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Title: The Kaiser's Memoirs

Author: German Emperor William II

Translator: T. R. Ybarra

Release date: August 22, 2013 [eBook #43522]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE KAISER'S
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The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Kaiser's Memoirs, by William II,
German Emperor, Translated by Thomas Russel Ybarra

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Archive. See http://archive.org/details/kaisersmemoirswi00will

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

WILHELM II

The
Kaiser's Memoirs

WILHELM II
Emperor of Germany 1888-1918
English Translation by
THOMAS R. YBARRA

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
1922

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Copyright, 1922
By McClure Newspaper Syndicate

Copyright, 1922

By Harper & Brothers
Printed in the U. S. A.

First Edition
K-W

CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. Bismarck 1
II. Caprivi 51
III. Hohenlohe 59
IV. Bülow 95
V. Bethmann 124
VI. My Co-workers in the Administration 171
VII. Science and Art 196
VIII. My Relations with the Church 208
IX. Army and Navy 223
X. The Outbreak of War 246
XI. The Pope and Peace 263
XII. End of the War and My Abdication 272
XIII. The Enemy Tribunal and the Neutral Tribunal 292
XIV. The Question of Guilt 303
XV. The Revolution and Germany's Future 337

FOOTNOTES
INDEX
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

CHAPTER I

Bismarck
Prince Bismarck's greatness as a statesman and his imperishable services to
Prussia and Germany are historical facts of such tremendous significance
that there is doubtless no man in existence, whatever his party affiliations,
who would dare to place them in question. For this very reason alone it is
stupid to accuse me of not having recognized the greatness of Prince
Bismarck. The opposite is the truth. I revered and idolized him. Nor could it
be otherwise. It should be borne in mind with what generation I grew up—
the generation of the devotees of Bismarck. He was the creator of the
German Empire, the paladin of my grandfather, and all of us considered
him the greatest statesman of his day and were proud that he was a German.
Bismarck was the idol in my temple, whom I worshiped.
But monarchs also are human beings of flesh and blood, hence they, too, are
exposed to the influences emanating from the conduct of others; therefore,
looking at the matter from a human point of view, one will understand how
Prince Bismarck, by his fight against me, himself destroyed, with heavy
blows, the idol of which I have spoken. But my reverence for Bismarck, the
great statesman, remained unaltered.
While I was still Prince of Prussia I often thought to myself: "I hope that the
great Chancellor will live for many years yet, since I should be safe if I
could govern with him." But my reverence for the great statesman was not
such as to make me take upon my own shoulders, when I became Emperor,
political plans or actions of the Prince which I considered mistakes. Even
the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was, to my way of thinking, a mistake,
likewise the "Kulturkampf." Moreover, the constitution of the Empire was
drawn up so as to fit in with Bismarck's extraordinary preponderance as a
statesman; the big cuirassier boots did not fit every man.
Then came the labor-protective legislation. I most deeply deplored the
dispute which grew out of this, but, at that time, it was necessary for me to

take the road to compromise, which has generally been my road both on
domestic and foreign politics. For this reason I could not wage the open
warfare against the Social Democrats which the Prince desired.
Nevertheless, this quarrel about political measures cannot lessen my
admiration for the greatness of Bismarck as a statesman; he remains the
creator of the German Empire, and surely no one man need have done more
for his country than that.
Owing to the fact that the great matter of unifying the Empire was always
before my eyes, I did not allow myself to be influenced by the agitations
which were the commonplaces of those days. In like manner, the fact that
Bismarck was called the majordomo of the Hohenzollerns could not shake
my trust in the Prince, although he, perhaps, had thoughts of a political
tradition for his family. As evidence of this, he felt unhappy, for instance,
that his son Bill felt no interest in politics and wished to pass on his power
to Herbert.

HIS GRANDFATHER'S SUCCESSOR

The tragic element for me, in the Bismarck case, lay in the fact that I
became the successor of my grandfather—in other words, that I skipped one
generation, to a certain extent. And that is a serious thing. In such a case
one is forced to deal constantly with old deserving men, who live more in
the past than in the present, and cannot grow into the future. When the
grandson succeeds his grandfather and finds a revered but old statesman of
the stature of Bismarck, it is not a piece of good luck for him, as one might
suppose, and I, in fact, supposed. Bismarck himself points that out in the
third volume of his memoirs (p. 40), when he speaks, in the chapter about
Bötticher, of the oldish caution of the Chancellor, and of the young
Emperor.
And when Ballin had the Prince cast a glance over the new harbor of
Hamburg, Bismarck himself felt that a new era had begun which he no
longer thoroughly understood. On that occasion the Prince remarked, in
astonishment, "Another world, a new world!"
This point of view also showed itself on the occasion of the visit of Admiral
von Tirpitz at Friedrichsruh, at the time when he wished to win the old
Imperial Chancellor over to favoring the first Navy bill.

As for me personally, I have the satisfaction of recalling that Bismarck
intrusted to me in 1886 the very delicate Brest mission, and said of me:
"Some day that man will be his own Chancellor." This shows that Bismarck
must have had some belief in me.
I feel no grudge against him for the third volume of his reminiscences. I
released this volume after I had sought and obtained my rights. To withhold
the volume any longer would have been pointless, since the main contents
had become known already through indiscretions; were this not true, there
might have been varying opinions as to the advisability in the choice of the
time for publication. Bismarck would turn over in his grave if he could
know at what time the third volume appeared, and what consequences it
had. I should be honestly grieved if the third volume had damaged the
memory of the great Chancellor, because Bismarck is one of the heroic
figures whom the German people need for their regeneration. My gratitude
and reverence for the great Chancellor cannot be impaired or extinguished
by the third volume nor by anything else whatever.
In the first half of the 'eighties I had been summoned to the Foreign Office
at the behest of Prince Bismarck; it was then presided over by Count
Herbert Bismarck. Upon reporting myself to the Prince he gave me a short
sketch of the personages employed at the Foreign Office, and when he
named Herr von Holstein, who was then one of the most prominent
collaborators of the Prince, it seemed to me that a slight warning against
this man ran through the Prince's words.
I got a room all to myself, and all the documents concerning the preliminary
history, origin, and conclusion of the alliance with Austria (Andrassy) were
laid before me in order that I might study them. I went often to the home of
the Prince and to that of Count Herbert.

THE MAN WITH THE HYENA'S EYES

When I had thus become more intimate in the Bismarck circle I heard more
open talk about Herr von Holstein. I heard that he was very clever, a good
worker, inordinately proud, an odd sort of man, who never showed himself
anywhere and had no social relations, full of distrust, much influenced by
whims, and, besides all this, a good hater, and, therefore, dangerous. Prince
Bismarck called him "The Man with the Hyena's Eyes," and told me that it

would be well for me to keep away from him. It was quite apparent that the
bitter attitude which the Prince showed later toward Holstein, his former
collaborator, was forming even at that time.
The Foreign Office was conducted with the strictest discipline by Count
Herbert, whose rudeness toward his employees particularly struck me. The
gentlemen there simply flew when they were summoned or dismissed by
the Count, so much so that a joking saying arose at the time that "their coat
tails stood straight out behind them." The foreign policy was conducted and
dictated by Prince Bismarck alone, after consultation with Count Herbert,
who passed on the commands of the Chancellor and had them transformed
into instructions. Hence the Foreign Office was nothing but an office of the
great Chancellor, where work was done according to his directions. Able
men, with independent ideas, were not schooled and trained there.
This was in contrast to the General Staff under Moltke. There new officers
were carefully developed and trained to independent thinking and action, in
accordance with approved principles, and by dint of preserving old
traditions and taking into account all that modern times had taught. At the
Foreign Office there were only executive instruments of a will, who were
not informed as to the important interrelationship of the questions turned
over to them for treatment, and could not, therefore, collaborate
independently. The Prince loomed up like a huge block of granite in a
meadow; were he to be dragged away, what would be found beneath would
be mostly worms and dead roots.
I won the confidence of the Prince, who consulted me about many things.
For instance, when the Prince brought about the first German colonial
acquisitions (Gross and Klein Popo, Togo, etc.), I informed him, at his wish,
concerning the state of mind created in the public and the navy by this
move, and described to him the enthusiasm with which the German people
had hailed the new road. The Prince remarked that the matter hardly
deserved this.
Later on I spoke often with the Prince about the colonial question and
always found in him the intention to utilize the colonies as commercial
objects, or objects for swapping purposes, other than to make them useful to
the fatherland or utilize them as sources of raw materials. As was my duty, I
called the Prince's attention to the fact that merchants and capitalists were

beginning energetically to develop the colonies and that, therefore—as I
had learned from Hanseatic circles—they counted upon protection from a
navy. For this reason, I pointed out that steps must be taken for getting a
fleet constructed in time, in order that German assets in foreign lands
should not be without protection; that, since the Prince had unfurled the
German flag in foreign parts, and the people stood behind it, there must also
be a navy behind it.

BISMARCK'S CONTINENTAL PREPOSSESSIONS

But the Prince turned a deaf ear to my statements and made use of his pet
motto: "If the English should land on our soil I should have them arrested."
His idea was that the colonies would be defended by us at home. The Prince
attached no importance to the fact that the very assumption that the English
could land without opposition in Germany—since Heligoland was English
—was unbearable for Germany, and that we, in order to make a landing
impossible from the start, needed a sufficiently strong navy, and, likewise,
Heligoland.
The political interest of the Prince was, in fact, concentrated essentially
upon continental Europe; England lay somewhat to one side among the
cares that burdened him daily, all the more so since Salisbury stood well
with him and had, in the name of England, hailed with satisfaction the
Double (i. e., Triple) Alliance, at the time of its formation. The Prince
worked primarily with Russia, Austria, Italy, and Rumania, whose relations
toward Germany and one another he constantly watched over. As to the
prudence and skill with which he acted, Emperor William the Great once
made a pointed remark to von Albedyll, his chief of Cabinet.
The General found His Majesty much excited after a talk with Bismarck, to
such an extent that he feared for the health of the old Emperor. He
remarked, therefore, that His Majesty should avoid similar worry in future;
that, if Bismarck was unwilling to do as His Majesty wished, His Majesty
should dismiss him. Whereupon the Emperor replied that, despite his
admiration and gratitude toward the great Chancellor, he had already
thought of dismissing him, since the self-conscious attitude of the Prince
became at times too oppressive. But both he and the country needed
Bismarck too badly. Bismarck was the one man who could juggle five balls

of which at least two were always in the air. That trick, added the Emperor,
was beyond his own powers.
Prince Bismarck did not realize that, through the acquisition of colonies for
Germany, he would be obliged to look beyond Europe and be automatically
forced to act, politically, on a large scale—with England especially.
England, to be sure, was one of the five balls in his diplomatic-statesmanly
game, but she was merely one of the five, and he did not grant her the
special importance which was her due.
For this reason it was that the Foreign Office likewise was involved entirely
in the continental interplay of politics, had not the requisite interest in
colonies, navy, or England, and possessed no experience in world politics.
The English psychology and mentality, as shown in the pursuit—constant,
though concealed by all sorts of little cloaks—of world hegemony, was to
the German Foreign Office a book sealed with seven seals.

SOURCE OF RUSSIAN ENMITY

Once Prince Bismarck remarked to me that his main object was to not let
Russia and England come to an understanding. I took the liberty of
observing that the opportunity to postpone such an understanding for a long
time lay ready to hand in 1877-78, when the Russians might have been
allowed to occupy Constantinople—had this been done, the English fleet
would have sailed in without further ado to defend Constantinople and the
Russo-English conflict would have been on. Instead, I continued, the Treaty
of San Stefano was forced upon the Russians and they were compelled to
turn about at the very gates of the city which they had reached and saw
before them, after frightful battles and hardships.
This, I went on, had created an inextinguishable hatred in the Russian army
against us (as had been reported by Prussian officers who had accompanied
the Russian army on the Turkish campaign, especially Count Pfeil);
moreover, the above-mentioned treaty had been cast aside and the Berlin
Treaty substituted for it, which had burdened us even more with the
hostility of the Russians, who looked upon us as the enemy of their "just
interests in the East." Thus the conflict between Russia and England, which
the Prince desired, had been relegated far into the future.

Prince Bismarck did not agree with this judgment of "his" Congress,
concerning the results of which he, as the "honest broker," was so proud; he
remarked earnestly that he had wished to prevent a general conflagration
and had been compelled to offer his services as a mediator. When I, later
on, told a gentleman at the Foreign Office about this conversation, he
replied that he had been present when the Prince, after signing the Berlin
Treaty, came into the Foreign Office and received the congratulations of the
officials assembled there. After he had listened to them the Prince stood up
and replied: "Now I am driving Europe four-in-hand!" In the opinion of the
said gentleman the Prince was mistaken in this, since, even at that time,
there was the threat of a Russo-French friendship in place of the Russo-
Prussian—in other words, two horses were already to be counted out of the
four-in-hand. As Russia saw it, Disraeli's statecraft had turned Bismarck's
work as "honest broker" into the negotiation of an Anglo-Austrian victory
over Russia.
Despite considerable differences in our opinions, Prince Bismarck remained
friendly and kindly disposed to me, and, despite the great difference in our
ages, a pleasant relationship grew up between us, since I, in common with
all those of my generation, was an ardent admirer of the Prince and had won
his trust by my zeal and frankness—nor have I ever betrayed that trust.
During the time of my assignment at the Foreign Office, Privy Councilor
Raschdau, among others, discoursed with me on commercial policy,
colonies, etc. In these matters, even at that early date, my attention was
called to our dependence upon England, due to the fact that we had no navy
and that Heligoland was in English hands. To be sure, there was a project to
extend our colonial possessions under the pressure of necessity, but all this
could happen only with England's permission. This was a serious matter,
and certainly an unworthy position for Germany.

INTERCOURT POLITICS

My assignment at the Foreign Office brought a very unpleasant happening
in its wake. My parents were not very friendly toward Prince Bismarck and
looked with disfavor upon the fact that their son had entered into the
Prince's circle. There was fear of my becoming influenced against my
parents, of superconservatism, of all sorts of perils, which all sorts of tale

bearers from England and "liberal circles," who rallied around my father,
imputed against me. I never bothered my head with all this nonsense, but
my position in the house of my parents was rendered much more difficult
for me and, at times, painful. Through my work under Prince Bismarck and
the confidence reposed in me—often subjected to the severest tests—I have
had to suffer much in silence for the sake of the Chancellor; he, however,
apparently took this quite as a matter of course.
I was on good terms with Count Herbert Bismarck. He could be a very gay
companion and knew how to assemble interesting men around his table,
partly from the Foreign Office, partly from other circles. However, true
friendship never ripened between us two. This was shown particularly when
the Count asked to go at the same time that his father retired. My request
that he stay by me and help me to maintain tradition in our political policy
elicited the sharp reply that he had become accustomed to report to his
father and serve him, wherefore it was out of the question to demand that he
come, with his dispatch case under his arm, to report to anybody else than
his father.
When Tsar Nicholas II, he who has been murdered, came of age, I was
assigned at the instigation of Prince Bismarck to confer upon the heir-
apparent at St. Petersburg the Order of the Black Eagle. Both the Emperor
and Prince Bismarck instructed me concerning the relationship of the two
countries and the two reigning dynasties with each other, as well as
concerning customs, personages, etc. The Emperor remarked in conclusion
that he would give his grandson the same piece of advice that was given
him, on the occasion of his first visit as a young man to Russia, by Count
Adlerberg, viz., "In general, there as well as elsewhere, people prefer praise
to criticism." Prince Bismarck closed his remarks with these words: "In the
East, all those who wear their shirts outside their trousers are decent people,
but as soon as they tuck their shirts inside their trousers and hang a medal
around their necks, they become pig-dogs."
From St. Petersburg I repeatedly reported to my grandfather and to Prince
Bismarck. Naturally, I described, to the best of my knowledge, the
impressions which I got. I noticed especially that the old Russo-Prussian
relations and sentiments had cooled to a marked extent and were no longer
such as the Emperor and Prince Bismarck in their talks with me had
assumed. After my return, both my grandfather and the Prince praised me

for my plain, clear report, which was all the pleasanter for me since I was
oppressed by the feeling that, in a number of things, I had been forced to
disillusion these high personages.

TO OFFER DARDANELLES TO RUSSIA

In 1886, at the end of August and beginning of September, after the last
meeting at Gastein of Emperor William the Great and Prince Bismarck with
Emperor Franz Josef, where I also was present at the command of my
grandfather, I was commissioned to report personally to Tsar Alexander II
concerning the decisions made there and to take up with him the questions
relating to the Mediterranean and Turkey. Prince Bismarck gave me his
instructions, sanctioned by Emperor William; they dealt most especially
with Russia's desire to reach Constantinople, to which the Prince meant to
raise no obstacles. On the contrary, I received direct instructions to offer
Russia Constantinople and the Dardanelles (in other words, San Stefano and
the Berlin Treaty had been dropped!). There was a plan to persuade Turkey
in a friendly way that an understanding with Russia was desirable for her
also.
The Tsar received me cordially at Brest-Litovsk and I was present there at
reviews of troops and fortress and defensive maneuvers, which, even then,
unquestionably bore an anti-German look.
To sum up my conversations with the Tsar, the following remark by him is
of importance: "If I wish to have Constantinople, I shall take it whenever I
feel like it, without need of permission or approval from Prince Bismarck."
After this rude refusal of the Bismarck offer of Constantinople, I looked
upon my mission as a failure and made my report to the Prince accordingly.
When the Prince decided to make his offer to the Tsar, he must have altered
his political conceptions which had led to San Stefano and the Congress of
Berlin; or else, on account of the development of the general political
situation in Europe, he considered that the moment had come for shuffling
the political cards in another way or, as my grandfather had put it, to
"juggle" differently. Only a man of the world importance and diplomatic
ability of Prince Bismarck could embark on such a course. Whether the
Prince had planned his big political game with Russia in such a way that he
might, first, by means of the Congress of Berlin, prevent a general war and

cajole England, and then, after having thus hindered Russia's Eastern
aspirations, cater to these aspirations later, by a stroke of genius, in an even
more striking manner, it is impossible for me to say—Prince Bismarck
never told anyone about his great political projects.
If the above is true, Bismarck, trusting absolutely to his statesmanlike skill,
must have reckoned upon bringing Germany all the more into Russian favor
because Russian aspirations were brought to fulfillment by Germany alone
—and that at a moment when the general European political situation was
less strained than in 1877-78. In this case, nobody except Prince Bismarck
could have played the tremendous game to a successful end. And therein
lies the weakness in the superiority of great men. Had he also informed
England of his offer to the Tsar? England must have been opposed to it, as
in 1878.
In any event, the Prince now adopted the policy which I had already noted
when I realized the disillusion of the Russians at having stood before the
gates of Constantinople without being allowed to enter.

PROPHECY OF RUSSIAN DOWNFALL

At Brest-Litovsk, in the course of the constant military preparations of all
kinds, I could easily see that the conduct of the Russian officers toward me
was essentially cooler and haughtier than on the occasion of my first visit to
St. Petersburg. Only the small group of old generals, especially those at the
Russian court, who dated from the days of Alexander II, and who knew and
esteemed Emperor William the Great, still showed their reverence for him
and their friendly feeling toward Germany. In the course of a talk with one
of them concerning the relations between the two courts, armies, and
countries, which I had found undergoing a change in comparison with
former times, the old General said: "C'est ce vilain congrès de Berlin. Une
grave faute du Chancelier. Il a détruit l'ancienne amitié entre nous, planté la
méfiance dans les cœurs de la Cour et du Gouvernement, et fourni le
sentiment d'un grave tort fait à l'armée russe après sa campagne sanglante
de 1877, pour lequel elle veut sa revanche. Et nous voilà ensemble avec
cette maudite République Française, pleins de haine contre vous et rempli
d'idées subversives, qui en cas de guerre avec vous, nous coûteront notre
dynastie."[1]

A prophetic foreshadowing of the downfall of the reigning Russian dynasty!
From Brest I went to Strassburg, where my grandfather was attending the
Imperial maneuvers. In spite of the failure of my mission I found calm
judgments of the political situation. My grandfather was pleased at the
cordial greetings from the Tsar, which, in so far as the personal relationship
of the two rulers was concerned, showed no change of heart. Also, to my
surprise, I received a letter from Prince Bismarck wherein he expressed
gratitude and appreciation to me for my actions and my report. This meant
all the more since my statements could not have been agreeable to my
grandfather and the Chancellor. The Congress of Berlin had, especially in
Russian military circles, done away with the remnants of the brotherhood in
arms still fostered among us and had engendered a hatred against
everything Prussian and German, stirred up by association with French
officers, which was increased by the French until it developed into the
desire of vengeance by means of arms. That was the soil in which, later, the
World War ambitions of our foes found nourishment. "Revanche pour
Sedan," combined with "Revanche pour San Stefano." The words of the old
General at Brest have remained unforgettably engraved upon my memory;
they induced me to bring about my many meetings with Alexander III and
Nicholas II, at which my grandfather's wish, impressed upon me on his
deathbed, that I watch over our relations with Russia, has always been my
guiding motive.

RELIEF AT CHANCELLOR'S DISMISSAL

In 1890, at the Narva maneuvers, I was obliged to describe minutely to the
Tsar the retirement of Prince Bismarck. The Tsar listened very attentively.
When I had finished, the usually very cool and reserved sovereign, who
seldom spoke about politics, spontaneously seized my hand, thanked me for
this token of my confidence, regretted that I had been brought into such a
situation and added, in exactly these words: "Je comprends parfaitement ta
ligne d'action; le Prince avec toute sa grandeur n'était après tout rien d'autre
que ton employé ou fonctionnaire. Le moment où il réfusait d'agir selon tes
ordres, il fallait le renvoyer. Moi pour ma part je me suis toujours méfié de
lui, et je ne lui ai jamais cru un mot de ce qu'il faisait savoir ou me disait
lui-même, car j'étais sûr et savais qu'il me blaguait tout le temps. Pour les

rapports entre nous deux, mon cher Guillaume [this was the first time that
the Tsar so addressed me], la chute du Prince aura les meilleures
conséquences, la méfiance disparaîtra. J'ai confiance en toi. Tu peux te fier
à moi."[2]
I immediately wrote down this important talk at the time it occurred. I am
objective enough to ask myself to what extent the courtesy of one ruler to
another and possibly, in addition, the satisfaction at the elimination of a
statesman of Bismarck's importance, can have influenced the Tsar,
consciously or unconsciously, in making the above-mentioned statement.
Prince Bismarck's belief in the Tsar's trust in him was, subjectively,
undoubtedly genuine; and, moreover, there can be no doubt as to the esteem
in which Alexander III held Bismarck's ability as a statesman.
In any event, the Tsar remained true to his word up to the day of his death.
This, to be sure, did little to change Russia's general policy, but Germany, at
least, was safe from an attack from that quarter. The straightforward
character of Alexander III guaranteed this—it became otherwise under his
weak son.
Whatever one's attitude may be toward Bismarck's Russian policy, one
thing must be acknowledged: the Prince, despite the Congress of Berlin and
the rapprochement of France to Russia, was able to avoid serious friction.
That is equivalent to saying that, reckoning from the time of the Berlin
Congress, he played a superior diplomatic and statesmanlike game for
twelve years (1878-90).

GERMANY AS PEACEMAKER

One must also lay stress upon the fact that it was a German statesman who,
in 1878, prevented a general war, even at the cost of weakening the
relations of Germany to Russia, in the justified belief that he would
succeed, being a statesman of genius who knew exactly what he was aiming
at, in strengthening these relations once more, or, at least, in avoiding
conflicts after he had overcome the crisis threatening all Europe.
He succeeded in doing that for twelve years and his successors at the helm
of the ship of state succeeded in doing likewise for twenty-four more years.

When I was a Prince I purposely held aloof from party politics,
concentrating my entire attention upon my duties in the different army
branches to which I was assigned. This afforded me satisfaction and filled
up my whole life. For this reason I avoided, while I was Prince of Prussia,
all attempts to drag me into party activities. Often enough endeavors were
made, under the cloak of harmless functions, teas and the like, to ensnare
me into political circles or for electioneering purposes. But I always held
aloof.
The outcome of the treacherous malady which killed Emperor Frederick III
was frankly told me in advance by German physicians called into
consultation as experts by the English physician, Sir Morell Mackenzie. My
deep grief and sorrow were all the greater because it was almost impossible
for me to speak alone with my beloved father. He was guarded like a
prisoner by the English physicians and, though reporters from all countries
could look upon the poor sick man from the physicians' room, every kind of
obstacle was placed in my path to keep me from my father's side and even
to prevent me from keeping in constant touch with him by writing; my
letters were often intercepted and not delivered. Moreover, from among the
group of watchers, an infamous, organized campaign of slander was
conducted in the newspapers against me. Two journalists were especially
active in this: one Herr Schnidrowitz and M. Jacques St. Cère, of the Figaro
—a German Jew—who slandered him who was later Emperor in the most
poisonous way in France, until the "Petit Sucrier" trial put an end to his
activities.
I gave the dying Emperor his last joy on earth when I had the Second
Infantry Brigade march past him, led by me in person. These were the first
and last troops seen by Frederick III as Emperor. He delighted his son by
writing on this occasion, on a little card, that he was grateful for having had
the pleasure of seeing these troops and proud to call them his own. This
event was a ray of light during the gloomy ninety-nine days, which brought
upon me also, as Crown Prince, much grief, humiliation, and suspicion. In
fulfillment of my duty during this crisis, I kept a watchful eye upon all
happenings in military, official, and social circles, and was inwardly
outraged at the signs of slackness which I noted everywhere, most
especially at the hostility against my mother, which was becoming more
and more noticeable. Moreover, I was naturally deeply hurt at the constant

campaign of slander directed against me which depicted me as living in
discord with my father.

HE BECOMES EMPEROR

After Emperor Frederick III had closed his eyes forever, the heavy burden
of governing the Empire fell upon my youthful shoulders. First of all I was
confronted with the necessity of making changes in the government
personnel in various quarters. The military entourage of the two emperors,
as well as the body of officialdom, had grown too old. The so-called
"maison militaire" (military household of Emperor William the Great) had
been retained in its entirety by Emperor Frederick III, without being
required to discharge military duties. In addition, there was the entourage of
Emperor Frederick III. I proceeded to dismiss, in the friendliest way, all
those gentlemen who wished to go into retirement; some of them received
positions in the army, a few of the younger remained in my service for the
transition period.
During the ninety-nine days, while I was still Crown Prince, I had silently
concerned myself with those personages to whom I proposed later to give
appointments, since the physicians had left me no doubt that my father had
only a short time to live. I ignored court or external considerations; nothing
but previous achievements and character moved me to my choice. I did
away with the term "maison militaire" and transformed it into "Main
Headquarters of His Majesty." In choosing my entourage I took the advice
of only one man in whom I reposed special confidence, my former chief
and brigade commander, General—afterward Adjutant General—von
Versen, a man of straightforward, knightly, rather harsh character, an officer
of the old Prussian school, a typical chip of the old block. During his
military service in line and guard regiments he had noted with an observing
eye the court influences and tendencies which had often worked to the
disadvantage of the officer corps in the old "maison militaire." In this
direction the circle of ladies of high position, jokingly known among the
officers as "trente et quarante" on account of their age, also played a certain
part. I wished to eliminate such influences.
I appointed General von Wittich my First Adjutant General and General von
Hahnke, commander of the Second Infantry Guard Division, chief of my

Military Cabinet. The latter was a friend of Emperor Frederick III and,
while I was still serving with the First Infantry Guard Regiment, he was my
brigade commander. These two were men of military experience and iron
principles, who shared absolutely the sentiments of their master, and
remained bound to me to the end of their lives by the most exemplary
fidelity.
As the head of my court I appointed a man known to me from his youth, the
former Court Marshal of my father, Count August Eulenburg, who
remained at the head of the Ministry of the Royal House until his death in
June, 1921, at the age of eighty-two years. He was a man of fine tact,
uncommon ability, clear insight in court as well as political matters, sincere
character, and golden fidelity to his King and his King's family. His
manifold abilities would have enabled him, to the same degree that they had
made him known as Court Marshal throughout Europe, to act with equal
success as ambassador or as Imperial Chancellor. Working with unswerving
zeal, endowed with winning politeness, he stood by me with helpful counsel
in many matters—dynastic, family, court, public life. He had to do with
many men, in all social strata and all walks of life, by all of whom he was
revered and esteemed, and he was treated by me likewise with friendship
and gratitude.

VICTORIA'S HAND IS FELT

After consultation with Prince Bismarck, Herr von Lucanus from the
Ministry of Public Worship and Instruction, was appointed chief of the Civil
Cabinet. Prince Bismarck observed jokingly that he was pleased with this
choice, since Herr von Lucanus was known to him as an able and
enthusiastic huntsman, which was always a good recommendation for a
civilian official; he added that a good huntsman was a regular good fellow.
Herr von Lucanus took over his post from His Excellency von Wilmowski.
He discharged his duties admirably and, being well endowed in all
pertaining to art, technical matters, science, and politics, he was to me a
counselor, untiring collaborator, and friend. He combined with a healthy
knowledge of men a strong dash of refined humor, which is so often lacking
in men of the Germanic race.

With Prince Bismarck I had stood on very good and trustful terms ever
since my assignment at the Foreign Office. Then, as well as before, I
revered the powerful Chancellor with all the ardor of my youth and was
proud to have served under him and to have the opportunity now to work
with him as my Chancellor.
The Prince, who was present during the last hours of the old Emperor and
had listened with me to the latter's political testament to his grandson—i. e.,
his wish as to the special care to be lavished upon relations with Russia—
brought about my summer trip to St. Petersburg as my first political act
before the eyes of the world, in order to emphasize our relationship to
Russia in accordance with the last wish of my dying grandfather. He also
had "travel arrangements" drawn up for me.
An obstacle was placed in the way of carrying out this plan by a letter from
Queen Victoria of England, who, upon hearing of the projected visit to St.
Petersburg, expressed to her eldest grandson, in a good-humored but
authoritative tone, her disapproval of the contemplated journey. She said
that a year of mourning must first elapse, after which my first visit was due
to her, since she was my grandmother, and to England, it being the native
country of my mother, before other lands should be considered. When I
placed this letter before the Prince, he gave way to a violent fit of anger. He
spoke about "family dictation in England," of interference from that quarter
which must cease; the tone of the letter showed, he said, how the Crown
Prince and Emperor Frederick had been ordered about and influenced by his
mother-in-law, wife, etc. Thereupon the Prince wished to draw up the text
of a reply to the Queen. I remarked that I would prepare the appropriate
answer, steering the proper middle course between the grandson and the
Emperor, and that I would show it to the Prince before dispatching it.
The answer paid heed in its outward form to the close relationship between
a grandson and his grandmother, who had carried him in her arms when he
was a baby and, in view of her age alone, commanded great respect—but,
in its essentials, it laid stress upon the position and duty of the German
Emperor, compelled to carry out unconditionally a command of his dying
father affecting Germany's most vital interests. It stated that the grandson
was obliged to respect this command of his grandfather in the interest of the
country, the representation of which interests had now devolved upon him
by the will of God, and that his royal grandmother must leave to him the

question of deciding in what manner this was to be done. I added that,
otherwise, I was her loving grandson, who would always be grateful for any
advice from his grandmother, who had derived so much experience from
her long reign; but that I was, nevertheless, in matters affecting Germany,
compelled to retain my freedom of action; the visit to St. Petersburg, I said,
was politically necessary, and the command of my Imperial grandfather was
consonant with the close family relations between me and the Russian
Imperial house; therefore it would be carried out.
The Prince approved of the letter. The answer, which arrived after a while,
was surprising. The Queen agreed that her grandson was in the right; he
must act in accordance with the interests of his country; she would be glad
to see him, even if it were later on, at her own home. From that day onward
my relations with the Queen, who was feared even by her own children,
were of the best imaginable; from that day onward she never treated her
grandson except as a sovereign of equal rank with herself!
On my first journeys I was accompanied by Count Herbert, as the
representative of the Foreign Office. He drew up the speeches and
conducted the political conferences, in so far as they were of an official
nature, in accordance with the instructions of his father.

CONFLICT ON TURKISH POLICY

Upon my return from Constantinople in 1889 I described to the Prince at his
request my impressions of Greece, where my sister Sophie was married to
the heir-apparent, Crown Prince Constantine, and also my Constantinople
impressions. In doing this, it struck me that Prince Bismarck spoke quite
disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high position there, and of conditions
in that land. I thought I might inspire him in part with essentially more
favorable opinions, but my efforts were of little avail. Upon asking the
Prince the reason why he held such an unfavorable opinion, he answered
that Count Herbert had reported very disapprovingly on Turkey. Prince
Bismarck and Count Herbert were never favorably inclined toward Turkey
and they never agreed with me in my Turkish policy—the old policy of
Frederick the Great.
During the last period of his tenure of office as Chancellor, Bismarck
declared that the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia, whose Tsar

reposed special trust in him, was the most important reason for his
remaining at his post. In this connection it was that he gave me the first
hints concerning the secret reinsurance treaty with Russia. Up to then I had
heard nothing about it, either from the Prince or the Foreign Office,
although it happened that I had concerned myself especially with Russian
matters.
When I assumed the reins of government owing to the early death of my
father, the generation of the grandson, as I have already remarked, followed
upon the generation of the grandfather, which meant that the entire
generation of Emperor Frederick was overleaped. This generation, through
its dealings with Crown Prince Frederick William, was imbued with many
liberal ideas and projects of reform which were to be carried out under the
direction of the Emperor Frederick. Upon his death, this entire generation,
especially the politicians, found itself deceived in its hopes of exerting
influence, and felt itself, to a certain extent, in the position of an orphan.
Those belonging to it, despite the fact that they did not know my inner
thoughts and aims, adopted a distrustful and reserved attitude toward me,
instead of transferring their interest from the father to the son, for the
purpose of furthering the welfare of the fatherland.
There was one exception to this—a representative of the National Liberals,
Herr von Benda—a man still in the full bloom of youth. While I was still
Prince I had made his acquaintance at the great hare hunts got up by
Councilor Dietze at Barby. There Herr von Benda had won my affection
and confidence when I, surrounded by older men, had listened to
discussions on political, agricultural, and national-economic questions. In
the course of these, Herr von Benda held my attention by means of his
independent, interesting judgment. I accepted with pleasure an invitation to
Benda's country seat, Rudow, near Berlin, and from this arose the custom of
a regular yearly visit.
The hours spent in the family circle at Rudow stand out pleasantly in my
memory. His talented daughters used to regale us with music. The political
conversations there proved Herr von Benda to be a man of great foresight,
which, free from partisan considerations, gave him an open mind as to the
general needs of the state to an extent seldom found among members of
political parties. He gave me many a helpful piece of advice for the future,
drawn from the depths of his faithful, genuinely Prussian heart, by which he

was attached firmly to the family of his sovereign; yet he was able to feel
broad tolerance for other parties.

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTIES

The later periods of my reign proved that I was not hostile to any party,
with the exception of the Ultra-Socialists; also, that I was not anti-Liberal.
My most important Finance Minister was the Liberal, Miquel; my Minister
of Commerce was the Liberal, Möller; the leader of the Liberals, Herr von
Bennigsen, was Chief President of Hanover. I stood very close, especially
in the second half of my reign, to an elderly Liberal deputy, whose
acquaintance I made through Herr von Miquel. This man was Herr Seydel
(Celchen), owner of an estate in eastern Germany—a man with two clever
eyes, which gazed forth from a clean-shaven face. He worked with Miquel
in railway and canal questions, and was a thoroughly able, simple, practical
man—a Liberal with a streak of conservatism.
Naturally, I had numerous dealings and points of contact with the
Conservative party, since the gentlemen of the country nobility often met
me at court hunts and other hunts, or else came to court and served in court
positions. Through them I could become thoroughly informed on all
agrarian questions and learn where the farmer's shoe pinched him.
The Free Thinkers, under the "unswerving" leader, entered into no relations
with me; they limited themselves to opposition.
In my conversations with Benda and Bennigsen we often spoke of the
future of Liberalism, and, on one occasion, Benda made this interesting
observation: "It is not necessary and also not advisable to have the Prussian
heir-apparent dabble in Liberalism—we have no use for that sort of thing.
He must be essentially conservative, though he must, at the same time,
combine this with breadth, and avoid narrowness and prejudice against
other parties."
Bennigsen agreed with me when I spoke to him of the necessity of having
the National Liberals revise their program, which—originally bearing the
motto: "Maintenance of the German Empire and Freedom of the Press"—
had long since rallied the members around the Liberal banner—in order
that, by such revision, the proselytizing power of the old brand of Prussian

Liberalism should not be lost among the people. Both the Prussian Liberals
and the Conservatives, I continued, made the mistake of remembering too
well the old period of conflict of 1861-66; and, at elections and other
political fights, they were prone to fall back into the habits of those days.
That period, I said, had already passed into history and come to an end so
far as our generation was concerned; the present had begun for us with the
year 1870 and the new Empire; our generation had drawn a line under the
year 1866; we must build anew upon the foundations of the Empire;
political parties must shape their course also in this direction and not take
over from the past stuff that was outworn and, moreover, calculated to
create discord. Unfortunately, all this has not come to pass. Bennigsen made
a very telling point when he said: "Woe to the North German Liberals if
they come under the leadership of the South German Democrats, for that
will mean the end of real, genuine Liberalism! Then we shall get the
masked democracy arising from below, for which we have no use
hereabout."
The Conservative party, honorable and faithful to its King, unfortunately
has not always produced leaders of superior endowments who were at the
same time skillful, tactically trained politicians. The agrarian wing was at
times too strongly marked and was a burden to the party. Moreover,
memories of the period of conflict were still too lively. I counseled union
with the Liberals, but found little support. I often pointed out that the
National Liberals in the Empire were true to the Empire and to the Emperor,
for which reason they should be thoroughly welcome to the Conservatives
as allies; that I could not and did not wish to govern without them in the
Empire, and was absolutely unwilling to govern against them; that North
German conservatism was misunderstood in some parts of the Empire
because of differences in historical development; and that, therefore, the
National Liberals were the natural allies. It was owing to these views of
mine, for instance, that I removed Court Preacher Stöcker, a man of brilliant
achievement as a social missionary, from his post, since he made a
demagogical provocative speech in South Germany, aimed against the
Liberals there.
The Center party was welded together by the "Kulturkampf" and was
strongly anti-Protestant and hostile to the Empire. Notwithstanding this, I
had dealings with many important men of the party and managed to interest

them in practical collaboration for the good of all. In this Schorlemer (the
father) was especially helpful to me. He never made a secret of his Prussian
loyalty to his King. His son, the well-known Minister of Agriculture, even
joined the Conservative party. In many matters the Center co-operated; at
one period it possessed in its old leader, Windthorst, the keenest politician
in the legislature. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, one could not help being
aware of the underlying Centerist conviction that the interests of the Roman
Church must always be maintained and never relegated to a secondary
place.

THE BREAK WITH BISMARCK

When I was Prince William I was placed for a long time under the Chief
President of the Province of Brandenburg, von Achenbach, in order that I
might learn about home administration, get experience in economic
questions, and, moreover, take an active part in the work. Spurred on by the
captivating discourses of Achenbach, I derived from this period of my life a
special interest in the economic side of the inner development of the
country, whereas the purely judicial side of the administration interested me
to a lesser degree. Improvements, canal construction, highway building,
forestry, improvement in all kinds of transportation facilities, betterment of
dwellings, introduction of machines into agriculture and their co-operative
development—all of these were matters with which I busied myself later
on; this being especially true of hydraulic work and the development of the
network of railways, particularly in the badly neglected territory of Eastern
Germany.
I discussed all these matters with the Ministers of State after I had ascended
the throne. In order to spur them on, I allowed them free rein in their
various domains. But it turned out that this was hardly possible so long as
Prince Bismarck remained in office, since he reserved for himself the main
deciding voice in everything, thereby impairing the independence of those
working with him. I soon saw that the Ministers, being entirely under
Bismarck's thumb, could not come out in favor of "innovations" or ideas of
the "young master" of which Bismarck disapproved.
The Ministry, in short, was nothing but a tool in the hands of Bismarck,
acting solely in accordance with his wishes. This state of things was, in

itself, natural enough, since a Premier of such overwhelming importance,
who had won for Prussia and Germany such great political victories,
naturally dominated his Ministers completely and led them despotically.
Nevertheless, I found myself in a difficult position; the typical answer with
which my suggestions were met was: "Prince Bismarck does not want that
done; we cannot get him to consent to that; Emperor William I would not
have asked such a thing; that is not in accordance with tradition, etc." I
understood more and more that, in reality, I had no Ministry of State at my
disposal; that the gentlemen composing it, from long force of habit,
considered themselves officials of Prince Bismarck.
Here is an example to show the attitude of the Cabinet toward me in those
Bismarck days: The question came up of renewing the Socialist law, a
political measure devised by Prince Bismarck for fighting socialism. A
certain paragraph therein was to be toned down, in order to save the law.
Bismarck opposed the change. There were sharp differences of opinion. I
summoned a Crown Council. Bismarck spoke in the antechamber with my
adjutant; he declared that His Majesty completely forgot that he was an
officer and wore a sword belt; that he must fall back upon the army and lead
it against the Socialists, in case the Socialists should resort to revolutionary
measures; that the Emperor should leave him a free hand, which would
restore quiet once for all. At the Crown Council Bismarck stuck to his
opinion. The individual Ministers, when asked to express their views, were
lukewarm. A vote was taken—the entire Ministry voted against me.
This vote showed me once more the absolute domination exerted by the
Chancellor over his Ministers. Deeply dissatisfied, I talked over the matter
with His Excellency Lucanus, who was as much struck as I was by the
situation. Lucanus looked up some of the gentlemen and took them to task
for their attitude, whereupon they made it clear that they were "not in a
position" to oppose the Prince and declared that it was quite impossible for
anybody to expect them to vote against the wishes of the Prince.

HANDLING A COAL STRIKE

The great Westphalian coal workers' strike in the spring of 1889 took the
civil administration by surprise, causing great confusion and bewilderment,
especially among members of the Westphalian provincial administration.

From all sides came calls for troops; every mine owner wanted, if possible,
to have sentries posted outside his room. The commanders of the troops
which were summoned immediately made reports on the situation as they
had found it.
Among these was one of my former barrack comrades, belonging to the
Hussar Guard Regiment, von Michaelis by name, who was famous as a wit.
He rode, alone and unarmed, among the striking crowds of workers, who—
the early spring being remarkably warm—were camped upon the hillsides,
and soon managed, by his confidence-inspiring, jovial ways, to set up a
harmless intercourse with the strikers. By questioning them he obtained
much valuable information about the grievances—real and imaginary—of
the workers, as well as about their plans, hopes, and wishes for the future.
He soon won for himself general appreciation and affection among the
workers and handled them so well that complete quiet reigned in his
territory. When I, on account of nervous and worried telegrams from the big
industrial leaders and officials received at the office of the Imperial
Chancellor, inquired of Michaelis how the situation stood, the following
telegraphed answer came from him: "Everything quiet excepting the
Government officials."
A mass of material was collected, during the spring and summer, from the
announcements and reports received which showed clearly that all was not
well in industrial circles; that many a wish of the workers was justified and,
to say the least, entitled to sympathetic investigation on the part both of the
employers and of the officials. The realization of this, which was confirmed
in me when I questioned my former private teacher, Privy Councilor Dr.
Hinzpeter—a man particularly well informed on social phenomena,
especially those in his own province—caused the resolve to ripen in me to
summon the State Council, include employers and employees in its
deliberations, and bring about, under my personal direction, a thorough
investigation of the labor question. I decided that in so doing guiding
principles and material were to be acquired which would serve the
Chancellor and the Prussian Government as a basis for working out
appropriate projects for new laws.
Inspired by such thought I went to His Excellency von Bötticher, who at
once prophesied opposition on the part of the Chancellor to such action, and
advised strongly against it. I stuck to my ideas, adducing in support of them

the maxim of Frederick the Great: "Je veux être un Roi des gueux" ("I wish
to be King of the rabble"). I said that it was my duty to take care of those
Germans who were used up by industry, to protect their strength and better
their chances of existence.

FURTHER CONFLICT WITH CHANCELLOR

The predicted opposition from Prince Bismarck was not long in coming.
There was much trouble and fighting before I put through what I wanted,
owing to the fact that some of the big industrial interests ranged themselves
on the side of the Chancellor. The State Council met, presided over by me.
At the opening session the Chancellor unexpectedly appeared. He made a
speech in which he ironically criticized and disapproved the whole
undertaking set in motion by me, and refused his co-operation. Thereupon
he walked out of the room.
After his departure the strange scene had its effect on the assemblage. The
fury and ruthlessness which the great Chancellor brought to the support of
his own policy and against mine, based upon his absolute belief in the
correctness of his own judgment, made a tremendous impression upon me
and all those present. Nevertheless, it stood to reason that I was deeply hurt
by what had occurred. The assemblage proceeded to take up its work again
and turned out a wealth of material for the extension of that social
legislation called into being by Emperor William the Great, which is the
pride of Germany, evincing, as it does, a protective attitude toward the
laboring classes such as is not to be found in any other land on earth.
Thereupon I decided to summon a general social congress. Prince Bismarck
opposed this also. Switzerland was contemplating something similar, and
had thought of convening a congress at Berne. Roth, the Swiss ambassador,
hearing of my scheme, advised canceling the invitations to Berne and
accepting an invitation to Berlin. What he wished occurred. Thanks to the
generosity of Herr Roth, it was possible to convene the congress at Berlin.
The material collected as a result of it was worked out and applied in the
form of laws—only in Germany, however.
Later on I talked with Bismarck concerning his project of fighting the
socialists, in case they resorted to revolutionary acts, with cannon and
bayonets. I sought to convince him that it was out of the question for me,

almost immediately after William the Great had closed his eyes after a
blessed reign, to stain the first years of my Government with the blood of
my own people. Bismarck was unmoved; he declared that he would assume
responsibility for his actions; that all I need do was to leave the thing to
him. I answered that I could not square such a course with my conscience
and my responsibility before God, particularly as I knew perfectly well that
conditions among the laboring classes were bad and must be bettered at all
costs.
The conflict between the views of the Emperor and the Chancellor relative
to the social question—i. e., the furtherance of the welfare of the laboring
classes of the population, with participation therein by the state—was the
real cause of the break between us, and caused a hostility toward me, lasting
for years, on the part of Bismarck and a large part of the German nation that
was devoted to him, especially of the official class.
This conflict between the Chancellor and me arose because of his belief that
the social problem could be solved by severe measures and, if the worst
came to the worst, by means of soldiers; not by following principles of
general love for mankind or humanitarian nonsense which, he believed, he
would have to adopt in conformity to my views.

BISMARCK'S LABOR VIEWS

Bismarck was not a foe to the laboring classes—on that I wish to lay stress,
in view of what I have previously said. On the contrary! He was far too
great a statesman to mistake the importance of the labor question to the
state. But he considered the whole matter from the standpoint of pure
expediency for the state. The state, he believed, should care for the laborer,
as much and in whatever manner it deemed proper; he would not admit of
any co-operation of the workers in this. Agitation and rebellion, he
believed, should be severely suppressed; by force of arms, if necessary.
Government protection on the one hand, the mailed fist on the other—that
was Bismarck's social policy.
I, however, wished to win over the soul of the German workingman, and I
fought zealously to attain this goal. I was filled with the consciousness of a
plain duty and responsibility toward my entire people—also, therefore,
toward the laboring classes. What was theirs by right and justice should

become theirs, I thought; moreover, I believed that this should be brought
about, wherever the will or power of the employers ceased, by the lord of
the land and his Government, in so far as justice or necessity demanded. As
soon as I had recognized the necessity for reforms, to some of which the
industrial elements would not consent, I took up the cudgels for the laboring
classes, impelled by a sense of justice.
I had studied history sufficiently to guard myself against the delusion of
believing in the possibility of making an entire people happy. I realized
clearly that it was impossible for one human being to make a nation happy.
The truth is that the only nation which is happy is the one that is contented,
or at least is willing to be contented; a willingness which implies a certain
degree of realization of what is possible—a sense of the practical, in short.
Unfortunately, there is often a lack of this.
I was well aware that, in the unbounded demands of the Socialist leaders,
unjustified greed would be constantly developed anew. But, for the very
reason that I wished to be able to combat unjustified aspirations with a clear
conscience and in a convincing way, it behooved me not to deny
recognition and aid to justified aspirations.

GERMAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The policy that kept in view the welfare of the workers unquestionably
imposed a heavy burden upon all the industrial elements of Germany in the
matter of competition in the world market, through the well-known laws for
the protection of workingmen. This was especially true in relation to an
industrial system like the Belgian, which could, without hindrance, squeeze
the last drop out of the human reserves of Belgium and pay low wages,
without feeling any pangs of conscience or compassion for the sinking
morale of the exhausted, unprotected people. By means of my social
legislation I made such conditions impossible in Germany, and I caused it to
be introduced also in Belgium, during the war, by General von Bissing, in
order to promote the welfare of the Belgian workers. First of all, however,
this legislation is—to use a sporting term—a handicap upon German
industry in the battle of world competition: it alienated many big leaders of
industry, which, from their point of view, was quite natural. But the lord of

the land must always bear in mind the welfare of the whole nation;
therefore, I went my way unswervingly.
Those workers, on the other hand, who blindly followed the Socialist
leaders, gave me no word of thanks for the protection created for them nor
for the work I had done. Between them and me lies the motto of the
Hohenzollerns, "Suum cuique." That means, "To each his own"—not, as the
Social Democrats would have it, "To everyone the same!"
I also harbored the idea of preventing to some extent competitive warfare,
at least in the industrial world of the European continent, by bringing about
a sort of quota-fixing in foreign lands, thereby facilitating production and
making possible a healthier mode of life among the working classes.
There is great significance in the impression which foreign workers get in
studying Germany's social legislation. A few years before the war people in
England, under the pressure of labor troubles, awoke to the conviction that
better care must be taken of the workers. As a result of this, commissions
visited Germany, some of them composed of workingmen. Guided by
representative Germans, among them Socialists, they visited the industrial
regions, factories, benevolent institutions, sanatoria of insurance companies,
etc., and were astonished at all the things they saw. At the farewell dinner
given them the English leader of the workingmen's deputation turned to
Bebel and made this concluding remark:
"After all we have seen of what is done in Germany for the workers, I ask
you: Are you people still Socialists?" And the Englishmen remarked to a
German that they would be quite satisfied if they could succeed, after long
fights in Parliament, in putting through one tenth of what had already been
accomplished years before in Germany toward bettering the condition of
the laboring classes.
I had observed with interest these visits of the English deputations and
marveled at their ignorance of German conditions. But I marveled even
more at a question asked by the English Government, through the channel
of the English Embassy, on the same subject, which betrayed an absolutely
amazing lack of knowledge of the progress made in Germany in the
province of social reform. I questioned the English ambassador, remarking
that England, having been represented in 1890 at the Berlin Social
Congress, must certainly have been informed, at least through the Embassy,

of the Reichstag debates, which had dealt in a detailed way with the various
social measures. The ambassador replied that the same thing had also
occurred to him and caused him to have the earlier records of the Embassy
investigated, whereupon it had transpired that the Embassy had sent the
fullest reports on the subject to London and that thorough reports had been
forwarded home concerning every important stage in the progress of social
reform; but, "because they came from Germany, nobody ever read them;
they were simply pigeon-holed and remained there ever since; it is a
downright shame; Germany does not interest people at home."
Thus the Briton, with a shrug of his shoulders. Neither the British King nor
Parliament had enough conscience or time or desire to work for the
betterment of the working class. The "policy of encirclement" for the
annihilation of Germany, especially of its industry, and, thereby, of its
working population, was, in their eyes, far more important and rewarding.
On the 9th of November (1918) the German Radical Socialist leaders, with
their like-minded followers, joined forces with this British policy of
annihilation.

"WELFARE WORK" AT THE COURT

In a small way, in places where I had influence, as, for instance, in the
administration of my court and in the Imperial Automobile Club, I laid
stress upon the social point of view. For instance, I caused a fund to be
established, out of the tips paid for visiting palaces, which was destined
solely to the benefit of the domestic staff, and which, in the course of time,
reached a magnificent total. From this fund the domestics and their families
received money for trips to bathing resorts, cost of taking cures, burial
expenses, dowries for their children, confirmation expenses, and similar
payments.
When I, at the request of the newly founded Imperial Automobile Club,
took it under my protection, I accepted an invitation to a luncheon in the
beautiful rooms of the clubhouse, built by Ihne. In addition to magnates like
the Duke of Ratibor, the Duke of Ujest, etc., I found there a number of
gentlemen from Berlin's high financial circles, some of whom behaved
rather wildly. When the conversation turned to the subject of drivers, I
suggested establishing a fund which, in case of accident, illness, or death

befalling these men, should provide means of livelihood for those whom
they left behind. The suggestion met with unanimous approval, and the fund
has had most excellent results. Later on I brought about the establishment of
something similar for the skippers and pilots attached to the Imperial Yacht
Club at Kiel.
Special pleasure was afforded me by the Kaiser Wilhelm Children's Home,
founded by me at Ahlbeck, at which, in peace times, between May and the
end of September in each year, a large number of children from the most
poverty-stricken working people's districts in Berlin were accommodated in
successive detachments, each lot staying four weeks. This home is still
under the tried direction of the admirable superintendent, Miss Kirschner,
daughter of the former Chief Burgomaster of Berlin, and it has achieved
most brilliant results, both in the physical and the psychical domain.
Weakened, pale, needy children were transformed there into fresh,
blooming, happy little beings, concerning whose welfare I often joyfully
convinced myself by personal visits.
For the very reason that I have spoken of my quarrel with Bismarck as a
result of labor questions, I wish to add to what I have already said about his
basic position in the matter—an example showing how brilliantly the Prince
behaved in something that concerned the workers. In this, to be sure, he was
impelled by nationalistic motives, but he also realized at once that it was
necessary to protect a large element against unemployment, which caused
him to intervene with the full weight of his authority.
Sometime around 1886, while I was still Prince Wilhelm, I had learned that
the great Vulcan shipping concern at Stettin was confronted, owing to lack
of orders, with bankruptcy, and its entire force of workmen, numbering
many thousands, with starvation, which would mean a catastrophe for the
city of Stettin. Only by an order for the building of a big ship could the
Vulcan shipyards be saved.
Spurred on some time before by Admiral von Stosch, who wished to free us
once and for all from the English shipbuilders, the Vulcan people had set to
work courageously to build the first German armored ship, christened by
my mother in 1874 on her birthday, on which occasion I was present. Ever
since that time the warships built at the Vulcan yards had always satisfied
naval experts—the concern, however, seldom built warships.

THE CHANCELLOR IN ACTION

The German merchant marine, on the other hand, had not dared to follow
the path courageously blazed by Admiral von Stosch. And now the brave
German shipyard company was faced with ruin, since the North German
Lloyd had refused its offer to build a passenger steamer, alleging that the
English, because of their years of shipbuilding traditions, could build it
better. It was a serious emergency. I hastened to Prince Bismarck and laid
before him the matter as I have described it above.
The Chancellor was furious; his eyes flashed, his fist came crashing down
on the table.
"What! Do you mean to say that these shopkeepers would rather have their
boats built in England than in Germany? Why, that is unheard of! And is a
good German shipyard to fail for such a reason? The devil take this gang of
traders!"
He rang the bell and a servant entered.
"Have Privy Councilor X come here immediately from the Foreign Office!"
In a few minutes—during which the Prince stamped up and down the room
—the man summoned appeared.
"Telegram to Hamburg, to our envoy—the Lloyd in Bremen is to have its
new ship built by the Vulcan Company in Stettin!"
The Privy Councilor vanished in hot haste, "with his coat tails sticking
straight out behind him." The Prince turned to me and said: "I am greatly
obliged to you. You have done the fatherland, and also myself, an important
service. Henceforth ships will be built only in our yards—I'll take care to
make this clear to the Hanseatic crowd. You may telegraph to the Vulcan
people that the Chancellor will guarantee that the ship will be built in the
Vulcan yards. May this be the first of a whole lot of such ships! As for the
workers whom you have thus saved from unemployment, I hope that they
will express their thanks to you!"
I passed on the news to Privy Councilor Schlutow at Stettin and great was
the joy caused thereby. This was the first step upon the road destined to lead
to the construction of the magnificent German express steamers.

When I went, after I had ascended the throne in 1888, to Stettin, in order to
place honorary insignia on the flags of my Pomeranian Grenadiers, I also
visited the Vulcan shipyards, at the invitation of the directors. After my
reception by the directors outside the yards, the great doors were flung open
and I walked inside. But, instead of work and pounding hammers, I found
deep silence. The entire body of workmen was standing in a half circle,
with bared heads; in the middle stood the oldest workman of all, a man with
a snow-white beard, bearing a laurel wreath in his hand.
I was deeply moved. Schlutow whispered to me: "A little pleasure for you,
which the workmen themselves have thought up." The old workman
stepped forward and, in pithy, plain words, expressed to me the gratitude of
the workmen to me for having saved them, and, above all, their wives and
children, from hardship and hunger, by my appeal to Bismarck about the
building of the ship. As a token of their gratitude, he asked my permission
to hand over the laurel wreath. Most deeply moved, I took the wreath and
expressed my pleasure at receiving my first laurels, without the shedding of
a drop of blood, from the hands of honest German workmen.
That was in the year 1888! In those days, the German laboring classes knew
how to appreciate the blessing of labor.

CHAPTER II

Caprivi
When I began my reign, General von Caprivi was Chief of the Admiralty.
He was the last general to hold this post. I at once took energetically in hand
the development and reform—in fact, one may say the foundation anew—
of the Imperial German Navy, based on my preliminary studies in England
and at home. That was not to the liking of the General, who was able, but
rather self-willed, and not entirely devoid of pride.
Unquestionably he had rendered valuable services in mobilization,
improvement of the officer corps, and the improvement and development of
the torpedo-boat organization. On the other hand, the building of ships and
the replacement of worn-out material were in a deplorable state, to the
detriment of the fleet and to the dissatisfaction of the shipbuilding industry,
which was growing and looking about for employment.
Being an old Prussian general, Caprivi's way of thinking was that of his day
—that of his comrades of 1864, 1865, 1870, 1871—in his eyes, the army
had always done everything and would continue to do so in the future;
therefore, no great demands for money to be devoted to the navy should be
imposed upon the country, since, should this be done, there was danger that
the sums destined to the army might be decreased and its development
thereby hampered. This idea, from which he was not to be dissuaded, is
false. The amounts granted did not flow into a reservoir from which they
might be directed, by the mere turning of a valve, now into army, now into
navy, channels. Whenever Caprivi was unwilling to demand anything for
naval construction, in order, by so doing, to turn more money toward the
army, things did not happen as he foresaw. By his action the army received
not one penny more, but merely whatever the Minister of War asked for and
received in accordance with his budget.
There was need of creating a Secretaryship of State for the Navy which,
entirely independent of the Ministry of War, should have as its duty to

demand and obtain for the navy as much as was required for the protection
of our commerce and colonies. And that is what came to pass later on.
Caprivi soon came to me with the request that I relieve him from his post.
He stated that he was not satisfied with it in itself; that, moreover, I had all
sorts of plans for the future affecting the navy which he considered
impossible of realization, in the first place, because there existed no means
of replacement for the officer corps—at that time the yearly influx of cadets
was between sixty and eighty—and a large navy without a large officer
corps was unthinkable. In addition to this, he informed me, he had soon
seen in the course of the inspection tours of His Majesty that the Emperor
knew more about naval matters than he, the General, which placed him in
an impossible situation in relation to his subordinates.
In view of these circumstances, I parted with him, placing him in command
of an army corps. Following the motto, "The navy for the seamen!" I chose,
for the first time, an admiral as its chief, a step which was received in
maritime circles with great joy. The man chosen was Admiral Count Monts.

BISMARCK'S SUCCESSOR

When I was soon afterward confronted with the rather unexpected
retirement of Prince Bismarck, I found the choice of his successor a
difficult one. Whoever it might be was sure to have a hard task, without any
prospect of appreciation for what he might achieve; he would be looked
upon as the usurper of a post to which he was not entitled, and which he
was not qualified to fill. Criticism, criticism, nothing but criticism—that
was sure to be the daily bread upon which the new Chancellor must reckon;
and he was also certain of becoming the target for the hostility of all those
who favored Prince Bismarck as well as with that of the many who
previously could not do enough in opposition to him. There was bound to
be a strong current of enmity toward the new Chancellor, in which the old
Prince himself would not be the least serious factor.
After taking all this into consideration, it was decided to choose a man
belonging to Prince Bismarck's generation, who had held a leading position
in the wars and had already filled a Government position under him. Hence
Caprivi was chosen. His age was a guarantee that he would be a careful and
calm adviser for the "orphaned" young Emperor.

Very soon the question arose of the extension of the reinsurance treaty with
Russia. Caprivi declared that, out of consideration for Austria, he was
unable to renew it, since the threat against Austria contained therein, when
it became known in Vienna—as it almost unavoidably would—was such as
to lead to very disagreeable consequences. For this reason the treaty lapsed.
To my way of thinking, it had already lost its main value from the fact that
the Russians no longer stood whole-heartedly behind it. I was confirmed in
this view by a memorial written by Count Berchem, Under Secretary of
State, who had worked with Prince Bismarck.
The Agrarian Conservatives opposed Caprivi as a man without landed
property and a violent fight raged around the commercial treaties. These
difficulties were greatly enhanced because Prince Bismarck, ignoring his
former maxims, took part in the fight against his successor with all his
characteristic energy. Thus arose the opposition of the Conservatives
against the Government and the Crown, and the Prince in person sowed the
seed from which later grew the "misunderstood Bismarck" and that
"Reichsverdrossenheit" (unfriendliness to the Empire) so often taken up in
the newspapers. The "misunderstood Bismarck" created permanent
opposition throughout my reign against my suggestions and aims by means
of quotations, speeches, and writings, as well as by passive resistance and
thoughtless criticism. Everything that was done was painted in black colors,
made ridiculous, and criticized from top to bottom, by a press that placed
itself quite willingly at the disposal of the Prince and often out-Bismarcked
Bismarck in its behavior.
This phenomenon became most apparent at the time of the acquisition of
Heligoland. This island, lying close in front of the great waterways leading
to the principal Hanseatic commercial ports, was, in the hands of the
British, a constant menace to Hamburg and Bremen and rendered
impossible any project for building up a navy. Owing to this, I had firmly
resolved to win back this formerly German island to its fatherland.

THE DEAL FOR HELIGOLAND

The way to cause England to give up the red rock of Heligoland was found
in the colonial domain. Lord Salisbury proved inclined to exchange the
"barren rock" for Zanzibar and Witu in East Africa. From commercial

sources and the reports of the commanders of German cruisers and
gunboats which were stationed there and cruised along the coast of the
recently acquired German East African colonies, I knew that, as soon as
Togo, Dar-es-Salaam, etc., rose to prosperity, the importance of Zanzibar on
the coast of Africa as the principal port of transshipment would be a thing
of the past, since, as soon as the above-mentioned harbors were made deep
enough and provided with sufficient cargo-loading equipment for trading
steamers, there would no longer be any need of ferrying goods coming from
the interior in dhows to Zanzibar, in order to have them again loaded on
vessels there, since they could be loaded direct at the new harbors along the
coast.
Therefore, I was convinced that we had, first, an acceptable asset for
swapping purposes, and, secondly, a good opportunity to avoid colonial
friction with England and come to a friendly understanding with her.
Caprivi agreed, the negotiations were concluded, and one evening, shortly
before dinner, I was able to tell the Empress and a few intimates the
exceedingly joyful tidings that Heligoland had become German.
A first and very important extension of the Empire had been achieved—
without bloodshed—the first condition for the upbuilding of the fleet was
fulfilled, something which the natives of the Hanseatic towns and the rest of
the North Germans had wished for centuries had come to pass. In silence,
an important event had occurred.
Had Heligoland been acquired in the Chancellorship of Prince Bismarck, it
would probably have been valued very highly. Having happened under
Caprivi, it loosed a lot of criticism. It was merely Caprivi, the usurper, who
had had the audacity to sit in the Prince's chair, and the "irresponsible,"
"ungrateful," "impulsive" young master who had done such a thing! Had
Bismarck only wished, he could have had the old rock any day, but he never
would have been so unskillful as to give up to the English for it the very
promising African possessions, and he never would have allowed himself to
be thus worsted. That was the sort of thing heard almost everywhere. The
newspapers of the Prince joined loudly in this sort of criticism, to the great
grief of the people of the Hanseatic cities.
Curious indeed were the criticisms occasioned by the swapping of Zanzibar
and Witu, which appeared in the Bismarckian press, although previously,

when I worked under him, these newspapers had always explained that he
had not much belief in the value of colonies in themselves and looked upon
them merely as objects to be exchanged, possibly, for something else, in
deals with the British. His successor acted according to these ideas in the
Heligoland question, and was most violently criticized and attacked. Not
until the World War was on did I see articles in the German press which
unreservedly admitted the acquisition of Heligoland to be an act of far-
sighted politics and added reflections as to what would doubtless have
happened if Heligoland had not become German.
The German nation has every reason to be thankful to Count Caprivi for
this achievement, since thereby the building of its navy and its victory at the
Skagerrak were made possible. As for the German navy, it long ago
acknowledged this.
The school law of Count Zedlitz aroused violent new conflicts. When they
led to Zedlitz's retirement, the cry arose among his adherents: "If the Count
goes, so must the Chancellor."
Caprivi left his post, in a calm, dignified manner. He tried honestly, within
the measure of his powers and abilities, to continue the traditions of Prince
Bismarck. In this he found little support among the political parties, and, for
this reason, all the more criticism and hostility in the public and among
those who, had they acted for the right and the interests of the state, should
have stood by him. Without one word of apology, Caprivi, in noble silence,
lived all the rest of his life in almost solitary retirement.

CHAPTER III

Hohenlohe
Again I was confronted with the difficult task of choosing a Chancellor. His
position and activities were to be under somewhat about the same auspices
and subject to the same conditions as in the case of his predecessor. But
now there was more of a desire that he should be a statesman, an older man,
of course, qualified to inspire Prince Bismarck with more confidence than a
mere general could do.
It was assumed that a statesman would know better how to walk in the
footsteps of the Prince, politically speaking; and provide Bismarck with less
opportunity for criticism and attacks. These latter had tended to create
gradually among all Government officials, who dated mostly from the
period of Bismarck, an unmistakable nervousness and dissatisfaction, by
which the work of the entire governmental system was impaired to an
extent by no means inconsiderable. Moreover, it lent to the opposition in the
Reichstag a constantly renewed strength drawn from elements previously
faithful to the Government, and made itself felt in a detrimental manner.
Especially in the Foreign Office, the spirit of Holstein, the supposed
representative of the "old, tried Bismarckian traditions," began to assert
itself, so that the unwillingness to collaborate with the Emperor became
particularly strong and the belief grew up that it was necessary to carry on,
independently, the policy of Bismarck.
After mature deliberation, I decided to intrust the post of Chancellor to
Prince Hohenlohe, who was then Governor of Alsace-Lorraine. At the
outbreak of the War of 1870 he had succeeded, as Bavarian Minister, in
getting Bavaria to enter the war on the side of Prussia. Ever since he had
been highly esteemed by Prince Bismarck on account of his fidelity to the
Empire. It was natural to expect that Bismarck's opposition would cool off
when confronted with such a successor. Thus, the choice of Hohenlohe as

Chancellor was strongly influenced by consideration for Prince Bismarck
and for the public opinion inspired by him.
Prince Hohenlohe was the typical old-style grand seigneur. He was
thoroughly urbane by nature and in his dealings with others: a man of
refined mind, with a slight touch of playful irony sometimes glinting
through, keen on account of his years, a level-headed observer and judge of
men. Despite the great difference in age between him and me he got along
very well with me, which was shown on the surface by the fact that he was
treated both by the Empress and by myself as our uncle, and addressed as
such, which brought about a certain atmosphere of intimate confidence in
our intercourse. In his talks with me, especially in giving his opinion as to
appointments of officials, he offered very characteristic descriptions of the
gentlemen being discussed, often combined with philosophical observations
which proved that he had reflected deeply on life and humanity, and which
were evidence of a maturity and wisdom grounded on experience.
Something happened during the first period of Hohenlohe's régime as
Chancellor which throws an interesting light upon the relations between
France and Russia. Having, at the time of the fraternization between Russia
and France, received reliable information from the General Staff as well as
from our Embassy at Paris to the effect that France contemplated
withdrawing a portion of her troops from Algeria, in order to shift them to
southern France either against Italy or against Alsace, I apprised Tsar
Nicholas II of this news, adding the remark that I should be obliged to adopt
counter-measures unless the Tsar could dissuade his ally from so
provocative a step.

SOME DIPLOMATIC FENCING

At that time the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Prince Lobanoff,
formerly ambassador at Vienna, well known for his pro-French proclivities.
During the summer of 1895 he had visited France and been very cordially
entertained. During the autumn, just as I was staying for the hunting at
Hubertusstock on the Schorfheide near Eberswalde, Prince Lobanoff, on his
return journey from Paris, requested to be received in audience, at the
behest of the Tsar. Upon being received by me he described the calm and
sensible frame of mind which he had found in Paris and sought to quiet me,

too, with regard to the above-mentioned troop movements, which,
according to him, were mere empty rumor and chatter without any real
basis. He added that he was bringing to me the most quieting assurances,
that there was no reason for my feeling the slightest alarm. I thanked him
heartily for his report, remarking that the word "alarm" was not to be found
in the dictionary of a German officer; and I added that, if France and Russia
wished to make war, I could not prevent it.
Whereupon the Prince, piously casting up his eyes toward heaven, made the
sign of the cross and said: "Oh, la guerre! quelle idée; qui y pense?—cela
ne doit pas être" ("Oh, war! what an idea; who thinks of such a thing? it
must not be"). To that I replied that I, in any event, was not thinking about
it, but that an observer—and he need not be very keen eyed—must
assuredly consider the constant celebrations and speeches, as well as the
official and unofficial visits exchanged between Paris and St. Petersburg, as
significant symptoms which could not be ignored, and which were
calculated to arouse great dissatisfaction in Germany; that, should it come
to war, against my own will and that of my people, I felt that, trusting in
God and in my army and people, it would be possible for Germany to get
the better of both opponents.
To this I added still another statement, reported to me from Paris, which had
been made by a Russian officer who was in France as a member of an
officers' deputation. Having been asked by a French comrade whether the
Russians believed that they could beat the Germans, the gallant Slav
replied: "Non, mon ami, nous serons battus à plate couture, mais qu'est-ce
que ça fait? Nous aurons la République" ("No, my friend, we shall be
thoroughly beaten, but what does that matter? We shall get a republic").
At first the Prince eyed me, speechless, then, shrugging his shoulders, he
remarked: "Oh, la guerre, il ne faut pas même y penser" ("Oh, war, one
must not even think about it"). The officer had merely expressed the general
opinion of the Russian intelligentsia and social circles. As far back as my
first visit to St. Petersburg, in the early 'eighties, a grand duchess said to me
at dinner, quite calmly: "Here we sit all the time on a volcano. We expect
the revolution any day! The Slavs are not faithful, they are not at all
monarchical, all of them are republicans at heart; they disguise their
sentiments, and they lie, every one of them, all the time."

Three important events, related to foreign politics, came within the period
of Prince Hohenlohe's incumbency of the Chancellorship: the opening, in
1895, of the Emperor William Canal (North Sea-Baltic Canal), begun under
Emperor William the Great, to which squadrons or individual ships
representing countries all over the world were invited; the annexation, in
1897, of Tsing-tao; and, third, the much-discussed Kruger dispatch.

THE SEIZURE OF TSING-TAO

Prince Hohenlohe played an especially important rôle in the annexation of
Tsing-tao. He, too, was of the opinion that Germany needed some coaling
stations for her ships, and that the demands of commercial elements that the
opportunity for opening up China to international trade be not allowed to
pass were justified. It was resolved that, under unimpaired Chinese
sovereignty and after payment of the likin (octroi, or internal revenue tax), a
trading port, with a marine coaling station as protection, was to be founded,
wherein it was contemplated to allow China to co-operate to the utmost
possible extent.
The station was to serve the ends of commerce, before all else, the military
measures being limited solely to the protection of the trading center as it
developed; they did not constitute an end in themselves or a basis for
further military enterprises.
Already several places had been considered, but these had proved, upon
more careful investigation, to be unfitted, mostly because they had either
bad connections or none at all with the interior regions, were not promising
from a commercial-political standpoint, or were encumbered by privileges
already granted to other foreign countries. Finally it was agreed—because
of the reports of Admiral Tirpitz, who was, at that time, chief of the East
Asiatic cruiser squadron, and because of the opinion of the geographical
expert, Freiherr von Richthofen, who, having been questioned on the
subject, had drawn a most promising picture of the possibilities of
development in Shantung—to found a settlement on the bay of Kiao-Chau.
The Chancellor proceeded to collect data on the political questions which
arose as a result of this and which must be taken into consideration. It was
particularly necessary not to interfere with Russia's designs, nor to disturb
her. Further information was obtained, some of it from our East Asiatic

division; from this source favorable reports came in as to anchorages and
the ice-free nature of the bay of Kiao-Chau, and as to the prospects, if a port
were to be founded there. From conversations among the officers of the
Russian China division, which had come to our ears in our intercourse with
them, it was learned that the Russian Admiral, in accordance with orders
from his Government, had anchored one winter in the bay, but had found it
so desolate and so atrociously lonesome—there were no tea houses with
Japanese geisha girls, which the Russians deemed absolutely indispensable
to winter quarters—that the Russian squadron would never go back there
any more.
It was also reported that the Russian Admiral had advised his Government
most earnestly against prosecuting any further its intention of founding a
settlement on this bay, since there was absolutely no advantage to be
derived from it. Hence, the Russians had no intention of gaining a foothold
there.
This last piece of news arrived at about the same time as the answer from
the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, sent through the German
ambassador, relative to the sounding of Russian opinion, which had been
made pursuant to instructions from the Chancellor. Muravieff set forth that
Russia, to be sure, had no direct claims, based on treaty with China, to the
bay, but that she, nevertheless, laid claim to it on the basis of the "droit du
premier mouillage" ("right of first anchorage"), since the Russian ships had
anchored there before those of any other fleet. This answer, it will be seen,
ran counter to the report of our East Asiatic division relative to the
statements made by the Russian Admiral.
When I, with Hollmann, met the Chancellor, in order to discuss the Russian
claim to Kiao-Chau, the Prince listened to the reading of it with his little
ironical smile, and remarked that he had been unable to find any jurist at the
Foreign Office who could tell him anything about this wonderful claim.
Was the navy in a position to do so? Admiral Hollmann declared that he, in
all his experience on foreign service, had never heard of it; that it was
nonsense and an invention of Muravieff, whose only motive was
unwillingness to have some other nation settle on the shores of the bay. I
advised that Privy Councilor of the Admiralty Perels, one of the most
famous living experts on international maritime law and an acknowledged
authority in this domain, be asked to deliver an opinion, in order to clarify

the question. This was done. The opinion tore Muravieff's contention to
pieces, corroborated that of Hollmann, and completely did away with the
legend about the "right of first anchorage."
Months elapsed; my August, 1897, visit to Peterhof was imminent. In
agreement with the Prince, my uncle, I decided to discuss the entire matter
in person and frankly with the Tsar, and, if possible, put an end to
Muravieff's notes and evasions. The talk took place at Peterhof. The Tsar
stated that he had no interest in the territory south of the Tientsin-Peking
line, which meant that there was no reason why he should place obstacles in
our path in Shantung: that his interest was concentrated upon the territory
on the Yalu, around Port Arthur, etc., now that the English had made
difficulties for him at Mokpo; that he would, in fact, be pleased if Germany
should locate herself in future on the other side of the Gulf of Chih-li as
Russia's welcome neighbor.
Afterward I had a talk with Muravieff. He employed all his arts, wriggled
back and forth in his statements, and finally brought up his famous "right of
first anchorage." That was all I wanted. I now passed to the offensive
myself, striking out at him squarely with the opinion delivered by Perels.
When I had told him, finally, as the Tsar desired, the result of the
conversations between us two sovereigns, the diplomat was even more
embarrassed, lost his assumed calm, and capitulated.
Thus was the soil prepared, politically speaking. In the autumn came the
news from Bishop Anzer of the murder of the two German Catholic
missionaries in Shantung. The entire German Catholic world, particularly
the "colonials" in the Centerist party, demanded energetic measures. The
Chancellor proposed to me immediate intervention. While I was engaged in
the winter hunting at Lotalingen, I consulted with him, in one of the little
towers of the castle there, as to what steps were to be taken. The Prince
proposed to intrust Prince Henry of Prussia, who was present, with the
command of the squadron that was to be sent out to reinforce the East
Asiatic Division. I informed my brother of this in the presence of the
Chancellor, whereat the Prince and the other gentlemen present were highly
pleased. The Chancellor sent the news to the Foreign Office and to the new
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Bülow, who was away on a
journey.

Kiao-Chau was occupied in November, 1897. In December of that year
Prince Henry sailed, on board the Deutschland, with his squadron to
Eastern Asia, where he later took over the command of the entire East
Asiatic Division. On the 6th of March, 1898, the agreement with China
concerning Kiao-Chau was signed. At the same time, Mr. Chamberlain in
London brought up before the Japanese ambassador, Baron Kato, the idea
of the conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, in order to bar Russia's
advance in the East.

QUEST FOR COALING STATIONS

One will naturally inquire why, in the discussion of our audacious move,
there is no mention of England, since she was certainly deeply interested
therein. Preliminaries, however, had already been gone into with England.
In order to meet the necessity for German coaling stations, I had intended to
found, lease, or buy some in agreement with England, so far as might be
possible. In view of the fact that my uncle, the Chancellor, was, as a
member of the Hohenlohe family, related to Queen Victoria, known to her
personally for years and highly esteemed by her, I hoped that this might
tend to facilitate the negotiations which were entered into with the English
Government for the above-noted purpose. My hope was disappointed. The
negotiations dragged along without any prospect of successful termination.
I took occasion, therefore, at the behest of the Chancellor, to discuss the
matter with the English ambassador at Berlin. I complained of the treatment
received from the English Government, which everywhere opposed German
wishes, even such as were justified. The ambassador agreed frankly with
this, and expressed his astonishment at England's failure to meet Germany
halfway, and at English shortsightedness, since, when a young, rising nation
like Germany, whose development, after all, was not to be prevented, turned
directly to England in order to acquire territory with her consent, instead of
going straight ahead or allying itself with other nations, it was certainly
more than England could reasonably ask.
Moreover, he added that, since England already owned almost all the world,
she could certainly find a place where she might permit Germany to
establish a station; that he was unable to understand the gentlemen in
Downing Street; that in case Germany should not succeed in obtaining

England's approval, she would probably occupy, on her own account, such
places as were suited to her ends, since, after all, there was no law against
it.
I laid stress upon the fact that this agreed entirely with my own view and, in
conclusion, I summed up my standpoint once more for the ambassador: I
told him that Germany was the only country in the world which, despite its
colonial possessions and its rapidly growing commerce, possessed no
coaling stations; that we were quite willing to acquire these with England's
consent; that, should she refuse to show a realization of our situation and
fail to meet us halfway, we should be compelled to turn to some other great
power, in order, with its help, to found settlements.
This talk, likewise, was fruitless. Finally, the negotiations with England
were broken off, without result, in a rather impolite manner. Thereupon the
Chancellor and I decided to appeal to Russia.
The occupation of Kiao-Chau aroused surprise and anger in the English
Government. Having refused us her support, England had definitely
reckoned on the belief that nobody would help Germany in attaining her
goal. Now things had turned out differently, and there was no lack of
recriminations from London. When the English ambassador took up this
tone he was referred to the conversation with me, and it was made clear to
him that it was solely the fault of his Government that it had come to no
understanding with Germany.
England's attitude of aloofness surprised us at that time. An occurrence
which, then, was unknown to me, may serve to throw light on the matter.

FINDS SEED OF WORLD WAR[3]

In a book (The Problem of Japan) which appeared anonymously at The
Hague in 1918 and was said to have been written by an "Ex-Diplomat from
the Far East," an excerpt was published from a work of the American,
Professor Usher of Washington University at St. Louis. Usher, like his
former colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, New
York, has often been called into consultation as an adviser on foreign
relations by the State Department at Washington, since he had a knowledge
possessed by few other Americans on international questions affecting the

United States. Professor Usher, in his book published in 1913, made known,
for the first time, the existence and contents of an "agreement" or "secret
treaty" between England, America, and France, dating from the spring of
1897. In this it was agreed that, in case Germany or Austria, or both of
them, should begin a war for the sake of "Pan-Germanism," the United
States should at once declare in favor of England and France and go to the
support of these powers with all its resources. Professor Usher cites at
length all the reasons, including those of a colonial character, which
inevitably imposed upon the United States the necessity of taking part, on
the side of England and France, in a war against Germany, which Professor
Usher, in 1913, prophesied as imminent!!
The unknown author of The Problem of Japan went to the trouble of
publishing in tabulated form the agreements between England, France, and
America in 1897, in order thereby to show, in a way easily understood, the
extent of the reciprocal obligations. This chapter is extraordinarily worth
reading; it gives a good glimpse into the preliminary history and
preparation of the World War on the part of the Entente, which even at that
time was uniting against Germany, although not yet appearing under the
name of Entente Cordiale. The ex-diplomat remarks in this connection:

Here is a treaty that Professor Usher alleges to have been entered into
as long ago as 1897, in which every phase of activity and participation
in future events by England, France, and the United States is provided
for, including the conquest of the Spanish dependencies, control over
Mexico and Central America, the opening of China, and the
annexation of coaling stations. And all these measures Professor Usher
wishes us to believe were taken to defend the world against Pan-
Germanism.
It is unnecessary to remind Professor Usher, or anybody else, for that
matter, that Pan-Germanism, if we go so far as to assume that such a
thing actually exists, had certainly never been heard of in 1897, at
which time Germany had not yet adopted her program for naval
construction on a large scale, the same having been bruited for the first
time in 1898. If, therefore, it is true that England, France, and the
United States harbored the mutual designs imputed to them by
Professor Usher, and entered into an alliance to accomplish them, it

will scarcely do to attribute the conception of the idea and the stimulus
to its consummation to so feeble a pretext as the rise of a Pan-
Germanism.[4]

Thus the ex-diplomat.
This is truly amazing. A definite treaty of partition directed against Spain,
Germany, etc., arranged even to minute details, was planned between Gauls
and Anglo-Saxons, in a time of the profoundest peace, and concluded
without the slightest twinge of conscience, in order to annihilate Germany
and Austria and eliminate their competition from the world market!
Seventeen years before the beginning of the World War this treaty was made
by the united Anglo-Saxons and its goal was systematically envisaged
throughout this entire period! Now one can understand the ease with which
King Edward VII could pursue his policy of encirclement; for years the
principal actors had been united and in readiness. When he christened the
compact "Entente Cordiale," its appearance was for the world, especially
for Germany, an unpleasant novelty, but in the countries on the other side it
was merely the official acknowledgment of facts long known there.
In view of this agreement, one can understand also the opposition of
England in 1897 to an agreement with Germany regarding coaling stations,
and the anger aroused because Germany managed, in agreement with
Russia, to gain a firm foothold in China, concerning the exploitation of
which land without German participation a tripartite treaty had already been
made.
Usher talked out of school and conclusively proved at whose door lies the
guilt for the World War. The treaty directed against Germany—sometimes
called the "gentleman's agreement"—of the spring of 1897, is the basis, the
point of departure, for this war, which was systematically developed by the
Entente countries for seventeen years. When they had succeeded in winning
over Russia and Japan likewise for their purposes, they struck the blow,
after Serbia had staged the Sarajevo murder and had thus touched the match
to the carefully filled powder barrel.
Professor Usher's statements are likewise a complete refutation of all those
who were impelled, during the war, to find the reason for the entry of the
United States in certain military acts on the part of Germany, as, for

instance, the Lusitania case, the expansion of U-boat warfare, etc. None of
that is right. The recently published, excellent book of John Kenneth
Turner, Shall It Be Again? points out, on the basis of convincing proofs, that
Wilson's alleged reasons for going to war and war aims were not the real
ones. America—or rather President Wilson—was resolved probably from
the start, certainly from 1915, to range herself against Germany and to fight.
She did the latter, alleging the U-boat warfare as a pretext, in reality under
the influence of powerful financial groups, and yielding to the pressure and
prayers of her partner, France, whose resources in man power were
becoming more and more exhausted. America did not wish to leave a
weakened France along with England, whose annexation designs on Calais,
Dunkirk, etc., were well known to her.
It was a fateful thing for Germany—let this be stated here, in a general way
—that our Foreign Office was unable to meet the broad policy of
encirclement of England and the cunning of Russia and France with an
equal degree of diplomatic skill. This was partly because it had not really
been trained under Prince Bismarck; and therefore when, after the
retirement of the Prince and Count Herbert, the all-dominating will and
spirit were lacking, it was not up to the task of conducting foreign affairs on
its own independent initiative.
Moreover, it is difficult in Germany to train up good diplomats, since our
people lack the taste and endowment for diplomacy which have shone forth
brilliantly only from a few German minds, like Frederick the Great and
Bismarck. Unfavorable also to the Foreign Office were the very frequent
changes of Secretaries of State. Imperial Chancellors, following the
example of Bismarck, maintained their influence upon the Foreign Office
and suggested the Secretaries of State who should direct its affairs. I
acquiesced in the proposals of the Imperial Chancellors as to these posts,
since I admitted their right to choose themselves their leading collaborators
in the domain of foreign affairs. That these frequent changes were not
calculated to work toward the continuity of political policy was a
disadvantage that had to be taken into account.
The Foreign Office was largely influenced by the axiom: "No disagreeable
quarrels with other powers"—"surtout pas d'histoires" ("above all, no
yarns"), as the French general said to a company of soldiers which, he had
heard, wished to mutiny. One of the Secretaries of State told me once when,

in placing some matter before me, I had called his attention to the
apparently serious situation in connection with some foreign question, that
this simply must be righted, that the Foreign Office based its acts primarily
upon the maxim: "Let us have quiet."
Given this attitude, one can also understand the answer which the German
representative gave to a German merchant in a South American republic
who had asked him for help and intercession with the authorities, since his
shop had been plundered and his property stolen: "Oh, don't bother me with
these things! We have established such pleasant relations with this republic;
any action undertaken in your behalf would only serve to upset them." I
need scarcely add that whenever such a conception of duty came to my
attention I removed the official concerned from his post.
The Foreign Office enjoyed general unpopularity both among the people
and in the army. I worked continuously, during the tenure of office of
various Chancellors, for thorough reform, but in vain. Every new
Chancellor, especially if he himself did not come from the ranks of the
foreign service, needed the Foreign Office in order to work himself into
foreign affairs, and this took time. But once he had worked himself in he
was under obligation to the officials, and was reluctant to make extensive
changes, burdened as he was by other matters and lacking detailed
knowledge regarding the Foreign Office personnel, particularly as he still
believed that he needed the advice of those who were "orientated."

DEVELOPMENT OF TSING-TAO

But let us return to Tsing-tao. Here everything was done to promote
commerce and industry, and done jointly with the Chinese; the flag of the
Chinese Empire, moreover, was hoisted over the Custom House at Tsing-
tao. The development there was such that the port, during the years
immediately preceding the war, ranked sixth among all Chinese trading
centers in the commercial register of the great Chinese merchants and of the
merchants' guild coming just after Tientsin. Tsing-tao was a prospering
German commercial colony, where many Chinese worked side by side with
Germans; it was, so to speak, a great sample warehouse of German abilities
and German achievements, to which the Chinese, who formerly had not
known Germany, her capabilities of achievement, or her products, could

repair for selection and emulation; it was a contrast to the naval stations of
Russia and England, which were purely military, directed solely toward
domination and conquest.
The rapid rise of Tsing-tao as a trading center aroused the envy of the
Japanese and English, but this did not prevent swarms of the latter from
journeying, with their families, to the splendid beach, enjoying its cool air
and the beautiful Strand Hotel, and devoting themselves to playing polo and
lawn tennis after they had escaped from the heat of Hongkong, Canton, and
Shanghai. Envy prompted England in 1914 to demand that Japan should
take Tsing-tao, although it was de facto Chinese. Japan did this joyfully,
promising to return it to China, but it was not returned until the beginning
of 1922, after much pressure, although Japan had agreed with America that
she was not to be allowed to make any territorial changes in China without
previous consultation with Washington.
Thus a great German cultural work in foreign lands, which stood as a model
of the method and manner which a cultured nation should employ in
extending the advantages of its culture to another nation, was annihilated by
English commercial envy. Some day, when Hongkong has gone the same
way, England will repent of her act and bitterly reproach herself for having
abandoned her old maxim, in accordance with which she has acted for so
many years: "White men together against colored men." When once Japan
has made a reality out of her watchword, "Asia for the Asiatics," and
brought China and India under her sway, England will cast her eyes about
in search of Germany and the German fleet.
As to the "yellow peril," I had the following interview with the Tsar later,
after the Russo-Japanese War, at a meeting between us.
The Tsar was, at that time, visibly impressed by the growing power of Japan
and its constant menace to Russia and Europe, and requested my opinion
concerning this. I answered that if the Russians counted themselves among
the cultured nations of Europe they must be ready to rally to the defense of
these nations against the "yellow peril" and to fight for and by the side of
Europe for their own and Europe's existence and culture; but that if the
Russians, on the other hand, considered themselves Asiatics they would
unite with the "yellow peril," and, joining forces with it, would assail

Europe. The Tsar, said I, must bear this in mind in providing for the defense
of his land and organizing his army.
When the Tsar asked me what course I thought the Russians would take, I
replied: "The second."
The Tsar was outraged and wished to know at once on what I based this
opinion. I answered that my opinion was based on Russia's construction of
railways and on the arraying of the Russian army along the Prussian-
Austrian frontier. Thereupon the Tsar protested that he and his house were
Europeans, that his country and his Russians would certainly cleave to
Europe, that he would look upon it as a matter of honor to protect Europe
from the "yellow men." To this I replied that if this was the Tsar's attitude
he must make his military preparations conform to it without delay. The
Tsar said nothing.
At all events, I sought to utilize Tsar Nicholas II's worry at the growing
power of Japan to the advantage of Germany and general European culture.
Russia, despite siding with Japan, was the first nation to collapse among all
those participating in the war.

REPROACHES FOR JAPAN

The able statesmen of Japan, of whom there are quite a number, must be in
some doubt as to whether they ranged their country on the right side in the
war. Yes, they will perhaps ask themselves whether it would not have been
more advantageous for Japan to have prevented the World War. This would
have been within her powers, had she ranged herself firmly and
unequivocally on the side of the Central Powers, from which in former
times she had learned so willingly and so much.
Had Japan adopted soon enough such an orientation in her foreign policy,
and, like Germany, fought by peaceful means for her share in world trade
and activity, I should have put the "yellow peril" away in a corner and
joyfully welcomed into the circle of peacefully inclined nations the
progressive Japanese nation, the "Prussians of the East." Nobody regrets
more than I that the "yellow peril" had not already lost its meaning when
the crisis of 1914 arose. The experience derived from the World War may
yet bring this about.

Germany's joint action with France and Russia at Shimonoseki was based
upon Germany's situation in Europe. Wedged in between on-marching
Russia, threatening Prussia's frontier, and France, fortifying her borders
anew with forts and groups of fortresses, confronted with a friendship
between these two nations resembling an alliance, Berlin looked with
anxiety into the future. The warlike preparations of the two powers were far
ahead of ours, their navies far more modern and powerful than the German
navy, which consisted of a few old ships almost without fighting value.
Therefore it seemed to us wise to acquiesce in the suggestion of this strong
group, in order that it might not—should we decline—turn immediately to
England and cause the entry of the latter into the combination. This would
have meant the formation, at that time, of the combination of 1914, which
would have been a serious matter for Germany. Japan, on the other hand,
was about to go over anyhow to England, in her sympathies. Moreover,
Germany's making common cause with the Franco-Russian group offered
the possibility of achieving gradually a more trusting and less strained
relationship in Europe and of living side by side with our two neighbors
there in more friendliness, as a result of the common policy, adopted in the
Far East. The policy adopted by us at this juncture was also consistently
based on the maintenance of world peace.
In the entire Kiao-Chau question, Prince Hohenlohe, despite his age,
evinced a capacity for sticking steadily to his purpose and a degree of
resolution which must be reckoned as greatly to his credit.
Unfortunately in the matter of the Kruger dispatch his prudence and his
vision, so clear on other occasions, abandoned him: only by so assuming is
his obstinate insistence on the sending of this dispatch to be understood.
The influence of such an energetic and eloquent personage as Herr von
Marschall, former State Attorney, may have been so powerful, the siren
song of Herr von Holstein so convincing, that the Prince yielded to them. In
any event, he did his country an ill turn in this matter, and damaged me
seriously both in England and at home.

THE KRUGER TELEGRAM[5]

Since the so-called Kruger dispatch made a big stir and had serious political
consequences, I shall tell the story of it in detail.

The Jameson raid caused great and increasing excitement in Germany. The
German nation was outraged at this attempt to overpower a little nation,
which was Dutch—and, hence, Lower Saxon-German in origin—and to
which we were sympathetic because of racial relationship. I was much
worried at this violent excitement, which also seized upon the higher
classes of society, foreseeing possible complications with England. I
believed that there was no way to prevent England from conquering the
Boer countries, should she so desire, although I also was convinced that
such a conquest would be unjust. But I was unable to overcome the reigning
excitement, and was even harshly judged by my intimates on account of the
attitude I adopted.
One day when I had gone to my uncle, the Imperial Chancellor, for a
conference, at which the Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral
Hollmann, was present, Freiherr Marschall, one of the Secretaries of State,
suddenly appeared in high excitement, with a sheet of paper in his hand. He
declared that the excitement among the people—in the Reichstag, even—
had grown to such proportions that it was absolutely necessary to give it
outward expression, and that this could best be done by a telegram to
Kruger, a rough draft of which he had in his hand.
I objected to this, being supported by Admiral Hollmann. At first the
Imperial Chancellor remained passive in the debate. In view of the fact that
I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and the Foreign Office were of
English national psychology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr Marschall
the consequences which such a step would have among the English; in this,
likewise, Admiral Hollmann seconded me. But Marschall was not to be
dissuaded.
Then, finally, the Imperial Chancellor took a hand. He remarked that I, as a
constitutional ruler, must not stand out against the national consciousness
and against my constitutional advisers; otherwise, there was danger that the
excited attitude of the German people, deeply outraged in its sense of
justice and also in its sympathy for the Dutch, might cause it to break down
the barriers and turn against me personally. Already, he said, statements
were flying about among the people; it was being said that the Emperor
was, after all, half an Englishman, with secret English sympathies; that he
was entirely under the influence of his grandmother, Queen Victoria; that

the dictation emanating from England must cease once for all; that the
Emperor must be freed from English tutelage, etc.

