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Title: A General View of Positivism

Author: Auguste Comte

Author of introduction, etc.: Frederic Harrison

Translator: John Henry Bridges

Release date: December 24, 2016 [eBook #53799]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A GENERAL
VIEW OF POSITIVISM ***

The New Universal Library

A GENERAL VIEW OF
POSITIVISM

A GENERAL VIEW
OF POSITIVISM

Translated from the French of
AUGUSTE COMTE

By J. H. BRIDGES, M.B.
Late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford

A New Edition, with an Introduction (1908), by
FREDERIC HARRISON

And the Additional Notes in the last French
Edition (Paris, 1907)

LONDON
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LIMITED
New York: E. P. DUTTON & CO.

Published by the kind consent of Mrs. Bridges and the Positivist Committee,
to whom the copyright of this translation belongs.

Republic of the West
Order and Progress

A GENERAL VIEW OF
POSITIVISM

Or,
SUMMARY EXPOSITION OF THE
SYSTEM OF THOUGHT
AND LIFE

Adapted to the Great Western Republic,
formed of the Five Advanced Nations, the
French, Italian, Spanish, British and German,

which, since the time of Charlemagne, have
always constituted a Political Whole

Réorganiser, sans dieu ni roi, par le culte systématique de
l’Humanité.
Nul n’a droit qu’à faire son devoir.
L’esprit doit toujours être le ministre du coeur, et jamais son
esclave.

Reorganisation, irrespectively of God or king, by the worship of
Humanity, systematically adopted.
Man’s only right is to do his duty.
The Intellect should always be the servant of the Heart, and
should never be its slave.

By
AUGUSTE COMTE
Author of ‘System of Positive Philosophy’
Paris, 1848

INTRODUCTION

By FREDERIC HARRISON
Although Positivism has been pretty widely discussed of late, not only
by those interested in philosophy and religion, but by the general reader and
the public press, perhaps but few of them, whether readers or critics, have
exactly grasped the full meaning of it as a system at once of thought and of
life. The vast range of the ground it covers and the technical, allusive, and
close style of Comte’s writings in the original have made it difficult to
master the subject as a whole. It has accordingly been thought that the time
has come to add to the ‘New Universal Library’ a translation of The
General View of Positivism, i.e., the careful summary of the Positive Polity
which Auguste Comte prefixed to the four volumes of his principal work.
The translation which was published by Dr. J. H. Bridges in 1865 is at the
same time a most accurate version by one of Comte’s earliest followers, and
also it is turned in an easy and simpler style, with the references and
allusions explained, marginal headings to the paragraphs, and a complete
analysis of the contents.
Positivism is not simply a system of Philosophy; nor is it simply a new
form of Religion; nor is it simply a scheme of social regeneration. It
partakes of all of these, and professes to harmonize them under one
dominant conception that is equally philosophic and social. ‘Its primary
object,’ writes Comte, ‘is twofold: to generalize our scientific conceptions
and to systematize the art of social life.’ Accordingly Comte’s ideal
embraces the three main elements of which human life consists—Thoughts,
Feelings and Actions.
Now it is clear that no such comprehensive system was ever before
offered to the world. Neither the Gospel nor any known type of religion
undertook to give a synthetic grouping of the Sciences. No synthetic

scheme of philosophy ever attempted to correlate religion, politics, art, and
industry. No system of Socialism, ancient or modern, started with
mathematics and led up to an ideal of a human devotion to duty, with a
ritual of worship, both public and private.
Now Comte’s famous Positive Polity did attempt this gigantic task.
And the novelty and extent of such a work explains and accounts for the
extreme difficulty met with by readers of the original French, and also for
the fascination which it has maintained more than fifty years after the
author’s death. It has been talked about, criticized, and even ridiculed, with
an ignorance of its true character which can only be excused by the abstract
and severe form in which Comte thought right to condense his thoughts.
Comte was primarily a mathematician, and neither Descartes nor Newton
troubled themselves about ‘the general reader’. Kepler, they say, declared
himself satisfied if he had one convert in a century; and philosophers have
seldom had justice done them until some generations have passed. The
difficulties presented by the scientific form of Comte’s works have been
obviated for English readers by the versions of his English followers, which
are at once literal translations, analyses, and elucidations. For the ‘general
reader’ nothing could be more serviceable than Bridges’ clear presentation
of Comte’s own ‘general view’, or summary of his system.
The translation itself is a literary masterpiece. It renders an extremely
abstract and complex French type of philosophical dogmatism into easy and
simple English, whilst at the same time preserving and even elucidating the
somewhat cryptic allusions and nuances of the original. The thought in the
French is full, pregnant, and suggestive, at once subtle and abstract, and
rich with words of a new coinage—such as altruism, sociology, dynamics
(i.e., history), and old words used in a special sense. This difficulty Dr.
Bridges surmounts by breaking up the involved sentences, supplying names
and facts indirectly referred to, and by transferring technical language into
popular English. The success of the translation has been proved by the
thousands of copies sold in the original 12mo edition of 1865, in the 8vo
edition of 1875, and in the stereotyped reprint of 1881.
A pathetic interest attaches to the history of the translation. In 1860 Dr.
Bridges, just settled as a physician in Melbourne, lost his young wife by
fever. He at once returned to England, bringing the remains of his wife for
interment in the family graveyard in Suffolk. In those days of sailing

vessels the voyage home round Cape Horn occupied at least three months.
Dr. Bridges resolved to conquer his sorrow, shut himself in his cabin during
the voyage home and completed the translation (in 430 pages of print)
within the time at sea:—
The sad mechanic exercise,
Like dull narcotics, numbing pain.

Auguste Comte always spoke of the Positive Polity as ‘his principal
work’. The Discours sur l’Ensemble, or General View of Positivism, formed
the introduction to the four volumes. It forms a summary of the entire work,
and it is indeed a systematic application of the doctrine to the actual
condition of society. As the Polity, taken as a whole, professes to embody a
set of doctrines for the regulation of thought and life, the present
Introduction is designed to show the need of such a body of doctrine, the
result that they would produce, and the mode in which they are likely to
work. Thus, one who desires to see in one view the social purpose which
Positivism proposes to effect would find it in no single volume better than
in this treatise.
The work consists of six chapters, treating Positivism respectively in its
intellectual aspect, its social aspect, its influence on the working classes, on
women, on art, and on religion. In other words it illustrates the application
of the system to Philosophy, Politics, Industry, The Family, Poetry and The
Future. It opens with a comparison of Positivist doctrines with those of the
leading extant philosophies. It closes with a picture of society should those
doctrines be realized. It is thus both a criticism of current theories, and an
utopia of a possible Future. Of the intermediate chapters, the first deals with
the principal changes proposed in our actual political system: the next
chapter deals with the changes proposed in our present social system. Then
come the last two chapters, dealing with the principal agents, Art, Poetry
and Religion, by which those changes may be promoted. The book is
therefore a practical introduction to the subject as a whole; for it sets forth
the aim of Positivism as a system, and then how it seeks to effect that aim.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF POSITIVISM 8

The object of Philosophy is to present a systematic view of
human life as a basis for modifying its imperfections—The
Theological Synthesis failed to include the practical side of human
nature—But the Positive spirit originated in practical life—In
human nature, and therefore in the Positive system, Affection is the
preponderating element—The proper function of Intellect is the
service of the Social Sympathies—Under Theology the Intellect was
the slave of the Heart; under Positivism, its servant—The
subordination of the Intellect to the Heart is the subjective principle
of Positivism—Objective basis of the system: Order of the external
World, as revealed by Science—By it the selfish affections are
controlled; the unselfish strengthened—Our conception of this
External Order has been gradually growing from the earliest times,
and is but just complete—Even where not modifiable, its influence
on the character is of the greatest value—But in most cases we can
modify it; and in these the knowledge of it forms the systematic
basis of human action—The chief difficulty of the Positive
Synthesis was to complete our conception of the External Order by
extending it to Social Phenomena—By the discovery of sociological
laws social questions are made paramount; and thus our subjective
principle is satisfied without danger to free thought—Distinction
between Abstract and Concrete laws. It is the former only that we
require for the purpose before us—In our Theory of Development
the required Synthesis of Abstract conceptions already exists—

Therefore we are in a position to proceed at once with the work of
social regeneration—Error of identifying Positivism with Atheism,
Materialism, Fatalism, or Optimism. Atheism, like Theology,
discusses insoluble mysteries—Materialism is due to the
encroachment of the lower sciences on the domain of the higher, an
error which Positivism rectifies—Nor is Positivism fatalist, since it
asserts the External Order to be modifiable—The charge of
Optimism applies to Theology rather than to Positivism. The
Positivist judges of all historical actions relatively, but does not
justify them indiscriminately—The word Positive connotes all the
highest intellectual attributes, and will ultimately have a moral
significance.

CHAPTER II
THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF POSITIVISM 64

The relation of Positivism to the French Revolution—The
negative or destructive phase of the Revolution stimulated the desire
of Progress, and consequently the study of social phenomena—The
constructive phase of the Revolution. The first attempts to construct
failed, being based on destructive principles—Counter-revolution
from 1794 to 1830—Political stagnation between 1830 and 1848—
The present position, 1848–1850. Republicanism involves the great
principle of subordinating Politics to Morals—It gives prominence
to the problem of reconciling Order and Progress—It brings the
metaphysical revolutionary schools into discredit—And it proves to
all the necessity of a true spiritual power; a body of thinkers whose
business is to study and to teach principles, holding aloof from
political action—The need of a spiritual power is common to the
whole Republic of Western Europe—This Republic consists of the
Italian, Spanish, British, and German populations, grouped round
France as their centre—Relation of Positivism to the mediæval
system, to which we owe the first attempt to separate Spiritual from

Temporal power—But the mediæval attempt was premature; and
Positivism will renew and complete it—The Ethical system of
Positivism—Subjection of Self-love to Social love is the great
ethical problem. The Social state of itself favours this result; but it
may be hastened by organized and conscious effort—Intermediate
between Self-love and universal Benevolence are the domestic
affections: filial, fraternal, conjugal, paternal—Personal virtues
placed upon a social basis—Moral education consists partly of
scientific demonstration of ethical truth, but still more of culture of
the higher sympathies—Organization of Public Opinion—
Commemoration of great men—The political motto of Positivism:
Order and Progress—Progress, the development of Order—Analysis
of Progress: material, physical, intellectual, and moral—Application
of our principles to actual politics. All government must for the
present be provisional—Danger of attempting political
reconstruction before spiritual—Politically what is wanted is
Dictatorship, with liberty of speech and discussion—Such a
dictatorship would be a step towards the separation of spiritual and
temporal power—The motto of 1830, Liberty and Public Order—
Liberty should be extended to Education—Order demands
centralization—Intimate connexion of Liberty with Order.

CHAPTER III
THE ACTION OF POSITIVISM UPON THE WORKING CLASSES
140
Positivism will not for the present recommend itself to the
governing classes, so much as to the People—The working man
who accepts his position is favourably situated for the reception of
comprehensive principles and generous sympathies—This the
Convention felt; but they encouraged the People to seek political
supremacy, for which they are not fit—It is only in exceptional
cases that the People can be really ‘sovereign’—The truth involved
in the expression is that the well-being of the people should be the

one great object of government—The People’s function is to assist
the spiritual power in modifying the action of government—Their
combined efforts result in the formation of Public Opinion—Public
opinion involves, (1) principles of social conduct, (2) their
acceptance by society at large, (3) an organ through which to
enunciate them—Working men’s clubs—All three conditions of
Public Opinion exist, but have not yet been combined—
Spontaneous tendencies of the people in a right direction. Their
Communism—Its new title of Socialism—Property is in its nature
social, and needs control—But Positivism rejects the Communist
solution of the Problem. Property is to be controlled by moral not
legal agencies—Individualization of functions as necessary as co-
operation—Industry requires its captains as well as War—
Communism is deficient in the historical spirit—In fact, as a system
it is worthless, though prompted by noble feelings—Property is a
public trust, not to be interfered with legally—Inheritance
favourable to its right employment—Intellect needs moral control as
much as wealth—Action of organized public opinion upon
Capitalists. Strikes—Public Opinion must be based upon a sound
system of Education—Education has two stages; from birth to
puberty, from puberty to adolescence. The first, consisting of
physical and esthetic training, to be given at home—The second part
consists of public lectures on the Sciences, from Mathematics to
Sociology—Travels of Apprentices—Concentration of study—
Governmental assistance not required, except for certain special
institutions, and this only as a provisional measure—We are not ripe
for this system at present; and Government must not attempt to
hasten its introduction—Intellectual attitude of the people.
Emancipation from theological belief—From metaphysical
doctrines—Their mistaken preference of literary and rhetorical
talent to real intellectual power—Moral attitude of the people. The
workman should regard himself as a public functionary—Ambition
of power and wealth must be abandoned—The working classes are
the best guarantee for Liberty and Order—It is from them that we
shall obtain the dictatorial power which is provisionally required.

CHAPTER IV
THE INFLUENCE OF POSITIVISM UPON WOMEN 227

Women represent the affective element in our nature, as
philosophers and people represent the intellectual and practical
elements—Women have stood aloof from the modern movement,
because of its anti-historic and destructive character—But they will
sympathize with constructive tendencies; and will distinguish sound
philosophy from scientific specialities—Women’s position in
society. Like philosophers and people, their part is not to govern,
but to modify—The united action of philosophers, women, and
proletaries constitutes Moral Force—Superiority of the new spiritual
power to the old. Self-regarding tendencies of Catholic doctrine—
The spirit of Positivism, on the contrary, is essentially social. The
Heart and the Intellect mutually strengthen each other—Intellectual
and moral affinities of women with Positivism—Catholicism
purified love, but did not directly strengthen it—Women’s influence
over the working classes and their teachers—Their social influence
in the salon—But the Family is their principal sphere of action—
Woman’s mission as a wife. Conjugal love an education for
universal sympathy—Conditions of marriage. Indissoluble
monogamy—Perpetual widowhood—Woman’s mission as a mother
—Education of children belongs to mothers. They only can guide
the development of character—Modern sophisms about Woman’s
rights. The domesticity of her life follows from the principle of
Separation of Powers—The position of the sexes tends to
differentiation rather than identity—Woman to be maintained by
Man—The education of women should be identical with that of men
—Women’s privileges. Their mission is in itself a privilege—They
will receive honour and worship from men—Development of
mediæval chivalry—The practice of Prayer, so far from
disappearing, is purified and strengthened in Positive religion—The
worship of Woman a preparation for the worship of Humanity—
Exceptional women. Joan of Arc—It is for women to introduce
Positivism into the Southern nations.

CHAPTER V
THE RELATION OF POSITIVISM TO ART 304

Positivism when complete is as favourable to Imagination, as,
when incomplete, it was unfavourable to it—Esthetic talent is for
the adornment of life, not for its government—The political
influence of literary men a deplorable sign and source of anarchy—
Theory of Art—Art is the idealized representation of Fact—Poetry
is intermediate between Philosophy and Polity—Art calls each
element of our nature into harmonious action—Three stages in the
esthetic process: Imitation, Idealization, Expression—Classification
of the arts on the principle of decreasing generality, and increasing
intensity—Poetry—Music—Painting. Sculpture. Architecture—The
conditions favourable to Art have never yet been combined—
Neither in Polytheism—Nor under the Mediæval system—Much
less in modern times—Under Positivism the conditions will all be
favourable. There will be fixed principles, and a nobler moral
culture—Predisposing influence of Education—Relation of Art to
Religion—Idealization of historical types—Art requires the highest
education; but little special instruction—Artists as a class will
disappear. Their function will be appropriated by the philosophic
priesthood—Identity of esthetic and scientific genius—Women’s
poetry—People’s poetry—Value of Art in the present crisis—
Construction of normal types on the basis furnished by philosophy
—Pictures of the Future of Man—Contrasts with the Past.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION. THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY 355

Recapitulation of the results obtained—Humanity is the centre
to which every aspect of Positivism converges—With the discovery

of sociological laws, a synthesis on the basis of Science becomes
possible, science being now concentrated on the study of Humanity
—Statical aspects of Humanity—Dynamical aspects—Inorganic
and organic sciences elevated by their connexion with the supreme
science of Humanity—The new religion is even more favourable to
Art than to Science—Poetic portraiture of the new Supreme Being,
and contrast with the old—Organization of festivals, representing
statical and dynamical aspects of Humanity—Worship of the dead.
Commemoration of their service—All the arts may co-operate in the
service of religion—Positivism the successor of Christianity, and
surpasses it—Superiority of Positive morality—Rise of the new
Spiritual power—Temporal power will always be necessary, but its
action will be modified by the spiritual—Substitution of duties for
rights—Consensus of the Social Organism—Continuity of the past
with the present—Necessity of a spiritual power to study and teach
these truths, and thus to govern men by persuasion, instead of by
compulsion—Nutritive functions of Humanity, performed by
Capitalists, as the temporal power—These are modified by the
cerebral functions, performed by the spiritual power—Women and
priests to have their material subsistence guaranteed—Normal
relation of priests, people, and capitalists—We are not yet ripe for
the normal state. But the revolution of 1848 is a step towards it—
First revolutionary motto; Liberty and Equality—Second motto;
Liberty and Order—Third motto; Order and Progress—Provisional
policy for the period of transition—Popular dictatorship with
freedom of speech—Positive Committee for Western Europe—
Occidental navy—International coinage—Occidental school—Flag
for the Western Republic—Colonial and foreign Associates of the
Committee, the action of which will ultimately extend to the whole
human race—Conclusion. Perfection of the Positivist ideal—
Corruption of Monotheism.

A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM

‘We tire of thinking and even of acting; we never tire of loving.’
In the following series of systematic essays upon Positivism the
essential principles of the doctrine are first considered; I then point out the
agencies by which its propagation will be effected; and I conclude by
describing certain additional features indispensable to its completeness. My
treatment of these questions will of course be summary; yet it will suffice, I
hope, to overcome several excusable but unfounded prejudices. It will
enable any competent reader to assure himself that the new general doctrine
aims at something more than satisfying the Intellect; that it is in reality quite
as favourable to Feeling and even to Imagination.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Positivism consists essentially of a Philosophy and a Polity. These can
never be dissevered; the former being the basis, and the latter the end of one
comprehensive system, in which our intellectual faculties and our social
sympathies are brought into close correlation with each other. For, in the
first place, the science of Society, besides being more important than any
other, supplies the only logical and scientific link by which all our varied
1
observations of phenomena can be brought into one consistent whole . Of
this science it is even more true than of any of the preceding sciences, that
its real character cannot be understood without explaining its exact relation
in all general features with the art corresponding to it. Now here we find a
coincidence which is assuredly not fortuitous. At the very time when the
theory of society is being laid down, an immense sphere is opened for the
application of that theory; the direction, namely, of the social regeneration
of Western Europe. For, if we take another point of view, and look at the

great crisis of modern history, as its character is displayed in the natural
course of events, it becomes every day more evident how hopeless is the
task of reconstructing political institutions without the previous remodelling
of opinion and of life. To form then a satisfactory synthesis of all human
conceptions is the most urgent of our social wants: and it is needed equally
for the sake of Order and of Progress. During the gradual accomplishment
of this great philosophical work, a new moral power will arise
spontaneously throughout the West, which, as its influence increases, will
lay down a definite basis for the reorganization of society. It will offer a
general system of education for the adoption of all civilized nations, and by
this means will supply in every department of public and private life fixed
principles of judgment and of conduct. Thus the intellectual movement and
the social crisis will be brought continually into close connexion with each
other. Both will combine to prepare the advanced portion of humanity for
the acceptance of a true spiritual power, a power more coherent, as well as
more progressive, than the noble but premature attempt of mediaeval
Catholicism.
The primary object, then, of Positivism is two-fold: to generalize our
scientific conceptions, and to systematize the art of social life. These are but
two aspects of one and the same problem. They will form the subjects of the
two first chapters of this work. I shall first explain the general spirit of the
new philosophy. I shall then show its necessary connexion with the whole
course of that vast revolution which is now about to terminate under its
guidance in social reconstruction.
This will lead us naturally to another question. The regenerating
doctrine cannot do its work without adherents; in what quarter should we
hope to find them? Now, with individual exceptions of great value, we
cannot expect the adhesion of any of the upper classes in society. They are
all more or less under the influence of baseless metaphysical theories, and
of aristocratic self-seeking. They are absorbed in blind political agitation
and in disputes for the possession of the useless remnants of the old
theological and military system. Their action only tends to prolong the
revolutionary state indefinitely, and can never result in true social
renovation.
Whether we regard its intellectual character or its social objects, it is
certain that Positivism must look elsewhere for support. It will find a

welcome in those classes only whose good sense has been left unimpaired
by our vicious system of education, and whose generous sympathies are
allowed to develop themselves freely. It is among women, therefore, and
among the working classes that the heartiest supporters of the new doctrine
will be found. It is intended, indeed, ultimately for all classes of society. But
it will never gain much real influence over the higher ranks till it is forced
upon their notice by these powerful patrons. When the work of spiritual
reorganization is completed, it is on them that its maintenance will
principally depend; and so too, their combined aid is necessary for its
commencement. Having but little influence in political government, they
are the more likely to appreciate the need of a moral government, the
special object of which it will be to protect them against the oppressive
action of the temporal power.
In the third chapter, therefore, I shall explain the mode in which
philosophers and working men will co-operate. Both have been prepared for
this coalition by the general course which modern history has taken, and it
offers now the only hope we have of really decisive action. We shall find
that the efforts of Positivism to regulate and develop the natural tendencies
of the people, make it, even from the intellectual point of view, more
coherent and complete.
But there is another and a more unexpected source from which
Positivism will obtain support; and not till then will its true character and
the full extent of its constructive power be appreciated. I shall show in the
fourth chapter how eminently calculated is the Positive doctrine to raise and
regulate the social condition of women. It is from the feminine aspect only
that human life, whether individually or collectively considered, can really
be comprehended as a whole. For the only basis on which a system really
embracing all the requirements of life can be formed, is the subordination of
intellect to social feeling: a subordination which we find directly
represented in the womanly type of character, whether regarded in its
personal or social relations.
Although these questions cannot be treated fully in the present work, I
hope to convince my readers that Positivism is more in accordance with the
spontaneous tendencies of the people and of women than Catholicism, and
is therefore better qualified to institute a spiritual power. It should be
observed that the ground on which the support of both these classes is

obtained is, that Positivism is the only system which can supersede the
various subversive schemes that are growing every day more dangerous to
all the relations of domestic and social life. Yet the tendency of the doctrine
is to elevate the character of both of these classes; and it gives a most
energetic sanction to all their legitimate aspirations.
Thus it is that a philosophy originating in speculations of the most
abstract character, is found applicable not merely to every department of
practical life, but also to the sphere of our moral nature. But to complete the
proof of its universality I have still to speak of another very essential
feature. I shall show, in spite of prejudices which exist very naturally on this
point, that Positivism is eminently calculated to call the Imaginative
faculties into exercise. It is by these faculties that the unity of human nature
is most distinctly represented: they are themselves intellectual, but their
field lies principally in our moral nature, and the result of their operation is
to influence the active powers. The subject of women treated in the fourth
chapter, will lead me by a natural transition to speak in the fifth of the
Esthetic aspects of Positivism. I shall attempt to show that the new doctrine
by the very fact of embracing the whole range of human relations in the
spirit of reality, discloses the true theory of Art, which has hitherto been so
great a deficiency in our speculative conceptions. The principle of the
theory is that, in co-ordinating the primary functions of humanity,
Positivism places the Idealities of the poet midway between the Ideas of the
philosopher and the Realities of the statesman. We see from this theory how
it is that the poetical power of Positivism cannot be manifested at present.
We must wait until moral and mental regeneration has advanced far enough
to awaken the sympathies which naturally belong to it, and on which Art in
its renewed state must depend for the future. The first mental and social
shock once passed, Poetry will at last take her proper rank. She will lead
Humanity onward towards a future which is now no longer vague and
visionary, while at the same time she enables us to pay due honour to all
phases of the past. The great object which Positivism sets before us
individually and socially, is the endeavour to become more perfect. The
highest importance is attached therefore to the imaginative faculties,
because in every sphere with which they deal they stimulate the sense of
perfection. Limited as my explanations in this work must be, I shall be able
to show that Positivism, while opening out a new and wide field for art,
supplies in the same spontaneous way new means of expression.

I shall thus have sketched with some detail the true character of the
regenerating doctrine. All its principal aspects will have been considered.
Beginning with its philosophical basis, I pass by natural transitions to its
political purpose; thence to its action upon the people, its influence with
women, and lastly, to its esthetic power. In concluding this work, which is
but the introduction to a larger treatise, I have only to speak of the
conception which unites all these various aspects. As summed up in the
positivist motto, Love, Order, Progress, they lead us to the conception of
Humanity, which implicitly involves and gives new force to each of them.
Rightly interpreting this conception, we view Positivism at last as a
complete and consistent whole. The subject will naturally lead us to speak
in general terms of the future progress of social regeneration, as far as the
history of the past enables us to foresee it. The movement originates in
France, and is limited at first to the great family of Western nations. I shall
show that it will afterwards extend, in accordance with definite laws, to the
rest of the white race, and finally to the other two great races of man.

CHAPTER I

THE INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF
POSITIVISM

The object of all true Philosophy is to frame a
The object of
Philosophy is to system which shall comprehend human life under every
present a systematic aspect, social as well as individual. It embraces,
view of human life, as
a basis for modifying
therefore, the three kinds of phenomena of which our
its imperfections life consists, Thoughts, Feelings, and Actions. Under all
these aspects, the growth of Humanity is primarily
spontaneous; and the basis upon which all wise attempts to modify it should
proceed, can only be furnished by an exact acquaintance with the natural
process. We are, however, able to modify this process systematically; and
the importance of this is extreme, since we can thereby greatly diminish the
partial deviations, the disastrous delays, and the grave inconsistencies to
which so complex a growth would be liable were it left entirely to itself. To
effect this necessary intervention is the proper sphere of politics. But a right
conception cannot be formed of it without the aid of the philosopher, whose
business it is to define and amend the principles on which it is conducted.
With this object in view the philosopher endeavours to co-ordinate the
various elements of man’s existence, so that it may be conceived of
theoretically as an integral whole. His synthesis can only be valid in so far
as it is an exact and complete representation of the relations naturally
existing. The first condition is therefore that these relations be carefully
studied. When the philosopher, instead of forming such a synthesis,
attempts to interfere more directly with the course of practical life, he
commits the error of usurping the province of the statesman, to whom all
practical measures exclusively belong. Philosophy and Politics are the two
principal functions of the great social organism. Morality, systematically

considered, forms the connecting link and at the same time the line of
demarcation between them. It is the most important application of
philosophy, and it gives a general direction to polity. Natural morality, that
is to say the various emotions of our moral nature, will, as I have shown in
my previous work, always govern the speculations of the one and the
operations of the other. This I shall explain more fully.
But the synthesis, which it is the social function of Philosophy to
construct, will neither be real nor permanent, unless it embraces every
department of human nature, whether speculative, effective, or practical.
These three orders of phenomena react upon each other so intimately, that
any system which does not include all of them must inevitably be unreal
and inadequate. Yet it is only in the present day, when Philosophy is
reaching the positive stage, that this which is her highest and most essential
mission can be fully apprehended.
The Theological The theological synthesis depended exclusively
synthesis failed to upon our affective nature; and this is owing its original
include the practical
side of human nature
supremacy and its ultimate decline. For a long time its
influence over all our highest speculations was
paramount. This was especially the case during the Polytheistic period,
when Imagination and Feeling still retained their sway under very slight
restraint from the reasoning faculties. Yet even during the time of its highest
development, intellectually and socially, theology exercised no real control
over practical life. It reacted, of course, upon it to some extent, but the
effects of this were in most cases far more apparent than real. There was a
natural antagonism between them, which though at first hardly perceived,
went on increasing till at last it brought about the entire destruction of the
theological fabric. A system so purely subjective could not harmonize with
the necessarily objective tendencies and stubborn realities of practical life.
Theology asserted all phenomena to be under the dominion of Wills more
or less arbitrary: whereas in practical life men were led more and more
clearly to the conception of invariable Laws. For without laws human
action would have admitted of no rule or plan. In consequence of this utter
inability of theology to deal with practical life, its treatment of speculative
and even of moral problems was exceedingly imperfect, such problems
being all more or less dependent on the practical necessities of life. To
present a perfectly synthetic view of human nature was, then, impossible as

long as the influence of theology lasted; because the Intellect was impelled
by Feeling and by the Active powers in two totally different directions. The
failure of all metaphysical attempts to form a synthesis need not be dwelt
upon here. Metaphysicians, in spite of their claims to absolute truth have
never been able to supersede theology in questions of feeling, and have
proved still more inadequate in practical questions. Ontology, even when it
was most triumphant in the schools, was always limited to subjects of a
purely intellectual nature; and even here its abstractions, useless in
themselves, dealt only with the case of individual development, the
metaphysical spirit being thoroughly incompatible with the social point of
view. In my work on Positive Philosophy I have clearly proved that it
constitutes only a transitory phase of mind, and is totally inadequate for any
constructive purpose. For a time it was supreme; but its utility lay simply in
its revolutionary tendencies. It aided the preliminary development of
Humanity by its gradual inroads upon Theology, which, though in ancient
times entrusted with the sole direction of society, had long since become in
every respect utterly retrograde.
But the Positive spirit But all Positive speculations owe their first origin
to the occupations of practical life; and, consequently,
originated in practical
life
they have always given some indication of their
capacity for regulating our active powers, which had been omitted from
every former synthesis. Their value in this respect has been and still is
materially impaired by their want of breadth, and their isolated and
incoherent character; but it has always been instinctively felt. The
importance that we attach to theories which teach the laws of phenomena,
and give us the power of prevision, is chiefly due to the fact that they alone
can regulate our otherwise blind action upon the external world. Hence it is
that while the Positive spirit has been growing more and more theoretical,
and has gradually extended to every department of speculation, it has never
lost the practical tendencies which it derived from its source; and this even
in the case of researches useless in themselves, and only to be justified as
logical exercises. From its first origin in mathematics and astronomy, it has
always shown its tendency to systematize the whole of our conceptions in
every new subject which has been brought within the scope of its
fundamental principle. It exercised for a long time a modifying influence
upon theological and metaphysical principles, which has gone on
increasing; and since the time of Descartes and Bacon it has become

evident that it is destined to supersede them altogether. Positivism has
gradually taken possession of the preliminary sciences of Physics and
Biology, and in these the old system no longer prevails. All that remained
was to complete the range of its influence by including the study of social
phenomena. For this study metaphysics had proved incompetent; by
theological thinkers it had only been pursued indirectly and empirically as a
condition of government. I believe that my work on Positive Philosophy has
so far supplied what was wanting. I think it must now be clear to all that the
Positive spirit can embrace the entire range of thought without lessening, or
rather with the effect of strengthening its original tendency to regulate
practical life. And it is a further guarantee for the stability of the new
intellectual synthesis that Social science, which is the final result of our
researches, gives them that systematic character in which they had hitherto
been wanting, by supplying the only connecting link of which they all
admit.
This conception is already adopted by all true thinkers. All must now
acknowledge that the Positive spirit tends necessarily towards the formation
of a comprehensive and durable system, in which every practical as well as
speculative subject shall be included. But such a system would still be far
from realizing that universal character without which Positivism would be
incompetent to supersede Theology in the spiritual government of
Humanity. For the element which really preponderates in every human
being, that is to say, Affection, would still be left untouched. This element it
is, and this only, which gives a stimulus and direction to the other two parts
of our nature: without it the one would waste its force in ill-conceived, or, at
least, useless studies, and the other in barren or even dangerous contention.
With this immense deficiency the combination of our theoretical and active
powers would be fruitless, because it would lack the only principle which
could ensure its real and permanent stability. The failure would be even
greater than the failure of Theology in dealing with practical questions; for
the unity of human nature cannot really be made to depend either on the
rational or the active faculties. In the life of the individual, and, still more,
in the life of the race, the basis of unity, as I shall show in the fourth
chapter, must always be feeling. It is to the fact that theology arose
spontaneously from feeling that its influence is for the most part due. And
although theology is now palpably on the decline, yet it will retain, in
principle at least, some legitimate claims to the direction of society so long

as the new philosophy fails to occupy this important vantage-ground. We
come then to the final conditions with which the modern synthesis must
comply. Without neglecting the spheres of Thought and Action it must also
comprehend the moral sphere; and the very principle on which its claim to
universality rests must be derived from Feeling. Then, and not till then, can
the claims of theology be finally set aside. For then the new system will
have surpassed the old in that which is the one essential purpose of all
general doctrines. It will have shown itself able to effect what no other
doctrine has done, that is, to bring the three primary elements of our nature
into harmony. If Positivism were to prove incapable of satisfying this
condition, we must give up all hope of systematization of any kind. For
while Positive principles are now sufficiently developed to neutralize those
of Theology, yet, on the other hand, the influence of theology would
continue to be far greater. Hence it is that many conscientious thinkers in
the present day are so inclined to despair for the future of society. They see
that the old principles on which society has been governed must finally
become powerless. What they do not see is that a new basis for morality is
being gradually laid down. Their theories are too imperfect and incoherent
to show them the direction towards which the present time is ultimately
tending. It must be owned, too, that their view seems borne out by the
present character of the Positive method. While all allow its utility in the
treatment of practical, and even of speculative, problems, it seems to most
men, and very naturally, quite unfit to deal with questions of morality.
In human nature, and But on closer examination they will see reason to
therefore in the rectify their judgment. They will see that the hardness
Positive system,
Affection is the
with which Positive science has been justly reproached,
preponderating is due to the speciality and want of purpose with which
element it has hitherto been pursued, and is not at all inherent in
its nature. Originating as it did in the necessities of our
material nature, which for a long time restricted it to the study of the
inorganic world, it has not till now become sufficiently complete or
systematic to harmonize well with our moral nature. But now that it is
brought to bear upon social questions, which for the future will form its
most important field, it loses all the defects peculiar to its long period of
infancy. The very attribute of reality which is claimed by the new
philosophy, leads it to treat all subjects from the moral still more than from
the intellectual side. The necessity of assigning with exact truth the place

occupied by the intellect and by the heart in the organization of human
nature and of society, leads to the decision that Affection must be the central
point of the synthesis. In the treatment of social questions Positive science
will be found utterly to discard those proud illusions of the supremacy of
reason, to which it had been liable during its preliminary stages. Ratifying,
in this respect, the common experience of men even more forcibly than
Catholicism, it teaches us that individual happiness and public welfare are
far more dependent upon the heart than upon the intellect. But,
independently of this, the question of co-ordinating the faculties of our
nature will convince us that the only basis on which they can be brought
into harmonious union, is the preponderance of Affection over Reason, and
even over Activity.
The fact that intellect, as well as social sympathy, is a distinctive
attribute of our nature, might lead us to suppose that either of these two
might be supreme, and therefore that there might be more than one method
of establishing unity. The fact, however, is that there is only one; because
these two elements are by no means equal in their fitness for assuming the
first place. Whether we look at the distinctive qualities of each, or at the
degree of force which they possess, it is easy to see that the only position
for which the intellect is permanently adapted is to be the servant of the
social sympathies. If, instead of being content with this honourable post, it
aspires to become supreme, its ambitious aims, which are never realized,
result simply in the most deplorable disorder.
Even with the individual, it is impossible to establish permanent
harmony between our various impulses, except by giving complete
supremacy to the feeling which prompts the sincere and habitual desire of
doing good. This feeling is, no doubt, like the rest, in itself blind; it has to
learn from reason the right means of obtaining satisfaction; and our active
faculties are then called into requisition to apply those means. But common
experience proves that after all the principal condition of right action is the
benevolent impulse; with the ordinary amount of intellect and activity that
is found in men this stimulus, if well sustained, is enough to direct our
thoughts and energies to a good result. Without this habitual spring of
action they would inevitably waste themselves in barren or incoherent
efforts, and speedily relapse into their original torpor. Unity in our moral

nature is, then, impossible, except so far as affection preponderates over
intellect and activity.
The proper function True as this fundamental principle is for the
of Intellect is the individual, it is in public life that its necessity can be
Service of the Social
Sympathies
demonstrated most irrefutably. The problem is in reality
the same, nor is any different solution of it required;
only it assumes such increased dimensions, that less uncertainty is felt as to
the method to be adopted. The various beings whom it is sought to
harmonize have in this case each a separate existence; it is clear, therefore,
that the first condition of co-operation must be sought in their own inherent
tendency to universal love. No calculations of self-interest can rival this
social instinct, whether in promptitude and breadth of intuition, or in
boldness and tenacity of purpose. True it is that the benevolent emotions
have in most cases less intrinsic energy than the selfish. But they have this
beautiful quality, that social life not only permits their growth, but
stimulates it to an almost unlimited extent, while it holds their antagonists
in constant check. Indeed the increasing tendency in the former to prevail
over the latter is the best measure by which to judge of the progress of
Humanity. But the intellect may do much to confirm their influence. It may
strengthen social feeling by diffusing juster views of the relations in which
the various parts of society stand to each other; or it may guide its
application by dwelling on the lessons which the past offers to the future. It
is to this honourable service that the new philosophy would direct our
intellectual powers. Here the highest sanction is given to their operations,
and an exhaustless field is opened out for them, from which far deeper
satisfaction may be gained than from the approbation of the learned
societies, or from the puerile specialities with which they are at present
occupied.
In fact, the ambitious claims which, ever since the hopeless decline of
the theological synthesis, have been advanced by the intellect, never were
or could be realized. Their only value lay in their solvent action on the
theological system when it had become hostile to progress. The intellect is
intended for service, not for empire; when it imagines itself supreme, it is
really only obeying the personal instead of the social instincts. It never acts
independently of feeling, be that feeling good or bad. The first condition of
command is force; now reason has but light; the impulse that moves it must

come from elsewhere. The metaphysical Utopias, in which a life of pure
contemplation is held out as the highest ideal, attract the notice of our men
of science; but are really nothing but illusions of pride, or veils for
dishonest schemes. True there is a genuine satisfaction in the act of
discovering truth; but it is not sufficiently intense to be an habitual guide of
conduct. Indeed, so feeble is our intellect, that the impulse of some passion
is necessary to direct and sustain it in almost every effort. When the impulse
comes from kindly feeling it attracts attention on account of its rarity or
value; when it springs from the selfish motives of glory, ambition, or gain,
it is too common to be remarked. This is usually the only difference
between the two cases. It does indeed occasionally happen that the intellect
is actuated by a sort of passion for truth in itself, without any mixture of
pride or vanity. Yet, in this case, as in every other, there is intense egotism
in exercising the mental powers irrespectively of all social objects.
Positivism, as I shall afterwards explain, is even more severe than
Catholicism in its condemnation of this type of character, whether in
metaphysicians or in men of science. The true philosopher would consider it
a most culpable abuse of the opportunities which civilization affords him
for the sake of the welfare of society, in leading a speculative life.
We have traced the Positive principle from its origin in the pursuits of
active life, and have seen it extending successively to every department of
speculation. We now find it, in its maturity, and that as a simple result of its
strict adherence to fact, embracing the sphere of affection, and making that
sphere the central point of its synthesis. It is henceforth a fundamental
doctrine of Positivism, a doctrine of as great political as philosophical
importance, that the Heart preponderates over the Intellect.
Under Theology the It is true that this doctrine, which is the only basis
for establishing harmony in our nature, had been, as I
intellect was the slave
of the heart; under
before remarked, instinctively accepted by theological
Positivism, its servant
systems. But it was one of the fatalities of society in its
preliminary phase, that the doctrine was coupled with an error which, after
a time, destroyed all its value. In acknowledging the superiority of the heart
the intellect was reduced to abject submission. Its only chance of growth lay
in resistance to the established system. This course it followed with
increasing effect, till after twenty centuries of insurrection, the system
collapsed. The natural result of the process was to stimulate metaphysical

and scientific pride, and to promote views subversive of all social order. But
Positivism, while systematically adopting the principle here spoken of as
the foundation of individual and social discipline, interprets that principle in
a different way. It teaches that while it is for the heart to suggest our
problems, it is for the intellect to solve them. Now the intellect was at first
quite inadequate to this task, for which a long and laborious training was
needed. The heart, therefore, had to take its place, and in default of
objective truth, to give free play to its subjective inspirations. But for these
inspirations, all progress, as I showed in my System of Positive Philosophy,
would have been totally impossible. For a long time it was necessary that
they should be believed absolutely; but as soon as our reason began to
mould its conceptions upon observations, more or less accurate, of the
external world, these supernatural dogmas became inevitably an obstacle to
its growth. Here lies the chief source of the important modifications which
theological belief has successively undergone. No further modifications are
now possible without violating its essential principles; and since, meantime,
Positive science is assuming every day larger proportions, the conflict
between them is advancing with increasing vehemence and danger. The
tendency on the one side is becoming more retrograde, on the other more
revolutionary; because the impossibility of reconciling the two opposing
forces is felt more and more strongly. Never was this position of affairs
more manifest than now. The restoration of theology to its original power,
supposing such a thing were possible, would have the most degrading
influence on the intellect, and, consequently, on the character also; since it
would involve the admission that our views of scientific truth were to be
strained into accordance with our wishes and our wants. Therefore no
important step in the progress of Humanity can now be made without
totally abandoning the theological principle. The only service of any real
value which it still renders, is that of forcing the attention of Western
Europe, by the very fact of its reactionary tendencies, upon the greatest of
all social questions. It is owing to its influence that the central point of the
new synthesis is placed in our moral rather than our intellectual nature; and
this, in spite of every prejudice and habit of thought that has been formed
during the revolutionary period of the last five centuries. And while in this,
which is the primary condition of social organization, Positivism, proves
more efficient than Theology, it at the same time terminates the disunion
which has existed so long between the intellect and the heart. For it follows

