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Title: Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 2

Author: A. T. Mahan

Release date: June 30, 2008 [eBook #25912]
Most recently updated: October 30, 2024

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SEA POWER IN ITS RELATIONS
TO THE WAR OF
1812

BY

CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.

United States Navy

AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783," "THE
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
AND EMPIRE," "THE INTEREST OF AMERICA
IN SEA POWER," ETC.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY
Limited

From a Copley Print copyright 1899 by
Curtis & Cameron, Publishers, Boston.
The ConstitutionToList

CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX
The Winter of 1812-1813—Bainbridge's Squadron:
Actions Between
"Constitution" and "Java," "Hornet" and
"Peacock"—Increasing
Pressure on Atlantic Coast
Page
Bainbridge's squadron sails 1
His plans for the cruise 2
The "Essex" fails to join 3
Proceedings of "Constitution" and "Hornet" 3
Action between "Constitution" and "Java" 4
The "Constitution" returns to the United States 7
Proceedings of the "Hornet" 7
Action between the "Hornet" and "Peacock" 8
The "Hornet" returns 9
The Chesapeake and Delaware blockaded 9
Subsequent extension of blockade to the whole
coast south of Newport 10
Three periods into which the War of 1812
divides 10
Difficulty of American frigates in getting to sea 11
Difficulty of manning the navy 12
Cruise of the "Chesapeake" 13

Gradual suppression of American commerce 14
Increasing stringency of the commercial
blockade 15
British occupation of Delaware and Chesapeake
Bays 16
Diminution of the coasting trade, and increase
of land carriage 17
Effects upon prices 18
Abandoned condition of the western Atlantic 20
Diminution in number of prizes taken by
Americans 20
Estimate of relative captures by the two
belligerents 21
Relative captures no indication of relative
immunity 23
American deprivation makes for the prosperity
of Halifax and Canada 23
The blockade the chief offensive maritime
operation of Great Britain, in 1813 24
No opposition longer possible to the American
Navy 25
Strength of the British blockading divisions 25
Escape possible only by evasion 25
The brunt of the British naval operations falls
upon the Chesapeake and Delaware 26

CHAPTER X
Campaign of 1813 on the Lake Frontier, To the Battle
of Lake Erie

The British naval service on the lakes under
Warren's supervision 28
Sir James Yeo appointed to the local command 29
Appoints Captain Barclay to take charge of
British vessels on Lake Erie 29

The Americans now superior on Ontario 29
Montreal the true American objective 29
Dearborn ordered to concentrate effort upon
Lake Ontario 30
Chauncey's first plan, to capture Kingston 30
Dearborn and Chauncey ordered to proceed
first against Kingston, then Toronto, then
Niagara 31
Dearborn's objections 32
His reports obtain change of plan from the
Government 33
Chauncey's new plan 33
The expedition leaves Sackett's Harbor 36
Capture of Toronto 36
Chauncey's anxiety for Sackett's Harbor 37
Capture of Fort George, and British retreat from
Niagara 38
Effects of the American occupation of the
Niagara peninsula 40
American naval vessels escape from Black
Rock to Erie 41
British attack upon Sackett's Harbor 42
Premature firing of the naval yard and vessels 45
Consequent delay in Chauncey's preparations 45
Yeo takes the lake with his squadron 46
American reverse at Stony Creek 46
The army retreats upon Fort George 47
The British re-occupy the peninsula, except
Fort George 47
Dearborn is relieved from command 48
Paralysis of the American forces at Niagara 48
Yeo in temporary control of Lake Ontario 49
Chauncey sails to contest control 51
Characteristics of the ensuing naval campaign 52
Predominant idea of Chauncey and Yeo 52

Relative powers of the two squadrons 53
Their encounter of August 10, 1813 56
Chauncey's extreme caution 59
The engagement of September 11 60
Expediency of a "general chase" under the
conditions 61

CHAPTER XI
The Campaign of 1813 on the Lakes and Northern
Frontier—The Battle
of Lake Erie

The American Navy on Lake Erie 62
Perry's eagerness for active operations 63
Coincidence of events on Lakes Erie and
Ontario 64
Inferiority of Perry's crews in numbers and
quality 64
Professional contrast between Chauncey and
Perry 65
Personal difficulty. Perry applies to be detached 66
The Navy Department refuses 67
Position of the American army on the Maumee 67
Procter's attack upon Fort Meigs 68
Procter and Barclay plan attack on Erie 69
Re-enforcements of troops refused them 69
Barclay blockades Erie 70
Barclay visits Long Point 71
Perry's squadron crosses the bar at Erie 72
Procter attacks Fort Stephenson, and is repulsed 73
Barclay retires to Malden 74
Perry in control of the lake 74
Destitution of provisions in the British camp
and fleet 75
Barclay goes out to fight 76

Composition and armament of the two
squadrons 76
Controversy about the battle 78
Dispositions of the two commanders 80
Opening of the battle 81
Examination of the controversy between Perry
and Elliott 82
Progress of the engagement 88
Second stage of the battle 89
The British surrender 94
Meritorious conduct of Captain Barclay 94
Question of credit on the American side 95
Comparison of the campaigns on Erie and on
Ontario 99
Effect of the battle on the fate of the Northwest 99
Its bearing upon the peace negotiations of the
following year 100
Influence of control of the water illustrated on
the lakes 101

CHAPTER XII
The Campaign of 1813 on the Lakes and Northern
Frontier, After
the Battle of Lake Erie

Perry's victory promptly followed up 102
General Harrison lands his army at Malden 103
Recovery of Detroit. Battle of the Thames,
October 5, 1813 103
The Indians fall away from the British 103
Harrison's army transferred to Niagara 104
Perry detached from the lake service 104
Changed American plan of campaign on
Ontario 104
General James Wilkinson replaces Dearborn 104

The Government designates Kingston as the
objective 105
The embarkation begins at Niagara under cover
of the navy 106
Yeo's squadron appears in the neighborhood 106
Encounter between the two squadrons,
September 28, 1813 107
Criticism of Chauncey's management 108
Wilkinson's troops reach Sackett's Harbor 110
The British re-enforce Kingston 110
New change of American plan. The army to be
directed on Montreal 111
Intended junction with the troops from Lake
Champlain, under General Hampton 111
Wilkinson's army assembled within the mouth
of the St. Lawrence 114
It proceeds down the river 114
Pursuit by a British detachment 114
American reverse at Chrystler's Farm 115
Hampton fails to join Wilkinson, and returns to
Plattsburg 116
The expedition abandoned. Wilkinson goes into
winter quarters at French Mills 116
Chauncey returns to Sackett's Harbor from the
St. Lawrence 117
Transports Harrison's division from Niagara to
Sackett's Harbor 117
Fleets lay up for the winter 117
Disastrous close of the campaign upon the
Niagara 118
Americans evacuate Fort George and the
peninsula 120
They burn Newark 120
Act disavowed by the American Government 120

Sir Gordon Drummond in command in Upper
Canada 120
The British, under General Riall, cross the
Niagara and capture Fort Niagara 121
Lewiston, Youngstown, and Manchester burned
in retaliation for Newark 121
Buffalo burned, and three naval vessels at
Black Rock 121
General failure of the campaign about Lake
Ontario 122
Discussion of the causes 123

CHAPTER XIII
Seaboard Maritime Operations, 1813
United States on the defensive on the seaboard 126
British reasons for partially relaxing severity of
blockade 127
Reasons do not apply to armed vessels or
coasting trade 127
American Navy powerless to protect commerce 127
To destroy that of the enemy its principal
mission 128
Cruises of the "President" and "Congress" 128
Efficacy of the British convoy system 130
Its chief failure is near ports of arrival 131
This dictates the orders to Captain Lawrence 131
Importance of the service 132
Imperfect preparation of the "Chesapeake" 132
Efficiency of the "Shannon." Broke's
professional merit 133
His challenge to Lawrence. Not received 134
The "Chesapeake" sails, purposely to fight 135
Account of the action 136
The "Chesapeake" captured 140

Analysis of the engagement 141
Decatur fails to get to sea with a squadron 148
Driven to take refuge in New London 148
Frigates confined there for the war 149
Particular anxiety of the British Government
about American frigates 150
Expectations of the Admiralty and the country
from Warren's fleet 151
Effects of the blockade of New London on local
coasting 152
Evidence of the closeness of the whole
blockade south of New London 153
Conditions at New York 154
British operations in the upper Chesapeake,
1813 156
Conditions in Delaware Bay 158
American precautions in Chesapeake and
Delaware 159
Circumspect conduct of the British vessels in
the Chesapeake 161
Warren brings a detachment of troops from
Bermuda 162
Rencounters in and near Hampton Roads 163
British attack upon Craney Island. Fails 164
Attack upon Hampton. Ineffective 166
Further movements of the British in the
Chesapeake 167
Movement of licensed vessels in Chesapeake
Bay during these operations 170
Consequent recommendation of President to
prohibit all exports during the blockade 173
Rejected by Senate. Enforced in Chesapeake by
executive order 174
Glaring necessity for such action 175
Embargo law passed in December, 1813 176

Main British fleet quits the Chesapeake. Its
failure in direct military operation 177
Efficacy of the blockade 177
Characteristics of the different sections of the
United States, as affecting their suffering from
blockade 178
Statistical evidences of its effects 181
Prices of great staples: flour and sugar 184
Dependence of Eastern and Southern States
upon coasting, greater than that of Middle
States 186
Captain Hull's reports on Eastern coasting 187
Action between the "Boxer" and "Enterprise" 188
Intermission of Eastern blockade during winter 192
Its resumption in increased vigor in 1814 192
Undefended conditions of the American coast 193
Conditions of Southern coasting trade 195
British blockade severs the mutual intercourse
of the different sections of the United States 198
Remarks of Representative Pearson, of North
Carolina 199
Message of the Governor of Pennsylvania 200
Rigors of the blockade shown by figures 201
Momentary importance of the North Carolina
coast 203
Advocacy of an internal navigation system 204
Evidence of privation in the rebound of prices
and shipping movement after peace 205
Exposition of conditions, in a contemporary
letter by a naval officer 207
The experiences of the War of 1812 now largely
forgotten 208
Lessons to be deduced 208
Pressure upon the British Government exerted,
even by the puny contemporary American Navy 209

Advantage of the American position 211
Opinions of Presidents Washington and Adams
as to the international advantage of a navy 212
Policy of President Jefferson 213

CHAPTER XIV
Maritime Operations External to the Waters of the
United States,
1813-1814
Commerce destruction the one offensive
maritime resort left open to the United States 215
Respective objects of privateers and of naval
vessels 216
The approaches to the British islands the most
fruitful field for operations against commerce 216
Cruise of the "Argus" 217
Capture of the "Argus" by the "Pelican" 217
Significance of the cruise of the "Argus" 219
Great number of captures by American cruisers 220
Comparatively few American merchant ships
captured at sea 221
Shows the large scale on which British
commerce throve, and the disappearance of
American shipping 221
Control of British Navy shown by American
practice of destroying prizes 222
Successes of the privateers "Scourge" and
"Rattlesnake" in the North Sea 223
The "Leo" and "Lion" off coast of Portugal 224
British army in southern France incommoded
by cruisers off Cape Finisterre 224
American cruises based on French ports 225
The privateer "Yankee" on the gold-coast of
Africa 226

Action between the American privateer "Globe"
and two British packets, off Madeira 227
Captures in the same neighborhood by
privateers "Governor Tompkins" and "America" 228
The West Indies as a field for warfare on
commerce 229
Activity there of American cruisers 230
Stringency of the Convoy Act in the West
Indies. Papers captured there by the
"Constitution" 230
Indirect effects of the warfare on commerce 231
Cruise in the West Indies of the naval brigs
"Rattlesnake" and "Enterprise" 232
Combat between the privateer "Decatur" and
British war schooner "Dominica" 233
The "Comet" and the British ship "Hibernia" 234
The "Saucy Jack" and the British ship "Pelham" 235
The "Saucy Jack" with the bomb-ship
"Volcano" and transport "Golden Fleece" 236
Remarkable seizure by the privateer "Kemp" 237
The cruises of the privateer "Chasseur" 237
Combat between the "Chasseur" and the British
war schooner "St. Lawrence" 238
Contrasted motives of the ship of war and the
privateer 241
Relative success of American naval vessels and
privateers in the war upon commerce 242
Cruise of the frigate "Essex" 244
Arrival in Valparaiso of the "Essex," and of the
British ships, "Phœbe" and "Cherub" 247
Action between the "Essex" and the "Phœbe"
and "Cherub" 249
Cruise of the "Wasp" 253
Action between the "Reindeer" and "Wasp" 254
Action between the "Avon" and "Wasp" 256

Disappearance of the "Wasp" 257
Cruise of the "Peacock" 258
Action between "Epervier" and "Peacock" 259
Further cruise of the "Peacock" 261
Activity of American cruisers in British waters 262
Agitation in Great Britain 263
The effect produced due to the American people
severally 265
Prostration of the Government in the United
States, 1814 265
Determination to accept peace without
relinquishment of impressment by Great Britain 266
Development of privateering 267
Adaptation of vessels to the pursuit 268
Practical considerations determining vessels to
be employed 269
Secretary of the Navy recommends squadrons
of schooners for action against commerce 270
Debate in Congress 271
Recommendation adopted 272

CHAPTER XV
The Niagara Campaign, and Events on the Great Lakes,
in 1814

British advantages of position on the Niagara
line 274
Unusual mildness of winter 1813-1814 276
Effect on operations 276
British project against the vessels in Put-in Bay 277
Difficulty of maintaining British garrison at
Mackinac 278
American army abandons cantonments at
French Mills 278

Part goes to Lake Champlain, part to Sackett's
Harbor 278
American project against Kingston 279
General Brown's mistake as to the
Government's purpose 280
Carries his army to the Niagara frontier 281
Chauncey's fears for Sackett's Harbor 281
Wilkinson's expedition to La Colle. Failure 282
Wilkinson superseded by General Izard 283
Yeo obtains momentary superiority on Ontario 283
Importance of Oswego 284
British capture Oswego, and destroy depots 284
Yeo blockades Sackett's Harbor 285
Difficulty of American situation on Ontario 285
British naval disaster in attempting to intercept
convoy from Oswego to Sackett's Harbor 286
Yeo abandons blockade of Sackett's Harbor 290
American plan of operations on northern
frontier 291
Brown crosses the Niagara. Surrender of Fort
Erie 294
Advance towards Fort George 294
Battle of Chippewa 295
Brown advances to Queenston 298
Chauncey's failure to co-operate 298
Consequent anxiety of the Government 299
Decatur ordered to relieve Chauncey 300
Chauncey's defence of his conduct 300
Discussion of his argument 301
British advantage through his inaction 304
Leads to the battle of Lundy's Lane 306
Battle of Lundy's Lane 309
Value to Americans of the battles of Chippewa
and Lundy's Lane 311

Improvement in the militia through association
with Brown's army 312
Brown unable longer to keep the field. Retires
to Fort Erie 314
British assault upon Fort Erie. Disastrous
repulse 314
British now embarrassed by Chauncey's
blockade 315
American successful sortie from Fort Erie 316
Drummond abandons the siege, and retires to
the Chippewa 317
Brown unable to follow him 317
Izard ordered from Lake Champlain to Brown's
aid 318
His march 320
His corps arrives at the Niagara frontier 321
Strength of the British position on the
Chippewa 322
Izard's hopelessness 322
Blows up Fort Erie and retires across the
Niagara 323
Naval and military expedition against Mackinac 324
Unsuccessful, except in destroying British
transports 324
British capture the American naval schooners
"Tigress" and "Scorpion" 325
American schooners "Ohio" and "Somers" also
captured, off Fort Erie 327
Loss of the "Caledonia" and "Ariel" 327
The Erie fleet lays up for the winter, after the
British abandon the siege of Fort Erie 328

CHAPTER XVI
Seaboard Operations in 1814. Washington, Baltimore,
and Maine

Defensive character of the British northern
campaign in 1814 329
Increase of vigor in their seaboard operations 330
Warren relieved by Cochrane 330
Intentions of the British Government 331
Retaliation for American actions in Canada 333
Prevost's call upon Cochrane to retaliate 334
Cochrane's orders to his vessels 334
Attitude of British officers 335
Early operations in Chesapeake Bay, 1814 336
Relations of Barney's flotilla to the British
project against Washington 337
Assembling of the British combined forces in
the Chesapeake 340
Condition of American preparations 342
British advance. Destruction of Barney's flotilla 344
Retreat of American forces 345
American position at Bladensburg 346
Battle of Bladensburg 347
Burning of Washington 349
Capture and ransom of Alexandria by British
frigates 350
Failure of British attempt on Baltimore 351
British harrying of New England coast 352
Occupation of Castine, in Maine 353
Destruction of the American frigate "Adams" 354

CHAPTER XVII
Lake Champlain and New Orleans

Arrival of large British re-enforcements in
Canada 355
Objects of the British northern campaign of
1814 356
Previous neglect of lake Champlain by both
belligerents 357
Operations on the lake in 1813 358
British attempt in spring of 1814 361
Macdonough in control of lake, in summer of
1814 362
British "Confiance" building to contest control 362
Instructions of British Government to Prevost 362
Prevost in August reports approaching
readiness to move 363
Treasonable actions of American citizens about
Lake Champlain 364
Izard, with four thousand troops, leaves
Plattsburg for Sackett's Harbor 365
Consequent destitution of the Champlain
frontier 365
British advance to Plattsburg 366
Relative positions of American squadron and
land forces 367
Question of distance between squadron and
land batteries 368
Opinions of Izard and Yeo as to the relations of
the batteries to the squadron 370
Proper combination for Prevost 371
Backward state of "Confiance" upon Downie's
taking command 372
Urgent letters of Prevost to Downie 373
Downie's expectations in attacking 375
Macdonough's dispositions 376
Downie's consequent plan of engagement 377
Naval battle of Lake Champlain 377

Decisive character of the American victory 381
Preoccupation of the British Government with
European conditions 382
Episodical character of the New Orleans
expedition 382
Negotiations of Admiral Cochrane for the co-
operation of the Creek Indians 383
His measures for training them, and
preparations for the expedition 384
Objects of the British ministry 385
Attack upon Fort Bowyer, Mobile Bay, by a
British squadron 386
Previous occupation of West Florida to the
Perdido, by the United States 387
Pensacola, remaining in Spanish hands, utilized
by British 387
Seized by Jackson, and works destroyed 388
Arrival of British expedition in Mississippi
Sound 388
Gunboat battle of Lake Borgne 390
British advance corps reaches the bank of the
Mississippi 391
Night attack by American Navy and Jackson 391
Sir Edward Pakenham arrives from England 392
His preliminary movements 392
Particular danger of Jackson's position 393
Details of the final day of assault, January 8,
1815 394
The British withdraw after repulse 396
Capture of Fort Bowyer, Mobile Bay 397
Final naval episodes 397
Sailing of the "President." She grounds on the
New York bar 398
Overtaken, and is captured, by the British
blockading division 398

The "Constitution" captures the "Cyane" and
"Levant" 404
Capture of the British sloop "Penguin" by the
"Hornet" 407

CHAPTER XVIII
The Peace Negotiations
Early overtures towards peace by the United
States 409
Castlereagh refuses to entertain the project of
abandoning impressment 410
Russia, in 1812, suggests negotiations for peace
under mediation of the Czar 411
United States accepts, but Great Britain refuses 412
Great Britain, through the Czar, offers a direct
negotiation, 1813 412
The United States accepts, and names five
commissioners 413
The original instructions to the American
Commission, 1813 413
Reduced, 1814, through pressure of the war 414
Confident attitude of Great Britain at the
opening of the negotiations 415
Hostile spirit in Great Britain towards the
United States 415
The instructions to the British Commission 416
The demand on behalf of the Indians 417
Faulty presentation of it by the British
Commission 418
British claim concerning the Great Lakes and
boundaries 419
Discussion of these propositions 419
Reasons for British advocacy of the Indians 421

Final reduction of British demand for the
Indians and acceptance by American
Commission 423
Concern of British ministry for the opinion of
Europe 424
News received of the capture of Washington 424
Sanguine anticipations based upon reports from
Cochrane and Ross 424
The British Government suggests the uti
possidetis as the basis of agreement 425
The American Commission refuse, and offer
instead the status ante bellum 426
News arrives of the British defeat on Lake
Champlain 426
The political instructions to the commanders of
the New Orleans expedition, to be
communicated for the satisfaction of the
continental powers 427
Urgency of the European situation 428
Dangerous internal state of France 428
Consequent wish of the British ministry to
withdraw Wellington from Paris 429
He is pressed to accept the American command 429
Wellington thus brought into the discussion of
terms 430
He pronounces against the basis of uti
possidetis 431
The British ministry accept his judgment 431
The status ante bellum accepted by Great
Britain 431
Subsequent rapid conclusion of agreement 432
Terms of the Treaty 432
Signed by the commissioners, December 24,
1814 434
Despatched to America by a British ship of war 435

Ratified by the United States, February 17,
1815 435
Gallatin's opinion of the effect of the war upon
the people of the United States 436
INDEX 439

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

VOLUME TWO.

The Chase of the Constitution Frontispiece
From the painting by S. Salisbury
Tuckerman.

The Quarterdeck of the Java Before the
Surrender Page 6
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

The New Carrying Trade Page 18
From a drawing by Stanley M. Arthurs.

The Retreat of the British From Sackett's
Harbor Page 44
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

The Fleets of Chauncey and Yeo Manœuvring
on Lake Champlain Page 52

From a drawing by Carlton T. Chapman.

Captain Isaac Chauncey Page 60
From the engraving by D. Edwin, after the
painting by J. Woods.

Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo Page 60
From the engraving by H.R. Cook, after the
painting by A. Buck.

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry Page 66
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the
possession of O.H. Perry, Esq.

Perry Receiving the Surrender of the British
at the Battle of Lake Erie Page 94
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke Page 134
From the mezzotint by Charles Turner, after
the painting by Samuel Lane, in the
possession of Lady Saumarez.

The Capture of the Chesapeake by the
Shannon—The Struggle on the Quarterdeck Page 138
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

Captain James Lawrence Page 140
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the
possession of the New Jersey Historical
Society, Newark, N.J.

The Burning of a Privateer Prize Page 222
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

Captain David Porter Page 244

From the painting by Charles Wilson Peale,
in Independence Hall, Philadelphia.

Captain Thomas Macdonough Page 360
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the
Century Club, New York, by permission of
the owner, Rodney Macdonough, Esq.

The Battle of Lake Champlain Page 380
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.

MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS.

VOLUME TWO.

Plan of Engagement between Constitution and
Java Page 4
Plan of Engagement between Hornet and
Peacock Page 8
Map of Niagara Peninsula Page 38
Surroundings of Sackett's Harbor Page 43
Plan of Chauncey's Engagement, August 10,
1813 Page 58
Plan of Erie Harbor, 1814 Page 72
Diagram of the Battle of Lake Erie, September
10, 1813 Page 82
Chauncey and Yeo, September 28, 1813 Page 108
Chesapeake and Shannon Page 136

Outline Map of Chesapeake Bay and Rivers Page 156
Enterprise and Boxer Page 188
Argus and Pelican Page 218
Montague, Pelham, and Globe Page 228
Chasseur and St. Lawrence Page 238
Wasp and Reindeer Page 254
Sketch of the March of the British Army, under
General Ross, from the 19th to the 29th August,
1814 Page 344
Tracing from pencil sketch of Battle of Lake
Champlain made by Commodore Macdonough Page 368
Battle of Lake Champlain Page 377
The Landing of the British Army, its
Encampments and Fortifications on the
Mississippi; Works they erected on their
Retreat; with the Encampments and
Fortifications of the American Army Page 392

Sea Power in its Relations to
the War of 1812

THE WAR (Continued)

CHAPTER IXToC

THE WINTER OF 1812-1813—BAINBRIDGE'S SQUADRON:
ACTIONS
BETWEEN "CONSTITUTION" AND "JAVA," "HORNET" AND
"PEACOCK"—INCREASING PRESSURE ON ATLANTIC COAST

The squadron under Commodore William Bainbridge, the third which
sailed from the United States in October, 1812, started nearly three weeks
after the joint departure of Rodgers and Decatur. It consisted of the
"Constitution" and sloop of war "Hornet," then in Boston, and of the
"Essex," the only 32-gun frigate in the navy, fitting for sea in the Delaware.
The original armament of the latter, from which she derived her rate, had
been changed to forty 32-pounder carronades and six long twelves; total,
forty-six guns. It is noticeable that this battery, which ultimately contributed
not merely to her capture, but to her almost helplessness under the fire of an
enemy able to maintain his distance out of carronade range, was strongly
objected to by Captain Porter. On October 14 he applied to be transferred to
the "Adams," giving as reasons "my insuperable dislike to carronades, and
the bad sailing of the "Essex," which render her, in my opinion, the worst
frigate in the service."[1] The request was not granted, and Porter sailed in
command of the ship on October 28, the two other vessels having left
Boston on the 26th.
In order to facilitate a junction, Bainbridge had sent Porter full details of
his intended movements.[2] A summary of these will show his views as to a
well-planned commerce-destroying cruise. Starting about October 25, he
would steer first a course not differing greatly from the general direction

taken by Rodgers and Decatur, to the Cape Verde Islands, where he would
fill with water, and by November 27 sail for the island Fernando de
Noronha, two hundred and fifty miles south of the Equator, and two
hundred miles from the mainland of Brazil, then a Portuguese colony, of
which the island was a dependency. The trade winds being fair for this
passage, he hoped to leave there by December 15, and to cruise south along
the Brazilian coast as far as Rio de Janeiro, until January 15. In the outcome
the meeting of the "Constitution" with the "Java" cut short her proceedings
at this point; but Bainbridge had purposed to stay yet another month along
the Brazilian coast, between Rio and St. Catherine's, three hundred miles
south. Thence he would cross the South Atlantic to the neighborhood of St.
Helena, remaining just beyond sight of it, to intercept returning British
Indiamen, which frequently stopped there. Porter failed to overtake the
other vessels, on account of the bad sailing of the "Essex." He arrived at
Fernando de Noronha December 14, one day before that fixed by
Bainbridge as his last there; but the "Constitution" and "Hornet" had
already gone on to Bahia, on the Brazilian mainland, seven hundred miles
to the southwest, leaving a letter for him to proceed off Cape Frio, sixty
miles from the entrance of Rio. He reached this rendezvous on the 25th, but
saw nothing of Bainbridge, who had been detained off Bahia by conditions
there. The result was that the "Essex" never found her consorts, and finally
struck out a career for herself, which belongs rather to a subsequent period
of the war. We therefore leave her spending her Christmas off Cape Frio.
The two other vessels had arrived off Bahia on December 13. Here was
lying a British sloop of war, the "Bonne Citoyenne," understood to have on
board a very large amount of specie for England. The American vessels
blockaded her for some days, and then Captain Lawrence challenged her to
single combat; Bainbridge acquiescing, and pledging his honor that the
"Constitution" should remain out of the way, or at least not interfere. The
British captain, properly enough, declined. That his ship and her reported
value were detaining two American vessels from wider depredations was a
reason more important than any fighting-cock glory to be had from an
arranged encounter on equal terms, and should have sufficed him without
expressing the doubt he did as to Bainbridge's good faith.[3] On the 26th the
Commodore, leaving Lawrence alone to watch the British sloop, stood out
to sea with the "Constitution," cruising well off shore; and thus on the 29th,
at 9 A.M., being then five miles south of the port and some miles from land,

discovered two strange sail, which were the British frigate "Java," Captain
Henry Lambert, going to Bahia for water, with an American ship, prize to
her.
Upon seeing the "Constitution" in the south-southwest, the British
captain shaped his course for her, directing the prize to enter the harbor.
Bainbridge, watching these movements, now tacked his ship, and at 11.30
A.M. steered away southeast under all plain sail, to draw the enemy well
away from neutral waters; the Portuguese authorities having shown some
sensitiveness on that score. The "Java" followed, running full ten miles an
hour, a great speed in those days, and gaining rapidly. At 1.30, being now as
far off shore as desired, Bainbridge went about and stood toward the enemy,
who kept away with a view to rake, which the "Constitution" avoided by the
usual means of wearing, resuming her course southeast, but under canvas
much reduced. At 2.10 the "Java," having closed to a half mile, the
"Constitution" fired one gun ahead of her; whereupon the British ship
hoisted her colors, and the American then fired two broadsides. The "Java"
now took up a position to windward of the "Constitution," on her port side,
a little forward (2.10); "within pistol-shot," according to the minutes
submitted by the officer who succeeded to the command; "much further
than I wished," by Bainbridge's journal. It is not possible entirely to
reconcile the pretty full details of further movements given by each;[4] but it
may be said, generally, that this battle was not mainly an artillery duel, like
those of the "Constitution" and "Guerrière," the "Wasp" and "Frolic," nor
yet one in which a principal manœuvre, by its decisive effect upon the use
of artillery, played the determining part, as was the case with the "United
States" and "Macedonian." Here it was a combination of the two factors, a
succession of evolutions resembling the changes of position, the retreats
and advances, of a fencing or boxing match, in which the opponents work
round the ring; accompanied by a continual play of the guns, answering to
the thrusts and blows of individual encounter. In this game of manœuvres
the "Constitution" was somewhat handicapped by her wheel being shot
away at 2.30. The rudder remained unharmed; but working a ship by
relieving tackles, the substitute for the wheel, is for several reasons neither
as quick nor as accurate.

PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CONSTITUTION AND
JAVAToList

Certain salient incidents stand out in both accounts, marking the progress
of the engagement. Shortly before three o'clock the head of the "Java's"
bowsprit was shot away, and with it went the jib-boom. At this time, the
fore and main masts of the British frigate being badly wounded, with all the
rigging cut to pieces, Captain Lambert looked upon the day as lost unless he
could board. The sailing master having been sent below wounded, the first
lieutenant, whose account is here followed, was directed to run the ship
alongside the enemy; but the helm was hardly put up when the foremast
went overboard, at five minutes past three, a time in which both accounts
agree. The British narrative states that the stump of their bowsprit caught in
the mizzen rigging of the "Constitution" (3.35). This Bainbridge does not
mention; but, if correct, the contact did not last long, for the "Constitution"
immediately wore across the "Java's" bow, and the latter's maintopmast
followed the foremast. The British frigate was now beaten beyond recovery;
nevertheless the flag was kept flying, and it was after this that Captain
Lambert fell, mortally wounded. Resistance was continued until 4.05, by
the American accounts; by the British, till 4.35. Then, the enemy's
mizzenmast having fallen, and nothing left standing but the main lower
mast, the "Constitution" shot ahead to repair damages. There was no more

firing, but the "Java's" colors remained up till 5.25,—5.50 by the British
times,—when they were hauled down as the "Constitution" returned. The
American loss was nine killed and twenty-five wounded; that of the British,
by their official accounts, twenty-two killed, one hundred and two
wounded.
The superiority in broadside weight of fire of the "Constitution" over the
"Java" was about the same as over the "Guerrière." The "Java's" crew was
stronger in number than that of the "Guerrière," mustering about four
hundred, owing to having on board a hundred supernumeraries for the East
India station, to which the ship was ultimately destined. On the other hand,
the material of the ship's company is credibly stated to have been extremely
inferior, a condition frequently complained of by British officers at this late
period of the Napoleonic wars. It has also been said, in apparent
extenuation of her defeat, that although six weeks out from England, having
sailed November 12, and greater part of that time necessarily in the trade
winds, with their usual good weather, the men had not been exercised in
firing the guns until December 28, the day before meeting the
"Constitution," when six broadsides of blank cartridges were discharged.
Whatever excuse may exist in the individual instance for such neglect, it is
scarcely receivable in bar of judgment when disaster follows. No particular
reason is given, except "the many services of a newly fitted ship, lumbered
with stores;" for in such latitudes the other allegation, "a succession of gales
of wind since the day of departure,"[5] is incredible. On broad general
grounds the "Java" needed no apology for being beaten by a ship so much
heavier; and the "Constitution's" loss in killed and wounded was over
double that suffered from the "Guerrière" four months before, when the
American ship had substantially the same crew.[6] Further, Bainbridge
reported to his Government that "the damage received in the action, but
more especially the decayed state of the "Constitution," made it necessary
to return to the United States for repairs." Although Lieutenant Chads, who
succeeded Lambert, was mistaken in supposing the American ship bound to
the East Indies, he was evidently justified in claiming that the stout
resistance of the "Java" had broken up the enemy's cruise, thus contributing
to the protection of the British commerce.

THE QUARTERDECK OF THE JAVA BEFORE THE SURRENDER.
Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl.ToList

The "Java" was considered by Bainbridge too much injured to be worth
taking to the United States. She was therefore set on fire December 31, and
the "Constitution" went back to Bahia, where the prisoners were landed
under parole. Thence she sailed for home January 6, 1813, reaching Boston
February 27. Before his departure the Commodore directed Lawrence to
blockade Bahia as long as seemed advisable, but to beware of a British
seventy-four, said to be on the coast. When it became expedient, he was to
quit the position and move northward; first off Pernambuco, and thence to
the coast of Cayenne, Surinam, and Demerara, a favorite cruising ground
for American commerce-destroyers. The "Hornet" was to be in Boston in
the first fortnight of April.
In pursuance of these discretionary orders Lawrence remained off Bahia
for eighteen days, till January 24, when the expected seventy-four, the
"Montagu," appeared, forcing him into the harbor; but the same night he
came out, gave her the slip, and proceeded on his cruise. On February 24,

off the Demarara River, he encountered the British brig of war "Peacock," a
vessel of the same class as the "Frolic," which was captured a few months
before by the "Wasp," sister ship to the "Hornet." There was no substantial
difference in size between these two approaching antagonists; but,
unfortunately for the equality of the contest, the "Peacock" carried 24-
pounder carronades, instead of the 32's which were her proper armament.
Her battery power was therefore but two thirds that of the "Hornet." The
vessels crossed on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides within half pistol-
shot, the "Hornet" to windward(1). The "Peacock" then wore; observing
which, Lawrence kept off at once for her and ran on board her starboard
quarter (2). In this position the engagement was hot for about fifteen
minutes, when the "Peacock" surrendered, hoisting a flag union down, in
signal of distress. She had already six feet of water in the hold. Being on
soundings, in less than six fathoms, both anchored, and every effort was
made to save the British vessel; but she sank, carrying down nine of her
own crew and three of the "Hornet's." Her loss in action was her
commander and four men killed, and twenty-nine wounded, of whom three
died; that of the American vessel, one killed and two wounded. The
inequality in armament detracts inevitably from glory in achievement; but
the credit of readiness and efficiency is established for Lawrence and his
crew by prompt action and decisive results. So, also, defeat is not inglorious
under such odds; but it remains to the discredit of the British commander
that his ship did no more execution, when well within the most effective
range of her guns. In commenting upon this engagement, after noticing the
dandy neatness of the "Peacock," James says, "Neglect to exercise the ship's
company at the guns prevailed then over two thirds of the British navy; to
which the Admiralty, by their sparing allowance of powder and shot for
practice, were in some degree instrumental."
With the survivors of the "Peacock," and prisoners from other prizes,
Captain Lawrence found himself now with two hundred and seventy-seven
souls on board and only thirty-four hundred gallons of water. There was at
hand no friendly port where to deposit his captives, and provisions were
running short. He therefore steered for the United States, and arrived at
Holmes' Hole on March 19.[7]

PLAN OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN HORNET AND
PEACOCKToList

The capture of the "Peacock" was the last of five naval duels, three
between frigates and two between sloops, all favorable in issue to the
United States, which took place in what may justly be considered the first
of the three periods into which the War of 1812 obviously divides. Great
Britain, long reluctant to accept the fact of war as irreversible, did not begin
to put forth her strength, or to exercise the measures of repression open to
her, until the winter of 1812-13 was drawing to a close. On October 13,
convinced that the mere news of the revocation of the Orders in Council
would not induce any change in the American determination, the hitherto
deferred authority for general reprisals was given; but accompanying them
was an express provision that they were not to be understood as recalling
the declaration which Warren had been commissioned to make, in order to
effect a suspension of hostilities.[8] On November 27, however, hopes from
this source having apparently disappeared, directions were sent the admiral
to institute a rigorous commercial blockade of Delaware and Chesapeake
bays,[9] the usual public notification of the fact to neutral Powers, for the
information of their shipping affected by it, being issued December 26,

three days before the action between the "Constitution" and "Java." On
February 21, three days before the "Hornet" sank the "Peacock," Warren
wrote that in compliance with the orders of November 27 this blockade had
been put in force. The ship "Emily," from Baltimore for Lisbon, under a
British license, with a cargo of flour, was turned back when attempting to
go to sea from the Chesapeake, about February 5; Warren indorsing on her
papers that the bay had been placed under rigorous blockade the day before.
[10] Captain Stewart, the senior United States officer at Norfolk, notified his
Government of these facts on February 10.[11] Soon after, by an Order in
Council dated March 30, the measure was extended to New York,
Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah, and the Mississippi River.[12] Later in the
year Warren, by a sweeping proclamation, dated November 16,[13] widened
its scope to cover Long Island Sound, inside of Montauk and Black Point;
the latter being on the Connecticut shore, eight miles west of New London.
From thence it applied not only to the ports named, but to all inlets
whatsoever, southward, as far as the Florida boundary. Narragansett Bay
and the rest of New England remained still exempt.
These restrictions, together with the increase of Warren's force and the
operations of 1813 in the Chesapeake, may be considered as initiating the
second stage of the war, when Great Britain no longer cherished hopes of
any other solution than by the sword, but still was restrained in the exercise
of her power by the conflict with Napoleon. With the downfall of the latter,
in April, 1814, began the third and final act, when she was more at liberty to
let loose her strength, to terminate a conflict at once weakening and
exasperating. It is not without significance that the treaty of peace with the
restored Bourbon government of France was signed May 30, 1814,[14] and
that on May 31 was issued a proclamation placing under strict and rigorous
blockade, not merely specified places, but "all the ports, harbors, bays,
creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands, and sea-coasts of the United States,"
from the border of New Brunswick to that of Florida.[15] In form, this was
only the public notification of a measure already instituted by Warren's
successor, Cochrane, embracing Newport, Boston, and the East under
restrictions heretofore limited to New York—including Long Island Sound
—and the coast southward; but it was not merely the assertion of a stringent
resolution. It was a clear defiance, in the assurance of conscious power, of a
principal contention of the United States, that the measure of blockades
against neutrals was not legitimately applicable to whole coasts, but only to

specified ports closely watched by a naval force competent to its avowed
purpose.
Despite the gathering of the storm, the full force of which was to be
expected in the spring, the United States ships of war that reached port in
the early and middle winter of 1812-13 remained. There is, perhaps, an
unrecognized element of "hindsight" in the surprise felt at this fact by a
seaman of to-day, knowing the views and wishes of the prominent officers
of the navy at that period. Decatur, with the "United States," reached New
York in December, accompanied by the "Macedonian." Neither of these
vessels got to sea again during the war. By the time they were ready, both
outlets to the port were effectually blocked. Rodgers, with the "President"
and "Congress," entered Boston December 31, but did not sail again until
April 23. The "Constellation," Captain Stewart, was reported, perhaps
erroneously, as nearly ready for sea at Washington, November 26, waiting
only for a few additional hands. Later in the winter she went to Annapolis,
to examine her powder, leaving there for Hampton Roads February 1, on
account of the ice. On the 4th, approaching her destination, she discovered
two ships of the line, three frigates, and two smaller British vessels,
working up from the Capes for the Roads. In the face of such a force there
was nothing to do but to escape to Norfolk, where she remained effectually
shut up for the rest of the war. Bainbridge, as already known, brought the
"Constitution" back for repairs in February. Even from Boston she was
unable to escape till the following December.
That there were satisfactory reasons for this seeming dilatoriness is
assured by the character of the officers. Probably the difficulty of keeping
up the ship's companies, in competition with the superior attractions of
privateering and the very high wages offered by the merchants for their
hazardous but remunerative commercial voyages accounted for much. Hull
wrote from New York, October 29, 1812, that the merchants fitting out their
vessels gave such high wages that it was difficult to get either seamen or
workmen.[16] Where no system of forced enrolment—conscription or
impressment—is permitted, privateering has always tended to injure the
regular naval service. Though unquestionably capable of being put by
owners on a business basis, as a commercial undertaking, with the
individual seaman the appeal of privateering has always been to the
stimulants of chance and gain, which prove so attractive in the lottery.

Stewart, an officer of great intelligence and experience in his profession,
found a further cause in the heavy ships of the enemy. In the hostilities with
France in 1798-1800, he said, "We had nearly four thousand able seamen in
the navy. We could frequently man a frigate in a week. One reason was
because the enemy we were then contending with had not afloat (with very
few exceptions) vessels superior in rate to frigates. The enemy we are
fighting now have ships of the line, and our sailors know the great
difference between them and frigates, and cannot but feel a degree of
reluctance at entering the service from the disparity of force."[17] The reason
seems to prove too much; pressed to an extreme, no navy would be able to
use light vessels, because the enemy had heavier which might—or might
not—be encountered. Certain it is, however, that when the government in
the following winter, in order to stop the license trade with the enemy,
embargoed all vessels in home ports, much less difficulty was experienced
in getting seamen for the navy.
Whatever the reasons, the only frigates at sea during the first four months
of 1813 were the "Essex" and the "Chesapeake." The former, after failing to
meet Bainbridge, struck off boldly for the Pacific Ocean on Porter's own
motion; and on March 15, 1813, anchored at Valparaiso, preparatory to
entering on a very successful career of a year's duration in those seas. The
"Chesapeake" had sailed from Boston December 17, making for the Cape
Verde Islands. In their neighborhood she captured two of a British convoy,
which, thinking itself beyond danger, had dispersed for South American
destinations. The frigate then proceeded to her cruising ground near the
equator, between longitudes 24° and 30° west, where she remained for
about a month, taking only one other merchantman. Leaving this position,
she was off the coast of Surinam from March 2 to 6, when she returned to
the United States; passing sixty miles east of the Caribbean Islands and
thence north of Porto Rico and Santo Domingo, as far west as longitude
75°, whence she ran parallel to the American coast, reaching Boston April
9. Having seen nothing between February 5 and March 19, she then began
to meet sails, speaking eight between the latter date and her arrival. Most of
these were Americans, homeward bound from the Spanish peninsula; the
others neutrals.[18] The conclusion is evident, that the British were keeping
their trade well shepherded in convoys. If a ship like the "Chesapeake"
struck one of them, she would probably have to fight the escorting vessel,
as the "Wasp" did the "Frolic," while the merchantmen escaped; but the

chances were against her seeing anything. Another evident conclusion,
corresponding to the export returns already quoted, is that the enemy had
not yet shut down upon the access of American merchant ships to their own
coast.
This process was gradual, but steady. It is necessary to keep in mind the
distinction between a blockade, in the loose use of the term, which closes a
port only to the ships of the hostile nation, and the commercial blockade
which forbids neutrals as well. The former may be intermittent, for the mere
fact of war authorizes the capture of the belligerent's shipping, wherever
found; hence to intercept them at the mouths of their own harbors is merely
a more effectual method of carrying out the measure. A blockade against
neutrals requires the permanent presence, before the blockaded port, of a
force adequate to make the attempt to enter or leave dangerous. For this
many more ships are needed. The British ministry, desirous chiefly to
compel the United States to peace, and embarrassed by the gigantic
continental strife in which it was engaged, sought at the outset to inflict
such harassment on the American coast as would cost the least diversion of
strength from the European contest. An ordinary blockade might be
tightened or relaxed as convenience demanded; and, moreover, there were
as yet, in comparison with American vessels, few neutrals to be restrained.
Normally, American shipping was adequate to American commerce. The
first move, therefore, was to gather upon the coast of the United States all
cruisers that could be spared from the Halifax and West India stations, and
to dispose along the approaches to the principal ports those that were not
needed to repress the privateers in the Bay of Fundy and the waters of Nova
Scotia. The action of these privateers, strictly offensive in character, and the
course of Commodore Rodgers in sailing with a large squadron, before
explained, illustrate exactly how offensive operations promote defensive
security. With numbers scanty for their work, and obliged to concentrate
instead of scattering, the British, prior to Warren's arrival, had not
disposable the cruisers with which greatly to harass even the hostile
shipping, still less to institute a commercial blockade. The wish to stock the
Spanish peninsula and the West Indies with provisions contributed further
to mitigate the pressure.
These restraining considerations gradually disappeared. Re-enforcements
arrived. Rodgers' squadron returned and could be watched, its position

being known. The license trade filled up Lisbon, Cadiz, and the West
Indies. Hopes of a change of mind in the American Government lessened.
Napoleon's disaster in Russia reversed the outlook in European politics.
Step by step the altered conditions were reflected in the measures of the
British ministry and navy. For months, only the maritime centres of the
Middle States were molested. The senior naval officer at Charleston, South
Carolina, wrote on October 14, four months after war was declared, "Till to-
day this coast has been clear of enemy's cruisers; now Charleston is
blockaded by three brigs, two very large, and they have captured nine sail
within three miles of the bar."[19] The number was increased shortly; and
two months later he expressed surprise that the inland navigation behind the
sea islands had not been destroyed,[20] in consequence of its defenceless
state. In January, 1813, the mouth of the Chesapeake was watched by a ship
of the line, two frigates, and a sloop; the commercial blockade not having
been yet established. The hostile divisions still remained outside, and
American vessels continued to go out and in with comparative facility, both
there and at Charleston. A lively trade had sprung up with France by letters-
of-marque; that is, by vessels whose primary object is commerce, and
which therefore carry cargoes, but have also guns, and a commission from
the Government to make prizes. Without such authorization capture is
piracy. By February 12 conditions grow worse. The blockaders have entered
the Chesapeake, the commercial blockade has been proclaimed, vessels
under neutral flags, Spanish and Swedish, are being turned away, and two
fine letter-of-marque schooners have been captured inside, one of them
after a gallant struggle in which her captain was killed. Nautical
misadventures of that kind became frequent. On April 3 three letters-of-
marque and a privateer, which had entered the Rappahannock, were
attacked at anchor by boats from Warren's fleet. The letters-of-marque, with
smaller crews, offered little resistance to boarding; but the privateer, having
near a hundred men, made a sharp resistance. The Americans lost six killed
and ten wounded; the enemy, two killed and eleven wounded.[21]
In like manner the lower Delaware was occupied by one or more ships of
the line. Supported thus by a heavy squadron, hostile operations were
pushed to the upper waters of both bays, and in various directions; the
extensive water communications of the region offering great facilities for
depredation. Dismay and incessant disquietude spread through all quarters
of the waterside. Light cruisers make their way above Reedy Island, fifty

miles from the Capes of the Delaware; coasting vessels are chased into the
Severn River, over a hundred miles above Hampton Roads; and a
detachment appears even at the mouth of the Patapsco, twelve miles from
Baltimore. The destruction of bay craft, and interruption of water traffic,
show their effects in the rise of marketing and fuel to double their usual
prices. By May 1, all intercourse by water was stopped, and Philadelphia
was also cut off from the lower Delaware. Both Philadelphia and Baltimore
were now severed from the sea, and their commerce destroyed, not to
revive till after the peace; while alarms, which the near future was to justify,
were felt for the land road which connected the two cities. As this crossed
the head waters of the Chesapeake, it was open to attack from ships, which
was further invited by deposits of goods in transit at Elkton and
Frenchtown. Fears for the safety of Norfolk were felt by Captain Stewart,
senior naval officer there. "When the means and force of the enemy are
considered, and the state of this place for defence, it presents but a gloomy
prospect for security."[22] Commodore Murray from Philadelphia reports
serious apprehensions, consternation among the citizens, a situation daily
more critical, and inadequate provision for resistance.[23] There, as
everywhere, the impotence of the General Government has to be
supplemented by local subscription and local energy.
At the same time, both northward and southward of these two great
estuaries, the approach of spring brought ever increasing enemies, big and
little, vexing the coasting trade; upon which, then as now, depended largely
the exchange of products between different sections of the country. What it
meant at that day to be reduced to communication by land may be realized
from a contemporary quotation: "Four wagons loaded with dry goods
passed to-day through Georgetown, South Carolina, for Charleston, forty-
six days from Philadelphia."[24] Under the heading "New Carrying Trade" a
Boston paper announces on April 28 the arrival of "a large number of teams
from New Bedford with West India produce, and four Pennsylvania
wagons, seventeen days from Philadelphia."[25] "The enemy has
commenced his depredations on the coasting trade of the Eastern States on
a very extensive scale, by several ships and sloops-of-war, and five or six
active privateers. The United States brig "Argus" cruises at the entrance of
Long Island Sound for the protection of trade, latterly jeopardized;"[26] a
position from which she was soon driven by an overwhelming force. Hull,
now commanding at Portsmouth, reports April 9, "several privateers on the

Eastern coast, which have been successful in cutting coasters out of several
harbors east." May 7: "A small force is indeed needed here; the enemy
appear off the harbor nearly every day. A few days since, a little east of this,
they burnt twelve coasters and chased several into this port."[27] The town is
defenceless. The Governor of Rhode Island laments to the Legislature "the
critical and exposed situation of our fellow-citizens in Newport, who are
frequently menaced by the ships and vessels about Point Judith";
mentioning beside, "the burning of vessels in Narragansett Bay, and the
destruction of our coasting trade, which deprives us of the usual and very
necessary supplies of bread stuffs from other States."[28] The ship
"Maddox," blockaded for two or three months in the Chesapeake, escaped
in May, and reached Newport with five thousand barrels of flour. This is
said to have reduced the price by $2.50 in Boston, where it was ranging at
$17 to $18; while at Cadiz and Lisbon, thanks to British licenses and heavy
stocking in anticipation of war, it stood at $12 to $13. The arrival at
Machias of a captured British vessel, laden with wheat, was hailed "as a
seasonable supply for the starving inhabitants of the eastward."[29]

THE NEW CARRYING TRADE.
Drawn by Stanley M. Arthurs.ToList

Ships returning from abroad necessarily had to pass through the cruisers
which interrupted the coasting trade. "Many valuable vessels arrive, making
at times hairbreadth escapes." The trade of Baltimore and Philadelphia is
thrown back upon New York and Boston; but both of these, and the eastern
entrance of Long Island Sound, have hostile squadrons before them. The
letter-of-marque schooner "Ned" has transmitted an experience doubtless
undergone by many. Bound to Baltimore, she arrived off the Chesapeake
April 18, and was chased away; tried to get into the Delaware on the 19th,
but was headed off; made for Sandy Hook, and was again chased. Finally,
she tried the east end of the Sound, and there made her way through four or
five ships of war, reaching New York April 24.[30] Of course, under such
circumstances trade rapidly dwindled. Only very fast and weatherly vessels
could hope to cope with the difficulties. Of these the conspicuous type was
the Baltimore schooner, which also had not too many eggs in one basket. In
the general deprivation of commerce a lucky voyage was proportionately
remunerative; but the high prices of the successful venture were but the
complement and reflection of suffering in the community. The harbors,
even of New York, became crowded with unemployed shipping.