SAYS HE SIGNED AGAINST HIS WILL

In view of all this, he continued, it was his duty as Imperial Chancellor,
notwithstanding he admitted the justification of my objections, to insist that
I sign the telegram in the general political interest, and, above all else, in the
interest of my relationship to my people. He and also Herr von Marschall,
he went on, in their capacity of my constitutional advisers, would assume
full responsibility for the telegram and its consequences.
Sir Valentine Chirol, at that time correspondent of the Times, wrote, in the
Times of September 11th, that Herr von Marschall, directly after the sending
of the dispatch, had stated to him that the dispatch did not give the personal
opinion of the Emperor, but was a governmental act, for which the
Chancellor and he himself assumed full responsibility.
Admiral Hollmann, when the Imperial Chancellor appealed to him for
corroboration of this point of view and was asked by him to uphold it to me,
declined to do so with the remark that the Anglo-Saxon world would
unquestionably attribute the telegram to the Kaiser, since nobody would
believe that such a provocative thing could come from His Majesty's elderly
advisers, and all would consider it an "impulsive" act of the "youthful"
Emperor.
Then I again tried to dissuade the gentlemen from their project. But the
Imperial Chancellor and Marschall insisted that I sign, reiterating that they
would be responsible for consequences. It seemed to me that I ought not to
refuse after their presentation of the case. I signed.
Not long before his death Admiral Hollmann recalled the occurrence to me
in full detail, as it is described here.
After the Kruger dispatch was made public the storm broke in England, as I
had prophesied. I received from all circles of English society, especially
from aristocratic ladies unknown to me, a veritable flood of letters
containing every possible kind of reproach, some of the writers not
hesitating even at slandering me personally and insulting me. Attacks and
calumnies began to appear in the press, so that soon the legend of the origin

of the dispatch was as firmly established as the amen at church. If
Marschall had also announced in the Reichstag what he stated to Chirol, I
personally would not have been drawn into the matter to such an extent.
In February, 1900, while the Boer War was in progress and while I was with
the fleet at Heligoland attending the maneuvers of ships of the line, after
having been present at the swearing in of recruits at Wilhelmshafen I
received news by telegraph from the Wilhelmstrasse, via Heligoland, that
Russia and France had proposed to Germany to make a joint attack on
England, now that she was involved elsewhere, and cripple her sea traffic. I
objected and ordered that the proposal be declined.
Since I assumed that Paris and St. Petersburg would present the matter at
London in such a way as to make it appear that Berlin had made the above
proposal to both of them, I immediately telegraphed from Heligoland to
Queen Victoria and to the Prince of Wales (Edward) the fact of the Russo-
French proposal, and its refusal by me. The Queen answered expressing her
hearty thanks, the Prince of Wales with an expression of astonishment.
Later, Her Majesty let me know secretly that, shortly before the receipt of
my telegram from Heligoland concerning the proposal from Paris and St.
Petersburg, the false version of the matter foreseen by me had indeed been
told, and that she was glad to have been able, thanks to my dispatch, to
expose the intrigue to her Government and quiet it as to the loyal attitude of
Germany; she added that she would not forget the service I had done
England in troublous times.

DEAL WITH CECIL RHODES

When Cecil Rhodes came to me, in order to bring about the construction of
the Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Telegraph line through the interior regions
of German East Africa, his wishes were approved by me, in agreement with
the Foreign Office and the Imperial Chancellor; with the proviso that a
branch railway should be built via Tabora, and that German material should
be used in the construction work on German territory. Both conditions were
acquiesced in by Rhodes most willingly. He was grateful at the fulfillment
of his pet ambition by Germany, only a short time after King Leopold of
Belgium had refused his request.

Rhodes was full of admiration for Berlin and the tremendous German
industrial plants, which he visited daily. He said that he regretted not having
been in Berlin before, in order to have learned about the power and
efficiency of Germany, and to have got into touch with the German
Government and prominent Germans in commercial circles. He said he had
wished, even before the Jameson raid, to visit Berlin, but had been
prevented in London at that time from so doing; that, had he been able to
inform us before of his plan to get permission to build the Cape-to-Cairo
line through the Boer countries, as well as through our colonies, the
German Government would probably have been able to help him by
bringing persuasion to bear upon Kruger, who was unwilling to grant this
permission; that "the stupid Jameson Raid" would never have been made, in
that case, and the Kruger dispatch never written—as to that dispatch, he had
never borne me a grudge on account of it.
He added that as we, in Germany, could not be correctly informed as to aim
and actual purposes, the said raid must have looked to us like "an act of
piracy," which naturally and quite rightly had excited the Germans; that all
he had wanted was to have such stretches of land as were needed for his rail
lines—such, in fact, as Germany had just granted to him in the interior of
her colonies—a demand which was not unjust and would certainly have met
with German support. I was not to worry, he added, about the dispatch and
not bother myself any more about the uproar in the English press. Rhodes
did not know about the origin of the Kruger dispatch and wanted to console
me, imagining that I was its originator.
Rhodes went on to advise me to build the Bagdad Railway and open up
Mesopotamia, after having had irrigation simultaneously introduced there.
He said that this was Germany's task, just as his was the Cape-to-Cairo line.
In view of the fact that the building of this line through our territory was
also made dependent upon the cession to us of the Samoan Islands, Rhodes
worked actively in London toward having them turned over to us.
In home politics, Prince Hohenlohe, as Chancellor, showed a mildness
which was not generally favorable. Owing to his long acquaintanceship
with Herr von Hertling, he was able to establish friendly relations with the
Vatican. His mildness and indulgence were also exercised toward Alsace-
Lorraine, in which, as an expert of long standing, he showed particular

interest. But he got little thanks for this, since the French element, indirectly
benefited thereby, behaved with ever-increasing arrogance.

PEN SKETCH OF HOHENLOHE

Prince Hohenlohe loved to employ mediation, compromise, and
conciliation—toward the Socialists likewise—and he employed them on
some occasions when energetic measures would have been more fitting. He
hailed with much joy my Far East trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem. He
was pleased at the strengthening of our relations with Turkey and
considered the plan for the Bagdad Railway arising from them as a great
cultural work worthy of Germany.
He also gave his most enthusiastic approval to my visit to England in 1899,
made by me with my wife and two sons at the desire of my royal
grandmother, who, growing steadily weaker on account of her years, wished
to see her oldest grandson once more. He hoped that this journey might
serve to efface somewhat the consequences of the Kruger dispatch sent by
him, and also to clarify some important questions by means of conferences
between me and English statesmen.
In order to avoid any unpleasantness from the English press, which, angered
by the Boer War and the partly unjustified attacks of certain German
newspapers, had been answering in like tone, the Queen had commissioned
the author of The Life of the Prince Consort, Sir Theodore Martin, to inform
the English press of Her Majesty's desire that a friendly reception be
accorded to her Imperial grandson. And that is what indeed came to pass.
The visit ran its course harmoniously and caused satisfaction on all sides. I
held important conferences with various leading men.
Not once in the entire visit was the Kruger dispatch mentioned. On the
other hand, my royal grandmother did not conceal from her grandson how
unwelcome the whole Boer War was to her; she made no secret of her
disapproval and aversion for Mr. Chamberlain and all that he represented,
and thanked me again for my prompt and sharp refusal of the Russo-French
proposal to interfere and for my immediate announcement of this proposal.
One could easily see how much the Queen loved her splendid army and
how deeply she had been grieved by the heavy reverses suffered by it at the
outset of the war, which had caused by no means negligible losses.

Referring to these, the aged Field Marshal Duke of Cambridge coined the
fine phrase: "The British nobleman and officer have shown that they can die
bravely as gentlemen."
On my departure, the Queen bade me farewell with cordial and grateful
greetings to her "much-cherished cousin," the Imperial Chancellor, whose
ability and experience, she hoped, would continue to maintain good
relations between our two countries.
My report entirely satisfied Prince Hohenlohe as to the success of my
journey; at the same time, however, I was the object of the most violent
attacks from a certain section of the press and from many excited "friends
of the Boers." The German lacks the very thing with which the English
people has been inoculated, and to which it has been trained by long
political self-discipline: when a fight is on, even though it be merely upon
the field of diplomacy, the Englishman unquestioningly follows the flag, in
accordance with the proverb: "You can't change the jockey while running."
In the autumn of 1900 Prince Hohenlohe retired from the Chancellorship,
since the work had become too arduous for a man of his advanced age.
Moreover, the constant quarrels and disputes of the political parties with
one another were disagreeable to him, and it went against the grain with
him to make speeches before them in the Reichstag. Equally disagreeable to
him was the press, part of which had taken the bit between its teeth and
imagined that it could conserve the Bismarckian tradition by quoting
sayings by Bismarck, and had greatly jeopardized relations with England,
especially during the Boer War.

CHANCELLOR'S RETIREMENT

The hope, aroused by the choice of Prince Hohenlohe as Chancellor and his
assumption of the office, that Prince Bismarck would place less obstacles in
his path, had been only partly fulfilled. The atmosphere had been much
relieved and Prince Bismarck brought to a much milder frame of mind by
my reconciliation with him, which had received outward expression in his
solemn entry into Berlin and his staying at the old Hohenzollern palace, but
his adherents and those rallying around him for the sake of opposition were
not to be dissuaded from their activities. Moreover, the political
representatives of the people succeeded, while I was on my way to

Friedrichsruh to celebrate Bismarck's eightieth birthday, in refusing to pay
homage to the old Imperial Chancellor, a thing which naturally deeply hurt
the sensitive Prince Hohenlohe and filled him with indignation.
He, like myself, was deeply moved by the death of his great predecessor,
and we, together with the German people, sincerely mourned Prince
Bismarck as one of the greatest of the sons of Prussia and Germany, in spite
of the fact that he had not always made our task easy. I insisted upon
hurrying back from my trip to Norway in order to pay honor to him who, as
a faithful servant of his old master, had helped the German nation to unity,
and under whom I, when I was Prince, had had the proud privilege of
working.
It is said that one of the reasons why Prince Hohenlohe retired from his post
was the advice of his son Alexander, who was much at his father's house; he
was known in society as "the Crown Prince," and was essentially different
from his lovable father.
Prince Hohenlohe could look back upon a series of successes during his
term as Chancellor: the overcoming of the disputes concerning the
"Citizens' Book of Laws," the reform of the military punishment procedure,
the Naval law, the appointment of Waldersee to the command in China at
the time of the Boxer War, Tsing-tao, and the Yangtse Treaty.
He bade me farewell on the 15th of October, 1900. Both of us were greatly
moved, for not only was the Chancellor and faithful co-worker parting from
his Emperor, but also the uncle from his nephew, who looked up with
grateful esteem to the old man. At the age of seventy-five years—an age
when others have long since retired to rest and contemplation—he had not
hesitated to obey the summons of the Emperor to subject himself to even
more exacting labors and devote his time and strength to the German
fatherland. When about to leave my room, he grasped my hand once again
with the request that I might grant him, during the years of life still
remaining to him (which he meant to spend in Berlin), the same plain,
faithful friendship which he had so long noted and admired between me and
Admiral von Hollmann. I shall always preserve him faithfully in my
memory.

CHAPTER IV

Bülow
On the day after Prince Hohenlohe's farewell, the man summoned by me as
his successor—Count Bülow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, arrived.
His choice for the post was eminently fitting, because he was thoroughly
cognizant of our foreign policy and, especially, of our relations with
England—which policy was becoming constantly livelier and more
complicated—and because he had already proved himself a skillful orator
and ready debater in the Reichstag. The fact that the second of these
qualities was lacking in his predecessor had often been painfully noticeable.
When Prince Hohenlohe's intention to retire became known in the Imperial
Council, the Bavarian ambassador at Berlin, Count Lerchenfeld, very
pointedly remarked to me that for Heaven's sake I was not to choose
another South German, since South Germans were not fitted for the leading
post at Berlin; North Germans were naturally better able to fill it and,
therefore, it would be better for the Empire to select a North German.
I had been acquainted personally with Bülow for a long time, ever since the
period of his ambassadorship at Rome and his work as Secretary of State.
Then I had often visited him at his home and had held many a conference
with him in his garden. He came into closer relationship with me when he
accompanied me on my journey to the Far East, where, in co-operation with
the ambassador, Freiherr Marschall, he assisted me in getting into personal
touch with the leading men of the Turkish Government. Hence, the relations
of the new Chancellor with me were already begun and, to a certain extent,
established, since we had for years discussed all political problems and
spheres. Moreover, he stood much nearer to me in age than his
predecessors, most of whom could have been my grandfather. He was the
first "young Chancellor" of Germany. And this made our common task
easier for both of us.

When I was in Berlin, scarcely a day went by without my taking a long
morning walk with the Chancellor in the garden of the Imperial
Chancellor's palace, during which outstanding business was cleared up and
problems of actuality discussed. I often had a meal with him and always
found at his table, where I was most hospitably received by the Count, his
amiable wife and a group of the most interesting men, in choosing whom
the Count was a master. He was likewise unsurpassed in skillfully
conducting conversation and in the witty handling of the various topics that
arose. To me it was always a pleasure to be in the company of the
Chancellor and enjoy his bubbling wit, to exchange views at his table with
many professors, savants, and artists, as well as Government officials of all
sorts, in informal, unofficial intercourse and stimulating exchange of ideas.
The Count was an excellent narrator of anecdotes, drawn both from books
and his own personal experience, which he told in several languages. He
liked to tell stories of the days when he was a diplomat, especially about his
stay at St. Petersburg.

BÜLOW A DISCIPLE OF BISMARCK

The Count's father was an intimate friend of Prince Bismarck and had been
one of his closest co-workers. Young Bülow also had begun his career
under the great Chancellor; he had been brought up on Bismarckian ideas
and traditions and strongly influenced by them, but, nevertheless, had not
adhered to them to such an extent as to lose his independence.
In the course of one of the first talks which I had with Bülow as Imperial
Chancellor he informed himself concerning my ideas of how best to handle
the English and have dealings with them. I told him that I considered
absolute frankness the most important thing in dealing with England and
Englishmen; that the Englishman, in presenting his point of view and
working for his interests, was inconsiderate to the point of brutality, for
which reason he thoroughly understood anybody who acted similarly
toward him; that there must be no playing the diplomatic game, or
"finessing," with an Englishman, because it made him distrust those with
whom he was dealing and suspect that they were not honest and wished
secretly to cheat him; that such devious methods could be successful only in
dealing with Latin and Slavic nations; that, once the Englishman had

become suspicious, there was nothing more to be done with him, despite the
most honeyed words and most obliging concessions; that the only advice,
therefore, which I could give the Chancellor was that he confine himself
entirely to straightforwardness in his English policy. I said this with
particular emphasis, since "finessing" was especially dear to the diplomatic
character of Count Bülow and had become second nature to him.
I also took occasion, during this talk, to warn the Chancellor against
Holstein. In spite of my warning—which was merely a repetition of that
given me before by Bismarck—Bülow worked a great deal, or was obliged
to work, with Holstein. This remarkable man had been able gradually,
especially since the time that the Foreign Office had been, so to speak,
orphaned by Bismarck's retirement, to create for himself a position that
became steadily more influential and to maintain it under three Chancellors
with such skill that he was considered indispensable.
Holstein was unquestionably possessed of great shrewdness, seconded by a
phenomenal memory and a certain talent for political combinations, which,
to be sure, often became a hobby in his case. His position was also based
largely on the fact that he was looked upon in many quarters, especially
among the older officials, as the "bearer of the Bismarckian traditions," the
man who upheld these in the teeth of "the young master." His importance
rested, above all, on his wide personal knowledge in the entire domain of
the foreign service. Since he wielded, on account of this, an authoritative
influence on all proposals relative to the appointment of officials and hence,
also, on the careers of the younger officials, it may be easily understood
why he, little by little, had obtained for himself a dominating position at the
Foreign Office. But he sought more and more to obtain, at the same time, a
decisive influence upon the conduct of foreign policy; he had, in fact,
become the guiding spirit both of the Foreign Office and of German foreign
policy.

HOLSTEIN'S SECRET POWER

The serious thing about this was that he exerted his far-reaching influence
entirely from under cover and avoided all official responsibility as an
adviser. He preferred to remain in the dark and exert his influence from
there. He refused every responsible post—many stood open to him—every

honorary title, every promotion. He lived in complete seclusion. For a long
time I tried in vain to become personally acquainted with him, for which
purpose I used to invite him to meals, but Holstein declined every time.
Only once, in the course of many years, did he consent to dine with me at
the Foreign Office, and it was characteristic of him that, whereas on this
occasion all the other gentlemen present wore full evening dress, he
appeared in a frock coat and excused himself on the plea that he had no
dress coat.
The secrecy with which he surrounded himself in his work, so as not to be
held responsible for it, became apparent also at times in the character of the
memorials drawn up by him; they were unquestionably ingenious and
attractive, but often as involved and ambiguous as the oracle of Delphi;
there were occasions when, after a decision had been made based on the
contents of one of these documents, Herr von Holstein would prove to a
nicety that he meant exactly the opposite of what had been thought.
I considered it a serious matter that an irresponsible counselor should bring
to bear such powerful influence, especially as he did so from under cover
and, hence, in doing it, eluded the officials who were in duty bound to exert
influence, and who were the responsible parties. Often, especially in the
von Richthofen era, it happened that I would advise a foreign ambassador to
discuss some political question, which he had taken up with me, with the
Secretary of State, and he would reply: "J'en parlerai avec mon ami
Holstein" ("I shall speak about it with my friend Holstein"). The fact alone
that an official of the Foreign Office dealt with foreign ambassadors, going
over the head of his superior, did not seem right to me; but that he should be
dubbed by these foreigners "friend" seemed to me to go beyond what I
deemed advisable.
Matters had, in fact, developed gradually to such a stage that Holstein
conducted a good part of our foreign affairs. To be sure, he still listened to
the Chancellor in connection with them, but what the Emperor thought or
said about foreign affairs was rather unimportant. If things turned out
successfully, the Foreign Office reaped the reward; if things went wrong,
then it was the fault of the "impulsive young master."
In spite of all this, Bülow, too, apparently thought Herr von Holstein
indispensable at first; he worked together with him for a long time, until at

last he, too, found unbearable the pressure which this strange man exerted
on everybody. To Herr von Tschirschky, during his tenure of office as
Secretary of State, belongs the merit of finally bringing the unendurable
situation to a head. On being questioned by me, he declared that he
considered it impossible that Herr von Holstein remain at his post any
longer, since he was embroiling the whole Foreign Office, seeking to
eliminate him, the Secretary of State, entirely, and creating all kinds of
obstacles, likewise, for the Chancellor.

DISMISSAL—AND AN ENEMY

Thereupon I ordered Herr von Tschirschky to prepare the way for the
dismissal of Herr von Holstein, which afterward took place, with the
approval of the Chancellor, after the latter had recovered from the serious
break-down in health which he had suffered meanwhile. Herr von Holstein
himself showed what manner of man he was by going at once after his
dismissal to Herr Harden and placing himself at the latter's disposal for the
campaign against the Emperor.
The year 1901 gave Count Bülow plentiful opportunities to show and assert
himself in dealings with England. Count Bülow still believed strongly in the
Bismarckian theory of having "two irons in the fire"—i. e., in making
friendly agreements with another country while always remaining on good
terms with Russia—in which he received support from the many pretended
adherents of Bismarck.
From the midst of the Jubilee celebration of the two hundredth coronation
anniversary, I was called to the deathbed of my grandmother, Queen
Victoria, by a dispatch announcing to me the serious condition of the
Queen. I hurriedly made the journey with my uncle, the Duke of
Connaught, who was at Berlin as the Queen's representative at the
festivities—he was the favorite son of the Queen and my particular friend,
and a son-in-law of Prince Frederick Charles—and I was cordially received
in London by the then Prince of Wales and the royal family. As my carriage
drove out at a trot from the railway station a plainly dressed man stepped
forward from the closely packed crowd standing there in absolute silence,
to the side of the carriage, bared his head, and said: "Thank you, Kaiser."

The Prince of Wales, later Edward VII, added: "That is what they all think,
and they will never forget this coming of yours."
Nevertheless, they did forget it, and quickly.
After the Queen had quietly breathed her last in my arms, the curtain fell for
me upon many memories of childhood. Her death signified the close of an
epoch in English history and in Germany's relations with England. I now
got into touch, as far as possible, with prominent personages, and noted
everywhere a thoroughly sympathetic, friendly spirit, which made no secret
of the wish for good relations with Germany.
At the farewell banquet impromptu speeches were made by King Edward
VII and myself, which were cordial in tone and content, and did not fail to
make an impression on their hearers. After the meal the English ambassador
at Berlin clasped my hand and said that my speech had touched all his
fellow countrymen's hearts, because what I said was sincere and simple, as
was fitting for Englishmen; that the speech must at once be made public,
since it would have an effect throughout the country, which was grateful for
my coming; and that this would be useful to the relations between the two
countries. I answered that it was a matter for the British Government and
the King to decide, that personally I had no objections to having the speech
made public.
Nevertheless, it was not made public, and the British people never learned
of my words, which were the sincere expression of my sentiments and
thoughts. In another talk later on with me at Berlin the same ambassador
deeply regretted this, but was unable to say what the reason was for this
omission.
In concluding my remarks on my stay in England I cannot pass over the fact
that a portion of the German press was unfortunately lacking both in tactful
appreciation of the grief of the English royal family and people, as well as
of the obligations which my family relationship and political considerations
imposed upon me.
After my return home from England I was able to report to the Chancellor
on the good impressions I had received, and particularly that opinion in
England was apparently in favor of an understanding and of closer
relations.

Bülow expressed himself as satisfied with the results of the journey, after
we had talked at length about it at Homburg, and consulted as to how the
situation created by the journey should be put to use. I suggested that we
should unquestionably come to a good agreement, if an alliance—which I
preferred—could not be brought about. In any event, a firm agreement
would suffice, I said, and would suit the English; in the long run an alliance
might always develop from it.
The opportunity for such an alliance came with unexpected promptness.
While I was at Homburg von der Höhe in the spring of 1901, Count
Metternich, who was with me as representative of the Foreign Office,
brought me a notification from Berlin that Mr. Chamberlain had inquired
there as to whether Germany was ready for an alliance with England. I
immediately asked: "Against whom?"—since, if England so suddenly
offered to make an alliance in the midst of peace, it was plain that she
needed the German army, which made it worth while to find out against
whom the army was needed and for what reason German troops were to
fight, at England's behest, by her side. Thereupon the answer came from
London that they were needed against Russia, since Russia was a menace
both to India and to Constantinople.
The first thing I did was to call London's attention to the old traditional
brotherhood-in-arms between the German and Russian armies, and the
close family ties between the reigning dynasties of the two countries; in
addition, I pointed out the dangers of a war on two fronts, in case France
came in on the side of Russia, and also the fact that we had acted jointly
with France and Russia in the Far East (Shimonoseki, 1895) and that there
was no reason to unloose a conflict with Russia at this time, when we were
in the midst of peace; that the superiority in number of the Russian army on
a peace footing was very great and the eastern frontiers of Prussia seriously
threatened by the grouping of the Russian forces; that England would not be
in a position to protect our eastern province from a Russian attack, since her
fleet could accomplish little in the Baltic and would be unable to sail into
the Black Sea; that, in case of our making common cause against Russia,
Germany would be the only one who would be in great danger, quite
independently of the possibility of the entry of France into the fight.
Chamberlain then informed us that a firm alliance should be made, by
which England would naturally bind herself to come to our aid.

BRITISH ALLIANCE FAILS

I had also pointed out that the validity of an alliance could only be assured
when the English Parliament had placed its approval upon it, since the
Ministry might be driven from office by the will of the nation as expressed
in Parliament, whereby signature of the Ministry might be rendered null and
void and the alliance invalidated, and that we could look upon the
Chamberlain suggestion, for the time being, merely as a purely personal
project of his own.
To this Chamberlain replied that he would get backing from Parliament in
due time and would find the way of winning the Unionists over to his idea;
that all needed now was the signature of Berlin. Matters did not progress as
far as that, because Parliament was not to be won over to Chamberlain's
plan; therefore the "plan" came to nothing. Soon afterward England
concluded her alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The Russo-Japanese War
broke out, in which Japan—owing to the fact that it fitted in with her
schemes—played the rôle of pawn for England's interests, which rôle had
originally been reserved for Germany. By this war Russia was thrown from
the east back to the west, where she might concern herself again with the
Balkans, Constantinople, and India—which was to Japan's advantage—
leaving to Japan a free hand in Korea and China.
In 1905 came my journey to Tangier, undertaken much against my will. It
came about as follows: Toward the end of March I intended, as in the
previous year, to take a Mediterranean trip for the sake of my health, for
which I proposed to avail myself of some ship running empty from
Cuxhaven to Naples. The Hamburg was destined by Ballin for this purpose.
At his request that I take along some other guests, since the steamer was
quite empty, I invited a number of gentlemen, among them Privy Councilor
Althoc, Admiral Mensing, Count Pückler, Ambassador von Varnbuhler,
Professor Schiemann, Admiral Hollmann, etc.
Soon after the proposed trip became known Bülow informed me that there
was a strong desire at Lisbon to have me stop there and pay the Portuguese
court a visit. To this I agreed. As the date of departure approached, Bülow
expressed the additional wish that I also stop at Tangier and, by visiting that
Moroccan port, strengthen the position of the Sultan of Morocco in relation
to the French.

This I declined, since it seemed to me that the Morocco question was too
full of explosive matter and I feared that such a visit would work out
disadvantageously rather than beneficially. Bülow returned to the attack,
without, however, persuading me of the necessity or advisability of the
visit.

AGAIN KAISER "GIVES IN"

During the journey I had several talks with Freiherr von Schoen, who
accompanied me as representative of the Foreign Office, as to the
advisability of the visit. We agreed that it would be better to drop it. I
telegraphed this decision to the Chancellor from Lisbon. Bülow replied
emphatically that I must take into consideration the view of the German
people and of the Reichstag, which had become interested in the project,
and that it was necessary that I stop at Tangier.
I gave in, with a heavy heart, for I feared that this visit, in view of the
situation at Paris, might be construed as a provocation and cause an
inclination in London to support France in case of war. Since I suspected
that Delcassé wished to make Morocco a pretext for war, I feared that he
might make use of the Tangier visit for this purpose.
The visit took place, after much difficulty had been experienced in the open
roadstead of Tangier, and it met with a certain amount of friendly
participation by Italian and Southern French anarchists, rogues, and
adventurers. A lot of Spaniards stood upon a small square, amid waving
banners and loud cries; these, according to a police official who
accompanied us, were an assembly of Spanish anarchists.
The first I learned about the consequences of my Tangier visit was when I
got to Gibraltar and was formally and frigidly received by the English, in
marked contrast to my cordial reception the year before. What I had
foreseen was justified by the facts. Embitterment and anger reigned in Paris,
and Delcassé tried to rouse the nation to war; the only reason that he did not
succeed was that both the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy
declared France not yet ready.
The fact that my fears were justified was also corroborated later by the
conversation between Delcassé and the editor of Le Gaulois, in which the

Minister informed an astonished world that, in case of war, England would
have sided with France. Thus, even as far back as that, I ran the risk,
through the Tangier visit forced upon me, of getting blamed for the
unchaining of a world war. To think and act constitutionally is often a hard
task for a ruler upon whom in every case responsibility is finally saddled.
In October, 1905, the Paris Matin reported that Delcassé had declared in the
Council of Ministers that England had offered, in case of war, to land
100,000 men in Holstein and seize the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. This English
offer was repeated once more later on, with the suggestion that it be
affirmed in writing. And the well-known Jaurès, who was murdered in
accordance with the political ideas of Isvolsky upon the outbreak of war in
1914, knew beforehand about the statements by Delcassé published in the
Matin.
The downfall of Delcassé and the accession of Rouvier to his post are to be
ascribed partly to the influence of the Prince of Monaco. During the regatta
week at Kiel the Prince had assured himself, by talks with me, the Imperial
Chancellor, and Government officials, of the sincerity of our desire to
compromise with France for the purpose of enabling us to live at peace with
each other. He stood well with the ambassador, Prince Radolin, and worked
actively toward a rapprochement between the two countries.
The Prince of Monaco himself was of the opinion that Delcassé was a
menace to the maintenance of peace and hoped that he would soon fall and
be replaced by Rouvier, who was a prudent politician thoroughly inclined to
coming to an understanding with Germany. The Prince said that he was on
good terms with Rouvier personally and would willingly place himself at
the disposal of the German ambassador as a go-between.

NEGOTIATIONS FRUITLESS

Then came Delcassé's fall, and Rouvier became Minister. At once I caused
the initiation of the measures wherein I could count upon the support of the
Prince of Monaco. The Chancellor was instructed to prepare a
rapprochement with France. And I particularly told Prince Radolin, who
personally received his instructions in Berlin, to make good use of the
Rouvier régime for the purpose of eliminating all possibilities of conflict
between the two countries. I added that the reports of the Prince of Monaco,

with whom he was well acquainted, would be useful to him in relations
with Rouvier. Prince Radolin proceeded with zeal and pleasure to the
accomplishment of this worth-while task.
At first the negotiations went well, so much so that I began to hope that the
important goal would be attained and the evil impression caused by the
Tangier visit effaced by an understanding. In the meantime, the negotiations
concerning Morocco were continued; they were concluded, after endless
trouble, by the summoning of the Algeciras Conference, based upon the
circular note of Prince Bülow, which pointed out that the Most-Favored-
Nation Clause No. 17 of the Madrid Convention should remain in force and
that the reforms in Morocco, for which France alone was working, should
be carried out, in so far as necessary, only in agreement with the signatory
powers of the Madrid Conference. These events, which riveted general
attention upon themselves, relegated the special negotiations with Rouvier
to the background.
With regard to domestic policy, I had agreed with the Chancellor that his
main task was to be the restoration of order in the relations between the
parties in the Reichstag, which had got into a bad way under Hohenlohe,
and, above all, to rally the Conservatives, who had been won over to the
opposition by the Post-Bismarckians, once more to the support of the
Government. The Chancellor accomplished this task with great patience and
tenacity. He finally formed the famous "bloc," which arose from the great
electoral defeat of the Socialists.
The Conservative party had many members who had direct relations with
the court, and also with me personally, so that it was easier for this party
than for any other to become informed as to my plans in political and other
matters and to discuss my ideas with me before they took shape in projects
for laws. I have not the impression that this was done to the extent that was
possible; I might perhaps have come into agreement with the gentlemen,
through informal conversations, in the question of the building of the
Central Canal—opposed, as is well known, by the Conservatives—as well
as in the less important matters of the construction of the Cathedral and the
Berlin Opera House, in which I was deeply interested for the sake of the
Church and of art.

I am saying nothing new if I remark that it was by no means easy to deal
with the gentlemen of the Conservative party. Through their traditional
services to the state they had acquired great experience and independence of
judgment, and had thus formed firm political convictions, to which they
held faithfully and in a genuinely conservative manner. From their ranks
great statesmen, eminent Ministers, a brilliant officer corps, a model body
of officials, had largely been produced. Therefore, the consciousness of
their own merit was not without justification; in addition, their loyalty to
their King was unshakable. The King and the country both owed them
gratitude.

FINDS FAULT WITH CONSERVATIVES

Their weakness lay in the fact that they were at times too conservative—
that is, they recognized too late the demands of the time and began by
opposing progress, although it might be progress advantageous to
themselves. One may understand this in view of their past, but the fact
remains that it worked to the detriment of their relations with me, especially
during my reign, when the development of the Empire, particularly of
industry and commerce, pushed rapidly forward; and I desired—and was
obliged—to place no obstacles in the way of that development, but to
promote it. When I said that it was not always easy, for the reasons
adduced, to deal with the Conservatives, I am well aware that the same
thing is maintained about me. Perhaps this is because I stood close to the
Conservatives on account of my traditions, but was not a Conservative for
party reasons. I was and am, indeed, in favor of progressive conservatism,
which preserves what is vital, rejects what is outworn, and accepts that
portion of the new which is useful.
Let me add that in discussions I was able to endure the truth, even when it
was uncomfortable and bitter, better than people are aware, provided it was
told to me tactfully.
So that, when it is maintained that I and the Conservatives did not get along
in dealings with each other, the same reason was at the root of the difficulty
on both sides. It would have been better to arrive oftener at an
understanding with me in private conversations, for which I was always
ready. And in the canal question, on which we could not agree, who was

better qualified than the Conservative to understand and appreciate the fact
that I have never subscribed to the pretty couplet, "Unser König absolut,
wenn er unseren Willen tut" ("Absolute our King may be, if he does what
we decree")? For, had I acted according to that principle—a very
comfortable one for me—the Conservatives, in view of their belief in a
strong King who really governs, would logically have been forced to
oppose me. Surely the Conservatives must have respected me for having
matched their honorable axiom of manly pride before the thrones of Kings
with mine of kingly pride before the Conservative party's throne, just as I
did with regard to all other parties.
In any event, the occasional differences with the Conservative party and
with individual Conservatives cannot make me forget the services rendered
by men of this very party to the House of Hohenzollern, the Prussian state,
and the German Empire.
Bülow finally did the great trick of bringing Conservatives and Liberals
together in Germany, thus getting a big majority for the parties siding with
the Government. In doing so, the great abilities of the Chancellor, his skill,
statecraft, and shrewd knowledge of men, shone forth most brilliantly. The
great service rendered by him in achieving this success won him thorough
appreciation and gratitude from his country and from myself; and, in
addition, an increase of my trust in him. The boundless delight of the people
of Berlin in the defeat of the Social Democrats at the polls led to the
nocturnal demonstration, which I shall never forget, in front of my palace,
in the course of which my automobile had to force a way for itself, little by
little, amid a cheering crowd of many thousands surrounding it. The
Lustgarten was packed with great multitudes of people, at whose
tumultuous request the Empress and I had to appear on the balcony in order
to receive their homage.
The Chancellor was present at the visit of King Edward VII to Kiel. Among
the many guests was the former Chief Court Marshal of the Empress,
Frederick, Count Seckendorff, long acquainted with Edward VII through
his many visits to England, who reposed great trust in the Count. This
gentleman, at the behest of Bülow, with whom he was friendly, arranged an
interview between the King and the Chancellor.

It took place on board the royal English yacht after a breakfast to which I
and the Chancellor were invited. Both gentlemen sat for a long time alone
over their cigars. Afterward Bülow reported to me what had transpired at
the interview. In discussing the possible conclusion of an alliance between
Germany and England, the King, he told me, had stated that such a thing
was not at all necessary in the case of our two countries, since there was no
real cause for enmity or strife between them. This refusal to make an
alliance was a plain sign of the English "policy of encirclement," which
soon made itself felt clearly and disagreeably at the Algeciras Conference.
The pro-French and anti-German attitude of England, which there came out
into the open, was due to special orders from King Edward VII, who had
sent Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace to Algeciras as his "supervising
representative," equipped with personal instructions.
From hints given by the latter to his friends it turned out that it was the
King's wish to oppose Germany strongly and support France at every
opportunity. When it was pointed out to him that it might be possible, after
all, to take up later with Germany this or that question and perhaps come to
an understanding, he replied that, first of all came the Anglo-Russian
agreement; that, once that was assured, an "arrangement" might be made
with Germany also. The English "arrangement" consisted in the
encirclement of Germany.

HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH BÜLOW

The relations between me and the Chancellor remained trustful and friendly
throughout this period. He was present repeatedly at the Kiel regatta. Here,
he found occasion, among other matters, to confer with the Prince of
Monaco and a number of influential Frenchmen, who were guests aboard
the Prince's yacht, among whom doubtless the most eminent was M. Jules
Roche, the leading expert on European budgets, and a great admirer of
Goethe. He always carried a copy of Faust in his pocket.
In April, 1906, came the unfortunate collapse in the Reichstag of the
overworked Chancellor. As soon as I received the news, I hurried there and
was glad that Privy Councilor Renvers could give me encouraging news
about Bülow's condition. While the Prince was recuperating during the
summer at Norderney, I went from Heligoland, which I had been

inspecting, on a torpedo boat to the island and surprised the Chancellor and
his wife at their villa. I spent the day in chatting with the Chancellor, who
had already recovered his health to an encouraging degree and was browned
by the sea air and sunlight.
In the late autumn of 1907 the Empress and I paid a visit to Windsor, at the
invitation of King Edward VII. We were most cordially received by the
English royal family and the visit went off harmoniously. After this visit I
went for a rest to the castle of Highcliffe, belonging to General Stewart
Worthley, situated on the south coast of England, opposite The Needles.
Before my departure for England, the Chancellor, who was much pleased at
the English invitation, had long talks with me as to the best way for getting
on a better footing with England, and had suggested to me a number of his
desires and projects, to serve me as guides in my conversations with
Englishmen. During my visit I had frequent occasion to discuss the subjects
agreed upon and conduct conversations as desired by the Chancellor. Cipher
telegrams containing my reports on these conversations went regularly to
Berlin and I repeatedly received from the Chancellor approving telegrams. I
used to show these after the evening meal to my intimates who
accompanied me on my visit; these men, among them the Chief Court
Marshal Count Eulenburg and Prince Max Egon Fürstenberg, read them and
rejoiced with me at the harmonious understanding between me and the
Chancellor.
After my return from England I made a general report to the Chancellor,
whereupon he expressed to me his thanks for my having personally troubled
myself so much and worked so hard toward improving the relations
between the two countries.

DEFENDS FAMOUS INTERVIEW[6]

A year later came the incident about the so-called "interview," published in
the Daily Telegraph. Its object was the improvement of German-English
relations. I had sent the draft submitted to me to the Chancellor for
examination through the representative of the Foreign Office, Herr von
Jenisch. I had called attention, by means of notes, to certain portions which,
to my way of thinking, did not belong therein and should be eliminated.

Through a series of mistakes on the part of the Foreign Office, when the
matter was taken up at my request, this was not done.
A storm broke loose in the press. The Chancellor spoke in the Reichstag,
but did not defend the Kaiser, who was the object of attack, to the extent
that I expected, declaring, on the other hand, that he wished to prevent in
future the tendency toward "personal politics" which had become apparent
in the last few years. The Conservative party took upon itself to address an
open letter to the King through the newspapers, the contents of which are
known.
During these proceedings, I was staying first at Eckartsau, with Franz
Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and later with Kaiser Franz Joseph at
Vienna, both of whom disapproved of the Chancellor's conduct. From
Vienna I went to Donaueschingen to visit Prince Fürstenberg, to whom the
press saw fit to address the demand that he should, being an honest, upright
man, tell the Emperor the truth for once. When we talked over the whole
matter, the Prince advised me to get together, at the Foreign Office, the
dispatches from Highcliffe in 1907, and the answers to them, and have these
laid before the Reichstag.
During this whole affair I underwent great mental anguish, which was
heightened by the sudden death before my eyes of the intimate friend of my
youth, Count Hülsen-Haeseler, chief of the Military Cabinet. The faithful,
self-sacrificing friendship and care of the Prince and his family were most
welcome to me in these bitter days. And letters and demonstrations from the
Empire, part of which sided with me and severely censured the Chancellor,
were a consolation to me during that period.
After my return, the Chancellor appeared, lectured me on my political sins,
and asked that I sign the document that is already known, which was
afterward communicated to the press. I signed it in silence and in silence I
endured the attacks of the press against myself and the Crown.
The Chancellor struck a serious blow, by his conduct, at the firm confidence
and sincere friendship which had bound me before to him. Undoubtedly
Prince Bülow thought that, handling the matter as he did both in the
Reichstag and with me personally, he could best serve me and the cause,
especially as public excitement was running very high at that time. In this I
could not agree with him, all the more so since his actions toward me in the

Daily Telegraph affair stood out in too sharp contrast to the complaisance
and recognition which Bülow had previously manifested toward me. I had
become so accustomed to the amiability of the Prince that I found the
treatment now accorded me incomprehensible.

A BREAK WITH BÜLOW

The relationship between Emperor and Chancellor, excellent and amicable
up to that time, was, at all events, disturbed. I gave up personal relations
with the Chancellor and confined myself to official dealings. After
consultation with the Minister of the Royal Household and the chief of the
Cabinet, I resolved to follow Prince Fürstenberg's advice as to getting
together the Highcliffe dispatches, and charged the Foreign Office with this
task. It failed of accomplishment because the dispatches in question were
not to be found.
Toward the end of the winter the Chancellor requested an audience with me.
I walked up and down with him in the picture gallery of the palace, between
the pictures of my ancestors, of the battles of the Seven Years' War, of the
proclamation of the Empire at Versailles, and was amazed when the
Chancellor harked back to the events of the autumn of 1908 and undertook
to explain his attitude. Thereupon I took occasion to talk with him about the
entire past. The frank talk and the explanations of the Prince satisfied me.
The result was that he remained in office.
The Chancellor requested that I dine with him that evening, as I had so
often done before, in order to show the outer world that all was again well. I
did so. A pleasant evening, enlivened by the visibly delighted Princess with
charming amiability, and by the Prince with his usual lively, witty talk,
closed that memorable day. Alluding to the Prince's audience with me, a
wag wrote later in a newspaper, parodying a famous line: "The tear flows,
Germania has me again."
By this reconciliation I also wished to show that I was in the habit of
sacrificing my own sensitiveness to the good of the cause. Despite Prince
Bülow's attitude toward me in the Reichstag, which was calculated to pain
me, I naturally never forgot his eminent gifts as a statesman and his
distinguished services to the fatherland. He succeeded, by his skill, in
avoiding a world war at several moments of crisis, during the period indeed,

when I, together with Tirpitz, was building our protecting fleet. That was a
great achievement.
A serious epilogue to the above-mentioned audience was provided by the
Conservatives. The Civil Cabinet informed the party leaders of the
Chancellor's audience and what happened there, with the request that the
party might now take back its "Open Letter." This request—which was
made solely in the interest of the Crown, not of myself personally—was
declined by the party. Not until 1916, when the war was under way, did we
get into touch again, through a delegate of the party, at Great General
Headquarters.
Just as the Conservatives did not do enough out of respect for the Crown to
satisfy me, so also the Liberals of the Left, the Democrats and the
Socialists, distinguished themselves by an outburst of fury, which became,
in their partisan press, a veritable orgy, in which loud demands were made
for the limitation of autocratic, despotic inclinations, etc. This agitation
lasted the whole winter, without hindrance or objection from high
Government circles. Only after the Chancellor's audience did it stop.
Later, a coolness gradually arose between the Chancellor and the political
parties. The Conservatives drew away from the Liberals—rifts appeared in
the bloc. Centrists and Socialists—but, above all, the Chancellor himself—
brought about its downfall, as Count Hertling repeatedly explained to me
later—for the last time at Spa. He was proud to have worked energetically
toward causing Bülow's downfall.
When matters had reached an impossible pass, the Chancellor drew the
proper conclusions and recommended to me the choice of Herr von
Bethmann as the fifth Chancellor of the Empire. After careful consultations,
I decided to acquiesce in the wish of Prince Bülow, to accept his request for
retirement, and to summon the man recommended by him as his successor.

CHAPTER V

Bethmann
I had been well acquainted since my youth with Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg. When I was in active service for the first time in 1877, as
Lieutenant in the Sixth Company of the First Infantry Guard Regiment, it
was quartered once at Hohenfinow, the home of old Herr von Bethmann,
father of the Chancellor. I was attracted by the pleasant family circle there,
which was presided over by Frau von Bethmann, a most worthy lady, born
of Swiss nationality, amiable and refined.
Often, as Prince and later as Emperor, I went to Hohenfinow to visit the old
gentleman, and I was received on every occasion by the young head of the
rural district administration; at that time neither of us imagined that he
would become Imperial Chancellor under me.
From these visits an intimate relationship sprang up little by little, which
served to increase steadily my esteem for the diligence, ability, and noble
character of Bethmann, which were much to my liking. These qualities
clung to him throughout his career.
As Chief President and as Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior
Bethmann gave a good account of himself, and, while occupying the last-
named post, made his appearance successfully before the Reichstag.
Co-operation with the Chancellor was easy for me. With Bethmann I kept
up my custom of daily visits whenever possible, and of discussing fully
with him, while walking in the garden of the Chancellor's palace, on
politics, events of the day, special bills, and occurrences and of hearing
reports from him. It was also a pleasure for me to visit the Chancellor's
home, since Bethmann's spouse was the very model of a genuine German
wife, one whose simple distinction earned the esteem of every visitor, while
her winning kindness of heart spread around her an atmosphere of
cordiality. During the Bethmann régime the custom of holding small
evening receptions, instituted by Prince Bülow and most enjoyable to me,

was continued, and this enabled me to keep on associating informally with
men of all circles and walks of life.
In the journeys which the Chancellor had to make in order to introduce
himself, he won esteem everywhere by his distinguished calm and sincere
methods of expression. Such foreign countries as were not hostile to us
considered him a factor making for political stability and peace, to the
maintenance and strengthening of which he devoted his most zealous
efforts. This was entirely to my liking.
In foreign politics he busied himself from the start with the position of
England in relation to Germany and with the "policy of encirclement" of
King Edward VII, which had made itself felt more and more since Reval,
and was a source of worry to Bethmann. This was likewise true of the
growing desire for revenge and enmity of France, and the unreliability of
Russia. During his régime as Chancellor it became clear that Italy was no
longer to be reckoned with militarily; the work of Barrère in that country
made "extra tours" chronic.
Upon assuming office, Herr von Bethmann found the situation with regard
to France cleared up to such an extent that the German-French Morocco
Agreement had been signed on February 9, 1909. By recognizing thereby
the political predominance of France in Morocco Prince Bülow had put the
finishing touch to the German political retreat from Morocco. The
standpoint which had determined the trip to Tangier and, in addition, the
Algeciras Conference, was thereby definitely abandoned. The great
satisfaction of the French Government over this victory was expressed in a
manner unwelcome to us by the conferring of the cross of the Legion of
Honor upon Prince Radolin and Herr von Schoen.

RECEIVES BRITISH ROYALTY

On the same day King Edward VII, with Queen Alexandra, made his first
official visit to the German Emperor and his wife at their capital city of
Berlin—eight years after his accession to the throne! Berlin received the
exalted gentleman with rejoicing (!!) and showed no signs of dissatisfaction
at his unfriendly policy.

The King did not look well; he was tired and aged, and suffered, moreover,
from a severe attack of catarrh. Nevertheless, he accepted the invitation of
the municipal authorities of Berlin to informal tea at the City Hall. From his
description, which was corroborated by Berlin gentlemen, the function must
have been satisfactory to both parties.
I informed my uncle of the signing of the German-French Morocco
Agreement and the news seemed to please him. When I added, "I hope this
agreement will be a stepping stone to a better understanding between the
two countries," the King nodded his head approvingly and said, "May that
be so!" If the King had co-operated toward this, my project would probably
not have failed. Nevertheless, the visit of Their English Majesties
engendered a more friendly atmosphere for the time being, which greeted
Herr von Bethmann upon his assuming office.
During his term of office Herr von Bethmann had plenty of foreign matters
to handle, connected with the well-known events of 1909-14. Concerning
this period a mass of material has been published in different quarters, for
instance, in the book, Causes of the World War, by Secretary of State von
Jagow. In the Belgian Documents the attitude of the German Government in
the various complications is described from a neutral standpoint. I had
based this attitude on the following:

Caution on the one hand, on the other, support of our Austro-
Hungarian allies whenever there is a plain threat against their position
as a world power, combined with counsels of moderation in action.
Efforts in the rôle of "honest broker" everywhere, activity as a go-
between wherever peace seems endangered. Firm assertion of our own
interests.

In view of the "encirclement" ambitions of our opponents, we were in duty
bound, for the sake of self-preservation, to work steadily at the same time
toward building up our army and navy for purposes of defense, because of
the central location of Germany and her open, unprotected frontiers. This
period of history is also well described in Stegemann's book, and Helfferich
and Friedjung also depict the prewar days interestingly.

