
Réflexions. still much. He quotes English critics, especially Addison,
pretty freely, and is not far from holding with them that
French drama deals too much with love. He has some really acute remarks
on what he calls poetry of style, distinguishing this style from mere diction
and versification, and connecting this directly with his Latin-French
paradox. He even ventures close to the sin unpardonable, in the eyes of
Classicism, by arguing that the beauty of the parts of a poem contributes
more to its effect than the justness and regularity of the plan, and that a
poem may be “regular” to the nth and yet quite a bad poem. He has respect
for the popular judgment—a respect suggesting a not impossible
acquaintance with Gravina (v. infra, p. 538), who had written a good many
years before him: and he distinctly postulates, after the manner of the
century, an Æsthetic Sense existing in almost all, and capable of deciding
on points of taste (Part II., § 22). He has some direct and more indirect
observations in reference to the Quarrel, speaking with trenchant, but not
too trenchant, disapproval (Part II., § 36) of those who endeavour to judge
works of art by translations and criticisms. On the main question he is
pretty sound. He is good on genius, and on what he calls the artisan, the
craftsman without genius. Taking him altogether, Du Bos may be allowed
the praise of a really fertile and original writer,[671] who says many things
which are well worth attention and which seldom received it before him, in
Page 512
regard to what may be called the previous questions of criticism. His
connection of poetry with painting sometimes helps him, and seldom leads
him absolutely wrong; but it to some extent distracts him, and constantly
gives an air of desultoriness and haphazard to his observation. It is,
moreover, quite remarkable how persistently he abides in generalibus,
scarcely ever descending below the mediate examination of Kinds. When
he touches on individual works of art he confines himself in the most
gingerly fashion to illustration merely; there is never an appreciation in
whole or in considerable part.
When Voltaire denounced Montesquieu for lèse-poésie, the accused, if he
had chosen, might have brought formidable counter accusations; but there
Montesquieu. was certainly some ground for the actual charge. When a
[672]
man says that “the four great poets are Plato, Malebranche, Shaftesbury,
and Montaigne,” he is evidently either a heretic or a paradoxer; and the
hundred and thirty-seventh of the Lettres Persanes gives a sad colour to the
worse supposition. There is perhaps less actual high treason to poetry here
than in the remarks of Signor Pococurante, that noble Venetian, but there is
more intended; the whole treatment is ostentatiously contemptuous.
Dramatists are allowed some merit, but poets in general “put good sense in
irons, and smother reason in ornament.” As for epic poems, connoisseurs
themselves say that there never have been but two good ones, and never
will be a third.[673] Lyric poets are contemptible creatures who deal in
nothing but harmonious extravagance and so forth. As for romances in
prose, they have the faults of poems and others to boot. Elsewhere, in Letter
xlviii., a “poet is the grotesque of the human race.” It is scarcely surprising
that, when we turn to the Essai sur le Goût, there is hardly any definite
reference to literature at all, and that Montesquieu is entirely occupied in
tracing or imagining abstract reasons for the attractiveness of abstract things
like “surprise,” “symmetry,” “variety,” and even of the je ne sais quoi. The
je ne sais quoi in an attractive, but not technically beautiful, girl is, it seems,
due to surprise at finding her so attractive, which, with all respect to the
President, seems to be somewhat “circular.” In fact, Montesquieu is chiefly
interesting to us, first, because he made no literary use of his own theories
as to climate and the rest—which later writers have used and abused in this
way; and secondly, because he shows, in excelsis, that radically unliterary
as well as unpoetical vein which, for all its remarkable literary performance,
is characteristic of his time.
connection of poetry with painting sometimes helps him, and seldom leads
him absolutely wrong; but it to some extent distracts him, and constantly
gives an air of desultoriness and haphazard to his observation. It is,
moreover, quite remarkable how persistently he abides in generalibus,
scarcely ever descending below the mediate examination of Kinds. When
he touches on individual works of art he confines himself in the most
gingerly fashion to illustration merely; there is never an appreciation in
whole or in considerable part.
When Voltaire denounced Montesquieu for lèse-poésie, the accused, if he
had chosen, might have brought formidable counter accusations; but there
Montesquieu. was certainly some ground for the actual charge. When a
[672]
man says that “the four great poets are Plato, Malebranche, Shaftesbury,
and Montaigne,” he is evidently either a heretic or a paradoxer; and the
hundred and thirty-seventh of the Lettres Persanes gives a sad colour to the
worse supposition. There is perhaps less actual high treason to poetry here
than in the remarks of Signor Pococurante, that noble Venetian, but there is
more intended; the whole treatment is ostentatiously contemptuous.
Dramatists are allowed some merit, but poets in general “put good sense in
irons, and smother reason in ornament.” As for epic poems, connoisseurs
themselves say that there never have been but two good ones, and never
will be a third.[673] Lyric poets are contemptible creatures who deal in
nothing but harmonious extravagance and so forth. As for romances in
prose, they have the faults of poems and others to boot. Elsewhere, in Letter
xlviii., a “poet is the grotesque of the human race.” It is scarcely surprising
that, when we turn to the Essai sur le Goût, there is hardly any definite
reference to literature at all, and that Montesquieu is entirely occupied in
tracing or imagining abstract reasons for the attractiveness of abstract things
like “surprise,” “symmetry,” “variety,” and even of the je ne sais quoi. The
je ne sais quoi in an attractive, but not technically beautiful, girl is, it seems,
due to surprise at finding her so attractive, which, with all respect to the
President, seems to be somewhat “circular.” In fact, Montesquieu is chiefly
interesting to us, first, because he made no literary use of his own theories
as to climate and the rest—which later writers have used and abused in this
way; and secondly, because he shows, in excelsis, that radically unliterary
as well as unpoetical vein which, for all its remarkable literary performance,
is characteristic of his time.
Page 513
It will surprise no one who has any acquaintance with the subject that but
a few lines should have been given to Montesquieu; it may shock some to
Voltaire: find but a very few pages given to Voltaire.[674] But while I
Disappointments
of his criticism.
have never been able to rank the Patriarch’s criticism high,
a reperusal of it in sequence, for the purpose of this book,
has even reduced the level of my estimate. The fact is that, consummate
literary craftsman as he was, and wanting only the je ne sais quoi itself (or
rather something that we know too well) to rank with the very greatest men
of letters, Voltaire was not a man with whom literary interest by any means
predominated. It is not merely that his anti-crusade against l’infâme
constantly colours his literary, as it does all his other, judgments; and that
once at least it made him certainly indorse, and possibly enounce, the
astounding statement that the Parables in the Gospels are “coarse and
low.”[675] But when this perpetually disturbing influence is at its least active
point, we can see perfectly that neither Voltaire’s treasure nor his heart is
anywhere, with the doubtful exception of the drama division, in literature.
In mathematics and in physical science there is no doubt that he was
genuinely interested; and he was perhaps still more interested (as indeed
men of his century generally were) in what may be vaguely called
anthropology, the moral, social, and (to some, though only to some, extent)
political history of mankind. But for literature he had very little genuine
love; though the vanity in which he certainly was not lacking could not fail
to be conscious of his own excellence as a practitioner in it; and though he
could not but recognise its power—its almost omnipotence—as a weapon.
It was probably the more human character of the drama that attracted him
there.
However this may be, it is impossible, for me at least, to rank him high as
a critic: and this refusal is hardly in the least due to his famous blasphemies
Examples of it. against Shakespeare and Milton. As we have seen—as we
shall see—it is possible to disagree profoundly with some, nay, with many,
of a critic’s estimates, and yet to think highly of his critical gifts. But
Voltaire scarcely anywhere shows the true ethos of the critic: and that
“smattering erudition” of his is nowhere so much of a smattering, and so
little of an erudition, as here. His two famous surveys of English and French
literature, in the Lettres sur les Anglais and the Siècle de Louis Quatorze,
show, on the French side at least, a more complete ignorance of literary
history than Boileau’s own: and the individual judgments, though admirably
a few lines should have been given to Montesquieu; it may shock some to
Voltaire: find but a very few pages given to Voltaire.[674] But while I
Disappointments
of his criticism.
have never been able to rank the Patriarch’s criticism high,
a reperusal of it in sequence, for the purpose of this book,
has even reduced the level of my estimate. The fact is that, consummate
literary craftsman as he was, and wanting only the je ne sais quoi itself (or
rather something that we know too well) to rank with the very greatest men
of letters, Voltaire was not a man with whom literary interest by any means
predominated. It is not merely that his anti-crusade against l’infâme
constantly colours his literary, as it does all his other, judgments; and that
once at least it made him certainly indorse, and possibly enounce, the
astounding statement that the Parables in the Gospels are “coarse and
low.”[675] But when this perpetually disturbing influence is at its least active
point, we can see perfectly that neither Voltaire’s treasure nor his heart is
anywhere, with the doubtful exception of the drama division, in literature.
In mathematics and in physical science there is no doubt that he was
genuinely interested; and he was perhaps still more interested (as indeed
men of his century generally were) in what may be vaguely called
anthropology, the moral, social, and (to some, though only to some, extent)
political history of mankind. But for literature he had very little genuine
love; though the vanity in which he certainly was not lacking could not fail
to be conscious of his own excellence as a practitioner in it; and though he
could not but recognise its power—its almost omnipotence—as a weapon.
It was probably the more human character of the drama that attracted him
there.
However this may be, it is impossible, for me at least, to rank him high as
a critic: and this refusal is hardly in the least due to his famous blasphemies
Examples of it. against Shakespeare and Milton. As we have seen—as we
shall see—it is possible to disagree profoundly with some, nay, with many,
of a critic’s estimates, and yet to think highly of his critical gifts. But
Voltaire scarcely anywhere shows the true ethos of the critic: and that
“smattering erudition” of his is nowhere so much of a smattering, and so
little of an erudition, as here. His two famous surveys of English and French
literature, in the Lettres sur les Anglais and the Siècle de Louis Quatorze,
show, on the French side at least, a more complete ignorance of literary
history than Boileau’s own: and the individual judgments, though admirably
Page 514
expressed, are banal and without freshness of grasp. The extensive
Commentary on Corneille contains, of course, interesting things, but is of
no high critical value. The Essai sur la Poésie Épique opens with some
excellent ridicule of “the rules”—a subject which indeed might seem to
invite the Voltairian method irresistibly; but after this and some serious
good sense of the same kind, he practically deserts to the rules themselves.
He admits fautes grossières in Homer, finds “monstrosity and absurdity up
to the limits of imagination” in Shakespeare, thinks that Virgil is “Homer’s
best work,” discovers in the supernatural of Tasso and Camoens only
“insipid stories fit to amuse children,” dismisses, as everybody knows, the
great Miltonic episode of Satan, Death, and Sin as “disgusting and
abominable,” and keeps up throughout his survey that wearisome castanet-
clatter of “fault and beauty—beauty and fault” which, whensoever and
wheresoever we find it, simply means that the critic is not able to see his
subject as a whole, and tell us whether it is foul or fair.
Perhaps no better instance of the feebleness of Voltaire’s criticism can be
found than in his dealings with Rabelais.[676] Here there are practically no
disturbing elements. Yet no one is more responsible than Voltaire is for the
common notion, equally facile and false, of Rabelais as a freethinker with a
sharp eye to the main chance, who disguised his freethinking in a cloak of
popular obscenity, who is often amusing, sometimes admirable, but as a
whole coarse, tedious, and illegible, or at best appealing to the most vulgar
taste. Take the famous sentence that Swift is a “Rabelais de bonne
compagnie,”[677] work it out either side, and it will be difficult to find
anywhere words more radically uncritical. Or turn to the Dictionnaire
Philosophique. Not only are the literary articles very few, and in some of
these few cases mere rechauffés of the Lettres sur Les Anglais, &c., but the
head “Literature” itself contains the singular statement that criticism is not
literature—because nobody speaks of “une belle critique.” The articles
“Esprit” and “Goût” are attractive—especially the latter, because it is on the
critical watchword of the century: but we are sent away, worse than empty,
with some abuse of Shakespeare, and with the statement, “No man of letters
can possibly fail to recognise the perfected taste of Boileau in the Art
Poétique.” Only, perhaps, the article on Art Dramatique is worthy of its
title, and the reason of this has been indicated.
The numerous Mélanges Littéraires are again interesting reading—
indeed, when is Voltaire not interesting, save when he is scientific, or when
Commentary on Corneille contains, of course, interesting things, but is of
no high critical value. The Essai sur la Poésie Épique opens with some
excellent ridicule of “the rules”—a subject which indeed might seem to
invite the Voltairian method irresistibly; but after this and some serious
good sense of the same kind, he practically deserts to the rules themselves.
He admits fautes grossières in Homer, finds “monstrosity and absurdity up
to the limits of imagination” in Shakespeare, thinks that Virgil is “Homer’s
best work,” discovers in the supernatural of Tasso and Camoens only
“insipid stories fit to amuse children,” dismisses, as everybody knows, the
great Miltonic episode of Satan, Death, and Sin as “disgusting and
abominable,” and keeps up throughout his survey that wearisome castanet-
clatter of “fault and beauty—beauty and fault” which, whensoever and
wheresoever we find it, simply means that the critic is not able to see his
subject as a whole, and tell us whether it is foul or fair.
Perhaps no better instance of the feebleness of Voltaire’s criticism can be
found than in his dealings with Rabelais.[676] Here there are practically no
disturbing elements. Yet no one is more responsible than Voltaire is for the
common notion, equally facile and false, of Rabelais as a freethinker with a
sharp eye to the main chance, who disguised his freethinking in a cloak of
popular obscenity, who is often amusing, sometimes admirable, but as a
whole coarse, tedious, and illegible, or at best appealing to the most vulgar
taste. Take the famous sentence that Swift is a “Rabelais de bonne
compagnie,”[677] work it out either side, and it will be difficult to find
anywhere words more radically uncritical. Or turn to the Dictionnaire
Philosophique. Not only are the literary articles very few, and in some of
these few cases mere rechauffés of the Lettres sur Les Anglais, &c., but the
head “Literature” itself contains the singular statement that criticism is not
literature—because nobody speaks of “une belle critique.” The articles
“Esprit” and “Goût” are attractive—especially the latter, because it is on the
critical watchword of the century: but we are sent away, worse than empty,
with some abuse of Shakespeare, and with the statement, “No man of letters
can possibly fail to recognise the perfected taste of Boileau in the Art
Poétique.” Only, perhaps, the article on Art Dramatique is worthy of its
title, and the reason of this has been indicated.
The numerous Mélanges Littéraires are again interesting reading—
indeed, when is Voltaire not interesting, save when he is scientific, or when
Page 515
he shows that “the zeal of the devil’s house” can inspire a man of genius
with forty-curate-power dulness? They include almost every kind of
writing, from actual reviews (Lettres aux Auteurs de La Gazette Littéraire)
on books French and foreign, upwards or downwards. But all those that are
probably genuine exhibit just the same characteristics as the more elaborate
works. The reviews of Sterne and of Churchill will show how really
superficial Voltaire’s literary grip was; though both of them (as being
Voltaire’s they could not well help doing) contain acute remarks. The too
famous argument-abstract of Hamlet[678] is perhaps the most remarkable
example of irony exploding through the touch-hole that literature affords.
The “Parallel of Horace, Boileau, and Pope” from such a hand might seem
as if it could not be without value: but it has very little. And perhaps
nowhere does Voltaire appear to much less critical advantage than in the
Lettre de M. de La Visclède on La Fontaine, where, as in the case of
Rabelais, it might be thought that no prejudice could possibly affect him.
The superfine condemnation of the bonhomme’s style, as filled with
expressions plus faites pour le peuple que pour les honnêtes gens (not, let it
be observed, in the Fables, but in the Contes), could hardly tell a more
disastrous tale. Philistia by its Goliath in Paris echoes Philistia by its
common folk in London, at this special time. La Fontaine and Goldsmith
are “low.”
The fact would appear to be that, independently of that lack of purely
literary interest which has been noted above, other causes kept Voltaire back
Causes of his from really original and valuable criticism. The sense of the
failure.
necessity of clinging to and conserving something, which
has often been shown by iconoclasts, seems to have directed itself in him
towards literary orthodoxy: while, on the other hand, as we have already
seen, his natural acuteness refused to blink entirely some of the absurdities
of the “Rule” system. His craftsmanship made it possible for him to succeed
in certain kinds of artificial poetry—the regular tragedy, the formal heroic
poem, the light piece, epigram, or epistle, or what not—which were
specially favoured by Classical criticism. He was not well equipped by
nature for success in any Romantic kind—not to mention that Romance was
almost indissolubly connected with those Ages of Faith which he scorned.
Moreover, though no man has committed more faults of taste, in the wider
and nobler sense, than did Voltaire, yet within a narrower and more
arbitrary circle of “taste” of the conventional kind, no one could walk with
with forty-curate-power dulness? They include almost every kind of
writing, from actual reviews (Lettres aux Auteurs de La Gazette Littéraire)
on books French and foreign, upwards or downwards. But all those that are
probably genuine exhibit just the same characteristics as the more elaborate
works. The reviews of Sterne and of Churchill will show how really
superficial Voltaire’s literary grip was; though both of them (as being
Voltaire’s they could not well help doing) contain acute remarks. The too
famous argument-abstract of Hamlet[678] is perhaps the most remarkable
example of irony exploding through the touch-hole that literature affords.
The “Parallel of Horace, Boileau, and Pope” from such a hand might seem
as if it could not be without value: but it has very little. And perhaps
nowhere does Voltaire appear to much less critical advantage than in the
Lettre de M. de La Visclède on La Fontaine, where, as in the case of
Rabelais, it might be thought that no prejudice could possibly affect him.
The superfine condemnation of the bonhomme’s style, as filled with
expressions plus faites pour le peuple que pour les honnêtes gens (not, let it
be observed, in the Fables, but in the Contes), could hardly tell a more
disastrous tale. Philistia by its Goliath in Paris echoes Philistia by its
common folk in London, at this special time. La Fontaine and Goldsmith
are “low.”
The fact would appear to be that, independently of that lack of purely
literary interest which has been noted above, other causes kept Voltaire back
Causes of his from really original and valuable criticism. The sense of the
failure.
necessity of clinging to and conserving something, which
has often been shown by iconoclasts, seems to have directed itself in him
towards literary orthodoxy: while, on the other hand, as we have already
seen, his natural acuteness refused to blink entirely some of the absurdities
of the “Rule” system. His craftsmanship made it possible for him to succeed
in certain kinds of artificial poetry—the regular tragedy, the formal heroic
poem, the light piece, epigram, or epistle, or what not—which were
specially favoured by Classical criticism. He was not well equipped by
nature for success in any Romantic kind—not to mention that Romance was
almost indissolubly connected with those Ages of Faith which he scorned.
Moreover, though no man has committed more faults of taste, in the wider
and nobler sense, than did Voltaire, yet within a narrower and more
arbitrary circle of “taste” of the conventional kind, no one could walk with
Page 516
more unerring precision. Yet again, the Great Assumption by which the neo-
classics made a changeling of their Taste with Good Sense, and mothered it
on Nature, appealed strongly to such philosophical theories as he had.
Accordingly, both in public and private,[679] the great heretic, with very few
exceptions, plays the part of a very Doctor of the Literary Sorbonne, and
leaves the attempt at a new criticism to the more audacious innovation, and
the more thorough-going naturalism, of Diderot.[680]
Of the other Di majores of the philosophe school, Rousseau would
always have been prevented by his temperament from expressing critically
the appreciations which the same temperament might have suggested: and,
if he had been a critic at all, he would have been on the revolting and
Others: Buffon. Romantic side. Diderot actually was so. The critical
utterances of D’Alembert,[681] chiefly if not wholly given in his Éloges,
express the clear understanding and by no means trivial good sense of their
writer. But, like Voltaire’s, D’Alembert’s heart was elsewhere. Buffon
remains; and by a curious accident he, though totus in the things of mere
science, has left us one of the most noteworthy phrases of literary criticism
in the history of literature. Moreover, this phrase is contained in a
discourse[682] which is all literary and almost all critical, which is very
admirable within its own range and on its own side, and which practically
provides us with one of the first, and to this day one of the best, discussions
of Style as such. That we have in these latter days “heard too much of
Style” is often said, and may be true: “where” we have seen too much of it
“you shall tell me” as Seithenin said to the Prince. But we, in the restricted
sense of students of criticism, have not “seen too much” of discussions of
style hitherto. On the contrary, we have seen that the ancients were
constantly shy of it in its quiddity; that even Longinus seems to prefer to
abstract and embody one of its qualities and discuss that; and that after the
revival of criticism the old avoidances, or the old apologies for the
phortikon ti, were too often renewed. Buffon has none of this prudery:
though he lays the greatest possible stress on the necessity of there being
something behind style, of style being “the burin that graves the thought.”
Perhaps he does not quite keep at the height of his famous and often
misquoted[683] dictum—“Le style est l’homme même”—in itself the best
thing ever said on the subject, and, as is the case with most good things,
“Style and the made better by the context. He has been showing why only
man.”
well-written books go down to posterity. Information can
classics made a changeling of their Taste with Good Sense, and mothered it
on Nature, appealed strongly to such philosophical theories as he had.
Accordingly, both in public and private,[679] the great heretic, with very few
exceptions, plays the part of a very Doctor of the Literary Sorbonne, and
leaves the attempt at a new criticism to the more audacious innovation, and
the more thorough-going naturalism, of Diderot.[680]
Of the other Di majores of the philosophe school, Rousseau would
always have been prevented by his temperament from expressing critically
the appreciations which the same temperament might have suggested: and,
if he had been a critic at all, he would have been on the revolting and
Others: Buffon. Romantic side. Diderot actually was so. The critical
utterances of D’Alembert,[681] chiefly if not wholly given in his Éloges,
express the clear understanding and by no means trivial good sense of their
writer. But, like Voltaire’s, D’Alembert’s heart was elsewhere. Buffon
remains; and by a curious accident he, though totus in the things of mere
science, has left us one of the most noteworthy phrases of literary criticism
in the history of literature. Moreover, this phrase is contained in a
discourse[682] which is all literary and almost all critical, which is very
admirable within its own range and on its own side, and which practically
provides us with one of the first, and to this day one of the best, discussions
of Style as such. That we have in these latter days “heard too much of
Style” is often said, and may be true: “where” we have seen too much of it
“you shall tell me” as Seithenin said to the Prince. But we, in the restricted
sense of students of criticism, have not “seen too much” of discussions of
style hitherto. On the contrary, we have seen that the ancients were
constantly shy of it in its quiddity; that even Longinus seems to prefer to
abstract and embody one of its qualities and discuss that; and that after the
revival of criticism the old avoidances, or the old apologies for the
phortikon ti, were too often renewed. Buffon has none of this prudery:
though he lays the greatest possible stress on the necessity of there being
something behind style, of style being “the burin that graves the thought.”
Perhaps he does not quite keep at the height of his famous and often
misquoted[683] dictum—“Le style est l’homme même”—in itself the best
thing ever said on the subject, and, as is the case with most good things,
“Style and the made better by the context. He has been showing why only
man.”
well-written books go down to posterity. Information can
Page 517
be transferred; fact becomes public property; novelty ceases to be novel.
Ces choses sont hors de l’homme; le style est [de?] l’homme même. In other
words, the style—the form—is that which the author adds to the matter; it is
that inseparable, but separably intelligible, element which cannot be
transferred, taken away, or lost. It is clear that Buffon would not have lent
himself to that discountenancing of the distinction of Matter and Form
which some have attempted. Perhaps his other remarks are less uniformly,
though they are often, admirable. He should not, as a man of natural
science, have congratulated the Academicians on contemning “le vain son
des mots,” which, he should have known, always has something, and may
have much, to do with style; and it is certainly inadequate to say that style is
“the order and movement given to our thoughts.” There is much that is true,
but also something of mere neo-classic orthodoxy, in his painful repetitions
of the necessity of unity and greatness of subject; and to say that “l’esprit
humain ne peut rien créer” is sheer lèse-littérature. Rather is it true that,
except God, the human mind is the only thing that can create, and that it
shows its divine origin thereby. But Buffon was only a man of science, and
we must excuse him. The special curse of the time[684] is curiously visible in
his enumeration, among the causes of nobility in style, of “L’attention à ne
nommer les choses que par les termes les plus généraux.” The “streak of the
tulip” barred again! But he is certainly right when he says that “jamais
l’imitation n’a rien créé”: though here it may be retorted, “Yes; but
imitation teaches how to discard itself, and to begin to create,” while, as he
has just extended the disability to the human faculties generally, his point
seems a blunt one. Still, his directions for ordonnance as a preliminary to
style, his cautions against pointes, traits saillants, pomposity [he might
have recked this rede a little more himself], and other things, are excellent.
The piece is extraordinary in its combination of originality, brilliancy, and
sense, and in it Science has certainly lent Literature one of the best critical
essays of the eighteenth century.
Not an unimportant document of the time for the history of criticism is
the critical attitude of that remarkable Marcellus of philosophism,
Vauvenargues.[685] The few Réflexions Critiques which he has left are very
curious. Vauvenargues was a man of an absolute independence of spirit so
far as he knew; but conditioned by the limits of his knowledge. He had
neither time nor opportunity for much reading; he probably knew little of
any literature but his own. It must be remembered also that his main bent
Ces choses sont hors de l’homme; le style est [de?] l’homme même. In other
words, the style—the form—is that which the author adds to the matter; it is
that inseparable, but separably intelligible, element which cannot be
transferred, taken away, or lost. It is clear that Buffon would not have lent
himself to that discountenancing of the distinction of Matter and Form
which some have attempted. Perhaps his other remarks are less uniformly,
though they are often, admirable. He should not, as a man of natural
science, have congratulated the Academicians on contemning “le vain son
des mots,” which, he should have known, always has something, and may
have much, to do with style; and it is certainly inadequate to say that style is
“the order and movement given to our thoughts.” There is much that is true,
but also something of mere neo-classic orthodoxy, in his painful repetitions
of the necessity of unity and greatness of subject; and to say that “l’esprit
humain ne peut rien créer” is sheer lèse-littérature. Rather is it true that,
except God, the human mind is the only thing that can create, and that it
shows its divine origin thereby. But Buffon was only a man of science, and
we must excuse him. The special curse of the time[684] is curiously visible in
his enumeration, among the causes of nobility in style, of “L’attention à ne
nommer les choses que par les termes les plus généraux.” The “streak of the
tulip” barred again! But he is certainly right when he says that “jamais
l’imitation n’a rien créé”: though here it may be retorted, “Yes; but
imitation teaches how to discard itself, and to begin to create,” while, as he
has just extended the disability to the human faculties generally, his point
seems a blunt one. Still, his directions for ordonnance as a preliminary to
style, his cautions against pointes, traits saillants, pomposity [he might
have recked this rede a little more himself], and other things, are excellent.
The piece is extraordinary in its combination of originality, brilliancy, and
sense, and in it Science has certainly lent Literature one of the best critical
essays of the eighteenth century.
Not an unimportant document of the time for the history of criticism is
the critical attitude of that remarkable Marcellus of philosophism,
Vauvenargues.[685] The few Réflexions Critiques which he has left are very
curious. Vauvenargues was a man of an absolute independence of spirit so
far as he knew; but conditioned by the limits of his knowledge. He had
neither time nor opportunity for much reading; he probably knew little of
any literature but his own. It must be remembered also that his main bent
Page 518
was ethical, not literary. Such a man should give us the form and pressure
of the time in an unusual and interesting way.
Vauvenargues does so. We find him, after a glowing and almost adequate
eulogy of La Fontaine, gibbeting him for showing plus de style que
d’invention, et plus de négligence que d’exactitude—not the happiest pair
Vauvenargues. of antitheses. The subjects of his Tales are “low”—
unfortunate word which “speaks” almost every one who uses it—and they
are not interesting, which is more surprising. Boileau, on the contrary, is
extolled to the skies. He has really too much genius (like the 'Badian who
was really too brave), and this excess, with a smaller excess of fire, truth,
solidity, agrément, may have perhaps injured his range, depth, height,
finesse, and grace. Molière again is trop bas (at least his subjects are), while
La Bruyère escapes this defect—you might as well set together Addison and
Shakespeare, and no doubt Vauvenargues would have done so. How
different is Racine, who is always “great”—“gallantly great,” let us add,
like Mr Pepys in his new suit. Voltaire, who had certainly prompted some of
these sins, made a little atonement by inducing Vauvenargues to admire
Corneille to some extent. But Corneille, he says, from his date, could not
have le goût juste, and the parallel with Racine is one of the most
interesting of its numerous kind. J. B. Rousseau might have been nearly as
good a poet as Boileau, if Boileau had not taught him all he knew in poetry,
but his vieux langage is most regrettable. Such were the opinions of a
young man of unusual ability, but with little taste in literature except that
which he found prevalent in the middle of the eighteenth century.
This middle, and the later part of it, saw in the Abbé Batteux the last of
that really remarkable, though not wholly estimable, line of législateurs du
Parnasse which had begun with Boileau, and whose edicts had been
accepted, for the best part of a century, with almost universal deference.
Batteux. Still later, and surviving into the confines of the nineteenth
century, La Harpe gives us almost the last distinguished defender, and
certainly a defender as uncompromising as he was able, of neo-classic
orthodoxy. Some attention must be given to each of these, and to
Marmontel between them, but we need not say very much of others—
except in the representative way.
Batteux began as an extoller of the Henriade, after many years spent in
schoolmastering and the occasional publication of Latin verses, but before
the century had reached the middle of its road. He essayed, a little later,
of the time in an unusual and interesting way.
Vauvenargues does so. We find him, after a glowing and almost adequate
eulogy of La Fontaine, gibbeting him for showing plus de style que
d’invention, et plus de négligence que d’exactitude—not the happiest pair
Vauvenargues. of antitheses. The subjects of his Tales are “low”—
unfortunate word which “speaks” almost every one who uses it—and they
are not interesting, which is more surprising. Boileau, on the contrary, is
extolled to the skies. He has really too much genius (like the 'Badian who
was really too brave), and this excess, with a smaller excess of fire, truth,
solidity, agrément, may have perhaps injured his range, depth, height,
finesse, and grace. Molière again is trop bas (at least his subjects are), while
La Bruyère escapes this defect—you might as well set together Addison and
Shakespeare, and no doubt Vauvenargues would have done so. How
different is Racine, who is always “great”—“gallantly great,” let us add,
like Mr Pepys in his new suit. Voltaire, who had certainly prompted some of
these sins, made a little atonement by inducing Vauvenargues to admire
Corneille to some extent. But Corneille, he says, from his date, could not
have le goût juste, and the parallel with Racine is one of the most
interesting of its numerous kind. J. B. Rousseau might have been nearly as
good a poet as Boileau, if Boileau had not taught him all he knew in poetry,
but his vieux langage is most regrettable. Such were the opinions of a
young man of unusual ability, but with little taste in literature except that
which he found prevalent in the middle of the eighteenth century.
This middle, and the later part of it, saw in the Abbé Batteux the last of
that really remarkable, though not wholly estimable, line of législateurs du
Parnasse which had begun with Boileau, and whose edicts had been
accepted, for the best part of a century, with almost universal deference.
Batteux. Still later, and surviving into the confines of the nineteenth
century, La Harpe gives us almost the last distinguished defender, and
certainly a defender as uncompromising as he was able, of neo-classic
orthodoxy. Some attention must be given to each of these, and to
Marmontel between them, but we need not say very much of others—
except in the representative way.
Batteux began as an extoller of the Henriade, after many years spent in
schoolmastering and the occasional publication of Latin verses, but before
the century had reached the middle of its road. He essayed, a little later,
Page 519
divers treatises[686] on Poetic and Rhetoric, all of which were adjusted and
collected in his Principes de la Littérature,[687] while he also executed
various minor works, the most useful of which was Les Quatre Poétiques,
[688]
a translation, with critical notes, of Aristotle, Horace, and Vida, with
Boileau added. In so far as I am able to judge, Batteux is about the best of
the seventeenth-eighteenth century “Preceptists.”[689] The Introduction to his
introductory tractate, Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même Principe, indulges
in some mild but by no means unbecoming irony on his predecessors,[690]
and expresses the candid opinion that few of them had really consulted
Aristotle at all. He admits the multiplicity and the galling character of
“rules”; but he thinks that these can be reduced to a tolerable and innoxious,
nay, in the highest degree useful, minimum, by keeping the eye fixed on the
Imitation of Nature, and of the best nature. But how is this to guide us?
Here Batteux shows real ingenuity by seizing on the other great fetich of the
eighteenth-century creed—Taste—as a regulator to be in its turn regulated.
Indeed a careful perusal of Batteux cannot but force on us the
consideration that the mechanical age, the age of Arkwright and Watt, was
His adjustment approaching, or had approached. His Rules and his Taste
of Rules and
Taste.
“clutch” each other by turns, like the elaborate plant of the
modern machinist. If the Rules are too narrow and precise,
Taste holds them open; if Taste shows any sign of getting lawless, the Rules
bring it to its bearings. It is extremely ingenious; but the questions remain—
Whether it is natural? and Whether any good came from the exercise of the
principles which it attempts to reconcile and defend? The manner of
Batteux, it must be allowed, is as much less freezing and unsatisfactory than
Le Bossu’s, as it is less arbitrary and less aggressive than Boileau’s. These
two would, in the face of fact and history, have identified Taste and a certain
construction of Rule. Batteux rather regards the two as reciprocal
escapements, easing and regulating each other. It is part of his merit that he
recognises, to some extent, the importance of observation. In fact, great part
of this introductory treatise is a naïf and interesting complaint of the
difficulty which the results of this observation are introducing into Rule-
criticism. “Rules are getting so many,” he admits in his opening sentence;
and, no doubt, so long as you find it necessary to make a new rule whenever
you find a new poet, the state of things must be more and more parlous.
But, like all his century-fellows without exception on the Classical, and like
collected in his Principes de la Littérature,[687] while he also executed
various minor works, the most useful of which was Les Quatre Poétiques,
[688]
a translation, with critical notes, of Aristotle, Horace, and Vida, with
Boileau added. In so far as I am able to judge, Batteux is about the best of
the seventeenth-eighteenth century “Preceptists.”[689] The Introduction to his
introductory tractate, Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même Principe, indulges
in some mild but by no means unbecoming irony on his predecessors,[690]
and expresses the candid opinion that few of them had really consulted
Aristotle at all. He admits the multiplicity and the galling character of
“rules”; but he thinks that these can be reduced to a tolerable and innoxious,
nay, in the highest degree useful, minimum, by keeping the eye fixed on the
Imitation of Nature, and of the best nature. But how is this to guide us?
Here Batteux shows real ingenuity by seizing on the other great fetich of the
eighteenth-century creed—Taste—as a regulator to be in its turn regulated.
Indeed a careful perusal of Batteux cannot but force on us the
consideration that the mechanical age, the age of Arkwright and Watt, was
His adjustment approaching, or had approached. His Rules and his Taste
of Rules and
Taste.
“clutch” each other by turns, like the elaborate plant of the
modern machinist. If the Rules are too narrow and precise,
Taste holds them open; if Taste shows any sign of getting lawless, the Rules
bring it to its bearings. It is extremely ingenious; but the questions remain—
Whether it is natural? and Whether any good came from the exercise of the
principles which it attempts to reconcile and defend? The manner of
Batteux, it must be allowed, is as much less freezing and unsatisfactory than
Le Bossu’s, as it is less arbitrary and less aggressive than Boileau’s. These
two would, in the face of fact and history, have identified Taste and a certain
construction of Rule. Batteux rather regards the two as reciprocal
escapements, easing and regulating each other. It is part of his merit that he
recognises, to some extent, the importance of observation. In fact, great part
of this introductory treatise is a naïf and interesting complaint of the
difficulty which the results of this observation are introducing into Rule-
criticism. “Rules are getting so many,” he admits in his opening sentence;
and, no doubt, so long as you find it necessary to make a new rule whenever
you find a new poet, the state of things must be more and more parlous.
But, like all his century-fellows without exception on the Classical, and like
Page 520
too many on the other side, he does not think of simply marching through
the open door, and leaving the prison of Rule and Kind behind him.
From these idols Batteux will not yet be separated: he hardens his heart
in a different manner from Pharaoh, and will not let himself go. The utile is
never to be parted from the dulce; “the poems of Homer and Virgil are not
vain Romances, where the mind wanders at the will of a mad imagination;
they are great bodies of doctrine,” &c. Anacreon [Heaven help us!] was
himself determined to be a moral teacher.[691] Again, there must be Action,
and it must be single, united, simple, yet of variety; the style must not be
too low, or too high, &c., &c.
When Batteux has got into the old rut, he remains in it. We slip into the
well-known treatises by Kinds—Dialogue, Eclogue, Heroic Poem, and the
rest—with the equally well-known examination afterwards of celebrated
examples in a shamefaced kind of way—to the extent of two whole
volumes for poetry, and a third (actually the fourth) for prose. Finally, we
have what is really a separate tractate, De la Construction Oratoire. The
details in these later volumes are often excellent; but obviously, and per se,
they fall into quite a lower rank as compared with the first. If we were to
look at nothing but the fact, frankly acknowledged by Batteux, that he is
now considering French classical literature only, we should be able to detect
the error. In his first volume he had at least referred to Milton.
In other words Batteux, like the rest of them, is not so much a halter
between two opinions as a man who has deliberately made up his mind to
abide by one, but who will let in as much of the other as he thinks it safe to
His do, or cannot help doing. Let him once extend his principle
incompleteness.
of observation in time, country, and kind, and, being a
reasonably ingenious and ingenuous person, he must discover, first, that his
elaborate double-check system of Rule and Taste will not work, and,
secondly, that there is not the least need of it. You must charge epicycle on
cycle before you can get, even with the freest play of Taste, the Iliad and
the Æneid and the Orlando to work together under any Rule. Epicycle must
be added to epicycle before you can get in the Chanson de Roland and the
Morte d’Arthur as well. Drop your “rule,” ask simply, “Are the things put
before me said poeticamente?” “Do they give me the poetic pleasure?” and
there is no further difficulty. Batteux, though, as we have seen, by no means
a bigot, would probably have stopped his ears and rent his clothes if such a
suggestion had been made to him.
the open door, and leaving the prison of Rule and Kind behind him.
From these idols Batteux will not yet be separated: he hardens his heart
in a different manner from Pharaoh, and will not let himself go. The utile is
never to be parted from the dulce; “the poems of Homer and Virgil are not
vain Romances, where the mind wanders at the will of a mad imagination;
they are great bodies of doctrine,” &c. Anacreon [Heaven help us!] was
himself determined to be a moral teacher.[691] Again, there must be Action,
and it must be single, united, simple, yet of variety; the style must not be
too low, or too high, &c., &c.
When Batteux has got into the old rut, he remains in it. We slip into the
well-known treatises by Kinds—Dialogue, Eclogue, Heroic Poem, and the
rest—with the equally well-known examination afterwards of celebrated
examples in a shamefaced kind of way—to the extent of two whole
volumes for poetry, and a third (actually the fourth) for prose. Finally, we
have what is really a separate tractate, De la Construction Oratoire. The
details in these later volumes are often excellent; but obviously, and per se,
they fall into quite a lower rank as compared with the first. If we were to
look at nothing but the fact, frankly acknowledged by Batteux, that he is
now considering French classical literature only, we should be able to detect
the error. In his first volume he had at least referred to Milton.
In other words Batteux, like the rest of them, is not so much a halter
between two opinions as a man who has deliberately made up his mind to
abide by one, but who will let in as much of the other as he thinks it safe to
His do, or cannot help doing. Let him once extend his principle
incompleteness.
of observation in time, country, and kind, and, being a
reasonably ingenious and ingenuous person, he must discover, first, that his
elaborate double-check system of Rule and Taste will not work, and,
secondly, that there is not the least need of it. You must charge epicycle on
cycle before you can get, even with the freest play of Taste, the Iliad and
the Æneid and the Orlando to work together under any Rule. Epicycle must
be added to epicycle before you can get in the Chanson de Roland and the
Morte d’Arthur as well. Drop your “rule,” ask simply, “Are the things put
before me said poeticamente?” “Do they give me the poetic pleasure?” and
there is no further difficulty. Batteux, though, as we have seen, by no means
a bigot, would probably have stopped his ears and rent his clothes if such a
suggestion had been made to him.
Page 521
Batteux is a remarkable, and probably the latest, example of neo-
classicism sitting at ease in Zion and promulgating laws for submissive
nations; in La Harpe, with an even stronger dogmatism, we shall find, if not
the full consciousness that the enemy is at the gates of the capital, at any
rate distinct evidence of knowledge that there is sedition in the provinces.
[692]
Marmontel. Between the two, Marmontel[693] is a distinguished, and
a not disagreeable, example of that middle state which we find everywhere
in the late eighteenth century but which in France is distinguished at once
by greater professed orthodoxy, and by concessions and compromises of a
specially tell-tale kind. The critical work of the author of Bélisaire and Les
Incas is very considerable in bulk. He has written an Essay on Romance in
connection with the two very “anodyne” examples of the kind just referred
to; an Essay (indeed two essays) on Taste; many book reviews for the
Observateur Littéraire, &c.; prefaces and comments for some specimens of
French early seventeenth-century drama—Mairet’s Sophonisbe, Du Ryer’s
Scévole, &c.; and, besides other things, a mass of articles on literary and
critical subjects for the Encyclopédie, which are generally known in their
collected form as Éléments de Littérature. He has been rather variously
judged as a critic. There is no doubt that he is a special sinner in that
perpetual gabble about la vertu, la morale, and the rest, which is so
sickening in the whole group; and which more than justified Mr Carlyle’s
vigorous apostrophe, “Be virtuous, in the Devil’s name and his
grandmother’s, and have done with it!” He has also that apparent
inconsistency, something of which (as we have seen once for all in
Dryden’s case) often shows itself in men of alert literary interests who do
not very early work out for themselves a personal literary creed, and who
are averse to swallowing a ready-made one. But at the same time he never
openly quarrels with neo-classicism, and is sometimes one of its most
egregious spokesmen; while he is “philosophastrous,” in the special
eighteenth-century kind, to a point which closely approaches caricature. I
Oddities and have quoted elsewhere, but must necessarily quote again
qualities of his
criticism.
here, his three egregious and pyramidal reasons[694] for the
puzzling excellence of English poetry. Either, it seems, the
Englishman, being a glory-loving animal, sees that poetry adds to the lustre
of nations, and so he goes and does it; or being naturally given to
meditation and sadness, he needs to be moved and distracted by the
classicism sitting at ease in Zion and promulgating laws for submissive
nations; in La Harpe, with an even stronger dogmatism, we shall find, if not
the full consciousness that the enemy is at the gates of the capital, at any
rate distinct evidence of knowledge that there is sedition in the provinces.
[692]
Marmontel. Between the two, Marmontel[693] is a distinguished, and
a not disagreeable, example of that middle state which we find everywhere
in the late eighteenth century but which in France is distinguished at once
by greater professed orthodoxy, and by concessions and compromises of a
specially tell-tale kind. The critical work of the author of Bélisaire and Les
Incas is very considerable in bulk. He has written an Essay on Romance in
connection with the two very “anodyne” examples of the kind just referred
to; an Essay (indeed two essays) on Taste; many book reviews for the
Observateur Littéraire, &c.; prefaces and comments for some specimens of
French early seventeenth-century drama—Mairet’s Sophonisbe, Du Ryer’s
Scévole, &c.; and, besides other things, a mass of articles on literary and
critical subjects for the Encyclopédie, which are generally known in their
collected form as Éléments de Littérature. He has been rather variously
judged as a critic. There is no doubt that he is a special sinner in that
perpetual gabble about la vertu, la morale, and the rest, which is so
sickening in the whole group; and which more than justified Mr Carlyle’s
vigorous apostrophe, “Be virtuous, in the Devil’s name and his
grandmother’s, and have done with it!” He has also that apparent
inconsistency, something of which (as we have seen once for all in
Dryden’s case) often shows itself in men of alert literary interests who do
not very early work out for themselves a personal literary creed, and who
are averse to swallowing a ready-made one. But at the same time he never
openly quarrels with neo-classicism, and is sometimes one of its most
egregious spokesmen; while he is “philosophastrous,” in the special
eighteenth-century kind, to a point which closely approaches caricature. I
Oddities and have quoted elsewhere, but must necessarily quote again
qualities of his
criticism.
here, his three egregious and pyramidal reasons[694] for the
puzzling excellence of English poetry. Either, it seems, the
Englishman, being a glory-loving animal, sees that poetry adds to the lustre
of nations, and so he goes and does it; or being naturally given to
meditation and sadness, he needs to be moved and distracted by the
Page 522
illusions of this beautiful art; or [Shade of Molière!] it is because his genius
in certain respects is proper for Poesy.
To comment on this would only spoil it; but let it be observed that
Marmontel does admit the excellence of English poetry. So also, though he
never swerves, in consciousness or conscience, from neo-classic orthodoxy,
he insinuates certain doubts about Boileau, and quotes,[695] at full length,
two pieces of the despised Ronsard as showing lyrical qualities in which the
legislator of Parnassus is wanting. His article Poétique is, considering his
standpoint, a quite extraordinarily just summary and criticism of the most
celebrated authorities on the subject—Aristotle, Horace, Vida, Scaliger,
Castelvetro, Vauquelin, Boileau, Le Bossu, Gravina, &c.—and the attitude
to Boileau,[696] visible, as has been said, elsewhere, is extremely noteworthy.
Marmontel speaks of Despréaux with compliments: but some, even of his
praises, are not a little equivocal, and he contrives to put his subject’s faults
with perfect politeness indeed, but without a vestige of compromise.
Boileau, he says, gives a precise and luminous notion of all the kinds, but
he is not deep on a single one: his Art may contribute to form the taste if it
be well understood, but to understand it well one must have the taste
already formed.