This condition of things coastwise, supplemented by the activity of
American privateers, induced abnormal conditions of navigation in the
western Atlantic. The scanty success of Rodgers, Bainbridge, and the
"Chesapeake" have been noted; and it may be observed that there was a
great similarity in the directions taken by these and others. The Cape
Verdes, the equator between 24° and 30° west, the Guiana coast, the eastern
West Indies, Bermuda to Halifax, indicate a general line of cruising; with
which coincides substantially a project submitted by Stewart, March 2,
1813, for a cruise by the "Constellation." These plans were conceived with
intelligent reference to known British trade-routes; but, being met by the
enemy with a rigid convoy system, it was often hard to find a sail. The
scattered American traders were rapidly diminishing in numbers, retained in
port as they arrived; and it is noted that a British division of four vessels,
returning to Halifax after a four months' cruise between the Banks of
Newfoundland and Bermuda, have captured only one American.[31] An
American privateer, arriving at Providence after an absence of nearly four
months, "vexing the whole Atlantic," reports not seeing a single enemy's
merchant ship. Niles' return of prizes[32] to American cruisers, national as
well as privateers, gives three hundred and five as the total for the first six
months of the war; of which seventy-nine only seem to have been taken
distant from the home shores. For the second six months, to June 30, 1813,
the aggregate has fallen to one hundred and fifty-nine, of which, as far as
can be probably inferred, ninety-one were captured in remote waters.
Comparing with the preceding and subsequent periods, we find here
evidently a time of transition, when American enterprise had not yet
aroused to the fact that British precaution in the Western Hemisphere had
made it necessary to seek prizes farther afield.
In view of the incompleteness of the data it is difficult to state more than
broad conclusions. It seems fairly safe, however, to say that after the winter
of 1812-13 American commerce dwindled very rapidly, till in 1814 it was
practically annihilated; but that, prior to Napoleon's downfall, the
necessities of the British Government, and the importunity of the British
mercantile community, promoted a certain collusive intercourse by licenses,
or by neutrals, real or feigned, between the enemy and the Eastern States of
the Union, for the exportation of American produce. This trade, from the
reasons which prompted it, was of course exempt from British capture.
Subsidiary to it, as a partial relief to the loss of the direct American market,

was fostered an indirect smuggling import from Great Britain, by way of
Halifax and Montreal, which conduced greatly to the prosperity of both
these places during the war, as it had during the preceding periods of
commercial restriction. It was to maintain this contraband traffic, as well as
to foster disaffection in an important section of the Union, that the first
extension of the commercial blockade, issued by Warren from Bermuda,
May 26, 1813, stopped short of Newport; while the distinction thus drawn
was emphasized, by turning back vessels even with British licenses seeking
to sail from the Chesapeake. By this insidious action the commercial
prosperity of the country, so far as any existed, was centred about the
Eastern States. It was, however, almost purely local. Little relief reached the
Middle and South, which besides, as before mentioned, were thus drained
of specie, while their products lay idle in their stores.
As regards relative captures made by the two belligerents, exact numbers
cannot be affirmed; but from the lists transmitted a fairly correct estimate
can be formed as to the comparative injury done in this way. It must be
remembered that such losses, however grievous in themselves, and
productive of individual suffering, have by no means the decisive effect
produced by the stoppage of commerce, even though such cessation
involves no more than the retention in harbor of the belligerent's ships, as
the Americans were after 1812, or as had been the case during Jefferson's
embargo of 1808. As that measure and its congeners failed in their object of
bringing the British Government to terms, by deprivation of commerce, the
pecuniary harm done the United States by them was much greater than that
suffered in the previous years from the arbitrary action of Great Britain. She
had seized, it was alleged, as many as nine hundred and seventeen
American vessels,[33] many of which were condemned contrary to law,
while the remainder suffered loss from detention and attendant expenses;
but despite all this the commercial prosperity was such that the commercial
classes were averse to resenting the insults and injury. It was the
agricultural sections of the country, not the commercial, which forced on
the war.
Niles' Register has transmitted a careful contemporary compilation of
American captures, in closing which the editor affirmed that in the course
of the war he had examined not less than ten, perhaps twelve, thousand
columns of ship news, rejecting all prizes not accounted for by arrival or

destruction. It is unlikely that data complete as he used are now attainable,
even if an increase of accuracy in this point were worth the trouble of the
search. Up to May 1, 1813, he records four hundred and eleven captures, in
which are included the British ships of war as well as merchantmen; not a
very material addition. The British Naval Chronicle gives the prize lists of
the various British admirals. From these may be inferred in the same period
at least three hundred seizures of American merchant vessels. Among these
are a good many Chesapeake Bay craft, very small. This excludes
privateers, but not letters-of-marque, which are properly cargo ships. Both
figures are almost certainly underestimates; but not improbably the
proportion of four to three is nearly correct. Granting, however, that the
Americans had seized four British ships for every three lost by themselves,
what does the fact establish as regards the effect upon the commerce of the
two peoples? Take the simple report of a British periodical in the same
month of May, 1813: "We are happy to announce the arrival of a valuable
fleet from the West Indies, consisting of two hundred and twenty-six sail,
under convoy of the "Cumberland," seventy-four, and three other ships of
war."[34] This one fleet among many, safely entering port, numbers more
than half of their total losses in the twelvemonth. Contrast this relative
security with the experience of the "Ned," cited a few pages back, hunted
from headland to headland on her home coast, and slipping in—a single
ship by dexterous management—past foes from whom no countryman can
pretend to shield her.
Even more mortifying to Americans, because under their very eyes, in
sharp contrast to their sufferings, was the prosperity of Halifax and Canada.
Vexed though British commerce was by the daring activity of American
cruisers, the main streams continued to flow; diminished in volume, but not
interrupted. The closure of American harbors threw upon the two ports
named the business of supplying American products to the British forces,
the British West Indies, and in measure to Great Britain itself. The same
reason fixed in them the deposit of British goods, to be illicitly conveyed
into the United States by the smuggling that went on actively along the
northern seacoast and land frontier; a revival of the practices under the
embargo of 1808. This underground traffic was of course inadequate to
compensate for that lost by the war and the blockade; but it was quite
sufficient to add immensely to the prosperity of these places, the
communications of which with the sea were held open and free by the

British navy, and in which centred what was left from one of the most
important branches of British trade in the days of peace. Halifax, from its
position on the sea, was the chief gainer. The effects of the war on it were
very marked. Trade was active. Prices rose. Provisions were in great
demand, to the profit of agriculture and fisheries. Rents doubled and
trebled. The frequent arrival of prizes, and of ships of war going and
coming, added to the transactions, and made money plentiful.[35]
Recalling the generalization already made, that the seacoast of the United
States was strictly a defensive frontier, it will be recognized that the
successive institution of the commercial blockades, first of the Chesapeake
and Delaware in March, and afterward of the whole coast south of Newport,
in May, were the offensive operations with which the British initiated the
campaign of 1813. These blockades were supported, and their effects
sustained and intensified, by an accumulation of naval force entirely beyond
the competition of the American navy. In view of such overwhelming
disparity, it was no longer possible, as in 1812, by assembling a squadron,
to impose some measure of concentration upon the enemy, and thus to
facilitate egress and ingress. The movements of the British had passed
wholly beyond control. Their admiral was free to dispose his fleet as he
would, having care only not to hazard a detachment weaker than that in the
port watched. This was a condition perfectly easy of fulfilment with the
numbers under his command. As a matter of fact, his vessels were
distributed over the entire seacoast; and at every point, with the possible
exception of Boston, the division stationed was so strong that escape was
possible only by evasion, under cover of severe weather conditions.
Under such circumstances, the larger the ship the more difficult for her to
get out. As early as the middle of April, Captain Jones, formerly of the
"Wasp," and now commanding the "Macedonian" in New York, reports that
"both outlets are at present strongly blocked, but I believe at dark of the
moon we shall be able to pass without much risk."[36] May 22, when a
moon had come and gone, Decatur, still on board the "United States," in
company with which the "Macedonian" was to sail, thinks it will be better
to try the Sound route. "The last gale, which promised the fairest
opportunity for us to get out, ended in light southerly winds, which
continued till the blockading ships had regained their stations."[37] A few
days later, the attempt by the Sound resulted in the two being driven into

New London, where they remained to the close of the war. The only
offensive operation by sea open to the United States, the destruction of the
enemy's commerce, fell therefore to the smaller cruisers and privateers, the
size and numbers of which combined to make it impossible to restrain them
all.
For defensive measures the seaboard depended upon such fortifications
as existed, everywhere inadequate, but which either the laxness or the
policy of the British commander did not attempt to overcome in the case of
the seaports, narrowly so called. The wide-mouthed estuaries of the
Chesapeake and Delaware, entrance to which could not thus be barred,
bore, therefore, the full brunt of hostile occupation and widespread
harassment. In this there may have been deliberate intention, as well as easy
adoption of the readiest means of annoyance. The war, though fairly
supported in the middle section of the Union, was essentially a Southern
and Western measure. Its most strenuous fomenters came from those parts,
and the administration was Virginian. The President himself had been
identified with the entire course of Jefferson's commercial retaliation, and
general policy toward Great Britain during twelve years past. It is
impossible for land forces alone to defend against naval aggression a region
like the Chesapeake, with its several great, and numerous small, streams
penetrating the country in every direction; and matters are not helped when
the defendants are loosely organized militia. The water in such a case offers
a great central district, with interior lines, in the hands of a power to which
belongs the initiative, with an overpowering mobile force, able at any
moment to appear where it will in superior strength.
No wonder then that the local journals of the day speak of continual
watchfulness, which from the present organization of the militia is
exceedingly toilsome, and of no little derangement to the private affairs of
the people.[38] The enemy spreads in every direction; and, although the
alarm caused much exceeds the injury done, disquietude is extreme and
universal. "Applications from various quarters are constantly pouring in
upon us," wrote a Governor of Maryland to the President; "and as far as our
very limited means will enable us we are endeavoring to afford protection.
But we have not arms and ammunition to supply the demands of every
section of the State; the unavoidable expense of calling out the militia for its
protection would greatly exceed the ability of the State government. The

capital of the State [which was three miles from the bay, on a navigable
river] has not sufficient force for its protection. By the Constitution of the
United States, the common defence is committed to the National
Government, which is to protect each State against invasion, and to defray
all necessary expenses of a national war; and to us it is a most painful
reflection that after every effort we have made, or can make, for the security
of our fellow-citizens and of their property, they have little to rely on but
the possible forbearance of the enemy."[39] The process of reaping what has
been sowed is at times extremely unpleasant.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Captains' Letters. Navy Department.
[2] Ibid., Bainbridge, Oct. 13, 1812.
[3] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 25.
[4] Bainbridge's report is in the Captains' Letters. Navy Department, Jan. 3,
1813. It will be found also in Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 410. Both give extracts
from Bainbridge's journal, which is very full on the subject of manœuvres and
times. The British account will be found in the Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. pp.
403-408, from which the plan of the battle is copied.
[5] James' Naval History, edition 1824, vol. v. p. 313.
[6] Bainbridge in a private letter speaks of the men looking forward to prize
money for the "Guerrière" on their return. Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 411.
[7] Lawrence's Report of these transactions is in Captains' Letters, March 19,
1813. It will be found also in Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 84.
[8] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 305.
[9] Admiralty to Warren, British Records Office.
[10] Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 383.
[11] Captains' Letters.
[12] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 159. The Admiralty's letter to Warren to institute
this blockade is dated March 25. British Records Office.
[13] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 264.
[14] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 464.
[15] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 475.

[16] Captains' Letters.
[17] American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p. 280.
[18] Captain Evans' Report, April 10, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[19] Captains' Letters.
[20] Ibid, Dec. 17, 1812.
[21] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 119. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. 501.
[22] March 17, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[23] March 17, 18, and 21. Ibid.
[24] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 222.
[25] Columbian Centinel.
[26] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 117.
[27] Captains' Letters.
[28] Message of the Governor of Rhode Island, May 5, 1813.
[29] Niles' Register, vol. iv. pp. 200, 209. There were reported in Cadiz at this
time 160,000 barrels of flour, unsold. The Columbian Centinel (Feb. 17) speaks
of the Lisbon market as deplorable.
[30] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 150.
[31] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 101.
[32] Ibid., p. 117.
[33] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 584. France in the
same period had seized five hundred and fifty-eight.
[34] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. 497. The following extract from an American
journal may have interest as indicating the extent of the British convoy
movement. "American brig 'Hazard,' arrived at New York from Madeira, June 5,
reports: 'April 11, arrived at Funchal the outward bound East India and Brazil
fleets, forty sail, under convoy. Sailed April 12. April 21, arrived outward bound
Cork fleet, one hundred and eighty sail convoyed by a seventy-four, a frigate,
and a sloop.' April 30, sailed from Jamaica, three hundred merchantmen, under
convoy of a seventy-four, two frigates and a sloop." (Columbian Centinel, of
Boston, June 9, 1813.)
[35] Murdoch's History of Nova Scotia, vol. iii. p. 351.
[36] Captains' Letters, April 13, 1813.
[37] Ibid., May 22.
[38] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 134.
[39] Letter of Governor Winder, April 26, 1813. Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 204.

CHAPTER XToC

CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKE FRONTIER, TO THE
BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

In April, 1813, on the land frontier of the north and west, no substantial
change had taken place in the conditions which gave to the United States
the power of the offensive. Such modification as Chauncey's energy had
effected was to strengthen superiority, by promising ultimate control of the
upper and lower lakes. The British had not been idle; but the greater natural
difficulties under which they labored, from less numerous population and
less advanced development of the country and its communications, together
with a greater severity of climate, had not been compensated by a naval
direction similar to that exercised by the American commodore and his
efficient second, Perry. Sir John Warren had been ordered to pay attention to
the lakes, the naval service of which was placed under his charge. This
added to his responsibilities, and to the drain upon his resources of men and
materials; but, with an oversight already extending from Halifax to Jamaica
and Barbados, he could do little for the lakes, beyond meeting requisitions
of the local authorities and furnishing a draft of officers. Among those sent
from his fleet was Captain Barclay, who commanded the British squadron
in Perry's action.
The Admiralty, meantime, had awaked to the necessity of placing
preparations and operations under competent naval guidance, if command
of the water was to be secured. For that purpose they selected Captain Sir
James Lucas Yeo, a young officer of much distinction, just turned thirty,
who was appointed to the general charge of the lake service, under Warren.
Leaving England in March, accompanied by a body of officers and seamen,
Yeo did not reach Kingston until May 15, 1813, when the campaign was
already well under way; having been begun by Dearborn and Chauncey

April 24. His impressions on arrival were discouraging. He found the
squadron in a weak state, and the enemy superior in fact and in promise.
They had just succeeded in burning at York a British vessel intended for
thirty guns, and they had, besides, vessels building at Sackett's Harbor. He
had set to work, however, getting his force ready for action, and would go
out as soon as possible to contest the control of Ontario; for upon that
depended the tenure of Upper Canada.[40] Barclay, upon the arrival of his
superior, was sent on to Amherstburg, to fulfil upon Erie the same relation
to Yeo that Perry did to Chauncey.
It had been clearly recognized by the American authorities that any
further movement for the recapture of Detroit and invasion of Canada
would depend upon the command of Lake Erie; and that that in turn would
depend largely upon mastery of Ontario. In fact, the nearer the sea control
over the water communications could be established, the more radical and
far-reaching the effect produced. For this reason, Montreal was the true
objective of American effort, but the Government's attention from the first
had centred upon the northwestern territory; upon the extremity of the
enemy's power, instead of upon its heart. Under this prepossession, despite
adequate warning, it had persisted in the course of which Hull's disaster was
the outcome; and now, though aroused by this stunning humiliation, its
understanding embraced nothing beyond the Great Lakes. Clear indication
of this narrow outlook is to be found in the conditions on Lake Champlain,
the natural highway to Canada. Only the scantiest mention is to be found of
naval preparation there, because actually little was being done; and
although the American force was momentarily superior, it was so simply
because the British, being in Canada wholly on the defensive, and therefore
obliged to conform to American initiative, contemplated no use of this lake,
the mastery of which, nevertheless, was soon afterward thrown into their
hands by a singularly unfortunate occurrence.
Dearborn, who still remained in chief command of the armies on the New
York frontier, was therefore directed to concentrate his effort upon Ontario,
starting from Sackett's Harbor as a base. Chauncey, whose charge extended
no farther than the upper rapids of the St. Lawrence, had of course no other
interest. His first plan, transmitted to the Navy Department January 21,
1813,[41] had been to proceed immediately upon the opening of navigation,
with the fleet and a land force of a thousand picked troops, against

Kingston, the capture of which, if effected, would solve at a single stroke
every difficulty in the upper territory. No other harbor was tenable as a
naval station; with its fall, and the destruction of shipping and forts, would
go the control of the lake, even if the place itself were not permanently
held. Deprived thus of the water communications, the enemy could retain
no position to the westward, because neither re-enforcements nor supplies
could reach them. To quote Chauncey's own words, "I have no doubt we
should succeed in taking or destroying their ships and forts, and, of course,
preserve our ascendency on this lake."
This remark, though sound, was narrow in scope; for it failed to
recognize, what was perfectly knowable, that the British support of the
Lake Erie stations and the upper country depended on their power to
control, or at worst to contest, Ontario. Of this they themselves were
conscious, as the words of Yeo and Brock alike testify. The new American
Secretary of War, Armstrong, who was a man of correct strategical
judgment and considerable military information, entered heartily into this
view; and in a letter dated February 10 communicated to Dearborn the
orders of the President for his operations, based upon the Secretary's
recommendation.[42] Four thousand men were to be assembled at Sackett's,
and three thousand at Buffalo. The former, under convoy of the fleet, was to
proceed first against Kingston, then against York (Toronto). After this the
two corps should co-operate in an attack to be made upon the British
Niagara frontier, which rested upon Fort George on the Ontario shore, and
Fort Erie upon Lake Erie. This plan was adopted upon the assumption,
which was probably correct, that the enemy's entire military force upon
Ontario did not exceed twenty-one hundred regular troops, of whom six
hundred were at Kingston and twelve hundred at Niagara. Armstrong, who
recognized the paramount importance of Montreal, had received the
exaggerated impression that there might be in that neighborhood eight to
ten thousand regulars. There were not yet nearly that number in all Canada;
[43] but he was perhaps correct in thinking that the provision for the
offensive, which he had found upon taking office a few weeks before, was
insufficient for an advance in that quarter.
Dearborn very soon discovered objections to proceeding against
Kingston, in his own estimates of the enemy's numbers, based upon
remarkable reports received from sources "entitled to full credit." On March

3 he was satisfied that from six to eight thousand men had been assembled
there from Quebec, Montreal, and Upper Canada; while the presence of Sir
George Prevost, the Governor General, and commander-in-chief in Canada,
who had seized an opportunity to make a hurried visit to Kingston to assure
himself as to the progress of the ships building, convinced the American
general that an attack upon Sackett's was contemplated.[44] From that time
forward Dearborn realized in his own person the process of making pictures
to one's self concerning a military situation, against which Napoleon uttered
a warning. Chauncey was more sceptical, although he could not very well
avoid attention to the reports brought in. He expresses himself as believing
that a considerable number of men had been assembled in Kingston, but
that their real object was to proceed against Harrison in the Far West.[45]
There seems to have been no foundation for any of these alarms. Prevost
was a soldier of good reputation, but wanting in initiative, audacity, and
resolution, as the current war was to prove. His presence at Kingston at this
moment was simply one incident in a rapid official visit to the upper
military posts, extending as far as Niagara, and accomplished in four weeks;
for, leaving Quebec February 17, he was again writing from there on the
17th of March. As far as can be deduced from his correspondence, four
companies of regulars had preceded him from Montreal to Kingston, and
there may very well have been a gathering of local forces for inspection or
otherwise; but no re-enforcements of regulars, other than that just
mentioned, reached Kingston from down the river before May. Dearborn
never renounced his belief in the meditated attack, though finally satisfied
that it was abandoned; and his positive reports as to the enemy's numbers
wrung from Armstrong acquiescence in a change of plan, by which York,
and not Kingston, should be the first object of the campaign.[46]
Chauncey, who had some sound military ideas, as his first plan showed,
was also brought round to this conclusion by a process of reasoning which
he developed in a second plan of operations, submitted March 18,[47] but
evidently long since matured. It apparently antedates Dearborn's
apprehensions, and is not affected by them, though the two worked together
to a common mistaken decision. The commodore's letter presents an
interesting study, in its demonstration of how an erroneous first conception
works out to false conclusions, and in the particular instance to ultimate
military disaster. The capture of Kingston, his first plan, and its retention,

which Armstrong purposed, would have settled the whole campaign and
affected decisively the issue of the war. Chauncey's new project is
dominated throughout by the view, which was that of the Government, that
the great object of the war was to control the northwestern territory by local
operations, instead of striking at the source of British power in its
communication with the sea. At this moment, the end of March, the British
naval force on Ontario was divided between York and Kingston; in each
were vessels afloat and vessels building. An attack upon Kingston,
Chauncey said, no doubt would be finally successful—an initial admission
which gave away his case; but as the opposing force would be considerable,
it would protract the general operations of the campaign—the reduction of
the northwest—longer than would be advisable, particularly as large re-
enforcements would probably arrive at Quebec in the course of two months.
On the other hand, to proceed against York, which probably could be
carried immediately, would result in destroying at once a large fraction of
the British fleet, greatly weakening the whole body. Thence the combined
Americans would turn against Fort George and the Niagara line. If
successful here, the abandonment of Fort Erie by the British would release
the American vessels which by its guns were confined at Black Rock. They
would sail forth and join their consorts at Erie; which done, Chauncey,
leaving his Ontario fleet to blockade Yeo at Kingston, would go to the upper
lake and carry against the British the squadron thus concentrated there,
would co-operate with the army under General Harrison, recover Detroit,
and capture Malden. Lake Erie and its surroundings would thus become an
American holding. After this, it would be but a step to reconquer
Michilimackinac, thereby acquiring an influence over the Indians which, in
conjunction with military and naval preponderance, would compel the
enemy to forsake the upper country altogether, and concentrate his forces
about Kingston and Montreal.
It is interesting to see an elaborate piece of serious reasoning gradually
culminate in a reductio ad absurdum; and Chauncey's reasoning ends in a
military absurdity. The importance of Kingston is conceded by him, and the
probability of capturing it at the first is admitted. Thereupon follows a long
project of operation, which ends in compelling the enemy to concentrate all
his strength at the very points—Kingston and Montreal—which it is most
important for the Americans to gain; away from which, therefore, they
should seek to keep the enemy, and not to drive him in upon them. This

comes from the bias of the Government, and of the particular officer,
regarding the Northwestern territory as the means whereby success was to
be accomplished instead of merely the end to be attained. To make the
Western territory and control of the Indians the objects of the campaign was
a political and military motive perfectly allowable, and probably, in view of
recent history, extremely necessary; but to make these things the objective
of operations was to invert the order of proceedings, as one who, desiring to
fell a tree, should procure a ladder and begin cutting off the outermost
branches, instead of striking at the trunk by the ground.
Eighteen months later Chauncey wrote some very wise words in this
spirit. "It has always been my opinion that the best means to conquer
Canada was to cut off supplies from Lower to Upper by taking and
maintaining some position on the St. Lawrence. That would be killing the
tree by girdling; the branches, dependent on ordinary supplies, die of
necessity. But it is now attempted to kill the tree by lopping off branches"
[he is speaking of the Niagara campaign of 1814]; "the body becomes
invigorated by reducing the demands on its resources."[48] By this time
Chauncey had been chastened by experience. He had seen his anticipated
glory reaped on Lake Erie by his junior. He had seen the control of Ontario
contested, and finally wrung from him, by vessels built at Kingston, the
place which he had failed to take when he thought it possible. He had been
blockaded during critical months by a superior squadron; and at the moment
of writing, November 5, 1814, Sir James Yeo was moving, irresistible, back
and forth over the waters of Ontario, with his flag flying in a ship of 102
guns, built at Kingston. In short, the Canadian tree was rooted in the ocean,
where it was nourished by the sea power of Great Britain. To destroy it,
failing the ocean navy which the United States had not, the trunk must be
severed; the nearer the root the better.
Demonstration of these truths was not long in coming, and will be
supplied by the narrative of events. When Chauncey penned the plan of
operations just analyzed, there were in York two vessels, the "Prince
Regent" of twenty guns, the "Duke of Gloucester," sixteen, and two—by his
information—on the stocks. On April 14 the ice in Sackett's Harbor broke
up, though large floes still remained in the lake. On the 19th these also had
disappeared. Eighteen hundred troops were embarked by the squadron, and
on the 24th the expedition started, but was driven back by heavy weather.

The next day it got away finally, and on the early morning of the 27th
appeared off York. The troops were landed westward of the town, and
proceeded to attack, supported by the shipping. The enemy, inferior in
number, retired; the small regular force making its escape, with the
exception of fifty who surrendered with the militia present. The American
loss, army and navy, was a little over three hundred; among whom was
General Pike, an excellent soldier, who commanded the landing and was
mortally wounded by the explosion of a magazine. The "Duke of
Gloucester" schooner was taken, but the "Prince Regent" had gone to
Kingston three days before; the weather which drove Chauncey back had
enabled her to join her fleet as soon as released by the ice. By her escape
the blow lost most of its effect; for York itself was indefensible, and was
taken again without difficulty in the following July. A 30-gun vessel
approaching completion was found on the stocks and burned, and a large
quantity of military and naval stores were either destroyed or brought away
by the victorious squadron. These losses were among the news that greeted
Yeo's arrival; but, though severe, they were not irreparable, as Chauncey for
the moment imagined. He wrote: "I believe that the enemy has received a
blow that he cannot recover, and if we succeed in our next enterprise, which
I see no reason to doubt, we may consider the upper province as
conquered."[49] The mistake here was soon to be evident.
No time was wasted at York. The work of destruction, and of loading
what was to be carried away, was completed in three days, and on May 1
the troops were re-embarked, to sail for Fort George on the morrow. The
wind, which for some days had been fair and moderate from the eastward,
then came on to blow a gale which would make landing impossible off
Niagara, and even navigation dangerous for the small vessels. This lasted
through the 7th, Chauncey writing on that day that they were still riding
with two anchors ahead and lower yards down. So crowded were the ships
that only half the soldiers could be below at one time; hence they were
exposed to the rain, and also to the fresh-water waves, which made a clean
breach over the schooners. Under such circumstances both troops and
seamen sickened fast. On the 8th, the weather moderating, the squadron
stood over to Fort Niagara, landed the troops for refreshment, and then
returned to Sackett's; it being thought that the opportunity for surprise had
been lost, and that no harm could come of a short further delay, during
which also re-enforcements might be expected.

Soon after his return Chauncey sent a flag of truce to Kingston. This
made observations as to the condition of the enemy which began to dispel
his fair illusions.[50] His purpose to go in person to Niagara was postponed;
and despatching thither the squadron with troops, he remained at Sackett's
to protect the yard and the ships building, in co-operation with the garrison.
His solicitude was not misplaced. Niagara being a hundred and fifty miles
from Sackett's, the fleet and army had been committed to a relatively distant
operation, depending upon a main line of communication,—the lake,—on
the flank and rear of which, and close to their own inadequately protected
base, was a hostile arsenal, Kingston, harboring a naval force quite able to
compete with their own. The danger of such a situation is obvious to any
military man, and even to a layman needs only to be indicated. Nevertheless
the enterprise was launched, and there was nothing for it now but to
proceed on the lines laid down.
Chauncey accordingly sailed May 22, re-enforcements of troops for the
defence of Sackett's having meantime arrived. He did not reach Niagara
until the 25th. The next day was spent in reconnoissances, and other
preparations for a landing on the lake shore, a short mile west of Fort
George. On the 27th, at 9 A.M., the attack began, covered by the squadron.
General Vincent, in command of the British Niagara frontier, moved out to
meet his enemy with the entire force near Fort George, leaving only a small
garrison of one hundred and thirty men to hold the post itself. There was
sharp fighting at the coast-line; but Vincent's numbers were much inferior,
and he was compelled steadily to give ground, until finally, seeing that the
only alternatives were the destruction of his force or the abandonment of
the position, he sent word to the garrison to spike the guns, destroy the
ammunition, and to join his column as it withdrew. He retreated along the
Niagara River toward Queenston, and thence west to Beaver Dam, about
sixteen miles from Fort George. At the same time word was sent to the
officers commanding at Fort Erie, and the intermediate post of Chippewa,
to retire upon the same place, which had already been prepared in
anticipation of such an emergency. The three divisions were thus in
simultaneous movement, converging upon a common point of
concentration, where they all assembled during the night; the whole, as
reported by Vincent to his superior, now not exceeding sixteen hundred.[51]
The casualties during the day's fighting had been heavy, over four hundred
killed and wounded; but in the retreat no prisoners were lost except the

garrison of the fort, which was intercepted. Dearborn, as before at York, had
not landed with his troops; prevented, doubtless, by the infirmities of age
increasing upon him. Two days later he wrote to the Department, "I had
presumed that the enemy would confide in the strength of his position and
venture an action, by which an opportunity would be afforded to cut off his
retreat."[52] This guileless expectation, that the net may be spread not in
vain before the eyes of any bird, provoked beyond control such measure of
equanimity as Armstrong possessed. Probably suspecting already that his
correct design upon Kingston had been thwarted by false information, he
retorted: "I cannot disguise from you the surprise occasioned by the two
escapes of a beaten enemy; first on May 27, and again on June 1. Battles are
not gained, when an inferior and broken enemy is not destroyed. Nothing is
done, while anything that might have been done is omitted."[53] Vincent was
unkind enough to disappoint his opponent. The morning after the
engagement he retired toward a position at the head of the lake, known then
as Burlington Heights, where the town of Hamilton now stands. Upon his
tenure here the course of operations turned twice in the course of the next
six months.

MAP OF NIAGARA PENINSULAToList

While Vincent was in retreat upon Burlington, Captain Barclay arrived at
his headquarters, on the way to take charge of the Lake Erie squadron;[54]
having had to coast the north shore of Ontario, on account of the American
control of the water. The inopportuneness of the moment was prophetic of
the numberless disappointments with which the naval officer would have to
contend during the brief three months preceding his defeat by Perry. "The
ordnance, ammunition, and other stores for the service on Lake Erie," wrote
Prevost on July 20, with reference to Barclay's deficiencies, "had been
deposited at York for the purpose of being transported to Amherstburg, but
unfortunately were either destroyed or fell into the enemy's hands when
York was taken by them; and the subsequent interruption to the
communication, by their occupation of Fort George, has rendered it
extremely difficult to afford the supplies Captain Barclay requires, which,
however, are in readiness to forward whenever circumstances will permit it
to be done with safety."[55] The road from Queenston to Fort Erie, around
Niagara Falls, was the most used and the best line of transportation, because
the shortest. To be thrown off it to that from Burlington to Long Point was a
serious mishap for a force requiring much of heavy and bulky supplies. To
add to these more vital embarrassments, the principal ship, the "Queen
Charlotte," which had been lying at Fort Erie, had been ordered by Vincent
to leave there when the place was evacuated, and to go to Amherstburg,
thus giving Barclay the prospect of a land journey of two hundred miles
through the wilderness to his destination. Fortunately for him, a vessel
turned up at Long Point, enabling him to reach Amherstburg about June 7.
The second step in Chauncey's programme had now been successfully
taken, and the vessels at Black Rock were free to move. With an energy and
foresight which in administration seldom forsook him, he had prepared
beforehand to seize even a fleeting opportunity to get them out.
Immediately upon the fall of York, "to put nothing to hazard, I directed Mr.
Eckford to take thirty carpenters to Black Rock, where he has gone to put
the vessels lying there in a perfect state of repair, ready to leave the river for
Presqu' Isle the moment we are in possession of the opposite shore." Perry
also was on hand, being actively engaged in the landing at Fort George; and
the same evening, May 27, he left for Black Rock to hasten the departure.

The process involved great physical labor, the several vessels having to be
dragged by oxen against the current of the Niagara, here setting heavily
toward the falls. It was not until June 12 that they were all above the rapids,
and even this could not have been accomplished but for soldiers furnished
by Dearborn.[56] The circumstance shows how hopeless the undertaking
would have been if the enemy had remained in Fort Erie. Nor was this the
only peril in their path. Barclay, with commendable promptitude, had taken
the lake in superior force very shortly after his arrival at Amherstburg, and
about June 15 appeared off Erie [Presqu' Isle]. Having reconnoitred the
place, he cruised between it and Black Rock, to intercept the expected
division; but the small vessels, coasting the beach, passed their adversary
unseen in a fog,[57] and on June 18 reached the port. As Chauncey had
reported on May 29 that the two brigs building there were launched, affairs
on that lake began to wear a promising aspect. The Lakes station as a
whole, however, was still very short of men; and the commodore added that
if none arrived before his approaching return to Sackett's, he would have to
lay up the Ontario fleet to man that upon Erie.
To do this would have been to abandon to the enemy the very important
link in the communications, upon which chiefly depended the re-
enforcement and supplies for both armies on the Niagara peninsula. The
inherent viciousness of the plan upon which the American operations were
proceeding was now quickly evident. At the very moment of the attack
upon Fort George, a threatening but irresolute movement against Sackett's
was undertaken by Prevost, with the co-operation of Yeo, by whom the
attempt is described as a diversion, in consequence of the enemy's attack
upon Fort George. Had the place fallen, Chauncey would have lost the ship
then building, on which he was counting to control the water; he would
have had nowhere to rest his foot except his own quarter-deck, and no
means to repair his fleet or build the new vessels continually needed to
maintain superiority. The case of Yeo dispossessed of Kingston would have
been similar, but worse; for land transport in the United States was much
better than in Canada. The issue of the war, as regarded the lakes and the
Northwestern territory, lay in those two places. Upon them depended
offensive and defensive action.
At the time of the attack upon Sackett's only two vessels of the squadron
were there, the senior officer of which, Lieutenant Chauncey, was in

momentary command of the navy yard as well. The garrison consisted of
four hundred regular troops, the coming of whom a week before had
enabled Chauncey to leave for Niagara. Dearborn had already written to
Major-General Jacob Brown, of the New York militia, asking him to take
command of the station; for which his local knowledge particularly fitted
him, as he was a resident of some years' standing. He had moreover
manifested marked military capacity on the St. Lawrence line, which was
under his charge. Brown, whose instincts were soldierly, was reluctant to
supersede Colonel Backus, the officer of regulars in command; but a letter
from the latter received on the 27th, asking him to take charge, determined
his compliance. When he arrived five hundred militia had assembled.
The British expedition left Kingston with a fine fair wind on the early
morning of May 27—the same day that the Americans were landing at Fort
George. The whole fleet accompanied the movement, having embarked
troops numbering over seven hundred; chiefly regulars. At noon they were
off Sackett's Harbor. Prevost and Yeo stood in to reconnoitre; but in the
course of an hour the troops, who were already in the boats, ready to pull to
the beach, were ordered to re-embark, and the squadron stood out into the
lake. The only result so far was the capture of twelve out of nineteen
American barges, on their way from Oswego to the Harbor. The other seven
gained the port.
During the next thirty-six hours militia kept coming in, and Brown took
command. Sackett's Harbor is an indentation on the south side of a broad
bay, called Black River Bay, into which the Black River empties. The
harbor opens eastward; that is, its back is toward the lake, from which it is
distant a little over a mile; and its north side is formed by a long narrow
point, called Navy Point, on which was the naval establishment. Where
Black River Bay meets the lake, its south shore is prolonged to the west by
a projection called Horse Island, connected with the land by a fordable
neck. Brown expected the landing to be made upon this, and he decided to
meet the attack at the water's edge of the mainland, as the enemy crossed
the neck. There he disposed his five hundred militia, placing the regulars
under Backus in a second line; a steadying point in case the first line of
untrained men failed to stand firm. It was arranged that, if the enemy could
not be resisted, Lieutenant Chauncey was to set fire to the naval stores and
shipping, and cross with his crews to the south side of the harbor, east of a

work called Fort Volunteer, where Brown proposed to make his final stand.
From there, although an enemy at the yard could be molested, he could not
certainly be prevented from carrying off stores or ships; hence the necessity
for destruction.

SURROUNDINGS OF SACKETT'S HARBORToList

The British landed upon Horse Island soon after daylight of May 29, and
from there advanced. The militia met them with a volley, but then broke and
fled, as had been foreseen by Brown, himself yet a militia officer. Their
colonel behaved gallantly, and was killed in trying to rally his men; while
Brown in person, collecting a hundred of the fugitives, worked round with
them to the left flank of the approaching British. These, moving through the
woods, now encountered Backus and his regulars, who made upon them an
impression of overwhelming numbers, to which the British official report
bears a vivid testimony. The failure to carry the place is laid by this paper
upon the light and adverse winds, which prevented the co-operation of the
squadron's heavy guns, to reduce the batteries and blockhouse. Without this

assistance, it was impracticable to carry by assault the works in which the
Americans had taken refuge. The gunboats alone could get within range,
and their small carronades were totally inadequate to make any impression
on the forts and blockhouses. "The troops were reluctantly ordered to leave
a beaten enemy." Brown makes no mention of this retreat into the works,
though it appears clear that the Americans fell gradually back to their
support; but he justifies Prevost's withdrawal, bitterly criticised by writers
of his own nation, in the words, "Had not General Prevost retreated most
rapidly under the guns of his vessels, he would never have returned to
Kingston."[58]
In the midst of the action word was brought to Lieutenant Chauncey that
the battle was lost, and that the yard must be fired. Brown, in his official
report, expressly acquitted him of blame, with words of personal
commendation. The two schooners in commission had retreated up Black
River; but the prize "Duke of Gloucester," and the ship approaching
completion, were fired. Fortunately, the flames were extinguished before
serious damage was done; but when Commodore Chauncey returned on
June 1, he found that among a large quantity of materials consumed were
the stores and sails of the new ship. The loss of these he thought would
delay the movements of the squadron three weeks; for without her Yeo's
force was now superior.[59]

THE RETREAT OF THE BRITISH FROM SACKETT'S HARBOR.
Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl.ToList

The defence of Sackett's Harbor obtained immediately for Brown, who
was just thirty-eight, the commission of brigadier general in the army; for
the new Secretary, Armstrong, was looking round anxiously for men to put
in command, and was quick to seize upon one when he found him. To
Chauncey, on the other hand, the affair in its consequences and
demonstration of actualities was a rude awakening, to which his
correspondence during the succeeding six weeks bears witness by an
evident waning of confidence, not before to be noted. On June 4 he tells the
Secretary of the Navy that he has on Ontario, exclusive of the new ship not
yet ready, fourteen vessels of every description, mounting sixty-two guns;
whereas Yeo has seven, which, with six gunboats, carry one hundred and
six. "If he leave Kingston, I shall meet him. The result may be doubtful, but
worth the trial." This resolution is not maintained. June 11 he hears, with
truth, that Yeo was seen at the head of the lake on the 7th, and that the
Americans at Fort George had taken his squadron to be Chauncey's. By the
same channel he learns of a disastrous engagement of the army there, which
was likewise true. His impulse is to go out to meet the British squadron; but
he reflects that the enemy may then again find an opportunity to descend
upon Sackett's, and perhaps succeed in burning the new ship. Her size and
armament will, he thinks, give him the decisive superiority. He therefore
resolves to put nothing to hazard till she is finished.[60]
The impression produced by the late attack is obvious, and this decision
was probably correct; but Yeo too is building, and meantime he has
possession of the lake. On June 3 he left Kingston with a squadron, two
ships and four schooners, carrying some three hundred troops for Vincent.
On the evening of the 7th, about six o'clock, he was sighted by the
American army, which was then at Forty Mile Creek on the Ontario shore; a
position to which it had retired after a severe reverse inflicted by the enemy
thirty-six hours before. Vincent's retreat had been followed as far as Stony
Creek, ten miles west of Forty Mile Creek, and somewhat less distant from
Burlington Heights, where the British lay. The situation of the latter was
extremely perilous; for, though strongly placed, they were greatly
outnumbered. In case of being driven from their lines, they must retreat on

York by a long and difficult road; and upon the same poor communications
they were dependent for supplies, unless their squadron kept control of the
lake. Recognizing that desperate conditions call for desperate remedies,
Vincent resolved to risk an attack with seven hundred men under Colonel
Harvey, in whose suggestion the movement originated. These fell upon the
American advance corps at two o'clock in the morning of June 6. An hour
of fighting ensued, with severe loss on both sides; then Harvey, considering
sufficient effect produced, drew off his men before daylight revealed the
smallness of their numbers.
There was in this affair nothing intrinsically decisive, scarcely more than
a business of outposts; but by a singular coincidence both American
generals present were captured in the confusion. The officer who succeeded
to the command, a colonel of cavalry, modestly distrustful of his own
powers, could think of nothing more proper than to return to Forty Mile
Creek, sending word to Fort George. Dearborn, still too weak to go to the
front, despatched thither General Morgan Lewis. On his way Lewis was
overtaken by two brief messages from the commander-in-chief announcing
the appearance of Yeo's fleet, and indicating apprehension that by means of
it Vincent might come upon Fort George before the main army could fall
back there. It was most improbable that the British general, with the
command of the lake in doubt would thus place himself again in the
position from which he had with difficulty escaped ten days before; but
Dearborn's fears for the safety of the forts prevailed, and he ordered a
retreat. The movement began by noon of June 8, and in a few days the army
was back at Niagara River, having lost or abandoned a quantity of stores.
The British followed to within ten miles of the fort, where they took up a
position. They also reoccupied Beaver Dam; and a force of six hundred
Americans sent to dislodge them, under Colonel Boerstler, was compelled
to surrender on June 24.[61] Dearborn, who had already reported to the
Department that he personally was "so reduced in strength as to be
incapable of any command," attributed his embarrassments "to the
temporary loss of command of the lake. The enemy has availed himself of
the advantage and forwarded re-enforcements and supplies." The effect of
controlling the water cannot be contested; but the conditions at Stony Creek
were such that it should have been possible to drive Vincent away from any
hold on the south shore of Ontario. Creditable as had been the enterprise of
Colonel Harvey, it had accomplished no change in material conditions.

Dearborn was soon afterward relieved. His officers, including Scott, joined
in a letter of regret and esteem, prompted doubtless by sympathy for the
sufferings and miscarriage of an aged officer who had served gallantly in
his youth during the War of Independence.
To Colonel Harvey's attack, on the morning of June 6, a British military
critic has with justice assigned the turning of the tide in the affairs of Upper
Canada.[62] It is perfectly true that that well-judged movement, admirable in
conception and execution, checked the progress of the American arms at a
moment most favorable to them, and put an end to conditions of advantage
which never there recurred. That this effect was produced, however, is
attributable to the inefficiency of the American officers in command. If
Harvey had divined this, from the previous operations, and made it a part of
his calculations, it is so much more to his credit; the competency of the
opponent is a chief factor to be considered in a military enterprise. It
detracts nothing from Harvey's merit to say that there was no occasion for
the American retreat, nor for the subsequent paralysis of effort, which ended
in expulsion from the Niagara peninsula at the end of the year. "For some
two months after this," wrote a very competent eye-witness, afterward
General Scott, "the army of Niagara, never less than four thousand strong,
stood fixed in a state of ignominy, under Boyd, within five miles of an
unintrenched enemy, with never more than three thousand five hundred
men."[63] Scott seems not to have known that this inactivity was enjoined by
the War Department till Chauncey could resume control of the lake.[64]
From this time, in fact, the Niagara army and its plans disappear from the
active operations.
Yeo remained in undisputed mastery of the water. That the British at this
time felt themselves the stronger in effective force, may be reasonably
inferred from their continuing to keep the lake after Chauncey's new ship
was out. She was launched June 12, and named the "General Pike," in honor
of the officer killed at the taking of York. Her armament was to be twenty-
six long 24-pounders, which under some circumstances would make her
superior, not only to any single vessel, but to any combination of vessels
then under the British flag. If it was still possible, by use of favoring
conditions, to contend with the American fleet after the addition to it of this
ship, by so much more was Yeo able to deal successfully with it before her
coming. A comparison of the armaments of the opposing forces also

demonstrates that, whatever Chauncey's duty might have been without such
prospect, he was justified, having this decisive advantage within reach, in
keeping his fleet housed waiting for its realization. The British new vessel,
the "Wolfe," with the "Royal George"[65] and the "Melville," together threw
a broadside weight of nine hundred and twenty pounds,[66] to which the
"Madison" and "Oneida" could oppose only six hundred; and the batteries
of all five being mainly carronades, there are no qualifications to be made
on the score of differing ranges. The American schooners, though much
more numerous than the British, in no way compensated for this disparity,
for reasons which will be given when the narrative of operations begins.
Unknown to Chauncey, the vindication of his delay was to be found in Yeo's
writing to the Admiralty, that he was trying to induce the enemy to come
out before his new ship was ready.
Disappointed in this endeavor, the British commodore meantime
employed his vessels in maintaining the communications of the British and
harassing those of the Americans, thus observing the true relation of the
lake to the hostilities. Mention has been made of the effect upon Dearborn;
morally, in the apprehension created, actually, in the strength contributed to
Vincent's army. "The enemy's fleet is constantly hovering on the coast and
interrupting our supplies," wrote General Lewis, during Dearborn's
incapacity. Besides incidental mentions by American officers, Yeo himself
reports the capture of two schooners and boats loaded with stores June 13;
and between that date and the 19th he landed parties at the Genesee River
and Great Sodus, capturing or destroying a quantity of provisions. Transit
between Oswego and Sackett's was also in constant danger of an
unexpected interference by the British squadron. On June 20 it appeared off
Oswego, with apparent disposition to attack; but Yeo, who in his exercise of
chief command displayed a degree of caution remarkable in view of his
deservedly high reputation for dash acquired in less responsible positions,
did not pass beyond threat. All the same, the mere uncertainty exercised a
powerful influence on the maintenance of intercourse. "If the schooners
'Lark' and 'Fly' are not now in Sackett's," wrote Lieutenant Woolsey from
Oswego, "they must have been taken yesterday by the British boats. They
were loaded with powder, shot, and hospital stores for the army." He has
also cordage, powder, guns, cables, to send, and boats in which to ship
them; but "under existing circumstances I dare not take upon myself to send
them farther than to Sandy Creek, under strong guard. I think it would be

unsafe to venture round Stony Point [a projecting headland twelve miles
from Sackett's] without convoy or a good guard."[67]
On July 2, having ranged the lake at will since June 1, Yeo returned to
Kingston, and Chauncey again began to hear rumors. "The fleet has taken
on board two thousand men, and two thousand more are to embark in boats;
an attack upon this place is the object. The plan is to make a desperate push
at our fleet before the 'General Pike' can be got ready.... His real object may
be to land re-enforcements near Fort George, to act with General Vincent
against Dearborn. If this be his object, he will succeed in obliging our army
to recross the Niagara River;"[68] a damaging commentary on the American
plan of campaign. This fear, however, was excessive, for the reason that an
effective American army on the Niagara had a land line of communication,
bad but possible, alternative to the lake. The British had not. Moreover, the
Niagara peninsula had for them a value, as a land link between Ontario and
Erie, to which nothing corresponded on the United States side. Had Vincent
been driven from Burlington Heights, not only would he have lost touch
with the lake, and been forced back on York, but Ontario would for the
British have been entirely cut off from Erie.
The "General Pike" was ready for service on July 20, and the following
evening Chauncey sailed. With this begins a period, extending over ten or
twelve weeks, which has no parallel in the naval lake history of the war. It
was unproductive of decisive results, and especially of the one particular
result which is the object of all naval action—the destruction of the enemy's
organized force, and the establishment of one's own control of the water;
nevertheless, the ensuing movements of Yeo and Chauncey constituted a
naval campaign of considerable interest. Nothing resembling it occurred on
either Lake Champlain or Erie, and no similar condition recurred on
Ontario. The fleets were frequently in presence of each other, and three
times came to blows. On Erie and on Champlain the opposing forces met
but once, and then without any prolonged previous attempts at manœuvring.
They fought immediately; the result in each case being an American
victory, not only complete but decisive, which has kept their remembrance
alive to this day in the national memory. On Ontario, after the close of the
season of 1813, the struggle resolved itself into a race of ship-building; both
parties endeavoring to maintain superiority by the creation of ever-
increasing numbers, instead of by crushing the enemy. Such a contest

sufficiently befits a period of peace; it is, for instance, at this moment the
condition of the great naval nations of the world, each of which is
endeavoring to maintain its place in the naval scale by the constant
production and development of material. In war, however, the object is to
put an end to a period of national tension and expense by destroying the
enemy; and the failure of the commanders to effect this object calls for
examination.
The indecisive result on Ontario was due to the particular composition of
the two squadrons; to the absence of strong compelling conditions, such as
made fighting imperative on Barclay upon Erie, and perhaps also on
Downie upon Champlain; and finally, to the extreme wariness of the
commanders, each of whom was deeply impressed with the importance of
preserving his own fleet, in order not to sacrifice control of the lake.
Chauncey has depicted for us his frame of mind in instructions issued at this
very moment—July 14—to his subordinate, Perry. "The first object will be
to destroy or cripple the enemy's fleet; but in all attempts upon the fleet you
ought to use great caution, for the loss of a single vessel may decide the fate
of the campaign."[69] A practical commentary of singular irony was passed
upon this utterance within two months; for by sacrificing a single ship Perry
decided his own campaign in his own favor. Given the spirit of Chauncey's
warning, and also two opponents with fleets so different in constitution that
one is strong where the other is weak, and vice versa, and there is found the
elements of wary and protracted fighting, with a strong chance that neither
will be badly hurt; but also that neither will accomplish much. This is what
happened on Ontario.