"EDWARD THE ENCIRCLER"

The death of the "encircler," Edward VII—of whom it was said once, in a
report of the Belgian Embassy at Berlin, that "the peace of Europe was
never in such danger as when the King of England concerned himself with
maintaining it"—called me to London, where I shared with my close
relations, the members of the English royal family, the mourning into which
the passing of the King had thrown the dynasty and the nation. The entire
royal family received me at the railway station as a token of their gratitude
for the deference to family ties shown by my coming.
King George drove with me to Westminster Hall, where the gorgeously
decorated coffin reposed upon a towering catafalque, guarded by household
troops, troops of the line, and detachments from the Indian and Colonial
contingents, all in the traditional attitude of mourning—heads bowed, hands
crossed over the butts and hilts of their reversed arms. The old, gray hall,
covered by its great Gothic wooden ceiling, towered imposingly over the
catafalque, lighted merely by a few rays of the sun filtering through narrow
windows. One ray flooded the magnificent coffin of the King, surmounted
by the English crown, and made marvelous play with the colors of the
precious stones adorning it.
Past the catafalque countless throngs of men, women, and children of all
classes and strata in the nation passed in silence, many with hands folded to
bid a reverent farewell to him who had been so popular as a ruler. A most
impressive picture, in its marvelous mediæval setting.
I went up to the catafalque, with King George, placed a cross upon it, and
spoke a silent prayer, after which my right hand and that of my royal cousin
found each other, quite unconsciously on our part, and met in a firm clasp.
This made a deep impression on those who witnessed it, to such an extent
that, in the evening, one of my relations said to me: "Your handshake with
our King is all over London: the people are deeply impressed by it, and take
it as a good omen for the future."
"That is the sincerest wish of my heart," I replied.
As I rode through London behind the coffin of my uncle I was a witness of
the tremendous and impressive demonstration of grief on the part of the
vast multitude—estimated at several millions—on streets, balconies, and
roofs, every one of whom was clad in black, every man of whom stood with
bared head, among all of whom reigned perfect order and absolute stillness.

Upon this somber, solemn background the files of British soldiers stood out
all the more gorgeously. In splendid array marched the battalions of the
English Guards: Grenadiers, Scots Guards, Coldstreams, Irish Guards—in
their perfectly-fitting coats, white leather facings, and heavy bearskin
headgear; all picked troops of superb appearance and admirable martial
bearing, a joy to any man with the heart of a soldier. And all the troops
lining the path of the funeral cortège stood in the attitude of mourning
already described.
During my stay I resided, at the special desire of King George, in
Buckingham Palace. The widow of the dead King, Queen Alexandra,
received me with moving and charming kindness, and talked much with me
about bygone days; my recollections stretched back to my childhood, since
I, while still a little boy, had been present at the wedding of my dead uncle.

THE PICHON CONVERSATION

The King gave a banquet to the many princely guests and their suites, as
well as for the representatives of foreign nations, at which M. Pichon was
also present. He was introduced to me and, in conversation with him, I told
him of the wishes which the Imperial Chancellor had communicated to me
regarding our interests in Morocco and some other political matters, which
M. Pichon readily agreed to carry out. All other combinations connected in
various quarters with this talk, belong in the domain of fancy.
Although the period between 1909 and 1914 demanded extraordinary
attention to foreign events, interior development was, nevertheless,
promoted zealously, and efforts made to meet the demands of commerce,
transportation, agriculture, and industry, which were growing rapidly.
Unfortunately endeavors in this direction were made much more difficult by
the discord among political parties.
The Chancellor wished to accomplish everything possible of
accomplishment. But his inclination to get to the bottom of problems and
his desire to deal only with what was, from his meticulous critical
standpoint, thoroughly matured, tended, in the course of time, to hamper
progress. It was difficult to bring him to make decisions before he was
thoroughly convinced of their being absolutely free from objection. This
made working with him tiresome and aroused in those not close to him the

impression of vacillation, whereas, in reality, it was merely
overconscientiousness carried too far.
In addition, the Chancellor eventually developed a strong and growing
inclination toward domination; in discussions this tended to make him
obstinate and caused him to lay down the law to those thinking otherwise as
dogmatically as a school teacher. This brought him many enemies and often
made things hard for me. A boyhood friend of the Chancellor, to whom I
spoke once about this, replied, with a smile, that it had been so with him
even in school; there Herr von Bethmann had constantly taught and school-
mastered his fellow students, of whom my informant was one, so that
finally his classmates had nicknamed him "the governess." He added that
this trait was a misfortune for Bethmann, but that it had so grown into his
very being that he would never be able to get rid of it.
An example of this is Bethmann's relationship to Herr von Kiderlen, whom
he desired to have as Secretary of State, despite my emphatic objections.
Herr von Kiderlen was an able worker and a man of strong character, who
always sought to assert his independence. He had been about one year in
office when Herr von Bethmann came to me one day, complained of
Kiderlen's obstinacy and insubordination, and asked me to appeal to his
conscience. I declined, with the observation that the Chancellor had chosen
Kiderlen against my wishes and must now manage to get along with him;
that the maintenance of discipline at the Foreign Office was a duty
devolving upon the Chancellor, in which I had no desire to interfere.

FINDS FAULT WITH BETHMANN

Meanwhile, Bethmann's inadequacy to the post of Chancellor became
evident. Deep down in his heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed with the
aberration of coming to an understanding with England. I can perfectly well
understand that a man of pacifist inclinations should act thus in the hope of
avoiding a war thereby. His object was entirely in accord with my policy.
The ways and means whereby Bethmann sought to achieve it were, in my
opinion, unsuitable. Nevertheless, I backed his endeavors. But I certainly
did not believe that real success would result. It became ever more
apparent, while he was Chancellor, that he was remote from political
realities. Yet he always knew everything better than anybody else. Owing to

this overestimation of his own powers he stuck unswervingly to his ideas,
even when things all turned out differently from what he had expected.
His reports were always admirably prepared, brilliant in form, and, hence,
impressive and attractive. And in this there was an element of danger. In his
opinion there was always but one solution, the one which he proposed! The
apparent solidity and thoroughness of his reports and suggestions, the
illuminating treatment of the matters reported upon from every angle, the
references to experts, to foreign and native statesmen and diplomats, etc.,
easily led to the impression that solely the Bethmann solution was worthy
of consideration. In spite of these thorough preparations, he made mistake
after mistake.
Thus he had an actual share in our misfortune. When I returned from my
Norwegian trip in 1914 he did not place his resignation in my hands, to be
sure, but he admitted that his political calculations had gone wrong.
Nevertheless, I left him in office, even after his Reichstag speech and the
English declaration of war of August 4, 1914, because I considered it most
serious to change the highest official in the Empire at the most critical
moment in German history. The unanimous attitude of the nation in the face
of the challenge from the Entente might have been impaired by such action.
Moreover, both the Chancellor and the chief of the Civil Cabinet
maintained that they had the working classes behind them. I was loath to
deprive the working classes, which behaved in an exemplary manner in
1914, of the statesman whom, I had been told, they trusted.
The theory, constantly repeated to me in 1914 by the chief of the Civil
Cabinet and the representative of the Foreign Office, that only Bethmann
had the support of the working classes, was finally supplemented further by
reports to me that the Chancellor enjoyed the confidence in foreign
countries which was necessary to the conclusion of peace. Thus it came
about that Bethmann always stayed in office, until, finally, the Crown
Prince made the well-known investigation among the party leaders which
showed that the above-mentioned theory was mistaken. This mistake was
made all the clearer to me when I read, at the time of Bethmann's dismissal
—to which other factors also contributed—the most unfavorable opinions
of him, especially in the Social Democratic and Democratic press.

I do not wish to blame Bethmann with these frank remarks, nor to exonerate
others; but, when such important matters are discussed, personal
considerations must be ignored. I never doubted the nobility of Bethmann's
sentiments.
May I be allowed to say a few words here concerning the reform in the
Prussian franchise, since the handling of this by Herr von Bethmann is
characteristic of his policy of vacillation. During the winter of 1914-15,
when, following the brilliant summer campaign, the hard, severe winter
trench-fighting had brought military movements to a standstill, the
extraordinary achievements of all the troops and the spirit which I had
found among officers and men, both at the front and in the hospitals, made
such a profound impression on me that I resolved to provide, for the tried,
magnificent "Nation in Arms," something in the political domain, when it
returned home, which should prove that I recognized what it had done and
wished to give the nation joy.
I often touched upon this theme in conversations and suggested reforms in
the Prussian franchise; the man, said I, who returned home, after a struggle
like this, with the Iron Cross—perhaps of both classes—must no longer be
"classified" at the polls.
At this juncture a memorial was submitted to me by Herr von Loebell
which proposed a reform in the Prussian franchise on similar grounds. The
concise, clear, and convincing treatment of the subject pleased me so much
that I had a number of gentlemen read the memorial, which took up, in its
original form, only general points of view, without going into detail, and I
was pleased to see that it found approval with all whom I questioned
concerning it.
I had my thanks expressed to Herr von Loebell through the chief of the
Cabinet, von Valentini, and caused Loebell to work out the matter in detail
and make suggestions. This was done in the spring of 1915. The memorial
was very thorough and dealt with a number of possibilities for the franchise,
without advising any one system. It was approved by me, and sent by the
chief of the Cabinet to the Chancellor, with the command that it be
discussed, in the course of the year, by the Ministers, and that their vote on
it—possibly, also, some suggestions from them—be laid before me. The

franchise law, of course, was not to be proposed until after the conclusion of
peace.

EARLY GERMAN VICTORIES

Immediately after that I went to Pless. The battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, with
its smashing victory over the enemy, brought on the Galician-Polish
campaign, leading to the reconquest of Lemberg, Przemysl and the capture
of Warsaw, Ivangorod, Modlin, Brest-Litovsk, etc., and completely engaged
my attention.
The Lusitania case, too, cast its shadow over events, and Italy severed her
alliance with us. So it is not to be wondered at if the franchise memorial
was pushed into the background.
The next winter, and the summer of 1916, likewise, with their fighting on
all fronts, the terrible battle of the Somme, and the brilliant Rumanian
autumn and winter campaign, took me to all sorts of places on the western
and eastern fronts, even as far as Nisch—where the first memorable
meeting with the Bulgarian Tsar took place—and to Orsova, so that I had no
opportunity to take up the matter of franchise reform with the care that its
importance demanded.
In the spring of 1917 I asked the Chancellor to draw up an announcement of
the reform, to be made to the nation at Easter, since I assumed that the
Ministers had long since discussed it. The Chancellor drew up the text of
the proclamation at Hamburg, in agreement with the chief of the Cabinet
and myself; he proposed that the method of voting be left open for the time
being, since he was not yet quite sure about this. The Easter proclamation
appeared; it was based, like previous treatments of the matter, on the idea
that the reform was not to be introduced until after the conclusion of peace,
because most of the voters were away facing the enemy.
Party and press did what they could to postpone the accomplishment of my
purpose by recriminations and strife, by bringing up the question of the
Prussian Reichstag franchise, and by the demand for the introduction of the
franchise bill while the war was still in progress. Thus the question
embarked upon its well-known and not very pleasant course, which dragged
itself out on account of the interminable negotiations in the Landtag. It was

not until after the retirement of Herr von Bethmann that I learned through
Loebell that the memorial of 1915 had never been submitted to the
Ministers, but had lain untouched for a year and a half in a desk drawer;
that the Chancellor, influenced by the desires expressed in the country, had
dropped the various systems proposed and concentrated upon the general
(Reichstag) franchise, of the eventual introduction of which he was,
doubtless, inwardly convinced.
In any event, the original basic idea was thoroughly bungled by Bethmann's
dilatoriness and the strife among the parties. What I wanted was to present a
gift of honor, of my own free will, on its triumphal return home, to my
victorious army, to my "Nation in Arms," my brave Prussians, with whom I
had stood before the enemy.

CHANCELLOR'S DIPLOMATIC POWER

One of the results of Bethmann's marked inclination toward control was that
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was, under him, a mere helper, so
much so that the Foreign Office was almost affiliated with the office of the
Chancellor, a state of affairs that made itself felt most especially in the use
made of the press department. Bethmann likewise asserted his
independence decidedly in his relations with me. Basing himself upon the
fact that, constitutionally, the Chancellor alone is responsible for foreign
policy, he ruled as he pleased. The Foreign Office was allowed to tell me
only what the Chancellor wished, so that it happened sometimes that I was
not informed concerning important occurrences.
The fact that this was possible is to be laid at the door of the Constitution of
the Empire. And this is the right place for saying a word concerning the
relations between the Emperor and the Chancellor. In what follows I do not
refer to my relationship to Herr von Bethmann, but, quite impersonally, to
the difficulties in the relationship of the German Emperor to the Imperial
Chancellors, which are caused by the Imperial Constitution.
I wish to call attention to the following points:
1. According to the Constitution of the Empire, the Chancellor is the
director and representative of the foreign policy of the Empire, for which he
assumes full responsibility; he has this policy carried out by the Foreign

Office, which is subordinated to him, after he has reported on it to the
Emperor.
2. The Emperor has influence on foreign policy only in so far as the
Chancellor grants it to him.
3. The Emperor can bring his influence to bear through discussions,
information, suggestion, proposals, reports, and impressions received by
him on his travels, which then take rank as a supplement to the political
reports of the ambassadors or ministers to the countries which he has
personally visited.
4. The Chancellor may act pursuant to such action by the Emperor, and may
make it the basis of his decisions, whenever he is in agreement with the
Emperor's point of view. Otherwise he is supposed to maintain his own
point of view and carry it out (Kruger dispatch).
5. According to the Constitution, the Emperor has no means of compelling
the Chancellor or the Foreign Office to accept his views. He cannot cause
the Chancellor to adopt a policy for which the latter feels that he cannot
assume responsibility. Should the Emperor stick to his view, the Chancellor
can offer his resignation or demand that he be relieved of his post.
6. On the other hand, the Emperor has no constitutional means of hindering
the Chancellor or the Foreign Office from carrying out a policy which he
thinks doubtful or mistaken. All he can do, if the Chancellor insists, is to
make a change in the Chancellorship.
7. Every change of Chancellors, however, is a serious matter, deeply
affecting the life of the nation, and hence, at a time of political
complications and high tension, an extremely serious step, an ultima ratio
(last resort) which is all the more daring in that the number of men qualified
to fill this abnormally difficult post is very small.
The position of the Imperial Chancellor, which was based on the towering
personality of Prince Bismarck, had assumed a serious preponderance
through the constantly growing number of posts under the Empire, over all
of which the Chancellor was placed as chief and responsible head.

DISCLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY

If this is borne in mind, it is absolutely impossible that anybody should still
hold the Emperor alone responsible for everything, as was done formerly,
especially toward the end of the war and after the war, by critical know-it-
alls and carping revolutionists, both at home and in the Entente countries.
That, quite apart from everything personal, is a proof of complete ignorance
of the earlier Constitution of the German Empire.
The visit of the Tsar to Potsdam in November, 1910, went off to the
satisfaction of all concerned, and was utilized by the Chancellor and Herr
von Kiderlen to get into touch with the newly appointed Foreign Minister,
Sazonoff, whom the Tsar had brought with him. Apparently, the Russian
ruler enjoyed himself among us, and he took an active part in the hunt
arranged in his honor, at which he proved himself an enthusiastic huntsman.
The result of the conferences between the two statesmen seemed to promise
well for the future; both, after they had felt each other out, harbored the
hope of favorable relations between the two countries.
During my spring visit to Corfu, the Melissori troubles began, which riveted
Greek attention upon themselves. Corfu was well informed of the constant
smuggling of arms from Italy by way of Valona into Albania, and there was
a feeling in Greek circles that machinations from across the Adriatic, as
well as from Montenegro, were not without responsibility for what was
happening. It was also felt that the new Turkish Government had not been
wise in its handling of the Albanians, who were very sensitive and
suspicious; the former Sultan Abdul-Hamid had realized this very well and
understood admirably how to get along with the Albanians and to keep
them quiet. Nevertheless, there was no fear that more serious complications
would ensue.
At the beginning of 1911 I received a most cordial invitation from King
George of England to be present at the unveiling of the statue of Queen
Victoria, the grandmother of both of us. Therefore I went in the middle of
May to London with the Empress and our daughter. The reception on the
part of the English royal family and the people of London was cordial.
The unveiling festivities were well arranged and very magnificent. The big,
round space in front of Buckingham Palace was surrounded by grandstands,
which were filled to overflowing by invited guests. In front of them were
files of soldiers of all arms and all regiments of the British army, in full

parade uniform, the cavalry and artillery being on foot. All the banners of
the troops were arrayed at the foot of the statue.
The royal family, with their guests and their suites, was grouped around the
statue. King George made a dedication speech which had a good effect, in
which he made mention also of the German Imperial couple.
Then, amid salutes and greetings, the statue was unveiled; the Queen, in
marble, seated upon a throne, became visible, surmounted by a golden
figure of victory. It was an impressive moment. Afterward the troops
marched past, the Guards in the van, then the Highlanders—who, with their
gayly colored, becoming costume, gave an especially picturesque touch to
the military spectacle—then the rest of the soldiers. The march past was
carried out on the circular space, with all the troops constantly wheeling:
the outer wings had to step out, the inner to hold back—a most difficult task
for troops. The evolution was carried out brilliantly; not one man made a
mistake. The Duke of Connaught, who had made all the military
arrangements, deservedly won unanimous applause.

FESTIVITIES IN ENGLAND

The remainder of our stay in England was devoted to excursions; we also
enjoyed the hospitality of noble English families, at whose homes there was
an opportunity to hold intercourse with many members of English nobility.
Special enjoyment in the domain of art was provided by the King to his
guests by a theatrical performance at Drury Lane Theater. A well-known
English play, "Money," was performed, by a company especially assembled
for the occasion, consisting of the leading actors and actresses of London.
As a surprise, a curtain fell between the acts, painted especially for the
occasion by a lady, which depicted King George and me, life size, on
horseback, riding toward each other and saluting militarily. The picture was
executed with much dash and was enthusiastically acclaimed by the
audience.
The performance of the actors and actresses in "Money" was veritably
masterly, since all concerned played their rôles, even the smallest, to
perfection. In fact, it was a classic performance.

Another day I attended, at the Olympia track, the sports of the British army
and navy, which included admirable individual feats on foot and horseback,
as well as evolutions by bodies of troops in close formation.
In describing the unveiling of the statue, as well as the funeral of King
Edward VII, I have concerned myself purposely with the externals and
pomp that are characteristic of such occasions in England. They show that,
in a land under parliamentary rule, a so-called democratic land, more
importance is attached to well-nigh mediæval magnificence than in the
young German Empire.
The French actions in Morocco, which were no longer such as could be
reconciled with the Algeciras Agreement, had once more engaged the
attention of the diplomats. For this reason the Chancellor had requested me
to find out, as soon as opportunity should arise, what King George thought
about the situation.
I asked him if he thought that the French methods were still in accordance
with the Algeciras Agreement. The King remarked that the agreement, to
tell the truth, no longer was in force, and that the best thing to do would be
to forget it; that the French, fundamentally, were doing nothing different in
Morocco from what the English had previously done in Egypt; that,
therefore, England would place no obstacles in the path of the French, but
would let them alone; that the thing to do was to recognize the "fait
accompli" of the occupation of Morocco and make arrangements, for
commercial protection, with France.
To the very end the visit went off well, and the inhabitants of London, of all
social strata, expressed their good will every time the guests of their King
showed themselves.
Thus the German Imperial couple was enabled to return home with the best
of impressions. When I informed the Chancellor of these, he expressed
great satisfaction. From the remarks of King George he drew the inference
that England considered the Algeciras Agreement no longer valid and
would not place any obstacles in the way of the French occupation of
Morocco.
From this the policy followed by him and the Foreign Office arose which
led to the Agadir case, the last and equally unsuccessful attempt to maintain

our influence in Morocco. The situation became more serious during the
Kiel regatta week. The Foreign Office informed me of its intention to send
the Panther to Agadir. I gave expression to strong misgivings as to this step,
but had to drop them in view of the urgent representations of the Foreign
Office.
In the first half of 1912 came the sending of Sir Ernest Cassel with a verbal
note in which England offered to remain neutral in case of an "unprovoked"
attack upon Germany, provided Germany agreed to limit her naval
construction program and to drop her new Naval bill, the latter being darkly
hinted at. Owing to our favorable answer to this Lord Haldane was intrusted
with the negotiations and sent to Berlin. The negotiations finally fell
through, owing to the constantly more uncompromising attitude of England
(Sir E. Grey), who finally disavowed Lord Haldane and withdrew his own
verbal note, because Grey was afraid to offend the French by a German-
English agreement and jeopardize the Anglo-French-Russian understanding.
Here are the details of the case:
On the morning of January 29, 1912, Herr Ballin had himself announced to
me at the palace in Berlin and asked for an audience. I assumed that it was a
case of a belated birthday greeting, therefore I was not a little astonished
when Ballin, after a short speech of congratulation, said that he had come as
an emissary of Sir Ernest Cassel, who had just arrived in Berlin on a special
mission and wished to be received.
I asked whether it was a political matter, and why, if so, the meeting had not
been arranged through the English ambassador. Ballin's answer was to the
effect that, from hints dropped by Cassel, he knew the matter to be of great
importance, and the explanation for Cassel's acting without the intervention
of the ambassador was because the earnest desire had been expressed in
London that the official diplomatic representatives, both the English and the
German, should not be apprised of the affair.
I declared that I was ready to receive Cassel at once, but added that, should
his mission have to do with political questions, I should immediately
summon the Chancellor, since I was a constitutional monarch and not in a
position to deal with the representative of a foreign power alone without the
Chancellor.

Ballin fetched Cassel, who handed me a document which, he stated, had
been prepared with the "approval and knowledge of the English
Government." I read the short note through and was not a little surprised to
see that I was holding in my hand a formal offer of neutrality in case
Germany became involved in future warlike complications, conditioned
upon certain limitations in the carrying out of our program of naval
construction, which were to be the subject of mutual conferences and
agreements. Walking with Ballin into the next room, I handed over the
document for him to read. After he had done so both of us exclaimed in the
same breath: "A verbal note!"
It was plainly apparent that this "verbal note" was aimed at the forthcoming
addition to our Naval law and designed in some way to delay or frustrate it.
No matter how the matter was interpreted, I found myself confronted with a
peculiar situation, which also amazed Ballin. It reminded me of the
situation at Cronberg-Friedrichshof in 1905, when I was obliged to decline
the demand, made to me personally by the English Under Secretary,
Hardinge, that we should forego our naval construction.

SURPRISE AT BRITISH NOTE

Now, an intimate business friend of Edward VII appears, without previous
announcement through official diplomatic channels, before the German
Emperor with a "verbal note" inspired by the English Government, with
explicit instructions to evade all the diplomatic officials of both countries.
He hands over an offer from the English Government to maintain neutrality
in future warlike complications provided certain agreements regarding
limitation of naval construction are made. And this is done by England, the
mother of "Constitutionalism"! When I pointed this out to Ballin, he
exclaimed: "Holy Constitutionalism! What has become of you? That is
'personal politics' with a vengeance!"
I agreed with Ballin to send at once for Herr von Bethmann, in order that he
might learn what was transpiring and decide what to do in this peculiar
situation.
Bethmann was called up on the telephone and soon appeared. At first the
situation aroused in him likewise a certain degree of astonishment; it was
interesting to watch the play of expression on his face as he was told about

the matter. The Chancellor suggested that Grand Admiral von Tirpitz also
be summoned, for the proper dispatching of the business, and recommended
that an answer be drawn up in English, in the same manner and form as the
note delivered by Cassel, and that it be handed to Sir Ernest, who wished to
return home that night. (English was chosen because there was fear of
obscurity and misunderstanding if the note were translated in London.) The
Chancellor asked me to draw up the note, since I knew English best. After
some objection I had to make up my mind to be myself the writer of the
answer.
And now the following scene took place:
I sat at the writing table in the adjutant's room; the other gentlemen stood
around me. I would read a sentence from the note aloud and sketch out an
answer, which was, in turn, read aloud. Then criticisms were made from
right and left: one thought the sentence too complaisant, another too abrupt;
it was thereupon remodeled, recast, improved, and polished. The Chancellor
particularly subjected my grammar and style to much torture, owing to his
habit of probing things philosophically, to his methods of profound
thoroughness, which caused him to be most particular with every word, in
order that it, having been studied from every angle, should later on afford
nobody cause for criticism.
After hours of work the note was finally finished and, having been passed a
couple of times from hand to hand and then read aloud by me half a dozen
times more, it was signed.
When our group broke up, the Chancellor asked Sir Ernest who was to be
expected from England to conduct the negotiations. Cassel replied that it
would certainly be a Minister, which one he did not know—perhaps Mr.
Winston Churchill, Minister of the Navy, since the question was a naval
one. Then the Chancellor arranged further with him that the unofficial
method should be retained and that Ballin should undertake to transmit all
the news regarding the matter which should emanate from England.
Sir Ernest expressed his lively gratitude for his cordial reception and his
satisfaction at the tenor of our reply. Later Ballin informed me from his
hotel that Cassel had expressed himself as completely satisfied over the
successful outcome of his mission, and that he would report to his
Government the good impression made upon him.

When I thereupon conferred on the matter with Admiral von Tirpitz we both
agreed that the Naval bill was in danger and, therefore, that we must be
very careful.

DIPLOMATIC PREPAREDNESS

In perfect secrecy the material was collected which Admiral von Tirpitz was
to present at the negotiations; it consisted of a short historical sketch of the
development of the fleet and of the increasingly difficult tasks devolving
upon it; the Naval law and its aims, nature, enactment, and extension;
finally, the contemplated Naval bill, its meaning and the method of putting
it through.
The Chancellor asked that the main negotiations should be conducted at the
palace in my presence. In addition, I agreed with Admiral von Tirpitz that
he should speak English, as far as possible, and that I, in case of difficult
technical expressions, would interpret.
Until England made known the name of the negotiator, our time was spent
in suppositions, and Ballin informed us of combinations in connection with
which a number of names, even that of Grey, came up.
At last the news arrived, through Ballin, that Haldane—the Minister of War,
previously a lawyer—had been intrusted with the conduct of the
negotiations and would soon arrive. General amazement! Just imagine,
"mutatis mutandis," that Germany had sent her Minister of War (at that time
von Heeringen) to London, instead of Admiral von Tirpitz, for the
discussion of a naval matter!
When this point was discussed with Bethmann and Tirpitz a number of
suppositions were advanced; the Chancellor said that Haldane was known
in England as a student of Goethe and as a man versed in German
philosophy and knowing the German language, so that his choice was a
piece of politeness toward us. Tirpitz observed that Haldane had formerly
spent some time in Berlin and worked with General von Einem at the War
Ministry, and hence knew the state of affairs in Germany. I suggested that
all that was very well, but that the choice of Haldane showed that England
looked upon the question as purely political, since he knew only
superficially about naval affairs; that the whole thing was probably directed

against Germany's naval policy in general and the new Naval bill in
particular; that it would be well, therefore, not to forget this, in order that
the whole thing might not develop into a foreign assault upon our right of
self-determination as to the strength of our defensive measures.
Haldane arrived and was received as an Imperial guest. Ballin, who
accompanied him, solved the riddle of Haldane's choice on the basis of
information received by him from England.
He said that when Cassel had got back to London, reported on his reception,
and handed over the German reply, the impression made was so favorable
that no further doubt was entertained there as to the satisfactory course of
the negotiations and their conclusion in the form of an agreement; that,
thereupon a keen dispute had arisen among the Ministers, especially
between Churchill and Grey, as to who should go to Berlin and affix his
name to this great historical document, in case the object should be
achieved of making Germany completely give up the further development
of her fleet; that Churchill thought himself the right man for the job, since
he was at the head of the navy. But Grey and Asquith would not let their
colleague reap the glory, and, for this reason, Grey stood for a while in the
foreground—another proof that it was politics rather than the number of
ships which was to play the leading rôle.

SELECTION OF CHURCHILL

After a while, however, it was decided that it was more fitting to Grey's
personal and official importance to appear only at the termination of the
negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement, and—as it was put in the
information transmitted from England to Ballin—"to get his dinner from the
Emperor and to come in for his part of the festivities and fireworks"—
which, in good German, means to enjoy the "Bengal light illumination."
As it had been decided that Churchill was not to get this in any event, it was
necessary to choose somebody for the negotiations who was close to
Asquith and Grey and who, possessing their complete confidence, was
willing to conduct the negotiations as far as the beginning of the
"fireworks"; one who, moreover, was already known at Berlin and not a
stranger in Germany. Churchill, to be sure, qualified in this, for he had been
present a few times at the Imperial maneuvers in Silesia and Württemberg

as a guest of the Emperor. Ballin guaranteed the reliability of his London
source of information.
Before the negotiations began I once more pointed out to Secretary of State
von Tirpitz that Haldane, in spite of being just then Minister of War,
probably had prepared himself for his task, and had surely received careful
instructions from the English Admiralty, in which the spirit of Fisher was
paramount. In his Handbook for English Naval Officers, Fisher had stated,
among other precepts well worthy of being remembered, one which is
characteristic of the Admiral, his department and its spirit, which runs, word
for word, as follows: "If you tell a lie, stick to it."
Moreover, I said to Tirpitz, we must not forget what an amazing
adaptability the Anglo-Saxons had, which fitted them for occupying
positions which had no relation to their previous life and training.
Furthermore, the interest in England in the navy was generally so intense
that almost every educated man was an expert up to a certain point on naval
questions.
In the course of the negotiations Haldane proved himself admirably well
informed and a skillful, tenacious debater, and his brilliant qualities as a
lawyer came to the fore. The conversation lasted several hours, and brought
about a general clarifying, as well as a preliminary agreement as to
postponement of time limits of ship construction, etc. The details
concerning it are deposited in documents at the Imperial Naval Office.
Tirpitz was splendid.
After some more conferences—at which, likewise, Ballin was present—
Haldane returned to England. Ballin informed me that Haldane had
expressed himself to him as entirely satisfied with the outcome of his
mission, and had stated that in about a week or two the first draft of the
agreement could be sent to us.
Time passed—the date set for the introduction of the Naval bill approached.
Tirpitz suggested, in case the agreement were concluded previously, that the
Naval bill be altered accordingly; otherwise, that it be introduced without
alteration.

SUSPECTS ENGLISH PURPOSES

At last we received, not the draft of the agreement, but a document asking
all sorts of questions and expressing a desire for all sorts of data, a reply to
which required many consultations and much reflection. Little by little the
suspicion grew in me that the English were not in earnest with regard to the
agreement, since question followed question and details were sought which
had nothing directly to do with the agreement. England withdrew more and
more from her promises, and no draft of the agreement came to hand.
In Berlin a big agitation set in against the Naval bill, Tirpitz and myself on
the part of the Foreign Office, and from other quarters, both qualified and
unqualified. The Chancellor also, who hoped to achieve the agreement and
affix his name to a document which would free Germany from
"encirclement" and bring her into a regular and better relationship with
England, came out in favor of dropping the Naval bill. But that would
simply have meant allowing a foreign power enormous influence in matters
of German national defense and jeopardizing thereby the national right of
self-determination and our readiness for battle in case of a war being forced
upon us. Had we allowed this it would have amounted to our consenting to
permit England, Germany's principal foe, to grant us whatever she wished,
after consulting her own interests, without receiving ourselves the guaranty
of any equivalent concession.
In this confused state of affairs differences of opinion and violent disputes
arose, which, especially in those circles which really knew little about the
navy, were conducted with much violence and not always in a practical
manner. Admiral von Tirpitz, all through that winter, which was so hard a
one for him and me, fought his fight like a genuine, patriotic officer,
realizing the situation and seeing through his opponents with clear vision
and supporting me with complete conviction to the limit of his ability. All
the Government officials agreed that no foreign country could be allowed
any voice in helping decide what we had or had not to do toward insuring
our protection.
The hope of bringing about the agreement grew ever fainter; England
continually showed lessening interest and kept eliminating important parts
of her original verbal note. And so it came about that Admiral von Tirpitz
and I realized that the whole proposal was merely a "maneuver."

The fight over the German Naval bill grew steadily hotter. I happened at
this time to meet at Cuxhaven Doctor von Burchard, President of the
Hamburg Senate, whom I respected greatly, as he was the very model of an
aristocratic citizen of a Hanseatic city, and who had often been consulted by
me in political matters. I described to him the entire course of the affair and
the disputes in Berlin as to the introduction or nonintroduction of the bill,
and asked him then to tell me, with his usual complete frankness, what he
thought the right thing to do in the interest of the national welfare, since I
greatly desired to hear an objective opinion, uninfluenced by the rival
camps of Berlin.
Doctor Burchard replied in his clear, keen, pointed, convincing manner that
it was my duty toward the people and the fatherland to stick to the bill; that
whosoever spoke against its introduction was committing a sin against
them; that whatever we thought necessary to our defense must be
unconditionally brought into being; that, above all else, we must never
permit a foreign country to have the presumption to interfere with us; that
the English offer was a feint to make us drop the Naval bill; that this must,
in no circumstances, be allowed; that the German nation would not
understand why its right of self-determination had been sacrificed; that the
bill must unquestionably be introduced; that he would work in its favor in
the Federal Council (as indeed he did in a brilliant, compelling speech) and
also otherwise press its acceptance in Berlin; that the English would
naturally resort to abuse, but that this made no difference, since they had
been doing so for a long time; that they certainly would not get into a war
for such a cause; that Admiral von Tirpitz was merely doing his duty and
fulfilling his obligations, and that I should support him in every way; that
the Chancellor must give up opposing the measure, otherwise he would run
the risk of finally forfeiting public esteem on account of being "pro-
English."
Thus spoke the representative of the great commercial city, which was
threatened before all others in case of war with England. The genuine
Hanseatic spirit inspired his words.
Strangely enough, this opinion of Doctor Burchard concerning the English
offer has recently been corroborated to me in Holland by a Dutchman who
heard from Englishmen at that time the English point of view. I and Tirpitz

guessed right—the offer of neutrality, in case naval expansion was curbed,
was a political maneuver.

COUNTERCHARGES OF CHEATING

Soon news also came from Ballin that the matter was not going well in
England: that, according to information received, a dispute had arisen about
the agreement; that there was dissatisfaction with Haldane, who, it was said,
had let himself be cheated by Tirpitz! This was plain evidence of the
indignation felt because Tirpitz had not walked into the trap and simply let
the bill drop, and that Haldane had been unable to serve up the bill to the
English Cabinet on a platter at tea time. It is useless to say that there was
any "cheating" on Germany's part, but the reproach leveled at Haldane
justifies the suspicion that his instructions were that he should seek to
"cheat" the Germans. Since his fellow countrymen thought that the reverse
was true, one can but thank Admiral von Tirpitz most sincerely for having
correctly asserted the German standpoint to the benefit of our fatherland.
Toward the end of March the fight about the bill took on such violence that
finally the Chancellor, on the 22d, asked me for his dismissal as I stepped
out of the vault in the Charlottenburg Park. After long consultation and after
I had told him Doctor Burchard's view, the Chancellor withdrew his request.
When, some time afterward, I paid a visit to Herr von Bethmann in his
garden, I found him quite overcome and holding in his hand a message
from London. It contained the entire disavowal of the verbal note delivered
by Cassel, the withdrawal of the offer of neutrality, as well as of every other
offer, and at the end the advice that I dismiss Herr von Bethmann from the
Imperial Chancellorship, since he enjoyed to a marked degree the
confidence of the British Government! Tears of anger shone in the eyes of
the Chancellor, thus badly deceived in his hopes; the praise accorded to him
by a foreign government with which Germany and he had just had such
painful experiences hurt him deeply. For the second time he offered me his
resignation; I did not accept it, but sought to console him. I then ordered
that the ambassador in London be asked how he could have accepted and
forwarded such a message under any conditions.
Now the Chancellor was in favor of the bill, but it was honorably proposed
with the limitation which it had been decided to impose upon it in case of

the conclusion of the agreement. In England, on the other hand, the full
naval construction program was carried out.
This "Haldane episode" is characteristic of England's policy. This whole
maneuver, conceived on a large scale, was engineered for the sole purpose
of hampering the development of the German fleet, while, simultaneously,
in America, which had an almost negligible merchant fleet; in France,
whose navy was superior in numbers to the German; in Italy, in Russia,
which also had ships built abroad—vast construction programs were carried
out without eliciting one word of protest from England. And Germany,
wedged in between France and Russia, certainly had to be at least prepared
to defend herself on the water against those nations.

DEFENDS NAVAL PROGRAM

For this our naval construction program was absolutely necessary; it was
never aimed against the English fleet, four or five times as strong as ours,
and assuring England's superiority and security, to equal the strength of
which no sensible man in Germany ever dreamed. We needed our fleet for
coast defense and the protection of our commerce; for this purpose the
lesser means of defense, like U-boats, torpedo boats, and mines, were not
sufficient. In addition the coast batteries on the Baltic were so antiquated
and miserably equipped that they would have been razed within forty-eight
hours by the massed fire of the heavy guns of modern battleships. Thus, our
Baltic coast was practically defenseless. To protect it the fleet was
necessary.
The Skagerrak (Jutland) battle has proved what the fleet meant and what it
was worth. That battle would have meant annihilation for England if the
Reichstag had not refused up to 1900 all proposals for strengthening the
navy. Those twelve lost years were destined never to be retrieved.
Before we take our leave of Haldane I wish to touch upon another episode
in his activities. In 1906 he came, with the permission of the German
Government, to Berlin, to inform himself concerning the Prussian defense
conditions, recruiting, General Staff, etc. He busied himself at the Ministry
of War, where the Minister, General von Einem, personally gave him
information. After about two or three weeks' work there he returned, well
satisfied, to England.

When, after the outbreak of the World War, the "pro-German" Haldane, the
friend of Goethe, was boycotted and treated with such hostility that he
could no longer show himself in public, he had a defense written of his term
of office as Minister of War by the well-known littérateur and journalist,
Mr. Begbie, entitled Vindication of Great Britain. Therein his services
toward forming a regular General Staff and preparing the British army for
the World War are placed in a bright light and emphasis is laid on the skill
with which he utilized the permission obtained from the Prussian War
Ministry in order to learn in Germany about military matters and to
reorganize the British army and General Staff, to the minutest detail and on
the German model, for the coming war against the erstwhile German hosts.
Here we see the sly, adroit lawyer, who, sheltered under the hospitality of a
foreign country, studies its military arrangements in order to forge weapons
against it out of the material and knowledge thus acquired. Quite
characteristically the book is dedicated to King Edward VII, whose
intimate, emissary, and tool Haldane was. In those days Berlin saw in
Haldane's mission a "rapprochement" with England, toward which Germans
were always bending their efforts; in reality, however, it was a
"reconnoitering expedition" under the very roof of the German cousin.
England showed her gratitude by the World War, which Haldane helped to
prepare; in this case Haldane "cheated" the Germans!
That is the history of the Haldane mission. Later it was summarily
maintained by all sorts of ignorant dabblers in politics, belonging to the
press and the general public, that the promising "rapprochement" with
England through Haldane had been wrecked by the obstinacy of the
Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz and by their clinging to the Naval bill
against the wishes of all "sensible counselors!"

KINGSHIP OF ALBANIA

At that time [in 1912] the question of the establishment of an independent
Albanian state and the choice by the Powers of a head for it, was brought to
my attention also. A number of candidates lusting for a crown had already
presented themselves before the tribunal of the Powers, without getting
themselves accepted; a number of candidates, considered by the Powers,
were declined by the Albanians. I looked upon the matter in itself with

indifference, and was of the opinion that—as in the case of every "creation
of a nation"—the greatest possible attention should be paid to historical
development, also to geographical peculiarities and the customs of the
inhabitants.
In this peculiar land there has never been any united nation under one ruler
and one dynasty. In valleys, encircled and cut off by high mountain ranges,
the Albanian tribes live separated to a considerable degree from one
another. Their political system is not unlike the clan system of the Scotch.
Christians and Mohammedans are represented in equal numbers.
The custom of "vendetta" is an ancient one, sanctified by tradition, which is
no less true of robbery and cattle stealing. Agriculture is still in a backward
stage of development, farming is in its infancy, the implements used therein
date from before the flood.
The head man of the clan dispenses justice in the open, under the village
tree, as it used to be done once upon a time among the ancient Germans.
Every man is armed and most are excellent shots. Whenever the head man
of the clan turns up while on a horseback tour through his territory in some
hamlet, the inhabitants expect a blessing from him in the form of jingling
coins, which sometimes are scattered about by him from the saddle. This, of
course, is particularly customary at the outset of a new Government's term,
and great is the dissatisfaction when it does not happen.
Up to the time of the Balkan War many Albanians entered the Turkish
service, where they rose to high importance, being greatly prized on
account of their diligence and keen intelligence, as well as their tenacious
energy. They supplied the Turkish administration with a large number of
officials, also with a certain percentage in the diplomatic corps and the
army. The young Albanian nobles were proud to serve in a splendid
company of palace guards of the Sultan, which scarcely had an equal for
size, martial appearance, and manly beauty. These were partly relatives of
the Sultan, since the latter used to have noble Albanian women of the
principal clans in his harem in order that he—protected by blood
brotherhood—might be safe from the "vendettas" of the clans, and, also,
that he might find out everything that might serve to influence the feelings
of the Albanian chieftains. The desires of the Albanians which reached him
by this road—for instance, as to supplies of arms and ammunition, school

houses, building of highways, etc.—were thereupon granted in an
inconspicuous manner. Thus the Sultan was enabled to keep the usually
turbulent Albanians quiet and loyal by means of "family ties."
With this knowledge of the state of affairs as a foundation, I sought to bring
my influence to bear toward having a Mohammedan Prince chosen, if
possible—perhaps an Egyptian Prince—not forgetting that he should have a
well-lined purse, which is an absolute necessity in Albania. My advice was
not heeded by the "Areopagus of the Powers," whose members were not
bothering themselves with the interests of the Albanians, but seeking, first
of all, for pretexts and opportunities for fishing in the troubled Albanian
waters in such a way as to benefit their own countries.

OPPOSED CHOICE OF GERMAN

Therefore, I was not at all pleased when the choice fell upon Prince William
of Wied. I esteemed him as a distinguished, knightly man of lofty
sentiments, but considered him unfitted for the post. The Prince knew
altogether too little about Balkan affairs to be able to undertake this thorny
task with hope of success. It was particularly unpleasant to me that a
German Prince should make a fool of himself there, since it was apparent
from the start that the Entente would place all sorts of obstacles in his path.
Upon being questioned by the Prince, I told my cousin all my doubts, laying
stress upon the difficulties awaiting him, and advised him urgently to
decline. I could not command him, since the Prince of Wied, as head of the
family, had the final word in the matter.
After the Prince's acceptance of the candidacy offered him by the Powers, I
received him in the presence of the Chancellor. A certain irresolution in the
bearing of the Prince, who contemplated his new task with anything but
enthusiasm, strengthened the resolve in me and the Chancellor to try hard
once more to dissuade the young candidate from ascending the recently
invented Albanian "throne." But in vain. The ambitious, mystically excited
wife of the Prince saw in Albania the fulfillment of her wishes. And "ce que
femme veut, Dieu le veut" ("what woman wishes, God wishes").
Carmen Sylva [the Queen of Rumania] also worked toward having him
accept; she went so far, in fact, as to publish an article in the newspapers
beginning "Fairyland Wants Its Prince."

So even the best meant warnings were useless. I had also strongly advised
the Prince not to go to Albania before the settlement of the financial
question, since the reasons which had led me to suggest the selection of a
rich ruler now came to the fore. The Prince was not very wealthy and the
Powers had to supply him with a "donation," concerning the amount of
which, and the method of paying it by installments, an unpleasant quarrel
arose. At last a part payment was made.
Danger lurked for the Prince and his eventual Government in the person of
Essad Pasha, an unreliable, intriguing, greedy soldier of fortune, who
himself had designs on the Albanian throne and held sway over a certain
number of armed adherents. From the start he was an opponent of the new
Prince and he plotted secretly with Italy, which was not favorably inclined
toward the Prince of Wied. Now, it would have been quite natural and a
matter of course if the new ruler had taken with him in his suite men from
Germany whom he knew and who were faithful to him. But he did not. An
Englishman and an Italian were attached to his person as "secretaries" and
they had nothing better to do than to work against his interests, to give him
bad advice and to intrigue against him.

REQUIREMENTS OF A RULER

During the time that the Prince of Wied was making his preparations the
excellently written pamphlet of an Austrian General Staff officer, dealing
with his travels in Albania, appeared. The officer described, in a lively and
clear style, the geographical and climatic drawbacks, the population and
customs, the general poverty and backwardness of the land.
He pointed out that a future ruler of the land must in no circumstances
reside on the coast, but must show himself to the inhabitants and travel
about in the country. Owing to the primitive means of transportation, he
went on, the lord of the land must sit all day on horseback and ride through
his domain, having at his saddle bow the famous "bag of sequins"
mentioned in all Oriental tales and legends, in order to sway public opinion
in his favor in the places visited by the expected shower of gold. The ruler
must be sure, the author continued, to bind some of the clans of the region
closely to himself, so as to have at his beck and call an armed force for
asserting his will and overcoming any opponents wishing to rebel, since this

was the only way to maintain his power, in view of the utter lack of
"troops" or an "army" in the European sense of the word.
This meant that the ruler of Albania must lead at first a nomadic, horseback
life, and, in addition, provide himself with a wandering camp, with tents
and other accessories and the necessary horses. Plenty of men adapted to
this sort of life might have been found in his squadron of the Third Guard
Uhlan Regiment, since many of his Uhlans, who were very fond of the
Prince, had declared that they were ready to accompany him as volunteers.
Surely, they would have served him better and been more useful to him than
what he did in preparing to take over the overlordship of Albania, without
knowledge of the country.
I advised my cousin urgently to study this pamphlet and to follow its
recommendations, especially with regard to his residence, which should be
fixed at some point as far as possible from the warships of the Powers, in
order that he might not be forced to act under their pressure and arouse
suspicion among the Albanians that their ruler needed these ships for
protection against his subjects. Did the Prince ever read the pamphlet? In
any event, the course adopted by him subsequently was contrary to its
advice and the advice given him by me.
The Prince and his wife journeyed to Albania, and things turned out as I had
foreseen. According to reports describing the arrival of the sovereign
couple, the Princess, although she was a German, addressed the assembled
Albanians from her balcony in French, since they understood no German!
The "court" remained at Durazzo under the guns of the foreign ships. The
Prince did not travel on horseback through the land, nor did he scatter gold
sequins about—not even from his balcony on the day of his arrival—nor
did he push Essad out of the way. So the adventure ended as one might
imagine.
I have gone into some detail in describing my opinion and attitude toward
the question of the choice of the ruler of Albania because, from every
possible quarter, false rumors have been circulated for the purpose of
imputing to me motives which were utterly foreign to me. In this matter,
also, I gave honest advice when questioned, based on sound knowledge of
mankind.

The year 1912 also witnessed the meeting with the Tsar at Baltisch-Port,
whither I repaired on board my yacht at the invitation of Nicholas II. Our
two yachts anchored side by side, so that visiting from ship to ship was
easy. The Tsar, his children, and his entire entourage vied with one another
in evidences of good will and hospitality. The Russian and German
escorting squadrons were inspected, turn and turn about, by the Tsar and
myself together, and we took our meals either at the Tsar's table or mine.
We spent one morning on land near Baltisch-Port. The Eighty-fifth
"Viborg" Infantry Regiment, whose commander I was, had been drawn up
in a field and was inspected first in parade formation, then in company and
battalion exercises, which were carried out in as satisfactory a manner as
was the parade with which the evolutions were brought to a close.
The regiment, composed of four battalions, made an excellent impression. It
was in field equipment—brown-gray blouses and caps—and the latter, worn
jauntily cocked over one ear by all, gave to the sun-browned, martial faces
of the strong young soldiers a bold air which brought joy to the heart of
every soldier who gazed upon them.
In the course of the brilliant and uncommonly amiable reception which I
met with on this occasion I received no hint of the Balkan alliance,
concluded a short time before.
It was my last visit in Russia before the outbreak of the war.