It would be possible, of course,—indeed, very easy,—to select from
Marmontel’s abundant critical writings, which covered great part of a long
lifetime in their composition, a bundle of “classical” absurdities which
would leave nothing to desire. But the critic is almost always better than his
form of creed. He takes an obviously genuine, if of necessity not at first a
thoroughly well instructed, interest in the Histoire du Théâtre of the Frères
Parfait, the first systematic[697] dealing with old French literature since
Fauchet and Pasquier: his Essai sur les Romans, though of course
considered du côté moral, is, for his date, a noteworthy attempt in that
comparative and historical study of literature which was to lead to the new
birth of criticism. It is most remarkable to find him, in the early reviews of
his Observateur,[698] dating from the midst of the fifth decade of the
eighteenth century, observing, as to Hamlet in La Place’s translation, that
the ghost-scene and the duel with Laertes inspire terror and pathetic interest
at the very reading, asking why “our poets” should deny themselves the use
of these great springs of the two tragic passions, admiring the taste and
justice of the observations to the players, and actually finding Titus
Andronicus, though “frightful and sanguinary,” a thing worth serious study.
in certain respects is proper for Poesy.
To comment on this would only spoil it; but let it be observed that
Marmontel does admit the excellence of English poetry. So also, though he
never swerves, in consciousness or conscience, from neo-classic orthodoxy,
he insinuates certain doubts about Boileau, and quotes,[695] at full length,
two pieces of the despised Ronsard as showing lyrical qualities in which the
legislator of Parnassus is wanting. His article Poétique is, considering his
standpoint, a quite extraordinarily just summary and criticism of the most
celebrated authorities on the subject—Aristotle, Horace, Vida, Scaliger,
Castelvetro, Vauquelin, Boileau, Le Bossu, Gravina, &c.—and the attitude
to Boileau,[696] visible, as has been said, elsewhere, is extremely noteworthy.
Marmontel speaks of Despréaux with compliments: but some, even of his
praises, are not a little equivocal, and he contrives to put his subject’s faults
with perfect politeness indeed, but without a vestige of compromise.
Boileau, he says, gives a precise and luminous notion of all the kinds, but
he is not deep on a single one: his Art may contribute to form the taste if it
be well understood, but to understand it well one must have the taste
already formed.
It would be possible, of course,—indeed, very easy,—to select from
Marmontel’s abundant critical writings, which covered great part of a long
lifetime in their composition, a bundle of “classical” absurdities which
would leave nothing to desire. But the critic is almost always better than his
form of creed. He takes an obviously genuine, if of necessity not at first a
thoroughly well instructed, interest in the Histoire du Théâtre of the Frères
Parfait, the first systematic[697] dealing with old French literature since
Fauchet and Pasquier: his Essai sur les Romans, though of course
considered du côté moral, is, for his date, a noteworthy attempt in that
comparative and historical study of literature which was to lead to the new
birth of criticism. It is most remarkable to find him, in the early reviews of
his Observateur,[698] dating from the midst of the fifth decade of the
eighteenth century, observing, as to Hamlet in La Place’s translation, that
the ghost-scene and the duel with Laertes inspire terror and pathetic interest
at the very reading, asking why “our poets” should deny themselves the use
of these great springs of the two tragic passions, admiring the taste and
justice of the observations to the players, and actually finding Titus
Andronicus, though “frightful and sanguinary,” a thing worth serious study.
Page 523
That it is possible to extract from these very places, as from others, the
usual stuff about Shakespeare’s “want of order and decency,” &c., is of no
moment. This is matter of course: it is not matter of course that, in the dead
waist and middle of the eighteenth century, a French critic should write of
the description of Cleopatra on the Cydnus: “Ce morceau présente
Shakespeare sous un nouveau point de vue. On n’a connu jusqu'à présent
que la force du génie de cet auteur: on ne s’attendait pas à tant de
délicatesse et de légèreté.”[699]
I should like to dwell longer on Marmontel if it were only for two or
three phrases which appear in one short article,[700] “Depuis que Pascal et
Corneille, Racine et Boileau ont épuré et appauvri la langue de Marot et de
Montaigne.... Boileau n’avait pas reçu de la nature l’organe avec lequel on
sent les beautés simples et touchantes de notre divin fabuliste [La Fontaine
of course].... Il est à souhaiter qu’on n’abandonne pas ce langage du bon
vieux temps ... on ferait un joli dictionnaire des mots qu’on a tort
d’abandonner et de laisser vieillir.” It must be clear to any one who reads
these phrases that there is the germ of mil-huit-cent-trente in them—the first
and hardly certain sound of the knell of narrow, colourless vocabulary and
literature in France. But enough has probably been said. It would be
difficult to make out a case for Marmontel as in any way a great critic. He
has not cleared his mind of cant enough for that. But he is an instance, and
an important instance, of the way in which the clearing agents were being
gradually thrown into the minds of men of letters at this time, and of the
reaction which they were—at first partially and accidentally—producing.
Even his Essai sur le Goût, fantastically arbitrary as it is, wears at times
almost an air of irony, as if the writer were really exposing the arbitrariness
and the convention of the thing he is ostensibly praising. He is comparing
and tasting, not simply deducing: and however much he may still be
inclined to think with his master that the Satan, Sin, and Death piece is an
unimaginable horror, and the citizen scenes in Shakespeare’s Roman plays a
vulgar excrescence, he is far from the obstinate sublimity-in-absurdity of La
Harpe. He at least does not hold that a beauty, not according to rule, has no
business to be a beauty; that the tree is not to be judged by the fruit, but the
fruit by the ticket on the tree.
In the mare magnum of critical writing at this period, constantly fed by
books, literary periodicals, academic competitions, and what not, it would
be idle to attempt to chronicle drops—individuals who are not in some
usual stuff about Shakespeare’s “want of order and decency,” &c., is of no
moment. This is matter of course: it is not matter of course that, in the dead
waist and middle of the eighteenth century, a French critic should write of
the description of Cleopatra on the Cydnus: “Ce morceau présente
Shakespeare sous un nouveau point de vue. On n’a connu jusqu'à présent
que la force du génie de cet auteur: on ne s’attendait pas à tant de
délicatesse et de légèreté.”[699]
I should like to dwell longer on Marmontel if it were only for two or
three phrases which appear in one short article,[700] “Depuis que Pascal et
Corneille, Racine et Boileau ont épuré et appauvri la langue de Marot et de
Montaigne.... Boileau n’avait pas reçu de la nature l’organe avec lequel on
sent les beautés simples et touchantes de notre divin fabuliste [La Fontaine
of course].... Il est à souhaiter qu’on n’abandonne pas ce langage du bon
vieux temps ... on ferait un joli dictionnaire des mots qu’on a tort
d’abandonner et de laisser vieillir.” It must be clear to any one who reads
these phrases that there is the germ of mil-huit-cent-trente in them—the first
and hardly certain sound of the knell of narrow, colourless vocabulary and
literature in France. But enough has probably been said. It would be
difficult to make out a case for Marmontel as in any way a great critic. He
has not cleared his mind of cant enough for that. But he is an instance, and
an important instance, of the way in which the clearing agents were being
gradually thrown into the minds of men of letters at this time, and of the
reaction which they were—at first partially and accidentally—producing.
Even his Essai sur le Goût, fantastically arbitrary as it is, wears at times
almost an air of irony, as if the writer were really exposing the arbitrariness
and the convention of the thing he is ostensibly praising. He is comparing
and tasting, not simply deducing: and however much he may still be
inclined to think with his master that the Satan, Sin, and Death piece is an
unimaginable horror, and the citizen scenes in Shakespeare’s Roman plays a
vulgar excrescence, he is far from the obstinate sublimity-in-absurdity of La
Harpe. He at least does not hold that a beauty, not according to rule, has no
business to be a beauty; that the tree is not to be judged by the fruit, but the
fruit by the ticket on the tree.
In the mare magnum of critical writing at this period, constantly fed by
books, literary periodicals, academic competitions, and what not, it would
be idle to attempt to chronicle drops—individuals who are not in some
Page 524
Others. special way interesting or representative. It would be
especially idle because—for reasons indicated more than once in passing
already—the bulk of the criticism of this time in France is really of little
value, being as doctrine make-believe, and destitute of thoroughness, and as
appreciation injured by narrowness of reading and want of true literary
interest. It cannot have been quite accidental, although the great
collaborative Histoire de la Littérature Française of the late M. Petit de
Julleville is not a model of methodic adequacy, that there is no strictly
Thomas, Suard, critical chapter in the volume on the eighteenth century.
&c.
Take, for instance, two such representative men as Suard
and Thomas, both of them born near the beginning of the second generation
of the century, and therefore characteristic of its very central class and crû.
Both enjoyed almost the highest reputation in the second rank. Marmontel
somewhere speaks of Thomas’s Essai sur les Éloges as the best piece of
critical inquiry which had appeared since Cicero on the Orator; but it is fair
to remember that Thomas had refused to stand against Marmontel for the
Academy. Suard, for many years Secretary of the Academy itself, seriously
endeavoured, and was by his contemporaries thought not to have
endeavoured in vain, to make that office a sort of Criticship Laureate or
King’s Remembrancership of Literature. He has left volumes on volumes of
critical work; and even now prefaces, introductions, &c., from his pen may
be found in the older class of standard editions of French classics. Yet the
work of neither of these would justify us in doing more than refer to them in
this fashion. It is excellently written in the current style, inclining to
declamation and solemnity in Thomas,[701] to persiflage and smartness in
Suard. It says what an academic critic of the time was supposed to say, and
knows what he was supposed to know. But it really is, in Miss Mills’
excellent figure, “the desert of Sahara,” and a desert without many, if any,
oases.
La Harpe is a different person. He is not very kind to Batteux. He
La Harpe. patronises his principles, and allows his scholarship to be
sound; but finds fault with his style, calls his criticism commune—“lacking
in distinction” is perhaps the best equivalent—his ideas narrow, and his
prejudices pedantic. It would not be quite just to say De te fabula, but this is
almost as much as we could say if we were judging La Harpe, after his own
fashion of judgment, from a different standpoint. But the historian cannot
judge thus. La Harpe is really an important person in the History of
especially idle because—for reasons indicated more than once in passing
already—the bulk of the criticism of this time in France is really of little
value, being as doctrine make-believe, and destitute of thoroughness, and as
appreciation injured by narrowness of reading and want of true literary
interest. It cannot have been quite accidental, although the great
collaborative Histoire de la Littérature Française of the late M. Petit de
Julleville is not a model of methodic adequacy, that there is no strictly
Thomas, Suard, critical chapter in the volume on the eighteenth century.
&c.
Take, for instance, two such representative men as Suard
and Thomas, both of them born near the beginning of the second generation
of the century, and therefore characteristic of its very central class and crû.
Both enjoyed almost the highest reputation in the second rank. Marmontel
somewhere speaks of Thomas’s Essai sur les Éloges as the best piece of
critical inquiry which had appeared since Cicero on the Orator; but it is fair
to remember that Thomas had refused to stand against Marmontel for the
Academy. Suard, for many years Secretary of the Academy itself, seriously
endeavoured, and was by his contemporaries thought not to have
endeavoured in vain, to make that office a sort of Criticship Laureate or
King’s Remembrancership of Literature. He has left volumes on volumes of
critical work; and even now prefaces, introductions, &c., from his pen may
be found in the older class of standard editions of French classics. Yet the
work of neither of these would justify us in doing more than refer to them in
this fashion. It is excellently written in the current style, inclining to
declamation and solemnity in Thomas,[701] to persiflage and smartness in
Suard. It says what an academic critic of the time was supposed to say, and
knows what he was supposed to know. But it really is, in Miss Mills’
excellent figure, “the desert of Sahara,” and a desert without many, if any,
oases.
La Harpe is a different person. He is not very kind to Batteux. He
La Harpe. patronises his principles, and allows his scholarship to be
sound; but finds fault with his style, calls his criticism commune—“lacking
in distinction” is perhaps the best equivalent—his ideas narrow, and his
prejudices pedantic. It would not be quite just to say De te fabula, but this is
almost as much as we could say if we were judging La Harpe, after his own
fashion of judgment, from a different standpoint. But the historian cannot
judge thus. La Harpe is really an important person in the History of
Page 525
Criticism. He “makes an end,” as Mr Carlyle used to say; in other words,
whether he is or is not the last eminent neo-classical critic of France, he
puts this particular phase of criticism as sharply and as effectively as it can
be put. Nay, he does even more than this for us; he shows us neo-classicism
at bay. Already, by the time of his later lectures, when by the oddest
coincidence he was defending Voltaire and abusing Diderot, making head at
once against the Jacobins and against that party of revived mediævalism
which was the surest antidote to Jacobinism, there were persons—
Népomucène Lemercier, and others—who held that Boileau and Racine had
killed French poetry. Against these La Harpe takes up his testimony; and the
necessity of opposition makes it all the more decided.
His Cours de Littérature is a formidable—I had almost called it an
impossible—book to tackle, composed of, or redacted from, the lectures of
many years, and unfortunately, though not unnaturally, dwelling most fully
His Cours de on the parts of the subject that are of least real importance.
Littérature.
Its first edition[702] was a shelf-full in itself. It now fills,
with some fragments, nearly the whole of three great volumes of the
Panthéon Littéraire, and nearly two-thirds, certainly three-fifths, of this are
devoted to the French literature of the eighteenth century, a subject for
which, to speak frankly, it may be doubted whether any posterity will have
time corresponding to spare. Even in the earlier and more general parts
there are defects, quite unconnected with the soundness or unsoundness of
La Harpe’s general critical position. There is nothing which one should be
slower to impute, save on the very clearest evidence, than ignorance of a
subject of which a writer professes knowledge; and one should be slow, not
merely on general principles of good manners, but because there is nothing
which the baser kind of critic is so ready to impute. But I own that, after
careful reading and reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that La
Harpe’s knowledge of the classics left a very great deal to desire. That, in
his survey of Epic, he omits Apollonius Rhodius in his proper place
altogether and puts him in a postscript, might be a mere oversight,
negligible by all but the illiberal: unfortunately the postscript itself shows
no signs of critical appreciation. It is more unfortunate still that he should
say that all the writers of ancient Rome loaded Catullus with eulogy, when
we know that Horace only spares him a passing sneer, that Quintilian has no
notice for anything but his “bitterness,” and that hardly anybody but Martial
does him real justice. However, we need not dwell on this. If La Harpe was
whether he is or is not the last eminent neo-classical critic of France, he
puts this particular phase of criticism as sharply and as effectively as it can
be put. Nay, he does even more than this for us; he shows us neo-classicism
at bay. Already, by the time of his later lectures, when by the oddest
coincidence he was defending Voltaire and abusing Diderot, making head at
once against the Jacobins and against that party of revived mediævalism
which was the surest antidote to Jacobinism, there were persons—
Népomucène Lemercier, and others—who held that Boileau and Racine had
killed French poetry. Against these La Harpe takes up his testimony; and the
necessity of opposition makes it all the more decided.
His Cours de Littérature is a formidable—I had almost called it an
impossible—book to tackle, composed of, or redacted from, the lectures of
many years, and unfortunately, though not unnaturally, dwelling most fully
His Cours de on the parts of the subject that are of least real importance.
Littérature.
Its first edition[702] was a shelf-full in itself. It now fills,
with some fragments, nearly the whole of three great volumes of the
Panthéon Littéraire, and nearly two-thirds, certainly three-fifths, of this are
devoted to the French literature of the eighteenth century, a subject for
which, to speak frankly, it may be doubted whether any posterity will have
time corresponding to spare. Even in the earlier and more general parts
there are defects, quite unconnected with the soundness or unsoundness of
La Harpe’s general critical position. There is nothing which one should be
slower to impute, save on the very clearest evidence, than ignorance of a
subject of which a writer professes knowledge; and one should be slow, not
merely on general principles of good manners, but because there is nothing
which the baser kind of critic is so ready to impute. But I own that, after
careful reading and reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that La
Harpe’s knowledge of the classics left a very great deal to desire. That, in
his survey of Epic, he omits Apollonius Rhodius in his proper place
altogether and puts him in a postscript, might be a mere oversight,
negligible by all but the illiberal: unfortunately the postscript itself shows
no signs of critical appreciation. It is more unfortunate still that he should
say that all the writers of ancient Rome loaded Catullus with eulogy, when
we know that Horace only spares him a passing sneer, that Quintilian has no
notice for anything but his “bitterness,” and that hardly anybody but Martial
does him real justice. However, we need not dwell on this. If La Harpe was
Page 526
not very widely or deeply read in old-world or in old-French literature, he
certainly knew the French literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries very well indeed.
On the other hand, it is significant, and awkward, that, in dealing with
English, German, and other modern literatures, he always seems to refer to
translations, and hardly ever ventures a criticism except on the mere matter
His critical of the poem. Moreover, which is of even more importance
position as
ultimus
for us, he was not in the slightest doubt about his point of
suorum. view either of these or of any other literature. His censures
and his praises are adjusted with almost unerring accuracy
to the neo-classic creed, as we have defined and illustrated it in this volume.
His Introduction pours all the scorn he could muster on those who contemn
the art of writing. Even Shakespeare, coarse as he is, was not without
learning. That poet, Dante, and Milton executed “monstrous” works; but in
these monsters there were some beautiful parts done according to “the
principles.” And, to do him justice, he never swerves or flinches from this.
English has “an inconceivable pronunciation.”[703] The Odyssey is an
Arabian Nights’ tale, puerile, languid, seriously extravagant, even ignoble
in parts. The sojourns with Calypso and Circe offer nothing interesting to
La Harpe. The wonderful descent to Hades is as bad as that of Æneas is
admirable. La Harpe tells us that these and other similar judgments are
proofs of his severe frankness. They certainly are; he has told us what he is.
That after this he should pronounce the Georgics “the most perfect poem
transmitted to us by the Ancients”; fix on the Prometheus his favourite
epithet of “monstrous,” and say that it “cannot even be called a tragedy”;
think Plutarch thoroughly justified in his censure of Aristophanes; read
Thucydides with less pleasure than Xenophon; and decide that Apuleius
wrote vers le moyen age, which was un désert,—these things do not
surprise us, nor that he should tolerate Ossian after not tolerating Milton. It
is in his fragment on the last-named poet that he gives us his whole secret,
with one of those intentional, yet really unconscious, bursts of frankness
which have been already noticed. “La poésie,” he says, “ne doit me peindre
que ce que je peux comprendre, admettre, ou supposer.” That “suspension
of disbelief” in which, at no distant date, Coleridge was to discover the real
poetic effect would, it is clear, have been vehemently resisted and refused
by La Harpe, or rather it could never have entered his head as possible.
certainly knew the French literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries very well indeed.
On the other hand, it is significant, and awkward, that, in dealing with
English, German, and other modern literatures, he always seems to refer to
translations, and hardly ever ventures a criticism except on the mere matter
His critical of the poem. Moreover, which is of even more importance
position as
ultimus
for us, he was not in the slightest doubt about his point of
suorum. view either of these or of any other literature. His censures
and his praises are adjusted with almost unerring accuracy
to the neo-classic creed, as we have defined and illustrated it in this volume.
His Introduction pours all the scorn he could muster on those who contemn
the art of writing. Even Shakespeare, coarse as he is, was not without
learning. That poet, Dante, and Milton executed “monstrous” works; but in
these monsters there were some beautiful parts done according to “the
principles.” And, to do him justice, he never swerves or flinches from this.
English has “an inconceivable pronunciation.”[703] The Odyssey is an
Arabian Nights’ tale, puerile, languid, seriously extravagant, even ignoble
in parts. The sojourns with Calypso and Circe offer nothing interesting to
La Harpe. The wonderful descent to Hades is as bad as that of Æneas is
admirable. La Harpe tells us that these and other similar judgments are
proofs of his severe frankness. They certainly are; he has told us what he is.
That after this he should pronounce the Georgics “the most perfect poem
transmitted to us by the Ancients”; fix on the Prometheus his favourite
epithet of “monstrous,” and say that it “cannot even be called a tragedy”;
think Plutarch thoroughly justified in his censure of Aristophanes; read
Thucydides with less pleasure than Xenophon; and decide that Apuleius
wrote vers le moyen age, which was un désert,—these things do not
surprise us, nor that he should tolerate Ossian after not tolerating Milton. It
is in his fragment on the last-named poet that he gives us his whole secret,
with one of those intentional, yet really unconscious, bursts of frankness
which have been already noticed. “La poésie,” he says, “ne doit me peindre
que ce que je peux comprendre, admettre, ou supposer.” That “suspension
of disbelief” in which, at no distant date, Coleridge was to discover the real
poetic effect would, it is clear, have been vehemently resisted and refused
by La Harpe, or rather it could never have entered his head as possible.
Page 527
He remains therefore hopelessly self-shut out of the gates of Poetry—
only admitting and comprehending those beauties which stray into the
precinct of Rhetoric; discerning with horror “monsters” within the gates
themselves; and in his milder moments conjecturing charitably that, if
Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton had only always observed the rules, which
they sometimes slipped into, they might have been nearly as good poets—
he will not say quite—as Racine and Voltaire. Never have we met, nor shall
we ever meet again, a critical Ephraim so utterly joined to idols. It is
unnecessary—it would even be useless—to argue about him; he must be
observed, registered, and passed. Yet I do not pretend to regret the time
which I have myself spent over him. He writes well; he sees clearly through
his “monstrous” spectacles and subject to their laws; above all, he has, what
is, for some readers at any rate, the intense and unfailing charm of
“Thorough.” He is no cowardly Braggadochio or inconstant Paridell: he is
Sansfoy and Sansloy in one—defending his Duessa, and perfectly ready to
draw sword and spend blood for her at any moment. Nor does he wield the
said sword by any means uncraftsmanly. Give him his premisses and his
postulates, his Rules, his false Reason and sham Nature, his criterion of the
admissible and comprehensible, and he very seldom makes a false
conclusion. Would that all Gloriana’s own knights were as
uncompromising, as hardy, and as deft!
Of the immense mass of Academic Éloges, and prize Essays generally,
composed during the eighteenth century, no extended or minute account
The Academic will be expected here. I have myself, speaking without the
Essay.
slightest exaggeration, read hundreds of them: indeed it is
difficult to find a French man of letters, of any name during the whole time,
in whose works some specimens of the kind do not figure. But—and it is at
once a reason for dealing with them generally and a reason for not dealing
with them as individuals—there is hardly any kind of publication which
more fatally indicates the defects of the Academic system, and of that phase
of criticism and literary taste of which it was the exponent. They were
written in some cases—it is but repeating in other words what has been just
said—by men of the greatest talent; they constituted with a play of one kind
or another, the almost invariable début of every Frenchman who had literary
talent, great or small. They exhibit a relatively high level of a certain kind
of literary, or at least rhetorical, attainment. But the last adjective has let
slip the dogs on them, for they are almost always rhetorical in the worst
only admitting and comprehending those beauties which stray into the
precinct of Rhetoric; discerning with horror “monsters” within the gates
themselves; and in his milder moments conjecturing charitably that, if
Dante, Shakespeare, and Milton had only always observed the rules, which
they sometimes slipped into, they might have been nearly as good poets—
he will not say quite—as Racine and Voltaire. Never have we met, nor shall
we ever meet again, a critical Ephraim so utterly joined to idols. It is
unnecessary—it would even be useless—to argue about him; he must be
observed, registered, and passed. Yet I do not pretend to regret the time
which I have myself spent over him. He writes well; he sees clearly through
his “monstrous” spectacles and subject to their laws; above all, he has, what
is, for some readers at any rate, the intense and unfailing charm of
“Thorough.” He is no cowardly Braggadochio or inconstant Paridell: he is
Sansfoy and Sansloy in one—defending his Duessa, and perfectly ready to
draw sword and spend blood for her at any moment. Nor does he wield the
said sword by any means uncraftsmanly. Give him his premisses and his
postulates, his Rules, his false Reason and sham Nature, his criterion of the
admissible and comprehensible, and he very seldom makes a false
conclusion. Would that all Gloriana’s own knights were as
uncompromising, as hardy, and as deft!
Of the immense mass of Academic Éloges, and prize Essays generally,
composed during the eighteenth century, no extended or minute account
The Academic will be expected here. I have myself, speaking without the
Essay.
slightest exaggeration, read hundreds of them: indeed it is
difficult to find a French man of letters, of any name during the whole time,
in whose works some specimens of the kind do not figure. But—and it is at
once a reason for dealing with them generally and a reason for not dealing
with them as individuals—there is hardly any kind of publication which
more fatally indicates the defects of the Academic system, and of that phase
of criticism and literary taste of which it was the exponent. They were
written in some cases—it is but repeating in other words what has been just
said—by men of the greatest talent; they constituted with a play of one kind
or another, the almost invariable début of every Frenchman who had literary
talent, great or small. They exhibit a relatively high level of a certain kind
of literary, or at least rhetorical, attainment. But the last adjective has let
slip the dogs on them, for they are almost always rhetorical in the worst
Page 528
senses of the word. Extensive reading in literature was not wanted by the
forty guards of the Capitol; original thinking was quite certain to alarm
them. The elegant nullity of the Greek Declamation, and the ampullæ of the
Roman, were the best things that were likely to be found. Yet sometimes in
literature, as in philosophy, the Academic Essay produced remarkable
things. And we may give some space to perhaps its most remarkable writer
towards the close of the time, a writer symptomatic in the very highest
degree, as showing the hold which neo-classic ideas still had in France—
that is to say, Rivarol.[704]
That “the St George of the epigram” might have been really great as a
critic there can be little doubt; besides lesser exercises in this vocation,
which are always acute if not always quite just, he has left us two fairly
solid Essays, and a brilliant literary “skit,” to enable us to judge. The last of
Rivarol. the three, the Almanach des Grands Hommes de nos jours,
does, with more wit, better temper, and better manners, what Gifford was to
do a little later in England; it is a sort of sprinkling of an anodyne but potent
Keating’s powder on the small poets and men of letters of the time just
before the Revolution. But the treatise De l’Universalité de la Langue
Française, laid before the Academy of Berlin in 1783, and the Preface to
the writer’s Translation of the Inferno, are really solid documents. Both are
prodigies of ingenuity, acuteness, and command of phrase, conditioned by
want of knowledge and by parti pris. How praise Dante better than by
saying that Italian took in his hands “une fierté qu’elle n’eut plus après lui”?
[705]
how better describe what we miss even in Ariosto, even in Petrarch? Yet
how go further astray than in finding fault with the Inferno because “on ne
rencontre pas assez d’épisodes”?[706] What a critical piercing to the joints
and marrow of the fault of eighteenth-century poetry is the remark that
Dante’s verses “se tiennent debout par la seule force du substantif et du
verbe sans le concours d’une seule épithète!” And what a falling off is there
when one passes from this to the old beauty-and-fault jangles and jars!
The Universality of French[707] has many points of curiosity; but we must
abide by those which are strictly literary. The temptation of the style to
rhetoric, and, at the same time, “the solace of this sin,” could hardly be
better shown than in Rivarol’s phrasing of the radical and inseparable
clearness of French, as “une probité attachée à son génie.”[708] How happy is
the admission that poets of other countries “give their metaphors at a higher
strength,” “embrace the figurative style closer,” and are deeper and fuller in
forty guards of the Capitol; original thinking was quite certain to alarm
them. The elegant nullity of the Greek Declamation, and the ampullæ of the
Roman, were the best things that were likely to be found. Yet sometimes in
literature, as in philosophy, the Academic Essay produced remarkable
things. And we may give some space to perhaps its most remarkable writer
towards the close of the time, a writer symptomatic in the very highest
degree, as showing the hold which neo-classic ideas still had in France—
that is to say, Rivarol.[704]
That “the St George of the epigram” might have been really great as a
critic there can be little doubt; besides lesser exercises in this vocation,
which are always acute if not always quite just, he has left us two fairly
solid Essays, and a brilliant literary “skit,” to enable us to judge. The last of
Rivarol. the three, the Almanach des Grands Hommes de nos jours,
does, with more wit, better temper, and better manners, what Gifford was to
do a little later in England; it is a sort of sprinkling of an anodyne but potent
Keating’s powder on the small poets and men of letters of the time just
before the Revolution. But the treatise De l’Universalité de la Langue
Française, laid before the Academy of Berlin in 1783, and the Preface to
the writer’s Translation of the Inferno, are really solid documents. Both are
prodigies of ingenuity, acuteness, and command of phrase, conditioned by
want of knowledge and by parti pris. How praise Dante better than by
saying that Italian took in his hands “une fierté qu’elle n’eut plus après lui”?
[705]
how better describe what we miss even in Ariosto, even in Petrarch? Yet
how go further astray than in finding fault with the Inferno because “on ne
rencontre pas assez d’épisodes”?[706] What a critical piercing to the joints
and marrow of the fault of eighteenth-century poetry is the remark that
Dante’s verses “se tiennent debout par la seule force du substantif et du
verbe sans le concours d’une seule épithète!” And what a falling off is there
when one passes from this to the old beauty-and-fault jangles and jars!
The Universality of French[707] has many points of curiosity; but we must
abide by those which are strictly literary. The temptation of the style to
rhetoric, and, at the same time, “the solace of this sin,” could hardly be
better shown than in Rivarol’s phrasing of the radical and inseparable
clearness of French, as “une probité attachée à son génie.”[708] How happy is
the admission that poets of other countries “give their metaphors at a higher
strength,” “embrace the figurative style closer,” and are deeper and fuller in
Page 529
colour! Yet the history, both of French and English literature, given in each
case at some length, is inadequate and incorrect, the comparisons are
childish, and the vaticinations absurd. In fact, Rivarol was writing up to
certain fixed ideas, the chief of which was that the French literature of
1660-1780 was the greatest that had ever existed—perhaps that ever could
exist—in the world.
This notion—to which it is but just to admit that other nations had given
only too much countenance and support, though England and Germany at
least were fast emancipating themselves—and the numbing effect of the
general neo-classic creed from which it was no very extravagant deduction,
mar a very large proportion[709] of French criticism during the century, and,
almost without exception, the whole of what we here call its orthodox
criticism. So long as it, or anything like it, prevails in any country, at any
time, the best criticism is impossible; the “He followeth not us” interferes
with all due appreciation.[710]
649. The standard edition of Fontenelle (8 vols., Paris, 1790) is an
agreeable book, excellent in print and paper.
650. Op. cit. sup., especially Part I., chaps, ix. and xi.
651. Though there is a good deal of the critical spirit in him, too, and the
famous advice to “Bélier, mon ami” has fellows of critical application.
652. Œuvres, ed. cit., i. 234.
653. Œuvres, i. 249.
654. Ibid., p. 270. The Dialogues, it should perhaps be said, appeared
first, as early as 1683.
655. Ed. cit., iii. 1-67.
656. Ed. cit., iii. 181.
657. As if, however, to show that one must never speak of Fontenelle
without reserves, there are some extremely interesting things here also. For
case at some length, is inadequate and incorrect, the comparisons are
childish, and the vaticinations absurd. In fact, Rivarol was writing up to
certain fixed ideas, the chief of which was that the French literature of
1660-1780 was the greatest that had ever existed—perhaps that ever could
exist—in the world.
This notion—to which it is but just to admit that other nations had given
only too much countenance and support, though England and Germany at
least were fast emancipating themselves—and the numbing effect of the
general neo-classic creed from which it was no very extravagant deduction,
mar a very large proportion[709] of French criticism during the century, and,
almost without exception, the whole of what we here call its orthodox
criticism. So long as it, or anything like it, prevails in any country, at any
time, the best criticism is impossible; the “He followeth not us” interferes
with all due appreciation.[710]
649. The standard edition of Fontenelle (8 vols., Paris, 1790) is an
agreeable book, excellent in print and paper.
650. Op. cit. sup., especially Part I., chaps, ix. and xi.
651. Though there is a good deal of the critical spirit in him, too, and the
famous advice to “Bélier, mon ami” has fellows of critical application.
652. Œuvres, ed. cit., i. 234.
653. Œuvres, i. 249.
654. Ibid., p. 270. The Dialogues, it should perhaps be said, appeared
first, as early as 1683.
655. Ed. cit., iii. 1-67.
656. Ed. cit., iii. 181.
657. As if, however, to show that one must never speak of Fontenelle
without reserves, there are some extremely interesting things here also. For
Page 530
instance, the characteristic malice, with a serious and sensible side to it, of
the law that the sentiments and language of the artificial pastoral shall bear
the same relation to nature as ces habits que l’on prend dans des ballets
pour représenter les paysans.
the law that the sentiments and language of the artificial pastoral shall bear
the same relation to nature as ces habits que l’on prend dans des ballets
pour représenter les paysans.
Page 531
658. My copy is the Œuvres (Paris, 1754) in 10 vols. (the first divided
into two parts).
659. The main documents of which are Madame Dacier’s Traité des
causes de la corruption du goût (Paris, 1714) and La Motte’s Réflexions sur
la Critique, which will be found in the third volume of the ed. just
mentioned.
660. In his Premier Discours sur la Tragédie, ed. cit. sup., iv. 23 sq.
661. 4 vols., Paris, 1720-1731.
662. Op. cit. inf., I. xx.
663. 3 vols., Paris, 1730.
664. I have found him repeatedly quoted in those interesting early
gropings of the German nonage, which will be referred to in the next
chapter. Had he anything to do with Lady Mary W. Montagu’s tormentor,
Rémond?
665. 5 vols., Amsterdam, 1750. It is rather too pretty, and so rare. But it is
in the British Museum: and I have a copy (which I owe to the kindness of
Mr Gregory Smith) of the Réflexions (v. inf.) It has only initials (“R. D. S.
M.”) on the title-page.
666. i. 65, ed. cit. The Dialogues themselves had appeared as early as
1711.
667. The Réflexions sur la poésie suivies de lettres, &c., had originally
appeared in 1733-34 at The Hague. The passage is this: On y rapproche de
nous les objets qui sont les plus éloignés—on leur donne du corps—on les
anime. Toute la Nature est agitée des mêmes passions que nous.
668. 6 vols., Paris, 1808. For in this kind of work one must often read six
volumes to justify the writing of six lines. And Racine, to do him justice, if
not a great genius, is no small symptom. When a Frenchman of his time and
associations reads Milton reverently, something will happen soon.
into two parts).
659. The main documents of which are Madame Dacier’s Traité des
causes de la corruption du goût (Paris, 1714) and La Motte’s Réflexions sur
la Critique, which will be found in the third volume of the ed. just
mentioned.
660. In his Premier Discours sur la Tragédie, ed. cit. sup., iv. 23 sq.
661. 4 vols., Paris, 1720-1731.
662. Op. cit. inf., I. xx.
663. 3 vols., Paris, 1730.
664. I have found him repeatedly quoted in those interesting early
gropings of the German nonage, which will be referred to in the next
chapter. Had he anything to do with Lady Mary W. Montagu’s tormentor,
Rémond?
665. 5 vols., Amsterdam, 1750. It is rather too pretty, and so rare. But it is
in the British Museum: and I have a copy (which I owe to the kindness of
Mr Gregory Smith) of the Réflexions (v. inf.) It has only initials (“R. D. S.
M.”) on the title-page.
666. i. 65, ed. cit. The Dialogues themselves had appeared as early as
1711.
667. The Réflexions sur la poésie suivies de lettres, &c., had originally
appeared in 1733-34 at The Hague. The passage is this: On y rapproche de
nous les objets qui sont les plus éloignés—on leur donne du corps—on les
anime. Toute la Nature est agitée des mêmes passions que nous.
668. 6 vols., Paris, 1808. For in this kind of work one must often read six
volumes to justify the writing of six lines. And Racine, to do him justice, if
not a great genius, is no small symptom. When a Frenchman of his time and
associations reads Milton reverently, something will happen soon.
Page 532
669. 2 vols., Paris, 1719. In English by T. Nugent: 3 vols., 1748.
670. Op. cit., Part I., § 35. His justest strictures are on the extravagantly
syllabic quality of French prosody, and its neglect of quantity. His ear seems
to have been good for rhythm, bad for rhyme.
671. Why did he think that Hudibras was written par un homme de la
maison Hovvart? [i.e., Howard] (i. 132). I may note here that Père Andrè,
with his Essai sur le Beau, is postponed, as a pure Æsthetician, to the next
volume.
672. Pensées Diverses (Œuvres, ed. Laboulaye, Paris, 1875, 7 vols., or
with Vian’s Life 8), vii. 171.
673. It has been thought that this passage, as glancing at the Henriade,
was one of the reasons of Voltaire’s affection for Montesquieu. It is perhaps
worth observing that there is a strong resemblance, with some minor
differences, between Montesquieu’s attitude to literature, and that of his
friend Chesterfield.
674. I use the thirteen-vol. ed. of the Panthéon Littéraire (Paris, 1876)
because, though cumbrous individually, it is the only one that will go in
moderate shelf-room.
675. This comes, it is true, from the Sentiments du Curé Meslier (vi.
542). But it is allowed that Voltaire rewrote this, and I should not be
surprised if he did a little more.
676. These are to be found in more places than one: the Lettres sur les
Anglais (originally Lettres Philosophiques), those to the Prince of
Brunswick, the dialogue in which Rabelais figures with Lucian and
Erasmus, &c.
677. This, the usually quoted form, runs in the Lettres sur les A., “un
Rabelais dans son bon sens, et vivant en bonne compagnie.”
678. Ed. cit., ix. 56.
670. Op. cit., Part I., § 35. His justest strictures are on the extravagantly
syllabic quality of French prosody, and its neglect of quantity. His ear seems
to have been good for rhythm, bad for rhyme.
671. Why did he think that Hudibras was written par un homme de la
maison Hovvart? [i.e., Howard] (i. 132). I may note here that Père Andrè,
with his Essai sur le Beau, is postponed, as a pure Æsthetician, to the next
volume.
672. Pensées Diverses (Œuvres, ed. Laboulaye, Paris, 1875, 7 vols., or
with Vian’s Life 8), vii. 171.
673. It has been thought that this passage, as glancing at the Henriade,
was one of the reasons of Voltaire’s affection for Montesquieu. It is perhaps
worth observing that there is a strong resemblance, with some minor
differences, between Montesquieu’s attitude to literature, and that of his
friend Chesterfield.
674. I use the thirteen-vol. ed. of the Panthéon Littéraire (Paris, 1876)
because, though cumbrous individually, it is the only one that will go in
moderate shelf-room.
675. This comes, it is true, from the Sentiments du Curé Meslier (vi.
542). But it is allowed that Voltaire rewrote this, and I should not be
surprised if he did a little more.
676. These are to be found in more places than one: the Lettres sur les
Anglais (originally Lettres Philosophiques), those to the Prince of
Brunswick, the dialogue in which Rabelais figures with Lucian and
Erasmus, &c.
677. This, the usually quoted form, runs in the Lettres sur les A., “un
Rabelais dans son bon sens, et vivant en bonne compagnie.”
678. Ed. cit., ix. 56.
Page 533
679. I have not thought it necessary to waste time and space by selecting
additional justificatory pieces from his enormous Correspondence.
680. This attitude was emphasised (perhaps by his dislike of Rousseau) in
his later years; and was handed on to men like Condorcet and La Harpe.
681. The gibe of Gautier (Caprices et Zigzags, “Un tour en Belgique”),
where he calls the Sun “un astre à qui M. de Malfilâtre fait une ode trouvée
admirable par D’Alembert” contains no doubt something of youthful
Romantic naughtiness in it: but also something more. The ode has a frigid
Akensidish grace; but there is too much about axes and orbits therein: and it
is to be feared that this, rather than the poetry, attracted the philosophe
critic.
682. His Academic Discours de Réception (Aug. 25, 1753). It is easily
accessible—for instance in the Didot Œuvres Choisies, i. 19-25.
683. It is generally quoted “Le style c’est l’homme.” There is a further
dispute whether it ought to be “de l’homme même.” For what is probably
the nearest anticipation of it, v. sup., p. 336.
684. So again in the remark, not made formally, but often thrown in his
face, that certain verses were “as fine as fine prose.” But this heresy, as
readers of this volume will know, is only that of Fénelon and La Motte
revived.
685. His literary work has only one small section to itself, the Réflexions
Critiques sur quelques Poètes; but some of it appears in the Fragments, the
Dialogues, and elsewhere. All is in Gilbert’s excellent edition of the
Œuvres, (2 vols., Paris, 1857), some in that volume of the Didot Collection
which gives Vauvenargues’ Maxims with those of La Rochefoucauld and
Montesquieu.
686. Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe, Paris, 1746; Cours de
Belles-Lettres, 4 vols., Paris, 1750; Traité de la Construction Oratoire,
Paris, 1764.
additional justificatory pieces from his enormous Correspondence.
680. This attitude was emphasised (perhaps by his dislike of Rousseau) in
his later years; and was handed on to men like Condorcet and La Harpe.
681. The gibe of Gautier (Caprices et Zigzags, “Un tour en Belgique”),
where he calls the Sun “un astre à qui M. de Malfilâtre fait une ode trouvée
admirable par D’Alembert” contains no doubt something of youthful
Romantic naughtiness in it: but also something more. The ode has a frigid
Akensidish grace; but there is too much about axes and orbits therein: and it
is to be feared that this, rather than the poetry, attracted the philosophe
critic.
682. His Academic Discours de Réception (Aug. 25, 1753). It is easily
accessible—for instance in the Didot Œuvres Choisies, i. 19-25.
683. It is generally quoted “Le style c’est l’homme.” There is a further
dispute whether it ought to be “de l’homme même.” For what is probably
the nearest anticipation of it, v. sup., p. 336.
684. So again in the remark, not made formally, but often thrown in his
face, that certain verses were “as fine as fine prose.” But this heresy, as
readers of this volume will know, is only that of Fénelon and La Motte
revived.
685. His literary work has only one small section to itself, the Réflexions
Critiques sur quelques Poètes; but some of it appears in the Fragments, the
Dialogues, and elsewhere. All is in Gilbert’s excellent edition of the
Œuvres, (2 vols., Paris, 1857), some in that volume of the Didot Collection
which gives Vauvenargues’ Maxims with those of La Rochefoucauld and
Montesquieu.
686. Les Beaux Arts réduits à un même principe, Paris, 1746; Cours de
Belles-Lettres, 4 vols., Paris, 1750; Traité de la Construction Oratoire,
Paris, 1764.
Page 534
687. 5 vols., Paris, 1764. This is the edition I have used; later ones seem
to be in 6 vols., but without addition so far as I know.
688. 2 vols., Paris, 1771.
689. It is perhaps right to warn the reader that this is not, I believe, the
general opinion.
690. See on Rollin, sup., p. 509.
691. Op. cit., i. 60.
692. He, with Condorcet and M. J. Chénier, is sometimes spoken of as
showing a classical reaction against the eighteenth-century toleration of
English and other vagaries which we shall see in Marmontel. I think
“reaction” is rather too strong a word, though “recrudescence” might do.
Condorcet was only a critic par interim, if even that, nor need we occupy
ourselves with him: justice shall be done (Fortune permitting) in the next
volume to the person who had the honour to be brother to André Chénier.
693. Œuvres Complètes, 7 vols., Paris 1819; Éléments de Littérature by
themselves, 3 vols. in the Didot Collection.
694. El. de Litt., article Poésie.
695. Ibid., art. Anacréontique.
696. The enemy will perhaps say, parodying Hegel: “With this historian
of criticism, anybody is a critic who does not believe in Boileau.” 'A will
have a little galled me: but not seriously.
697. I use this word not as synonymous with “methodical,” but as
contrasting the book with fragmentary commentaries like those of La
Monnoye and Le Duchat.
698. These will be found in vol. vii. of ed. cit.
699. M. Texte must have forgotten these remarkable passages, or perhaps
not have known them, when in M. Petit de Julleville’s large History (vi.
to be in 6 vols., but without addition so far as I know.
688. 2 vols., Paris, 1771.
689. It is perhaps right to warn the reader that this is not, I believe, the
general opinion.
690. See on Rollin, sup., p. 509.
691. Op. cit., i. 60.
692. He, with Condorcet and M. J. Chénier, is sometimes spoken of as
showing a classical reaction against the eighteenth-century toleration of
English and other vagaries which we shall see in Marmontel. I think
“reaction” is rather too strong a word, though “recrudescence” might do.
Condorcet was only a critic par interim, if even that, nor need we occupy
ourselves with him: justice shall be done (Fortune permitting) in the next
volume to the person who had the honour to be brother to André Chénier.
693. Œuvres Complètes, 7 vols., Paris 1819; Éléments de Littérature by
themselves, 3 vols. in the Didot Collection.
694. El. de Litt., article Poésie.
695. Ibid., art. Anacréontique.
696. The enemy will perhaps say, parodying Hegel: “With this historian
of criticism, anybody is a critic who does not believe in Boileau.” 'A will
have a little galled me: but not seriously.
697. I use this word not as synonymous with “methodical,” but as
contrasting the book with fragmentary commentaries like those of La
Monnoye and Le Duchat.
698. These will be found in vol. vii. of ed. cit.
699. M. Texte must have forgotten these remarkable passages, or perhaps
not have known them, when in M. Petit de Julleville’s large History (vi.
Page 535
754) he wrote that La Place’s version could only confirm readers in the idea
that Shakespeare was a chaos of monstrosity and triviality. Evidently it had
quite a different effect on Marmontel.
700. Under the head Marotique.
701. L’emphatique Thomas, as he is duly called in that traditional
distribution of epithets which is so dear to the French mind, and which
helps to explain why it is always, in its depths, neo-classic.
702. 18 vols. (Paris, 1825 sq.)
703. La Harpe here anticipated the Malay chief whom Mr Wallace met in
the farthest isles of the Bird of Paradise, and who chased him therefrom
with contumely when he said he came from a place called “England.”