THE FLEETS OF CHAUNCEY AND YEO MANŒUVRING ON
LAKE CHAMPLAIN.
Drawn by Carlton T. Chapman.ToList

The relative powers of the two fleets need to be briefly explained; for
they constituted, so to say, the hands in the game which each commander
had to play. The British had six vessels, of varying sizes and rigs, but all
built for war, and sailing fairly well together. They formed therefore a good
manœuvring squadron. The Americans had three vessels built for war, and
at the beginning ten schooners also, not so designed, and not sailing well
with the armaments they bore. Whatever the merits of this or that vessel, the
squadron as a whole manœuvred badly, and its movements were impeded
by the poorer sailors. The contrast in armaments likewise had a very
decisive effect. There were in those days two principal classes of naval
cannon,—long guns, often called simply "guns," and carronades. The guns
had long range with light weight of shot fired; the carronades had short
range and heavy shot. Now in long guns the Americans were four times as
strong as the British, while in carronades the British were twice as strong as
the Americans. It follows that the American commodore should prefer long
range to begin with; whereas the British would be careful not to approach

within long range, unless with such a breeze as would carry him rapidly
down to where his carronades would come into play.
There was another controlling reason why short range favored the British
against the Americans. The schooners of the latter, not being built for war,
carried their guns on a deck unprotected by bulwarks. The men, being
exposed from the feet up, could be swept away by canister, which is a
quantity of small iron balls packed in a case and fired from a cannon. When
discharged, these separate and spread like buckshot, striking many in a
group. They can maim or kill a man, but their range is short and penetrative
power small. A bulwarked vessel was, so to say, armored against canister;
for it makes no difference whether the protection is six inches of wood or
ten of iron, provided it keeps out the projectile. The American schooners
were in this respect wholly vulnerable.
Over-insistence upon details of advantage or disadvantage is often
wearisome, and may be pushed to pettifogging; but these quoted are general
and fundamental. To mention them is not to chaffer over details, but to state
principles. There is one other which should be noted, although its value may
be differently estimated. Of the great long-gun superiority of the Americans
more than one half was in the unprotected schooners; distributed, that is,
among several vessels not built for war, and not capable of acting well
together, so as to concentrate their fire. There is no equality between ten
guns in five such vessels and the same ten concentrated on one deck, under
one captain. That this is not special pleading, to contravene the assertion
advanced by James of great American superiority on Ontario, I may quote
words of my own, written years ago with reference to a British officer: "An
attempt was made to disparage Howe's conduct (in 1778), and to prove that
his force was even superior to that of the French, by adding together the
guns in all his ships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of
his small vessels against D'Estaing's larger units. For this kind of
professional arithmetic Howe felt and expressed just and utter contempt."
[70] So Nelson wrote to the commander of a British cruising squadron,
"Your intentions of attacking the 'Aigle'"—a seventy-four—"with your three
frigates are certainly very laudable, but I do not consider your force by any
means equal to it." The new American ship, the "General Pike," possessed
this advantage of the seventy-four. One discharge of her broadside was
substantially equal to that of the ten schooners, and all her guns were long;

entirely out-ranging the batteries of her antagonists. Under some
circumstances—a good breeze and the windward position—she was
doubtless able to encounter and beat the whole British squadron on Ontario.
But the American schooners were mere gunboats, called to act in conditions
unfavorable to that class of vessel, the record of which for efficiency is
under no circumstances satisfactory.
After leaving Sackett's, Chauncey showed himself off Kingston and then
went up the lake, arriving off Niagara on the evening of July 27. An
abortive attempt, in conjunction with the army, was made upon a position of
the enemy at Burlington Heights, then far in rear of his main line; but it
being found too strong, the fleet, with the troops still on board, bore over to
York and there retaliated the injury done by Yeo at Genesee and Sodus.
There was no opposition; many stores were destroyed or brought away,
some military buildings burned, and the vessels then returned to Niagara.
They were lying there at daybreak of August 7 when the British appeared:
two ships, two brigs, and two large schooners. Chauncey had substantially
his whole force: two ships, the "Pike" and "Madison," the brig "Oneida,"
and ten schooners. He got under way shortly and put out into the lake.
Various manœuvres followed, his principal object being to get to windward
of the enemy; or, when the wind failed, to sweep[71] the schooners close
enough for their long guns to reach; the only useful function they possessed.
These efforts were unsuccessful, and night shut in with the two opponents
sailing in parallel lines, heading north, with the wind at west; the Americans
to leeward and in rear of the British. At two in the morning, in a heavy
squall, two schooners upset, with the loss of all on board save sixteen souls.
Chauncey reckoned these to be among his best, and, as they together
mounted nineteen guns, he considered that "this accident gave the enemy
decidedly the superiority"; another instance of faulty professional
arithmetic, omitting from the account the concentration of power in the
"General Pike."
Yeo did not estimate conditions in the same way, and persisted warily in
keeping the weather gage, watching for a chance to cut off schooners, or for
other favoring opportunity; while Chauncey as diligently sought to gain the
advantage of the wind, to force action with his heavy ships. Manœuvring
continued all day of the 8th, 9th, and 10th. The winds, being light and
shifting, favored now one, now the other; but in no case for long enough to

insure a meeting which the American with good reason desired, and his
antagonist with equal propriety would accept only under conditions that
suited him. At nine in the evening of August 10 the American squadron was
standing northwest, with the wind at southwest, when the British, which
was then following to windward, wore and stood south. Chauncey made no
change in direction, but kept his vessels in two lines; this being the order of
battle by which, not being able to attack himself, he hoped to induce Yeo to
engage incautiously. The six smallest schooners, of the eight now left to
him, were put in the weather line; therefore toward the enemy, if he
persisted in keeping to windward. The lee line, abreast of the other, and six
hundred yards from it, was composed of the "Pike," "Madison," and
"Oneida," astern of which were the two heaviest schooners. The smaller
vessels were displayed as a tempting bait, disposed, as it were, in such
manner that the opponent might hope to lay hands on one or more, without
coming too much under the "Pike's" heavy guns; for her two larger
consorts, carrying carronades chiefly, might be neglected at the distance
named. If such an attempt were made, the schooners' orders were to edge
imperceptibly to leeward, enticing the enemy to follow in his eagerness;
and when he was near enough they were to slip cleverly through the
intervals in the lee line, leaving it to finish the business. The lure was
perhaps a little too obvious, the enemy's innocent forgetfulness of the
dangers to leeward too easily presumed; for a ship does not get out of the
hold of a clear-headed captain as a mob of troops in hot pursuit may at
times escape the control of their officers. In view, however, of Yeo's evident
determination to keep his "fleet in being," by avoiding action except on his
own terms, nothing better was open to Chauncey, unless fortune should
favor him.
At half-past ten the British again wore, now standing northwest after the
American squadron, the rear vessels of which opened fire at eleven (A). At
quarter-past eleven the cannonade became general between the enemy and
the weather line (B). Fifteen minutes later, the four rear schooners of the
latter, which were overmatched when once within carronade range, bore up
and ran to leeward; two taking position on the other side of the main
division, and two astern of it (c, c). So far all went according to plan; but
unhappily the leading two American schooners, instead of keeping away in
obedience to orders, tacked—went about towards the enemy—keeping to
windward (d). Chauncey, seeing the risk involved for them, but

prepossessed with the idea of luring Yeo down by the appearance of flight
set by the schooners, made what can scarcely be considered other than the
mistake of keeping away himself, with the heavy ships; "filled the
maintopsail, and edged away two points, to lead the enemy down, not only
to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him away from the 'Growler'
and 'Julia'" (C). Yeo, equally dominated by a preconceived purpose not to
bring his ships under the guns of the "Pike," acted much as a squirrel would
do with two nuts in sight; he went for the one safely distant from suspected
danger. "He kept his wind," reported Chauncey, "until he had completely
separated those two vessels from the rest of the squadron, exchanged a few
shot with the 'Pike,' as he passed, without injury to us, and made sail after
the two schooners" (e). Some time after midnight these surrendered to odds
plainly irresistible.[72]
The tacking of the two schooners was an act as ill-judged as it was
insubordinate, for which Chauncey was in no wise responsible. His bearing
up was certainly an error, which unfortunately lent itself to the statement,
contemporaneously made by an American paper, that he retreated, leaving
the two vessels to their fate. It was possible, therefore, for Sir James to
word the transaction as he airily did: "At eleven we came within gunshot of
their line of schooners, which opened a heavy fire, their ships keeping off
the wind to prevent our closing. At half-past twelve this ship came within
gunshot of the 'Pike' and 'Madison,' when they immediately bore up, fired
their stern chase-guns, and made sail for Niagara, leaving two of their
schooners astern, which we captured."[73] This gives a more victorious and
dashing air to the success than it quite deserves. As it stood, it was real
enough, though trivial. To take two vessels from a superior fleet, within
range of its commander-in-chief, is a handsome business, which should not
need to be embellished by the implication that a greatly desired fight could
not be had. To quote Marryat, "It is very hard to come at the real truth of
this sort of thing, as I found out during the time that I was in his Majesty's
service." Chauncey's version is perfectly probable. Seeing that the enemy
would not follow, "tacked and stood after him. At twelve (midnight),
finding that I must either separate from the rest of the squadron, or
relinquish the hope of saving the two which had separated, I reluctantly
gave up the pursuit." His reading of Yeo's conduct is plausible. "From what
I have been able to discover of the movements of the enemy, he has no
intention of engaging us, except he can get decidedly the advantage of wind

and weather; and as his vessels in squadron sail better than our squadron, he
can always avoid an action.... He thinks to cut off our small dull sailing
schooners in detail." Here and always Chauncey's conduct reflects the
caution prescribed in his instructions to Perry, rather than the resolute
determination the latter showed to bring matters to an issue. On the other
hand, it is to be remembered that, owing to the nearly equal facilities for
ship-building—for replacing ships lost—possessed by Kingston and
Sackett's, a decisive naval victory would not have the finality of result to be
expected on Lake Erie. Contrary to the usual conditions of naval war, the
two ports, not the fleets dependent on them, were the decisive elements of
the Ontario campaign; and the ignoring of that truth was the fundamental,
irremediable, American error.

PLAN OF CHAUNCEY'S ENGAGEMENT AUGUST 10, 1813ToList

Chauncey returned to Sackett's on August 13, provisioned the squadron
for five weeks, and sailed the same evening. On the 16th he was back off
Niagara, and there again sighted the enemy; but a heavy westerly gale drove

both squadrons to the lower end of the lake, where each entered its own
harbor on the 19th. August 29 the American put out again, having an
additional newly built schooner, named the "Sylph," large and fast, carrying
three or four long 32-pounders. Chauncey reported that he had now nine
vessels with ninety-one guns, but that the enemy was still superior. In
number of guns, possibly; but it is difficult to accept the statement
otherwise, except in the one very important particular of squadron
manœuvring power. This enabled Yeo to avoid action, except when it suited
him to fight; or unless Chauncey was willing to engage first with part only
of his squadron, following it with the rest. Such advantage in manœuvring
greatly increases the ability of the inferior to serve his own cause, but it
does not constitute superiority. The delusion of measuring force by guns,
irrespective of the ships that carry them, has been explained.
Yeo's intermediate movements do not appear, but on September 7 the
antagonists again met off the Niagara River. From that day till the 12th the
American fleet endeavored to force a general action, which the other
steadily, and properly, refused. The persistent efforts of the one to close, and
of the other to avoid, led to a movement round the lake, ending by the
British entering Amherst Bay, five miles west of Kingston. On one
occasion, off the Genesee on September 11, a westerly breeze carried the
United States squadron within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy, before
the latter felt it. A cannonade and pursuit of some hours followed, but
without decisive result. There seems traceable throughout Chauncey's
account a distinct indisposition to what is called technically "a general
chase;" to press on with part of the squadron, trusting to the slower vessels
coming up soon enough to complete the work of the faster. He was
unwilling thus to let his fleet loose. "This ship" (the "General Pike"), "the
'Madison,' and the 'Sylph,' have each a schooner constantly in tow, yet the
others cannot sail as fast as the enemy's squadron, which gives him
decidedly the advantage, and puts it in his power to engage me when and
how he chooses." In such a situation success can be had only by throwing
the more rapid upon the enemy as an advance guard, engaging as they get
within range, relying upon their effecting such detention that the others can
arrive in time to their support. To this recourse, though in halting fashion,
Chauncey finally came on what proved to be his last collision with Yeo,
September 28.

CAPTAIN ISAAC CHAUNCEY.
From the engraving by D. Edwin after the painting by J. Woods.ToList

CAPTAIN SIR JAMES LUCAS YEO
From the engraving by H.R. Cook after the Painting by A. Buck.ToList

FOOTNOTES:

[40] Yeo to Croker, May 26, 1813. Admiralty In-Letters, Records Office.
[41] Captains' Letters, Navy Department.
[42] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 439.
[43] Between July, 1812, and March 25, 1813, Prevost received re-enforcements
amounting in all to 2,175 regulars. His total force then, for all Canada, excluding
militia, was 9,177; of which 2,000 were provincial corps. British Records Office.
[44] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 441.
[45] Chauncey to Navy Department, March 8, 12, and 16, 1813. Captains'
Letters.

[46] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 442.
[47] Captains' Letters.
[48] Captains' Letters, Nov. 5, 1814.
[49] Captains' Letters, May 7, 1813.
[50] Ibid., May 15.
[51] Canadian Archives. C. 678, p. 332.
[52] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 445.
[53] Ibid., p. 449. Armstrong's italics.
[54] Barclay's Narrative before the British Court Martial on the Battle of Lake
Erie. British Records Office.
[55] Prevost to Bathurst, Canadian Archives.
[56] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. i. p. 148.
[57] Barclay's Narrative.
[58] Brown's and Prevost's Reports of this affair may be found in Niles' Register,
vol. iv. pp. 260, 261. That of Yeo is in the Canadian Archives; M. 389, 6, p. 22.
[59] Captains' Letters, June 11, 1813.
[60] Captains' Letters.
[61] The account of these transactions is summarized from American State
Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. pp. 445-449. For Vincent's report of the Stony
Creek affair see Cruikshank's Documentary History of the Campaign on the
Niagara Frontier, 1813, Part II, p. 8.
[62] Smyth's Précis of Wars in Canada, p. 137.
[63] Scott's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 94.
[64] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. pp. 450, 451.
[65] Formerly the "Prince Regent."
[66] Yeo's Report of the Vessels on the Lakes, July 15, 1813. British Records
Office.
[67] Woolsey to Chauncey, June 20 and 21, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[68] Chauncey to the Department, July 5, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[69] Captains' Letters. Navy Department MSS.
[70] "History of the Royal Navy," edited by Sir W.L. Clowes, vol. iii. p. 411.
[71] That is,—row
[72] Chauncey's Report of this cruise is in Captains' Letters, Aug. 13, 1813. Also,
in Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 421.
[73] James, Naval Occurrences. Appendix, p. lxxiv.

CHAPTER XIToC

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKES AND NORTHERN
FRONTIER.
THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

While the movements last related in the preceding chapter were in
progress, the contest for Lake Erie was brought to a final decision. After the
successful transfer of the vessels from Black Rock to Erie, June 18, Perry
remained upon the upper lake superintending all administrative work; but in
particular pressing the equipment of the two brigs ordered by Chauncey the
previous winter. To one of these, on which Perry intended to embark his
own fortunes, was given the name of "Lawrence," the captain of the
"Chesapeake," whose death, heroic in defeat, occurred at this period. The
other was called the "Niagara." They were sister vessels, of five hundred
tons, constructed for war, and brig-rigged; that is, with two masts, and
carrying square sails on both. Their armaments also were alike; eighteen 32-
pounder carronades, and two long 12-pounder guns. They were thus about
equivalent in fighting force to the ocean sloops-of-war, "Wasp" and
"Hornet," which, however, were three-masted. The remainder of the force
would now be called a scratch lot. Three were schooner-rigged gunboats,
built for the navy at Erie; the remainder were the vessels brought from
Black Rock. Of these, one was the brig "Caledonia," formerly British,
captured by Elliott the previous autumn; the others were purchased lake
craft. When finally taking the lake, August 6, the squadron consisted of the
two brigs, of the Black Rock division,—"Caledonia," "Somers," "Tigress,"
"Ohio," and "Trippe,"—and of three other schooners,—"Ariel," "Scorpion,"
and "Porcupine,"—apparently those built at Erie; ten sail, all of which,
except the "Ohio," were in the final decisive battle.

On July 23 the vessels were rigged, armed, and ready for service, but
there were not men enough to man them. How little exacting Perry was in
this matter, and how eager to enter upon active operations, is shown by a
letter from his superior, Chauncey, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated July
8: "I am at a loss," he says, "to account for the change in Captain Perry's
sentiments with respect to the number of men required for the little fleet at
Presqu' Isle; for when I parted with him on the last of May, we coincided in
opinion perfectly as to the number required for each vessel, which was one
hundred and eighty for each of the new brigs, sixty for the 'Caledonia,' and
forty for each of the other vessels, making in all seven hundred and forty
officers and men. But if Captain Perry can beat the enemy with half that
number, no one will feel more happy than myself."[74] Chauncey having
supreme control over both lakes, all re-enforcements from the seaboard
were sent to him; and as he had his own particular enemy on Ontario to
confront, it was evident, and natural, that Perry would be least well served.
Hence, after successive disappointments, and being of more venturous
temper than his superior, it is not surprising that he soon was willing to
undertake his task with fewer men than his unbiased judgment would call
necessary.
The clash of interests between the two squadrons, having a common
superior but separate responsibilities, is seen by a comparison of dates,
which shows operations nearly simultaneous. On July 23 the Erie squadron
was reported "all ready to meet the enemy the moment they are officered
and manned;" on July 20 the "General Pike" was ready, and on the 21st the
Ontario squadron sailed from Sackett's Harbor. On August 5 Perry had his
vessels across the bar at Erie, and next day stood out into the lake. On the
7th Chauncey and Yeo met for their first encounter. On the 8th the two
Ontario schooners, "Hamilton" and "Scourge," were lost with nearly all on
board; and on the 10th the "Julia" and "Growler" were captured. After this,
it may be imagined that Chauncey with difficulty parted with men; and in
the midst of his second collision with Yeo the battle of Lake Erie occurred.
In it, of the one hundred and eighty men deemed necessary by Chauncey,
Perry's brig had one hundred and forty-two, of whom thirty were sick; while
the squadron, with nearly all its vessels present, instead of the intended
seven hundred and forty, had but four hundred and ninety. Of this total,
nearly one hundred were received from the army on August 31, only nine
days before the action. For the most part these were strangers to shipboard.

Barring them, Perry's fighting force was barely more than half that required
by Chauncey's estimate.
Indirectly, and notwithstanding Perry's disposition to make the best of his
difficulty, this condition came near causing his withdrawal from the lake
service; a loss which, had it occurred, might have reversed the issues, for in
few general actions has the personality of the commander counted for so
much, after the battle joined. In a letter of July 26 to Chauncey, he had
written: "The men that came by Mr. Champlin are a motley set, blacks,
soldiers, and boys. I cannot think you saw them after they were selected."
[75] Chauncey replied, somewhat testily, "I regret you are not pleased with
the men sent you; for, to my knowledge, a part of them are not surpassed by
any seamen we have in the fleet; and I have yet to learn that the color of the
skin, or the cut and trimmings of the coat, can affect a man's qualifications
or usefulness." To this he added a warning not much short of a reproof: "As
you have assured the secretary that you should conceive yourself equal or
superior to the enemy, with a force in men so much less than I had deemed
necessary, there will be a great deal expected from you by your country, and
I trust they will not be disappointed in the high expectations formed of your
gallantry and judgment. I will barely make an observation, which was
impressed upon my mind by an old soldier; that is, 'Never despise your
enemy.'"[76]
This advice was sound, rightly weighed. Yet it is not too much to say that
the confidence which carried Perry on to decisive victory has in it
inevitably something of that assurance of success which is akin to contempt
of the enemy, and that it was the precise quality in which Chauncey,
throughout his own career on the lakes, showed himself deficient, and
consequently failed. His plan at that moment, as he himself said in a letter
to Perry of July 14, was "to seek a meeting with Sir James Yeo as soon as
possible, in order to decide the fate of this lake, and join you immediately
after." This was an intelligent project: to beat one enemy first, and then
carry his force over to beat the other; but never, when in presence of his
antagonist, could he despise him sufficiently to cut his gunboats adrift, and
throw one or two vessels into the midst of the fire, as Perry rushed his own
ship in, had her cut to pieces,—and won. It is even worse to respect your
enemy too greatly than to despise him. Said Farragut, speaking of an officer
he highly valued: "Drayton does not know fear, but he believes in acting as

if the enemy never can be caught unprepared; whereas I believe in judging
him by ourselves, and my motto in action is, 'L'audace, et encore de
l'audace, et toujours de l'audace!'" This described Perry in battle.
Although Chauncey closed with expressions of confidence which might
be considered conciliatory, Perry experienced an annoyance which was
natural, though excessive. He was only twenty-eight, quick of temper,
though amiable, and somewhat prone to see more offence than was
intended. When the letter reached him, the squadron had just crossed the
bar; the most critical movement of the campaign, had the enemy been duly
watchful. Having accomplished this, he had before him only the common
vicissitudes of naval warfare. Nevertheless, under his first impulse of
resentment, he applied to be removed from the station,[77] giving as his
reason, not the quality of men sent, concerning which indeed he had said, "I
am pleased to see anything in the shape of a man," but that "I cannot serve
under an officer who has been so totally regardless of my feelings." He then
summarized the difficulties with which he had contended, and added, "The
critical state of General Harrison was such that I took upon myself the
responsibility of going out with the few young officers you had been
pleased to send me," (Elliott, the second in command, did not arrive till the
squadron was over the bar), "with the few seamen I had, and as many
volunteers as I could muster from the militia. I did not shrink from this
responsibility; but, Sir, at that very moment I surely did not anticipate the
receipt of a letter in every line of which is an insult." He then renewed his
request. "I am willing to forego that reward which I have considered for two
months past almost within my grasp." Fortunately for the renown of the
service, from which one of its finest actions might have been lost, it was
impossible to grant his application until after the battle had made the
question of the command on Lake Erie one of very minor importance. The
secretary replied to him with words in which rebuke and appreciation were
aptly blended. "A change of commander, under existing circumstances, is
equally inadmissible as it respects the interest of the service and your own
reputation. It is right that you should reap the harvest which you have
sown."[78]

CAPTAIN OLIVER HAZARD PERRY.
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart in the possession of O.H. Perry,
Esq.ToList

After the Frenchtown disaster[79] of January 22, 1813, the Army of the
Northwest under General Harrison had remained strictly on the defensive
throughout the spring and summer. The tenure of its position on the
Maumee River depended upon Fort Meigs, built during the winter just
above the Rapids, some twenty miles from the lake. Thirty miles east of
Meigs was Fort Stephenson at the mouth of the Sandusky River, protecting
the approaches to Sandusky Bay, near which were Harrison's headquarters
at the time Perry's squadron was ready to move. Fort Stephenson by its
situation contributed also to secure the communications of the Maumee line
with Central Ohio, and was an obstacle to an enemy's approach by land to
Erie, a hundred and fifty miles further east. It was not, however, a work
permanent in character, like Meigs; and neither post could be considered
secure, because inadequately garrisoned. Fortunately, the general tenor of
the instructions received by Procter from Prevost conspired with his own

natural character to indispose him to energetic measures. His force of
regulars was small; and he had not the faculty, which occasional white men
have shown, to arouse vigorous and sustained activity in the Indians, of
whom he had an abundance at call. The use of them in desultory guerilla
warfare, which was prescribed to him by Prevost, became in his hands
ineffective. Nevertheless, from the number known to be under his
command, and the control of the water enabling him to land where he
would, the threat of savage warfare hung over the frontier like a pall, until
finally dissipated by Perry's victory.
The danger to British control of the water, and thereby to the
maintenance of their position in the northwest, if the American fleet now
building should succeed in getting upon the lake, was perfectly apparent,
and made Erie a third and principal point of interest. At the time of Perry's
arrival, March 27, the place was entirely defenceless, and without any
organization for defence, although the keels of the two brigs were laid, and
the three gunboats well advanced in construction. By a visit to Pittsburgh he
obtained from an army ordnance officer four small guns, with some
muskets; and upon his application the local commander of Pennsylvania
militia stationed at Erie five hundred men, who remained till the vessels
crossed the bar. Under this slender protection went on the arduous work of
building and equipping a squadron in what was substantially a wilderness,
to which most of the mechanics and material had to be brought half a
thousand miles from the seaboard, under the difficulties of transport in
those days. The rapid advance in the preparations aroused the disquietude of
the British, but Procter had not the enterprising temper to throw all upon the
hazard, for the sake of destroying an armament which, if completed, might
destroy him; while the British inferiority of force on Lake Ontario and the
Niagara peninsula, together with the movement of Chauncey and Dearborn
resulting in the capture of York, April 27, effectually prevented intervention
from that quarter in the affairs of Lake Erie. At this time Procter made his
first effort of the season, directed against Fort Meigs, which he held
besieged for over a week,—from May 1 to May 9. Although unable to
capture it, the mismanagement of an American relief force enabled him to
inflict a very severe loss; a corps of eight hundred and sixty-six men being
cut to pieces or captured, only one hundred and seventy escaping. The chief
points of interest in this business are the demonstration of the weakness of
the American frontier,—the principal defence of which was thus not merely

braved but threatened,—and the effect of control of the water. By it Procter
brought over gunboats which ascended the river, and guns of a weight not
to be transported by land. The lake also secured his communications.
After the failure before Meigs, Procter turned his attention more seriously
to the situation at Erie, and demanded re-enforcements to enable him to
attack the place.[80] Prevost, being commander-in-chief for all Canada,
recognized the expediency of the move, and wrote him, June 20, that he had
directed General De Rottenburg at Niagara, to push on re-enforcements and
supplies; but Prevost was in Kingston, and De Rottenburg, immediately
responsible for Niagara, wrote declining to weaken his force. He was
already inferior to the United States army under Boyd, which was then
confronting him, resting upon Fort George; and there was the prospect also
that Chauncey might regain control of the lake. Instead of co-operation for
offence, he transmitted arrangements for retreat in case of a disaster to Yeo
on Ontario. Procter enclosed this letter to the commander-in-chief,
remarking pathetically that he was fully confident of receiving aid from
him, but intentions were of no avail. Had the force ordered been sent, he felt
sure of destroying the fleet at Erie, thus securing the command of the lake,
which would have benefited also the centre [Niagara] division. He should
now, he said, make an attempt upon Sandusky; Erie was impossible without
re-enforcements. At the same time, July 13, Captain Barclay was about to
sail for Long Point, on the Canada shore directly opposite Erie, to embark
one hundred troops, and then to endeavor to retain the American fleet in
port until the required assistance could be sent. The new British ship
"Detroit" was nearly ready for launching at Amherstburg, and could be
equipped and gunned there; but seamen were absolutely needed.
In accordance with these plans Barclay went with his squadron to Long
Point. There the desired soldiers were refused him; and, as also no seamen
were forthcoming, he wrote on July 16 a letter directly to Sir George
Prevost, "lest Sir James Yeo should be on the lake," representing the critical
state of affairs, owing to the inadequate equipment of his vessels, the want
of seamen, and the advanced preparations of the Americans to put afloat a
force superior to his. July 20 he appeared off Erie, where Perry's fleet was
still in the harbor, waiting for men. How imminent the exposure of the
American flotilla at that moment, and how great the British opportunity,
appears from the recently published memoirs of a prominent resident.[81]

"An English fleet of five vessels of war was at that time cruising off the
harbor, in full view. That fleet might at any time have sent in its boats
during a dark night, and the destruction of the whole American fleet was
almost inevitable; for Perry's force was totally inadequate to its defence,
and the regiment of Pennsylvania militia, stationed at Erie expressly for the
defence of the fleet, refused to keep guard at night on board. 'I told the boys
to go, Captain,' said the worthless colonel of the regiment, 'but the boys
won't go.'" Like American merchant ships, American militia obeyed or
disobeyed as they pleased. Two hundred soldiers, loaned by Dearborn when
the Black Rock flotilla came round, had been recalled July 10. On the 23d
and 30th re-enforcements were received from Chauncey, in all one hundred
and thirty men. With these, and some landsmen enlisted on the spot for four
months, the force of the squadron, estimated to require seven hundred and
forty men, was raised to three hundred; but having lately received two
pressing letters from the Navy Department, urging General Harrison's
critical need of co-operation, Perry determined to go out. Most opportunely
for his purpose, Barclay disappeared on the 30th, Friday, which thus for him
made good its title to "unlucky." He was absent until August 4, and was by
the Americans believed to have gone to Long Point. Before his Court
Martial he merely stated that "I blockaded as closely as I could, until I one
morning saw the whole of the enemy's force over the bar, and in a most
formidable state of preparation." The Court did not press inquiry on the
point, which perhaps lay beyond its instructions; but the double failure, to
intercept the Black Rock division on its way to Erie,[82] and to prevent the
crossing of the bar, were serious strategic misadventures when confronting
superior numbers. Perry's preparations for the passage had been for some
time completed, but information of contemplated movements travelled so
easily from shore to shore that he gave no indication of immediate action
until Sunday. On that day the officers were permitted to disperse in town as
usual, but afterwards were hastily summoned back, and the vessels moved
down to the bar, on which the depth ordinarily was from five to seven feet,
much less than needed for the "Lawrence" and "Niagara." This obstacle,
hitherto a protection against naval attack, now imposed an extremely
critical operation; for to get over, the brigs must be lightened of their guns
and their hulls lifted upon floats. So situated, they were helplessly exposed
to destruction, as far as their own powers went.

From point to point the mouth of the harbor, where the outer bar occurs,
was eight tenths of a mile wide. As shown by a sketch of the period, the
distance to be travelled on the floats, from deep water within to deep water
without, was a mile; rather less than more. On Monday morning, August 2,
the movement of the vessels began simultaneously. Five of the smaller,
which under usual conditions could pass without lightening, were ordered
to cross and take positions outside, covering the channel; a sixth, with the
"Niagara," were similarly posted within. The protection thus afforded was
re-enforced by three 12-pounder long guns, mounted on the beach, abreast
the bar; distant not over five hundred yards from the point where the
channel issued on the lake. While these dispositions were being made, the
"Lawrence's" guns were hoisted out, and placed in boats to be towed astern
of her; the floats taken alongside, filled, sunk, and made fast, so that when
pumped out their rising would lift the brig. In the course of these
preparations it was found that the water had fallen to four feet, so that even
the schooners had to be lightened, while the transit of the "Lawrence" was
rendered more tedious and difficult. The weather, however, was propitious,
with a smooth lake; and although the brig grounded in the shoalest spot,
necessitating a second sinking of the burden-bearing floats,—appropriately
called "camels,"—perseverance protracted through that night and the day of
the 3d carried her outside. At 8 A.M. of the 4th she was fairly afloat. Guns,
singly light in weight as hers were, were quickly hoisted on board and
mounted; but none too soon, for the enemy appeared almost immediately.
The "Niagara's" passage was more easily effected, and Barclay offered no
molestation. In a letter to the Department, dated August 4, 1813, 9 P.M.,
Perry reported, "I have great pleasure in informing you that I have
succeeded in getting over the bar the United States vessels, the 'Lawrence,'
'Niagara,' 'Caledonia,' 'Ariel,' 'Scorpion,' 'Somers,' 'Tigress,' and
'Porcupine.'" He added, "The enemy have been in sight all day." The vessels
named, with the schooner "Ohio" and the sloop "Trippe," constituted the
entire squadron.

PLAN OF ERIE HARBOR 1814ToList

While Perry was thus profitably employed, Procter had embarked on
another enterprise against the magazines on the American front of
operations. His intention, as first reported to Prevost, was to attack
Sandusky; but the conduct of the Indians, upon the co-operation of whom
he had to rely, compelled him to diverge to Fort Meigs. Here the savages
began to desert, an attempt to draw the garrison into an ambush having
failed; and when Procter, after two days' stay, determined to revert to
Sandusky, he was accompanied by "as many hundred of them as there
should have been thousands." The white troops went on by water, the
Indians by the shore. They appeared before Fort Stephenson on Sunday,
August 1. The garrison was summoned, with the customary intimation of
the dire consequences to be apprehended from the savages in case of an
assault. The American commander, Major Croghan, accepted these
possibilities, and the following day, during which the "Lawrence" was
working her way over Erie bar, the artillery and the guns of the gunboats
were busy battering the northwest angle of the fort. At 4 P.M. an assault was
made. It was repelled with heavy loss to the assailants, and little to the
besieged. That night the baffled enemy withdrew to Malden.

The American squadron having gained the lake and mounted its batteries,
Barclay found himself like Chauncey while awaiting the "General Pike."
His new and most powerful vessel, the ship "Detroit," was approaching
completion. He was now too inferior in force to risk action when he might
expect her help so soon, and he therefore retired to Malden. Perry was thus
left in control of Lake Erie. He put out on August 6; but, failing to find the
enemy, he anchored again off Erie, to take on board provisions, and also
stores to be carried to Sandusky for the army. While thus occupied, there
came on the evening of the 8th the welcome news that a re-enforcement of
officers and seamen was approaching. On the 10th, these joined him to the
number of one hundred and two. At their head was Commander Jesse D.
Elliott, an officer of reputation, who became second in command to Perry,
and took charge of the "Niagara."
On August 12 the squadron finally made sail for the westward, not to
return to Erie till the campaign was decided. Its intermediate movements
possess little interest, the battle of Lake Erie being so conspicuously the
decisive incident as to reduce all preceding it to insignificance. Perry was
off Malden on August 25, and again on September 1. The wind on the latter
day favoring movement both to go and come, a somewhat rare
circumstance, he remained all day reconnoitring near the harbor's mouth.
The British squadron appeared complete in vessels and equipment; but
Barclay had his own troubles about crews, as had his antagonist, his
continual representations to Yeo meeting with even less attention than Perry
conceived himself to receive from Chauncey. He was determined to
postpone action until re-enforcements of seamen should arrive from the
eastward, unless failure of provisions, already staring him in the face,
should force him to battle in order to re-establish communications by the
lake.
The headquarters of the United States squadron was at Put-in Bay, in the
Bass Islands, a group thirty miles southeast of Malden. The harbor was
good, and the position suitable for watching the enemy, in case he should
attempt to pass eastward down the lake, towards Long Point or elsewhere.
Hither Perry returned on September 6, after a brief visit to Sandusky Bay,
where information was received that the British leaders had determined that
the fleet must, at all hazards, restore intercourse with Long Point. From
official correspondence, afterwards captured with Procter's baggage, it

appears that the Amherstburg and Malden district was now entirely
dependent for flour upon Long Point, access to which had been effectually
destroyed by the presence of the American squadron. Even cattle, though
somewhat more plentiful, could no longer be obtained in the neighborhood
in sufficient numbers, owing to the wasteful way in which the Indians had
killed where they wanted. They could not be restrained without alienating
them, or, worse, provoking them to outrage. Including warriors and their
families, fourteen thousand were now consuming provisions. In the
condition of the roads, only water transport could meet the requirements;
and that not by an occasional schooner running blockade, but by the free
transit of supplies conferred by naval control. To the decision to fight may
have been contributed also a letter from Prevost, who had been drawn down
from Kingston to St. David's, on the Niagara frontier, by his anxiety about
the general situation, particularly aroused by Procter's repulse from Fort
Stephenson. Alluding to the capture of Chauncey's two schooners on
August 10, he wrote Procter on the 22d, "Yeo's experience should convince
Barclay that he has only to dare and he will be successful."[83] It was to be
Sir George's unhappy lot, a year later, to goad the British naval commander
on Lake Champlain into premature action; and there was ample time for the
present indiscreet innuendo to reach Barclay, and impel him to a step which
Prevost afterwards condemned as hasty, because not awaiting the arrival of
a body of fifty seamen announced to be at Kingston on their way to Malden.
At sunrise of September 10, the lookout at the masthead of the
"Lawrence" sighted the British squadron in the northwest. Barclay was on
his way down the lake, intending to fight. The wind was southwest, fair for
the British, but adverse to the Americans quitting the harbor by the channel
leading towards the enemy. Fortunately it shifted to southeast, and there
steadied; which not only enabled them to go out, but gave them the
windward position throughout the engagement. The windward position, or
weather gage, as it was commonly called, conferred the power of initiative;
whereas the vessel or fleet to leeward, while it might by skill at times force
action, or itself obtain the weather gage by manœuvring, was commonly
obliged to await attack and accept the distance chosen by the opponent.
Where the principal force of a squadron, as in Perry's case, consists in two
vessels armed almost entirely with carronades, the importance of getting
within carronade range is apparent.

Looking forward to a meeting, Perry had prearranged the disposition of
his vessels to conform to that which he expected the enemy to assume.
Unlike ocean fleets, all the lake squadrons, as is already known of Ontario,
were composed of vessels very heterogeneous in character. This was
because the most had been bought, not designed for the navy. It was
antecedently probable, therefore, that a certain general principle would
dictate the constitution of the three parts of the order of battle, the centre
and two flanks, into which every military line divides. The French have an
expression for the centre,—corps de bataille,—which was particularly
appropriate to squadrons like those of Barclay and Perry. Each had a natural
"body of battle," in vessels decisively stronger than all the others combined.
This relatively powerful division would take the centre, as a cohesive force,
to prevent the two ends—or flanks—being driven asunder by the enemy.
Barclay's vessels of this class were the new ship, "Detroit," and the "Queen
Charlotte;" Perry's were the "Lawrence" and "Niagara." Each had an
intermediate vessel; the British the "Lady Prevost," the Americans the
"Caledonia." In addition to these were the light craft, three British and six
Americans; concerning which it is to be said that the latter were not only
the more numerous, but individually much more powerfully armed.
The same remark is true, vessel for vessel, of those opposed to one
another by Perry's plan; that is, measuring the weight of shot discharged at a
broadside, which is the usual standard of comparison, the "Lawrence" threw
more metal than the "Detroit," the "Niagara" much more than the "Queen
Charlotte," and the "Caledonia," than the "Lady Prevost." This, however,
must be qualified by the consideration, more conspicuously noticeable on
Ontario than on Erie, of the greater length of range of the long gun. This
applies particularly to the principal British vessel, the "Detroit." Owing to
the difficulties of transportation, and the demands of the Ontario squadron,
her proper armament had not arrived. She was provided with guns from the
ramparts of Fort Malden, and a more curiously composite battery probably
never was mounted; but, of the total nineteen, seventeen were long guns. It
is impossible to say what her broadside may have weighed. All her pieces
together fired two hundred and thirty pounds, but it is incredible that a
seaman like Barclay should not so have disposed them as to give more than
half that amount to one broadside. That of the "Lawrence," was three
hundred pounds; but all her guns, save two twelves, were carronades.

Compared with the "Queen Charlotte," the battery of the "Niagara" was as 3
to 2; both chiefly carronades.
From what has been stated, it is evident that if Perry's plan were carried
out, opposing vessel to vessel, the Americans would have a superiority of at
least fifty per cent. Such an advantage, in some quarter at least, is the aim of
every capable commander; for the object of war is not to kill men, but to
carry a point: not glory by fighting, but success in result. The only obvious
dangers were that the wind might fail or be very light, which would unduly
protract exposure to long guns before getting within carronade range; or
that, by some vessels coming tardily into action, one or more of the others
would suffer from concentration of the enemy's fire. It was this
contingency, realized in fact, which gave rise to the embittered controversy
about the battle; a controversy never settled, and probably now not
susceptible of settlement, because the President of the United States, Mr.
Monroe, pigeonholed the charges formulated by Perry against Elliott in
1818. There is thus no American sworn testimony to facts, searched and
sifted by cross-examination; for the affidavits submitted on the one side and
the other were ex parte, while the Court of Inquiry, asked by Elliott in 1815,
neglected to call all accessible witnesses—notably Perry himself. In fact,
there was not before it a single commanding officer of a vessel engaged.
Such a procedure was manifestly inadequate to the requirement of the Navy
Department's letter to the Court, that "a true statement of the facts in
relation to Captain Elliott's conduct be exhibited to the world."
Investigation seems to have been confined to an assertion in a British
periodical, based upon the proceedings of the Court Martial upon Barclay,
to the effect that Elliott's vessel "had not been engaged, and was making
away,"[84] at the time when Perry "was obliged to leave his ship, which soon
after surrendered, and hoist his flag on board another of his squadron." The
American Court examined two officers of Perry's vessel, and five of
Elliott's; no others. To the direct question, "Did the 'Niagara' at any time
during the action attempt to make off from the British fleet?" all replied,
"No." The Court, therefore, on the testimony before it, decided that the
charge "made in the proceedings[85] of the British Court Martial ... was
malicious, and unfounded in fact;" expressing besides its conviction "that
the attempts to wrest from Captain Elliott the laurels he gained in that
splendid victory ... ought in no wise to lessen him in the opinion of his
fellow citizens as a brave and skilful officer." At the same time it regretted

that "imperious duty compelled it to promulgate testimony which appears
materially to differ in some of its most important points."
In this state the evidence still remains, owing to the failure of the
President to take action, probably with a benevolent desire to allay discord,
and envelop facts under a kindly "All's well that ends well." Perry died a
year after making his charges, which labored under the just imputation that
he had commended Elliott in his report, and again immediately afterwards,
though in terms that his subordinate thought failed to do him justice.
American naval opinion divided, apparently in very unequal numbers.
Elliott's officers stood by him, as was natural; for men feel themselves
involved in that which concerns the conduct of their ship, and see incidents
in that light. Perry's officers considered that the "Lawrence" had not been
properly supported; owing to which, after losses almost unparalleled, she
had to undergo the mortification of surrender. Her heroism, her losses, and
her surrender, were truths beyond question.
The historian to-day thus finds himself in the dilemma that the American
testimony is in two categories, distinctly contradictory and mutually
destructive; yet to be tested only by his own capacity to cross-examine the
record, and by reference to the British accounts. The latter are impartial, as
between the American parties; their only bias is to constitute a fair case for
Barclay, by establishing the surrender of the American flagship and the
hesitancy of the "Niagara" to enter into action. This would indicate victory
so far, changed to defeat by the use Perry made of the vessel preserved to
him intact by the over-caution of his second. Waiving motives, these claims
are substantially correct, and constitute the analysis of the battle as fought
and won.
Barclay, finding the wind to head him and place him to leeward, arranged
his fleet to await attack in the following order, from van to rear: The
schooner "Chippewa," "Detroit," "Hunter," "Queen Charlotte," "Lady
Prevost," "Little Belt."[86] This, he said in his official letter, was "according
to a given plan, so that each ship [that is, the "Detroit" and "Queen
Charlotte"] might be supported against the superior force of the two brigs
opposed to them." The British vessels lay in column, in each other's wake,
by the wind on the port tack, hove-to (stopped) with a topsail to the mast,
heading to the southwest (position 1). Perry now modified some details of
his disposition. It had been expected that the "Queen Charlotte" would

precede the "Detroit," and the American commander had therefore placed
the "Niagara" leading, as designated to fight the "Charlotte," the
"Lawrence" following the "Niagara." This order was now reversed, and the
"Caledonia" interposed between the two; the succession being "Lawrence,"
"Caledonia," "Niagara." Having more schooners than the enemy, he placed
in the van two of the best, the "Scorpion" and the "Ariel"; the other four
behind the "Niagara." His centre, therefore, the "Lawrence," "Caledonia,"
and "Niagara," were opposed to the "Detroit," "Hunter," and "Queen
Charlotte." The long guns of the "Ariel," "Scorpion," and "Caledonia"
supplied in measure the deficiency of gun power in the "Lawrence," while
standing down outside of carronade range; the "Caledonia," with the rear
schooners, giving a like support to the "Niagara." The "Ariel," and perhaps
also the "Scorpion," was ordered to keep a little to windward of the
"Lawrence." This was a not uncommon use of van vessels, making more
hazardous any attempt of the opponent to tack and pass to windward, in
order to gain the weather gage with its particular advantages (position 1).
The rear four schooners, as is frequently the case in long columns, were
straggling somewhat at the time the signal to bear down was made; and they
had difficulty in getting into action, being compelled to resort to the sweeps
because the wind was light. It is not uncommon to see small vessels with
low sails thus retarded, while larger are being urged forward by their lofty
light canvas. The line otherwise having been formed, Perry stood down
without regard to them. At quarter before noon the "Detroit" opened upon
the "Lawrence" with her long guns. Ten minutes later the Americans began
to reply. Finding the British fire at this range more destructive than he had
anticipated, Perry made more sail upon the Lawrence. Word had already
been passed by hail of trumpet to close up in the line, and for each vessel to
come into action against her opponent, before designated. The "Lawrence"
continued thus to approach obliquely, using her own long twelves, and
backed by the long guns of the vessels ahead and astern, till she was within
"canister range," apparently about two hundred and fifty yards, when she
turned her side to the wind on the weather quarter of the "Detroit," bringing
her carronade battery to bear (position 2). This distance was greater than
desirable for carronades; but with a very light breeze, little more than two
miles an hour, there was a limit to the time during which it was prudent to
allow an opponent's raking fire to play, unaffected in aim by any reply.
Moreover, much of her rigging was already shot away, and she was

becoming unmanageable. The battle was thus joined by the commander-in-
chief; but, while supported to his satisfaction by the "Scorpion" and "Ariel"
ahead, and "Caledonia" astern, with their long guns, the "Niagara" did not
come up, and her carronades failed to do their share. The captain of her
opponent, the "Queen Charlotte," finding that his own carronades would not
reach her, made sail ahead, passed the "Hunter," and brought his battery to
the support of the "Detroit" in her contest with the "Lawrence" (Q2). Perry's
vessel thus found herself under the combined fire of the "Detroit," "Queen
Charlotte," and in some measure of the "Hunter"; the armament of the last,
however, was too trivial to count for much.
Elliott's first placing of the "Niagara" may, or may not, have been
judicious as regards his particular opponent. The "Queen Charlotte's"
twenty-fours would not reach him; and it may be quite proper to take a
range where your own guns can tell and your enemy's cannot. Circumstance
must determine. The precaution applicable in a naval duel may cease to be
so when friends are in need of assistance; and when the British captain,
seeing how the case stood, properly and promptly carried his ship forward
to support his commander, concentrating two vessels upon Perry's one, the
situation was entirely changed. The plea set up by Cooper, who fought
Elliott's battle conscientiously, but with characteristic bitterness as well as
shrewdness, that the "Niagara's" position, assigned in the line behind the
"Caledonia," could not properly be left without signal, practically
surrenders the case. It is applying the dry-rot system of fleet tactics in the
middle of the eighteenth century to the days after Rodney and Nelson, and
is further effectually disposed of by the consentient statement of several of
the American captains, that their commander's dispositions were made with
reference to the enemy's order; that is, that he assigned a special enemy's
ship to a special American, and particularly the "Detroit" to the "Lawrence,"
and the "Queen Charlotte" to the "Niagara." The vessels of both fleets being
so heterogeneous, it was not wise to act as with units nearly homogeneous,
by laying down an order, the governing principle of which was mutual
support by a line based upon its own intrinsic qualities. The considerations
dictating Perry's dispositions were external to his fleet, not internal; in the
enemy's order, not in his own. This was emphasized by his changing the
previously arranged stations of the "Lawrence" and the "Niagara," when he
saw Barclay's line. Lastly, he re-enforced all this by quoting to his

subordinates Nelson's words, that no captain could go very far wrong who
placed his vessel close alongside those of the enemy.