CHAPTER VI

My Co-workers in the Administration
It behooves me to remark that I found particular pleasure in working with
His Excellency von Stephan and in dealing with him. He was a man of the
old school, who fitted in so well with me that he always grasped my ideas
and suggestions and afterward carried them out with energy and power,
owing to his firm belief in them. A man of iron energy and unflagging
capacity for work and joyousness; endowed, moreover, with refreshing
humor, quick to perceive new possibilities, never at a loss for expedients,
well versed in political and technical matters, he seemed to have been born
especially for creative co-operation. I trusted him implicitly, and my trust in
him was never betrayed. I learned much from my association with this
stimulating, shrewd counselor.
The Post-Office Department reached an unimagined degree of excellence
and aroused the admiration of the whole world. The great invention of the
telephone was utilized to the limit, was applied extensively to the public
service, and was developed so as to facilitate it. Likewise in the domain of
building Stephan brought about a decided improvement, which received my
approval and support.
All great state building projects depended on the vote of the investigating
"Academy of Building," which, at that time, was a slow-moving, cumbrous,
and backward body. I had already had experiences of my own with it. The
"White Drawing Room," originally merely provisional, had been put up
without much attention to style—it had been intended at first for an Indian
masquerade, a "Lalla Rookh" festival, in honor of the Grand Duchess
Charlotte, daughter of Frederick William III, and her husband, later Tsar
Nicholas I. An investigation instituted at my order showed the material to
be spurious and inferior; the structure was in the worst possible state of
decay and in danger of collapse; a new one was needed.

With the co-operation and collaboration of the Empress Frederick, projects
and plans were made, and, finally, a big model was provided by Building
Councilor Ihne—the "modern Schlüter," as the Empress Frederick used to
call him—which won unanimous approval. Only the Building Academy
opposed wearisome objections, stating that the "White Drawing Room"
ought to be preserved "in its old historical beauty," and required no
alterations. When the new structure was completed, however, it also met
with the approval of the gentlemen who had been formerly so critical.
Herr von Stephan also was at loggerheads with the Academy of Building.
He wanted to alter many post offices, or build entirely new ones, especially
in the big cities, but, in view of the fearful slowness and devotion to red
tape of the aforesaid official body, he used to receive no answers at all, or
else refusals, when he brought these matters to its attention. The rule of
thumb was supreme there. Herr von Stephan was of the opinion that, in its
buildings as well as in other directions, the youthful German Empire must
give an impression of power, and that the Imperial post offices must be built
accordingly; he believed that they should harmonize with the general style
of the towns where they were located, or, at least, conform to the style of
the oldest and most important buildings there. Nor could I do otherwise
than agree with such a view.

ACADEMY'S SHACKLES BROKEN

At last there came a rupture with the aforementioned Academy. His
Excellency von Stephan lost patience and informed me that he had freed his
office, and the buildings erected by it, from the supervision of the Academy;
that he had even formed a committee from among his own architects and
officials for supervising purposes; and that all he asked of me was to subject
the more important plans for buildings to a final inspection. I did so
willingly.
Stephan was an enthusiastic huntsman, so that I had additional
opportunities, while on the court hunts, to enjoy association with this
refreshing, unchanging, faithful official and counselor.
Among the Ministers whom I particularly esteemed His Excellency Miquel
took first place. He it was who, as my Finance Minister, put through for
Prussia the great reform which placed the land on a sound basis and helped

it toward prosperity. Intercourse with this astute political expert gave me
great pleasure, and a wealth of teaching and stimulus.
The degree to which Miquel was versed in all possible matters was
astounding. In conversation he was brisk, humorous, and keen in
elucidating and arguing on a subject, in addition to which a strong historical
bent ran, like a red thread, through his quotations. In history and ancient
languages he was marvelously well equipped, so that, in his reports, he was
able often to hark back to the times of the Romans and quote from his store
of knowledge—not out of Büchmann[7]—pieces of Latin in support of his
arguments. Even when he was instructing he was never tiresome on account
of his brilliant dialectics, but used to hold his hearers spellbound to the very
end.
It was His Excellency Miquel likewise who incited me to favor the great
canal projects and supported me when the Prussian Conservatives opposed
the Central [Rhine-Weser-Elbe] Canal, and caused the failure of the plan to
build it. He lent strength to the King and made the latter decide not to let up
in this fight until victory was won. He knew, as I did, what blessings the
canals in Holland and the splendid canal network of France had brought to
those lands and what a relief they were to the ever more hard-pressed
railways. In the World War we might have had a splendid east-to-west
artery of transportation for ammunition, wounded, siege material, supplies,
and the like, which would have made it possible, by thus relieving the
railways, for the latter to transport troops on an even greater scale—
moreover, this would have lessened the shortage of coal. In time of peace
also, for which the canal was destined, it would have been most beneficial.
Minister von Miquel was a most ardent enthusiast for the Imperial German
idea and the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns: I lent an attentive ear to
his spirited handling of this theme. He was a man who, clinging to the old
tradition, thought in a great German, Imperial way; he was fully adequate to
the requirements and demands of the new era, rightly appreciating when
these were of value.
From the start I concerned myself with the completion of the railway
system. From the reports relating to national defense and the complaints of
the General Staff, as well as from personal observation, I knew of the
absolutely incredible neglect suffered by East Prussia in the matter of

railways. The state of affairs was absolutely dangerous, in view of the
steady, though gradual, reinforcing of the Russian troops facing our frontier,
and the development of the Russian railway system.
During the last years of his reign Emperor William the Great had
commanded Field Marshal Moltke to report on the situation, since the
Russian armies, under the influence of France, were being posted ever more
conspicuously on the eastern frontier of Prussia, arousing apprehension as
to the possibility of irruptions of great masses of Russian cavalry into
Prussia, Posen, and Silesia. Quartermaster-General Count Waldersee and I
were present at the reading of this report. From it came the resolve to shift
Prussian troops eastward and to push toward completion the neglected
railway system.
The measures ordained by Emperor William I and begun by him required
time, particularly as the new railway bridges over the Vistula and Nogat had
to be built by the military authorities in the teeth of strong official
opposition (Maybach). Since the railways were considered a "national
pocketbook," there was a desire to build only "paying" lines, which caused
prejudice against outlays for military lines designed for the defense of the
fatherland, since it diminished the fine surplus funds by which such great
store was laid.
Not until my reign were the plans of Emperor William I brought to
realization. Anyone taking up a railway map of 1888 will be amazed at the
lack of railway connection in the east, particularly in East Prussia,
especially if he compares it with a 1914 map showing the development in
the intervening years. If we had had the old network, we should have lost
our eastern territory in 1914.
Unquestionably, Minister von Maybach rendered valuable services in the
promotion and development of the railway system. He had to take into
account the wishes and demands of the rapidly developing industrial
sections of Western Germany, in doing which he naturally considered
military desires also, as far as he could. But during his régime Eastern
Germany was very badly treated with regard to railway lines, bridges, and
rolling stock. Had there been mobilization at that time, it would have been
necessary to transfer hundreds of locomotives to the east in order to
maintain schedules capable of meeting even part of the requirements of the

General Staff. The only means of communication with the east were the two
antiquated trestle bridges at Dirschau and Marienburg. The General Staff
became insistent, which brought quarrels between it and Maybach.
Not until Minister Thielen came into office was there a change, occasioned
by his self-sacrificing work, for which thanks are due him. Realizing
correctly what the military requirements were, he pushed forward the
completion of the eastern railways. Thielen was an able, diligent,
thoroughly reliable official of the old Prussian type, faithful to me and
enjoying my high esteem. In common with Miquel, he stood faithfully by
the side of his sovereign in the fight for the Central Canal. Characteristic of
him were the words which he said in my presence, before a big assembly of
people, at the opening of the Elbe-Trave Canal: "The Central Canal must
and will be built." Relations between him and me remained harmonious
until his retirement.
Despite the railway construction work in the western part of Germany, there
were in that region likewise serious gaps in the network of railways, from
the point of view of mobilization and deployment of troops, which had long
since needed remedying. The Rhine, as far up as Mainz, was crossed by one
railway bridge only; the Main could be crossed only at Frankfort. For a long
time the General Staff had been demanding the remedying of these
conditions. Fortunately, general traffic moved in the same direction—for
instance, if a traveler coming from the west wished to reach one of the
watering places in the Taunus Mountains, or some place on the railway
along the right bank of the Rhine, he had to go as far as Frankfort, and then
return in the same direction whence he had come, although at Mainz he had
almost been opposite Wiesbaden.
Minister Budde was the man chosen for the accomplishment of this work.
As chief of the railway department of the General Staff he had long since
attracted my attention by his extraordinary capacity for work, his energy,
and his promptness in making decisions. He had often reported to me on the
gaps in our railway system, which would hamper quick deployment of
troops on two fronts, and always pointed out the preparations being made
by Russia and France, which we were in duty bound to meet with
preparations of equal scope, in the interests of the national defense.

The first consideration, of course, in railway construction had been the
improvement and facilitation of industry and commerce, but it had not been
able to meet the immeasurably increased demands of these, since the great
network of canals, designed to relieve the railways, was not in existence.
The war on two fronts, which threatened us more and more—and for which
our railways were, technically speaking, not yet ready, partly from
financial-technical reasons—made necessary that more careful attention
should be paid to military requirements. Russia was building, with French
billions, an enormous network of railways against us, while in France the
railways destined to facilitate the deployment of forces against Germany
were being indefatigably extended by the completion of three-track lines—
something as yet totally unknown in Germany.
Minister Budde set to work without delay. The second great railway bridge
over the Rhine at Mainz was constructed, likewise the bridge over the Main
at Costheim, and the necessary switches and loops for establishing
communication with the line along the right bank of the Rhine, and with
Wiesbaden; also the triangle at Biebrich-Mosbach was completed. Budde's
talents found brilliant scope in the organization and training of the railway
employees, whose numbers had grown until they formed a large army, and
in his far-sighted care for his subordinates.
I respected this vigorous, active man with all my heart, and deeply regretted
that a treacherous ailment put an end to his career in the very midst of his
work.
In His Excellency von Breitenbach I acquired a new and valuable aid and
co-worker in my plans regarding the railways. In the course of years he
developed into a personage of high eminence. Distinguished and obliging,
of comprehensive attainments, keen political insight, great capacity for
work and untiring industry, he stood in close relationship to me.
His co-operation with the General Staff in military matters was due to his
thorough belief in the necessity of strengthening our means of defense
against possible hostile attacks. Plans were made for the construction of
three new Rhine bridges, at Rüdesheim, Neuwied, and the Loreley, which
were not completed until during the war—they were named, respectively,
after the Crown Prince, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff. In the east, great

extensions of railway stations, bridges, and new railway lines were built,
some of them while the war was in progress.
Other important works carried out by Breitenbach in the west were the great
railway bridge at Cologne, to replace the old trestle bridge; a new bridge, by
the Beyen Tower, for freight traffic; and new railways in the Eiffel
Mountains. Moreover, at my special suggestion, a through line was built
from Giessen to Wiesbaden, which included reconstruction of the stations at
Homburg and Wiesbaden and the building of a loop around Frankfort and
Höchst. In addition, trains were provided with through cars from Flushing
to the Taunus.
To show that it is impossible to please everybody, I wish to observe in
passing that we were violently attacked by the hotel proprietors of
Frankfort, who were naturally not at all pleased at this elimination of
Frankfort and of the necessity, existing previously, for passengers to change
trains there, since they lost thereby many customers formerly obliged to
spend a night in some Frankfort hotel. This element brought particularly
strong opposition to bear against the loop line around Höchst.
The battle concerning the Central Canal was decided at last in favor of my
plans. Under Breitenbach, construction on it was pushed forward by
sections with great energy. Those portions of this canal which it had been
possible to place in operation have fully met expectations.
During this period, also, the extraordinarily difficult extension and
deepening of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, almost equivalent to building an
entirely new waterway, was brought to completion, likewise the great
Emden sea lock. These were remarkable achievements in the domain of
bridge and lock construction, which aroused the admiration of the world; in
the matter of locks, for instance, those built at this time far surpassed the
locks of the Panama Canal in size. The difficult tasks were brilliantly and
thoroughly completed by the officials in charge; in so far as the construction
work was in the hands of the Empire, it was carried out mostly with the
supervising co-operation of the Prussian Ministry of Transportation.
I often went to Breitenbach's home, where I had an opportunity, thanks to
him, of having interesting talks on commercial-political and economic
subjects with a highly intelligent circle, of meeting a lot of eminent men
and discussing important questions. The plans and sketches of all the larger

railway stations, locks, and bridges were submitted to me before the work
of building or rebuilding them was begun, and reports concerning them
were made to me.
I have intentionally gone into detail in this matter in order to show the
following: First, how a monarch can and must influence the development of
his realm by personal participation; second, how, if he makes his selections
quite independently of party reasons, he can place able men at the head of
the various departments; third, how, by the honest co-operation of these
men with the sovereign, whose complete confidence they enjoy, brilliant
results can be achieved. Everything that we did together was aboveboard
and honest; nothing mattered but the welfare and development of the
fatherland, its strengthening and equipment for competition in the world
market.
As was natural, I had close and lasting relations in the regular course of
events with the Ministry of Public Worship and Instruction. Herr von
Gossler and Herr von Trott may surely be considered the most important
and prominent occupants of this post. In this Ministry a co-worker almost
without equal arose in the person of Ministry Director Althoff, a man of
genius.
I had been made acquainted with the dark side of the high-school system of
education by my own school experiences. The predominantly philological
character of the training led, in the whole educational system as well, to a
certain one-sidedness.
When I was at the Cassel High School in 1874-77 I had observed that,
although there was great enthusiasm for 1870-71 and the new Empire
among the boys, there was, nevertheless, a distinct lack of the right
conception of the German idea, of the feeling "civis Germanus sum" ("I am
a German citizen")—which I impressed later upon my people at the laying
of the foundation-stone of the Saalburg. To create such sentiments and
awaken them in the rising generation and to lay the foundations for them
firmly in the young hearts was a task somewhat beyond the powers of the
teaching staff, in view of the fossilized, antiquated philological curriculum.
There was great neglect in the department of German history, which is
exactly the study through which young hearts may be made to glow,
through which the love of one's native country, its future and greatness, may

be aroused. But little was taught of more recent history, covering the years
since 1815. Young philologists were produced, but no German citizens
qualified for practical co-operation toward building up the flourishing
young Empire.
In other words, no youths who were consciously Germans were being
turned out. In a small reading club composed of my classmates I often tried
to inculcate the idea of the Greater Germany, in order to eliminate parochial
and similar conceptions which hampered the German idea. Admiral
Werner's Book of the German Fleet was one of the few works by means of
which the living feeling for the German Empire could be fanned into flame.
Another thing that struck me, in addition to the one-sidedness of the
education in the schools, was the tendency, among youths planning their
careers in those days, to turn their attention to becoming Government
officials, and always consider the profession of lawyer or judge the most
worthy goal.
This was doubtless due to the fact that the conditions obtaining in the
Prussia of olden days still had their effect in the youthful German Empire.
As long as the state consisted, so to speak, of government and
administration, this tendency among German youths in the shaping of their
lives was understandable and justified; since we were living in a country of
officials, the right road for a young man to select was the service of the
state. British youths of that time, self-reliant and made robust by sports,
were already talking, to be sure, of colonial conquests, of expeditions to
explore new regions of the earth, of extending British commerce; and they
were trying, in the guise of pioneers of their country, to make Great Britain
still stronger and greater, by practical, free action, not as paid hirelings of
the state. But England had long been a world empire when we were still a
land of officials; therefore, the youth of Britain could seek more remote and
important goals than the German.
Now that Germany had entered into world economics and world politics,
however, as a by no means negligible factor, the aspirations of German
youth should have undergone a more prompt transformation. For this reason
it was that I, during the later years of my reign, used to compare, with a
heavy heart, the proud young Britons, who had learned much less Latin and
Greek than was required among us, with the children of Germany, pale

from overstudy. To be sure, there were even then enterprising men in
Germany—brilliant names can be cited among them—but the conception of
serving the fatherland, not by traveling along a definite, officially certified
road, but by independent competition, had not yet become sufficiently
generalized. Therefore I held up the English as an example, for it seems to
me better to take the good where one finds it, without prejudice, than to go
through the world wearing blinkers.
With these considerations as a basis I won for my German youths the
School Reform against desperate opposition from the philologists, inside
and outside the Ministry and school circles. Unfortunately, the reform did
not take the shape which I hoped, and did not lead to the results which I had
expected.
The Germanic idea in all its splendor was first revealed and preached to the
astonished German people by Chamberlain in his Foundations of the
Nineteenth Century. But, as is proved by the collapse of the German people,
this was in vain. To be sure, there was much singing of "Deutschland über
alles," but Germans, obeying the commands of their enemies, allowed the
Emperor to fall and the Empire to be broken to pieces; and, placing
themselves under the orders of Russian criminals vastly inferior to them in
culture, they stabbed their own army in the back while it was still fighting
valiantly.
Had Germans of all classes and conditions been educated to feel joy and
pride in their fatherland, such a degradation of a great nation would have
been unimaginable.
This degradation—which, it must be admitted, occurred under remarkable,
extremely difficult circumstances—is all the more difficult to understand in
view of the fact that the youth of Germany, although it was impaired in
health by overstudy, and not so toughened by sports as the English,
achieved brilliant feats in the World War, such as were nowhere equaled
before.
The years 1914-18 showed what might have been made out of the German
people had it only developed its admirable qualities in the right direction.
The 4th of August, 1914, the heroes of Langemark, countless splendid
figures from all classes, rise up from the chaos of the long war to show
what the German can do when he throws away Philistinism and devotes

himself, with the enthusiasm which so seldom reveals itself completely in
him, to a great cause. May the German people never forget these
incarnations of its better self; may it emulate them with its full strength by
inculcating in itself the true German spirit!
In the post of Minister of Justice I found His Excellency Friedberg, the
intimate, faithful friend of my father, whom I had known ever since my
youth, when he was a welcome guest in the home of my parents. This
simple, affable man enjoyed with me the same consideration which had
been shown him by my parents.
In later years I had frequent and welcome dealings with His Excellency
Beseler, who also enabled me to hear informal discussion at his house of
many an interesting legal problem by prominent lawyers, and to come into
touch with legal luminaries. I felt no particular inclination toward the
lawyers in themselves—since pedantry, remoteness from actualities and
doctrinaire leanings often assert themselves in the domain of the law
altogether too much for my taste—but the compilation of the Citizens' Law
Book interested me greatly. I was present at sessions dealing with it, and
was proud that this fundamental German work should have been brought to
completion in my reign.
When I met the Lord Chief Justice of England, while I was on a visit to that
country, at the home of Lord Haldane, I asked that great jurist what he
thought of the administration and interpretation of the law in Germany. His
answer ran thus: "You pronounce judgment too much according to the letter
of the law; we according to the spirit and content of the law."
I have often pointed out how unfortunate it was that we have not been able
to introduce, in police cases—connected with traffic, streets, etc.—the
prompt procedure of the English "police court." For, in England,
punishment in such cases is meted out on the very next day, whereas in
Germany months often elapse, what with gathering of evidence and
examination of witnesses, until, finally, some insignificant sentence is
pronounced long after the case has been forgotten. I should also have liked
to introduce into Germany the heavy penalties for libels published in the
press which are customary in England.
I have often pointed out how unfortunate it was Prince, with Minister of
Finance Scholz, and had taken part in sessions wherein that famous man,

His Excellency Meinecke, figured. Meinecke was Under Secretary of State
in the Finance Ministry and had, therefore, much to do with other Ministers,
since finances were an important thing everywhere. He had achieved a
certain degree of fame because he—as he thought—was always able
smilingly to find the best way out of tight places.
Scholz was faithful to his duty and able, but he did not succeed in making
the dry substance of taxes and the like particularly interesting and pleasant
to me, nor was there any change in this state of affairs until the versatile
Miquel took charge of the Finance Ministry. When Miquel reported to me
concerning the Prussian financial reform, he suggested three plans: one
modest, one medium, one ambitious. To the delight of the Minister I
decided, without hesitation, for the third. Both the monarch and the
Minister were filled with satisfaction when the reform was carried out.
The Minister of the Interior, Herr von Puttkamer, had been forced to retire
during the ninety-nine days, to the great sorrow of him who was then
Crown Prince. He was an able, tried old Prussian official; one of those
Pomeranians of the old school, filled with loyalty to the King—a nobleman
through and through. Rumor had it that the Empress Frederick had driven
him from office by a plot, but this is not true. The Empress, with her
inclination to English Liberalism, doubtless did not like the old-time
Prussian Conservative, yet she was not at all to blame for his going. Prince
Bismarck pushed him aside, perhaps out of consideration for the Empress
Frederick.
I was deeply interested in forestry and its improvement along practical
lines, especially as new gold reserves could be created for the state by
reforestation.
Next to Herr von Podbielski, the ablest Minister of Agriculture and Forests
was Freiherr von Schorlemer. Just as Herr von Podbielski bent his efforts
toward creating great stretches of forests in the east, in order to keep off the
east wind by a compact forest zone and thus improve our climate, and, at
the same time, provide a natural protection against Russian attacks, so Herr
von Schorlemer opened up the eastern forest reservations by extensive
construction of roads, and by thus facilitating the transportation of wood
helped Germany greatly in making headway in competition against wood
from Russia.

Both Ministers sought, in co-operation with me, to improve our splendid
Prussian forestry personnel and better living conditions among them, and to
help toward promotions in their ranks—all of which these officials, zealous
in their work and faithful to their King, fully deserved.
The influx of large sums into the state's pocketbook depended indeed on the
honesty, industry, and reliability of these men. I expected much toward the
restoration of the fatherland from the statesmanlike shrewdness and ability
of Herr von Schorlemer, who was always quite conscious of the goal at
which he was aiming.[8]
I learned much about forestry from Head Foresters Freiherr von Hövel
(Joachimsthal, Schorfheide) and Freiherr Speck von Sternburg
(Szittkohnen, Rominten) on my many hunting expeditions with these
excellent huntsmen and administrators.
Let me say a word here regarding a Russian curiosity in the domain of
preserving wild game. The Tsar, who had heard a great deal about the fine
antlers of the stags at Rominten, wished to have some of the same sort at
Spala, in Poland. Freiherr von Sternburg was sent to the Spala hunting
lodge one summer in order to give advice regarding this project.
He was received very cordially by a general, who had charge of the hunting
there and lived at the lodge. Sternburg noticed that all the apartments, even
those not inhabited, were always kept heated. When he spoke of the
enormous waste of wood occasioned by this, the general shrugged his
shoulders and remarked that one never could tell, the Tsar might put in an
appearance some day, after all. A gamekeeper, who was a German, was
assigned to Sternburg, since the general did not know his way about on the
reservation and was quite ignorant of game feeding.
In the course of his tours about the place Sternburg observed a number of
places where meadows could be turned into pastures or good feeding places
could be installed. He drew attention to the need of such arrangements,
having noticed that the deer had already begun to shed their horns to a
considerable extent, thereby causing much damage to the trees.
But the gamekeeper shook his head sadly and remarked that he had already
reported all that, but in vain, since the hay for the deer had to be brought by
rail from the Black Sea and the shipments sometimes either did not arrive at

all or were greatly delayed and arrived spoiled. But nothing would be done
to alter this, continued the gamekeeper, since too many people made a good
thing out of this transporting of the hay, which was paid for at huge prices.
He also told how—after he had called attention to the many splinters of
wood found in the intestines of the deer, in order to prove that they were
insufficiently fed and that feeding places must be provided—a committee of
animal doctors had been brought from St. Petersburg to investigate the
matter. The said committee lived and ate for weeks in Spala at the Tsar's
expense, shot many deer, examined them, and held sessions; and the upshot
of all this was a report that the animals had wood in their stomachs, which
proved that they could live on wood, for which reason feeding places would
be superfluous and the hay from the Black Sea would suffice to supplement
the wood. And there the matter remained, in spite of Sternburg's visit!
When I heard this yarn, I involuntarily thought of an anecdote which Prince
Bülow especially delighted to tell in connection with his sojourn at St.
Petersburg. While there, he had attended the salon of Madame Durnovo,
where society used often to gather. One day a prominent general was
complaining to the hostess that he had been trapped in a money matter,
which had brought him much unpleasantness from "above." Apparently he
wished, by his mournful description, to arouse sympathy for his bad luck,
but Madame Durnovo retorted, in her rough way: "Mon cher Général,
quand on fait des sâletés, il faut qu'elles réussissent!" ("My dear General,
when you play dirty tricks it is necessary that they be successful!")
As Secretary of State in the Imperial Postal Department likewise, Herr von
Podbielski, after I had chosen him and declined a number of other
candidates, did excellent work, treading worthily in the footsteps of
Stephan. Very practical; endowed with the business sense and a great
knowledge of business; well versed and clever in financial matters; of
innate administrative talent, and, at the same time, quick to fight;
caustically witty; a good speaker and debater—he worked with zeal and
skill, often as a pioneer, particularly in matters of world postal service,
wireless telegraphy, etc. This former colonel in the Ziethen Hussars made a
name for himself in the service of his fatherland which will never be
forgotten.

An amusing contrast to his career is that of a Russian Hussar officer under
Nicholas I. This Tsar, being full of anger against the Holy Synod, had
driven away the man at the head of it. Shortly afterward he inspected the
Hussar Body Guard Regiment, commanded by Colonel Count Protassoff.
The immense satisfaction of the Tsar at the splendid appearance and
maneuvering of the fine regiment found expression in the words, amazing
alike to the commander and his men: "Thou hast maneuvered thy regiment
magnificently, and, as a token of my satisfaction, I name thee Procurator of
the Holy Synod, which thou must put into good shape for me!"
Mention must be made here of another excellent and worthy man, Minister
Möller. He came from Bielefeld, like Hinzpeter, and was bound to my old
teacher by lasting ties of friendship. In the legislature he was one of the
leaders of the National Liberals, by whom he was highly esteemed, as he
was in the Reichstag, on account of his upright, distinguished Westphalian
characteristics and his great experience in the commercial-political domain.
When Imperial Chancellor Bülow suggested Möller to me as Minister I
remarked that he was a party man and member of the Reichstag. The
Chancellor said that the National Liberals would be pleased at Möller's
appointment. I observed that the state Ministry of the Prussian King could
not and must not be a party Ministry, but must stand above the parties in
entire independence of them; that I esteemed Möller personally very much,
but, should he become Minister, every member of the legislature would
have the ambition to become one likewise; that, through Möller's
appointment, the ambitions of the other parties to obtain ministerial chairs
would also be aroused and nobody could foresee the consequences; that,
moreover, Möller would be greatly missed in the Reichstag, from which I
did not wish to take him on account of his influence with all parties.
Despite these objections and my advice against it, Bülow stuck to his idea.
Möller became Minister, and, as such, stood very well with me. But what I
had prophesied occurred comparatively soon: Minister Möller was obliged
to retire by circumstances partially connected with the inner workings of his
party.

CHAPTER VII

Science and Art
The broad and many-sided field whose care devolved upon the Ministry of
Public Worship and Instruction—embracing art, science, research, medical
matters, etc.—always aroused my lively interest and enlisted my efforts in
its behalf.
Special pleasure was afforded me by the development of the Technical High
School. The increasing importance of technical matters drew ever larger
numbers of the ablest youths to institutions of learning of this description,
and the achievements of the teachers there and of the young engineers who
were graduated constantly brought new laurels to the German name.
Among the teachers at Charlottenburg one of the most prominent and best
known all over the world was Professor Doctor Slaby. Until his death he
had constant dealings with me and kept me informed concerning the newest
inventions by means of captivating discourses. These were given not only in
his laboratory, but also in the quiet hunting lodge in the forests of
Brandenburg, where I, together with the Empress, surrounded by a few
intimates, used to listen eagerly to Slaby's words. Slaby was also dear to me
as an individual and caused me much mental enjoyment by his simple, clear
views on every possible sort of thing in this world, which he could always
express in the most stimulating and enthralling manner. Slaby meant much
to me, and I felt grateful affection for him up to the time of his death.
Influenced by the achievements of the technical high schools and of such
men as Slaby, Intze, and so on, I resolved to grant the high schools the same
privilege of representation in the Prussian upper house as was enjoyed by
the universities. But the universities protested vehemently against this to the
Minister of Public Worship and Instruction, and there ensued a violent fight
against the classical-scientific arrogance of the savants, until I finally
enforced my will by a decree. Slaby received the news from me by
telegraph in his laboratory while he was delivering a lecture, and gave it to

the students, who burst into wild cheers. The technical high schools have
shown themselves worthy of the honor conferred upon them.
In view of the constantly more violent fight for the markets of the world
and its outlets, it became necessary, in order to utilize the wisdom of the
leaders of German science in this direction, to provide them with more
freedom, quiet, possibility for working, and materials. Many savants of
importance were hampered in research work by their activities as teachers,
so that the only time they had left over for research was their vacation. This
state of affairs resulted in overwork and overburdening, which had to be
stopped.

CHEMICAL RESEARCH

Attention was turned first to improvements in the domain of chemistry.
Minister von Trott and Director of the Ministry Althoff, having grasped the
state of affairs with clear understanding, made possible for me the
establishment of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and drew up the statutes
governing it. In the short time of its existence it has achieved brilliant
results and given me an opportunity, at its general meetings, to become
acquainted with eminent men in all branches of knowledge with whom I
thereafter entered into regular intercourse. I also visited their laboratories,
where I could follow the progress of their labors. New laboratories were
founded, others subsidized from the contributions of the senate and
members of the organization.
I was proud of this creation of mine, since it proved a boon to the
fatherland. The inventions due to the research of its members benefited the
entire nation. It was a peace-time achievement with a great and most
promising future, which, under the guidance of Herr von Trott, was in most
excellent hands; unfortunately, the war robbed me of this joy, along with all
others. Nowadays I must do without the intercourse with my men of
learning of my association, and that is a cruel blow to me. May it continue
to live and labor for the benefit of research and the good of the fatherland!
I had to face a severe fight in getting Professor Harnack summoned to
Berlin. The theologians of the Right and the Orthodox element protested
vehemently. After I had again obtained full information from Hinzpeter and
he had closed his opinion with the words that it would be most regrettable

for Berlin and Prussia if I backed down, I insisted upon the summoning of
Harnack, and summoned he was.
Nowadays it is impossible to understand the opposition to him. What a man
Harnack is! What an authoritative position he has won for himself in the
world of the mind! What benefit, what knowledge, intercourse with this
fiery intellect has brought to me! What wonders he has achieved, as head of
the Royal Library and dean of the senate of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society,
where he, the theologian, delivered the most learned and most substantial
talks on exact sciences, research, inventions, and chemistry. I shall always
look back with pleasure on the personality of Harnack and on his labors.
Professor Erich Schmidt of the University of Berlin was also a friend of
mine and was often at my home; I owe many an enjoyable evening to the
learned discourses of this savant.
Professor Schiemann enjoyed my particular confidence. An upright man, a
native of the Baltic Provinces, a champion of the Germanic idea against
Slavic arrogance, a clear-sighted politician and brilliant historian and writer,
Schiemann was constantly asked by me for advice on political and
historical questions. To him I owe much good counsel, especially regarding
the East. He was often at my home and often accompanied me on journeys
—as, for instance, to Tangier—and he heard from me in our talks much
important confidential matter not yet known to others on political questions.
His unshakable capacity for keeping his mouth shut justified my trust in
him. It was a source of satisfaction to me to appoint this tried man curator
of the University of Dorpat, after the liberation of the Baltic Provinces.

KAISER'S RUSSIAN FORESIGHT

How well he and I agreed in our political views regarding Russia is
illustrated by the following incident: After the Peace of Portsmouth,
between Russia and Japan, brought about by me in conjunction with
President Roosevelt in 1905, there was much official (Foreign Office) and
unofficial puzzling of heads at Berlin as to what political line Russia would
take. In general it was thought that Russia, angered at her defeat, would
lean toward the West—and hence toward Germany—in order to find there
new connections and strength to help her in striking a blow for revenge
against Japan and reconquest of her lost territory and prestige.

My opinion was quite different—but I could not make the official world
share it. I emphasized the following points: That the Russians were Asiatics
and Slavs; being the first, they would be inclined to favor Japan, in spite of
their defeat; being the second, they would like to ally themselves with those
who had proved themselves strong. Hence I thought that, after a while,
Russia, despite the Björkö Agreement, would join Japan, not Germany, and
turn later against Germany. On account of these "fantastic" ideas, I was
actually ridiculed, officially and unofficially.
I summoned Schiemann and questioned him on this subject, without
revealing to him what I thought about it. I was much pleased when his
answer agreed absolutely with the views held by me. For a long time
Schiemann and I stood almost alone when this weighty matter of foreign
politics came up in discussions.
The event justified us. The so-called "Russian experts" of Berlin, as well as
the official world, were mistaken.
During the very first years of my reign there was occasion for much
important building work.
First, there was the question of erecting a worthy monument over the tomb
of my grandparents. Since the old mausoleum at Charlottenburg was
inadequate, it was necessary to erect an addition. Unfortunately, the funds
left by Emperor William the Great for such "extra construction"—the so-
called Extra Construction Fund—had been used up during the ninety-nine
days on something else. Hence I was obliged to burden the Crown revenues
with unforeseen building expenses. The mausoleum of my parents at Marly
was erected by the Empress Frederick, according to her own sketches and
designs, and for this, too, I had to provide the funds.
A thorough examination of the royal palaces—including those in the
provinces—had revealed, particularly at the palace in Berlin, such
deplorable conditions in sanitation, comfort, and so on, that there could be
no more delay in remedying them. In the course of my thirty years' reign I
restored these palaces to good condition—working in accordance with
carefully prepared budgets, examined, corrected, and supervised by myself
with the help of architects (such as Ihne), and of artists, with due regard for
the traditions of my ancestors—all of which gave me much trouble and
tried my patience, but also provided me with a great deal of enjoyment.

ARCHITECTURAL INTERESTS

In restoring the Berlin palace, the Empress Frederick, with her sure, keen
eye for the proper style and her sound judgment, helped materially in
offsetting the harm and neglect dating from bygone days. My mother's
expression of her view ought surely to be of general interest: "Any style is
good so long as it is pure." Ihne used to call the eclecticism of the 'nineties
"à peu près style" (the "almost style"). The restoration of the Picture
Gallery, the last work of Herr Ihne—who died, unfortunately, all too soon—
was not completed until during the first half of the war. The palace of my
forefathers, erected at much pains and a source of pride to me, was later
bombarded, stormed, sacked, and devastated by revolutionary hordes.
These artistic building enterprises, as well as the already-mentioned
restoration of the White Drawing Room, belong among the duties of
representation devolving upon every Government, be it absolute,
constitutional, or democratic in form. They afford a criterion of the national
culture and are a means of encouraging artists and, through them, the
development of art.
During my vacations I busied myself with archæology and was active in
excavation work. Here I kept in view one basic idea: to discover the roots
from which ancient Greek art developed and to erect or find a bridge in the
endeavor to establish the cultural influence of the East on the West. It
appeared to me that Assyriology was important, since from it might be
expected an elucidation and vitalizing of the Old Testament, and, hence, of
the Holy Scriptures. Therefore, I accepted with pleasure the offer of the
presidency of the German Orient Society and devoted myself to the study of
its work, which I promoted to the best of my ability, never missing one of
its public lectures on the results of its explorations. I had much to do with
those at the head of it, and caused detailed reports to be made to me of the
excavations at Nineveh, Assur, and Babylon, in Egypt and in Syria, for the
protection and facilitation of which I often personally brought influence to
bear on the Turkish Government.
Professor Delitzsch, a member of the society gave his well-known and
much-attacked lecture on "Babel and Bible," which, unfortunately, fell upon
the ears of a public as yet too ignorant and unprepared, and led to all sorts
of misinterpretations, some of them in church circles.

I strove hard to clear up the matter. Since I realized that the importance of
Assyriology, then enlisting the efforts of many prominent men, including
clergymen of both religions, was not yet understood and appreciated by the
general public, I had my trusted friend and brilliant theater director, Count
Hülsen-Haeseler, produce the play "Assurbanipal," after long preparation,
under the auspices of the German Orient Society. Assyriologists of all
countries were invited to the dress rehearsal; in the boxes, all mixed up
together, were professors, Protestant and Catholic clergymen, Jews and
Christians. Many expressed to me their thanks for having shown, by this
performance, how far research work had already progressed and for having,
at the same time, revealed more clearly to the general public the importance
of Assyriology.
My sojourn at Corfu likewise afforded me the pleasure of serving
archæology and of busying myself personally with excavation. The
accidental discovery of a relief head of a Gorgon near the town of Corfu led
me to take charge of the work myself. I called to my aid the experienced
excavator and expert in Greek antiques, Professor Dörpfeld, who took over
the direction of the excavation work. This savant, who was as enthusiastic
as I for the ancient Hellenic world, became in the course of time a faithful
friend of mine and an invaluable source of instruction in questions relating
to architecture, styles, and so on among the ancient Greeks and Achæans.

"ILIAD" AS A GUIDE BOOK

It was a joy to hear Dörpfeld read and elucidate the old Homeric poems,
and establish, by means of a map and following the hints and descriptions
of the poet, the location of the old Achæan settlements destroyed later by
the Doric migration. It appeared that the names of the old places had often
been transferred by the dispossessed inhabitants to the new places. This
made the identification of the location more difficult. Nevertheless,
Dörpfeld had rediscovered the location of a whole series of them, with the
help of his Homer, which he carried in his hand like a Baedeker, hitting
upon it by following the minute geographical descriptions given by Homer.
This interested me so much that I took a trip by water, with the Empress, in
the company of Dörpfeld, in order to put the matter to the test. We went to
Leukas (Ithaca) and visited, one after another, the places made famous by

the "Odyssey," while Dörpfeld read from his Homer the descriptive text
referring to each. I was amazed and had to admit that the region and the
description tallied exactly.
The excavations begun by me in Corfu under Dörpfeld's direction had
valuable archæological results, since they produced evidence of an
extremely remote epoch of the earliest Doric art. The relief of the Gorgon
has given rise already to many theories—probable and improbable—
combined, unfortunately, with a lot of superfluous acrimonious discussion.
From all this, it seems to me, one of the piers for the bridge sought by me
between Asia and Europe is assuming shape.
I sent reports regularly to the Archæological Society, and I also brought the
well-known Professor Caro from Athens to work with me. I was busy with
preparations for lectures to be delivered before the society during the winter
of 1914-15, and with searching discussions on many disputed questions,
which I hoped to bring toward a solution "sine ira et studio." It was a
pleasure to me to be visited almost regularly, at Corfu, by English and
American archæologists, former pupils of Dörpfeld, who helped zealously
in throwing light on the difficult problems which often came up. Since they
were at work in Asia Minor, I was deeply interested in hearing what
importance they attached to the Asiatic influence on early Greek art—as a
result of their discoveries—and how readily they recognized a connection
with the East in the finds made at Corfu. In 1914, Professor Duhn of
Heidelberg visited the excavations at Corfu and, after thorough
investigation, gave his support to the views held by Dörpfeld and me. I shall
tell in a separate piece of writing about the result of my Corfu excavations.
That was the sort of thing which, in the spring of 1914, occupied the
thoughts of the German Emperor, who, lusting for robbery and conquest, is
accused of having bloodthirstily brought on the World War. While I was
exploring and discussing Gorgons, Doric columns, and Homer, they were
already mobilizing against us in the Caucasus and Russia. And the Tsar, at
the beginning of the year, when asked about his travel plans, had replied:
"Je resterai chez moi cette année, car nous aurons la guerre!" ("I shall stay
at home this year, for we are going to have war!")

CHAPTER VIII

My Relations with the Church
Much has been written and said about my relations with the Church. Even
when I was still a prince and a student at Bonn, I realized the harmful
influence of the "Kulturkampf" in its last phase. The religious rift did so
much toward antagonism that once, for example, I was directly boycotted,
while on a hunting expedition, by members of leading noble Rhenish-
Westphalian families of the Rhineland belonging to the Ultra-Montane
party. Even as far back as that I resolved, in the interests of the national
welfare, to work toward creating a modus vivendi such as would make it
possible for people professing the two creeds to live peacefully with each
other. The "Kulturkampf," as such, had come to an end before the beginning
of my reign.
I strove patiently and earnestly to be on good terms with the Bishops, and I
was on very friendly terms with several, especially Cardinal Kopp,
Archbishop Simar, Doctor Schulte, Prince-Bishop Bertram, Bishop Thiel,
and, last but not least, Archbishop Faulhaber and Cardinal von Hartmann.
All of these were men far above the average and an ornament to the
episcopate, who gave proof during the war of their patriotic devotion to
Emperor and Empire. This shows that I had succeeded in clearing away the
mists of the "Kulturkampf" and enabling my Catholic subjects, like others,
to rejoice in the Empire, in accordance with the motto, "suum cuique" ("to
each his own").
I was bound particularly closely all my life to Cardinal Kopp, Prince-
Bishop of Breslau. He always served me loyally, so that my relationship to
him was most trusting. Of much value to me was his mediation in dealings
with the Vatican, where he stood in high honor, although he championed
absolutely the German point of view.

FRIENDSHIP FOR POPE LEO XIII

Probably little is known by the general public of the friendly, trusting
relationship that existed between me and Pope Leo XIII. A prelate who was
close to him told me later that I had won the confidence of the Pope on my
first visit by the absolute frankness which I showed toward him and with
which I told him things which others intentionally kept from his ears.
Receptions by the Pope were conducted with tremendous pomp. Swiss and
Noble Guards, in brilliant uniforms, servants, chamberlains, and
ecclesiastical dignitaries, were present in large numbers—a miniature
representation of the might of the Roman Catholic Church.
After I had traversed the courts, halls, and drawing-rooms, in which all
these men had arrayed themselves, I seated myself opposite the Pope
himself, in his little, one-windowed study. The distinguished gentleman,
with the fine, noble-featured old face, whose eyes gazed piercingly at his
visitor, made a deep impression upon me. We discussed many timely
subjects. I was greatly pleased that the Pope spoke appreciatively and
gratefully of the position occupied in Germany by the Catholic religion and
its adherents, adding the assurance that he, for his part, would contribute
toward having the German Catholics yield to no other Germans in love for
their fatherland and in loyalty.
Pope Leo XIII gave evidences of friendliness toward me whenever he
could. For instance, on the occasion of one of my visits to Rome, he
accorded my suite and servants the honor of a special audience; he sent
Prince-Bishop Kopp as Papal Delegate on the occasion of the consecration
by me of the portal which I had had added to the cathedral at Metz, and was
so kind as to inform me of the naming of Archbishop Fischer of Cologne as
Cardinal, which was done to celebrate that day.
On the occasion of the Papal Jubilee in 1903 to celebrate the twenty-fifth
anniversary of his accession to the Papacy, I sent a special mission to
convey my congratulations to the Pope, at the head of which was Freiherr
von Loë, for many years intimately acquainted with him.
Not long after that—and only a few months before his death—I paid my
third and last visit to the Pope. Though he was very weak, this ninety-three-
year-old man came up to me, holding both his hands outstretched.
Concerning this visit, which was characterized by great cordiality on both

sides, I immediately jotted down some notes, which recently came into my
possession again.
The Pope said, among other things, that he could not but give his full
approval to the principles according to which I governed; that he had
followed with interest my methods of governing and recognized with
pleasure that I had built up my rule on a foundation of firm Christianity;
that such lofty religious principles underlay it that it behooved him to ask
the blessing of Heaven upon myself, my dynasty, and the German Empire,
and to grant me his apostolic benediction.

"SWORD OF CATHOLIC CHURCH"

It was of interest to me that the Pope said to me on this occasion that
Germany must become the sword of the Catholic Church. I remarked that
the old Roman Empire of the German nation no longer existed and that
conditions had changed. But he stuck to his words.
Then the Pope went on to say that he must thank me once more for my
unflagging attention to the welfare of my Catholic subjects; that he had
heard about this from so many sources that he was glad to tell me
personally how grateful both he and the German Catholics were for this
attention to their interests; that he could assure me that my Catholic subjects
would stand by me, in good and bad times, with absolute fidelity. "Ils
resteront absolument et infailliblement fidèles" ("They will remain
absolutely and infallibly faithful").
I rejoiced greatly at these words of appreciation from such an exalted
source. I answered that I considered it the duty of a Christian sovereign to
care for his subjects to the best of his ability, irrespective of creed; that I
could assure him that, during my reign, everybody could profess his
religion without interference and fulfill his duties toward his ecclesiastical
overlord; that this was a fundamental principle of my life, from which I
could not be swerved.
Because I showed my Catholic fellow countrymen from the very beginning
that I wished to allow them complete freedom in the exercise of their
religion, a quieter spirit was engendered in the land and the aftermath of the
"Kulturkampf" disappeared more and more. But I did not conceal from

myself the fact that, despite all politeness and friendliness, the prelates, with
the sole exception of Cardinal Kopp, still continued to look upon me as the
Emperor, and I was compelled to take into account that, in the Catholic
south and west, this idea would never quite vanish. Grateful
acknowledgment has repeatedly been made to me of the fact that the
Catholics were as well off, during my reign, as they could possibly desire;
but the constantly more uncompromising attitude of the Church on mixed
marriages, and that of the Centrist party in politics, were certainly a sign
that the antiheretical tendency still lived beneath the peaceful surface.
This made all the more intense my desire for the firm union of the
Protestant Churches—first, in Prussia, then in Germany, finally, in all
Europe. My endeavors, in conjunction with the Chief Ecclesiastical
Councilor, the General Superintendent, and so on, to find means of
effecting this union, were most earnest. I hailed the Eisenach Conference
with joy and followed its proceedings with interest. I assembled all the
General Superintendents for the consecration of the Church at Jerusalem
and also was able to greet invited deputations from Sweden, Norway, and
so forth; and I did likewise on the occasion of the consecration of the Berlin
cathedral, where, among many other deputations, the Church of England
was represented by the Bishop of Ripon (W. Boyd-Carpenter), the pastor of
Queen Victoria of England, equally prominent as a writer and preacher.
Whenever possible, I worked toward compromise, closer relations and
union, yet nothing definite resulted. Though church union in Prussia has
been a success, Lutherans and Reformists kept apart in other sections of the
fatherland. Many local rulers kept sharp watch over their rights in relation
to religions and, owing to this, were hostile to a closer union of the different
creeds within their territory. Therefore, despite my endeavors, the German
Protestant Church was not able to unite and make common cause against
the elements hostile to it. Only through the emergency brought on by the
revolution was this made possible. On Ascension Day, 1922, to my great
joy, the "German Evangelical Church Union" was solemnly formed at the
Schloss Church at Wittenberg.

DOCTOR DRYANDER'S INFLUENCE

During the first years of my military service at Potsdam I had felt deeply
the inadequacy of the sermons, which often dealt only with dry dogmatic
matter and paid too little attention to the person of Christ. In Bonn I became
acquainted with Doctor Dryander, who made an impression on me lasting
throughout my life. His sermons were free from dogma, the person of
Christ was their pivotal point, and "practical Christianity" was brought into
the foreground.
Later I brought him to Berlin and soon had him appointed to a post at the
Cathedral and in my palace. Dryander was by my side for years, until long
after the 9th of November, standing close to me spiritually, and bringing to
me spiritual consolation. We often talked on religious matters and thrashed
out thoroughly the tasks and the future of the Protestant Church. The views
of Dryander—mild, yet powerful, clear, and of truly evangelical strength—
made of him a pillar and an ornament of his Church, and a faithful co-
worker with the Emperor, to whom he was closely bound, in the interests of
the Church and its development.
Since the 9th of November, Doctor Dryander also has been exposed to
persecutions, but he has stood his ground courageously; the hopes, beliefs,
and trust of his King are with him and the Evangelical Church! The Church
must again raise up the broken nation inwardly according to the gospel of
"Ein'feste Burg ist unser Gott."
I cannot allow to pass without remark the influence exerted by the work—
translated at my instigation—of the English missionary Bernard Lucas,
entitled Conversations with Christ; as well as the sermons on Jesus by
Pastor Schneller (Jerusalem), and the collections of sermons called The Old
God Still Lives and From Deep Trouble, by Consistorial Councilor Conrad.
These brought us much inspiration and comfort by their vital ability to
absorb and hold readers and hearers.
The fact that I could deal with religious and church questions with complete
objectivity "sine ira et studio" is due to my excellent teacher, Professor
Doctor Hinzpeter, a Westphalian Calvinist. He caused his pupil to grow up
and live with the Bible, eliminating, at the same time, all dogmatic and
polemical questions; owing to this, polemics in religion have remained alien
to me, and expressions like that autocratic one, "orthodox," are repulsive to
me. As to my own religious convictions, I set forth what they were years

ago, in a letter to my friend, Admiral Hollmann, made public at the time,
part of which is reproduced at the end of this chapter.
I was enabled to bring joy to the hearts of my Catholic subjects when I
presented the plot of ground known as the "Dormition," acquired by me
from the Sultan in 1898 as a result of my sojourn in Jerusalem, to the
German Catholics there. The worthy, faithful Father Peter Schmitz,
representative of the Catholic Society in Jerusalem, expressed to me the
heartfelt thanks of the German Catholics on the spot in eloquent words at
the ceremony of taking possession.