logically from its principles, and also from the whole spirit of the system,
that the intellect shall be free to exercise its full share of influence in every
department of human life. When it is said that the intellect should be
subordinate to the heart, what is meant is, that the intellect should devote
itself exclusively to the problems which the heart suggests, the ultimate
object being to find proper satisfaction for our various wants. Without this
limitation, experience has shown too clearly that it would almost always
follow its natural bent for useless or insoluble questions, which are the most
plentiful and the easiest to deal with. But when any problem of a legitimate
kind has been once proposed, it is the sole judge of the method to be
pursued, and of the utility of the results obtained. Its province is to inquire
into the present, in order to foresee the future, and to discover the means of
improving it. In this province it is not to be interfered with. In a word the
intellect is to be the servant of the heart, not its slave. Under these two
correlative conditions the elements of our nature will at last be brought into
harmony. The equilibrium of these two elements, once established, is in
little danger of being disturbed. For since it is equally favourable to both of
them, both will be interested in maintaining it. The fact that Reason in
modern times has become habituated to revolt, is no ground for supposing
that it will always retain its revolutionary character, even when its
legitimate claims have been fully satisfied. Supposing the case to arise,
however, society, as I shall show afterwards, would not be without the
means of repressing any pretensions that were subversive of order. There is
another point of view which may assure us that the position given to the
heart under the new system will involve no danger to the growth of
intellect. Love, when real, ever desires light, in order to attain its ends. The
influence of true feeling is as favourable to sound thought as to wise
activity.
The subordination of Our doctrine, therefore, is one which renders
hypocrisy and oppression alike impossible. And it now
the intellect to the
heart is the Subjective
Principle of
stands forward as the result of all the efforts of the past,
Positivism for the regeneration of order, which, whether considered
individually or socially, is so deeply compromised by
the anarchy of the present time. It establishes a fundamental principle by
which true philosophy and sound polity are brought into correlation; a
principle which can be felt as well as proved, and which is at once the
keystone of a system and a basis of government. I shall show, moreover, in

the fifth chapter, that the doctrine is as rich in esthetic beauty as in
philosophical power and in social influence. This will complete the proof of
its efficacy as the centre of a universal system. Viewed from the moral,
scientific, or poetical aspect, it is equally valuable; and it is the only
principle which can bring Humanity safely through the most formidable
crisis that she has ever yet undergone. It will be now clear to all that the
force of demonstration, a force peculiar to modern times, and which still
retains much of its destructive character, becomes matured and elevated by
Positivism. It begins to develop constructive tendencies, which will soon be
developed more largely. It is not too much, then, to say that Positivism,
notwithstanding its speculative origin, offers as much to natures of deep
sympathy as to men of highly cultivated intellects, or of energetic character.
Objective basis of the The spirit and the principle of the synthesis which
system; External all true philosophers should endeavour to establish,
Order of the World, as
revealed by Science
have now been defined. I proceed to explain the method
that should be followed in the task, and the peculiar
difficulty with which it is attended.
The object of the synthesis will not be secured until it embraces the
whole extent of its domain, the moral and practical departments as well as
the intellectual. But these three departments cannot be dealt with
simultaneously. They follow an order of succession which, so far from
dissevering them from the whole to which they belong, is seen when
carefully examined to be a natural result of their mutual dependence. The
truth is, and it is a truth of great importance, that Thoughts must be
systematized before Feelings, Feelings before Actions. It is doubtless,
owing to a confused apprehension of this truth, that philosophers hitherto,
in framing their systems of human nature, have dealt almost exclusively,
with our intellectual faculties.
The necessity of commencing with the co-ordination of ideas is not
merely due to the fact that the relations of these, being more simple and
more susceptible of demonstration, form a useful logical preparation for the
remainder of the task. On closer examination we find a more important,
though less obvious reason. If this first portion of the work be once
efficiently performed, it is the foundation of all the rest. In what remains no
very serious difficulty will occur, provided always that we content ourselves

with that degree of completeness which the ultimate purpose of the system
requires.
To give such paramount importance to this portion of the subject may
seem at first sight inconsistent with the proposition just laid down, that the
strength of the intellectual faculties is far inferior to that of the other
elements of our nature. It is quite certain that Feeling and Activity have
much more to do with any practical step that we take than pure Reason. In
attempting to explain this paradox, we come at last to the peculiar difficulty
of this great problem of human Unity.
The first condition of unity is a subjective principle; and this principle
in the Positive system is the subordination of the intellect to the heart:
Without this the unity that we seek can never be placed on a permanent
basis, whether individually or collectively. It is essential to have some
influence sufficiently powerful to produce convergence amid the
heterogeneous and often antagonistic tendencies of so complex an organism
as ours. But this first condition, indispensable as it is, would be quite
insufficient for the purpose, without some objective basis, existing
independently of ourselves in the external world. That basis consists for us
in the laws or Order of the phenomena by which Humanity is regulated. The
subjection of human life to this order is incontestable; and as soon as the
intellect has enabled us to comprehend it, it becomes possible for the
feeling of love to exercise a controlling influence over our discordant
tendencies. This, then, is the mission allotted to the intellect in the Positive
synthesis; in this sense it is that it should be consecrated to the service of
the heart.
I have said that our conception of human unity must be totally
inadequate, and, indeed, cannot deserve the name, so long as it does not
embrace every element of our nature. But it would be equally fatal to the
completeness of this great conception to think of human nature
irrespectively of what lies outside it. A purely subjective unity, without any
objective basis, would be simply impossible. In the first place any attempt
to co-ordinate man’s moral nature, without regard to the external world,
supposing the attempt feasible, would have very little permanent influence
on our happiness, whether collectively or individually; since happiness
depends so largely upon our relations to all that exists around us. Besides
this, we have to consider the exceeding imperfection of our nature. Self-

love is deeply implanted in it, and when left to itself is far stronger than
Social Sympathy. The social instincts would never gain the mastery were
they not sustained and called into constant exercise by the economy of the
external world, an influence which at the same time checks the power of the
selfish instincts.
By it the selfish To understand this economy aright; we must
affections are remember that it embraces not merely the inorganic
controlled; the
unselfish strengthened
world, but also the phenomena of our own existence.
The phenomena of human life, though more modifiable
than any others, are yet equally subject to invariable laws; laws which form
the principal objects of Positive speculation. Now the benevolent affections,
which themselves act in harmony with the laws of social development,
incline us to submit to all other laws, as soon as the intellect has discovered
their existence. The possibility of moral unity depends, therefore, even in
the case of the individual, but still more in that of society, upon the
necessity of recognizing our subjection to an external power. By this means
our self-regarding instincts are rendered susceptible of discipline. In
themselves they are strong enough to neutralize all sympathetic tendencies,
were it not for the support that the latter find in this External Order. Its
discovery is due to the intellect; which is thus enlisted in the service of
feeling, with the ultimate purpose of regulating action.
Thus it is that an intellectual synthesis, or systematic study of the laws
of nature, is needed on far higher grounds than those of satisfying our
theoretical faculties, which are, for the most part, very feeble, even in men
who devote themselves to a life of thought. It is needed, because it solves at
once the most difficult problem of the moral synthesis. The higher impulses
within us are brought under the influence of a powerful stimulus from
without. By its means they are enabled to control our discordant impulses,
and to maintain a state of harmony towards which they have always tended,
but which, without such aid, could never be realized. Moreover, this
conception of the order of nature evidently supplies the basis for a synthesis
of human action; for the efficacy of our action depends entirely upon their
conformity to this order. But this part of the subject has been fully
explained in my previous work, and I need not enlarge upon it further. As
soon as the synthesis of mental conceptions enables us to form a synthesis
of feelings, it is clear that there will be no very serious difficulties in

constructing a synthesis of actions. Unity of action depends upon unity of
impulse, and unity of design; and thus we find that the co-ordination of
human nature, as a whole, depends ultimately upon the co-ordination of
mental conceptions, a subject which seemed at first of comparatively slight
importance.
The subjective principle of Positivism, that is, the subordination of the
intellect to the heart is thus fortified by an objective basis, the immutable
Necessity of the external world; and by this means it becomes possible to
bring human life within the influence of social sympathy. The superiority of
the new synthesis to the old is even more evident under this second aspect
than under the first. In theological systems the objective basis was supplied
by spontaneous belief in a supernatural Will. Now, whatever the degree of
reality attributed to these fictions, they all proceeded from a subjective
source; and therefore their influence in most cases must have been very
confused and fluctuating. In respect of moral discipline they cannot be
compared either for precision, for force, or for stability, to the conception of
an invariable Order, actually existing without us, and attested, whether we
will or no, by every act of our existence.
Our conception of this This fundamental doctrine of Positivism is not to be
External Order has attributed in the full breadth of its meanings to any
been gradually
growing from the
single thinker. It is the slow result of a vast process
carried out in separate departments, which began with
earliest times, and is
but just complete the first use of our intellectual powers, and which is
only just completed in those who exhibit those powers
in their highest form. During the long period of her infancy Humanity has
been preparing this the most precious of her intellectual attainments, as the
basis for the only system of life which is permanently adapted to our nature.
The doctrine has to be demonstrated in all the more essential cases from
observation only, except so far as we admit argument from analogy.
Deductive argument is not admissible, except in such cases as are evidently
compounded of others in which the proof given has been sufficient. Thus,
for instance, we are authorized by sound logic to assert the existence of
laws of weather; though most of these are still, and, perhaps, always will be,
unknown. For it is clear that meteorological phenomena result from a
combination of astronomical, physical and chemical influences, each of
which has been proved to be subject to invariable laws. But in all

phenomena which are not thus reducible, we must have recourse to
inductive reasoning; for a principle which is the basis of all deduction
cannot be itself deduced. Hence it is that the doctrine, being so entirely
foreign as it is to our primitive mental state, requires such a long course of
preparation. Without such preparation even the greatest thinkers could not
anticipate it. It is true that in some cases metaphysical conceptions of a law
have been formed before the proof really required had been furnished. But
they were never of much service, except so far as they generalized in a
more or less confused way the analogies naturally suggested by the laws
which had actually been discovered in simpler phenomena. Besides, such
assertions always remained very doubtful and very barren in result, until
they were based upon some outline of a really Positive theory. Thus, in spite
of the apparent potency of this metaphysical method, to which modern
intellects are so addicted, the conception of an External Order is still
extremely imperfect in many of the most cultivated minds, because they
have not verified it sufficiently in the most intricate and important class of
phenomena, the phenomena of society. I am not, of course, speaking of the
few thinkers who accept my discovery of the principal laws of Sociology.
Such uncertainty in a subject so closely related to all others, produces great
confusion in men’s minds, and affects their perception of an invariable
order, even in the simplest subjects. A proof of this is the utter delusion into
which most geometricians of the present day have fallen with respect to
what they call the Calculus of Chances; a conception which presupposes
that the phenomena considered are not subject to law. The doctrine,
therefore, cannot be considered as firmly established in any one case, until
it has been verified specially in every one of the primary categories in
which phenomena may be classed. But now that this difficult condition has
really been fulfilled by the few thinkers who have risen to the level of their
age, we have at last a firm objective basis on which to establish the
harmony of our moral nature. That basis is, that all events whatever, the
events of our own personal and social life included, are always subject to
natural relations of sequence and similitude, which in all essential respects
lie beyond the reach of our interference.
Even where not This, then, is the external basis of our synthesis,
modifiable, its which includes the moral and practical faculties, as well
influence on the
as the speculative. It rests at every point upon the
unchangeable Order of the world. The right

character is of the understanding of this order is the principal subject of
greatest value
our thoughts; its preponderating influence determines
the general course of our feelings; its gradual improvement is the constant
object of our actions. To form a more precise notion of its influence, let us
imagine that for a moment it were really to cease. The result would be that
our intellectual faculties, after wasting themselves in wild extravagancies,
would sink rapidly into incurable sloth; our nobler feelings would be unable
to prevent the ascendancy of the lower instincts; and our active powers
would abandon themselves to purposeless agitation. Men have, it is true,
been for a long time ignorant of this Order. Nevertheless we have been
always subject to it; and its influence has always tended, though without our
knowledge, to control our whole being; our actions first, and subsequently
our thoughts, and even our affections. As we have advanced in our
knowledge of it, our thoughts have become less vague, our desires less
capricious, our conduct less arbitrary. And now that we are able to grasp the
full meaning of the conception, its influence extends to every part of our
conduct. For it teaches us that the object to be aimed at in the economy
devised by man, is wise development of the irresistible economy of nature,
which cannot be amended till it is first studied and obeyed. In some
departments it has the character of fate; that is, it admits of no modification.
But even here, in spite of the superficial objections to it which have arisen
from intellectual pride, it is necessary for the proper regulation of human
life. Suppose, for instance, that man were exempt from the necessity of
living on the earth, and were free to pass at will from one planet to another,
the very notion of society would be rendered impossible by the licence
which each individual would have to give way to whatever unsettling and
distracting impulses his nature might incline him. Our propensities are so
heterogeneous and so deficient in elevation, that there would be no fixity or
consistency in our conduct, but for these insurmountable conditions. Our
feeble reason may fret at such restrictions, but without them all its
deliberations would be confused and purposeless. We are powerless to
create: all that we can do in bettering our condition is to modify an order in
which we can produce no radical change. Supposing us in possession of that
absolute independence to which metaphysical pride aspires, it is certain that
so far from improving our condition, it would be a bar to all development,
whether social or individual. The true path of human progress lies in the
opposite direction; in diminishing the vacillation, inconsistency, and

discordance of our designs by furnishing external motives for those
operations of our intellectual, moral and practical powers, of which the
original source was purely internal. The ties by which our various diverging
tendencies are held together would be quite inadequate for their purpose,
without a basis of support in the external world, which is unaffected by the
spontaneous variations of our nature.
But, however great the value of Positive doctrine in pointing out the
unchangeable aspects of the universal Order, what we have principally to
consider are the numerous departments in which that order admits of
artificial modifications. Here lies the most important sphere of human
activity. The only phenomena, indeed, which we are wholly unable to
modify are the simplest of all, the phenomena of the Solar System which
we inhabit. It is true that now that we know its laws we can easily conceive
them improved in certain respects; but to whatever degree our power over
nature may extend, we shall never be able to produce the slightest change in
them. What we have to do is so to dispose our life as to submit to these
resistless fatalities in the best way we can; and this is comparatively easy,
because their greater simplicity enables us to foresee them with more
precision and in a more distinct future. Their interpretation by Positive
science has had a most important influence on the gradual education of the
human intellect: and it will always continue to be the source from which we
obtain the clearest and most impressive sense of Immutability. Too
exclusively studied they might even now lead to fatalism; but controlled as
their influence will be henceforward by a more philosophic education, they
may well become a means of moral improvement, by disposing us to submit
with resignation to all evils which are absolutely insurmountable.
But in most cases we In other parts of the external economy, invariability
in all primary aspects is found compatible with
can modify it; and in
these the knowledge
of it forms the
modifications in points of secondary importance. These
systematic basis ofmodifications become more numerous and extensive as
human action the phenomena are more complex. The reason of this is
that the causes from a combination of which the effects
proceed being more varied and more accessible, offer greater facilities to
our feeble powers to interfere with advantage. But all this has been fully
explained in my System of Positive Philosophy. The tendency of that work
was to show that our intervention became more efficacious in proportion as

the phenomena upon which we acted had a closer relation to the life of man
or society. Indeed the extensive modifications of which society admits, go
far to keep up the common mistake that social phenomena are not subject to
any constant law.
At the same time we have to remember that this increased possibility of
human intervention in certain parts of the External Order necessarily
coexists with increased imperfection, for which it is a valuable but very
inadequate compensation. Both features alike result from the increase of
complexity. Even the laws of the Solar System are very far from perfect,
notwithstanding their greater simplicity, which indeed makes their defects
more perceptible. The existence of these defects should be taken into
careful consideration; not indeed with the hope of amending them, but as a
check upon unreasoning admiration. Besides, they lead us to a clearer
conception of the true position of Humanity, a position of which the most
striking feature is the necessity of struggling against difficulties of every
kind. Lastly, by observing these defects we are less likely to waste our time
in seeking for absolute perfection, and so neglecting the wiser course of
looking for such improvements as are really possible.
In all other phenomena, the increasing imperfection of the economy of
nature becomes a powerful stimulus to all our faculties, whether moral,
intellectual or practical. Here we find sufferings which can really be
alleviated to a large extent by wise and well-sustained combination of
efforts. This consideration should give a firmness and dignity of bearing, to
which Humanity could never attain during her period of infancy. Those who
look wisely into the future of society will feel that the conception of man
becoming, without fear or boast, the arbiter, within certain limits, of his
own destiny, has in it something far more satisfying than the old belief in
Providence, which implied our remaining passive. Social union will be
strengthened by the conception, because every one will see that union forms
our principal resource against the miseries of human life. And while it calls
out our noblest sympathies, it impresses us more strongly with the
importance of high intellectual culture, being itself the object for which
such culture is required. These important results have been ever on the
increase in modern times; yet hitherto they have been too limited and casual
to be appreciated rightly, except so far as we could anticipate the future of
society by the light of sound historical principles. Art, so far as it is yet

organized, does not include that part of the economy of nature which, being
the most modifiable, the most imperfect, and the most important of all,
ought on every ground to be regarded as the principal object of human
exertions. Even Medical Art, specially so called, is only just beginning to
free itself from its primitive routine. And Social Art, whether moral or
political, is plunged in routine so deeply that few statesmen admit the
possibility of shaking it off. Yet of all the arts, it is the one which best
admits of being reduced to a system; and until this is done it will be
impossible to place on a rational basis all the rest of our practical life. All
these narrow views are due simply to insufficient recognition of the fact,
that the highest phenomena are as much subject to laws as others. When the
conception of the Order of Nature has become generally accepted in its full
extent, the ordinary definition of Art will become as comprehensive and as
homogeneous as that of Science; and it will then become obvious to all
sound thinkers that the principal sphere of both Art and Science is the social
life of man.
Thus the social services of the Intellect are not limited to revealing the
existence of an external Economy, and the necessity of submission to its
sway. If the theory is to have any influence upon our active powers, it
should include an exact estimate of the imperfections of this economy and
of the limits within which it varies, so as to indicate and define the
boundaries of human intervention. Thus it will always be an important
function of philosophy to criticize nature in a Positive spirit, although the
antipathy to theology by which such criticism was formerly animated has
ceased to have much interest, from the very fact of having done its work so
effectually. The object of Positive criticism is not controversial. It aims
simply at putting the great question of human life in a clearer light. It bears
closely on what Positivism teaches to be the great end of life, namely, the
struggle to become more perfect; which implies previous imperfection. This
truth is strikingly apparent when applied to the case of our own nature, for
true morality requires a deep and habitual consciousness of our natural
defects.
The chief difficulty of I have now described the fundamental condition of
the Positive Synthesis the Positive Synthesis. Deriving its subjective principle
was to complete our
conception of the
from the affections, it is dependent ultimately on the
External Order, by intellect for its objective basis. This basis connects it

extending it to Social
with the Economy of the external world, the dominion
phenomena
of which Humanity accepts, and at the same time
modifies. I have left many points unexplained; but enough has been said for
the purpose of this work, which is only the introduction to a larger treatise.
We now come to the essential difficulty that presented itself in the
construction of the Synthesis. That difficulty was to discover the true
Theory of human and social Development. The first decisive step in this
discovery renders the conception of the Order of Nature complete. It stands
out then as the fundamental doctrine of an universal system, for which the
whole course of modern progress has been preparing the way. For three
centuries men of science have been unconsciously co-operating in the work.
They have left no gap of any importance, except in the region of Moral and
Social phenomena. And now that man’s history has been for the first time
systematically considered as a whole, and has been found to be, like all
other phenomena, subject to invariable laws, the preparatory labours of
modern Science are ended. Her remaining task is to construct that synthesis
which will place her at the only point of view from which every department
of knowledge can be embraced.
In my System of Positive Philosophy both these objects were aimed at. I
attempted, and in the opinion of the principal thinkers of our time
successfully, to complete and at the same time co-ordinate Natural
Philosophy, by establishing the general law of human development, social
as well as intellectual. I shall not now enter into the discussion of this law,
since its truth is no longer contested. Fuller consideration of it is reserved
for the third volume of my new treatise. It lays down, as is generally
known, that our speculations upon all subjects whatsoever, pass necessarily
through three successive stages: a Theological stage, in which free play is
given to spontaneous fictions admitting of no proof; the Metaphysical stage,
characterized by the prevalence of personified abstractions or entities;
lastly, the Positive stage, based upon an exact view of the real facts of the
case. The first, though purely provisional, is invariably the point from
which we start; the third is the only permanent or normal state; the second
has but a modifying or rather a solvent influence, which qualifies it for
regulating the transition from the first stage to the third. We begin with
theological Imagination, thence we pass through metaphysical Discussion,
and we end at last with positive Demonstration. Thus by means of this one

general law we are enabled to take a comprehensive and simultaneous view
of the past, present, and future of Humanity.
In my System of Positive Philosophy, this law of Filiation has always
been associated with the law of Classification, the application of which to
Social Dynamics furnishes the second element requisite for the theory of
development. It fixes the order in which our different conceptions pass
through each of these phases. That order, as is generally known, is
determined by the decreasing generality, or what comes to the same thing,
by the increasing complexity of the phenomena; the more complex being
naturally dependent upon those that are more simple and less special.
Arranging the sciences according to this mutual relation, we find them
2
grouped naturally in six primary divisions ; Mathematics, Astronomy,
Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Sociology. Each passes through the three
phases of developments before the one succeeding it. Without continuous
reference to this classification the theory of development would be
confused and vague.
The theory thus derived from the combination of this second or statical
law with the dynamical law of the three stages, seems at first sight to
include nothing but the intellectual movement. But my previous remarks
will have shown that this is enough to guarantee its applicability to social
progress also; since social progress has invariably depended on the growth
of our fundamental beliefs with regard to the economy that surrounds us.
The historical portion of my Positive Philosophy has proved an unbroken
connexion between the development of Activity and that of Speculation; on
the combined influence of these depends the development of Affection. The
theory therefore requires no alteration: what is wanted is merely an
additional statement explaining the phases of active, that is to say, of
political development. Human activity, as I have long since shown, passes
successively through the stages of Offensive warfare, Defensive warfare,
and Industry. The respective connexion of these states with the
preponderance of the theological, then metaphysical, or the positive spirit
leads at once to a complete explanation of history. It reproduces in a
systematic form the only historical conception which has become adopted
by universal consent; the division, namely, of history into Ancient,
Mediaeval, and Modern.

Thus the foundation of Social science depends simply upon
establishing the truth of this theory of development. We do this by
combining the dynamic law, which is its distinctive feature, with the statical
principle which renders it coherent; we then complete the theory by
extending it to practical life. All knowledge is now brought within the
sphere of Natural Philosophy; and the provisional distinction by which,
since Aristotle and Plato, it has been so sharply demarcated from Moral
Philosophy, ceases to exist. The Positive spirit, so long confined to the
simpler inorganic phenomena, has now passed through its difficult course
of probation. It extends to a more important and more intricate class of
speculations, and disengages them for ever from all theological or
metaphysical influence. All our notions of truth are thus rendered
homogeneous, and begin at once to converge towards a central principle. A
firm objective basis is consequently laid down for that complete co-
ordination of human existence towards which all sound Philosophy has ever
tended, but which the want of adequate materials has hitherto made
impossible.
By the discovery of It will be felt, I think, that the principal difficulty of
Sociological laws the Positive Synthesis was met by my discovery of the
social questions are
made paramount; and
laws of development, if we bear in mind that while that
thus our subjective theory completes and co-ordinates the objective basis of
principle is satisfied the system, it at the same time holds it in subordination
without danger to free
thought
to the subjective principle. It is under the influence of
this moral principle that the whole philosophical
construction should be carried on. The inquiry into the Order of the
Universe is an indispensable task, and it comes necessarily within the
province of the intellect; but the intellect is too apt to aim in its pride at
something beyond its proper function, which consists in unremitting service
of the social sympathies. It would willingly escape from all control and
follow its own bent towards speculative digressions; a tendency which is at
present favoured by the undisciplined habits of thought naturally due to the
first rise of Positivism in its special departments. The influence of the moral
principle is necessary to recall it to its true function; since if its
investigations were allowed to assume an absolute character, and to
recognize no limit, we should only be repeating in a scientific form many of
the worst results of theological and metaphysical belief. The Universe is to
be studied not for its own sake, but for the sake of Man or rather of

Humanity. To study it in any other spirit would not only be immoral, but
also highly irrational. For, as statements of pure objective truth, our
scientific theories can never be really satisfactory. They can only satisfy us
from the subjective point of view; that is, by limiting themselves to the
treatment of such questions as have some direct or indirect influence over
human life. It is for social feeling to determine these limits; outside which
our knowledge will always remain imperfect as well as useless, and this
even in the case of the simplest phenomena; as astronomy testifies. Were
the influence of social feeling to be slackened, the Positive spirit would
soon fall back to the subjects which were preferred during the period of its
infancy; subjects the most remote from human interest, and therefore also
the easiest. While its probationary period lasted, it was natural to investigate
all accessible problems without distinction; and this was often justified by
the logical value of many problems that, scientifically speaking, were
useless. But now that the Positive method has been sufficiently developed
to be applied exclusively to the purpose for which it was intended, there is
no use whatever in prolonging the period of probation by these idle
exercises. Indeed the want of purpose and discipline in our researches is
rapidly assuming a retrograde character. Its tendency is to undo the chief
results obtained by the spirit of detail during the time when that spirit was
really essential to progress.
Here, then, we are met by a serious difficulty. The construction of the
objective basis for the Positive synthesis imposes two conditions which
seem, at first sight, incompatible. On the one hand we must allow the
intellect to be free, or else we shall not have the full benefit of its services;
and, on the other, we must control its natural tendency to unlimited
digressions. The problem was insoluble, so long as the study of the natural
economy did not include Sociology. But as soon as the Positive spirit
extends to the treatment of social questions, these at once take precedence
of all others, and thus the moral point of view becomes paramount.
Objective science, proceeding from without inwards, falls at last into
natural harmony with the subjective or moral principle, the superiority of
which it had for so long a time resisted. As a mere speculative question it
may be considered as proved to the satisfaction of every true thinker, that
the social point of view is logically and scientifically supreme over all
others, being the only point from which all our scientific conceptions can be
regarded as a whole. Yet its influence can never be injurious to the progress

of other Positive studies; for these, whether for the sake of their method or
of their subject matter, will always continue to be necessary as an
introduction to the final science. Indeed the Positive system gives the
highest sanction and the most powerful stimulus to all preliminary sciences,
by insisting on the relation which each of them bears to the great whole,
Humanity.
Thus the foundation of social science bears out the statement made at
the beginning of this work, that the intellect would, under Positivism,
accept its proper position of subordination to the heart. The recognition of
this, which is the subjective principle of Positivism, renders the
construction of a complete system of human life possible. The antagonism
which, since the close of the Middle Ages, has arisen between Reason and
Feeling, was an anomalous though inevitable condition. It is now for ever at
an end; and the only system which can really satisfy the wants of our
nature, individually or collectively, is therefore ready for our acceptance. As
long as the antagonism existed, it was hopeless to expect that Social
Sympathy could do much to modify the preponderance of self-love in the
affairs of life. But the case is different as soon as reason and sympathy are
brought into active co-operation. Separately, their influence in our imperfect
organization is very feeble; but combined it may extend indefinitely. It will
never, indeed, be able to do away with the fact that practical life must, to a
large extent, be regulated by interested motives; yet it may introduce a
standard of morality inconceivably higher than any that has existed in the
past, before these two modifying forces could be made to combine their
action upon our stronger and lower instincts.
Distinction between In order to give a more precise conception of the
Abstract and Concreteintellectual basis on which the system of Positive Polity
laws. It is the former
only that we require
should rest, I must explain the general principle by
which it should be limited. It should be confined to
for the purpose before
us what is really indispensable to the construction of that
Polity. Otherwise the intellect will be carried away, as it
has been before, by its tendency to useless digressions. It will endeavour to
extend the limits of its province; thereby escaping from the discipline
imposed by social motives, and putting off all attempts at moral and social
regeneration for a longer time than the construction of the philosophic basis
for action really demands. Here we shall find a fresh proof of the

importance of my theory of development. By that discovery the intellectual
synthesis may be considered as having already reached the point from
which the synthesis of affections may be at once begun; and even that of
actions, at least in its highest and most difficult part, morality properly so
called.
With the view of restricting the construction of the objective basis
within reasonable limits, there is this distinction to be borne in mind. In the
Order of Nature, there are two classes of laws; those that are simple or
Abstract, those that are compound or Concrete. In my work on Positive
Philosophy, the distinction has been thoroughly established, and frequent
use has been made of it. It will be sufficient here to point out its origin and
the method of applying it.
Positive science may deal either with objects themselves as they exist,
or with the separate phenomena that the objects exhibit. Of course we can
only judge of an object by the sum of its phenomena; but it is open to us
either to examine a special class of phenomena abstracted from all the
beings that exhibit it, or to take some special object, and examine the whole
concrete group of phenomena. In the latter case we shall be studying
different systems of existence; in the former, different modes of activity. As
good an example of the distinction as can be given is that, already
mentioned, of Meteorology. The facts of weather are evidently
combinations of astronomical, physical, chemical, biological, and even
social phenomena; each of these classes requiring its own separate theories.
Were these abstract laws sufficiently well known to us, then the whole
difficulty of the concrete problem would be so to combine them, as to
deduce the order in which each composite effect would follow. This,
however, is a process which seems to me so far beyond our feeble powers
of deduction, that, even supposing our knowledge of the abstract laws
perfect, we should still be obliged to have recourse to the inductive method.
Now the investigation of the economy of nature here contemplated is
evidently of the abstract kind. We decompose that economy into its primary
phenomena, that is to say, into those which are not reducible to others.
These we range in classes, each of which, notwithstanding the connexion
that exists between all, requires a separate inductive process; for the
existence of laws cannot be proved in any one of them by pure deduction. It
is only with these simpler and more abstract relations that our synthesis is

directly concerned: when these are established, they afford a rational
groundwork for the more composite and concrete researches. The great
complexity of concrete relations makes it probable that we shall never be
able to co-ordinate them perfectly. In that case the synthesis would always
remain limited to abstract laws. But its true object, that of supplying an
objective basis for the great synthesis of human life, will none the less be
attained. For this groundwork of abstract knowledge would introduce
harmony between all our mental conceptions, and thereby would make it
impossible to systematize our feelings and actions, which is the object of all
sound philosophy. The abstract study of nature is therefore all that is
absolutely indispensable for the establishment of unity in human life. It
serves as the foundation of all wise action; as the philosophia prima, the
necessity of which in the normal state of humanity was dimly foreseen by
Bacon. When the abstract laws exhibiting the various modes of activity
have been brought systematically before us, our practical knowledge of
each special system of existence ceases to be purely empirical, though the
greater number of concrete laws may still be unknown. We find the best
example of this truth in the most difficult and important subject of all,
Sociology. Knowledge of the principal statical and dynamical laws of social
existence is evidently sufficient for the purpose of systematizing the various
aspects of private or public life, and thereby of rendering our condition far
more perfect. Should this knowledge be acquired, of which there is now no
doubt, we need not regret being unable to give a satisfactory explanation of
every state of society that we find existing throughout the world in all ages.
The discipline of social feeling will check any foolish indulgence of the
spirit of curiosity, and prevent the understanding from wasting its powers in
useless speculations; for feeble as these powers are, it is from them that
Humanity derives her most efficient means of contending against the
defects of the External Order. The discovery of the principal concrete laws
would no doubt be attended by the most beneficial results, moral as well as
physical; and this is the field in which the science of the future will reap its
richest harvest. But such knowledge is not indispensable for our present
purpose, which is to form a complete synthesis of life, effecting for the final
state of humanity what the theological synthesis effected for its primitive
state. For this purpose Abstract philosophy is undoubtedly sufficient; so that
even supposing that Concrete philosophy should never become so perfect as
we desire, social regeneration will still be possible.

In my Theory of
Regarded under this more simple aspect, our
Development, the system of scientific knowledge is already so far
elaborated, that all thinkers whose nature is sufficiently
required Synthesis of
Abstract conceptions
already exists
sympathetic may proceed without delay to the problem
of moral regeneration; a problem which must prepare
the way for that of political reorganization. For we shall find that the theory
of development of which we have been speaking, when looked at from
another point of view, condenses and systematizes all our abstract
conceptions of the order of nature.
This will be understood by regarding all departments of our knowledge
as being really component parts of one and the same science; the science of
Humanity. All other sciences are but the prelude or the development of this.
Before we can enter upon it directly, there are two subjects which it is
necessary to investigate; our external circumstances, and the organization of
our own nature. Social life cannot be understood without first understanding
the medium in which it is developed, and the beings who manifest it. We
shall make no progress, therefore, in the final science until we have
sufficient abstract knowledge of the outer world and of individual life to
define the influence of these laws on the special laws of social phenomena.
And this is necessary from the logical as well as from the scientific point of
view. The feeble faculties of our intellect require to be trained for the more
difficult speculations by practice in the easier. For the same reasons, the
study of the inorganic world should take precedence of the organic. For, in
the first place, the laws of the more universal mode of existence have a
preponderating influence over those of the more special modes; and in the
second place it is clearly incumbent on us to begin the study of the Positive
method with its simplest and most characteristic applications. I need not
dwell further upon principles so fully established in my former work.
Social Philosophy, therefore, ought on every ground to be preceded by
Natural Philosophy in the ordinary sense of the word; that is to say by the
study of inorganic and organic nature. It is reserved for our own century to
take in the whole scope of science; but the commencement of these
preparatory studies dates from the first astronomical discoveries of
antiquity. Natural Philosophy was completed by the modern science of
Biology, of which the ancients possessed nothing but a few statical
principles. The dependence of biological conditions upon astronomical is

very certain. But these two sciences differ too much from each other and are
too indirectly connected to give us an adequate conception of Natural
Philosophy as a whole. It would be pushing the principle of condensation
too far to reduce it to these two terms. One connecting link was supplied by
the science of Chemistry which arose in the Middle Ages. The natural
succession of Astronomy, Chemistry, and Biology leading gradually up to
the final science, Sociology, made it possible to conceive more or less
imperfectly of an intellectual synthesis. But the interposition of Chemistry
was not enough: because, though its relation to Biology was intimate, it was
too remote from Astronomy. For want of understanding the mode in which
astronomical conditions really affected us, the arbitrary and chimerical
fancies of astrology were employed, though of course quite valueless except
for this temporary purpose. In the seventeenth century, however, the science
of Physics specially so called, was founded; and a satisfactory arrangement
of scientific conceptions began to be formed. Physics included a series of
inorganic researches, the more general branch of which bordered on
Astronomy, the more special on Chemistry. To complete our view of the
scientific hierarchy we have now only to go back to its origin, Mathematics;
a class of speculations so simple and so general, that they passed at once
and without effort into the Positive stage. Without Mathematics, Astronomy
was impossible: and they will always continue to be the starting-point of
Positive education for the individual as they have been for the race. Even
under the most absolute theological influence they stimulate the Positive
spirit to a certain degree of systematic growth. From them it extends step by
step to the subjects from which at first it had been most rigidly excluded.
We see from these brief remarks that the series of the abstract sciences
naturally arranges itself according to the decrease in generality and the
increase in complication. We see the reason for the introduction of each
member of the series, and the mutual connexion between them. The
classification is evidently the same as that before laid down in my theory of
development. That theory therefore may be regarded, from the statical point
of view, as furnishing a direct basis for the co-ordination of Abstract
conception, on which, as we have seen, the whole synthesis of human life
depends. That co-ordination at once establishes unity in our intellectual
operations. It realizes the desire obscurely expressed by Bacon for a scala
intellectûs, a ladder of the understanding, by the aid of which our thoughts
may pass with ease from the lowest subjects to the highest, or vice versa,

without weakening the sense of their continuous connexion in nature. Each
of the six terms of which our series is composed is in its central portion
quite distinct from the two adjoining links; but it is closely related in its
commencement to the preceding term, in its conclusion to the term which
follows. A further proof of the homogeneousness and continuity of the
system is that the same principle of classification, when applied more
closely, enables us to arrange the various theories of which each science
consists. For example, the three great orders of mathematical speculations,
Arithmetic, Geometry, and Mechanics, follow the same law of classification
as that by which the entire scale is regulated. And I have shown in my
Positive Philosophy that the same holds good of the other sciences. As a
whole, therefore, the series is the most concise summary that can be formed
of the vast range of Abstract truth; and conversely, all rational researches of
a special kind result in some partial development of this series. Each term in
it requires its own special processes of induction; yet in each we reason
deductively from the preceding term, a method which will always be as
necessary for purposes of instruction as it was originally for the purpose of
discovery. Thus it is that all our other studies are but a preparation for the
final science of Humanity. By it their mode of culture will always be
influenced and will gradually be imbued with the true spirit of generality,
which is so closely connected with social sympathy. Nor is there any danger
of such influence becoming oppressive, since the very principle of our
system is to combine a due measure of independence with practical
convergence. The fact that our theory of classification, by the very terms of
its composition, subordinates intellectual to social considerations, is
eminently calculated to secure its popular acceptance. It brings the whole
speculative system under the criticism, and at the same time under the
protection of the public, which is usually not slow to check any abuse of
those habits of abstraction which are necessary to the philosopher.
The same theory then which explains the mental evolution of
Humanity, lays down the true method by which our abstract conceptions
should be classified; thus reconciling the conditions of Order and
Movement, hitherto more or less at variance. Its historical clearness and its
philosophical force strengthen each other, for we cannot understand the
connexion of our conceptions except by studying the succession of the
phases through which they pass. And on the other hand, but for the
existence of such a connexion, it would be impossible to explain the

historical phases. So we see that for all sound thinkers, History and
Philosophy are inseparable.
Therefore we are in a A theory which embraces the statical as well as the
dynamical aspects of the subject, and which fulfils the
position to proceed at
once with the work of
social regeneration
conditions here spoken of, may certainly be regarded as
establishing the true objective basis on which unity can
be established in our intellectual functions. And this unity will be developed
and consolidated as our knowledge of its basis becomes more satisfactory.
But the social application of the system will have far more influence on the
result than any overstrained attempts at exact scientific accuracy. The object
of our philosophy is to direct the spiritual reorganization of the civilized
world. It is with a view to this object that all attempts at fresh discovery or
at improved arrangement should be conducted. Moral and political
requirements will lead us to investigate new relations; but the search should
not be carried farther than is necessary for their application. Sufficient for
our purpose, if this incipient classification of our mental products be so far
worked out that the synthesis of Affection and of Action may be at once
attempted; that is, that we may begin at once to construct that system of
morality under which the final regeneration of Humanity will proceed.
Those who have read my Positive Philosophy will, I think, be convinced
that the time for this attempt has arrived. How urgently it is needed will
appear in every part of the present work.