“Unglung,” said the chief, was not a word that a man could pronounce. And
therefore—this is La Harpe all over—there could be no such place, and Mr
Wallace was a liar.
704. There is not, I think, even yet any complete edition of Rivarol,
though M. de Lescure some years ago devoted much attention to him. All
the work referred to below will be found in the older Œuvres de Rivarol
(published by Delahays, Paris, 1857), with a useful selection of criticisms.
The present writer contributed to the Fortnightly Review for January 1879
an essay on Rivarol and Chamfort, which will be found reprinted in
Miscellaneous Essays (2nd ed., London, 1895). Chamfort himself can only
be mentioned here as showing, in his Éloges on Molière and La Fontaine,
how insignificant such things, written even by such a man, can be.
705. Ed. cit., p. 277 sq.
706. This is neo-classic criticism in its quintessence of corruption. What
fit reader wants, or could endure, an episode between Per me si va and
riveder le stelle? You might as well demand “half an hour’s interval for
refreshments.” But your Epic must have your Episode. It is like “Where is
your brown tree?”
707. Ed. cit., p. 79 sq.
that Shakespeare was a chaos of monstrosity and triviality. Evidently it had
quite a different effect on Marmontel.
700. Under the head Marotique.
701. L’emphatique Thomas, as he is duly called in that traditional
distribution of epithets which is so dear to the French mind, and which
helps to explain why it is always, in its depths, neo-classic.
702. 18 vols. (Paris, 1825 sq.)
703. La Harpe here anticipated the Malay chief whom Mr Wallace met in
the farthest isles of the Bird of Paradise, and who chased him therefrom
with contumely when he said he came from a place called “England.”
“Unglung,” said the chief, was not a word that a man could pronounce. And
therefore—this is La Harpe all over—there could be no such place, and Mr
Wallace was a liar.
704. There is not, I think, even yet any complete edition of Rivarol,
though M. de Lescure some years ago devoted much attention to him. All
the work referred to below will be found in the older Œuvres de Rivarol
(published by Delahays, Paris, 1857), with a useful selection of criticisms.
The present writer contributed to the Fortnightly Review for January 1879
an essay on Rivarol and Chamfort, which will be found reprinted in
Miscellaneous Essays (2nd ed., London, 1895). Chamfort himself can only
be mentioned here as showing, in his Éloges on Molière and La Fontaine,
how insignificant such things, written even by such a man, can be.
705. Ed. cit., p. 277 sq.
706. This is neo-classic criticism in its quintessence of corruption. What
fit reader wants, or could endure, an episode between Per me si va and
riveder le stelle? You might as well demand “half an hour’s interval for
refreshments.” But your Epic must have your Episode. It is like “Where is
your brown tree?”
707. Ed. cit., p. 79 sq.
Page 536
708. This, however, is not in the Essay, but in a separate “Maxim.”
709. Cf., for instance, Batteux, quite a reasonable person on the whole.
He has no doubt (i. 80, 81) of the excellence, the almost perfection, at
which French taste has arrived; he only fears that it may be impossible to
guard against falling from so high an estate. This extraordinary self-
complacency is a little less noticeable in England, but only a little. When
we thought that Mr Pope had improved even upon Mr Dryden, and was in a
sort of Upper House of Literature as compared with Shakespeare and
Chaucer, we could not throw many stones at those who considered Voltaire
a better poet than Ronsard.
710. The corresponding chapter to this in that “History of Critical Ana,”
which we must not write, would be particularly rich. Every branch of
French literature at the time is full of such things; the most amusing of all,
perhaps, being Crébillon’s malicious eulogy-satire on Marivaudage at the
end of the 2nd book of L’Ecumoire, where Tanzäi condemns, and Néadarné
is charmed with, the juxtaposition of words “that never met before, and
thought they could not possibly get on together,” and the depicting “not
merely of what everybody has done and said and thought, but of what they
would like to have thought but did not!”
709. Cf., for instance, Batteux, quite a reasonable person on the whole.
He has no doubt (i. 80, 81) of the excellence, the almost perfection, at
which French taste has arrived; he only fears that it may be impossible to
guard against falling from so high an estate. This extraordinary self-
complacency is a little less noticeable in England, but only a little. When
we thought that Mr Pope had improved even upon Mr Dryden, and was in a
sort of Upper House of Literature as compared with Shakespeare and
Chaucer, we could not throw many stones at those who considered Voltaire
a better poet than Ronsard.
710. The corresponding chapter to this in that “History of Critical Ana,”
which we must not write, would be particularly rich. Every branch of
French literature at the time is full of such things; the most amusing of all,
perhaps, being Crébillon’s malicious eulogy-satire on Marivaudage at the
end of the 2nd book of L’Ecumoire, where Tanzäi condemns, and Néadarné
is charmed with, the juxtaposition of words “that never met before, and
thought they could not possibly get on together,” and the depicting “not
merely of what everybody has done and said and thought, but of what they
would like to have thought but did not!”
Page 537
CHAPTER III.
CLASSICISM IN THE OTHER NATIONS.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS—TEMPORARY REVIVAL OF ITALIAN CRITICISM—GRAVINA
—MURATORI: HIS ‘DELLA PERFETTA POESIA’—CRESCIMBENI—QUADRIO—THE
EMERGENCE OF LITERARY HISTORY—FURTHER DECADENCE OF ITALIAN
CRITICISM—METASTASIO—NEO-CLASSICISM TRIUMPHS IN SPAIN—THE
ABSURDITIES OF ARTIGA—LUZÁN—THE REST UNINERESTING—FEYJÓO, ISLA,
AND OTHERS—RISE AT LAST OF GERMAN CRITICISM—ITS SCHOOL TIME—
CLASSICISM AT BAY ALMOST FROM THE FIRST: GOTTSCHED—THE ‘VERSUCH
EINER CRITISCHEN DICHTKUNST’—ITS CHIEF IDEA—SPECIMEN DETAILS—
GELLERT: HE TRANSACTS.
It would be scarcely more than one of those sweeping generalisations
which attract a certain class of readers, if one were to say that, during the
eighteenth century, England and France exercised a reciprocal influence
over one another in literature, the results of which the remaining nations did
Preliminary little but imitate. It is certainly true that, as regards the
remarks.
special subject of this particular Book—the criticism of
orthodox neo-classicism in the eighteenth century—Germany, Italy, and
Spain play a part to which justice can be very briefly done, while the rest
may well be silence. Nor will Spain and Italy at least have much more to
give us when, and if, in the next volume, we turn from the setting to the
rising sun. But it will be very different with Germany, where almost the
entire interest lies in the restless struggles and obstinate questioning which
lead to Romanticism, and which practically show themselves from the very
moment when the Swiss School aroused German criticism from its long
sleep after Opitz. What has to be said of the Gottscheds and Gellerts of the
Northern Country had better be said last, so as to bring the matter into
closer juxtaposition with the account of the Romantic Revolt itself. Italy
(which has some interest in at least the beginning of the century) and Spain,
which has very little in any part of it, must be taken first.
For some reason, or for none, the closing years of the seventeenth
century, and the opening of the eighteenth, in Italy saw a very considerable
CLASSICISM IN THE OTHER NATIONS.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS—TEMPORARY REVIVAL OF ITALIAN CRITICISM—GRAVINA
—MURATORI: HIS ‘DELLA PERFETTA POESIA’—CRESCIMBENI—QUADRIO—THE
EMERGENCE OF LITERARY HISTORY—FURTHER DECADENCE OF ITALIAN
CRITICISM—METASTASIO—NEO-CLASSICISM TRIUMPHS IN SPAIN—THE
ABSURDITIES OF ARTIGA—LUZÁN—THE REST UNINERESTING—FEYJÓO, ISLA,
AND OTHERS—RISE AT LAST OF GERMAN CRITICISM—ITS SCHOOL TIME—
CLASSICISM AT BAY ALMOST FROM THE FIRST: GOTTSCHED—THE ‘VERSUCH
EINER CRITISCHEN DICHTKUNST’—ITS CHIEF IDEA—SPECIMEN DETAILS—
GELLERT: HE TRANSACTS.
It would be scarcely more than one of those sweeping generalisations
which attract a certain class of readers, if one were to say that, during the
eighteenth century, England and France exercised a reciprocal influence
over one another in literature, the results of which the remaining nations did
Preliminary little but imitate. It is certainly true that, as regards the
remarks.
special subject of this particular Book—the criticism of
orthodox neo-classicism in the eighteenth century—Germany, Italy, and
Spain play a part to which justice can be very briefly done, while the rest
may well be silence. Nor will Spain and Italy at least have much more to
give us when, and if, in the next volume, we turn from the setting to the
rising sun. But it will be very different with Germany, where almost the
entire interest lies in the restless struggles and obstinate questioning which
lead to Romanticism, and which practically show themselves from the very
moment when the Swiss School aroused German criticism from its long
sleep after Opitz. What has to be said of the Gottscheds and Gellerts of the
Northern Country had better be said last, so as to bring the matter into
closer juxtaposition with the account of the Romantic Revolt itself. Italy
(which has some interest in at least the beginning of the century) and Spain,
which has very little in any part of it, must be taken first.
For some reason, or for none, the closing years of the seventeenth
century, and the opening of the eighteenth, in Italy saw a very considerable
Page 538
revival of that critical spirit which, as we know, had died away so strangely,
Temporary after its vigorous flourishing a hundred years earlier. It is
revival of Italian
Criticism.
true that this new Italian criticism is of a rather tell-tale
kind—that it is, in great part at least, criticism of erudition
and of retrospect. But Gravina, Muratori, Crescimbeni, and even Quadrio,
form a group of no small interest. The first is a real critic of great, if not
always well-directed, ability; the second, something of a real critic too, with
amazing erudition; the third, the author of the first really literary history of
a national literature; and the fourth, the first pioneer—no Lynceus, certainly,
but still a pioneer-guide—in the ways of general and comparative literary
study.
Gianvincenzo Gravina is one of those persons who particularly invite the
student to idle ægri somnia as to what they might have been in other times
Gravina. and circumstances. A lawyer, a littérateur, the adoptive
father of Metastasio, the joint founder of the Arcadian Academy, a critic of
remarkable shrewdness, who wrote excellent things on tragedy, and thought
his own bad tragedies excellent—he tempts one strangely. His most famous
and most often quoted critical work is Della Ragion Poetica,[711] but it is
necessary, in order to appreciate his criticism, to go to his Works[712] and
read also the Della Tragedia and the Discorso delle Favole. The total effect
is, as with most other eighteenth-century critics, a conclusion that the writer
has not “found his way”: though he is nearer to it than some others writing
later. The Della Ragion Poetica is a most interesting labyrinth of cross-
purposes. The strongly scholastic character of Italian serious thought, which
we have noticed in Rinaldini only a few years earlier,[713] betrays itself in
Gravina’s opening del vero e del falso; del reale e del finto; and in an
episodic discussion of the origin of Idolatry, which may seem absolutely
preposterous at first sight, but which works itself into the consideration of
Fable not so ill. The admirable description of Homer as “the potentest of
mages and the wisest of enchanters, in that he makes use of words not so
much for the complacency of the ear as for the advantage of the
imagination,”[714] is balanced, at a page or two’s distance, by a fling at the
perniciosa turba de' Romanzi. The utility of poetry is gravely insisted on,
and we are invited as usual to the study of the Kinds; but section xiv., on
“Popular Judgment,” is instinct with that Italian common-sense which had
shown itself in various ways during the sixteenth century, through mouths
so different as those of Castelvetro and Cinthio Giraldi, a sense almost
Temporary after its vigorous flourishing a hundred years earlier. It is
revival of Italian
Criticism.
true that this new Italian criticism is of a rather tell-tale
kind—that it is, in great part at least, criticism of erudition
and of retrospect. But Gravina, Muratori, Crescimbeni, and even Quadrio,
form a group of no small interest. The first is a real critic of great, if not
always well-directed, ability; the second, something of a real critic too, with
amazing erudition; the third, the author of the first really literary history of
a national literature; and the fourth, the first pioneer—no Lynceus, certainly,
but still a pioneer-guide—in the ways of general and comparative literary
study.
Gianvincenzo Gravina is one of those persons who particularly invite the
student to idle ægri somnia as to what they might have been in other times
Gravina. and circumstances. A lawyer, a littérateur, the adoptive
father of Metastasio, the joint founder of the Arcadian Academy, a critic of
remarkable shrewdness, who wrote excellent things on tragedy, and thought
his own bad tragedies excellent—he tempts one strangely. His most famous
and most often quoted critical work is Della Ragion Poetica,[711] but it is
necessary, in order to appreciate his criticism, to go to his Works[712] and
read also the Della Tragedia and the Discorso delle Favole. The total effect
is, as with most other eighteenth-century critics, a conclusion that the writer
has not “found his way”: though he is nearer to it than some others writing
later. The Della Ragion Poetica is a most interesting labyrinth of cross-
purposes. The strongly scholastic character of Italian serious thought, which
we have noticed in Rinaldini only a few years earlier,[713] betrays itself in
Gravina’s opening del vero e del falso; del reale e del finto; and in an
episodic discussion of the origin of Idolatry, which may seem absolutely
preposterous at first sight, but which works itself into the consideration of
Fable not so ill. The admirable description of Homer as “the potentest of
mages and the wisest of enchanters, in that he makes use of words not so
much for the complacency of the ear as for the advantage of the
imagination,”[714] is balanced, at a page or two’s distance, by a fling at the
perniciosa turba de' Romanzi. The utility of poetry is gravely insisted on,
and we are invited as usual to the study of the Kinds; but section xiv., on
“Popular Judgment,” is instinct with that Italian common-sense which had
shown itself in various ways during the sixteenth century, through mouths
so different as those of Castelvetro and Cinthio Giraldi, a sense almost
Page 539
epigrammatically concentrated in the phrase ne con solo popolo ne senza il
popolo. In these passages of Gravina’s there is to be found, put not indeed
quite clearly, but unmistakably on fair allowance, a doctrine which hardly
any critic of any day has sufficiently digested—that there is something in
poetry corresponding, in measure and degree, to a poetical sentiment which
only needs waking in all but the exceptions of mankind. What libraries of
vain or positively mischievous disquisition should we have been spared,
what unintelligent laudation of Burns when the intelligent is so easy, what
unintelligent depreciation of Béranger when the abstinence from it is surely
not so difficult, what idle and obstinate questionings about Donne or
Whitman, Macaulay or Moore, and a hundred others of the most opposite
kinds, if people would only have remembered our author’s sound and sober
law[715] that "in all men there gleams through [traspare] I know not what
discernment of the Good "to which poets, if they know how, can appeal!
A large part of Gravina’s work in the Ragion consists of an actual
historical survey of poets and poetry in the spirit which, as we have seen
and shall see, was so prevalent in his day; and his judgments, if a little
traditional, are almost always sound, whether he is dealing with the classics
or with the great Renaissance group of Italian-Latin poets.[716] Nor should he
lack due meed for the word of praise he gives to Folengo, a writer little
likely to appeal to the ordinary eighteenth-century spirit. When one thinks
of the extreme inadequacy of French judgments of Rabelais himself at this
time, it is no small merit in Gravina to have said, of one of not the least of
Rabelais’ creditors, that “he wanted only will, not strength, to write a noble
poem,” and actually possessed learning, invention, and fancy. The first book
of the Della Ragion Poetica ends thus with an author who must have
seemed, to the usual eighteenth-century critic, nearly as sad and bad and
mad as Rabelais and Shakespeare,[717] and in whom it is not now difficult to
see much Rabelaisian and even some Shakespearian quality. The second
deals with the Italian vernacular. Gravina duly admires Dante; but his
elaborate apology for rhyme is noteworthy and amusing. It was the way of
the eighteenth century to apologise for all sorts of things—from the Bible
downwards—that were not in the least need of it. He is a little less
shamefaced on the question of the vulgar tongue; and says excellent things
about the De Vulgari itself—that “discourse so subtle and so true.” Indeed
he conducts his whole discussion on the Vernacular, which is long, in
accordance with the principles of the tractate, and gives to Dante in all
popolo. In these passages of Gravina’s there is to be found, put not indeed
quite clearly, but unmistakably on fair allowance, a doctrine which hardly
any critic of any day has sufficiently digested—that there is something in
poetry corresponding, in measure and degree, to a poetical sentiment which
only needs waking in all but the exceptions of mankind. What libraries of
vain or positively mischievous disquisition should we have been spared,
what unintelligent laudation of Burns when the intelligent is so easy, what
unintelligent depreciation of Béranger when the abstinence from it is surely
not so difficult, what idle and obstinate questionings about Donne or
Whitman, Macaulay or Moore, and a hundred others of the most opposite
kinds, if people would only have remembered our author’s sound and sober
law[715] that "in all men there gleams through [traspare] I know not what
discernment of the Good "to which poets, if they know how, can appeal!
A large part of Gravina’s work in the Ragion consists of an actual
historical survey of poets and poetry in the spirit which, as we have seen
and shall see, was so prevalent in his day; and his judgments, if a little
traditional, are almost always sound, whether he is dealing with the classics
or with the great Renaissance group of Italian-Latin poets.[716] Nor should he
lack due meed for the word of praise he gives to Folengo, a writer little
likely to appeal to the ordinary eighteenth-century spirit. When one thinks
of the extreme inadequacy of French judgments of Rabelais himself at this
time, it is no small merit in Gravina to have said, of one of not the least of
Rabelais’ creditors, that “he wanted only will, not strength, to write a noble
poem,” and actually possessed learning, invention, and fancy. The first book
of the Della Ragion Poetica ends thus with an author who must have
seemed, to the usual eighteenth-century critic, nearly as sad and bad and
mad as Rabelais and Shakespeare,[717] and in whom it is not now difficult to
see much Rabelaisian and even some Shakespearian quality. The second
deals with the Italian vernacular. Gravina duly admires Dante; but his
elaborate apology for rhyme is noteworthy and amusing. It was the way of
the eighteenth century to apologise for all sorts of things—from the Bible
downwards—that were not in the least need of it. He is a little less
shamefaced on the question of the vulgar tongue; and says excellent things
about the De Vulgari itself—that “discourse so subtle and so true.” Indeed
he conducts his whole discussion on the Vernacular, which is long, in
accordance with the principles of the tractate, and gives to Dante in all
Page 540
nearly fifty pages, or more than half of the book, announcing his deliberate
intention giudicare spediatamente of the rest from Boiardo and Ariosto
downwards. The whole forms a very interesting survey of Italian poetry,
though perhaps the most interesting of Gravina’s separate critical utterances
is to be found, not in it but, in his short Latin Letter De Poesi to Maffei, in
which he speaks of La Casa as qui alter potest haberi a Petrarca Lyricorum
princeps. It is a bold saying, but not hard to justify, concerning the author of
Errai gran tempo and O sonno, o de la queta.
The monumental work of Muratori in history and antiquities has
overshadowed his accomplishment in literature; and some respectable
books of reference hardly mention this; but it is in fact considerable. We
Muratori: his have already had occasion to refer to the service that he did
Della Perfetta
Poesia.
in editing the miscellaneous critical papers of Castelvetro,
and he also did important work on the Italian Theatre; but
his Della Perfetta Poesia Italiana[718] is a more original title-deed. There is
no doubt that it had great influence: some have even thought that Luzán (v.
infra, p. 548) was indebted to it for the impulse which enabled him finally
to overcome the remnants of Romantic resistance in Spain, and to seat Neo-
classicism at last triumphant in the country of Don Quixote. But it does not
need this doubtful and reflected honour. The book is, given its lights and its
time, a very good book. It accepts, without much or any demur, that notion
of Good Taste which the seventeenth century excogitated and the eighteenth
almost universally accepted, postponing inquiry whether it were the false
Florimel or the true. But Muratori is both a historian and a philosopher; and
he makes good use of both his qualifications. He contrasts, effectively
enough, the supposed infallibility of Petrarch in Taste, the variety (without
deserting this) of the sixteenth century, and the pessimo gusto of that which
had just closed when he wrote. He will have it that Poetry is “a daughter
and servant of Moral Philosophy”—in which case it must be sadly admitted
that the mother is too often not justified of the daughter, and that the service
is not seldom unprofitable. But he comes (perhaps inspired by Tasso) nearer
to universal acceptance when he tells us that Poetic Beauty is “a new and
marvellously delightful Truth,” and he is specially copious on the Fancy—
so much so that one imagines it not impossible that Addison may have seen
the treatise, more particularly as there is much about “True and False Wit”
in the Second Book of the Perfetta Poesia. He is, in his Third Book, liberal
on the question of Useful or Delightful—the latter will do very well if it is
intention giudicare spediatamente of the rest from Boiardo and Ariosto
downwards. The whole forms a very interesting survey of Italian poetry,
though perhaps the most interesting of Gravina’s separate critical utterances
is to be found, not in it but, in his short Latin Letter De Poesi to Maffei, in
which he speaks of La Casa as qui alter potest haberi a Petrarca Lyricorum
princeps. It is a bold saying, but not hard to justify, concerning the author of
Errai gran tempo and O sonno, o de la queta.
The monumental work of Muratori in history and antiquities has
overshadowed his accomplishment in literature; and some respectable
books of reference hardly mention this; but it is in fact considerable. We
Muratori: his have already had occasion to refer to the service that he did
Della Perfetta
Poesia.
in editing the miscellaneous critical papers of Castelvetro,
and he also did important work on the Italian Theatre; but
his Della Perfetta Poesia Italiana[718] is a more original title-deed. There is
no doubt that it had great influence: some have even thought that Luzán (v.
infra, p. 548) was indebted to it for the impulse which enabled him finally
to overcome the remnants of Romantic resistance in Spain, and to seat Neo-
classicism at last triumphant in the country of Don Quixote. But it does not
need this doubtful and reflected honour. The book is, given its lights and its
time, a very good book. It accepts, without much or any demur, that notion
of Good Taste which the seventeenth century excogitated and the eighteenth
almost universally accepted, postponing inquiry whether it were the false
Florimel or the true. But Muratori is both a historian and a philosopher; and
he makes good use of both his qualifications. He contrasts, effectively
enough, the supposed infallibility of Petrarch in Taste, the variety (without
deserting this) of the sixteenth century, and the pessimo gusto of that which
had just closed when he wrote. He will have it that Poetry is “a daughter
and servant of Moral Philosophy”—in which case it must be sadly admitted
that the mother is too often not justified of the daughter, and that the service
is not seldom unprofitable. But he comes (perhaps inspired by Tasso) nearer
to universal acceptance when he tells us that Poetic Beauty is “a new and
marvellously delightful Truth,” and he is specially copious on the Fancy—
so much so that one imagines it not impossible that Addison may have seen
the treatise, more particularly as there is much about “True and False Wit”
in the Second Book of the Perfetta Poesia. He is, in his Third Book, liberal
on the question of Useful or Delightful—the latter will do very well if it is
Page 541
healthy delight[719]—and he discusses the defects of poets, and the various
parts of poetry, with sense and discrimination. All this is of course still too
much “in the air”; it makes the old mistake of taking for granted that poesis
can be in some way strained off, or distilled from, poeta and poema. But
this defect is to some extent repaired in the sequel, and the whole is a book
far from despicable. The chief defect of it (a defect which extends also to
Gravina) is the absence of comparative criticism—of the attempt, at least, to
study literature as a whole.
The two historians, especially Quadrio, are freer from this defect, though
by no means free from it; but they compensate for this advantage by a much
Crescimbeni. weaker dose of really critical spirit. Crescimbeni is not an
unimportant figure in the History of his own literature, to which he
contributed, after writing in 1700 on La Bellezza del Volgar Poesia, a
regular work[720] on the whole subject as far as poetry is concerned. Part,
and the best part, of this is made up of a refashioning of the Bellezza. Its
contents, which are not contemptible, though too like much that we have
already gone through to require minute attention, are almost indicated by its
title—an enumeration of poetical beauties, cautions against defects and
mistakes in the application of them, and the usual analysis of Kinds. The
rest of the book is a really valuable literary encyclopædia, with extracts,
commentaries, lists, indices, &c., “all very capital” in their own way, but
somewhat out of ours.
If Quadrio seems to invite more attention, it is partly because of his
goodly bulk which fills the eye, and partly because of the oddity of some of
his judgments, but partly also (in a third part) because he really intends to
be critical, and because he extends his view far beyond Italian. The Della
Quadrio. Storia e della Ragione d’Ogni Poesia[721] is a sufficiently
ambitious attempt; and I do not think I know anything of the kind, by a
single man, which is at any rate more voluminous. Seven big quartos,
tightly packed, give Quadrio ample room and verge enough for proceedings
alike methodical and far-ranging in their method; and his Distinzioni—the
sub-divisions of his Books—leave few things unattempted. He is able to
include both branches of Patrizzi’s old division, Disputata and Istoriale,
and he extends the purview of the latter as widely as he can, if not as
happily. The good faith, and the less than doubtful judgment, of some of his
excursions will be sufficiently, and here most interestingly, demonstrated by
some instances from his English notes. After devoting great space to the
parts of poetry, with sense and discrimination. All this is of course still too
much “in the air”; it makes the old mistake of taking for granted that poesis
can be in some way strained off, or distilled from, poeta and poema. But
this defect is to some extent repaired in the sequel, and the whole is a book
far from despicable. The chief defect of it (a defect which extends also to
Gravina) is the absence of comparative criticism—of the attempt, at least, to
study literature as a whole.
The two historians, especially Quadrio, are freer from this defect, though
by no means free from it; but they compensate for this advantage by a much
Crescimbeni. weaker dose of really critical spirit. Crescimbeni is not an
unimportant figure in the History of his own literature, to which he
contributed, after writing in 1700 on La Bellezza del Volgar Poesia, a
regular work[720] on the whole subject as far as poetry is concerned. Part,
and the best part, of this is made up of a refashioning of the Bellezza. Its
contents, which are not contemptible, though too like much that we have
already gone through to require minute attention, are almost indicated by its
title—an enumeration of poetical beauties, cautions against defects and
mistakes in the application of them, and the usual analysis of Kinds. The
rest of the book is a really valuable literary encyclopædia, with extracts,
commentaries, lists, indices, &c., “all very capital” in their own way, but
somewhat out of ours.
If Quadrio seems to invite more attention, it is partly because of his
goodly bulk which fills the eye, and partly because of the oddity of some of
his judgments, but partly also (in a third part) because he really intends to
be critical, and because he extends his view far beyond Italian. The Della
Quadrio. Storia e della Ragione d’Ogni Poesia[721] is a sufficiently
ambitious attempt; and I do not think I know anything of the kind, by a
single man, which is at any rate more voluminous. Seven big quartos,
tightly packed, give Quadrio ample room and verge enough for proceedings
alike methodical and far-ranging in their method; and his Distinzioni—the
sub-divisions of his Books—leave few things unattempted. He is able to
include both branches of Patrizzi’s old division, Disputata and Istoriale,
and he extends the purview of the latter as widely as he can, if not as
happily. The good faith, and the less than doubtful judgment, of some of his
excursions will be sufficiently, and here most interestingly, demonstrated by
some instances from his English notes. After devoting great space to the
Page 542
usual general questions of the nature, origin, position, &c., of poetry, he has
a proportionately large distribution of Kinds, extending not merely into
Acrostic-land but into Cento and Macaronic. He deals further with Poetic
Art and Poetic Fury, and, in successive Distinzioni, with Plot and Manners,
Erudition, Verse in general, Italian verse, &c. Then he attacks the actual
contents of his subject, and devotes the whole of a volume of 800 pages to
“Melic” or Lyric poetry. It cannot but be interesting to the reader to note
who represented English Lyric poetry to the eyes of a learned and laborious
Italian Jesuit in the second quarter of the eighteenth century; but it is pretty
safe to say that not one of a hundred guessers would name the trio in a
hundred guesses each. They are Gower, “Arthur Kelton,” and
“Wicherley.”[722]
He proceeds through all the divisions in the same way. His notice of
Shakespeare is obviously a recollection of the milder view of Voltaire, who
was a friend of Quadrio’s. Dryden wrote a “tragedy” entitled King Arthur;
Addison is treated at length, and with evident sympathy, as well as with at
least more direct knowledge than that shown of “Il Benjanson” (sic). There
is a whole chapter on Milton, in which Rapin and the Chevalier Ramsay[723]
are quoted. The critic is aware of (let us hope he had not read) Glover’s
Leonidas; and he is naturally copious on Pope, though his section on The
Rape of the Lock shades itself off in the oddest manner into a Discourse on
Hair, with references to Apuleius and the obliging Fotis, to Dion
Chrysostom, and to Firenzuola. But Chaucer and Spenser are not (unless I
have missed them) discussed by the citer of Arthur Kelton.
Of course there is no need to laugh at Quadrio; and if we do it must be
done only in the most good-humoured and politest way possible. Doubtless
we all make mistakes in dealing with foreign Literatures; and those of us
who have dealt most with them have doubtless sinned most. But what is
important to notice here about the Historian of All Poetry is—first, that he
has shrewdly seen and manfully accepted, if not the necessity, at least the
immense advantage, of comparative literary study; and secondly, that while
emancipating himself to this extent, he is still under the domination of
Kinds. If he had gone to A. Kelton himself, and had examined that worthy’s
works—not to range him under Melic or Epic or anything quod exit in ’ic,
but—to see whether he wrote good or bad poetry, he would at least have
been in a fairer way of escape. But the mania for Kind- and Subject-
division, instead of studying poetic treatment, can hardly be better
a proportionately large distribution of Kinds, extending not merely into
Acrostic-land but into Cento and Macaronic. He deals further with Poetic
Art and Poetic Fury, and, in successive Distinzioni, with Plot and Manners,
Erudition, Verse in general, Italian verse, &c. Then he attacks the actual
contents of his subject, and devotes the whole of a volume of 800 pages to
“Melic” or Lyric poetry. It cannot but be interesting to the reader to note
who represented English Lyric poetry to the eyes of a learned and laborious
Italian Jesuit in the second quarter of the eighteenth century; but it is pretty
safe to say that not one of a hundred guessers would name the trio in a
hundred guesses each. They are Gower, “Arthur Kelton,” and
“Wicherley.”[722]
He proceeds through all the divisions in the same way. His notice of
Shakespeare is obviously a recollection of the milder view of Voltaire, who
was a friend of Quadrio’s. Dryden wrote a “tragedy” entitled King Arthur;
Addison is treated at length, and with evident sympathy, as well as with at
least more direct knowledge than that shown of “Il Benjanson” (sic). There
is a whole chapter on Milton, in which Rapin and the Chevalier Ramsay[723]
are quoted. The critic is aware of (let us hope he had not read) Glover’s
Leonidas; and he is naturally copious on Pope, though his section on The
Rape of the Lock shades itself off in the oddest manner into a Discourse on
Hair, with references to Apuleius and the obliging Fotis, to Dion
Chrysostom, and to Firenzuola. But Chaucer and Spenser are not (unless I
have missed them) discussed by the citer of Arthur Kelton.
Of course there is no need to laugh at Quadrio; and if we do it must be
done only in the most good-humoured and politest way possible. Doubtless
we all make mistakes in dealing with foreign Literatures; and those of us
who have dealt most with them have doubtless sinned most. But what is
important to notice here about the Historian of All Poetry is—first, that he
has shrewdly seen and manfully accepted, if not the necessity, at least the
immense advantage, of comparative literary study; and secondly, that while
emancipating himself to this extent, he is still under the domination of
Kinds. If he had gone to A. Kelton himself, and had examined that worthy’s
works—not to range him under Melic or Epic or anything quod exit in ’ic,
but—to see whether he wrote good or bad poetry, he would at least have
been in a fairer way of escape. But the mania for Kind- and Subject-
division, instead of studying poetic treatment, can hardly be better
Page 543
illustrated than in Quadrio, whose schedule of narrative poetry, for instance,
is as complicated and as meticulous as a Government return.
Yet the value of his attempt, and in a less degree of Crescimbeni’s, is
very great: and it perhaps exceeds in general critical importance the results
of the exercise of the superior talent of Muratori and Gravina. These latter
The emergence said more noteworthy things than the others: but they said
of literary
history.
them in a kind of criticism which, to speak our best for it,
had already done all the good that was in it to do. Nay, their
method of handling was likely to stand in the way of real critical advance or
recovery, not to help it. Crescimbeni and Quadrio, especially the latter,
recognised indeed, if they did not themselves quite understand, or lay down
in so many words for the instruction of others, the great fact that before all
things, and for some time at any rate instead of all things, it was time for
criticism to “take stock”—that instead of theorising at large, and controlling
the theory at best by a partial study of the classics and a very limited and
arbitrary selection of the literature of the student’s own country, it was time
for him to take the whole of that literature, to compare it with the whole of
the classics, and, so far as he possibly could, with the whole of foreign
modern literature as a third standard. That is practically what we have been
doing for nearly two hundred years past, more or less—for more than a
hundred years past, pretty steadily and with a will. It is not done yet; and it
never can be done wholly, because every generation and every country
adds, in its varying measure and degree, fresh supplies of matter which
cannot be digested all at once, but which must sooner or later be added to
the rest, and may affect conclusions drawn from that rest, as vitally as did
the work of Dante or that of Shakespeare. But it has been done, and is being
done, after a fashion in which, before the time of these two Italian
historians, it had hardly been done by anybody.
The promise, however, of this group—the elder of whose members
almost belong to the seventeenth century, while the youngest does not come
Further below the middle of the eighteenth—was not fulfilled.
decadence of
Italian
Hardly a single person among the other (and chiefly later)
Criticism. Italian critics of the time has achieved, or, so far as I have
been able to inform myself, has deserved to achieve, any
great reputation. Tiraboschi indeed continued the merely historical part of
Crescimbeni’s labour with an industry probably unparalleled in any other
Metastasio. country. Metastasio, in his later days, occupied himself a
is as complicated and as meticulous as a Government return.
Yet the value of his attempt, and in a less degree of Crescimbeni’s, is
very great: and it perhaps exceeds in general critical importance the results
of the exercise of the superior talent of Muratori and Gravina. These latter
The emergence said more noteworthy things than the others: but they said
of literary
history.
them in a kind of criticism which, to speak our best for it,
had already done all the good that was in it to do. Nay, their
method of handling was likely to stand in the way of real critical advance or
recovery, not to help it. Crescimbeni and Quadrio, especially the latter,
recognised indeed, if they did not themselves quite understand, or lay down
in so many words for the instruction of others, the great fact that before all
things, and for some time at any rate instead of all things, it was time for
criticism to “take stock”—that instead of theorising at large, and controlling
the theory at best by a partial study of the classics and a very limited and
arbitrary selection of the literature of the student’s own country, it was time
for him to take the whole of that literature, to compare it with the whole of
the classics, and, so far as he possibly could, with the whole of foreign
modern literature as a third standard. That is practically what we have been
doing for nearly two hundred years past, more or less—for more than a
hundred years past, pretty steadily and with a will. It is not done yet; and it
never can be done wholly, because every generation and every country
adds, in its varying measure and degree, fresh supplies of matter which
cannot be digested all at once, but which must sooner or later be added to
the rest, and may affect conclusions drawn from that rest, as vitally as did
the work of Dante or that of Shakespeare. But it has been done, and is being
done, after a fashion in which, before the time of these two Italian
historians, it had hardly been done by anybody.
The promise, however, of this group—the elder of whose members
almost belong to the seventeenth century, while the youngest does not come
Further below the middle of the eighteenth—was not fulfilled.
decadence of
Italian
Hardly a single person among the other (and chiefly later)
Criticism. Italian critics of the time has achieved, or, so far as I have
been able to inform myself, has deserved to achieve, any
great reputation. Tiraboschi indeed continued the merely historical part of
Crescimbeni’s labour with an industry probably unparalleled in any other
Metastasio. country. Metastasio, in his later days, occupied himself a
Page 544
good deal with criticism, and at an earlier time his Estratto dell' Arte
Poetica d’Aristotile[724] would have deserved a good deal of attention from
us. At his own date Metastasio is partly an eminent example of that halting
between two opinions which has been so often mentioned, partly an
inheritor of others’ thoughts. He is in hardly any sense a Romantic; yet he
observes, against the Dacierian extension and hardening of Aristotle’s
definition of poetry, that if this be so “it will be very difficult to find any
writer who is not a poet”, and a little farther he has excogitated, or
borrowed from the æestheticians, the all-important doctrine that the object
of the sculptor is “not the illusion of the spectator but his own victory over
the marble.” But these things are late, transitional, and, perhaps, as has been
hinted, borrowed. The earlier critical work of the polygraphic, polyglottic,
and polypragmatic Marquis Scipione Maffei has no distinction: and the very
names[725] of Palesi, Salio, Denina, Zanotti are unknown to all but special
students of Italian literature, and probably to not a few of these. We must
come to quite modern times—to times indeed so near our own that the rule
of silence as to living contemporaries may often come into operation—
before we can find any heirs to the glory of Castelvetro and Patrizzi, if we
can find them then.
The singularity which in so many ways besets Spanish literature shows
itself, perhaps not least, in the fact that the establishment of the neo-classic
creed in Spain does not take place till that creed is beginning to be, in one
Neo-classicism way or another, deserted or undermined in other countries.
triumphs in
Spain.
It must be admitted that there was some excuse for Don
Ignacio de Luzán Claramunt de Suelves y Gurrea, whose
Poética in 1737 argued Spain’s poetry away, far more actually than
Cervantes had ever laughed away her chivalry. It has been usual to
represent Luzán as a mere populariser of Boileau in Spain: but this is not
just. Any one who has followed the course of reading which this book
represents will see that it was the antiqua mater of Spanish criticism, Italy,
which really started Luzán’s inquiries—that Muratori, and perhaps Gravina,
rather than Boileau and the French schoolmen, were his masters. Indeed it
seems that he had actually sketched, in Italian and in Italy (or at least
Sicily), certain Ragionamenti sopra la Poesia, nearly a decade before his
Spanish book appeared.
Poetica d’Aristotile[724] would have deserved a good deal of attention from
us. At his own date Metastasio is partly an eminent example of that halting
between two opinions which has been so often mentioned, partly an
inheritor of others’ thoughts. He is in hardly any sense a Romantic; yet he
observes, against the Dacierian extension and hardening of Aristotle’s
definition of poetry, that if this be so “it will be very difficult to find any
writer who is not a poet”, and a little farther he has excogitated, or
borrowed from the æestheticians, the all-important doctrine that the object
of the sculptor is “not the illusion of the spectator but his own victory over
the marble.” But these things are late, transitional, and, perhaps, as has been
hinted, borrowed. The earlier critical work of the polygraphic, polyglottic,
and polypragmatic Marquis Scipione Maffei has no distinction: and the very
names[725] of Palesi, Salio, Denina, Zanotti are unknown to all but special
students of Italian literature, and probably to not a few of these. We must
come to quite modern times—to times indeed so near our own that the rule
of silence as to living contemporaries may often come into operation—
before we can find any heirs to the glory of Castelvetro and Patrizzi, if we
can find them then.
The singularity which in so many ways besets Spanish literature shows
itself, perhaps not least, in the fact that the establishment of the neo-classic
creed in Spain does not take place till that creed is beginning to be, in one
Neo-classicism way or another, deserted or undermined in other countries.
triumphs in
Spain.
It must be admitted that there was some excuse for Don
Ignacio de Luzán Claramunt de Suelves y Gurrea, whose
Poética in 1737 argued Spain’s poetry away, far more actually than
Cervantes had ever laughed away her chivalry. It has been usual to
represent Luzán as a mere populariser of Boileau in Spain: but this is not
just. Any one who has followed the course of reading which this book
represents will see that it was the antiqua mater of Spanish criticism, Italy,
which really started Luzán’s inquiries—that Muratori, and perhaps Gravina,
rather than Boileau and the French schoolmen, were his masters. Indeed it
seems that he had actually sketched, in Italian and in Italy (or at least
Sicily), certain Ragionamenti sopra la Poesia, nearly a decade before his
Spanish book appeared.
Page 545
The absurdities There was, it has been said, some excuse for him. We
of Artiga.
have seen in the last Book that, though isolated expressions
and aperçus of remarkable promise and acuteness appear in Spanish
criticism of the seventeenth century, it was always impar sibi, and was
constantly aiming at the establishment of a kind of illegitimate compromise
between the national drama, which the critics would not give up, and the
general theories of literature which they did not dare—perhaps did not wish
—to impugn. In fact, this state of compromise, by yet another of the
anomalies above referred to, anticipates the similar things which we see in
England and in France, in Italy and in Germany, much later. At the same
time, Spain had been a special victim, with Gongorism and Culteranism and
Conceptism, of those contortions of the Romantic agony which, all over
Europe, invited the tyranny of neo-classicism. Also its great creative period
had closed for some considerable time. Lastly, there had survived in Spain a
kind of childishly scholastic rhetoric, which the rest of Europe, with some
slight exceptions in Italy, had long outgrown. Ticknor, the most amiable of
Historians (when Protestantism is not in point), calls by the name of “a
really ridiculous book” the Epitome de la Eloquencia Española of Don
Francisco José Artiga or Artieda, to which he gives the date of 1725, but of
which the British Museum copy bears a date more than thirty years earlier.
[726]
People are apt to be so unkind to technical Rhetorics and Poetics that I
own I had a faint hope, before I actually read this book, of being able to
remonstrate with the Ticknorian judgment: but no puede ser. The work is
dedicated to Francesco Borgia, Duke of Gandia—the tragic elder
associations of the name serving, to those who are susceptible to such
things, as a sort of heightening of the farce. It consists of verse-dialogues, in
octosyllabic quatrain, between a Hijo and a Padre by way of question and
answer. Eloquence is angelic, celestial, ethereal, elementary, mixed, dumb,
and several other things. Receipts and formulas are given for all sorts of
compositions down to visiting cards: and the style of exposition may
perhaps best be appreciated from an extract of two quatrains—
P. La Imágen o Icon se haze,
bosquejando una pintúra
de algúnas cosas con otras
con propriedád y hermosúra.
And a little later the Hijo says—
H. En entrambos ejempláres
of Artiga.
have seen in the last Book that, though isolated expressions
and aperçus of remarkable promise and acuteness appear in Spanish
criticism of the seventeenth century, it was always impar sibi, and was
constantly aiming at the establishment of a kind of illegitimate compromise
between the national drama, which the critics would not give up, and the
general theories of literature which they did not dare—perhaps did not wish
—to impugn. In fact, this state of compromise, by yet another of the
anomalies above referred to, anticipates the similar things which we see in
England and in France, in Italy and in Germany, much later. At the same
time, Spain had been a special victim, with Gongorism and Culteranism and
Conceptism, of those contortions of the Romantic agony which, all over
Europe, invited the tyranny of neo-classicism. Also its great creative period
had closed for some considerable time. Lastly, there had survived in Spain a
kind of childishly scholastic rhetoric, which the rest of Europe, with some
slight exceptions in Italy, had long outgrown. Ticknor, the most amiable of
Historians (when Protestantism is not in point), calls by the name of “a
really ridiculous book” the Epitome de la Eloquencia Española of Don
Francisco José Artiga or Artieda, to which he gives the date of 1725, but of
which the British Museum copy bears a date more than thirty years earlier.
[726]
People are apt to be so unkind to technical Rhetorics and Poetics that I
own I had a faint hope, before I actually read this book, of being able to
remonstrate with the Ticknorian judgment: but no puede ser. The work is
dedicated to Francesco Borgia, Duke of Gandia—the tragic elder
associations of the name serving, to those who are susceptible to such
things, as a sort of heightening of the farce. It consists of verse-dialogues, in
octosyllabic quatrain, between a Hijo and a Padre by way of question and
answer. Eloquence is angelic, celestial, ethereal, elementary, mixed, dumb,
and several other things. Receipts and formulas are given for all sorts of
compositions down to visiting cards: and the style of exposition may
perhaps best be appreciated from an extract of two quatrains—
P. La Imágen o Icon se haze,
bosquejando una pintúra
de algúnas cosas con otras
con propriedád y hermosúra.
And a little later the Hijo says—
H. En entrambos ejempláres
Page 546
resplandecen las figúras:
mostradme, si [la Apostrofe] la Adversion
encierra tanta hermosúra.
One is too apt to forget, in censuring eighteenth-century flippancy and
superficiality in regard to the past, that all over Europe, more or less, this
kind of childish stuff was still actually taught.
Luzán is at least not childish, though he betrays the insufficient historical
examination and the hasty generalising which beset the whole school. He
Luzán. devotes the principal attention of his folio,[727] after
generalities avowedly taken from Muratori, to Epic and Tragedy, and while
using complimentary words to Lope and Calderon, indicates, without doubt
or hesitation, that his heart is with Corneille and Racine. It is true that he is
himself—as all these Eighteenth-century “classics” are without exception,
save the mere school dogmatists or the obstinate reactionaries like La Harpe
—inconsistent. Mr Fitzmaurice Kelly[728] goes so far as to say that there is
hardly a proposition in his book which is not contradicted elsewhere in it.
But that he at least meant to be a neo-classic, a Unitarian, a Nicolaitan,
there can be no doubt, nor any that he met with no markworthy or effectual
resistance.
The rest of the Spanish criticism of the eighteenth century has, save for
special students of Spanish literature, and perhaps even for them, very little
The rest interest; and it is noticeable that, from this point, even the
uninteresting.
accomplished and indefatigable historian of the subject[729]
practically breaks away from Spain itself, and gives a history of æsthetic
ideas, not as they arose, and developed, and changed, and fell there, but
rather as they went through these phases in Europe at large. The better
known names of Spanish authors of the time, such as Isla and Feyjóo, have
a certain right to figure here, but their literary critical work is only a part,
and not a very important or interesting part, of the extension of the
Aufklärung, especially in the forms which it assumed in France, to the most
bigoted and conservative (except its sister Portugal) of European countries.