THE CHURCH IN JERUSALEM

When I conferred with him as to future building operations and as to the
selection of persons to occupy the place, the old expert on Jerusalem
advised me to select none of the order of monks there, since all were more
or less mixed up in the intrigues and quarrels concerning the "loci sacri"
(sacred spots). After my return a delegation of the German Knights of
Malta, under Count Praschma, appeared before me to express their
gratitude. The design for the church, made by a very talented Cologne
architect and skillfully adapted to the local style, was submitted to me. After
the completion of the church I decided that the Benedictine monks of
Beuron should take over the "Dormition"; they did so in 1906, also taking
over the monastery built next the new St. Mary's Church.
I was on friendly terms for many years with the Benedictine monks of the
Beuron Congregation, with whose Archabbot, Wolter, I had become
acquainted at Sigmaringen. In mediæval times the order always stood well
with the German Emperors, of whom scarcely one failed to visit, in
connection with his journeys to Rome, the magnificently situated Monte
Cassino. When the Benedictine monks asked permission to establish a
settlement on the Rhine I had the splendid Romanesque abbey of Maria
Laach—unused at the time—turned over to them. The order, which counts
among its members excellent artists, including Father Desiderius, has
brought new glory to the abbey, which had fallen into neglect and decay, by
magnificent interior decorations. Often have I visited Maria Laach and
rejoiced in the progress of its restoration, as well as in conversations with

the intelligent abbots and in the hearty, simple reception on the part of the
faithful brethren.
When I visited the monastery of Monte Cassino I became acquainted, in the
person of Archabbot Monsignor Krug, with a man of extraordinary mental
gifts and comprehensive culture, who had traveled a great deal about the
world. He could express himself with equal fluency in Italian, English, and
French, and his mother tongue, German. In his address to King Victor
Emmanuel of Italy and me, he pointed out that nearly all the German
Emperors, as well as the Lombard Kings before them, had paid visits to
Monte Cassino. He presented me with a magnificent collection of copies of
documents of the time of the Emperor Frederick II, taken from the library
of the order, and I reciprocated by presenting him with the works of
Frederick the Great.
Agriculture flourishes in the environs of the monasteries maintained by the
Benedictine Order, being carried on by the lay brothers with all the latest
improvements, to the benefit of the backward peasantry of the region; and
in the country and town communities of the order church singing and organ
playing are zealously cultivated by the monks, who have attained a high
degree of artistic skill. The art of the goldsmith also flourishes among the
monks, likewise art embroidery among the Benedictine nuns.
I caused to be reproduced in its full size the Labarum (standard) of the
Emperor Constantine the Great, designed in accordance with the researches
made by Monsignor Wilpert: one copy I presented to the Pope, another to
my Palace Chapel at Berlin. The latter was stolen from the chapel by the
mob during the days of the revolution. The metal work was done entirely by
monks, the embroidery by nuns of the order, both excellently. One of the
places inhabited by nuns of this order is the convent of Saint Hildegard,
above Rüdesheim, which I visited in 1917.
My letter to Admiral Hollmann was due to the excitement aroused by a
lecture entitled "Babel and Bible," delivered by Professor Delitzsch before
the German Orient Society, of which Admiral Hollmann was one of the
Board of Managers.

SCHOLARSHIP AND RELIGION

The first part of the letter, which deals primarily with Professor Delitzsch's
statements, has been omitted from the reproduction of the letter printed
below:

Feb. 15, 1903.
My Dear Hollmann:
I should now like to return once again to my own standpoint regarding
the doctrine or view of revelation, as I have often set it forth to you,
my dear Hollmann, and other gentlemen. I distinguish between two
different kinds of revelation: a progressive, to a certain extent
historical revelation, and a purely religious one, paving the way to the
future coming of the Messiah.
Of the first, this is to be said: There is not the smallest doubt in my
mind that God constantly reveals Himself through the human race
created by Him. He has "breathed His breath into mankind," or, in
other words, given it a piece of Himself, a soul. He follows the
development of the human race with a Father's love and interest; for
the purpose of leading it forward and benefiting it, he "reveals"
Himself in some great savant or priest or king, whether among the
heathens, Jews, or Christians.
Hammurabi was one of these, likewise Moses, Abraham, Homer,
Charlemagne, Luther, Shakespeare, Goethe, Kant, Emperor William
the Great. These men were selected by Him and made worthy of His
grace; of achieving for their people, both in the spiritual and the
physical domain, splendid and imperishable things, in accordance with
His will. How often did my grandfather clearly emphasize that he was
but an instrument in the hand of the Lord.
The works of great minds are gifts of God to the peoples of the earth,
in order that they may improve themselves on these models and grope
forward, by means of them, through the confusion of that which is still
unexplored here below. God has certainly revealed Himself in different
ways to different peoples, according to their standing and degree of
culture, and He is still doing it now. For, just as we are overcome most
by the greatness and majesty of the splendor of Creation when we
contemplate it, and are amazed at the greatness of God as revealed

therein, so also may we, in contemplating whatever is great or splendid
in the works of a man or a people, recognize therein with gratitude the
splendor of the revelation of God. He works directly upon us and
among us! The second kind of revelation, the more religious kind, is
that which leads to the coming of the Lord. It is introduced from
Abraham onward, slowly but with foresight, all-wise and all-knowing;
for without it mankind would have been doomed.
And now begins the most astounding influence, the revelation of God.
The tribe of Abraham, and the people descended from it, consider the
holiest thing of all, unescapable in its logical consequences, the belief
in one God. This belief they must have and cultivate. Scattered by the
captivity in Egypt, the separate parts are welded together by Moses for
the second time, and still they try to maintain their "monotheism." The
direct intervention of God is what brings regeneration to this people.

KAISER'S THEOLOGY

And thus it goes through the centuries, until the Messiah announced
and foreshadowed by the Prophets and Psalmists shall at last appear.
The greatest revelation of God in the world! For He Himself appeared
in the body of His Son; Christ is God, God in human form. He saved
us. He inspires us, we are led to follow Him, we feel His fire burning
within us, His pity strengthening us, His dissatisfaction destroying us,
but also His intercession saving us. Sure of victory, building solely
upon His word, we go through work, scorn, grief, misery, and death,
for in Him we have the revealed word of God, and God never lies.
That is my view of this question. The Word, especially for us of the
Evangelical faith, has become everything on account of Luther; and
Delitzsch, as a good theologian, should not forget that our great Luther
taught us to sing and believe: "Das Wort sie sollen lassen stehn" ("The
Word they must allow to stand").
It is self-evident that the Old Testament contains a large number of
parts which are of purely human-historical character and not "God's
revealed Word." These are purely historical descriptions of events of
all sorts, which occur in the life of the people of Israel in the domain of
politics, religion, morals, and spiritual life.

For instance, the giving out of the Law on Mount Sinai can be looked
upon only symbolically as having been inspired by God, since Moses
had to turn to a revival of laws perhaps known of old (possibly drawn
from the Code of Hammurabi), in order to bring coherence and
solidarity to the framework of his people, which was loose and little
capable of resistance. Here the historian may perhaps find a
connection, either in sense or words, with the laws of Hammurabi, the
friend of Abraham, which may be logically right; but this can never
affect the fact that God had inspired Moses to act thus, and, to that
extent, had revealed Himself to the people of Israel.
Therefore, my view is that our good professor should rather avoid
introducing and treating of religion as such in his lectures before our
association, but that he may continue, unhindered, to describe
whatever brings the religion, customs, and so on of the Babylonians,
and so on, into relation with the Old Testament.
As far as I am concerned, I am led by the above to the following
conclusion:
(a) I believe in one only God.
(b) We men need, in order to teach Him, a Form, especially for our
children.
(c) This Form has been, up to now, the Old Testament, as we now
know it. This Form will be essentially changed by research,
inscriptions, and excavations; but that will cause no harm, nor will the
fact that, thereby, much of the halo of the Chosen People will
disappear, cause any harm. The kernel and content remain always the
same: God and His influence.
Religion was never a result of science, but something flowing from the
heart and being of man, through his relations with God.
With heartiest thanks and many greetings, I remain always
Your sincere friend,
(Signed) Wilhelm I. R.

CHAPTER IX

Army and Navy
My close relations with the army are a matter of common knowledge. In
this direction I conformed to the tradition of my family. Prussia's kings did
not chase cosmopolitan mirages, but realized that the welfare of their land
could only be assured by means of a real power protecting industry and
commerce. If, in a number of utterances, I admonished my people to "keep
their powder dry" and "their swords sharp," the warning was addressed
alike to foe and friend. I wished our foes to pause and think a long time
before they dared to engage with us. I wished to cultivate a manly spirit in
the German people; I wished to make sure that, when the hour struck for us
to defend the fruits of our industry against an enemy's lust of conquest, it
should find a strong race.
In view of this I attached high value to the educational duty of the army.
General compulsory military service has a social influence upon men in the
mass equaled by nothing else. It brings together rich and poor, sons of the
soil and of the city; it brings acquaintanceship and mutual understanding
among young people whose roads, otherwise, would lead them far apart; the
feeling that they are serving one idea unites them.
And think what we made out of our young men! Pale town boys were
transformed into erect, healthy, sport-hardened men; limbs grown stiff
through labor were made adroit and pliable.
I stepped direct from brigade commander to king—to repeat the well-
known words of King Frederick William III. Up to then I had climbed the
steps of an officer's career. I still think with pleasure of my pride when, on
the 2d of May, 1869, during the spring parade, I first stood in the ranks
before my grandfather. Relations with the individual man have always
seemed valuable to me, and, therefore, I particularly treasured the
assignments, during my military service, where I could cultivate such

relations. My activities as commander of a company, a squadron, and a
battery, likewise as head of a regiment, are unforgettable to me.
I felt at home among my soldiers. In them I placed unlimited trust. The
painful experiences of the autumn of 1918 have not diminished this trust. I
do not forget that a part of the German people, after four years of
unprecedented achievements and privations, had become too ill to
withstand being corrupted by foes within and without. Moreover, the best of
the Germans lay under the green sod; the others were thrown into such
consternation by the events of the revolution which had been held to be
impossible that they could not spur themselves to act.
Compulsory military service was the best school for the physical and moral
toughening of our people. It created for us free men who knew their own
value. From these an excellent corps of noncommissioned officers was
formed; from the latter, in turn, we drew our Government officials, the like
of whom, in ability, incorruptibility and fidelity to duty no other nation on
earth can show.

BELIEVES OFFICERS STILL LOYAL

And it is from these very elements that I receive nowadays signs of loyalty,
every one of which does me good. My old Second Company of the First
Infantry Guard Regiment has shared, through good and evil days, the
vicissitudes of its old captain. I saw them for the last time in 1913, in close
formation—still one hundred twenty-five strong—under that excellent
sergeant, Hartmann, on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth
anniversary of my accession to the throne.
In view of its proud duty as an educator and leader of the nation in arms, the
officer corps occupied a particularly important position in the German
Empire. The method of replacement, which, by adoption of the officers'
vote, had been lodged in the hands of the various bodies of officers
themselves, guaranteed the needed homogeneity. Harmful outcroppings of
the idea of caste were merely sporadic; wherever they made themselves felt
they were instantly rooted out.
I entered much and willingly into relations with the various officer corps
and felt like a comrade among them. The materialistic spirit of our age, to

be sure, had not passed over the officer corps without leaving traces; but, on
the whole, it must be admitted that nowhere else were self-discipline,
fidelity to duty, and simplicity cultivated to such an extent as among the
officers.
A process of weeding out such as existed in no other profession allowed
only the ablest and best to reach positions of influence. The commanding
generals were men of a high degree of attainment and ability and—what is
even more important—men of character. It is a difficult matter to single out
individuals from among them.
Though the man in the ranks at the front was always particularly close to
my heart, I must, nevertheless, give special prominence to the General Staff
as a school for the officer corps. I have already remarked that Field Marshal
Count Moltke had known how by careful training to build up men who
were not only up to requirements, technically speaking, but also qualified
for action demanding willingness to assume responsibility, independence of
judgment, and far-sightedness. "To be more than you seem" is written in the
preface to the Pocket Manual for the General Staff Officer.
Field Marshal Count Moltke laid the foundations for this training; and his
successors—Count Waldersee, that great genius, Count Schlieffen, and
General von Moltke—built upon them. The result was the General Staff,
which accomplished unprecedented feats in the World War, and aroused
admiration throughout the world.
I soon realized that the greatest possible improvement of our highly
developed technical department was absolutely necessary and would save
precious blood. Wherever possible, I worked toward the perfection of our
armament and sought to place machinery in the service of our army.
Among new creations, the very first place is taken by the heavy artillery of
the army in the field. In bringing this into being I was obliged to overcome
much opposition—particularly, strange to relate, in the ranks of the artillery
itself. It is a source of great satisfaction to me that I put this matter through.
It laid the foundation for the carrying out of operations on a large scale, and
it was long before our foes could catch up with us in this direction.

BETTER MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Mention must also be made of the machine gun, which developed from
modest beginnings to being the backbone of the infantry's fighting powers;
the replacement of the rifle by the machine gun multiplied the firing power
of the infantry while, at the same time, diminishing its losses.
Nor can I pass over without mention the introduction of the movable field
kitchen, which I had seen for the first time at some maneuvers of the
Russian army. It was of the greatest value in maintaining the fighting
efficiency of the army, since the possibility of getting sufficient
nourishment kept our troops fresh and healthy.
All human work remains unfinished. Nevertheless, it may be said, without
exaggeration, that the German army which marched to battle in 1914 was
an instrument of warfare without an equal.
Whereas, at my accession to the throne, I had found the army in a condition
which merely required development upon the foundations already laid, the
navy, on the other hand, was in the first stage of development. After the
failure of all the attempts of Admiral Hollmann to move the recalcitrant
Reichstag to adopt a slowly progressing, systematic strengthening of
German sea power—largely due to the cheap catchwords of Deputy Richter
and the lack of understanding of the Liberals of the Left, who were fooled
by them—the Admiral requested me to retire him. Deeply moved, I acceded
to his request; this plain, loyal man, the son of a genuine Berlin bourgeois
family, had become dear to me through his upright character, his devotion
to duty, and his attachment to me. My friendship with him, based upon this
estimate, lasted for many years up to the moment of the Admiral's sudden
death; it often caused me to visit this faithful man, endowed with fine
Berlin wit, at his home, and there to associate with him as head of the
German Orient Society, as well as to see him, in a small circle of intimates,
at my own home, or to take him with me as a treasured traveling
companion. He was one of the most faithful of my faithful friends, always
remaining the same in his disinterestedness, never asking anything for
himself. Happy the city which can produce such citizens! I preserve a
grateful memory of this tried and trusted friend.
Admiral Tirpitz succeeded Hollmann. In his very first reports, which laid
the foundation of the first Naval law, he showed himself thoroughly in
accord with me in the belief that the sanction of the Reichstag for the

building of warships was not to be gained by the old form of procedure. As
I have already pointed out, the opposition was not to be convinced; the tone
of the debates conducted by Richter was unworthy of the importance of the
subject; for instance, the gunboat obtained in the Reichstag by the Poles,
under Herr von Koscielsky, was jokingly dubbed Koscielska. Ridicule was
the weapon used, though the future of the fatherland was in question.
It was necessary that the representative of the navy should have a solid
phalanx behind him, both among the Ministers of State and in the
Reichstag, and that it should, from absolute conviction, energetically
support him and the cause. Therefore, there was need of communicating to
the Reichstag members, still rather ignorant in naval matters, the details of
the great work; moreover, a great movement must be engineered among the
people, among the "general public," indifferent as yet, to arouse its interest
and enthusiasm for the navy, in order that pressure from the people itself
might be brought to bear upon the Reichstag members. To this end, an
energetic propaganda was needed, through a well-organized and well-
directed press, as well as through eminent men of science at the universities
and technical high schools.

FIGHT IN THE REICHSTAG

There was need of a complete change in the whole method of handling the
matter in the Reichstag. There must be no more bickerings about individual
ships and docks. In making up the military budget, no arguments arose over
the strength of the army, unless it was a matter of new formations. The
makeup of the navy, like that of the army, must be settled by law once for
all, its right of existence recognized and protected. The units composing it
must no longer be a matter for debate. Moreover, not only the officer corps
but that of noncommissioned officers must be strengthened and trained, in
order to be ready for service on the new ships. At the beginning of my
reign, sixty to eighty cadets, at the most, were enrolled every year; in the
last few years before the war several hundred asked admission. Twelve
precious years, never to be retrieved, were lost by the failure of the
Reichstag; it is even harder to create a navy overnight than an army.
The goal to be striven for was implied in the law, which expressed the "idea
of risk"; the aim was to cause even the strongest hostile fleet to think

seriously before it came to blows with the German fleet, in view of the
heavy losses that were to be feared in a battle, which put the foe in danger
of becoming too weak for other tasks. The "idea of risk" was brilliantly
vindicated in the Skager-Rak (Jutland) battle; the enemy, in spite of his
immense superiority, dared not risk a second battle. Trafalgar was already
dim; its laurels must not be completely lost.
The total number of units (ships) on hand—it was principally a matter of
ships of the line—was taken as a basis for the Naval law, although these,
with the exception of the four ships of the Brandenburg class, were little
better than old iron.
The Naval law was looked upon by many laymen, in view of the numbers
involved, as a naval increase. In reality, however, this was a false view,
since the so-called existing fleet was absolutely no longer a fleet. It was
slowly dying of old age—as Hollmann said when he retired; included in it
were almost the oldest ships still in service in all Europe.
Now that the Naval law was gradually coming into force, lively building
operations set in, launchings were reported in the press, and there was joy
among those under the dominion of the "rage du nombre" at the growing
number of ships. But when it was made clear to them that as soon as the
new ships were ready the old ones must be eliminated, so that, as a matter
of fact, the total number of ships of fighting value would, at first, not be
increased, they were greatly disillusioned. Had the necessary ships been
built in time during the wasted twelve years the Naval law would have
found a quite different, usable basis already in existence. But as matters
now stood it was really a question of the complete rebuilding of the entire
German fleet.
The large number of ships, to which those which had to be eliminated were
added, was a fallacy. Therefore the English made a mistake when they
merely took account of the number of ships—since that fitted in well with
the propaganda against Germany—but paid no attention to age or type,
arriving thus at a total that was far too high, and, by such misleading
methods, artificially nourishing the so-called apprehension at the growth of
the German navy.
Admiral Tirpitz now went ahead with the program approved by me. With
iron energy and merciless sacrifice of his health and strength he soon was

able to inject efficiency and power into the handling of the naval question.
At my command he went, after the drafting of the Naval law, to
Friedrichsruh, the residence of Prince Bismarck, in order to convince the
latter of the necessity for having a German navy.
The press worked zealously toward the introduction of the Naval law, and
political economists, experts on commerce and politics and so forth, placed
their pens at the service of the great national cause, the necessity for a navy
having been by now widely realized.
In the meantime the English, too, helped—though quite unconsciously—
toward bettering the Naval law's chance of being passed. The Boer War had
broken out, and had aroused among the German people much sympathy for
the little country and much indignation on account of England's violent
assault upon it. Thereupon the news came of the utterly unjustified capture
of two German steamers on the East African coast by English warships.
Indignation was general.
The news of the stopping of the second steamer happened to be received by
the Secretary of State, von Bülow, at the very moment when Tirpitz and I
were with him. As soon as Bülow had read the dispatch aloud, I quoted the
old English proverb, "It's an ill wind that blows nobody good," and Tirpitz
exclaimed, "Now we have the wind we need for bringing our ship into port.
The Naval law will go through. Your Majesty must present a medal to the
captain of the English ship in gratitude for having put it through."
The Imperial Chancellor ordered up champagne and the three of us drank
joyously to the new law, its acceptance, and the future German fleet, not
forgetting to express our thanks to the English navy, which had proved so
helpful to us.
Many years later, on my return from Lowther Castle, where I had been
hunting with Lord Lonsdale, I was invited to dine with Lord Rosebery, the
great Liberal statesman and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, also known
through his researches in the history of Napoleon, at his beautiful country
estate of Dalmeny Castle, situated close to the sea, not far from the great
Forth bridge. Among the guests was General Sir Ian Hamilton, a
Scotchman, well known on account of his part in the Boer War, with whom
I had become acquainted when he was a guest at the Imperial German

maneuvers, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and a captain of the English
navy, who was commander of the naval station there.
The last sat next Admiral Freiherr von Senden, directly across the table
from me, and attracted my attention by the obvious embarrassment which
he manifested in his talk with the Admiral, which he conducted in a low
voice. After dinner Admiral von Senden introduced the captain to me,
whereat the Englishman's embarrassment caused him to behave even more
awkwardly than before, and aroused my attention because of the worried
look of his eyes and his pale face.
After the conversation, which turned on various maritime topics, had come
to an end, I asked Freiherr von Senden what the matter was with the man;
the Admiral laughed and replied that he had elicited from his neighbor,
during the meal, that he had been the commander of the ship which had
captured the two German steamers in the Boer War, and that he had been
afraid that I might find this out. Senden had thereupon told him that he was
entirely mistaken about this; that had His Majesty learned who he was he
could rest assured that he would have been very well treated and thanked
into the bargain.
"Thanked? What for?" queried the Englishman.
"For having made the passage of the Naval law so much easier for the
Emperor!"
One of the prime considerations in the passage of the Naval law—as also
for all later additions, and, in general, for the whole question of warship
construction—was the question whether the German shipbuilding industry
would be in a position to keep pace with the naval program; whether, in
fact, it would be able to carry it out at all. Here, too, Admiral von Tirpitz
worked with tireless energy. Encouraged and fired with enthusiasm by him,
the German shipbuilding yards went at the great problem, filled with
German audacity, and solved it with positively brilliant results, greatly
distancing their foreign competitors. The admirable technical endowment of
the German engineers, as well as the better education of the German
working classes, contributed in full measure toward this achievement.

FEVERISH HASTE FOR NAVY

Consultations, conferences, reports to me, service trips to all shipbuilding
yards, were the daily bread of the indefatigable Tirpitz. But the tremendous
trouble and work were richly rewarded. The people woke up, began to have
a thought for the value of the colonies (raw materials provided by ourselves
without foreign middlemen!) and for commercial relations, and to feel
interest in commerce, navigation, shipping, etc.
And, at last, the derisive opposition stopped cracking its jokes. Tirpitz,
always ready for battle, wielded a sharp blade in fighting, never joked and
allowed nobody to joke with him, so that his opponents no longer felt like
laughing. Things went particularly badly with Deputy Richter when Tirpitz
brilliantly snubbed and silenced him by quoting a patriotic saying, dating
from the 'forties, of old Harkort—whose district Richter represented—
concerning the need for a German fleet. Now it was the turn of the other
side of the Reichstag to laugh.
And so the great day dawned. The law was passed, after much fighting and
talking, by a great majority. The strength of the German navy was assured;
naval construction was to be accomplished.
By means of construction and keeping an increased number of ships in
service a fleet soon sprang into being. In order to maneuver, lead, and train
its personnel a new book of regulations and signal code were needed—at
the beginning of my reign these had been worked out merely for one
division—four ships—since at that time a larger number of units never
navigated together in the German navy—i. e., a larger number were not
kept in service. And even these were out of service in the autumn, so that, in
winter, there was (with the exception of cruisers in foreign waters)
absolutely no German navy. All the care expended during the summer
season on training of crews, officers, noncommissioned officers, engine-
room crews, and stokers, as well as on rigging and upkeep of ships, was as
good as wasted when the ships were retired from service in the autumn; and
when spring came and they were put back into commission things had to be
started at the beginning again. The result was that any degree of continuity
in training and of coherence among the crews with relation to each other
and their ships—of "ship spirit," in short—could not be maintained. This
was maintained only on board the ships stationed in foreign waters.
Therefore, after the necessary heating equipment, etc., had been put in, I

ordered that ships be kept in service also through the winter, which was a
veritable boon to the development of the fleet.
In order to obtain the necessary number of units needed by the new
regulations, Admiral von Tirpitz, in view of the shortage of ships of the line,
had already formed into divisions all the sorts of vessels available,
including gunboats and dispatch boats, and carried out evolutions with
them, so that when the replacement of line ships began to take place the
foundations for the new regulations had already been laid. The latter were
then constantly developed with the greatest energy by all the officials
concerned and kept pace with the growth of the fleet.
Hard work was done on the development of that important weapon, the
torpedo boat. At that time we were filled with joyful pride that a German
torpedo-boat division was the first united torpedo squadron ever to cross the
North Sea. It sailed, under the command of my brother, Prince Henry, to
take part in the celebration of Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee (1887).

COLONEL GOETHAL'S VISIT

The development of Heligoland and its fortifications as a point of support
for small cruisers and torpedo boats—also, later on, for U-boats—was also
taken in hand, after the necessary protective work for preserving the island
had been constructed by the state—in connection with which work the
Empire and Prussia fought like cat and dog.
On account of the growth of the fleet it became necessary to widen the
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. After a hard struggle we caused the new locks to be
built of the largest possible size, capable of meeting the development of
dreadnaughts for a long time to come. There the far-sighted policy of the
Admiral was brilliantly vindicated.
This found unexpected corroboration by a foreigner. Colonel Goethals, the
builder of the Panama Canal, requested through the United States
Government permission to inspect the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and its new
locks. Permission was most willingly granted. After a meal with me, at
which Admiral von Tirpitz was present, the Admiral questioned the
American engineer (who was enthusiastic over our construction work)
concerning the measurements of the Panama locks, whereupon it transpired

that the measurements of the locks of the Panama Canal were much smaller
than those of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. To my astonished question as to
how that could be possible, Goethals replied that the Navy Department,
upon inquiry by him, had given those measurements for ships of the line.
Admiral von Tirpitz then remarked that this size would be far from
adequate for the future, and that the newer type of dreadnaughts and
superdreadnaughts would not be able to go through the locks, consequently
the canal would soon be useless for American and other big battleships. The
Colonel agreed, and remarked that this was already true of the newest ships
under construction, and he congratulated His Excellency upon having had
the courage to demand and put through the big locks of the Kaiser Wilhelm
Canal, which he had looked upon with admiration and envy.
In like manner the very backward and antiquated Imperial docks [the old
tinker's shops, as Tirpitz called them] were rebuilt and developed into
model modern plants and the arrangements for the workers were developed
so as to further the welfare of the latter along the most approved lines. Only
those who, like myself, have followed and seen with their own eyes from
the very beginning the origin and development of all these factors necessary
to the building up—nay, the creation anew—of the fleet can form anything
like a proper idea of the enormous achievement of Admiral von Tirpitz and
his entire corps of assistants.
The office of the Imperial Naval Department was also a new creation; the
old "Oberkommando" was eliminated when it was divided into the two
main branches of Admiralty Staff and Imperial Naval Department. Both of
these (as in the army) were directly under the supreme war commander in
chief—this meant that there was no longer any official between the
Emperor and his navy.

COMING OF THE DREADNAUGHT

When Admiral Fisher evolved an entirely new type of ship for England in
the shape of the "dreadnaught"—thereby surprising the world as if he had
launched a sudden assault upon it—and thought that he had thus given
England, once for all, an unapproachable naval superiority which the rest of
the powers could never meet, there was naturally great excitement in all
naval circles. The idea, to be sure, did not originate with Fisher, but came—

in the form of an appeal to shipbuilders of the whole world—from the
famous Italian engineer Cuniberti, who had made public a sketch in Fred
Jane's Illustrated Naval Atlas.
At the first conference regarding the introduction of the "dreadnaught" type
of big fighting ship by England I at once agreed with Admiral von Tirpitz
that it had robbed all pre-dreadnaughts of their value and consigned them to
the scrap heap, especially the German ships, which it had been necessary to
keep considerably smaller, on account of the measurements of our old
locks, than the ships of other navies, particularly the English.
Thereupon Admiral von Tirpitz remarked that this would also apply to the
English fleet itself as soon as the other nations had followed Fisher's
example; that England had robbed her enormous pre-dreadnaught force,
upon which her great superiority lasted, of its fighting value, which would
necessitate her building an entirely new fleet of big fighting ships, in
competition with the entire world, which would do likewise; that this would
be exceedingly costly; that England, in order to maintain her notorious
"two-Power standard," would have to exert herself to such an extent that
she would look with more disfavor than ever on new warships built by other
nations, toward whom she was unfriendly, and begin to make objections;
then this would be especially true if we started building, but would be in
vain, since, with the existing types of ships in our fleet, we could not expect
to fight against big battleships, but were forced, "nolens volens," to follow
England along this road.
The war fully confirmed Admiral Tirpitz's opinion. Every one of our ships
not in the big fighting-ship class had to be retired from service.
When the first German big fighting ship was placed in service there was a
loud outcry in the land of the British. The conviction gradually dawned that
Fisher and his shipbuilders had counted absolutely on the belief that
Germany would not be able to build any big fighting ships. Therefore the
disappointment was all the greater. Why such an assumption was made is
beyond comprehension, since, even at that time, German shipbuilders had
already built the great ocean greyhounds, far surpassing our warships of the
line in tonnage, which had occasioned painfully noticeable competition to
the English steamship lines. Our big fighting ships, despite their small
number, showed themselves, at the Skager-Rak (Jutland) battle, not only

equal to their English opponents, but superior to them both in seaworthiness
and in standing up under gunfire.

IMPATIENT FOR U-BOATS

The building of U-boats, unfortunately, could not be pushed forward before
the war to an extent commensurate with my desires. On the one hand, it was
necessary not to overburden the naval budget during the carrying out of the
Naval law; moreover, most important of all, it was necessary to collect
further data from experiments.
Tirpitz believed that the types with which other nations were experimenting
were too small and fit only for coast defense; that Germany must build
"seagoing" submarines capable of navigating in the open sea; that this
necessitated a larger type—which, however, must first be systematically
developed. This took a long time and required careful experiments with
models.
The result was that, at first, in 1914, there were only a small number of
seaworthy submarines in readiness. Even then more pressure might have
been brought to bear upon England with the available submarines had not
the Chancellor been so concerned lest England be provoked thereby.
The number and efficiency of the submarines rose rapidly in the course of
the war; in considering numbers, however, one must always remember that
in wartime, U-boats are to be reckoned as follows: One third of the total in
active service, one third on the outward or return journey, one third
undergoing repairs. The achievements of the U-boats aroused the
admiration of the entire world and won the ardent gratitude of the
fatherland.
Admiral von Tirpitz's tremendous success in creating the commercial
colony of Tsing-tao must never be forgotten. Here he gave proof once more
of his brilliant talent for administration and organization in all directions.
Those talents of his created, out of a place that was previously almost
unknown and entirely without importance, a commercial center which,
within a few years, showed a turnover of between fifty and sixty millions.
The dealings with Reichstag members, the press, and big industrial and
world-commercial elements gradually increased the Admiral's interest in

political matters, particularly in foreign affairs, which were always bound
up with the utilization of ships. The clear world-vision acquired by him as a
traveled sailor, well acquainted with foreign parts, qualified Tirpitz to make
quick decisions, which his fiery temperament wished to see translated
promptly into action.
The opposition and slowness of officialdom irritated him greatly. A certain
tendency to distrust, perhaps strengthened by many an experience, often
misled him to harbor suspicion—sometimes justified, sometimes not—
against individuals. This caused a strong tinge of reserve in Tirpitz's
character and "hampered the joyful workings of the heart" in others. He was
also capable of bringing to bear new views on a matter with great decision,
when, after renewed reflection or study of new facts, he had altered his
previous view. This made working with him not always exactly agreeable or
easy. The tremendous results of his achievements, of which he was justly
proud, gave him a consciousness of the power of his personality, which
sometimes made itself apparent even to his friends.
During the war Tirpitz's tendency to mix in politics got the upper hand with
him so much that it eventually led to differences of opinion which finally
caused his retirement, since von Bethmann, the Imperial Chancellor,
demanded the dismissal of the Admiral-in-chief with the observation that
the Imperial Secretaries of State were his subordinates and that the political
policy must be conducted by himself alone.
It was with a heavy heart that I acquiesced in the departure of this energetic,
strong-willed man, who had carried out my plans with genius and who was
indefatigable as a co-worker. Tirpitz may always rest assured of my
Imperial gratitude. If only this source of strength might stand soon again by
the side of the unfortunate German fatherland in its misery and distress!
Tirpitz can do and dares to do what many others do not dare. The saying of
the poet most certainly applies to Admiral von Tirpitz: "The greatest
blessing to the children of earth is, after all, personality!"
The criticisms which the Admiral felt constrained to make of me, in his
book—which is well worth reading—cannot change, in the slightest, my
opinion of him.

CHAPTER X

The Outbreak of War
After the arrival of the news of the assassination of my friend, the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, I gave up going to Kiel for the regatta week and went
back home, since I intended to go to Vienna for his funeral. But I was asked
from there to give up this plan. Later I heard that one of the reasons for this
was consideration for my personal safety; to this I naturally would have
paid no attention.
Greatly worried on account of the turn which matters might now take, I
decided to give up my intended journey to Norway and remain at home.
The Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Office held a view contrary to
mine and wished me to undertake the journey, as they considered that it
would have a quieting effect on all Europe. For a long time I argued against
going away from my country at a time when the future was so unsettled, but
Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann told me, in short and concise terms, that
if I were now to give up my travel plans, which were already widely
known, this would make the situation appear more serious than it had been
up to that moment and possibly lead to the outbreak of war, for which I
might be held responsible; that the whole world was merely waiting to be
put out of suspense by the news that I, in spite of the situation, had quietly
gone on my trip.
Thereupon I consulted the Chief of the General Staff, and, when he also
proved to be calm and unworried regarding the state of affairs and himself
asked for a summer leave of absence to go to Carlsbad, I decided, though
with a heavy heart, upon my departure.
The much-discussed so-called Potsdam Crown Council of July 5th in reality
never took place. It is an invention of malevolent persons. Naturally, before
my departure, I received, as was my custom, some of the Ministers
individually, in order to hear from them reports concerning their

departments. Neither was there any council of Ministers and there was no
talk about war preparations at a single one of the conferences.
My fleet was cruising in the Norwegian fjords, as usual, while I was on my
summer vacation trip. During my stay at Balholm I received only meager
news from the Foreign Office and was obliged to rely principally on the
Norwegian newspapers, from which I got the impression that the situation
was growing worse. I telegraphed repeatedly to the Chancellor and the
Foreign Office that I considered it advisable to return home, but was asked
each time not to interrupt my journey.
When I learned that the English fleet had not dispersed after the review at
Spithead, but had remained concentrated, I telegraphed again to Berlin that
I considered my return necessary. My opinion was not shared there.
But when, after that, I learned from the Norwegian newspapers—not from
Berlin—about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and, immediately
thereafter, about the Serbian note to Austria, I started without further ado
upon my return journey and commanded the fleet to repair to
Wilhelmshaven. Upon my departure I learned from a Norwegian source that
it was said that a part of the English fleet had left secretly for Norway in
order to capture me (though peace still reigned!). It is significant that Sir
Edward Goschen, the English ambassador, was informed on July 26th at the
Foreign Office that my return journey, undertaken on my own initiative,
was to be regretted, since agitating rumors might be caused by it.

SAYS WAR WAS NOT FORESEEN

Upon my arrival at Potsdam I found the Chancellor and the Foreign Office
in conflict with the Chief of the General Staff, since General von Moltke
was of the opinion that war was sure to break out, whereas the other two
stuck firmly to their view that things would not get to such a bad pass, that
there would be some way of avoiding war, provided I did not order
mobilization. This dispute kept up steadily. Not until General von Moltke
announced that the Russians had set fire to their frontier posts, torn up the
frontier railway tracks, and posted red mobilization notices did a light break
upon the diplomats in the Wilhelmstrasse and bring about both their own
collapse and that of their powers of resistance. They had not wished to
believe in the war.

This shows plainly how little we had expected—much less prepared for—
war in July, 1914. When, in the spring of 1914, Tsar Nicholas II was
questioned by his Court Marshal as to his spring and summer plans, he
replied: "Je resterai chez moi cette année parceque nous aurons la guerre"
("I shall stay at home this year because we shall have war"). (This fact, it is
said, was reported to Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann; I heard nothing
about it then and learned about it for the first time in November, 1918.) This
was the same Tsar who gave me, on two separate occasions—at Björkö and
Baltisch-Port—entirely without being pressed by me and in a way that
surprised me, his word of honor as a sovereign, to which he added weight
by a clasp of the hand and an embrace, that he would never draw his sword
against the German Emperor—least of all as an ally of England—in case a
war should break out in Europe, owing to his gratitude to the German
Emperor for his attitude in the Russo-Japanese War, in which England alone
had involved Russia, adding that he hated England, since she had done him
and Russia a great wrong by inciting Japan against them.
At the very time that the Tsar was announcing his summer war program I
was busy at Corfu excavating antiquities; then I went to Wiesbaden, and,
finally, to Norway. A monarch who wishes war and prepares it in such a
way that he can suddenly fall upon his neighbors—a task requiring long
secret mobilization preparations and concentration of troops—does not
spend months outside his own country and does not allow his Chief of the
General Staff to go to Carlsbad on leave of absence. My enemies, in the
meantime, planned their preparations for an attack.
Our entire diplomatic machine failed. The menace of war was not seen
because the Foreign Office was so hypnotized with its idea of "surtout pas
d'histoires" ("above all, no stories"), its belief in peace at any cost, that it
had completely eliminated war as a possible instrument of Entente
statesmanship from its calculations, and, therefore, did not rightly estimate
the importance of the signs of war.
Herein also is proof of Germany's peaceful inclinations. The above-
mentioned standpoint of the Foreign Office brought it to a certain extent
into conflict with the General Staff and the Admiralty Staff, who uttered
warnings, as was their duty, and wished to make preparations for defense.
This conflict in views showed its effect for a long time; the army could not
forget that, by the fault of the Foreign Office, it had been taken by surprise,

and the diplomats were piqued because, in spite of their stratagems, war had
ensued, after all.
Innumerable are the pieces of evidence that as early as the spring and
summer of 1914, when nobody in Germany believed as yet in the Entente's
attack, war had been prepared for in Russia, France, Belgium, and England.
I included the most important proofs of this, in so far as they are known to
me, in the Comparative Historical Tables compiled by me. On account of
their great number, I shall cite only a few here. If in so doing I do not
mention all names, this is done for reasons easily understood. Let me
remark furthermore that this whole mass of material became known to me
only little by little, partly during the war, mostly after the war.

1. As far back as April, 1914, the accumulation of gold reserves in the
English banks began. On the other hand, Germany, as late as July, was
still exporting gold and grain; to the Entente countries, among others.
2. In April, 1914, the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo, Captain von
Knorr, reported that he was greatly struck by the certainty with which
everyone there foresaw a war of the Triple Alliance against Germany
in the near future ... that there was a something in the air as if, so to
speak, people were expressing their condolences over a death sentence
not yet pronounced.
3. At the end of March, 1914, General Sherbatsheff, director of the St.
Petersburg War Academy, made an address to his officers, wherein,
among other things, he said: That war with the powers forming the
Triple Alliance had become unavoidable on account of Austria's anti-
Russian Balkan policy; that there existed the strongest sort of
probability that it would break out as early as that same summer; that,
for Russia, it was a point of honor to assume the offensive
immediately.
4. In the report of the Belgian ambassador at Berlin regarding a
Japanese military mission which had arrived from St. Petersburg in
April, 1914, it was stated, among other things: At the regimental
messes the Japanese officers had heard quite open talk of an imminent
war against Austria-Hungary and Germany; it was stated, however,

that the army was ready to take the field, and that the moment was as
auspicious for the Russians as for their allies, the French.
5. According to the memoirs of the then French ambassador at St.
Petersburg, M. Paléologue, published in 1921, in the Revue des Deux
Mondes, the Grand Duchesses Anastasia and Militza told him on July
22, 1914, at Tsarskoe Selo, that their father, the King of Montenegro,
had informed them, in a cipher telegram, that "we shall have war
before the end of the month [that is, before the 13th of August, Russian
style]; ... nothing will be left of Austria.... You will take back Alsace-
Lorraine.... Our armies will meet in Berlin.... Germany will be
annihilated."
6. The former Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, Bogitshevich, tells
in his book, Causes of the War, published in 1919, of the following
statement which Cambon, the then French ambassador at Berlin, made
to him on the 26th or 27th of July, 1914: "If Germany wishes matters
to come to a war, she will have England also against her. The English
fleet will take Hamburg. We shall thoroughly beat the Germans."
Bogitshevich states that this talk made him sure that the war had been
decided upon at the time of the meeting of Poincaré with the Russian
Tsar at St. Petersburg, if not sooner.

RUSSIAN CROWN COUNCIL

7. Another Russian of high rank, a member of the Duma and a good
friend of Sazonoff, told me later about the secret Crown Council held,
with the Tsar presiding, in February, 1914; moreover, I obtained
corroboration, from other Russian sources mentioned in my Historical
Tables, of the following: At this Crown Council Sazonoff made an
address wherein he suggested to the Tsar to seize Constantinople,
which, since the Triple Alliance would not acquiesce in it, would cause
a war against Germany and Austria. He added that Italy would break
away from these two, in the natural course of events; that France was
to be trusted absolutely and England probably.
The Tsar had agreed, it was said, and given orders to take the
necessary preliminary steps. The Russian Finance Minister, Count
Kokovzeff, wrote to the Tsar advising against this course—I was

informed of this by Count Mirbach after the peace of Brest-Litovsk—
recommending a firm union with Germany and warning against war,
which, he said, would be unfavorable to Russia and lead to revolution
and the fall of the dynasty. The Tsar did not follow this advice, but
pushed on toward war.
The same gentleman told me this: Two days after the outbreak of war
he had been invited by Sazonoff to breakfast. The latter came up to
him, beaming with joy, and, rubbing his hands together, asked: "Come
now, my dear Baron, you must admit that I have chosen the moment
for war excellently, haven't I?" When the Baron, rather worried, asked
him what stand England would take, the Minister smote his pocket,
and, with a sly wink, whispered: "I have something in my pocket
which, within the next few weeks, will bring joy to all Russia and
astound the entire world; I have received the English promise that
England will go with Russia against Germany!"
8. Russian prisoners belonging to the Siberian Corps, who were taken
in East Prussia, said that they had been transported by rail in the
summer of 1913, to the vicinity of Moscow, since maneuvers were to
be held there by the Tsar. The maneuvers did not take place, but the
troops were not taken back. They were stationed for the winter in the
vicinity of Moscow. In the summer of 1914 they were brought forward
to the vicinity of Vilna, since big maneuvers were to be held there by
the Tsar; at and near Vilna they were deployed and then, suddenly, the
sharp cartridges (war ammunition) were distributed and they were
informed that there was a war against Germany; they were unable to
say why and wherefore.
9. In a report, made public in the press, during the winter of 1914-15;
by an American, concerning his trip through the Caucasus in the spring
of 1914, the following was stated: When he arrived in the Caucasus, at
the beginning of May, 1914, he met, while on his way to Tiflis, long
columns of troops of all arms, in war equipment. He had feared that a
revolt had broken out in the Caucasus. When he made inquiries of the
authorities at Tiflis, while having his passport inspected, he received
the quieting news that the Caucasus was quite peaceful, that he might
travel wheresoever he wished, that what he had seen had to do only
with practice marching and maneuvers.

At the close of his trip at the end of May, 1914, he wished to embark at
a Caucasian port, but all the vessels there were so filled with troops
that only after much trouble could he manage to get a cabin for himself
and his wife. The Russian officers told him that they were to land at
Odessa and march from there to take part in some great maneuvers.

THE COSSACK'S TESTIMONY

10. Prince Tundutoff, Hetman of the Calmuck Cossacks living between
Tsaritsin and Astrakhan, who was, before and during the war, personal
aid of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, came to General
Headquarters at Bosmont in 1918, seeking to establish connection with
Germany, since the Cossacks were not Slavs at all and thoroughly
hostile to the Bolsheviki.
He stated that he had been sent by Nicholas Nicholaievitch, before the
outbreak of war, to the General Staff, in order to keep the Grand Duke
posted on happenings there and that he had been a witness of the
notorious telephone talks between the Tsar and the Chief of the
General Staff, General Januskevitch; that the Tsar, deeply impressed
by the earnest telegram of the German Emperor, had resolved to forbid
mobilization and had ordered Januskevitch by telephone not to carry
out mobilization, i. e., to break it off; that the latter had not obeyed the
unmistakable order, but had inquired by telephone of Sazonoff,
Minister of Foreign Affairs—with whom, for weeks, he had kept in
touch, intrigued and incited to war—what he was to do now; that
Sazonoff had answered that the Tsar's order was nonsense, that all the
General need do was to carry out mobilization, that he [Sazonoff]
would bring the Tsar around again next day and talk him out of
heeding the stupid telegram from the German Emperor; that,
thereupon, Januskevitch had informed the Tsar that mobilization was
already under way and could no longer be broken off.
Prince Tundutoff added: "This was a lie, for I myself saw the
mobilization order lying beside Januskevitch on his writing table,
which shows that it had not as yet been given out at all."
The psychologically interesting point about the above is that Tsar
Nicholas, who helped prepare the World War and had already ordered

mobilization, wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest,
warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly for the first time
the colossal responsibility which he was bringing upon himself by his
warlike preparations. Therefore, he wished to stop the war machine,
the murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in motion. This
would have been possible and peace might have been preserved if
Sazonoff had not frustrated his wish.
When I asked whether the Grand Duke, who was known as a German-
hater, had incited much to war, the Cossack chief replied that the
Grand Duke had certainly worked zealously for war, but that
incitement on his part would have been superfluous, since there was
already a strong sentiment against Germany all through the Russian
officer corps; that this spirit was transmitted, principally, from the
French army to the Russian officers; that there had been a desire, in
fact, to go to war in 1908-09 (Bosnian Question), but France was not
then ready; that, in 1914, Russia, likewise, was not quite ready; that
Januskevitch and Sukhomlinoff had really planned the war for 1917,
but Sazonoff and Isvolsky, as well as the French, could not be
restrained any longer; that the former two were afraid of revolution in
Russia and of the influence of the German Emperor on the Tsar, which
might dissuade the Tsar from the idea of waging war; and that the
French, who were sure, for the time being, of England's help, were
afraid that England might come to an understanding later on with
Germany at the expense of France.
When I asked whether the Tsar had been aware of the warlike spirit in
Russia and had tolerated it, the Cossack Prince answered that it was
worthy of note that the Tsar had forbidden once for all, as a matter of
precaution, the inviting of German diplomats or military attachés to
luncheons or evening meals given by Russian officers at which he
himself was to be present.