Error of identifying
I have now described the general spirit of
Positivism with Positivism. But there are two or three points on which
Atheism, Materialism, some further explanation is necessary, as they are the
Fatalism, or
Optimism. Atheism,
source of misapprehensions too common and too
like Theology, serious to be disregarded. Of course I only concern
discusses insoluble myself with such objections as are made in good faith.
mysteries
The fact of entire freedom from theological belief
being necessary before the Positive state can be perfectly attained, has
induced superficial observers to confound Positivism with a state of pure
negation. Now this state was at one time, and that even so recently as the
last century, favourable to progress; but at present in those who
unfortunately still remain in it, it is a radical obstacle to all sound social and
even intellectual organization. I have long ago repudiated all philosophical

or historical connexion between Positivism and what is called Atheism. But
it is desirable to expose the error somewhat more clearly.
Atheism, even from the intellectual point of view, is a very imperfect
form of emancipation; for its tendency is to prolong the metaphysical stage
indefinitely, by continuing to seek for new solutions of Theological
problems, instead of setting aside all inaccessible researches on the ground
of their utter inutility. The true Positive spirit consists in substituting the
study of the invariable Laws of phenomena for that of their so-called
Causes, whether proximate or primary; in a word, in studying the How
instead of the Why. Now this is wholly incompatible with the ambitious and
visionary attempts of Atheism to explain the formation of the Universe, the
origin of animal life, etc. The Positivist comparing the various phases of
human speculation, looks upon these scientific chimeras as far less valuable
even from the intellectual point of view than the first spontaneous
inspirations of primeval times. The principle of Theology is to explain
everything by supernatural Wills. That principle can never be set aside until
we acknowledge the search for Causes to be beyond our reach, and limit
ourselves to the knowledge of Laws. As long as men persist in attempting to
answer the insoluble questions which occupied the attention of the
childhood of our race, by far the more rational plan is to do as was done
then, that is, simply to give free play to the imagination. These spontaneous
beliefs have gradually fallen into disuse, not because they have been
disproved, but because mankind has become more enlightened as to its
wants and the scope of its powers, and has gradually given an entirely new
direction to its speculative efforts. If we insist upon penetrating the
unattainable mystery of the essential Cause that produces phenomena, there
is no hypothesis more satisfactory than that they proceed from Wills
dwelling in them or outside them; an hypothesis which assimilates them to
the effect produced by the desires which exist within ourselves. Were it not
for the pride induced by metaphysical and scientific studies, it would be
inconceivable that any atheist, modern or ancient, should have believed that
his vague hypotheses on such a subject were preferable to this direct mode
of explanation. And it was the only mode which really satisfied the reason,
until men began to see the utter inanity and inutility of all search for
absolute truth. The Order of Nature is doubtless very imperfect in every
respect; but its production is far more compatible with the hypothesis of an
intelligent Will than with that of a blind mechanism. Persistent atheists

therefore would seem to be most illogical of theologists: because they
occupy themselves with theological problems, and yet reject the only
appropriate method of handling them. But the fact is that pure Atheism even
in the present day is very rare. What is called Atheism is usually a phase of
Pantheism, which is really nothing but a relapse disguised under learned
terms, into a vague and abstract form of Fetichism. And it is not impossible
that it may lead to the reproduction in one form or other of every
theological phase as soon as the check which modern society still imposes
on metaphysical extravagance has become somewhat weakened. The
adoption of such theories as a satisfactory system of belief, indicates a very
exaggerated or rather false view of intellectual requirements, and a very
insufficient recognition of moral and social wants. It is generally connected
with the visionary but mischievous tendencies of ambitious thinkers to
uphold what they call the empire of Reason. In the moral sphere it forms a
sort of basis for the degrading fallacies of modern metaphysicians as to the
absolute preponderance of self-interest. Politically, its tendency is to
unlimited prolongation of the revolutionary position: its spirit is that of
blind hatred to the past: and it resists all attempts to explain it on Positive
principles, with a view of disclosing the future. Atheism, therefore, is not
likely to lead to Positivism except in those who pass through it rapidly as
the last and most short-lived of metaphysical phases. And the wide diffusion
of the scientific spirit in the present day makes this passage so easy that to
arrive at maturity without accomplishing it, is a symptom of a certain
mental weakness, which is often connected with moral insufficiency, and is
very incompatible with Positivism. Negation offers but a feeble and
precarious basis for union: and disbelief in Monotheism is of itself no better
proof of a mind fit to grapple with the questions of the day than disbelief in
Polytheism or Fetichism, which no one would maintain to be an adequate
ground for claiming intellectual sympathy. The atheistic phase indeed was
not really necessary, except for the revolutionists of the last century who
took the lead in the movement towards radical regeneration of society. The
necessity has already ceased; for the decayed condition of the old system
makes the need of regeneration palpable to all. Persistence in anarchy, and
Atheism is the most characteristic symptom of anarchy, is a temper of mind
more unfavourable to the organic spirit, which ought by this time to have
established its influence, than sincere adhesion to the old forms. This latter
is of course obstructive: but at least it does not hinder us from fixing our

attention upon the great social problem. Indeed it helps us to do so: because
it forces the new philosophy to throw aside every weapon of attack against
the older faith except its own higher capacity of satisfying our moral and
social wants. But in the Atheism maintained by many metaphysicians and
scientific men of the present day, Positivism, instead of wholesome rivalry
of this kind, will meet with nothing but barren resistance. Anti-theological
as such men may be, they feel unmixed repugnance for any attempts at
social regeneration, although their efforts in the last century had to some
extent prepared the way for it. Far, then, from counting upon their support,
Positivists must expect to find them hostile: although from the incoherence
of their opinions it will not be difficult to reclaim those of them whose
errors are not essentially due to pride.
Materialism is due to The charge of Materialism which is often made
the encroachment of against Positive philosophy is of more importance. It
the lower sciences on
the domain of the
originates in the course of scientific study upon which
higher: an error whichthe Positive system is based. In answering the charge, I
Positivism rectifies need not enter into any discussion of impenetrable
mysteries. Our theory of development will enable us to
see distinctly the real ground of the confusion that exists upon the subject.
Positive science was for a long time limited to the simplest subjects: it
could not reach the highest except by a natural series of intermediate steps.
As each of these steps is taken, the student is apt to be influenced too
strongly by the methods and results of the preceding stage. Here, as it seems
to me, lies the real source of that scientific error which men have
instinctively blamed as materialism. The name is just, because the tendency
indicated is one which degrades the higher subjects of thought by
confounding them with the lower. It was hardly possible that this usurpation
by one science of the domain of another should have been wholly avoided.
For since the more special phenomena do really depend upon the more
general, it is perfectly legitimate for each science to exercise a certain
deductive influence upon that which follows it in the scale. By such
influence the special inductions of that science were rendered more
coherent. The result, however, is that each of the sciences has to undergo a
long struggle against the encroachments of the one preceding it; a struggle
which, even in the case of the subjects which have been studied longest, is
not yet over. Nor can it entirely cease until the controlling influence of

sound philosophy be established over the whole scale, introducing juster
views of the relations of its several parts, about which at present there is
such irrational confusion. Thus it appears that Materialism is a danger
inherent in the mode in which the scientific studies necessary as a
preparation for Positivism were pursued. Each science tended to absorb the
one next to it, on the ground of having reached the Positive stage earlier and
more thoroughly. The evil then is really deeper and more extensive than is
imagined by most of those who deplore it. It passes generally unnoticed
except in the highest class of subjects. These doubtless are more seriously
affected, inasmuch as they undergo the encroaching process from all the
rest; but we find the same thing in different degrees, in every step of the
scientific scale. Even the lowest step, Mathematics, is no exception, though
its position would seem at first sight to exempt it. To a philosophic eye
there is Materialism in the common tendency of mathematicians at the
present day to absorb Geometry or Mechanics into the Calculus, as well as
in the more evident encroachments of Mathematics upon Physics, of
Physics upon Chemistry, of Chemistry, which is more frequent, upon
Biology, or lastly in the common tendency of the best biologists to look
upon Sociology as a mere corollary of their own science. In all cases it is
the same fundamental error: that is, an exaggerated use of deductive
reasoning; and in all it is attended with the same result; that the higher
studies are in constant danger of being disorganized by the indiscriminate
application of the lower. All scientific specialists at the present time are
more or less materialists, according as the phenomena studied by them are
more or less simple and general. Geometricians, therefore, are more liable
to the error than any others; they all aim consciously or otherwise at a
synthesis in which the most elementary studies, those of Number, Space,
and Motion, are made to regulate all the rest. But the biologists who resist
this encroachment most energetically, are often guilty of the same mistake.
They not unfrequently attempt, for instance, to explain all sociological facts
by the influence of climate and race, which are purely secondary; thus
showing their ignorance of the fundamental laws of Sociology, which can
only be discovered by a series of direct inductions from history.
This philosophical estimate of Materialism explains how it is that it has
been brought as a charge against Positivism, and at the same time proves
the deep injustice of the charge. Positivism, far from countenancing so
dangerous an error, is, as we have seen, the only philosophy which can

completely remove it. The error arises from certain tendencies which are in
themselves legitimate, but which have been carried too far; and Positivism
satisfies these tendencies in their due measure. Hitherto the evil has
remained unchecked, except by the theologico-metaphysical spirit, which,
by giving rise to what is called Spiritualism, has rendered a very valuable
service. But useful as it has been, it could not arrest the active growth of
Materialism, which has assumed in the eyes of modern thinkers something
of a progressive character, from having been so long connected with the
cause of resistance to a retrograde system. Notwithstanding all the protests
of the spiritualists, the lower sciences have encroached upon the higher to
an extent that seriously impairs their independence and their value. But
Positivism meets the difficulty far more effectually. It satisfies and
reconciles all that is really tenable in the rival claims of both Materialism
and Spiritualism; and, having done this, it discards them both. It holds the
one to be as dangerous to Order as the other to Progress. This result is an
immediate consequence of the establishment of the encyclopædic scale, in
which each science retains its own proper sphere of induction, while
deductively it remains subordinate to the science which precedes it. But
what really decides the matter is the fact that such paramount importance,
both logically and scientifically, is given by Positive Philosophy to social
questions. For these are the questions in which the influence of Materialism
is most mischievous, and also in which it is most easily introduced. A
system therefore which gives them the precedence over all other questions
must hold Materialism to be quite as obstructive as Spiritualism, since both
are alike an obstacle to the progress of that science for the sake of which all
other sciences are studied. Further advance in the work of social
regeneration implies the elimination of both of them, because it cannot
proceed without exact knowledge of the laws of moral and social
phenomena. In the next chapter I shall have to speak of the mischievous
effects of Materialism upon the Art or practice of social life. It leads to a
misconception of the most fundamental principle of that Art, namely, the
systematic separation of spiritual and temporal power. To maintain that
separation, to carry out on a more satisfactory basis the admirable attempt
made in the Middle Ages by the Catholic Church, is the most important of
political questions. Thus the antagonism of Positivism to Materialism rests
upon political no less than upon philosophical grounds.

With the view of securing a dispassionate consideration of this subject,
and of avoiding all confusion, I have laid no stress upon the charge of
immorality that is so often brought against Materialism. The reproach, even
when made sincerely, is constantly belied by experience, indeed it is
inconsistent with all that we know of human nature. Our opinions, whether
right or wrong, have not, fortunately, the absolute power over our feelings
and conduct which is commonly attributed to them. Materialism has been
provisionally connected with the whole movement of emancipation, and it
has therefore often been found in common with the noblest aspirations. That
connexion, however, has now ceased; and it must be owned that even in the
most favourable cases this error, purely intellectual though it be, has to a
certain extent always checked the free play of our nobler instincts, by
leading men to ignore or misconceive moral phenomena, which were left
unexplained by its crude hypothesis. Cabanis gave a striking example of
3
this tendency in his unfortunate attack upon mediaeval chivalry. Cabanis
was a philosopher whose moral nature was as pure and sympathetic as his
intellect was elevated and enlarged. Yet the materialism of his day had
entirely blinded him to the beneficial results of the attempts made by the
most energetic of our ancestors to institute the Worship of Woman.
We have now examined the two principal charges brought against the
Positive system, and we have found that they apply merely to the
unsystematic state in which Positive principles are first introduced. But the
system is also accused of Fatalism and of Optimism; charges on which it
will not be necessary to dwell at great length, because, though frequently
made, they are not difficult to refute.
Nor is Positivism The charge of Fatalism has accompanied every
fresh extension of Positive science, from its first
fatalist, since it asserts
the External Order to
be modifiable
beginnings. Nor is this surprising; for when any series
of phenomena passes from the dominion of Wills,
whether modified by metaphysical abstractions or not, to the dominion of
Laws, the regularity of the latter contrasts so strongly with the instability of
the former, as to present an appearance of fatality, which nothing but a very
careful examination of the real character of scientific truth can dissipate.
And the error is the more likely to occur from the fact that our first types of
natural laws are derived from the phenomena of the heavenly bodies. These,
being wholly beyond our interference, always suggest the notion of absolute

necessity, a notion which it is difficult to prevent from extending to more
complex phenomena, as soon as they are brought within the reach of the
Positive method. And it is quite true that Positivism holds the Order of
Nature to be in its primary aspects strictly invariable. All variations,
whether spontaneous or artificial, are only transient and of secondary
import. The conception of unlimited variations would in fact be equivalent
to the rejection of Law altogether. But while this accounts for the fact that
every new Positive theory is accused of Fatalism, it is equally clear that
blind persistence in the accusation shows a very shallow conception of what
Positivism really is. For, unchangeable as the Order of Nature is in its main
aspects, yet all phenomena, except those of Astronomy, admit of being
modified in their secondary relations, and this the more as they are more
complicated. The Positive spirit, when confined to the subjects of
Mathematics and Astronomy, was inevitably fatalist; but this ceased to be
the case when it extended to Physics and Chemistry, and especially to
Biology, where the margin of variation is very considerable. Now that it
embraces Social phenomena, the reproach, however it may have been once
deserved, should be heard no longer, since these phenomena, which will for
the future form its principal field, admit of larger modification than any
others, and that chiefly by our own intervention. It is obvious then that
Positivism, far from encouraging indolence, stimulates us to action,
especially to social action, far more energetically than any Theological
doctrine. It removes all groundless scruples, and prevents us from having
recourse to chimeras. It encourages our efforts everywhere, except where
they are manifestly useless.
The charge of For the charge of Optimism there is even less
Optimism applies to ground than for that of Fatalism. The latter was, to a
Theology rather than
to Positivism. The
certain extent, connected with the rise of the Positive
spirit; but Optimism is simply a result of Theology; and
positivist judges of all
historical actions its influence has always been decreasing with the
relatively, but does
not justify them
growth of Positivism. Astronomical laws, it is true,
indiscriminately suggest the idea of perfection as naturally as that of
necessity. On the other hand, their great simplicity
places the defects of the Order of Nature in so clear a light, that optimists
would never have sought their arguments in astronomy, were it not that the
first elements of the science had to be worked out under the influence of
Monotheism, a system which involved the hypothesis of absolute wisdom.

But by the theory of development on which the Positive synthesis is here
made to rest, Optimism is discarded as well as Fatalism, in the direct
proportion of the intricacy of the phenomena. It is in the most intricate that
the defects of Nature, as well as the power of modifying them, become most
manifest. With regard, therefore, to social phenomena, the most complex of
all, both charges are utterly misplaced. Any optimistic tendencies that
writers on social subjects may display, must be due to the fact that their
education has not been such as to teach them the nature and conditions of
the true scientific spirit. For want of sound logical training, great misuse has
been made in our own time of a property peculiar to social phenomena. It is
that we find in them a greater amount of spontaneous wisdom than might
have been expected from their complexity. It would be a mistake, however,
to suppose this wisdom perfect. The phenomena in question are those of
intelligent beings who are always occupied in amending the defects of their
economy. It is obvious, therefore, that they will show less imperfection than
if, in a case equally complicated, the agents could have been blind. The
standard by which to judge of action is always to be taken relatively to the
social state in which the action takes place. Therefore all historical positions
and changes must have at least some grounds of justification; otherwise
they would be totally incomprehensible, because inconsistent with the
nature of the agents and of the actions performed by them. Now this
naturally fosters a dangerous tendency to Optimism in all thinkers, who,
whatever their powers may be, have not passed through any strict scientific
training, and have consequently never cast off metaphysical and theological
modes of thought in the higher subjects. Because every government shows
a certain adaptation to the civilization of its time, they make the loose
assertion that the adaptation is perfect; a conception which is of course
chimerical. But it is unjust to charge Positivism with errors which are
evidently contrary to its true spirit, and merely due to the want of logical
and scientific training in those who have hitherto engaged in the study of
social questions. The object of Sociology is to explain all historical facts;
not to justify them indiscriminately, as is done by those who are unable to
distinguish the influence of the agent from that of surrounding
circumstances.
The word Positive On reviewing this brief sketch of the intellectual
connotes all the character of Positivism, it will be seen that all its
highest intellectual
essential attributes are summed up in the word Positive,

attributes, and will which I applied to the new philosophy at its outset. All
ultimately have a
moral significance the languages of Western Europe agree in understanding
by this word and its derivatives the two qualities of
reality and usefulness. Combining these, we get at once an adequate
definition of the true philosophic spirit, which, after all, is nothing but good
sense generalized and put into a systematic form. The term also implies in
all European languages, certainty and precision, qualities by which the
intellect of modern nations is markedly distinguished from that of antiquity.
Again, the ordinary acceptation of the term implies a directly organic
tendency. Now the metaphysical spirit is incapable of organizing; it can
only criticize. This distinguishes it from the Positive spirit, although for a
time they had a common sphere of action. By speaking of Positivism as
organic, we imply that it has a social purpose; that purpose being to
supersede Theology in the spiritual direction of the human race.
But the word will bear yet a further meaning. The organic character of
the system leads us naturally to another of its attributes, namely its
invariable relativity. Modern thinkers will never rise above that critical
position which they have hitherto taken up towards the past, except by
repudiating all absolute principles. This last meaning is more latent than the
others, but is really contained in the term. It will soon become generally
accepted, and the word Positive will be understood to mean relative as
much as it now means organic, precise, certain, useful, and real. Thus the
highest attributes of human wisdom have, with one exception, been
gradually condensed into a single expressive term. All that is now wanting
is that the word should denote what at first could form no part of the
meaning, the union of moral with intellectual qualities. At present, only the
latter are included; but the course of modern progress makes it certain that
the conception implied by the word Positive, will ultimately have a more
direct reference to the heart than to the understanding. For it will soon be
felt by all that the tendency of Positivism, and that by virtue of its primary
characteristic, reality, is to make Feeling systematically supreme over
Reason as well as over Activity. After all, the change consists simply in
4
realizing the full etymological value of the word Philosophy . For it was
impossible to realize it until moral and mental conditions had been
reconciled; and this has been now done by the foundation of a Positive
science of society.

CHAPTER II
THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF POSITIVISM, AS SHOWN BY ITS
CONNEXION WITH THE GENERAL REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENT OF WESTERN EUROPE

As the chief characteristic of Positive Philosophy is the paramount
importance that is given, and that on speculative grounds, to social
considerations, its efficiency for the purposes of practical life is involved in
the very spirit of the system. When this spirit is rightly understood, we find
that it leads at once to an object far higher than that of satisfying our
scientific curiosity; the object, namely, of organizing human life.
Conversely, this practical aspect of Positive Philosophy exercises the most
salutary influence upon its speculative character. By keeping constantly
before us the necessity of concentrating all scientific efforts upon the social
object which constitutes their value, we take the best possible means of
checking the tendency inherent in all abstract inquiries to degenerate into
useless digressions. But this general connexion between theory and practice
would not by itself be sufficient for our purpose. It would be impossible to
secure the acceptance of a mental discipline, so new and so difficult, were it
not for considerations derived from the general conditions of modern
society; considerations calculated to impress philosophers with a more
definite sense of obligation to do their utmost towards satisfying the wants
of the time. By thus arousing public sympathies and showing that the
success of Positivism is a matter of permanent and general importance, the
coherence of the system as well as the elevation of its aims will be placed
beyond dispute. We have hitherto been regarding Positivism as the issue in
which intellectual development necessarily results. We have now to view it
from the social side; for until we have done this, it is impossible to form a
true conception of it.
The relation of And to do this, all that is here necessary is to point
Positivism to the out the close relation in which the new philosophy

French Revolution stands to the whole course of the French Revolution.
This revolution has now been agitating Western nations
5
for sixty years . It is the final issue of the vast transition through which we
have been passing during the five previous centuries.
In this great crisis there are naturally two principal phases; of which
only the first, or negative, phase has yet been accomplished. In it we gave
the last blow to the old system, but without arriving at any fixed and distinct
prospect of the new. In the second or positive phase, which is at last
beginning, a basis for the new social state has to be constructed. The first
phase led as its ultimate result to the formation of a sound philosophical
system; and by this system the second phase will be directed. It is this
twofold connexion which we are now to consider.
The negative or The strong reaction which was exercised upon the
destructive phase ofintellect by the first great shock of revolution was
the Revolution
absolutely necessary to rouse and sustain our mental
stimulated the desire
of Progress, and efforts in the search for a new system. For the greatest
consequently the thinkers of the eighteenth century had been blinded to
study of social
phenomena
the true character of the new state by the effete
remnants of the old. And the shock was especially
necessary for the foundation of social science. For the basis of that science
is the conception of human Progress, a conception which nothing but the
Revolution could have brought forward into sufficient prominence.
Social Order was regarded by the ancients as stationary: and its theory
under this provisional aspect was admirably sketched out by the great
Aristotle. In this respect the case of Sociology resembles that of Biology. In
Biology statical conceptions were attained without the least knowledge of
dynamical laws. Similarly, the social speculations of antiquity are entirely
devoid of the conception of Progress. Their historical field was too narrow
to indicate any continuous movement of Humanity. It was not till the
Middle Ages that this movement became sufficiently manifest to inspire the
feeling that we were tending towards a state of increased perfection. It was
then seen by all that Catholicism was superior to Polytheism and Judaism;
and this was afterwards confirmed by the corresponding political
improvement produced by the substitution of Feudalism for Roman
government. Confused as this first feeling of human Progress was, it was

yet very intense and very largely diffused; though it lost much of its vitality
in the theological and metaphysical discussions of later centuries. It is here
that we must look if we would understand that ardour in the cause of
Progress which is peculiar to the Western family of nations, and which has
been strong enough to check many sophistical delusions, especially in the
countries where the noble aspirations of the Middle Ages have been least
impaired by the metaphysical theories of Protestantism or Deism.
But whatever the importance of this nascent feeling, it was very far
from sufficient to establish the conviction of Progress as a fundamental
principle of human society. To demonstrate any kind of progression, at least
three terms are requisite. Now the absolute character of theological
philosophy, by which the comparison between Polytheism and Catholicism
was instituted, prevented men from conceiving the bare possibility of any
further stage. The limits of perfection were supposed to have been reached
by the mediaeval system, and beyond it there was nothing but the Christian
Utopia of a future life. The decline of mediaeval theology soon set the
imagination free from any such obstacles; but it led at the same time to a
mental reaction which for a long time was unfavourable to the development
of this first conception of Progress. It brought a feeling of blind antipathy to
the Middle Ages. Almost all thinkers in their dislike of the Catholic dogmas
were seized with such irrational admiration for Antiquity as entirely to
ignore the social superiority of the mediaeval system; and it was only
among the untaught masses, especially in the countries preserved from
Protestantism, that any real feeling of this superiority was retained. It was
not till the middle of the seventeenth century that modern thinkers began to
dwell on the conception of Progress.
It re-appeared then under a new aspect. Conclusive evidence had by
that time been furnished that the more civilized portion of our race had
advanced in science and industry, and even, though not so unquestionably,
in the fine arts. But these aspects were only partial: and though they were
undoubtedly the source of the more systematic views held by our own
century upon the subject, they were not enough to demonstrate the fact of a
progression. And indeed, from the social point of view, so far more
important than any other, Progress seemed more doubtful than it had been
in the Middle Ages.

But this condition of opinion was changed by the revolutionary shock
which impelled France, the normal centre of Western Europe, to apply itself
to the task of social regeneration. A third term of comparison, that is to say
the type on which modern society is being moulded, now presented itself;
though it lay as yet in a distant and obscure future. Compared with the
mediaeval system it was seen to be an advance as great as that which
justified our ancestors of chivalrous times in asserting superiority to their
predecessors of antiquity. Until the destruction of Catholic Feudalism
became an overt fact, its effete remnants had concealed the political future,
and the fact of continuous progress in society had always remained
uncertain. Social phenomena have this peculiarity, that the object observed
undergoes a process of development as well as and simultaneously with the
observer. Now up to the time of the Revolution, political development, on
which the principal argument for the theory of Progress must always be
based, corresponded in its imperfection to the incapacity of the scientific
spirit to frame the theory of it. A century ago, thinkers of the greatest
eminence were unable to conceive of a really continuous progression; and
Humanity, as they thought, was destined to move in circles or in
oscillations. But under the influence of the Revolution a real sense of
human development has arisen spontaneously and with more or less result,
in minds of the most ordinary cast; first in France, and subsequently
throughout the whole of Western Europe. In this respect the crisis has been
most salutary; it has given us that mental courage as well as force without
which the conception could never have arisen. It is the basis of social
science and therefore of all Positive Philosophy; since it is only from the
social aspect that Positive Philosophy admits of being viewed as a
connected whole. Without the theory of Progress, the theory of Order, even
supposing that it could be formed, would be inadequate as a basis for
Sociology. It is essential that the two should be combined. The very fact
that Progress, however viewed, is nothing but the development of Order,
shows that Order cannot be fully manifested without Progress. The
dependence of Positivism upon the French Revolution may now be
understood more clearly. Nor was it by a merely fortuitous coincidence that
by this time the introductory course of scientific knowledge by which the
mind is prepared for Positivism should have been sufficiently completed.
But we must here observe that, beneficial as the intellectual reaction of
this great crisis undoubtedly was, its effects could not be realized until the

ardour of the revolutionary spirit had been to some extent weakened. The
dazzling light thrown upon the Future for some time obscured our vision of
the Past. It disclosed, though obscurely, the third term of the social
progression; but it prevented us from fairly appreciating the second term. It
encouraged that blind aversion to the Middle Ages, which had been inspired
by the emancipating process of modern times; a feeling which had once
been necessary to induce us to abandon the old system. The suppression of
this intermediate step would be as fatal to the conception of Progress as the
absence of the last; because this last differs too widely from the first to
admit of any direct comparison with it. Right views upon the subject were
impossible therefore until full justice had been rendered to the Middle Ages,
which form at once the point of union and of separation between ancient
and modern history. Now it was quite impossible to do this as long as the
excitement of the first years of the revolution lasted. In this respect the
philosophical reaction, organized at the beginning of our century by the
great De Maistre, was of material assistance in preparing the true theory of
Progress. His school was of brief duration, and it was no doubt animated by
a retrograde spirit; but it will always be ranked among the necessary
antecedents of the Positive system; although its works are now entirely
superseded by the rise of the new philosophy, which in a more perfect form
has embodied all their chief results.
What was required therefore for the discovery of Sociological laws,
and for the establishment upon these laws of a sound philosophical system,
was an intellect in the vigour of youth, imbued with all the ardour of the
revolutionary spirit, and yet spontaneously assimilating all that was
valuable in the attempts of the retrograde school to appreciate the historical
importance of the Middle Ages. In this way and in no other could the true
spirit of history arise. For that spirit consists in the sense of human
continuity, which had hitherto been felt by no one, not even by my
illustrious and unfortunate predecessor Condorcet. Meantime the genius of
Gall was completing the recent attempts to systematize biology, by
commencing the study of the internal functions of the brain; as far at least
as these could be understood from the phenomena of individual as distinct
from social development. And now I have explained the series of social and
intellectual conditions by which the discovery of sociological laws, and
consequently the foundation of Positivism, was fixed for the precise date at
which I began my philosophical career: that is to say, one generation after

the progressive dictatorship of the Convention, and almost immediately
after the fall of the retrograde tyranny of Bonaparte.
Thus it appears that the revolutionary movement, and the long period of
reaction which succeeded it, were alike necessary, before the new general
doctrine could be distinctly conceived of as a whole. And if this preparation
was needed for the establishment of Positivism as a philosophical system,
far more needful was it for the recognition of its social value. For it
guaranteed free exposition and discussion of opinion: and it led the public
to look to Positivism as the system which contained in germ the ultimate
solution of social problems. This is a point so obvious that we need not
dwell upon it further.
Having satisfied ourselves of the dependence of Positivism upon the
first phase of the Revolution, we have now to consider it as the future guide
of the second phase.
The constructive It is often supposed that the destruction of the old
phase of the regime was brought about by the Revolution. But
Revolution. The first
history when carefully examined points to a very
attempts to construct
different conclusion. It shows that the Revolution was
failed, being based on
not the cause but the consequence of the utter
destructive principles
decomposition of the mediaeval system; a process
which had been going on for five centuries throughout Western Europe, and
especially in France; spontaneously at first, and afterwards in a more
systematic way. The Revolution, far from protracting the negative
movement of previous centuries, was a bar to its further extension. It was a
final outbreak in which men showed their irrevocable purpose of
abandoning the old system altogether, and of proceeding at once to the task
of entire reconstruction. The most conclusive proof of this intention was
given by the abolition of royalty; which had been the rallying point of all
the decaying remnants of the old French constitution. But with this
exception, which only occupied the Convention during its first sitting, the
constructive tendencies of the movement were apparent from its outset; and
they showed themselves still more clearly as soon as the republican spirit
had become predominant. It is obvious, however, that strong as these
tendencies may have been, the first period of the Revolution produced
results of an extremely negative and destructive kind. In fact the movement
was in this respect a failure. This is partly to be attributed to the pressing

necessities of the hard struggle for national independence which France
maintained so gloriously against the combined attacks of the retrograde
nations of Europe. But it is far more largely owing to the purely critical
character of the metaphysical doctrines by which the revolutionary spirit
was at that time directed.
The negative and the positive movements which have been going on in
Western Europe since the close of the Middle Ages, have been of course
connected with each other. But the former has necessarily advanced with
greater rapidity than the latter. The old system had so entirely declined, that
a desire for social regeneration had become general, before the groundwork
of the new system had been sufficiently completed for its true character to
be understood. As we have just seen, the doctrine by which social
regeneration is now to be directed could not have arisen previously to the
Revolution. The impulse which the Revolution gave to thought was
indispensable to its formation. Here then was an insurmountable fatality by
which men were forced to make use of the critical principles which had
been found serviceable in former struggles, as the only available
instruments of construction. As soon as the old order had once been fairly
abandoned, there was of course no utility whatever in the negative
philosophy. But its doctrines had become familiar to men’s minds, and its
motto of ‘Liberty and Equality’, was at that time the one most compatible
with social progress. Thus the first stage of the revolutionary movement
was accomplished under the influence of principles that had become
obsolete, and that were quite inadequate to the new task required of them.
For constructive purposes the revolutionary philosophy was valueless;
except so far as it put forward a vague programme of the political future
founded on sentiment rather than conviction, and unaccompanied by any
explanation of the right mode of realizing it. In default of organic principles
the doctrines of the critical school were employed: and the result speedily
showed their inherent tendency to anarchy; a tendency as perilous to the
germs of the new order as to the ruins of the old. The experiment was tried
once for all, and it left such ineffaceable memories that it is not probable
that any serious attempt will be made to repeat it. The incapacity for
construction inherent in the doctrine in which the revolutionary spirit had
embodied itself was placed beyond the reach of doubt. The result was to

impress every one with the urgent necessity for social renovation; but the
principles of that renovation were still left undetermined.
Counter-revolution In this condition of philosophical and political
from 1794 to 1830 opinion, the necessity of Order was felt to be
paramount, and a long period of reaction ensued. Dating
from the official Deism introduced by Robespierre, it reached its height
under the aggressive system of Bonaparte, and it was feebly protracted, in
spite of the peace of 1815, by his insignificant successors. The only
permanent result of this period was the historical and doctrinal evidence
brought forward by De Maistre and his school, of the social inutility of
modern metaphysics, while at the same time their intellectual weakness was
being proved by the successful attempts of Cabanis, and still more of Gall,
to extend the Positive method to the highest biological questions. In all
other respects this elaborate attempt to prevent the final emancipation of
Humanity proved a complete failure; in fact, it led to a revival of the
instinct of Progress. Strong antipathies were roused everywhere by these
fruitless efforts at reconstructing a system which had become so entirely
obsolete, that even those who were labouring to rebuild it no longer
understood its character or the conditions of its existence.
A re-awakening of the revolutionary spirit was thus inevitable; and it
took place as soon as peace was established, and the chief upholder of the
retrograde system had been removed. The doctrines of negation were called
back to life; but very little illusion now remained as to their capacity for
organizing. In want of something better, men accepted them as a means of
resisting retrograde principles, just as these last had owed their apparent
success to the necessity of checking the tendency to anarchy. Amidst these
fresh debates on worn-out subjects, the public soon became aware that a
final solution of the question had not yet arisen even in germ. It therefore
concerned itself for little except the maintenance of Order and Liberty;
conditions as indispensable for the free action of philosophy as for material
prosperity. The whole position was most favourable for the construction of
a definite solution; and it was, in fact, during the last phase of the retrograde
movement that the elementary principle of a solution was furnished, by my
discovery, in 1822, of the two-fold law of intellectual development.
Political stagnation The apparent indifference of the public, to whom
between 1830 and all the existing parties seemed equally devoid of insight

1848 into the political future, was at last mistaken by a blind
government for tacit consent to its unwise schemes. The
cause of Progress was in danger. Then came the memorable crisis of 1830,
by which the system of reaction, introduced thirty-six years previously, was
brought to an end. The convictions which that system inspired were indeed
so superficial, that its supporters came of their own accord to disavow them,
and to uphold in their own fashion the chief revolutionary doctrines. These
again were abandoned by their previous supporters on their accession to
power. When the history of these times is written, nothing will give a
clearer view of the revulsion of feeling on both sides, than the debates
which took place on Liberty of Education. Within a period of twenty years,
it was alternately demanded and refused by both; and this in behalf of the
same principles, as they were called, though it was in reality a question of
interest rather than principle on either side.
All previous convictions being thus thoroughly upset, more room was
left for the instinctive feeling of the public; and the question of reconciling
the spirit of Order with that of Progress now came into prominence. It was
the most important of all problems, and it was now placed in its true light.
But this only made the absence of a solution more manifest; and the
principle of the solution existed nowhere but in Positivism, which as yet
was immature. All the opinions of the day had become alike utterly
incompatible both with Order and with Progress. The Conservative school
undertook to reconcile the two; but it had no constructive power; and the
only result of its doctrine was to give equal encouragement to anarchy and
to reaction, so as to be able always to neutralize the one by the other. The
establishment of Constitutional Monarchy was now put forward as the
ultimate issue of the great Revolution. But no one could seriously place any
real confidence in a system so alien to the whole character of French
history, offering as it did nothing but a superficial and unwise imitation of a
political anomaly essentially peculiar to England.
The period then between 1830 and 1848 may be regarded as a natural
pause in the political movement. The reaction which succeeded the original
crisis had exhausted itself; but the final or organic phase of the Revolution
was still delayed for want of definite principles to guide it. No conception
had been formed of it, except by a small number of philosophic minds who
had taken their stand upon the recently established laws of social science,

and had found themselves able, without recourse to any chimerical views,
to gain some general insight into the political future, of which Condorcet,
my principal predecessor, knew so little. But it was impossible for the
regenerating doctrine to spread more widely and to be accepted as the
peaceful solution of social problems, until a distinct refutation had been
given of the false assertion so authoritatively made that the parliamentary
system was the ultimate issue of the Revolution. This notion once
destroyed, the work of spiritual reorganization should be left entirely to the
free efforts of independent thinkers. In these respects our last political
change (1848) will have accomplished all that is required.
The present position, Thanks to the instinctive sense and vigour of our
1848–1850. working classes, the reactionist leanings of the Orleanist
Republicanism
involves the great
government, which had become hostile to the purpose
principle of for which it was originally instituted, have at last
brought about the final abolition of monarchy in France.
subordinating Politics
to Morals
The prestige of monarchy had long been lost, and it
now only impeded Progress, without being of any real benefit to Order. By
its fictitious supremacy it directly hindered the work of spiritual
reformation, whilst the measure of real power which it possessed was
insufficient to control the wretched political agitation maintained by
animosities of a purely personal character.
Viewed negatively, the principle of Republicanism sums up the first
phase of the Revolution. It precludes the possibility of recurrence to
Royalism, which, ever since the second half of the reign of Louis XIV, has
been the rallying point of all reactionist tendencies. Interpreting the
principle in its positive sense, we may regard it as a direct step towards the
final regeneration of society. By consecrating all human forces of whatever
kind to the general service of the community, republicanism recognizes the
doctrine of subordinating Politics to Morals. Of course it is as a feeling
rather than as a principle that this doctrine is at present adopted; but it could
not obtain acceptance in any other way; and even when put forward in a
more systematic shape, it is upon the aid of feeling that it will principally
rely, as I have shown in the previous chapter. In this respect France has
proved worthy of her position as the leader of the great family of Western
nations, and has in reality already entered upon the normal state. Without
the intervention of any theological system, she has asserted the true

principle on which society should rest, a principle which originated in the
Middle Ages under the impulse of Catholicism; but for the general
acceptance of which a sounder philosophy and more suitable circumstances
were necessary. The direct tendency, then, of the French Republic is to
sanction the fundamental principle of Positivism, the preponderance,
namely, of Feeling over Intellect and Activity. Starting from this point,
public opinion will soon be convinced that the work of organizing society
on republican principles is one which can only be performed by the new
philosophy.
It gives prominence to The whole position brings into fuller prominence
the problem of the fundamental problem previously proposed, of
reconciling Order and
Progress
reconciling Order and Progress. The urgent necessity of
doing so is acknowledged by all; but the utter
incapacity of any of the existing schools of opinion to realize it becomes
increasingly evident. The abolition of monarchy removes the most
important obstacle to social Progress: but at the same time it deprives us of
the only remaining guarantee for public Order. Thus the time is doubly
favourable to constructive tendencies; yet at present there are no opinions
which possess more than the purely negative value of checking, and that
very imperfectly, the error opposite to their own. In a position which
guarantees Progress and compromises Order, it is naturally for the latter that
the greatest anxiety is felt; and we are still without any organ capable of
systematically defending it. Yet experience should have taught us how
extremely fragile every government must be which is purely material, that
is, which is based solely upon self-interest, and is destitute of sympathies
and convictions. On the other hand, spiritual order is not to be hoped for at
present in the absence of any doctrine which commands general respect.
Even the social instinct is a force on the political value of which we cannot
always rely: for when not based on some definite principle, it not
unfrequently becomes source of disturbance. Hence we are driven back to
the continuance of a material system of government, although its
inadequacy is acknowledged by all. In a republic, however, such a
government cannot employ its most efficient instrument, corruption. It has
to resort instead to repressive measures of a more or less transitory kind,
every time that the danger of anarchy becomes too threatening. These
occasional measures, however, naturally proportion themselves to the
necessities of the case. Thus, though Order is exposed to greater perils than

Progress, it can count on more powerful resources for its defence. Shortly
after the publication of the first edition of this work, the extraordinary
outbreak of June, 1848, proved that the republic could call into play, and,
indeed, could push to excess, in the cause of public Order, forces far greater
than those of the monarchy. Thus royalty no longer possesses that
monopoly of preserving Order, which has hitherto induced a few sincere
and thinking men to continue to support it; and henceforth the sole political
characteristic which it retains is that of obstructing Progress. And yet by
another reaction of this contradictory position of affairs, the monarchical
party seems at present to have become the organ of resistance in behalf of
material Order. Retrograde as its doctrines are, yet from their still retaining
a certain organic tendency, the conservative instincts rally round them. To
this the progressive instincts offer no serious obstacle, their insufficiency
for the present needs being more or less distinctly recognized. It is not to
the monarchical party, however, that we must look for conservative
principles; for in this quarter they are wholly abandoned, and unhesitating
adoption of every revolutionary principle is resorted to as a means of
retaining power; so that the doctrines of the Revolution would seem fated to
close their existence in the retrograde camp. So urgent is the need of Order
that we are driven to accept for the moment a party which has lost all its old
convictions, and which had apparently become extinct before the Republic
began. Positivism and Positivism alone can disentangle and terminate this
anomalous position. The principle on which it depends is manifestly this:
As long as Progress tends towards anarchy, so long will Order continue to
be retrograde. But the retrograde movement never really attains its object:
indeed its principles are always neutralized by inconsistent concessions.
Judged by the boastful language of its leaders, we might imagine that it was
destroying republicanism; whereas the movement would not exist at all, but
for the peculiar circumstances in which we are placed; circumstances which
are forced into greater prominence by the foolish opposition of most of the
authorities. As soon as the instinct of political improvement has placed
itself under systematic guidance, its growth will bear down all resistance;
and then the reason of its present stagnation will be patent to all.