This process, though perhaps necessary, is not in any department, political,
religious, or other, particularly grateful to study; for Spain lost venerable
and fascinating illusions—if illusions they were—to gain a very shallow,
dubious, and second-rate civilisation and enlightenment. And this was
almost more the case in literature than anywhere else.
mostradme, si [la Apostrofe] la Adversion
encierra tanta hermosúra.
One is too apt to forget, in censuring eighteenth-century flippancy and
superficiality in regard to the past, that all over Europe, more or less, this
kind of childish stuff was still actually taught.
Luzán is at least not childish, though he betrays the insufficient historical
examination and the hasty generalising which beset the whole school. He
Luzán. devotes the principal attention of his folio,[727] after
generalities avowedly taken from Muratori, to Epic and Tragedy, and while
using complimentary words to Lope and Calderon, indicates, without doubt
or hesitation, that his heart is with Corneille and Racine. It is true that he is
himself—as all these Eighteenth-century “classics” are without exception,
save the mere school dogmatists or the obstinate reactionaries like La Harpe
—inconsistent. Mr Fitzmaurice Kelly[728] goes so far as to say that there is
hardly a proposition in his book which is not contradicted elsewhere in it.
But that he at least meant to be a neo-classic, a Unitarian, a Nicolaitan,
there can be no doubt, nor any that he met with no markworthy or effectual
resistance.
The rest of the Spanish criticism of the eighteenth century has, save for
special students of Spanish literature, and perhaps even for them, very little
The rest interest; and it is noticeable that, from this point, even the
uninteresting.
accomplished and indefatigable historian of the subject[729]
practically breaks away from Spain itself, and gives a history of æsthetic
ideas, not as they arose, and developed, and changed, and fell there, but
rather as they went through these phases in Europe at large. The better
known names of Spanish authors of the time, such as Isla and Feyjóo, have
a certain right to figure here, but their literary critical work is only a part,
and not a very important or interesting part, of the extension of the
Aufklärung, especially in the forms which it assumed in France, to the most
bigoted and conservative (except its sister Portugal) of European countries.
This process, though perhaps necessary, is not in any department, political,
religious, or other, particularly grateful to study; for Spain lost venerable
and fascinating illusions—if illusions they were—to gain a very shallow,
dubious, and second-rate civilisation and enlightenment. And this was
almost more the case in literature than anywhere else.
Page 547
Feyjóo’s Teátro Crίtico, a series of Essays published between 1726 and
1738, and his Letters, which after a short interval he began in 1742, and
continued at intervals for eighteen years more, are more philosophical and
The rest “moral,” in the French sense, than literary. But the “Spanish
uninteresting.
Hotel de Rambouillet”—the “Academy of good taste”
which met about the middle of the century at the house of the Countess de
Lemos—included not only Luzán, but another littérateur of high rank, Luis
José Velasquez, Marquis of Valdeflores, with Nasarre y Ferriz, and others.
The whole school was rather anti-national, but Gregorio Mayáns y Siscar,
their contemporary, did great service to Spanish literature by publishing the
Origins, to which we have been indebted above,[730] and some by compiling
a Rhetoric, traditional enough, but not specially “Gallo”-Classic. The
famous Father Isla not only attacked the remnants of extravagant style,
which had sought refuge in the Spanish pulpit, in Fray Gerundio, the one
Spanish book of this time, which became a European possession, but left
unpublished other critical work, especially in his poem of Ciceron, much of
which is satirically critical of literature. Isla was probably more of a patriot
than of a critic in his well-known attempt to claim Gil Blas for Spain, not
merely in suggestion but in direct original. Nor should we omit to mention
with honour, as members of that invaluable class of restorers of ancient
literature which arose in almost all countries in the latter half of the century,
Sedano of the Spanish Parnassus, Sanchez of the Poesias Anteriores al
Siglo XV, and Sarmiento, the first general Historian of Old Spanish Poetry.
Their work was, if a somewhat slow, a sure and certain antidote to the
Gallicism of Moratin (Luzán’s chief successor) and others of the later time.
[731]
Despite some exceptions (which only prove the rule rather more than is
usual), and despite the immense dead-lift which at one time they gave, or
helped to give, to criticism, the Germans have never been very good critics.
Rise at last of There has always been too much in them of the girl in the
German
Criticism.
fable who jumped on the floor to hunt mice, instead of
attending to the more important business and pleasure of
the occasion. And though that dead-lift which has been referred to began
extremely early in the eighteenth century, its history belongs to our next
volume. It is, indeed, less easy to effect the separation which our plan
1738, and his Letters, which after a short interval he began in 1742, and
continued at intervals for eighteen years more, are more philosophical and
The rest “moral,” in the French sense, than literary. But the “Spanish
uninteresting.
Hotel de Rambouillet”—the “Academy of good taste”
which met about the middle of the century at the house of the Countess de
Lemos—included not only Luzán, but another littérateur of high rank, Luis
José Velasquez, Marquis of Valdeflores, with Nasarre y Ferriz, and others.
The whole school was rather anti-national, but Gregorio Mayáns y Siscar,
their contemporary, did great service to Spanish literature by publishing the
Origins, to which we have been indebted above,[730] and some by compiling
a Rhetoric, traditional enough, but not specially “Gallo”-Classic. The
famous Father Isla not only attacked the remnants of extravagant style,
which had sought refuge in the Spanish pulpit, in Fray Gerundio, the one
Spanish book of this time, which became a European possession, but left
unpublished other critical work, especially in his poem of Ciceron, much of
which is satirically critical of literature. Isla was probably more of a patriot
than of a critic in his well-known attempt to claim Gil Blas for Spain, not
merely in suggestion but in direct original. Nor should we omit to mention
with honour, as members of that invaluable class of restorers of ancient
literature which arose in almost all countries in the latter half of the century,
Sedano of the Spanish Parnassus, Sanchez of the Poesias Anteriores al
Siglo XV, and Sarmiento, the first general Historian of Old Spanish Poetry.
Their work was, if a somewhat slow, a sure and certain antidote to the
Gallicism of Moratin (Luzán’s chief successor) and others of the later time.
[731]
Despite some exceptions (which only prove the rule rather more than is
usual), and despite the immense dead-lift which at one time they gave, or
helped to give, to criticism, the Germans have never been very good critics.
Rise at last of There has always been too much in them of the girl in the
German
Criticism.
fable who jumped on the floor to hunt mice, instead of
attending to the more important business and pleasure of
the occasion. And though that dead-lift which has been referred to began
extremely early in the eighteenth century, its history belongs to our next
volume. It is, indeed, less easy to effect the separation which our plan
Page 548
demands here than anywhere else; for hardly had German vernacular
criticism begun to exert itself once more, after its long inertia since Opitz,
than the double current of abstract æstheticism, and of study of Romantic
literature, began to appear. But it would be impossible to omit from a
gallery or panorama of Neo-classicism such a typical specimen of the
perruque as Gottsched, such an eminent example of the “man who looks
over his shoulder” as Gellert. And though we must leave substantive
dealings with Bodmer, Breitinger, and their fellows and followers to that
early division of the next volume in which, with leave of Nemesis,
Germany will be compensated for the little pride of place she has hitherto
enjoyed, it will be very proper here at least to mention the singular and
interesting process of novitiate by which the Germans vindicated their
character as the good boys of technical education; and, by sheer hard study
and omnivorous reading, put the national abilities into a condition to turn
out a Lessing and a Goethe.
The means—sufficiently obvious, but not often resorted to save by those
nations which have not “decayed through pride”—were those of abundant
translation from the more forward vernaculars, as well as from the classics.
Its school time. The German Sammlungen of the first half of the eighteenth
[732]
century are very interesting things. From French, from English, from the
Latin writings of the previous century, they selected, and batched together,
critical tractates which they thought might do them good, taking these to
heart with Aristotle and Horace, with Boileau and Vida. That the
assemblage had sometimes something of a “Groves of Blarney” character—
that people like Camusat[733] find themselves jostling Pope and Addison
among writers of Belles-Lettres, and Vossius and Casaubon among
scholars, mattered not so very much. Manure, seed, patterns (to take various
lines of metaphor) were what the German mind wanted; and it received
them in plenty, and certainly not without good result.
There are some very good authorities[734] who do not see much difference
between Gottsched and his adversaries of the Swiss school, Bodmer and
Classicism at Breitinger. I am not able to agree with them. That there are
bay almost from
the first:
characteristics in common nobody can deny,—that
Gottsched. Gottsched is of the evening and Bodmer and Breitinger of
the morning of the same day on the older arrangement, I do
most sincerely think. And “the German Johnson”—so echt-deutsch and so
little Johnsonian—is much too characteristic and agreeable a figure not to
criticism begun to exert itself once more, after its long inertia since Opitz,
than the double current of abstract æstheticism, and of study of Romantic
literature, began to appear. But it would be impossible to omit from a
gallery or panorama of Neo-classicism such a typical specimen of the
perruque as Gottsched, such an eminent example of the “man who looks
over his shoulder” as Gellert. And though we must leave substantive
dealings with Bodmer, Breitinger, and their fellows and followers to that
early division of the next volume in which, with leave of Nemesis,
Germany will be compensated for the little pride of place she has hitherto
enjoyed, it will be very proper here at least to mention the singular and
interesting process of novitiate by which the Germans vindicated their
character as the good boys of technical education; and, by sheer hard study
and omnivorous reading, put the national abilities into a condition to turn
out a Lessing and a Goethe.
The means—sufficiently obvious, but not often resorted to save by those
nations which have not “decayed through pride”—were those of abundant
translation from the more forward vernaculars, as well as from the classics.
Its school time. The German Sammlungen of the first half of the eighteenth
[732]
century are very interesting things. From French, from English, from the
Latin writings of the previous century, they selected, and batched together,
critical tractates which they thought might do them good, taking these to
heart with Aristotle and Horace, with Boileau and Vida. That the
assemblage had sometimes something of a “Groves of Blarney” character—
that people like Camusat[733] find themselves jostling Pope and Addison
among writers of Belles-Lettres, and Vossius and Casaubon among
scholars, mattered not so very much. Manure, seed, patterns (to take various
lines of metaphor) were what the German mind wanted; and it received
them in plenty, and certainly not without good result.
There are some very good authorities[734] who do not see much difference
between Gottsched and his adversaries of the Swiss school, Bodmer and
Classicism at Breitinger. I am not able to agree with them. That there are
bay almost from
the first:
characteristics in common nobody can deny,—that
Gottsched. Gottsched is of the evening and Bodmer and Breitinger of
the morning of the same day on the older arrangement, I do
most sincerely think. And “the German Johnson”—so echt-deutsch and so
little Johnsonian—is much too characteristic and agreeable a figure not to
Page 549
have some substantive place here. It is interesting no doubt—and it would
give an excellent subject for one of the many not-to-be-written excursus of
this history—that he, the analogue, to some extent, in Germany, of Johnson
himself in England and of La Harpe in France, comes far earlier than these
representatives of the neo-classicism which “makes an end” in countries far
more accomplished in literature. But this is natural. The seventeenth century
in Germany had but been one long fallow, producing nothing but not
unfascinating weeds, like Lohenstein and Hoffmanswaldau, or wildings like
Grimmelshausen. But, as in other cases of fallow, the rains of heaven had
descended, and the winds had blown, and the worms had done their work of
breaking up, and the soil, if technically “foul,” was also fertile. Its
production was necessarily mixed; but it was at any rate not subject to the
desperate hook of the preceptist weeder, or to the traditional courses of the
orthodox agriculturist. The German man of letters of 1700-1750 had the
“Y” before him as few men of letters have had.
Gottsched took the classical branch of the letter unflinchingly, and
quarrelled with others, like a good party man, as he realised that they were
The Versuch taking the Romantic. His Versuch einer Critischen
einer Critischen
Dichtkunst.
Dichtkunst[735] is frontispieced with a striking picture of
Apollo, and the Muses, and Pegasus looking benignly at
Bellerophon(?), whom he is just pitching off, and Mercury, probably flying,
but in appearance rather tumbling, down the Holy Hill, with a copy of
Horace in his hand, and a group of critics and poets and personified Kinds
of poetry waiting to receive it in ecstatic attitudes at the bottom. It has three
separate dedication-pages, in the largest print, to three fair ladies of the
same family,—the high-born Countess and Lady, Lady Ernestine
Wilhelmine, widowed Baroness von Plotho, born Reichsgräfinn von
Manteufel, “my especially gracious Countess and Lady”; the high-born
Countess Johanna Henrietta Constantia, born the same, “my especially
gracious Countess”; and my ditto the high-born Countess Louisa Marianne,
born the same,—not to mention a beautiful Ode, several Prefaces, an
Introduction, and the full text, with translation in German Alexandrines, of
the Ars Poetica itself. If writer and reader do not feel themselves safe under
the convoy of all these charming spells and periapts, it is surely a pity.
It would, however, be most uncritical, and entirely unjust to Gottsched, to
assert or insinuate that his apparatus is mere matter of parade. On the
Its chief idea. contrary, the preface to the second edition first enumerates
give an excellent subject for one of the many not-to-be-written excursus of
this history—that he, the analogue, to some extent, in Germany, of Johnson
himself in England and of La Harpe in France, comes far earlier than these
representatives of the neo-classicism which “makes an end” in countries far
more accomplished in literature. But this is natural. The seventeenth century
in Germany had but been one long fallow, producing nothing but not
unfascinating weeds, like Lohenstein and Hoffmanswaldau, or wildings like
Grimmelshausen. But, as in other cases of fallow, the rains of heaven had
descended, and the winds had blown, and the worms had done their work of
breaking up, and the soil, if technically “foul,” was also fertile. Its
production was necessarily mixed; but it was at any rate not subject to the
desperate hook of the preceptist weeder, or to the traditional courses of the
orthodox agriculturist. The German man of letters of 1700-1750 had the
“Y” before him as few men of letters have had.
Gottsched took the classical branch of the letter unflinchingly, and
quarrelled with others, like a good party man, as he realised that they were
The Versuch taking the Romantic. His Versuch einer Critischen
einer Critischen
Dichtkunst.
Dichtkunst[735] is frontispieced with a striking picture of
Apollo, and the Muses, and Pegasus looking benignly at
Bellerophon(?), whom he is just pitching off, and Mercury, probably flying,
but in appearance rather tumbling, down the Holy Hill, with a copy of
Horace in his hand, and a group of critics and poets and personified Kinds
of poetry waiting to receive it in ecstatic attitudes at the bottom. It has three
separate dedication-pages, in the largest print, to three fair ladies of the
same family,—the high-born Countess and Lady, Lady Ernestine
Wilhelmine, widowed Baroness von Plotho, born Reichsgräfinn von
Manteufel, “my especially gracious Countess and Lady”; the high-born
Countess Johanna Henrietta Constantia, born the same, “my especially
gracious Countess”; and my ditto the high-born Countess Louisa Marianne,
born the same,—not to mention a beautiful Ode, several Prefaces, an
Introduction, and the full text, with translation in German Alexandrines, of
the Ars Poetica itself. If writer and reader do not feel themselves safe under
the convoy of all these charming spells and periapts, it is surely a pity.
It would, however, be most uncritical, and entirely unjust to Gottsched, to
assert or insinuate that his apparatus is mere matter of parade. On the
Its chief idea. contrary, the preface to the second edition first enumerates
Page 550
as “the greatest connoisseurs and masters of Poetic,” Aristotle, Horace,
Longinus, Scaliger, Boileau, Bossu, Dacier, Perrault, Bouhours, Fénelon,
Saint-Evremond, Fontenelle, La Motte, Corneille, Racine, Callières,
Furetière, Shaftesbury, Addison, Steele, Castelvetro, Muralt, and Voltaire.
For all of whom, except where (like Béat de Muralt, for instance) they have
been reserved for reasons,[736] reference may be made to other pages of the
present History. It afterwards specially alleges, as additional authorities,
Riccoboni’s history of the Italian Stage, an anonymous Paragone della
Poesia Tragica d' Italia con quella de Francia which I have not seen,
Rapin, Brumoy [spelt Brumois], Hédelin, Rémond de Saint-Mard, an
English anonymus[737] on The Taste of the Town, Ramsay, Pope, Casaubon,
Heinsius, Voss, Rappolt, and Sebastian Regulus his Imitations of the First
Book of the Æneis (which last I have not read and do not think I intend to
read). In the Preface to the Third Edition his quarrel with the Swiss school
breaks out. We shall see in future, I trust, what this school taught; it is here
of chief, if not of only, import to know what, according to Gottsched, the
“Zürichers” (i.e., those about Bodmer) did not teach and he did. “While I,”
he says in mingled pride and indignation, “after treating of poetry in
general, have dealt with all its Kinds, and given its own rules to each, so
that beginners may turn them out impeccably, the Zürich poetic has nothing
of the sort.” “Man would,” adds Gottsched incredulously and detesting,
“thereout neither an Ode nor a Cantata, neither an Eclogue nor an Elegy,
neither a Verse Epistle nor a Satire, neither an Epigram nor a Song of
Praise, neither an Epic nor a Tragedy, neither a Comedy nor an Opera to
make learn!”[738]
The Slurk-and-Pott objurgation which follows concerns us little. But the
passage just quoted has real weight. For it shows how, to the absolute and
half-incredulous horror of one party, and probably by the not entirely
conscious or intentional purpose of the other, the battle of Rule-poetic
against Appreciation-poetic had begun. To Gottsched the Art, or Science, or
what-not, of Poetry is a huge schedule, which may be quite emptied of
actual contents and yet retain its pre-established compartments and the rules
for filling them; to his adversaries Poetry itself is a library, a treasury, a new
world full of things and persons that cause, or do not cause, the poetic
pleasure.
It would be unnecessary to analyse this not quite “the poor last” of
Classical Poetics. It may be sufficient to say that Gottsched has his first or
Longinus, Scaliger, Boileau, Bossu, Dacier, Perrault, Bouhours, Fénelon,
Saint-Evremond, Fontenelle, La Motte, Corneille, Racine, Callières,
Furetière, Shaftesbury, Addison, Steele, Castelvetro, Muralt, and Voltaire.
For all of whom, except where (like Béat de Muralt, for instance) they have
been reserved for reasons,[736] reference may be made to other pages of the
present History. It afterwards specially alleges, as additional authorities,
Riccoboni’s history of the Italian Stage, an anonymous Paragone della
Poesia Tragica d' Italia con quella de Francia which I have not seen,
Rapin, Brumoy [spelt Brumois], Hédelin, Rémond de Saint-Mard, an
English anonymus[737] on The Taste of the Town, Ramsay, Pope, Casaubon,
Heinsius, Voss, Rappolt, and Sebastian Regulus his Imitations of the First
Book of the Æneis (which last I have not read and do not think I intend to
read). In the Preface to the Third Edition his quarrel with the Swiss school
breaks out. We shall see in future, I trust, what this school taught; it is here
of chief, if not of only, import to know what, according to Gottsched, the
“Zürichers” (i.e., those about Bodmer) did not teach and he did. “While I,”
he says in mingled pride and indignation, “after treating of poetry in
general, have dealt with all its Kinds, and given its own rules to each, so
that beginners may turn them out impeccably, the Zürich poetic has nothing
of the sort.” “Man would,” adds Gottsched incredulously and detesting,
“thereout neither an Ode nor a Cantata, neither an Eclogue nor an Elegy,
neither a Verse Epistle nor a Satire, neither an Epigram nor a Song of
Praise, neither an Epic nor a Tragedy, neither a Comedy nor an Opera to
make learn!”[738]
The Slurk-and-Pott objurgation which follows concerns us little. But the
passage just quoted has real weight. For it shows how, to the absolute and
half-incredulous horror of one party, and probably by the not entirely
conscious or intentional purpose of the other, the battle of Rule-poetic
against Appreciation-poetic had begun. To Gottsched the Art, or Science, or
what-not, of Poetry is a huge schedule, which may be quite emptied of
actual contents and yet retain its pre-established compartments and the rules
for filling them; to his adversaries Poetry itself is a library, a treasury, a new
world full of things and persons that cause, or do not cause, the poetic
pleasure.
It would be unnecessary to analyse this not quite “the poor last” of
Classical Poetics. It may be sufficient to say that Gottsched has his first or
Page 551
Specimen general and his second or particular book, the first dealing
details.
with the origin and growth of poetry, the character and taste
of a poet, the species of poetic imitation, the Wonderful in poetry, the
Admirable in poetry, and the like, the second with the usual Kinds in
regular order. His occasional utterances are, at this stage of the history, of
far greater importance. We find (p. 86) the sonnet classed with madrigals,
rondeaux, and other “little things which are worth little.” The old German
Heldengedichten are (p. 88), if not so good as Homer, Virgil, and Voltaire,
yet not so bad as Marino, Ariosto, Chapelain, Saint-Amand, and Milton.[739]
Later (p. 109), “Among Englishmen, who are specially inclined to
excessive fantasy, Milton in his Paradise Lost has exhibited everything that
man can possibly do in this kind of schwärmerei.” It is well to remember
that the detested Zürichers were special admirers of Milton; but there is no
reason to suspect Gottsched of being unduly biassed by this, either here or
in the longer examination which he gives to Milton’s sins afterwards. He is
almost as severe on Ariosto (p. 209), arguing with unruffled gravity that the
discoveries of Astolfo (which he sums up as solemnly as a judge) are not
probable, and finishing with the sad observation that the Italian’s fantasies
are really more like a sick man’s dream than like the reasonable inventions
of a poet.
The good Gottsched, in fact, is an apostle not so much even of classicism
as of that hopeless prosaism to which classicism lent itself but too easily.[740]
Even Voltaire is not sufficiently wahrscheinlich for him; and he asks (pp.
183, 215) in agitated tones whether Herr Voltaire, who has elsewhere such
sound ideas on the Highest of Beings, has not made a mistake in the magic
scenes of the Henriade? He is, however, no friend to prosaic diction, and
stoutly defends what he calls (p. 263) “good florid expression,”[741] giving
some better examples, from poets like Amthor and Flemming, than those
who regard the German seventeenth century as a mere desert might expect.
So long as he can get these flights under the recognised Figures, and so long
as they do not outstep “the rules of prudence” (273), all is well. But the
outstepping, as may be guessed, is not very far off. He finds it, under the
guidance of Bouhours, in Malherbe of all remarkable places, and naturally
much more in Hoffmanswaldau and Lohenstein, as well as in Ariosto and
Marino and Gracián,—being as severe on galimatias and “Phébus” as he
had previously (and quite justly) been against that medley of German-
French which Opitz had long before condemned. There is, in fact, a good
details.
with the origin and growth of poetry, the character and taste
of a poet, the species of poetic imitation, the Wonderful in poetry, the
Admirable in poetry, and the like, the second with the usual Kinds in
regular order. His occasional utterances are, at this stage of the history, of
far greater importance. We find (p. 86) the sonnet classed with madrigals,
rondeaux, and other “little things which are worth little.” The old German
Heldengedichten are (p. 88), if not so good as Homer, Virgil, and Voltaire,
yet not so bad as Marino, Ariosto, Chapelain, Saint-Amand, and Milton.[739]
Later (p. 109), “Among Englishmen, who are specially inclined to
excessive fantasy, Milton in his Paradise Lost has exhibited everything that
man can possibly do in this kind of schwärmerei.” It is well to remember
that the detested Zürichers were special admirers of Milton; but there is no
reason to suspect Gottsched of being unduly biassed by this, either here or
in the longer examination which he gives to Milton’s sins afterwards. He is
almost as severe on Ariosto (p. 209), arguing with unruffled gravity that the
discoveries of Astolfo (which he sums up as solemnly as a judge) are not
probable, and finishing with the sad observation that the Italian’s fantasies
are really more like a sick man’s dream than like the reasonable inventions
of a poet.
The good Gottsched, in fact, is an apostle not so much even of classicism
as of that hopeless prosaism to which classicism lent itself but too easily.[740]
Even Voltaire is not sufficiently wahrscheinlich for him; and he asks (pp.
183, 215) in agitated tones whether Herr Voltaire, who has elsewhere such
sound ideas on the Highest of Beings, has not made a mistake in the magic
scenes of the Henriade? He is, however, no friend to prosaic diction, and
stoutly defends what he calls (p. 263) “good florid expression,”[741] giving
some better examples, from poets like Amthor and Flemming, than those
who regard the German seventeenth century as a mere desert might expect.
So long as he can get these flights under the recognised Figures, and so long
as they do not outstep “the rules of prudence” (273), all is well. But the
outstepping, as may be guessed, is not very far off. He finds it, under the
guidance of Bouhours, in Malherbe of all remarkable places, and naturally
much more in Hoffmanswaldau and Lohenstein, as well as in Ariosto and
Marino and Gracián,—being as severe on galimatias and “Phébus” as he
had previously (and quite justly) been against that medley of German-
French which Opitz had long before condemned. There is, in fact, a good
Page 552
deal of sense as well as of minuteness in Gottsched’s particular rules, both
as to poetry in general and as to the Kinds. In dealing with these last he
gives very extensive examples, and since these are taken from a division of
poetry not much in most readers’ way, they are distinctly interesting. But we
must not follow him into these details; nor is it at all necessary to do so. The
neo-classic critic has at least the virtue of adhering to his own rules, and
observing his own type, with Horatian strictness. There is little danger of
finding in him a politic Achilles, a prudent youth, or an old man who is
good-humoured and does not praise the past. Gottsched says of Epic and
Romance, of Comedy and Tragedy, exactly what we should expect him to
say, if not exactly what we may think he ought to have said. He cannot
understand how Tasso could hope to “unite this Gothic taste of chivalrous
books” (p. 682) with the Greek rules of Heroic poetry; and he makes so
bold as almost to rebuke the great Voltaire for according the name of Heroic
poem to the Lusiad and the Araucana. But there is a characteristic note in
the words, “It is time to leave the historic-critic part and come to the
dogmatic,” which, it seems, we shall find—all of it—in Aristotle, Dacier,
and Le Bossu. It is, in a different relation, like Balzac’s passons aux choses
réelles—“Never mind the Poems: come to the Rules!”
Gellert, a pupil of Gottsched, at any rate for a time, and a pretty poet in
his own way, betrays that tendency to compromise, if not actually to
capitulate, which we have seen in parts of French Classicism. His principal
Gellert: he critical tractate[742] carries a confession in its very title,
transacts.
“How far the Use of the Rules extends in Rhetoric and
Poetry,” and the confession is emphasised in the text. It comes to this—that
the Rules are useful, but only generally so, and with a “thus far and no
further.” It is evident that, when this point is reached, the Oppression of
Gwenhidwy is on the eve of descending upon the land of Gwaelod, the
dykes are bursting, and the sea is flowing in.[743] We saw just now
Gottsched’s indignant horror at the idea of writing upon poetry without
giving rules to anybody how he shall do anything. He must have been more
horrified still, because there is an element of treacherous surrender instead
of bold defiance in it, at this other view of the rules as not bad things in
their way—to be followed when it is convenient and when you please, and
broken or left behind when it is convenient, or when you please again. In
fact, any such admission at once reduces the whole Neoclassic system to an
absurdity. A law which may be obeyed or not exactly as people choose—a
as to poetry in general and as to the Kinds. In dealing with these last he
gives very extensive examples, and since these are taken from a division of
poetry not much in most readers’ way, they are distinctly interesting. But we
must not follow him into these details; nor is it at all necessary to do so. The
neo-classic critic has at least the virtue of adhering to his own rules, and
observing his own type, with Horatian strictness. There is little danger of
finding in him a politic Achilles, a prudent youth, or an old man who is
good-humoured and does not praise the past. Gottsched says of Epic and
Romance, of Comedy and Tragedy, exactly what we should expect him to
say, if not exactly what we may think he ought to have said. He cannot
understand how Tasso could hope to “unite this Gothic taste of chivalrous
books” (p. 682) with the Greek rules of Heroic poetry; and he makes so
bold as almost to rebuke the great Voltaire for according the name of Heroic
poem to the Lusiad and the Araucana. But there is a characteristic note in
the words, “It is time to leave the historic-critic part and come to the
dogmatic,” which, it seems, we shall find—all of it—in Aristotle, Dacier,
and Le Bossu. It is, in a different relation, like Balzac’s passons aux choses
réelles—“Never mind the Poems: come to the Rules!”
Gellert, a pupil of Gottsched, at any rate for a time, and a pretty poet in
his own way, betrays that tendency to compromise, if not actually to
capitulate, which we have seen in parts of French Classicism. His principal
Gellert: he critical tractate[742] carries a confession in its very title,
transacts.
“How far the Use of the Rules extends in Rhetoric and
Poetry,” and the confession is emphasised in the text. It comes to this—that
the Rules are useful, but only generally so, and with a “thus far and no
further.” It is evident that, when this point is reached, the Oppression of
Gwenhidwy is on the eve of descending upon the land of Gwaelod, the
dykes are bursting, and the sea is flowing in.[743] We saw just now
Gottsched’s indignant horror at the idea of writing upon poetry without
giving rules to anybody how he shall do anything. He must have been more
horrified still, because there is an element of treacherous surrender instead
of bold defiance in it, at this other view of the rules as not bad things in
their way—to be followed when it is convenient and when you please, and
broken or left behind when it is convenient, or when you please again. In
fact, any such admission at once reduces the whole Neoclassic system to an
absurdity. A law which may be obeyed or not exactly as people choose—a
Page 553
sealed pattern which is followed or not at the taste and fancy of the tailor or
other craftsman—you surely cannot too soon repeal the first and throw the
second into the dustbin. And this was, as we shall see, what Germany very
speedily did.
other craftsman—you surely cannot too soon repeal the first and throw the
second into the dustbin. And this was, as we shall see, what Germany very
speedily did.
Page 554
INTERCHAPTER VI.
§ I. THE NEMESIS OF CORRECTNESS.
§ II. THE BALANCE-SHEET OF NEO-CLASSIC
CRITICISM.
§ I. THE NEMESIS OF CORRECTNESS.
§ II. THE BALANCE-SHEET OF NEO-CLASSIC
CRITICISM.
Page 555
I.
In the present Interchapter, as in that at the close of the former volume, it
seems desirable to make the summary twofold: in the first place, with
reference to the Book which the chapter immediately follows, so as to
provide a corresponding view to that given by the Interchapters of the two
earlier Books in the volume itself; in the second, surveying the State of
Criticism—with a look before and after—at the period which we have
reached. This survey is here of even more importance than it was on the
former occasion because of the greater—in fact the almost absolute—
homogeneity of the subject. But it comes second in order, and for the
moment we must busy ourselves only with that portion or side of
Eighteenth-Century Criticism itself which has been considered in the last
three chapters.
In one way Eighteenth-Century criticism has a very notable advantage
over Seventeenth and Sixteenth. In the earliest of the three, as we saw,
criticism exists almost without a critic. Its authorities are either men of
something less (to speak kindly) than the first rank as men of letters, or else
they devote only a slight and passing attention to the subject. In the
Seventeenth this is not quite so, for Dryden is a host in himself, and
Boileau, to name nobody else, is no common man of letters.
But in the Eighteenth the case is far more altered. English and French, the
two leading literatures of Europe, are copiously and intensely critical, if not
entirely according to knowledge. Addison, Johnson, Pope, Voltaire, are all
dictators of literature, whose fame and authority, in the case at least of the
two last, go far beyond their own country—and they are all critics. In
another country, though in a division, for reasons, not yet noticed, Goethe,
who, if any one, is the representative man of letters in his own nation, is a
critic. The second class of names—mentioned or to be mentioned—Vico,
Shaftesbury, Lessing, Gray, Buffon, Diderot, and others, approaches very
nearly, if it does not sometimes reach, the first rank. Moreover, criticism has
enormously multiplied its appearances and opportunities of appearance: it
has, in a manner, become popular. The critical Review—the periodical by
means of which it is possible, and becomes easy, to give critical account of
the literature, not merely of the past but of the present—becomes common.
In the present Interchapter, as in that at the close of the former volume, it
seems desirable to make the summary twofold: in the first place, with
reference to the Book which the chapter immediately follows, so as to
provide a corresponding view to that given by the Interchapters of the two
earlier Books in the volume itself; in the second, surveying the State of
Criticism—with a look before and after—at the period which we have
reached. This survey is here of even more importance than it was on the
former occasion because of the greater—in fact the almost absolute—
homogeneity of the subject. But it comes second in order, and for the
moment we must busy ourselves only with that portion or side of
Eighteenth-Century Criticism itself which has been considered in the last
three chapters.
In one way Eighteenth-Century criticism has a very notable advantage
over Seventeenth and Sixteenth. In the earliest of the three, as we saw,
criticism exists almost without a critic. Its authorities are either men of
something less (to speak kindly) than the first rank as men of letters, or else
they devote only a slight and passing attention to the subject. In the
Seventeenth this is not quite so, for Dryden is a host in himself, and
Boileau, to name nobody else, is no common man of letters.
But in the Eighteenth the case is far more altered. English and French, the
two leading literatures of Europe, are copiously and intensely critical, if not
entirely according to knowledge. Addison, Johnson, Pope, Voltaire, are all
dictators of literature, whose fame and authority, in the case at least of the
two last, go far beyond their own country—and they are all critics. In
another country, though in a division, for reasons, not yet noticed, Goethe,
who, if any one, is the representative man of letters in his own nation, is a
critic. The second class of names—mentioned or to be mentioned—Vico,
Shaftesbury, Lessing, Gray, Buffon, Diderot, and others, approaches very
nearly, if it does not sometimes reach, the first rank. Moreover, criticism has
enormously multiplied its appearances and opportunities of appearance: it
has, in a manner, become popular. The critical Review—the periodical by
means of which it is possible, and becomes easy, to give critical account of
the literature, not merely of the past but of the present—becomes common.
Page 556
The critic as such is no longer regarded as a mere pedant; he at least
attempts to take his place as a literary man of the world. If Italy and Spain
fail—even allowing for the remarkable Italian critical group at the
beginning of the century—to justify their old reputation, Germany, on the
other hand, begins that career of critical hard labour to which she has
apparently sentenced herself in perpetuity, and relieves it with more
excursions into the fairer letters than of late. The French, though subject
more severely than men of any other country to the idols of the time,
continue to justify themselves both in the lighter and the severer critical
work.
But the contribution of England is the most interesting of all. Our
position at the time may be compared, with some advantage and no danger
of straining, to that of Spain at a somewhat earlier period (see pp. 338-350).
We do not indeed find, in any English critic after Dryden, formal
expressions of such weight and pregnancy in the Romantic direction as
those which the sharp-sightedness and patience of Señor Menéndez y
Pelayo have extracted from the Spanish Preceptists. But the general
tendency is even more comprehensive, if not yet catholic. In consequence,
very mainly, of Dryden’s own magnificent championship of Shakespeare
and Milton, it was, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, felt in
England that these two at any rate had to be reckoned with; while Chaucer
also had the same powerful recommendation, and Spenser had never lost
the affection of the fit, though for a time they might be few. With these four
to be somehow or other—by hook or by crook—taken into consideration, it
was impossible for the worst harm to be done; and the peculiarities of
English character, combined with the more vigorous condition of English
creative literature, made the compromise work far better than that which
had been in a manner entertained in Spain on the subject of Lope and
Calderon. It might have been dangerous if Johnson had written the Lives at
the age which was Pope’s when he wrote the Essay on Criticism; but this
danger also the Fortune of England—kindest of Goddesses, and most
abused in her kindness, yet justified of Fate!—averted.
We shall, it is to be hoped, be able to show in the next volume how these
conditions of Classicism in the several countries affected the rise or
resurrection of Romanticism. For the present we must confine ourselves to
the way in which they affected Classicism itself.
attempts to take his place as a literary man of the world. If Italy and Spain
fail—even allowing for the remarkable Italian critical group at the
beginning of the century—to justify their old reputation, Germany, on the
other hand, begins that career of critical hard labour to which she has
apparently sentenced herself in perpetuity, and relieves it with more
excursions into the fairer letters than of late. The French, though subject
more severely than men of any other country to the idols of the time,
continue to justify themselves both in the lighter and the severer critical
work.
But the contribution of England is the most interesting of all. Our
position at the time may be compared, with some advantage and no danger
of straining, to that of Spain at a somewhat earlier period (see pp. 338-350).
We do not indeed find, in any English critic after Dryden, formal
expressions of such weight and pregnancy in the Romantic direction as
those which the sharp-sightedness and patience of Señor Menéndez y
Pelayo have extracted from the Spanish Preceptists. But the general
tendency is even more comprehensive, if not yet catholic. In consequence,
very mainly, of Dryden’s own magnificent championship of Shakespeare
and Milton, it was, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, felt in
England that these two at any rate had to be reckoned with; while Chaucer
also had the same powerful recommendation, and Spenser had never lost
the affection of the fit, though for a time they might be few. With these four
to be somehow or other—by hook or by crook—taken into consideration, it
was impossible for the worst harm to be done; and the peculiarities of
English character, combined with the more vigorous condition of English
creative literature, made the compromise work far better than that which
had been in a manner entertained in Spain on the subject of Lope and
Calderon. It might have been dangerous if Johnson had written the Lives at
the age which was Pope’s when he wrote the Essay on Criticism; but this
danger also the Fortune of England—kindest of Goddesses, and most
abused in her kindness, yet justified of Fate!—averted.
We shall, it is to be hoped, be able to show in the next volume how these
conditions of Classicism in the several countries affected the rise or
resurrection of Romanticism. For the present we must confine ourselves to
the way in which they affected Classicism itself.
Page 557
For the purpose we need not repeat, or even recapitulate, what has been
said of its fortunes in Germany, Italy, and Spain, save to say that in the first-
named country it only appeared to disappear, while in the other two it
suffered increasing decrepitude. England and France are much more
important and interesting subjects of consideration and comparison.
In both, as we saw, Neo-classicism is undoubtedly the accepted
orthodoxy of the time. If that draft confession of Faith, which has been
sketched in a former page, had been laid before an assembly of the leading
men of letters in both countries, many might have taken exception to its
actual form; but as for its spirit, there is hardly a Frenchman who would
have refused to accept it, while not many Englishmen would have done so.
At the same time—until, towards the later years of the century, the “alarums
and excursions” of the Romantic rising recalled the orthodox to strictness—
a more searching examination would have revealed serious defections and
latitudinarianisms. Pope was perhaps the most orthodox neo-classic, in
criticism as in creation, of the greater men of letters of the time; but Pope
was fond of Spenser. Addison had never thoroughly cleared his mind up
about criticism; but many things in him point the Romantic way, and we
know that some of the more orthodox thought him weak and doubtful.
Voltaire, at one time, had considerable leanings towards both Shakespeare
and Milton; and we have seen how Johnson, though he resisted and
recovered himself, was at least once within appreciable distance of that
precipice of “judging by the event,” over which, when a Classic once lets
himself slip, he falls for ever and for ever through the Romantic void.
Of lesser men we need not speak much—reference to what has been said
above of the escapades of Fontenelle and Marmontel, of Steele and Kames,
is sufficient. But all these things were as the liberalities of a securely
established orthodoxy, estated and endowed, dreading no disturbance, and
able to be generous to others—even to indulge itself a little in licence and
peccadillo. Everywhere but in England the vast majority of men, and even
in England all but a very small minority, had no doubt about the general
principles of the Neo-classic Creed. They still judged by Rules and Kinds;
they still had the notion that you must generalise, always generalise; they
still believed that, in some way or other, Homer and Virgil—especially
Virgil—had exhausted the secrets of Epic, and almost of poetry; and, above
all, they were entirely unprepared to extend patient and unbiassed judgment
to something acknowledged, and acknowledging itself, to be new. On the
said of its fortunes in Germany, Italy, and Spain, save to say that in the first-
named country it only appeared to disappear, while in the other two it
suffered increasing decrepitude. England and France are much more
important and interesting subjects of consideration and comparison.
In both, as we saw, Neo-classicism is undoubtedly the accepted
orthodoxy of the time. If that draft confession of Faith, which has been
sketched in a former page, had been laid before an assembly of the leading
men of letters in both countries, many might have taken exception to its
actual form; but as for its spirit, there is hardly a Frenchman who would
have refused to accept it, while not many Englishmen would have done so.
At the same time—until, towards the later years of the century, the “alarums
and excursions” of the Romantic rising recalled the orthodox to strictness—
a more searching examination would have revealed serious defections and
latitudinarianisms. Pope was perhaps the most orthodox neo-classic, in
criticism as in creation, of the greater men of letters of the time; but Pope
was fond of Spenser. Addison had never thoroughly cleared his mind up
about criticism; but many things in him point the Romantic way, and we
know that some of the more orthodox thought him weak and doubtful.
Voltaire, at one time, had considerable leanings towards both Shakespeare
and Milton; and we have seen how Johnson, though he resisted and
recovered himself, was at least once within appreciable distance of that
precipice of “judging by the event,” over which, when a Classic once lets
himself slip, he falls for ever and for ever through the Romantic void.
Of lesser men we need not speak much—reference to what has been said
above of the escapades of Fontenelle and Marmontel, of Steele and Kames,
is sufficient. But all these things were as the liberalities of a securely
established orthodoxy, estated and endowed, dreading no disturbance, and
able to be generous to others—even to indulge itself a little in licence and
peccadillo. Everywhere but in England the vast majority of men, and even
in England all but a very small minority, had no doubt about the general
principles of the Neo-classic Creed. They still judged by Rules and Kinds;
they still had the notion that you must generalise, always generalise; they
still believed that, in some way or other, Homer and Virgil—especially
Virgil—had exhausted the secrets of Epic, and almost of poetry; and, above
all, they were entirely unprepared to extend patient and unbiassed judgment
to something acknowledged, and acknowledging itself, to be new. On the
Page 558
contrary, they must still be vindicating even things which they liked, but
which appeared to them to be novel, on the score of their being so very like
the old—as we saw in the case of Blair and Ossian.
The Nemesis of this their Correctness, as far as creation is concerned, in
prose to some extent, but still more in verse, has been described over and
over again by a thousand critics and literary historians. The highest and
most poetical poetry they could not write at all—except when they had, like
Collins, and Smart, and Blake, a little not merely of furor poeticus, but of
actual insanity in their constitution, or when they violated their own rules
by transgressing into pure nature-poetry or into intense realism of
anthropology. In their own chosen way they could at best achieve the really
poetical rhetoric, but at the same time strictly rhetorical poetry, of Pope,
and, in a lower range, of Akenside.[744] For prose they had the luck to
discover, in the Novel, a Kind which, never having been to any great extent
practised before, was a Kind practically without rules, and so could make or
neglect its rules for itself. In another, not quite so new, their performance
gave striking instance of their limitations. The Periodical Essay was a thing
of almost infinite possibilities: but because it had happened at first to be
written in a certain form by persons of genius, they turned practice into
Kind and Rule once more, and for nearly the whole century—not merely in
England—went on imitating the Spectator.
In Criticism itself the effects were not wholly different, though of course
to some extent apparently dissimilar. We have seen how, during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the necessary and ineluctable set of the
critical current towards full and free “judging of authors” seems to have
been resisted by a sort of unconscious recalcitrance on the part of critics;
yet how they are drawn nearer and nearer to it, and, in Dryden’s case at any
rate, achieve admirable results. By the eighteenth, in all countries, the
tendency becomes irresistible. The interest in literature, the bent and
occupations of men of letters great and small, the new institution of
periodicals—all combine to strengthen it: and every kind of critical
estimate, from the elaborate literary history to the brief review, begins to be
written, and is written, ever more copiously.
This was what criticism wanted; and it could not but do good. Yet the
results illustrated, as mere abstract treatises never could have done, the
deficiencies of the common critical theory. The writers save themselves, as
a rule, from the worst mistakes by simply ignoring that of which they are
which appeared to them to be novel, on the score of their being so very like
the old—as we saw in the case of Blair and Ossian.
The Nemesis of this their Correctness, as far as creation is concerned, in
prose to some extent, but still more in verse, has been described over and
over again by a thousand critics and literary historians. The highest and
most poetical poetry they could not write at all—except when they had, like
Collins, and Smart, and Blake, a little not merely of furor poeticus, but of
actual insanity in their constitution, or when they violated their own rules
by transgressing into pure nature-poetry or into intense realism of
anthropology. In their own chosen way they could at best achieve the really
poetical rhetoric, but at the same time strictly rhetorical poetry, of Pope,
and, in a lower range, of Akenside.[744] For prose they had the luck to
discover, in the Novel, a Kind which, never having been to any great extent
practised before, was a Kind practically without rules, and so could make or
neglect its rules for itself. In another, not quite so new, their performance
gave striking instance of their limitations. The Periodical Essay was a thing
of almost infinite possibilities: but because it had happened at first to be
written in a certain form by persons of genius, they turned practice into
Kind and Rule once more, and for nearly the whole century—not merely in
England—went on imitating the Spectator.
In Criticism itself the effects were not wholly different, though of course
to some extent apparently dissimilar. We have seen how, during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the necessary and ineluctable set of the
critical current towards full and free “judging of authors” seems to have
been resisted by a sort of unconscious recalcitrance on the part of critics;
yet how they are drawn nearer and nearer to it, and, in Dryden’s case at any
rate, achieve admirable results. By the eighteenth, in all countries, the
tendency becomes irresistible. The interest in literature, the bent and
occupations of men of letters great and small, the new institution of
periodicals—all combine to strengthen it: and every kind of critical
estimate, from the elaborate literary history to the brief review, begins to be
written, and is written, ever more copiously.
This was what criticism wanted; and it could not but do good. Yet the
results illustrated, as mere abstract treatises never could have done, the
deficiencies of the common critical theory. The writers save themselves, as
a rule, from the worst mistakes by simply ignoring that of which they are
Page 559
ignorant. But in regard to the things with which they do deal the inadequacy
and the hamper of their theory are sufficiently apparent.