DIAGRAM OF THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE SEPTEMBER 10,
1813ToList

Cooper, the ablest of Elliott's champions, has insisted so strongly upon
the obligation of keeping the station in the line, as laid down, that it is
necessary to examine the facts in the particular case. He rests the certainty
of his contention on general principles, then long exploded, and further
upon a sentence in Perry's charges, preferred in 1818, that "the commanding
officer [Perry] issued, 1st, an order directing in what manner the line of
battle should be formed ... and enjoined upon the commanders to preserve
their stations in the line" thus laid down.[87] This is correct; but Cooper
omits to give the words immediately following in the specification: "and in
all cases to keep as near the commanding officer's vessel [the "Lawrence"]
as possible."[88] Cooper also omits that which next succeeds: "2d, An order
of attack, in which the 'Lawrence' was designated to attack the enemy's new
ship (afterwards ascertained to have been named the 'Detroit'), and the
'Niagara' designated to attack the 'Queen Charlotte,' which orders were then
communicated to all the commanders, including the said Captain Elliott,
who for that purpose ... were by signal called together by the said
commanding officer ... and expressly instructed that 'if, in the expected
engagement, they laid their vessels close alongside of those of the enemy,
they could not be out of the way.'"[89] An officer, if at once gallant and

intelligent, finding himself behind a dull sailing vessel, as Cooper tells us
the "Caledonia" was, could hardly desire clearer authority than the above to
imitate his commanding officer when he made sail to close the enemy:
—"Keep close to him," and follow up the ship which "the 'Niagara' was
designated to attack."
Charges preferred are not technical legal proof, but, if duly scrutinized,
they are statements equivalent in value to many that history rightly accepts;
and, at all events, that which Cooper quotes is not duly scrutinized if that
which he does not quote is omitted. He does indeed express a gloss upon
them, in the words: "Though the 'Niagara' was ordered to direct her fire at
the 'Queen Charlotte,' it could only be done from her station astern of the
'Caledonia,' ... without violating the primary order to preserve the line."[90]
This does not correctly construe the natural meaning of Perry's full
instructions. It is clear that, while he laid down a primary formation, "a line
of battle," he also most properly qualified it by a contingent instruction, an
"order of attack," designed to meet the emergency likely to occur in every
fleet engagement, and which occurred here, when a slavish adherence to the
line of battle would prevent intelligent support to the main effort. If he
knew naval history, as his quotation from Nelson indicates, he also knew
how many a battle had been discreditably lost by "keeping the line."
With regard to the line, however, it is apt to remark that in fleet battle,
unless otherwise specially directed, the line of the assailant was supposed to
be parallel to that of the defence, for the obvious reason that the attacking
vessels should all be substantially at the same effective range. This distance,
equal for all in fleets as usually constituted, would naturally be set, and in
practice was set, by the commander-in-chief; his ship forming the point
through which should be drawn the line parallel to the enemy. This rule,
well established under Rodney, who died in 1792, was rigidly applicable
between vessels of the same force, such as the "Lawrence" and "Niagara;"
and whatever deductions might be made for the case of a light-framed
vessel, armed with long guns, like the "Caledonia," keeping out of
carronade distance of an opponent with heavy scantling, would not in the
least apply to the "Niagara." For her, the standard of position was not, as
Cooper insists, a half-cable's length from her next ahead, the "Caledonia;"
but abreast her designated opponent, at the same distance as the "Lawrence"
from the enemy's line. Repeated mishaps had established the rule that

position was to be taken from the centre,—that is, from the commander-in-
chief. Ships in line of battle, bearing down upon an enemy in like order, did
not steer in each other's wake, unless specially ordered; and there is
something difficult to understand in the "Niagara" with her topsail sharp
aback to keep from running on board the "Caledonia," although the fact is
in evidence. The expression in Perry's report of the action, "at 10 A.M. ...
formed the line and bore up," would by a person familiar with naval battles
be understood to mean that the line was first formed parallel to the enemy,
the vessels following one another, after which they steered down for him,
changing course together; they would then no longer be in each other's
wake, but in echelon, or as the naval phrase then went, in bow and quarter
line. Barclay confirms this, "At 10 the enemy bore up under easy sail, in a
line abreast."[91] Thus, when the distance desired by the commander-in-
chief was reached,—a fact more often indicated by his example than by
signal,—the helm would bring them again in line of battle, their broadsides
bearing upon the enemy.
The technical point at issue is whether Perry, finding the long-gun fire of
the "Detroit" more destructive than he had anticipated, and determining in
consequence to shorten the period of its duration by changing his original
plan, increasing sail beyond the speed of such slower vessels as the
"Caledonia," had a right to expect that his subordinates would follow his
example. In the opinion of the writer, he had, in the then condition of the
theory and practice of fleet battles; his transfer of his own position
transferred the line of battle in its entirety to the distance relative to the
enemy which he himself was seeking to assume. Were other authority
lacking, his action was warrant to his captains; but the expression in his
report, "I made sail, and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose
of closing with the enemy," causes increased regret that the exact facts were
not ascertained by cross-examination before a Court-Martial.
Elliott's place therefore was alongside the "Queen Charlotte," so to
engage her that she could attend to nothing else. This he did not do, and for
failure the only possible excuse was inability, through lack of wind. The
wind was light throughout, yet not so light but that the "Lawrence" closed
with the "Detroit," and the "Queen Charlotte" with her flagship when she
wished. None of Elliott's witnesses before the Court of Inquiry state that he
made sail before the middle of the action, but they attribute the failure to get

down to the lightness of the wind. They do state that, after the "Lawrence"
was disabled, a breeze springing up, sail was made; which indicates that
previously it had not been. Again, it is alleged by the testimony in favor of
Elliott that much of the time the maintopsail was sharp aback, to keep from
running into the "Caledonia;" a circumstance upon which Cooper dwells
triumphantly, as showing that the "Niagara" was not by the wind and was in
her place, close astern of the "Caledonia." Accepting the statements, they
would show there was wind enough to fan the "Niagara" to—what was
really her place—her commodore's aid; for in those days the distance
between under fire and out of fire for efficient action was a matter of half a
mile.[92] Perry's formulated charge, addressed to the Navy Department, and
notified to Elliott, but never brought to trial, was that when coming into
action an order was passed by trumpet for the vessels astern to close up in
the line; that a few moments previously to the enemy's opening fire the
"Niagara" had been within hail of the "Lawrence," and nevertheless she was
allowed to drop astern, and for two hours to remain at such distance from
the enemy as to render useless all her battery except the two long guns.
Perry himself made sail at the time the hail by trumpet was passed. The
"Niagara" did not.
There is little reason for doubt that the tenor of Perry's instructions
required Elliott to follow the "Queen Charlotte," and no doubt whatever that
military propriety imperiously demanded it of him. The question of wind
must be matter of inference from the incidents above stated: the movement
of the "Lawrence" and "Queen Charlotte," and the bracing aback of the
"Niagara's" topsail. A sentence in Perry's report apparently, but only
apparently, attenuates the force of these. He said, "At half-past two, the
wind springing up, Captain Elliott was enabled to bring his vessel, the
'Niagara,' gallantly into close action." Alluding to, without insisting on,
Perry's subsequent statement that he endeavored to give as favorable a color
as possible to Elliott's course, it is clear enough that these words simply
state that Captain Elliott at 2.30 reached the range at which the "Lawrence"
had fought since a little after noon.
Quitting now the discussion of proprieties, the order of events seems to
have been as follows: Perry having taken the initiative of bearing down,
under increased sail, Elliott remained behind, governed by, or availing
himself of—two very different motives, not lightly to be determined, or

assumed, by the historian—the technical point, long before abandoned in
practice, that he could not leave his place in the line without a signal. Thus
his action was controlled by the position of his next ahead in the line, the
dull-sailing "Caledonia," a vessel differing radically from his own in
armament, having two long and for that day heavy guns, quite equal in
range and efficiency to the best of the "Detroit's,"[93] and therefore capable
of good service, though possibly not of their best, from the distance at
which Perry changed his speed. Elliott's battery was the same as Perry's. He
thus continued until it became evident that, the "Queen Charlotte" having
gone to the support of the "Detroit," the "Lawrence" was heavily
overpowered. Then, not earlier than an hour after Perry bore down, he
realized that his commander-in-chief would be destroyed under his eyes,
unless he went to his support, and he himself would rest under the
imputation of an inefficient spectator. He ordered the "Caledonia" to bear
up, in order that he might pass (position 3; C1, C2). Though not
demonstrably certain, it seems probable that the wind, light throughout, was
now so fallen as to impede the retrieval of his position; the opportunity to
close, used by Perry, had passed away. At all events it was not till between 2
and 2.30 that the "Niagara" arrived on the scene, within effective range of
the carronades which constituted nine tenths of her battery.
With this began the second stage of the battle (3). Perry's bearing down,
receiving only the support of the long guns of the "Caledonia" and of the
schooners ahead of him, had brought the "Lawrence" into hot engagement
with the "Detroit," supported a half hour later by the "Queen Charlotte." By
a little after two o'clock both flagships were well-nigh disabled, hull and
battery; the "Lawrence" most so, having but one gun left out of ten on the
broadside. "At 2.30," wrote Barclay, "the Detroit was a perfect wreck,
principally from the raking fire of the gunboats." Which gunboats?
Evidently the "Ariel" and "Scorpion," for all agree that the rear four were at
this hour still far astern, though not absolutely out of range. To these last
was probably due the crippling of the "Lady Prevost," which by now had
gone to leeward with her rudder injured. Up to this time, when the first
scene closed, what had been the general course of the action? and what now
the situation? Assuming, as is very probable, that Barclay did not open with
his long 24's until Perry was a mile, two thousand yards, from him,—that
distance requiring six degrees elevation for those guns,—an estimate of

speeds and courses, as indicated by the evidence, would put the "Lawrence"
in action, at two hundred and fifty yards, at 12.10. This calculation, made
independently, received subsequent confirmation in consulting Barclay's
report, which says 12.15.[94] The same time, for the duller "Caledonia" and
the "Niagara," would place them one thousand yards from the British line.
This range, for the 32-pounder carronades of the "Niagara," and the 24's of
the "Queen Charlotte," required an elevation of from four to six degrees.
Coupling this with the British statement, that the carronades of the
"Charlotte" could not reach the "Niagara," we obtain probable positions,
two hundred and fifty yards and one thousand yards, for the principal two
American vessels at quarter-past noon.
From the general lightness and occasional failure of the wind up to 2 P.M.,
it is more than likely that no great change took place before that hour. What
air there was might touch all alike, but would affect least the "Lawrence,"
"Detroit," and "Queen Charlotte," because their sails were being rent; and
also they were in the centre of the cannonade, which is believed usually to
kill the breeze. The tendency of the "Caledonia," "Niagara," and American
vessels in rear of them, between 12.30 and 2 P.M., during which period, to
use Barclay's report, "the action continued with great fury," would therefore
be to approach slowly the scene where the "Lawrence," supported by the
long guns of the "Ariel," "Scorpion," and "Caledonia," maintained the day
against the "Detroit" and "Queen Charlotte," backed by the schooner
"Chippewa" and the 6 and 4 pounder pop-guns of the "Hunter." How near
they drew is a mere matter of estimate. Taking all together, it may be
inferred that the "Niagara" had then been carried as close as five hundred to
six hundred yards to the British line, but it would appear also towards its
rear; rather, probably, that the British had advanced relatively to her, owing
to her course being oblique to theirs.
The situation then was as follows: The "Lawrence," disabled, was
dropping astern of the "Detroit," "Queen Charlotte," and "Hunter." More
than half her ship's company lay dead or wounded on her decks. Her loss,
83 killed and wounded out of a total of 142,—sick included,[95]—was
mostly incurred before this. With only one gun left, she was a beaten ship,
although her colors were up. The "Detroit" lay in the British line almost
equally mauled. On her lee quarter,—that is, behind, but on the lee side,—
and close to her, was the "Queen Charlotte." Her captain, second to Barclay,

had been killed,—the first man hit on board,—and her first lieutenant
knocked senseless; being succeeded in command by an officer whom
Barclay described as of little experience. The first lieutenant of the
"Detroit" was also wounded mortally; and Barclay himself, who already
had been once hit in the thigh, was now a second time so severely injured,
—being his eighth wound in battle, though now only thirty-two,—that he
was forced at this critical instant to go below, leaving the deck with the
second lieutenant. The "Hunter" was astern of her two consorts. The "Lady
Prevost," fifth in the British order, had fallen to leeward with her rudder
crippled. The position of the leading and rear British schooners is not
mentioned, and is not important; the reliance of each being one long 9-
pounder gun.
Before this, taking advantage of the breeze freshening, the "Niagara" had
gone clear of the "Caledonia," on her windward side, and had stood to the
southwest, towards the "Detroit." She had not at first either foresail or
topgallantsails set; and since she passed the "Lawrence" to windward, she
was then almost certainly over two hundred and fifty yards from the British
line, for there is no conclusive proof that the "Lawrence" was nearer than
that. Combining the narrative of the British commodore with that of his
second lieutenant, who now took charge, it appears that Barclay, before
going below, saw a boat passing from the "Lawrence" to the "Niagara," and
that the second lieutenant, Inglis, after relieving him, found the "Niagara"
on the weather beam of the "Detroit." Perry, seeing the "Lawrence"
incapable of further offensive action, had decided to leave her and go on
board the "Niagara," and in this brief interval was making his passage from
one vessel to the other. After leaving the "Lawrence" astern, the "Niagara"
had made sail; the foresail having been set, and the topgallantsails "in the
act of being set, before Captain Perry came on board."[96] This necessarily
prolonged the time of his passage, and may have given rise to the
opprobrious British report that she was making off. Her making sail as she
did indicated that she had suffered little aloft; she had been out of carronade
range, while her consort, still in fighting condition, was bearing the brunt; it
was natural to conclude that she would not alone renew the action, now that
the "Lawrence" was hopelessly disabled. The wish, too, may possibly have
helped the thought. The "Lawrence," in fact, having kept her colors flying
till Perry reached the "Niagara," struck immediately afterwards. Had she
surrendered while he was on board, he could not honorably have quitted

her; and the record was clearer by his reaching a fresh ship while the flag of
the one he left was still up.
What next happened is under no doubt so far as the movements of the
"Niagara" are concerned, though there is irreconcilable difference as to who
initiated the action. Immediately after Perry came on board, Elliott left her,
to urge forward the rear gunboats. Her helm was put up, and she bore down
ahead of the "Detroit" to rake her; supported in so doing by the small
vessels, presumably the "Ariel," "Scorpion," and "Caledonia." The British
ship tried to wear, both to avoid being raked and to get her starboard battery
into action; many of the guns on the broadside heretofore engaged being
disabled. The "Charlotte" being on her lee quarter, and ranging ahead, the
two fell foul, and so remained for some time. This condition gave free play
to the American guns, which were soon after re-enforced by those of the
rear gunboats; enabled, like the "Niagara," to close with the freshening
breeze. After the two British vessels got clear, another attempt was made to
bring their batteries to bear; but the end was inevitable, and is best told in
the words of the officer upon whom devolved the duty of surrendering the
"Detroit." "The ship lying completely unmanageable, every brace cut away,
the mizzen-topmast and gaff down, all the other masts badly wounded, not a
stay left forward, hull shattered very much, a number of guns disabled, and
the enemy's squadron raking both ships ahead and astern, none of our own
in a position to support us, I was under the painful necessity of answering
the enemy to say we had struck, the 'Queen Charlotte' having previously
done so."[97] A Canadian officer taken prisoner at the battle of the Thames
saw the "Detroit," a month later, at Put-in Bay. "It would be impossible," he
wrote, "to place a hand upon that broadside which had been exposed to the
enemy's fire without covering some portion of a wound, either from grape,
round, canister, or chain shot."[98] Her loss in men was never specifically
given. Barclay reported that of the squadron as a whole to be forty-one
killed, ninety-four wounded. He had lost an arm at Trafalgar; and on this
occasion, besides other injuries, the one remaining to him was so shattered
as to be still in bandages a year later, when he appeared before the Court
Martial which emphatically acquitted him of blame. The loss of the
American squadron was twenty-seven killed, ninety-six wounded; of whom
twenty-two killed and sixty-one wounded were on board the "Lawrence."

PERRY RECEIVING THE SURRENDER OF THE BRITISH AT
THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE.
Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl.ToList

Thus was the battle of Lake Erie fought and won. Captain Barclay not
only had borne himself gallantly and tenaciously against a superior force,—
favored in so doing by the enemy attacking in detail,—but the testimony on
his trial showed that he had labored diligently during the brief period of his
command, amid surroundings of extreme difficulty, to equip his squadron,
and to train to discipline and efficiency the heterogeneous material of which
his crews were composed. The only point not satisfactorily covered is his
absence when Perry was crossing the bar. In his defence his allusion to this
incident is very casual,—resembles somewhat gliding rapidly over thin ice;
but the Court raised no question, satisfied, probably, with the certainty that
the honor of the flag had not suffered in the action. On the American side,
since the history of a country is not merely the narrative of principal
transactions, but the record also of honor reflected upon the nation by the
distinguished men it produces, it is proper to consider the question of credit,
which has been raised in this instance. There can be no doubt that
opportunity must be seized as it is offered; for accident or chance may

prevent its recurrence. Constituted as Perry's squadron was, the opportunity
presented to him could be seized only by standing down as he did, trusting
that the other vessels would follow the example of their commander. The
shifting of the wind in the morning, and its failure during the engagement,
alike testify to the urgency of taking the tide as it serves. There was no
lagging, like Chauncey's, to fetch up heavy schooners; and the campaign
was decided in a month, instead of remaining at the end of three months a
drawn contest, to lapse thenceforth into a race of ship-building. Had the
"Niagara" followed closely, there could have been no doubling on the
"Lawrence"; and Perry's confidence would have been justified as well as his
conduct. The latter needs no apology. Without the help of the "Niagara," the
"Detroit" was reduced to a "defenceless state," and a "perfect wreck,"[99] by
the carronades of the "Lawrence," supported by the raking fire of the
"Ariel" and "Scorpion." Both the expressions quoted are applied by the
heroic Barclay to her condition at 2.30, when, as he also says, the "Niagara"
was perfectly fresh. Not only was the "Detroit" thus put out of action, but
the "Charlotte" was so damaged that she surrendered before her. To this the
"Caledonia's" two long twenty-fours had contributed effectively. The first
lieutenant of the "Queen Charlotte" testified that up to the time he was
disabled, an hour or an hour and a quarter after the action began, the vessel
was still manageable; that "the 'Niagara' engaged us on our quarter, out of
carronade range, with what long guns she had; but our principal injury was
from the 'Caledonia,' who laid on our beam, with two long 24-pounders on
pivots, also out of carronade-shot distance."[100]
Is it to Perry, or to Elliott, that is due the credit of the "Niagara's" action
in bearing up across the bows of the "Detroit"? This is the second stage of
the battle; the bringing up the reserves. An absolute reply is impossible in
the face of the evidence, sworn but not cross-examined. A probable
inference, which in the present writer amounts to conviction, is attainable.
Before the Court of Inquiry, in 1815, Captain Elliott put the question to
several of his witnesses, "Was not the 'Niagara's' helm up and she standing
direct for the 'Detroit' when Captain Perry came on board?" They replied,
"Yes." All these were midshipmen. By a singular fatality most of the
"Niagara's" responsible officers were already dead, and the one surviving
lieutenant had been below, stunned, when Perry reached the deck. It may
very possibly be that this answer applied only to the first change of course,
when Elliott decided to leave his position behind the "Caledonia"; but if it is

claimed as covering also the subsequent bearing up eight points (at right
angles), to cross the bows of the "Detroit," it is to be observed that no
mention of this very important movement is made in a letter addressed to
the Secretary of the Navy, October 13, 1813, one month after the battle,
drawn up for the express purpose of vindicating Elliott, and signed by all
the lieutenants of the "Niagara," and by the purser, who formerly had been a
lieutenant in the navy. Their account was that Perry, on reaching the ship,
said he feared the day was lost; that Elliott replied it was not, that he would
repair on board the rear schooners, and bring them up; that he did so, and
"the consequence was that in ten minutes the 'Detroit' and 'Queen Charlotte'
with the 'Lady Prevost,' struck to us, and soon after the whole of the
enemy's squadron followed their example."[101] This attributes the victory to
the half-dozen long guns of the four schooners, mostly inferior in caliber to
the nine carronades on board a single vessel, the "Niagara," raking within
pistol-shot of antagonists already in the condition described by Barclay.
Such a conclusion traverses all experience of the tactical advantage of guns
massed under one captain over a like number distributed in several
commands, and also contravenes the particular superiority of carronades at
close quarters. An officer of the "Detroit," who was on deck throughout,
testified that the "Lawrence" had engaged at musket-shot, the "Niagara,"
when she bore down under Perry, at pistol-shot. Barclay, and his surviving
lieutenant, Inglis, both lay most weight upon this action of the "Niagara,"
from which arose also the fouling of the two largest British ships.
Perry's charges of 1818 against Elliott formulated deliberate statements,
under the responsible expectation of cross-examination under oath. This is
his account: "When the commanding officer [Perry] went on board the
'Niagara,' Captain Elliott was keeping her on a course by the wind, which
would in a few minutes have carried said vessel entirely out of action, to
prevent which, and in order to bring the said vessel into close action with
the enemy, the said commanding officer was under the necessity of
heaving-to, stopping and immediately wearing said vessel, and altering her
course at least eight points"; that is, perpendicular to the direction before
steered. Against this solemn and serious charge is unquestionably to be
placed the commendatory mention and letter given by Perry to Elliott
immediately after the battle. Upon these also he had to expect the sharpest
interrogation, to the mortification attendant upon which he could only
oppose evidence extenuative of, but in no case justifying, undeniable self-

contradiction. If the formal charge was true, no excuse can be admitted for
the previous explicit commendation. As a matter of historical inquiry,
however, such contradictions have to be met, and must be weighed in the
light of all the testimony. The author's conclusion upon the whole is that, as
Perry's action in first standing down insured decisive action, so by him was
imparted to the "Niagara" the final direction which determined victory. The
influence of the rear gunboats brought up by Elliott was contributive, but
not decisive.
In short, the campaign of Lake Erie was brought to an immediate
successful issue by the ready initiative taken by Perry when he found the
British distant fire more destructive than he expected, and by his instant
acceptance of necessary risk, in standing down exposed to a raking
cannonade to which he for a long while could not reply. If, as the author
holds, he was entitled to expect prompt imitation by the "Niagara," the risk
was actual, but not undue. As it was, though the "Lawrence" surrendered, it
was not until she had, with the help of gunboats stationed by Perry for that
object, so damaged both her opponents that they were incapable of further
resistance. In the tactical management of the "Lawrence" and her supports
was no mere headlong dash, but preparation adequate to conditions. Had the
"Niagara" followed, the "Lawrence" need never have struck. The
contemporary incidents on Erie and Ontario afford an instructive
commentary upon Napoleon's incisive irony, that "War cannot be waged
without running risks." There has been sufficient quotation from Chauncey
to indicate why the campaign on Ontario dragged through two seasons, and
then left the enemy in control. Small as the scale and the theatre of these
naval operations, they illustrate the unvarying lesson that only in offensive
action can defensive security be found.
The destruction of the British naval force decided the campaign in the
Northwest by transferring the control of the water. Its general military
results were in this respect final. Nothing occurred to modify them during
the rest of the war. Detroit and Michigan territory fell back into the hands of
the United States; and the allegiance of the Indians to the British cause,
procured by Brock's sagacious daring a twelvemonth before, but rudely
shaken by the events narrated, was destroyed by the death of their great
leader, Tecumseh, a month later in the battle of the Thames, itself the direct
consequence of Perry's success. The frontier was henceforth free from the

Indian terror, which had hitherto disquieted it from the Maumee to
Cleveland.
A more far-reaching political issue was also here definitely settled. A
sense of having betrayed the Indian interests in the previous treaties of 1783
and 1794 was prevalent in British official circles, and in their counsels a
scheme had been circulated for constituting an independent Indian territory,
under joint guarantee of the two nations, between their several dominions.
This would be locally within the boundaries of the United States; the sole
jurisdiction of which was thus to be limited and trammelled, because open
to continual British representation and reclamation, based upon treaty
stipulations.[102] This infringement upon the perfect sovereignty of the
nation inside its own borders, in favor of savage communities and under
foreign guarantee, was one of the propositions formally brought forward as
a sine quâ non by the British negotiators at Ghent. Although by that time
the United States stood alone face to face with Great Britain, at whose full
disposal were now the veterans of the Peninsular War, and the gigantic
navy, which the abdication of Napoleon had released from all other
opponents, the American commissioners refused with dignity to receive the
proposition even for reference. "It is not necessary," they replied, "to refer
such demands to the American Government for its instructions. They will
only be a fit subject for deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide
upon the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence."
[103]

The envoys of the United States were able to be firm, because secure of
indignant support by their people; but it is beyond question that two naval
victories had arrayed upon their side, at the moment, the preponderance of
military argument, which weighs so heavily in treaties of peace. New
Orleans was yet in the future, with adverse chances apparent; but, owing to
the victory of Perry, the United States was in firm military tenure of the
territory, the virtual cession of which was thus demanded. A year after
Perry, McDonough's equally complete success on Lake Champlain, by
insuring control of the water route for invasion, rolled back the army of
Peninsular veterans under Prevost, at a season of the year which forbade all
hope of renewing the enterprise until another spring. Great Britain was too
eager to end twenty years of continued war to brook further delay. The lake
campaigns of 1813 and 1814 thus emphasized the teaching of history as to

the influence of control of the water upon the course of events; and they
illustrate also the too often forgotten truth, that it is not by brilliant
individual feats of gallantry or skill, by ships or men, but by the massing of
superior forces, that military issues are decided. For, although on a small
scale, the lakes were oceans, and the forces which met on them were fleets;
and as, on a wider field and in more tremendous issues, the fleets of Great
Britain saved their country and determined the fortunes of Europe, so Perry
and McDonough averted from the United States, without further fighting, a
rectification of frontier—as it is euphemistically styled,—the effecting of
which is one of the most fruitful causes and frequent results of war in every
continent and at every period.
Note.—For the battle of Lake Erie, the most important original
data are the Court Martial upon Barclay (British Records Office),
and the Court of Inquiry held at Elliott's request, in April, 1815. The
proceedings and testimony of the latter are published in the
appendix to a "Biographical Notice of Commodore Jesse D. Elliott,"
by Russell Jarvis, Philadelphia, 1835. Perry's Report of the battle,
Sept. 13, 1813, is in American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p.
295. Barclay's report is in Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. pp. 250-253,
as well as in the record of the Court. Jarvis, and Mackenzie's Life of
Perry (5th edition), give a large number of affidavits by officers
present in the engagement, and Mackenzie gives also a copy of the
charges preferred by Perry in 1818 against Elliott. In the
controversy which arose over the battle, Mackenzie, in the appendix
to the fifth edition of Perry's Life, Duer, and Tristam Burges, Battle
of Lake Erie (Boston, 1839), are the principal champions on Perry's
side; Jarvis (as above) and J. Fenimore Cooper, Battle of Lake Erie,
on the side of Elliott; but the latter himself published several
vindications of his conduct. The usual naval histories, American and
British, may be consulted, and there are also incidental mentions
and reports in Niles' Register and the British Naval Chronicle,
which will be found useful.

FOOTNOTES:

[74] Captains' Letters, Navy Department MSS.
[75] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. i. p. 166.
[76] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. i. p. 186.
[77] Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 10, 1813. Mackenzie's Life of
Perry, vol. i. p. 191.
[78] Secretary's Letters, Aug. 18, 1813. Navy Department MSS.
[79] Otherwise known by the name of the River Raisin. Ante, vol. i. p. 370.
[80] The data of this paragraph are taken from the Report on Canadian Archives,
1896, Lower Canada, pp. 132, 138-140. Barclay in his Defence before the Court
Martial mentions the designs on Erie.
[81] Harm Jan Huidekoper, by Nina Moore Tiffany and Francis Tiffany. 1904. p.
187. Mr. Huidekoper speaks admiringly of the unfaltering composure and
cheerfulness which under these circumstances accompanied Perry's energy.
[82] See ante, p. 41.
[83] Report on Canadian Archives, 1896. Lower Canada, p. 133.
[84] This statement appeared in the course of a summary of the evidence before
the British Court, given by the Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. pp. 241-242. The
only support to it in the evidence, as recorded, is Barclay's official letter, which
he appears to have confirmed under oath, that the "Niagara" kept out of
carronade range, and "was perfectly fresh at 2.30," when Perry went on board
her. The first lieutenant of the "Queen Charlotte," who remained in command,
the captain being killed, corroborated Barclay as to her distance.
[85] In the finding—or verdict—of the British Court, as in the evidence, there is
no expression of a charge that the "Niagara" was making away. The finding
restricted itself to the matter before the Court, namely, Barclay's official conduct.
[86] There was a question whether the "Hunter" was ahead or astern of the
"Queen Charlotte." In the author's opinion the balance of evidence is as stated in
the text. Perry rearranged his line with reference to the British, upon seeing their
array. Had the "Charlotte" been next the "Detroit," as James puts her, it seems
probable he would have placed the "Niagara" next the "Lawrence."
[87] Cooper, Battle of Lake Erie, p. 63.
[88] See Mackenzie's Life of Perry, 5th edition, vol. ii. pp. 251-252. Perry's
charges against Elliott, dated Aug. 8, 1818, are there given in full.
[89] See Mackenzie's Life of Perry, 5th edition, vol. ii. pp. 251-252.
[90] Cooper's Battle of Lake Erie, p. 63.
[91] Barclay's Report, Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 251.
[92] The range of a 32 pdr. carronade, with which the "Niagara" was armed,
throwing one solid shot, with ¼ degree elevation,—substantially point-blank,—
was 260 yards; at 5 degrees, 1260 yards. The difference, 1000 yards, is just half a

sea mile. A British professional writer of that day, criticising their commander's
choice of position at Lake Champlain, says: "At 1000 or 1100 yards the elevation
necessary to be given a carronade would have been so great that none but chance
shots [from the Americans] could have taken effect; whereas, in closing, he gave
up this advantage." Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 132.
[93] The "Caledonia" had two long 24-pounders, and one other lighter gun,
variously stated. The "Detroit's" heaviest were also two long 24's; she had
besides one long 18, six long 12's, etc.
[94] With reference to times, always very difficult to establish, and often very
important as bases of calculation, the following extract from the Diary of Dr.
Usher Parsons, surgeon of the "Lawrence," possesses value; the more so as it is
believed to have been copied from the log of the vessel, which afterwards
disappeared. The phraseology is that of a log and a seaman, not of a physician.
"At 10 called all hands to quarters. A quarter before meridian the enemy began
action at one mile distance. In a half hour came within musket-shot of the
enemy's new ship.... At 1.30, so entirely disabled we could work the brig no
longer. At 2 P.M., most of the guns were dismounted, breechings gone, or
carriages knocked to pieces. At half-past two, when not another gun could be
worked or fired, Captain Perry hauled down the fighting flag [not the national
flag], which bore this motto 'Don't give up the ship,' and repaired on board the
'Niagara,' where he raised it again. In ten minutes after we struck." Publications
of the Rhode Island Historical Society, vol. vii. p. 244. This was called to the
author's attention after the account in the text was written.
[95] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. ii. p. 283.
[96] Evidence of Midshipman Montgomery of the "Niagara," before the Court of
Inquiry.
[97] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 252.
[98] Richardson, War of 1812, p. 243.
[99] Barclay's Report.
[100] British Court Martial Record.
[101] Navy Department, MSS. Miscellaneous Letters. My italics.
[102] This scheme appears outlined in a letter of Oct. 5, 1812, to Lord Bathurst
from Sir George Prevost, who in support of it adduces Brock's opinion
(Canadian Archives MSS). Bathurst replied, Dec. 9, 1812, "I so entirely concur
in the expediency of the suggestions contained in your despatch, as to the
necessity of securing the territories of the Indians from encroachment, that I have
submitted it to His Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in order that
whenever negotiations for peace may be entered into, the security of their
possessions may not be either compromised or forgotten." (British Colonial
Office Records). Prevost transmitted a copy of the letter to Admiral Warren, in
his early diplomatic capacity as a peace envoy. Gordon Drummond, the
successor of Brock, and later of Prevost, expressed the same interest (Canadian
Archives MSS., April 2, 1814).
[103] American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, vol. iii. pp. 710-713.

CHAPTER XIIToC

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKES AND NORTHERN
FRONTIER,
AFTER THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

Perry's victory was promptly followed up by himself and Harrison.
Besides its ultimate influence on the general course of events, already
mentioned, it produced immediate military consequences, the effect of
which was felt throughout the lake frontier, from Detroit to Champlain.
That success elsewhere did not follow was due to other causes than
remissness on their part to improve the occasion. Although the "Lawrence"
had to be sent back to Erie for extensive repairs, and the "Detroit" and
"Queen Charlotte" rolled their masts overboard at anchor in Put-in Bay on
the third day after the battle, Perry within a week had his squadron and four
of the prizes sufficiently in repair to undertake the transport of the army.
This timely facility, which betrayed the enemy's expectations, was due
largely to the "Lawrence" having borne the brunt of the action. Had the
injuries been more distributed, the delay of repairs must have been greater.
The British Adjutant General at Niagara, Harvey, the hero of Stoney Creek,
wrote on hearing of the battle, "After an action of three hours and a half, the
enemy's vessels must have received so much damage as not to be in a
situation to undertake anything for some time."[104] By September 26
Harrison had assembled his forces at an island in the lake, called Middle
Sister, twelve miles from Malden. On the 27th they were conveyed to
Malden, partly in vessels and partly in boats, the weather being fine. By
September 30 Sandwich and Detroit were occupied; Procter retreating

eastward up the valley of the Thames. Harrison pursued, and on October 5
overtook the British and Indians at a settlement called Moravian Town.
Here they made a stand and were defeated, with the destruction or dispersal
of the entire body, in an action known to Americans as the battle of the
Thames. Procter himself, with some two hundred men, fled eastward and
reached the lines at Burlington Heights, at the head of Ontario, whither
Vincent had again retreated on October 9, immediately upon receiving news
of the disaster at Moravian Town.
After this the Western Indians fell wholly away from the British alliance,
and Harrison returned to Detroit, satisfied that it was useless to pursue the
enemy by land. The season was thought now too far advanced for
operations against Michilimackinac, which was believed also to be so
effectually isolated, by the tenure of Lake Erie, as to prevent its receiving
supplies. This was a mistake, there being a route, practicable though
difficult, from Toronto to Georgian Bay, on Lake Huron, by which
necessary stores were hurried through before the winter closed in. Mackinac
remained in British hands to the end of the war.
At Detroit Harrison and Perry received orders to transport a body of
troops down Lake Erie, to re-enforce the army on the general scene of
operations centring round Lake Ontario. By the control of the Niagara
peninsula, consequent upon Vincent's necessary retreat after the battle of the
Thames, the American communications were complete and secure
throughout from Detroit to Sackett's Harbor, permitting free movement
from end to end. The two officers embarked together, taking with them
thirteen hundred men in seven vessels. October 24 they reached Buffalo.
Harrison went on to Niagara, but Perry was here detached from the lake
service, and returned to the seaboard, leaving Elliott to command on Erie.
In acknowledging the order for Perry's removal, Chauncey regretted the
granting of his application as a bad precedent; and further took occasion to
remark that when he himself was sent to the lakes the only vessel on them
owned by the United States was the brig "Oneida." "Since then two fleets
have been created, one of which has covered itself with glory: the other,
though less fortunate, has not been less industrious." It may be questioned
whether the evident difference of achievement was to be charged to fortune,
or to relative quickness to seize opportunity, when offered.

The successes on Lake Erie had come very appositely for a change
recently introduced into the plans of the Government, and then in process of
accomplishment. Since the middle of the summer the Secretary of War,
Armstrong, who at this time guided the military counsels, had become
disgusted by the fruitlessness of the movements at the west end of Ontario,
and had reverted to his earlier and sounder prepossession in favor of an
attack upon either Kingston or Montreal. It had now been for some time in
contemplation to transfer to Sackett's Harbor all the troops that could be
spared from Niagara, leaving there only sufficient to hold Fort George, with
Fort Niagara on the American side, as supports to a defensive attitude upon
that frontier. Assured command of the lake was essential to the safety and
rapidity of the concentration at Sackett's, and this led to the next meeting of
the squadrons.
General James Wilkinson, an officer advanced in years, of extremely
poor reputation, personal as well as professional, and of broken
constitution, had been either selected by, or forced upon,[105] the Secretary
of War to replace Dearborn in command of the New York frontier and
conduct of the proposed operations. To his suggested doubts as to the
direction of effort, whether westward or eastward, Armstrong had replied
definitely and finally on August 8: "Operations westward of Kingston, if
successful, leave the strength of the enemy unbroken. It is the great depot of
his resources. So long as he retains this, and keeps open his communication
with the sea, he will not want the means of multiplying his naval and other
defences, and of re-enforcing or renewing the war in the West." He then
explained that there were two ways of reducing the place; by direct attack,
or, indirectly, by cutting its communications with the lower river. To
accomplish the latter, a demonstration of direct attack should be made by
part of the troops, while the main body should move rapidly down the St.
Lawrence to Madrid (or Hamilton),[106] in New York, and cross there to the
Canadian side, seizing and fortifying a bluff on the north bank to control the
road and river. This done, the rest of the force should march upon Montreal.
The army division on Champlain was to co-operate by a simultaneous
movement and subsequent junction. The project, in general outline, had
been approved by the President. In transmitting it Armstrong wrote to
Wilkinson, "After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that, in
conducting the present campaign, you will make Kingston your primary

object, and that you will choose (as circumstances may warrant), between a
direct and indirect attack upon that post."[107]
Contemporary and subsequent movements are to be regarded in their
bearing on this plan. The first object was the concentration at Sackett's, for
which some three thousand troops were to be withdrawn from the Niagara
frontier. Wilkinson arrived at Sackett's from Washington, August 20.
Chauncey was then in port, after the gale which had driven both him and
Yeo down the lake. He sailed on the 29th. Wilkinson followed shortly,
reaching Fort George September 4. On the 5th, Armstrong himself came to
Sackett's, having established the War Department in northern New York for
the campaign. On the 10th Perry destroyed the British squadron on Lake
Erie, opening the way for Harrison's victorious entry to Upper Canada and
subsequent transfer to Niagara.
Some days before the battle of the Thames the embarkation from Niagara
for Sackett's Harbor took place under cover of the naval operations. After
Yeo had gone into Amherst Bay on September 12, as already mentioned,
[108] Chauncey remained cruising in the neighborhood till the 17th, when he
went to Sackett's, the enemy having got into Kingston. On the 19th he
sailed again for Niagara, to support the movement of the army. He arrived
on the 24th, and found there a report of Perry's victory, which had been
received on the 22d. On the 25th embarkation began, and Wilkinson hoped
that the whole body, three thousand strong, would start on their coasting
voyage along the south shore of the lake on the 27th; but after dark, to
conceal the direction taken. At this juncture, on September 26, Chauncey
heard that the British fleet was at York, which was confirmed by a lookout
vessel despatched by him. As Yeo, unless checked, might molest the
transportation of the troops, it became necessary first to seek him; but
owing to a head wind the American squadron could not leave the river till
the evening of the 27th.
As the schooner gun-vessels sailed badly, the "Pike," the "Madison," and
the "Sylph" each took one in tow on the morning of the 28th, steering for
York, where the British fleet was soon after sighted. As the Americans stood
in, the British quitted the bay to gain the open lake; for their better
manœuvring powers as a squadron would have scope clear of the land.
They formed on the port tack, running south with the wind fresh at east
(Positions 1). When about three miles distant, to windward, Chauncey put

his fleet on the same tack as the enemy and edged down towards him
(Positions 2). At ten minutes past noon, the Americans threatening to cut off
the rearmost two of the British, Yeo tacked his column in succession,
beginning with his own ship, the leader (a), heading north toward his
endangered vessels, between them and the opponents. When round, he
opened fire on the "General Pike." As this movement, if continued, would
bring the leading and strongest British ships upon the weaker Americans
astern, Chauncey put his helm up and steered for the "Wolfe" (b), as soon as
the "General Pike" came abreast of her; the American column following in
his wake. The "Wolfe" then kept away, and a sharp encounter followed
between the two leaders, in which the rest of the squadrons took some share
(Positions 3).
At the end of twenty minutes the "Wolfe" lost her main and mizzen
topmasts, and main yard. With all her after sail gone, there was nothing to
do but to keep before the wind, which was fair for the British posts at the
head of the bay (Positions 4). The American squadron followed; but the
"Madison," the next heaviest ship to the "Pike," superior in battery power to
the "Wasp" and "Hornet" of the ocean navy, and substantially equal to the
second British ship, the "Royal George," "having a heavy schooner in tow,
prevented her commander from closing near enough to do any execution
with her carronades."[109] The explanation requires explanation, which is
not forthcoming. Concern at such instants for heavy schooners in tow is not
the spirit in which battles are won or campaigns decided; and it must be
admitted that Commodore Chauncey's solicitude to keep his schooners up
with his real fighting vessels, to conform, at critical moments, the action of
ships of eight hundred and six hundred tons, like the "Pike" and "Madison,"
to those of lake craft of under one hundred, is not creditable to his military
instincts. He threw out a signal, true, for the fleet to make all sail; but as he
held on to the schooner he had in tow, neither the "Madison" nor "Sylph"
dropped hers. His flagship, individually, appears to have been well fought;
but anxiety to keep a squadron united needs to be tempered with discretion
of a kind somewhat more eager than the quality commonly thus named, and
which on occasion can drop a schooner, or other small craft, in order to get
at the enemy. As the dismasted "Wolfe" ran to leeward, "the 'Royal
George,'" says the American naval historian Cooper, "luffed up in noble
style across her stern to cover the English commodore" (c), and "kept
yawing athwart her stern, delivering her broadsides in a manner to extort

exclamations of delight from the American fleet (Positions 5). She was
commanded by Captain Mulcaster." Her fighting mate, the "Madison," had
a heavy schooner in tow. This interposition of the "Royal George" was
especially timely if, as Yeo states, Chauncey was holding at a distance
whence his long twenty-fours told, while the "Wolfe's" carronades did not
reach.
At quarter before three Chauncey relinquished pursuit. Both squadrons
were then about six miles from the head of the lake, running towards it
before a wind which had increased to a gale, with a heavy sea. Ahead of
them was a lee shore, and for the Americans a hostile coast. "Though we
might succeed in driving him on shore, the probability was we should go on
shore also, he amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies; and after the
gale abated, if he could get off one or two vessels out of the two fleets, it
would give him as completely the command of the lake as if he had twenty
vessels. Moreover, he was covered at his anchorage by part of his army and
several small batteries thrown up for the purpose." For these reasons, the
commodore "without hesitation relinquished the opportunity then
presenting itself of acquiring individual reputation at the expense of my
country." The British squadron anchored without driving ashore. The
American returned to Niagara, having received a certain amount of damage
aloft, and one of the purchased schooners having lost her foremast; but the
killed and wounded by the enemy amounted to only five, all on board the
"General Pike." That vessel lost also twenty-two men by the bursting of a
gun.

CHAUNCEY AND YEO, SEPTEMBER 28, 1813ToList

Chauncey had been in consultation with Armstrong at Sackett's, and
understood perfectly the plans of the Government. On his return to Niagara
he was requested by Wilkinson to keep watch over the hostile squadron in
its present position under Burlington Heights, so as to cover the eastward
movement of the troops, which began October 1. On the 2d the last
transport had gone, and Wilkinson himself set out for Sackett's; bringing, as
he reported, thirty-five hundred men. On the 3d the British fleet was seen
well towards the west end of the lake; but on the 4th a vessel sent especially
to reconnoitre came back with the report that it was no longer there. This
proved to be a mistake; but, as it came from a careful and competent officer,
Chauncey inferred that the enemy had given him the slip and gone to the
eastward. He therefore ran down the lake, to cover the arrival of the troops
as he had their departure. On the afternoon of the 5th, near Kingston, he
captured six out of seven transports bound thither with re-enforcements. Of
these, two were the schooners taken by Yeo in the engagement of August
10, which the British had not thought fit to add to their fleet, but used
simply as carriers; mounting their guns on the fortifications of Kingston.
Cooper justly remarks, "This sufficiently proves the equivocal advantage
enjoyed by the possession of these craft." Chauncey himself, at the end of
the campaign, recommended the building of "one vessel of the size of the

'Sylph,'"—three hundred and forty tons,—"in lieu of all the heavy
schooners; for really they are of no manner of service, except to carry
troops or use as gunboats."[110] The reflection is inevitable,—Why, then,
had he allowed them so to hamper his movements? It is to be feared that the
long ascendency of the gunboat policy in the councils of the Government
had sapped the professional intelligence even of some naval officers.
The capture of the detachment going from York to Kingston showed that
the British had divined the general character of the American plans. In fact,
as early as October 2, Major General de Rottenburg, who after an interval
had succeeded to Brock's place in Upper Canada, as lieutenant governor
and commander of the forces, had started with two regiments to re-enforce
Kingston, leaving the Niagara peninsula again under the command of
General Vincent. On October 6 Chauncey's squadron entered Sackett's,
where Wilkinson had arrived on the 4th. The general began at once to
remonstrate strenuously with Armstrong against an attempt upon Kingston,
as delaying and possibly frustrating what he saw fit to style the chief object
of the campaign, the capture of Montreal. The Secretary listened patiently,
but overruled him.[111] Kingston had been the principal object from the
beginning, and still so continued; but, if the garrison should be largely re-
enforced, if the British fleet should enter the harbor, or if the weather should
make navigation of the lake dangerous for the transports, then the troops
should proceed direct for Montreal by the river. Yeo apparently returned to
Kingston soon after this; but when Chauncey left port on October 16, to
bring forward from the Genesee River a detachment under Colonel
Winfield Scott, he still had the understanding that Kingston was first to be
attacked.
On October 19, however, the Secretary reconsidered his decision. The
concentration of the army at Sackett's had not been effected until the 18th.
On the 16th de Rottenburg, having coasted the north shore of the lake,
reached Kingston with his two regiments, reckoned by Armstrong at fifteen
hundred men. These raised to twenty-two hundred the garrison previously
estimated at seven to eight hundred.[112] The numbers of the Americans
were diminishing by sickness, and no further re-enforcement was to be
expected, excepting by uniting with the Champlain division. This had been
on the move from Plattsburg since September 19, and was now at
Chateaugay, on the Chateaugay River; a local centre, whence roads running

northeast, to the river's junction with the St. Lawrence, immediately
opposite the island of Montreal, and west to St. Regis on the St. Lawrence,
forty miles higher up, gave facilities for moving in either direction to meet
Wilkinson's advance. By a letter of October 12 from its commander,
General Wade Hampton, this corps numbered "four thousand effective
infantry, with a well-appointed train." To bring it by land to Sackett's, over a
hundred miles distant, was considered too protracted and laborious in the
state of the roads; better utilize the current of the St. Lawrence to carry
Wilkinson down to it. In view of these circumstances, and of the supposed
increased strength of Kingston, Armstrong decided to abandon the attack
upon the latter and to move against Montreal, which was believed to be
much weaker, as well as strategically more important.[113] The movement
was hazardous; for, as planned, ultimate success depended upon junction
with another corps, which had natural difficulties of its own to contend
with, while both were open to obstruction by an active enemy. As a
distinguished military critic has said, "The Americans committed upon this
occasion the same error that the British Government did in their plan for
Burgoyne's march from the head of Champlain to Albany,—that of making
the desired result of an important operation depend upon the success of all
its constituent or component parts." It is one of the most common of
blunders in war. Wilkinson and Hampton did not meet. Both moved, but
one had retreated before the other arrived.
In fact, while Montreal, as the most important point in Canada for the
British, except Quebec, and at the same time the one most accessible to the
United States, was the true objective of the latter, concentration against it
should have been made in territory entirely under American control, about
Lake Champlain, and the advance begun early in the season. By its own
choice the Government had relinquished this obvious and natural course,
and throughout the summer had directed its efforts to the westward. When
the change of operations from Niagara to the lower end of the lake was
initiated, in the beginning of October, it was already too late to do more
than attack Kingston, the strength of which appears to have been gravely
over-estimated. Armstrong had good military ideas; but at this critical
moment he seems to have faltered in the presence of an immediate
difficulty, and to have sought escape from it by a hasty consent to a side
measure, contrary to the soundest teachings of war.