It brings the
And for this Theologism is, unawares, preparing
metaphysical the way. Its apparent preponderance places Positivism
revolutionary schools in precisely that position which I wished for ten years
into discredit
ago. The two organic principles can now be brought

side by side, and their relative strength tested, without the complication of
any metaphysical considerations. For the incoherence of metaphysical
systems is now recognized, and they are finally decaying under the very
political system which seemed at one time likely to promote their
acceptance. Construction is seen by all to be the thing wanted: and men are
rapidly becoming aware of the utter hollowness of all schools which
confine themselves to protests against the institutions of theologism, while
admitting its essential principles. So defunct, indeed, have these schools
become, that they can no longer fulfil even their old office of destruction.
This has fallen now as an accessory task upon Positivism, which offers the
only systematic guarantee against retrogression as well as against anarchy.
Psychologists, strictly so called, have already for the most part disappeared
with the fall of constitutional monarchy; so close is the relation between
these two importations from Protestantism. It seemed likely therefore that
the Ideologists, their natural rivals, would regain their influence with the
people. But even they cannot win back the confidence reposed in them
during the great Revolution, because the doctrines in virtue of which it was
then given are now so utterly exploded. The most advanced of their number,
unworthy successors of the school of Voltaire and Danton, have shown
themselves thoroughly incapable either morally or intellectually of directing
the second phase of the Revolution, which they are hardly able to
distinguish from the first phase. Formerly I had taken as their type a man of
far superior merit, the noble Armand Carrel, whose death was such a
grievous loss to the republican cause. But he was a complete exception to
the general rule. True republican convictions were impossible with men
who had been schooled in parliamentary intrigues, and who had directed or
aided the pertinacious efforts of the French press to rehabilitate the name of
Bonaparte. Their accession to power was futile; for they could only
maintain material order by calling in the retrograde party; and they soon
became mere auxiliaries of this party, disgracefully abjuring all their
philosophical convictions. There is one proceeding which, though it is but
an episode in the course of events, will always remain as a test of the true
character of this unnatural alliance. I allude to the Roman expedition of
1849; a detestable and contemptible act, for which just penalties will
speedily be imposed on all who were accessory to it; not to speak of the
damnatory verdict of history. But precisely the same hypocritical opposition
to progress has been exhibited by the other class of Deists, the disciples,

that is, of Rousseau, who profess to adopt Robespierre’s policy. Having had
no share in the government, they have not so entirely lost their hold upon
the people; but they are at the present time totally devoid of political
coherence. Their wild anarchy is incompatible with the general tone of
feeling maintained by the industrial activity, the scientific spirit, and the
esthetic culture of modern life. These Professors of the Guillotine, as they
may be called, whose superficial sophisms would reduce exceptional
outbreaks of popular fury into a cold-blooded system, soon found
themselves forced, for the sake of popularity, to sanction the law which
very properly abolished capital punishment for political offences. In the
same way they are now obliged to disown the only real meaning of the red
flag which serves to distinguish their party, too vague as it is for any other
name. Equally wrong have they shown themselves in interpreting the
tendencies of the working classes, from being so entirely taken up with
questions of abstract rights. The people have allowed these rights to be
taken from them without a struggle whenever the cause of Order has
seemed to require it; yet they still persist, mechanically, in maintaining that
it is on questions of this sort that the solution of all our difficulties depends.
Taking for their political ideal a short and anomalous period of our history
which is never likely to recur, they are always attempting to suppress liberty
for the sake of what they call progress. In a time of unchangeable peace
they are the only real supporters of war. Their conception of the
organization of labour is simply to destroy the industrial hierarchy of
capitalist and workman established in the Middle Ages; and, in fact, in
every respect these sophistical anarchists are utterly out of keeping with the
century in which they live. There are some, it is true, who still retain a
measure of influence with the working classes, incapable and unworthy
though they be of their position. But their credit is rapidly declining; and it
is not likely to become dangerous at a time when political enthusiasm is no
longer to be won by metaphysical prejudices. The only effect really
produced by this party of disorder, is to serve as a bugbear for the benefit of
the retrograde party, who thus obtain official support from the middle class,
in a way which is quite contrary to all the principles and habits of that class.
It is very improbable that these foolish levellers will ever succeed to power.
Should they do so, however, their reign will be short, and will soon result in
their final extinction; because it will convince the people of their profound
incapacity to direct the regeneration of Europe. The position of affairs,

therefore, is now distinct and clear; and it is leading men to withdraw their
confidence from all metaphysical schools, as they had already withdrawn it
from theology. In this general discredit of all the old systems the way
becomes clear for Positivism, the only school which harmonizes with the
real tendencies as well as with the essential needs of the nineteenth century.
And it proves to all In this explanation of the recent position of French
affairs one point yet remains to be insisted on. We have
the necessity of a true
spiritual power; a
body of thinkers
seen from the general course of the philosophical, and
whose business is to yet more of the political, movement, the urgent
study and to teach necessity for a universal doctrine capable of checking
principles, holding
aloof from political
erroneous action, and of avoiding or moderating
action popular outbreaks. But there is another need equally
manifest, the need of a spiritual power, without which it
would be utterly impossible to bring our philosophy to bear upon practical
life. Widely divergent as the various metaphysical sects are, there is one
point in which they all spontaneously agree; that is, in repudiating the
distinction between temporal and spiritual authority. This has been the great
revolutionary principle ever since the fourteenth century, and more
especially since the rise of Protestantism. It originated in repugnance to the
mediaeval system. The so-called philosophers of our time, whether
psychologists or ideologists, have, like their Greek predecessors, always
aimed at a complete concentration of all social powers; and they have even
spread this delusion among the students of special sciences. At present there
is no appreciation, except in the Positive system, of that instinctive sagacity
which led all the great men of the Middle Ages to institute, for the first
time, the separation of moral from political authority. It was a masterpiece
of human wisdom; but it was premature, and could not be permanently
successful at a time when men were still governed on theological principles,
and practical life still retained its military character. This separation of
powers, on which the final organization of society will principally depend,
is understood and valued nowhere but in the new school of philosophy, if
we except the unconscious and tacit admiration for it which still exists in
the countries from which Protestantism has been excluded. From the outset
of the Revolution, the pride of theorists has always made them wish to
become socially despotic; a state of things to which they have ever looked
forward as their political ideal. Public opinion has by this time grown far
too enlightened to allow any practical realization of a notion at once so

chimerical and so retrograde. But public opinion not being as yet
sufficiently organized, efforts in this direction are constantly being made.
The longing among metaphysical reformers for practical as well as
theoretical supremacy is now greater than ever; because, from the changed
state of affairs, their ambition is no longer limited to mere administrative
functions. Their various views diverge so widely, and all find so little
sympathy in the public, that there is not much fear of their ever being able
to check free discussion to any serious extent, by giving legal sanction to
their own particular doctrine. But quite enough has been attempted to
convince every one how essentially despotic every theory of society must
be which opposes this fundamental principle of modern polity, the
permanent separation of spiritual from temporal power. The disturbances
caused by metaphysical ambition corroborate, then, the view urged so
conclusively by the adherents of the new school, that this division of
powers is equally essential to Order and to Progress. If Positivist thinkers
continue to withstand all temptations to mix actively in politics, and go on
quietly with their own work amidst the unmeaning agitation around them,
they will ultimately make the impartial portion of the public familiar with
this great conception. It will henceforth be judged irrespectively of the
religious doctrines with which it was originally connected. Men will
involuntarily contrast it with other systems, and will see more and more
clearly that Positive principles afford the only basis for true freedom as well
as for true union. They alone can tolerate full discussion, because they alone
rest upon solid proof. Men’s practical wisdom, guided by the peculiar
nature of our political position, will react strongly upon philosophers, and
keep them strictly to their sphere of moral and intellectual influence. The
slightest tendency towards the assumption of political power will be
checked, and the desire for it will be considered as a certain sign of mental
weakness, and indeed of moral deficiency. Now that royalty is abolished, all
true thinkers are secure of perfect freedom of thought, and even of
expression, as long as they abide by the necessary conditions of public
order. Royalty was the last remnant of the system of castes, which gave the
monopoly of deciding on important social questions to a special family; its
abolition completes the process of theological emancipation. Of course the
magistrates of a republic may show despotic tendencies; but they can never
become very dangerous where power is held on so brief a tenure, and
where, even when concentrated in a single person, it emanates from

suffrage, incompetent as that may be. It is easy for the Positivist to show
that these functionaries know very little more than their constituents of the
logical and scientific conditions necessary for the systematic working out of
moral and social doctrines. Such authorities, though devoid of any spiritual
sanction, may, however, command obedience in the name of Order. But
they can never be really respected, unless they adhere scrupulously to their
temporal functions, without claiming the least authority over thought. Even
before the central power falls into the hands of men really fit to wield it, the
republican character of our government will have forced this conviction
upon a nation that has now got rid of all political fanaticism, whether of a
retrograde or anarchical kind. And the conviction is the more certain to
arise, because practical authorities will become more and more absorbed in
the maintenance of material order, and will therefore leave the question of
spiritual order to the unrestricted efforts of thinkers. It is neither by accident
nor by personal influence that I have myself always enjoyed so large a
measure of freedom in writing, and subsequently in public lectures, and this
under governments all of which were more or less oppressive. Every true
philosopher will receive the same licence, if, like myself, he offers the
intellectual and moral guarantees which the public and the civil power are
fairly entitled to expect from the systematic organs of Humanity. The
necessity of controlling levellers may lead to occasional acts of unwise
violence. But I am convinced that respect will always be shown to
constructive thinkers, and that they will soon be called in to the assistance
of public order. For order will not be able to exist much longer without the
sanction of some rational principle.
The need of a spiritual The result, then, of the important political changes
power is common to which have recently taken place is this. The second
the whole Republic of
Western Europe
phase of the Revolution, which hitherto has been
restricted to a few advanced minds, is now entered by
the public, and men are rapidly forming juster views of its true character. It
is becoming recognized that the only firm basis for a reform of our political
institutions, is a complete reorganization of opinion and of life; and the way
is open for the new religious doctrine to direct this work. I have thus
explained the way in which the social mission of Positivism connects itself
with the spontaneous changes which are taking place in France, the centre
of the revolutionary movement. But it would be a mistake to suppose that
France will be the only scene of these reorganizing efforts. Judging on

sound historical principles, we cannot doubt that they will embrace the
whole extent of Western Europe.
During the five centuries of revolutionary transition which have
elapsed since the Middle Ages, we have lost sight of the fact that in all
fundamental questions the Western nations form one political system. It was
under Catholic Feudalism that they were first united; a union for which
their incorporation into the Roman empire had prepared them, and which
was finally organized by the incomparable genius of Charlemagne. In spite
of national differences, embittered as they were afterwards by theological
discord, this great Republic has in modern times shown intellectual and
social growth both in the positive and negative direction, to which other
portions of the human race, even in Europe, can show no parallel. The
rupture of Catholicism, and the decline of Chivalry, at first seriously
impaired this feeling of relationship. But it soon began to show itself again
under new forms. It rests now, though the basis is inadequate, upon the
feeling of community in industrial development, in esthetic culture, and in
scientific discovery. Amidst the disorganized state of political affairs, which
have obviously been tending towards some radical change, this similarity in
civilization has produced a growing conviction that we are all participating
in one and the same social movement; a movement limited as yet to our
own family of nations. The first step in the great crisis was necessarily
taken by the French nation, because it was better prepared than any other. It
was there that the old order of things had been most thoroughly uprooted,
and that most had been done in working out the materials of the new. But
the strong sympathies which the outbreak of our revolution aroused in every
part of Western Europe, showed that our sister-nations were only granting
us the honourable post of danger in a movement in which all the nobler
portion of Humanity was to participate. And this was the feeling proclaimed
by the great republican assembly in the midst of their war of defence. The
military extravagances which followed, and which form the distinguishing
feature of the counter-revolution, of course checked the feeling of union on
both sides. But so deeply was it rooted in all the antecedents of modern
history that peace soon restored it to life, in spite of the pertinacious efforts
of all parties interested in maintaining unnatural separation between France
and other countries. What greatly facilitates this tendency is the decline of
every form of theology, which removes the chief source of former
disagreement. During the last phase of the counter-revolution, and still more

during the long pause in the political movement which followed, each
member of the group entered upon a series of revolutionary efforts more or
less resembling those of the central nation. And our recent political changes
cannot but strengthen this tendency; though of course with nations less fully
prepared the results of these efforts have at present been less important than
in France. Meanwhile it is evident that this uniform condition of internal
agitation gives increased security for peace, by which its extension had
been originally facilitated. And thus, although there is no organized
international union as was the case in the Middle Ages, yet the pacific
habits and intellectual culture of modern life have already been sufficiently
diffused to call out an instinct of fraternity stronger than any that has ever
existed before. It is strong enough to prevent the subject of social
regeneration from being ever regarded as a merely national question.
And this is the point of view which displays the character of the second
phase of the Revolution in its truest light. The first phase, although in its
results advantageous to the other nations, was necessarily conducted as if
peculiar to France, because no other country was ripe for the original
outbreak. Indeed French nationality was stimulated by the necessity of
resisting the counter-revolutionary coalition. But the final and constructive
phase which has begun now that the national limits of the crisis have been
reached, should always be regarded as common to the whole of Western
Europe. For it consists essentially in spiritual reorganization; and the need
of this in one shape or other presses already with almost equal force upon
each of the five nations who make up the great Western family. Conversely,
the more occidental the character of the reforming movement, the greater
will be the prominence given to intellectual and moral regeneration as
compared with mere modifications of government, in which of course there
must be very considerable national differences. The first social need of
Western Europe is community in belief and in habits of life; and this must
be based upon a uniform system of education controlled and applied by a
spiritual power that shall be accepted by all. This want satisfied, the
reconstruction of governments may be carried out in accordance with the
special requirements of each nation. Difference in this respect is legitimate:
it will not affect the essential unity of the Positivist Republic, which will be
bound together by more complete and durable ties than the Catholic
Republic of the Middle Ages.

Not only then do we find from the whole condition of Western Europe
that the movement of opinion transcends in importance all political
agitation; but we find that everything points to the necessity of establishing
a spiritual power, as the sole means of directing this free yet systematic
reform of opinion and of life with the requisite consistency and largeness of
view. We now see that the old revolutionary prejudice of confounding
temporal and spiritual power is directly antagonistic to social regeneration,
although it once aided the preparation for it. In the first place it stimulates
the sense of nationality which ought to be subordinate to larger feelings of
international fraternity. And at the same time, with the view of satisfying
the conditions of uniformity which are so obviously required for the
solution of the common problem, it induces efforts at forcible incorporation
of all the nations into one, efforts as dangerous as they are fruitless.
This Republic My work on Positive Philosophy contains a
consists of the Italian, detailed historical explanation of what I mean by the
Spanish, British, and
German populations,
expression, Western Europe. But the conception is one
grouped round France of such importance in relation to the questions of our
as their centre time, that I shall now proceed to enumerate and arrange
in their order the elements of which this great family of
nations consists.
Since the fall of the Roman empire, and more especially from the time
of Charlemagne, France has always been the centre, socially as well as
geographically, of this Western region which may be called the nucleus of
Humanity. On the one great occasion of united political action on the part of
Western Europe, that is, in the crusades of the eleventh and twelfth century,
it was evidently France that took the initiative. It is true that when the
decomposition of Catholicism began to assume a systematic form, the
centre of the movement for two centuries shifted its position. It was
Germany that gave birth to the metaphysical principles of negation. Their
first political application was in the Dutch and English revolutions, which,
incomplete as they were, owing to insufficient intellectual preparation, yet
served as preludes to the great final crisis. These preludes were most
important, as showing the real social tendency of the critical doctrines. But
it was reserved for France to co-ordinate these doctrines into a consistent
system and to propagate them successfully. France then resumed her
position as the principal centre in which the great moral and political

questions were to be worked out. And this position she will in all
probability retain, as in fact it is only a recurrence to the normal
organization of the Western Republic, which had been temporarily modified
to meet special conditions. A fresh displacement of the centre of the social
movement is not to be expected, unless in a future too distant to engage our
attention. It can indeed only be the result of wide extension of our advanced
civilization beyond European limits, as will be explained in the conclusion
of this work.
North and south of this natural centre, we find two pairs of nations,
between which France will always form an intermediate link, partly from
her geographical position, and also from her language and manners. The
first pair is for the most part Protestant. It comprises, first, the great
Germanic body, with the numerous nations that may be regarded as its
offshoots; especially Holland, which, since the Middle Ages, has been in
every respect the most advanced portion of Germany. Secondly, Great
Britain, with which may be classed the United States, notwithstanding their
present attitude of rivalry. The second pair is exclusively Catholic. It
consists of the great Italian nationality, which in spite of political divisions
has always maintained its distinct character; and of the population of the
Spanish Peninsula (for Portugal, sociologically considered, is not to be
separated from Spain), which has so largely increased the Western family
by its colonies. To complete the conception of this group of advanced
nations, we must add two accessory members, Greece and Poland, countries
which, though situated in Eastern Europe, are connected with the West, the
one by ancient history, the other by modern. Besides these, there are various
intermediate nationalities which I need not now enumerate, connecting or
demarcating the more important branches of the family.
In this vast Republic it is that the new philosophy is to find its sphere of
intellectual and moral action. It will endeavour so to modify the initiative of
the central nation, by the reacting influences of the other four, as to give
increased efficiency to the general movement. It is a task eminently
calculated to test the social capabilities of Positivism, and for which no
other system is qualified. The metaphysical spirit is as unfit for it as the
theological. The rupture of the mediaeval system is due to the decadence of
theology: but the direct agency in the rupture was the solvent force of the
metaphysical spirit. Neither the one nor the other then is likely to recombine

elements, the separation of which is principally due to their own
conceptions. It is entirely to the spontaneous action of the Positive spirit
that we owe those new though insufficient links of union, whether
industrial, artistic, or scientific, which, since the close of the Middle Ages,
have been leading us more and more decidedly to a reconstruction of the
Western alliance. And now that Positivism has assumed its matured and
systematic form, its competence for the work is even more unquestionable.
It alone can effectually remove the national antipathies which still exist. But
it will do this without impairing the natural qualities of any of them. Its
object is by a wise combination of these qualities, to develop under a new
form the feeling of a common Occidentality.
Relation of Positivism By extending the social movement to its proper
to the mediaeval limits, we thus exhibit on a larger scale the same
system, to which we
owe the first attempt
features that were noticed when France alone was being
to separate spiritualconsidered. Abroad or at home, every great social
from temporal power problem that arises proves that the object of the second
revolutionary phase is a reorganization of principles and
of life. By this means a body of public opinion will be formed of sufficient
force to lead gradually to the growth of new political institutions. These will
be adapted to the special requirements of each nation, under the general
superintendence of the spiritual power, from whom our fundamental
principles will have proceeded. The general spirit of these principles is
essentially historical, whereas the tendency of the negative phase of the
revolution was anti-historical. Without blind hatred of the past, men would
never have had sufficient energy to abandon the old system. But henceforth
the best evidence of having attained complete emancipation will be the
rendering full justice to the past in all its phases. This is the most
characteristic feature of that relative spirit which distinguishes Positivism.
The surest sign of superiority, whether in persons or systems, is fair
appreciation of opponents. And this must always be the tendency of social
science when rightly understood, since its prevision of the future is
avowedly based upon systematic examination of the past. It is the only way
in which the free and yet universal adoption of general principles of social
reconstruction can ever be possible. Such reconstruction, viewed by the
light of Sociology, will be regarded as a necessary link in the series of
human development; and thus many confused and incoherent notions
suggested by the arbitrary beliefs hitherto prevalent will finally disappear.

The growth of public opinion in this respect is aided by the increasing
strength of social feeling. Both combine to encourage the historical spirit
which distinguishes the second period of the Revolution, as we see
indicated already in so many of the popular sympathies of the day.
Acting on this principle, Positivists will always acknowledge the close
relation between their own system and the memorable effort of mediaeval
Catholicism. In offering for the acceptance of Humanity a new organization
of life, we would not dissociate it with all that has gone before. On the
contrary, it is our boast that we are but proposing for her maturity the
accomplishment of the noble effort of her youth, an effort made when
intellectual and social conditions precluded the possibility of success. We
are too full of the future to fear any serious charge of retrogression towards
the past. It would be strange were such a charge to proceed from those of
our opponents whose political ideal is that amalgamation of temporal and
spiritual power which was adopted by the theocratic or military systems of
antiquity.
The separation of these powers in the Middle Ages is the greatest
advance ever yet made in the theory of social Order. It was imperfectly
effected, because the time was not ripe for it; but enough was done to show
the object of the separation, and some of its principal results were partially
arrived at. It originated the fundamental doctrine of modern social life, the
subordination of Politics to Morals; a doctrine which in spite of the most
obstinate resistance has survived the decline of the religion which first
proclaimed it. We see it now sanctioned by a republican government which
has shaken off the fetters of that religion more completely than any other. A
further result of the separation is the keen sense of personal honour,
combined with general fraternity, which distinguishes Western nations,
especially those who have been preserved from Protestantism. To the same
source is due the general feeling that men should be judged by their
intellectual and moral worth, irrespectively of social position, yet without
upsetting that subordination of classes which is rendered necessary by the
requirements of practical life. And this has accustomed all classes to free
discussion of moral and even of political questions; since every one feels it
a right and a duty to judge actions and persons by the general principles
which a common system of education has inculcated alike on all. I need not
enlarge on the value of the mediaeval church in organizing the political

system of Western Europe, in which there was no other recognized principle
of union. All these social results are usually attributed to the excellence of
the Christian doctrine; but history when fairly examined shows that the
source from which they are principally derived is the Catholic principle of
separating the two powers. For these effects are nowhere visible except in
the countries where this separation has been effected, although a similar
code of morals and indeed a faith identically the same have been received
elsewhere. Besides, although sanctioned by the general tone of modern life,
they have been neutralized to a considerable extent by the decline of the
Catholic organization, and this especially in the countries where the greatest
efforts have been made to restore the doctrine to its original purity and
power.
In these respects Positivism has already appreciated Catholicism more
fully than any of its own defenders, not even excepting De Maistre himself,
as indeed some of the more candid organs of the retrograde school have
allowed. But the merit of Catholicism does not merely depend on the fact
that it forms a most important link in the series of human development.
What adds to the glory of its efforts is that, as history clearly proves, they
were in advance of their time. The political failure of Catholicism resulted
from the imperfection of its doctrines, and the resistance of the social
medium in which it worked. It is true that Monotheism is far more
compatible with the separation of powers than Polytheism. But from the
absolute character of every kind of theology, there was always a tendency in
the mediaeval system to degenerate into mere theocracy. In fact, the
proximate cause of its decline was the increased development of this
tendency in the fourteenth century, and the resistance which it provoked
among the kings, who stood forward to represent the general voice of
condemnation. Again, though separation of powers was less difficult in the
defensive system of mediaeval warfare than in the aggressive system of
antiquity, yet it is thoroughly repugnant to the military spirit in all its
phases, because adverse to that concentration of authority which is requisite
in war. And thus it was never thoroughly realized, except in the conceptions
of a few leading men among both the spiritual and temporal class. Its brief
success was principally caused by a temporary combination of
circumstances. It was for the most part a condition of very unstable
equilibrium, oscillating between theocracy and empire.

But the mediaeval
But Positive civilization will accomplish what in
attempt was the Middle Ages could only be attempted. We are aided,
premature; and not merely by the example of the Middle Ages, but by
Positivism will renew
and complete it
the preparatory labours of the last five centuries. New
modes of thought have arisen, and practical life has
assumed new phases; and all are alike tending towards the separation of
powers. What in the Middle Ages was but dimly foreseen by a few ardent
and aspiring minds, becomes now an inevitable and obvious result,
instinctively felt and formally recognized by all. From the intellectual point
of view it is nothing more than the distinction between theory and practice;
a distinction which is already admitted more or less formally throughout
civilized Europe in subjects of less importance; which therefore it would be
unreasonable to abandon in the most difficult of all arts and sciences.
Viewed socially, it implies the separation of education from action; or of
morals from politics; and few would deny that the maintenance of this
separation is one of the greatest blessings of our progressive civilization.
The distinction is of equal importance to morality and to liberty. It is the
only way of bringing opinion and conduct under the control of principle; for
the most obvious application of a principle has little weight when it is
merely an act of obedience to a special command. Taking the more general
question of bringing our political forces into harmony, it seems clear that
theoretical and practical power are so totally distinct in origin and
operation, whether in relation to the heart, or intellect, or character, that the
functions of counsel and of command ought never to belong to the same
organs. All attempts to unite them are at once retrograde and visionary, and
if successful would lead to the intolerable government of mediocrities
equally unfit for either kind of power. But as I shall show in the following
chapters this principle of separation will soon find increasing support
among women and the working classes; the two elements of society in
which we find the greatest amount of good sense and right feeling.
Modern society is, in fact, already ripe for the adoption of this
fundamental principle of polity; and the opposition to it proceeds almost
entirely from its connexion with the doctrines of the mediaeval church
which have now become deservedly obsolete. But there will be an end of
these revolutionary prejudices among all impartial observers as soon as the
principle is seen embodied in Positivism, the only doctrine which is wholly
disconnected with Theology. All human conceptions, all social

improvements originated under theological influence, as we see proved
clearly in many of the humblest details of life. But this has never prevented
Humanity from finally appropriating to herself the results of the creeds
which she has outgrown. And so it will be with this great political principle;
it has already become obsolete except for the Positive school, which has
verified inductively all the minor truths implied in it. The only direct attacks
against it come from the metaphysicians, whose ambitious aspirations for
absolute authority would be thwarted by it. It is they who attempt to fasten
on Positivism the stigma of theocracy: a strange and in most cases
disingenuous reproach, seeing that Positivists are distinguished from their
opponents by discarding all beliefs which supersede the necessity for
discussion. The fact is that serious disturbances will soon be caused by the
pertinacious efforts of these adherents of pedantocracy to regulate by law
what ought to be left to moral influences; and then the public will become
more alive to the necessity of the Positivist doctrine of systematically
separating political from moral government. The latter should be
understood to rely exclusively on the forces of conviction and persuasion;
its influence on action being simply that of counsel; whereas the former
employs direct compulsion, based upon superiority of physical force.
We now understand what is meant by the constructive character of the
second revolutionary phase. It implies a union of the social aspirations of
the Middle Ages with the wise political instincts of the Convention. In the
interval of these two periods the more advanced nations were without any
systematic organization, and were abandoned to the two-fold process of
transition, which was decomposing the old order and preparing the new.
Both these preliminary steps are now sufficiently accomplished. The desire
for social regeneration has become too strong to be resisted, and a
philosophical system capable of directing it has already arisen. We may,
therefore, recommence on a better intellectual and social basis the great
effort of Catholicism, to bring Western Europe to a social system of
peaceful activity and intellectual culture, in which Thought and Action
should be subordinated to universal Love. Reconstruction will begin at the
points where demolition began previously. The dissolution of the old
organism began in the fourteenth century by the destruction of its
international character. Conversely, reorganization begins by satisfying the
intellectual and mental wants common to the five Western nations.

The Ethical system of
And here, since the object of this character is to
Positivism explain the social value of Positivism, I may show
briefly that it leads necessarily to the formation of a
definite system of universal Morality; this being the ultimate object of all
Philosophy, and the starting-point of all Polity. Since it is by its moral code
that every spiritual power must be principally tested, this will be the best
mode of judging of the relative merits of Positivism and Catholicism.
Subjection of Self- To the Positivist the object of Morals is to make our
love to Social love is sympathetic instincts preponderate as far as possible
the great ethical
problem. The Social
over the selfish instincts; social feelings over personal
state of itself favours feelings. This way of viewing the subject is peculiar to
this result; but it may the new philosophy, for no other system has included
be hastened by
organized and
the more recent additions to the theory of human nature,
conscious effort of which Catholicism gave so imperfect a
representation.
It is one of the first principles of Biology that organic life always
preponderates over animal life. By this principle the Sociologist explains
the superior strength of the self-regarding instincts, since these are all
connected more or less closely with the instinct of self-preservation. But
although there is no evading this fact, Sociology shows that it is compatible
with the existence of benevolent affections, affections which Catholicism
had asserted to be altogether alien to our nature, and to be entirely
dependent on superhuman Grace derived from a sphere beyond the reach of
Law. The great problem, then, is to raise social feeling by artificial effort to
the position which, in the natural condition, is held by selfish feeling. The
solution is to be found in another biological principle, namely, that
functions and organs are developed by constant exercise, and atrophied by
prolonged inaction. Now the effect of the Social state is, that while our
sympathetic instincts are constantly stimulated, the selfish propensities are
restricted; since, if free play were given to them, human intercourse would
very shortly become impossible. Thus it compensates to some extent the
natural weakness of the Sympathies that they are capable of almost
indefinite extension, while Self-love meets inevitably with a more or less
efficient check. Both these tendencies naturally increase with the progress
of Humanity, and their increase is the best measure of the degree of
perfection that we have attained. Their growth, though spontaneous, may be

materially hastened by organized intervention, both of individuals and of
society, the object being to increase all favourable influences and diminish
the unfavourable. This is the object of the art of Morals. Like every other
art, it is restricted within certain limits. But in this case the limits are less
narrow, because the phenomena, being more complex, are also more
modifiable.
Positive morality differs therefore from that of theological as well as of
metaphysical systems. Its primary principle is the preponderance of Social
Sympathy. Full and free expansion of the benevolent emotions is made the
first condition of individual and social well-being, since these emotions are
at once the sweetest to experience, and are the only feelings which can find
expression simultaneously in all. The doctrine is as deep and pure as it is
simple and true. It is eminently characteristic of a philosophy which, by
virtue of its attribute of reality, subordinates all scientific conceptions to the
social point of view, as the sole point from which they can be co-ordinated
into a whole. The intuitive methods of metaphysics could never advance
with any consistency beyond the sphere of the individual. Theology,
especially Christian theology, could only rise to social conceptions by an
indirect process, forced upon it, not by its principles, but by its practical
functions. Intrinsically, its spirit was altogether personal; the highest object
placed before each individual was the attainment of his own salvation, and
all human affections were made subordinate to the love of God. It is true
that the first training of our higher feelings is due to theological systems;
but their moral value depended mainly on the wisdom of the priesthood.
They compensated the defects of their doctrine, and at that time no better
doctrine was available, by taking advantage of the antagonism which
naturally presented itself between the interests of the imaginary and those of
the real world. The moral value of Positivism on the contrary, is inherent in
its doctrine, and can be largely developed, independently of any spiritual
discipline, though not so far as to dispense with the necessity for such
discipline. Thus, while Morality as a science is made far more consistent by
being placed in its true connexion with the rest of our knowledge, the
sphere of natural morality is widened by bringing human life, individually
and collectively, under the direct and continuous influence of Social
Feeling.

Intermediate between
I have stated that Positive morality is brought into a
self-love and coherent and systematic form by its principle of
universal benevolence universal love. This principle must now be examined
are the domestic
affections: filial,
first in its application to the separate aspects of the
fraternal, conjugal, subject, and subsequently as the means by which the
paternal various parts may be co-ordinated.
There are three successive states of morality answering to the three
principal stages of human life; the personal, the domestic, and the social
stage. The succession represents the gradual training of the sympathetic
principle; it is drawn out step by step by a series of affections which, as it
diminishes in intensity, increases in dignity. This series forms our best
resource in attempting as far as possible to reach the normal state;
subordination of self-love to social feeling. These are the two extremes in
the scale of human affections; but between them there is an intermediate
degree, namely, domestic attachment, and it is on this that the solution of
the great moral problem depends. The love of his family leads Man out of
his original state of Self-love and enables him to attain finally a sufficient
measure of Social love. Every attempt on the part of the moral educator to
call this last into immediate action, regardless of the intermediate stage, is
to be condemned as utterly chimerical and profoundly injurious. Such
attempts are regarded in the present day with far too favourable an eye. Far
from being a sign of social progress, they would, if successful, be an
immense step backwards; since the feeling which inspires them is one of
perverted admiration for antiquity.
Since the importance of domestic life is so great as a transition from
selfish to social feeling, a systematic view of its relations will be the best
mode of explaining the spirit of Positive morality, which is in every respect
based upon the order found in nature.
The first germ of social feeling is seen in the affection of the child for
its parents. Filial love is the starting-point of our moral education: from it
springs the instinct of Continuity, and consequently of reverence for our
ancestors. It is the first tie by which the new being feels himself bound to
the whole past history of Man. Brotherly love comes next, implanting the
instinct of Solidarity, that is to say of union with our contemporaries; and
thus we have already a sort of outline of social existence. With maturity
new phases of feeling are developed. Relationships are formed of an

entirely voluntary nature; which have therefore a still more social character
than the involuntary ties of earlier years. This second stage in moral
education begins with conjugal affection, the most important of all, in
which perfect fullness of devotion is secured by the reciprocity and
indissolubility of the bond. It is the highest type of all sympathetic instincts,
and has appropriated to itself in a special sense the name of Love. From this
most perfect of unions proceeds the last in the series of domestic
sympathies, parental love. It completes the training by which Nature
prepares us for universal sympathy: for it teaches us to care for our
successors; and thus it binds us to the Future, as filial love had bound us to
the Past.
I placed the voluntary class of domestic sympathies after the
involuntary, because it was the natural order of individual development, and
it thus bore out my statement of the necessity of family life as an
intermediate stage between personal and social life. But in treating more
directly of the theory of the Family as the constituent element of the body
politic, the inverse order should be followed. In that case conjugal
attachment would come first, as being the feeling through which the family
comes into existence as a new social unit, which in many cases consists
simply of the original pair. Domestic sympathy, when once formed by
marriage, is perpetuated first by parental then by filial affection; it may
afterwards be developed by the tie of brotherhood, the only relation by
which different families can be brought into direct contact. The order
followed here is that of decrease in intensity, and increase in extension. The
feeling of fraternity, which I place last, because it is usually least powerful,
will be seen to be of primary importance when regarded as the transition
from domestic to social affections; it is, indeed, the natural type to which all
social sympathies conform. But there is yet another intermediate relation,
without which this brief exposition of the theory of the family would be
incomplete; I mean the relation of household servitude, which may be
called indifferently domestic or social. It is a relation which at the present
time is not properly appreciated on account of our dislike to all subjection;
and yet the word domestic is enough to remind us that in every normal state
of Humanity, it supplies what would otherwise be a want in household
relations. Its value lies in completing the education of the social instinct, by
a special apprenticeship in obedience and command, both being
subordinated to the universal principle of mutual sympathy.

The object of the preceding remarks was to show the efficacy of the
Positive method in moral questions by applying it to the most important of
all moral theories, the theory of the Family. For more detailed proof, I must
refer to my treatise on Positive Polity, to which this work is introductory. I
would call attention, however, to the beneficial influence of Positivism on
personal morality. Actions which hitherto had always been referred even by
Catholic philosophers to personal interests, are now brought under the great
principle of Love on which the whole Positive doctrine is based.
Personal virtues Feelings are only to be developed by constant
placed upon a social exercise; and exercise is most necessary when the
basis
intrinsic energy of the feeling is least. It is therefore
quite contrary to the true spirit of moral education to degrade duty in
questions of personal morality to a mere calculation of self-interest. Of
course, in this elementary part of Ethics, it is easier to estimate the
consequences of actions, and to show the personal utility of the rules
enjoined. But this method of procedure inevitably stimulates the self-
regarding propensities, which are already too preponderant, and the exercise
of which ought as far as possible to be discouraged. Besides, it often results
in practical failure. To leave the decision of such questions to the judgment
of the individual, is to give a formal sanction to all the natural difference in
men’s inclinations. When the only motive urged is consideration for
personal consequences, every one feels himself to be the best judge of
these, and modifies the rule at his pleasure. Positivism, guided by a truer
estimate of the facts, entirely remodels this elementary part of Ethics. Its
appeal is to social feeling, and not to personal, since the actions in question
are of a kind in which the individual is far from being the only person
interested. For example, such virtues as temperance and chastity are
inculcated by the Positivist on other grounds than those of their personal
advantages. He will not of course be blind to their individual value; but this
is an aspect on which he will not dwell too much, for fear of concentrating
attention on self-interest. At all events, he will never make it the basis of his
precepts, but will invariably rest them upon their social value. There are
cases in which men are preserved by an unusually strong constitution from
the injurious effects of intemperance or libertinage; but such men are bound
to sobriety and continence as vigorously as the rest, because without these
virtues they cannot perform their social duties rightly. Even in the
commonest of personal virtues, cleanliness, this alteration in the point of

view may be made with advantage. A simple sanitary regulation is thus
ennobled by knowing that the object of it is to make each one of us more fit
for the service of others. In this way and in no other, can moral education
assume its true character at the very outset. We shall become habituated to
the feeling of subordination to Humanity, even in our smallest actions. It is
in these that we should be trained to gain the mastery over the lower
propensities; and the more so that, in these simple cases, it is less difficult to
appreciate their consequences.
The influence of Positivism on personal morality is in itself a proof of
its superiority to other systems. Its superiority in domestic morality we have
already seen, and yet this was the best aspect of Catholicism, forming
indeed the principal basis of its admirable moral code. On social morality
strictly so called, I need not dwell at length. Here the value of the new
philosophy will be more direct and obvious, the fact of its standing at the
social point of view being the very feature which distinguishes it from all
other systems. In defining the mutual duties arising from the various
relations of life, or again in giving solidity and extension to the instinct of
our common fraternity, neither theological nor metaphysical morality can
bear comparison with Positivism. Its precepts are adapted without difficulty
to the special requirements of each case, because they are ever in harmony
with the general laws of society and of human nature. But on these obvious
characteristics of Positivism I need not further enlarge, as I shall have other
occasions for referring to them.
After this brief exposition of Positive morality I must allude with equal
brevity to the means by which it will be established and applied. These are
of two kinds. The first lay down the foundations of moral training for each
individual: they furnish principles, and they regulate feelings. The second
carry out the work begun, and ensure the application of the principles
inculcated to practical life. Both these functions are in the first instance
performed spontaneously, under the influence of the doctrine and of the
sympathies evoked by it. But for their adequate performance a spiritual
power specially devoted to the purpose is necessary.
Moral education The moral education of the Positivist is based both
consists partly of upon Reason and on Feeling, the latter having always
scientific
demonstration of
the preponderance, in accordance with the primary
ethical truth, but still principle of the system.

more of culture of the The result of the rational basis is to bring moral
highest sympathies
precepts to the test of rigorous demonstration, and to
secure them against all danger from discussion, by showing that they rest
upon the laws of our individual and social nature. By knowing these laws,
we are enabled to form a judgment of the influence of each affection,
thought, action, or habit, be that influence direct or indirect, special or
general, in private life or in public. Convictions based upon such knowledge
will be as deep as any that are formed in the present day from the strictest
scientific evidence, with the excess of intensity due to their higher
importance and their close connexion with our noblest feelings. Nor will
such convictions be limited to those who are able to appreciate the logical
value of the arguments. We see constantly in other departments of Positive
science that men will adopt notions upon trust, and carry them out with the
same zeal and confidence, as if they were thoroughly acquainted with all
the grounds for their belief. All that is necessary is, that they should feel
satisfied that their confidence is well bestowed, the fact being, in spite of all
that is said of the independence of modern thought, that it is often given too
readily. The most willing assent is yielded every day to the rules which
mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, chemists, or biologists, have laid
down in their respective arts, even in cases where the greatest interests are
at stake. And similar assent will certainly be accorded to moral rules when
they, like the rest, shall be acknowledged to be susceptible of scientific
proof.
But while using the force of demonstration to an extent hitherto
impossible, Positivists will take care not to exaggerate its importance.
Moral education, even in its more systematic parts, should rest principally
upon Feeling, as the mere statement of the great human problem indicates.
The study of moral questions, intellectually speaking, is most valuable; but
the effect it leaves is not directly moral, since the analysis will refer, not to
our own actions, but to those of others; for all scientific investigations, to be
impartial and free from confusion, must be objective, not subjective. Now
to judge others without immediate reference to self, is a process which may
possibly result in strong convictions, but so far from calling out right
feelings, it will, if carried too far, interfere with or check their natural
development. However, the new school of moralists is the less likely to err
in this direction, that it would be totally inconsistent with that profound
knowledge of human nature in which Positivism has already shown itself so

far superior to Catholicism. No one knows so well as the Positivist that the
principal source of real morality lies in direct exercise of our social
sympathies, whether systematic or spontaneous. He will spare no efforts to
develop these sympathies from the earliest years by every method which
sound philosophy can indicate. It is in this that moral education, whether
private or public, principally consists; and to it mental education is always
to be held subordinate. I shall revert to these remarks in the next chapter,
when I come to the general question of educating the People.
Organization of But however efficient the training received in
Public Opinion youth, it will not be enough to regulate our conduct in
after years, amidst all the distracting influences of
practical life, unless the same spiritual power which provides the education
prolong its influence over our maturity. Part of its task will be to recall
individuals, classes, and even nations, when the case requires it, to
principles which they have forgotten or misinterpreted, and to instruct them
in the means of applying them wisely. And here, even more than in the
work of education strictly so called, the appeal will be to Feeling rather than
to pure Reason. Its force will be derived from Public Opinion strongly
organized. If the spiritual power awards its praise and blame justly, public
opinion, as I shall show in the next chapter, will lend it the most irresistible
support. This moral action of Humanity upon each of her members has
always existed whenever there was any real community of principles and
feelings. But its strength will be far greater under the Positive system. The
reality of the doctrine and the social character of modern civilization give
advantages to the new spiritual power which were denied to Catholicism.
Commemoration of And these advantages are brought forward very
great men prominently by the Positive system of commemoration.
Commemoration, when regularly instituted, is a most
valuable instrument in the hands of a spiritual power for continuing the
work of moral education. It was the absolute character of Catholicism, even
more than the defective state of mediaeval society, that caused the failure of
its noble aspirations to become the universal religion. In spite of all its
efforts, its system of commemoration has always been restricted to very
narrow limits, both in time and space. Outside these limits, Catholicism has
always shown the same blindness and injustice that it now complains of
receiving from its own opponents. Positivism, on the contrary, can yield the

full measure of praise to all times and all countries, without either weakness
or inconsistency. Possessing the true theory of human development, every
mode and phase of that development will be celebrated. Thus every moral
precept will be supported by the influence of posterity; and this in private
life as well as in public, for the system of commemoration will be applied in
the same spirit to the humblest services as well as to the highest.
While reserving special details for the treatise to which this work is
introductory, I may yet give one illustration of this important aspect of
Positivism; an illustration which probably will be the first step in the
practical application of the system. I would propose to institute in Western
Europe on any days that may be thought suitable, the yearly celebration of
the three greatest of our predecessors, Caesar, St. Paul and Charlemagne,
who are respectively the highest types of Greco-Roman civilization, of
Mediaeval Feudalism, and of Catholicism, which forms the link between
the two periods. The services of these illustrious men have never yet been
adequately recognized, for want of a sound historical theory enabling us to
explain the prominent part which they played in the development of our
race. Even in St. Paul’s case the omission is noticeable. Positivism gives
him a still higher place than has been given him by Theology; for it looks
upon him as historically the founder of the religion which bears the
inappropriate name of Christianity. In the other two cases the influence of
Positive principles is even more necessary. For Caesar has been almost
equally misjudged by theological and by metaphysical writers; and
Catholicism has done very little for the appreciation of Charlemagne.
However, notwithstanding the absence of any systematic appreciation of
these great men, yet from the reverence with which they are generally
regarded, we can hardly doubt that the celebration here proposed would
meet with ready acceptance throughout Western Europe.
To illustrate my meaning still further, I may observe that history
presents cases where exactly the opposite course is called for, and which
should be held up not for approbation but for infamy. Blame, it is true,
should not be carried to the same extent as praise, because it stimulates the
destructive instincts to a degree which is always painful and sometimes
injurious. Yet strong condemnation is occasionally desirable. It strengthens
social feelings and principles, if only by giving more significance to our
approval. Thus I would suggest that after doing honour to the three great

men who have done so much to promote the development of our race, there
should be a solemn reprobation of the two principal opponents of progress,
Julian and Bonaparte; the latter being the more criminal of the two, the
former the more insensate. Their influence has been sufficiently extensive
6
to allow of all the Western nations joining in this damnatory verdict.
The principal function of the spiritual power is to direct the future of
society by means of education; and, as a supplementary part of education,
to pronounce judgment upon the past in the mode here indicated. But there
are functions of another kind, relating more immediately to the present; and
these too result naturally from its position as an educating body. If the
educators are men worthy of their position, it will give them an influence
over the whole course of practical life, whether private or public. Of course
it will merely be the influence of counsel, and practical men will be free to
accept or reject it; but its weight may be very considerable when given
prudently, and when the authority from which it proceeds is recognized as
competent. The questions on which its advice is most needed are the
relations between different classes. Its action will be coextensive with the
diffusion of Positive principles; for nations professing the same faith, and
sharing in the same education, will naturally accept the same intellectual
and moral directors. In the next chapter I shall treat this subject more in
detail. I merely mention it here as one among the list of functions belonging
to the new spiritual power.
The political motto of It will now not be difficult to show all the
characteristics of Positivism are summed up in the
Positivism: Order and
Progress
motto, Order and Progress, a motto which has a
philosophical as well as political bearing, and which I shall always feel glad
to have put forward.
Positivism is the only school which has given a definite significance to
these two conceptions, whether regarded from their scientific or their social
aspect. With regard to Progress, the assertion will hardly be disputed, no
definition of it but the Positive ever having yet been given. In the case of
Order, it is less apparent; but, as I have shown in the first chapter, it is no
less profoundly true. All previous philosophies had regarded Order as
stationary, a conception which rendered it wholly inapplicable to modern
politics. But Positivism, by rejecting the absolute, and yet not introducing

the arbitrary, represents Order in a totally new light, and adapts it to our
progressive civilization. It places it on the firmest possible foundation, that
is, on the doctrine of the invariability of the laws of nature, which defends it
against all danger from subjective chimeras. The Positivist regards artificial
Order in Social phenomena, as in all others, as resting necessarily upon the
Order of nature, in other words, upon the whole series of natural laws.
Progress, the But Order has to be reconciled with Progress: and
development of Order here Positivism is still more obviously without a rival.
Necessary as the reconciliation is, no other system has
even attempted it. But the facility with which we are now enabled, by the
encyclopædic scale, to pass from the simplest mathematical phenomena to
the most complicated phenomena of political life, leads at once to a solution
of the problem. Viewed scientifically, it is an instance of that necessary
correlation of existence and movement, which we find indicated in the
inorganic world, and which becomes still more distinct in Biology. Finding
it in all the lower sciences, we are prepared for its appearance in a still more
definite shape in Sociology. Here its practical importance becomes more
obvious, though it had been implicitly involved before. In Sociology the
correlation assumes this form: Order is the condition of all Progress;
Progress is always the object of Order. Or, to penetrate the question still
more deeply, Progress may be regarded simply as the development of
Order; for the order of nature necessarily contains within itself the germ of
all possible progress. The rational view of human affairs is to look on all
their changes, not as new Creations, but as new Evolutions. And we find
this principle fully borne out in history. Every social innovation has its roots
in the past; and the rudest phases of savage life show the primitive trace of
all subsequent improvement.
Analysis of Progress: Progress then is in its essence identical with Order,
material, physical, and may be looked upon as Order made manifest.
intellectual, and moral
Therefore, in explaining this double conception on
which the Science and Art of society depend, we may at present limit
ourselves to the analysis of Progress. Thus simplified it is more easy to
grasp, especially now that the novelty and importance of the question of
Progress are attracting so much attention. For the public is becoming
instinctively alive to its real significance, as the basis on which all sound
moral and political teaching must henceforth rest.