Of course the deficiencies of Eighteenth-century criticism are to be easily
matched with other, and sometimes opposite, deficiencies in other times. It
takes considerably more pains to get at something like a real appreciation of
its subject, something more than a bare reference to schedule, than had been
the case, either in ancient times or in the two centuries immediately
preceding. It is very much better furnished with a critical theory (whether
good or bad does not at the moment matter) than has usually been the case
with Criticism from the early years of the nineteenth century to the early
years of the twentieth. It is not even intentionally ignorant—its ignorance
only proceeds from a mistaken estimate of things as worth or not worth
knowing; and there is rarely to be found in it the bland assumption that “I
like this,” or perhaps rather, “I choose to say I like this,” will settle
everything, which has been not entirely unknown later. But it combines, in a
fashion already perhaps sufficiently illustrated, the awkwardness of
dogmatism and of compromise; and it is perhaps more exposed to those two
terrible questions, “Why?” and “Why Not?” which are the Monkir and
Nakir of all critics and all criticism, than the criticism of any other period. It
is difficult to see how a critic such as Dennis could give any reasons for
admiring Shakespeare at all, save ethical ones; and it is quite certain that a
persistent Te sequar with the “Why Not?” will dispose of almost all the
stock eighteenth-century objections both to Shakespeare and to all other
suspected persons. In a certain way La Harpe had the advantage of all his
predecessors, for he was at least consistent.
The theory not merely of the authades kallos, the “head-strong beauty,”
but of the “monstrous beauty”—the beauty which is beautiful but has no
business to be so, the miracle-working power which does work miracles,
but is to be forbidden as magia nigra, because it does not work them
according to the rules—may seem itself so monstrous as to be a patent
reductio ad absurdum. In fact it acted as such. Yet the logic of it is
undeniable. It had all along been the unspoken word, but the word that
ought to have been spoken, and had to be spoken some day. Nor need we
grudge the admission that it was in a certain sense better than the practice
(which had been often resorted to before, and which has not seldom been
resorted to since) of absolutely denying the beauty altogether, with the
possible result of being, after a time, honestly unable to see it.
and the hamper of their theory are sufficiently apparent.
Of course the deficiencies of Eighteenth-century criticism are to be easily
matched with other, and sometimes opposite, deficiencies in other times. It
takes considerably more pains to get at something like a real appreciation of
its subject, something more than a bare reference to schedule, than had been
the case, either in ancient times or in the two centuries immediately
preceding. It is very much better furnished with a critical theory (whether
good or bad does not at the moment matter) than has usually been the case
with Criticism from the early years of the nineteenth century to the early
years of the twentieth. It is not even intentionally ignorant—its ignorance
only proceeds from a mistaken estimate of things as worth or not worth
knowing; and there is rarely to be found in it the bland assumption that “I
like this,” or perhaps rather, “I choose to say I like this,” will settle
everything, which has been not entirely unknown later. But it combines, in a
fashion already perhaps sufficiently illustrated, the awkwardness of
dogmatism and of compromise; and it is perhaps more exposed to those two
terrible questions, “Why?” and “Why Not?” which are the Monkir and
Nakir of all critics and all criticism, than the criticism of any other period. It
is difficult to see how a critic such as Dennis could give any reasons for
admiring Shakespeare at all, save ethical ones; and it is quite certain that a
persistent Te sequar with the “Why Not?” will dispose of almost all the
stock eighteenth-century objections both to Shakespeare and to all other
suspected persons. In a certain way La Harpe had the advantage of all his
predecessors, for he was at least consistent.
The theory not merely of the authades kallos, the “head-strong beauty,”
but of the “monstrous beauty”—the beauty which is beautiful but has no
business to be so, the miracle-working power which does work miracles,
but is to be forbidden as magia nigra, because it does not work them
according to the rules—may seem itself so monstrous as to be a patent
reductio ad absurdum. In fact it acted as such. Yet the logic of it is
undeniable. It had all along been the unspoken word, but the word that
ought to have been spoken, and had to be spoken some day. Nor need we
grudge the admission that it was in a certain sense better than the practice
(which had been often resorted to before, and which has not seldom been
resorted to since) of absolutely denying the beauty altogether, with the
possible result of being, after a time, honestly unable to see it.
Page 560
A certain number of points, affecting the criticism and the taste of the
Eighteenth century in particular, remains to be noticed briefly before we
pass to the consideration of the Neo-classic Dispensation generally.
In the first place, both could not fail to be influenced most powerfully by
the constant growth of literature in volume; by the appearance, almost for
the first time in large numbers, of the man of letters by profession; and,
lastly, by certain changes in general education, and so in the quality of
writers and readers. To say that the general reader first made his appearance
about 1660, in what were to be thenceforward the two great literary
countries of Europe, would be an exaggeration, but only an exaggeration, of
the truth. He certainly increased and multiplied in both thenceforward; and,
by an inevitable consequence, at once created the vocation of the writer and
determined the cast and quality of the things written. Matters like the
continued engouement of the French court and French society for literature,
and the alternate exaltation and depression, the Secretaryships of State and
the Grub Street kennels, for it in England, only concern us indirectly; but
they do concern us. Prosperity and patronage enticed the literary man to
work; poverty and contempt drove him to it, if only to hack-work.
Influences came, too, from the subdivision of Kinds, the specialisation of
study required, the reduction of mere erudition among those who were not
specialists. I should suppose that, taking the average reading of those who
had any reading at all, the late sixteenth century, with a great part of the
seventeenth, was the most erudite time in the known history of the world.
The level of general erudition has been constantly declining since, though
with some fluctuations; and it was at a specially low level during the later
eighteenth century. Although it is an auxiliary on whose aid Romantic
criticism—or rather that catholic criticism which is neither Classic nor
Romantic exclusively, but both and more than both—can by no means pride
herself, there is little doubt that the increasing neglect of the classics did
help to discredit the criticism which chiefly appealed to them; while the
constantly growing attention to certain kinds of physical science could not
but tell upon the purely literary estimate. The historical studies which were
so great a characteristic of the later century could not, again, but be
powerful unsettlers of the fixed point of view; the ever-growing popularity
of the novel was constantly lifting into greater prominence a kind of which
the ancients had practically taken no notice at all; the equally constant
development of the newspaper was always adding writers, who knew little
Eighteenth century in particular, remains to be noticed briefly before we
pass to the consideration of the Neo-classic Dispensation generally.
In the first place, both could not fail to be influenced most powerfully by
the constant growth of literature in volume; by the appearance, almost for
the first time in large numbers, of the man of letters by profession; and,
lastly, by certain changes in general education, and so in the quality of
writers and readers. To say that the general reader first made his appearance
about 1660, in what were to be thenceforward the two great literary
countries of Europe, would be an exaggeration, but only an exaggeration, of
the truth. He certainly increased and multiplied in both thenceforward; and,
by an inevitable consequence, at once created the vocation of the writer and
determined the cast and quality of the things written. Matters like the
continued engouement of the French court and French society for literature,
and the alternate exaltation and depression, the Secretaryships of State and
the Grub Street kennels, for it in England, only concern us indirectly; but
they do concern us. Prosperity and patronage enticed the literary man to
work; poverty and contempt drove him to it, if only to hack-work.
Influences came, too, from the subdivision of Kinds, the specialisation of
study required, the reduction of mere erudition among those who were not
specialists. I should suppose that, taking the average reading of those who
had any reading at all, the late sixteenth century, with a great part of the
seventeenth, was the most erudite time in the known history of the world.
The level of general erudition has been constantly declining since, though
with some fluctuations; and it was at a specially low level during the later
eighteenth century. Although it is an auxiliary on whose aid Romantic
criticism—or rather that catholic criticism which is neither Classic nor
Romantic exclusively, but both and more than both—can by no means pride
herself, there is little doubt that the increasing neglect of the classics did
help to discredit the criticism which chiefly appealed to them; while the
constantly growing attention to certain kinds of physical science could not
but tell upon the purely literary estimate. The historical studies which were
so great a characteristic of the later century could not, again, but be
powerful unsettlers of the fixed point of view; the ever-growing popularity
of the novel was constantly lifting into greater prominence a kind of which
the ancients had practically taken no notice at all; the equally constant
development of the newspaper was always adding writers, who knew little
Page 561
of ancient rules, on subjects of which the ancients had never thought. Even
without the special literary influences which we may hope to consider in the
next Book, the general trend of habit and event made for a change in
criticism; and such a change was imperatively called for, at once by that
reductio ad absurdum of neo-classic strictures, and by that illogical
tolerance of certain great writers of the past, to which we have given the
joint name and status of its Nemesis.[745]
without the special literary influences which we may hope to consider in the
next Book, the general trend of habit and event made for a change in
criticism; and such a change was imperatively called for, at once by that
reductio ad absurdum of neo-classic strictures, and by that illogical
tolerance of certain great writers of the past, to which we have given the
joint name and status of its Nemesis.[745]
Page 562
II.
We now have before us the more important, but also the more difficult,
task of summing up the achievements and the shortcomings of the whole
period covered by this volume—the only period, be it remembered, in
which Criticism was regarded from the point of view of a commonly
accepted, if not very commonly understood, orthodoxy. This of itself is an
advantage, which, though it has not recently counted for very much, will
never be overlooked by true critics. Even if we drop the quod semper, the
quod ubique, quod ab omnibus has a weight which leaves it wholly for the
other side to show case and cause against. Orthodoxy may be really right—
really orthodox; on that head it has at least an even chance against any of its
opponents. Even if it is not, it has merits which they can rarely claim. It has
no temptations for the clever fool, who is perhaps on the whole the most
pestilent, intellectually, of human beings. It demands a certain amount of
self-abnegation, which is always a good thing. It does not perhaps really
offer any greater temptation to the merely stupid than does the cheap
heterodoxy of other times. Above all, it directly tends to a certain
intellectual calmness—to an absence of fuss, and worry, and pother, which
is certainly not one of the least characteristics of the Judge. At all times the
wise man would rather be orthodox than not; and at most times, though not
quite at all, the wisest men have been orthodox, if only because they have
recognised that every opinion has some amount of truth in it, and that this
truth, plus the advantages of orthodoxy just mentioned, is greatest, and
should prevail.
This will be recognised by all fair-minded persons as a handsome
allowance in any case; it is surely a particularly handsome allowance when
the arbiter happens not to be a partisan of the orthodoxy in question. And it
is quite sincere. The present writer has emerged from the serious and
consecutive examination of “classical” critics, necessary for the writing of
this volume, with a distinctly higher opinion of them generally, with a
higher opinion in most cases in particular, than he held previously on
piecemeal and imperfect acquaintance. It is only in such a case as that of
Boileau—where an almost consummate faculty of expression masks really
small critical gifts, and where the worst faults of the critical character,
We now have before us the more important, but also the more difficult,
task of summing up the achievements and the shortcomings of the whole
period covered by this volume—the only period, be it remembered, in
which Criticism was regarded from the point of view of a commonly
accepted, if not very commonly understood, orthodoxy. This of itself is an
advantage, which, though it has not recently counted for very much, will
never be overlooked by true critics. Even if we drop the quod semper, the
quod ubique, quod ab omnibus has a weight which leaves it wholly for the
other side to show case and cause against. Orthodoxy may be really right—
really orthodox; on that head it has at least an even chance against any of its
opponents. Even if it is not, it has merits which they can rarely claim. It has
no temptations for the clever fool, who is perhaps on the whole the most
pestilent, intellectually, of human beings. It demands a certain amount of
self-abnegation, which is always a good thing. It does not perhaps really
offer any greater temptation to the merely stupid than does the cheap
heterodoxy of other times. Above all, it directly tends to a certain
intellectual calmness—to an absence of fuss, and worry, and pother, which
is certainly not one of the least characteristics of the Judge. At all times the
wise man would rather be orthodox than not; and at most times, though not
quite at all, the wisest men have been orthodox, if only because they have
recognised that every opinion has some amount of truth in it, and that this
truth, plus the advantages of orthodoxy just mentioned, is greatest, and
should prevail.
This will be recognised by all fair-minded persons as a handsome
allowance in any case; it is surely a particularly handsome allowance when
the arbiter happens not to be a partisan of the orthodoxy in question. And it
is quite sincere. The present writer has emerged from the serious and
consecutive examination of “classical” critics, necessary for the writing of
this volume, with a distinctly higher opinion of them generally, with a
higher opinion in most cases in particular, than he held previously on
piecemeal and imperfect acquaintance. It is only in such a case as that of
Boileau—where an almost consummate faculty of expression masks really
small critical gifts, and where the worst faults of the critical character,
Page 563
personal rudeness and spite, are continually lurking behind what seem to be
systematic judgments—that the result of the reading has gone the other
way. At the same time, if we take the true reading of illud Syrianum, “Judex
damnatur [capitis cum [in]nocens [culpatur vel minime],” then the case of
the criticism with which we have been dealing becomes somewhat parlous.
It is all the worse because its worsening is gradual and continuous. The sins
of the earliest Renaissance criticism are sins chiefly of neglect, and are not
as a rule aggravated by commission; while its merits are very great. We
could have done nothing without it: at best we should have had to do for
ourselves all that it has done for us. But the bad side of the matter betrays
itself in the code-making of the seventeenth century; it is but imperfectly
and unsatisfactorily disguised in the compromises of the earlier eighteenth;
and it appears in all its deformity in the La Harpian recrudescence.
The fault of the whole is undoubtedly but an aggravation of what in
Ancient Criticism could hardly be called with justice a fault at all, though it
was even there a serious defect—the absence, that is to say, of a wide
enough collection of instances from the past, and of an elastic and tolerant
system of trial and admission for the present and future. We may now[746]
use the word “fault” almost without qualification, proviso, or apology. The
Greek could not, and the Roman until very late days could only to a most
limited extent, exercise the proper sweep of observation and comparison;
the man of the earlier Middle Ages was, from different causes, prevented
from doing so to any effect. But the contemporaries of Lilius Giraldus who
knew (or knew of) Chaucer and Wyatt—still more, in the next generation,
those of Patrizzi who knew Ronsard and the Pléiade—could plead no such
exemption or excuse. They had recovered the exacter knowledge of the
remoter past which the Middle Ages lacked, the critical spirit which during
the Middle Ages was asleep: and they had accumulated and were
accumulating treasures, of completed mediæval work and of modern work
constantly accruing, enough to give them every comparison, without
exception, that they could have wanted. Their guilt was deepening daily as
their opportunities increased.
For they neglected these opportunities, they “sinned” these mercies,
almost without exception. If England in any way deserved the good fortune
that fell to her at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of
the nineteenth, it was because she had never wholly denied either Chaucer
or Spenser, either Shakespeare or Milton. But the just men who thus saved
systematic judgments—that the result of the reading has gone the other
way. At the same time, if we take the true reading of illud Syrianum, “Judex
damnatur [capitis cum [in]nocens [culpatur vel minime],” then the case of
the criticism with which we have been dealing becomes somewhat parlous.
It is all the worse because its worsening is gradual and continuous. The sins
of the earliest Renaissance criticism are sins chiefly of neglect, and are not
as a rule aggravated by commission; while its merits are very great. We
could have done nothing without it: at best we should have had to do for
ourselves all that it has done for us. But the bad side of the matter betrays
itself in the code-making of the seventeenth century; it is but imperfectly
and unsatisfactorily disguised in the compromises of the earlier eighteenth;
and it appears in all its deformity in the La Harpian recrudescence.
The fault of the whole is undoubtedly but an aggravation of what in
Ancient Criticism could hardly be called with justice a fault at all, though it
was even there a serious defect—the absence, that is to say, of a wide
enough collection of instances from the past, and of an elastic and tolerant
system of trial and admission for the present and future. We may now[746]
use the word “fault” almost without qualification, proviso, or apology. The
Greek could not, and the Roman until very late days could only to a most
limited extent, exercise the proper sweep of observation and comparison;
the man of the earlier Middle Ages was, from different causes, prevented
from doing so to any effect. But the contemporaries of Lilius Giraldus who
knew (or knew of) Chaucer and Wyatt—still more, in the next generation,
those of Patrizzi who knew Ronsard and the Pléiade—could plead no such
exemption or excuse. They had recovered the exacter knowledge of the
remoter past which the Middle Ages lacked, the critical spirit which during
the Middle Ages was asleep: and they had accumulated and were
accumulating treasures, of completed mediæval work and of modern work
constantly accruing, enough to give them every comparison, without
exception, that they could have wanted. Their guilt was deepening daily as
their opportunities increased.
For they neglected these opportunities, they “sinned” these mercies,
almost without exception. If England in any way deserved the good fortune
that fell to her at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of
the nineteenth, it was because she had never wholly denied either Chaucer
or Spenser, either Shakespeare or Milton. But the just men who thus saved
Page 564
her were wofully few, and they were almost all of them followers of
Naaman, who extorted a permission to bow in the house of Rimmon, rather
than of the glorious Three Children, who would do obeisance to no graven
image that any king set up. If Germany had the honour of leading the way
—or very nearly leading the way—in the Critical Reformation, it was
because, from the very beginning of her really modern literature, she had
put faith in her Heldenbuch and her Bergreihen. But even this faith was
rather hesitating for a long time, and it had no foothold in courtly, and
curial, and academic places. The men who were the real pioneers in the
revival or commencement of that universal study of literature which alone
can lead to a universal criticism, were as a rule mere scholars and
antiquaries, men like Oldys and Capell, La Monnoye and Sainte-Palaye,
Sanchez and Sedano. Gray, the greatest man of letters by far who at least
fumbled with the key of the enchanted garden, did but fumble with that key:
and his successors Percy and Warton, who opened what they could, were
not great men of letters at all. Abroad, and especially in France, their
analogues, such as Marmontel, never got so far even as they did. In Spain it
became fashionable to deny Lope if not Cervantes: in Italy Dante-worship
was too often, if not in most cases, lip-worship only.
The spectacle of these centuries is almost infinitely interesting and
surprising. I cannot, after having, with not a little pains, attained to some
Pisgah-sight of it, exhaust my own wonder, especially in regard to the
Eighteenth, or disentangle myself from that fatalism which I have already—
with the result of some misunderstanding in the house of no un-friends—
announced at the end of the First volume. We can understand the Sixteenth
century, with its vernaculars hardly yet fully formed, with their greatest
literature coming and to come, with an almost excusable distaste for the
immediate past, and with the full eagerness—the honeymoon intoxication—
of their intercourse with the classics upon them—we can understand this
being excessive in admitting, in continuing, in caricaturing, the critical
principles of the classics themselves. We can also, if not quite so fully,
understand how the dwindling enthusiasms of the Seventeenth, with its still
greater sense of “the petty done, the undone vast” in the matter of mere
erudition, and its thick-coming concerns of party politics, material progress,
physical science, rivalry of nations, and the like—we can understand its
sinking, in mid-journey or thereabouts, to an “age of prose and sense,”
where the prose was as certain as the sense was sometimes problematical.
Naaman, who extorted a permission to bow in the house of Rimmon, rather
than of the glorious Three Children, who would do obeisance to no graven
image that any king set up. If Germany had the honour of leading the way
—or very nearly leading the way—in the Critical Reformation, it was
because, from the very beginning of her really modern literature, she had
put faith in her Heldenbuch and her Bergreihen. But even this faith was
rather hesitating for a long time, and it had no foothold in courtly, and
curial, and academic places. The men who were the real pioneers in the
revival or commencement of that universal study of literature which alone
can lead to a universal criticism, were as a rule mere scholars and
antiquaries, men like Oldys and Capell, La Monnoye and Sainte-Palaye,
Sanchez and Sedano. Gray, the greatest man of letters by far who at least
fumbled with the key of the enchanted garden, did but fumble with that key:
and his successors Percy and Warton, who opened what they could, were
not great men of letters at all. Abroad, and especially in France, their
analogues, such as Marmontel, never got so far even as they did. In Spain it
became fashionable to deny Lope if not Cervantes: in Italy Dante-worship
was too often, if not in most cases, lip-worship only.
The spectacle of these centuries is almost infinitely interesting and
surprising. I cannot, after having, with not a little pains, attained to some
Pisgah-sight of it, exhaust my own wonder, especially in regard to the
Eighteenth, or disentangle myself from that fatalism which I have already—
with the result of some misunderstanding in the house of no un-friends—
announced at the end of the First volume. We can understand the Sixteenth
century, with its vernaculars hardly yet fully formed, with their greatest
literature coming and to come, with an almost excusable distaste for the
immediate past, and with the full eagerness—the honeymoon intoxication—
of their intercourse with the classics upon them—we can understand this
being excessive in admitting, in continuing, in caricaturing, the critical
principles of the classics themselves. We can also, if not quite so fully,
understand how the dwindling enthusiasms of the Seventeenth, with its still
greater sense of “the petty done, the undone vast” in the matter of mere
erudition, and its thick-coming concerns of party politics, material progress,
physical science, rivalry of nations, and the like—we can understand its
sinking, in mid-journey or thereabouts, to an “age of prose and sense,”
where the prose was as certain as the sense was sometimes problematical.
Page 565
But the Eighteenth was beginning to be disengaged, to specialise, to take
stock, to disuse the Chronicle and begin the History. How, we must ask
ourselves, could men like Muratori and Gravina, like Addison and Johnson,
like Fontenelle and Du Bos, rest even partly satisfied (for wholly, as we
have seen, some of them at least were not) with literary sealed patterns
which admittedly would not fit the greatest admitted literature of all their
respective countries except France, and which presented, to the not
insufficient self-sufficiency of Frenchmen, the proposition that, for
hundreds of years, French men of letters had been barbarians, if not idiots?
There is no explanation but Grandgousier’s, eked a little by the
remembrance that—as we shall, it is to be hoped, see in the next volume—
there was a searching of hearts, a moving of the waters, not very late, in fact
very early, in the Eighteenth century itself. But, as we have seen already, the
creed of the majority, the orthodoxy of the time, admitted no hint of this. It
made a few concessions or extensions—till it found them obviously unsafe
—in the direction of amiable but illogical compromise in particulars. It
yielded up no jot of the general creed. It was still matter of breviary circa
1780, as it had begun to be circa 1580, that the Fable was the Poem (let us
say that if Homer had written an argument of the Iliad, and had left off
there, he would have done all that was actually necessary); that you must
follow Nature by following the ancients; that you must not use epic verse in
non-epic poetry, and so forth. In all countries, or almost all,—the extreme
literary poverty and disarray of Germany here serving her in good stead,—
these general assumptions, and the many others which have been noticed in
the foregoing pages, had narrowed down to yet others of the particular kind
—that the pause in an English verse must be absolutely within a syllable or
two of the middle; that a French Alexandrine must not have the impudence
to overflow into its neighbour; and the like. And the whole sums itself up all
the more strikingly—because of the doubtful and argumentative tone of the
passage—in that memorable decision of Johnson’s which has been
discussed above, the decision justifying Rymer, justifying La Harpe, that we
must not “judge by the event,”—that the presence of the fig is no proof of
the nature of the fig-tree.
No very elaborate indications of the faults inseparable from this style of
criticism can be necessary. That if carried out rigorously (as in some
instances at least it was) it would simply have sterilised and petrified the
literary production of the world, is of course obvious. That journey au fond
stock, to disuse the Chronicle and begin the History. How, we must ask
ourselves, could men like Muratori and Gravina, like Addison and Johnson,
like Fontenelle and Du Bos, rest even partly satisfied (for wholly, as we
have seen, some of them at least were not) with literary sealed patterns
which admittedly would not fit the greatest admitted literature of all their
respective countries except France, and which presented, to the not
insufficient self-sufficiency of Frenchmen, the proposition that, for
hundreds of years, French men of letters had been barbarians, if not idiots?
There is no explanation but Grandgousier’s, eked a little by the
remembrance that—as we shall, it is to be hoped, see in the next volume—
there was a searching of hearts, a moving of the waters, not very late, in fact
very early, in the Eighteenth century itself. But, as we have seen already, the
creed of the majority, the orthodoxy of the time, admitted no hint of this. It
made a few concessions or extensions—till it found them obviously unsafe
—in the direction of amiable but illogical compromise in particulars. It
yielded up no jot of the general creed. It was still matter of breviary circa
1780, as it had begun to be circa 1580, that the Fable was the Poem (let us
say that if Homer had written an argument of the Iliad, and had left off
there, he would have done all that was actually necessary); that you must
follow Nature by following the ancients; that you must not use epic verse in
non-epic poetry, and so forth. In all countries, or almost all,—the extreme
literary poverty and disarray of Germany here serving her in good stead,—
these general assumptions, and the many others which have been noticed in
the foregoing pages, had narrowed down to yet others of the particular kind
—that the pause in an English verse must be absolutely within a syllable or
two of the middle; that a French Alexandrine must not have the impudence
to overflow into its neighbour; and the like. And the whole sums itself up all
the more strikingly—because of the doubtful and argumentative tone of the
passage—in that memorable decision of Johnson’s which has been
discussed above, the decision justifying Rymer, justifying La Harpe, that we
must not “judge by the event,”—that the presence of the fig is no proof of
the nature of the fig-tree.
No very elaborate indications of the faults inseparable from this style of
criticism can be necessary. That if carried out rigorously (as in some
instances at least it was) it would simply have sterilised and petrified the
literary production of the world, is of course obvious. That journey au fond
Page 566
de l’inconnu pour trouver du nouveau, which, with whatever success or
failure it may meet, however dangerous it may be in some high functions
and departments of Life and Thought, is the motive principle of Art, was
barred by it at once. It was no question of “progress” in the very likely
chimerical sense of improvement; there was to be not even any difference.
“To-morrow” was not, according to the proverb, to be “a new day”: if the
men of this school did not go as far as Musette and pronounce that Demain,
c’est une fatuité du calendrier, they held that it was to be as yesterday, and
much more also. It is equally obvious that this doctrine positively invited
indulgence in some of the worst faults of criticism. The critic who
nowadays compasses all the reference shelves of the British Museum in
order to find one discrepancy with his author, and then triumphs over him,
is mostly confined to dates and names, or to more or less transparent
erections of personal opinion (or personal ignorance) into standards, which
the fairly intelligent reader takes for what they are worth. A hundred and
fifty years ago the child of Momus had much better cards in his hand. The
“exact scales of Bossu” were not only infinitely complicated and elaborate,
but people in general, however intelligent, were by no means inclined to
find any fault with them or question their justice. He had a hundred
chances, to one that he now has, of catching his author tripping under
statute, and without any actual garbling or dishonesty.
But between the dangers on the great scale and the dangers on the small,
which have been indicated in the last paragraph, there were many of
intermediate kinds. Without absolute distrust of novelty or unfamiliarity as
such on the one hand, and without a mere peddling tendency to pick holes
on the other, a critic under this dispensation might, and almost must, find
himself distracted, hampered, wellnigh mantrapped, in his critical
investigations. A dreamlike network or chain of obsessions was upon him.
To submit himself frankly to the effect of the work and judge it as he would
a prospect or a picture,[747] a vintage or a face, was forbidden him. It was his
duty, in the first place, if the author openly classed his work in any Kind, to
decide whether it really belonged to this or to another; if the author had
omitted that ceremony, to determine the classification sedulously for
himself. Then he had to remember, or look up, the most celebrated ancient
examples of the Kind, or those modern ones which had obtained the credit
of being most like the ancients; and to decide whether the resemblance was
sufficient in general. And then he had to descend—if descent be possible in
failure it may meet, however dangerous it may be in some high functions
and departments of Life and Thought, is the motive principle of Art, was
barred by it at once. It was no question of “progress” in the very likely
chimerical sense of improvement; there was to be not even any difference.
“To-morrow” was not, according to the proverb, to be “a new day”: if the
men of this school did not go as far as Musette and pronounce that Demain,
c’est une fatuité du calendrier, they held that it was to be as yesterday, and
much more also. It is equally obvious that this doctrine positively invited
indulgence in some of the worst faults of criticism. The critic who
nowadays compasses all the reference shelves of the British Museum in
order to find one discrepancy with his author, and then triumphs over him,
is mostly confined to dates and names, or to more or less transparent
erections of personal opinion (or personal ignorance) into standards, which
the fairly intelligent reader takes for what they are worth. A hundred and
fifty years ago the child of Momus had much better cards in his hand. The
“exact scales of Bossu” were not only infinitely complicated and elaborate,
but people in general, however intelligent, were by no means inclined to
find any fault with them or question their justice. He had a hundred
chances, to one that he now has, of catching his author tripping under
statute, and without any actual garbling or dishonesty.
But between the dangers on the great scale and the dangers on the small,
which have been indicated in the last paragraph, there were many of
intermediate kinds. Without absolute distrust of novelty or unfamiliarity as
such on the one hand, and without a mere peddling tendency to pick holes
on the other, a critic under this dispensation might, and almost must, find
himself distracted, hampered, wellnigh mantrapped, in his critical
investigations. A dreamlike network or chain of obsessions was upon him.
To submit himself frankly to the effect of the work and judge it as he would
a prospect or a picture,[747] a vintage or a face, was forbidden him. It was his
duty, in the first place, if the author openly classed his work in any Kind, to
decide whether it really belonged to this or to another; if the author had
omitted that ceremony, to determine the classification sedulously for
himself. Then he had to remember, or look up, the most celebrated ancient
examples of the Kind, or those modern ones which had obtained the credit
of being most like the ancients; and to decide whether the resemblance was
sufficient in general. And then he had to descend—if descent be possible in
Page 567
this process of grovelling—to particulars, and see if they were “according to
Cocker.” If everything were entirely en règle, he was at liberty to admire
and enjoy, supposing that, after the preliminaries, he had any disposition
towards admiration and enjoyment left in him.
This is not a caricature; it is absolutely exact according to the
“regulation” theory: and as the examples quoted before will have shown,
and as hundreds of others might be produced to show, it is by no means
untrue to practice. A critic, great, or generous, or happily both, might
transcend his brief, be better than his creed, as in that noble eulogy of
Gray’s Elegy which makes up for much in Johnson’s Life of the poet. But
these were works of supererogation; and it is not quite certain that the
exercise of them was entirely orthodox. The “stop-watch” was orthodox: it
was the very centre and pulse of the machine of neo-classic criticism.
I do not think that it is part of my duty as a Historian to support this view
by any further argument. I have given the strongest possible, in a minute,
and I believe faithful, exposition of the actual survey, the actual opinions,
the actual processes and judgments of neo-classic critics. If it is necessary
to say any more, let it be this only. The weakness of their position is
sufficiently shown by the fact that it could not bear the light of a historical
knowledge of literature. There was none such, so long as it lasted: and when
that light shone, it fell. The coincidences may not be causative; but it is for
others to show that they are not.
If, however, any one should conclude from these strictures that, in the
view of the present writer, the critical work of these three centuries was
only evil continually, he would make a very great mistake. Moreover,
putting all personal views out of the question, it is certain that this could not
be the case. In almost all arts and even sciences, but in Art even more than
in Science, the task set before the human faculties is a gigantic “Rule of
False,” as the older arithmetic books called it, in which, by following out
certain hypotheses, and ascertaining how and to what extent you are led
wrong by them, you at last discover the right way. The most grotesque error
is thus a benefit to Humanity, which, indeed, sometimes shows itself
conscious enough of the beneficial character to perform the experiment
over and over again. And further, in all arts and in all sciences, but
especially in the higher division of Art, the reward of these excursions is not
confined to the somewhat negative advantage of discovering that man need
go that way no more. Corollaries and episodes—wayside windfalls of the
Cocker.” If everything were entirely en règle, he was at liberty to admire
and enjoy, supposing that, after the preliminaries, he had any disposition
towards admiration and enjoyment left in him.
This is not a caricature; it is absolutely exact according to the
“regulation” theory: and as the examples quoted before will have shown,
and as hundreds of others might be produced to show, it is by no means
untrue to practice. A critic, great, or generous, or happily both, might
transcend his brief, be better than his creed, as in that noble eulogy of
Gray’s Elegy which makes up for much in Johnson’s Life of the poet. But
these were works of supererogation; and it is not quite certain that the
exercise of them was entirely orthodox. The “stop-watch” was orthodox: it
was the very centre and pulse of the machine of neo-classic criticism.
I do not think that it is part of my duty as a Historian to support this view
by any further argument. I have given the strongest possible, in a minute,
and I believe faithful, exposition of the actual survey, the actual opinions,
the actual processes and judgments of neo-classic critics. If it is necessary
to say any more, let it be this only. The weakness of their position is
sufficiently shown by the fact that it could not bear the light of a historical
knowledge of literature. There was none such, so long as it lasted: and when
that light shone, it fell. The coincidences may not be causative; but it is for
others to show that they are not.
If, however, any one should conclude from these strictures that, in the
view of the present writer, the critical work of these three centuries was
only evil continually, he would make a very great mistake. Moreover,
putting all personal views out of the question, it is certain that this could not
be the case. In almost all arts and even sciences, but in Art even more than
in Science, the task set before the human faculties is a gigantic “Rule of
False,” as the older arithmetic books called it, in which, by following out
certain hypotheses, and ascertaining how and to what extent you are led
wrong by them, you at last discover the right way. The most grotesque error
is thus a benefit to Humanity, which, indeed, sometimes shows itself
conscious enough of the beneficial character to perform the experiment
over and over again. And further, in all arts and in all sciences, but
especially in the higher division of Art, the reward of these excursions is not
confined to the somewhat negative advantage of discovering that man need
go that way no more. Corollaries and episodes—wayside windfalls of the
Page 568
Muses—await, not so thinly spread, the adventurous and single-hearted
practitioner of Allegory as of Alchemy, on the acrostic as on the astrolabe.
And considering the secondary or parasitic character which so specially
belongs to Criticism, it is inevitable, not merely that these “bonuses,” these
“extras,” should be more abundant here than anywhere else, but that the
regular profits of the ordinary work should be considerable. Unless the
critic is utterly incompetent and bad—unless he is a very Rymer, I do not
say a Dennis, much less a Boileau—his mere contact with a new work of art
must result in something useful, in a critical datum and fact for the future. It
is very unlikely—if he is a person of even rather more than average brains it
is practically impossible—that the exact equation or conjunction of his
temperament, and his equipment, and the character of the work, will ever
recur. It is, ex hypothesi, quite certain that it can never have occurred
before. That he judges under a certain system, even a wrong one, will not
detract from the value of the result, save in quantity. There will still be the
actual fact—acquired to the stock of critical data for the future—that a
critical power, say A, applied under the restrictions of system m or n, to
work B, has resulted in the judgment x. And this result, in its own line and
sphere, is as much a “thing,” and a thing of interest, to the critical student of
literature, as a new beetle to the man of science, or a new judgment of the
House of Lords to the man of law. Nay, to such a student it has a higher
interest still: it is in rank and line (mutatis mutandis again) with the work
criticised, with a picture, with a sonata, as a thing of art itself.
And critics in these centuries, from these points of view and others,
estated criticism more richly than it could have hoped to be endowed when
the Humanists began once more to attack and defend Poetry, or when
Daniello a little later set himself down to write the first treatise of criticism
proper in a vernacular language. They attempted, and to the best of their
power arranged, the more general questions of the Art, always with zeal, if
not always with discretion; they did valuable, if also somewhat and
sometimes mistaken, work in its intermediate regions; and slowly,
grudgingly, but surely, they set themselves to the apparently humbler but
really fruitful work of actual critical examination of literature, at first as it
had been provided and already criticised long ago, at last as it was being
provided by the flying day. Their own theories, right or wrong, they worked
out with altogether admirable patience and thoroughness, applying them,
too, with a faithfulness which must excite admiration, if it cannot command
practitioner of Allegory as of Alchemy, on the acrostic as on the astrolabe.
And considering the secondary or parasitic character which so specially
belongs to Criticism, it is inevitable, not merely that these “bonuses,” these
“extras,” should be more abundant here than anywhere else, but that the
regular profits of the ordinary work should be considerable. Unless the
critic is utterly incompetent and bad—unless he is a very Rymer, I do not
say a Dennis, much less a Boileau—his mere contact with a new work of art
must result in something useful, in a critical datum and fact for the future. It
is very unlikely—if he is a person of even rather more than average brains it
is practically impossible—that the exact equation or conjunction of his
temperament, and his equipment, and the character of the work, will ever
recur. It is, ex hypothesi, quite certain that it can never have occurred
before. That he judges under a certain system, even a wrong one, will not
detract from the value of the result, save in quantity. There will still be the
actual fact—acquired to the stock of critical data for the future—that a
critical power, say A, applied under the restrictions of system m or n, to
work B, has resulted in the judgment x. And this result, in its own line and
sphere, is as much a “thing,” and a thing of interest, to the critical student of
literature, as a new beetle to the man of science, or a new judgment of the
House of Lords to the man of law. Nay, to such a student it has a higher
interest still: it is in rank and line (mutatis mutandis again) with the work
criticised, with a picture, with a sonata, as a thing of art itself.
And critics in these centuries, from these points of view and others,
estated criticism more richly than it could have hoped to be endowed when
the Humanists began once more to attack and defend Poetry, or when
Daniello a little later set himself down to write the first treatise of criticism
proper in a vernacular language. They attempted, and to the best of their
power arranged, the more general questions of the Art, always with zeal, if
not always with discretion; they did valuable, if also somewhat and
sometimes mistaken, work in its intermediate regions; and slowly,
grudgingly, but surely, they set themselves to the apparently humbler but
really fruitful work of actual critical examination of literature, at first as it
had been provided and already criticised long ago, at last as it was being
provided by the flying day. Their own theories, right or wrong, they worked
out with altogether admirable patience and thoroughness, applying them,
too, with a faithfulness which must excite admiration, if it cannot command
Page 569
agreement. And, as we have taken all fair pains to show, they not
unfrequently strayed and stumbled upon outside truths, leant over the
border of their somewhat narrow world and pried into others, after a fashion
which, when the due time came, was sure to start more adventurous
discoverers on wider paths of exploration.
It would be superfluous to extend this already long volume with any list
of selected specimens of individual achievement and excellence. I hope,
indeed, that this book may attract or help attention to some critics—
Capriano, Cinthio, Patrizzi, Ogier are a very few examples—who are at
present very little known: and to others, unnecessary to specify, whose
claims have, as it seems to me, been underrated or misunderstood. But I
have included, I think, no one of all the hundreds appearing in this volume
who is not profitable in some way, for example, or for correction, or for
reproof—who has not done something, if it be only in the way of warning,
to help the student of all time.
We may also advantageously compare this balance-sheet with the
balance-sheets of Ancient Criticism as given before, and of Modern in an
anticipated draft. As compared with the former, Neo-Classicism has the
disadvantage that, with at least equal if not greater narrowness, it is almost
entirely destitute of the same excuse for being narrow. The Greeks of the
great age wrote with nothing but Greek literature before them; those of the
decadence and the Romans with nothing but Greek literature and Roman,
which was for the most part a pale copy of Greek. The men of the
eighteenth century, had they chosen, could have compared, with the practice
and the theory of these two literatures, not merely the vast, the interesting,
and, as “correcting” classicism, the inestimable literature of the Middle
Ages, but at least four substantive and important literatures of modern
times, those of France, Italy, England, and Spain. They not only did not do
this as a matter of fact, but they invariably in practice, and not seldom as a
matter of express theory, flouted and scouted the bare idea of doing it. They
persisted in applying a travesty of the system of Horace, itself travestied
from Aristotle, to these totally different products. Sometimes this resulted in
the bland absurdity of the Battle of the Books attitude, sometimes in the
hardly less ludicrous compromise which, by stretching the faults-and-
beauties doctrine to its farthest possible extent, allowed critics to make
room, as it were by sufferance, for Shakespeare and Milton, for Dante and
Cervantes. They could laugh heartily at a dinner in the style of the ancients,
unfrequently strayed and stumbled upon outside truths, leant over the
border of their somewhat narrow world and pried into others, after a fashion
which, when the due time came, was sure to start more adventurous
discoverers on wider paths of exploration.
It would be superfluous to extend this already long volume with any list
of selected specimens of individual achievement and excellence. I hope,
indeed, that this book may attract or help attention to some critics—
Capriano, Cinthio, Patrizzi, Ogier are a very few examples—who are at
present very little known: and to others, unnecessary to specify, whose
claims have, as it seems to me, been underrated or misunderstood. But I
have included, I think, no one of all the hundreds appearing in this volume
who is not profitable in some way, for example, or for correction, or for
reproof—who has not done something, if it be only in the way of warning,
to help the student of all time.
We may also advantageously compare this balance-sheet with the
balance-sheets of Ancient Criticism as given before, and of Modern in an
anticipated draft. As compared with the former, Neo-Classicism has the
disadvantage that, with at least equal if not greater narrowness, it is almost
entirely destitute of the same excuse for being narrow. The Greeks of the
great age wrote with nothing but Greek literature before them; those of the
decadence and the Romans with nothing but Greek literature and Roman,
which was for the most part a pale copy of Greek. The men of the
eighteenth century, had they chosen, could have compared, with the practice
and the theory of these two literatures, not merely the vast, the interesting,
and, as “correcting” classicism, the inestimable literature of the Middle
Ages, but at least four substantive and important literatures of modern
times, those of France, Italy, England, and Spain. They not only did not do
this as a matter of fact, but they invariably in practice, and not seldom as a
matter of express theory, flouted and scouted the bare idea of doing it. They
persisted in applying a travesty of the system of Horace, itself travestied
from Aristotle, to these totally different products. Sometimes this resulted in
the bland absurdity of the Battle of the Books attitude, sometimes in the
hardly less ludicrous compromise which, by stretching the faults-and-
beauties doctrine to its farthest possible extent, allowed critics to make
room, as it were by sufferance, for Shakespeare and Milton, for Dante and
Cervantes. They could laugh heartily at a dinner in the style of the ancients,
Page 570
and their common-sense would at once have pronounced any one fit for
Bedlam who attempted to journey from London to York bareheaded,
clothed in a toga, and with sandals on foot; but in theory, and even partly in
practice, they imposed the classical uniform on literature.
Still, they show, at least in some respects, better beside their modern
successors than it is the fashion to think. We have opened the road which
they barred, and permitted the exploration of the countries which they
forbade; but it is rather a question whether we have profited as we should
by this gain. It is still the very rarest thing to find a critic who, by
equipment or even by inclination, is himself disposed to take a really
catholic view of literature; and those who do endeavour to take such a view
are constantly regarded with distrust by the general, and with a rather comic
rancour by specialists. It follows that the modern critic is, taking each on his
own scheme, very much less well prepared as a rule than the critic, not
merely of the eighteenth century, as has been said above, but of our period
generally, and very nearly as liable as that critic was to take hasty sweeping
views in condemnation of whole provinces of his subject.
Excesses, moreover, of this kind, which critics from the Renaissance
onwards committed, are a natural result of reaction in all histories. And in
the History of Literature a hundred years of something approaching to
Anarchy are perhaps not too much to balance three hundred of mistakenly
experimental Order. We shall see the causes and the faults, as well as the
excuses and the gains, of the Anarchy later. For the present it is fitting to
conclude, with an acknowledgment anew of the merits of the Order also, in
respect to the faults of which we have been so frank. They are the merits of
a remarkable industry, of a commendable freedom from mere dilettantism,
of the discovery of not a few sound critical principles, and the registration
of not a few sound critical judgments, of an experimentation and
accomplishment which, even if it went wrong, serves as an invaluable
warning to other ages not to pursue the paths which have so misled. And,
yet once more, let us recognise that adjustment of criticism to creation—
mysterious or simply natural as it may seem to different temperaments and
different systems of thought—which we have observed before, in the
cautious check of Renaissance criticism on the heady exuberance of the
great Renaissance creation, in the support given by Seventeenth-century
classicism to such mediate powers and dispositions as those of Corneille
and even Racine, of Dryden and even Pope; in the salutary deterrence of
Bedlam who attempted to journey from London to York bareheaded,
clothed in a toga, and with sandals on foot; but in theory, and even partly in
practice, they imposed the classical uniform on literature.
Still, they show, at least in some respects, better beside their modern
successors than it is the fashion to think. We have opened the road which
they barred, and permitted the exploration of the countries which they
forbade; but it is rather a question whether we have profited as we should
by this gain. It is still the very rarest thing to find a critic who, by
equipment or even by inclination, is himself disposed to take a really
catholic view of literature; and those who do endeavour to take such a view
are constantly regarded with distrust by the general, and with a rather comic
rancour by specialists. It follows that the modern critic is, taking each on his
own scheme, very much less well prepared as a rule than the critic, not
merely of the eighteenth century, as has been said above, but of our period
generally, and very nearly as liable as that critic was to take hasty sweeping
views in condemnation of whole provinces of his subject.
Excesses, moreover, of this kind, which critics from the Renaissance
onwards committed, are a natural result of reaction in all histories. And in
the History of Literature a hundred years of something approaching to
Anarchy are perhaps not too much to balance three hundred of mistakenly
experimental Order. We shall see the causes and the faults, as well as the
excuses and the gains, of the Anarchy later. For the present it is fitting to
conclude, with an acknowledgment anew of the merits of the Order also, in
respect to the faults of which we have been so frank. They are the merits of
a remarkable industry, of a commendable freedom from mere dilettantism,
of the discovery of not a few sound critical principles, and the registration
of not a few sound critical judgments, of an experimentation and
accomplishment which, even if it went wrong, serves as an invaluable
warning to other ages not to pursue the paths which have so misled. And,
yet once more, let us recognise that adjustment of criticism to creation—
mysterious or simply natural as it may seem to different temperaments and
different systems of thought—which we have observed before, in the
cautious check of Renaissance criticism on the heady exuberance of the
great Renaissance creation, in the support given by Seventeenth-century
classicism to such mediate powers and dispositions as those of Corneille
and even Racine, of Dryden and even Pope; in the salutary deterrence of
Page 571
Eighteenth-century orthodoxy, which saved us from more Beatties and
more Anne Radcliffes when the time was not ready for Keatses or for
Scotts. For so also in literature—and even in that, as some would have it,
not divinest part of literature, Criticism—do all the works of the Lord, the
lesser as well as the greater, praise Him and magnify Him for ever.