Not the least of objections was the risk to which Sackett's Harbor, the
naval base, was to be exposed. After October 16, Chauncey had remained
cruising between there and Kingston, covering the approaches to the St.
Lawrence. His intended trip to Genesee, to bring up Scott's eight hundred
regulars, had been abandoned at the urgent demand of Wilkinson, who,
while the troops were being transferred from Sackett's to Grenadier Island,
at the outlet of the lake to the river, "would not allow any part of the fleet to
be absent four days without throwing the responsibility, in case of a failure
of his expedition, wholly on the navy."[114] The commodore did not learn of
the new scheme until October 30, ten days after its adoption, when he was
asked to cover the rear of the army from pursuit by water, by taking position
inside the St. Lawrence. While objecting strongly to the change of plan, he
of course consented to afford all the co-operation in his power; but he wrote
to the Navy Department, "If Sir James Yeo knows the defenceless situation
of Sackett's, he can take advantage of a westerly wind while I am in the
river, run over and burn it; for to the best of my knowledge there are no
troops left there except sick and invalids, nor are there more than three guns
mounted."[115]
After many delays by rough water, Wilkinson's troops were assembled at
Grenadier Island towards the end of October. On November 1 they began
entering the river by detachments, collecting at French Creek, on the
American side, fifteen miles from the lake. Being here immediately
opposite one of the points considered suitable for advance on Kingston, the
object of the movement remained still doubtful to the enemy. The
detachments first arriving were cannonaded by four of Yeo's vessels that
had come through the channel north of Long Island, which here divides the
stream. On November 2 Chauncey anchored near by, preventing the
recurrence of this annoyance. On the 4th the entire force was assembled,
and next day started down the river with fine weather, which lasted until the
11th. Up to this date no serious difficulty was encountered; but immediately
that the departure from French Creek proclaimed the real direction of the
movement, de Rottenburg despatched a body of six hundred regular troops,
under Lieutenant Colonel Morrison, accompanied by some gunboats under
Captain Mulcaster, to harass the rear. For the purpose of being on hand to
fall upon the American flotilla, should the attempt be made to cross the
river to the north bank, Sir James Yeo on the 5th came out from Kingston
with his fleet. He anchored on the north side of Long Island, only five miles

from the American squadron, but separated by a reef, over which the
"General Pike" could not pass without being lightened.[116] Steps were
taken to effect this, and to buoy a channel; but on the 6th Yeo retired to
Kingston. Chauncey's letters make no mention of Mulcaster's division, and
after Yeo's withdrawal he moved down to Carleton Island.
Morrison and Mulcaster on the 8th reached Fort Wellington, opposite
Ogdensburg. Here they paused and received re-enforcements from the
garrison, raising their numbers to eight hundred, who continued to follow,
by water and by land, until the 11th. Then they were turned upon by the
rearguard of an American division, marching on the north bank to suppress
the harassment to which the flotilla otherwise was liable in its advance. An
action followed, known as that of Chrystler's Farm, in which the Americans
were the assailants and in much superior numbers; but they were worsted
and driven back, having lost one hundred and two killed and two hundred
and thirty-seven wounded, besides one hundred prisoners. The troops
engaged then embarked, and passed down the Long Saut Rapids to
Cornwall, which is one hundred and twenty miles from Kingston and
eighty-two from Montreal. Here they were rejoined on the 12th by the
vanguard of the division, which had met little resistance in its progress.
At this time and place Wilkinson received a letter from General
Hampton, to whom he had written that the provisions of his army were
insufficient, and requested him to send "two or three months' supply by the
safest route in a direction to the proposed scene of action."[117] He also
instructed him to join the advance at St. Regis, opposite Cornwall, the point
which had now been reached. As the two bodies were co-operating, and
Wilkinson was senior, these instructions had the force of orders. In his
reply, dated November 8,[118] Hampton said, "The idea of meeting at St.
Regis was most pleasing, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of
your supplies of provision." Actually, the disclosure about the supplies
preceded in the letter the appointment to meet at St. Regis, which was the
last subject mentioned. "It would be impossible," Hampton continued, "for
me to bring more than each man could carry on his back; and when I
reflected that, in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be
weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the
opinion that by throwing myself back upon my main depot [Plattsburg],
where all means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's

flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburg
to ... the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success
than by the junction at St. Regis."
Hampton then retired to Plattsburg, in the direction opposite from St.
Regis. Wilkinson, upon receiving his letter, held a council of war and
decided that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present
season." The army accordingly crossed to the American side and went into
winter quarters at French Mills, just within the New York boundary; on the
Salmon River, which enters the St. Lawrence thirteen miles below St.
Regis. Wilkinson was writing from there November 17, twelve days after he
started from French Creek to capture Montreal. Thus two divisions, of eight
thousand and four thousand respectively, both fell back helplessly, when
within a few days of a junction which the enemy could not have prevented,
even though he might successfully have opposed their joint attack upon
Montreal.
It is a delicate matter to judge the discretion of a general officer in
Hampton's position; but the fact remains, as to provisions, that he was in a
country where, by his own statement of a month before, "we have, and can
have, an unlimited supply of good beef cattle."[119] A British commissary at
Prescott wrote two months later, January 5, 1814, "Our supplies for sixteen
hundred men are all drawn from the American side of the river. They drive
droves of cattle from the interior under pretence of supplying their army at
Salmon River, and so are allowed to pass the guards, and at night to cross
them over to our side,"—the river being frozen. He adds, "I shall be also
under the necessity of getting most of my flour from their side."[120] It is not
necessary greatly to respect Wilkinson in order to think that in such a region
Hampton might safely have waited for his superior to join, and to decide
upon the movements of the whole. He was acting conjointly, and the junior.
[121] Under all the circumstances there can be no reasonable doubt that his
independent action was precipitate, unnecessary, contrary to orders, and
therefore militarily culpable. It gave Wilkinson the excuse, probably much
desired, for abruptly closing a campaign which had been ludicrously
inefficient from the first, and under his leadership might well have ended in
a manner even more mortifying.
Chauncey remained within the St. Lawrence until November 10, the day
before the engagement at Chrystler's Farm. He was troubled with fears as to

what might happen in his rear; the defenceless condition of Sackett's, and
the possibility that the enemy by taking possession of Carleton Island,
below him, might prevent the squadron's getting out.[122] None of these
things occurred, and it would seem that the British had not force to attempt
them. On the 11th the squadron returned to the Harbor, where was found a
letter from Armstrong, requesting conveyance to Sackett's for the brigade of
Harrison's army, which Perry had brought to Niagara, and which the
Secretary destined to replace the garrison gone down stream with
Wilkinson. The execution of this service closed the naval operations on
Ontario for the year 1813. On November 21 Chauncey wrote that he had
transported Harrison with eleven hundred troops. On the night of December
2 the harbor froze over, and a few days later the commodore learned that
Yeo had laid up his ships for the winter.
There remains yet to tell the close of the campaign upon the Niagara
peninsula, control of which had been a leading motive in the opening
operations. Its disastrous ending supplies a vivid illustration of the military
truth that positions are in themselves of but little value, if the organized
forces of the enemy, armies or fleets, remain unimpaired. The regular troops
were all withdrawn for Wilkinson's expedition; the last to go being the
garrison of Fort George, eight hundred men under Colonel Winfield Scott,
which left on October 13. The command of the frontier was turned over to
Brigadier General George M'Clure of the New York Militia. Scott reported
that Fort George, "as a field work, might be considered as complete at that
period. It was garnished with ten pieces of artillery, which number might
have been increased from the spare ordnance of the opposite fort"[123]—
Niagara. The latter, on the American side, was garrisoned by two companies
of regular artillery and "such of M'Clure's brigade as had refused to cross
the river."
It was immediately before Scott's departure that the British forces under
General Vincent, upon receipt of news of the battle of the Thames, had
retreated precipitately to Burlington Heights, burning all their stores, and
abandoning the rest of the peninsula. This was on October 9; a week after
de Rottenburg had started for Kingston with two regiments, leaving only ten
or twelve hundred regulars. De Rottenburg sent word for these also to retire
upon York, and thence to Kingston; but the lateness of the season, the
condition of the roads, and the necessity in such action to abandon sick and

stores, decided Vincent, in the exercise of his discretion, to hold on. This
resolution was as fortunate for his side as it proved unfortunate to the
Americans. M'Clure's force, as stated by himself, was then about one
thousand effective militia in Fort George, and two hundred and fifty
Indians. Concerning the latter he wrote, "An exhibition of two or three
hundred of them will strike more terror into the British than a thousand
militia."[124] From time to time there were also bodies of "volunteers," who
assembled on call and were subject to the orders of the national government
for the period of their service. With such numbers, so constituted, it was as
impossible for M'Clure to trouble Vincent as it was inexpedient for Vincent
to attack Fort George.
A gleam of hope appeared for the American commander when Perry
brought down the thirteen hundred of Harrison's victorious army, with the
general himself. The latter, who was senior to M'Clure, lent a favorable ear
to his suggestion that the two forces should be combined to attack Vincent's
lines. Some four hundred additional volunteers gathered for this purpose;
but, before the project could take effect, Chauncey arrived to carry
Harrison's men to Sackett's, stripped of troops for Wilkinson's expedition.
The urgency was real, and Chauncey pressing, on account both of Sackett's
and the season. In reply to a very aggrieved remonstrance from M'Clure,
Harrison expressed extreme sympathy with his disappointment and that of
the volunteers, but said no material disadvantage was incurred, for he was
convinced the British were removing as fast as they could from the head of
the lake, and that an expedition thither would find them gone. Therewith, on
November 16, he embarked and sailed.
The period of service for which the militia were "draughted" would
expire December 9. To M'Clure's representations the national government,
which was responsible for the general defence, replied impotently by
renewing its draught on the state government for another thousand militia.
But, wrote Armstrong, if you cannot raise volunteers, "what are you to
expect from militia draughts, with their constitutional scruples?"—about
leaving their state. Armstrong was not personally responsible for the lack of
organized power in the nation; but as the representative of the Government,
which by a dozen years of inefficiency and neglect had laid open this and
other frontiers, the fling was unbecoming. On December 10, the garrison of
Fort George was reduced to "sixty effective regulars and probably forty

volunteers. The militia have recrossed the river almost to a man."[125]
M'Clure also learned "that the enemy were advancing in force." That night
he abandoned the works, retiring to Fort Niagara, and carrying off such
stores as he could; but in addition he committed the grave error of setting
fire to the adjacent Canadian village of Newark, which was burned to the
ground.
For this step M'Clure alleged the authority of the Secretary of War, who
on October 4 had written him, "Understanding that the defence of the post
committed to your charge may render it proper to destroy the town of
Newark, you are directed to apprise its inhabitants of this circumstance, and
to invite them to remove themselves and their effects to some place of
greater safety." The general construed this to justify destruction in order to
deprive the hostile troops of shelter near Fort George. "The enemy are now
completely shut out from any hopes or means of wintering in the vicinity of
Fort George." The exigency was insufficient to justify the measure, which
was promptly disavowed by the United States Government; but the act
imparted additional bitterness to the war, and was taken by the enemy as a
justification and incentive to the retaliatory violence with which the
campaign closed.
The civil and military government of Upper Canada at this time passed
into the hands of Sir Gordon Drummond. For the moment he sent to
Niagara General Riall, who took over the command from Vincent. On
December 13, M'Clure reported the enemy appearing in force on the
opposite shore; but, "having deprived them of shelter, they are marching up
to Queenston." This alone showed the futility of burning Newark, but more
decisive demonstration was to be given. Early on the 19th the British and
Indians crossed the river before dawn, surprised Fort Niagara, and carried it
at the point of the bayonet; meeting, indeed, but weak and disorganized
resistance. At the same time a detachment of militia at Lewiston was
attacked and driven in, and that village, with its neighbors, Youngstown and
Manchester, were reduced to ashes, in revenge for Newark. On December
30 the British again crossed, burned Buffalo, and destroyed at Black Rock
three small vessels of the Erie flotilla; two of which, the "Ariel" and
"Trippe," had been in Perry's squadron on September 10, while the third,
the "Little Belt," was a prize taken in that action. Two thousand militia had
been officially reported assembled on the frontier on December 26,

summoned after the first alarm; but, "overpowered by the numbers and
discipline of the enemy," wrote their commander, "they gave way and fled
on every side. Every attempt to rally them was ineffectual."[126]
With this may be said to have terminated the northern campaign of 1813.
The British had regained full control of the Niagara peninsula, and they
continued to hold Fort Niagara, in the state of New York, till peace was
concluded. The only substantial gain on the whole frontier, from the
extreme east to the extreme west, was the destruction of the British fleet on
Lake Erie, and the consequent transfer of power in the west to the United
States. This was the left flank of the American position. Had the same result
been accomplished on the right flank,—as it might have been,—at
Montreal, or even at Kingston, the centre and left must have fallen also. For
the misdirection of effort to Niagara, the local commanders, Dearborn and
Chauncey, are primarily responsible; for Armstrong yielded his own correct
perceptions to the representations of the first as to the enemy's force,
supported by the arguments of the naval officer favoring the diversion of
effort from Kingston to Toronto. Whether Chauncey ever formally admitted
to himself this fundamental mistake, which wrecked the summer's work
upon Lake Ontario, does not appear; but that he had learned from
experience is shown by a letter to the Secretary of the Navy,[127] when the
squadrons had been laid up. In this he recognized the uselessness of the
heavy sailing schooners when once a cruising force of ships for war had
been created, thereby condemning much of his individual management of
the campaign; and he added: "If it is determined to prosecute the war
offensively, and secure our conquests in Upper Canada, Kingston ought
unquestionably to be the first object of attack, and that so early in the spring
as to prevent the enemy from using the whole of the naval force that he is
preparing."
In the three chapters which here end, the Ontario operations have been
narrated consecutively and at length, without interruption by other issues,—
except the immediately related Lake Erie campaign,—because upon them
turned, and upon them by the dispositions of the Government this year were
wrecked the fortunes of the war. The year 1813, from the opening of the
spring to the closing in of winter, was for several reasons the period when
conditions were most propitious to the American cause. In 1812 war was
not begun until June, and then with little antecedent preparation; and it was

waged halfheartedly, both governments desiring to nip hostilities. In 1814,
on the other hand, when the season opened, Napoleon had fallen, and the
United States no longer had an informal ally to divert the efforts of Great
Britain. But in the intervening year, 1813, although the pressure upon the
seaboard, the defensive frontier, was undoubtedly greater than before, and
much vexation and harassment was inflicted, no serious injury was done
beyond the suppression of commerce, inevitable in any event. In the north,
on the lakes frontier, the offensive and the initiative continued in the hands
of the United States. No substantial re-enforcements reached Canada until
long after the ice broke up, and then in insufficient numbers. British naval
preparations had been on an inadequate scale, receiving no proper
professional supervision. The American Government, on the contrary, had
had the whole winter to prepare, and the services of a very competent naval
organizer. It had also the same period to get ready its land forces; while
incompetent Secretaries of War and of the Navy gave place in January to
capable men in both situations.
With all this in its favor, and despite certain gratifying successes, the
general outcome was a complete failure, the full measure of which could be
realized only when the downfall of Napoleon revealed what disaster may
result from neglect to seize opportunity while it exists. The tide then ebbed,
and never again flowed. For this many causes may be alleged. The imbecile
ideas concerning military and naval preparation which had prevailed since
the opening of the century doubtless counted for much. The intrusting of
chief command to broken-down men like Dearborn and Wilkinson was
enough to ruin the best conceived schemes. But, despite these very serious
drawbacks, the strategic misdirection of effort was the most fatal cause of
failure.
There is a simple but very fruitful remark of a Swiss military writer, that
every military line may be conceived as having three parts, the middle and
the two ends, or flanks. As sound principle requires that military effort
should not be distributed along the whole of an enemy's position,—unless
in the unusual case of overwhelming superiority,—but that distinctly
superior numbers should be concentrated upon a limited portion of it, this
idea of a threefold division aids materially in considering any given
situation. One third, or two thirds, of an enemy's line may be assailed, but
very seldom the whole; and everything may depend upon the choice made

for attack. Now the British frontier, which the United States was to assail,
extended from Montreal on the east to Detroit on the west. Its three parts
were: Montreal and the St. Lawrence on the east, or left flank; Ontario in
the middle, centring at Kingston; and Erie on the right; the strength of the
British position in the last named section being at Detroit and Malden,
because they commanded the straits upon, which the Indian tribes depended
for access to the east. Over against the British positions named lay those of
the United States. Given in the same order, these were: Lake Champlain,
and the shores of Ontario and of Erie, centring respectively in the naval
stations at Sackett's Harbor and Presqu' Isle.
Accepting these definitions, which are too obvious to admit of dispute,
what considerations should have dictated to the United States the direction
of attack; the one, or two, parts out of the three, on which effort should be
concentrated? The reply, as a matter of abstract, accepted, military
principle, is certain. Unless very urgent reasons to the contrary exist, strike
at one end rather than at the middle, because both ends can come up to help
the middle against you quicker than one end can get to help the other; and,
as between the two ends, strike at the one upon which the enemy most
depends for re-enforcements and supplies to maintain his strength.
Sometimes this decision presents difficulties. Before Waterloo, Wellington
had his own army as a centre of interest; on his right flank the sea, whence
came supplies and re-enforcements from England; on his left the Prussian
army, support by which was imminently necessary. On which flank would
Napoleon throw the weight of his attack? Wellington reasoned, perhaps
through national bias, intensified by years of official dependence upon sea
support, that the blow would fall upon his right, and he strengthened it with
a body of men sorely needed when the enemy came upon his left, in
overwhelming numbers, seeking to separate him from the Prussians.
No such doubt was possible as to Canada in 1813. It depended wholly
upon the sea, and it touched the sea at Montreal. The United States, with its
combined naval and military strength, crude as the latter was, was at the
beginning of 1813 quite able in material power to grapple two out of the
three parts,—Montreal and Kingston. Had they been gained, Lake Erie
would have fallen; as is demonstrated by the fact that the whole Erie region
went down like a house of cards the moment Perry triumphed on the lake.
His victory was decisive, simply because it destroyed the communications

of Malden with the sea. The same result would have been achieved, with
effect over a far wider region, by a similar success in the east.

FOOTNOTES:

[104] Canadian Archives MSS.
[105] Scott says, "The selection of this unprincipled imbecile was not the
blunder of Secretary Armstrong." Memoirs, vol. i. p. 94, note.
[106] Both these names are used, confusingly, by Armstrong. Madrid was the
township, Hamilton a village on the St. Lawrence, fifteen to twenty miles below
the present Ogdensburg.
[107] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 464. Armstrong's italics.
[108] Ante, p. 60.
[109] Chauncey's report, Oct. 1, 1813, Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 134. The extract
has been verified from the original in the Captains' Letters. The report of Sir
James Yeo (British Records Office) agrees substantially with Chauncey's
accounts of the movements, but adds that upon the fall of the "Wolfe's" topmasts
the "Pike" immediately took a distance out of carronade range, whence her long
24's would tell. "I can assure you, Sir, that the great advantage the enemy have
over us from their long 24-pounders almost precludes the possibility of success,
unless we can force them to close action, which they have ever avoided with the
most studied circumspection."
[110] Chauncey to Navy Department, Dec. 17, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[111] Armstrong, Oct. 5, 1813. American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p.
470.
[112] Ibid., p. 471.
[113] Armstrong, Oct. 20, 1813. American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i.
p. 473.
[114] Scott's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 106. In consequence, though Scott personally
succeeded in joining the movement from which so much was expected, this
considerable number of regulars were withdrawn from it. They ultimately
reached Sackett's, forming the nucleus of a garrison.
[115] Captains' Letters, Oct. 30, 1813.
[116] Chauncey to the Navy Department, Nov. 11, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[117] Wilkinson to Hampton. American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p.
462.

[118] Ibid.
[119] Hampton's Letters during this movement are in American State Papers,
Military Affairs, vol. i. pp. 458-463.
[120] Ridout, Ten Years in Upper Canada, p. 269.
[121] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 465.
[122] Chauncey to Navy Department, Nov. 11. Captains' Letters.
[123] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 483.
[124] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 484.
[125] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 486.
[126] Report of General A. Hall, Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 394.
[127] December 17, 1813. Captains' Letters, Navy Department.

CHAPTER XIIIToC

SEABOARD MARITIME OPERATIONS

Upon the Canada frontier the conditions of 1813 had permitted the
United States an ample field for offensive operations, with good prospect of
success. What use was made of the opportunity has now been narrated.
Upon the seaboard, continuous illustration was afforded that there the
country was widely open to attack, thrown wholly on the defensive, with
the exception of preying upon the enemy's commerce by numerous small
cruisers. As a secondary operation of war this has always possessed value,
and better use of it perhaps never was made than by the American people at
this time; but it is not determinative of great issues, and the achievements of
the public and private armed vessels of the United States, energetic and
successful as they were at this period, constituted no exception to the
universal experience. Control of the highways of the ocean by great fleets

destroys an enemy's commerce, root and branch. The depredations of
scattered cruisers may inflict immense vexation, and even embarrassment;
but they neither kill nor mortally wound, they merely harass. Co-operating
with other influences, they may induce yielding in a maritime enemy; but
singly they never have done so, and probably never can. In 1814 no
commerce was left to the United States; and that conditions remained
somewhat better during 1813 was due to collusion of the enemy, not to
national power.
The needs of the British armies in the Spanish Peninsula and in Canada,
and the exigencies of the West India colonies, induced the enemy to wink
at, and even to uphold, a considerable clandestine export trade from the
United States. Combined with this was the hope of embarrassing the
general government by the disaffection of New England, and of possibly
detaching that section of the country from the Union. For these reasons, the
eastern coast was not included in the commercial blockade in 1813. But no
motive existed for permitting the egress of armed vessels, or the
continuance of the coasting trade, by which always, now as then, much of
the intercourse between different parts of the country must be maintained,
and upon which in 1812 it depended almost altogether. With the approach
of spring in 1813, therefore, not only was the commercial blockade
extended to embrace New York and all south of it, together with the
Mississippi River, but the naval constriction upon the shore line became so
severe as practically to annihilate the coasting trade, considered as a means
of commercial exchange. It is not possible for deep-sea cruisers wholly to
suppress the movement of small vessels, skirting the beaches from headland
to headland; but their operations can be so much embarrassed as to reduce
their usefulness to a bare alleviation of social necessities, inadequate to any
scale of interchange deserving the name of commerce.
"I doubt not," wrote Captain Broke, when challenging Lawrence to a ship
duel, "that you will feel convinced that it is only by repeated triumphs in
even combat that your little navy can now hope to console your country for
the loss of that trade it cannot protect."[128] The taunt, doubtless intended to
further the object of the letter by the provocation involved, was applicable
as well to coasting as to deep-sea commerce. It ignored, however, the
consideration, necessarily predominant with American officers, that the
conditions of the war imposed commerce destruction as the principal

mission of their navy. They were not indeed to shun combat, when it offered
as an incident, but neither were they to seek it as a mere means of glory,
irrespective of advantage to be gained. Lawrence, whom Broke's letter did
not reach, was perhaps not sufficiently attentive to this motive.
The British blockade, military and commercial, the coastwise operations
of their navy, and the careers of American cruisers directed to the
destruction of British commerce, are then the three heads under which the
ocean activities of 1813 divide. Although this chapter is devoted to the first
two of these subjects, brief mention should be made here of the distant
cruises of two American vessels, because, while detached from any
connection with other events, they are closely linked, in time and place,
with the disastrous seaboard engagement between the "Chesapeake" and
"Shannon," with which the account of sea-coast maritime operations opens.
On April 30 Captain John Rodgers put to sea from Boston in the frigate
"President," accompanied by the frigate "Congress," Captain John Smith.
Head winds immediately after sailing detained them inside of Cape Cod
until May 3, and it was not till near George's Bank that any of the
blockading squadron was seen. As, by the Admiralty's instructions, one of
the blockaders was usually a ship of the line, the American vessels very
properly evaded them. The two continued together until May 8, when they
separated, some six hundred miles east of Delaware Bay. Rodgers kept
along northward to the Banks of Newfoundland, hoping, at that junction of
commercial highways, to fall in with a West India convoy, or vessels bound
into Halifax or the St. Lawrence. Nothing, however, was seen, and he
thence steered to the Azores with equal bad fortune. Obtaining thereabouts
information of a homeward-bound convoy from the West Indies, he went in
pursuit to the northeast, but failed to find it. Not till June 9 did he make
three captures, in quick succession. Being then two thirds of the way to the
English Channel, he determined to try the North Sea, shaping his course to
intercept vessels bound either by the north or south of Ireland. Not a sail
was met until the Shetland Islands were reached, and there were found only
Danes, which, though Denmark was in hostility with Great Britain, were
trading under British licenses. The "President" remained in the North Sea
until the end of July, but made only two prizes, although she lay in wait for
convoys of whose sailing accounts were received. Having renewed her
supply of water at Bergen, in Norway, she returned to the Atlantic, made
three captures off the north coast of Ireland, and thence beat back to the

Banks, where two stray homeward-bound West Indiamen were at last
caught. From there the ship made her way, still with a constant head wind,
to Nantucket, off which was captured a British man-of-war schooner, tender
to the admiral. On September 27 she anchored in Narragansett Bay, having
been absent almost five months, and made twelve prizes, few of which were
valuable. One, however, was a mail packet to Halifax, the capture of which,
as of its predecessors, was noted by Prevost.[129]
The "Congress" was still less successful in material result. She followed a
course which had hitherto been a favorite with American captains, and
which Rodgers had suggested as alternative to his own; southeast, passing
near the Cape Verde Islands, to the equator between longitudes 24° and 31°
west; thence to the coast of Brazil, and so home, by a route which carried
her well clear of the West India Islands. She entered Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, December 14, having spent seven months making this wide
sweep; in the course of which three prizes only were taken.[130] It will be
remembered that the "Chesapeake," which had returned only a month
before the "Congress" sailed, had taken much the same direction with
similar slight result.
These cruises were primarily commerce-destroying, and were pursued in
that spirit, although with the full purpose of fighting should occasion arise.
The paucity of result is doubtless to be attributed to the prey being sought
chiefly on the high seas, too far away from the points of arrival and
departure. The convoy system, rigidly enforced, as captured British
correspondence shows, cleared the seas of British vessels, except in the
spots where they were found congested, concentrated, by the operation of
the system itself. It may be noted that the experience of all these vessels
showed that nowhere was the system so rigidly operative as in the West
Indies and Western Atlantic. Doubtless, too, the naval officers in command
took pains to guide the droves of vessels entrusted to them over unusual
courses, with a view to elude pursuers. As the home port was neared, the
common disposition to relax tension of effort as the moment of relief draws
nigh, co-operated with the gradual drawing together of convoys from all
parts of the world to make the approaches to the English Channel the most
probable scene of success for the pursuer. There the greatest number were
to be found, and there presumption of safety tended to decrease carefulness.
This was to be amply proved by subsequent experience. It had been

predicted by Rodgers himself, although he apparently did not think wise to
hazard in such close quarters so fine and large a frigate as the "President."
"It is very generally believed," he had written, "that the coasts of England,
Ireland, and Scotland are always swarming with British men of war, and
that their commerce would be found amply protected. This, however, I well
know by experience, in my voyages when a youth, to be incorrect; and that
it has always been their policy to keep their enemies as far distant from
their shores as possible, by stationing their ships at the commencement of a
war on the enemy's coasts, and in such other distant situations, ... and
thereby be enabled to protect their own commerce in a twofold degree.
This, however, they have been enabled to do, owing as well to the inactivity
of the enemy, as to the local advantages derived from their relative
situations."[131]
The same tendency was observable at other points of arrival, and
recognition of this dictated the instructions issued to Captain Lawrence for
the cruise of the "Chesapeake," frustrated through her capture by the
"Shannon." Lawrence was appointed to the ship on May 6; the sailing
orders issued to Captain Evans being transferred to him on that date. He
was to go to the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, seeking there to
intercept the military store-ships, and transports with troops, destined to
Quebec and Upper Canada. "The enemy," wrote the Secretary, "will not in
all probability anticipate our taking this ground with our public ships of
war; and as his convoys generally separate between Cape Race and Halifax,
leaving the trade of the St. Lawrence to proceed without convoy, the chance
of captures upon an extensive scale is very flattering." He added the just
remark, that "it is impossible to conceive a naval service of a higher order
in a national point of view than the destruction of the enemy's vessels, with
supplies for his army in Canada and his fleets on this station."[132]
Lawrence took command of the "Chesapeake" at Boston on May 20. The
ship had returned from her last cruise April 9, and had been so far prepared
for sea by her former commander that, as has been seen, her sailing orders
were issued May 6. It would appear from the statement of the British naval
historian James,[133] based upon a paper captured in the ship, that the
enlistments of her crew expired in April. Although there were many
reshipments, and a nucleus of naval seamen, there was a large infusion of
new and untrained men, amounting to a reconstitution of the ship's

company. More important still was the fact that both the captain and first
lieutenant were just appointed; her former first lying fatally ill at the time
she sailed. The third and fourth lieutenants were also strange to her, and in a
manner to their positions; being in fact midshipmen, to whom acting
appointments as lieutenants were issued at Lawrence's request, by
Commodore Bainbridge of the navy yard, on May 27, five days before the
action. The third took charge of his division for the first time the day of the
battle, and the men were personally unknown to him. The first lieutenant
himself was extremely young.
The bearing of these facts is not to excuse the defeat, but to enforce the
lesson that a grave military enterprise is not to be hazarded on a side issue,
or on a point of pride, without adequate preparation. The "Chesapeake" was
ordered to a service of very particular importance at the moment—May,
1813—when the Canada campaign was about to open. She was to act
against the communications of the enemy; and while it is upon the whole
more expedient, for the morale of a service, that battle with an equal should
not be declined, quite as necessarily action should not be sought when it
will materially interfere with the discharge of a duty intrinsically of greater
consequence. The capture of a single enemy's frigate is not to be
confounded with, or inflated to, that destruction of an enemy's organized
force which is the prime object of all military effort. Indeed, the very
purpose to which the "Chesapeake" was designated was to cripple the
organized force of the British, either the army in Canada, or the navy on the
lakes. The chance of a disabling blow by unexpected action in the St.
Lawrence much exceeded any gain to be anticipated, even by a victorious
ship duel, which would not improbably entail return to port to refit; while
officers new to their duties, and unknown to their men, detracted greatly
from the chances of success, should momentary disaster or confusion occur.
The blockade of Boston Harbor at this moment was conducted by
Captain Philip Vere Broke of the "Shannon", a 38-gun frigate, which he had
then commanded for seven years. His was one of those cases where singular
merit as an officer, and an attention to duty altogether exceptional, had not
yet obtained opportunity for distinction. It would probably be safe to say
that no more thoroughly efficient ship of her class had been seen in the
British navy during the twenty years' war with France, then drawing
towards its close; but after Trafalgar Napoleon's policy, while steadily

directed towards increasing the number of his ships, had more and more
tended to husbanding them against a future occasion, which in the end
never came. The result was a great diminution in naval combats. Hence, the
outbreak of the American war, followed by three frigate actions in rapid
succession, opened out a new prospect, which was none the less stimulative
because of the British reverses suffered. Captain Broke was justly confident
in his own leadership and in the efficiency of a ship's company, which,
whatever individual changes it may have undergone, had retained its
identity of organization through so many years of his personal and energetic
supervision. He now reasonably hoped to demonstrate what could be done
by officers and men so carefully trained. Captain Pechell of the "Santo
Domingo," the flagship on the American station, wrote: "The 'Shannon's'
men were better trained, and understood gunnery better, than any men I
ever saw;" nevertheless, he added, "In the action with the 'Chesapeake' the
guns were all laid by Captain Broke's directions, consequently the fire was
all thrown in one horizontal line, not a shot going over the 'Chesapeake.'"
[134]

The escape of the "President" and "Congress" early in May, while the
"Shannon" and her consort, the "Tenedos," were temporarily off shore in
consequence of easterly weather, put Broke still more upon his mettle; and,
fearing a similar mishap with the "Chesapeake," he sent Lawrence a
challenge.[135] It has been said, by both Americans and English, that this
letter was a model of courtesy. Undoubtedly it was in all respects such as a
gentleman might write; but the courtesy was that of the French duellist,
nervously anxious lest he should misplace an accent in the name of the man
whom he intended to force into fight, and to kill. It was provocative to the
last degree, which, for the end in view, it was probably meant to be. In it
Broke showed himself as adroit with his pen—the adroitness of Canning—
as he was to prove himself in battle. Not to speak of other points of
irritation, the underlining of the words, "even combat," involved an
imputation, none the less stinging because founded in truth, upon the
previous frigate actions, and upon Lawrence's own capture of the
"Peacock." In guns, the "Chesapeake" and "Shannon" were practically of
equal force; but in the engagement the American frigate carried fifty more
men than her adversary. To an invitation couched as was Broke's Lawrence
was doubly vulnerable, for only six months had elapsed since he himself
had sent a challenge to the "Bonne Citoyenne." With his temperament he

could scarcely have resisted the innuendo, had he received the letter; but
this he did not. It passed him on the way out and was delivered to
Bainbridge, by whom it was forwarded to the Navy Department.

CAPTAIN PHILIP BOWES VERE BROKE.
From the mezzotint by Charles Turner after the painting by Samuel
Lane
in the possession of Lady Saumarez.ToList

Although Broke's letter did not reach him, Captain Lawrence made no
attempt to get to sea without engagement. The "Shannon's" running close to
Boston Light, showing her colors, and heaving-to in defiance, served the
purpose of a challenge. Cooper, who was in full touch with the naval
tradition of the time, has transmitted that Lawrence went into the action
with great reluctance. This could have proceeded only from consciousness
of defective organization, for the heroic temper of the man was notorious,
and there is no hint of that mysterious presentiment so frequent in the
annals of military services. The wind being fair from the westward, the

"Chesapeake," which had unmoored at 8 A.M., lifted her last anchor at noon,
June 1, and made sail. The "Shannon," seeing at hand the combat she had
provoked, stood out to sea until on the line between Cape Ann and Cape
Cod, where she hove-to on the starboard tack, heading to the southeast. The
"Chesapeake" followed under all sail until 5 P.M., when she took in her light
canvas, sending the loftier—royal—yards on deck; and at 5.30 hauled up
her courses, thus reducing herself to the fighting trim already assumed by
her adversary. The "Shannon," which had been lying stopped for a long
time, at this same moment filled her sails, to regain headway with which to
manœuvre, in case her opponent's action should require it; but, after
gathering speed sufficient for this purpose, the British captain again slowed
his ship, by so bracing the maintopsail that it was kept shaking in the wind.
Its effect being thus lost, though readily recoverable, her forward movement
depended upon the sails of the fore and mizzen masts (1). In this attitude,
and steering southeast by the wind, she awaited her antagonist, who was
running for her weather—starboard—quarter, and whose approach, thus
seconded, became now very rapid. Broke made no further change in the
ship's direction, leaving the choice of windward or leeward side to
Lawrence, who took the former, discarding all tactical advantages, and
preferring a simple artillery duel between the vessels.
Just before she closed, the "Chesapeake" rounded-to, taking a parallel
course, and backing the maintopsail (1) to reduce her speed to that of the
enemy. Captain Lawrence in his eagerness had made the serious error of
coming up under too great headway. At 5.50, as her bows doubled on the
quarter of the "Shannon" (1), at the distance of fifty yards, the British ship
opened fire, beginning with the after gun, and continuing thence forward, as
each in succession bore upon the advancing American frigate. The latter
replied after the second British discharge, and the combat at once became
furious. The previous history of the two vessels makes it probable that the
British gunnery was the better; but it is impossible, seeing the course the
action finally took, so far to disentangle the effects of the fire while they
were on equal terms of position, from the totals afterwards ascertained, as
to say where the advantage, if any, lay during those few minutes. The
testimony of the "Chesapeake's" second lieutenant, that his division—the
forward one on the gun deck—fired three rounds before their guns ceased
to bear, agrees with Broke's report that two or three broadsides were
exchanged; and the time needed by well-drilled men to do this is well

within, yet accords fairly with, James' statement, that from the first gun to
the second stage in the action six minutes elapsed. During the first of this
period the "Chesapeake" kept moving parallel at fifty yards distance, but
gaining continually, threatening thus to pass wholly ahead, so that her guns
would bear no longer. To prevent this Lawrence luffed closer to the wind to
shake her sails, but in vain; the movement increased her distance, but she
still ranged ahead, so that she finally reached much further than abreast of
the enemy. To use the nautical expression, she was on the "Shannon's"
weather bow (2). While this was happening her sailing master was killed
and Lawrence wounded; these being the two officers chiefly concerned in
the handling of the ship.

Diagram of the Chesapeake vs. Shannon BattleToList

Upon this supervened a concurrence of accidents, affecting her
manageability, which initiated the second scene in the drama, and called for
instantaneous action by the officers injured. The foretopsail tie being cut by
the enemy's fire, the yard dropped, leaving the sail empty of wind; and at
the same time were shot away the jib-sheet and the brails of the spanker.
Although the latter, flying loose, tends to spread itself against the mizzen
rigging, it probably added little to the effect of the after sails; but, the
foresail not being set, the first two mishaps practically took all the forward

canvas off the "Chesapeake." Under the combined impulses she, at 5.56,
came up into the wind (3), lost her way, and, although her mainyard had
been braced up, finally gathered sternboard; the upshot being that she lay
paralyzed some seventy yards from the "Shannon" (3, 4, 5), obliquely to the
latter's course and slightly ahead of her. The British ship going, or steering,
a little off (3), her guns bore fair upon the "Chesapeake," which, by her
involuntarily coming into the wind,—to such an extent that Broke thought
she was attempting to haul off, and himself hauled closer to the wind in
consequence (4),—lost in great measure the power of reply, except by
musketry. The British shot, entering the stern and quarter of her opponent,
swept diagonally along the after parts of the spar and main decks, a half-
raking fire.
Under these conditions Lawrence and the first lieutenant were mortally
wounded, the former falling by a musket-ball through his body; but he had
already given orders to have the boarders called, seeing that the ship must
drift foul of the enemy (5). The chaplain, who in the boarding behaved
courageously, meeting Broke in person with a pistol-shot, and receiving a
cutlass wound in return, was standing close by the captain at this instant. He
afterwards testified that as Lawrence cried "Boarders away", the crews of
the carronades ran forward; which corresponds to Broke's report that, seeing
the enemy flinching from their guns, he then gave the order for boarding.
This may have been, indeed, merely the instinctive impulse which drives
disorganized men to seek escape from a fire which they cannot return; but if
Cooper is correct in saying that it was the practice of that day to keep the
boarders' weapons, not by their side, but on the quarter-deck or at the masts,
it may also have been that this division, which had so far stuck to its guns
while being raked, now, at the captain's call, ran from them to get the side-
arms. At the Court of Inquiry it was in evidence that these men were
unarmed; and one of them, a petty officer, stated that he had defended
himself with the monkey tail of his gun. Whatever the cause, although there
was fighting to prevent the "Chesapeake" from being lashed to the
"Shannon", no combined resistance was offered abaft the mainmast. There
the marines made a stand, but were overpowered and driven forward. The
negro bugler of the ship, who should have echoed Lawrence's summons,
was too frightened to sound a note, and the voices of the aids, who shouted
the message to the gun deck, were imperfectly heard; but, above all, leaders
were wanting. There was not on the upper deck an officer above the grade

of midshipman; captain, first lieutenant, master, marine officer, and even
the boatswain, had been mortally wounded before the ships touched. The
second lieutenant was in charge of the first gun division, at the far end of
the deck below, as yet ignorant how the fight was going, and that the fate of
his superiors had put him in command. Of the remaining lieutenants, also
stationed on the gun deck, the fourth had been mortally wounded by the
first broadside; while the third, who had heard the shout for boarders,
committed the indiscretion, ruinous to his professional reputation, of
accompanying those who, at the moment the ships came together, were
carrying below the wounded captain.

THE CAPTURE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BY THE SHANNON.—
THE STRUGGLE ON THE QUARTERDECK.
Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl.ToList

Before the new commanding officer could get to the spar deck, the ships
were in contact. According to the report of Captain Broke, the most
competent surviving eye-witness, the mizzen channels of the "Chesapeake"
locked in the fore-rigging of the "Shannon." "I went forward," he continues,
"to ascertain her position, and observing that the enemy were flinching from
their guns, I gave orders to prepare for boarding." When the "Chesapeake's"
second lieutenant reached the forecastle, the British were in possession of
the after part of the ship, and of the principal hatchways by which the

boarders of the after divisions could come up. He directed the foresail set,
to shoot the ship clear, to prevent thus a re-enforcement to the enemy
already on board; and he rallied a few men, but was himself soon wounded
and thrown below. In brief, the fall of their officers and the position of the
ship, in irons and being raked, had thrown the crew into the confusion
attendant upon all sudden disaster. From this state only the rallying cry of a
well-known voice and example can rescue men. "The enemy," reported
Broke, "made a desperate but disorderly resistance." The desperation of
brave men is the temper which at times may retrieve such conditions, but it
must be guided and fashioned by a master spirit into something better than
disorder, if it is to be effective. Disorder at any stage of a battle is incipient
defeat; supervening upon the enemy's gaining a commanding position it
commonly means defeat consummated.
Fifteen minutes elapsed from the discharge of the first gun of the
"Shannon" to the "Chesapeake's" colors being hauled down. This was done
by the enemy, her own crew having been driven forward. In that brief
interval twenty-six British were killed and fifty-six wounded; of the
Americans forty-eight were killed and ninety-nine wounded. In proportion
to the number on board each ship when the action began, the "Shannon" lost
in men 24 per cent; the "Chesapeake" 46 per cent, or practically double.
Although a certain amount of national exultation or mortification attends
victory or defeat in an international contest, from a yacht race to a frigate
action, there is no question of national credit in the result where initial
inequality is great, as in such combats as that of the "Chesapeake" and
"Shannon," or the "Constitution" and "Guerrière." It is possible for an
officer to command a ship for seven years, as Broke had, and fail to make
of her the admirable pattern of all that a ship of war should be, which he
accomplished with the "Shannon"; but no captain can in four weeks make a
thoroughly efficient crew out of a crowd of men newly assembled, and
never out of harbor together. The question at issue is not national, but
personal; it is the credit of Captain Lawrence. That it was inexpedient to
take the "Chesapeake" into action at all at that moment does not admit of
dispute; though much allowance must be made for a gallant spirit, still in
the early prime of life, and chafing under the thought that, should he get to
sea by successful evasion, he would be open to the taunt, freely used by

Broke,[136] of dodging, "eluding," an enemy only his equal in material
force.
Having, however, undertaken a risk which cannot be justified, was
Captain Lawrence also reckless, and vainly confident, in his conduct before
and during the action? Was he foolhardy, or only rash? The reply, if
favorable, is due to one of the most gallant and attractive personalities in
the annals of the United States Navy.

CAPTAIN JAMES LAWRENCE.
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart in the possession of the New
Jersey Historical Society, Newark, N.J.ToList

From his action it is evident that Lawrence clearly recognized that a
green crew can be more quickly formed to efficiency at the battery than to
that familiarity with the rigging and the sails, and that habit of working
together about decks, on which manœuvring power depends. He therefore
chose an artillery duel, surrendering even the opportunity of raking
permitted him by Broke, who awaited his approach without an attempt at
molestation. How far was his expectation as to the results overstrained? The

American crew lost double in proportion to their enemy; but it did not fail
to inflict a very severe punishment, and it must be added under a very
considerable disadvantage, which there has been a tendency recently to
underestimate. The loss of the head sails, and all that followed, is part of the
fortune of war; of that unforeseeable, which great leaders admit may
derange even the surest calculations. It is not, therefore, to be complained
of, but it is nevertheless to receive due account in the scales of praise and
blame; for the man who will run no risks of accidents accomplishes
nothing.
In the preceding narrative, and in the following analysis, the account of
the British naval writer James is in essentials adopted; chiefly because, of
all historians having contemporary sources of information, he has been at
most pains to insure precision.[137] As told by him, the engagement divides
into three stages. First, the combat side to side; second, the period during
which the "Chesapeake" lay in the wind being raked; third, the boarding
and taking possession. To these James assigns, as times: for the first, six
minutes; for the second, four; for the third, five; this last being again
subdivisible into a space of two minutes, during which the "Chesapeake"
was being lashed to her opponent, and the actual fighting on her decks,
which Broke states did not exceed three.
The brief and disorderly, though desperate, resistance to boarding proves
that the "Chesapeake" was already beaten by the cannonade, which lasted,
as above, ten minutes. During only six of these, accepting James' times, was
she on equal gunnery terms. During four tenths—nearly one half—of the
gunnery contest she was at a great disadvantage. The necessity of
manœuvring, which Lawrence tried to avoid, was forced upon him; and the
ship's company, or her circumstances, proved unequal to meeting it.
Nevertheless, though little more than half the time on equal terms of
position with her opponent, half her own loss was inflicted upon him. How
great her subsequent disadvantage is best stated in the words of James,
whom no one will accuse of making points in favor of Americans. "At 5.56,
having had her jib-sheet and foretopsail tie shot away, and her helm,
probably from the death of the men stationed at it, being at the moment
unattended to, the 'Chesapeake' came so sharp to the wind as completely to
deaden her way." How extreme this deviation from her course is shown by
the impression made on Broke. "As the manœuvres of the 'Chesapeake'

indicated an intention to haul away, Captain Broke ordered the helm to be
put a-lee, as the 'Shannon' had fallen off a little." The "Chesapeake's" way
being deadened, "the ship lay with her stern and quarter exposed to her
opponent's broadside. The shot from the 'Shannon's' aftermost guns now
took a diagonal direction along[138] the decks of the 'Chesapeake,' beating in
her stern ports, and sweeping the men from their quarters. The shot from the
'Shannon's' foremost guns, at the same time, entering the 'Chesapeake's'
ports from the mainmast aft, did considerable execution." This describes a
semi-raking fire, which lasted four minutes, from 5.56 to 6 P.M., when the
ships came together.
The manner of collision and the injuries received bear out the above
account. The quarter of the "Chesapeake" came against the side of the
"Shannon," the angle at the moment, as represented in James' diagram,
being such as to make it impossible that any of the "Chesapeake's" guns,
save one or two of the after ones, could then bear; and as she was already
paying off, they had been in worse position before. "She was severely
battered in the hull, on the larboard quarter particularly; and several shot
entered the stern windows.... Her three lower masts were badly wounded,
the main and mizzen especially. The bowsprit received no injury." All these
details show that the sum total of the "Shannon's" fire was directed most
effectively upon the after part of the ship, in the manner described by
James; and coupled with the fact that the British first broadside, always
reckoned the most deadly, would naturally take effect chiefly on the fore
part of the "Chesapeake," as she advanced from the "Shannon's" stern to her
bow,[139] we are justified in the inference that the worst of her loss was
suffered after accident had taken her movements out of Lawrence's instant
control. Under these circumstances it may be claimed for him that the
artillery duel, to which he sought to confine the battle, was not so entirely a
desperate chance as has been inferred.
It may therefore be said that, having resolved upon a risk which cannot
be justified at the bar of dispassionate professional judgment, Captain
Lawrence did not commit the further unpardonable error of not maturely
weighing and judiciously choosing his course. That the crew was not
organized and exercised at the guns, as far as his time and opportunity
permitted, is disproved by incidental mention in the courts martial that
followed, as well as by the execution done. Within ten minutes at the

utmost, within six of equal terms, the "Chesapeake," an 18-pounder frigate,
killed and wounded of the "Shannon's" ship's company as many as the
"Constitution" with her 24's did of the "Guerrière's" in over twenty;[140] and
the "Constitution" not only was a much heavier ship than her opponent, but
had been six weeks almost continuously at sea. When her crew had been
together four months longer, the loss inflicted by her upon the "Java," in a
contest spread over two hours, did not greatly exceed in proportion that
suffered by the "Shannon"; and the circumstances of that engagement,
being largely manœuvring, justified Lawrence's decision, under his
circumstances, to have none of it. His reliance upon the marksmanship of
his men is further vindicated by Broke's report that neither vessel suffered
much aloft. The American and best British tradition of firing low was
sustained by both ships. Finally, although the organization of the
"Chesapeake" was not matured sufficiently to hold the people together,
without leaders, after a tremendous punishment by the enemy's battery, and
in the face of well-trained and rapidly supported boarders, it had so far
progressed in cohesion that they did not flinch from their guns through a
severe raking fire. What further shows this is that the boatswain of the
"Shannon," lashing the ships together in preparation for boarding, was
mortally wounded, not by musketry only but by sabre. When thus attacked
he doubtless was supported by a body of fighters as well as a gang of
workers. In fact, Broke was himself close by.
Under thus much of preparation, certainly not sufficient, Lawrence chose
for action a smooth sea, a royal breeze, an artillery duel, and a close range.
"No manœuvring, but downright fighting," as Nelson said of his most
critical battle; critical, just because his opponents, though raw tyros
compared to his own crews, had nothing to do but to work their guns. The
American captain took the most promising method open to him for
achieving success, and carried into the fight a ship's company which was
not so untrained but that, had some luck favored him, instead of going the
other way, there was a fighting chance of victory. More cannot be claimed
for him. He had no right, under the conditions, voluntarily to seek the odds
against him, established by Broke's seven years of faithful and skilful
command. Except in material force, the "Chesapeake" was a ship much
inferior to the "Shannon," as a regiment newly enlisted is to one that has
seen service; and the moment things went seriously wrong she could not
retrieve herself. This her captain must have known; and to the accusation of

his country and his service that he brought upon them a mortification which
endures to this day, the only reply is that he died "sword in hand." This
covers the error of the dead, but cannot justify the example to the living.
As is customary in such cases, a Court of Inquiry was ordered to
investigate the defeat of the "Chesapeake," and sat from February 2 to
February 8, 1814. Little can be gleaned from the evidence concerning the
manœuvring of the ship; the only two commissioned officers surviving,
having been stationed on the gun deck, could not see what passed above.
Incidental statements by midshipmen examined confirm substantially the
account above given. One mentions the particular that, when the head
sheets were shot away, "the bow of the 'Shannon' was abreast of the
'Chesapeake's' midships, and she came into the wind;" he adds that the
mizzen-topsail was a-back, as well as the main. This is the only important
contribution to the determination of the relative positions and handling of
the vessels. As far as it goes, it confirms a general impression that
Lawrence's eagerness prevented his making due allowance for the way of
the "Chesapeake," causing him to overshoot his aim; an error of judgment,
which the accidents to the headsails converted into irretrievable disaster.
The general testimony agrees that the crew, though dissatisfied at non-
receipt of pay and prize money, behaved well until the moment of boarding.
Four witnesses, all officers, stated as of their own observation that the
"Shannon" received several shot between wind and water, and used her
pumps continuously on the way to Halifax. Budd, the second lieutenant,
"was informed by an officer of the 'Shannon' that she was in a sinking
condition." "The 'Chesapeake' was not injured below her quarters, except by
one or two shot." "The 'Chesapeake' made no water; but the 'Shannon' had
hands at the pumps continually." A good deal of pumping in a ship seven
years in commission did not necessarily indicate injuries in action;
Midshipman Curtis, however, who was transferred to the "Shannon,"
testified that "the British officers were encouraging the men by cheering to
work at the pumps," which looks more serious. The purser of the
"Chesapeake" swore that she had shot plugs at the water-line, and that "her
sailing master said she had three shot holes below." The repetition of
remarks made by the "Shannon's" officers is of course only hearsay
testimony; but as regards the shots below the water-line,—as distinguished
from the general body of the ship,—this on the one hand shows that the
"Shannon" had her share of bad luck, for in the smoke of the battle this

result is not attributable to nice precision of aiming. On the other hand it
strongly re-enforces the proof of the excellent marksmanship of the
American frigate, deducible from the killed and wounded of her opponent,
and it confirms the inference that her own disproportionate loss was at least
partly due to the raking fire and her simultaneous disability to reply. Upon
the whole, the conclusion to the writer is clear that, while Lawrence should
not have courted action, the condition of the "Chesapeake" as a fighting
ship was far better than has commonly been supposed. It may be added that
an irresponsible contemporary statement, that his "orders were peremptory,"
is disproved by the Department's letter, which forms part of the Court's
record. He was to "proceed to sea as soon as weather, and the force and
position of the enemy, will admit." Even a successful action must be
expected to compel return to port, preventing his proceeding; and there is an
obvious difference between fighting an enemy when met, and going out
especially to fight him. The orders were discretional.
Whether, by paying attention to favoring conditions, Captain Lawrence
could have repeated the success of Commodore Rodgers in gaining the sea
a month before, must remain uncertain. The "Constitution," under Captain
Stewart, a seaman of very excellent reputation, was unable to do so, until
the winter gales made it impossible for the blockaders to maintain an
uninterrupted watch off Boston. The sailing of the "President" and
"Congress" was the last successful effort for many months; and the capture
of the "Chesapeake" was the first of several incidents illustrating how
complete was the iron-barring of the coast, against all but small vessels.
Commodore Decatur, having found it impossible to get out from New
York by the Sandy Hook route, undertook that by Long Island Sound.
Passing through Hell Gate, May 24, with his little squadron,—the "United
States," the "Macedonian," her late prize, and the sloop of war "Hornet,"—
he was on the 26th off Fisher's Island, abreast of New London. Here he
remained until June 1, obtaining various information concerning the enemy,
but only certain that there was at least a ship of the line and a frigate in the
neighborhood. On the last named day, that of the fight between the
"Chesapeake" and the "Shannon," the wind serving, and the two enemy's
vessels being far to the southwest of Montauk Point, at the east end of Long
Island, the squadron put to sea together; but on approaching Block Island,
which was close to their course, two more enemy's cruisers loomed up to

the eastward. The hostile groups manœuvred severally to get between the
Americans and their ports of refuge, New London in the one quarter,
Newport in the other. In plain sight of this overwhelming force Decatur
feared the results of trying to slip out to sea, and therefore beat back to New
London.[141] The enemy followed, and, having now this division securely
housed, instituted a close blockade. It was apprehended even that they
might endeavor to take it by main force, the defences of the place being
weak; but, as is commonly the case, the dangers of an attack upon land
batteries were sufficient to deter the ships from an attempt, the object of
which could be attained with equal certainty by means less hazardous, if
less immediate.
The upshot was that the two frigates remained there blockaded to the end
of the war; dependent for their safety, in Decatur's opinion, rather upon the
difficulty of the channel than upon the strength of the fortifications. "Fort
Trumbull, the only work here mounted or garrisoned, was in the most
unprepared state, and only one or two cannon were to be had in the
neighborhood for any temporary work which should be erected. I
immediately directed all my exertions to strengthening the defences. Groton
Heights has been hastily prepared for the reception of a few large guns, and
they will be mounted immediately.... I think the place might be made
impregnable; but the hostile force on our coast is so great that, were the
enemy to exert a large portion of his means in an attack here, I do not feel
certain he could be resisted successfully with the present defences."[142] On
December 6 he reported that the squadron was moored across the channel
and under Groton Heights, which had been fortified; while in the mouth of
the harbor, three gunshots distant, was anchored a British division,
consisting of one ship of the line, a frigate, and two smaller vessels. Two
other ships of the line and several frigates were cruising in the open,
between the east end of Long Island and Gay Head. This state of affairs
lasted throughout the winter, during which the ships were kept in a state of
expectancy, awaiting a possible opportunity; but, when the return of spring
found the hope unfulfilled, it was plainly idle to look to the summer to
afford what winter had denied. The frigates were lightened over a three-
fathom bar, and thence, in April, 1814, removed up the Thames fourteen
miles, as far as the depth of water would permit. Being there wholly out of
reach of the enemy's heavy vessels, they were dismantled, and left to the
protection of the shore batteries and the "Hornet," retained for that purpose.