STORES OF ENGLISH COATS

11. When our troops advanced in 1914 they found, in northern France
and along the Belgian frontier, great stores of English soldiers'
greatcoats. According to statements by the inhabitants, these were

placed there during the last years of peace. Most of the English
infantrymen who were made prisoners by us in the summer of 1914
had no greatcoats; when asked why, they answered, quite naïvely: "We
are to find our greatcoats in the stores at Maubeuge, Le Quesnoy, etc.,
in the north of France and in Belgium."
It was the same regarding maps. In Maubeuge great quantities of
English military maps of northern France and Belgium were found by
our men; copies of these have been shown to me. The names of places
were printed in French and English, and all sorts of words were
translated in the margin for the convenience of soldiers; for instance:
moulin=mill, pont=bridge, maison=house, ville=town, bois=wood, etc.
These maps date from 1911 and were engraved at Southampton.
The stores were established by England, with the permission of the
French and Belgian Governments, before the war, in the midst of
peace. What a tempest of horror would have broken out in Belgium,
the "neutral country," and what a rumpus England and France would
have kicked up, if we had wished to establish stores of German
soldiers' greatcoats and maps in Spa, Liège, and Namur!
Among the statesmen who, besides Poincaré, particularly helped
unleash the World War, the Sazonoff-Isvolsky group probably should
take first rank. Isvolsky, it is said, when at Paris, proudly placed his
hand upon his breast and declared: "I made the war. Je suis le père de
cette guerre" ("I am the father of this war").
Delcassé also has a large share in the guilt for the World War, and Grey
an even larger share, since he was the spiritual leader of the
"encirclement policy," which he faithfully pushed forward and brought
to completion, as the "legacy" of his dead sovereign.

I have been informed that an important rôle was played in the preparation of
the World War directed against the monarchical Central Powers by the
policy of the international "Great Orient Lodge"; a policy extending over
many years and always envisaging the goal at which it aimed. But the
German Great Lodges, I was furthermore told—with two exceptions
wherein non-German financial interests are paramount and which maintain
secret connection with the "Great Orient" in Paris—had no relationship to

the "Great Orient." They were entirely loyal and faithful, according to the
assurance given me by the distinguished German Freemason who explained
to me this whole interrelationship, which had, until then, been unknown to
me. He said that in 1917 an international meeting of the lodges of the
"Great Orient" was held, after which there was a subsequent conference in
Switzerland; at this the following program was adopted: Dismemberment of
Austria-Hungary, democratization of Germany, elimination of the House of
Hapsburg, abdication of the German Emperor, restitution of Alsace-
Lorraine to France, union of Galicia with Poland, elimination of the Pope
and the Catholic Church, elimination of every state Church in Europe.
I am not now in a position to investigate the very damaging information
which has been transmitted to me, in the best of faith, concerning the
organization and activities of the Great Orient Lodges. Secret and public
political organizations have played important parts in the life of peoples and
states, ever since history has existed. Some of them have been beneficial:
most of them have been destructive, if they had to have secret passwords
which shunned the light of day. The most dangerous of these organizations
hide under the cloak of some ideal object or other—such as active love of
their neighbors, readiness to help the weak, and poor, and so forth—in order
that, with such pretexts as a blind, they may work for their real secret ends.
It is certainly advisable to study the activities of the Great Orient Lodges,
since one cannot adopt a final attitude toward this worldwide organization
until it has been thoroughly investigated.
I shall not take up the war operations in this work. I shall leave this task all
the more readily to my officers and to the historians, since I, writing as I am
without a single document, would be able to describe events only in very
broad outline.
When I look back upon the four arduous war years, with their hopes and
fears, their brilliant victories and losses in precious blood, what is
uppermost in my mind is the feeling of ardent gratitude and undying
admiration for the unequaled achievements of the German Nation in arms.

PROUD OF GERMAN ARMY

Just as no sacrifice in endurance and privation was too great for those
staying at home, so also the army, in defending itself during the war

criminally forced upon us, did not merely overcome the crushing
superiority of twenty-eight hostile nations, but likewise, on land and water
and in the air, won victories whose glory may have paled a bit in the mists
of the present day, but, for that very reason, will shine forth all the more
brightly in the light of history. Nor is that all. Wherever there was distress
among our allies, German intervention, often with weak forces, always
restored the situation and often won noteworthy successes. Germans fought
on all the battlefields of the far-flung World War.
Surely the heroic bravery of the German nation deserved a better fate than
to fall a victim to the dagger that treacherously stabbed it from behind; it
seems to be the German destiny that Germans shall always be defeated by
Germans. Recently I read the unfortunately not entirely unjustified words:
"In Germany every Siegfried has his Hödur behind him."
Finally, let me say a word concerning the German "atrocities" and give two
instances thereof!
After our advance into northern France I immediately ordered that art
treasures be protected. Art historians and professors were assigned to each
army, who traveled about inspecting, photographing, and describing
churches, châteaux, and castles. Among them Professor Clemen, Curator of
the Rhine Province, especially distinguished himself and reported to me,
when I was at the front, on the protection of art treasures.
All the collections in towns, museums, and castles were catalogued and
numbered; whenever they seemed to be imperiled by the fighting they were
taken away and assembled, at Valenciennes and Maubeuge, in two splendid
museums. There they were carefully preserved and the name of the owner
marked on each article.
The old windows of the cathedral of St. Quentin were removed by German
soldiers, at the risk of their lives, under English shell-fire. The story of the
destruction of the church by the English was told by a German Catholic
priest, who published it with photographs, and it was sent, by my orders, to
the Pope.
At the château of Pinon, which belongs to the Princess of Poix, who had
been a guest of mine and the Empress, the headquarters of the general
commanding the Third Army Corps was located. I visited the château and

lived there. Previously the English had been quartered there and had
ravaged the place terribly. The commanding general, von Lochow, and his
staff had a great deal of trouble getting it into some sort of shape again after
the devastation wrought by the English.
Accompanied by the general, I visited the private apartments of the
Princess, which, up to then, our soldiers had been forbidden to enter. I
found that her entire wardrobe had been thrown out of the clothes presses
by the English soldiers and, together with her hats, was lying about on the
floor. I had every garment carefully cleaned, hung in the presses, and locked
up. The writing desk had also been broken into and the Princess's
correspondence was scattered about. At my command, all the letters were
gathered together, sealed in a package, placed in the writing desk, and
locked up.
Afterward, all the silverware was found buried in the garden. According to
the villagers this had been ordered as early as the beginning of July, so the
Princess had known about the war long before its outbreak! I at once
ordered that the silver be inventoried, deposited in the bank at Aix-la-
Chapelle, and returned to the Princess after the war. Through neutral
channels I caused news to be transmitted to the Princess in Switzerland, by
my Court Marshal, Freiherr von Reischach, concerning Pinon, her
silverware, and my care for her property. No answer was received. Instead,
the Princess had published in the French press a letter to the effect that
General von Kluck had stolen all her silver.
On account of my care and the self-sacrificing work of German art experts
and soldiers—partly at the risk of their lives—art treasures worth billions
were preserved for their French owners and for French towns. This was
done by the Huns, the boches!

CHAPTER XI

The Pope and Peace
In the summer of 1917 I received at Krueznach a visit from the Papal
Nuncio, Pacelli, who was accompanied by a chaplain. Pacelli is a
distinguished, likable man, of high intelligence and excellent manners, the
perfect pattern of an eminent prelate of the Catholic Church. He knows
German well enough to understand it easily when he hears it, but not
sufficiently to speak it with fluency.
Our conversation was conducted in French, but the Nuncio now and then
employed German expressions of speech. The chaplain spoke German
fluently and took part—even when not asked—in the conversation,
whenever he feared that the Nuncio was becoming too much influenced by
what I said.
Very soon the conversation turned on the possibility of peace mediation and
the bringing about of peace, in which connection all sorts of projects and
possibilities were touched upon, discussed, and dismissed.
Finally, I suggested that the Pope should make an effort, seeing that my
peace offer of December 12, 1916, had been rejected in such an
unprecedented manner. The Nuncio remarked that he thought such a step
would be attended with great difficulties; that the Pope had already been
rebuffed when he had made certain advances in this direction; that, aside
from this, the Pope was absolutely in despair on account of the slaughter
and wondered ceaselessly how he might help toward freeing the world and
European culture from the scourge of war. Any suggestion as to this, he
added, would be most valuable to the Vatican.
I stated that the Pope, as the highest in rank among all the priests of the
Roman Catholic Christians and Church, should, first of all, seek to issue
instructions to his priests in all countries to banish hate, once for all, from
their minds, since hate was the greatest obstacle in the path of the peace
idea; that it was, unfortunately, true that the clergy in the Entente countries

were, to a positively frightful extent, the standard-bearers and instigators of
hate and fighting.
I called attention to the numerous reports from soldiers at the beginning of
the war concerning abbés and parish priests captured with arms in their
hands; to the machinations of Cardinal Mercier and the Belgian clergy,
members of which often worked as spies; to the sermon of the Protestant
Bishop of London, who, from the pulpit, glorified the "Baralong"
murderers; and to other similar cases. I added that it would be, therefore, a
great achievement if the Pope should succeed in having the Roman Catholic
clergy in all the countries at war condemn hatred and recommend peace, as
was already being done by the German clergy, be it from the pulpit or by
means of pastoral letters.

URGES PAPAL INTERCESSION

Pacelli found this idea excellent and worthy of attention, but he remarked
that it would be difficult to enlist the efforts of the various prelates in its
support. I replied that, in view of the severe discipline of the hierarchy of
the Roman Catholic Church, I could not imagine that, if the Pope should
solemnly call upon the prelates of the Church to preach reconciliation and
consideration for the foe, those of any country whatsoever should refuse
obedience; that the prelates, on account of their eminent rank, were above
all parties, and, since reconciliation and love of our neighbor were
fundamental principles of the Christian religion, they were absolutely in
duty bound to work toward making people observe these principles.
Pacelli agreed to this and promised to give the idea his earnest attention and
report upon it to the Vatican. In the further course of the conversation, the
Nuncio asked what form—beyond the purely ecclesiastical step suggested
by me—the bringing about of peace possibilities through the intervention of
the Pope might take. I pointed out that Italy and Austria were two Roman
Catholic states, upon which the Pope could bring influence to bear easily
and effectively; that one of these lands was his native country and place of
residence, in which he was greatly revered by the people and exerted direct
influence upon his fellow countrymen; that Austria was ruled by a
sovereign who actually bore the title "apostolic"; who, with all his family,
had direct relations with the Vatican and was among the most faithful

adherents of the Catholic Church; that I was, therefore, of the opinion that it
would not be difficult for the Pope to try at least to make a beginning with
these two countries and cause them to talk peace.
I added that the diplomatic skill and wide vision of the Vatican were known
the world over; that, if once a beginning were made in this way—and it had
a good chance of success—the other Powers could scarcely refuse an
invitation from the Vatican later on to an exchange of views, which should
be, at first, not binding upon them.
The Nuncio remarked that it would be difficult for the Vatican to make the
Italian Government agree to such a thing, since it had no direct relation with
the said Government and no influence upon its members; that the Italian
Government would never look with favor upon an invitation, even to mere
conferences.
Here the chaplain interposed that such a step by the Pope was absolutely out
of the question, since it would entail consequences which might be actually
dangerous to the Vatican; the Government would at once mobilize the
"piazza" ("man in the street") against the Vatican, and the Vatican certainly
could not expose itself to that. When I refused to attach importance to this
objection, the chaplain grew more and more excited. He said that I did not
know the Romans; that, when they were incited they were simply terrible;
that just as soon as the "piazza" got into action things would get
disagreeable; that, if it did, there was even a possibility of an attack on the
Vatican, which might actually imperil the life of the Pope himself.

SCOUTS DANGER FROM "PIAZZA"

I replied that I, too, was well acquainted with the Vatican; that no rabble or
"piazza" could storm it; that, in addition, the Pope had a strong party of
adherents in society circles and among the people, which would at once be
ready to defend him. The Nuncio agreed with me, but the chaplain
continued unabashed to expatiate upon the terrors of the "piazza" and paint
the risks run by the Pope in the blackest of colors.
I then remarked that anyone wishing to capture the Vatican must first get a
battery of heavy mortars and howitzers, as well as pioneers and storm
troops, and institute a regular siege; that all this was scarcely possible for

the "piazza"; that, therefore, it was highly improbable that the latter would
undertake anything. Moreover, I mentioned having heard that measures had
already been taken in the Vatican to guard against such an emergency. At
this the priest was silent.
The Nuncio then remarked that it was difficult for the Pope to do anything
really practical toward peace without giving offense and arousing
opposition in lay Italy, which would place him in danger; that it must be
borne in mind that he was, unfortunately, not free; that had the Pope a
country, or at least a district of his own where he could govern
autonomously and do as he pleased, the situation would be quite different;
that, as matters stood, he was too dependent upon lay Rome and not able to
act according to his own free will.
I remarked that the aim of bringing peace to the world was so holy and
great that it was impossible for the Pope to be frightened away, by purely
worldly considerations, from accomplishing such a task, which seemed
created especially for him; that, should he succeed in it, the grateful world
would assuredly bring influence to bear upon the Italian Government in
support of his wishes and of his independence.
This made an impression on the Nuncio; he remarked that I was right, after
all; that the Pope must do something in the matter.
Then I called the attention of the Nuncio to the following point: He must
have noticed, I said, how the Socialists of all countries were zealously
working in favor of peace efforts. I told him that we had always allowed the
German Socialists to travel to foreign parts in order to discuss the question
of making peace at conferences, because I believed them to be acquainted
with the desires and views of the lower classes; that we placed no obstacles
in the path of anybody desiring to work honestly and without veiled
purpose in the interests of peace; that the same desires for peace also
existed among the Entente nations and among their Socialists, but that the
latter were prevented by refusal of passports from attending congresses in
neutral lands; that the desire for peace was gaining strength in the world,
nations were acquiring it more and more, and if nobody in any Government
should be found willing to work for peace—I, unfortunately, had failed in
my attempt—the peoples would finally take the matter into their own
hands. I added that this would not occur without serious shocks and

revolutions, as history proved, through which the Roman Church and the
Pope would not come unscathed.

WINS PROMISE OF ACTION

What must a Catholic soldier think, I asked, when he reads always of efforts
by Socialists only, never of an effort by the Pope, to free him from the
horrors of war? If the Pope did nothing, I continued, there was danger of
peace being forced upon the world by the Socialists, which would mean the
end of the power of the Pope and the Roman Church, even among
Catholics!
This argument struck home to the Nuncio. He stated that he would at once
report it to the Vatican and give it his support; that the Pope would have to
act.
Greatly worried, the chaplain again interposed, remarking that the Pope
would endanger himself by such a course; that the "piazza" would attack
him.
To this I replied that I was a Protestant, and, hence, a heretic in the
chaplain's eyes, notwithstanding which I was obliged to point out that the
Pope was designated the "Viceroy of Christ upon earth" by the Catholic
Church and world; that I had, in studying the Holy Scriptures, occupied
myself earnestly and carefully with the person of the Saviour and sought to
immerse myself profoundly therein; that the Lord had never feared the
"piazza," although no fortresslike building, with guards and weapons, was
at His disposal; that the Lord had always walked into the midst of the
"piazza," spoken to it, and finally gone to His death on the Cross for the
sake of this hostile "piazza."
Was I now to believe, I asked, that His "Viceroy upon earth" was afraid of
the possibility of becoming a martyr, like his Lord, in order to bring peace
to the bleeding world, all on account of the ragged Roman "piazza"? I, the
Protestant, thought far too highly of a Roman priest, particularly of the
Pope, to believe such a thing. Nothing could be more glorious for him, I
went on, than to devote himself unreservedly, body and soul, to the great
cause of peace, even despite the remote danger of thus becoming a martyr!

With shining eyes, the Nuncio grasped my hand and said, deeply moved:
"Vous avez parfaitement raison! C'est le devoir du Pape; il faut qu'il agisse;
c'est par lui que le monde doit être régagné à la paix. Je transmettrai vos
paroles à Sa Sainteté" ("You are absolutely right! It is the duty of the Pope;
he must act; it is through him that the world must be won back to peace. I
shall transmit your words to His Holiness").
The chaplain turned away, shaking his head, and murmured to himself: "Ah,
la piazza, la piazza!"

CHAPTER XII

End of the War and My Abdication
A few days after August 8, 1918, I summoned a Crown Council, in order to
get a clear conception of the situation and to draw therefrom the necessary
conclusions upon which to base the policy to be followed by Count
Hertling. The Chief Military Command approved the idea that the Imperial
Chancellor should keep in sight the possibility of getting into closer touch
with the enemy, but laid stress on the necessity of first occupying the
Siegfried line and there thoroughly beating off the foe, and on the fact that
negotiations must not begin before this occurred. Thereupon I directed that
the Chancellor get into communication with a neutral power—the
Netherlands—in order to ascertain whether it was ready to undertake such a
step toward mediation.
What rendered the contemplated action through Dutch channels very
difficult was that Austria could not be brought to a definite agreement, but
continually postponed the declaration which had been requested of her.
Even a verbal agreement given to me by the Emperor Charles was
afterward broken by him under Burian's influence.
The Dutch government had already been informed by me and had signified
its readiness to act. Meanwhile, Austria, without notifying us, made her first
separate peace offer, which set the ball rolling. The Emperor Charles had
indeed got into touch secretly with the Entente and had long since resolved
to abandon us. He acted according to the plan which he had explained thus
to his entourage: "When I go to the Germans, I agree to everything they say,
and when I return home, I do whatever I please."
Thus it happened that my government and I were constantly deceived by
actions in Vienna, without being able to do anything against it, since from
there we constantly received the hint: "If you make things hard for us, we
shall leave you in the lurch; in other words, our army will no longer fight by

your side." In view of our situation, such action on Austria's part had to be
avoided in any way possible, both on military and political grounds.
The defection of Hungary and Austria brought a crisis upon us. Had
Emperor Charles kept control of his nerves for three weeks longer, many
things would have turned out differently. But Andrassy—as he himself
admitted—had been negotiating for a long time in Switzerland, behind our
backs, with the Entente. Thus Emperor Charles believed that he would
assure himself of good treatment at the hands of the Entente.
After our failure of August 8th, General Ludendorff had declared that he
could no longer guarantee a military victory. Therefore, the preparation of
peace negotiations was necessary. Since diplomacy had not succeeded in
initiating any promising negotiations and the military situation had become
even worse in the meantime, on account of revolutionary agitation,
Ludendorff, on the 29th of September, demanded that preparations be made
for an armistice instead of for peace negotiations.

MOVEMENT FOR ABDICATION

At this critical time a strong movement began at home in favor of setting up
a new government for the now necessary termination of the war. I could not
ignore this movement, since the old government, during the seven weeks
from August 8th to the end of September, had not managed to initiate peace
negotiations offering any hope of success.
Meanwhile, General von Gallwitz and General von Mudra, summoned from
the front, appeared before me. They gave a picture of the inner situation of
the army, laying due emphasis upon the great number of shirkers behind the
front, the frequency of insubordination, the displaying of the red flag upon
trains filled with soldiers returning from furloughs at home and other
similar phenomena.
The two generals considered that the principal cause of the bad conditions
was to be sought in the unfavorable influence exerted upon the soldiers by
the spirit predominating behind the front and in the general desire for
ending the fighting and getting peace, which was spreading from the
homeland along the lines of communication behind the front and was
already becoming noticeable even among some of the troops at the front

itself. The generals advanced the opinion that, owing to these reasons, the
army must immediately be withdrawn behind the Antwerp-Meuse line.
On that same day I commanded Field Marshal von Hindenburg by
telephone to effect as soon as possible the retreat to the Antwerp-Meuse
line. The falling back of the tired, but nowhere decisively beaten, army to
this position merely signified occupying an essentially shorter line,
possessing far greater natural advantages. It was not yet completed, to be
sure, but the fact was to be borne in mind that we had engaged in battle on
the Somme while occupying positions composed largely of shell craters.
What we had to do was to regain operative freedom, which, to my way of
thinking, was by no means impossible; in the course of the war, had we not
often retreated in order to put ourselves in a situation that was more
advantageous from the military point of view?
The army, to be sure, was no longer the old army. The new 1918 troops
particularly were badly tainted with revolutionary propaganda and often
took advantage of the darkness at night to sneak away from the firing and
vanish to the rear.
But the majority of my divisions fought flawlessly to the very end and
preserved their discipline and military spirit. To the very end they were
always a match for the foe in morale; despite superiority in numbers,
cannon, munitions, tanks, and airplanes, the foe invariably succumbed when
he ran up against serious resistance. Therefore, the associations of our ex-
fighters at the front are right in bearing upon their banners the motto:
"Unbeaten on land and sea!"

SAYS ARMY WAS STILL STRONG

The achievements of the German fighters at the front and of the German
Nation in arms, during four and a half years of war, are beyond all praise.
One does not know what to admire most: the enthusiasm with which the
magnificent youth of 1914, without waiting for our artillery fire to take
effect, joyfully charged on the enemy, or the self-sacrificing fidelity to duty
and tenacity with which our men in field gray, sparingly fed and seldom
relieved, year in, year out, digging by night, living in dugouts and
earthholes by day, or crouching in shell holes, defied the hail of steel from
the enemy artillery, flyers, and tanks. And this army, which one might have

expected was to be rated as utterly fought to a finish, was able, after nearly
four years of war, to carry out successful offensive operations such as our
foes could nowhere boast of, despite their colossal superiority.
In spite of all this, it was not right to believe the German army capable of
accomplishing the superhuman; it was necessary for us to fall back, in order
to get breath.
The Field Marshal balked at the order to retreat; the army, he thought,
should stay where it was, for political reasons (peace negotiations and so
on); he also pointed out, among other things, that it was necessary, first, to
arrange for the withdrawal to the rear of war materials, etc.
I now resolved to go to the front, acquiescing in the desire expressed to me
by the army that I might be with my hard-fighting troops and convince
myself personally of their spirit and condition.
I could carry out this resolve all the sooner in view of the fact that, ever
since the new Government had been set up, no further claims were made
upon my time either by it or by the Imperial Chancellor, which made my
staying at home seem useless.
The notes to Wilson were discussed and written by Solf, the War Cabinet,
and the Reichstag, after sessions lasting hours, without my being informed
thereof; until, finally, on the occasion of the last note to Wilson, I caused
Solf to be given to understand very plainly, through my chief of Cabinet,
that I demanded to know about the note before it was sent.
Solf appeared and showed the note; he was proud of his antithesis between
laying down of arms ("Waffenstreckung"), which was demanded by Wilson,
and armistice ("Waffenstillstand"), which was proposed. When I spoke
about the rumors of abdication and demanded that the Foreign Office adopt
an attitude, through the press, against what was unworthy in the newspaper
polemics, Solf replied that already everybody on every street corner was
talking about abdication and that, even in the best circles, people were
discussing it quite unreservedly.
When I expressed my indignation at this, Solf sought to console me by
observing that, should His Majesty go, he also would, since he could serve
no longer under such conditions. I went, or—to put it much more correctly
—I was overthrown by my own Government, and—Herr Solf remained.

When the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max, heard of my resolve to go to the
front, he did all he could to prevent it. He asked why I wished to go and
received the answer that I considered it my duty, as Supreme Commander,
to return to the front, since I had been separated for almost a month from
the hard-fighting army. When the Chancellor objected that I was
indispensable at home, I retorted that we were at war, that the Emperor
belonged to his soldiers. Finally, I declared, once for all, that I would go;
that in case Wilson's armistice note arrived, it would have to be discussed,
anyhow, at the General Headquarters of the army, for which purpose the
Chancellor and other members of the Government would be obliged to go
to Spa for the conferences.

"JOYFULLY RECEIVED" BY ARMY

I went to the army in Flanders, after having once more given the General
Staff at Spa definite orders to fall back as quickly as possible to the
Antwerp-Meuse line, in order that the troops might finally be taken out of
the fighting and given a rest. Despite objections that this would demand
time, that the position was not yet ready, that the war material must first be
taken back, and so forth, I stood by the order. The retreat was begun.
In Flanders I saw delegations from the different divisions, spoke with the
soldiers, distributed decorations, and was everywhere joyfully received by
officers and men. Particularly ardent enthusiasm reigned among the soldiers
of a royal Saxon recruit depot, who greeted me with wild cheers at the
railway station when I was returning to my train. While I was giving out
decorations to members of the Reserve Guard Division, an enemy bombing
squadron, followed by heavy fire from anti-aircraft guns and machine guns,
flew directly over us and dropped bombs near the special train.
The commanders of the army were unanimous in declaring that the spirit of
the troops at the front was good and reliable; that, further to the rear, among
the supply columns, it was not so good; that the worst of all were the
soldiers back from leave, who, it was plain to be seen, had been worked
upon and infected at home, whence they had brought back a poor spirit. The
young recruits at the depots, it was stated, furthermore, were good.
At Spa, whither I now went, news came constantly from home about the
ever more violent agitation and hostile attitude against the Emperor and the

growing slackness and helplessness of the Government, which, without
initiative or strength, was letting itself be pushed around at will. It was
alluded to contemptuously in the newspapers as the "debating society" and
Prince Max was called by leading newspapers the "Revolution Chancellor."
As I learned afterward, he lay in bed for ten days, suffering from grippe and
incapable of really directing affairs. His Excellency von Payer and Solf,
with the so-called War Cabinet, which was in permanent session, governed
the German Empire.
At such a critical time, to my way of thinking, the imperiled ship of state
should not be steered by representatives of the Imperial Chancellor, since
they certainly cannot have the authority possessed by the responsible head
of the Government. What was particularly needed at this juncture was
authority; yet, so far as I know, no wide powers to act had been conferred
upon the Vice Chancellor.
The right solution—i. e., the one that those concerned were in duty bound
to adopt—would have been to remove Prince Max actually from the post of
Chancellor and summon in his place some man of strong personality. Since
we had the parliamentary form of government it devolved upon the political
parties to bring about the change in the Chancellorship and present me with
a successor to Prince Max. This did not take place.
Now the efforts of the Government and the Imperial Chancellor to induce
me to abdicate began. Drews, the Minister of the Interior, came to me at the
behest of the Chancellor, in order to supply me with information concerning
the spirit in the country. He described the well-known happenings in press,
high finance, and public, and laid emphasis on the fact that the Imperial
Chancellor himself adopted no attitude toward the question of my
abdication, but, nevertheless, had sent him to me. Drews, in short, was to
suggest to me that I myself should decide to abdicate, in order that it might
not appear that the Government had exerted pressure upon me.
I spoke to the Minister about the fateful consequences of my abdication and
asked how he, as a Prussian official, could reconcile such a supposition with
his oath as an official to his King. The Minister grew embarrassed and
excused himself by reference to the command of the Imperial Chancellor,
who had been unable to find any other man for the task. I was informed

later that Drews was one of the first officials who spoke of the abdication of
his master and King.
I refused to abdicate and declared that I would gather troops together and
return with them in order to help the Government to maintain order in the
land.
After that, Drews was received, in my presence, by Field Marshal von
Hindenburg and General Gröner, whom he informed of the mission
intrusted to him by the Imperial Chancellor and by both of whom he was
very sharply rebuked in the name of the army. Gröner's characterization of
Prince Max, in particular, was expressed in such plain terms that I had to
appease and comfort the Minister.
The Field Marshal also called Drews's attention to the fact that, in the event
of my abdication, the army would not go on fighting, but would disperse,
and that the majority of the officers, in particular, would probably resign
and thus leave the army without leaders.
Soon after that I learned from one of my sons that the Imperial Chancellor
had tried to ascertain whether he was prepared to undertake the mission
which subsequently was undertaken by Drews. My son indignantly declined
to suggest abdication to his father.
In the meantime I had sent the chief of Cabinet, von Delbrück, to Berlin, in
order to lay before the Chancellor a general address, also intended for
publication, which should take the place of my address to the Ministry (not
published by the Chancellor), deal more broadly with the matters taken up
therein, and make clear my attitude toward the Government and toward the
new direction taken by public opinion. At first the Chancellor failed to
publish this. Not until several days later did he find himself forced to permit
publication, owing to a letter written to him, as I learned afterward, by the
Empress.
Thereupon Herr von Delbrück informed me that the address had made a
good impression in Berlin and in the press, relieved the situation, and
tended to quiet the people, so that the idea of abdication had begun to
disappear and even the Socialists of the Right had decided to postpone
action concerning it.

SOCIALIST ACTIVITY

During the next few days there were constant reports that the Socialists in
Berlin were planning trouble and that the Chancellor was growing steadily
more nervous. The report given by Drews to the Government, after his
return from Spa, had not failed to cause an impression; the gentlemen
wished to get rid of me, to be sure, but for the time being they were afraid
of the consequences.
Their point of view was as obscure as their conduct. They acted as if they
did not want a republic, yet failed completely to realize that their course
was bound to lead straight to a republic. Many, in fact, explained the actions
of the Government by maintaining that the creation of a republic was the
very end that its members had in view; plenty of people drew the
conclusion, from the puzzling conduct of the Chancellor toward me, that he
was working to eliminate me in order to become himself President of the
German Republic, after being, in the interim, the administrator of the
Empire.
To believe this is undoubtedly to do the Prince an injustice; such a train of
thought is impossible in a man belonging to an old German princely family.
General Gröner, who had gone to Berlin to study the situation, reported on
his return that he had received very bad impressions regarding the
Government and the sentiment prevailing in the country; that things were
approaching revolution; that the Government was merely tearing down
without setting up anything positive; that the people wanted peace at last, at
any cost, no matter what kind of peace; that the authority of the
Government was equal to zero, the agitation against the Emperor in full
swing, my abdication hardly to be avoided longer.
He added that the troops at home were unreliable and disagreeable surprises
might come in case of a revolt; that the courier chests of the Russian
Bolshevist ambassador, seized by the criminal police, had disclosed some
very damaging evidence that the Russian Embassy, in conjunction with the
Spartacus group, had long since thoroughly prepared, without being
disturbed, a Bolshevist revolution on the Russian model. (This had gone on
with the knowledge of the Foreign Office—which had received constant
warning, but had either laughed at them all or dismissed them with the

remark that the Bolsheviki must not be angered—likewise under the very
eyes of the police, which was continually at loggerheads with the Foreign
Office.) The men back from leave, he went on, infected by propaganda, had
already carried the poison to the army, which was already partly affected
and would, as soon as it had been made free by an armistice, refuse to fight
against the rebels upon its return home.
Therefore, he declared, it was necessary to accept, immediately and
unconditionally, any sort of armistice, no matter how hard its conditions
might be; the army was no longer to be trusted and revolution was
imminent behind the front.

PRINCE MAX INSISTENT

On the morning of the 9th of November,[9] the Imperial Chancellor, Prince
Max of Baden, caused me to be informed again—as he had already done on
the 7th—that the Social Democrats, and also the Social Democratic
Secretaries of State, demanded my abdication; that the rest of the members
of the Government, who had stood out so far against it, were now in favor
of it, and that the same was true of the majority parties in the Reichstag. For
these reasons, he continued, he requested me to abdicate immediately, since,
otherwise, extensive street fighting attended by bloodshed would take place
in Berlin; it had already started on a small scale.
I immediately summoned Field Marshal von Hindenburg and the
Quartermaster General, General Gröner. General Gröner again announced
that the army could fight no longer and wished rest above all else, and that,
therefore, any sort of armistice must be unconditionally accepted; that the
armistice must be concluded as soon as possible, since the army had
supplies for only six to eight days more and was cut off from all further
supplies by the rebels, who had occupied all the supply storehouses and
Rhine bridges; that, for some unexplained reason, the armistice commission
sent to France—consisting of Erzberger, Ambassador Count Oberndorff,
and General von Winterfeldt—which had crossed the French lines two
evenings before, had sent no report as to the nature of the conditions.
The Crown Prince also appeared, with his Chief of Staff, Count
Schulenburg, and took part in the conference. During our conversation

several telephone inquiries came from the Imperial Chancellor, which,
pointing out that the Social Democrats had left the Government and that
delay was dangerous, became most insistent. The Minister of War reported
uncertainty among part of the troops in Berlin—4th Jägers, Second
Company of Alexander Regiment, Second Battery, Jüterbog, gone over to
the rebels—no street fighting.
I wished to spare my people civil war. If my abdication was indeed the only
way to prevent bloodshed, I was willing to renounce the Imperial throne,
but not to abdicate as King of Prussia; I would remain, as such, with my
troops, since the military leaders had declared that the officers would leave
in crowds if I abdicated entirely, and the army would then pour back,
without leaders, into the fatherland, damage it, and place it in peril.
A reply had been sent to the Imperial Chancellor to the effect that my
decision must first be carefully weighed and formulated, after which it
would be transmitted to the Chancellor. When, a little later, this was done,
there came the surprising answer that my decision had arrived late! The
Imperial Chancellor, on his own initiative, had summarily announced my
abdication—which had not occurred yet at all!—as well as renunciation of
the throne by the Crown Prince, who had not even been questioned. He had
turned over the Government to the Social Democrats and summoned Herr
Ebert as Imperial Chancellor. All this had been spread simultaneously by
wireless, so the entire army could read it.

DENIES HE FORSOOK FOLLOWERS

Thus the decision as to my going or staying, as to my renunciation of the
Imperial Crown and retention of the Royal Crown of Prussia, was
summarily snatched from me. The army was shaken to the core by the
erroneous belief that its King had abandoned it at the most critical moment
of all.
If the conduct of the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, is
considered as a whole, it appears as follows: first, solemn declaration that
he will place himself, together with the new Government, before the
Emperor's throne, to protect it; then, suppression of the address, which
might have impressed public opinion favorably, elimination of the Emperor
from all co-operation in the Government, sacrifice of the respect due the

Emperor by suppression of the censorship, failure to come to the support of
the monarchy in the matter of abdication; then, attempts to persuade the
Emperor to abdicate voluntarily; and, finally, announcement of my
abdication by wireless, in which the Chancellor went over my head.
This sequence of events shows the course—a perilous one to the nation—
adopted by Scheidemann, who held the Chancellor in the hollow of his
hand. Scheidemann left the Ministers, his colleagues, in the dark as to his
real purposes, drove the Prince from one step to another, and finally
summoned Ebert, declaring that the leaders no longer had the masses under
control. Thus he caused the Prince to sacrifice the Emperor, the princes, and
the Empire, and made him the destroyer of the Empire. After that,
Scheidemann overthrew the weak princely "statesman."
Following the arrival of the wireless message, the situation was difficult. To
be sure, troops were being transported to Spa for the purpose of going on
undisturbed with the work at Great General Headquarters, but the Field
Marshal now thought it no longer possible to reckon absolutely on their
reliability in case rebellious forces should advance from Aix-la-Chapelle
and Cologne and confront our troops with the dilemma of whether or not to
fight against their own comrades. In view of this, he advised me to leave the
army and go to some neutral country, for the purpose of avoiding such a
"civil war."
I went through a fearful internal struggle. On the one hand, I, as a soldier,
was outraged at the idea of abandoning my still faithful, brave troops. On
the other hand, there was the declaration of our foes that they were
unwilling to conclude with me any peace endurable to Germany, as well as
the statement of my own Government that only by my departure for foreign
parts was civil war to be prevented.
In this struggle I set aside all that was personal. I consciously sacrificed
myself and my throne in the belief that, by so doing, I was best serving the
interests of my beloved fatherland. The sacrifice was in vain. My departure
brought us neither better armistice conditions nor better peace terms; nor
did it prevent civil war—on the contrary, it hastened and intensified, in the
most pernicious manner, the disintegration in the army and the nation.

PROUD OF THE ARMY

For thirty years the army was my pride. For it I lived, upon it I labored. And
now, after four and a half brilliant years of war with unprecedented
victories, it was forced to collapse by the stab in the back from the dagger
of the revolutionists, at the very moment when peace was within reach!
And the fact that it was in my proud navy, my creation, that there was first
open rebellion, cut me most deeply to the heart.
There has been much talk about my having abandoned the army and gone to
neutral foreign parts.
Some say the Emperor should have gone to some regiment at the front,
hurled himself with it upon the enemy, and sought death in one last attack.
That, however, would not only have rendered impossible the armistice,
ardently desired by the nation, concerning which the commission sent from
Berlin to General Foch was already negotiating, but would also have meant
the useless sacrifice of the lives of many soldiers—of some of the very best
and most faithful, in fact.
Others say the Emperor should have returned home at the head of the army.
But a peaceful return was no longer possible; the rebels had already seized
the Rhine bridges and other important points in the rear of the army. I
could, to be sure, have forced my way back at the head of loyal troops taken
from the fighting front; but, by so doing, I should have put the finishing
touch to Germany's collapse, since, in addition to the struggle with the
enemy, who would certainly have pressed forward in pursuit, civil war
would also have ensued.
Still others say the Emperor should have killed himself. That was made
impossible by my firm Christian beliefs. And would not people have
exclaimed:
"How cowardly! Now he shirks all responsibility by committing suicide!"
This alternative was also eliminated because I had to consider how to be of
help and use to my people and my country in the evil time that was to be
foreseen.
I knew also that I was particularly called upon to champion the cause of my
people in the clearing up of the question of war guilt—which was
disclosing itself more and more as the pivotal point in our future destiny—

since I better than anyone else could bear witness to Germany's desire for
peace and to our clean conscience.
After unspeakably arduous soul struggles, and following the most urgent
advice of my counselors of the highest rank who were present at the
moment, I decided to leave the country, since, in view of the reports made
to me, I must needs believe that, by so doing, I should most faithfully serve
Germany, make possible better armistice and peace terms for her, and spare
her further loss of human lives, distress, and misery.

CHAPTER XIII

The Enemy Tribunal and the Neutral Tribunal
When the Entente's demand that I and the German army leaders should be
surrendered for trial before Entente tribunals became known, I immediately
asked myself whether I could be of use to my fatherland by giving myself
up before the German people and the German Government had expressed
themselves regarding this demand. It was clear to me that, in the opinion of
the Entente, such a surrender would so seriously shake the prestige of
Germany, as a state and people, for all time, that we could never again take
our place, with equal rights, equal dignity, and equal title to alliances, in the
first rank of nations, where we belonged.
I recognized it as my duty not to sacrifice the honor and dignity of
Germany. The question resolved itself into deciding whether there was any
way to give myself up which might benefit the German nation and not
subject it to the above-mentioned disadvantages. Were there such a way I
should have been ready without hesitation to add another sacrifice to those
already made.
The question of my giving myself up has also been debated—as I know—in
well-meaning and earnest German circles. Wherever this was due to
psychological depression or failure to realize the impression which self-
chastisement, self-debasement, and fruitless martyrdom in the face of the
Entente must arouse, all that was needed was to recall the materially
political origin of the Entente's demand, cursorily mentioned above, in
order to arrive at a clean-cut decision—in other words, at an emphatic
refusal.
It was otherwise with the considerations based upon the assumption that I
might, by taking upon myself, before the eyes of the whole world, the
responsibility for all important decisions and acts of my Government
connected with the war, contribute toward making the fate of the German
nation easier. Here was not an act of unpolitical sentimentality, but, on the

contrary, a deed which, in my eyes, had much to commend it. The thought
that, according to the Constitution of the Empire then in force, not I, but the
Chancellor alone as was well known—bore the responsibility, would
naturally not have bothered me with regard to this.
Had there been even the slightest prospect of bettering Germany's situation
by taking such a step, there would have been no possible doubt for me
personally as to what I should do. Already I had shown my personal
willingness to sacrifice myself when I left the country and gave up the
throne of my fathers, because I had been erroneously and deceivingly
assured that I could, by so doing, make possible better peace terms for my
people and prevent civil war. I should likewise have made this further
attempt to help my people, despite the fact that, in the meantime, one of the
considerations in favor of it which have been urged upon me—viz., the
prevention of civil war—had already turned out to be false.

RECALLS PLIGHT OF VERCINGETORIX

There was, however, no possibility of helping the German people by such
an act. Surrender of my person would have had no result beyond our
obedience to the demand from the Entente that I be given up. For no
tribunal in the world can pronounce a just sentence before the state archives
of all the nations participating in the war are thrown open, as has been
done, and is still being done, by Germany.
Who, after the unprecedented judgment of Versailles, could still summon up
optimism enough to believe that the Entente nations would place their
secret documents at the disposal of such a tribunal? Therefore, after careful
reflection on my part, I gave the decisive importance that was their due to
the above-mentioned weighty considerations of personal and national
dignity and honor, and rejected the idea of giving myself up. It was not for
me to play the rôle of Vercingetorix, who, as is well known, relying upon
the magnanimity of his foes, surrendered himself to them in order to obtain
a better fate for his people. In view of the conduct of our enemies during the
war and in the peace negotiations, it was surely not to be assumed that the
Entente would show any greater magnanimity than did Cæsar when he
threw the noble Gaul into chains, subsequently had him executed, and, in
spite of what Vercingetorix had done, enslaved his people just the same.

I wish to remark in a general way that it has always proved wrong to follow
the suggestions of the enemy or to heed them to any extent. The well-meant
suggestions regarding my giving myself up, emanating from Germans, also
grew from the soil of the enemy demands, though perhaps partly unknown
to those making them. For that very reason it was necessary to refuse to
heed them.
Thus the only solution remaining is an international, nonpartisan court,
which, instead of trying individuals, shall examine and pronounce judgment
upon all the happenings leading to the World War, in all the countries taking
part therein, after all the national archives, not merely those of Germany,
have been opened up. Germany can well agree to this mode of procedure.
Whosoever opposes it pronounces judgment upon himself!
My standpoint on the subject here discussed is expressed in the letter
reproduced below, which I addressed, under date of April 5, 1921, to Field
Marshal von Hindenburg, and which the latter has made public in the
meantime. To make matters clearer, the letter which preceded it, from the
Marshal, is also given.[10]

HINDENBURG'S LETTER

Hanover, March 30, 1921.
Your Imperial and Royal Majesty:
I beg to thank Your Majesty most respectfully for his gracious interest
in the illness of my wife. She is not yet out of danger.
I have little that is pleasant to report from our country. The troubles in
Central Germany are more serious than they are represented to be by
the Prussian Government. I hope that they will soon be suppressed.
The effects of the Versailles peace decree lie ever more crushingly
upon the German people, and the object of this peace—the policy of
annihilation of our enemies—comes more plainly to the fore every
day. For the purpose of justifying this policy of force the fairy tale of
German war guilt must be adhered to.
The spokesman of the enemy alliance, Mr. Lloyd George, is little
disturbed by the fact that, on December 20th of last year, he declared

that no statesman wished war in the summer of 1914, that all the
nations had slipped or stumbled into it. In his speech at the London
conference on March 3d he calmly remarked that Germany's
responsibility for the war was fundamental, that it was the basis on
which the Peace of Versailles was erected, and that, if the admission of
this guilt should be refused or given up, the treaty would become
untenable.
Now as before, the question of war guilt is the cardinal point in the
future of the German nation. The admission of our alleged "guilt"
regarding the war, forced from the German representatives at
Versailles against their judgment, is wreaking frightful vengeance;
equally so the untrue acknowledgment of Germany's "complicity"
which Minister Simons gave at the London conference.
I agree with Your Majesty to the uttermost depths of my soul—in my
long term of military service I have had the good fortune and honor to
enter into close personal relations with Your Majesty. I know that all
the efforts of Your Majesty throughout your reign were bent toward
maintaining peace. I can realize how immeasurably hard it is for Your
Majesty to be eliminated from positive co-operation for the fatherland.
The Comparative Historical Tables compiled by Your Majesty, a
printed copy of which Your Majesty sent me recently, are a good
contribution to the history of the origin of the war and are calculated to
remove many an incorrect conception. I have regretted that Your
Majesty did not make the tables public, but limited them instead to a
small circle. Now that the tables, owing to indiscretions, have been
published in the foreign press, partly in the form of incomplete
excerpts, it seems to me advisable to have them published in full in the
German press.
To my great joy I have heard that there has been an improvement
recently in the health of Her Majesty. May God help further!
With the deepest respect, unlimited fidelity and gratitude, I am Your
Imperial and Royal Majesty's most humble servant,
(Signed) Von Hindenburg,
Field Marshal.

THE KAISER'S LETTER

House Doorn, April 5, 1921.
My Dear Field Marshal:
Accept my warmest thanks for your letter of March 30th, ult. You are
right. The hardest thing of all for me is to be obliged to live in foreign
parts, to follow, with burning anguish in my soul, the awful fate of our
dear fatherland, to which I have devoted the labors of my entire life,
and to be barred from co-operation.
You stood beside me during the dark, fatal days of November, 1918.
As you know, I forced myself to the difficult, terrible decision to leave
the country only upon the urgent declaration of yourself and the rest of
my counselors who had been summoned that only by my so doing
would it be possible to obtain more favorable armistice terms for our
people and spare it a bloody civil war.
The sacrifice was in vain. Now, as well as before, the enemy wishes to
make the German people expiate the alleged guilt of "Imperial
Germany."

SILENT UNDER ATTACKS

In my endeavor to subordinate all personal considerations to the
welfare of Germany, I keep myself completely in the background. I am
silent in the face of all the lies and slanders which are spread abroad
concerning me. I consider it beneath my dignity to defend myself
against attacks and abuse.
In accordance with this policy of restraint I have also kept the
Historical Tables mentioned by you strictly objective and made them
accessible only to a narrow circle of acquaintances. I am utterly at a
loss to understand how they have now become public through some
sort of indiscretion or theft (?). The purpose inspiring me when I
prepared the historical tables was this: To bring together strictly
historical material by a systematic enumeration of sober facts, such as
might enable the reader to form his own judgment of the historical
happenings preceding the war. I found my most convincing sources, be

it remarked, in the literature which has sprung up after the war,
particularly in the works of natives of the enemy countries. Therefore I
am glad that you find my modest contribution to history useful.
As to your suggestion to make the tables, which have been completed
in the meantime, accessible to the German press, I thank you, and will
follow it.[11]
Truth will hew a way for itself—mightily, irresistibly, like an
avalanche. Whoever does not close his ears to it against his better
judgment must admit that, during my twenty-six-year reign previous to
the war, Germany's foreign policy was directed solely to the
maintenance of peace. Its one and only aim was to protect our sacred
native soil, threatened from the west and the east, and the peaceful
development of our commerce and political economy.
Had we ever had warlike intentions we should have struck the blow in
1900, when England's hands were tied by the Boer War, Russia's by
the Japanese War, at which time almost certain victory beckoned us. In
any event, we assuredly would not have singled out the year 1914,
when we were confronted by a compact, overwhelmingly superior foe.
Also, every impartial man must acknowledge to himself that Germany
could expect nothing from the war, whereas our enemies hoped to
obtain from it the complete realization of the aims which they had
based, long since, upon our annihilation.
The fact that my zealous efforts and those of my Government were
concentrated, during the critical July and August days of 1914, upon
maintaining world peace is being proved more and more conclusively
by the most recent literary and documentary publications in Germany,
and, most especially, in the enemy countries. The most effective proof
thereof is Sazonoff's statement: "The German Emperor's love of peace
is a guarantee to us that we ourselves can decide upon the moment of
war." What further proof of our innocence is needed? The above means
that the intention existed to make an attack upon one who was
absolutely unsuspecting.