711. My copy is the Naples edition of 1732. But the book had appeared
some four-and-twenty years earlier at Rome (some even quote a Roman ed.
of 1704).
712. Leipsic, 1737.
713. V. sup., p. 330.
714. Ed. cit., p. 12.
715. Ibid., p. 45.
716. He is very interesting on these, being the principal critic, between
their own times and those modern days which have forgotten them, to deal
with the subject.
717. Gravina calls the opposite style to Macaronic not, as most do,
pedantesco, but Fidenziano, from Fidentio, the nom de guerre of Camillo
Scrofa, author of certain egregious pedantesque pieces.
718. Modena, 1706.
719. Du Bos, a little later, with the apolausticism of the French
eighteenth century, says bluntly (op. cit. sup., i. 275) that “the best poem is
that which interests most,” and that “one hardly ever opens a poem for the
sake of instruction.”
720. Istoria del Volgar Poesia, Roma, 1698 and later.
721. 7 vols. (Bologna and Milan, 1739-1752).
more Anne Radcliffes when the time was not ready for Keatses or for
Scotts. For so also in literature—and even in that, as some would have it,
not divinest part of literature, Criticism—do all the works of the Lord, the
lesser as well as the greater, praise Him and magnify Him for ever.
711. My copy is the Naples edition of 1732. But the book had appeared
some four-and-twenty years earlier at Rome (some even quote a Roman ed.
of 1704).
712. Leipsic, 1737.
713. V. sup., p. 330.
714. Ed. cit., p. 12.
715. Ibid., p. 45.
716. He is very interesting on these, being the principal critic, between
their own times and those modern days which have forgotten them, to deal
with the subject.
717. Gravina calls the opposite style to Macaronic not, as most do,
pedantesco, but Fidenziano, from Fidentio, the nom de guerre of Camillo
Scrofa, author of certain egregious pedantesque pieces.
718. Modena, 1706.
719. Du Bos, a little later, with the apolausticism of the French
eighteenth century, says bluntly (op. cit. sup., i. 275) that “the best poem is
that which interests most,” and that “one hardly ever opens a poem for the
sake of instruction.”
720. Istoria del Volgar Poesia, Roma, 1698 and later.
721. 7 vols. (Bologna and Milan, 1739-1752).
Page 572
722. I shall own frankly that, when I first read this, I had either never
heard of Arthur Kelton, or had utterly forgotten him, and thought the name
must be a muddle of “Skelton.” What is known about him may be found in
Warton, iv. 159, ed. Hazlitt (taken, as was probably Quadrio’s knowledge of
him, from Wood and Bale), and also in the Dictionary of National
Biography. According to the latter, his poem in praise of the Welsh nation is
not now extant or discoverable; and though a Chronicle exists I have never
seen it. What made the Jesuit name Kelton at all is as dark to me as what
made him transform Gower and “Wicherley” into “Melic” bards.
723. If I have said nothing about this excellent Scoto-French disciple of
Fénelon, author of the Voyages de Cyrus (which all good little eighteenth-
century boys and girls read), and writer of French which was admitted by
Frenchmen to be the best (except Hamilton’s) written by any non-
Frenchman, it is neither from ignorance nor from outre-cuidance He takes
place in criticism for a Discourse of Epic Poetry, prefixed to Télémaque.
724. It fills the greater part of the 12th and last vol. of the Paris ed.
(1782). The passages quoted are at pp. 29, 30, and 57 of this.
725. For instance, of these four only Denina occurs in Dr Garnett’s
excellent Short History of Italian Literature (London, 1898), and that for
his historical, not his literary, work.
726. Huesca, 1692, 12mo.
727. Published at Saragossa, date as above. A later edition is said to be
garbled.
728. Op. cit., p. 348.
729. Señor Menéndez y Pelayo, as cited before, in vols. 5 and 6 of his
History.
730. P. 333.
731. This Gallicism was not universal. As Mr Ticknor (III. v., opening)
says, while Moratin spoke contemptuously of the ballad of “Calaynos,” his
heard of Arthur Kelton, or had utterly forgotten him, and thought the name
must be a muddle of “Skelton.” What is known about him may be found in
Warton, iv. 159, ed. Hazlitt (taken, as was probably Quadrio’s knowledge of
him, from Wood and Bale), and also in the Dictionary of National
Biography. According to the latter, his poem in praise of the Welsh nation is
not now extant or discoverable; and though a Chronicle exists I have never
seen it. What made the Jesuit name Kelton at all is as dark to me as what
made him transform Gower and “Wicherley” into “Melic” bards.
723. If I have said nothing about this excellent Scoto-French disciple of
Fénelon, author of the Voyages de Cyrus (which all good little eighteenth-
century boys and girls read), and writer of French which was admitted by
Frenchmen to be the best (except Hamilton’s) written by any non-
Frenchman, it is neither from ignorance nor from outre-cuidance He takes
place in criticism for a Discourse of Epic Poetry, prefixed to Télémaque.
724. It fills the greater part of the 12th and last vol. of the Paris ed.
(1782). The passages quoted are at pp. 29, 30, and 57 of this.
725. For instance, of these four only Denina occurs in Dr Garnett’s
excellent Short History of Italian Literature (London, 1898), and that for
his historical, not his literary, work.
726. Huesca, 1692, 12mo.
727. Published at Saragossa, date as above. A later edition is said to be
garbled.
728. Op. cit., p. 348.
729. Señor Menéndez y Pelayo, as cited before, in vols. 5 and 6 of his
History.
730. P. 333.
731. This Gallicism was not universal. As Mr Ticknor (III. v., opening)
says, while Moratin spoke contemptuously of the ballad of “Calaynos,” his
Page 573
opponent Huerta pronounced Athalie fit for nothing but its original purpose
of being acted by schoolgirls.
732. One of the most important works of the Swiss school itself is
Bodmer’s Sammlung Kritischer Schriften, 1741, but this is for another time.
Nicolai’s Bibliothek der Schönen Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1757) and
Literaturbriefe (ibid., 1759-66) perhaps show the movement best.
733. I did not think it worth while to mention Camusat in the French
chapter, though he is not quite a contemptible person. He was one of the
tribe of French men of letters who, for this reason or that, settled in
Holland. He has the not small credit of being one of the first to attempt a
Literary History (Amsterdam, 1722, 3 vols.) of France. He edited part of
the literary contents of Chapelain’s letters, and did other things. But the
Germans seem to have been particularly attracted by a Lettre sur les Poètes
qui ont chanté la Volupté, which he wrote, I think, in connection with the
work of Chaulieu, but which I have only read in German. It may have had,
for them, the attraction of elegant naughtiness; but it has in reality very little
either of the adjective or of the noun.
734. E.g., my friend Professor Elton, in his Augustan Ages (Edinburgh,
1899), p. 348. It is, I trust, not immoral, I am sure it is not illiberal, to edit a
book without absolutely indorsing all its opinions, or insisting that all these
opinions shall be one’s own.
735. My copy is the third edition, Leipsic, 1742. The first is, I think, of
1730.
736. Callières, a diplomatist and Academician, who wrote a good deal on
various subjects, in his later years, has been referred to under Swift (p. 450).
For more on him and his Histoire poétique de la guerre des A. et des M., v.
Rigault, op. cit., pp. 213-217. As to Furetière, the agreeable author of the
Roman Bourgeois seemed to me to lie too far outside any possible limits
here, though, of course, there are critical touches in his work. Some might
even reckon, as an important if rather excessive testimony to the rise of the
novel, the curious picture of the girl Javotte—pretty but innocent to the
verge of idiocy—turned into an accomplished and intelligent young lady by
the mere reading of the Astrée. Furetière even defends this representation
of being acted by schoolgirls.
732. One of the most important works of the Swiss school itself is
Bodmer’s Sammlung Kritischer Schriften, 1741, but this is for another time.
Nicolai’s Bibliothek der Schönen Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1757) and
Literaturbriefe (ibid., 1759-66) perhaps show the movement best.
733. I did not think it worth while to mention Camusat in the French
chapter, though he is not quite a contemptible person. He was one of the
tribe of French men of letters who, for this reason or that, settled in
Holland. He has the not small credit of being one of the first to attempt a
Literary History (Amsterdam, 1722, 3 vols.) of France. He edited part of
the literary contents of Chapelain’s letters, and did other things. But the
Germans seem to have been particularly attracted by a Lettre sur les Poètes
qui ont chanté la Volupté, which he wrote, I think, in connection with the
work of Chaulieu, but which I have only read in German. It may have had,
for them, the attraction of elegant naughtiness; but it has in reality very little
either of the adjective or of the noun.
734. E.g., my friend Professor Elton, in his Augustan Ages (Edinburgh,
1899), p. 348. It is, I trust, not immoral, I am sure it is not illiberal, to edit a
book without absolutely indorsing all its opinions, or insisting that all these
opinions shall be one’s own.
735. My copy is the third edition, Leipsic, 1742. The first is, I think, of
1730.
736. Callières, a diplomatist and Academician, who wrote a good deal on
various subjects, in his later years, has been referred to under Swift (p. 450).
For more on him and his Histoire poétique de la guerre des A. et des M., v.
Rigault, op. cit., pp. 213-217. As to Furetière, the agreeable author of the
Roman Bourgeois seemed to me to lie too far outside any possible limits
here, though, of course, there are critical touches in his work. Some might
even reckon, as an important if rather excessive testimony to the rise of the
novel, the curious picture of the girl Javotte—pretty but innocent to the
verge of idiocy—turned into an accomplished and intelligent young lady by
the mere reading of the Astrée. Furetière even defends this representation
Page 574
by serious argument (Roman Bourgeois, i. 171 sq., ed. Jannet, 2 vols., Paris,
1878).
737. This was James Ralph—the “Ralph to Cynthia howls” of Pope. It
appeared in 1731, and deals with public amusements, from the theatre
(which it defends from Prynne and Collier) to cock-fighting, auctions, and
“Henley’s oratory.” It is rather amusing, and by no means, as Mr Pope calls
its author, “wholly illiterate.”
738. It is notable that, since the beginning of the twentieth century, critics
of the youngest school have been found Gottschedising in this sense, and
proposing to judge the worth or worthlessness of criticism on similar
cookery-book lines. I have seen an excellent critic rebuked by a reviewer
for not “showing how to do something”—as if he were a dancing-master.
739. Gottsched, like a true Klassiker, dislikes and distrusts romance,
ancient as well as modern, prose as well as verse, in and for itself.
“Romance writers,” he says (at p. 167), “know as little of the rules of poetic
imitation as of true morality.”
740. Thus we are to divide the Wonderful in Poetry (p. 171) into three
parts—like omnis Gallia! One may hesitate whether to emend “three
thousand” or “three million.”
741. He quotes a passage which he calls ein Muster des guten verblümten
Ausdruckes.
742. In the 7th vol. (pp. 117-154) of his Works, 10 vols., Berne, 1774-75.
743. See The Misfortunes of Elphin.
744. I take these examples all from English merely to avoid confusion.
The case in French is even clearer.
745. One word to guard against a possible supposition that the writer
supposes Classicism dead. Nothing in literature dies: things only wane and
wax, retire and come forward again. At this very moment there is even a
sort of Classical reaction, which has shown itself in France for a long time
1878).
737. This was James Ralph—the “Ralph to Cynthia howls” of Pope. It
appeared in 1731, and deals with public amusements, from the theatre
(which it defends from Prynne and Collier) to cock-fighting, auctions, and
“Henley’s oratory.” It is rather amusing, and by no means, as Mr Pope calls
its author, “wholly illiterate.”
738. It is notable that, since the beginning of the twentieth century, critics
of the youngest school have been found Gottschedising in this sense, and
proposing to judge the worth or worthlessness of criticism on similar
cookery-book lines. I have seen an excellent critic rebuked by a reviewer
for not “showing how to do something”—as if he were a dancing-master.
739. Gottsched, like a true Klassiker, dislikes and distrusts romance,
ancient as well as modern, prose as well as verse, in and for itself.
“Romance writers,” he says (at p. 167), “know as little of the rules of poetic
imitation as of true morality.”
740. Thus we are to divide the Wonderful in Poetry (p. 171) into three
parts—like omnis Gallia! One may hesitate whether to emend “three
thousand” or “three million.”
741. He quotes a passage which he calls ein Muster des guten verblümten
Ausdruckes.
742. In the 7th vol. (pp. 117-154) of his Works, 10 vols., Berne, 1774-75.
743. See The Misfortunes of Elphin.
744. I take these examples all from English merely to avoid confusion.
The case in French is even clearer.
745. One word to guard against a possible supposition that the writer
supposes Classicism dead. Nothing in literature dies: things only wane and
wax, retire and come forward again. At this very moment there is even a
sort of Classical reaction, which has shown itself in France for a long time
Page 575
and is showing itself in England now. When people are asking, not whether
Old Mortality, and Vingt Ans Après, and Esmond, and Westward Ho! are
good books, but whether the Historical novel is a good Kind,—when they
argue, not that a play is decent, or sensible, or brilliant as literature, but that
it is a “problem”-play, and therefore sacred—John Barleycorn is going to
get up again, not to the surprise at all of historical students.
746. Cf. vol. i. p. 485.
747. In judging pictures he would, indeed, have been almost equally
liable to be “connoisseured out of his senses,” but the interference was less
authoritative. Towards the end of the century the prophets of the
Picturesque tried to invade prospects also with their preceptism: but Nature
laughed at them too obviously.
Old Mortality, and Vingt Ans Après, and Esmond, and Westward Ho! are
good books, but whether the Historical novel is a good Kind,—when they
argue, not that a play is decent, or sensible, or brilliant as literature, but that
it is a “problem”-play, and therefore sacred—John Barleycorn is going to
get up again, not to the surprise at all of historical students.
746. Cf. vol. i. p. 485.
747. In judging pictures he would, indeed, have been almost equally
liable to be “connoisseured out of his senses,” but the interference was less
authoritative. Towards the end of the century the prophets of the
Picturesque tried to invade prospects also with their preceptism: but Nature
laughed at them too obviously.
Page 576
INDEX.
(Dates in the following entries are only given in the case of critical
writers actually belonging to the period dealt with in the volume. To
economise space, also, the kind of writing practised is only indicated where
confusion is possible.)
Abrégé de l’Art Poétique, 121.
Academic Éloges, 533, 534.
Academy, the French, 256 sq.
Account of the English Dramatic Poets, 400, 401.
Account of the greatest English Poets, 438, 439.
Adagia of Erasmus, the, 11.
Addison, Joseph (1672-1719), 271, 325, 415 note, 432 sq., 437-448, 463,
541, 561 sq.
“Admiration,” 52, 270.
Adone, 259.
Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry, 433 sq.
—— of Learning, 191 sq.
Advice to a Young Poet, 452.
Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini—Pope Pius II. (1405-64), 18.
Æschylus, 61, 77.
Æthiopica, 77, 131.
Agamemnon, the, 262 note, 313.
(Dates in the following entries are only given in the case of critical
writers actually belonging to the period dealt with in the volume. To
economise space, also, the kind of writing practised is only indicated where
confusion is possible.)
Abrégé de l’Art Poétique, 121.
Academic Éloges, 533, 534.
Academy, the French, 256 sq.
Account of the English Dramatic Poets, 400, 401.
Account of the greatest English Poets, 438, 439.
Adagia of Erasmus, the, 11.
Addison, Joseph (1672-1719), 271, 325, 415 note, 432 sq., 437-448, 463,
541, 561 sq.
“Admiration,” 52, 270.
Adone, 259.
Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry, 433 sq.
—— of Learning, 191 sq.
Advice to a Young Poet, 452.
Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini—Pope Pius II. (1405-64), 18.
Æschylus, 61, 77.
Æthiopica, 77, 131.
Agamemnon, the, 262 note, 313.
Page 577
Agrippa, Cornelius (1486-1535), 17 note, 28, 29, 352 note.
Agudeza y arte de ingenio, 349, 350.
Aguilar, Francesco López de, 346.
A King and No King, Rymer on, 394.
Alaric, 257, 265.
Alexander, Sir William, Earl of Stirling (1567?-1640), 196, 197.
All for Love, Preface to, 384.
Almanack des Grands Hommes de nos jours, 534.
Ambra, 24 sq.
Amour Tyrannique, 266.
Amthor, 556.
Amyot, 139.
Ana, the, 274-277.
Anacreon, 522.
Anacrisis, 196, 197.
Anchères, Daniel d', see Schélandre, Jean de.
Ancient Mariner, The, 497 note.
“Ancients and Moderns,” 270, 320-322, 324, 327, 401, 412, 457, 503 sq.
André, Père, 513 note.
Andromeda, 161.
Anecdotes, Spence’s, 332, 454.
An Evening’s Love, Preface to, 383.
Annus Mirabilis, Preface to, 375.
Anticlaudianus, 67, 96.
Antigone, the, 256, 432.
Antiquity of the English Tongue, The, 452.
Agudeza y arte de ingenio, 349, 350.
Aguilar, Francesco López de, 346.
A King and No King, Rymer on, 394.
Alaric, 257, 265.
Alexander, Sir William, Earl of Stirling (1567?-1640), 196, 197.
All for Love, Preface to, 384.
Almanack des Grands Hommes de nos jours, 534.
Ambra, 24 sq.
Amour Tyrannique, 266.
Amthor, 556.
Amyot, 139.
Ana, the, 274-277.
Anacreon, 522.
Anacrisis, 196, 197.
Anchères, Daniel d', see Schélandre, Jean de.
Ancient Mariner, The, 497 note.
“Ancients and Moderns,” 270, 320-322, 324, 327, 401, 412, 457, 503 sq.
André, Père, 513 note.
Andromeda, 161.
Anecdotes, Spence’s, 332, 454.
An Evening’s Love, Preface to, 383.
Annus Mirabilis, Preface to, 375.
Anticlaudianus, 67, 96.
Antigone, the, 256, 432.
Antiquity of the English Tongue, The, 452.
Page 578
Apollo, The British, 406.
Apollonius Rhodius, 393, 531.
Apology of Heroic Poetry, 384.
—— for Poetry, 171 sq.
—— for Smectymnuus, 366.
Apophthegmata of Erasmus, the, 11.
Apuleius, 14, 254 note, 532.
Aquinas, 20.
Araucana, the, 348.
Arber, Professor, Bk. IV., ch. vi., notes passim.
Arbuthnot, 450 sq.
Arcadian Rhetoric, 186 note.
Architrenius, 67, 96.
Aretino, L., see Bruni.
—— C., 66.
Argensolas, the (Lupercio, 1565-1613; Bartolomé, 1566-1631), 346 note.
Arias Montano, Benito (1577-98), 336.
Ariosto, 53 sq., 64, 85, 91, 293 sq., 303, 555.
Aristophanes, 54, 254 note, 151, 308.
Aristotle, 6, 37, 38, 40, 41, 52 sq., 60 sq., 70, 80 sq., 97 sq., 103, 106, 213,
219, 413, 454 and passim.
Arnold, Matthew, 144-146, 219, 272, 277, 437, 462 note, 489 sq., 493 sq.,
506, 512.
Aromatari, Giuseppe (1588-1660), 328, 329, 411.
Arte de Trobar, 333.
Arte Nuevo de Hacer Comedias, 50 note, 332, 343-346.
Arte Poetica, Minturno’s, 51 sq.
Apollonius Rhodius, 393, 531.
Apology of Heroic Poetry, 384.
—— for Poetry, 171 sq.
—— for Smectymnuus, 366.
Apophthegmata of Erasmus, the, 11.
Apuleius, 14, 254 note, 532.
Aquinas, 20.
Araucana, the, 348.
Arber, Professor, Bk. IV., ch. vi., notes passim.
Arbuthnot, 450 sq.
Arcadian Rhetoric, 186 note.
Architrenius, 67, 96.
Aretino, L., see Bruni.
—— C., 66.
Argensolas, the (Lupercio, 1565-1613; Bartolomé, 1566-1631), 346 note.
Arias Montano, Benito (1577-98), 336.
Ariosto, 53 sq., 64, 85, 91, 293 sq., 303, 555.
Aristophanes, 54, 254 note, 151, 308.
Aristotle, 6, 37, 38, 40, 41, 52 sq., 60 sq., 70, 80 sq., 97 sq., 103, 106, 213,
219, 413, 454 and passim.
Arnold, Matthew, 144-146, 219, 272, 277, 437, 462 note, 489 sq., 493 sq.,
506, 512.
Aromatari, Giuseppe (1588-1660), 328, 329, 411.
Arte de Trobar, 333.
Arte Nuevo de Hacer Comedias, 50 note, 332, 343-346.
Arte Poetica, Minturno’s, 51 sq.
Page 579
—— Muzio’s, 46.
Arthurian Romances, Ronsard on, 124, 125.
—— Chapelain on, 260.
—— Montaigne on, 139.
Artieda, M. A. Rey de (1560-1625), 346 note.
Artiga, Francesco José (fl. c. 1690), 547, 548.
Art of English Poesy, Puttenham’s, 176 sq.
Art of Poetry, Bysshe’s, 426 sq.
—— Gildon’s, 429 sq.
Art of Rhetoric, Wilson’s, 148-151.
Art Poétique, Boileau’s, 281 sq.
—— La Mesnardière’s, 265.
—— Laudun’s, 127, 128.
—— Pelletier’s, 117 sq.
—— Vauquelin’s, 128 sq.
Artus, 124, 125.
Ascham, Roger (1515-68), 9, 46, 113, 148-162, 193, 224 sq.
Asselineau, M., 255.
Athalie, 298.
Athenæum, the, 40 note.
Athenian Mercury, The, 406.
Athenian Oracle, The, 406.
Athenian Sport, 406.
Atterbury, Francis, Bishop of Rochester (1672-1732), 449.
Aubignac, F. Hédelin, Abbé d’(1604-76), 241, 308-310, 357, 369 note.
Aubigné, Agrippa d', 505.
Arthurian Romances, Ronsard on, 124, 125.
—— Chapelain on, 260.
—— Montaigne on, 139.
Artieda, M. A. Rey de (1560-1625), 346 note.
Artiga, Francesco José (fl. c. 1690), 547, 548.
Art of English Poesy, Puttenham’s, 176 sq.
Art of Poetry, Bysshe’s, 426 sq.
—— Gildon’s, 429 sq.
Art of Rhetoric, Wilson’s, 148-151.
Art Poétique, Boileau’s, 281 sq.
—— La Mesnardière’s, 265.
—— Laudun’s, 127, 128.
—— Pelletier’s, 117 sq.
—— Vauquelin’s, 128 sq.
Artus, 124, 125.
Ascham, Roger (1515-68), 9, 46, 113, 148-162, 193, 224 sq.
Asselineau, M., 255.
Athalie, 298.
Athenæum, the, 40 note.
Athenian Mercury, The, 406.
Athenian Oracle, The, 406.
Athenian Sport, 406.
Atterbury, Francis, Bishop of Rochester (1672-1732), 449.
Aubignac, F. Hédelin, Abbé d’(1604-76), 241, 308-310, 357, 369 note.
Aubigné, Agrippa d', 505.
Page 580
Aurengzebe, Prologue to, 384.
Autre Art Poétique, 111 note.
Avellaneda, 347 note.
Averroes, 20.
Axon, Mr W. E. A., 29.
Bacon, Sir Francis, Lord Verulam (1561-1626), 191-196, 206, 232, 318
note.
Bacon-Shakespeare theory, 207 note, 318 note, 486.
Baillet, Adrien (1649-1706), 102 note, 107 note, 241, 316, 317-319.
Balzac, J. Guez de (1594-1655), 241, 252-254, 257.
—— Honoré de, 557.
Barbauld, Mrs, 497 note.
Barbon, Le, 254.
Barreda, Francesco de la, 346 note.
Bartas, Du, 199, 505.
Basia, 68.
Bath-Easton Vase, the, 240.
Batteux, Charles, Abbé (1713-80), 522-525, 536 note.
Battle of the Books, The, 450.
Baudelaire, 87.
Bausset, Louis Francois, Cardinal de, (1748-1824), 304 note.
Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706), 316, 317, 363, 364.
Béat de Muralt, 553.
Beaumont and Fletcher, 378 sq., 393 sq.
Beaux Arts réduits a un même Principe, Les, 523.
Beccadelli, 63, 66.
Autre Art Poétique, 111 note.
Avellaneda, 347 note.
Averroes, 20.
Axon, Mr W. E. A., 29.
Bacon, Sir Francis, Lord Verulam (1561-1626), 191-196, 206, 232, 318
note.
Bacon-Shakespeare theory, 207 note, 318 note, 486.
Baillet, Adrien (1649-1706), 102 note, 107 note, 241, 316, 317-319.
Balzac, J. Guez de (1594-1655), 241, 252-254, 257.
—— Honoré de, 557.
Barbauld, Mrs, 497 note.
Barbon, Le, 254.
Barreda, Francesco de la, 346 note.
Bartas, Du, 199, 505.
Basia, 68.
Bath-Easton Vase, the, 240.
Batteux, Charles, Abbé (1713-80), 522-525, 536 note.
Battle of the Books, The, 450.
Baudelaire, 87.
Bausset, Louis Francois, Cardinal de, (1748-1824), 304 note.
Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706), 316, 317, 363, 364.
Béat de Muralt, 553.
Beaumont and Fletcher, 378 sq., 393 sq.
Beaux Arts réduits a un même Principe, Les, 523.
Beccadelli, 63, 66.
Page 581
Beddoes, 87.
Bee, The, 498.
Behn, Afra, 426.
Bellay, see Du Bellay.
Bembo, Pietro (1470-1547), 49, 455.
Ben, see Jonson.
Beni, Paolo (1552-1625), 107, 324, 325.
Benserade, Isaac de (1612-91), 254.
Bentley, Richard (1662-1742), 24 note, 392, 400, 401, 450, 451.
Béranger, 87, 539.
Bergerac, Cyrano de (1619-55), 285 note, 297.
Bergreihen, 569.
Berni, Francesco (1490-1536), 29.
Bertaut, 281.
Biographia Literaria, 52.
Blair, Hugh (1718-1800), 419, 462-465.
Blake, 391 note, 426.
Blanchemain, M. Prosper, 120.
Blankenburg, 329, 330 notes.
Blount, Sir Thomas Pope (1649-97), 404, 406.
Boccaccio, 7, 8, 22, 43, 334.
Boccalini, Trajano (1556-1613), 329, 330.
Bodmer, J. J., 551.
Boileau, Nicolas B. Despréaux (1636-1711), 29, 34, 70, 241, 247, 278 note,
280-300, 321, 389, 390, 411, 455 sq., 517, 526 sq., 567.
Bolingbroke, 332.
Bee, The, 498.
Behn, Afra, 426.
Bellay, see Du Bellay.
Bembo, Pietro (1470-1547), 49, 455.
Ben, see Jonson.
Beni, Paolo (1552-1625), 107, 324, 325.
Benserade, Isaac de (1612-91), 254.
Bentley, Richard (1662-1742), 24 note, 392, 400, 401, 450, 451.
Béranger, 87, 539.
Bergerac, Cyrano de (1619-55), 285 note, 297.
Bergreihen, 569.
Berni, Francesco (1490-1536), 29.
Bertaut, 281.
Biographia Literaria, 52.
Blair, Hugh (1718-1800), 419, 462-465.
Blake, 391 note, 426.
Blanchemain, M. Prosper, 120.
Blankenburg, 329, 330 notes.
Blount, Sir Thomas Pope (1649-97), 404, 406.
Boccaccio, 7, 8, 22, 43, 334.
Boccalini, Trajano (1556-1613), 329, 330.
Bodmer, J. J., 551.
Boileau, Nicolas B. Despréaux (1636-1711), 29, 34, 70, 241, 247, 278 note,
280-300, 321, 389, 390, 411, 455 sq., 517, 526 sq., 567.
Bolingbroke, 332.
Page 582
Bolton, Edmund (1573?-1633), 187.
Boscan, Juan (1500-43), 337.
Boswell, 474.
Bouhours, Dominique, Abbé (1628-1702), 308, 315, 316, 330, 417.
Bourgoin, M., 240 note, 256, 258, 268, 287 note, 301 note, 304 note, 319
note.
Boyl, Carlos, 346 note.
Bradamante, 132.
Breitinger, J. J., 551.
—— M. H., 44 note.
Brocense, El, see Sanchez, F.
Brossette, Claude (1671-1743), 247 note, 290 note.
Brown, John (1715-66), 476, 477.
Browne, Sir T., 272, 326.
Browning, Mr, 404 note.
Brumoy, Père Pierre (1688-1742), 509.
Brunetière, M. Ferdinand, 113 sq., 144, 280.
Bruni, Leonardo (often called L. Aretino (1369-1444), 20.
Bruno, Giordano (1549-1600), 95 and note, 97 and note, 101.
Brunot, M., 243 note, 251 note.
Bruttezza, Tassoni on, 327, 417, 418.
Buch von der Deutschen Poeterei, 360-363.
Buckhurst, see Dorset.
Buehler, J., 355.
Buffon, Jean Louis Leclerc, Comte de (1707-1788), 202, 519-521.
Burns, 87, 539.
Boscan, Juan (1500-43), 337.
Boswell, 474.
Bouhours, Dominique, Abbé (1628-1702), 308, 315, 316, 330, 417.
Bourgoin, M., 240 note, 256, 258, 268, 287 note, 301 note, 304 note, 319
note.
Boyl, Carlos, 346 note.
Bradamante, 132.
Breitinger, J. J., 551.
—— M. H., 44 note.
Brocense, El, see Sanchez, F.
Brossette, Claude (1671-1743), 247 note, 290 note.
Brown, John (1715-66), 476, 477.
Browne, Sir T., 272, 326.
Browning, Mr, 404 note.
Brumoy, Père Pierre (1688-1742), 509.
Brunetière, M. Ferdinand, 113 sq., 144, 280.
Bruni, Leonardo (often called L. Aretino (1369-1444), 20.
Bruno, Giordano (1549-1600), 95 and note, 97 and note, 101.
Brunot, M., 243 note, 251 note.
Bruttezza, Tassoni on, 327, 417, 418.
Buch von der Deutschen Poeterei, 360-363.
Buckhurst, see Dorset.
Buehler, J., 355.
Buffon, Jean Louis Leclerc, Comte de (1707-1788), 202, 519-521.
Burns, 87, 539.
Page 583
Burton, R., 326.
Butcher, Prof., 61.
Bysshe, Edward (fl. c. 1700), 107, 426-429.
Cæsar, 152.
Calcagnini, Celio, 62.
Calderon, de la Barca, &c., Pedro (1600-81), 349.
Callières, François de (1645-1717), 450.
Camoens, 497 note, 516, 553 note.
Campbell, George (1709-96), 470-473.
Campion, Thomas (?-1619), 187-189, 199, 366.
Camusat, Denis François (1695-1732), 551 note.
Canons of Criticism, the, 497 note.
Capell, 569.
Caporali, Cesare (1531-1601), 344 note, 347 note.
Capriano, G. P. (fl. c. 1550), 47, 48, 219.
Caprice au Seig. S. Nicolas, 129 sq.
“Car of Cambridge”—i.e., Carr, Nicholas (1524-68), Greek Professor? 193.
Caractères, Les, 301 sq.
Carlyle, Mr, 526.
Caro, Annibale (1507-66), 49, 91.
Carvallo, Louis Alfonso de (fl. c. 1600), 341.
Cascales, Francisco (?-1640), 338.
Castelvetro, Lodovico (1505-71), 17, 22 note, 31 note, 57, 80-89, 90, 91,
101, 215, 219, 233, 244 note, 265, 273 note, 326, 331, 341.
Castiglione, 93.
Castle of Indolence, the, 495.
Butcher, Prof., 61.
Bysshe, Edward (fl. c. 1700), 107, 426-429.
Cæsar, 152.
Calcagnini, Celio, 62.
Calderon, de la Barca, &c., Pedro (1600-81), 349.
Callières, François de (1645-1717), 450.
Camoens, 497 note, 516, 553 note.
Campbell, George (1709-96), 470-473.
Campion, Thomas (?-1619), 187-189, 199, 366.
Camusat, Denis François (1695-1732), 551 note.
Canons of Criticism, the, 497 note.
Capell, 569.
Caporali, Cesare (1531-1601), 344 note, 347 note.
Capriano, G. P. (fl. c. 1550), 47, 48, 219.
Caprice au Seig. S. Nicolas, 129 sq.
“Car of Cambridge”—i.e., Carr, Nicholas (1524-68), Greek Professor? 193.
Caractères, Les, 301 sq.
Carlyle, Mr, 526.
Caro, Annibale (1507-66), 49, 91.
Carvallo, Louis Alfonso de (fl. c. 1600), 341.
Cascales, Francisco (?-1640), 338.
Castelvetro, Lodovico (1505-71), 17, 22 note, 31 note, 57, 80-89, 90, 91,
101, 215, 219, 233, 244 note, 265, 273 note, 326, 331, 341.
Castiglione, 93.
Castle of Indolence, the, 495.
Page 584
Catiline, Rymer on, 396.
Catullus, 45, 81, 531.
Caxton, William (1442?-91?), 145.
Celtes, Conrad, 28.
Cervantes, Miguel de (1547-1616), 347-349.
Chamfort, Sebastien Roch Nicolas (1741-94), 534 note.
Champfleury, 110 note, 135.
Chapelain, Jean (1595-1674), 249 note, 252, 256-261, 297, 387 note, 393,
417.
Chapman, 199, 384, 387.
Character of Saint-Evremond, 271, 385 note.
Chaucer, 6, 63 and note, 146 sq., 150, 158 sq., 179 sq., 388, 390, 393, 438,
561.
Cheke, Sir John (1514-57), 148, 151-153.
Chénier, M. J., 525 note.
Chester, Thomas, 6.
Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stanhope (1694-1773), 476 note, 514 note.
Chevræana, 274 note.
Chevy Chase, 173, 443.
Choice, the, 488.
Christopher North, 496.
Christus Patiens, 357 note.
Churchill, 517.
Cicero, 11, 12, 40, 48 and note, 53 note, 59, 150, 471.
Ciceronianus, 10-12, 193, 276.
Cid, the, and the censure on it, 257 sq.
Cigarrales de Toledo, 332, 342, 343.
Catullus, 45, 81, 531.
Caxton, William (1442?-91?), 145.
Celtes, Conrad, 28.
Cervantes, Miguel de (1547-1616), 347-349.
Chamfort, Sebastien Roch Nicolas (1741-94), 534 note.
Champfleury, 110 note, 135.
Chapelain, Jean (1595-1674), 249 note, 252, 256-261, 297, 387 note, 393,
417.
Chapman, 199, 384, 387.
Character of Saint-Evremond, 271, 385 note.
Chaucer, 6, 63 and note, 146 sq., 150, 158 sq., 179 sq., 388, 390, 393, 438,
561.
Cheke, Sir John (1514-57), 148, 151-153.
Chénier, M. J., 525 note.
Chester, Thomas, 6.
Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stanhope (1694-1773), 476 note, 514 note.
Chevræana, 274 note.
Chevy Chase, 173, 443.
Choice, the, 488.
Christopher North, 496.
Christus Patiens, 357 note.
Churchill, 517.
Cicero, 11, 12, 40, 48 and note, 53 note, 59, 150, 471.
Ciceronianus, 10-12, 193, 276.
Cid, the, and the censure on it, 257 sq.
Cigarrales de Toledo, 332, 342, 343.
Page 585
Cinna, 379.
Cinthio Giraldi, Giambattista (1504-73), 58-62, 81, 84, 90-92, 101, 214,
219.
Cisne de Apolo, 341.
Citizen of the World, the, 498.
“Classical Metres,” 157 sq.
Claudian, 384, 405.
Claveret, 258 note.
Cleveland, 235, 377, 387, 421.
Cœlius Rhodiginus, 405.
Coleridge, 52, 145, 202, 532.
Colet, John (1467-1513), 15, 63.
Colletet family, 286 and note.
Collier, Jeremy (1650-1726), 392, 402-404, 433 sq., 451.
Collins (the poet), 490 sq.
Colloquies of Erasmus, the, 11, 13, 14.
“Columbarius, Julius,” 346.
Comical Gallant, the, 434.
Comparaisons, Rapin’s, 310 sq.
Comus, 490.
Conceptismo, 350.
Concio, sive Merdardus, 13.
Condorcet, M. J. A. N. Caritat, Marquis de (1743-94), 525 note.
Conflictus Thaliæ et Barbariei, 13.
Congreve, 403.
Conrart, Valentin (1603-75), 240, 278.
Cinthio Giraldi, Giambattista (1504-73), 58-62, 81, 84, 90-92, 101, 214,
219.
Cisne de Apolo, 341.
Citizen of the World, the, 498.
“Classical Metres,” 157 sq.
Claudian, 384, 405.
Claveret, 258 note.
Cleveland, 235, 377, 387, 421.
Cœlius Rhodiginus, 405.
Coleridge, 52, 145, 202, 532.
Colet, John (1467-1513), 15, 63.
Colletet family, 286 and note.
Collier, Jeremy (1650-1726), 392, 402-404, 433 sq., 451.
Collins (the poet), 490 sq.
Colloquies of Erasmus, the, 11, 13, 14.
“Columbarius, Julius,” 346.
Comical Gallant, the, 434.
Comparaisons, Rapin’s, 310 sq.
Comus, 490.
Conceptismo, 350.
Concio, sive Merdardus, 13.
Condorcet, M. J. A. N. Caritat, Marquis de (1743-94), 525 note.
Conflictus Thaliæ et Barbariei, 13.
Congreve, 403.
Conrart, Valentin (1603-75), 240, 278.
Page 586
Conti, Armand de Bourbon, Prince de (1629-66), 402 note.
Conversations with Drummond, 198 sq.
Convivium Poeticum, 13.
Cook, Prof. A. S., 30.
Cooper’s Hill, 375, 500.
Corneille, Pierre (1606-84), 54, 258, 261-264, 297, 304, 378 sq., 419, 504
sq., 522.
—— Voltaire’s Commentary on, 516.
—— Thomas (1625-1706), 316 note.
Correa, L. (fl. c. 1590), 107.
Costar, Pierre (1603-60), 278.
Cotin, Charles, Abbé (1604-82), 282, 287 note, 297.
Cours de Littérature, 530 sq.
Courthope, Mr, 444 note, 453 note.
Courtier, the, 93.
Cowley, Abraham (1618-67), 366, 367, 393, 404, 438, 439, 450, 481, 488
sq.
Cowper, 87, 476 note.
Coxe, Leonard, 148 note.
Craik, Sir Henry, 398 note.
Crashaw, Pope on, 453 note.
Crébillon, Fils, 536 note.
Creed, attempted summary of the Neo-Classic, 216, 217.
Crescimbeni, Giovanni Maria (1663-1728), 218 note, 324, 542. 324, 542.
Crinitus, Petrus (Pietro Riccio, 1465-1505), 27.
Critical Review, the, 497.
Croy, Henri de, 110.
Conversations with Drummond, 198 sq.
Convivium Poeticum, 13.
Cook, Prof. A. S., 30.
Cooper’s Hill, 375, 500.
Corneille, Pierre (1606-84), 54, 258, 261-264, 297, 304, 378 sq., 419, 504
sq., 522.
—— Voltaire’s Commentary on, 516.
—— Thomas (1625-1706), 316 note.
Correa, L. (fl. c. 1590), 107.
Costar, Pierre (1603-60), 278.
Cotin, Charles, Abbé (1604-82), 282, 287 note, 297.
Cours de Littérature, 530 sq.
Courthope, Mr, 444 note, 453 note.
Courtier, the, 93.
Cowley, Abraham (1618-67), 366, 367, 393, 404, 438, 439, 450, 481, 488
sq.
Cowper, 87, 476 note.
Coxe, Leonard, 148 note.
Craik, Sir Henry, 398 note.
Crashaw, Pope on, 453 note.
Crébillon, Fils, 536 note.
Creed, attempted summary of the Neo-Classic, 216, 217.
Crescimbeni, Giovanni Maria (1663-1728), 218 note, 324, 542. 324, 542.
Crinitus, Petrus (Pietro Riccio, 1465-1505), 27.
Critical Review, the, 497.
Croy, Henri de, 110.
Page 587
Crusca, Ac. della, 92 sq.
Culteranismo, 346 sq.
Cultismo, 346 sq.
Cursor Mundi, 230.
Cynthia’s Revels, 198 note.
Dacier, André (1651-1722), 81, 84.
—— Madame (Anne Lefèvre) (1654-1720), 508.
D’Alembert, Jean le Rond, called (1717-83), 518.
Daniel, Samuel (1562-1619), 189-191, 199, 226, 366.
Danielle, Bernardo (fl. c. 1530), 42-44, 213, 219.
Dante, 6, 8, 34, 40 note, 82, 160, 313 note, 334, 369, 372, 373, 405, 532 sq.,
534 sq., 540.
—— Rivarol’s Preface to, 534 sq.
Darmesteter and Hatsfeld, MM., 112 note.
Davenant, Sir William (1606-68), 365, 367, 371.
Davideis, 367 note.
De Arte Poetica, Viperano’s, 103.
De Augmentis, 192 note.
De Divisione et Utilitate Omnium Scientiarum, 21 note.
De Genealogia Deorum, 7.
De Honesta Sapientia, 27.
De Imitatione Poetica, 102.
De Ludicra Dictione, 254 note.
De Perfecta Poeseos Ratione, 107.
De Poemate Epico, 265-268.
De Poeta (Minturno’s), 51 sq.
Culteranismo, 346 sq.
Cultismo, 346 sq.
Cursor Mundi, 230.
Cynthia’s Revels, 198 note.
Dacier, André (1651-1722), 81, 84.
—— Madame (Anne Lefèvre) (1654-1720), 508.
D’Alembert, Jean le Rond, called (1717-83), 518.
Daniel, Samuel (1562-1619), 189-191, 199, 226, 366.
Danielle, Bernardo (fl. c. 1530), 42-44, 213, 219.
Dante, 6, 8, 34, 40 note, 82, 160, 313 note, 334, 369, 372, 373, 405, 532 sq.,
534 sq., 540.
—— Rivarol’s Preface to, 534 sq.
Darmesteter and Hatsfeld, MM., 112 note.
Davenant, Sir William (1606-68), 365, 367, 371.
Davideis, 367 note.
De Arte Poetica, Viperano’s, 103.
De Augmentis, 192 note.
De Divisione et Utilitate Omnium Scientiarum, 21 note.
De Genealogia Deorum, 7.
De Honesta Sapientia, 27.
De Imitatione Poetica, 102.
De Ludicra Dictione, 254 note.
De Perfecta Poeseos Ratione, 107.
De Poemate Epico, 265-268.
De Poeta (Minturno’s), 51 sq.
Page 588
De Poetis Latinis, 27.
De Poetis Nostrorum Temporum, 63 sq.
De Quincey, 47 note, 98, 219.
De Re Poetica, 353 sq.
De Scientiis, 21.
De Tragœdiæ Constitutione, 356, 357.
De Vanitate Scientiarum, 28, 29.
De Vulgari Eloquio, 40 note, 112, 160, 328, 540.
Deca Disputata, La, 95 sq.
Deca Istoriale, La, 95 sq.
Dedication of the Æneis, 385.
—— of the Spanish Friar, 384.
Defence of Poesy, 170 sq.
Defence of Rhyme, 189-191.
Defence of the Epilogue (to Conquest of Granada), 383.
Défense du Poème Héroique, 277.
Défense et Illustration de la Langue Française, 111 sq.
Defoe, 277.
Degli Autori del Ben Parlare, 328.
Deimier, Pierre de (1576-1620), 251 note.
Dell’ Imitatione Poetica, 47 note.
Della Bellezza del Volgar Poesia, 542.
Della Crusca, see Crusca.
Della Difesa di Dante, 105.
Della Lingua Toscana, 47 note.
Della Perfetta Poesia Italiana, 541, 542.
De Poetis Nostrorum Temporum, 63 sq.
De Quincey, 47 note, 98, 219.
De Re Poetica, 353 sq.
De Scientiis, 21.
De Tragœdiæ Constitutione, 356, 357.
De Vanitate Scientiarum, 28, 29.
De Vulgari Eloquio, 40 note, 112, 160, 328, 540.
Deca Disputata, La, 95 sq.
Deca Istoriale, La, 95 sq.
Dedication of the Æneis, 385.
—— of the Spanish Friar, 384.
Defence of Poesy, 170 sq.
Defence of Rhyme, 189-191.
Defence of the Epilogue (to Conquest of Granada), 383.
Défense du Poème Héroique, 277.
Défense et Illustration de la Langue Française, 111 sq.
Defoe, 277.
Degli Autori del Ben Parlare, 328.
Deimier, Pierre de (1576-1620), 251 note.
Dell’ Imitatione Poetica, 47 note.
Della Bellezza del Volgar Poesia, 542.
Della Crusca, see Crusca.
Della Difesa di Dante, 105.
Della Lingua Toscana, 47 note.
Della Perfetta Poesia Italiana, 541, 542.
Page 589
Della Poesia, 106, 107.
Della Ragion Poetica, 538 sq.
Della Storia e della Ragione d’Ogni Poesia, 542-545.
Della Vera Poetica, 47, 48.
Delminio, G. C., 329.
De l’Origine des Romans, 274, 275.
De l’Universalité de la Langue Française, 534 sq.
Denham, 439.
Dennis, John (1657-1734), 387 note, 431-437.
Denores, Jason (fl. c. 1570), 106, 107, 219.
Derby, Lord, 433.
Descartes, René (1596-1650), 221, 278.