Decatur was transferred to the "President," then at New York, taking with
him his ship's company; while the crew of the "Macedonian" was sent to the
lakes. The enemy's vessels then off New London were three seventy-fours,
four frigates, and three sloops.
This accumulation of force, to watch Decatur's two frigates and the
"President," which during October and November was lying at Bristol,
Rhode Island, testified to the anxiety of the British Government to restrain
or capture the larger American cruisers. Their individual power was such
that it was unwilling to expose to attack by them the vessels, nominally of
the same class, but actually much inferior, which were ranging all seas to
protect British commerce. That this should suffer, and in some considerable
degree, from the operations of well-developed privateering enterprise,
pursued by a maritime people debarred from every other form of maritime
activity, was to be expected, and must be endured; but the frigates carried
with them the further menace, not indeed of serious injury to the colossal
naval power of Great Britain, but of mortification for defeats, which,
however reasonably to be accounted for by preponderance of force, are not
patiently accepted by a nation accustomed to regard itself as invincible.
There are few things more wearing than explaining adverse results; and the
moral effect of so satisfactory a reply as the victory of the "Shannon" might
well have weighed with an American captain, not to risk prestige already
gained, by seeking action when conscious of deficient preparation. The
clamor aroused in Great Britain by the three rapidly succeeding captures of
the "Guerrière," "Macedonian," and "Java," was ample justification of the
American policy of securing superior force in single cruisers, throughout
their several classes; a policy entirely consistent with all sound military
principle. It should be remembered, however, that a cruiser is intended
generally to act singly, and depends upon herself alone for that
preponderance of strength which military effort usually seeks by
concentration of numbers. The advantage of great individual power,
therefore, does not apply so unqualifiedly to the components of fleets, the
superiority of which depends upon the mutual support of its members, by
efficient combination of movement, as well as upon their separate power.
Both the Government and people of Great Britain expected with some
confidence, from the large fleet placed under Sir John Warren, the utter
destruction of the frigates and of the American navy generally. "We were in

hopes, ere this," said a naval periodical in June, 1813, "to have announced
the capture of the American navy; and, as our commander-in-chief on that
station has sufficient force to effect so desirable an object, we trust, before
another month elapses, to lay before our readers what we conceive ought
long since to have happened."[143] The words of the Admiralty were more
measured, as responsible utterances are prone to be; but their tenor was the
same. Expressing to Warren disappointment with the results so far obtained,
they added: "It is of the highest importance to the character and interests of
the country that the naval force of the enemy should be quickly and
completely disposed of. Their Lordships therefore have thought themselves
justified at this moment in withdrawing ships from other important services,
for the purpose of placing under your command a force with which you
cannot fail to bring the naval war to a termination, either by the capture of
the American national vessels, or by strictly blockading them in their own
waters."[144] This expectancy doubtless weighed with Broke; and probably
also prompted a challenge sent to Decatur's squadron to meet two British
frigates, under pledge of fair play, and of safe return if victorious. In the
latter case they at least would be badly injured; so in either event the
blockaders would be relieved of much of their burden.
The presence of several American frigates, blockaded close to the point
where Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound meet, constituted a great
inconvenience to all that region, by attracting thither so many enemy's
cruisers. To a coasting trade—then so singularly important—projecting
headlands, or capes, are the places of greatest exposure; in this resembling
the danger entailed by salients in all military lines, in fortification or in the
field. Traffic between New England and New York, general and local, had
derived a further impetus from the fact that Newport, not being included in
the commercial blockade, could still receive external supplies by neutral
vessels. Intercourse depended largely on these waters; and it was to them a
grave misfortune that there were no United States frigates left in New York
to divert the enemy's attention. The vexations entailed were forcibly
presented by the Governor of Connecticut.[145] "The British force stationed
in our waters having occasioned great inquietude along the whole of our
maritime frontier, every precaution consistent with due regard to the general
safety has been adopted for its protection.... In our present state of
preparedness, it is believed a descent upon our coast will not be attempted;
a well-grounded hope is entertained that it will be attended with little

success. Unfortunately, we have not the means of rendering our navigation
equally secure. Serious depredations have been committed even in our
harbors, and to such an extent that the usual communication through the
Sound is almost wholly interrupted. Thus, while anxiously engaged in
protecting our public ships [Decatur's], we are doomed to witness the
unrestrained capture of our private vessels, and the consequent suspension
of commercial pursuits." As "the disapprobation of the war by the people of
Connecticut had been publicly declared through the proper organs shortly
after hostilities commenced,"[146] it may be supposed the conditions
described, accompanied by continual alarms withdrawing the militiaman
from his shop or his harvest, to repel petty invasion, did not tend to
conciliate opinion. An officer of the Connecticut militia wrote in December,
"Our engagements with the enemy have become so frequent that it would
be in vain to attempt a particular statement of each."[147]
Similar conditions prevailed along the entire seaboard, from Maine to
Georgia; being of course greatest where inland navigation with wide
entrances, like Long Island Sound, had given particular development to the
coasting trade, and at the same time afforded to pursuers particular
immunity from ordinary dangers of the sea. Incidental confirmation of the
closeness of the hostile pressure is afforded by Bainbridge's report of the
brig "Siren's" arrival at Boston, June 11, 1813, from New Orleans.
"Although at sea between thirty and forty days, and great time along our
blockaded coast, she did not see one enemy's cruiser."[148] The cause is
evident. The Chesapeake and Delaware were blockaded from within. Ships
watching New York and Long Island Sound would be far inside the course
of one destined to Boston from the southward. From Hatteras to the Florida
line the enemy's vessels, mostly of small class, kept in summer well inside
the line from cape to cape, harassing even the water traffic behind the sea-
islands; while at Boston, her port of arrival, the "Siren" was favored by
Broke's procedure. In his eagerness to secure action with the "Chesapeake,"
he had detached his consort, the "Tenedos," with orders not to rejoin until
June 14. Under cover of her absence, and the "Shannon's" return to Halifax
with her prize, the "Siren" slipped into a harbor wholly relieved of the
enemy's presence. With such conditions, a voyage along the coast could
well be outside the British line of cruising.

Owing to the difficulty of the New York entrance, except with good
pilotage, and to the absence thence of ships of war after Decatur's departure,
that port ceased to present any features of naval activity; except as
connected with the lake squadrons, which depended upon it for supplies of
all kinds. The blockade of the Sound affected its domestic trade; and after
May its external commerce shared the inconveniences of the commercial
blockade, then applied to it, and made at least technically effective. What
this pressure in the end became is shown by a casual mention a year later,
under the heading "progress of luxury. A private stock of wine brought the
average 'extraordinary' price of twenty-five dollars the gallon; while at the
same period one auction lot of prize goods, comprising three decanters and
twelve tumblers, sold for one hundred and twelve dollars."[149] The arrival
in August, 1813, of a vessel in distress, which, like the "Siren," had passed
along the whole Southern coast without seeing a hostile cruiser, would seem
to show some lapse of watchfulness; but, although there were the
occasional evasions which attend all blockades, the general fact of neutrals
turned away was established. A flotilla of a dozen gunboats was kept in
commission in the bay, but under an officer not of the regular navy. As
might readily have been foreseen from conditions, and from experience
elsewhere, the national gunboat experiment had abundantly shown that
vessels of that class were not only excessively costly in expenditure, and
lamentably inefficient in results, as compared with seagoing cruisers, but
were also deleterious to the professional character of officers and seamen.
Two years before the war Captain Campbell, then in command both at
Charleston and Savannah, had commented on the unofficer-like neglect
noticeable in the gunboats, and Gordon now reported the same effect upon
the crew of the "Constellation," while thus detached for harbor defence.[150]
The Secretary of the Navy, affirming the general observation, remarked that
officers having knowledge of their business were averse to gunboat duty,
while those who had it yet to acquire were unwilling, because there it could
not be learned. "It is a service in which those who are to form the officers
for the ships of war ought not to be employed."[151] He therefore had
recommended the commissioning of volunteer officers for this work. This
local New York harbor guard at times convoyed coasters in the Sound, and
at times interfered, both in that quarter and off Sandy Hook, to prevent
small cruisers or boats of the enemy from effecting seizures of vessels,
close in shore or run on the beach. Such military action possesses a certain

minor value, diminishing in some measure the grand total of loss; but it is
not capable of modifying seriously the broad results of a strong commercial
blockade.
The Delaware and the Chesapeake—the latter particularly—became the
principal scenes of active operations by the British navy. Here in the early
part of the summer there seems to have been a formed determination on the
part of Sir John Warren to satisfy his Government and people by evidence
of military exertion in various quarters. Rear Admiral George Cockburn, an
officer of distinction and energy, had been ordered at the end of 1812 from
the Cadiz station, with four ships of the line and several smaller cruisers, to
re-enforce Warren. This strong detachment, a token at once of the relaxing
demand upon the British navy in Europe, and of the increasing purpose of
the British Government towards the United States, joined the commander-
in-chief at Bermuda, and accompanied him to the Chesapeake in March.
Cockburn became second in command. Early in April the fleet began
moving up the bay; an opening incident, already mentioned,[152] being the
successful attack by its boats upon several letters-of-marque and privateers
in the Rappahannock upon the 3d of the month. Some of the schooners
there captured were converted into tenders, useful for penetrating the
numerous waterways which intersected the country in every direction.
The fleet, comprising several ships of the line, besides numerous smaller
vessels, continued slowly upwards, taking time to land parties in many
quarters, keeping the country in perpetual alarm. The multiplicity and
diverseness of its operations, the particular object of which could at no
moment be foreseen, made it impossible to combine resistance. The
harassment was necessarily extreme, and the sustained suspense wearing;
for, with reports continually arriving, now from one shore and now from the
other, each neighborhood thought itself the next to be attacked. Defence
depended wholly upon militia, hastily assembled, with whom local
considerations are necessarily predominant. But while thus spreading
consternation on either side, diverting attention from his main objective, the
purpose of the British admiral was clear to his own mind. It was "to cut off
the enemy's supplies, and destroy their foundries, stores, and public works,
by penetrating the rivers at the head of the Chesapeake."

OUTLINE MAP OF CHESAPEAKE BAY AND RIVERSToList

On April 16 an advanced division arrived off the mouth of the Patapsco, a
dozen miles from Baltimore. There others successively joined, until the
whole force was reported on the 22d to be three seventy-fours, with several
frigates and smaller vessels, making a total of fifteen. The body of the fleet
remained stationary, causing the city a strong anticipation of attack; an
impression conducing to retain there troops which, under a reasonable
reliance upon adequate fortifications, might have been transferred to the
probable scene of operations, sufficiently indicated by its intrinsic
importance. Warren now constituted a light squadron of two frigates, with a
half-dozen smaller vessels, including some of those recently captured.
These he placed in charge of Cockburn and despatched to the head of the
bay. In addition to the usual crews there went about four hundred of the
naval brigade, consisting of marines and seamen in nearly equal numbers.
This, with a handful of army artillerists, was the entire force. With these
Cockburn went first up the Elk River, where Washington thirty years before

had taken shipping on his way to the siege of Yorktown. At Frenchtown,
notwithstanding a six-gun battery lately erected, a landing was effected on
April 29, and a quantity of flour and army equipments were destroyed,
together with five bay schooners. Many cattle were likewise seized;
Cockburn, in this and other instances, offering to pay in British government
bills, provided no resistance was attempted in the neighborhood. From
Frenchtown he went round to the Susquehanna, to obtain more cattle from
an island, just below Havre de Grace; but being there confronted on May 2
by an American flag, hoisted over a battery at the town, he proceeded to
attack the following day. A nominal resistance was made; but as the British
loss, here and at Frenchtown, was one wounded on each occasion, no great
cause for pride was left with the defenders. Holding the inhabitants
responsible for the opposition in their neighborhood, he determined to
punish the town. Some houses were burned. The guns of the battery were
then embarked; and during this process Cockburn himself, with a small
party, marched three or four miles north of the place to a cannon foundry,
where he destroyed the guns and material found, together with the buildings
and machinery.
"Our small division," he reported to Warren, "has been during the whole
of this day on shore, in the centre of the enemy's country, and on his high
road between Baltimore and Philadelphia." The feat testified rather to the
military imbecility of the United States Government during the last decade
than to any signal valor or enterprise on the part of the invaders. Enough
and to spare of both there doubtless was among them; for the expedition
was of a kind continuously familiar to the British navy during the past
twenty years, under far greater difficulty, in many parts of the world. Seeing
the trifling force engaged, the mortification to Americans must be that no
greater demand was made upon it for the display of its military virtues.
Besides the destruction already mentioned, a division of boats went up the
Susquehanna, destroyed five vessels and more flour; after which,
"everything being completed to my utmost wishes, the division embarked
and returned to the ships, after being twenty-two hours in constant
exertion." From thence Cockburn went round to the Sassafras River, where
a similar series of small injuries was inflicted, and two villages,
Georgetown and Frederickstown, were destroyed, in consequence of local
resistance offered, by which five British were wounded. Assurance coming
from several quarters that no further armed opposition would be made, and

as there was "now neither public property, vessels, nor warlike stores
remaining in the neighborhood," the expedition returned down the bay, May
7, and regained the fleet.[153]
The history of the Delaware and its waters during this period was very
much the same as that of the Chesapeake; except that, the water system of
the lower bay being less extensive and practicable, and the river above
narrower, there was not the scope for general marauding, nor the facility for
systematic destruction, which constituted the peculiar exposure of the
Chesapeake and gave Cockburn his opportunity. Neither was there the same
shelter from the sweep of the ocean, nor any naval establishment to draw
attention. For these reasons, the Chesapeake naturally attracted much more
active operations; and Virginia, which formed so large a part of its coast-
line, was the home of the President. She was also the leading member of the
group of states which, in the internal contests of American politics, was
generally thought to represent hatred to Great Britain and attachment to
France. In both bays the American Government maintained flotillas of
gunboats and small schooners, together with—in the Delaware at least—a
certain number of great rowing barges, or galleys; but, although creditable
energy was displayed, it is impossible to detect that, even in waters which
might be thought suited to their particular qualities, these small craft
exerted any substantial influence upon the movements of the enemy. Their
principal effect appears to have been to excite among the inhabitants a
certain amount of unreasonable expectation, followed inevitably by similar
unreasoning complaint.
It is probable, however, that they to some extent restricted the movements
of small foraging parties beyond the near range of their ships; and they
served also the purpose of watching and reporting the dispositions of the
British fleet. When it returned downwards from Cockburn's expedition, it
was followed by a division of these schooners and gunboats, under Captain
Charles Gordon of the navy, who remained cruising for nearly a month
below the Potomac, constantly sighting the enemy, but without an
opportunity offering for a blow to be struck under conditions favorable to
either party. "The position taken by the enemy's ships," reported Gordon,
"together with the constant protection given their small cruisers, particularly
in the night, rendered any offensive operations on our part impracticable."
[154] In the Delaware, a British corvette, running upon a shoal with a falling

tide, was attacked in this situation by a division of ten gunboats which was
at hand. Such conditions were unusually favorable to them, and, though a
frigate was within plain sight, she could not get within range on account of
the shoalness of water; yet the two hours' action which followed did no
serious injury to the grounded ship. Meantime one of the gunboats drifted
from its position, and was swept by the tide out of supporting distance from
its fellows. The frigate and sloop then manned boats, seven in number,
pulled towards her, and despite a plucky resistance carried her; their largely
superior numbers easily climbing on board her low-lying deck. Although
the record of gunboats in all parts of the world is mostly unfruitful, some
surprise cannot but be felt at the immunity experienced by a vessel aground
under such circumstances.[155]
On May 13 Captain Stewart of the "Constellation" reported from Norfolk
that the enemy's fleet had returned down the bay; fifteen sail being at
anchor in a line stretching from Cape Henry to near Hampton Roads. Little
had yet been done by the authorities to remedy the defenceless condition of
the port, which he had deplored in his letter of March 17; and he
apprehended a speedy attack either upon Hampton, on the north shore of the
James River, important as commanding communications between Norfolk
and the country above, or upon Craney Island, covering the entrance to the
Elizabeth River, through the narrow channel of which the navy yard must
be approached. There was a party now at work throwing up a battery on the
island, on which five hundred troops were stationed, but he feared these
preparations were begun too late. He had assigned seven gunboats to assist
the defence. It was clear to his mind that, if Norfolk was their object, active
operations would begin at one of these approaches, and not immediately
about the place itself. Meanwhile, he would await developments, and
postpone his departure to Boston, whither he had been ordered to command
the "Constitution."
Much to Stewart's surprise, considering the force of the enemy, which he,
as a seaman, could estimate accurately and compare with what he knew to
be the conditions confronting them, most of the British fleet soon after put
to sea with the commander-in-chief, leaving Cockburn with one seventy-
four and four frigates to hold the bay. This apparent abandonment, or at best
concession of further time to Craney Island, aroused in him contempt as
well as wonder. He had commented a month before on their extremely

circumspect management; "they act cautiously, and never separate so far
from one another that they cannot in the course of a few hours give to each
other support, by dropping down or running up, as the wind or tide serve."
[156] Such precaution, however, was not out of place when confronted with
the presence of gunboats capable of utilizing calms and local conditions. To
avoid exposure to useless injury is not to pass the bounds of military
prudence. It was another matter to have brought so large a force, and to
depart with no greater results than those of Frenchtown and Havre de
Grace. "They do not appear disposed to put anything to risk, or to make an
attack where they are likely to meet with opposition. Their conduct while in
these waters has been highly disgraceful to their arms, and evinces the
respect and dread they have for their opponents."[157] He added a
circumstance which throws further light upon the well-known discontent of
the British crews and their deterioration in quality, under a prolonged war
and the confinement attending the impressment system. "Their loss in
prisoners and deserters has been very considerable; the latter are coming up
to Norfolk almost daily, and their naked bodies are frequently fished up on
the bay shore, where they must have been drowned in attempting to swim.
They all give the same account of the dissatisfaction of their crews, and
their detestation of the service they are engaged in."[158] Deserters,
however, usually have tales acceptable to those to whom they come.
Whether Warren was judicious in postponing attack may be doubted, but
he had not lost sight of the Admiralty's hint about American frigates. There
were just two in the waters of the Chesapeake; the "Constellation," 36, at
Norfolk, and the "Adams," 24, Captain Charles Morris, in the Potomac. The
British admiral had been notified that a division of troops would be sent to
Bermuda, to be under his command for operations on shore, and he was
now gone to fetch them. Early in June he returned, bringing these soldiers,
two thousand six hundred and fifty in number.[159] From his Gazette letters
he evidently had in view the capture of Norfolk with the "Constellation";
for when he designates Hampton and Craney Island as points of attack, it is
because of their relations to Norfolk.[160] This justified the forecast of
Stewart, who had now departed; the command of the "Constellation"
devolving soon after upon Captain Gordon. In connection with the military
detachment intrusted to Warren, the Admiralty, while declining to give
particular directions as to its employment, wrote him: "Against a maritime
country like America, the chief towns and establishments of which are

situated upon navigable rivers, a force of the kind under your orders must
necessarily be peculiarly formidable.... In the choice of objects of attack, it
will naturally occur to you that on every account any attempt which should
have the effect of crippling the enemy's naval force should have a
preference."[161] Except for the accidental presence of Decatur's frigates in
New London, as yet scarcely known to the British commander-in-chief,
Norfolk, more than any other place, met this prescription of his
Government. His next movements, therefore, may be considered as
resulting directly from his instructions.
The first occurrence was a somewhat prolonged engagement between a
division of fifteen gunboats and the frigate "Junon," which, having been
sent to destroy vessels at the mouth of the James River, was caught
becalmed and alone in the upper part of Hampton Roads; no other British
vessel being nearer than three miles. The cannonade continued for three
quarters of an hour, when a breeze springing up brought two of her consorts
to the "Junon's" aid. The gunboats, incapable of close action with a single
frigate in a working breeze, necessarily now retreated. They had suffered
but slightly, one killed and two wounded; but retired with the confidence,
always found in the accounts of such affairs, that they had inflicted great
damage upon the enemy. The commander of a United States revenue cutter,
lately captured, who was on board the frigate at the time, brought back
word subsequently that she had lost one man killed and two or three
wounded.[162] The British official reports do not allude to the affair. As
regards positive results, however, it may be affirmed with considerable
assurance that the military value of gunboats in their day, as a measure of
coast defence, was not what they effected, but the caution imposed upon the
enemy by the apprehension of what they might effect, did this or that
combination of circumstances occur. That the circumstances actually almost
never arose detracted little from this moral influence. The making to one's
self a picture of possible consequences is a powerful factor in most military
operations; and the gunboat is not without its representative to-day in the
sphere of imaginative warfare.
The "Junon" business was a casual episode. Warren was already
preparing for his attack on Craney Island. This little strip of ground, a half-
mile long by two hundred yards across, lies within easy gunshot to the west
of the Elizabeth River, a narrow channel-way, three hundred yards from

edge to edge, which from Hampton Roads leads due south, through
extensive flats, to Norfolk and Portsmouth. The navy yard is four miles
above the island, on the west side of the river, the banks of which there have
risen above the water. Up to and beyond Craney Island the river-bed proper,
though fairly clear, is submerged and hidden amid the surrounding expanse
of shoal water. Good pilotage, therefore, is necessary, and incidental thereto
the reduction beforehand of an enemy's positions commanding the
approach. Of these Craney Island was the first. From it the flats which
constitute the under-water banks of the Elizabeth extend north towards
Hampton Roads, for a distance of two miles, and are not traversable by
vessels powerful enough to act against batteries. For nearly half a mile the
depth is less than four feet, while the sand immediately round the island
was bare when the tide was out.[163] Attack here was possible only by boats
armed with light cannon and carrying troops. On the west the island was
separated from the mainland by a narrow strip of water, fordable by infantry
at low tide. It was therefore determined to make a double assault,—one on
the north, by fifteen boats, carrying, besides their crews, five hundred
soldiers; the other on the west, by a division eight hundred strong,[164] to be
landed four miles away, at the mouth of the Nansemond River. The garrison
of the island numbered five hundred and eighty, and one hundred and fifty
seamen were landed from the "Constellation" to man one of the principal
batteries.
The British plan labored under the difficulty that opposite conditions of
tide were desirable for the two parties which were to act in concert. The
front attack demanded high water, in order that under the impulse of the
oars the boats might get as near as possible before they took the ground,
whence the advance to the assault must be by wading. The flanking
movement required low water, to facilitate passing the ford. Between the
two, the hour was fixed for an ebbing tide, probably to allow for delays, and
to assure the arrival of the infantry so as to profit by the least depth. At 11
A.M. of June 22 the boat division arrived off the northwest point of the
island, opposite the battery manned by the seamen, in that day notoriously
among the best of artillerists. A difference of opinion as to the propriety of
advancing at all here showed itself among the senior naval officers; for
there will always be among seamen a dislike to operating over unknown
ground with a falling tide. The captain in command, however, overruled
hesitations; doubtless feeling that in a combined movement the particular

interest of one division must yield to the requirements of mutual support. A
spirited forward dash was therefore made; but the guiding boat, sixty yards
ahead of the others, grounded a hundred yards from the battery. One or two
others, disregarding her signal, shared her mishap; and two were sunk by
the American fire. Under these circumstances a seaman, sounding with a
boat hook, declared that he found along side three or four feet of slimy
mud. This was considered decisive, and the attack was abandoned.
The shore division had already retreated, having encountered obstacles,
the precise character of which is not stated. Warren's report simply said, "In
consequence of the representation of the officer commanding the troops, of
the difficulty of their passing over from the land, I considered that the
persevering in the attempt would cost more men than the number with us
would permit, as the other forts must have been stormed before the frigate
and dockyard could be destroyed." The enterprise was therefore abandoned
at the threshold, because of probable ulterior difficulties, the degree of
which it would require to-day unprofitable labor even to conjecture; but
reduced as the affair in its upshot was to an abortive demonstration,
followed by no serious effort, it probably was not reckoned at home to have
fulfilled the Admiralty's injunctions, that the character as well as the interest
of the country required certain results. The loss was trifling,—three killed,
sixteen wounded, sixty-two missing.[165]
Having relinquished his purpose against Craney Island, and with it,
apparently, all serious thought of the navy yard and the "Constellation",
Warren next turned his attention to Hampton. On the early morning of June
26 two thousand troops were landed to take possession of the place, which
they did with slight resistance. Three stand of colors were captured and
seven field guns, with their equipment and ammunition. The defences of the
town were destroyed; but as no further use was made of the advantage
gained, the affair amounted to nothing more than an illustration on a larger
scale of the guerilla depredation carried on on all sides of the Chesapeake.
With it ended Warren's attempts against Norfolk. His force may have been
really inadequate to more; certainly it was far smaller than was despatched
to the same quarter the following year; but the Admiralty probably was
satisfied by this time that he had not the enterprise necessary for his
position, and a successor was appointed during the following winter.

For two months longer the British fleet as a whole remained in the bay,
engaged in desultory operations, which had at least the effect of greatly
increasing their local knowledge, and in so far facilitating the more serious
undertakings of the next season. The Chesapeake was not so much
blockaded as occupied. On June 29 Captain Cassin of the navy yard
reported that six sail of the line, with four frigates, were at the mouth of the
Elizabeth, and that the day before a squadron of thirteen—frigates, brigs,
and schooners—had gone ten miles up the James, causing the inhabitants of
Smithfield and the surroundings to fly from their homes, terrified by the
transactions at Hampton. The lighter vessels continued some distance
farther towards Richmond. A renewal of the attack was naturally expected;
but on July 11 the fleet quitted Hampton Roads, and again ascended the
Chesapeake, leaving a division of ten sail in Lynnhaven Bay, under Cape
Henry. Two days later the main body entered the Potomac, in which, as has
before been mentioned, was the frigate "Adams"; but she lay above the
Narrows, out of reach of such efforts as Warren was willing to risk. He went
as high as Blakiston Island, twenty-five to thirty miles from the river's
mouth, and from there Cockburn, with a couple of frigates and two smaller
vessels, tried to get beyond the Kettle Bottom Shoals, an intricate bit of
navigation ten miles higher up, but still below the Narrows.[166] Two of his
detachment, however, took the ground; and the enterprise of approaching
Washington by this route was for that time abandoned. A year afterwards it
was accomplished by Captain Gordon, of the British Navy, who carried two
frigates and a division of bomb vessels as far as Alexandria.
Two United States gunboats, "The Scorpion" and "Asp", lying in
Yeocomico River, a shallow tributary of the Potomac ten miles from the
Chesapeake, were surprised there July 14 by the entrance of the enemy.
Getting under way hastily, the "Scorpion" succeeded in reaching the main
stream and retreating up it; but the "Asp", being a bad sailer, and the wind
contrary, had to go back. She was pursued by boats; and although an attack
by three was beaten off, she was subsequently carried when they were re-
enforced to five. Her commander, Midshipman Sigourney, was killed, and
of the twenty-one in her crew nine were either killed or wounded. The
assailants were considerably superior in numbers, as they need to be in such
undertakings. They lost eight. This was the second United States vessel thus
captured in the Chesapeake this year; the revenue cutter "Surveyor" having
been taken in York River, by the boats of the frigate "Narcissus", on the

night of June 12. In the latter instance, the sword of the commander, who
survived, was returned to him the next day by the captor, with a letter
testifying "an admiration on the part of your opponents, such as I have
seldom witnessed, for your gallant and desperate attempt to defend your
vessel against more than double your numbers."[167] Trivial in themselves
as these affairs were, it is satisfactory to notice that in both the honor of the
flag was upheld with a spirit which is worth even more than victory.
Sigourney had before received the commendation of Captain Morris, no
mean judge of an officer's merits.
The British fleet left the Potomac July 21, and went on up the bay,
spreading alarm on every side. Morris, with a body of seamen and marines,
was ordered from the "Adams" to Annapolis, the capital of Maryland, on
the River Severn, to command the defences. These he reported, on August
13, to be in the "miserable condition" characteristic of all the national
preparations to meet hostilities. With a view to entering, the enemy was
sounding the bar, an operation which frequently must be carried on beyond
protection by ships' guns; "but we have no floating force to molest them."
The bulk of the fleet was above the Severn, as were both admirals, and
Morris found their movements "contradictory, as usual."[168] As many as
twenty sail had at one time been visible from the state-house dome in the
city. On August 8, fifteen, three of which were seventy-fours, were counted
from North Point, at the mouth of the Patapsco, on which Baltimore lies.
Kent Island, on the eastern shore of the bay abreast Annapolis, was taken
possession of, and occupied for some days. At the same period attacks were
reported in other quarters on that side of the Chesapeake, as elsewhere in
the extensive basin penetrated by its tributaries. The prosecution of these
various enterprises was attended with the usual amount of scuffling
encounter, which associates itself naturally with coastwise warfare of a
guerilla character. The fortune of war inclined now to one side, now to the
other, in the particular cases; but in the general there could be no doubt as to
which party was getting the worst, undergoing besides almost all the
suffering and quite all the harassment. This is the necessary penalty of the
defensive, when inadequate.
Throughout most of this summer of conflict there went on, singularly
enough, a certain amount of trade by licensed vessels, neutral and
American, which passed down Chesapeake Bay and went to sea. Doubtless

the aggregate amount of traffic thus maintained was inconsiderable, as
compared with normal conditions, but its allowance by either party to the
war is noticeable,—by the British, because of the blockade declared by
them; by the Americans, because of the evident inexpediency of permitting
to depart vessels having full knowledge of conditions, and almost certain to
be boarded by the enemy. Sailing from blockaded ports is of course
promoted in most instances by the nation blockaded, for it is in support of
trade; and with the sea close at hand, although there is risk, there is also
chance of safe passage through a belt of danger, relatively narrow and
entered at will. The case is quite different where a hazardous navigation of
sixty to a hundred miles, increasing in intricacy at its further end, and lined
throughout with enemy's cruisers, interposes before the sea is reached. The
difficulty here is demonstrated by the fact that the "Adams," a ship by no
means large or exceptionally fettered by navigational difficulties, under a
young captain burning to exercise his first command in war, waited four
months, even after the bulk of the enemy's fleet had gone, before she was
able to get through; and finally did so only under such conditions of
weather as caused her to miss her way and strike bottom.
The motive of the British for collusion is clear. The Chesapeake was the
heart of the wheat and flour production of the United States, and while
some provision had been made for meeting the wants of the West Indies,
and of the armies in Canada and Spain, by refraining from commercial
blockade of Boston and other eastern ports, these necessary food supplies
reached those places only after an expensive transport which materially
increased their price; the more as they were carried by land to the point of
exportation, it not suiting the British policy to connive at coasting trade
even for that purpose. A neutral or licensed vessel, sailing from the
Chesapeake with flour for a port friendly to the United States, could be
seized under cover of the commercial blockade, which she was violating,
sent to Halifax, and condemned for her technical offence. The cargo then
was available for transport whither required, the whole transaction being
covered by a veil of legality; but it is plain that the risks to a merchant, in
attempting bonâ fide to run a blockade like that of Chesapeake Bay,
exceeded too far any probable gain to have been undertaken without some
assurance of compensation, which did not appear on the surface.

Taken in connection with intelligence obtained by this means, the British
motive is apparent; but why did the United States administration tolerate
procedures which betrayed its counsels, and directly helped to sustain the
enemy's war? Something perhaps is due to executive weakness in a
government constituted by popular vote; more, probably, at least during the
period when immediate military danger did not threaten, to a wish to
frustrate the particular advantage reaped by New England, through its
exemption from the restrictions of the commercial blockade. When
breadstuffs were pouring out of the country through the coast-line of a
section which gloried in its opposition to the war,[169] and lost no
opportunity to renew the declaration of its disapproval and its criticism of
the Government, it was at least natural, perhaps even expedient, to wink at
proceedings which transferred elsewhere some of the profits, and did not
materially increase the advantage of the enemy. But circumstances became
very different when a fleet appeared in the bay, the numbers and action of
which showed a determination to carry hostile operations wherever
conditions permitted. Then, betrayal of such conditions by passing vessels
became an unbearable evil; and at the same time the Administration had
forced upon its attention the unpleasant but notorious fact that, by the active
complicity of many of its own citizens, not only the flour trade continued,
but the wants of the blockading squadrons along the coast were being
supplied. Neutrals, real or pretended, and coasting vessels, assuming a
lawful destination, took on board cattle, fresh vegetables, and other stores
acceptable to ships confined to salt provisions, and either went direct to
enemy's ports or were captured by collusion. News was received of
contracts made by the British admiral at Bermuda for fresh beef to be
supplied from American ports, by American dealers, in American vessels;
while Halifax teemed with similar transactions, without serious attempt at
concealment.
Such aid and comfort to an enemy is by no means unexampled in the
history of war, particularly where one of the belligerents is shrewdly
commercial; but it is scarcely too much to say that it attained unusual
proportions at this time in the United States, and was countenanced by a
public opinion which was more than tolerant, particularly in New England,
where the attitude of the majority towards the Government approached
hostility. As a manifestation of contemporary national character, of
unwillingness to subordinate personal gain to public welfare, to loyalty to

country, it was pitiable and shameful, particularly as it affected large
communities; but its instructive significance at this time is the evidence it
gives that forty years of confederation, nearly twenty-five being of the
closer union under the present Constitution, had not yet welded the people
into a whole, or created a consciousness truly national. The capacity for
patriotism was there, and readiness to suffer for patriotic cause had been
demonstrated by the War of Independence; but the mass of Americans had
not yet risen sufficiently above local traditions and interests to discern
clearly the noble ideal of national unity, and vagueness of apprehension
resulted inevitably in lukewarmness of sentiment. This condition goes far to
palliate actions which it cannot excuse; the reproach of helping the enemies
of one's country is somewhat less when the nation itself has scarcely
emerged to recognition, as it afterwards did under the inspiring watchword,
"The Union."
The necessity to control these conditions of clandestine intercourse found
official expression in a message of the President to Congress, July 20, 1813,
[170] recommending "an immediate and effectual prohibition of all exports"
for a limited time; subject to removal by executive order, in case the
commercial blockade were raised. A summary of the conditions above
related was given, as a cause for action. The President's further comment
revealed the continuity of thought and policy which dictated his
recommendation, and connected the proposed measure with the old series
of commercial restrictions, associated with his occupancy of the State
Department under Jefferson's administration. "The system of the enemy,
combining with the blockade of our ports special licenses to neutral vessels,
and insidious discrimination between different ports of the United States, if
not counteracted, will have the effect of diminishing very materially the
pressure of the war on the enemy, and encourage perseverance in it, and at
the same time will leave the general commerce of the United States under
all the pressure the enemy can impose, thus subjecting the whole to British
regulation, in subserviency to British monopoly."
The House passed a bill meeting the President's suggestions, but it was
rejected by the Senate on July 28. The Executive then fell back on its own
war powers; and on July 29 the Secretary of the Navy, by direction of the
President, issued a general order to all naval officers in command, calling
attention to "the palpable and criminal intercourse held with the enemy's

forces blockading and invading the waters of the United States." "This
intercourse," he explicitly added, "is not only carried on by foreigners,
under the specious garb of friendly flags, who convey provisions, water,
and succors of all kinds (ostensibly destined for friendly ports, in the face,
too, of a declared and rigorous blockade),[171] direct to the fleets and
stations of the enemy, with constant intelligence of our naval and military
force and preparation, ... but the same traffic, intercourse, and intelligence is
carried on with great subtlety and treachery by profligate citizens, who, in
vessels ostensibly navigating our own waters, from port to port [coasters],
find means to convey succors or intelligence to the enemy, and elude the
penalty of law."[172] Officers were therefore instructed to arrest all vessels,
the movements or situation of which indicated an intention to effect any of
the purposes indicated.
A similar order was issued, August 5, by the War Department to army
officers.[173] In accordance with his instructions, Captain Morris of the
"Adams," on July 29 or 30, stopped the ship "Monsoon," from Alexandria.
Her agent wrote a correspondent in Boston that, when the bill failed in the
Senate, he had had no doubt of her being allowed to proceed, "but the
Secretary and Mr. Madison have made a sort of embargo, or directed the
stoppage of vessels."[174] He added that another brig was lying in the river
ready loaded, but held by the same order. Morris's indorsement on the ship's
papers shows the barefacedness of the transaction. "Whereas the within-
mentioned ship 'Monsoon' is laden with flour, and must pass within the
control of the enemy's squadron now within, and blockading Chesapeake
Bay, if she be allowed to proceed on her intended voyage, and as the enemy
might derive from her such intelligence and succor as would be serviceable
to themselves and injurious to the United States, I forbid her proceeding
while the enemy shall be so disposed as to prevent a reasonable possibility
of her getting to sea without falling into their possession."[175] At this
writing the British had left the Potomac itself, and the most of them were
above. A week later, at Charleston, a ship called the "Caroline" was visited
by a United States naval officer, and found with a license from Cockburn to
carry a cargo, free from molestation by British cruisers.[176] "With flour at
Lisbon $13 per barrel, no sale, and at Halifax $20, in demand," queries a
Baltimore paper of the day, "where would all the vessels that would in a few
days have been off from Alexandria have gone, if the 'Monsoon' had not
been stopped? They would have been captured and sent to Halifax."[177]

Morris's action was in accordance with the Secretary's order, and went no
further than to stop a voyage which, in view of the existing proclaimed
blockade, and of the great British force at hand, bore collusion on its face.
The President's request for legislation, which Congress had denied, went
much further. It was a recurrence, and the last, to the policy of commercial
retaliation, fostered by himself and Jefferson in preference to armed
resistance. By such measures in peace, and as far as commercial prosperity
was concerned, they had opened the nation's veins without vindicating its
self-respect. The military value of food supplies to the enemy in Canada
and on the coast, however, could not be contested; and during the recess of
Congress it received emphasis by a Canadian embargo upon the export of
grain. Hence, at the next session the President's recommendation of July
was given attention, and there was passed almost immediately—December
17, 1813,—a sweeping embargo law, applicable not only to external
commerce but to coasters. As this ended the long series of commercial
restrictions, so was it also of limited duration as compared with them, being
withdrawn the following April.
By the Act of December 17, as interpreted by the Treasury, foreign
merchant vessels might depart with cargoes already laden, except
provisions and military stores, which must be relanded; but nothing could
be shipped that was not already on board when the Act was received.
Coasters, even for accustomed voyages, could obtain clearances only by
permission from the President; and the rules for such permission, given
through the collectors, were extremely stringent. In no case were the vessels
permitted to leave interior waters, proceeding from one sound or bay to
another, and be "at sea" for even a short distance; nor were they to be
permitted to carry any provisions, or supplies useful to an enemy, if there
was the slightest chance of their falling into his power. It would appear that
the orders of July 29 had been allowed to lapse after the great body of the
British left the Chesapeake; for Morris, still in the Potomac, acknowledging
the receipt of this Act on December 20, writes: "There are several vessels
below us in the river with flour. I have issued orders to the gunboats to
detain them, and as soon as the wind will permit, shall proceed with this
ship, to give all possible effect to the Act." Six days afterwards, having
gone down as he intended, he found the British anchored off the mouth of
the stream, at a point where the bay is little more than five miles wide.

"Two American brigs passed down before us, and I have every reason to
believe threw themselves into the enemy's hands last Wednesday."[178]
On September 6 the principal part of the British fleet quitted Chesapeake
Bay for the season; leaving behind a ship of the line with some smaller
vessels, to enforce the blockade. Viewed as a military campaign, to sustain
the character as well as the interests of the country, its operations cannot be
regarded as successful. With overwhelming numbers, and signally favored
by the quiet inland waters with extensive ramifications which characterized
the scene of war, the results, though on a more extensive scale, differed
nothing in kind from the harassment inflicted all along the coast from
Maine to Georgia, by the squadrons cruising outside. Ample demonstration
was indeed afforded, there as elsewhere, of the steady, remorseless, far-
reaching effect of a predominant sea power; and is confirmed explicitly by
an incidental remark of the Russian minister at Washington writing to
Warren, April 4, 1813, concerning an armistice, in connection with the
abortive Russian proffer of mediation.[179] Even at this early period, "It
would be almost impossible to establish an armistice, without raising the
blockade, since the latter does them more harm than all the hostilities."[180]
But in direct military execution the expedition had undoubtedly fallen far
short of its opportunity, afforded by the wretchedly unprepared state of the
region against which it had been sent. Whether the fault lay with the
commander-in-chief, or with the Admiralty for insufficient means given
him, is needless here to inquire. The squadron remaining through the winter
perpetuated the isolation of Norfolk from the upper bay, and barred the
"Constellation" and "Adams" from the sea. Ammunition and stores had to
be brought by slow and unwieldly transportation from the Potomac across
country, and it was not till January 18, 1814, that the "Adams" got away.
Two attempts of the "Constellation" a month later were frustrated.
The principal two British divisions, the action of which has so far been
considered, the one blockading the Chesapeake, the other watching
Decatur's squadron in New London, marked the extremities of what may be
considered the central section of the enemy's coastwise operations upon the
Atlantic. Although the commercial shipping of the United States belonged
largely to New England, much the greater part of the exports came from the
district thus closed to the world; and within it also, after the sailing of the
"President" and "Congress" from Boston, and the capture of the

"Chesapeake", lay in 1813 all the bigger vessels of the navy, save the
"Constitution".
In the conditions presented to the enemy, the sections of the coast-line
south of Virginia, and north of Cape Cod, differed in some important
respects from the central division, and from each other. There was in them
no extensive estuary wide open to the sea, resembling Chesapeake and
Delaware bays, and Long Island Sound, accessible to vessels of all sizes;
features which naturally determined upon these points the chief effort of a
maritime enemy, enabling him readily to paralyze the whole system of
intercourse depending upon them, domestic as well as foreign. The southern
waters abounded indeed in internal coastwise communications; not
consecutive throughout, but continuous for long reaches along the shores of
North and South Carolina and Georgia. These, however, were narrow, and
not easily approached. Behind the sea islands, which inclose this
navigation, small craft can make their voyages sheltered from the perils of
the sea, and protected in great measure from attack other than by boats or
very light cruisers; to which, moreover, some local knowledge was
necessary, for crossing the bars, or threading the channels connecting sound
with sound. Into these inside basins empty numerous navigable rivers,
which promoted intercourse, and also furnished lines of retreat from danger
coming from the sea. Coupled with these conditions was the fact that the
United States had in these quarters no naval establishment, and no naval
vessels of force. Defence was intrusted wholly to gunboats, with three or
four armed schooners of somewhat larger tonnage. American offensive
operation, confined here as elsewhere to commerce destroying, depended
entirely on privateers. Into these ports, where there were no public facilities
for repair, not even a national sloop of war entered until 1814 was well
advanced.
Prior to the war, one third of the domestic export of the United States had
issued from this southern section; and in the harassed year 1813 this ratio
increased. The aggregate for the whole country was reduced by one half
from that of 1811, and amounted to little more than one fourth of the
prosperous times preceding Jefferson's embargo of 1808, with its vexatious
progeny of restrictive measures; but the proportion of the South increased.
The same was observable in the Middle states, containing the great centres
of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. There a ratio to the total, of a

little under fifty per cent, rose to something above that figure. The relative
diminution, corresponding to the increases just noted, fell upon New
England, and is interesting because of what it indicates. Before the war the
export of domestic produce from the eastern ports was twenty per cent of
the national total; in 1813 it fell to ten per cent. When the domestic export is
taken in conjunction with the re-exportation of foreign products, the loss of
New England is still more striking. From twenty-five per cent of the whole
national export, domestic and foreign, she now fell to ten per cent of the
diminished total. When it is remembered that throughout 1813 the Eastern
ports alone were open to neutral ships, no commercial blockade of them
having yet been instituted, these results are the more noticeable.
The general explanation is that the industries of the United States at that
time divided into two principal classes,—agricultural and maritime; the
former of which supplied the material for commerce, while the latter
furnished transportation for whatever surplus of production remained for
export. Manufactures sufficed only for home demands, being yet in a state
of infancy; forced, in fact, upon an unwilling New England by the policy of
commercial restriction which drove her ships off the sea. Domestic products
for export therefore meant almost wholly the yield of the fields, the forests,
and the fisheries. The latter belonged to New England, but they fell with the
war. Her soil did not supply grain enough to feed her people; and her
domestic exports, therefore, were reduced to shipments of wheat and flour
conveyed to her by inland transportation from the more fertile, but
blockaded, regions to the southward. Despite the great demand for
provisions in Halifax and the St. Lawrence region, and the facility for
egress by sea, through the absence of blockade, the slowness and cost of
land carriage brought forward an insufficient supply, and laid a heavy
charge upon the transaction; while the license system of the British,
modifying this condition of things to their own advantage, by facilitating
exports from the Chesapeake, certainly did operate, as the President's
message said, to regulate American commerce in conformity with British
interests.
The re-exportation of foreign produce had once played a very large part
in the foreign trade of New England. This item consisted chiefly in West
India commodities; and although, owing to several causes, it fell off very
much in the years between 1805 and 1811, it had remained still

considerable. It was, however, particularly obnoxious to British interests, as
then understood by British statesmen and people; and since it depended
entirely upon American ships,—for it was not to the interest of a neutral to
bring sugar and coffee to an American port merely to carry it away again,—
it disappeared entirely when the outbreak of war rendered all American
merchant vessels liable to capture. In fact, as far as the United States was
concerned, although this re-exportation appeared among commercial
returns, it was not an interest of commerce, accurately so called, but of
navigation, of carrying trade. It had to do with ships, not with cargoes; its
gain was that of the wagoner. Still, the loss by the idleness of the ships, due
to the war, may be measured in terms of the cargoes. In 1805 New England
re-exported foreign products to the amount of $15,621,484; in 1811,
$5,944,121; in 1813, no more than $302,781. It remains to add that, as can
be readily understood, all export, whether of foreign or domestic produce,
was chiefly by neutrals, which were not liable to capture so long as there
was no blockade proclaimed. From December 1 to 24, 1813, forty-four
vessels cleared from Boston for abroad, of which five only were Americans.
[181]

Under the very reduced amount of their commercial movement, the
tonnage of the Middle and Southern states was more than adequate to their
local necessities; and they now had no need of the aid which in conditions
of normal prosperity they received from the Eastern shipping. The latter,
therefore, having lost its usual local occupation, and also the office it had
filled towards the other sections of the Union, was either left idle or turned
perforce to privateering. September 7, 1813, there were in Boston harbor
ninety-one ships, two barks, one hundred and nine brigs, and forty-three
schooners; total, two hundred and forty-five, besides coasters. The
accumulation shows the lack of employment. December 15, two hundred
square-rigged vessels were laid up in Boston alone.[182] Insurance on
American vessels was stated to be fifty per cent.[183]
Whether tonnage to any large amount was transferred to a neutral flag, as
afterwards so much American shipping was during the Civil War, I have not
ascertained. It was roundly intimated that neutral flags were used to cover
the illicit intercourse with the enemy before mentioned; but whether by
regular transfer or by fraudulent papers does not appear. An officer of the
frigate "Congress," in her unprofitable voyage just mentioned, says that

after parting with the "President," she fell in with a few licensed Americans
and a great number of Spaniards and Portuguese.[184] The flags of these two
nations, and of Sweden, certainly abounded to an abnormal extent, and did
much of the traffic from America; but it seems unlikely that there was at
that particular epoch any national commerce, other than British, at once
large enough, and sufficiently deficient in shipping of its own, to absorb any
great number of Americans. In truth, the commerce of the world had lost
pretty much all its American component, because this, through a variety of
causes, had come to consist chiefly of domestic agricultural products, which
were thrown back upon the nation's hands, and required no carriers; the
enemy having closed the gates against them, except so far as suited his own
purposes. The disappearance of American merchant ships from the high
seas corresponded to the void occasioned by the blockade of American
staples of commerce. The only serious abatement from this generalization
arises from the British system of licenses, permitting the egress of certain
articles useful to themselves.
The results from the conditions above analyzed are reflected in the
returns of commerce, in the movements of American coasters, and in the
consequent dispositions of the enemy. In the Treasury year ending
September 30, 1813, the value of the total exports from the Eastern states
was $3,049,022; from the Middle section, $17,513,930; from the South,
$7,293,043. Virginia is here reckoned with the Middle, because her exports
found their way out by the Chesapeake; and this appreciation is commercial
and military in character, not political or social. While this was the state of
foreign trade under war conditions, the effect of local circumstances upon
coasting is also to be noticed. The Middle section, characterized by the
great estuaries, and by the description of its products,—grain primarily, and
secondly tobacco,—was relatively self-sufficing and compact. Its growth of
food, as has been seen, was far in excess of its wants, and the distance by
land between the extreme centres of distribution, from tide-water to tide-
water, was comparatively short. From New York to Baltimore by road is but
four fifths as far as from New York to Boston; and at New York and
Baltimore, as at Boston, water communication was again reached for the
great lines of distribution from either centre. In fact, traffic from New York
southward needed to go no farther than Elk River, forty miles short of
Baltimore, to be in touch with the whole Chesapeake system. Philadelphia

lies half-way between New York and Baltimore, approximately a hundred
miles from each.
The extremes of the Middle section of the country were thus
comparatively independent of coastwise traffic for mutual intercourse, and
the character of their coasts co-operated to reduce the disposition to employ
coasters in war. From the Chesapeake to Sandy Hook the shore-line sweeps
out to sea, is safely approachable by hostile navigators, and has for refuge
no harbors of consequence, except the Delaware. The local needs of the
little communities along the beaches might foster a creeping stream of very
small craft, for local supply; but as a highway, for intercourse on a large
scale, the sea here was too exposed for use, when taken in connection with
the facility for transport by land, which was not only short but with
comparatively good roads.
In war, as in other troublous times, prices are subject to complicated
causes of fluctuation, not always separable. Two great staples, flour and
sugar, however, may be taken to indicate with some certainty the effects of
impeded water transport. From a table of prices current, of August, 1813, it
appears that at Baltimore, in the centre of the wheat export, flour was $6.00
per barrel; in Philadelphia, $7.50; in New York, $8.50; in Boston, $11.87.
At Richmond, equally well placed with Baltimore as regarded supplies, but
with inferior communications for disposing of its surplus, the price was
$4.00. Removing from the grain centre in the other direction, flour at
Charleston is reported at $8.00—about the same as New York; at
Wilmington, North Carolina, $10.25. Not impossibly, river transportation
had in these last some cheapening effect, not readily ascertainable now. In
sugar, the scale is seen to ascend in an inverse direction. At Boston,
unblockaded, it is quoted at $18.75 the hundredweight, itself not a low rate;
at New York, blockaded, $21.50; at Philadelphia, with a longer journey,
$22.50; at Baltimore, $26.50; at Savannah, $20. In the last named place,
nearness to the Florida line, with the inland navigation, favored smuggling
and safe transportation. The price at New Orleans, a sugar-producing
district, $9.00, affords a standard by which to measure the cost of carriage
at that time. Flour in the same city, on February 1, 1813, was $25 the barrel.
In both articles the jump between Boston and New York suggests forcibly
the harassment of the coasting trade. It manifests either diminution of
supply, or the effect of more expensive conveyance by land; possibly both.