Taking, then, this point of view, we may say that the one great object of
life, personal and social, is to become more perfect in every way; in our
external condition first, but also, and more especially, in our own nature.
The first kind of Progress we share in common with the higher animals; all
of which make some efforts to improve their material position. It is of
course the least elevated stage of progress; but being the easiest, it is the
point from which we start towards the higher stages. A nation that has made
no efforts to improve itself materially, will take but little interest in moral or
mental improvement. This is the only ground on which enlightened men can
feel much pleasure in the material progress of our own time. It stirs up
influences that tend to the nobler kinds of Progress; influences which would
meet with even greater opposition than they do, were not the temptations
presented to the coarser natures by material prosperity so irresistible. Owing
to the mental and moral anarchy in which we live, systematic efforts to gain
the higher degrees of Progress are as yet impossible; and this explains,
though it does not justify, the exaggerated importance attributed nowadays
to material improvements. But the only kinds of improvement really
characteristic of Humanity are those which concern our own nature; and
even here we are not quite alone; for several of the higher animals show
some slight tendencies to improve themselves physically.
Progress in the higher sense includes improvements of three sorts; that
is to say, it may be Physical, Intellectual, or Moral progress; the difficulty of
each class being in proportion to its value and the extent of its sphere.
Physical progress, which again might be divided on the same principle,
seems under some of its aspects almost the same thing as material. But
regarded as a whole it is far more important and far more difficult: its
influence on the well-being of Man is also much greater. We gain more, for
instance, by the smallest addition to length of life, or by any increased
security for health, than by the most elaborate improvements in our modes
of travelling by land or water, in which birds will probably always have a
great advantage over us. However, as I said before, physical progress is not
exclusively confined to Man. Some of the animals, for instance, advance as
far as cleanliness, which is the first step in the progressive scale.
Intellectual and Moral progress, then, is the only kind really distinctive
of our race. Individual animals sometimes show it, but never a whole
species, except as a consequence of prolonged intervention on the part of

Man. Between these two highest grades, as between the two lower, we shall
find a difference of value, extent, and difficulty; always supposing the
standard to be the manner in which they affect Man’s well-being,
collectively or individually. To strengthen the intellectual powers, whether
for art or for science, whether it be the powers of observation or those of
induction and deduction, is, when circumstances allow of their being made
available for social purposes, of greater and more extensive importance,
than all physical, and, a fortiori than all material improvements. But we
know from the fundamental principle laid down in the first chapter of this
work, that moral progress has even more to do with our well-being than
intellectual progress. The moral faculties are more modifiable, although the
effort required to modify them is greater. If the benevolence or courage of
the human race were increased, it would bring more real happiness than any
addition to our intellectual powers. Therefore to the question, What is the
true object of human life, whether looked at collectively or individually?
the simplest and most precise answer would be, the perfection of our moral
nature; since it has a more immediate and certain influence on our well-
being than perfection of any other kind. All the other kinds are necessary, if
for no other reason than to prepare the way for this; but from the very fact
of this connexion it may be regarded as their representative; since it
involves them all implicitly and stimulates them to increased activity.
Keeping then to the question of moral perfection, we find two qualities
standing above the rest in practical importance, namely, Sympathy and
Energy. Both these qualities are included in the word Heart, which in all
European languages has a different meaning for the two sexes. Both will be
developed by Positivism, more directly, more continuously, and with greater
result, than under any former system. The whole tendency of Positivism is
to encourage sympathy; since it subordinates every thought, desire, and
action to social feeling. Energy is also presupposed, and at the same time
fostered, by the system. For it removes a heavy weight of superstition, it
reveals the true dignity of man, and it supplies an unceasing motive for
individual and collective action. The very acceptance of Positivism
demands some vigour of character; it implies the braving of spiritual
terrors, which were once enough to intimidate the firmest minds.
Progress, then, may be regarded under four successive aspects:
Material, Physical, Intellectual, and Moral. Each of these might again be
divided on the same principle, and we should then discover several

intermediate phases. These cannot be investigated here; and I have only to
note that the philosophical principle of this analysis is precisely the same as
that on which I have based the Classification of the Sciences. In both cases
the order followed is that of increasing generality and complexity in the
phenomena. The only difference is in the mode in which the two
arrangements are developed. For scientific purposes the lower portion of the
scale has to be expanded into greater detail; while from the social point of
view attention is concentrated on the higher parts. But whether it be the
scale of the True or that of the Good, the conclusion is the same in both.
Both alike indicate the supremacy of social considerations; both point to
universal Love as the highest ideal.
I have now explained the principal purpose of Positive Philosophy,
namely, spiritual reorganization; and I have shown how that purpose is
involved in the Positivist motto, Order and Progress. Positivism, then,
realizes the highest aspirations of mediaeval Catholicism, and at the same
time fulfils the conditions, the absence of which caused the failure of the
Convention. It combines the opposite merits of the Catholic and the
Revolutionary spirit, and by so doing supersedes them both. Theology and
Metaphysics may now disappear without danger, because the service which
each of them rendered is now harmonized with that of the other, and will be
performed more perfectly. The principle on which this result depends is the
separation of spiritual from temporal power. This, it will be remembered,
had always been the chief subject of contention between the two
antagonistic parties.
Application of our I have spoken of the moral and mental
principles to actualreorganization of Western Europe as characterizing the
politics. All
government must for
second phase of the Revolution. Let us now see what
the present be are its relations with the present state of politics. Of
provisional course the development of Positivism will not be much
affected by the retrograde tendencies of the day,
whether theological or metaphysical. Still the general course of events will
exercise an influence upon it, of which it is important to take account. So
too, although the new doctrine cannot at present do much to modify its
surroundings, there are yet certain points in which action may be taken at
once. In the fourth volume of this treatise the question of a transitional
policy will be carefully considered, with the view of facilitating the advent

of the normal state which social science indicates in a more distant future. I
cannot complete this chapter without some notice of this provisional policy,
which must be carried on until Positivism has made its way to general
acceptance.
The principal feature of this policy is that it is temporary. To set up any
permanent institution in a society which has no fixed opinions or principles
of life, would be hopeless. Until the most important questions are
thoroughly settled, both in principle and practice, the only measures of the
least utility are those which facilitate the process of reconstruction.
Measures adopted with a view to permanence must end, as we have seen
them end so often, in disappointment and failure, however enthusiastically
they may have been received at first.
Inevitable as this consequence of our revolutionary position is, it has
never been understood, except by the great leaders of the republican
movement in 1793. Of the various governments that we have had during the
last two generations, all, except the Convention, have fallen into the vain
delusion of attempting to found permanent institutions, without waiting for
any intellectual or moral basis. And therefore it is that none but the
Convention has left any deep traces in men’s thoughts or feelings. All its
principal measures, even those which concerned the future more than the
present, were avowedly provisional; and the consequence was that they
harmonized well with the peculiar circumstances of the time. The true
philosopher will always look with respectful admiration on these men, who
not only had no rational theory to guide them, but were encumbered with
false metaphysical notions; and who yet notwithstanding proved themselves
the only real statesmen that Western Europe can boast of since the time of
Frederick the Great. Indeed the wisdom of their policy would be almost
unaccountable, only that the very circumstances which called for it so
urgently, were to some extent calculated to suggest it. The state of things
was such as to make it impossible to settle the government on any
permanent basis. Again, amidst all the wild extravagance of the principles
in vogue, the necessity of a strong government to resist foreign invasion
counteracted many of their worst effects. On the removal of this salutary
pressure, the Convention fell into the common error, though to a less extent
than the Constituent Assembly. It set up a constitution framed according to
some abstract model, which was supposed to be final, but which did not last

so long as the period originally proposed for its own provisional labours. It
is on this first period of its government that its fame rests.
The plan originally proposed was that the government of the
Convention should last till the end of the war. If this plan could have been
carried out, it would probably have been extended still further, as the
impossibility of establishing any permanent system would have been
generally recognized. The only avowed motive for making the government
provisional was of course the urgent necessity of national defence. But
beneath this temporary motive, which for the time superseded every other
consideration, there was another and a deeper motive for it, which could not
have been understood without sounder historical principles than were at that
time possible. That motive was the utterly negative character of the
metaphysical doctrines then accepted, and the consequent absence of any
intellectual or moral basis for political reconstruction. This of course was
not recognized, but it was really the principal reason why the establishment
of any definite system of government was delayed. Had the war been
brought to an end, clearer views of the subject would no doubt have been
formed; indeed they had been formed already in the opposite camp, by men
of the Neo-catholic school, who were not absorbed by the urgent question
of defending the Republic. What blinded men to the truth was the
fundamental yet inevitable error of supposing the critical doctrines of the
preceding generation applicable to purposes of construction. They were
undeceived at last by the utter anarchy which the triumph of these
principles occasioned; and the next generation occupied itself with the
counter-revolutionary movement, in which similar attempts at finality were
made by the various reactionist parties. For these parties were quite as
destitute as their opponents of any principles suited to the task of
reconstruction; and they had to fall back upon the old system as the only
recognized basis on which public Order could be maintained.
Danger of attempting And in this respect the situation is still unchanged.
political It still retains its revolutionary character; and any
reconstruction before
spiritual
immediate attempt to reorganize political administration
would only be the signal for fresh attempts at reaction,
attempts which now can have no other result than anarchy. It is true that
Positivism has just supplied us with a philosophical basis for political
reconstruction. But its principles are still so new and undeveloped, and

besides are understood by so few, that they cannot exercise much influence
at present on political life. Ultimately, and by slow degrees, they will mould
the institutions of the future; but meanwhile they must work their way
freely into men’s minds and hearts, and for this at least one generation will
be necessary. Spiritual organization is the only point where an immediate
beginning can be made; difficult as it is, its possibility is at last as certain as
its urgency. When sufficient progress has been made with it, it will cause a
gradual regeneration of political institutions. But any attempt to modify
these too rapidly would only result in fresh disturbances. Such disturbances,
it is true, will never be as dangerous as they were formerly, because the
anarchy of opinion is so profound that it is far more difficult for men to
agree in any fixed principles of action. The absolute doctrines of the last
century which inspired such intense conviction, can never regain their
strength, because, when brought to the crucial test of experience as well as
of discussion, their uselessness for constructive purposes and their
subversive tendency became evident to every one. They have been
weakened, too, by theological concessions which their supporters, in order
to carry on the government at all, were obliged to make. Consequently the
policy with which they are at present connected is one which oscillates
between reaction and anarchy, or rather which is at once despotic and
destructive, from the necessity of controlling a society which has become
almost as diverse to metaphysical as to theological rule. In the utter
absence, then, of any general convictions, the worst forms of political
commotion are not to be feared, because it would be impossible to rouse
men’s passions sufficiently. But unwise efforts to set up a permanent system
of government would even now lead, in certain cases, to lamentable
disorder, and would at all events be utterly useless. Quiet at home depends
now, like peace abroad, simply on the absence of disturbing forces; a most
insecure basis, since it is itself a symptom of the extent to which the
disorganizing movement has proceeded. This singular condition must
necessarily continue until the interregnum which at present exists in the
moral and intellectual region comes to an end. As long as there is such an
utter want of harmony in feeling as well as in opinion, there can be no real
security against war or internal disorder. The existing equilibrium has arisen
so spontaneously that it is no doubt less unstable than is generally supposed.
Still it is sufficiently precarious to excite continual panics, both at home and
abroad, which are not only very irritating, but often exercise a most

injurious influence over our policy. Now attempts at immediate
reconstruction of political institutions, instead of improving this state of
things, make it very much worse, by giving factitious life to the old
doctrines, which, being thoroughly worn out, ought to be left to the natural
process of decay. The inevitable result of restoring them to official authority
will be to deter the public, and even the thinking portion of it, from that free
exercise of the mental powers by which, and by which only, we may hope
to arrive without disturbance at fixed principles of action.
The cessation of war therefore justifies no change in republican policy.
As long as the spiritual interregnum lasts, it must retain its provisional
character. Indeed this character ought to be more strongly impressed upon it
than ever. For no one now has any real belief in the organic value of the
received metaphysical doctrines. They would never have been revived but
for the need of having some sort of political formula to work with, in
default of any real social convictions. But the revival is only apparent, and
it contrasts most strikingly with the utter absence of systematic principles in
most active minds. There is no real danger of repeating the error of the first
revolutionists and of attempting to construct with negative doctrines. We
have only to consider the vast development of industry, of esthetic culture,
and of scientific study, to free ourselves from all anxiety on this head. Such
things are incompatible with any regard for the metaphysical teaching of
ideologists or psychologists. Nor is there much to fear in the natural
enthusiasm which is carrying us back to the first days of the Revolution. It
will only revive the old republican spirit, and make us forget the long period
of retrogression and stagnation which have elapsed since the first great
outbreak; for this is the point on which the attention of posterity will be
finally concentrated. But while satisfying these very legitimate feelings, the
people will soon find that the only aspect of this great crisis which we have
to imitate is the wise insight of the Convention during the first part of its
administration, in perceiving that its policy could only be provisional, and
that definite reconstruction must be reserved for better times. We may fairly
hope that the next formal attempt to set up a constitution according to some
abstract ideal, will convince the French nation, and ultimately the whole
West, of the utter futility of such schemes. Besides, the free discussion
which has now become habitual to us, and the temper of the people, which
is as sceptical of political entities as of Christian mysteries, would make any
such attempts extremely difficult. Never was there a time so unfavourable

to doctrines admitting of no real demonstration: demonstration being now
the only possible basis of permanent belief. Supposing then a new
constitution to be set on foot, and the usual time to be spent in the process
of elaborating it, public opinion will very possibly discard it before it is
completed; not allowing it even the short average duration of former
constitutions. Any attempt to check free discussion on the subject would
defeat its own object; since free discussion is the natural consequence of
our intellectual and social position.
Politically what is The same conditions which require our policy to be
wanted is provisional while the spiritual interregnum lasts, point
Dictatorship, with
liberty of speech and
also to the mode in which this provisional policy should
discussion be carried out. Had the revolutionary government of the
Convention continued till the end of the war, it would
probably have been prolonged up to the present time. But in one most
important respect a modification would have been necessary. During the
struggle for independence what was wanted was a vigorous dictatorship,
combining spiritual with temporal powers: a dictatorship even stronger than
the old monarchy, and only distinguished from despotism by its ardour in
the cause of progress. Without complete concentration of political power,
the republic could never have been saved. But with peace the necessity for
such concentration was at an end. The only motive for still continuing the
provisional system was the absence of social convictions. But this would
also be a motive for giving perfect liberty of speech and discussion, which
till then had been impossible or dangerous. For liberty was a necessary
condition for elaborating and diffusing a new system of universal
principles, as the only sure basis for the future regeneration of society.
This hypothetical view of changes which might have taken place in the
Conventional government, may be applied to the existing condition of
affairs. It is the policy best adapted for the republican government which is
now arising in all the security of a settled peace, and yet amidst the most
entire anarchy of opinion. The successors of the Convention, men unworthy
of their task, degraded the progressive dictatorship entrusted to them by the
circumstances of the time into a retrograde tyranny. During the reign of
Charles X, which was the last phase of the reaction, the central power was
thoroughly undermined by the legal opposition of the parliamentary or local
power. The central government still refused to recognize any limits to its

authority; but the growth of free thought made its claims to spiritual
jurisdiction more and more untenable, leaving it merely the temporal
authority requisite for public order. During the neutral period which
followed the counter-revolution, the dictatorship was not merely restricted
to its proper functions, but was legally destroyed; that is the local power as
represented by parliament took the place of the central power. All
pretentions to spiritual influence were abandoned by both; their thoughts
being sufficiently occupied with the maintenance of material order. The
intellectual anarchy of the time made this task difficult enough; but they
aggravated the difficulty by unprincipled attempts to establish their
government on the basis of pure self-interest, irrespectively of all moral
considerations. The restoration of the republic and the progressive spirit
aroused by it has no doubt given to both legislative and executive a large
increase of power: to an extent indeed which a few years back would have
caused violent antipathy. But it would be a grievous error for either of them
to attempt to imitate the dictatorial style of the Conventional government.
Unsuccessful in any true sense as the attempt would be, it might occasion
very serious disturbances, which like the obsolete metaphysical principles
in which they originate, would be equally dangerous to Order and to
Progress.
We see, then, that in the total absence of any fixed principles on which
men can unite, the policy required is one which shall be purely provisional,
and limited almost entirely to the maintenance of material order. If order be
preserved, the situation is in all other respects most favourable to the work
of mental and moral regeneration which will prepare the way for the society
of the future. The establishment of a republic in France disproves the false
claims set up by official writers in behalf of constitutional government, as if
it was the final issue of the Revolution. Meantime there is nothing
irrevocable in the republic itself, except the moral principle involved in it,
the absolute and permanent preponderance of Social Feeling; in other
words, the concentration of all the powers of Man upon the common
welfare. This is the only maxim of the day which we can accept as final. It
needs no formal sanction, because it is merely the expression of feelings
generally avowed, all prejudices against it having been entirely swept away.
But with the doctrines and the institutions resulting from them, through
which this dominion of social feeling is to become an organized reality, the
republic has no direct connexion; it would be compatible with many

different solutions of the problem. Politically, the only irrevocable point is
the abolition of monarchy, which for a long time has been in France and to
a less extent throughout the West, the symbol of retrogression.
That spirit of devotion to the public welfare, which is the noblest
feature of republicanism, is strongly opposed to any immediate attempts at
political finality, as being incompatible with conscientious endeavours to
find a real solution of social problems. For before the practical solution can
be hoped for, a systematic basis for it must exist: and this we can hardly
expect to find in the remnants left to us of the old creeds. All that the true
philosopher desires is simply that the question of moral and intellectual
reorganization shall be left to the unrestricted efforts of thinkers of
whatever school. And in advocating this cause, he will plead the interests of
the republic, for the safety of which it is of the utmost importance that no
special set of principles should be placed under official patronage.
Republicanism then, will do far more to protect free thought, and resist
political encroachment, than was done during the Orleanist government by
the retrograde instincts of Catholicism. Catholic resistance to political
reconstructions was strong, but blind: its place will now be more than
supplied by wise indifference on the part of the public, which has learnt by
experience the inevitable failure of these incoherent attempts to realize
metaphysical Utopias. The only danger of the position is lest it divert the
public, even the more reflective portion of it, from deep and continuous
thought, to practical experiments based on superficial and hasty
considerations. It must be owned that the temper of mind which now
prevails would have been most unfavourable for the original elaboration of
Positivism. That work, however, had already been accomplished under the
Constitutional system; which, while not so restrictive as the preceding
government, was yet sufficiently so to concentrate our intellectual powers,
which of themselves would have been too feeble, upon the task. The
original conception had indeed been formed during the preceding reign; but
its development and diffusion took place under the parliamentary system.
Positivism now offers itself for practical application to the question of
social progress, which has become again the prominent question, and will
ever remain so. Unfavourable as the present political temper would have
been to the rise of Positivism, it is not at all so to its diffusion; always
supposing its teachers to be men of sufficient dignity to avoid the snare of
political ambition into which thinkers are now so apt to fall. By explaining,

as it alone can explain, the futility and danger of the various Utopian
schemes which are now competing with each other for the reorganization of
society, Positivism will soon be able to divert public attention from these
political chimeras, to the question of a total reformation of principles and of
life.
Such a dictatorship Republicanism, then, will offer no obstacle to the
would be a step diffusion of Positivist principles. Indeed, there is one
towards the separation
of spiritual and
point of view from which we may regard it as the
temporal power commencement of the normal state. It will gradually
lead to the recognition of the fundamental principle that
spiritual power must be wholly independent of every kind of temporal
power, whether central or local. It is not merely that statesmen will soon
have to confess their inability to decide on the merits of a doctrine which
supposes an amount of deep scientific knowledge from which they must
necessarily be precluded. Besides this, the disturbance caused by the
ambition of metaphysical schemers, who are incapable of understanding the
times in which they live, will induce the public to withdraw their
confidence from such men, and give it only to those who are content to
abandon all political prospects, and to devote themselves to their proper
function as philosophers. Thus Republicanism is, on the whole, favourable
to this great principle of Positivism, the separation of temporal from
spiritual power, notwithstanding the temptations offered to men who wish
to carry their theories into immediate application. The principle seems, no
doubt, in opposition to all our revolutionary prejudices. But the public, as
well as the government, will be brought to it by experience. They will find
it the only means of saving society from the consequences of metaphysical
Utopias, by which Order and Progress are alike threatened. Thinkers too,
those of them at least who are sincere, will cease to regard it with such
blind antipathy, when they see that while it condemns their aspirations to
political influence, it opens out to them a noble and most extensive sphere
of moral influence. Independently of social considerations, it is the only
way in which the philosopher can maintain the dignity to which his position
entitles him, and which is at present so often compromised by the very
success of his political ambition.
The political attitude which ought for the present to
The motto of 1830,
Liberty and Public be assumed is so clearly indicated by all the

Order circumstances of the time, that practical instinct has in
this respect anticipated theory. The right view is well
expressed in the motto, Liberty and Public Order, which was adopted
spontaneously by the middle class at the commencement of the neutral
period in 1830. It is not known who was the author of it; but it is certainly
far too progressive to be considered as representing the feelings of the
monarchy. It is not of course the expression of any systematic convictions;
but no metaphysical school could have pointed out so clearly the two
principal conditions required by the situation. Positivism, while accepting it
as an inspiration of popular wisdom, makes it more complete by adding two
points which should have been contained in it at first, only that they were
too much opposed to existing prejudices to have been sanctioned by public
opinion. Both parts of the motto require some expansion. Liberty ought to
include perfect freedom of teaching; Public Order should involve the
preponderance of the central power over the local. I subjoin a few brief
remarks on these two points, which will be considered more fully in the
fourth volume of this treatise.
Liberty should be Positivism is now the only consistent advocate of
extended to Educationfree speech and free inquiry. Schools of opinion which
do not rest on demonstration, and would consequently
be shaken by any argumentative attacks, can never be sincere in their wish
for Liberty, in the extended sense here given to it. Liberty of writing we
have now had for a long time. But besides this we want liberty of speech;
and also liberty of teaching; that is to say, the abandonment by the State of
all its educational monopolies. Freedom of teaching, of which Positivists
are the only genuine supporters, has become a condition of the first
importance: and this not merely as a provisional measure, but as an
indication of the normal state of things. In the first place, it is the only
means by which any doctrine that has the power of fixing and harmonizing
men’s convictions can become generally known. To legalize any system of
education would imply that such a doctrine had been already found; it most
assuredly is not the way to find it. But again, freedom of teaching is a step
towards the normal state; it amounts to an admission that the problem of
education is one which temporal authorities are incompetent to solve.
Positivists would be the last to deny that education ought to be regularly
organized. Only they assert, first, that as long as the spiritual interregnum
lasts, no organization is possible; and secondly, that whenever the

acceptance of a new synthesis makes it possible, it will be effected by the
spiritual power to which that synthesis gives rise. In the meantime no
general system of State education should be attempted. It will be well,
however, to continue State assistance to those branches of instruction which
are the most liable to be neglected by private enterprise, especially reading
and writing. Moreover, there are certain institutions either established or
revived by the Convention for higher training in special subjects; these
ought to be carefully preserved, and brought up to the present state of our
knowledge, for they contain the germs of principles which will be most
valuable when the problem of reorganizing general education comes before
us. But all the institutions abolished by the Convention ought now to be
finally suppressed. Even the Academies should form no exception to this
rule, for the harm which they have done, both intellectually and morally,
since their reinstalment, has fully justified the wisdom of the men who
decided on their abolition. Government should no doubt exercise constant
vigilance over all private educational institutions; but this should have
nothing to do with their doctrines, but with their morality, a point
scandalously neglected in the present state of the law. These should be the
limits of state interference in education. With these exceptions it should be
left to the unrestricted efforts of private associations, so as to give every
opportunity for a definitive educational system to establish itself. For to
pretend that any satisfactory system exists at present would only be a
hypocritical subterfuge on the part of the authorities. The most important
step towards freedom of education would be the suppression of all grants to
theological or metaphysical societies, leaving each man free to support the
religion and the system of instruction which he prefers. This, however,
should be carried out in a just and liberal spirit worthy of the cause, and
without the least taint of personal dislike or party feeling. Full indemnity
should be given to members of Churches or Universities, upon whom these
changes would come unexpectedly. By acting in this spirit it will be far less
difficult to carry out measures which are obviously indicated by the position
in which we stand. As there is now no doctrine which commands general
assent, it would be an act of retrogression to give legal sanction to any of
the old creeds, whatever their former claim to spiritual ascendancy. It is
quite in accordance with the republican spirit to refuse such sanction,
notwithstanding the tendency that there is to allow ideologists to succeed to
the Academic offices held under the constitutional system by psychologists.

But Positivism will have as beneficial an influence
Order demands
centralization on Public Order as on Liberty. It holds, in exact
opposition to revolutionary prejudices, that the central
power should preponderate over the local. The constitutionalist principle of
separating the legislative from the executive is only an empirical imitation
of the larger principle of separating temporal and spiritual power, which
was adopted in the Middle Ages. There will always be a contest for political
supremacy between the central and local authorities; and it is an error into
which, from various causes, we have fallen recently, to attempt to balance
them against each other. The whole tendency of French history has been to
let the central power preponderate, until it degenerated and became
retrograde towards the end of the seventeenth century. Our present
preference for the local power is therefore an historical anomaly, which is
sure to cease as soon as the fear of reaction has passed away. And as
Republicanism secures us against any dangers of this kind, our political
sympathies will soon resume their old course. The advantages of the central
power are, first, that it is more directly responsible than the other; and,
secondly, that it is more practical and less likely to set up any claims to
spiritual influence. This last feature is of the highest importance, and is
likely to become every day more marked. Whereas the local or legislative
power, not having its functions clearly defined, is very apt to interfere in
theoretical questions without being in any sense qualified for doing so. Its
preponderance would, then, in most cases be injurious to intellectual
freedom, which, as it feels instinctively, will ultimately result in the rise of a
spiritual authority destined to supersede its own. On the strength of these
tendencies, which have never before been explained, Positivists have little
hesitation in siding in almost all cases with the central as against the local
power. Philosophers, whom no one can accuse of reactionist or servile
views, who have given up all political prospects, and who are devoting
themselves wholly to the work of spiritual reorganization, need not be
afraid to take this course; and they ought to exert themselves vigorously in
making the central power preponderant, limiting the functions of the local
power to what is strictly indispensable. And, notwithstanding all
appearances to the contrary, republicanism will help to modify the
revolutionary feeling on this point. It removes the distrust of authority
caused naturally by the retrograde spirit of the old monarchy; and it makes
it easier to repress any further tendencies of the same kind, without

necessitating an entire change in the character of our policy for the sake of
providing against a contingency, of which there is now so little fear. As
soon as the central power has given sufficient proof of its progressive
intentions, there will be no unwillingness on the part of the French public to
restrict the powers of the legislative body, whether by reducing it to one-
third of its present numbers, which are so far too large, or even by limiting
its functions to the annual vote of the supplies. During the last phase of the
counter-revolution, and the long period of parliamentary government which
followed, a state of feeling has arisen on this subject, which is quite
exceptional, and which sound philosophical teaching, and wise action on
the part of government, will easily modify. It is inconsistent with the whole
course of French history; and only leads us into the mistake of imitating the
English constitution, which is adapted to no other country. The very
extension which has just been given to the representative system will bring
it into discredit, by showing it to be as futile and subversive in practice as
philosophy had represented it to be in theory.

Such, then, is the way in which Positivism would
Intimate connexion of
Liberty with Order interpret these two primary conditions of our present
policy, Liberty and Public Order. But besides this, it
explains and confirms the connexion which exists between them. It teaches
in the first place, that true liberty is impossible at present without the
vigorous control of a central power, progressive in the true sense of the
word, wise enough to abdicate all spiritual influence, and keep to its own
practical functions. Such a power is needed in order to check the despotic
spirit of the various doctrines now in vogue. As all of them are more or less
inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers, they would all be
willing to employ forcible means of securing uniformity of opinion.
Besides, the anarchy which is caused by our spiritual interregnum, might,
but for a strong government, very probably interfere with the philosophical
freedom which we now enjoy. Conversely, unless Liberty in the sense here
spoken of be granted, it will be impossible for the central power to maintain
itself in the position which public order requires. The obstacle to that
position at present is the fear of reaction; and a scrupulous regard for
freedom is the only means of removing these feelings which, though
perhaps unfounded, are but too natural. All fears will be allayed at once
when liberty of instruction and association becomes part of the law of the
land. There will then be no hope, and indeed no wish, on the part of
government to regulate our social institutions in conformity with any
particular doctrine.
The object of this chapter has been to show the social value of
Positivism. We have found that not merely does it throw light upon our
Future policy, but that it also teaches us how to act upon the Present; and
these indications have in both cases been based upon careful examination of
the Past, in accordance with the fundamental laws of human development.
It is the only system capable of handling the problem now proposed by the
more advanced portion of our race to all who would claim to guide them.
That problem is this; to reorganize human life, irrespectively of god or king;
recognizing the obligation of no motive, whether public or private, other
than Social Feeling, aided in due measure by the positive science and
practical energy of Man.

CHAPTER III

THE ACTION OF POSITIVISM UPON THE
WORKING CLASSES

Positivism, whether looked at as a philosophical
Positivism will not for
the present system or as an instrument of social renovation, cannot
recommend itself to count upon much support from any of the classes,
the governing classes,
so much as to the
whether in Church or State, by whom the government
People of mankind has hitherto been conducted. There will be
isolated exceptions of great value, and these will soon
become more numerous: but the prejudices and passions of these classes
will present serious obstacles to the work of moral and mental
reorganization which constitutes the second phase of the great Western
revolution. Their faulty education and their repugnance to system prejudice
them against a philosophy which subordinates specialities to general
principles. Their aristocratic instincts make it very difficult for them to
recognize the supremacy of Social Feeling; that doctrine which lies at the
root of social regeneration, as conceived by Positivism. That no support can
be expected from the classes who were in the ascendant before the
Revolution, is of course obvious; and we shall probably meet with
opposition, quite as real though more carefully concealed, from the middle
classes, to whom that revolution transferred the authority and social
influence which they had long been coveting. Their thoughts are entirely
engrossed with the acquisition of power; and they concern themselves but
little with the mode in which it is used, or the objects to which it is directed.
They were quite convinced that the Revolution had found a satisfactory
issue in the parliamentary system instituted during the recent period of
political oscillation. They will long continue to regret that stationary period,
because it was peculiarly favourable to their restless ambition. A movement

tending to the complete regeneration of society is almost as much dreaded
now by the middle classes as it was formerly by the higher. And both would
at all events agree in prolonging the system of theological hypocrisy, as far
as republican institutions admitted of it. That policy is now the only means
by which retrogression is still possible. Ignoble as it is, there are two
motives for adopting it; it secures respect and submission on the part of the
masses, and it imposes no unpleasant duties on their governors. All their
critical and metaphysical prejudices indispose them to terminate the state of
spiritual anarchy which is the greatest obstacle to social regeneration: while
at the same time their ambition dreads the establishment of a new moral
authority, the restrictive influence of which would of course press most
heavily upon themselves. In the eighteenth century, men of rank, and even
kings, accepted the purely negative philosophy that was then in vogue; it
removed many obstacles, it was an easy path to reputation, and it imposed
no great sacrifice. But we can hardly hope from this precedent that the
wealthy and literary classes of our own time will be equally willing to
accept Positive philosophy; the avowed purpose of which is to discipline
our intellectual powers, in order to reorganize our modes of life.
The avowal of such a purpose is quite sufficient to prevent Positivism
from gaining the sympathies of any one of the governing classes. The
classes to which it must appeal are those who have been left untrained in
the present worthless methods of instruction by words and entities, who are
animated with strong social instincts, and who consequently have the
largest stock of good sense and good feeling. In a word it is among the
Working Classes that the new philosophers will find their most energetic
allies. They are the two extreme terms in the social series as finally
constituted; and it is only through their combined action that social
regeneration can become a practical possibility. Notwithstanding their
difference of position, a difference which indeed is more apparent than real,
there are strong affinities between them, both morally and intellectually.
Both have the same sense of the real, the same preference for the useful,
and the same tendency to subordinate special points to general principles.
Morally they resemble each other in generosity of feeling, in wise
unconcern for material prospects, and in indifference to worldly grandeur.
This at least will be the case as soon as philosophers in the true sense of that
word have mixed sufficiently with the nobler members of the working
classes to raise their own character to its proper level. When the sympathies

which unite them upon these essential points have had time to show
themselves, it will be felt that the philosopher is, under certain aspects, a
member of the working class fully trained; while the working man is in
many respects a philosopher without the training. Both too will look with
similar feelings upon the intermediate or capitalist class. As that class is
necessarily the possessor of material power, the pecuniary existence of both
will as a rule be independent upon it.