Deschamps, Eustache (? 1340-? 1410), 109.
Deserted Village, The, 297.
Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin, Jean (1595-1676), 257, 277, 278, 369.
Desportes, Philippe (1546-1601), 242 sq., 281, 366 note, 450.
“Despréaux,” 450, and see Boileau.
Dialogo contra i Poeti, 29.
Dialogo de la[s] Lengua[s], 335.
Dialogues des Dieux, 510.
—— des Morts, 503.
—— sur l’Eloquence, 305 sq.
—— sur les Héros de Roman, 292.
Dialogus in Defensionem Poetices, 27, 28.
Dictionnaire Philosophique, 517.
Diderot, 518 sq.
Della Ragion Poetica, 538 sq.
Della Storia e della Ragione d’Ogni Poesia, 542-545.
Della Vera Poetica, 47, 48.
Delminio, G. C., 329.
De l’Origine des Romans, 274, 275.
De l’Universalité de la Langue Française, 534 sq.
Denham, 439.
Dennis, John (1657-1734), 387 note, 431-437.
Denores, Jason (fl. c. 1570), 106, 107, 219.
Derby, Lord, 433.
Descartes, René (1596-1650), 221, 278.
Deschamps, Eustache (? 1340-? 1410), 109.
Deserted Village, The, 297.
Desmarets de Saint-Sorlin, Jean (1595-1676), 257, 277, 278, 369.
Desportes, Philippe (1546-1601), 242 sq., 281, 366 note, 450.
“Despréaux,” 450, and see Boileau.
Dialogo contra i Poeti, 29.
Dialogo de la[s] Lengua[s], 335.
Dialogues des Dieux, 510.
—— des Morts, 503.
—— sur l’Eloquence, 305 sq.
—— sur les Héros de Roman, 292.
Dialogus in Defensionem Poetices, 27, 28.
Dictionnaire Philosophique, 517.
Diderot, 518 sq.
Page 590
Difesa di Dante, 105.
Digressions sur les Anciens et les Modernes, 506.
Dionysius Areopagita, 22.
Discorsi, Cinthio’s, 581 sq.
—— Summo’s, 108.
—— Tasso’s, 92 sq.
Discours de Réception, Buffon’s, 519 sq.
Discours des Trois Unités, 262 sq.
Discourse of English Poesy, 176 sq.
Discourse on Medals, 439.
—— on Music, Painting, and Poetry, 473 sq.
—— on Satire, 385.
—— on the Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy, 384.
Discoveries, Jonson’s, 198 sq.
Dissertation on Ossian, 464.
—— on Phalaris, 401, 402.
—— on the Rise of Poetry and Music, 474.
Dissertation sur le mot “Vaste,” 269 sq.
Donatus, Ælius, 6 note, 48 and note, 59, 345.
Donne, 199, 489.
Dorset, Earl of, 376 sq., 439.
Douglas, Gavin, 218.
Drant, Thomas (d. 1578?), 162 sq.
Drayton, 199, 498.
Drummond (of Hawthornden), 198 sq., 356 note, 399.
Digressions sur les Anciens et les Modernes, 506.
Dionysius Areopagita, 22.
Discorsi, Cinthio’s, 581 sq.
—— Summo’s, 108.
—— Tasso’s, 92 sq.
Discours de Réception, Buffon’s, 519 sq.
Discours des Trois Unités, 262 sq.
Discourse of English Poesy, 176 sq.
Discourse on Medals, 439.
—— on Music, Painting, and Poetry, 473 sq.
—— on Satire, 385.
—— on the Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy, 384.
Discoveries, Jonson’s, 198 sq.
Dissertation on Ossian, 464.
—— on Phalaris, 401, 402.
—— on the Rise of Poetry and Music, 474.
Dissertation sur le mot “Vaste,” 269 sq.
Donatus, Ælius, 6 note, 48 and note, 59, 345.
Donne, 199, 489.
Dorset, Earl of, 376 sq., 439.
Douglas, Gavin, 218.
Drant, Thomas (d. 1578?), 162 sq.
Drayton, 199, 498.
Drummond (of Hawthornden), 198 sq., 356 note, 399.
Page 591
Dryden, John (1631-1700), 56, 93, 119, 121, 144, 232, 237 and motto, 262,
264, 271, 300, 314 note, 322, 332, 344, 347, 369, 371-391, 393, 403, 411,
413, 416, 417, 425 sq., 432, 438, 439, 449, 454, 472 note, 485, 489 sq.,
503, 560.
Du Bartas, 313, 369.
Du Bellay, Joachim (1524-60), 111-116, 221, 233, 369.
Du Bos, Jean Baptiste, Abbé (1670-1742), 511-513, 542 note.
Dunton, John (1659-1733), 406.
Du Pont, Gratien (fl. c. 1540), 110.
Dyer, Sir Edward, 165.
—— John, 421, 478.
Edgeworth, Miss, 97, 348.
Edwards, Thomas (1699-1757), 497 note.
Ejemplar Poético, 338, 341.
E. K., 224.
Eléments de Littérature, 526 sq.
Elements of Criticism, the, 465-470.
Éloges, D’Alembert’s, 519.
—— Fontenelle’s, 506.
—— Other, 529, 533.
Elton, Professor, 552.
Encina, Juan del (1468-1534), 335.
English Parnassus, the, 426 note.
Entretiens d’Ariste, 308.
Ephemerides of Phialo, 169 note.
Epistle to Augustus, Pope’s, 453 sq.
Epistles, Ovid’s, Dryden’s Preface to, 384.
264, 271, 300, 314 note, 322, 332, 344, 347, 369, 371-391, 393, 403, 411,
413, 416, 417, 425 sq., 432, 438, 439, 449, 454, 472 note, 485, 489 sq.,
503, 560.
Du Bartas, 313, 369.
Du Bellay, Joachim (1524-60), 111-116, 221, 233, 369.
Du Bos, Jean Baptiste, Abbé (1670-1742), 511-513, 542 note.
Dunton, John (1659-1733), 406.
Du Pont, Gratien (fl. c. 1540), 110.
Dyer, Sir Edward, 165.
—— John, 421, 478.
Edgeworth, Miss, 97, 348.
Edwards, Thomas (1699-1757), 497 note.
Ejemplar Poético, 338, 341.
E. K., 224.
Eléments de Littérature, 526 sq.
Elements of Criticism, the, 465-470.
Éloges, D’Alembert’s, 519.
—— Fontenelle’s, 506.
—— Other, 529, 533.
Elton, Professor, 552.
Encina, Juan del (1468-1534), 335.
English Parnassus, the, 426 note.
Entretiens d’Ariste, 308.
Ephemerides of Phialo, 169 note.
Epistle to Augustus, Pope’s, 453 sq.
Epistles, Ovid’s, Dryden’s Preface to, 384.
Page 592
Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum, 14 note.
Epitome de la Eloquencia Española, 547, 548.
Erasmus, Desiderius (1467-1536), 9-16, 61, 65, 75, 85, 193, 276, 352 note.
Ercolano, L’, 49.
Eschenbach, Wolfram von, 230.
Espinel, Vicente (1544-1634), 337.
Essai sur la Poésie Epique, 516.
—— sur le Beau, 513 note.
—— sur le Goût, 514, 528.
—— sur les Éloges, 529.
—— sur les Romans, 527.
Essay of Dramatic Poesy, 332, 376-382.
—— of Heroic Plays, 383.
—— on a New Species of Writing, 497 note.
—— on Criticism, 453 sq.
—— on Modern Education, 452.
Essay on Poetry (Temple’s), 401.
—— on the Genius of Shakespeare, 434.
—— on Translated Verse, 404.
—— upon Poetry and Painting, 497 note.
Essays, Collier’s, 404.
—— Critical (Scott’s), 500.
—— Montaigne’s, 138 sq.
—— Moral and Literary, 499.
Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, 476.
Estratto dell’ Arte Poetica d’Aristotile, 546.
Epitome de la Eloquencia Española, 547, 548.
Erasmus, Desiderius (1467-1536), 9-16, 61, 65, 75, 85, 193, 276, 352 note.
Ercolano, L’, 49.
Eschenbach, Wolfram von, 230.
Espinel, Vicente (1544-1634), 337.
Essai sur la Poésie Epique, 516.
—— sur le Beau, 513 note.
—— sur le Goût, 514, 528.
—— sur les Éloges, 529.
—— sur les Romans, 527.
Essay of Dramatic Poesy, 332, 376-382.
—— of Heroic Plays, 383.
—— on a New Species of Writing, 497 note.
—— on Criticism, 453 sq.
—— on Modern Education, 452.
Essay on Poetry (Temple’s), 401.
—— on the Genius of Shakespeare, 434.
—— on Translated Verse, 404.
—— upon Poetry and Painting, 497 note.
Essays, Collier’s, 404.
—— Critical (Scott’s), 500.
—— Montaigne’s, 138 sq.
—— Moral and Literary, 499.
Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, 476.
Estratto dell’ Arte Poetica d’Aristotile, 546.
Page 593
Etherege, 463.
Euphuism, 225 sq.
Euripides, 14, 54.
Evening’s Love, An, Preface to, 383.
Examens, Corneille’s, 262 sq.
Expostulatio Spongiæ, 346.
Fables, Dryden’s, Preface to, 386.
Fabri, Pierre (fl. c. 1520), 110.
Fabriano, see Gilio.
Fabricius, Georgius (1515-71), 108, 181, 353-355.
Faerie, Queene, the, 168.
“Fatura,” 63.
Fauchet, Claude (1530-1601), 101, 135.
Feillet, M., 258.
Feltre, Vittorino da, 20.
Fénelon, Francois de Salignac de La Mothe (1651-1715), 241, 272, 301,
304-308.
Feyjóo y Montenegro, Benito Geronimo (1701-64), 549.
“Fidenziano,” 540 note.
Fielding, 349.
Filosofia Antigua Poética, 338-340.
Fingal, 464.
Flaubert, G., 12, 302.
Flecknoe, 377.
Flemming, 556.
Fletcher, 378 sq.
Euphuism, 225 sq.
Euripides, 14, 54.
Evening’s Love, An, Preface to, 383.
Examens, Corneille’s, 262 sq.
Expostulatio Spongiæ, 346.
Fables, Dryden’s, Preface to, 386.
Fabri, Pierre (fl. c. 1520), 110.
Fabriano, see Gilio.
Fabricius, Georgius (1515-71), 108, 181, 353-355.
Faerie, Queene, the, 168.
“Fatura,” 63.
Fauchet, Claude (1530-1601), 101, 135.
Feillet, M., 258.
Feltre, Vittorino da, 20.
Fénelon, Francois de Salignac de La Mothe (1651-1715), 241, 272, 301,
304-308.
Feyjóo y Montenegro, Benito Geronimo (1701-64), 549.
“Fidenziano,” 540 note.
Fielding, 349.
Filosofia Antigua Poética, 338-340.
Fingal, 464.
Flaubert, G., 12, 302.
Flecknoe, 377.
Flemming, 556.
Fletcher, 378 sq.
Page 594
Floriant et Florete, 394 note.
Folengo, 540.
Fontaine, Ch. (1513-88?), 116.
Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de (1657-1757), 292, 416, 419, 423 motto,
501-507.
Fracastoro, Jeronimo (1483-1553), 44-46, 67, 88, 90, 214, 217, 219.
Franciade, Preface to the, 120 sq.
Fraunce, Abraham (fl. c. 1590), 186 note, 199.
Fray Gerundio, 550.
Froissart, 141.
Froude, Mr, 5.
Fulgentius, 8, 397.
Fureteriana, 274 note.
Furetière, Antoine (1620-88), 553, 554 note.
“Furor Poeticus,” 97 and note, 267, 268, 295, 340, 410, 420.
“Gallo-Classic,” the term, 411.
Gambara, F. (fl. c. 1580), 107 note, 278 note.
Garbett, Rev. J., 298 note, 372 note.
Garnett, Dr, 546 note.
Gascoigne, George (1525?-77), 162 sq., 177, 226, 429.
Gautier, Th., 282 note, 519 note.
Gayley and Scott, Professors, 195 note, 329 note.
Gellert, Christian Furchtegott (1715-69), 557.
Gentleman’s Magazine, the, 497.
Gerusalemme Liberata, 18, 87 sq.
Gibert, Balthasar (1662-1741), 319, 320.
Folengo, 540.
Fontaine, Ch. (1513-88?), 116.
Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de (1657-1757), 292, 416, 419, 423 motto,
501-507.
Fracastoro, Jeronimo (1483-1553), 44-46, 67, 88, 90, 214, 217, 219.
Franciade, Preface to the, 120 sq.
Fraunce, Abraham (fl. c. 1590), 186 note, 199.
Fray Gerundio, 550.
Froissart, 141.
Froude, Mr, 5.
Fulgentius, 8, 397.
Fureteriana, 274 note.
Furetière, Antoine (1620-88), 553, 554 note.
“Furor Poeticus,” 97 and note, 267, 268, 295, 340, 410, 420.
“Gallo-Classic,” the term, 411.
Gambara, F. (fl. c. 1580), 107 note, 278 note.
Garbett, Rev. J., 298 note, 372 note.
Garnett, Dr, 546 note.
Gascoigne, George (1525?-77), 162 sq., 177, 226, 429.
Gautier, Th., 282 note, 519 note.
Gayley and Scott, Professors, 195 note, 329 note.
Gellert, Christian Furchtegott (1715-69), 557.
Gentleman’s Magazine, the, 497.
Gerusalemme Liberata, 18, 87 sq.
Gibert, Balthasar (1662-1741), 319, 320.
Page 595
Gifford, 198 note, 534.
Gildon, Charles (1665-1724), 429, 430.
Gilio da Fabriano Antonio (fl. c. 1580), 104.
Girac, Paul Thomas de (?-1663), 278 note.
Giraldi, Cinthio, see Cinthio.
Giraldus, Lilius, see Lilius.
Goethe, 356, 372, 560.
Goldsmith, Oliver (1728-74), 429, 498.
Gondibert, Preface to, 365, 367-371.
Góngora y Argote, Luis de (1561-1627), 349.
Gongorism, 331, 414.
Gonzales de Salas (fl. c. 1630), 341, 342, 349.
Gorboduc, 173, 206, 374, 503.
Gorgias, the, 82.
Gosson, Stephen (1555-1624), 169-171.
Gottsched, Johann Christopher (1700-66), 552-557.
Gournay, Mlle. de, 251, 253, 254.
Gower, 146 sq., 179 sq.
Gracián, Balthasar (1584-1658?), 349, 350.
Granada, Luis de (1504-81), 336.
Gravina, Gianvincenzo (1664-1718), 272, 324, 513, 538-541.
Gray, 461, 478, 479, 487, 491 sq., 500, 569.
Grazzini, Ant. Francesco ["Il Lasca"] (1403-83), 48, 59.
Grévin, Jacques (1538?-70), 127.
Grimmelshausen, 552.
Grongar Hill, 488, 500.
Gildon, Charles (1665-1724), 429, 430.
Gilio da Fabriano Antonio (fl. c. 1580), 104.
Girac, Paul Thomas de (?-1663), 278 note.
Giraldi, Cinthio, see Cinthio.
Giraldus, Lilius, see Lilius.
Goethe, 356, 372, 560.
Goldsmith, Oliver (1728-74), 429, 498.
Gondibert, Preface to, 365, 367-371.
Góngora y Argote, Luis de (1561-1627), 349.
Gongorism, 331, 414.
Gonzales de Salas (fl. c. 1630), 341, 342, 349.
Gorboduc, 173, 206, 374, 503.
Gorgias, the, 82.
Gosson, Stephen (1555-1624), 169-171.
Gottsched, Johann Christopher (1700-66), 552-557.
Gournay, Mlle. de, 251, 253, 254.
Gower, 146 sq., 179 sq.
Gracián, Balthasar (1584-1658?), 349, 350.
Granada, Luis de (1504-81), 336.
Gravina, Gianvincenzo (1664-1718), 272, 324, 513, 538-541.
Gray, 461, 478, 479, 487, 491 sq., 500, 569.
Grazzini, Ant. Francesco ["Il Lasca"] (1403-83), 48, 59.
Grévin, Jacques (1538?-70), 127.
Grimmelshausen, 552.
Grongar Hill, 488, 500.
Page 596
Grosart, Dr, 196 note.
Grotius, 359.
Grundlicher Bericht des Deutschen Meistergesangs, 360 note.
Guarini, Battista (1537-1612), poet, 107, 199.
Guarino (?-1460), humanist, 18.
Guest, Dr, 178, 188.
Guicciardini, 331.
Habington, 485.
Hamelius, Herr, 425 note, 432 note, 448 note.
Hamilton, Anthony, 502.
Hannay, Mr David, 332 note, 341, 350.
Hardy, Alexandre (1560-1631), 255 note.
Harington, Sir John (1561-1612), 183 note, 186, 199.
Harris, James (1709-80), 473-476.
Harvey, Gabriel (1545-1630), 148, 165 sq.
Hawes, Stephen (?-1523?), 146, 147.
Hazlitt, 145, 219, 372 note, 496.
Heads of an Answer to Rymer, 373 note, 397 note.
Hédelin, see Aubignac.
Hegel, 274, 527 note.
Heinsius, Daniel (1580-1655), 356, 357.
Heldenbuch, 569.
Heliodorus, 77, 131.
Henriade, the, 514 note, 522, 526.
Henry IV., Dennis on, 434.
Herbert, G., 87.
Grotius, 359.
Grundlicher Bericht des Deutschen Meistergesangs, 360 note.
Guarini, Battista (1537-1612), poet, 107, 199.
Guarino (?-1460), humanist, 18.
Guest, Dr, 178, 188.
Guicciardini, 331.
Habington, 485.
Hamelius, Herr, 425 note, 432 note, 448 note.
Hamilton, Anthony, 502.
Hannay, Mr David, 332 note, 341, 350.
Hardy, Alexandre (1560-1631), 255 note.
Harington, Sir John (1561-1612), 183 note, 186, 199.
Harris, James (1709-80), 473-476.
Harvey, Gabriel (1545-1630), 148, 165 sq.
Hawes, Stephen (?-1523?), 146, 147.
Hazlitt, 145, 219, 372 note, 496.
Heads of an Answer to Rymer, 373 note, 397 note.
Hédelin, see Aubignac.
Hegel, 274, 527 note.
Heinsius, Daniel (1580-1655), 356, 357.
Heldenbuch, 569.
Heliodorus, 77, 131.
Henriade, the, 514 note, 522, 526.
Henry IV., Dennis on, 434.
Herbert, G., 87.
Page 597
Héricault, M. Ch. d’, 112 note.
Hermaphroditus, 66 note.
Hermes, 473.
Hermogenes, 319, 329.
Hero and Leander, 74.
“Heroic Play,” the, 367 sq.
“Heroic Poem,” the, 367 sq.
Hessus, Eobanus, 14, 28.
Heywood, Thomas, 398 note.
Histoire du Théâtre Français, Fontenelle’s, 505.
—— the Frères Parfait’s, 527.
Historia de las Ideas Estéticas en España, 331-351 passim.
History of the Rise and Progress of Poetry, 476.
—— of the Royal Society, 398.
Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679), 40, 367-371.
Hoffmanswaldau, 552.
Home, Henry, see Kames.
Homer, 25, 31-35, 47, 52, 74, 86, 99, 122-126, 130-132, 141, 310 sq.
Horace, 6, 9, 129 sq. and passim.
Howard, Edward, 367 note.
—— Henry, see Surrey, Earl of.
—— J., 367 note.
—— Sir Robert (d. 1698: his birth-date and those of his brothers E. and J.
are very uncertain), 376 sq.
Howell’s Letters, 371 note.
Hudibras, 513 note.
Hermaphroditus, 66 note.
Hermes, 473.
Hermogenes, 319, 329.
Hero and Leander, 74.
“Heroic Play,” the, 367 sq.
“Heroic Poem,” the, 367 sq.
Hessus, Eobanus, 14, 28.
Heywood, Thomas, 398 note.
Histoire du Théâtre Français, Fontenelle’s, 505.
—— the Frères Parfait’s, 527.
Historia de las Ideas Estéticas en España, 331-351 passim.
History of the Rise and Progress of Poetry, 476.
—— of the Royal Society, 398.
Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679), 40, 367-371.
Hoffmanswaldau, 552.
Home, Henry, see Kames.
Homer, 25, 31-35, 47, 52, 74, 86, 99, 122-126, 130-132, 141, 310 sq.
Horace, 6, 9, 129 sq. and passim.
Howard, Edward, 367 note.
—— Henry, see Surrey, Earl of.
—— J., 367 note.
—— Sir Robert (d. 1698: his birth-date and those of his brothers E. and J.
are very uncertain), 376 sq.
Howell’s Letters, 371 note.
Hudibras, 513 note.
Page 598
Huerta, Vicente Garcia de la (1730?-87), 550 note.
Huet, Pierre Daniel (1630-1721), bishop of Avranches, 274, 275.
Huetiana, 275.
Hugo, Victor, 87.
Hume, Alexander, 209 note.
—— David, 462.
Hunt, Leigh, 372 note.
Hurd, 469.
Hutten, Ulrich von (1488-1523), 352 note.
Iago, Rymer on, 395, 396.
Ibrahim, 265.
Idler, the, 484.
I Fiori della Poesia, 107.
Il Castellano, 40.
“Il Lasca,” see Grazzini.
Il Sogno, 106, 107.
“Imagination,” Addison on, 443-448.
“Imlac,” 484, 485.
Impartial Critic, The, 432.
Indian Emperor, The, Preface to, 382.
Inés de Castro, 507.
Inquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe, 498.
Institutiones Oratoriæ, Voss’s, 358-360.
—— Poeticæ, Spanmüller’s, 355.
I Romanzi, 63.
Isidore (of Seville), 8, 334.
Huet, Pierre Daniel (1630-1721), bishop of Avranches, 274, 275.
Huetiana, 275.
Hugo, Victor, 87.
Hume, Alexander, 209 note.
—— David, 462.
Hunt, Leigh, 372 note.
Hurd, 469.
Hutten, Ulrich von (1488-1523), 352 note.
Iago, Rymer on, 395, 396.
Ibrahim, 265.
Idler, the, 484.
I Fiori della Poesia, 107.
Il Castellano, 40.
“Il Lasca,” see Grazzini.
Il Sogno, 106, 107.
“Imagination,” Addison on, 443-448.
“Imlac,” 484, 485.
Impartial Critic, The, 432.
Indian Emperor, The, Preface to, 382.
Inés de Castro, 507.
Inquiry into the Present State of Polite Learning in Europe, 498.
Institutiones Oratoriæ, Voss’s, 358-360.
—— Poeticæ, Spanmüller’s, 355.
I Romanzi, 63.
Isidore (of Seville), 8, 334.
Page 599
I Simillimi, 38.
Iskra, Augustinus, 360, 361.
Isla, José Francisco, Father (1703-81), 550.
Istoria del Volgar Poesia, 542.
Italia Liberata, 38.
James the First (1566-1625), 177, 178.
Jerome, St, Erasmus on, 15, 16.
Jeronimo, 235.
Johannes Secundus, 27.
John of Garlandia, 14.
—— of Salisbury, 8.
Johnson, Samuel (1709-84), 145, 375, 429, 434, 437, 458, 465, 474, 477-
496, 512, 552, 561, 571.
Jonson, Ben (1573-1637), 42, 71, 138, 144, 156, 185 note, 197-209, 227
sq., 233, 262, 271, 367, 368, 370 sq., 393 sq., 486 note.
Journal des Savants, 316.
Jugements des Savants, 276.
—— —— —— sur les auteurs que ont traité de la Rhétorique, 319, 320.
Julius Cæsar, Rymer on, 396.
—— Dennis on, 434.
Juvenal, Dryden’s Preface to, 385.
Kames, Henry Home, Lord (1696-1782), 465-470.
Käsenbrot, see Olmucensis.
Keats, 280, 412, 485.
Keble, 87, 312 note, 372 note.
Kelly, Mr J. Fitzmaurice, 332 note, 335 note, 348 note, 350.
Iskra, Augustinus, 360, 361.
Isla, José Francisco, Father (1703-81), 550.
Istoria del Volgar Poesia, 542.
Italia Liberata, 38.
James the First (1566-1625), 177, 178.
Jerome, St, Erasmus on, 15, 16.
Jeronimo, 235.
Johannes Secundus, 27.
John of Garlandia, 14.
—— of Salisbury, 8.
Johnson, Samuel (1709-84), 145, 375, 429, 434, 437, 458, 465, 474, 477-
496, 512, 552, 561, 571.
Jonson, Ben (1573-1637), 42, 71, 138, 144, 156, 185 note, 197-209, 227
sq., 233, 262, 271, 367, 368, 370 sq., 393 sq., 486 note.
Journal des Savants, 316.
Jugements des Savants, 276.
—— —— —— sur les auteurs que ont traité de la Rhétorique, 319, 320.
Julius Cæsar, Rymer on, 396.
—— Dennis on, 434.
Juvenal, Dryden’s Preface to, 385.
Kames, Henry Home, Lord (1696-1782), 465-470.
Käsenbrot, see Olmucensis.
Keats, 280, 412, 485.
Keble, 87, 312 note, 372 note.
Kelly, Mr J. Fitzmaurice, 332 note, 335 note, 348 note, 350.
Page 600
Kelton, Arthur (fl. c. 1550), 542 note.
Ker, Mr W. P., 93 note, 332 note, 373 sq.
Kingsley, Ch., 124, 161.
Knox, Vicesimus (1752-1821), 499.
La Boétie, E. de, 71.
La Bruyère, Jean de (1645-96), 241, 300-304, 355, 521.
Labyrinthus, 8, 24, 64, 231.
La Casa, 93, 162 note, 512, 540 note.
La Croze, J. Cornand de (not to be confused with his contemporary, M.
Veyssière de la Croze, a learned but fantastic philologist and antiquary),
406 note.
La Cueva, Juan de (1550-1606), 338, 340, 341, 355.
La Fontaine, 293 sq., 298, 519, 521.
La Harpe, Jean François de (1739-1803), 530-533, 564, 571.
Lamb, Charles, 145, 496.
La Mesnardière, Hippolyte Jules Pelet de (1616-63), 265.
La Monnoye, Bernard de (1641-1728), 273 note, 316 note, 527 note.
La Mothe le Vayer, F. de (1588-1672), 251.
La Motte, A. Houdard de (1672-1731), 321, 507-509.
—— Charles (?-?), Irish divine and critic, 497 note.
Lancelot, 124, 260.
Landi, Ortensio (1501-60), 29.
Langbaine, Gerard (1656-92), 400, 401, 430.
Langlois, M. G., 109 note.
Langhorne, 449.
Langland, 179 sq.
Ker, Mr W. P., 93 note, 332 note, 373 sq.
Kingsley, Ch., 124, 161.
Knox, Vicesimus (1752-1821), 499.
La Boétie, E. de, 71.
La Bruyère, Jean de (1645-96), 241, 300-304, 355, 521.
Labyrinthus, 8, 24, 64, 231.
La Casa, 93, 162 note, 512, 540 note.
La Croze, J. Cornand de (not to be confused with his contemporary, M.
Veyssière de la Croze, a learned but fantastic philologist and antiquary),
406 note.
La Cueva, Juan de (1550-1606), 338, 340, 341, 355.
La Fontaine, 293 sq., 298, 519, 521.
La Harpe, Jean François de (1739-1803), 530-533, 564, 571.
Lamb, Charles, 145, 496.
La Mesnardière, Hippolyte Jules Pelet de (1616-63), 265.
La Monnoye, Bernard de (1641-1728), 273 note, 316 note, 527 note.
La Mothe le Vayer, F. de (1588-1672), 251.
La Motte, A. Houdard de (1672-1731), 321, 507-509.
—— Charles (?-?), Irish divine and critic, 497 note.
Lancelot, 124, 260.
Landi, Ortensio (1501-60), 29.
Langbaine, Gerard (1656-92), 400, 401, 430.
Langlois, M. G., 109 note.
Langhorne, 449.
Langland, 179 sq.
Page 601
La Place, translator of Shakespeare, 527, 528.
Lasca, Il, see Grazzini.
La Taille, Jacques de (1541?-62?), 127.
—— Jean de (1540?-1608), 127.
Latimer, 150.
Laudun, Pierre de (1575-1629), 127, 128.
Le Bossu, René (1631-80), 300, 314, 315.
Le Clerc, Jean (1657-1736), 276, 277, 363, 364.
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 462 sq.
Lee, Mr Sidney, 400 note.
Lemaître, M. Jules, 259 note.
Lemercier, N., 530.
Le Moyne, Père, 257, 393, 505.
Lessing, 219, 356, 410.
L’Estrange, 392, 451.
Le Tre Sorelle, 93.
Letter to a Young Clergyman, 452.
Letters on Chivalry, 469.
Letters, Pope’s, 453.
Lettre de M. de la Visclède, 517.
Lettres aux Auteurs de la Gazette Littéraire, 517.
Lettres Galantes et Philosophiques, 510.
Lettres Persanes, 514.
Lettres sur les Anglais, 516.
Lilius Gregorius Giraldus (1478-1552), 63-68, 96 note, 413.
Lilly, William, 65.
Lasca, Il, see Grazzini.
La Taille, Jacques de (1541?-62?), 127.
—— Jean de (1540?-1608), 127.
Latimer, 150.
Laudun, Pierre de (1575-1629), 127, 128.
Le Bossu, René (1631-80), 300, 314, 315.
Le Clerc, Jean (1657-1736), 276, 277, 363, 364.
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 462 sq.
Lee, Mr Sidney, 400 note.
Lemaître, M. Jules, 259 note.
Lemercier, N., 530.
Le Moyne, Père, 257, 393, 505.
Lessing, 219, 356, 410.
L’Estrange, 392, 451.
Le Tre Sorelle, 93.
Letter to a Young Clergyman, 452.
Letters on Chivalry, 469.
Letters, Pope’s, 453.
Lettre de M. de la Visclède, 517.
Lettres aux Auteurs de la Gazette Littéraire, 517.
Lettres Galantes et Philosophiques, 510.
Lettres Persanes, 514.
Lettres sur les Anglais, 516.
Lilius Gregorius Giraldus (1478-1552), 63-68, 96 note, 413.
Lilly, William, 65.
Page 602
L’Infarinato, 92.
“L’Infortuné,” 110.
Lionardi, Alessandro (fl. c. 1550), 47.
Lives of the Poets, Heywood’s, 398 note.
—— Johnson’s, 480 sq., 486 sq.
—— Winstanley’s, 400.
Locke, John (1632-1704), 53, 446 sq., 468.
Lodge, Thomas (1558?-1625), 170, 171.
Logic and Poetry, 20 note.
Lohenstein, 552.
Longfellow, 87.
Longinus, 6, 34, 206, 220, 288 sq., 302, 319, 373, 430, 435.
Longolius (Christophe de Longueil), (1490-1522), 11, 67, 276.
Lope de Vega Carpio, Felix (1562-1635), 332, 343-347, 380 note.
Love’s Labour’s Lost, Collier on, 403.
Lucan, 199.
Lucian, 24 note, 330, 402.
Lucilius, 254 note.
Lucretius, 33, 40, 88, 139, 140, 202.
Lutrin, Le, 290.
Luzan Claramumt de Suelves y Gurrea, Ignacio de (1702-54), 347, 350,
414, 541, 546, 547.
Lycidas, 490, 500.
Lydgate, 146 sq., 179 sq.
Macaulay, 320, 391 sq., 401 sq., 492, 498.
Machiavelli, 54.
“L’Infortuné,” 110.
Lionardi, Alessandro (fl. c. 1550), 47.
Lives of the Poets, Heywood’s, 398 note.
—— Johnson’s, 480 sq., 486 sq.
—— Winstanley’s, 400.
Locke, John (1632-1704), 53, 446 sq., 468.
Lodge, Thomas (1558?-1625), 170, 171.
Logic and Poetry, 20 note.
Lohenstein, 552.
Longfellow, 87.
Longinus, 6, 34, 206, 220, 288 sq., 302, 319, 373, 430, 435.
Longolius (Christophe de Longueil), (1490-1522), 11, 67, 276.
Lope de Vega Carpio, Felix (1562-1635), 332, 343-347, 380 note.
Love’s Labour’s Lost, Collier on, 403.
Lucan, 199.
Lucian, 24 note, 330, 402.
Lucilius, 254 note.
Lucretius, 33, 40, 88, 139, 140, 202.
Lutrin, Le, 290.
Luzan Claramumt de Suelves y Gurrea, Ignacio de (1702-54), 347, 350,
414, 541, 546, 547.
Lycidas, 490, 500.
Lydgate, 146 sq., 179 sq.
Macaulay, 320, 391 sq., 401 sq., 492, 498.
Machiavelli, 54.
Page 603
“Machines” and “Machinery,” 369 sq., 435.
Mackenzie, Sir George, 320.
Macpherson (Ossian), 464.
Macrobius, 22 note.
Maffei, Francisco Scipione, Marquis (1676-1755), 546.
Maggi, 41, 42.
Mairet, Jean (1604-86), 115.
Maistre, Joseph de, 327.
Malebranche, Nicolas (1638-1715), 279 and note, 514.
Malfilâtre, 519.
Malherbe, François de (1555-1628), 115, 241-251, 257, 283, 303.
Malory, Sir Thomas, 6, 155.
Mambrun, Pierre (1600-61), 266-268, 410.
Manière de Bien Penser dans les Ouvrages d’Esprit, 315, 316.
Manto, 24 sq.
Mantuan, 66.
Marinism and Marino, 331, 393, 414.
Marlowe, 205, 399.
Marmontel, Jean François (1723-99), 287 note, 525-529.
Marot, Clément (1497-1544), 110 note, 137, 281, 304.
Marryat, 34.
Martianus Capella, 42.
Martinus Scriblerus, 452.
Masson, Professor, 195 note.
Matamoros, Alfonso Guida, 336.
Maucroix, François de (1619-1708), 278.
Mackenzie, Sir George, 320.
Macpherson (Ossian), 464.
Macrobius, 22 note.
Maffei, Francisco Scipione, Marquis (1676-1755), 546.
Maggi, 41, 42.
Mairet, Jean (1604-86), 115.
Maistre, Joseph de, 327.
Malebranche, Nicolas (1638-1715), 279 and note, 514.
Malfilâtre, 519.
Malherbe, François de (1555-1628), 115, 241-251, 257, 283, 303.
Malory, Sir Thomas, 6, 155.
Mambrun, Pierre (1600-61), 266-268, 410.
Manière de Bien Penser dans les Ouvrages d’Esprit, 315, 316.
Manto, 24 sq.
Mantuan, 66.
Marinism and Marino, 331, 393, 414.
Marlowe, 205, 399.
Marmontel, Jean François (1723-99), 287 note, 525-529.
Marot, Clément (1497-1544), 110 note, 137, 281, 304.
Marryat, 34.
Martianus Capella, 42.
Martinus Scriblerus, 452.
Masson, Professor, 195 note.
Matamoros, Alfonso Guida, 336.
Maucroix, François de (1619-1708), 278.
Page 604
Mayáns y Siscar, Gregorio (1699-1781), 333 note, 549.
Mazzone da Miglionico (fl. c. 1590), 107, 108.
Mazzoni (fl. c. 1550), 105.
Meditation on a Broomstick, 451.
Mémoire sur les Occupations de l’Académie Française, 305 sq.
Ménage, Gilles de (1613-92), 160, 273, 317, 321 note.
Ménagiana, 53 note, 273 sq., 321 note.
Menéndez y Pelayo, Señor, 331-352, passim.
Mercure Galant, 316.
Meres, Francis (1565-1647), 187.
Merry Wives of Windsor, Dennis on, 434.
Mesa, Cristóbal de (1540-1620), 338 note, 346 note.
Meslier, le Curé (1678-1733), 515 note.
Metastasio (Pietro A. D. B. Trapassi), (1698-1782), 545, 546.
Mickle, 449.
Millar, Mr J. H., 486 note.
Milton, John (1608-74), 7, 45, 54, 56, 93, 262, 365, 398, 399, 402, 411
note, 435 sq., 439, 443 sq., 449, 467, 480 sq., 516, 532, 555, 560.
“Minim, Dick,” 484.
Minturno, Ant. Sebastiano (fl. c. 1560), 50-57, 90, 129 and note, 215, 219.
Miscellanies, Dryden’s Preface to, 384 sq.
Mitford, W., 164 note.
Molière, 261, 273, 298, 303, 307, 322 note, 378 sq., 521.
Molinet, Jean (d. 1507), 110.
Mondragon, Hieronimo de, 337 note.
Montagu, Mrs, 240.
Mazzone da Miglionico (fl. c. 1590), 107, 108.
Mazzoni (fl. c. 1550), 105.
Meditation on a Broomstick, 451.
Mémoire sur les Occupations de l’Académie Française, 305 sq.
Ménage, Gilles de (1613-92), 160, 273, 317, 321 note.
Ménagiana, 53 note, 273 sq., 321 note.
Menéndez y Pelayo, Señor, 331-352, passim.
Mercure Galant, 316.
Meres, Francis (1565-1647), 187.
Merry Wives of Windsor, Dennis on, 434.
Mesa, Cristóbal de (1540-1620), 338 note, 346 note.
Meslier, le Curé (1678-1733), 515 note.
Metastasio (Pietro A. D. B. Trapassi), (1698-1782), 545, 546.
Mickle, 449.
Millar, Mr J. H., 486 note.
Milton, John (1608-74), 7, 45, 54, 56, 93, 262, 365, 398, 399, 402, 411
note, 435 sq., 439, 443 sq., 449, 467, 480 sq., 516, 532, 555, 560.
“Minim, Dick,” 484.
Minturno, Ant. Sebastiano (fl. c. 1560), 50-57, 90, 129 and note, 215, 219.
Miscellanies, Dryden’s Preface to, 384 sq.
Mitford, W., 164 note.
Molière, 261, 273, 298, 303, 307, 322 note, 378 sq., 521.
Molinet, Jean (d. 1507), 110.
Mondragon, Hieronimo de, 337 note.
Montagu, Mrs, 240.
Page 605
Montagu (Lord Halifax), 439.
Montaigne, Michel de (1533-92), 138-142, 205, 232, 254, 279, 514.
Monte-Melone (Chiodino da), 329, 330.
Montesquieu, Charles de Sécondat, baron de la Brède, et de (1689-1755),
513, 514.
Monthly Review, the, 497.
Moratin, Nicolas Fernandez de (1737-80): to be distinguished from his son
and successor in classicism, Leandro Fernandez de M., (1760-1828), 550.
More, Sir T., 63.
Morel-Fatio, M., 50 note, 332 note, 343 note, 346 note.
Morley, Prof. H., 162 note.
Morte d’Arthur, the, 155.
Mulcaster, Richard (1530?-1611), 209 note.
Mulgrave, John Sheffield, Earl of, later Duke of Buckinghamshire (1649-
1721), 402.
“Mumpsimus,” 15.
Muratori, Ludovico Antonio (1672-1750), 80 note, 324, 541, 542.
Musæus, 74.
Mutius, Macarius, 326.
Muzio, G. (fl. c. 1550), 46.
Nasarre y Ferriz, 549.
Naturaleza, 342 sq.
Naugerius sive de Poetica, 45, 214, 217.
Navagero, Andrea (Naugerius) (1483-1529), 45, 66, 81.
Nebrija, Antonio de (Nebrissensis) (fl. c. 1530), 336.
New World Discovered in the Moon, the, 198 note.
Nichols, Mr, 14 note, 15.
Montaigne, Michel de (1533-92), 138-142, 205, 232, 254, 279, 514.
Monte-Melone (Chiodino da), 329, 330.
Montesquieu, Charles de Sécondat, baron de la Brède, et de (1689-1755),
513, 514.
Monthly Review, the, 497.
Moratin, Nicolas Fernandez de (1737-80): to be distinguished from his son
and successor in classicism, Leandro Fernandez de M., (1760-1828), 550.
More, Sir T., 63.
Morel-Fatio, M., 50 note, 332 note, 343 note, 346 note.
Morley, Prof. H., 162 note.
Morte d’Arthur, the, 155.
Mulcaster, Richard (1530?-1611), 209 note.
Mulgrave, John Sheffield, Earl of, later Duke of Buckinghamshire (1649-
1721), 402.
“Mumpsimus,” 15.
Muratori, Ludovico Antonio (1672-1750), 80 note, 324, 541, 542.
Musæus, 74.
Mutius, Macarius, 326.
Muzio, G. (fl. c. 1550), 46.
Nasarre y Ferriz, 549.
Naturaleza, 342 sq.
Naugerius sive de Poetica, 45, 214, 217.
Navagero, Andrea (Naugerius) (1483-1529), 45, 66, 81.
Nebrija, Antonio de (Nebrissensis) (fl. c. 1530), 336.
New World Discovered in the Moon, the, 198 note.
Nichols, Mr, 14 note, 15.
Page 606
Nicolai, Christoph-Frederich (1733-1811), 551 note.
Nisard, D., 114.
Notes of Instruction, 162 sq.
Nueva Idea de la Tragedia Antigua, 341, 342.
Nutricia, 24 sq.
Obscuri Viri, the, 9.
Observateur Littéraire, 527.
Odyssey, the, 58, 267, 532.
Oedipus, the, 263.
Of Studies (Bacon’s), 192.
Ogier, François (fl. c. 1630), 254-256, 259, 346, 347, 409.
Oldys, 457.
Olmucensis, Augustinus Moravus (Käsenbrot, c. 1500), 17 note, 27, 28,
218, 352 note.
Opera, Saint-Evremond on, 271.
Opitz, Martin (1597-1639), 17, 360-363, 556.
Orbecche, 58, 60.
Origenes de la Lengua Española, 333 note.
Origines de la Poésie Française, 101.
Orlando Furioso, 85, and see Ariosto.
Ossian, 464 sq., 532.
Othello, Rymer on, 395.
Ovid, 384.
Panigarola, Francesco (1548-94), 329.
Paradise Lost, 325, 443 sq.
Paradossi, 29.
Nisard, D., 114.
Notes of Instruction, 162 sq.
Nueva Idea de la Tragedia Antigua, 341, 342.
Nutricia, 24 sq.
Obscuri Viri, the, 9.
Observateur Littéraire, 527.
Odyssey, the, 58, 267, 532.
Oedipus, the, 263.
Of Studies (Bacon’s), 192.
Ogier, François (fl. c. 1630), 254-256, 259, 346, 347, 409.
Oldys, 457.
Olmucensis, Augustinus Moravus (Käsenbrot, c. 1500), 17 note, 27, 28,
218, 352 note.
Opera, Saint-Evremond on, 271.
Opitz, Martin (1597-1639), 17, 360-363, 556.
Orbecche, 58, 60.
Origenes de la Lengua Española, 333 note.
Origines de la Poésie Française, 101.
Orlando Furioso, 85, and see Ariosto.
Ossian, 464 sq., 532.
Othello, Rymer on, 395.
Ovid, 384.
Panigarola, Francesco (1548-94), 329.
Paradise Lost, 325, 443 sq.
Paradossi, 29.
Page 607
Paragone della Poesia Tragica, 554.
Parallel of Poetry and Painting, 385.
Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes, 321 note.
Parfai(c)t, François (1698-1733) and Claude (1701-77), 527.
Paris, M. Gaston, 110 note.
Parnassus, The English, 426 note.
Parrhasiana, 276, 277.
Partenio, B. (fl. c. 1560), 102, 103.
Pascal, Blaise (1623-62), 279 note.
Pasquier, Etienne (1529-1615), 135-138, 224 note, 232.
Pastor Fido, the, 107, 108.
Patin, Gui (1602-72), 272, 273, 316 note.
Patrizzi, Francesco (1529-97) [not to be confused with the Siennese Bp. of
Gaeta, in the generation before, who wrote on politics, &c.], anti-
Peripatetic philosopher and critic (half-title of Bk. IV.), 57, 61, 63, 90, 93,
94-102, 107, 215, 219, 230, 233, 320 note, 329, 413.
Patru, Olivier (1604-81), 277, 291.
Pazzi, Alessandro de (fl. c. 1530), 41.
Peacham, Henry (1576?-1643?), 187.
Pecock, Reginald (1395-1460), 151.
Pellegrino, C., 100.
Pel(l)etier, Jacques (1517-82), Pléiade poet and critic, 117-119.
Pel(l)etier, Jacques (fl. c. 1660), 17th cent. poet, 291.
Pellissier, M. Georges, 110 note, 129 sq.
Pellisson, Paul (1624-93), 273.
Peña, Don P. M., 339 sq.
Pensieri Diversi, Tassoni’s, 326 sq.
Parallel of Poetry and Painting, 385.
Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes, 321 note.
Parfai(c)t, François (1698-1733) and Claude (1701-77), 527.
Paris, M. Gaston, 110 note.
Parnassus, The English, 426 note.
Parrhasiana, 276, 277.
Partenio, B. (fl. c. 1560), 102, 103.
Pascal, Blaise (1623-62), 279 note.
Pasquier, Etienne (1529-1615), 135-138, 224 note, 232.
Pastor Fido, the, 107, 108.
Patin, Gui (1602-72), 272, 273, 316 note.
Patrizzi, Francesco (1529-97) [not to be confused with the Siennese Bp. of
Gaeta, in the generation before, who wrote on politics, &c.], anti-
Peripatetic philosopher and critic (half-title of Bk. IV.), 57, 61, 63, 90, 93,
94-102, 107, 215, 219, 230, 233, 320 note, 329, 413.
Patru, Olivier (1604-81), 277, 291.
Pazzi, Alessandro de (fl. c. 1530), 41.
Peacham, Henry (1576?-1643?), 187.
Pecock, Reginald (1395-1460), 151.
Pellegrino, C., 100.