The case of the southern seaboard cities was similar to that of Boston; for it
will not be overlooked that, as the more important food products came from
the middle of the country, they would be equally available for each extreme.
The South was the more remote, but this was compensated in some degree
by better internal water communications; and its demand also was less, for
the white population was smaller and less wealthy than that of New
England. The local product, rice, also went far to supply deficiencies in
other grains. In the matter of manufactured goods, however, the
disadvantage of the South was greater. These had to find their way there
from the farther extreme of the land; for the development of manufactures
had been much the most marked in the east. It has before been quoted that
some wagons loaded with dry goods were forty-six days in accomplishing
the journey from Philadelphia to Georgetown, South Carolina, in May of
this year. Some relief in these articles reached the South by smuggling
across the Florida line, and the Spanish waters opposite St. Mary's were at
this time thronged with merchant shipping to an unprecedented extent; for
although smuggling was continual, in peace as in war, across a river frontier
of a hundred miles, the stringent demand consequent upon the interruption
of coastwise traffic provoked an increased supply. "The trade to Amelia,"—
the northernmost of the Spanish sea-islands,—reported the United States
naval officer at St. Mary's towards the end of the war, "is immense.
Upwards of fifty square-rigged vessels are now in that port under Swedish,
Russian, and Spanish colors, two thirds of which are considered British
property."[185] It was the old story of the Continental and License systems
of the Napoleonic struggle, re-enacted in America; and, as always, the
inhabitants on both sides the line co-operated heartily in beating the law.
The two great food staples chosen sufficiently indicate general conditions
as regards communications from centre to centre. Upon this supervened the
more extensive and intricate problem of distribution from the centres. This
more especially imparted to the Eastern and Southern coasts the particular
characteristics of coasting trade and coast warfare, in which they differ from
the Middle states. These form the burden of the letters from the naval
captains commanding the stations at Charleston, Savannah, and Portsmouth,
New Hampshire; nor is it without significance that Bainbridge at Boston,
not a way port, but a centre, displayed noticeably less anxiety than the
others about this question, which less touched his own command. Captain
Hull, now commanding the Portsmouth Yard, writes, June 14, 1813, that

light cruisers like the "Siren," lately arrived at Boston, and the "Enterprise,"
then with him, can be very useful by driving away the enemy's small
vessels and privateers which have been molesting the coasting trade. He
purposes to order them eastward, along the Maine coast, to collect coasters
in convoy and protect their long-shore voyages, after the British fashion on
the high seas. "The coasting trade here," he adds, "is immense. Not less than
fifty sail last night anchored in this harbor, bound to Boston and other
points south. The 'Nautilus' [a captured United States brig] has been seen
from this harbor every week for some time past, and several other enemy's
vessels are on the coast every few days." An American privateer has just
come in, bringing with her as a prize one of her own class, called the
"Liverpool Packet," which "within six months has taken from us property to
an immense amount."[186]
Ten days later Hull's prospects have darkened. There has appeared off
Portsmouth a blockading division; a frigate, a sloop, and two brigs. "When
our two vessels were first ordered to this station, I believed they would be
very useful in protecting the coasting trade; but the enemy's cruisers are
now so much stronger that we can hardly promise security to the trade, if
we undertake to convoy it." On the contrary, the brigs themselves would be
greatly hazarded, and resistance to attack, if supported by the neighborhood,
may entail destruction upon ports where they have taken refuge; a thought
possibly suggested by Cockburn's action at Havre de Grace and
Frenchtown. He therefore now proposes that they should run the blockade
and cruise at sea. This course was eventually adopted; but for the moment
the Secretary wrote that, while he perceived the propriety of Hull's remarks,
"the call for protection on that coast has been very loud, and having sent
those vessels for that special purpose, I do not now incline immediately to
remove them."[187] It was necessary to bend to a popular clamor, which in
this case did not, as it very frequently does, make unreasonable demands
and contravene all considerations of military wisdom. A month later Hull
reports the blockade so strict that it is impossible to get out by day. The
commander of the "Enterprise," Johnston Blakely, expresses astonishment
that the enemy should employ so large a force to blockade so small a vessel.
[188] It was, however, no matter for surprise, but purely a question of
business. The possibilities of injury by the "Enterprise" must be blasted at
any cost, and Blakely himself a year later, in the "Wasp," was to illustrate

forcibly what one smart ship can effect in the destruction of hostile
commerce and hostile cruisers.
Blakely's letter was dated July 31. The "Enterprise" had not long to wait
for her opportunity, but it did not fall to his lot to utilize it. Being promoted
the following month, he was relieved in command by Lieutenant William
Burrows. This officer had been absent in China, in mercantile employment,
when the war broke out, and, returning, was captured at sea. Exchanged in
June, 1813, he was ordered to the "Enterprise," in which he saw his only
service in the war,—a brief month. She left Portsmouth September 1, on a
coasting cruise, and on the morning of the 5th, being then off Monhegan
Island, on the coast of Maine, sighted a vessel of war, which proved to be
the British brig "Boxer," Commander Samuel Blyth.
The antagonists in the approaching combat were nearly of equal force,
the respective armaments being, "Enterprise," fourteen 18-pounder
carronades, and two long 9-pounders, the "Boxer," twelve 18-pounder
carronades and two long sixes. The action began side by side, at half pistol-
shot, the "Enterprise" to the right and to windward (position 1). After fifteen
minutes the latter ranged ahead (2). As she did so, one of her 9-pounders,
which by the forethought of Captain Burrows had been shifted from its
place in the bow to the stern,[189] was used with effect to rake her opponent.
She then rounded-to on the starboard tack, on the port-bow of the enemy,—
ahead but well to the left (3),—in position to rake with her carronades; and,
setting the foresail, sailed slowly across from left to right. In five minutes
the "Boxer's" maintopmast and foretopsailyard fell. This left the
"Enterprise" the mastery of the situation, which she continued to hold until
ten minutes later, when the enemy's fire ceased. Her colors could not be
hauled down, Blyth having nailed them to the mast. He himself had been
killed at the first broadside, and almost at the same instant Burrows too fell,
mortally wounded.

Diagram of the Enterprise vs. Boxer battleToList

The "Boxer" belonged to a class of vessel, the gun brigs, which Marryat
through one of his characters styled "bathing machines," only not built, as
the legitimate article, to go up, but to go down. Another,—the immortal
Boatswain Chucks,—proclaimed that they would "certainly d—n their
inventor to all eternity;" adding characteristically, that "their low common
names, 'Pincher,' 'Thrasher,' 'Boxer,' 'Badger,' and all that sort, are quite
good enough for them." In the United States service the "Enterprise," which
had been altered from a schooner to a brig, was considered a singularly dull
sailer. As determined by American measurements, taken four days after the
action, the size of the two was the same within twenty tons; the "Boxer" a
little the larger. The superiority of the "Enterprise" in broadside force, was
eight guns to seven; or, stated in weight of projectiles, one hundred and
thirty-five pounds to one hundred and fourteen. This disparity, though real,
was in no sense decisive, and the execution done by each bore no
comparison to the respective armaments. The hull of the "Boxer" was
pierced on the starboard side by twelve 18-pound shot, nearly two for each
of the "Enterprise's" carronades. The 9-pounder had done even better,

scoring five hits. On her port side had entered six of 18 pounds, and four of
9 pounds. By the official report of an inspection, made upon her arrival in
Portland, it appears that her upper works and sides forward were torn to
pieces.[190] In her mainmast alone were three 18-pound shot.[191] As a set-
off to this principal damage received, she had to show only one 18-pound
shot in the hull of the "Enterprise," one in the foremast, and one in the
mainmast.[192]
From these returns, the American loss in killed and wounded, twelve,
must have been largely by grapeshot or musketry. The British had twenty-
one men hurt. It has been said that this difference in loss is nearly
proportionate to the difference in force. This is obviously inexact; for the
"Enterprise" was superior in gun power by twelve per cent, while the
"Boxer's" loss was greater by seventy-five per cent. Moreover, if the
statement of crews be accurate, that the "Enterprise" had one hundred and
twenty and the "Boxer" only sixty-six,[193] it is clear that the latter had
double the human target, and scored little more than half the hits. The
contest, in brief, was first an artillery duel, side to side, followed by a
raking position obtained by the American. It therefore reproduced in leading
features, although on a minute scale, the affair between the "Chesapeake"
and "Shannon"; and the exultation of the American populace at this
rehabilitation of the credit of their navy, though exaggerated in impression,
was in principle sound. The British Court Martial found that the defeat was
"to be attributed to a superiority of the enemy's force, principally in the
number of men, as well as to a greater degree of skill in the direction of her
fire, and the destructive effects of her first broadside."[194] This admission
as to the enemy's gunnery is substantially identical with the claim made for
that of the "Shannon,"—notably as to the first broadside. As to the greater
numbers, one hundred and twenty is certainly almost twice sixty-six, and
the circumstance should be weighed; but in an engagement confined to the
guns, and between 18-pounder carronade batteries, it is of less consequence
than at first glance appears. A cruiser of those days expected to be ready to
fight with many men away in prizes. Had it come to boarding, or had the
"Boxer's" gunnery been good, disabling her opponent's men, the numbers
would have become of consideration. As it was, they told for something, but
not for very much.

If national credit were at issue in every single-ship action, the balance of
the "Chesapeake" and "Shannon," "Enterprise" and "Boxer," would incline
rather to the American side; for the "Boxer" was not just out of port with
new commander, officers, and crew, but had been in commission six
months, had in that time crossed the ocean, and been employed along the
coast. The credit and discredit in both cases is personal, not national. It was
the sadder in Blyth's case because he was an officer of distinguished
courage and activity, who had begun his fighting career at the age of eleven,
when he was on board a heavily battered ship in Lord Howe's battle of June
1, 1794. At thirty, with little influence, and at a period when promotion had
become comparatively sluggish, he had fairly fought his way to the modest
preferment in which he died. Under the restricted opportunities of the
United States Navy, Burrows had seen service, and his qualities received
recognition, in the hostilities with Tripoli. The unusual circumstance of both
captains falling, and so young,—Burrows was but twenty-eight,—imparted
to this tiny combat an unusual pathos, which was somewhat heightened by
the fact that Blyth himself had acted as pall-bearer when Lawrence, three
months before, was buried with military honors at Halifax. In Portland,
Maine, the two young commanders were borne to their graves together, in a
common funeral, with all the observance possible in a small coast town;
business being everywhere suspended, and the customary tokens of
mourning displayed upon buildings and shipping.
After this engagement, as the season progressed, coastwise operations in
this quarter became increasingly hazardous for both parties. On October 22,
Hull wrote that neither the "Enterprise" nor the "Rattlesnake" could cruise
much longer. The enemy still maintained his grip, in virtue of greater size
and numbers. Ten days later comes the report of a convoy, with one of the
brigs, driven into port by a frigate; that the enemy appear almost every day,
and never without a force superior to that of both his brigs, which he fears
to trust out overnight, lest they find themselves at morning under the guns
of an opponent of weightier battery. The long nights and stormy seas of
winter, however, soon afforded to coasters a more secure protection than
friendly guns, and Hull's letters intermit until April 6, 1814, when he
announces that the enemy has made his appearance in great force; he
presumes for the summer. Besides the danger and interruption of the
coasting trade, Hull was increasingly anxious as to the safety of Portsmouth
itself. By a recent act of Congress four seventy-fours had been ordered to be

built, and one of them was now in construction there under his supervision.
Despite the navigational difficulties of entering the port, which none was
more capable of appreciating than he, he regarded the defences as so
inadequate that it would be perfectly possible to destroy her on the stocks.
"There is nothing," he said, "to prevent a very small force from entering the
harbor." At the same moment Decatur was similarly concerned for the
squadron at New London, and we have seen the fears of Stewart for
Norfolk. So marked was Hull's apprehension in this respect, that he sent the
frigate "Congress" four miles up the river, where she remained to the end of
the war; her crew being transferred to Lake Ontario. New York, the greater
wealth of which increased both her danger and her capacity for self-
protection, was looking to her own fortifications, as well as manning,
provisioning, and paying the crews of the gunboats that patrolled her
waters, on the side of the sea and of the Sound.
The exposure of the coasting trade from Boston Bay eastward was
increased by the absence of interior coastwise channels, until the chain of
islands about and beyond the Penobscot was reached. On the other hand,
the character of the shore, bold, with off-lying rocks and many small
harbors, conferred a distinct advantage upon those having local knowledge,
as the coasting seamen had. On such a route the points of danger are capes
and headlands, particularly if their projection is great, such as the
promontory between Portsmouth and Boston, of which Cape Ann is a
conspicuous landmark. There the coaster has to go farthest from his refuge,
and the deep-sea cruiser can approach with least risk. In a proper scheme of
coast defence batteries are mounted on such positions. This, it is needless to
say, in view of the condition of the port fortifications, had not been done in
the United States. Barring this, the whole situation of the coast, of trade,
and of blockade, was one with which British naval officers had then been
familiar for twenty years, through their employment upon the French and
Spanish coasts, as well Mediterranean as Atlantic, and in many other parts
of the world. To hover near the land, intercepting and fighting by day,
manning boats and cutting out by night, harassing, driving on shore,
destroying the sinews of war by breaking down communications, was to
them simply an old experience to be applied under new and rather easier
circumstances.

Of these operations frequent instances are given in contemporary journals
and letters; but less account has been taken of the effects, as running
through household and social economics, touching purse and comfort.
These are traceable in commercial statistics. At the time they must have
been severely felt, bringing the sense of the war vividly home to the
community. The stringency of the British action is betrayed, however, by
casual notices. The captain of a schooner burned by the British frigate
"Nymphe" is told by her commander that he had orders to destroy every
vessel large enough to carry two men. "A brisk business is now carrying on
all along our coast between British cruisers and our coasting vessels, in
ready money. Friday last, three masters went into Gloucester to procure
money to carry to a British frigate to ransom their vessels. Thursday, a
Marblehead schooner was ransomed by the "Nymphe" for $400. Saturday,
she took off Cape Ann three coasters and six fishing boats, and the masters
were sent on shore for money to ransom them at $200 each." There was
room for the wail of a federalist paper: "Our coasts unnavigable to
ourselves, though free to the enemy and the money-making neutral; our
harbors blockaded; our shipping destroyed or rotting at the docks; silence
and stillness in our cities; the grass growing upon the public wharves."[195]
In the district of Maine, "the long stagnation of foreign, and embarrassment
of domestic trade, have extended the sad effects from the seaboard through
the interior, where the scarcity of money is severely felt. There is not
enough to pay the taxes."[196]
South of Chesapeake Bay the coast is not bold and rocky, like that north
of Cape Cod, but in its low elevation and gradual soundings resembles
rather those of New Jersey and Delaware. It has certain more pronounced
features in the extensive navigable sounds and channels, which lie behind
the islands and sandbars skirting the shores. The North Carolina system of
internal water communications, Pamlico Sound and its extensions, stood by
itself. To reach that to the southward, it was necessary to make a
considerable sea run, round the far projecting Cape Fear, exposed to capture
outside; but from Charleston to the St. Mary's River, which then formed the
Florida boundary for a hundred miles of its length, the inside passages of
South Carolina and Georgia were continuous, though in many places
difficult, and in others open to attack from the sea. Between St. Mary's and
Savannah, for example, there were seven inlets, and Captain Campbell, the
naval officer in charge of that district, reported that three of these were

practicable for frigates;[197] but this statement, while literally accurate,
conveys an exaggerated impression, for no sailing frigate would be likely to
cross a difficult bar for a single offensive operation, merely to find herself
confronted with conditions forbidding further movement.
The great menace to the inside traffic consisted in the facility with which
cruisers outside could pass from entrance to entrance, contrasted with the
intricacies within impeding similar action by the defence. If a bevy of
unprotected coasters were discerned by an enemy's lookouts, the ship could
run down abreast, send in her boats, capture or destroy, before the gunboats,
if equidistant at the beginning, could overcome the obstacles due to rise and
fall of tide, or narrowness of passage, and arrive to the rescue.[198] A
suggested remedy was to replace the gunboats by rowing barges, similar to,
but more powerful than, those used by the enemy in his attacks. The
insuperable trouble here proved to be that men fit for such work, fit to
contend with the seamen of the enemy, were unwilling to abandon the sea,
with its hopes of prize money, or to submit to the exposure and discomfort
of the life. "The crews of the gunboats," wrote Captain Campbell, "consist
of all nations except Turks, Greeks, and Jews." On one occasion the ship's
company of an American privateer, which had been destroyed after a
desperate and celebrated resistance to attack by British armed boats, arrived
at St. Mary's. Of one hundred and nineteen American seamen, only four
could be prevailed upon to enter the district naval force.[199] This was partly
due to the embarrassment of the national finances. "The want of funds to
pay off discharged men," wrote the naval captain at Charleston, "has given
such a character to the navy as to stop recruiting."[200] "Men could be had,"
reported his colleague at St. Mary's, now transferred to Savannah, "were it
not for the Treasury notes, which cannot be passed at less than five per cent
discount. Men will not ship without cash. There are upwards of a hundred
seamen in port, but they refuse to enter, even though we offer to ship for a
month only."[201]
During the American Civil War, fifty years after the time of which we are
speaking, this internal communication was effectually intercepted by
stationing inside steamers of adequate force; but that recourse, while not
absolutely impracticable for small sailing cruisers, involved a risk
disproportionate to the gain. Through traffic could have been broken up by
keeping a frigate in any one of the three sounds, entrance to which was

practicable for vessels of that class. In view of the amount of trade passing
back and forth, which Campbell stated to be in one period of four months as
much as eight million dollars, it is surprising that this obvious expedient
was not adopted by the enemy. That they appreciated the situation is shown
by the intention, announced in 1813, of seizing one of the islands; which
was effected in January, 1815, by the occupation of Cumberland and St.
Simons'. As it was, up to that late period the routine methods of their
European experience prevailed, with the result that their coastwise
operations in the south differed little from those in the extreme north.
Smaller vessels occasionally, armed boats frequently, pushed inside the
inlets, seizing coasters, and at times even attacking the gunboats. While the
positive loss thus inflicted was considerable, it will readily be understood
that it was much exceeded by the negative effect, in deterring from
movement, and reducing navigation to the limits of barest necessity.
In these operations the ships of war were seconded by privateers from the
West Indies, which hovered round this coast, as the Halifax vessels did
round that of New England, seeking such scraps of prize money as might be
left over from the ruin of American commerce and the immunities of the
licensed traders. The United States officers at Charleston and Savannah
were at their wits' ends to provide security with their scanty means,—more
scanty even in men than in vessels; and when there came upon them the
additional duty of enforcing the embargo of December, 1813, in the many
quarters, and against the various subterfuges, by which evasion would be
attempted, the task was manifestly impossible. "This is the most convenient
part of the world for illicit trade that I have ever seen," wrote Campbell.
From a return made this summer by the Secretary of the Navy to Congress,
[202] it is shown that one brig of eighteen guns, which was not a cruiser, but
a station ship at Savannah, eleven gunboats, three other schooners, and four
barges, were apportioned to the stretch of coast from Georgetown to St.
Mary's,—over two hundred miles. With the fettered movement of the
gunboats before mentioned, contrasted with the outside cruisers, it was
impossible to meet conditions by distributing this force, "for the protection
of the several inlets," as had at first been directed by the Navy Department.
The only defensive recourse approximately satisfactory was that of the
deep-sea merchant service of Great Britain, proposed also by Hull at the
northward, to assemble vessels in convoys, and to accompany them
throughout a voyage. "I have deemed it expedient," wrote Campbell from

St. Mary's, "to order the gun vessels to sail in company, not less than four in
number, and have ordered convoy to the inland trade at stated periods, by
which means vessels may be protected, and am sorry to say this is all that
can be effected in our present situation."[203] In this way a fair degree of
immunity was attained. Rubs were met with occasionally, and heavy losses
were reported from time to time. There was a certain amount of fighting and
scuffling, in which advantage was now on one side, now on the other; but
upon the whole it would appear that the novelty of the conditions and
ignorance of the ground rather imposed upon the imagination of the enemy,
and that their operations against this inside trade were at once less active
and less successful than under the more familiar features presented by the
coasts of Maine and Massachusetts.
Whatever more or less of success or injury attended the coastwise trade
in the several localities, the point to be observed is that the enemy's
operations effectually separated the different sections of the country from
one another, so far as this means of intercourse was concerned; thereby
striking a deadly blow at the mutual support which might be given by
communities differing so markedly in resources, aptitudes, and industries.
The remark before made upon the effect of headlands, on the minor scale of
a particular shore-line, applied with special force to one so extensive as that
of the United States Atlantic coast in 1813. Cape Cod to the north and Cape
Fear to the south were conspicuous examples of such projection. Combined
with the relatively shelterless and harborless central stretch, intervening
between them, from the Chesapeake to Sandy Hook, they constituted
insuperable obstacles to sustained intercommunication by water. The
presence of the enemy in great numbers before, around, and within the
central section, emphasized the military weakness of position which nature
herself had there imposed. To get by sea from one end of the country to the
other it was necessary to break the blockade in starting, to take a wide
sweep out to sea, and again to break it at the desired point of entrance. This,
however, is not coasting.
The effect which this coast pressure produced upon the welfare of the
several sections is indicated here and there by official utterances. The war
party naturally inclined to minimize unfavorable results, and their
opponents in some measure to exaggerate them; but of the general tendency
there can be no serious doubt. Mr. Pearson, an opposition member of the

House from North Carolina, speaking February 16, 1814, when the record
of 1813 was made up, and the short-lived embargo of December was yet in
force, said: "Blocked up as we are by the enemy's squadron upon our coast,
corked up by our still more unmerciful embargo and non-importation laws,
calculated as it were to fill up the little chasm in the ills which the enemy
alone could not inflict; the entire coasting trade destroyed, and even the
little pittance of intercourse from one port to the other in the same state
destroyed [by the embargo], the planters of the Southern and Middle states,
finding no market at home for their products, are driven to the alternative of
wagoning them hundreds of miles, in search of a precarious market in the
Northern and Eastern states, or permitting them to rot on their hands. Many
articles which are, or by habit have become, necessary for comfort, are
obtained at extravagant prices from other parts of the Union. The balance of
trade, if trade it may be called, from these and other causes being so entirely
against the Southern and Middle states, the whole of our specie is rapidly
travelling to the North and East. Our bank paper is thrown back upon the
institutions from which it issued; and as the war expenditures in the
Southern and Middle states, where the loans have been principally obtained,
are proportionately inconsiderable, the bills of these banks are daily
returning, and their vaults drained of specie, to be locked up in Eastern and
Western states, never to return but with the return of peace and prosperity."
[204]

The isolation of North Carolina was extreme, with Cape Fear to the south
and the occupied Chesapeake north of her. The Governor of the central state
of Pennsylvania, evidently in entire political sympathy with the national
Administration, in his message to the legislature at the same period,[205] is
able to congratulate the people on the gratifying state of the commonwealth;
a full treasury, abundant yield of agriculture, and the progress of
manufacturing development, which, "however we may deprecate and
deplore the calamities of protracted war, console us with the prospect of
permanent and extensive establishments equal to our wants, and such as
will insure the real and practical independence of our country." But he adds:
"At no period of our history has the immense importance of internal
navigation been so strikingly exemplified as since the commencement of
hostilities. The transportation of produce, and the intercourse between
citizens of the different states, which knit more strongly the bonds of social
and political union, are greatly retarded, and, through many of their

accustomed channels, entirely interrupted by the water craft of the enemy,
sinking, burning, and otherwise destroying, the property which it cannot
appropriate to its own use." He looks forward to a renewal of similar
misfortune in the following year, an anticipation more than fulfilled. The
officials of other states, according to their political complexion, either
lamented the sufferings of the war and its supposed injustice, or comforted
themselves and their hearers by reflecting upon the internal fruitfulness of
the country, and its increasing self-sufficingness. The people were being
equipped for independence of the foreigner by the progress of
manufactures, and by habits of economy and self-denial, enforced by
deprivation arising from the suppression of the coasting trade and the rigors
of the commercial blockade.
The effect of the latter, which by the spring of 1814 had been in force
nearly a twelvemonth over the entire coast south of Narragansett Bay, can
be more directly estimated and concisely stated, in terms of money, than
can the interruption of the coasting trade; for the statistics of export and
import, contrasted with those of years of peace, convey it directly. It has
already been stated that the exports for the year ending September 30, 1814,
during which the operation of the blockade was most universal and
continuous, fell to $7,000,000, as compared with $25,000,000 in 1813, and
$45,000,000 in 1811, a year of peace though of restricted intercourse. Such
figures speak distinctly as well as forcibly; it being necessary, however, to
full appreciation of the difference between 1813 and 1814, to remember that
during the first half of the former official period—from October 1, 1812, to
April 1, 1813,—there had been no commercial blockade beyond the
Chesapeake and Delaware; and that, even after it had been instituted, the
British license system operated to the end of September to qualify its
effects.
Here and there interesting particulars may be gleaned, which serve to
illustrate these effects, and to give to the picture that precision of outline
which heightens impression. "I believe," wrote a painstaking Baltimore
editor in December, 1814, "that there has not been an arrival in Baltimore
from a foreign port for a twelvemonth";[206] yet the city in 1811 had had a
registered tonnage of 88,398, and now boasted that of the scanty national
commerce still maintained, through less secluded ports, at least one half
was carried on by its celebrated schooners,[207] the speed and handiness of

which, combined with a size that intrusted not too many eggs to one basket,
imparted special facilities for escaping pursuit and minimizing loss. A
representative from Maryland at about this time presented in the House a
memorial from Baltimore merchants, stating that "in consequence of the
strict blockade of our bays and rivers the private-armed service is much
discouraged," and submitting the expediency "of offering a bounty for the
destruction of enemy's vessels;" a suggestion the very extravagance of
which indicates more than words the extent of the depression felt. The price
of salt in Baltimore, in November, 1814, was five dollars the bushel. In
Charleston it was the same, while just across the Spanish border, at Amelia
Island, thronged with foreign merchant ships, it was selling at seventy
cents.[208]
Such a contrast, which must necessarily be reproduced in other articles
not indigenous, accounts at once for the smuggling deplored by Captain
Campbell, and at the same time testifies both to the efficacy of the blockade
and to the pressure exercised upon the inland navigation by the outside
British national cruisers and privateers. This one instance, affecting one of
the prime necessaries of life, certifies to the stringent exclusion from the sea
of the coast on which Charleston was the chief seaport. Captain Dent,
commanding this naval district, alludes to the constant presence of
blockaders, and occasionally to vessels taken outside by them, chased
ashore, or intercepted in various inlets; narrating particularly the singular
incident that, despite his remonstrances, a flag of truce was sent on board
the enemy by local authorities to negotiate a purchase of goods thus
captured.[209] This unmilitary proceeding, which evinces the necessities of
the neighborhood, was of course immediately stopped by the Government.
A somewhat singular incidental circumstance, supporting the other
inferences, is found in the spasmodic elevation of the North Carolina coast
into momentary commercial consequence as a place of entry and deposit;
not indeed to a very great extent, but ameliorating to a slight degree the
deprivation of the regions lying north and south,—the neighborhood of
Charleston on the one hand, of Richmond and Baltimore on the other. "The
waters of North Carolina, from Wilmington to Ocracoke, though not
favorable to commerce in time of peace, by reason of their shallowness and
the danger of the coast, became important and useful in time of war, and a
very considerable trade was prosecuted from and into those waters during

the late war, and a coasting trade as far as Charleston, attended with less
risk than many would imagine. A vessel may prosecute a voyage from
Elizabeth City [near the Virginia line] to Charleston without being at sea
more than a few hours at any one time."[210] Some tables of arrivals show a
comparative immunity for vessels entering here from abroad; due doubtless
to the unquestioned dangers of the coast, which conspired with the
necessarily limited extent of the traffic to keep the enemy at a distance. It
was not by them wholly overlooked. In July, 1813, Admiral Cockburn
anchored with a division off Ocracoke bar, sent in his boats, and captured a
privateer and letter-of-marque which had there sought a refuge denied to
them by the blockade elsewhere. The towns of Beaufort and Portsmouth
were occupied for some hours. The United States naval officer at
Charleston found it necessary also to extend the alongshore cruises of his
schooners as far as Cape Fear, for the protection of this trade on its way to
his district.
The attention aroused to the development of internal navigation also
bears witness to the pressure of the blockade. "It is my opinion," said the
Governor of Pennsylvania, "that less than one half the treasure expended by
the United States for the protection of foreign commerce, if combined with
state and individual wealth, would have perfected an inland water
communication from Maine to Georgia." It was argued by others that the
extra money spent for land transportation of goods, while the coasting trade
was suspended, would have effected a complete tide-water inland
navigation such as here suggested; and there was cited a declaration of
Robert Fulton, who died during the war, that within twenty-one months as
great a sum had been laid out in wagon hire as would have effected this
object. Whatever the accuracy of these estimates, their silent witness to the
influence of the blockade upon commerce, external and coastwise, quite
overbears President Madison's perfunctory denials of its effectiveness,
based upon the successful evasions which more or less attend all such
operations.
Perhaps, however, the most signal proof of the pressure exerted is to be
seen in the rebound, the instant it was removed; in the effect upon prices,
and upon the movements of shipping. Taken in connection with the other
evidence, direct and circumstantial, so far cited, what can testify more
forcibly to the strangulation of the coasting trade than the fact that in the

month of March, 1815,—news of the peace having been received February
11,—there sailed from Boston one hundred and forty-four vessels, more
than half of them square-rigged; and that of the whole all but twenty-six
were for United States ports. Within three weeks of April there arrived at
Charleston, exclusive of coasters, one hundred and fifty-eight vessels; at
Savannah, in the quarter ending June 30, two hundred and three. Something
of this outburst of activity, in which neutrals of many nations shared, was
due, as Mr. Clay said, to the suddenness with which commerce revived after
momentary suspension. "The bow had been unstrung that it might acquire
fresh vigor and new elasticity"; and the stored-up products of the country,
so long barred within, imparted a peculiar nervous haste to the renewal of
intercourse. The absolute numbers quoted do not give as vivid impression
of conditions at differing times as do some comparisons, easily made. In the
year 1813, as shown by the returns of the United States Treasury, out of
674,853 tons of registered—sea-going—shipping, only 233,439—one third
—paid the duties exacted upon each several voyage, and of these many
doubtless sailed under British license.[211] In 1814 the total tonnage,
674,632, shows that ship-building had practically ceased; and of this
amount one twelfth only, 58,756 tons, paid dues for going out.[212] In 1816,
when peace conditions were fully established, though less than two years
had passed, the total tonnage had increased to 800,760; duties, being paid
each voyage, were collected on 865,219.[213] Thus the foreign voyages that
year exceeded the total shipping of the country, and by an amount greater
than all the American tonnage that put to sea in 1814.
The movement of coasting vessels, technically called "enrolled," is not so
clearly indicated by the returns, because all the trips of each were covered
by one license annually renewed. A licensed coaster might make several
voyages, or she might make none. In 1813 the figures show that, of 471,109
enrolled tonnage, 252,440 obtained licenses. In 1814 there is, as in the
registered shipping, a diminution of the total to 466,159, of which a still
smaller proportion, 189,662, took out the annual license. In 1816 the
enrolment was 522,165, the licensing 414,594. In the fishing craft, a class
by themselves, the employment rose from 16,453 in 1814 to 48,147 in
1816;[214] the difference doubtless being attributable chiefly to the
reopening of the cod fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, necessarily
closed to the American flag by the maritime hostilities.

The influence of the peace upon prices is likewise a matter too interesting
to a correct appreciation of effects to be wholly passed over. In considering
it, the quotations before the receipt of the news doubtless represent
conditions more correctly than do the immediate changes. The official
tidings of peace reached New York, February 11, 1815. The Evening Post,
in its number of February 14, says, "We give to-day one of the effects of the
prospect of peace, even before ratification. Our markets of every kind
experienced a sudden, and to many a shocking, change. Sugar, for instance,
fell from $26 per hundredweight to $12.50. Tea, which sold on Saturday at
$2.25, on Monday was purchased at a $1.00. Specie, which had got up to
the enormous rate of 22 per cent premium, dropped down to 2. The article
of tin, in particular, fell from the height of $80 the box to $25. Six per cents
rose from 76 to 88; ten per cents and Treasury notes from 92 to 98. Bank
stock generally rose from five to ten per cent." In Philadelphia, flour which
sold at $7.50 the barrel on Saturday had risen to $10 on Monday; a
testimony that not only foreign export but home supply to the eastward was
to be renewed. The fall in foreign products, due to freedom of import, was
naturally accompanied by a rise in domestic produce, to which an open
outlet with proportionate increase of demand was now afforded. In
Philadelphia the exchange on Boston reflected these conditions; falling
from twenty-five per cent to thirteen.
It may then be concluded that there is little exaggeration in the words
used by "a distinguished naval officer" of the day, in a letter contributed to
Niles' Register, in its issue of June 17, 1815. "No sooner had the enemy
blockaded our harbors, and extended his line of cruisers from Maine to
Georgia, than both foreign and domestic commerce came at once to be
reduced to a deplorable state of stagnation; producing in its consequences
the utter ruin of many respectable merchants, as well as of a great multitude
besides, connected with them in their mercantile pursuits. But these were
not the only consequences. The regular supply of foreign commodities
being thereby cut off, many articles, now become necessaries of life, were
raised to an exorbitant price, and bore much upon the finances of the
citizen, whose family could not comfortably exist without them. Add to
this, as most of the money loaned to the Government for the purposes of the
war came from the pockets of merchants, they were rendered incapable of
continuing these disbursements in consequence of this interruption to their
trade; whence the cause of that impending bankruptcy with which the

Government was at one time threatened.... At a critical period of the war
[April, 1814] Congress found it necessary to remove all restrictions upon
commerce, both foreign and domestic. It is a lamentable fact, however, that
the adventurous merchant found no alleviation from these indulgences, his
vessels being uniformly prevented by a strong blockading force, not only
from going out, but from coming into port, at the most imminent risk of
capture. The risk did not stop here; for the islands and ports most frequented
by American vessels being known to the enemy, he was enabled from his
abundance of means to intercept them there also. The coasting trade, that
most valuable appendage to an extensive mercantile establishment in the
United States, was entirely annihilated. The southern and northern sections
of the Union were unable to exchange their commodities, except upon a
contracted scale through the medium of land carriage, and then only at a
great loss; so that, upon the whole, nothing in a national point of view
appeared to be more loudly called for by men of all parties than a naval
force adequate to the protection of our commerce, and the raising of the
blockade of our coast."
Such was the experience which sums up the forgotten bitter truth,
concerning a war which has left in the United States a prevalent impression
of distinguished success, because of a few brilliant naval actions and the
closing battle of New Orleans. The lesson to be deduced is not that the
country at that time should have sought to maintain a navy approaching
equality to the British. In the state of national population and revenue, it
was no more possible to attempt this than that it would be expedient to do it
now, under the present immense development of resources and available
wealth. What had been possible during the decade preceding the war,—had
the nation so willed,—was to place the navy on such a footing, in numbers
and constitution, as would have made persistence in the course Great
Britain was following impolitic to the verge of madness, because it would
add to her war embarrassments the activity of an imposing maritime enemy,
at the threshold of her most valuable markets,—the West Indies,—three
thousand miles away from her own shores and from the seat of her principal
and necessary warfare. The United States could not have encountered Great
Britain single-handed—true; but there was not then the slightest prospect of
her having to do so. The injuries of which she complained were incidental
to a state of European war; inconceivable and impossible apart from it. She
was therefore assured of the support of most powerful allies, occupying the

attention of the British navy and draining the resources of the British
empire. This condition of things was notorious, as was the fact that, despite
the disappointment of Trafalgar, Napoleon was sedulously restoring the
numbers of a navy, to the restraining of which his enemy was barely
competent.
The anxiety caused to the British Admiralty by the operations of the
small American squadrons in the autumn of 1812 has already been depicted
in quotations from its despatches to Warren.[215] Three or four divisions,
each containing one to two ships of the line, were kept on the go, following
a general round in successive relief, but together amounting to five or six
battle ships—to use the modern term—with proportionate cruisers. It was
not possible to diminish this total by concentrating them, for the essence of
the scheme, and the necessity which dictated it, was to cover a wide sweep
of ocean, and to protect several maritime strategic points through which the
streams of commerce, controlled by well-known conditions, passed,
intersected, or converged. So also the Admiralty signified its wish that one
ship of the line should form the backbone of the blockade before each of the
American harbors. For this purpose Warren's fleet was raised to a number
stated by the Admiralty's letter to him of January 9, 1813, to be "upwards of
ten of the line, exclusive of the six sail of the line appropriated to the
protection of the West India convoys." These numbers were additional to
detachments which, outside of his command, were patrolling the eastern
Atlantic, about the equator, and from the Cape Verde Islands to the Azores,
as mentioned in another letter of February 10. "In all, therefore, about
twenty sail of the line were employed on account of American hostilities;
and this, it will be noticed, was after Napoleon's Russian disaster was fully
known in England. It has not been without interfering for the moment with
other very important services that my Lords have been able to send you this
re-enforcement, and they most anxiously hope that the vigorous and
successful use you will make of it will enable you shortly to return some of
the line of battle ships to England, which, if the heavy American frigates
should be taken or destroyed, you will immediately do, retaining four line
of battle ships." Attention should fasten upon the importance here attached
by the British Admiralty to the bigger ships; for it is well to learn of the
enemy, and to appreciate that it was not solely light cruisers and privateers,
but chiefly the heavy vessels, that counted in the estimate of experienced

British naval officers. The facts are little understood in the United States,
and consequently are almost always misrepresented.
The reasons for this abundance of force are evident. As regards
commerce Great Britain was on the defensive; and the defensive cannot tell
upon which of many exposed points a blow may fall. Dissemination of
effort, however modified by strategic ingenuity, is thus to a certain extent
imposed. If an American division might strike British trade on the equator
between 20° and 30° west longitude, and also in the neighborhood of the
Cape Verdes and of the Azores, preparation in some form to protect all
those points was necessary, and they are too wide apart for this to be
effected by mere concentration. So the blockade of the United States
harbors. There might be in New York no American frigates, but if a division
escaped from Boston it was possible it might come upon the New York
blockade in superior force, if adequate numbers were not constantly kept
there. The British commercial blockade, though offensive in essence, had
also its defensive side, which compelled a certain dispersion of force, in
order to be in local sufficiency in several quarters.
These several dispersed assemblages of British ships of war constituted
the totality of naval effort imposed upon Great Britain by "the fourteen sail
of vessels of all descriptions"[216] which composed the United States navy.
It would not in the least have been necessary had these been sloops of war
—were they fourteen or forty. The weight of the burden was the heavy
frigates, two of which together were more than a match for three of the
same nominal class—the 38-gun frigate—which was the most numerous
and efficient element in the British cruising force. The American forty-four
was unknown to British experience, and could be met only by ships of the
line. Add to this consideration the remoteness of the American shore, and its
dangerous proximity to very vital British interests, and there are found the
elements of the difficult problem presented to the Admiralty by the
combination of American force—such as it was—with American advantage
of position for dealing a severe blow to British welfare at the period, 1805-
1812, when the empire was in the height of its unsupported and almost
desperate struggle with Napoleon; when Prussia was chained, Austria
paralyzed, and Russia in strict bonds of alliance—personal and political—
with France.

If conditions were thus menacing, as we know them to to have been in
1812, when war was declared, and the invasion of Russia just beginning,
when the United States navy was "fourteen pendants," what would they not
have been in 1807, had the nation possessed even one half of the twenty
ships of the line which Gouverneur Morris, a shrewd financier, estimated
fifteen years before were within her competency? While entirely convinced
of the illegality of the British measures, and feeling keenly—as what
American even now cannot but feel?—the humiliation and outrage to which
his country was at that period subjected, the writer has always recognized
the stringent compulsion under which Great Britain lay, and the military
wisdom, in his opinion, of the belligerent measures adopted by her to
sustain her strength through that unparalleled struggle; while in the matter
of impressment, it is impossible to deny—as was urged by Representative
Gaston of North Carolina and Gouverneur Morris—that her claim to the
service of her native seamen was consonant to the ideas of the time, as well
as of utmost importance to her in that hour of dire need. Nevertheless,
submission by America should have been impossible; and would have been
avoidable if for the fourteen pendants there had been a dozen sail of the
line, and frigates to match. To an adequate weighing of conditions there will
be indeed resentment for impressment and the other mortifications; but it is
drowned in wrath over the humiliating impotence of an administration
which, owing to preconceived notions as to peace, made such endurance
necessary. It is not always ignominious to suffer ignominy; but it always is
so to deserve it.
President Washington, in his last annual message, December 7, 1796,
defined the situation then confronting the United States, and indicated its
appropriate remedy, in the calm and forcible terms which characterized all
his perceptions. "It is in our own experience, that the most sincere neutrality
is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations at war. To
secure respect for a neutral flag requires a naval force, organized and ready,
to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the
necessity of going to war, by discouraging belligerent powers from
committing such violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or
last, leave no other option" [than war]. The last sentence is that of the
statesman and soldier, who accurately appreciates the true office and sphere
of arms in international relations. His successor, John Adams, yearly
renewed his recommendation for the development of the navy; although,

not being a military man, he seems to have looked rather exclusively on the
defensive aspect, and not to have realized that possible enemies are more
deterred by the fear of offensive action against themselves than by
recognition of a defensive force which awaits attack at an enemy's pleasure.
Moreover, in his administration, it was not Great Britain, but France, that
was most actively engaged in violating the neutral rights of American
shipping, and French commercial interests then presented nothing upon
which retaliation could take effect. The American problem then was purely
defensive,—to destroy the armed ships engaged in molesting the national
commerce.
President Jefferson, whose influence was paramount with the dominant
party which remained in power from his inauguration in 1801 to the war,
based his policy upon the conviction, expressed in his inaugural, that this
"was the only government where every man would meet invasions of the
public order as his own personal concern;" and that "a well-disciplined
militia is our best reliance for the first moments of war, till regulars may
relieve them." In pursuance of these fundamental principles, it was
doubtless logical to recommend in his first annual message that, "beyond
the small force which will probably be wanted for actual service in the
Mediterranean [against the Barbary pirates], whatever annual sum you may
think proper to appropriate to naval preparations would perhaps be better
employed in providing those articles which may be kept without waste or
consumption, and be in readiness when any exigence calls them into use.
Progress has been made in providing materials for seventy-four gun ships;"
but this commended readiness issued in not laying their keels till after the
war began.
Upon this first recommendation followed the discontinuance of building
ships for ocean service, and the initiation of the gunboat policy;
culminating, when war began, in the decision of the administration to lay up
the ships built for war, to keep them out of British hands. The urgent
remonstrances of two or three naval captains obtained the reversal of this
resolve, and thereby procured for the country those few successes which, by
a common trick of memory, have remained the characteristic feature of the
War of 1812.
Note.—After writing the engagement between the "Boxer" and
the "Enterprise," the author found among his memoranda,

overlooked, the following statement from the report of her surviving
lieutenant, David McCreery: "I feel it my duty to mention that the
bulwarks of the 'Enterprise' were proof against our grape, when her
musket balls penetrated through our bulwarks." (Canadian Archives,
M. 389, 3. p. 87.) It will be noted that this does not apply to the
cannon balls, and does not qualify the contrast in gunnery.

FOOTNOTES:

[128] Broke's Letter to Lawrence, June, 1813. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx. p. 413.
[129] Rodgers' Report of this cruise is in Captains' Letters, Sept. 27, 1813.
[130] Captains' Letters, Dec. 14, 1813.
[131] Captains' Letters, June 3, 1812.
[132] The Department's orders to Evans and the letter transferring them to
Lawrence, captured in the ship, can be found published in the Report on
Canadian Archives, 1896, p. 74. A copy is attached to the Record of the
subsequent Court of Inquiry, Navy Department MSS.
[133] James' Naval History, vol. vi., edition of 1837. The account of the action
between the "Chesapeake" and "Shannon" will be found on pp. 196-206.
[134] Secretary to the Admiralty, In-Letters, May, 1814, vol. 505, p. 777.
[135] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx, p. 413.
[136] Broke, in his letter of challenge, "was disappointed that, after various
verbal messages sent into Boston, Commodore Rodgers, with the 'President' and
'Congress,' had eluded the 'Shannon' and 'Tenedos,' by sailing the first chance,
after the prevailing easterly winds had obliged us to keep an offing from the
coast."
[137] For the reason here assigned, and others mentioned in the narrative, the
author has preferred to follow in the main James' account, analyzed, and
compared with Broke's report (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx. p. 83), and with the
testimony in the Court of Inquiry held in Boston on the surrender of the
"Chesapeake," and in the resultant courts martial upon Lieutenant Cox and other
persons connected with the ship, which are in the Navy Department MSS. The
official report of Lieutenant Budd, the senior surviving officer of the
"Chesapeake", is published in Niles' Register (vol. iv, p. 290), which gives also
several unofficial statements of onlookers, and others.
[138] Not "across"; the distinction is important, being decisive of general raking
direction.