CALLS ACCUSATION FUTILE

God is my witness that I, in order to avoid war, went to the uttermost
limit compatible with responsibility for the security and inviolability of
my dear fatherland.
It is futile to accuse Germany of war guilt. To-day there is no longer
any doubt that not Germany, but the alliance of her foes, prepared the
war according to a definite plan, and intentionally caused it.
For the purpose of concealing this, the allied enemies extorted the false
"admission of guilt" from Germany in the shameful Peace Treaty and
demanded that I be produced before a hostile tribunal. You, my dear
Field Marshal, know me too well not to be aware that no sacrifice for
my beloved fatherland is too great for me. Nevertheless, a tribunal in
which the enemy alliance would be at once plaintiff and judge would
be not an organ of justice, but an instrument of political arbitrariness,
and would serve only, through the sentence which would inevitably be
passed upon me, to justify subsequently the unprecedented peace
conditions imposed upon us. Therefore, the enemy's demand naturally
had to be rejected by me.
But, in addition, the idea of my being produced before a neutral
tribunal, no matter how constituted, cannot be entertained by me. I do
not recognize the validity of any sentence pronounced by any mortal
judge whatsoever, be he never so exalted in rank, upon the measures
taken by me most conscientiously as Emperor and King—in other
words, as the constitutional, not responsible, representative of the
German nation—since, were I to do so, I should thereby be sacrificing
the honor and dignity of the German nation represented by me.
Legal proceedings having to do with guilt and punishment, instituted
solely against the head of one of the nations which took part in the
war, deprive that one nation of every vestige of equality of rights with
the other nations, and thereby of its prestige in the community of
nations. Moreover, this would cause, as a consequence, the impression
desired by the enemy that the entire "question of guilt" concerns only
this one head of a nation and the one nation represented by him. It
must be taken into consideration, moreover, that a nonpartisan
judgment of the "question of guilt" is impossible, if the legal
proceedings are not made to include the heads and leading statesmen

of the enemy powers, and if their conduct is not subjected to the same
investigation, since it goes without saying that the conduct of the
aforesaid one nation at the outbreak of the war can be judged correctly
only if there is simultaneous consideration of the actions of its
opponents.
A real clearing up of the "question of guilt," in which surely Germany
would have no less interest than her foes, could be accomplished only
if an international, nonpartisan tribunal, instead of trying individuals
as criminals, should establish all the events which led to the World
War, as well as all other offenses against international law, in order
thereafter to measure correctly the guilt of individuals implicated in
every one of the nations participating in the war.
Such an honest suggestion was officially made in Germany after the
end of the war, but, so far as I know, it was partly refused, partly found
unworthy of any answer at all. Furthermore, Germany, immediately
after the war, unreservedly threw open her archives, whereas the
enemy alliance has taken good care so far not to follow such an
example. The secret documents from the Russian archives, now being
made public in America, are but the beginning.
This method of procedure on the part of the enemy alliance in itself,
combined with overwhelming damaging evidence coming to hand,
shows where the "war guilt" is really to be sought! This makes it all
the more a solemn duty for Germany to collect, sift, and make public,
by every possible means, every bit of material bearing on the "question
of guilt," in order, by so doing, to unmask the real originators of the
war.
Unfortunately, the condition of Her Majesty has become worse. My
heart is filled with the most grievous worry.
God with us!
Your grateful
(Signed) Wilhelm.

CHAPTER XIV

The Question of Guilt
History can show nothing to compare with the World War of 1914-18. It
also can show nothing like the perplexity which has arisen as to the causes
leading up to the World War.
This is all the more astounding in that the Great War befell a highly
cultivated, enlightened, politically trained race of men, and the causes
leading up to it were plainly to be seen.
The apparent complicity in the crisis of July, 1914, should deceive nobody.
The telegrams exchanged at that time between the Cabinets of the great
powers and their rulers, the activities of the statesmen and leading private
individuals in verbal negotiations with important personages of the Entente,
were certainly of the greatest importance on account of the decisive
significance assumed by almost every word when it came from responsible
lips, by every line that was written or telegraphed. The essential basis of the
causes of the war, however, is not altered by such things; it is firmly
established, and people must never hesitate from freeing it, calmly and with
an eye to realities, from the bewildering outcroppings from the events
accompanying the outbreak of war.
The general situation of the German Empire in the period before the war
had become continually more brilliant, and for that very reason continually
more difficult from the point of view of foreign politics. Unprecedented
progress in industry, commerce, and world traffic had made Germany
prosperous. The curve of our development tended steadily upward.
The concomitant of this peaceful penetration of a considerable part of the
world's markets, to which German diligence and our achievements justly
entitled us, was bound to be disagreeable to older nations of the world,
particularly to England. This is quite a natural phenomenon, having nothing
remarkable about it. Nobody is pleased when a competitor suddenly appears
and obliges one to look on while the old customers desert to him. For this

reason I cannot reproach the British Empire because of English ill humor at
Germany's progress in the world's markets.
Had England been able, by introducing better commercial methods, to
overcome or restrict German competition, she would have been quite within
her rights in doing so and no objections could have been made. It simply
would have been a case of the better man winning. In the life of nations
nobody can find it objectionable if two nations contend against each other
peacefully by the same methods—i. e., peaceful methods—yet with all their
energy, daring, and organizing ability, each striving to benefit itself.
On the other hand, it is quite another matter if one of these nations sees its
assets on the world's balance sheet threatened by the industry,
achievements, and super business methods of the other, and hence, not
being able to apply ability like that of its young competitor, resorts to force
—i. e., to methods that are not those of peace, but of war—in order to call a
halt upon the other nation in its peaceful campaign of competition, or to
annihilate it.

NAVY MERELY PROTECTIVE

Our situation became more serious since we were obliged to build a navy
for the protection of our welfare, which, in the last analysis, was not based
on the nineteen billions yearly to which German exports and imports
amounted. The supposition that we built this navy for the purpose of
attacking and destroying the far stronger English fleet is absurd, since it
would have been impossible for us to win a victory on the water, because of
the discrepancy between the two navies. Moreover, we were striding
forward in the world market in accordance with our desires and had no
cause for complaint. Why, then, should we wish to jeopardize the results of
our peaceful labors?
In France the idea of revenge had been sedulously cultivated ever since
1870-71; it was fostered, with every possible variation, in literary, political,
and military writings, in the officer corps, in schools, associations, political
circles.
I can well understand this spirit. Looked at from the healthy national
standpoint, it is, after all, more honorable for a nation to desire revenge for

a blow received than to endure it without complaint.
But Alsace-Lorraine had been German soil for many centuries; it was stolen
by France and taken back by us in 1871 as our property. Hence, a war of
revenge which had as its aim the conquest of thoroughly German territory
was unjust and immoral. For us to have yielded on this point would have
been a slap in the face to our sentiments of nationality and justice. Since
Germany could never voluntarily return Alsace-Lorraine to France, the
French dream could be realized only by means of a victorious war which
should push forward the French boundary posts to the left bank of the
Rhine.
Germany, on the contrary, had no reason for staking what she had won in
1870-71, so the course for her to pursue was to maintain peace with France,
all the more so because of the fact that the combination of the powers
against the German-Austrian Dual Alliance was continually becoming more
apparent.
As to Russia, the mighty empire of the Tsars was clamoring for an outlet on
the sea to the southward. This was a natural ambition and not to be harshly
judged. In addition, there was the Russian-Austrian conflict of influence,
especially in Serbia, which also concerned Germany in so far as Germany
and Austria-Hungary were allies.
The Russia of the Tsars, moreover, was in a state of continual internal
ferment and every Tsaristic Government had to keep the possibility for a
foreign conflict ever in readiness, in order always to be able to deflect
attention from inner troubles to foreign difficulties; to have a safety valve as
an outlet for the passions that might lead to trouble at home.
Another point was that Russia's enormous demand for loans was met almost
exclusively by France; more than twenty billions of French gold francs
found their way to Russia, and France had a voice, to some extent, in
determining how they should be expended. As a result, it became entirely a
matter of expenditure on strategic measures and preparations for war. The
golden chain of the French billions not only bound Russia to France
financially, but made Russia serve the French idea of revenge.

PURPOSE OF "ENCIRCLEMENT"

Thus England, France, and Russia had, though for different reasons, an aim
in common—viz., to overthrow Germany. England wished to do so for
commercial-political reasons, France on account of her policy of revenge,
Russia because she was a satellite of France and also for reasons of internal
politics and because she wished to reach the southern sea. These three great
nations, therefore, were bound to act together. The union of these ambitions
in a common course of action, duly planned, is what we call the "policy of
encirclement."
Added to all this there was also the Gentlemen's Agreement which has only
recently come to light and has already been thoroughly discussed in the
"Hohenlohe" chapter; concerning this agreement I knew absolutely nothing
during my reign, and the German Foreign Office was only superficially and
unreliably informed.
When I learned of it, I immediately sought information about it from Herr
von Bethmann. He wrote me a rather puzzling letter to the effect that there
was surely something about it among the documents of the Foreign Office;
that the German ambassador at that time in Washington, von Holleben, had
made some confidential report on it, to be sure, but had not given his source
of information, wherefore the Foreign Office had not attached any
importance to the matter and had not reported further on it to me. Hence the
said agreement had actually no influence upon Germany's policy, but it
constitutes supplementary proof that the Anglo-Saxon world as far back as
1897 had combined against us, and thereby explains a number of obstacles
encountered by Germany in her foreign policy. It also explains America's
attitude in the war.
We were quite well acquainted, on the other hand, with the Entente
Cordiale, its foundations and purposes, and it decisively influenced the
course of our policy.
In view of the grouping of England, France, and Russia—three very strong
powers—only one political course lay open to Germany, the threat of
deciding Germany's future by force of arms must be avoided until we had
secured for ourselves such an economic, military, naval, and national-
political position in the world as to make it seem advisable to our opponents
to refrain from risking a decision by arms and to yield us the share in the
apportionment and management of the world to which our ability entitled

us. We neither desired nor were we entitled to jeopardize our hard-won
welfare.
The aims of the Entente could be attained only through a war, those of
Germany only without a war. It is necessary to hold fast to this basic idea; it
is of more decisive value than all accessory matters. Hence I shall not go
into detail here, nor take up Belgian or other reports, nor the telegrams sent
just before the outbreak of war. The thorough treatment of these details lies
in the domain of research.
In Germany our situation was correctly understood, and we acted
accordingly.

SOUGHT ENGLAND'S FRIENDSHIP

Taking up once more our relations with England, we did everything in our
power to bring about a rapprochement; we consented to the demand for
limitation of naval construction, as I have shown in my report of Haldane's
visit to Berlin. I went so far as to try to utilize my family connections. But
in vain. The actions of King Edward VII are explained by the simple fact
that he was an Englishman and was trying to bring to realization the plans
of his Government. Maybe the political ambitions of the King, who did not
begin to reign until well along in years, contributed to this.
We certainly did all that was possible to meet England halfway, but it was
useless, because the German export figures showed an increase; naturally
we could not limit our world commerce in order to satisfy England. That
would have been asking too much.
As regards our policy toward England, we have been much blamed for
having refused the offer of an alliance made us by Chamberlain, the English
Colonial Minister, toward the close of the 'nineties. This matter, however,
was far different in character, on closer inspection, from what it was
represented as being.
First, Chamberlain brought a letter with him from the English Premier,
Salisbury, to Bülow, in which the English Prime Minister declared that
Chamberlain was dealing on his own account only, that the English Cabinet
was not behind him. This, to be sure, might have meant the adoption of a
course that was diplomatically permissible, giving the English Cabinet,

which was responsible to Parliament, a free hand; but it turned out later, be
it remarked, that the Liberal group in England was at that time hostile to a
German-English alliance.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that there was a possibility that the course
adopted was a mere diplomatic formality—that Chamberlain might have
been sent on ahead and complete freedom of action retained for the English
Cabinet, which is a favorite method in London—Prince Bülow, with my
consent, went thoroughly into the matter with Chamberlain.
It transpired then that the English-German alliance was aimed
unquestionably against Russia. Chamberlain spoke directly about a war to
be waged later by England and Germany against Russia. Prince Bülow, in
full agreement with me, declined politely but emphatically thus to disturb
the peace of Europe. In so doing he was but following the example of the
great Chancellor, for Prince Bismarck coined the phrase—I myself have
heard it repeatedly in the Bismarck family circle: "Germany must never
become England's dagger on the European continent."
So we did nothing further at that time than to go straight ahead with our
policy—viz., we refused all agreements which might lead to a war which
was not based directly on the defense of our native soil. The refusal of the
Chamberlain offer is a proof of the German love of peace.
As to France, we sought to bring about an endurable state of affairs. This
was difficult, for, in French eyes, we were the archenemy and it was
impossible for us to acquiesce in the demands inspired by the policy of
revenge. We settled the Morocco quarrel peacefully; no man of standing in
Germany entertained the idea of war on account of Morocco. For the sake
of peace we allowed France at that time to encroach upon the essentially
legitimate interests of Germany in Morocco, strengthened as the French
were by the agreement concluded secretly with England as to mutual
compensation in Egypt and Morocco.
In the Algeciras Conference the outline of the Great War was already
visible. It is assuredly not pleasant to be forced to retreat politically, as we
did in the Morocco matter, but Germany's policy subordinated everything to
the great cause of preserving the peace of the world.

We tried to attain this end by courtesy, which was partially resented. I recall
the journey of my mother, the Empress Frederick, to Paris. We expected a
tolerably good reception, since she was an English Princess and went, as an
artist, to be the guest of French art. Twice I visited the Empress Eugénie—
once from Aldershot at her castle of Fernborough, the other time aboard her
yacht, in Norwegian waters, near Bergen. This was a piece of politeness
that seemed to me perfectly natural, seeing that I happened to be very near
her. When the French General Bonnal was in Berlin with several officers,
these gentlemen dined with the Second Infantry Regiment. I was present
and toasted the French army—something that was still out of the ordinary,
but was done with the best intentions. I brought French female and male
artists to Germany. All this sort of thing, of course, was a trifle in the great
game of politics, but it at least showed our good will.
With regard to Russia, I went to the utmost trouble. My letters, published in
the meantime, were naturally never sent without the knowledge of the
Imperial Chancellors, but always in agreement with them and largely at
their desire. Russia would doubtless never have got into a war with
Germany under Alexander III, for he was reliable. Tsar Nicholas was weak
and vacillating; whoever had last been with him was right; and, naturally, it
was impossible for me always to be that individual.
I made every effort with this Tsar, also, to restore the traditional friendship
between Germany and Russia. I was moved to do so not only by political
reasons, but by the promise which I had made to my grandfather on his
deathbed.
I most urgently advised Tsar Nicholas, repeatedly, to introduce liberal
reforms within his country, to summon the so-called Great Duma, which
existed and functioned even as far back as the reign of Ivan the Terrible. In
doing so it was not my intention to interfere in Russian internal affairs;
what I wanted was to eliminate, in the interests of Germany, the ferment
going on in Russia, which had often enough been deflected before to
foreign conflicts, as I have already described. I wished to help toward
eliminating at least this one phase of the internal situation in Russia, which
threatened to cause war, and I was all the more willing to make the effort
since I might thereby serve both the Tsar and Russia.

The Tsar paid no heed to my advice, but created a new Duma instead, which
was quite inadequate for coping with the situation. Had he summoned the
old Duma he might have dealt and talked personally with all the
representatives of his huge realm and won their confidence.
When the Tsar resolved upon war against Japan, I told him that I would
assure him security in the rear and cause him no annoyances. Germany kept
this promise.

GRAND DUKE'S VISIT

When the course taken by the war did not fulfill the Tsar's expectations, and
the Russian and Japanese armies finally lay before each other for weeks
without serious fighting, the young brother of the Tsar, Grand Duke
Michael, arrived at Berlin for a visit. We could not quite make out what he
wanted. Prince Bülow, who was then Chancellor, requested me to ask the
Grand Duke sometime how matters really stood with Russia; he said that
he, the Prince, had received bad news and thought it was high time for
Russia to bring the war to an end.
I undertook this mission. The Grand Duke was visibly relieved when I
spoke to him frankly; he declared that things looked bad for Russia. I told
him that it seemed to me that the Tsar ought to make peace soon, since what
the Grand Duke had told me about the unreliability of troops and officers
appeared to me quite as serious as the renewed internal agitation.
Grand Duke Michael was grateful for my having given him an opportunity
to talk. He said that the Tsar was vacillating, as always, but he must make
peace and would make it if I advised him to do so. He asked me to write a
few lines to the Tsar to that effect, for him to deliver.
I drafted a letter in English to Tsar Nicholas, went to Bülow, told him what
the Grand Duke had told me, and showed him the draft of my letter. The
Prince thanked me and found the letter suitable. The Grand Duke informed
the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Count Osten-Sacken, and, after he had
repeatedly expressed his thanks, went direct to the Tsar, who then had peace
negotiations begun.
Count Osten-Sacken told me, when next we met, that I had done Russia a
great service. I was glad this was recognized, and felt justified in hoping, on

account of this, that my conduct would contribute toward bringing about
friendly relations with Russia. In acting as I did I also worked toward
preventing the possible spread of a Russian revolution, during the Russo-
Japanese War, across the frontiers of Germany. Germany earned no thanks
thereby; however, our conduct during the Russo-Japanese War is another
proof of our love of peace.
The same purpose underlay my suggestion which led to the Björkö
agreement (July, 1905). It contemplated an alliance between Germany and
Russia, which both the Allies as well as other nations should be at liberty to
join. Ratification of this agreement failed through the opposition of the
Russian Government (Isvolsky).
It remains to say a few words about America. Aside from the Gentlemen's
Agreement already mentioned, which assured America's standing beside
England and France in a World War, America did not belong to the Entente
Cordiale created by King Edward VII at the behest of his Government, and,
most important of all, America, in so far as it is possible at present to judge
events, did not contribute toward bringing on the World War. Perhaps the
unfriendly answer given by President Wilson to the German Government at
the beginning of the war may have had some connection with the
Gentlemen's Agreement.

AMERICAN FACTORS IN DEFEAT

But there can be no doubt that America's entry into the war, and the
enormous supplies of ammunition, and especially of war materials, which
preceded her entry, seriously hurt the chance of the Central Powers to bring
the war to a successful termination by force of arms.
It is necessary, however, to avoid all emotional criticism of America also,
since, in the great game of politics, real factors only can be considered.
America was at liberty (despite the Gentlemen's Agreement) to remain
neutral or to enter the war on the other side. One cannot reproach a nation
for a decision as to war or peace made in accordance with its sovereign
rights so long as the decision is not in violation of definite agreements.
Such is not the case here.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that John Kenneth Turner, in his already
mentioned book, Shall It Be Again? shows, on the basis of extensive proofs,
that all Wilson's reasons for America's entry into the war were fictitious,
that it was far more a case of acting solely in the interest of Wall Street high
finance.
The great profit derived by America from the World War consists in the fact
that the United States was able to attract to itself nearly fifty per cent of all
the gold in the world, so that now the dollar, instead of the English pound,
determines the world's exchange rate. But here also no reproach is at all
justified, since any other nation in a position to do so would have rejoiced
in attracting to itself this increase of gold and of prestige in the world's
money market. It was certainly regrettable for us that America did not do
this stroke of business on the side of the Central Powers.
But just as Germany objects with perfect justification to having had her
peaceful labors combated by the Entente, not with peaceful, but with
warlike means, so also she can and must enter constant protest—as she is
already trying to do by means of published material—against America's
violation of the right at the close of the World War.
Personally I do not believe that the American people would have consented
to this; American women particularly would not have participated in the
denial of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, if they could have been
enlightened at that time as to the facts. America, more than other countries,
had been misled by English propaganda, and therefore allowed President
Wilson, who had been provided with unprecedented powers, to act on his
own initiative at Paris—in other words, to be beaten down on his Fourteen
Points. Just as Mr. Wilson omitted mention, later on, of the English
blockade, against which he had protested previously, so also he acted with
regard to his Fourteen Points.
The German Government had accepted Wilson's Fourteen Points, although
they were severe enough. The Allies likewise had accepted the Fourteen
Points, with the exception of those on reparations and the freedom of the
seas. Wilson had guaranteed the Fourteen Points.

FOURTEEN POINTS ABANDONED

I fail to find the most important of them in the Versailles instrument, but
only those expressing the Entente's policy of violence, and even part of
these in a greatly falsified form. Relying on Wilson's guaranty, Germany
evacuated the enemy territory occupied by her and surrendered her weapons
—in other words, made herself defenseless. In this blind confidence and the
abandonment of the Fourteen Points on the one side, and in the outbreak of
the German revolution on the other, lies the key to our present condition.
According to Turner, the Fourteen Points, as far back as the drawing up of
the armistice terms, were, to Wilson, no more than a means of making
Germany lay down her arms; as soon as this end was achieved he dropped
them.
Already a very large part of the American people has arrayed itself against
Mr. Wilson and is unwilling to be discredited along with him. I am not
dreaming of spontaneous American help for Germany; all I count upon is
the sober acknowledgment by the American people that it has to make good
the gigantic wrong done Germany by its former President. For the
atmosphere of a victory does not last forever, and later on, not only in
Germany, but elsewhere, people will remember the unreliability of the
American President and look upon it as American unreliability.
That is not a good thing, however, for the American people. To have the
policy of a nation branded with the stigma of unreliability is not
advantageous. When judgment is passed hereafter on American policy,
people will forget that Mr. Wilson, unversed in the ways of the world, was
trapped by Lloyd George and Clemenceau.
I have met—particularly at the Kiel regattas—many American men and
women whose political judgment and caution would make it impossible for
them to approve such a flagrant breach of faith as was committed by Mr.
Wilson, because of its effect on America's political prestige. It is upon such
considerations of national egotism, not upon any sort of sentimental
considerations, that I base my hope that Germany's burden will be lightened
from across the ocean.
Besides the injustice in the abandonment of the Fourteen Points, it must
also be remembered that Mr. Wilson was the first to demand of the German
reigning dynasty that it withdraw, in doing which he hinted that, were such
action taken, the German people would be granted a better peace. Before

the Government of Prince Max joined in the demand for my abdication of
the throne, which it based on the same grounds as Mr. Wilson—that
Germany would thereby get better terms—(prevention of civil war was
used as a second means of bringing pressure on me)—it was in duty bound
to get some sort of a binding guaranty from Mr. Wilson. In any event, the
statements made, which became continually more urgent and pressing,
contributed toward making me resolve to quit the country, since I was
constrained to believe that I could render my country a great service by so
doing.

ACCEPTED "SIGHT UNSEEN"

I subordinated my own interests and those of my dynasty, which certainly
were not unimportant, and forced myself, after the severest inward
struggles, to acquiesce in the wish of the German authorities. Later it
transpired that the German Government had obtained no real guaranties.
But, in the tumultuous sequence of events during those days, it was
necessary for me to consider the unequivocal and definite announcement of
the Imperial Chancellor as authoritative. For this reason I did not
investigate it.
Why the Entente demanded, through Mr. Wilson, that I should abdicate is
now obvious. It felt perfectly sure that, following my being dispossessed of
the throne, military and political instability would necessarily ensue in
Germany and enable it to force upon Germany not easier but harder terms.
At that time the revolution had not yet appeared as an aid to the Entente.
For me to have remained on the throne would have seemed to the Entente
more advantageous to Germany than my abdication. I myself agree with
this view of the Entente, now that it has turned out that the Max of Baden
Government had no substantial foundation for its declaration that my
abdication would bring better terms to my fatherland.
I go even further and declare that the Entente would never have dared to
offer such terms to an intact German Empire. It would not have dared to
offer them to an imperial realm upon which the parliamentary system had
not yet been forced, with the help of German Utopians, at the very moment
of its final fight for existence; to a realm whose monarchical Government
had not been deprived of the power to command its army and navy.

In view of all this, heavy guilt also lies on the shoulders of the American
ex-President as a result of his having demanded my abdication under the
pretense that it would bring Germany better terms. Here also we certainly
have a point of support for the powerful lever which is destined to drag the
Treaty of Versailles from where it lies behind lock and key. In Germany,
however, Mr. Wilson should never be confused with the American people.
In setting forth my political principles in what follows I am actuated solely
by a desire to contribute toward proving Germany's innocence of having
brought on the World War.
From the outset of my reign German policy was based upon compromise of
the differences which it found existing between nations. In its entirety,
therefore, my policy was eminently peaceful. This policy of peaceful
compromise became apparent in internal politics, at the very beginning of
my reign, in the legislation desired by me for the protection of the workers.
The development of social legislation, which placed Germany at the head of
civilized nations in the domain of governmental protection, was based on a
like foundation.
The fundamental idea of a policy of compromise went so far within
Germany that the strength of the army would have remained far less than
universal compulsory military service and the size of the population made
possible. Here, as well as in the matter of naval construction, the
curtailments demanded by the Reichstag were put up with by the Crown
and the Government. Already at that time the question of Germany's
capabilities of defense was left to the decision of the people's
representatives. A nation that wished and prepared war would have adopted
quite different tactics.

INADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS

The more apparent the Entente's "policy of encirclement" and attack
became, the more the means of protecting our welfare should have been
strengthened for defensive reasons. This idea of natural and justified self-
protection, by means of defensive measures against a possible hostile attack
was carried out in a wretchedly inadequate manner.

Germany's desire for peace, in fact, was unable to develop this protection
by land and sea in a manner compatible with her financial and national
strength and with the risk which our welfare was bound to run in case of a
war. Therefore, we are now suffering not from the consequences of the
tendency toward aggression falsely imputed to us, but actually from the
consequences of a well-nigh incredible love of peace and of blind
confidence.
The entirely different political principles of the Entente have already been
described by me, also our continuous efforts to get upon friendly terms with
the individual Entente nations.
I do not wish to ignore completely the less important work done by
Germany, also included within the framework of politics on a large scale,
which was always inspired by the same purpose: to effect compromise of
existing points of conflict. The Kiel regatta brought us guests from all the
leading nations. We sought compromise with the same zeal on the neutral
territory of sport as in the domain of science by means of exchange
professors, and foreign officers were most willingly allowed to inspect our
army system. This latter might be adjudged a mistake, now that we can look
back, but, in any event, all these points are certain proofs of our honest
desire to live at peace with all.
Moreover, Germany did not take advantage of a single one of the
opportunities that arose for waging war with a sure prospect of success.
I have already pointed out the benevolent neutrality of Germany toward
Russia at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.
At the time when England was deeply involved in the Boer War we might
have fought against England or against France, which, at that time, would
have been obliged to forego help from England. But we did not do so. Also,
while the Russo-Japanese War was in progress, we might have fought not
only against Russia, but also against France. But we did not do so.
In addition to the Morocco crisis already touched upon, in connection with
which we set aside the idea of going to war, we also gave evidence of our
desire for peace by overcoming the Bosnian crisis by diplomatic means.
When one considers these plainly visible political events as a whole and
adduces the declarations of Entente statesmen such as Poincaré,

Clemenceau, Isvolsky, Tardieu, and others, one is bound to ask one's self, in
amazement, how a peace treaty, founded upon Germany's guilt in having
brought on the World War, could have been drafted and put through. This
miscarriage of justice will not stand before the bar of world history.

BLAMES FRANCE FOR 1870

A Frenchman, Louis Guetant, delegate from Lyon to the Society for the
Rights of Man, recently made this statement:
"If we once look upon events without prejudice, with complete
independence and frankness, without bothering about which camp chance
placed us in at birth, the following is forced upon our attention first of all:
The War of 1914 is a consequence of the War of 1870. For, ever since that
earlier date, the idea of revenge, more or less veiled, has never left us.
"The War of 1870, however, was prepared and declared by the French
Government. The French Empire, indeed, needed it very badly in order to
contend against interior troubles and its steadily growing unpopularity with
the public. Even Gambetta, the wild tribune of the opposition, exclaimed: 'If
the Empire brings us the left bank of the Rhine, I shall become reconciled
with it!' Thus, it was a war of conquest; nobody bothered about what the
conquered populations might have to say about it. 'We shall bend their will
to ours!' Thus it is written in the law of the victor!
"And now, suddenly, the opportunity for doing this was to escape France. In
view of the political difficulties and dangers of war caused by his
candidacy, Prince Leopold declared himself ready to withdraw. That is bad!
Without a pretext there can be no war!
"It was the same with France as with the milkmaid and the broken pitcher in
the fable, only instead of, 'Farewell, calf, cow, pig, hens,' it was, 'Farewell,
bloody profits, glory, victory, left bank of the Rhine, even Belgium!'—for
the latter, too, lay on that left bank of the Rhine which France coveted. No,
that would have been too hard, the disillusionment would have been too
great, the opportunity must be created anew. The entire chauvinistic press,
the entire clan of boasters, set to work and soon found a way. Gramont,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent Ambassador Benedetti to visit Emperor
William, who was taking the cure at Ems, and demand from him a written

promise that, in case Prince Leopold should change his mind about his
withdrawal, he, William, as head of the family, would take issue against
this.
"The withdrawal of Prince Leopold was announced to France in a valid
manner and officially accepted by the Spanish Government. There could be
no doubt as to its genuineness. Nevertheless the Paris newspapers, almost
without exception, clamored for war. Whoever, like Robert Michell in the
Constitutionel, expressed his pleasure at the prospects for peace and
declared himself satisfied, was insulted on the street. Gambetta shouted at
him: 'You are satisfied! What a base expression!' Copies of his newspapers
were stolen from the news stands, thrown into the river, hurled in his face!
Emilie de Girandin wrote to him: 'The opportunity is unique, unhoped-for;
if the Empire misses it the Empire is lost!' Then it was that preparation for
the War of 1914 was begun."
Voices like this also, which are not unique either in France or England, must
always be adduced as proof that the guilt is not ours.

"MISTAKEN, BUT NOT GUILTY"

Our political and diplomatic operations in the course of decades were not, it
must be admitted, faultlessly conceived or executed. But where we made
mistakes they were caused invariably by the too great desire to maintain
world peace. Such mistakes do not constitute guilt.
As I mentioned elsewhere, I even consider the Congress of Berlin a
mistake, for it made our relations with Russia worse. The congress was a
victory for Disraeli, an Anglo-Austrian victory over Russia, which turned
Russian anger upon Germany. Yet—think of all that has been done since
then to make up with Russia! I have partly enumerated these acts. And
Bismarck's sole intention in bringing about the Congress of Berlin was, as I
have pointed out, the prevention of a great general war.
Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg also, who had strict orders from me to
maintain peace if it was at all possible, made mistakes in 1914; as a
statesman he was not at all adequate to the world crisis. But the blame for
the war cannot be put upon us simply because our opponents profited by
our mistakes. Bethmann Hollweg wished to avoid the war, like all of us—

sufficient proof of this is to be found in the one fact alone that he persisted,
until the 4th of August, in his political inertia, negotiating with England in
the erroneous belief that he could keep England out of the Entente.
While on this subject I wish also to call attention to the delusion under
which Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, was
laboring. Soon after he had become ambassador, King George came to the
Embassy to dinner. The King's example was followed automatically by the
best society people in London.
The Prince and Princess were singled out for marked attentions and
exceedingly well treated socially. From this the German ambassador drew
the conclusion that our relations with England had improved, until, shortly
before the war, Sir Edward Grey coolly informed him that he must draw no
political conclusions from social favors and good treatment accorded to him
personally.
Nothing could give a better insight into the difference between the English
and German mentality than this. The German assumed social friendliness to
be the expression of political friendliness, since the German is accustomed
to express aversion and approval by means of social forms as well as
otherwise. He is very outspoken about what he has on his mind.

CHARGES ENGLISH INSINCERITY

The Englishman, however, makes a distinction; in fact, he is rather pleased
if the man to whom he is speaking confuses form with substance, or, in
other words, if he takes the form to be the expression of actual sentiments
and political views. Judged from the English standpoint, the above-
mentioned words of Sir Edward Grey were a perfectly frank statement.
The much-discussed nonrenewal of the reinsurance treaty with Russia,
already touched upon by me, is not to be considered so decisive as to have
influenced the question of whether there was to be war or peace. The
reinsurance treaty, in my opinion, would not have prevented the Russia of
Nicholas II from taking the road to the Entente; under Alexander III it
would have been superfluous.
Prince Bismarck's view that the Russian ambassador, Prince Shuvaloff,
would have renewed the reinsurance treaty with him but not with his

successor, is naturally the honest, subjective way of looking at the matter—
judged in the light of fact, however, it does not hold water, in view of what
the two parties concerned had to consider at that time. For instance, the
Under Secretary of State of the Prince, Count Berchem, stated officially in a
report to the Prince that the treaty could not be renewed, which meant that it
could not be renewed through Shuvaloff, either.
I thought that not the old treaty, but only a new and different kind of treaty,
was possible, in the drawing up of which Austria must participate, as in the
old Three-Emperor-Relationship.
But, as I said, treaties with Nicholas II would not have seemed absolutely
durable to me, particularly after the sentiment of the very influential
Russian general public had also turned against Germany.
Our acts were founded upon the clear perception that Germany could reach
the important position in the world and obtain the influence in world affairs
necessary to her solely by maintaining world peace. This attitude was
strengthened, moreover, by personal considerations.
Never have I had warlike ambitions. In my youth my father had given me
terrible descriptions of the battlefields of 1870 and 1871, and I felt no
inclination to bring such misery, on a colossally larger scale, upon the
German people and the whole of civilized mankind. Old Field Marshal
Moltke, whom I respected greatly, had left behind him the prophetic
warning: Woe to him who hurls the firebrand of war upon Europe! And I
considered as a political legacy from the great Chancellor the fact that
Prince Bismarck had said that Germany must never wage a preventive war;
that German resistance would be neutralized if she did.
Thus the trend of the German policy of maintaining the peace was
determined by political insight, personal inclination, the legacies of two
great men, Bismarck and Moltke, and the desire of the German people to
devote itself to peaceful labors and not to plunge into adventures.
Whatever has been said in malevolent circles about the existence of a
German party favoring war is a conscious or unconscious untruth. In every
land there are elements which, in serious situations, either from honest
conviction or less lofty motives, favor the appeal to the sword, but never
have such elements influenced the course of German policy.

The accusations, especially those which have been made against the
General Staff to the effect that it worked for war, are pretty untenable. The
Prussian General Staff served its King and fatherland by hard, faithful
work, and maintained Germany's ability to defend herself by labors
extending over many years of peace, as was its duty, but it exerted
absolutely no political influence whatsoever. Interest in politics, as is well
known, was never particularly strong in the Prussian-German army.
Looking backward, one might almost say, in fact, that it would have been
better for us if those in leading military circles had concerned themselves a
bit more with foreign policy.
Therefore, how the Peace of Versailles, in view of this perfectly clear state
of affairs, could have been founded upon Germany's guilt in having caused
the World War, would seem an insoluble riddle if it were not possible to
trace the tremendous effect of a new war weapon—viz., the political
propaganda of England against Germany—planned on a large scale and
applied with audacity and unscrupulousness. I cannot bring myself to
dismiss this propaganda by branding it with catchwords such as "a piece of
rascality," etc., since it constitutes an achievement which, in spite of its
repugnant nature, cannot be ignored; it did us more harm than the arms in
the hands of our opponents.
To us Germans, such an instrument of insincerity, distortion, and hypocrisy
is not pleasing; it is something that is incompatible with the German
character; we try to convince our opponents with the weapon of truth as
well as with other weapons. But war is a cruel thing and what matters in it
is to win; after all, to fire heavy guns at civilized beings is not a pleasant
matter, nor to bombard beautiful old towns, yet this had to be done by both
sides in the war.
Moreover, we could not have developed a propaganda on a large scale like
that of our enemies during the war for the very reason that they had no foes
in their rear, whereas we were surrounded. In addition, most Germans have
not the gift to fit a scheme of propaganda to the different nationalities of the
nations upon which it is supposed to work. But, just as the English were
more than our match with that terrible weapon of theirs, the tank, against
which we could bring nothing of equal efficiency, so also were they
superior to us with their very effective weapon of propaganda.

And this weapon still continues its work and we are compelled still to
defend ourselves against it over and over again. For there can be no doubt
that the unjust Peace of Versailles could not have been founded upon
Germany's war guilt unless propaganda had previously accomplished its
task and, partly with the support of German pacifists, instilled into the
brains of 100,000,000 human beings the belief in Germany's guilt, so that
the unjust Peace of Versailles seemed to many justified.

HOPES FOR VERSAILLES REACTION

Meanwhile, things have changed, the barriers between nations have fallen,
and gradually they are awakening to the realization of how their confidence
was imposed upon. The reaction will be crushing to the makers of the
Versailles Peace, but helpful to Germany. It goes without saying that,
among the statesmen, politicians, and publicists of the Entente who really
know, not a single one is really convinced of Germany's guilt in having
caused the World War. Every one of them knows the real interrelation of
events, and assuredly there never was a case where so many augurs smiled
at each other over a secret held in common as the case of the responsibility
for the World War. In fact, one may even speak of a chorus of such
individuals, since twenty-eight nations took part in the war against
Germany. But, in the long run, not even the shrewdest augurs will suffice to
make world history. Truth will make its way forward and thus Germany will
come into her rights.
The various stipulations of the Versailles Treaty are in themselves null and
void, since they can be observed neither by the Entente nor by Germany. It
has been possible for months to note what difficulties are arising in the path
not only of Germany, but of the victors, as a result of such an extravagant
instrument.
In many ways the treaty has been punctured by the Entente itself, and for
this the reason is easily found. In the present highly developed state of the
world, which rests upon free, systematic exchange of material and
intellectual property, regulated solely by production itself, it is quite out of
the question for three men—no matter how eminent they may be—to sit
themselves down anywhere and dictate paragraphed laws to the world. Yet
that is what the Versailles Treaty does, not only for Germany, but also,

indirectly, for the Entente and America, since all economic questions can be
solved by mutual, not one-sided, action.
The life of nations is regulated always—and most particularly in our day—
not by paragraphs, but simply and solely by the needs of nations. It is
possible, to be sure, to do violence to those national needs temporarily by
the imposition of arbitrary decisions, but, in such cases, both parties
concerned must suffer.
The world is in such a stage just now. Conditions like those at present
cannot last; not guns, nor tanks, nor squadrons of airplanes, can perpetuate
them. Therefore, their removal has already begun; for, if the peace of
Versailles were really such a judicious, unimpeachable instrument, bringing
blessings upon the world, there would not be constant need of new
conferences, discussions, and meetings having to do with this "marvelous"
document. The constant necessity for new interpretations is due, indeed, to
the fact that the needs of highly cultivated and civilized nations were not
taken into account when the peace was concluded.
One must not be pharisaical, however; up to a certain point the
extravagance of the terms imposed by the victor after a life-and-death
struggle is a natural consequence of the relief felt at having escaped alive
from deadly danger.
Nevertheless, I know that Germany, if we had emerged victorious from the
war, would have imposed quite different terms—i. e., terms that would have
been just and endurable. The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest
—which indeed are not at all comparable with the Treaty of Versailles—
cannot be adduced against us. They were concluded in the very midst of the
war and had to include conditions which would guarantee our safety until
the end of the war. Had it come to a general peace, the treaty made by us in
the East would have had a far different aspect; had we won the war, it
would have been revised by ourselves. At the time it was made it was
necessary to give preference to military requirements.
But enlightenment regarding the unjust Treaty of Versailles is on the way
and the necessities of life among present-day nations will speak in
imperious tones to victors and vanquished.

After years of the heaviest trial will come the liberation from a yoke
imposed unjustly upon a great, strong, honest nation. Then every one of us
will be glad and proud again that he is a German.

CHAPTER XV

The Revolution and Germany's Future
I do not care what my foes say about me. I do not recognize them as my
judges. When I see how the same people who exaggeratedly spread incense
before me in other days are now vilifying me, the most that I can feel is
pity. The bitter things that I hear about myself from home disappoint me.
God is my witness that I have always wished what was best for my country
and my people, and I believed that every German had recognized and
appreciated this. I have always tried to keep my political acts, everything
that I did as a ruler and a man, in harmony with God's commandments.
Much turned out differently from what I desired, but my conscience is
clean. The welfare of my people and my Empire was the goal of my actions.
I bear my personal fate with resignation, for the Lord knows what He does
and what He wishes. He knows why He subjects me to this test. I shall bear
everything with patience and await whatsoever God still holds in store for
me.
The only thing that grieves me is the fate of my country and my people. I
am pained at the hard period of trial which my children of the German land
are undergoing, which I—obliged to live in foreign parts—cannot suffer
with them. That is the sword thrust which pierces through my soul; that is
what is bitter to me. Here in solitude I still feel and think solely for the
German people, still wonder how I can better matters and help with
enlightenment and counsel.
Nor can bitter criticism ever lessen my love for my land and people. I
remain faithful to the Germans, no matter how each individual German may
now stand with regard to me. To those who stand by me in misfortune as
they stood in prosperity, I am grateful—they comfort me and relieve my
gnawing homesickness for my beloved German home. And I can respect
those who, impelled by honest convictions, array themselves against me; as

for the rest, let them look to justifying themselves to God, their consciences,
and history.
They will not succeed in separating me from the Germans. Always I can
look upon country and people solely as one whole. They remain to me what
they were when I said on the occasion of the opening of the Reichstag on
the 1st of August, 1914, in the Imperial Palace: "I know no more of parties;
I know only Germans."
The revolution broke the Empress's heart. She aged visibly from November,
1918, onward, and could not resist her bodily ills with the strength of
before. Thus her decline soon began. The hardest of all for her to bear was
her homesickness for the soil of Germany, for the German people.
Notwithstanding this, she still tried to bring me consolation.
The revolution destroyed things of enormous value. It was brought about at
the very moment when the German nation's fight for existence was to have
been ended, and every effort should have been concentrated upon
reconstruction. It was a crime against the nation.

WIND AND WHIRLWIND

I am well aware that many who rally around the Social Democratic banner
did not wish revolution; some of the individual Social Democratic leaders
likewise did not wish it at that time, and more than one among them was
ready to co-operate with me. Yet these Social Democrats were incapable of
preventing the revolution, and therein lies their share of guilt for what is
now going on, all the more so since the Socialist leaders stood closer to the
revolutionary masses than the representatives of the monarchical
Government and, therefore, could exert more influence upon them.
But the leaders, even in the days before the war, had brought the idea of
revolution to the masses and fostered it, and the Social Democracy had
been, from time immemorial, openly hostile to the earlier, monarchical form
of government, and had worked systematically toward eliminating it. It
sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind.
The time and nature of the revolution were not to the liking of a number of
the leaders, but it was exactly these men who, at the decisive moment,

abandoned leadership to the most unbridled elements and failed to bring
their influence to bear toward maintaining the Government.
It was the duty of the Government of Prince Max to protect the old form of
government. It failed to fulfill its holy duty because it had become
dependent on the Socialist leaders, the very men who had lost their
influence on the masses to the radical elements.
Therefore, the greatest share of the guilt falls upon the leaders, and for that
reason history will not brand the German working classes, but their leaders,
with the curse of the revolution, in so far as these leaders participated in
making the revolution or failed to prevent it and it will also brand the
Government of Prince Max of Baden with that curse.
The German workers fought brilliantly in battle under my leadership, and at
home, as well, labored ceaselessly to provide munitions and war material.
That is something which must not be forgotten. It was only later that some
of them began to break away, but the responsibility for this lies at the door
of the agitators and revolutionists, not at that of the decent, patriotic section
of the working classes.
The conscienceless agitators are the men really responsible for Germany's
total collapse. That will be recognized some day by the working classes
themselves.
The present is a hard time for Germany. Of the future of this healthy, strong
nation I do not despair. A nation which can achieve such an unprecedented
rise as that of Germany between 1871 and 1914, a nation which can
maintain itself successfully for over four years in a defensive war against
twenty-eight nations, cannot be driven from the earth. Economically, the
world cannot do without us.
But in order that we may regain the position in the world which is
Germany's due, we must not await or count upon help from outside. Such
help will not come, in any event; were it to come, it would but mean at best
our being mere Helots. Also, the help which the German Social Democratic
party hoped for from abroad has not materialized, after all. The
international part of the socialistic program has proved itself a frightful
mistake.

The workers of the Entente lands took the field against the German people
in order to destroy it; nowhere was there a trace of international solidarity
among the masses.

ANOTHER GERMAN MISTAKE

This mistake, too, is one of the reasons why the war turned out so badly for
Germany. The English and French working classes were rightly directed—i.
e., nationalistically—by their leaders; the German working classes were
wrongly directed—i. e., internationally.
The German people must rely upon no other people, but solely upon
themselves. When self-conscious, national sentiment returns to all the Strata
of our people our upward march will begin. All classes of the population
must be united in national sentiment, no matter if their ways lie apart in
other departments of the nation's life. Therein lies the strength of England,
of France—even of the Poles.
If this comes to pass, the feeling of solidarity with all fellow members of
the nation, the consciousness of the dignity of our noble land, the pride in
being German, and the genuinely German conception of ethics, which was
one of the secret sources of strength that have made Germany so great, will
come back to us.
In the community of cultured nations Germany will again play, as she did
before the war, the rôle of the nation with the greatest capacity for labor,
and will once more march victoriously in the van in peaceful competition,
offering not only to herself, but to all the nations of the earth, whatever is
best in the domain of technical achievement, of science, of art.
I believe in the revocation of the unjust Peace of Versailles by the judgment
of the sensible elements of foreign lands and by Germany herself. I believe
in the German people and in the continuation of its peaceful mission in the
world, which has been interrupted by a terrible war, for which Germany,
since she did not will it, does not bear the guilt.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "It is that confounded Congress of Berlin. A serious mistake on the part of the
Chancellor. He has destroyed the old friendship between us, sown distrust in the
hearts of the Court and the Government, and engendered the idea of a great
injustice done the Russian army after its bloody 1877 campaign, for which it
wishes revenge. And here we are by the side of that damned French Republic,
full of hate for you and of subversive ideas, which, in case of a war against you,
will cost us our dynasty."
[2] "I understand perfectly your line of action; the Prince, with all his greatness,
was, after all, merely your employee or official. As soon as he refused to follow
your orders, it was necessary to dismiss him. As for me, I always distrusted him,
and I never believed a word of what he had told me or said to me himself, for I
was sure and knew that he was hoaxing me all the time. As to the relations
between us two, my dear William, the downfall of the Prince will have the best
of results; distrust will disappear. I have confidence in you. You can trust me."
[3] "Once the magnitude of Pan-Germanism dawned on the English and French
diplomats, once they became aware of the lengths to which Germany was willing
to go, they realized the necessity of strengthening their position, and therefore
made overtures to the United States, which resulted, probably before the summer
of the year 1897, in an understanding between the three countries. There seems
to be no doubt whatever that no papers of any sort were signed, that no pledges
were given which circumstances would not justify any one of the contracting
parties in denying or possibly repudiating. Nevertheless, an understanding was
reached that in case of a war begun by Germany or Austria for the purpose of
executing Pan-Germanism, the United States would promptly declare in favor of
England and France and would do her utmost to assist them."—Roland G.
Usher, Pan-Germanism, chap. x, p. 139.
[4] The Problem of Japan, by an Ex-Counselor of Legation in the Far East, chap.
viii, p. 136, note. Published by C. L. Langenhuysen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
1918.
[5] Tremendous excitement was caused in England when the incident of the
Kruger message became known. On January 3, 1896, the German Emperor
telegraphed as follows to the President of the South African Republic:
"I congratulate you most sincerely on having succeeded, with your people,
without calling on the help of foreign powers, by opposing your own force to an
armed band which broke into your country to disturb the peace, in restoring quiet
and in maintaining the independence of your country against external attack."
On January 6th, in conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles, Baron von Marschall
protested against the view of the English press that it was an act of hostility
against England and an encroachment on English rights for the German Emperor
to congratulate the head of a friendly state on his victory over an armed band that
had invaded his land in defiance of international law, and had been declared to be
outside the pale of the law by the English Government itself. But it was not
recorded that he disavowed the Kaiser's responsibility for it.
[6] One of the most startling incidents of the Kaiser's reign was the interview
with him printed in the London Daily Telegraph of Oct. 28, 1908. In it he said
that "Englishmen, in giving rein to suspicions unworthy of a great nation," were
"mad as March hares"; and that "the prevailing sentiment among large sections

of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I
am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of
the best elements, just as it is in England with respect to Germany." German
opinion was, he admitted, "bitterly hostile" to England during the Boer War, and,
that the German people, if he had permitted Boer delegates in Berlin, "would
have crowned them with flowers." He asserted that he had formulated a plan of
campaign in South Africa which Lord Roberts adopted in substance.
The Kaiser was quoted in this interview as declaring Germany needed a large
fleet chiefly on account of the Far Eastern situation.
The interview was republished in official German organs, and caused as great a
stir in Germany as in England. There were many debates on it in the Reichstag
and one or two "investigations."
[7] A German philologist who compiled a well-known book of quotations.
[8] His recent death, which snatched him away in the midst of beneficial labors,
is a serious loss to the fatherland.
[9] Concerning the course of events up to the fateful 9th of November and this
day itself there are authentic statements by an eyewitness in the book (well worth
reading) of Major Niemann, who was sent by the Chief Army Command to me,
entitled War and Revolution (Krieg und Revolution), Berlin, 1922.
[10] This letter and the letter from the Field Marshal which preceded it are
reprinted herewith. The parts which are most important in relation to the matter
in question are underscored in the text.
[11] This has meanwhile been done. The Comparative Historical Tables from
1878 to the Outbreak of the War in 1914 were published in December, 1921, by
K. F. Koehler, Leipsic.