Pel(l)etier, Jacques (1517-82), Pléiade poet and critic, 117-119.
Pel(l)etier, Jacques (fl. c. 1660), 17th cent. poet, 291.
Pellissier, M. Georges, 110 note, 129 sq.
Pellisson, Paul (1624-93), 273.
Peña, Don P. M., 339 sq.
Pensieri Diversi, Tassoni’s, 326 sq.
Page 608
Pepys, 377 note, 522.
Perceforest, 160.
Percy, 479.
Peri Bathous, 452.
Perrault, Charles (1628-1703), 285, 293, 321, 418, 419.
—— Claude (1613-88), 285.
—— Pierre (1608-80), 285.
“Person of Quality,” the (who rewrote Spenser), 416 note, 561.
Petit de Julleville, M., 110 note.
Petrarch, 44 and note, 82, 199.
Petronius, 27, 201 note, 254 note, 284.
Phalaris, the Pseudo-, 24 note, 401, 402.
Phillips, Edward (1630-96), 398, 399.
Philological Enquiries, 473 sq.
Philosophia Rationalis, 330.
Philosophical Arrangements, 473.
Philosophy of Rhetoric, 470-473.
Piccolomini, Æneas Sylvius, see that name.
—— Alessandro (1508-78), 103, 104.
Pico della Mirandola (1463-94), 22, 23.
Pigna, Giovanbattista (fl. c. 1550), 58 sq., 62, 63, 81, 84, 155, 214.
Pinciano, Alfonso López, called El. P. (150-?-160-?), 338-340.
Pitt, Christopher (1699-1748), 29 sq.
Plato, 6, 9, 38, 71, 82, 154, 213, 220, 514.
Pléiade, the, 110 sq. and Bk. IV., ch. iv., passim.
Plotinus, 9.
Perceforest, 160.
Percy, 479.
Peri Bathous, 452.
Perrault, Charles (1628-1703), 285, 293, 321, 418, 419.
—— Claude (1613-88), 285.
—— Pierre (1608-80), 285.
“Person of Quality,” the (who rewrote Spenser), 416 note, 561.
Petit de Julleville, M., 110 note.
Petrarch, 44 and note, 82, 199.
Petronius, 27, 201 note, 254 note, 284.
Phalaris, the Pseudo-, 24 note, 401, 402.
Phillips, Edward (1630-96), 398, 399.
Philological Enquiries, 473 sq.
Philosophia Rationalis, 330.
Philosophical Arrangements, 473.
Philosophy of Rhetoric, 470-473.
Piccolomini, Æneas Sylvius, see that name.
—— Alessandro (1508-78), 103, 104.
Pico della Mirandola (1463-94), 22, 23.
Pigna, Giovanbattista (fl. c. 1550), 58 sq., 62, 63, 81, 84, 155, 214.
Pinciano, Alfonso López, called El. P. (150-?-160-?), 338-340.
Pitt, Christopher (1699-1748), 29 sq.
Plato, 6, 9, 38, 71, 82, 154, 213, 220, 514.
Pléiade, the, 110 sq. and Bk. IV., ch. iv., passim.
Plotinus, 9.
Page 609
Plutarch, 22, 71, 99, 154.
Poemata Selecta Italorum, 29 note, 45 note.
Poetaster, the, 198.
Poetics (Poetica, Poética, Poétique), of Aristotle, 6 and passim.
—— of Daniello, 42-44.
—— of Denores, 105, 106.
—— of Luzán, 548.
—— of Scaliger, 69-80.
—— of Sibilet, 111, 112.
—— of Trissino, 38-41.
—— of Vida, 29-37.
—— of Viperano, 103.
Poetry and Logic, 20 note.
Poggio Bracciolino (1380-1459), 6 note.
Politian (Angelo Ambrogini, surnamed Poliziano) (1557-94), 15, 23-26, 66,
402, 455.
Polyeucte, 379.
Pomfret, John, 488, 495.
Pompée, 379.
Pontanus, J. (Spanmüller) (1542-1626), 353-356.
—— J. J., 66.
Poole, Joshua (fl. c. 1650), 426 note.
Pope, Alexander (1688-1744), 29 note, 45 note, 247, 413, 415, 421, 429,
432 sq., 438 note, 452-461, 490 sq., 561.
Possevino, Antonio (1534-1611), 325, 326.
Prælections Academicæ, Garbett’s, 298 note, 372 note.
—— Keble’s, 312 note, 372 note.
Poemata Selecta Italorum, 29 note, 45 note.
Poetaster, the, 198.
Poetics (Poetica, Poética, Poétique), of Aristotle, 6 and passim.
—— of Daniello, 42-44.
—— of Denores, 105, 106.
—— of Luzán, 548.
—— of Scaliger, 69-80.
—— of Sibilet, 111, 112.
—— of Trissino, 38-41.
—— of Vida, 29-37.
—— of Viperano, 103.
Poetry and Logic, 20 note.
Poggio Bracciolino (1380-1459), 6 note.
Politian (Angelo Ambrogini, surnamed Poliziano) (1557-94), 15, 23-26, 66,
402, 455.
Polyeucte, 379.
Pomfret, John, 488, 495.
Pompée, 379.
Pontanus, J. (Spanmüller) (1542-1626), 353-356.
—— J. J., 66.
Poole, Joshua (fl. c. 1650), 426 note.
Pope, Alexander (1688-1744), 29 note, 45 note, 247, 413, 415, 421, 429,
432 sq., 438 note, 452-461, 490 sq., 561.
Possevino, Antonio (1534-1611), 325, 326.
Prælections Academicæ, Garbett’s, 298 note, 372 note.
—— Keble’s, 312 note, 372 note.
Page 610
—— Trapp’s, 462.
Pratique du Théâtre, 309, 310.
Principes de la Littérature, 522 sq.
Prior, 306, 415, 428, 429.
Promos and Cassandra, Preface to, 186 note.
Proposal for Correcting the English Tongue, 452.
Pucelle, La (Chapelain’s), 257.
Puritan objection to Literature, the, 7, 10.
Puschmann, Adam (1532-1600), 360 note.
Puttenham, George (fl. c. 1580), 104, 182-186.
Quadrio, Francisco Xavier (1695-1756), 324, 542-545.
Quatre Poétiques, Les, 522.
Quevedo [y] Villegas, Francisco Gómez de (1580-1645), 339 note, 349.
Quintil Horatien, Le, 116 sq.
Quintilian, 6, 130, 151 note, 198 sq., 455, 471 and passim.
Rabelais, François (1495-1553), 135, 141 note, 150, 304, 455, 516.
Racan, H. de Bueil, Marquis de (1589-1670), 242 sq.
Racine, Jean, 54, 290 sq., 298, 504 sq., 511, 522.
Racine, Louis (1692-1763), 511.
Ragguagli di Parnasso, 329-331.
Ralph, James (1605?-62), 430 note, 554 note.
Rambler, The, 480 sq.
Rambouillet, the Hôtel, 240.
Ramsay, Allan, 457.
—— Andrew Michael, (Chevalier) (1686-1743), 305, 544 note.
Pratique du Théâtre, 309, 310.
Principes de la Littérature, 522 sq.
Prior, 306, 415, 428, 429.
Promos and Cassandra, Preface to, 186 note.
Proposal for Correcting the English Tongue, 452.
Pucelle, La (Chapelain’s), 257.
Puritan objection to Literature, the, 7, 10.
Puschmann, Adam (1532-1600), 360 note.
Puttenham, George (fl. c. 1580), 104, 182-186.
Quadrio, Francisco Xavier (1695-1756), 324, 542-545.
Quatre Poétiques, Les, 522.
Quevedo [y] Villegas, Francisco Gómez de (1580-1645), 339 note, 349.
Quintil Horatien, Le, 116 sq.
Quintilian, 6, 130, 151 note, 198 sq., 455, 471 and passim.
Rabelais, François (1495-1553), 135, 141 note, 150, 304, 455, 516.
Racan, H. de Bueil, Marquis de (1589-1670), 242 sq.
Racine, Jean, 54, 290 sq., 298, 504 sq., 511, 522.
Racine, Louis (1692-1763), 511.
Ragguagli di Parnasso, 329-331.
Ralph, James (1605?-62), 430 note, 554 note.
Rambler, The, 480 sq.
Rambouillet, the Hôtel, 240.
Ramsay, Allan, 457.
—— Andrew Michael, (Chevalier) (1686-1743), 305, 544 note.
Page 611
Rapin de Thoyras, P. (1661-1725), 247 note.
—— Nicolas (1535-1608), 247.
—— René (1621-87), 247 note, 310-314, 321 note.
—— Rymer’s Preface to, 310 note, 392 sq.
Rappolt, 554.
Rasselas, 480 sq.
Recherches de la France, 135 sq.
Réflexions Critiques sur la Poésie et sur la Peinture, 510-513.
—— Critiques sur quelques Poètes, 521.
—— Rapin’s, 310 sq.
—— sur la Critique, 508.
—— sur la Poésie, 510, 511.
—— sur la Poétique, 310.
—— sur Longin, 292 sq.
Regnier, Mathurin (1573-1613), 242-251, 284.
Regulus, Sebastian, 554.
Rehearsal, The, 415 note.
Relapse, The, Collier on, 463.
Religio Medici, G. Patin on, 272.
Remarks on Italy, 439.
—— on the Rape of the Lock, 435.
Rémond de Saint-Mard, see Saint-Mard.
Renaissance, the term, 4 note.
Rengifo, Juan Diaz or Diego Garcia [they were brothers: the book appeared
under the name of the first, and is now attributed to the second], 337,
338.
Return from Parnassus, 97 note.
—— Nicolas (1535-1608), 247.
—— René (1621-87), 247 note, 310-314, 321 note.
—— Rymer’s Preface to, 310 note, 392 sq.
Rappolt, 554.
Rasselas, 480 sq.
Recherches de la France, 135 sq.
Réflexions Critiques sur la Poésie et sur la Peinture, 510-513.
—— Critiques sur quelques Poètes, 521.
—— Rapin’s, 310 sq.
—— sur la Critique, 508.
—— sur la Poésie, 510, 511.
—— sur la Poétique, 310.
—— sur Longin, 292 sq.
Regnier, Mathurin (1573-1613), 242-251, 284.
Regulus, Sebastian, 554.
Rehearsal, The, 415 note.
Relapse, The, Collier on, 463.
Religio Medici, G. Patin on, 272.
Remarks on Italy, 439.
—— on the Rape of the Lock, 435.
Rémond de Saint-Mard, see Saint-Mard.
Renaissance, the term, 4 note.
Rengifo, Juan Diaz or Diego Garcia [they were brothers: the book appeared
under the name of the first, and is now attributed to the second], 337,
338.
Return from Parnassus, 97 note.
Page 612
Reulis and Cautelis, K. James’s, 176 sq.
Riccio, Bartolommeo, 81.
—— Pietro, see Crinitus.
Riccoboni, Antonio (1541-99), 50 note.
Rigault, M. H., 240 note, 388 note, 502.
Rime Diverse, 46.
Rinaldini, Carlo (fl. c. 1680), 330.
Rival Ladies, Preface to, 374.
Rivarol, Antoine, Comte (?) de (1753-1801), 534, 535.
Robortello, Francesco (1516-67), 41, 42, 49 note, 50, 345.
Rodogune, 263.
Rollin, Charles (1661-1741), 509.
Rollo (B. and F.’s), Rymer on, 394.
Roman de la Rose, 160 note.
Roman Bourgeois, 553 note.
Romanzi, the critical dispute on, 55 sq.
Romeo and Juliet,
Ronsard, Pierre de (1524-85), 63, 119-126, 137, 162 note, 222, 223, 233,
244 note, 257 note, 258, 264, 304, 307, 313, 362.
Roscommon, W. Dillon, Earl of (1633-85), 404, 439.
Rousseau, J. B., 522.
—— J. J., 518.
Rücktaschel, Herr, 110 note, 127.
Ruskin, Mr, 496.
Rusticus, 24 sq.
Rymer, Thomas (1646-1713), 357, 391-397, 405, 432 sq., 571.
Riccio, Bartolommeo, 81.
—— Pietro, see Crinitus.
Riccoboni, Antonio (1541-99), 50 note.
Rigault, M. H., 240 note, 388 note, 502.
Rime Diverse, 46.
Rinaldini, Carlo (fl. c. 1680), 330.
Rival Ladies, Preface to, 374.
Rivarol, Antoine, Comte (?) de (1753-1801), 534, 535.
Robortello, Francesco (1516-67), 41, 42, 49 note, 50, 345.
Rodogune, 263.
Rollin, Charles (1661-1741), 509.
Rollo (B. and F.’s), Rymer on, 394.
Roman de la Rose, 160 note.
Roman Bourgeois, 553 note.
Romanzi, the critical dispute on, 55 sq.
Romeo and Juliet,
Ronsard, Pierre de (1524-85), 63, 119-126, 137, 162 note, 222, 223, 233,
244 note, 257 note, 258, 264, 304, 307, 313, 362.
Roscommon, W. Dillon, Earl of (1633-85), 404, 439.
Rousseau, J. B., 522.
—— J. J., 518.
Rücktaschel, Herr, 110 note, 127.
Ruskin, Mr, 496.
Rusticus, 24 sq.
Rymer, Thomas (1646-1713), 357, 391-397, 405, 432 sq., 571.
Page 613
Sadolet, 455.
Saint-Amant, M. A. de (1594-1661), 257, 297.
Saint-Evremond, Ch. de M. de Saint-Denis, Seigneur de (1610-1703), 241,
268-272, 502.
Saint-Louis, 505.
Saint-Mard, Rémond de (sometimes incorrectly called Raymond de Saint-
Marc) (1682-1757), 510, 511.
Sainte-Beuve, 219, 257, 277 note, 278 note, 280, 320.
Sainte-Palaye, 569.
Salisbury, John of, 8.
Sallust, Cheke on, 152.
Salviati, Leonardo (1540-89), 41 note, 81 note, 91, 92, 103 note, 328.
Sanchez, Alfonso, 346.
—— Francisco, “El Brocense” (1523-1601), 336.
—— T. Antonio (1732-98), 550, 569.
Sannazaro, Jacopo (1458-1530), 51, 173, 174.
Santillana, Iñigo López de Mendoza, Marquis of (1398-1458), 333, 334.
Sarrasin, J. (1605-54), 260, 265 sq.
Savonarola, Girolamo (1452-98), 20-23, 173, 213.
Scaliger, Joseph Justus (1540-1609), 276.
—— Julius Cæsar (1484-1558), 8, 12, 17, 42, 57, 69-80, 96 note, 215, 219,
233, 241 note, 267, 355, 375, 405.
Scaligerana, 276.
Schélandre, Jean de (1585-1635), 255.
Schelling, Prof., 144 note, 200 note and sq.
Schoolmaster, The, 152 sq.
School of Abuse, the, 169-171.
Saint-Amant, M. A. de (1594-1661), 257, 297.
Saint-Evremond, Ch. de M. de Saint-Denis, Seigneur de (1610-1703), 241,
268-272, 502.
Saint-Louis, 505.
Saint-Mard, Rémond de (sometimes incorrectly called Raymond de Saint-
Marc) (1682-1757), 510, 511.
Sainte-Beuve, 219, 257, 277 note, 278 note, 280, 320.
Sainte-Palaye, 569.
Salisbury, John of, 8.
Sallust, Cheke on, 152.
Salviati, Leonardo (1540-89), 41 note, 81 note, 91, 92, 103 note, 328.
Sanchez, Alfonso, 346.
—— Francisco, “El Brocense” (1523-1601), 336.
—— T. Antonio (1732-98), 550, 569.
Sannazaro, Jacopo (1458-1530), 51, 173, 174.
Santillana, Iñigo López de Mendoza, Marquis of (1398-1458), 333, 334.
Sarrasin, J. (1605-54), 260, 265 sq.
Savonarola, Girolamo (1452-98), 20-23, 173, 213.
Scaliger, Joseph Justus (1540-1609), 276.
—— Julius Cæsar (1484-1558), 8, 12, 17, 42, 57, 69-80, 96 note, 215, 219,
233, 241 note, 267, 355, 375, 405.
Scaligerana, 276.
Schélandre, Jean de (1585-1635), 255.
Schelling, Prof., 144 note, 200 note and sq.
Schoolmaster, The, 152 sq.
School of Abuse, the, 169-171.
Page 614
Schosser, 353 note.
Science et Asnerye, 13.
Scott, John, of Amwell (1739-83), 499, 500.
—— Professor, 519 note.
—— Sir Walter, 88, 502.
Scudéry, Georges de (1601-67), 256, 258, 265 sq.
Seconde Rhétorique, 110.
Secundus, see Johannes.
Sedley, Sir C., 376 sq.
Seebohm, Mr, 15, 22.
Segni, 42.
Selecta Poemata Italorum, 29 note, 45 note, 454 note.
Seneca (L. Annæus?), the tragedian, 60, 61, 342, 433.
Sentiments du Curé Meslier, 515 note.
Servois, M., 303.
Sévigné, Marie de Rabutin-Chantal, Marquise de (1626-96), 241, 273, 274.
Shadwell, 271.
Shaftesbury, 22 note, 514.
Shakespeare, 177, 199 sq., 206 sq., 228 note, 262, 375, 378 sq., 393 sq.,
399, 409 note, 434 sq., 454, 464, 480 sq., 485 sq., 516, 532, 560.
—— Johnson’s Preface to, 480 sq..
—— Pope’s Preface to, 453, 454.
Shelley, 87, 426.
Shenstone, 478.
Shepherd’s Kalendar, 173.
Sheringham, Robert (1602-78), 392 note.
Science et Asnerye, 13.
Scott, John, of Amwell (1739-83), 499, 500.
—— Professor, 519 note.
—— Sir Walter, 88, 502.
Scudéry, Georges de (1601-67), 256, 258, 265 sq.
Seconde Rhétorique, 110.
Secundus, see Johannes.
Sedley, Sir C., 376 sq.
Seebohm, Mr, 15, 22.
Segni, 42.
Selecta Poemata Italorum, 29 note, 45 note, 454 note.
Seneca (L. Annæus?), the tragedian, 60, 61, 342, 433.
Sentiments du Curé Meslier, 515 note.
Servois, M., 303.
Sévigné, Marie de Rabutin-Chantal, Marquise de (1626-96), 241, 273, 274.
Shadwell, 271.
Shaftesbury, 22 note, 514.
Shakespeare, 177, 199 sq., 206 sq., 228 note, 262, 375, 378 sq., 393 sq.,
399, 409 note, 434 sq., 454, 464, 480 sq., 485 sq., 516, 532, 560.
—— Johnson’s Preface to, 480 sq..
—— Pope’s Preface to, 453, 454.
Shelley, 87, 426.
Shenstone, 478.
Shepherd’s Kalendar, 173.
Sheringham, Robert (1602-78), 392 note.
Page 615
Short View of the Profaneness and Immorality of the English Stage, A, 402-
404.
Short View of Tragedy, A, 392 sq.
Sibilet, Thomas (1512-89), 111, 112.
Sidney, Sir Philip (1554-86), 7, 43, 45, 171-176, 199, 226 sq., 262, 348,
375, 409.
Siècle de Louis Quatorze, 516.
Silent Woman, The, 380.
Silius Italicus, 59.
Simylus, 203 note.
Smart, Christopher, 562.
Smith, Adam, 462.
—— Mr Gregory, 27, 144 note, 426 note, 442 note, 510 note.
—— Mr Nichol, 281 note.
Sofonisba, 38.
Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg, 327.
Somnium Scipionis, 22 note.
Spanmüller, see Pontanus, J.
Spence, Joseph (1698-1768), 332, 415, 438 note, 454, 455.
Spenser, Edmund (1552-99), 165-169, 201 sq., 264, 369, 393, 399, 416,
438-448, 482 sq.
Spenser Redivivus, 416, 561.
Speroni, Speron(e), (1500-88), 55 note.
Spingarn, Mr Joel Elias, 3 note, and Bk. IV. passim.
Sprat, Thomas, Bishop of Rochester (1635-1713), 398, 405, 456.
Stanyhurst, 167 note.
Statius, 58, 59.
404.
Short View of Tragedy, A, 392 sq.
Sibilet, Thomas (1512-89), 111, 112.
Sidney, Sir Philip (1554-86), 7, 43, 45, 171-176, 199, 226 sq., 262, 348,
375, 409.
Siècle de Louis Quatorze, 516.
Silent Woman, The, 380.
Silius Italicus, 59.
Simylus, 203 note.
Smart, Christopher, 562.
Smith, Adam, 462.
—— Mr Gregory, 27, 144 note, 426 note, 442 note, 510 note.
—— Mr Nichol, 281 note.
Sofonisba, 38.
Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg, 327.
Somnium Scipionis, 22 note.
Spanmüller, see Pontanus, J.
Spence, Joseph (1698-1768), 332, 415, 438 note, 454, 455.
Spenser, Edmund (1552-99), 165-169, 201 sq., 264, 369, 393, 399, 416,
438-448, 482 sq.
Spenser Redivivus, 416, 561.
Speroni, Speron(e), (1500-88), 55 note.
Spingarn, Mr Joel Elias, 3 note, and Bk. IV. passim.
Sprat, Thomas, Bishop of Rochester (1635-1713), 398, 405, 456.
Stanyhurst, 167 note.
Statius, 58, 59.
Page 616
Steele, Sir Richard (1672-1729), 448.
Sterne, 205, 517.
Strabo, 22 and note, 361.
Sturm, Johann (1507-89), 153 sq. notes, 319, 353, 356.
Suard, Jean Baptiste Antoine (1733-1817), 529.
Suckling, 463.
Summo, Faustino (fl. c. 1600), 108, 218, 219.
Sur la Lecture des Vieux Romans, 258, 260.
Sur les Héros de Roman, 292.
Surrey, Earl of (1517?-47), 159 sq.
Swift, Jonathan (1667-1745), 320, 449-452, 517.
Swinburne, Mr, 426 note.
Sylvæ (Politian’s), 23-26.
Symonds, Mr J. A., 25 note.
Syphilis, 44 note, 99.
Tale of a Tub, A, 451.
Tallemant des Réaux Gédéon (1619-92), 242 note, 273.
Tamburlaine, 97 note.
Tanneguy le Fèvre, 321 note, 405.
Tasso, Bernardo (1493-1569), 47, 90.
—— Torquato (1544-95), 47, 56, 89-94, 100, 219, 220, 233, 264, 278 note,
324, 369, 393, 516.
Tassoni, Alessandro (1565-1635), 326-328, 417, 418.
Taste of the Town, the, 554.
Tatler, the, 439 sq., 450.
Taylor (the Water-Poet), 201 note.
Sterne, 205, 517.
Strabo, 22 and note, 361.
Sturm, Johann (1507-89), 153 sq. notes, 319, 353, 356.
Suard, Jean Baptiste Antoine (1733-1817), 529.
Suckling, 463.
Summo, Faustino (fl. c. 1600), 108, 218, 219.
Sur la Lecture des Vieux Romans, 258, 260.
Sur les Héros de Roman, 292.
Surrey, Earl of (1517?-47), 159 sq.
Swift, Jonathan (1667-1745), 320, 449-452, 517.
Swinburne, Mr, 426 note.
Sylvæ (Politian’s), 23-26.
Symonds, Mr J. A., 25 note.
Syphilis, 44 note, 99.
Tale of a Tub, A, 451.
Tallemant des Réaux Gédéon (1619-92), 242 note, 273.
Tamburlaine, 97 note.
Tanneguy le Fèvre, 321 note, 405.
Tasso, Bernardo (1493-1569), 47, 90.
—— Torquato (1544-95), 47, 56, 89-94, 100, 219, 220, 233, 264, 278 note,
324, 369, 393, 516.
Tassoni, Alessandro (1565-1635), 326-328, 417, 418.
Taste of the Town, the, 554.
Tatler, the, 439 sq., 450.
Taylor (the Water-Poet), 201 note.
Page 617
Temora, 464.
Temple, Sir William (1628-99), 401, 438 note, 450.
Tennyson, 34, 262 note, 485.
Terence, 303.
Tertullian, 17, 279.
Texte, M., 528 note.
Thackeray, 77.
Théâtre des Grecs, 509.
Theatrum Poetarum, 398, 399.
Theobald, 198 note.
Théophile (de Viau), 291, 297, 303.
Thomas, Antoine Léonard (1732-85), 529.
—— Mr P. G., 18 note.
Thomson, 478.
Ticknor, 332 note, 335 note.
Tiraboschi, Jeronimo (1731-70), 545.
Tirso de Molina (Gabriel Tellez) (1585-1648), 332, 342, 343.
Tolomei, 46.
Tomitano, 47.
Topica Poetica, 104.
Tory, Geoffroy (1480-1533), 110, 135, 150.
Toxophilus, 153 sq.
Tragedies of the Last Age, the, 392 sq.
Traill, Mr, 504.
Traité de la Construction Oratoire, 522-524.
—— des Etudes, 509.
Temple, Sir William (1628-99), 401, 438 note, 450.
Tennyson, 34, 262 note, 485.
Terence, 303.
Tertullian, 17, 279.
Texte, M., 528 note.
Thackeray, 77.
Théâtre des Grecs, 509.
Theatrum Poetarum, 398, 399.
Theobald, 198 note.
Théophile (de Viau), 291, 297, 303.
Thomas, Antoine Léonard (1732-85), 529.
—— Mr P. G., 18 note.
Thomson, 478.
Ticknor, 332 note, 335 note.
Tiraboschi, Jeronimo (1731-70), 545.
Tirso de Molina (Gabriel Tellez) (1585-1648), 332, 342, 343.
Tolomei, 46.
Tomitano, 47.
Topica Poetica, 104.
Tory, Geoffroy (1480-1533), 110, 135, 150.
Toxophilus, 153 sq.
Tragedies of the Last Age, the, 392 sq.
Traill, Mr, 504.
Traité de la Construction Oratoire, 522-524.
—— des Etudes, 509.
Page 618
—— du Poème Epique, 308-310.
Trapp, Joseph (1679-1747), 462.
Trimerone, 100.
Trissino, Gian-Giorgio (1478-1550), 38-41, 64.
Tritical Essay, A, 451.
Turia, Ricardo de[l] = Luis Ferrer de Cardona or Pedro Juan de Rejaule? see
Morel-Fatio, op. cit. (fl. c. 1616), 346, 347.
Tyr et Sidon, 255.
Tyrius, Maximus, 22, 43.
Underhill, Mr, 406 note, 454 note.
Unities, the Three, Books IV. and V. passim. See especially Scaliger,
Castelvetro, Corneille, Ogier, Dryden, Johnson.
“Unity of Interest,” 508.
Usefulness of the Stage, the, 433.
“Vadius,” 273.
Valdeflores, the Marquis of, 549.
Valdés, Juan de (1500-44), 335.
Valesiana (written by Valois, Charles de (1671-1747), on his father Adrien),
275.
Vanbrugh, 403.
Varchi, Benedetto (1502-65), 49.
Varro, 70.
Vaugelas, C. F. de (1585-1650), 240 sq., 257.
Vaughan, Sir W. (1577-1648), 187.
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye, Jean (1535-1607), 128-134, 196, 220, 222, 223,
246, 278 note.
Vauvenargues, Luc de Clapiers, Marquis de (1715-47), 521, 522.
Trapp, Joseph (1679-1747), 462.
Trimerone, 100.
Trissino, Gian-Giorgio (1478-1550), 38-41, 64.
Tritical Essay, A, 451.
Turia, Ricardo de[l] = Luis Ferrer de Cardona or Pedro Juan de Rejaule? see
Morel-Fatio, op. cit. (fl. c. 1616), 346, 347.
Tyr et Sidon, 255.
Tyrius, Maximus, 22, 43.
Underhill, Mr, 406 note, 454 note.
Unities, the Three, Books IV. and V. passim. See especially Scaliger,
Castelvetro, Corneille, Ogier, Dryden, Johnson.
“Unity of Interest,” 508.
Usefulness of the Stage, the, 433.
“Vadius,” 273.
Valdeflores, the Marquis of, 549.
Valdés, Juan de (1500-44), 335.
Valesiana (written by Valois, Charles de (1671-1747), on his father Adrien),
275.
Vanbrugh, 403.
Varchi, Benedetto (1502-65), 49.
Varro, 70.
Vaugelas, C. F. de (1585-1650), 240 sq., 257.
Vaughan, Sir W. (1577-1648), 187.
Vauquelin de la Fresnaye, Jean (1535-1607), 128-134, 196, 220, 222, 223,
246, 278 note.
Vauvenargues, Luc de Clapiers, Marquis de (1715-47), 521, 522.
Page 619
Vavasseur, François, 254 note.
Vegius, M., 66.
Venice Preserved,
Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst, 552 sq.
Vettori, Pietro = Petrus Victorius (fl. c. 1560), 41 sq.
Viaje del Parnaso, 347.
Vida, Marco Girolamo, Bishop of Alba (1480-1546), 26, 29-37, 66, 68, 70,
129 and note, 203, 213, 455 sq.
Vie de Corneille, Fontenelle’s, 505.
Vigneul-Marville, 275.
Villena, Enrique de (1384-1434), 333.
Villon, François (fl. c. 1460), 110 note, 281.
Viperano (fl. c. 1580), 103, 128, 341.
Virgil, 24-26, 30-35, 47, 52 sq., 74-78, 86, 122-126, 131, 139, 140, 310 sq.,
415, 482.
—— Dryden’s Preface to, 385.
Visé or Vizé, Jean Donneau de (1640-1710), 316 note.
Vittorino da Feltre, 18.
Vives, Juan Luis (1492-1540), 336, 356.
Vogelweide, Walther von der, 361.
Voiture, Vincent (1598-1648), 246.
Voltaire, François Arouet de (1694-1778), 287 note, 317, 513-518, 556.
Voss, Gerard J. (1577-1649), 267, 356-360.
Wallace, Mr A. R., 532 note.
Waller, 271, 322, 375 sq., 439, 449.
Walpole, Horace, 479.
Vegius, M., 66.
Venice Preserved,
Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst, 552 sq.
Vettori, Pietro = Petrus Victorius (fl. c. 1560), 41 sq.
Viaje del Parnaso, 347.
Vida, Marco Girolamo, Bishop of Alba (1480-1546), 26, 29-37, 66, 68, 70,
129 and note, 203, 213, 455 sq.
Vie de Corneille, Fontenelle’s, 505.
Vigneul-Marville, 275.
Villena, Enrique de (1384-1434), 333.
Villon, François (fl. c. 1460), 110 note, 281.
Viperano (fl. c. 1580), 103, 128, 341.
Virgil, 24-26, 30-35, 47, 52 sq., 74-78, 86, 122-126, 131, 139, 140, 310 sq.,
415, 482.
—— Dryden’s Preface to, 385.
Visé or Vizé, Jean Donneau de (1640-1710), 316 note.
Vittorino da Feltre, 18.
Vives, Juan Luis (1492-1540), 336, 356.
Vogelweide, Walther von der, 361.
Voiture, Vincent (1598-1648), 246.
Voltaire, François Arouet de (1694-1778), 287 note, 317, 513-518, 556.
Voss, Gerard J. (1577-1649), 267, 356-360.
Wallace, Mr A. R., 532 note.
Waller, 271, 322, 375 sq., 439, 449.
Walpole, Horace, 479.
Page 620
Warton, Joseph, 321 note
—— Thomas, 179 note, 479.
Watson, James (King’s printer in Scotland, 1711-22), 457.
—— John (correspondent of Erasmus and Master of Christ’s), 14.
—— Thomas, Bishop of Lincoln, 161.
Webbe, William (fl. c. 1580), 178-182.
Webster, John, 187.
Welsted, Leonard (1688-1742), 430, 431.
Wesley, Ch., 87.
—— Samuel, 406.
West, Gilbert, 482 note.
Whately, 98, 470.
Whetstone, George (fl. c. 1580), 186 note.
Wie weit sich der Nutzen der Regeln in d. Beredsamkeit und Poesie
erstrecke, 557.
Wild, 377.
Wilson, [Sir] Thomas (?-1581), 148-151.
Winchelsea, Lady, 421, 478, 485.
Winstanley, William (1628?-90?), 399, 400.
Wither, 377, 399.
Woodward, Mr, 18 note.
Wordsworth, 72 note, 202.
Works of the Learned, the, 406 note.
Worsfold, Mr, 195 note, 437 sq.
Wotke, Herr, 63 note.
Wotton, 450.
—— Thomas, 179 note, 479.
Watson, James (King’s printer in Scotland, 1711-22), 457.
—— John (correspondent of Erasmus and Master of Christ’s), 14.
—— Thomas, Bishop of Lincoln, 161.
Webbe, William (fl. c. 1580), 178-182.
Webster, John, 187.
Welsted, Leonard (1688-1742), 430, 431.
Wesley, Ch., 87.
—— Samuel, 406.
West, Gilbert, 482 note.
Whately, 98, 470.
Whetstone, George (fl. c. 1580), 186 note.
Wie weit sich der Nutzen der Regeln in d. Beredsamkeit und Poesie
erstrecke, 557.
Wild, 377.
Wilson, [Sir] Thomas (?-1581), 148-151.
Winchelsea, Lady, 421, 478, 485.
Winstanley, William (1628?-90?), 399, 400.
Wither, 377, 399.
Woodward, Mr, 18 note.
Wordsworth, 72 note, 202.
Works of the Learned, the, 406 note.
Worsfold, Mr, 195 note, 437 sq.
Wotke, Herr, 63 note.
Wotton, 450.
Page 621
Wyatt, Sir Thomas (1503-42), 63, 159 sq.
Wycherley, 543.
Xenophon, 59.
Yalden, 495.
Zabarella (Professor of Philosophy in latter half of 16th century; not to be
confused with the scholastic Cardinal 150 years earlier), 50 note.
Zénobie, 309.
Zinano, Gabriele (fl. c. 1590), 106, 107.
Zoilus, 397.
Zürichers, the, 554 sq.
Wycherley, 543.
Xenophon, 59.
Yalden, 495.
Zabarella (Professor of Philosophy in latter half of 16th century; not to be
confused with the scholastic Cardinal 150 years earlier), 50 note.
Zénobie, 309.
Zinano, Gabriele (fl. c. 1590), 106, 107.
Zoilus, 397.
Zürichers, the, 554 sq.
Page 622
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.
Page 623
Transcriber’s Note
There was no opening half-title in the source used to prepare
this text.
The two column table of contents for each chapter is
retained. Since the contents of Chapters II & V were split by a
page break, the left column of the second page followed the
right column of the preceding page. These have been
reorganized as they would have been had they fit on a single
page.
Only the validity of index references to footnotes have been
checked. A number of them, listed below, were incorrect.
Index Notes
1: Arte Nuevo de Hacer Comedias refers to a note on p. 50,
but there is no mention there.
2: Camoens refers to a note on p. 553, but there is no mention.
3: Cotin should refer to the text on p. 287 not to a note.
4: Courthope refers incorrectly to a note on p. 444. It should
be p. 449
5: Crescimbeni references a non-existent note on p. 218.
6 De Vulgari Eloquio references a note on p 40. The nearest
mention is in the text of p. 38.
7 John Dennis references a note p. 387, but should have been
p. 278.
8 Donatus references notes on p. 48 which do not seem
pertinent.
9: Herr Hamelius, refers to a note, apparently out of order,
which should be p. 432, not p. 452.
10 Keble mentions a note on p. 312, where he is not
mentioned. The same note is referenced in the entry for
Prælections Academicæ.
11: La Casa should refer to the text on p. 540, not to a note.
12: Roman de la Rose refers a non-existent note. It is
mentioned at p. 110n, p. 281, and p. 334.
There was no opening half-title in the source used to prepare
this text.
The two column table of contents for each chapter is
retained. Since the contents of Chapters II & V were split by a
page break, the left column of the second page followed the
right column of the preceding page. These have been
reorganized as they would have been had they fit on a single
page.
Only the validity of index references to footnotes have been
checked. A number of them, listed below, were incorrect.
Index Notes
1: Arte Nuevo de Hacer Comedias refers to a note on p. 50,
but there is no mention there.
2: Camoens refers to a note on p. 553, but there is no mention.
3: Cotin should refer to the text on p. 287 not to a note.
4: Courthope refers incorrectly to a note on p. 444. It should
be p. 449
5: Crescimbeni references a non-existent note on p. 218.
6 De Vulgari Eloquio references a note on p 40. The nearest
mention is in the text of p. 38.
7 John Dennis references a note p. 387, but should have been
p. 278.
8 Donatus references notes on p. 48 which do not seem
pertinent.
9: Herr Hamelius, refers to a note, apparently out of order,
which should be p. 432, not p. 452.
10 Keble mentions a note on p. 312, where he is not
mentioned. The same note is referenced in the entry for
Prælections Academicæ.
11: La Casa should refer to the text on p. 540, not to a note.
12: Roman de la Rose refers a non-existent note. It is
mentioned at p. 110n, p. 281, and p. 334.
Page 624
13: Romeo and Juliet has no references. The sole reference
appears on p. 512.
14: Professor Scott refers to a note on p. 519. The note
appears on p. 319.
15: Syphilis should refer to the text on p. 44, not to a note
there.
16: P.G. Thomas refers to a note on p. 18. The sole reference
is to a note on p. 20.
17: Venice Preserved has no references. It is mentioned on p.
442.
Corrections
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been
corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page
and line in the original.
19.21 SHORT [“/‘]PRÉCIS’ OF THE DIALOGUES Replaced.
63.33 [“]Fuere et in Britannorum Added.
125.49 [‘/“]Su tu veux faire mourir Replaced.
168.34 [“]mea domina Immerita Added.
180.27 platform or Prosodia of versifying[”]: Added.
180.29 from their divine cogitations[”], Added.
198.34 I pray you[?] Added,
220.21 in that odd famil[i]arity Added.
228.3 the three centur[i]es Inserted.
235.1 a perpetual [“]Thou shalt not.” Restored.
291.39 for his public injustice[.] Added.
306.15 of the Acade[n/m]y Replaced.
331.34 (Ed. 2, 9 vols., Madrid, 1890-1896[)] Added.
431.9 more native and genuine population[.] Added.
516.13 Essai sur la Poésie [E/É]pique Replaced.
522.35 Les Beaux Arts r[e/é]duits à un même principe Replaced.
525.39 [E/É]léments de Littérature Replaced.
526.3 [E/É]léments de Littérature Replaced.
545.37 in any other country[.] Added.
588.16 Leandro Fernandez de M., [(]1760-1828) Added.
appears on p. 512.
14: Professor Scott refers to a note on p. 519. The note
appears on p. 319.
15: Syphilis should refer to the text on p. 44, not to a note
there.
16: P.G. Thomas refers to a note on p. 18. The sole reference
is to a note on p. 20.
17: Venice Preserved has no references. It is mentioned on p.
442.
Corrections
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been
corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page
and line in the original.
19.21 SHORT [“/‘]PRÉCIS’ OF THE DIALOGUES Replaced.
63.33 [“]Fuere et in Britannorum Added.
125.49 [‘/“]Su tu veux faire mourir Replaced.
168.34 [“]mea domina Immerita Added.
180.27 platform or Prosodia of versifying[”]: Added.
180.29 from their divine cogitations[”], Added.
198.34 I pray you[?] Added,
220.21 in that odd famil[i]arity Added.
228.3 the three centur[i]es Inserted.
235.1 a perpetual [“]Thou shalt not.” Restored.
291.39 for his public injustice[.] Added.
306.15 of the Acade[n/m]y Replaced.
331.34 (Ed. 2, 9 vols., Madrid, 1890-1896[)] Added.
431.9 more native and genuine population[.] Added.
516.13 Essai sur la Poésie [E/É]pique Replaced.
522.35 Les Beaux Arts r[e/é]duits à un même principe Replaced.
525.39 [E/É]léments de Littérature Replaced.
526.3 [E/É]léments de Littérature Replaced.
545.37 in any other country[.] Added.
588.16 Leandro Fernandez de M., [(]1760-1828) Added.
Page 625
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF
CRITICISM AND LITERARY TASTE IN EUROPE FROM THE
EARLIEST TEXTS TO THE PRESENT DAY. VOLUME 2 (OF 3), FROM
THE RENAISSANCE TO THE DECLINE OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
ORTHODOXY ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright royalties.
Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license,
apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic
works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and
trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not
be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of
the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project
Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this
eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may
use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative
works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks
may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically
ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S.
copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license,
especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
CRITICISM AND LITERARY TASTE IN EUROPE FROM THE
EARLIEST TEXTS TO THE PRESENT DAY. VOLUME 2 (OF 3), FROM
THE RENAISSANCE TO THE DECLINE OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
ORTHODOXY ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright royalties.
Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license,
apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic
works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and
trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not
be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of
the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project
Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this
eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may
use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative
works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks
may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically
ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S.
copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license,
especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
Page 626
THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or
any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
Gutenberg License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing
Project Gutenberg electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg electronic
work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to and accept
all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
all copies of Project Gutenberg electronic works in your possession. If
you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg
electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms of this
agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or entity to whom
you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people
who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg electronic
works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or
any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
Gutenberg License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing
Project Gutenberg electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg electronic
work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to and accept
all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
all copies of Project Gutenberg electronic works in your possession. If
you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg
electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms of this
agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or entity to whom
you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people
who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg electronic
works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the
Page 627
collection of Project Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the
individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the
United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in
the United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg mission of promoting free
access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg works
in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the Project
Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can easily comply with
the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format
with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when you share it
without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear prominently
whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work on which
the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase
“Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed,
viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with
individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the
United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in
the United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg mission of promoting free
access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg works
in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the Project
Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can easily comply with
the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format
with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when you share it
without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear prominently
whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work on which
the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase
“Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed,
viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with
Page 628
this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located
in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the
country where you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is derived
from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a
notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright
holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the United
States without paying any fees or charges. If you are redistributing or
providing access to a work with the phrase “Project Gutenberg”
associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply either with
the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain
permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg License for all works posted
with the permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of
this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide
access to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the
country where you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is derived
from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a
notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright
holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the United
States without paying any fees or charges. If you are redistributing or
providing access to a work with the phrase “Project Gutenberg”
associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply either with
the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain
permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg License for all works posted
with the permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of
this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide
access to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
Page 629
version posted on the official Project Gutenberg website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of
obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works provided
that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from the
use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method you
already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed to the
owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has agreed to donate
royalties under this paragraph to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid within 60 days
following each date on which you prepare (or are legally required to
prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly
marked as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information about
donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he does
not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ License. You
must require such a user to return or destroy all copies of the works
possessed in a physical medium and discontinue all use of and all
access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of
obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works provided
that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from the
use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method you
already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed to the
owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has agreed to donate
royalties under this paragraph to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid within 60 days
following each date on which you prepare (or are legally required to
prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly
marked as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information about
donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he does
not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™ License. You
must require such a user to return or destroy all copies of the works
possessed in a physical medium and discontinue all use of and all
access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™ works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
Page 630
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free distribution
of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set forth
in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of the
Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in
Section 3 below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend
considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and
proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the
Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the medium on which they may be
stored, may contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete,
inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -
Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in
paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation,
the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party
distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work under this
agreement, disclaim all liability to you for damages, costs and
expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO
REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH
OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE
FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY
DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT,
CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES
of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set forth
in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of the
Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in
Section 3 below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend
considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and
proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the
Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the medium on which they may be
stored, may contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete,
inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -
Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in
paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation,
the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party
distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work under this
agreement, disclaim all liability to you for damages, costs and
expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO
REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH
OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE
FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY
DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT,
CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES
Page 631
EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you
discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it,
you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by
sending a written explanation to the person you received the work
from. If you received the work on a physical medium, you must return
the medium with your written explanation. The person or entity that
provided you with the defective work may elect to provide a
replacement copy in lieu of a refund. If you received the work
electronically, the person or entity providing it to you may choose to
give you a second opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu
of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a
refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in
paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. If
any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the law
of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any
provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the
Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and distribution
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless from all liability,
costs and expenses, including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly
from any of the following which you do or cause to occur: (a)
DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you
discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it,
you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by
sending a written explanation to the person you received the work
from. If you received the work on a physical medium, you must return
the medium with your written explanation. The person or entity that
provided you with the defective work may elect to provide a
replacement copy in lieu of a refund. If you received the work
electronically, the person or entity providing it to you may choose to
give you a second opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu
of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a
refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in
paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. If
any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the law
of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any
provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the
Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and distribution
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless from all liability,
costs and expenses, including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly
from any of the following which you do or cause to occur: (a)
Page 632
distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg work, (b) alteration,
modification, or additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg work,
and (c) any Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project
Gutenberg
Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s goals
and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg collection will remain freely
available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure and
permanent future for Project Gutenberg and future generations. To
learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and
the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the state
of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue
Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification number is
64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S.
federal laws and your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza
#516, Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact
modification, or additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg work,
and (c) any Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project
Gutenberg
Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s goals
and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg collection will remain freely
available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure and
permanent future for Project Gutenberg and future generations. To
learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and
the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the state
of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal Revenue
Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification number is
64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S.
federal laws and your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza
#516, Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact
Page 633
links and up to date contact information can be found at the
Foundation’s website and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small
donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax
exempt status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United States.
Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a considerable
effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up with these
requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations where we have
not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular
state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Foundation’s website and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small
donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax
exempt status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United States.
Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a considerable
effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up with these
requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations where we have
not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular
state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Page 634
Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg
electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg
concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project
Gutenberg eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search facility:
www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg, including
how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg
concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
with anyone. For forty years, he produced and distributed Project
Gutenberg eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search facility:
www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg, including
how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.