[139] Actually, a contemporary account, borrowed by the British "Naval
Chronicle" (vol. xxx. p. 161) from a Halifax paper, but avouched as trustworthy,
says the "Chesapeake" was terribly battered on the larboard bow as well as
quarter. The details in the text indicate merely the local preponderance of injury,
and the time and manner of its occurrence.
[140] A slight qualification is here needed, in that of the injured of the "Shannon"
some were hurt in the boarding, not by the cannonade; but the general statement
is substantially accurate.
[141] Decatur to Navy Department. Captains' Letters, June, 1813.
[142] Decatur to Navy Department. Captains' Letters, June, 1813.
[143] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. 497.
[144] Croker to Warren, Jan. 9, 1813. Admiralty Out-Letters, British Records
Office. My italics.
[145] Message of the Governor of Connecticut, October, 1813. Niles' Register,
vol. v. p. 121.
[146] Message of the Governor of Connecticut, October, 1813. Niles' Register,
vol. v. p. 121.
[147] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 302.
[148] Captains' Letters.
[149] Niles' Register, vol. vi. p. 136.
[150] Captains' Letters, Nov. 3 and Dec. 31, 1809; March 26, 1810; and Oct. 12,
1813.
[151] American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p. 307.
[152] Ante, page 16.
[153] The official reports of Warren and Cockburn concerning these operations
are published in the Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx. pp. 162-168.
[154] Captains' Letters, June 21, 1813.
[155] The American official account of this affair is given in Niles' Register, vol.
iv. pp. 375, 422. James' Naval History, vol. vi. pp. 236-238, gives the British
story.
[156] Captains' Letters, April, 1813.
[157] Captains' Letters, May 21, 1813.
[158] Ibid.
[159] James, Naval History (edition 1837), vol. vi. p. 231.
[160] Warren's Gazette Letters, here referred to, can be found in Naval
Chronicle, vol. xxx. pp. 243, 245.
[161] Croker to Warren, March 20, 1813. Admiralty Out-Letters, Records Office.
[162] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 404.
[163] The rise of the tide is about two and a half feet.

[164] This is the number stated by James, the British naval historian, and is
somewhat difficult to reconcile with Warren's expression, "the troops and a re-
enforcement of seamen and marines from the ships." To be effective, the attack
should have been in greater numbers.
[165] The British story of this failure, outside the official despatches, is given in
James' Naval History, vol. vi. pp. 232-234.
[166] Report of the commander of the "Scorpion" to Captain Morris, July 21,
1813. Captains' Letters.
[167] This letter, from the commanding officer of the "Narcissus", is in Niles'
Register, vol. iv. p. 279.
[168] Morris to Navy Department, August 13, 23, and 27. Captains' Letters.
[169] Captain Hayes, of the "Majestic," in charge of the blockade of Boston,
wrote to Warren, October 25, 1813: "Almost every vessel I meet has a license, or
is under a neutral flag. Spanish, Portuguese, and Swedes are passing in and out
by hundreds, and licensed vessels out of number from the West Indies. I find the
licenses are sent blank to be filled up in Boston. This is of course very
convenient, and the Portuguese consul is said to be making quite a trade of that
flag, covering the property and furnishing the necessary papers for any person at
a thousand dollars a ship." Canadian Archives, M. 389. 3. p. 189.
[170] Annals of Congress, 1813-1814, vol. i. p. 500.
[171] This parenthesis shows that the censures were not directed against New
England only, for the blockade so far declared did not extend thither.
[172] Niles' Register, vol. iv. pp. 370, 386.
[173] Ibid., p. 387.
[174] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 387.
[175] Ibid., p. 402.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid. Author's italics.
[178] Morris to Navy Department, Dec. 20 and 26, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[179] Post, chapter xviii.
[180] British Records Office, Secret Papers MSS.
[181] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 311.
[182] The Columbian Centinel, Boston, Sept. 7 and Dec. 15, 1813.
[183] Ibid., Dec. 18.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Campbell to the Navy Department, Nov. 11, 1814. Captains' Letters.
[186] Captains' Letters.
[187] Ibid., June 24, 1813.
[188] Hull to Navy Department, July 31, 1813. Ibid.

[189] Cooper tells the story that when this gun was transported, and preparations
being made to use it as a stern instead of a bow chaser, the crew—to whom
Burrows was as yet a stranger, known chiefly by his reputation for great
eccentricity—came to the mast to express a hope that the brig was not going to
retreat.
[190] Report of Lieutenant Tillinghast to Captain Hull. Captains' Letters, Sept. 9,
1813.
[191] Hull to Bainbridge, Sept. 10. Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 58.
[192] Report of the carpenter of the "Enterprise." Captains' Letters.
[193] There is a discrepancy in the statements concerning the "Boxer's" crew.
Hull reported officially, "We have sixty-seven, exclusive of those killed and
thrown overboard." (Sept. 25. Captains' Letters.) Lieutenant McCall, who
succeeded to the command after Burrows fell, reported that "from information
received from officers of the 'Boxer' it appears that there were between twenty
and thirty-five killed, and fourteen wounded." (U.S. State Papers, Naval Affairs,
vol. i. p. 297.) The number killed is evidently an exaggerated impression
received, resembling some statements made concerning the "Chesapeake;" but it
is quite likely that the "Boxer's" loss should be increased by several bodies
thrown overboard.

[194] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. 473.
[195] Columbian Centinel, July 28, Sept. 1, and Nov. 13, 1813.
[196] Ibid., Sept. 25.
[197] Campbell to Navy Department, Jan. 4, 1814. Captains' Letters.
[198] For full particulars see Captains' Letters (Campbell), June 12, 1813; Jan. 2
and 4, Aug. 20, Sept. 3, Oct. 8, Oct. 15, Dec. 4, 1814.
[199] Campbell, Dec. 2, 1814. Captains' Letters.
[200] Dent to Navy Department, Jan. 28, 1815. Ibid.
[201] Campbell, Feb. 3, 1815. Ibid.
[202] June 7, 1813. Navy Department MSS.
[203] Captains' Letters, Sept. 3, 1814.
[204] Benton's Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, vol. v. p. 202.
[205] Dec. 10, 1813. Niles' Register, vol. v. pp. 257-260.
[206] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 194.
[207] Ibid., vol. viii. p. 234.
[208] Ibid., vol. vii. p. 168. Quoted from a Charleston, S.C., paper.
[209] Captains' Letters, May 3, 23, 24; June 27, 29; August 7, 17; Nov. 9, 13, 23,
1813.
[210] Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 311. Quoted from a Norfolk paper.
[211] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. i. p. 1017.
[212] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 12.
[213] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. ii. p. 87.
[214] Ibid., vol. i. p. 1017; vol. ii. pp. 12, 87.
[215] Ante, vol. i. pp. 402-404.
[216] Admiralty's Letter to Warren. Feb. 10, 1813.

CHAPTER XIVToC

MARITIME OPERATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE WATERS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1813-1814

In broad generalization, based upon analysis of conditions, it has been
said that the seacoast of the United States was in 1812 a defensive frontier,
from which, as from all defensive lines, there should be, and was,
opportunity for offensive returns; for action planned to relieve the shore-
line, and the general military situation, by inflicting elsewhere upon the
opponent injury, harassment, and perplexity. The last chapter dealt with the
warfare depending upon the seaboard chiefly from the defensive point of
view; to illustrate the difficulties, the blows, and the sufferings, to which the
country was exposed, owing to inability to force the enemy away from any
large portion of the coast. The pressure was as universal as it was
inexorable and irresistible.
It remains still to consider the employment and effects of the one
offensive maritime measure left open by the exigencies of the war; the
cruises directed against the enemy's commerce, and the characteristic
incidents to which they gave rise. In this pursuit were engaged both the
national ships of war and those equipped by the enterprise of the mercantile
community; but, as the operations were in their nature more consonant to
the proper purpose of privateers, so the far greater number of these caused
them to play a part much more considerable in effect, though
proportionately less fruitful in conspicuous action. Fighting, when
avoidable, is to the privateer a misdirection of energy. Profit is his object,
by depredation upon the enemy's commerce; not the preservation of that of
his own people. To the ship of war, on the other hand, protection of the
national shipping is the primary concern; and for that reason it becomes her
to shun no encounter by which she may hope to remove from the seas a
hostile cruiser.
The limited success of the frigates in their attempts against British trade
has been noted, and attributed to the general fact that their cruises were
confined to the more open sea, upon the highways of commerce. These
were now travelled by British ships under strict laws of convoy, the effect
of which was not merely to protect the several flocks concentrated under
their particular watchdogs, but to strip the sea of those isolated vessels, that

in time of peace rise in irregular but frequent succession above the horizon,
covering the face of the deep with a network of tracks. These solitary
wayfarers were now to be found only as rare exceptions to the general rule,
until the port of destination was approached. There the homing impulse
overbore the bonds of regulation; and the convoys tended to the conduct
noted by Nelson as a captain, "behaving as all convoys that ever I saw did,
shamefully ill, parting company every day." Commodore John Rodgers has
before been quoted, as observing that the British practice was to rely upon
pressure on the enemy over sea, for security near home; and that the waters
surrounding the British Islands themselves were the field where commerce
destruction could be most decisively effected.
The first United States vessel to emphasize this fact was the brig
"Argus," Captain William H. Allen, which sailed from New York June 18,
1813, having on board a newly appointed minister to France, Mr. William
H. Crawford, recently a senator from Georgia. On July 11 she reached
L'Orient, having in the twenty-three days of passage made but one prize.
[217] Three days later she proceeded to cruise in the chops of the English
Channel, and against the local trade between Ireland and England;
continuing thus until August 14, thirty-one days, during which she captured
nineteen sail, extending her depredations well up into St. George's Channel.
The contrast of results mentioned, between her voyage across and her
occupancy of British waters, illustrates the comparative advantages of the
two scenes of operations, regarded in their relation to British commerce.
On August 12 the British brig of war "Pelican," Captain Maples,
anchored at Cork from the West Indies. Before her sails were furled she
received orders to go out in search of the American ship of war whose
depredations had been reported. Two hours later she was again at sea. The
following evening, at half-past seven, a burning vessel to the eastward gave
direction to her course, and at daybreak, August 14, she sighted a brig of
war in the northeast, just quitting another prize, which had also been fired.
The wind, being south, gave the windward position to the "Pelican," which
stood in pursuit; the "Argus" steering east, near the wind, but under
moderate sail to enable her opponent to close (positions 1). The advantage
in size and armament was on this occasion on the British side; the "Pelican"
being twenty per cent larger, and her broadside seventeen per cent heavier.

At 5.55 A.M., St. David's Head on the coast of Wales bearing east, distant
about fifteen miles, the "Argus" wore, standing now to the westward, with
the wind on the port side (2). The "Pelican" did the same, and the battle
opened at six; the vessels running side by side, within the range of
grapeshot and musketry,—probably under two hundred yards apart (2).
Within five minutes Captain Allen received a wound which cost him his
leg, and in the end his life. He at first refused to be taken below, but loss of
blood soon so reduced him that he could no longer exercise command. Ten
minutes later the first lieutenant was stunned by the graze of a grapeshot
along his head, and the charge of the ship devolved on the second. By this
time the rigging of the "Argus" had been a good deal cut, and the "Pelican"
bore up (3) to pass under her stern; but the American brig, luffing close to
the wind and backing her maintopsail (3), balked the attempt, throwing
herself across the enemy's path, and giving a raking broadside, the poor aim
of which seems to have lost her the effect that should have resulted from
this ready and neat manœuvre. The main braces of the "Argus" had already
been shot away, as well as much of the other gear upon which the after sails
depended; and at 6.18 the preventer (duplicate) braces, which formed part
of the preparation for battle, were also severed. The vessel thus became
unmanageable, falling off before the wind (4), and the "Pelican" was
enabled to work round her at will. This she did, placing herself first under
the stern (4), and then on the bow (5) of her antagonist, where the only
reply to her broadside was with musketry.
In this helpless situation the "Argus" surrendered, after an engagement of
a little over three quarters of an hour. The British loss was two killed and
five wounded; the American, six killed and seventeen wounded, of whom
five afterwards died. Among these was Captain Allen, who survived only
four days, and was buried with military honors at Plymouth, whither
Captain Maples sent his prize.[218] After every allowance for disparity of
force, the injury done by the American fire cannot be deemed satisfactory,
and suggests the consideration whether the voyage to France under pressure
of a diplomatic mission, and the busy preoccupation of making, manning,
and firing prizes, during the brief month of Channel cruising, may not have
interfered unduly with the more important requirements of fighting
efficiency. The surviving officer in command mentions in explanation, "the
superior size and metal of our opponent, and the fatigue which the crew of
the 'Argus' underwent from a very rapid succession of prizes."

Diagram of the Argus vs. Pelican battleToList

From the broad outlook of the universal maritime situation, this rapid
succession of captures is a matter of more significance than the loss of a
single brig of war. It showed the vulnerable point of British trade and local
intercommunication; and the career of the "Argus," prematurely cut short
though it was, tended to fix attention upon facts sufficiently well known,
but perhaps not fully appreciated. From this time the opportunities offered
by the English Channel and adjacent waters, long familiar to French
corsairs, were better understood by Americans; as was also the difficulty of
adequately policing them against a number of swift and handy cruisers,
preying upon merchant vessels comparatively slow, lumbering, and
undermanned. The subsequent career of the United States ship "Wasp," and
the audacious exploits of several privateers, recall the impunity of Paul
Jones a generation before, and form a sequel to the brief prelude, in which
the leading part, though ultimately disastrous, was played by the "Argus."

While the cruise of the "Argus" stood by no means alone at this time, the
attending incidents made it conspicuous among several others of a like
nature, on the same scene or close by; and it therefore may be taken as
indicative of the changing character of the war, which soon began to be
manifest, owing to the change of conditions in Europe. In general summary,
the result was to transfer an additional weight of British naval operations to
the American side of the Atlantic, which in turn compelled American
cruisers, national and private, in pursuit of commerce destruction, to get
away from their own shores, and to seek comparative security as well as
richer prey in distant waters. To this contributed also the increasing
stringency of British convoy regulation, enforced with special rigor in the
Caribbean Sea and over the Western Atlantic. It was impossible to impose
the same strict prescription upon the coastwise trade, by which chiefly the
indispensable continuous intercourse between the several parts of the
United Kingdom was maintained. Before the introduction of steam this had
a consequence quite disproportionate to the interior traffic by land; and its
development, combined with the feeling of greater security as the British
Islands were approached, occasioned in the narrow seas, and on the coasts
of Europe, a dispersion of vessels not to be seen elsewhere. This favored the
depredations of the light, swift, and handy cruisers that alone are capable of
profiting by such an opportunity, through their power to evade the
numerous, but necessarily scattered, ships of war, which under these
circumstances must patrol the sea, like a watchman on beat, as the best
substitute for the more formal and regularized convoy protection, when that
ceases to apply.
From the end of the summer of 1813, when this tendency to distant
enterprise became predominant, to the corresponding season a year later,
there were captured by American cruisers some six hundred and fifty
British vessels, chiefly merchantmen; a number which had increased to
between four and five hundred more, when the war ended in the following
winter.[219] An intelligible account of such multitudinous activities can be
framed only by selecting amid the mass some illustrative particulars,
accompanied by a general estimate of the conditions they indicate and the
results they exemplify. Thus it may be stated, with fair approach to
precision, that from September 30, 1813, to September 30, 1814, there were
taken six hundred and thirty-nine British vessels, of which four hundred and
twenty-four were in seas that may be called remote from the United States.

From that time to the end of the war, about six months, the total captures
were four hundred and fourteen, of which those distant were two hundred
and ninety-three. These figures, larger actually and in impression than they
are relatively to the total of British shipping, represent the offensive
maritime action of the United States during the period in question; but, in
considering them, it must be remembered that such results were possible
only because the sea was kept open to British commerce by the paramount
power of the British navy. This could not prevent all mishaps; but it reduced
them, by the annihilation of hostile navies, to such a small percentage of the
whole shipping movement, that the British mercantile community found
steady profit both in foreign and coasting trade, of which the United States
at the same time was almost totally deprived.
The numerous but beggarly array of American bay-craft and oyster boats,
which were paraded to swell British prize lists, till there seemed to be a
numerical set-off to their own losses, show indeed that in point of size and
value of vessels taken there was no real comparison; but this was due to the
fact, not at once suggested by the figures themselves, that there were but
few American merchant vessels to be taken, because they did not dare to go
to sea, with the exception of the few to whom exceptional speed gave a
chance of immunity, not always realized. In the period under consideration,
September, 1813, to September, 1814, despite the great falling off of trade
noted in the returns, over thirty American merchant ships and letters of
marque were captured at sea;[220] at the head of the list being the "Ned,"
whose hair-breadth escapes in seeking to reach a United States port have
been mentioned already.[221] She met her fate near the French coast,
September 6, 1813, on the outward voyage from New York to Bordeaux.
Privateering, risky though it was, offered a more profitable employment,
with less chance of capture; because, besides being better armed and
manned, the ship was not impeded in her sailing by the carriage of a heavy
cargo. While the enemy was losing a certain small proportion of vessels, the
United States suffered practically an entire deprivation of external
commerce; and her coasting trade was almost wholly suppressed, at the
time that her cruisers, national and private, were causing exaggerated
anxiety concerning the intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland,
which, though certainly molested, was not seriously interrupted.

Further evidence of the control exerted by the British Navy, and of the
consequent difficulty under which offensive action was maintained by the
United States, is to be found in the practice, from this time largely followed,
of destroying prizes, after removing from them packages of little weight
compared to their price. The prospect of a captured vessel reaching an
American port was very doubtful, for the same reason that prevented the
movement of American commerce; and while the risk was sometimes run, it
usually was with cargoes which were at once costly and bulky, such as West
India goods, sugars and coffees. Even then specie, and light costly articles,
were first removed to the cruiser, where the chances for escape were
decidedly better. Recourse to burning to prevent recapture was permissible
only with enemy's vessels. If a neutral were found carrying enemy's goods,
a frequent incident of maritime war, she must be sent in for adjudication;
which, if adverse, affected the cargo only. Summary processes, therefore,
could not be applied in such cases, and the close blockade of the United
States coast seriously restricted the operations of her cruisers in this
particular field.

THE BURNING OF A PRIVATEER PRIZE.
Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl.ToList

Examination of the records goes to show that, although individual
American vessels sometimes made numerous seizures in rapid succession,
they seldom, if ever, effected the capture or destruction of a large convoy at
a single blow. This was the object with which Rodgers started on his first
cruise, but failed to accomplish. A stroke of this kind is always possible,
and he had combined conditions unusually favorable to his hopes; but,
while history certainly presents a few instances of such achievement on the
large scale, they are comparatively rare, and opportunity, when it offers, can
be utilized only by a more numerous force than at any subsequent time
gathered under the American flag. In 1813 two privateers, the "Scourge" of
New York and "Rattlesnake" of Philadelphia, passed the summer in the
North Sea, and there made a number of prizes,—twenty-two,—which being
reported together gave the impression of a single lucky encounter; were
supposed in fact to be the convoy for which Rodgers in the "President" had
looked unsuccessfully the same season.[222] The logs, however, showed that
these captures were spread over a period of two months, and almost all
made severally. Norway being then politically attached to Denmark, and
hostile to Great Britain, such prizes as were not burned were sent into her
ports. The "Scourge" appears to have been singularly fortunate, for on her
homeward trip she took, sent in, or destroyed, ten more enemy's vessels;
and in an absence extending a little over a year had taken four hundred and
twenty prisoners,—more than the crew of a 38-gun frigate.[223]
At the same time the privateer schooner "Leo," of Baltimore, was
similarly successful on the coast of Spain and Portugal. By an odd
coincidence, another of the same class, bearing the nearly identical name,
"Lion," was operating at the same time in the same waters, and with like
results; which may possibly account for a contemporary report in a London
paper, that an American off the Tagus had taken thirty-two British vessels.
The "Leo" destroyed thirteen, and took four others; while the "Lion"
destroyed fifteen, having first removed from them cargo to the amount of
$400,000, which she carried safely into France. A curious circumstance,
incidental to the presence of the privateers off Cape Finisterre, is that
Wellington's troops, which had now passed the Pyrenees and were operating

in southern France, had for a long time to wait for their great-coats, which
had been stored in Lisbon for the summer, and now could not be returned
by sea to Bayonne and Bordeaux before convoy was furnished to protect
the transports against capture. Money to pay the troops, and for the
commissariat, was similarly detained. Niles' Register, which followed
carefully the news of maritime capture, announced in November, 1813, that
eighty British vessels had been taken within a few months in European seas
by the "President," "Argus," and five privateers. Compared with the
continuous harassment and loss to which the enemy had become hardened
during twenty years of war with France, allied often with other maritime
states, this result, viewed singly, was not remarkable; but coming in
addition to the other sufferings of British trade, and associated with similar
injuries in the West Indies, and disquiet about the British seas themselves,
the cumulative effect was undeniable, and found voice in public meetings,
resolutions, and addresses to the Government.
Although the United States was not in formal alliance with France, the
common hostility made the ports of either nation a base of operations to the
other, and much facilitated the activities of American cruisers in British
seas. One of the most successful of the privateers, the "True Blooded
Yankee," was originally equipped at Brest, under American ownership,
though it does not appear whether she was American built. On her first
cruise her prizes are reported at twenty-seven. She remained out thirty-
seven days, chiefly off the coast of Ireland, where she is said to have held
an island for six days. Afterwards she burned several vessels in a Scotch
harbor. Her procedure illustrates the methods of privateering in more
respects than one. Thus, two large ships, one from Smyrna and one from
Buenos Ayres, were thought sufficiently valuable to attempt sending into a
French port, although the enemy watched the French coast as rigorously as
the American. The recapture of a third, ordered to Morlaix, received
specific mention, because one of the prize crew, being found to be an
Englishman, was sentenced to death by an English court.[224] Eight others
were destroyed; and, when the privateer returned to port, she carried in her
own hold a miscellaneous cargo of light goods, too costly to risk in a less
nimble bottom. Among these are named eighteen bales of Turkey carpets,
forty-three bales of raw silk, seventy packs of skins, etc.[225] The "True
Blooded Yankee" apparently continued to prefer European waters; for
towards the end of 1814 she was taken there and sent into Gibraltar.

While there were certain well-known districts, such as these just
mentioned, and others before specified, in which from causes constant in
operation there was always to be found abundant material for the hazardous
occupation of the commerce-destroyer, it was not to them alone that
American cruisers went. There were other smaller but lucrative fields, into
which an occasional irruption proved profitable. Such were the gold-coast
on the west shore of Africa, and the island groups of Madeira, the Canaries,
and Cape Verde, which geographically appertain to that continent. Thither
Captain Morris directed the frigate "Adams," in January, 1814, after first
escaping from his long blockade in the Potomac. This voyage, whence he
returned to Savannah in April, was not remunerative; his most valuable
prize, an East India ship, being snatched out of his hands, when in the act of
taking possession, by an enemy's division in charge of a convoy of twenty-
five sail, to which probably she had belonged, and had been separated by
the thick weather that permitted her capture.[226] A year before this the
privateer "Yankee," of Bristol, Rhode Island, had had better success. When
she returned to Narragansett Bay in the spring of 1813, after a five months'
absence, she reported having scoured the whole west coast of Africa, taking
eight vessels, which carried in the aggregate sixty-two guns, one hundred
and ninety-six men, and property to the amount of $296,000. In accordance
with the practice already noticed, of distributing the spoil in order better to
insure its arrival, she brought back in her own hold the light but costly items
of six tons of ivory, thirty-two bales of fine goods, and $40,000 in gold-
dust.[227] This vessel was out again several times; and when the war closed
was said to have been the most successful of all American cruisers. Her
prizes numbered forty, of which thirty-four were ships or brigs; that is, of
the larger classes of merchantmen then used. The estimated value of
themselves and cargoes, $3,000,000, is to be received with reserve.[228]
It was in this neighborhood that the privateer schooner "Globe," Captain
Moon, of Baltimore, mounting eight 9-pounder carronades and one long
gun, met with an adventure illustrative of the fighting incidental to the
business. To this the privateersmen as a class were in no wise loath, where
there was a fair prospect of the gain for which they were sent to look. Being
off Funchal, in the island of Madeira, November 1, 1813, two brigs, which
proved to be English packets, the "Montague" and "Pelham," were seen
"backing and filling;" that is, keeping position in the open roadstead which
constitutes the harbor, under sail, but not anchored. Packets, being in

government service, were well armed for their size, and as mail carriers
were necessarily chosen for speed; they therefore frequently carried specie.
In one taken by the "Essex," Captain Porter found $55,000, which as ready
cash helped him much to pay his frigate's way in a long and adventurous
career. It does not appear that the "Globe" at first recognized the character
of these particular vessels; but she lay-by during the night, watching for
their quitting the shelter of neutral waters. This they did at 9 P.M., when the
privateer pursued, but lost sight of them in a squall. The next morning they
were seen in the southwest, and again chased. At 10.15 A.M. the "Montague"
began firing her stern guns. The schooner replied, but kept on to board,
knowing her superiority in men, and at 12.30 ran alongside (1). The attack
being smartly met, and the vessels separating almost immediately, the
attempt failed disastrously; there being left on board the packet the two
lieutenants of the "Globe" and three or four seamen. Immediately upon this
repulse, the "Pelham" crossed the privateer's bow and raked her (P 2),
dealing such destruction to sails and rigging as to leave her unmanageable.
The "Montague" and "Globe" now lay broadside to broadside (2), engaging;
and ten minutes later the "Montague" by her own report was completely
disabled (M 3). Captain Moon claimed that she struck; and this was
probably the case, if his further incidental mention, that the mailbags were
seen to be thrown overboard, is not a mistake. The action then continued
with the "Pelham," within pistol-shot (3), for an hour or so, when the
schooner, being found in a sinking condition, was compelled to haul off;
"having seven shot between wind and water, the greater part of our standing
and running rigging shot away, and not a sail but was perfectly riddled and
almost useless." After separating, the several combatants all steered with the
tradewinds for the Canaries; the British going to Teneriffe, and the
American to the Grand Canary.[229]
From the injuries received, it is apparent that, for the armaments of the
vessels, this was a very severe as well as determined engagement. The
British had six killed and twelve wounded; the American five killed and
thirteen wounded, besides the prisoners lost in boarding. All three captains
were severely hurt, that of the "Montague" being killed. The figures given
are those reported by each side; how exaggerated the rumors current about
such encounters, and the consequent difficulty to the historian, is shown by
what each heard about the other's casualties. A Spanish brig from Teneriffe
told Moon that the enemy had twenty-seven men killed; while the British

were equally credibly informed that the "Globe" lost thirty-three killed and
nineteen wounded.
Near about this time, in the same neighborhood of Madeira, the privateer
schooner "Governor Tompkins," of New York, captured in rapid succession
three British merchant vessels which had belonged to a convoy from
England to Buenos Ayres, but after its dispersal in a gale were pursuing
their route singly. Two of these reached an American port, their bulky and
heavy ladings of dry goods and hardware not permitting transfer or
distribution. The sale of one cargo realized $270,000.[230] At about the same
moment came in a brig of like value, not improbably another wanderer from
the same group, captured near Madeira by the ship "America," of Salem.
This vicinity, from the islands to the equator, between 20° and 30° west
longitude, belongs essentially to the thronged highway and cross-roads of
commerce, which has been noted as a favorite cruising ground of American
ships of war. Hereabouts passed vessels both to and from the East Indies
and South America. The bad luck of several frigates, and the rough handling
of the "Globe" by the packets, illustrate one side of the fortune of war, as
the good hap of the "America" and "Governor Tompkins" shows the other.

Diagram of the Montague, Pelham, Globe battleToList

It is, however, the beginnings and endings of commercial routes, rather
than the intermediate stretch, which most favor enterprises against an
enemy's trade. In the thronging of vessels, the Caribbean Sea, with its
teeming archipelago, was second only, if second, to the waters surrounding
the United Kingdom. England was one extremity, and the several West
India Islands the other, of a traffic then one of the richest in the world;
while the tropical articles of this exchange, if not absolute necessaries of
life, had become by long indulgence indispensable to the great part of
civilized mankind. Here, therefore, the numbers, the efforts, and the
successes of American privateers most nearly rivalled the daring
achievements of their fellows in the Narrow Seas and the approaches to
Great Britain and Ireland. The two regions resembled each other in another
respect. Not only was there for both an external trade, mainly with one
another, but in each there was also a local traffic of distribution and
collection of goods, from and to central ports, in which was concentrated
the movement of import and export. As has been remarked concerning the
coastwise carriage of the United Kingdom, this local intercourse, to be
efficient, could not be regulated and hampered to the same extent as the
long voyage, over-sea, transportation. A certain amount of freedom and
independence was essential, and the risk attendant upon such separate
action must be compensated, as far as might be, by diminishing the size of
the vessels engaged; a resource particularly applicable to the moderate
weather and quiet seas prevalent in the tropics.
Both the exposure of trade under such relaxed conditions, and the relative
security obtained by the convoy system, rigidly applied, are shown by a few
facts. From September 1, 1813, to March 1, 1814, six months, the number
of prizes taken by Americans, exclusive of those on the Lakes, was reported
as two hundred and seventy. Of these, nearly one third—eighty-six—were
to, from, or within the West Indies. Since in many reports the place of
capture is not given, nor any data sufficient to fix it, it is probable that quite
one third belonged to this trade. This evidences the scale, both of the
commerce itself and of its pursuers, justifying a contemporary statement
that "the West Indies swarm with American privateers;" and it suggests also
that many of the seizures were local traders between the islands, or at least
vessels taking their chance on short runs. On the other hand, the stringency
with which the local officials enforced the Convoy Act was shown,
generally, by the experience at this time of the United States naval vessels,

the records of which, unlike those of most privateers, have been preserved
by filing or publication; and, specifically, by a number of papers found in a
prize by the United States frigate "Constitution," Captain Charles Stewart,
while making a round of these waters in the first three months of 1814.
Among other documents was a petition, signed by many merchants of
Demerara, praying convoy for fifty-one vessels which were collected and
waiting for many weary weeks, as often had to be done. In one letter occurs
the following: "With respect to procuring a license for the "Fanny" to run it,
in case any other ships should be about to do so, we do not believe that, out
of forty vessels ready to sail, any application has been made for such
license, though out of the number are several out-port vessels well armed
and manned. Indeed, we are aware application would be perfectly useless,
as the present Governor, when at Berbice, would not permit a vessel from
that colony to this [adjoining] without convoy. If we could obtain a license,
we could not justify ourselves to shippers, who have ordered insurance with
convoy."[231]
The expense and embarrassment incident to such detentions are far-
reaching, and the effects are as properly chargeable as are captures
themselves to the credit of the cruisers, by the activity of which they are
occasioned. The "Constitution" could report only four prizes as the result of
a three months' cruise, necessarily shortened by the approach of spring. This
made it imperative for a vessel, denied admission to most home ports by her
draught of water, to recover the shelter of one of them before the blockade
again began, and the exhaustion of her provisions should compel her to
attempt entrance under risk of an engagement with superior force. As it
was, she was chased into Salem, and had to lighten ship to escape. But
Stewart had driven an enemy's brig of war into Surinam, chased a packet
off Barbados, and a frigate in the Mona Passage; and the report of these
occurrences, wherever received, imposed additional precaution, delay, and
expense.
At the same time that the "Constitution" was passing through the
southern Caribbean, the naval brigs "Rattlesnake" and "Enterprise" were
searching its northern limits. These had put out from Portsmouth, New
Hampshire, when the winter weather drove the blockaders from there, as
from Boston, whence the "Constitution" had sailed. Starting early in
January, 1814, these two light cruisers kept company, passing east of

Bermuda to the island of St. Thomas, at the northeast corner of the
Caribbean. Thence they turned west, skirting the north shores of Porto Rico
and Santo Domingo as far as the Windward Passage. Through this they
entered the Caribbean, followed the south coast of Cuba, between it and
Jamaica, rounded Cape San Antonio, at its western extremity, and thence,
traversing the Straits of Florida, returned along the coast of the United
States. Having already been chased twice in this cruise, they were
compelled by a third pursuer to separate, February 25. The stranger chose to
keep after the "Enterprise," which being a very dull sailer was obliged in a
flight of seventy hours to throw overboard most of her battery to escape.
The two put into Wilmington, North Carolina, a port impracticable to a
frigate.[232]
In this long round the brigs overhauled eleven vessels, two only of which
were under the British flag. Two were Americans; the rest neutrals, either
Swedes or Spaniards. Of the two enemies, only one was a merchant ship.
The other was a privateer, the chase of which gave rise to a curious and
significant incident. Being near the Florida coast, and thinking the brigs to
be British, twenty or thirty of the crew took to the boats and fled ashore to
escape anticipated impressment. As Marryat remarks, a British private
vessel of that day feared a British ship of war more than it did an enemy of
equal force. Of the neutrals stopped, one was in possession of a British
prize crew, and another had on board enemy's goods. For these reasons they
were sent in for adjudication, and arrived safely. Judged by these small
results from the several cruises of the "Enterprise," "Rattlesnake," and
"Constitution," the large aggregate of captures before quoted, two hundred
and seventy, would indicate that to effect them required a great number of
cruisers, national and private. That this inference is correct will be shown
later, by some interesting and instructive figures.
While the making of prizes was the primary concern of the American
privateers, their cruises in the West Indies, as elsewhere, gave rise to a
certain amount of hard fighting. One of the most noted of these encounters,
that of the schooner "Decatur," of Charleston, with the man-of-war
schooner "Dominica," can hardly be claimed for the United States; for,
though fought under the flag, her captain, Diron, was French, as were most
of the crew. The "Dominica" was in company with a King's packet, which
she was to convoy part of the way to England from St. Thomas. On August

5, 1813, the "Decatur" met the two about three hundred miles north of the
island. The British vessel was superior in armament, having fifteen guns; all
carronades, except two long sixes. The "Decatur's" battery was six
carronades, and one long 18-pounder. For long distances the latter was
superior in carrying power and penetration to anything on board the
"Dominica;" but the American captain, knowing himself to have most men,
sought to board, and the artillery combat was therefore mainly at close
quarters, within carronade range. It began at 2 P.M. At 2.30 the schooners
were within half-gunshot of one another; the "Dominica" in the position of
being chased, because of the necessity of avoiding the evident intention of
the "Decatur" to come hand to hand. Twice the latter tried to run alongside,
and twice was foiled by watchful steering, accompanied in each case by a
broadside which damaged her rigging and sails, besides killing two of her
crew. The third attempt was successful, the "Decatur's" bow coming against
the quarter of the "Dominica," the jib-boom passing through her mainsail.
The crew of the privateer clambered on board, and there followed a hand-
to-hand fight equally honorable to both parties. The British captain,
Lieutenant Barretté, a young man of twenty-five, who had already proved
his coolness and skill in the management of the action, fell at the head of
his men, of whom sixty out of a total of eighty-eight were killed or
wounded before their colors were struck. The assailants, who numbered one
hundred and three, lost nineteen. The packet, though armed, took no part in
the fight, and when it was over effected her escape.[233] The "Decatur" with
her prize reached Charleston safely, August 20; bringing also a captured
merchantman. The moment of arrival was most opportune; two enemy's
brigs, which for some time had been blockading the harbor, having left only
the day before.
In March, 1814, the privateer schooner "Comet," of Baltimore, not being
able to make her home port, put into Wilmington, North Carolina. She had
been cruising in the West Indies, and had there taken twenty vessels, most
of which were destroyed after removing valuables. In the course of her
operations she encountered near St. Thomas the British ship "Hibernia;" the
size of which, and her height above the water, by preventing boarding,
enabled her successfully to repel attack, and the privateer was obliged to
haul off, having lost three men killed and thirteen wounded. The American
account of this affair ascribes twenty-two guns to the "Hibernia." The
British story says that she had but six, with a crew of twenty-two men; of

whom one was killed and eleven wounded. The importance of the matter in
itself scarcely demands a serious attempt to reconcile this discrepancy; and
it is safer to accept each party's statement of his own force. The two agree
that the action lasted eight or nine hours, and that both were much cut up. It
is evident also from each narrative that they lay alongside most of the time,
which makes it probable that the ship's height saved her from being
overborne by superior numbers.
The "Saucy Jack," of Charleston, passed through several severe combats,
in one of which she was even worse mauled than the "Comet" in the
instance just cited. On April 30, 1814, off St. Nicolas Mole, in the
Windward Passage between Cuba and Santo Domingo, she met the British
ship "Pelham," a vessel of five hundred and forty tons, and mounting ten
guns, bound from London to Port au Prince. The "Pelham" fought well, and
the action lasted two hours, at the end of which she was carried by
boarding. Her forty men were overpowered by numbers, but nevertheless
still resisted with a resolution which commanded the admiration of the
victors. She lost four killed and eleven wounded; among the latter her
captain, dangerously. The privateer had two killed and nine wounded. Both
vessels reached Charleston safely, and the "Saucy Jack" at once fitted out
again. It is told that, between daylight and dark of the day she began to
enlist, one hundred and thirty able-bodied seamen had shipped; and this at a
time when the navy with difficulty found crews.[234]
The "Saucy Jack" returned to the West Indies for another cruise, in which
she encountered one of those rude deceptions which privateers often
experienced. She had made already eight prizes, for one of which, the ship
"Amelia," she had had to fight vigorously, killing four and wounding five of
the enemy, while herself sustaining a loss of one killed and one wounded,
when on October 31, 1814, about 1 A.M., being then off Cape Tiburon at the
west end of Haïti, she sighted two vessels standing to the westward. Chase
was made, and an hour later the privateer opened fire. The strangers replied,
at the same time shortening sail, which looked ominous; but the "Saucy
Jack," willing to justify her name, kept on to close. At 6 A.M., having arrived
within a few hundred yards, the enemy were seen to be well armed, but
appeared not to be well manned. At seven, by which time it was daylight,
the "Saucy Jack" began an engagement with the nearer, and ten minutes
later ran her alongside, when she was found to be full of soldiers. The

privateer sheered off at once, and took to her heels, followed by an
incessant fire of grape and musketry from those whom she had recently
pursued. This awkward position, which carried the chance of a disabling
shot and consequent capture, lasted till eight, when the speed of the
schooner took her out of range, having had in all eight men killed and
fifteen wounded; two round shot in the hull, and spars and rigging much cut
up. It was afterwards ascertained that her opponent was the "Volcano"
bombship, convoying the transport "Golden Fleece," on board which were
two hundred and fifty troops from Chesapeake Bay for Jamaica. The
"Volcano" lost an officer and two men killed, and two wounded; proving
that under somewhat awkward circumstances the "Saucy Jack" could give
as well as take.[235]
A little later in this season a group of nine sail, from the West Indies for
Europe, was encountered by the privateer "Kemp," of Baltimore, broad off
the coast of North Carolina. Excluded, like the "Comet" and others, from
return to the port where she belonged, the "Kemp" had been in Wilmington,
which she left November 29, 1814; the strangers being sighted at 8 A.M.
December 1. One was a convoying frigate, which, when the "Kemp"
pursued, gave chase and drove her off that afternoon. The privateer outran
her pursuer, and during the night by devious courses gave her the slip;
thereupon steering for the position where she judged she would again fall in
with the merchant vessels. In this she was successful, at daylight
discovering them,—three ships, three brigs, and two schooners. At 11 A.M.
one ship was overtaken, but proving to be Spanish, from Havana to
Hamburg, was allowed to proceed, while the "Kemp" again followed the
others. At noon they were five miles to windward, drawn up in a line to
fight; for in those days of war and piracy most merchant ships carried at
least a few guns for defence, and in this case their numbers, combined in
mutual support, might effect a successful resistance. At two they took the
initiative, bearing down together and attacking. The "Kemp" engaged them
all, and in half an hour the untrained squadron was naturally in confusion.
One after the other, six of the seven were boarded, or without waiting to be
attacked struck their colors as the schooner drew up; but while four were
being taken into possession, the two others seized the opportunity and made
off. Two ships and two brigs remained in the hands of the captor. All were
laden with sugar and coffee, valuable at any time, but especially so in the
then destitute condition of the United States. After this unusual, if not

wholly unique, experience, the "Kemp" returned to port, having been absent
only six days. Her prisoners amounted to seventy-one, her own crew being
fifty-three. The separation of the escort from the convoy, the subsequent
judicious search for the latter, and the completeness of the result, constitute
this a very remarkable instance of good management accompanied by good
fortune; success deserved and achieved.[236]
The privateer brig "Chasseur," of Baltimore, Captain Thomas Boyle, was
one of the typically successful and renowned cruisers of the time. She
carried a battery of sixteen 12-pounder carronades, and in the course of the
war thirty prizes are credited to her. In the late summer of 1814 she cruised
off the coast of Great Britain and Ireland, returning at the end of October;
having made eighteen captures during an absence of three months. From
these she paroled and sent in by cartels one hundred and fifty prisoners,
bringing back with her forty-three, of whom she had not been able thus to
rid herself.[237] After refitting she went to the West Indies for a winter
cruise, which extended from the Windward Islands to the neighborhood of
Havana. Here she signalized the approaching end of her career by an action,
fought after peace not only had been concluded at Ghent, but already was
known in the United States. On February 26, 1815, at 11 A.M., being then
twenty miles east of Havana, and six miles from the Cuban coast, a
schooner was seen in the northeast (1), running down before the northeast
trade-wind. Sail was made to intercept her (2), there being at the time
visible from the "Chasseur's" masthead a convoy lying-to off Havana,
information concerning which probably accounts for her presence at this
spot. The chase steered more to the northward (2), bringing the wind on her
starboard side, apparently wishing to avoid a meeting. The "Chasseur"
followed her motions, and when within about three miles the stranger's
foretopmast went over the side, showing the press of sail she was carrying.
After clearing the wreck she hauled close on the wind, heading northerly. At
1 P.M., she began to fire her stern gun and showed British colors; but only
three port-holes were visible on her port side,—towards the "Chasseur."
Believing from appearances that he had before him a weakly armed
vessel making a passage, and seeing but few men on her deck, Captain
Boyle pressed forward without much preparation and under all sail. At 1.26
P.M. the "Chasseur" had come within pistol-shot (3), on the port side, when
the enemy disclosed a tier of ten ports and opened his broadside, with round

shot, grape, and musket balls. The American schooner, having much way
on, shot ahead, and as she was to leeward in doing so, the British vessel
kept off quickly (4) to run under her stern and rake. This was successfully
avoided by imitating the movement (4), and the two were again side by
side, but with the "Chasseur" now to the right (5). The action continued thus
for about ten minutes, when Boyle found his opponent's battery too heavy
for him. He therefore ran alongside (6), and in the act of boarding the
enemy struck. She proved to be the British schooner "St. Lawrence,"
belonging to the royal navy; formerly a renowned Philadelphia privateer,
the "Atlas." Her battery, one long 9-pounder and fourteen 12-pounder
carronades, would have been no very unequal match for the sixteen of her
antagonist; but the "Chasseur" had been obliged recently to throw
overboard ten of these, while hard chased by the Barrosa frigate, and had
replaced them with some 9-pounders from a prize, for which she had no
proper projectiles. The complement allowed the "St. Lawrence" was
seventy-five, though it does not seem certain that all were on board; and she
was carrying also some soldiers, marines, and naval officers, bound to New
Orleans, in ignorance probably of the disastrous end of that expedition. The
"Chasseur" had eighty-nine men, besides several boys. The British loss
reported by her captain was six killed and seventeen wounded; the
American, five killed and eight wounded.[238]

Diagram of the Chasseur vs. St. Lawrence battleToList

This action was very creditably fought on both sides, but to the American
captain belongs the meed of having not only won success, but deserved it.
His sole mistake was the over-confidence in what he could see, which made
him a victim to the very proper ruse practised by his antagonist in
concealing his force. His manœuvring was prompt, ready, and accurate; that
of the British vessel was likewise good, but a greater disproportion of injury
should have resulted from her superior battery. In reporting the affair to his
owners, Captain Boyle said, apologetically: "I should not willingly, perhaps,
have sought a contest with a King's vessel, knowing that is not our object;
but my expectations at first were a valuable vessel, and a valuable cargo
also. When I found myself deceived, the honor of the flag intrusted to my
care was not to be disgraced by flight." The feeling expressed was modest
as well as spirited, and Captain Boyle's handsome conduct merits the
mention that the day after the action, when the captured schooner was
released as a cartel to Havana, in compassion to her wounded, the

commander of the "St. Lawrence" gave him a letter, in the event of his
being taken by a British cruiser, testifying to his "obliging attention and
watchful solicitude to preserve our effects, and render us comfortable
during the short time we were in his possession;" in which, he added, the
captain "was carefully seconded by all his officers."[239]
These instances, occurring either in the West Indies, or, in the case of the
"Kemp," affecting vessels which had just loaded there, are sufficient, when
taken in connection with those before cited from other quarters of the globe,
to illustrate the varied activities and fortunes of privateering. The general
subject, therefore, need not further be pursued. It will be observed that in
each case the cruiser acts on the offensive; being careful, however, in
choosing the object of attack, to avoid armed ships, the capture of which
seems unlikely to yield pecuniary profit adequate to the risk. The gallantry
and skill of Captain Boyle of the "Chasseur" made particularly permissible
to him the avowal, that only mistake of judgment excused his committing
himself to an encounter which held out no such promise; and it may be
believed that the equally capable Captain Diron, if free to do as he pleased,
would have chosen the packet, and not her escort the "Dominica," as the
object of his pursuit. This the naval schooner of course could not permit. It
was necessary, therefore, first to fight her; and, although she was beaten, the
result of the action was to insure the escape of the ship under her charge.
These examples define exactly the spirit and aim of privateering, and
distinguish them from the motives inspiring the ship of war. The object of
the privateer is profit by capture; to which fighting is only incidental, and
where avoidable is blamable. The mission of a navy on the other hand is
primarily military; and while custom permitted the immediate captor a
share in the proceeds of his prizes, the taking of them was in conception not
for direct gain, personal or national, but for injury to the enemy.
It may seem that, even though the ostensible motive was not the same,
the two courses of operation followed identical methods, and in outcome
were indistinguishable. This is not so. However subtle the working of the
desire for gain upon the individual naval officer, leading at times to acts of
doubtful propriety, the tone and spirit of a profession, even when not clearly
formulated in phrase and definition, will assert itself in the determination of
personal conduct. The dominating sense of advantage to the state, which is
the military motive, and the dominating desire for gain in a mercantile

enterprise, are very different incentives; and the result showed itself in a
fact which has never been appreciated, and perhaps never noted, that the
national ships of war were far more effective as prize takers than were the
privateers. A contrary impression has certainly obtained, and was shared by
the present writer until he resorted to the commonplace test of adding up
figures.
Amid much brilliant achievement, privateering, like all other business
pursuits, had also a large and preponderant record of unsuccess. The very
small number of naval cruisers necessarily yielded a much smaller
aggregate of prizes; but when the respective totals are considered with
reference to the numbers of vessels engaged in making them, the returns
from the individual vessels of the United States navy far exceed those from
the privateers. Among conspicuously successful cruisers, also, the United
States ships "Argus," "Essex," "Peacock," and "Wasp" compare favorably in
general results with the most celebrated privateers, even without allowing
for the evident fact that a few instances of very extraordinary qualities and
record are more likely to be found among five hundred vessels than among
twenty-two; this being the entire number of naval pendants actually
engaged in open-sea cruising, from first to last. These twenty-two captured
one hundred and sixty-five prizes, an average of 7.5 each, in which are
included the enemy's ships of war taken. Of privateers of all classes there
were five hundred and twenty-six; or, excluding a few small nondescripts,
four hundred and ninety-two. By these were captured thirteen hundred and
forty-four vessels, an average of less than three; to be exact, 2.7. The
proportion, therefore, of prizes taken by ships of war to those by private
armed vessels was nearly three to one.
Comparison may be instituted in other ways. Of the twenty-two national
cruisers, four only, or one in five, took no prize; leaving to the remaining
eighteen an average of nine. Out of the grand total of five hundred and
twenty-six privateers only two hundred and seven caught anything; three
hundred and nineteen, three out of five, returned to port empty-handed, or
were themselves taken. Dividing the thirteen hundred and forty-four prizes
among the two hundred and seven more or less successful privateers, there
results an average of 6.5; so that, regard being had only to successful
cruisers, the achievement of the naval vessels was to that of the private
armed nearly as three to two. These results may be accepted as disposing

entirely of the extravagant claims made for privateering as a system, when
compared with a regular naval service, especially when it is remembered
with what difficulty the American frigates could get to sea at all, on account
of their heavy draft and the close blockade; whereas the smaller vessels,
national or private, had not only many harbors open, but also comparatively
numerous opportunities to escape. The frigate "United States" never got out
after her capture of the "Macedonian," in 1812; the "Congress" was shut up
after her return in December, 1813; and the "Chesapeake" had been
captured in the previous June. All these nevertheless count in the twenty-
two pendants reckoned above.
The figures here cited are from a compilation by Lieutenant George F.
Emmons,[240] of the United States Navy, published in 1853 under the title,
"The United States Navy from 1775 to 1853." Mr. Emmons made no
analyses, confining himself to giving lists and particulars; his work is
purely statistical. Counting captures upon the lakes, and a few along the
coast difficult of classification, his grand total of floating craft taken from
the enemy reaches fifteen hundred and ninety-nine; which agrees nearly
with the sixteen hundred and thirty-four of Niles, whom he names among
his sources of information. From an examination of the tables some other
details of interest may be drawn. Of the five hundred and twenty-six
privateers and letters-of-marque given by name, twenty-six were ships,
sixty-seven brigs, three hundred and sixty-four schooners, thirty-five
sloops, thirty-four miscellaneous; down to, and including, a few boats
putting out from the beach. The number captured by the enemy was one
hundred and forty-eight, or twenty-eight per cent. The navy suffered more
severely. Of the twenty-two vessels reckoned above, twelve were taken, or
destroyed to keep them out of an enemy's hands; over fifty per cent. Of the
twelve, six were small brigs, corresponding in size and nautical powers to
the privateer. Three were frigates—the "President," "Essex," and
"Chesapeake." One, the "Adams," was not at sea when destroyed by her
own captain to escape capture. Only two sloops of war, the first "Wasp" and
the "Frolic,"[241] were taken; and of these the former, as already known, was
caught when partially dismasted, at the end of a successful engagement.
Contemporary with the career of the "Argus," the advantage of a sudden
and unexpected inroad, like hers, upon a region deemed safe by the enemy,
was receiving confirmation in the remote Pacific by the cruise of the frigate