The working man
These affinities follow as a natural result from their
who accepts his respective position and functions. The reason of their
not having been recognized more distinctly is, that at
position is favourably
situated for the
reception of
present we have nothing that can be called a
comprehensive philosophic class, or at least it is only represented by a
principles and few isolated types. Workmen worthy of their position
generous sympathies
are happily far less rare; but hitherto it is only in France,
or rather in Paris, that they have shown themselves in their true light, as
men emancipated from chimerical beliefs, and careless of the empty
prestige of social position. It is, then, only in Paris that the truth of the
preceding remarks can be fully verified.
The occupations of working men are evidently far more conducive to
philosophical views than those of the middle classes; since they are not so
absorbing, as to prevent continuous thought, even during the hours of
labour. And besides having more time for thinking, they have a moral
advantage in the absence of any responsibility when their work is over. The
workman is preserved by his position from the schemes of aggrandisement,
which are constantly harassing the capitalist. Their difference in this respect
causes a corresponding difference in their modes of thought; the one cares
more for general principles, the other more for details. To a sensible
workman, the system of dispersive speciality now so much in vogue shows
itself in its true light. He sees it, that is, to be brutalizing, because it would
condemn his intellect to the most paltry mode of culture, so much so that it
will never be accepted in France, in spite of the irrational endeavours of our
Anglo-maniac economists. To the capitalist, on the contrary, and even to the
man of science, that system, however rigidly and consistently carried out,
will seem far less degrading; or rather it will be looked upon as most
desirable, unless his education has been such as to counteract these

tendencies, and to give him the desire and the ability for abstract and
general thought.
Morally, the contrast between the position of the workman and the
capitalist is even more striking. Proud as most men are of worldly success,
the degree of moral or mental excellence implied in the acquisition of
wealth or power, even when the means used have been strictly legitimate, is
hardly such as to justify that pride. Looking at intrinsic qualities rather than
at visible results, it is obvious that practical success, whether in industry or
in war, depends far more on character than on intellect or affection. The
principal condition for it is the combination of a certain amount of energy
with great caution, and a fair share of perseverance. When a man has these
qualities, mediocrity of intellect and moral deficiency will not prevent his
taking advantage of favourable chances; chance being usually a very
important element in worldly success. Indeed it would hardly be an
exaggeration to say that poverty of thought and feeling has often something
to do with forming and maintaining the disposition requisite for the
purpose. Vigorous exertion of the active powers is more frequently induced
by the personal propensities of avarice, ambition, or vanity, than by the
higher instincts. Superiority of position, when legitimately obtained,
deserves respect; but the philosopher, like the religionist, and with still
better grounds, refuses to regard it as a proof of moral superiority, a
conclusion which would be wholly at variance with the true theory of
human nature.
The life of the workman, on the other hand, is far more favourable to
the development of the nobler instincts. In practical qualities he is usually
not wanting, except in caution, a deficiency which makes his energy and
perseverance less useful to himself, though fully available for society. But it
is in the exercise of the higher feelings that the moral superiority of the
working class is most observable. When our habits and opinions have been
brought under the influence of systematic principles, the true character of
this class, which forms the basis of modern society, will become more
distinct; and we shall see that home affections are naturally stronger with
them than with the middle classes, who are too much engrossed with
personal interests for the full enjoyment of domestic ties. Still more evident
is their superiority in social feelings strictly so called, for these with them
are called into daily exercise from earliest childhood. Here it is that we find

the highest and most genuine types of friendship, and this even amongst
those who are placed in a dependent position, aggravated often by the
aristocratic prejudices of those above them, and whom we might imagine
on that account condemned to a lower moral standard. We find sincere and
simple respect for superiors, untainted by servility, not vitiated by the pride
of learning, not disturbed by the jealousies of competition. Their personal
experience of the miseries of life is a constant stimulus to the nobler
sympathies. In no class is there so strong an incentive to social feeling, at
least to the feeling of Solidarity between contemporaries; for all are
conscious of the support that they derive from union, support which is not
at all incompatible with strong individuality of character. The sense of
Continuity with the past has not, it is true, been sufficiently developed; but
this is a want which can only be supplied by systematic culture. It will
hardly be disputed that there are more remarkable instances of prompt and
unostentatious self-sacrifice at the call of a great public necessity in this
class than in any other. Note, too, that in the utter absence of any systematic
education, all these moral excellences must be looked upon as inherent in
the class. It is impossible to attribute them to theological influence, now
that they have so entirely shaken off the old faith. The type I have described
would be generally considered imaginary; and at present it is only in Paris
that it can be fully realized. But the fact of its existence in the centre of
Western Europe is enough for all rational observers. A type so fully in
accordance with what we know of human nature cannot fail ultimately to
spread everywhere, especially when these spontaneous tendencies are
placed under the systematic guidance of Positivism.
This the Convention These remarks will prepare us to appreciate the
felt; but they wise and generous instincts of the Convention in
encouraged the
People to seek
looking to the Proletariate as the mainspring of its
political supremacy,policy; and this is not merely on account of the
incidental danger of foreign invasion, but in dealing
for which they are not
fit
with the larger question of social regeneration, which it
pursued so ardently, though in such ignorance of its true principles. Owing,
however, to the want of a satisfactory system, and the disorder produced by
the metaphysical theories of the time, the spirit in which this alliance with
the people was framed was incompatible with the real object in view. It was
considered that government ought as a rule to be in the hands of the people.
Now under the special circumstances of the time popular government was

undoubtedly very useful. The existence of the republic depended almost
entirely upon the proletariate, the only class that stood unshaken and true to
its principles. But in the absolute spirit of the received political theories,
this state of things was regarded as normal, a view which is incompatible
with the most important conditions of modern society. It is of course always
right for the people to assist government in carrying out the law, even to the
extent of physical force, should the case require it. Interference of this
subordinate kind, whether in foreign or internal questions, so far from
leading to anarchy, is obviously a guarantee for order which ought to exist
in every properly constituted society. Indeed in this respect our habits in
France are still very defective; men are too often content to remain mere
lookers on, while the police to whom they owe their daily protection is
doing its duty. But for the people to take a direct part in government, and to
have the final decision of political measures, is a state of things which in
modern society is only adapted to times of revolution. To recognize it as
final would lead at once to anarchy, were it not so utterly impossible to
realize.
It is only in Positivism rejects the metaphysical doctrine of the
exceptional cases thatSovereignty of the people. But it appropriates all that is
the People can be
really ‘sovereign’
really sound in the doctrine, and this with reference not
merely to exceptional cases but to the normal state;
while at the same time it guards against the danger involved in its
application as an absolute truth. In the hands of the revolutionary party the
doctrine is generally used to justify the right of insurrection. Now in
Positive Polity, this right is looked upon as an ultimate resource, with which
no society should allow itself to dispense. Absolute submission, which is
too strongly inculcated by modern Catholicism, would expose us to the
danger of tyranny. Insurrection may be regarded, scientifically, as a sort of
reparative crisis, of which societies stand in more need than individuals in
accordance with the well-known biological law, that the higher and the
more complicated the organism, the more frequent and also the more
dangerous is the pathological state. Therefore, the fear that Positivism,
when generally accepted, will encourage passive obedience, is perfectly
groundless; although it is certainly not favourable to the pure revolutionary
spirit, which would fain take the disease for the normal type of health. Its
whole character is so essentially relative, that it finds no difficulty in
accepting subordination as the rule, and yet allowing for exceptional cases

of revolt; a course by which good taste and human dignity are alike
satisfied. Positivism looks upon insurrection as a dangerous remedy that
should be reserved for extreme cases; but it would never scruple to sanction
and even to encourage it when it is really indispensable. This is quite
compatible with refusing, as a rule, to submit the decision of political
questions and the choice of rulers to judges who are obviously incompetent;
and who, under the influence of Positivism, will of their own free will
abdicate rights which are subversive of order.
The truth involved in The metaphysical doctrine of the Sovereignty of the
people, contains, however, a truth of permanent value,
the expression is that
the well-being of the
people should be the
though in a very confused form. This truth Positivism
one great object of separates very distinctly from its dangerous alloy, yet
government without weakening, on the contrary, with the effect of
enforcing, its social import. There are two distinct
conceptions in this doctrine, which have hitherto been confounded; a
political conception applicable to certain special cases; a moral conception
applicable to all.
In the first place the name of the whole body politic ought to be
invoked in the announcement of any special measure, of which the motives
are sufficiently intelligible, and which directly concern the practical
interests of the whole community. Under this head would be included
decisions of law courts, declarations of war, etc. When society has reached
the Positive state, and the sense of universal solidarity is more generally
diffused, there will be even more significance and dignity in such
expressions than there is now, because the name invoked will no longer be
that of a special nation, but that of Humanity as a whole. It would be
absurd, however, to extend this practice to those still more numerous cases
where the people is incompetent to express any opinion, and has merely to
adopt the opinion of superior officers who have obtained its confidence.
This may be owing either to the difficulty of the question or to the fact of its
application being indirect or limited. Such, for instance, would be
enactments, very often of great importance, which deal with scientific
principles; or again most questions relating to special professions or
branches of industry. In all these cases popular good sense would, under
Positivist influence, easily be kept clear from political illusions. It is only
under the stimulus of metaphysical pride that such illusions become

dangerous; and the untaught masses have but little experience of this
feeling.
There is, however, another truth implied in the expression, Sovereignity
of the people. It implies that it is the first of duties to concentrate all the
efforts of society upon the common good. And in this there is a more direct
reference to the working class than to any other; first, on account of their
immense numerical superiority, and, secondly, because the difficulties by
which their life is surrounded require special interference to a degree which
for other classes would be unnecessary. From this point of view it is a
principle which all true republicans may accept. It is, in fact, identical with
what we have laid down as the universal basis of morality, the direct and
permanent preponderance of social feeling over all personal interests. Not
merely, then, is it incorporated by Positivism, but, as was shown in the first
chapter, it forms the primary principle of the system, even under the
intellectual aspect. Since the decline of Catholicism the metaphysical spirit
has been provisionally the guardian of this great social precept. Positivism
now finally appropriates it, and purifies it for the future from all taint of
anarchy. Revolutionists, as we should expect from their characteristic
dislike to the separation of the two powers, had treated the question
politically. Positivism avoids all danger by shifting it to the region of
morality. I shall show presently that this very salutary change, so far from
weakening the force of the principle, increases its permanent value, and at
the same time removes the deceptive and subversive tendencies which are
always involved in the metaphysical mode of regarding it.
The People’s function What then, it will be asked, is the part assigned to
is to assist the the Proletariate in the final constitution of society? This
spiritual power in
modifying the action
similarity of position which I pointed out between
of government themselves and the philosophic class suggests the
answer. They will be of the most essential service to the
spiritual power in each of its three social functions, judgment, counsel, and
even education. All the intellectual and moral qualities that we have just
indicated in this class concur in fitting them for this service. If we except
the philosophic body, which is the recognized organ of general principles,
there is no class which is so habitually inclined to take comprehensive
views of any subject. Their superiority in Social Feeling is still more
obvious. In this even the best philosophers are rarely their equals; and it

would be a most beneficial corrective of their tendency to over-abstraction
to come into daily contact with the noble and spontaneous instincts of the
people. The working class, then, is better qualified than any other for
understanding, and still more for sympathizing with the highest truths of
morality, though it may not be able to give them a systematic form. And, as
we have seen, it is in social morality, the most important and the highest of
the three branches of Ethics, that their superiority is most observable.
Besides, independently of their intrinsic merits, whether intellectual or
moral, the necessities of their daily life serve to impress them with respect
for the great rules of morality, which in most cases were framed for their
own protection. To secure the application of these rules in daily life is a
function of the spiritual power in the performance of which they will meet
with but slight assistance from the middle classes. It is with them that
temporal power naturally resides, and it is their misuse of power that has to
be controlled and set right. The working classes are the chief sufferers from
the selfishness and domineering of men of wealth and power. For this
reason they are the likeliest to come forward in defence of public morality.
And they will be all the more disposed to give it their hearty support if they
have nothing to do directly with political administration. Habitual
participation in temporal power, to say nothing of its unsettling influence,
would lead them away from the best remedy for their sufferings of which
the constitution of society admits. Popular sagacity will soon detect the
utter hollowness of the off-hand solutions that are now being obtruded upon
us. The people will rapidly become convinced that the surest method of
satisfying all legitimate claims lies in the moral agencies which Positivism
offers, though it appears to them at the same time to abdicate political
power which either yields them nothing or results in anarchy.
So natural is this tendency of the people to rally round the spiritual
power in defence of morality, that we find it to have been the case even in
mediaeval times. Indeed this it is which explains the sympathies which
Catholicism still retains, notwithstanding its general decline, in the
countries where Protestantism has failed to establish itself. Superficial
observers often mistake these sympathies for evidence of sincere
attachment to the old creeds, though in point of fact they are more
thoroughly undermined in those countries than anywhere else. It is an
historical error which will, however, soon be corrected by the reception
which these nations, so wrongly imagined to be in a backward stage of

political development, will give to Positivism. For they will soon see its
superiority to Catholicism in satisfying the primary necessity with which
their social instincts are so justly preoccupied.
In the Middle Ages, however, the relations between the working classes
and the priesthood were hampered by the institution of serfage, which was
not wholly abolished until Catholicism had begun to decline. In fact a
careful study of history will show that one of the principal causes of its
decline was the want of popular support. The mediaeval church was a
noble, but premature attempt. Disbelief in its doctrines, and also retrograde
tendencies in its directors, had virtually destroyed it, before the Proletariate
had attained sufficient social importance to support it successfully,
supposing it could have deserved their support. But we are now sufficiently
advanced for the perfect realization of the Catholic ideal in Positivism. And
the principal means of realizing it will be the formation of an alliance
between philosophers and the working classes, for which both are alike
prepared by the negative and positive progress of the last five centuries.
Their combined The direct object of their combined action will be
efforts result in theto set in motion the force of Public Opinion. All views
formation of Public
Opinion
of the future condition of society, the views of practical
men as well as of philosophic thinkers, agree in the
belief that the principal feature of the state to which we are tending, will be
the increased influence which Public Opinion is destined to exercise.
It is in this beneficial influence that we shall find the surest guarantee
for morality; for domestic and even for personal morality, as well as for
social. For as the whole tendency of Positivism is to induce every one to
live as far as possible without concealment, the public will be intrusted with
a strong check upon the life of the individual. Now that all theological
illusions have become so entirely obsolete, the need of such a check is
greater than it was before. It compensates for the insufficiency of natural
goodness which we find in most men, however wisely their education has
been conducted. Except the noblest of joys, that which springs from social
sympathy when called into constant exercise, there is no reward for doing
right so satisfactory as the approval of our fellow-beings. Even under
theological systems it has been one of our strongest aspirations to live
esteemed in the memory of others. And still more prominence will be given
to this noble form of ambition under Positivism, because it is the only way

left us of satisfying the desire which all men feel of prolonging their life
into the Future. And the increased force of Public Opinion will correspond
to the increased necessity for it. The peculiar reality of Positive doctrine and
its constant conformity with facts facilitate the recognition of its principles,
and remove all obscurity in their application. They are not to be evaded by
subterfuges like those to which metaphysical and theological principles,
from their vague and absolute character, have been always liable. Again, the
primary principle of Positivism, which is to judge every question by the
standard of social interests, is in itself a direct appeal to Public Opinion;
since the public is naturally the judge of the good or bad effect of action
upon the common welfare. Under theological and metaphysical systems no
appeal of this sort was recognized; because the objects upheld as the highest
aims of life were purely personal.
In political questions the application of our principle is still more
obvious. For political morality Public Opinion is almost our only guarantee.
We feel its force even now in spite of the intellectual anarchy in which we
live. Neutralized as it is in most cases by the wide divergences of men’s
convictions, yet it shows itself on the occasion of any great public
excitement. Indeed, we feel it to our cost sometimes when the popular mind
has taken a wrong direction; government in such cases being very seldom
able to offer adequate resistance. These cases may convince us how
irresistible this power will prove when used legitimately, and when it is
formed by systematic accordance in general principles instead of by a
precarious and momentary coincidence of feeling. And here we see more
clearly than ever how impossible it is to effect any permanent
reconstruction of the institutions of society, without a previous
reorganization of opinion and of life. The spiritual basis is necessary not
merely to determine the character of the temporal reconstruction, but to
supply the principal motive force by which the work is to be carried out.
Intellectual and moral harmony will gradually be restored, and under its
influence the new political system will by degrees arise. Social
improvements of the highest importance may therefore be realized long
before the work of spiritual reorganization is completed. We find in
mediaeval history that Catholicism exercised a powerful influence on
society during its emergence from barbarism, before its own internal
constitution had advanced far. And this will be the case to a still greater
degree with the regeneration which is now in progress.

Having defined the sphere within which Public
Public opinion
involves, (1) Opinion should operate, we shall find little difficulty in
principles of social determining the conditions requisite for its proper
conduct, (2) their
acceptance by society
organization. These are, first, the establishment of fixed
principles of social action; secondly, their adoption by
at large, (3) an organ
through which to the public, and its consent to their application in special
enunciate them
cases; and, lastly, a recognized organ to lay down the
principles, and to apply them to the conduct of daily life. Obvious as these
three conditions appear, they are still so little understood, that it will be well
to explain each of them somewhat more fully.
The first condition, that of laying down fixed principles, is, in fact, the
extension to social questions of that separation between theory and practice,
which in subjects of less importance is universally recognized. This is the
aspect in which the superiority of the new spiritual system to the old is most
perceptible. The principles of moral and political conduct that were
accepted in the Middle Ages were little better than empirical, and owed
their stability entirely to the sanction of religion. In this respect, indeed, the
superiority of Catholicism to the systems which preceded it, consisted
merely in the fact of separating its precepts from the special application of
them. By making its precepts the distinct object of preliminary study, it
secured them against the bias of human passions. Yet important as this
separation was, the system was so defective intellectually, that the
successful application of its principles depended simply on the good sense
of the teachers; for the principles in themselves were as vague and as
absolute as the creeds from which they were derived. The influence
exercised by Catholicism was due to its indirect action upon social feeling
in the only mode then possible. But the claims with which Positivism
presents itself are far more satisfactory. It is based on a complete synthesis;
one which embraces, not the outer world only, but the inner world of human
nature. This, while in no way detracting from the practical value of social
principles, give them the imposing weight of theoretical truth; and ensures
their stability and coherence, by connecting them with the whole series of
laws on which the life of man and of society depend. For these laws will
corroborate even those which are not immediately deduced from them. By
connecting all our rules of action with the fundamental conception of social
duty, we render their interpretation in each special case clear and consistent,
and we secure it against the sophisms of passion. Principles such as these,

based on reason, and rendering our conduct independent of the impulses of
the moment, are the only means of sustaining the vigour of Social Feeling,
and at the same time of saving us from the errors to which its unguided
suggestions so often lead. Direct and constant culture of Social Feeling in
public as well as in private life is no doubt the first condition of morality.
But the natural strength of Self-love is such that something besides this is
required to control it. The course of conduct must be traced beforehand in
all important cases by the aid of demonstrable principles, adopted at first
upon trust, and afterwards from conviction.
There is no art whatever in which, however ardent and sincere our
desire to succeed, we can dispense with knowledge of the nature and
conditions of the object aimed at. Moral and political conduct is assuredly
not exempt from such an obligation, although we are more influenced in
this case by the direct promptings of feeling than in any other of the arts of
life. It has been shown only too clearly by many striking instances how far
Social Feeling may lead us astray when it is not directed by right principles.
It was for want of fixed convictions that the noble sympathies entertained
by the French nation for the rest of Europe at the outset of the Revolution so
soon degenerated into forcible oppression, when her retrograde leader
began his seductive appeal to selfish passions. Inverse cases are still more
common; and they illustrate the connexion of feeling and opinion as clearly
as the others. A false social doctrine has often favoured the natural
ascendency of Self-love by giving a perverted conception of public well-
being. This has been too plainly exemplified in our own time by the
deplorable influence which Malthus’s sophistical theory of population
obtained in England. This mischievous error met with very little acceptance
in the rest of Europe, and it has been already refuted by the nobler thinkers
of his own country; but it still gives the show of scientific sanction to the
criminal antipathy of the governing classes in Great Britain to all effectual
measures of reform.
Next to a system of principles, the most important condition for the
exercise of Public Opinion is the existence of a strong body of supporters
sufficient to make the weight of these principles felt. Now it was here that
Catholicism proved so weak; and therefore, even had its doctrine been less
perishable, its decline was unavoidable. But the defect is amply supplied in
the new spiritual order, which, as I have before shown, will receive the

influential support of the working classes. And the need of such assistance
is as certain as the readiness with which it will be yielded. For though the
intrinsic efficacy of Positive teaching is far greater than that of any doctrine
which is not susceptible of demonstration, yet the convictions it inspires
cannot be expected to dispense with the aid of vigorous popular support.
Human nature is imperfectly organized; and the influence which Reason
exercises over it is not by any means so great as this supposition would
imply. Even Social Feeling, though its influence is far greater than that of
Reason, would not in general be sufficient for the right guidance of
practical life, if Public Opinion were not constantly at hand to support the
good inclinations of individuals. The arduous struggle of Social Feeling
against Self-love requires the constant assertion of true principles to remove
uncertainty as to the proper course of action in each case. But it requires
also something more. The strong reaction of All upon Each is needed,
whether to control selfishness or to stimulate sympathy. The tendency of
our poor and weak nature to give way to the lower propensities is so great
that, but for this universal co-operation, Feeling and Reason would be
almost inadequate to their task. In the working class we find the requisite
conditions. They will, as we have seen, form the principal source of
opinion, not merely from their numerical superiority, but also from their
intellectual and moral qualities, as well as from the influence directly due to
their social position. Thus it is that Positivism views the great problem of
human life, and shows us for the first time that the bases of a solution
already exist in the very structure of the social organism.
Working men’s clubs Working men, whether as individuals or, what is
still more important, collectively, are now at liberty to
criticize all the details, and even the general principles, of the social system
under which they live; affecting, as it necessarily does, themselves more
nearly than any other class. The remarkable eagerness lately shown by our
people to form clubs, though there was no special motive for it, and no very
marked enthusiasm, was a proof that the checks which had previously
prevented this tendency from showing itself were quite unsuited to our
times. Nor is this tendency likely to pass away; on the contrary, it will take
deeper root and extend more widely, because it is thoroughly in keeping
with the habits, feelings, and wants of working men, who form the majority
in these meetings. A consistent system of social truth will largely increase
their influence, by giving them a more settled character and a more

important aim. So far from being in any way destructive, they form a
natural though imperfect model of the mode of life which will ultimately be
adopted in the regenerate condition of Humanity. In these unions social
sympathies are kept in constant action by a stimulus of a most beneficial
kind. They offer the speediest and most effectual means of elaborating
Public Opinion: this at least is the case when there has been a fair measure
of individual training. No one at present has any idea of the extent of the
advantages which will one day spring from these spontaneous meetings,
when there is an adequate system of general principles to direct them.
Spiritual reorganization will find them its principal basis of support, for
they secure its acceptance by the people; and this will have the greater
weight, because it will always be given without compulsion or violence.
The objection that meetings of this kind may lead to dangerous political
agitation, rests upon a misinterpretation of the events of the Revolution. So
far from their stimulating a desire for what are called political rights, or
encouraging their exercise in those who possess them, their tendency is
quite in the opposite direction. They will soon divert working men entirely
from all useless attempts to interfere with existing political institutions, and
bring them to their true social function, that of assisting and carrying out the
operations of the new spiritual power. It is a noble prospect which is thus
held out to them by Positivism, a prospect far more inviting than any of the
metaphysical illusions of the day. The real intention of the Club is to form a
provisional substitute for the Church of old times, or rather to prepare the
way for the religious building of the new form of worship, the worship of
Humanity; which, as I shall explain in a subsequent chapter, will be
gradually introduced under the regenerating influence of Positive doctrine.
Under our present republican government all progressive tendencies are
allowed free scope, and therefore it will not be long before our people
accept this new vent for social sympathies, which in former times could
find expression only in Catholicism.
In this theory of Public Opinion one condition yet remains to be
described. A philosophic organ is necessary to interpret the doctrine; the
influence of which would otherwise in most cases be very inadequate. This
third condition has been much disputed; but it is certainly even more
indispensable than the second. And in fact it has never been really wanting,
for every doctrine must have had some founder, and usually has a
permanent body of teachers. It would be difficult to conceive that a system

of moral and political principles should be possessed of great social
influence, and yet at the same time that the men who originate or inculcate
the system should exercise no spiritual authority. It is true that this
inconsistency did for a time exist under the negative and destructive
influence of Protestantism and Deism, because men’s thoughts were for the
time entirely taken up with the struggle to escape from the retrograde
tendencies of Catholicism. During this long period of insurrection, each
individual became a sort of priest; each, that is, followed his own
interpretation of a doctrine which needed no special teachers, because its
function was not to construct but to criticize. All the constitutions that have
been recently established on metaphysical principles give a direct sanction
to this state of things, in the preambles with which they commence. They
apparently regard each citizen as competent to form a sound opinion on all
social questions, thus exempting him from the necessity of applying to any
special interpreters. This extension to the normal state of things of a phase
of mind only suited to the period of revolutionary transition, is an error
which I have already sufficiently refuted.
In the minor arts of life, it is obvious that general principles cannot be
laid down without some theoretical study; and that the application of these
rules to special cases is not to be entirely left to the untaught instinct of the
artisan. And can it be otherwise with the art of Social Life, so far harder and
more important than any other, and in which, from its principles being less
simple and less precise, a special explanation of them in each case is even
more necessary? However perfect the demonstration of social principles
may become, it must not be supposed that knowledge of Positive doctrine,
even when it has been taught in the most efficient way, will dispense with
the necessity of frequently appealing to the philosopher for advice in
questions of practical life, whether private or public. And this necessity of
an interpreter to intervene occasionally between the principle and its
application, is even more evident from the moral than it is from the
intellectual aspect. Certain as it is that no one will be so well acquainted
with the true character of the doctrine as the philosopher who teaches it, it is
even more certain that none is so likely as himself to possess the moral
qualifications of purity, of exalted aims, and of freedom from party spirit,
without which his counsels could have but little weight in reforming
individual or social conduct. It is principally through his agency that we
may hope in most cases to bring about that reaction of All upon Each,

which, as we have seen, is of such indispensable importance to practical
morality. Philosophers are not indeed the principal source of Public
Opinion, as intellectual pride so often leads them to believe. Public Opinion
proceeds essentially from the free voice and spontaneous co-operation of
the people. But in order that the full weight of their unanimous judgment
may be felt, it must be announced by some recognized organ. There are, no
doubt, rare cases where the direct expression of popular feeling is enough,
but these are quite exceptional. Thus working men and philosophers are
mutually necessary, not merely in the creation of Public Opinion, but also in
most cases in the manifestation of it. Without the first, the doctrine,
however well established, would not have sufficient force. Without the
second, it would usually be too incoherent to overcome those obstacles in
the constitution of man and of society, which make it so difficult to bring
practical life under the influence of fixed principles.
In fact this necessity for some systematic organ to direct and give effect
to Public Opinion, has always been felt, even amidst the spiritual anarchy
which at present surrounds us, on every occasion in which such opinion has
played any important part. For its effect on these occasions would have
been null and void but for some individual to take the initiative and
personal responsibility. This is frequently verified in private life by cases in
which we see the opposite state of things; we see principles which no one
would think of contesting, practically inadequate, for want of some
recognized authority to apply them. It is a serious deficiency, which is,
however, compensated, though imperfectly, by the greater facility of
arriving at the truth in such cases, and by the greater strength of the
sympathies which they call forth. But in public life, with its more difficult
conditions and more important claims, such entire absence of systematic
intervention could never be tolerated. In all public transactions even now
we may perceive the participation of a spiritual authority of one kind or
other; the organs of which, though constantly varying, are in most cases
metaphysicians or literary men writing for the press. Thus even in the
present anarchy of feelings and convictions, Public Opinion cannot
dispense with guides and interpreters. Only it has to be content with men
who at the best can only offer the guarantee of personal responsibility,
without any reliable security either for the stability of their convictions or
the purity of their feelings. But now that the problem of organizing Public
Opinion has once been proposed by Positivism, it cannot remain long

without a solution. It plainly reduces itself to the principle of separating the
two social powers; just as we have seen that the necessity of an established
doctrine rested on the analogous principle of separating theory from
practice. It is clear, on the one hand, that sound interpretation of moral and
political rules, as in the case of any other art, can only be furnished by
philosophers engaged in the study of the natural laws on which they rest.
On the other hand these philosophers, in order to preserve that breadth and
generality of view which is their principal intellectual characteristic, must
abstain scrupulously from all regular participation in practical affairs, and
especially from political life: on the ground that its specializing influence
would soon impair their speculative capacity. And such a course is equally
necessary on moral grounds. It helps to preserve purity of feeling and
impartiality of character; qualities essential to their influence upon public as
well as upon private life.
Such, in outline, is the Positive theory of Public Opinion. In each of its
three constituent elements, the Doctrine, the Power, and the Organ, it is
intimately connected with the whole question of spiritual reorganization; or
rather, it forms the simplest mode of viewing that great subject. All the
essential parts of it are closely related to each other. Positive principles, on
the one hand, cannot count on much material support, except from the
working classes; these in their turn will for the future regard Positivism as
the only doctrine with which they can sympathize. So, again, with the
philosophic organs of opinion; without the People, their necessary
independence cannot be established or sustained. To our literary classes the
separation of the two powers is instinctively repugnant, because it would
lay down systematic limits to the unwise ambition which we now see in
them. And it will be disliked as strongly by the rich classes, who will look
with fear upon a new moral authority destined to impose an irresistible
check upon their selfishness. At present it will be generally understood and
welcomed only by the proletary class, who have more aptitude for general
views and for social sympathy. In France especially they are less under the
delusion of metaphysical sophisms and of aristocratic prestige than any
other class; and the Positivist view of this primary condition of social
regeneration will find a ready entrance into their minds and hearts.
All three conditions Our theory of Public Opinion shows us at once how
of Public Opinion far we have already gone in organizing this great

exist, but have not yet
regulator of modern society; how far we still fall short
been combined
of what is wanted. The Doctrine has at last arisen: there
is no doubt of the existence of the Power; and even the Organ is not
wanting. But they do not as yet stand in their right relation to each other.
The effective impulse towards social regeneration depends, then, on one
ultimate condition; the formation of a firm alliance between philosophers
and proletaries.
Of this powerful coalition I have already spoken. I have now to explain
the advantages which it offers to the people in the way of obtaining
sufficient recognition of all legitimate claims.
Of these advantages, the principal, and that by which the rest will
speedily be developed and secured, is the important social function which is
hereby conferred upon them. They become auxiliaries of the new spiritual
power; auxiliaries indispensable to its action. This vast proletary class,
which ever since its rise in the Middle Ages has been shut out from the
political system, will now assume the position for which by nature it is best
adapted, and which is most conducive to the general well-being of society.
Its members, independently of their special vocation, will at last take a
regular and most important part in public life, a part which will compensate
for the hardships inseparable from their social position. Their combined
action, far from disturbing the established order of things, will be its most
solid guarantee, from the fact of being moral, not political. And here we see
definitely the alteration which Positivism introduces in the revolutionary
conception of the action of the working classes upon society. For stormy
discussions about rights, it substitutes peaceable definition of duties. It
supersedes useless disputes for the possession of power, by inquiring into
the rules that should regulate its wise employment.
Spontaneous A superficial observer of the present state of things
tendencies in the might imagine our working classes to be as yet very far
people of a right
direction. Their
from this frame of mind. But he who looks deeper into
Communism the question will see that the very experiment which
they are now trying, of extending their political rights,
will soon have the effect of showing them the hollowness of a remedy
which has so slight a bearing upon the objects really important to them.
Without making any formal abdication of rights, which might seem
inconsistent with their social dignity, there is little doubt that their

instinctive sagacity will lead them to the still more efficacious plan of
indifference. Positivism will readily convince them that whereas spiritual
power, in order to do its work, must ramify in every direction, it is essential
to public order that political power should be as a rule concentrated. And
this conviction will grow upon them, as they see more clearly that the
primary social problems which are very properly absorbing their attention
are essentially moral rather than political.
One step in this direction they have already taken of their own accord,
though its importance has not been duly appreciated. The well-known
scheme of Communism, which has found such rapid acceptance with them,
serves, in the absence of sounder doctrine, to express the way in which they
are now looking at the great social problem. The experience of the first part
of the Revolution has not yet wholly disabused them of political illusions,
but it has at least brought them to feel that Property is of more importance
than Power in the ordinary sense of the word. So far Communism has given
a wider meaning to the great social problem, and has thereby rendered an
essential service, which is not neutralized by the temporary dangers
involved in the metaphysical forms in which it comes before us.
Communism should therefore be carefully distinguished from the numerous
extravagant schemes brought forward in this time of spiritual anarchy; a
time which stimulates incompetent and ill-trained minds to the most
difficult subjects of thought. The foolish schemes referred to have so few
definite features, that we have to distinguish them by the names of their
authors. But Communism bears the name of no single author, and is
something more than an accidental product of anomalous circumstances.
We should look upon it as the natural progress in the right direction of the
revolutionary spirit; progress of a moral rather than intellectual kind. It is a
proof that revolutionary tendencies are now concentrating themselves upon
moral questions, leaving all purely political questions in the background. It
is quite true that the solution of the problem which Communists are now
putting forward, is still as essentially political as that of their predecessors;
since the only mode by which they propose to regulate the employment of
property, is by a change in the mode of its tenure. Still it is owing to them
that the question of property is at last brought forward for discussion: and it
is a question which so evidently needs a moral solution, the solution of it by
political means is at once so inadequate and so destructive, that it cannot
long continue to be debated, without leading to the more satisfactory result

offered by Positivism. Men will see that it forms a part of the final
regeneration of opinion and of life, which Positivism is now inaugurating.
To do justice to Communism, we must look at the generous sympathies
by which it is inspired, not at the shallow theories in which those
sympathies find expression provisionally, until circumstances enable them
to take some other shape. Our working classes, caring but very little for
metaphysical principles, do not attach nearly the same importance to these
theories as is done by men of literary education. As soon as they see a better
way of bringing forward the points on which they have such legitimate
claims, they will very soon adopt the clear and practical conceptions of
Positivism, which can be carried out peaceably and permanently, in
preference to these vague and confused chimeras, which, as they will
instinctively feel, lead only to anarchy. Till then they will naturally abide by
Communism, as the only method of bringing forward the most fundamental
of social problems in a way which there shall be no evading. The very
alarm which their present solution of the problem arouses helps to stir
public attention, and fix it on this great subject. But for this constant appeal
to their fears, the metaphysical delusions and aristocratic self-seeking of the
governing classes would shelve the question altogether, or pass it by with
indifference. The errors of Communism must be rectified; but there is no
necessity for giving up the name, which is a simple assertion of the
paramount importance of Social Feeling. However, now that we have
happily passed from monarchy to republicanism, the name of Communist is
no longer indispensable; the word Republican expresses the meaning as
well, and without the same danger. Positivism, then, has nothing to fear
from Communism; on the contrary, it will probably be accepted by most
Communists among the working classes, especially in France where
abstractions have but little influence on minds thoroughly emancipated
from theology. The people will gradually find that the solution of the great
social problem which Positivism offers is better than the Communistic
solution.
Its new title of A tendency in this direction has already shown
Socialism itself since the first edition of this work was published.
The working classes have now adopted a new
expression, Socialism, thus indicating that they accept the problem of the
Communists while rejecting their solution. Indeed that solution would seem

to be finally disposed of by the voluntary exile of their leader. Yet, if the
Socialists at present keep clear of Communism, it is only because their
position is one of criticism or inaction. If they were to succeed to power,
with principles so far below the level of their sympathies, they would
inevitably fall into the same errors and extravagances which they now
instinctively feel to be wrong. Consequently the rapid spread of Socialism
very naturally alarms the upper classes; and their resistance, blind though it
be, is at present the only legal guarantee for material order. In fact, the
problem brought forward by the Communists admits of no solution but their
own, so long as the revolutionary confusion of temporal and spiritual power
continues. Therefore the universal blame that is lavished on these utopian
schemes cannot fail to inspire respect for Positivism, as the only doctrine
which can preserve Western Europe from some serious attempt to bring
Communism into practical operation. Positivists stand forward now as the
party of construction, with a definite basis for political action; namely,
systematic prosecution of the wise attempt of mediaeval statesmen to
separate the two social powers. On this basis they are enabled to satisfy the
Poor, and at the same time to restore the confidence of the Rich. It is a final
solution of our difficulties which will make the titles of which we have been
speaking unnecessary. Stripping the old word Republican of any false
meaning at present attached to it, we may retain it as the best expression of
the social sympathies on which the regeneration of society depends. For the
opinions, manners, and even institutions of future society, Positivist is the
only word suitable.
Property is in its The peculiar reality of Positivism, and its invariable
nature social, and tendency to concentrate our intellectual powers upon
needs control
social questions, are attributes, both of which involve its
adoption of the essential principle of Communism; that principle being, that
Property is in its nature social, and that it needs control.
Property has been erroneously represented by most modern jurists as
conferring an absolute right upon the possessor, irrespectively of the good
or bad use made of it. This view is instinctively felt by the working classes
to be unsound, and all true philosophers will agree with them. It is an anti-
social theory, due historically to exaggerated reaction against previous
legislation of a peculiarly oppressive kind, but it has no real foundation
either in justice or in fact. Property can neither be created, nor even

transmitted by the sole agency of its possessor. The co-operation of the
public is always necessary, whether in the assertion of the general principle
or in the application of it to each special case. Therefore the tenure of
property is not to be regarded as a purely individual right. In every age and
in every country the state has intervened, to a greater or less degree, making
property subservient to social requirements. Taxation evidently gives the
public an interest in the private fortune of each individual; an interest
which, instead of diminishing with the progress of civilization, has been
always on the increase, especially in modern times, now that the connexion
of each member of society with the whole is becoming more apparent. The
practice of confiscation, which also is in universal use, shows that in certain
extreme cases the community considers itself authorized to assume entire
possession of private property. Confiscation has, it is true, been abolished
for a time in France. But this isolated exception is due only to the abuses
which recently accompanied the exercise of what was in itself an undoubted
right; and it will hardly survive when the causes which led to it are
forgotten, and the power which introduced it has passed away. In their
abstract views of property, then, Communists are perfectly able to maintain
their ground against the jurists.
They are right, again, in dissenting as deeply as they do from the
Economists, who lay it down as an absolute principle that the application of
wealth should be entirely unrestricted by society. This error, like the one
just spoken of, is attributable to instances of unjustifiable interference. But
it is utterly opposed to all sound philosophical teaching, although it has a
certain appearance of truth, in so far as it recognizes the subordination of
social phenomena to natural laws. But the Economists seem to have
adopted this important principle only to show how incapable they are of
comprehending it. Before they applied the conception of Law to the higher
phenomena of nature, they ought to have made themselves well acquainted
with its meaning, as applied to the lower and more simple phenomena. Not
having done so, they have been utterly blind to the fact that the Order of
nature becomes more and more modifiable as it grows more complicated.
This conception lies at the very root of our whole practical life; therefore
nothing can excuse the metaphysical school of Economists for
systematically resisting the intervention of human wisdom in the various
departments of social action. That the movement of society is subject to
natural laws is certain; but this truth, instead of inducing us to abandon all

efforts to modify society, should rather lead to a wiser application of such
efforts, since they are at once more efficacious, and more necessary in
social phenomena than in any other.
So far, therefore, the fundamental principle of Communism is one
which the Positivist school must obviously adopt. Positivism not only
confirms this principle, but widens its scope, by showing its application to
other departments of human life; by insisting that, not wealth only, but that
all our powers shall be devoted in the true republican spirit to the
continuous service of the community. The long period of revolution which
has elapsed since the Middle Ages has encouraged individualism in the
moral world, as in the intellectual it has fostered the specializing tendency.
But both are equally inconsistent with the final order of modern society. In
all healthy conditions of Humanity, the citizen, whatever his position, has
been regarded as a public functionary, whose duties and claims were
determined more or less distinctly by his faculties. The case of property is
certainly no exception to this general principle. Proprietorship is regarded
by the Positivist as an important social function; the function, namely, of
creating and administering that capital by means of which each generation
lays the foundation for the operations of its successor. This is the only
tenable view of property; and wisely interpreted, it is one which, while
ennobling to its possessor, does not exclude a due measure of freedom. It
will in fact place his position on a firmer basis than ever.
But Positivism rejects But the agreement here pointed out the between
the Communist sociological science and the spontaneous inspirations of
solution of the
problem. Property is
popular judgment, goes no farther. Positivists accept,
to be controlled by and indeed enlarge, the programme of Communism; but
moral not legal we reject its practical solution on the ground that it is at
agencies
once inadequate and subversive. The chief difference
between our own solution and theirs is that we substitute moral agencies for
political. Thus we come again to our leading principle of separating
spiritual from temporal power; a principle which, disregarded as it has
hitherto been in the system of modern renovators, will be found in every
one of the important problems of our time to be the sole possible issue. In
the present case, while throwing such light on the fallacy of Communism, it
should lead us to excuse the fallacy, by reminding us that politicians of
every accredited school are equally guilty of it. At a time when there are so

very few, even of cultivated minds, who have a clear conception of this the
primary principle of modern politics, it would be harsh to blame the people
for still accepting a result of revolutionary empiricism, which is so
universally adopted by other classes.
I need not enter here into any detailed criticism of the utopian scheme
of Plato. It was conclusively refuted twenty-two centuries ago, by the great
Aristotle, who thus exemplified the organic character, by which, even in its
earliest manifestations, the Positive spirit is distinguished. In modern
Communism, moreover, there is one fatal inconsistency, which while it
proves the utter weakness of the system, testifies at the same time to the
honourable character of the motives from which it arose. Modern
Communism differs from the ancient, as expounded by Plato, in not making
women and children common as well as property; a result to which the
principle itself obviously leads. Yet this, the only consistent view of
Communism, is adopted by none but a very few literary men, whose
affections, in themselves too feeble, have been perverted by vicious
intellectual training. Our untaught proletaries, who are the only
Communists worthy our consideration, are nobly inconsistent in this
respect. Indivisible as their erroneous system is, they only adopt that side of
it which touches on their social requirements. The other side is repugnant to
all their highest instincts, and they utterly repudiate it.
Without discussing these chimerical schemes in detail, it will be well to
expose the errors inherent in the method of reasoning which leads to them,
because they are common to all the other progressive schools, the Positivist
school excepted. The mistake consists in the first place, in disregarding or
even denying the natural laws which regulate social phenomena; and
secondly, in resorting to political agencies where moral agency is the real
thing needed. The inadequacy and the danger of the various utopian systems
which are now setting up their rival claims to bring about the regeneration
of society, are all attributable in reality to these two closely-connected
errors. For the sake of clearness, I shall continue to refer specially to
Communism as the most prominent of these systems. But it will be easy to
extend the bearing of my remarks to all the rest.
Individualization of The ignorance of the true laws of social life under
functions as necessary which Communists labour is evident in their dangerous
as co-operation
tendency to suppress individuality. Not only do they

ignore the inherent preponderance in our nature of the personal instincts;
but they forget that, in the collective Organism, the separation of functions
is a feature no less essential than the co-operation of functions. Suppose for
a moment that the connexion between men could be made such that they
were physically inseparable, as has been actually the case with twins in
certain cases of monstrosity; society would obviously be impossible.
Extravagant as this supposition is, it may illustrate the fact that in social life
individuality cannot be dispensed with. It is necessary in order to admit of
that variety of simultaneous efforts which constitutes the immense
superiority of the Social Organism over every individual life. The great
problem for man is to harmonize, as far as possible, the freedom resulting
from isolation, with the equally urgent necessity for convergence. To dwell
exclusively upon the necessity of convergence would tend to undermine not
merely our practical energy, but our true dignity; since it would do away
with the sense of personal responsibility. In exceptional cases where life is
spent in forced subjection to domestic authority, the comforts of home are
often not enough to prevent existence from becoming an intolerable burden,
simply from the want of sufficient independence. What would it be, then, if
everybody stood in a similar position of dependence towards a community
that was indifferent to his happiness? Yet no less a danger than this would
be the result of adopting any of those utopian schemes which sacrifice true
liberty to uncontrolled equality, or even to an exaggerated sense of
fraternity. Wide as the divergence between Positivism and the Economic
schools is, Positivists adopt substantially the strictures which they have
passed upon Communism; especially those of Dunoyer, their most
advanced writer.
Industry requires its There is another point in which Communism is
captains as well as equally inconsistent with the laws of Sociology. Acting
War
under false views of the constitution of our modern
industrial system, it proposes to remove its directors, who form so essential
a part of it. An army can no more exist without officers than without
soldiers; and this elementary truth holds good of Industry as well as of War.
The organization of modern industry has not been found practicable as yet;
but the germ of such organization lies unquestionably in the division which
has arisen spontaneously between Capitalist and Workman. No great works
could be undertaken if each worker were also to be a director, or if the
management, instead of being fixed, were entrusted to a passive and

irresponsible body. It is evident that under the present system of industry
there is a tendency to a constant enlargement of undertakings: each fresh
step leads at once to still further extension. Now this tendency, so far from
being opposed to the interests of the working classes, is a condition which
will most seriously facilitate the real organization of our material existence,
as soon as we have a moral authority competent to control it. For it is only
the larger employers that the spiritual power can hope to penetrate with a
strong and habitual sense of duty to their subordinates. Without a sufficient
concentration of material power, the means of satisfying the claims of
morality would be found wanting, except at such exorbitant sacrifices as
would be incompatible with all industrial progress. This is the weak point of
every plan of reform which limits itself to the mode of acquiring power,
whether public power or private, instead of aiming at controlling its use in
whosever hands it may be placed. It leads to a waste of those forces which,
when rightly used, form our principal resource in dealing with grave social
difficulties.
Communism is The motives, therefore, from which modern
deficient in the Communism has arisen, however estimable, lead at
historical spirit
present, in the want of proper scientific teaching, to a
very wrong view both of the nature of the disease and of its remedy. A
heavier reproach against it is, that in one point it shows a manifest
insufficiency of social instinct. Communists boast of their spirit of social
union; but they limit it to the union of the present generation, stopping short
of historical continuity, which yet is the principal characteristic of
Humanity. When they have matured their moral growth, and have followed
out in Time that connexion which at present they only recognize in Space,
they will at once see the necessity of these general conditions which at
present they would reject. They will understand the importance of
inheritance, as the natural means by which each generation transmits to its
successor the result of its own labours and the means of improving them.
The necessity of inheritance, as far as the community is concerned, is
evident, and its extension to the individual is an obvious consequence. But
whatever reproaches Communists may deserve in this respect are equally
applicable to all the other progressive sects. They are all pervaded by an
anti-historic spirit, which leads them to conceive of Society as though it had
no ancestors; and this, although their own ideas for the most part can have
no bearing except upon posterity.

Serious as these errors are, a philosophic mind will
In fact, as a system, it
is worthless, though treat the Communism of our day, so far as it is adopted
prompted by noble in good faith, with indulgence, whether he look at the
feelings
motives from which it arose, or at the practical results
which will follow from it. It is hardly fair to criticize the intrinsic merits of
a doctrine, the whole meaning and value of which are relative to the
peculiar phase of society in which it is proposed. Communism has in its
own way discharged an important function. It has brought prominently
forward the greatest of social problems; and, if we except the recent
Positivist explanation, its mode of stating it has never been surpassed. And
let no one suppose that it would have been enough simply to state the
problem, without hazarding any solution of it. Those who think so do not
understand the exigencies of man’s feeble intellect. In far easier subjects
than this, it is impossible to give prolonged attention to questions which are
simply asked, without any attempt to answer them. Suppose, for instance,
that Gall and Broussais had limited themselves to a simple statement of
their great problems without venturing on any solution; their principles,
however incontestable, would have been barren of result, for want of that
motive power of renovation which nothing can give but a systematic
solution of some kind or other, hazardous as the attempt must be at first.
Now it is hardly likely that we should be able to evade this condition of our
mental faculties in subjects which are not only of the highest difficulty, but
also more exposed than any others to the influence of passion. Besides,
when we compare the errors of Communism with those of other social
doctrines which have recently received official sanction, we shall feel more
disposed to palliate them. Are they, for instance, more shallow and more
really dangerous than the absurd and chimerical notion which was accepted
in France for a whole generation, and is still upheld by so many political
teachers; the notion that the great Revolution has found its final issue in the
constitutional system of government, a system peculiar to England during
her stage of transition? Moreover, our so-called conservatives only escape
the errors of Communism by evading or ignoring its problems, though they
are becoming every day more urgent. Whenever they are induced to deal
with them, they render themselves liable to exactly the same dangers,
dangers common to all schools which reject the division of the two powers,
and which consequently are for ever trying to make legislation do the work
of morality. Accordingly we see the governing classes nowadays upholding

institutions of a thoroughly Communist character, such as alms-houses,
foundling hospitals, etc.; while popular feeling strongly and rightly
condemns such institutions, as being incompatible with that healthy growth
of home affection which should be common to all ranks.
Were it not that Communism is provisionally useful in antagonizing
other doctrines equally erroneous, it would have, then, no real importance,
except that due to the motives which originated it; since its practical
solution is far too chimerical and subversive ever to obtain acceptance. Yet,
from the high morality of these motives, it will probably maintain and
increase its influence until our working men find that their wants can be
more effectually satisfied by gentler and surer means. Our republican
system seems at first sight favourable to the scheme; but it cannot fail soon
to have the reverse effect, because, while adopting the social principle
which constitutes the real merit of Communism, it repudiates its
mischievous illusions. In France, at all events, where property is so easy to
acquire and is consequently so generally enjoyed, the doctrine cannot lead
to much practical harm; rather its reaction will be beneficial, because it will
fix men’s minds more seriously on the just claims of the People. The danger
is far greater in other parts of Western Europe; especially in England, where
aristocratic influence is less undermined, and where consequently the
working classes are less advanced and more oppressed. And even in
Catholic countries, where individualism and anarchy have been met by a
truer sense of fraternity, Communistic disturbances can only be avoided
finally by a more rapid dissemination of Positivism, which will ultimately
dispel all social delusions, by offering the true solution of the questions that
gave rise to them.
The nature of the evil shows us at once that the remedy we seek must
be almost entirely of a moral kind. This truth, based as it is on real
knowledge of human nature, the people will soon come to feel instinctively.
And here Communists are, without knowing it, preparing the way for the
ascendancy of Positivism. They are forcing upon men’s notice in the
strongest possible way a problem to which no peaceable and satisfactory
solution can be given, except by the new philosophy.
Property is a public That philosophy, abandoning all useless and
trust, not to be irritating discussion as to the origin of wealth and the
interfered with legally
extent of its possession, proceeds at once to the moral

rules which should regulate it as a social function. The distribution of power
among men, of material power especially, lies so far beyond our means of
intervention, that to set it before us as our main object to rectify the defects
of the natural order in this respect, would be to waste our short life in barren
and interminable disputes. The chief concern of the public is that power, in
whosever hands it may be placed, should be exercised for their benefit; and
this is a point to which we may direct our efforts with far greater effect.
Besides, by regulating the employment of wealth, we do, indirectly, modify
its tenure; for the mode in which wealth is held has some secondary
influence over the right use of it.
The regulations required should be moral, not political in their source;
general, not special, in their application. Those who accept them will do so
of their own free will, under the influence of their education. Thus their
obedience, while steadily maintained, will have, as Aristotle long ago
observed, the merit of voluntary action. By converting private property into
a public function, we would subject it to no tyrannical interference; for this,
by the destruction of free impulse and responsibility, would prove most
deeply degrading to man’s character. Indeed, the comparison of proprietors
with public functionaries will frequently be applied in the inverse sense;
with the view, that is, of strengthening the latter rather than of weakening
the former. The true principle of republicanism is, that all forces shall work
together for the common good. With this view we have on the one hand, to
determine precisely what it is that the common good requires; and on the
other, to develop the temper of mind most likely to satisfy the requirement.
The conditions requisite for these two objects are, a recognized Code of
principles, an adequate Education, and a healthy direction of Public
Opinion. For such conditions we must look principally to the philosophic
body which Positivism proposes to establish at the apex of modern society.
Doubtless this purely moral influence would not be sufficient of itself.
Human frailty is such that Government, in the ordinary sense of the word,
will have as before to repress by force the more palpable and more
dangerous class of delinquencies. But this additional control, though
necessary, will not fill so important a place as it did in the Middle Ages
under the sway of Catholicism. Spiritual rewards and punishments will
preponderate over temporal, in proportion as human development evokes a
stronger sense of the ties which unite each with all, by the threefold bond of
Feeling, Thought, and Action.

Positivism, being more pacific and more
Inheritance
efficacious than Communism, because more true, is also
favourable to its right
employment broader and more complete in its solution of great
social problems. The superficial view of property,
springing too often from envious motives, which condemns Inheritance
because it admits of possession without labour, is not subversive merely, but
narrow. From the moral point of view we see at once the radical weakness
of these empirical reproaches. They show blindness to the fact that this
mode of transmitting wealth is really that which is most likely to call out
the temper requisite for its right employment. It saves the mind and the
heart from the mean and sordid habits which are so often engendered by
slow accumulation of capital. The man who is born to wealth is more likely
to feel the wish to be respected. And thus those whom we are inclined to
condemn as idlers may very easily become the most useful of the rich
classes, under a wise reorganization of opinions and habits. Of course too,
since with the advance of Civilization the difficulty of living without
industry increases, the class that we are speaking of becomes more and
more exceptional. In every way, then, it is a most serious mistake to wish to
upset society on account of abuses which are already in course of removal,
and which admit of conversion to a most beneficial purpose.
Intellect needs moral Again, another feature in which the Positivist
control as much as solution surpasses the Communist, is the remarkable
wealth
completeness of its application. Communism takes no
account of anything but wealth; as if wealth were the only power in modern
society badly distributed and administered. In reality there are greater
abuses connected with almost every other power that man possesses; and
especially with the powers of intellect; yet these our visionaries make not
the smallest attempt to rectify. Positivism being the only doctrine that
embraces the whole sphere of human existence, is therefore the only
doctrine that can elevate Social Feeling to its proper place, by extending it
to all departments of human activity without exception. Identification, in a
moral sense, of private functions with public duties is even more necessary
in the case of the scientific man or the artist, than in that of the proprietor;
whether we look at the source from which his powers proceed, or at the
object to which they should be directed. Yet the men who wish to make
material wealth common, the only kind of wealth that can be held
exclusively by an individual, never extend their utopian scheme to

intellectual wealth, in which it would be far more admissible. In fact the
apostles of Communism often come forward as zealous supporters of what
they call literary property. Such inconsistencies show the shallowness of the
system; it proclaims its own failure in the very cases that are most
favourable for the application. The extension of the principle here suggested
would expose at once the inexpediency of political regulations on the
subject, and the necessity of moral rules; for these and these only can
ensure the right use of all our faculties without distinction. Intellectual
effort, to be of any value, must be spontaneous; and it is doubtless an
instinctive sense of this truth which prevents Communists from subjecting
intellectual faculties to their utopian regulations. But Positivism can deal
with these faculties which stand in the most urgent need of wise direction,
without inconsistency and without disturbance. It leaves to them their fair
measure of free action; and in the case of other faculties which, though less
eminent, are hardly less dangerous to repress, it strengthens their freedom.
When a pure morality arises capable of impressing a social tendency upon
every phase of human activity, the freer our action becomes the more useful
will it be to the public. The tendency of modern civilization, far from
impeding private industry, is to entrust it more and more with functions,
especially with those of a material kind, which were originally left to
government. Unfortunately this tendency, which is very evident, leads
economists into the mistake of supposing that industry may be left
altogether without organization. All that it really proves is that the influence
of moral principles is gradually preponderating over that of governmental
regulations.
Action of organized The method which is peculiar to Positivism of
public opinion upon solving our great social problems by moral agencies,
Capitalists. Strikes
will be found applicable also to the settlement of
industrial disputes, so far as the popular claims involved are well founded.
These claims will thus become clear from all tendency to disorder, and will
consequently gain immensely in force; especially when they are seen to be
consistent with principles which are freely accepted by all, and when they
are supported by a philosophic body of known impartiality and
enlightenment. This spiritual power, while impressing on the people the
duty of respecting their temporal leaders, will impose duties upon these
latter, which they will find impossible to evade. As all classes will have
received a common education, they will all alike be penetrated with the

general principles on which these special obligations will rest. And these
weapons, derived from no source but that of Feeling and Reason, and aided
solely by Public Opinion, will wield an influence over practical life, of
which nothing in the present day can give any conception. We might
compare it with the influence of Catholicism in the Middle Ages, only that
men are too apt to attribute the results of Catholicism to the chimerical
hopes and fears which it inspired, rather than to the energy with which
praise and blame were distributed. With the new spiritual power praise and
blame will form the only resource; but it will be developed and
consolidated to a degree which, as I have before shown, was impossible for
Catholicism.
This is the only real solution of the disputes that are so constantly
arising between workmen and their employers. Both parties will look to this
philosophic authority as a supreme court of arbitration. In estimating its
importance, we must not forget that the antagonism of employer and
employed has not yet been pushed to its full consequences. The struggle
between wealth and numbers would have been far more serious, but for the
fact that combination, without which there can be no struggle worth
speaking of, has hitherto only been permitted to the capitalist. It is true that
in England combinations of workmen are not legally prohibited. But in that
country they are not yet sufficiently emancipated either intellectually or
morally, to make such use of the power as would be the case in France.
When French workmen are allowed to concert their plans as freely as their
employers, the antagonism of interests that will then arise will make both
sides feel the need of a moral power to arbitrate between them. Not that the
conciliating influence of such a power will ever be such as to do away
entirely with extreme measures; but it will greatly restrict their application,
and in cases where they are unavoidable, will mitigate their excesses. Such
measures should be limited on both sides to refusal of co-operation; a
power which every free agent ought to be allowed to exercise, on his own
personal responsibility, with the object of impressing on those who are
teaching him unjustly the importance of the services which he has been
rendering. The workman is not to be compelled to work any more than the
capitalist to direct. Any abuse of this extreme protest on either side will of
course be disapproved by the moral power; but the option of making the
protest is always to be reserved to each element in the collective organism,
by virtue of his natural independence. In the most settled times

functionaries have always been allowed to suspend their services on special
occasions. It was done frequently in the Middle Ages by priests, professors,
judges, etc. All we have to do is to regulate this privilege, and embody it
into the industrial system. This will be one of the secondary duties of the
philosophic body, who will naturally be consulted on most of these
occasions, as on all others of public or private moment. The formal sanction
which it may give to a suspension or positive prohibition of work would
render such a measure far more effective than it is at present. The operation
of the measure is but partial at present, but it might in this way extend, first
to all who belong to the same trade, then to other branches of industry, and
even ultimately to every Western nation that accepts the same spiritual
guides. Of course persons who think themselves aggrieved may always
resort to this extreme course on their own responsibility, against the advice
of the philosophic body. True spiritual power confines itself to giving
counsel: it never commands. But in such cases, unless the advice given by
the philosophers has been wrong, the suspension of work is not likely to be
sufficiently general to bring about any important result.
This theory of trade-unions is, in fact, in the industrial world, what the
power of insurrection is with regard to the higher social functions; it is an
ultimate resource which every collective organism must reserve. The
principle is the same in the simpler and more ordinary cases as in the more
unusual and important. In both the intervention of the philosophic body,
whether solicited or not, whether its purpose be to organize popular effort
or to repress it, will largely influence the result.
We are now in a position to state with more precision the main practical
difference between the policy of Positivism, and that of Communism or of
Socialism. All progressive political schools agree in concentrating their
attention upon the problem, How to give the people their proper place as a
component element of modern Society, which ever since the Middle Ages
has been tending more and more distinctly to its normal mode of existence.
They also agree that the two great requirements of the working classes are,
the organization of Education, and the organization of Labour. But here
their agreement ends. When the means of effecting these two objects have
to be considered, Positivists find themselves at issue with all other
Progressive schools. They maintain that the organization of Industry must
be based upon the organization of Education. It is commonly supposed that

both may be begun simultaneously: or indeed that Labour may be organized
irrespectively of Education. It may seem as if we are making too much of a
mere question of arrangement; yet the difference is one which affects the
whole character and method of social reconstruction. The plan usually
followed is simply a repetition of the old attempt to reconstruct politically
without waiting for spiritual reconstruction; in other words, to raise the
social edifice before its intellectual and moral foundations have been laid.
Hence the attempts made to satisfy popular requirements by measures of a
purely political kind, because they appear to meet the evil directly; a course
which is as useless as it is destructive. Positivism, on the contrary,
substitutes for such agencies, an influence which is sure and peaceful,
although it be gradual and indirect; the influence of a more enlightened
morality, supported by a purer state of Public Opinion; such opinion being
organized by competent minds, and diffused freely amongst the people. In
fact, the whole question, whether the solution of the twofold problem before
us is to be empirical, revolutionary, and therefore confined simply to
France; or whether it is to be consistent, pacific, and applicable to the whole
of Western Europe, depends upon the preference or the postponement of the
organization of Labour to the organization of Education.
Public Opinion must This conclusion involves a brief explanation of the
be based upon a general system of education which Positivism will
sound system of
Education
introduce. This the new spiritual power regards as its
principal function, and as its most efficient means of
satisfying the working classes in all reasonable demands.
It was the great social virtue of Catholicism, that it introduced for the
first time, as far as circumstances permitted, a system of education common
to all classes without distinction, not excepting even those who were still
slaves. It was a vast undertaking, yet essential to its purpose of founding a
spiritual power which was to be independent of the temporal power. Apart
from its temporary value, it has left us one imperishable principle, namely
that in all education worthy of the name, moral training should be regarded
as of greater importance than scientific teaching. Catholic education,
however, was of course, extremely defective; owing partly to the
circumstances of the time, and partly to the weakness of the doctrine on
which it rested. Having reference almost exclusively to the oppressed
masses, the principal lesson which it taught was the duty of almost passive

resignation, with the exception of certain obligations imposed upon rulers.
Intellectual culture in any true sense there was none. All this was natural in
a faith which directed men’s highest efforts to an object unconnected with
social life, and which taught that all the phenomena of nature were
regulated by an impenetrable Will. Catholic Education was consequently
quite unsuited to any period but the Middle Ages; a period during which the
advanced portion of Humanity was gradually ridding itself of the ancient
institution of slavery, by commuting it first into serfdom, as a preliminary
step to entire personal freedom. In the ancient world Catholic education
would have been too revolutionary; at the present time it would be servile
and inadequate. Its function was that of directing the long and difficult
transition from the social life of Antiquity to that of Modern times. Personal
emancipation once obtained, the working classes began to develop their
powers and rise to their true position as a class; and they soon became
conscious of intellectual and social wants which Catholicism was wholly
incapable of satisfying.
And yet this is the only real system of universal education which the
world has hitherto seen. For we cannot give that name to the so-called
University system which metaphysicians began to introduce into Europe at
the close of the Middle Ages; and which offered little more than the special
instruction previously given to the priesthood; that is, the study of the Latin
language, with the dialectical training required for the defence of their
doctrines. Morals were untaught except as a part of the training of the
professed theologian. All this metaphysical and literary instruction was of
no great service to social evolution, except so far as it developed the critical
power; it had, however, a certain indirect influence on the constructive
movement, especially on the development of Art. But its defects, both
practical and theoretical, have been made more evident by its application to
new classes of society, whose occupations, whether practical or speculative,
required a very different kind of training. And thus, while claiming the title
of Universal, it never reached the working classes, even in Protestant
countries, where each believer became to a certain extent his own priest.
The theological method being obsolete, and the metaphysical method
inadequate, the task of founding an efficient system of popular education
belongs to Positivism; the only doctrine capable of reconciling these two
orders of conditions, the intellectual and the moral, which are equally

necessary, but which since the Middle Ages have always proved
incompatible. Positivist education, while securing the supremacy of the
heart over the understanding more efficiently than Catholicism, will yet put
no obstacle in the way of intellectual growth. The function of Intellect, in
education as in practical life, will be to regulate Feeling; the culture of
which, beginning at birth, will be maintained by constant exercise of the
three classes of duties relative to Self, to the Family, and to Society.
I have already explained the mode in which the principles of universal
morality will be finally co-ordinated; a task which, as I have shown, is
connected with the principal function of the new spiritual power. I have
now only to point out the paramount influence of morality on every part of
Positive Education. It will be seen to be connected at first spontaneously,
and afterwards in a more systematic form, with the entire system of human
knowledge.
Positive Education, adapting itself to the requirements of the Organism
with which it has to deal, subordinates intellectual conditions to social.
Social conditions are considered as the main object, intellectual as but the
means of attaining it. Its principal aim is to induce the working classes to
accept their high social function of supporting the spiritual power, while at
the same time it will render them more efficient in their own special duties.
Education has two Presuming that Education extends from birth to
stages: from birth tomanhood, we may divide it into two periods, the first
puberty, from puberty
to adolescence. The
ending with puberty, that is, at the beginning of
first, consisting of industrial apprenticeship. Education here should be
physical and estheticessentially spontaneous, and should be carried on as far
training to be given at
home
as possible in the bosom of the family. The only studies
required should be of an esthetic kind. In the second
period, Education takes a systematic form, consisting chiefly of a public
course of scientific lectures, explaining the essential laws of the various
orders of phenomena. These lectures will be the groundwork of Moral
Science, which will co-ordinate the whole, and point out the relation of
each part to the social purpose common to all. Thus, at about the time which
long experience has fixed as that of legal majority, and when in most cases
the term of apprenticeship closes, the workman will be prepared
intellectually and morally for his public and private service.

The first years of life, from infancy to the end of the period of second
dentition, should be devoted to education of the physical powers, carried on
under the superintendence of the parents, especially of the mother. Physical
education, as usually practised, is nothing but mere muscular exercise; but a
more important object is that of training the senses, and giving manual skill,
so as to develop from the very first our powers of observation and action.
Study, in the ordinary acceptation, there should be none during this period,
not even reading or writing. An acquaintance with facts of various kinds,
such as may spontaneously attract the growing powers of attention, will be
the only instruction received. The philosophic system of the infant
individual, like that of the infant species, consists in pure Fetichism, and its
natural development should not be disturbed by unwise interference. The
only care of the parents will be to impress those feelings and habits for
which a rational basis will be given at a later period. By taking every
opportunity of calling the higher instincts into play, they will be laying
down the best foundation for true morality.
During the period of about seven years comprised between the second
dentition and puberty, Education will become somewhat more systematic;
but it will be limited to the culture of the fine arts; and it will be still most
important, especially on moral grounds, to avoid separation from the family.
The study of Art should simply consist in practising it more or less
systematically. No formal lectures are necessary, at least for the purposes of
general education, though of course for professional purposes they may still
be required. There is no reason why these studies should not be carried on
at home by the second generation of Positivists, when the culture of the
parents will be sufficiently advanced to allow them to superintend it. They
will include Poetry, the art on which all the rest are based; and the two most
important of the special arts, music and drawing. Meantime the pupil will
become familiar with the principal Western languages, which are included
in the study of Poetry, since modern poetry cannot be properly appreciated
without them. Moreover, independently of esthetic considerations, a
knowledge of them is most important morally, as a means of destroying
national prejudices, and of forming the true Positivist standard of
Occidental feeling. Each nation will be taught to consider it a duty to learn
the language of contiguous countries; an obvious principle, which, in the
case of Frenchmen, will involve their learning all the other four languages,
as a consequence of that central position which gives them so many

advantages. When this rule becomes general, and the natural affinities of the
five advanced nations are brought fully into play, a common Occidental
language will not be long in forming itself spontaneously, without the aid of
any metaphysical scheme for producing a language that shall be absolutely
universal.
During the latter portion of primary Education, which is devoted to the
culture of the imaginative powers, the philosophic development of the
individual, corresponding to that of the race, will carry him from the simple
Fetichism with which he began to the state of Polytheism. This resemblance
between the growth of the individual and that of society has always shown
itself more or less, in spite of the irrational precautions of Christian
teachers. They have never been able to give children a distaste for those
simple tales of fairies and genii, which are natural to this phase. The
Positivist teacher will let this tendency take its own course. It should not,
however, involve any hypocrisy on the part of the parents, nor need it lead
to any subsequent contradiction. The simple truth is enough. The child may
be told that these spontaneous beliefs are but natural to his age, but that they
will gradually lead him on to others, by the fundamental law of all human
development. Language of this kind will not only have the advantage of
familiarizing him with a great principle of Positivism, but will stimulate the
nascent sense of sociability, by leading him to sympathize with the various
nations who still remain at his own primitive stage of intellectual
development.
The second part The second part of Positivist Education cannot be
consists of public conducted altogether at home, since it involves public
lectures on the
Sciences, from
lectures, in which of course the part taken by the parent
Mathematics to can only be accessory. But this is no reason for
Sociology depriving the pupil of the advantages of family life; it
remains as indispensable as ever to his moral
development, which is always to be the first consideration. It will be easy
for him to follow the best masters without weakening his sense of personal
and domestic morality, which is the almost inevitable result of the monastic
seclusion of modern schools. The public-school system is commonly
thought to compensate for these disadvantages, by the knowledge of the
world which it gives; but this is better obtained by free intercourse with
society, where sympathies are far more likely to be satisfied. Recognition of

this truth would do much to facilitate and improve popular education; and it
applies to all cases, except perhaps to some special professions, where
seclusion of the pupils may still be necessary, though even in these cases
probably it may be ultimately dispensed with.
The plan to be followed in this period of education, will obviously be
that indicated by the encyclopædic law of Classification, which forms part
of my Theory of Development. Scientific study, whether for the working
man or the philosopher, should begin with the inorganic world around us,
and then pass to the subject of Man and Society; since our ideas on these
two subjects form the basis of our practical action. The first class of studies,
as I have stated before, includes four sciences which we may arrange in
pairs: Mathematics and Astronomy forming the first pair; Physics and
Chemistry the second. To each of these pairs, two years may be given. But
as the first ranges over a wide field, and is of greater logical importance, it
will require two lectures weekly; whereas, for all the subsequent studies one
lecture will be sufficient. Besides, during these two years, the necessities of
practical life will not press heavily, and more time may fairly be spent in
mental occupation. From the study of inorganic science, the pupil will
proceed to Biology: this subject may easily be condensed in the fifth year
into a series of forty lectures, without really losing either its philosophic or
its popular character. This concludes the introductory part of Education. The
student will now co-ordinate all his previous knowledge by the direct study
of Sociology, statically and dynamically viewed. On this subject also forty
lectures will be given, in which the structure and growth of human
societies, especially those of modern times, will be clearly explained. With
this foundation we come to the last of the seven years of pupillage, in which
the great social purpose of the scheme is at last reached. It will be devoted
to a systematic exposition of Moral Science, the principles of which may be
now fully understood by the light of the knowledge previously obtained of
the World, of Life, and of Humanity.
During this course of study, part of the three unoccupied months of
each year will be spent in public examinations, to test the degree to which
the instruction has been assimilated. The pupils will of their own accord
continue their esthetic pursuits, even supposing their natural tastes in this
direction not to be encouraged as they ought to be. During the last two years
the Latin and Greek languages might be acquired, as an accessory study,

which would improve the poetic culture of the student, and be useful to him
in the historical and moral questions with which he will then be occupied.
For the purposes of Art, Greek is the more useful of the two; but in the
second object, that of enabling us to realize our social Filiation, Latin is of
even greater importance.
In the course of these seven years the philosophic development of the
individual, preserving its correspondence with that of the race, will pass
through its last phase. As the pupil passed before from Fetichism to
Polytheism, so he will now pass, as spontaneously, into Monotheism,
induced by the influence on his imaginative powers which hitherto have
been supreme, of the spirit of discussion. No interference should be offered
to this metaphysical transition, which is the homage that he pays to the
necessary conditions under which mankind arrives at truth. There is
something in this provisional phase which evidently harmonizes well with
the abstract and independent character of Mathematics, with which the two
first years of the seven are occupied. As long as more attention is given to
deduction than to induction, the mind cannot but retain a leaning to
metaphysical theories. Under their influence the student will soon reduce
his primitive theology to Deism of a more or less distinct kind; and this
during his physico-chemical studies will most likely degenerate into a
species of Atheism; which last phase, under the enlightening influence of
biological and still more of sociological knowledge, will be finally replaced
by Positivism. Thus at the time fixed for the ultimate study of moral
science, each new member of Humanity will have been strongly impressed
by personal experience, with a sense of historical Filiation, and will be
enabled to sympathize with his ancestors and contemporaries, while
devoting his practical energies to the good of his successors.
Travels of There is an excellent custom prevalent among the
Apprentices working men of France and creditable to their good
sense, with which our educational scheme seems at first
sight incompatible. I refer to the custom of travelling from place to place
during the last years of apprenticeship; which is as beneficial to their mind
and character, as the purposeless excursions of our wealthy and idle classes
are in most cases injurious. But there is no necessity for its interfering with
study, since it always involves long residence in the chief centres of
production, where the workman is sure to find annual courses of lectures

similar to those which he would otherwise have been attending at home. As
the structure and distribution of the philosophic body will be everywhere
the same, there need be no great inconvenience in these changes. For every
centre not more than seven teachers will be required; each of whom will
take the whole Encyclopædic scale successively. Thus the total number of
lectures will be so small as to admit of a high standard of merit being
everywhere attained, and of finding everywhere a fair measure of material
support. So far from discouraging the travelling system, Positivism will
give it a new character, intellectually and socially, by extending the range of
travel to the whole of Western Europe, since there is no part of it in which
the workman will not be able to prosecute his education. The difference of
language will then be no obstacle. Not only would the sense of fraternity
among Western nations be strengthened by such a plan, but great
improvement would result esthetically. The languages of Europe would be
learnt more thoroughly, and there would be a keener appreciation of works
of art, whether musical, pictorial, or architectural; for these can never be
properly appreciated but in the country which gave them birth.
Concentration of Judging by our present practice, it would seem
study impossible to include such a mass of important
scientific studies, as are here proposed, in three hundred
and sixty lectures. But the length to which courses of lectures on any
subject extend at present, is owing partly to the special or professional
object with which the course is given, and still more to the discursive and
unphilosophical spirit of most of the teachers, consequent on the miserable
manner in which our scientific system is organized. Such a regeneration of
scientific studies as Positivism proposes, will animate them with a social
spirit, and thus give them a larger and more comprehensive tendency.
Teachers will become more practised in the art of condensing, and their
lectures will be far more substantial. They will not indeed be a substitute for
voluntary effort, on which all the real value of teaching depends. Their aim
will be rather to direct such effort. A striking example, which is not so well
remembered as it should be, will help to explain my meaning. At the first
opening of the Polytechnic School, courses of lectures were given, very
appropriately named Revolutionary Courses, which concentrated the
teaching of three years into three months. What was in that case an
extraordinary anomaly, due to republican enthusiasm, may become the
normal state when a moral power arises not inferior in energy, and yet based

upon a consistent intellectual synthesis, of which our great predecessors of
the Revolution could have no conception.
Little attention has hitherto been given to the didactic value of Feeling.
Since the close of the Middle Ages, the heart has been neglected in
proportion as the mind has been cultivated. But it is the characteristic
principle of Positivism, a principle as fertile in intellectual as in moral
results, that the Intellect, whether we look at its natural or at its normal
position, is subordinate to Social Feeling. Throughout this course of popular
education, parents and masters will seize every suitable occasion for calling
Social Feeling into play; and the most abstruse subjects will often be
vivified by its influence. The office of the mind is to strengthen and to
cultivate the heart; the heart again should animate and direct the mental
powers. This mutual influence of general views and generous feelings will
have greater effect upon scientific study, from the esthetic culture
previously given, in which such habits of mind will have been formed, as
will give grace and beauty to the whole life.
Governmental When I speak of this education as specially
assistance not destined for the people, I am not merely using words to
required, except for
certain special
denote its comprehensiveness and philosophic
character. It is, in my opinion, the only education, with
institutions, and this
only as a provisionalthe exception of certain special branches, for which
measure
public organization is needed. It should be looked on as
a sacred debt which the republic owes to the working classes. But the claim
does not extend to other classes, who can easily pay for any special
instruction that they may require. Besides such instruction will be only a
partial development of the more general teaching, or an application of it to
some particular purpose. Therefore if the general training be sound, most
people will be able to prosecute accessory studies by themselves.
Apprenticeship to any business involves very little, except the practice of it.
Even in the highest arts, no course of systematic instruction is necessary.
The false views now prevalent on the subject are due to the unfortunate
absence of all general education, since the decay of Catholicism. The
special institutions founded in Europe during the last three centuries, and
carefully remodelled in France by the Convention, are only valuable as
containing certain germs of truth, which will be found indispensable when
general education is finally reorganized. But important as they may be from

a scientific aspect, their practical utility, which seems to have been the
motive for establishing them, is exceedingly doubtful. The arts which they
were intended to promote could have done perfectly well without them. I
include in these remarks such institutions as the Polytechnic School, the
Museum of Natural History, etc. Their value, like that of all good
institutions of modern times, is purely provisional. Viewed in this light, it
may be worth our while to reorganize them. Positivist principles, discarding
all attempts to make them permanent, will be all the better able to adapt
them to their important temporary purpose. Indeed there are some new
institutions which it might be advisable to form; such, for instance, as a
School of Comparative Philology, the object of which would be to range all
human languages according to their true affinities. This would compensate
the suppression of Greek and Latin professorships, which is certainly an
indispensable measure. But the whole of this provisional framework would
no doubt disappear before the end of the nineteenth century, when a system
of general education will have been thoroughly organized. The present
necessity for a provisional system should lead to no misconception of its
character and purpose. Working men are the only class who have a real
claim upon the State for instruction; and this, if wisely organized, dispenses
with the necessity of special institutions. The adoption of these views would
at once facilitate and ennoble popular education. Nations, provinces, and
towns will vie with one another in inviting the best teachers that the
spiritual authorities of Western Europe can supply. And every true
philosopher will take pride in such teaching, when it becomes generally
understood that the popular character of his lectures implies that they shall
be at the same time systematic. Members of the new spiritual power will in
most cases regard teaching as their principal occupation, for at least a
considerable portion of their public life.
We are not ripe for What has been said makes it clear that any
organization of such education as this at the present
this system at present;
and Government must
time would be impossible. However sincere the
not attempt to hasten
its introduction intentions of governments to effect this great result
might be, any premature attempt to do it would but
injure the work, especially if they put in a claim to superintend it. The truth
is that a system of education, if it deserve the name, presupposes the
acceptance of a definite philosophical and social creed to determine its
character and purpose. Children cannot be brought up in convictions

contrary to those of their parents; indeed, the influence of the parent is
essential to the instructor. Opinions and habits that have been already
formed may subsequently be strengthened by an educational system; but the
carrying out of any such system is impossible, until the principles of
combined action and belief have been well established. Till then the
organization that we propose can only be effected in the case of individuals
who are ripe for it. Each of these will endeavour to repair the faults and
deficiencies of his own education in the best way he can, by the aid of the
general doctrine which he accepts. Assuming that the doctrine is destined to
triumph, the number of such minds gradually increases, and they
superintend the social progress of the next generation. This is the natural
process, and no artificial interference can dispense with it. So far, then,
from inviting government to organize education, we ought rather to exhort
it to abdicate the educational powers which it already holds, and which, I
refer more especially to France, are either useless or a source of discord.
There are only two exceptions to this remark, namely, primary education,
and special instruction in certain higher branches. Of these I have already
spoken. But with these exceptions, it is most desirable that government,
whether municipal or central, should surrender its unreasonable monopoly,
and establish real liberty of teaching; the condition of such liberty being, as
I said before, the suppression of all annual grants whatsoever for
theological or metaphysical purposes. Until some universal faith has been
accepted on its own merits, all attempts made by Government to reform
education must necessarily be reactionary; since they will always be based
on some one of the retrogressive creeds which it is our object to supersede
altogether.
It is with adults, then, that we must deal. We must endeavour to
disseminate systematic convictions among them, and thus open the door to
a real reform of education for the next generation. The press and the power
of free speech offer many ways of bringing about this result. The most
important of these would be a more or less connected series of popular
lectures on the various positive sciences, including history, which may now
be ranked among them. Now for these lectures to produce their full effect,
they must even when treating of the most elementary point in mathematics,
be thoroughly philosophic and consequently animated by a social spirit.
They must be entirely independent of government, so as not to be hampered
by any of the authorized views. Lastly, there is a condition in which all the

rest are summed up. These lectures should be Occidental, not simply
National. What we require is a free association of philosophers throughout
Western Europe, formed by the voluntary co-operation of all who can
contribute efficiently to this great preliminary work; their services being
essentially gratuitous. It is a result which no system but Positivism is
capable of effecting. By its agency that coalition between philosophers and
the working classes, on which so much depends, will speedily be
established.
While the work of propagating Positivist convictions is going on in the
free and unrestricted manner here described, the spiritual authority will at
the same time be forming itself, and will be prepared to make use of these
convictions as the basis for social regeneration. Thus the transitional state
will be brought as nearly as possible into harmony with the normal state;
and this the more in proportion as the natural affinity between philosophers
and workmen is brought out more distinctly. The connexion between
Positivist lectures and Positivist clubs will illustrate my meaning. While the
lectures prepare the way for the Future, the clubs work in the same direction
by judging the Past, and advising for the Present; so that we have at once a
beginning of the three essential functions of the new spiritual power.
We have now a clear conception of popular education in its provisional,
and in its normal state. Long before the normal state can be realized, the
mutual action of philosophers and workmen will have done great service to
both. Meeting with such powerful support from the people, the rising
spiritual power will win the respect if not the affection of their rulers, even
of those among them who are now the most contemptuous of every
influence but that of material power. Their excess of pride will often be so
far humbled that they will invite its mediation in cases where the people
have been roused to just indignation. The force of numbers seems at first so
violent as to carry all before it; but in the end it usually proves far inferior
to that of wealth. It cannot exist for any length of time without complete
convergence of opinion and feeling. Hence, a spiritual power has very great
weight in controlling or directing its action. Philosophers will never, indeed,
be able to manage the working classes as they please, as some unprincipled
agitators have imagined; but when they exercise their authority rightly,
whether it be in the cause of Order or that of Progress, they will have great
power over their passions and conduct. Such influence can only spring from

long cherished feelings of gratitude and trust, due not merely to presumed
capacity but to services actually rendered. No one is a fit representative of
his own claims; but the philosopher may honourably represent the cause of
working men before the governing classes; and the people will in their turn
compel their rulers to respect the new spiritual power. By this habitual
exchange of services the aspirations of the people will be kept clear of all
subversive tendencies, and philosophers will be led to abandon the folly of
seeking political power. Neither class will degrade itself by making its own
interest the chief consideration: each will find its own reward in keeping to
the nobler course of its own social duty.
Intellectual attitude ofTo complete this view of the political attitude
the people. which Positivism recommends to the working class, I
Emancipation from
theological belief
have now to speak of the intellectual and moral
conditions which that attitude requires, and on which
the character of their spiritual leaders depends. What is wanted is only a
more perfect development of tendencies which already exist in the people,
and which have already shown themselves strong in Paris, the centre of the
great Western movement.
Intellectually the principal conditions are two; Emancipation from
obsolete beliefs, and a sufficient amount of mental culture.
The emancipation of the working classes from theology is complete, at
least in Paris. In no other class has it so entirely lost its power. The shallow
deism, which satisfies so many of our literary men, finds little favour with
the people. They are happily unversed in studies of words and abstractions,
without which this last stage in the process of emancipation speedily comes
to an end. We only require a stronger expression of popular feeling on this
point, so as to avoid all deception and false statement as to the intellectual
character of the reorganization that is going on. And the freedom that we are
now enjoying will admit of these feelings being unmistakably manifested,
especially now that they have the new philosophy for their exponent. A
distinct declaration of opinion on this subject is urgently needed on social
grounds. That hypocritical affectation of theological belief against which
we have to fight, is designed to prevent, or at least has the effect of
preventing, the just enforcement of popular claims. These unscrupulous
attempts to mystify the people involve their mental subjection. The result is,
that their legitimate aspirations for real progress are evaded, by diverting

their thoughts towards an imaginary future state. It is for the working
classes themselves to break through this concerted scheme, which is even
more contemptible than it is odious. They have only to declare without
disguise what their intellectual position really is; and to do this so
emphatically as to make any mistake on the part of the governing classes
impossible. They will consequently reject all teachers who are insufficiently
emancipated, or who in any way support the system of theological
hypocrisy, which, from Robespierre downwards, has been the refuge of all
reactionists, whether democrat or royalist. But there are teachers of another
kind, who sincerely maintain that our life here on earth is a temporary
banishment, and that we ought to take as little interest in it as possible. A
prompt answer may be given to such instructors as these. They should be
requested to follow out their principle consistently, and to cease to interfere
in the management of a world which is so alien to what, in their ideas, is the
sole aim of life.
From metaphysical Metaphysical principles have more hold on our
doctrines working classes than theological; yet their abandonment
is equally necessary. The subtle extravagances by which
the German mind has been so confused, find, it is true, little favour in
Catholic countries. But even in Paris the people retains a prejudice in favour
of metaphysical instruction, though happily it has not been able to obtain it.
It is most desirable that this last illusion of our working classes should be
dissipated, as it forms the one great obstacle to their social action. One
reason for it is that they fall into the common error of confounding
knowledge with intelligence, and imagine in their modesty that none but
instructed men are capable of governing. Now this error, natural as it is,
often leads them to choose incompetent leaders. A truer estimate of modern
society would teach them that it is not among our literary, or even our
scientific men, proud as they may be of their attainments, that the largest
number of really powerful intellects are to be found. There are more of
them among the despised practical class, and even amongst the most
uninstructed working men. In the Middle Ages this truth was better known
than it is now. Education was thought more of than instruction. A knight
would be appreciated for his sagacity and penetration, and appointed to
important posts, though he might be extremely ignorant. Clear-sightedness,
wisdom, and even consistency of thought, are qualities which are very
independent of learning; and, as matters now stand, they are far better

cultivated in practical life than in scholastic study. In breadth of view, which
lies at the root of all political capacity, our literary classes have certainly
shown themselves far below the average.
Their mistaken And now we come to another and a deeper reason
for the prejudice of which I am speaking. It is that they
preference of literary
and rhetorical talent
to real intellectual
make no distinction between one kind of instruction and
power another. The unfortunate confidence which they still
bestow on literary men and lawyers shows that the
prestige of pedantry lingers among them longer than the prestige of
theology or monarchy. But all this will soon be altered under the influence
of republican government, and the strong discipline of a sound
philosophical system. Popular instinct will soon discover that constant
practice of the faculty of expression, whether in speech or in writing, is no
guarantee for real power of thought; indeed that it has a tendency to
incapacitate men from forming a clear and decided judgment on any
question. The instruction which such men receive is utterly deficient in
solid principles, and it almost always either presupposes or causes a total
absence of fixed convictions. Most minds thus trained, while skilled in
putting other men’s thoughts into shape, become incapable of distinguishing
true from false in the commonest subjects, even when their own interest
requires it. The people must give up the feeling of blind respect which leads
them to intrust such men with their higher interests. Reverence for superiors
is doubtless indispensable to a well-ordered state; only it needs to be better
guided than it is now.
What then, working men may ask, is the proper training for themselves,
and consequently for those who claim to guide them? The answer is,
systematic cultivation of the Positive spirit. It is already called into exercise
by their daily occupations; and all that is wanted is to strengthen it by a
course of scientific study. Their daily work involves a rudimentary
application of the Positive method: it turns their attention to many most
important natural laws. In fact, the workmen of Paris, whom I take as the
best type of their class, have a clearer sense of that union of reality with
utility by which the Positive spirit is characterized, than most of our
scientific men. The speciality of their employment is no doubt
disadvantageous with respect to breadth and coherence of ideas. But it
leaves the mind free from responsibility, and this is the most favourable

condition for developing these qualities to which all vigorous intellects are
naturally disposed. But nothing will so strongly impress on the people the
importance of extending and organizing their scientific knowledge, as their
interest in social questions. Their determination to rectify a faulty condition
of society will suggest to them that they must first know what the laws of
Social life really are; knowledge which is obviously necessary in every
other subject. They will then feel how impossible it is to understand the
present state of society, without understanding its relation on the one hand
with the Past, and on the other with the Future. Their desire to modify the
natural course of social phenomena will make them anxious to know the
antecedents and consequences of these phenomena, so as to avoid all
mischievous or useless interference. They will thus discover that Political
Art is even more dependent than other arts, upon its corresponding Science.
And then they will soon see that this science is no isolated department of
knowledge, but that it involves preliminary study of Man and of the World.
In this way they will pass downwards through the hierarchic scale of
Positive conceptions, until they come back to the inorganic world, the
sphere more immediately connected with their own special avocations. And
thus they will reach the conclusion that Positivism is the only system which
can satisfy either the intellectual or material wants of the people, since its
subject-matter and its objects are identical with their own, and since, like
themselves, it subordinates everything to social considerations. All that it
claims is to present in a systematic form principles which they already hold
instinctively. By co-ordinating these principles of morality and good sense,
their value, whether in public or in private questions, is largely increased;
and the union of the two forms of wisdom, theoretical and practical
wisdom, is permanently secured. When all this is understood, the people
will feel some shame at having entrusted questions of the greatest
complexity to minds that have never quite comprehended the difference
between a cubic inch and a cubic foot. As to men of science, in the common
acceptation of the word, who are so respected by the middle classes, we
need not be afraid of their gaining much influence with the people. They are
alienated from them by their utter indifference to social questions; and
before these their learned puerilities fade into insignificance. Absorbed in
the details of their own special science, they are quite incapable of
satisfying unsophisticated minds. What the people want is to have clear
conceptions on all subjects, des clartés de tout, as Molière has it. Whenever

the savants of our time are drawn by their foolish ambition into politics,
ordinary men find to their surprise that, except in a few questions of limited
extent and importance, their minds have become thoroughly narrow under
the influence of the specializing system of which they are so proud.
Positivism explains the mystery, by showing that, since the necessity for the
specializing system now no longer exists, it naturally results if prolonged, in
a sort of academic idiocy. During the last three centuries it did real service
to society, by laying down the scientific groundwork for the renovation of
Philosophy projected by Bacon and Descartes. But as soon as the
groundwork was sufficiently finished to admit of the formation of true
Science, that is, of Science viewed relatively to Humanity, the specializing
method became retrograde. It ceased to be of any assistance to the modern
spirit; and indeed it is now, especially in France, a serious obstacle to its
diffusion and systematic working. The wise revolutionists of the
Convention were well aware of this when they took the bold step of
suppressing the Academy of Sciences. The beneficial results of this
statesman-like policy will soon be appreciated by our workmen. The danger
lest, in withdrawing their confidence from metaphysicians or literary men,
they should fall into the bad scientific spirit, is not therefore very great.
With the social aims which they have in view, they cannot but see that
generality in their conceptions is as necessary as positivity. The Capitalist
class by which industry is directed, being more concentrated on special
objects, will always look on men of pure science with more respect. But the
people will be drawn by their political leanings towards philosophers in the
true sense of that word. The number of such men is but very small at
present; but it will soon increase at the call of the working classes, and will
indeed be recruited from their ranks.
Moral attitude of the This, then, should be the attitude of the working
people. The workman class, intellectually. Morally, what is required is, that
should regard himself
as a public
they should have a sufficient sense of the dignity of
functionary labour, and that they should be prepared for the mission
that now lies before them.
The workman must learn to look upon himself, morally, as a public
servant, with functions of a special and also of a general kind. Not that he is
to receive his wages for the future from the State instead of from a private
hand. The present plan is perfectly well adapted to all services which are so

direct and definite, that a common standard of value can be at once applied
to them. Only let it be understood that the service is not sufficiently
recompensed, without the social feeling of gratitude towards the agent that
performs it. In what are called liberal professions, this feeling already
obtains. The client or patient is not dispensed from gratitude by payment of
his fee. In this respect the republican instincts of the Convention have
anticipated the teaching of philosophy. They valued the workman’s labour
at its true worth. Workmen have only to imagine labour suppressed or even
suspended in the trade to which they may belong, to see its importance to
the whole fabric of modern society. Their general function as a class, the
function of forming public opinion, and of supporting the action of the
spiritual power, it is of course less easy for them to understand at present.
But, as I have already shown, it follows so naturally from their character
and position, and corresponds so perfectly with their requirements as a
class, that they cannot fail to appreciate its importance, when the course of
events allows, or rather compels them to bring it into play. The only danger
lies in their insisting on the possession of what metaphysicians call political
rights, and in engaging in useless discussions about the distribution of
power, instead of fixing their attention on the manner in which it is used. Of
this, however, there is no great fear, at all events in France, where the
metaphysical theory of Right has never reached so fanatical a pitch with the
working classes as elsewhere. Ideologists may blame them, and may use
their official influence as they will; but the people have too much good
sense to be permanently misled as to their true function in society. Deluged
as they have been with electoral votes, they will soon voluntarily abandon
this useless qualification, which now has not even the charm of a privilege.
Questions of pure politics have ceased to interest the people; their attention
is fixed, and will remain fixed, on social questions, which are to be solved
for the most part through moral agencies. That substitutions of one person
or party for another, or that mere modifications of any kind in the
administration should be looked on as the final issue of the great
Revolution, is a result in which they will never acquiesce.
And if this is to be the attitude of the people, it must be the attitude no
less of those who seek to gain their confidence. With them, as with the
people, political questions should be subordinate to social questions; and
with them the conviction should be even more distinct, that the solution of
social problems depends essentially on moral agencies. They must, in fact,

accept the great principle of separation of spiritual from temporal power, as
the basis on which modern society is to be prominently organized. So
entirely does the principle meet the wants of the people, that they will soon
insist on its adoption by their teachers. They will accept none who do not
formally abandon any prospects they may have of temporal power,
parliamentary as well as administrative. And by thus dedicating their lives
without reservation to the priesthood of Humanity, they will gain
confidence, not merely from the people, but from the governing classes.
Governments will offer no impediment to social speculations which do not
profess to be susceptible of immediate application; and thus the normal
state may be prepared for in the future without disturbance, and yet without
neglecting the present. Practical statesmen meanwhile, no longer interfered
with by pretentious sophists, will give up their retrograde tendencies, and
will gradually adapt their policy to the new ideas current in the public mind,
while discharging the indispensable function of maintaining material order.

For the people to rise to the true level of their
Ambition of power
and wealth must be position, they have only to develop and cultivate certain
abandoned dispositions which already exist in them spontaneously.
And the most important of these is, absence of ambition
for wealth or rank. Political metaphysicians would say that the sole object
of the Great Revolution was to give the working classes easier access to
political and civil power. But this, though it should always be open to them,
is very far from meeting their true wants. Individuals among them may be
benefited by it, but the mass is left unaffected, or rather is placed often in a
worse position, by the desertion of the more energetic members. The
Convention is the only government by which this result has been properly
appreciated. It is the only government which has shown due consideration
for working men as such; which has recognized the value of their services,
and encouraged what is the chief compensation for their condition of
poverty, their participation in public life. All subsequent governments,
whether retrograde or constitutional, have, on the contrary, done all they
could to divert the people from their true social function, by affording
opportunity for individuals among them to rise to higher positions. The
monied classes, under the influence of blind routine, have lent their aid to
this degrading policy, by continually preaching to the people the necessity
of saving; a precept which is indeed incumbent on their own class, but not
on others. Without saving, capital could not be accumulated and
administered; it is therefore of the highest importance that the monied
classes should be as economical as possible. But in other classes, and
especially in those dependent on fixed wages, parsimonious habits are
uncalled for and injurious; they lower the character of the labourer, while
they do little or nothing to improve his physical condition; and neither the
working classes nor their teachers should encourage them. Both the one and
the other will find their truest happiness in keeping clear of all serious
practical responsibility, and in allowing free play to their mental and moral
faculties in public as well as private life. In spite of the Economists,
savings-banks are regarded by the working classes with unmistakable
repugnance. And the repugnance is justifiable; they do harm morally, by
checking the exercise of generous feelings. Again, it is the fashion to
declaim against wine-shops; and yet after all they are at present the only
places where the people can enjoy society. Social instincts are cultivated
there which deserve our approval far more than the self-helping spirit which

carries men to the savings-bank. No doubt this unconcern for money, wise
as it is, involves real personal risk; but it is a danger which civilization is
constantly tending to diminish, without effacing qualities which do the
workman honour, and which are the source of his most cherished pleasures.
The danger ceases when the mental and moral faculties are called into
stronger exercise. The interest which Positivism will arouse among the
people in public questions, will lead to the substitution of the club for the
wine-shop. In these questions, the generous inspirations of popular instinct
hold out a model which philosophers will do well to follow themselves.
Fondness for money is as much a disqualification for the spiritual
government of Humanity, as political ambition. It is a clear proof of moral
incompetence, which is generally connected in one way or other with
intellectual feebleness.
One of the principal results of the spiritual power exercised by
philosophers and the working classes under the Positivist system, will be to
compensate by a just distribution of blame and praise for the imperfect
arrangements of social rank, in which wealth must always preponderate.
Leaving the present subordination of offices untouched, each functionary
will be judged by the intrinsic worth of his mind and heart, without servility
and yet without any encouragement to anarchy. It must always be obvious
that the political importance which high position gives, is out of all
proportion to the real merit implied in gaining that position. The people will
come to see more and more clearly that real happiness, so far from
depending on rank, is far more compatible with their own humble station.
Exceptional men no doubt there are, whose character impels them to seek
power; a character more dangerous than useful, unless there be sufficient
wisdom in the social body to turn it to good account. The best workmen,
like the best philosophers, will soon cease to feel envy for greatness, laden,
as it always must be, with heavy responsibilities. At present, the
compensation which I hold out to them has not been realized; but when it
exists, the people will feel that their spiritual and temporal leaders are
combining all the energies of society for the satisfaction of their wants.
Recognizing this, they will care but little for fame that must be bought by
long and tedious meditation, or for power burdened with constant care.
There are men whose talents call them to these important duties, and they
will be left free to perform them; but the great mass of society will be well
satisfied that their own lot is one far more in keeping with the constitution

of our nature; more compatible with that harmonious exercise of the
faculties of Thought, Feeling, and Action, which is most conducive to
happiness. The immediate pressure of poverty once removed, the highest
reward of honourable conduct will be found in the permanent esteem,
posthumous as it may be sometimes, of that portion of Humanity which has
witnessed it. In a word the title, servus servorum, which is still retained by
the Papacy from false humility, but which originated in anticipation of a
social truth, is applicable to all functionaries in high position. They may be
described as the involuntary servants of voluntary subordinates. It is not
chimerical to conceive Positivist society so organized that its theoretical and
practical directors, with all their personal advantages, will often regret that
they were not born, or that they did not remain, in the condition of
workmen. The only solid satisfaction which great minds have hitherto
found in political or spiritual power has been that, being more occupied
with public interests, they had a wider scope for the exercise of social
feeling. But the excellence of the future condition of society will be, that the
possibility of combining public and private life will be open to all. The
humblest citizen will be able to influence not by command but by counsel,
in proportion to his energy and worth.
All the views brought forward in this chapter bear out the statement
with which it began, that the Proletariate forms the principal basis of the
social system, not merely as finally constituted, but in its present state of
transition; and admitting this, the present state will be seen to have no
essential difference from the normal future to which it tends. The principal
conditions of our transitional policy were described at the conclusion of the
last chapter. The security for these conditions is to be found in the natural
tendencies of the people of Western Europe, and especially of France. Our
governors will do well to follow these tendencies instead of attempting to
lead them; for they are in perfect keeping with the two great requirements
of the present time, Liberty and Public Order.
Liberty of thought and speech is enjoyed in France,
The working classes
and especially in Paris, to an extent impossible in any
are the best guarantee
other country, and it is due principally to the intellectual
for Liberty and for
Order
emancipation of our workmen. They have rid
themselves of theology in all its forms, and yet have not accepted any
metaphysical system. At the same time, though totally devoid at present of

systematic convictions, there is in them a submissiveness of mind which
predisposes them to receive convictions combining reality with utility. In all
other classes there is a tendency to use forcible measures in spreading their
doctrines when discussion fails. It is only to the people that philosophers
can look for the support and extension of Liberty, which is so essential to
their objects; and from this they derive moral confidence far more
reassuring than any legal security. However reactionary or stationary the
views of particular leaders or sects may be, with such a population as that of
Paris, no real oppression is possible. Of all the claims which France has to
the leadership of Europe, this is the strongest. The resistance which is still
offered to freedom of association and freedom of education will soon be
overcome by the force of its liberal sympathies. A population of such strong
social feeling as ours will certainly not allow itself to be permanently
deprived of the power of meeting together freely in clubs; institutions most
conducive both to its culture and to the protection of its interests. It will
insist with equal force upon perfect liberty of teaching, feeling deeply the
need of solid instruction, and the incapacity of metaphysicians and
theologians to give it. Without popular pressure, the essential conditions of
educational liberty will always be evaded.
And if Liberty depends upon popular support, Public Order, whether at
home or abroad, depends upon it no less. The inclinations of the working
classes are altogether on the side of peace. Their strong dislike of war is the
principal reason of the present remarkable tranquillity of Europe. The
foolish regret expressed by all the retrograde parties for the decline of the
military spirit is a sufficient indication of what the popular feeling is; but
even more significant is the necessity for compulsory enlistment, which
began in France and has extended to other parts of Europe. There has been
much factitious indignation on the subject, but at least it must be allowed,
that in our armies the officers are the only volunteers. Again, the working
class is more free than any other from international prejudices, which still
disunite the great family of Western nations, although they are very much
weaker than formerly. They are strongest in the middle classes, a fact
principally due to industrial competition. But working men feel how similar
their wants and their conditions are in all countries, and this feeling checks
their animosity. And the consciousness of union will become far stronger,
now that the great social problem of their incorporation into modern society
is being raised everywhere. No errors that statesmen can commit, whether

in matters of war or peace, can prevent this from becoming the
preponderating question in every European country; and thus it tends to
preserve their mutual concord.
Popular sympathies of this sort are, it may be said, less conducive to
internal tranquillity than to pacific foreign relations. But the alarm which is
naturally aroused by the spiritual anarchy around us must not blind us to the
real guarantees for Order which popular tendencies, rightly interpreted, hold
out. It is to the people that we must look for the ascendancy of central over
local power, which, as we have seen, is so indispensable to public order.
The executive authority, provided only that it gives no cause to fear
reaction, will always have their support when opposed by an assembly the
prevalent tendencies of which will usually be adverse to their interests.
They will always turn instinctively to the dictatorial rather than to the
parliamentary branch of the administration; feeling that from its practical
character and the directness of its action, it is more likely to meet their
wants. Useless discussions on constitutional questions may suit ambitious
members of the middle classes, by facilitating their arrival to power. But the
people take very little interest in all this unmeaning agitation, and often
treat it with merited contempt. They know that it can be of no use to them,
and that its only result is to evade their real wants by undermining the only
authority that can do them justice. Consequently the people are certain to
give their support to every government that deserves it; especially in
France, where political passions have already yielded to the superior and
more permanent interest of social questions. And while strengthening the
government they may do much to elevate its character; by confining it
strictly to its practical function, and resisting any attempts that it may make
to interfere with opinion. In all these respects the spontaneous influence of
the working classes will be of material assistance in carrying out the
systematic conceptions of social philosophy.
It is from them that But a more striking proof of the political influence
we shall obtain the to be exercised by the people is this. The dictatorship
dictatorial power
which is provisionally
which our transitional policy requires as long as the
required spiritual interregnum lasts must arise in the first
instance from their ranks.
In the word People, especially in the French language, there is a
fortunate ambiguity, which may serve to remind us that the proletariate

class is not, properly speaking, a class at all, but constitutes the body of
society. From it proceed the various special classes, which we may regard
as organs necessary to that body. Since the abolition of royalty, the last
remnant of caste, our political leaders have been recruited, and will
continue to be so, from the working class. In the normal state, however, it
will be required as a preliminary condition, that the holder of dictatorial
power shall have first received the political training which is given by the
exercise of authority in his own business. In a settled state of society,
Government, strictly so called, is a mere extension of civil influence.
Ultimately, therefore, political power will fall into the hands of the great
leaders of industry. As spiritual reorganization proceeds, they will gradually
become more worthy of it than they are at present. Besides, the tenure of
power will become less burdensome, because it will be confined to duties of
a purely practical kind.
As yet, however, the case is very different; and therefore the wealthy,
though ultimately they will be the administrators of power, are not those to
whom it should as a rule be entrusted in our present condition. Special
departments may be given to them with advantage, as we have seen proved
recently, and that in cases where the functions to be performed had no
relation whatever to industrial skill. But they are not competent as yet for
dictatorial power, the power which has to supply the place of royalty.
Individual exceptions, of course, there may be, though none have appeared
hitherto, and at least they are not enough for our provisional system to rely
on. As yet the wealthy classes have shown themselves too debased in
thought and feeling for an office of such importance. Nor do we find greater
aptitude for it outside the industrial class. Scientific men are most assuredly
unfit for it, especially in France, where the system of Academies has
narrowed the mind, withered the feelings, and enervated the character to
such an extent, that most of them fail in the conduct of common life, and
are utterly unworthy of the smallest post of authority, even in their own
department.
All other classes failing us, we have to look to the working class, which
has been left more free to form broad views, and in which the sense of duty
has been better cultivated. On historical grounds I feel convinced that the
workmen of France are more likely than any other class to supply men

competent for supreme power, as long as the spiritual interregnum lasts;
that is, for at least one generation.
On looking at this question calmly and without scholastic or aristocratic
prejudice, it will be seen, as I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter,
that the working class is better situated than any other with respect to
generality of views and generosity of feeling. In knowledge and experience
of administration they would ordinarily be deficient; they would therefore
not be fit for the work of any special department. But this is no
disqualification for the supreme power, or indeed for any of the higher
offices for which breadth of view rather than special knowledge is required.
These may be filled by working men, whose good sense and modesty will
at once lead them to choose their agents for special departments from the
classes who have usually furnished them before. The practical character and
progressive spirit of such a government being beyond suspicion, special
talent of whatever kind may be made available, even in the case of men
who, if they had been placed in a higher position, would have proved
thoroughly hostile to republican institutions. Of all the diversified elements
of modern society, there is not one which may not be of real service in
assisting the transition. Among soldiers and magistrates, for instance, there
are many who will join the popular movement, and become sincere
supporters of republicanism. A government of this kind would tranquillize
the people, would obviate the necessity for violent compressive measures,
and would at the same time have a most beneficial influence on the
capitalist class. It would show them the necessity of attaining to greater
purity of feeling and greater breadth of view, if they are to become worthy
of the position for which they are ultimately destined.
Thus, whether we look at the interests of Public Order, or at those of
Liberty, it appears necessary as a provisional measure, during the
continuance of our spiritual interregnum, that the holders of dictatorial
power shall be chosen from the working class. The success of a few
working men in the pursuit of wealth has exercised an unsettling influence
on the rest; but in the present instance we need not fear this result. It will be
obvious that the career of a proletary governor is a rare exception, and one
which requires peculiar endowments.
In examining the mode in which this anomalous policy should be
carried out, we must bear in mind the object with which it was instituted. It

is most important to get rid of the custom, based on motives of self-interest,
which has grown up during the last generation, of insisting on
parliamentary experience as an apprenticeship for executive power;
executive power being always the real object of ambition. We have found
from experience what we might have anticipated on theoretical grounds,
that this plan excludes all except mere talkers of the Girondin type, men
totally devoid of statesman-like qualities. To working men it offers almost
insurmountable obstacles; and even supposing these obstacles to be
overcome, we may be sure that they would lose the straightforwardness and
native vigour which constitute their best claim to the exceptional position
proposed for them.
It is best, then, that they should reach the position assigned to them at
once, without the circuitous process of a parliamentary career. Our
transition towards the normal state will then exhibit its true character. It will
be tranquil and yet decisive; for it will rest on the combined action of
philosophers without political ambition, and dictators adverse to spiritual
encroachment. The teacher who attempts to govern, the governor who
attempts to educate, will both incur severe public censure, as enemies alike
of peace and progress. The whole result will be a change in our
revolutionary condition identical with that which the Convention would
have realized, if, as its founders contemplated, it had lasted till the Peace.
Such, then, is the nature of the compact into which all true philosophers
should enter with the leading members of the proletary class. Their object is
to direct the organic and final phase through which the Great Revolution is
now passing. What they have to do is carefully to prolong the provisional
system adopted by the Convention, and to ignore, as far as possible, the
traditions of all succeeding governments, whether stationary or retrograde.
Comprehensiveness of view and social sympathy predominate alike in both
members of this great alliance; and it is thus a guarantee for our present
state of transition, and a sure earnest of the normal future. The people are
the spontaneous representatives of this alliance; the philosophers its
systematic organ. The intellectual deficiencies of the former will easily be
remedied by philosophers, who will show them how essential it is on social
grounds that they should understand the true meaning of history; since
otherwise their conception of the union of mankind must be limited to the
present generation, ignoring the more important truth of the continuity of

the Present with the Past and the Future. A far greater obstacle is the moral
deficiency of most philosophers of our time. But the wholesome influence
of the people upon them, combined with a deep philosophic conviction of
the preponderance of Feeling in every subject of thought, will do much to
overcome the ambitious instincts which weaken and distract their energies
in the common cause of social renovation.

CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCE OF POSITIVISM UPON
WOMEN

In their action, then, upon society, philosophers
Women represent the
affective element in may hope for the energetic support of the working
our nature, as classes. But the regenerating movement requires still
philosophers and
people represent the
the co-operation of a third element, an element
intellectual and indicated by our analysis of human nature, and
practical elements suggested also by historical study of the great crisis of
modern times.
The moral constitution of man consists of something more than
Intellect and Activity. These are represented in the constitution of society by
the philosophic body and the proletariate. But besides these there is Feeling,
which, in the theory put forward in the first chapter of this work, was shown
to be the predominating principle, the motive power of our being, the only
basis on which the various parts of our nature can be brought into unity.
Now the alliance between philosophers and working men, which has been
just described, however perfectly it may be realized, does not represent the
element of Feeling with sufficient distinctness and prominence.
Certainly without Social Feeling, neither philosophers nor proletaries
can exercise any real influence. But in their case its source is not
sufficiently pure nor deep to sustain them in the performance of their duty.
A more spontaneous and more perennial spring of inspiration must be
found.
With the philosopher social sympathies will never be wanting in
coherence, since they will be connected with his whole system of thought;

but this very scientific character will deaden their vigour, unless they are
revived by impulses in which reflection has no share. Roused as he will be
by the consciousness of public duty to a degree of activity of which abstract
thinkers can form no conception, the emotions of private life will yet be not
less necessary for him than for others. Intercourse with the working classes
will be of the greatest benefit to him; but even this is not enough to
compensate the defects of a life devoted to speculation.
The sympathies of the people again, though stronger and more
spontaneous than those of the philosopher, are, in most cases, less pure and
not so lasting. From the pressure of daily necessities it is difficult for them
to maintain the same consistent and disinterested character. Great as are the
moral advantages which will result from the incorporation of the people in
modern society, they are not enough by themselves to outweigh the force of
self-interest aroused by the precarious nature of their position. Emotions of
a gentler and less transient kind must be called into play. Philosophers may
relieve the working classes from the necessity of pressing their own claims
and grievances; but the fact still remains, that the instincts by which those
claims are prompted are personal rather than social.
Thus, in the alliance which has been here proposed as necessary for
social reorganization, Feeling, the most influential part of human nature,
has not been adequately represented. An element is wanting which shall
have the same relation to the moral side of our constitution, as the
philosophic body has with Intellect, and the people with Activity. On this,
as well as on other grounds, it is indispensable that Women be associated in
the work of regeneration as soon as its tendencies and conditions can be
explained to them. With the addition of this third element, the constructive
movement at last assumes its true character. We may then feel confident that
our intellectual and practical faculties will be kept in due subordination to
universal Love. The digressions of intellect, and the subversive tendencies
of our active powers will be as far as possible prevented.
Women have stood Indispensable to Positivism as the co-operation of
aloof from the women is, it involves one essential condition. Modern
modern movement,
because of its anti-
progress must rise above its present imperfect character,
historic and before women can thoroughly sympathize with it.
destructive character

At present the general feeling amongst them is antipathy to the
Revolution. They dislike the destructive character which the Revolution
necessarily exhibited in its first phase. All their social sympathies are given
to the Middle Ages. And this is not merely due, as is supposed, to the regret
which they very naturally feel for the decline of chivalry, although they
cannot but feel that the Middle Ages are the only period in which the
feeling of reverence for women has been properly cultivated. But the real
ground of their predilection is deeper and less interested. It is that, being
morally the purest portion of Humanity, they venerate Catholicism, as the
only system which has upheld the principle of subordinating Politics to
Morals. This, I cannot doubt, is the secret cause of most of the regret with
which women still regard the irrevocable decay of mediaeval society.
They do not disregard the progress which modern times have made in
various special directions. But our erroneous tendencies towards bringing
back the old supremacy of Politics over Morality, are, in their eyes, a
retrograde movement so comprehensive in its character that no partial
improvements can compensate for it. True, we are able to justify this
deviation provisionally, since the decay of Catholicism renders political
dictatorship necessary. But women, having comparatively little to do with
the practical business of life, can hardly appreciate this necessity without a
more satisfactory theory of history than they at present possess. It is a
complete mistake to charge women with being retrograde on account of
these feelings of regret which are most honourable to them. They might
retort the charge with far better reason on the revolutionists, for their blind
admiration of Greek and Roman society, which they still persist in asserting
to be superior to Catholic Feudalism; a delusion, the continuance of which
is principally due to our absurd system of classical education, from which
women are fortunately preserved.
However this may be, the feelings of women upon these subjects are a
very plain and simple demonstration of the first condition of social
regeneration, which is, that Politics must again be subordinated to Morality;
and this upon a more intelligible, more comprehensive, and more
permanent basis than Catholicism could supply. A system which supplied
such a basis would naturally involve reverence for women as one of its
characteristic results. Such, then, are the terms on which women will
cordially co-operate in the progressive movement. Nothing but incapacity

to satisfy these terms could induce any thinkers to condemn the conception
as retrograde.
It is not, then, to the Revolution itself that women feel antipathy, but to
the anti-historic spirit which prevailed in its first phase. The blind abuse
lavished on the Middle Ages wounds their strongest sympathies. They care
little for metaphysical theories of society in which human happiness is
made to consist in a continual exercise of political rights; for political
rights, however attractively presented, will always fail to interest them. But
they give their cordial sympathy to all reasonable claims of the people; and
these claims form the real object of the revolutionary crisis. They will wish
all success to philosophers and workmen when they see them endeavouring
to transform political disputes into social compacts, and proving that they
have greater regard for duties than for rights. If they regret the decline of
the gentle influence which they possessed in former times, it is principally
because they find it superseded by coarse and egotistic feelings, which are
now no longer counterbalanced by revolutionary enthusiasm. Instead of
blaming their antipathies, we should learn from them the urgent necessity of
putting an end to the moral and intellectual anarchy of our times; for this it
is which gives a ground of real justice to their reproaches.
But they will Women will gladly associate themselves with the
sympathize with Revolution as soon as its work of reconstruction is
constructive
tendencies; and will
fairly begun. Its negative phase must not be prolonged
distinguish sound too far. It is difficult enough for them to understand
philosophy from how such a phase could ever be necessary; therefore
scientific specialities
they cannot be expected to excuse its aberrations. The
true connexion of the Revolution with the Middle Ages must be fairly
stated. History, when rightly interpreted, will show them that its real object
is, while laying down a surer basis for Morality, to restore it to the old
position of superiority over Politics in which the mediaeval system first
placed it. Women will feel enthusiasm for the second phase of the
Revolution, when they see republicanism in the light in which Positivism
presents it, modified by the spirit of ancient chivalry.
Then, and not till then, will the movement of social regeneration be
fairly begun. The movement can have no great force until women give
cordial support to it; for it is they who are the best representatives of the
fundamental principle on which Positivism rests, the victory of social over

selfish affections. On philosophers rests the duty of giving logical
coherence to this principle, and saving it from sophistical attacks. Its
practical working depends upon the proletary class, without whose aid it
would almost always be evaded. But to maintain it in all its purity, as an
inspiration that needs neither argument nor compulsion, is the work of
women only. So constituted, the alliance of the three classes will be the
foreshadowed image of the normal state to which Humanity is tending. It
will be the living type of perfect human nature.
Unless the new philosophy can obtain the support of women, the
attempt to substitute it for theology in the regulation of social life had better
be abandoned. But if the theory stated in my first chapter be true, Positivism
will have even greater influence with women than with the working classes.
In the principle which animates it, in its manner of regarding and of
handling the great problem of human life, it is but a systematic development
of what women have always felt instinctively. To them, as to the people, it
offers a noble career of social usefulness, and it holds out a sure prospect of
improvement in their own personal position.
Nor is it surprising that the new philosophy should possess such
qualities. They follow naturally from the reality which is one of its chief
claims to acceptance; in other words, from the exactness with which it takes
account of the facts of every subject that it deals with. Strong as the
prejudices of women are upon religious questions, it cannot be long before
they find out that Positivism satisfies, not merely their intellectual, but their
moral and social wants better than Catholicism. They will then have no
further reason for clinging to the old system, of the decayed condition of
which they are perfectly aware. At present they not unnaturally confound
Positivism with the scientific specialities on which it is based. Scientific
studies have, as they see, a hardening influence, which they cannot suppose
that the new school of philosophers, who insist so strongly upon the
necessity of studying science, can have escaped. Closer acquaintance with
the subject will show them where their error lies. They will see that the
moral danger of scientific studies arises almost entirely from want of
purpose and from irrational speciality, which always alienate them from the
social point of view. But for the Positivist this danger does not exist; since,
however far he may carry these preliminary studies, he does so simply in
order to gain a stronger grasp of social questions. His one object is to

concentrate all the powers of Man upon the general advancement of the
race. And so long as this object be kept in view, women’s good sense will
readily distinguish between the training necessary for it, and the puerilities
of the learned societies. The general spirit of this work, however, makes
further explanation unnecessary.

Women’s position in
The social mission of woman in the Positive system
society. Like follows as a natural consequence from the qualities
philosophers and peculiar to her nature.
people, their part is
not to govern, but to In the most essential attribute of the human race,
modify the tendency to place social above personal feeling, she
is undoubtedly superior to man. Morally, therefore, and apart from all
material considerations, she merits always our loving veneration, as the
purest and simplest impersonation of Humanity, who can never be
adequately represented in any masculine form. But these qualities do not
involve the possession of political power, which some visionaries have
claimed for women, though without their own consent. In that which is the
great object of human life, they are superior to men; but in the various
means of attaining that object they are undoubtedly inferior. In all kinds of
force, whether physical, intellectual, or practical, it is certain that Man
surpasses Woman, in accordance with a general law which prevails
throughout the animal kingdom. Now practical life is necessarily governed
by force rather than by affection, because it requires unremitting and
laborious activity. If there were nothing else to do but to love, as in the
Christian utopia of a future life in which there are no material wants,
Women would be supreme. But life is surrounded with difficulties, which it
needs all our thoughts and energies to avoid; therefore Man takes the
command, notwithstanding his inferiority in goodness. Success in all great
efforts depends more upon energy and talent than upon goodwill, although
this last condition reacts strongly upon the others.
Thus the three elements of our moral constitution do not act in perfect
harmony. Force is naturally supreme, and all that women can do is to
modify it by affection. Justly conscious of their superiority in strength of
feeling, they endeavour to assert their influence in a way which is often
attributed by superficial observers to the mere love of power. But
experience always teaches them that in a world where the simplest
necessaries of life are scarce and difficult to procure, power must belong to

the strongest, not to the most affectionate, even though the latter may
deserve it best. With all their efforts they can never do more than modify
the harshness with which men exercise their authority. And men submit
more readily to this modifying influence, from feeling that in the highest
attributes of Humanity women are their superiors. They see that their own
supremacy is due principally to the material necessities of life, provision for
which calls into play the self-regarding rather than the social instincts.
Hence we find it the case in every phase of human society that women’s life
is essentially domestic, public life being confined to men. Civilization, so
far from effacing this natural distinction, tends, as I shall afterwards show,
to develop it, while remedying its abuses.
Thus the social position of women is in this respect very similar to that
of philosophers and of the working classes. And we now see why these
three elements should be united. It is their combined action which
constitutes the moral or modifying force of society.
Philosophers are excluded from political power by the same fatality as
women, although they are apt to think that their intellectual eminence gives
them a claim to it. Were our material wants more easily satisfied, the
influence of intellect would be less impeded than it is by the practical
business of life. But, on this hypothesis, women would have a better claim
to govern than philosophers. For the reasoning faculties would have
remained almost inert had they not been needed to guide our energies; the
constitution of the brain not being such as to favour their spontaneous
development. Whereas the affective principle is dependent on no such
external stimulus for its activity. A life of thought is a more evident
disqualification for the government of the world even than a life of feeling,
although the pride of philosophers is a greater obstacle to submission than
the vanity of women. With all its pretensions, intellectual force is not in
itself more moral than material force. Each is but an instrument; the merit
depends entirely upon its right employment. The only element of our nature
which is in itself moral is Love; for Love alone tends of itself towards the
preponderance of social feeling over self-interest. And since even Love
cannot govern, what can be the claim of Intellect? In practical life
precedence must always depend upon superior energy. Reason, even more
than Feeling, must be restricted to the task of modifying. Philosophers
therefore must be excluded from government, at least as rigidly as women.

It is in vain for intellect to attempt to command; it never can do more than
modify. In fact, the morality which it indirectly possesses is due to this
impossibility of exercising compulsory power, and would be ruined by the
attainment of it, supposing it were possible. Intellect may do much to
amend the natural order of things, provided that it does not attempt to
subvert it. What it can do is by its power of systematic arrangement to
effect the union of all the classes who are likely to exert a beneficial
influence on material power. It is with this view that every spiritual power
has availed itself of the aid of women, as we see was the case in the Middle
Ages.
Proceeding with our sociological analysis of moral force, we shall find
an equally striking resemblance between the influence of Women and that
exercised by the People.
In the first stage of progress, there is no modifying power except what
springs from Feeling; afterwards Intellect combines with it, finding itself
unable to govern. The only element now wanting is Activity; and this want,
which is indispensable, is supplied by the co-operation of the people. The
fact is, that although the people constitute the basis on which all political
power rests, yet they have as little to do directly with the administration of
power as philosophers or women.
Power, in the strict sense of the word, power, that is, which controls
action without persuading the will, has two perfectly distinct sources,
numbers and wealth. The force of numbers is usually considered the more
material of the two; but in reality it is the more moral. Being created by co-
operation, it involves some convergence of ideas and feelings, and therefore
it does not give such free scope for the self-regarding instincts as the more
concentrated power of wealth. But for this very reason, it is too indirect and
precarious for the ordinary purposes of government. It can influence
government morally, but cannot take an active part in it. The same causes
which exclude philosophers and women apply in the case of the people. Our
material necessities are so urgent, that those who have the means of
providing for them will always be the possessors of power. Now the
wealthy have these means; they hold in their hands the products of labour,
by which each generation facilitates the existence and prepares the
operations of its successor. Consequently the power of the capitalist is one
of so concentrated a kind, that numbers can very seldom resist it

successfully. Even in military nations we find the same thing; the influence
of numbers, though more direct, affects only the mode of acquiring wealth,
not its tenure. But in industrial states, where wealth is acquired by other
ways than violence, the law is evident. And with the advance of civilization
it will operate not less, but more strongly. Capital is ever on the increase,
and consequently is ever creating means of subsistence for those who
possess nothing. In this sense, but in no other, the cynical maxim of
Antiquity, Paucis nascitur humanum genus, will always bear a true
meaning. The few provide subsistence for the many. We come back, then, to
the conclusion of the last chapter; that the working classes are not destined
for political power, but that they tend to become a most important source of
moral power. The moral value of their influence is even more indirect than
that of philosophers, and depends even more in their case upon
subordination politically. In the few cases where government passes for a
time into the hands of the masses, wealth in its turn assumes a sort of moral
influence foreign to its nature. It moderates the violence with which
government is apt to be administered in such cases. The high intellectual
and moral qualities belonging to the working classes are, as we have seen,
in great part due to their social position. They would be seriously impaired
if the political authority that belongs to wealth were habitually transferred
to numbers.
The united action of Such, in outline, is the Positive theory of Moral
philosophers, women, Force. By it the despotism of material force may be in
and proletaries
constitutes Moral
part controlled. It rests upon the union of the three
Force elements in society who are excluded from the sphere
of politics strictly so called. In their combined action
lies our principal hope of solving, so far as it can be solved, the great
problem of man’s nature, the successful struggle of Social Feeling against
Self-love. Each of the three elements supplies a quality indispensable to the
task. Without women this controlling power would be deficient in purity
and spontaneous impulse; without philosophers, in wisdom and coherence;
without the people, in energy and activity. The philosophic element,
although neither the most direct nor the most efficient, is yet the distinctive
feature of this power, because its function is to organize its constitution and
direct its operations in accordance with the true laws of social life. As being
the systematic organ of the spiritual power it has become identified with it
in name. This, however, may lead to an erroneous conception. The moral

aspect of the spiritual power is more important than the intellectual. While
retaining the name as an historical tradition of real value, Positivists attach a
somewhat different meaning to it. It originated in a time when theories of
society were unknown, and when Intellect was considered as the central
principle of human nature.
Spiritual power, as interpreted by Positivism, begins with the influence
of women in the family; it is afterwards moulded into a system by thinkers,
while the people are the guarantees for its political efficiency. Although it is
the intellectual class that institutes the union, yet its own part in it, as it
should never forget, is less direct than that of women, less practical than
that of the people. The thinker is socially powerless except so far as he is
supported by feminine sympathy and popular energy.
Thus the necessity of associating women in the movement of social
regeneration creates no obstacle whatever to the philosophy by which that
movement is to be directed. On the contrary, it aids its progress, by showing
the true character of the moral force which is destined to control all the
other forces of man. It involves as perfect an inauguration of the normal
state as our times of transition admit. For the chief characteristic of that
state will be a more complete and more harmonious union of the same three
classes to whom we are now looking for the first impulse of reform.
Already we can see how perfectly adapted to the constitution of man this
final condition of Humanity will be. Feeling, Reason, Activity, whether
viewed separately or in combination, correspond exactly to the three
elements of the regenerative movement, Women, Philosophers, and People.
Verification of this theory may be found more or less distinctly in every
period of history. Each of the three classes referred to have always borne
out the biological law that the life of relation or animal life, is subordinated
to the life of nutrition. Still more striking is the application to this case of
another general principle, namely, that Progress is the development of
Order; a principle which, as I showed in the second chapter, connects every
dynamical question in Sociology with the corresponding statical
conception. For with the growth of society, the modifying influence of
moral force is always increasing, both by larger scope being given to each
of its three elements specially, and also by the more perfect consolidation of
their union. Robertson has made an important remark on the gradual
improvement in the condition of women, which is but a particular case of

this sociological law. The general principle on which progress in all three
classes depends, is the biological law, that the preponderance of vegetable
life over animal life diminishes as the organism is higher in the scale and is
more perfectly developed.
During the various phases of ancient Polytheism, the controlling power
consisted simply of the moral influence exerted by women in the Family. In
public life the influence of thinkers had not made itself independent of the
governmental authority, of which it was sometimes the source, sometimes
the instrument. Mediaeval Catholicism went a step further, and took the
first step in systematizing moral force. It created an independent spiritual
authority to which political governments were subordinated, and this
authority was always supported by women. But the complete organization
of moral force was reserved for modern times. It is only recently that the
working classes have begun to interfere actively in social questions; and, as
I have shown in the preceding chapter, it is from their co-operation that the
new spiritual power will derive its practical efficiency. Limited originally to
the sphere of Feeling, and subsequently extended to the intellectual sphere,
it henceforward embraces the sphere of Activity; and this without losing its
spiritual character, since the influences of which it consists are entirely
distinct from the domain of practical politics. Each of its three elements
persuades, advises, judges; but except in isolated cases, never commands.
The social mission of Positivism is to regulate and combine their
spontaneous action, by directing each to the objects for which it is best
adapted.
And this mission, in spite of strong prejudices to the contrary, it will be
found well calculated to fulfil. I have already shown its adaptation to the
case of the people and of the philosophic body, whether regarded separately
or in combination: I have now to show that it is equally adapted to the case
of women.
In proof of this I have but to refer to the principle on which, as stated in
the first chapter, the whole system of Positivism is based; the
preponderance of affection in our nature. Such a principle is of itself an
appeal to women to associate themselves with the system, as one of its
essential elements. In Catholicism, their co-operation, though valuable, was
not of primary importance, because Catholicism claimed a divine origin
independent of their assistance. But to Positivism they are indispensable, as

being the purest and simplest embodiment of its fundamental principle. It is
not merely in the Family that their influence will be required. Their duty
will often be to call philosophers and people back to that unity of purpose
which originated in the first place with themselves, and which each of the
other elements is often disposed to violate.
All true philosophers will no doubt accept and be profoundly
influenced by the conviction, that in all subjects of thought the social point
of view should be logically and scientifically preponderant. They will
consequently admit the truth that the Heart takes precedence of the
Understanding. Still they require some more direct incentive to universal
Love than these convictions can supply. Knowing, as they do, how slight is
the practical result of purely intellectual considerations, they will welcome
so precious an incentive, were it only in the interest of their own mission. I
recognized its necessity myself, when I wrote on the 11th of March, 1846,
7
to her who, in spite of death, will always remain my constant companion :
‘I was incomplete as a philosopher, until the experience of deep and pure
passion has given me fuller insight into the emotional side of human
nature’. Strong affection exercises a marvellous influence upon mental
effort. It elevates the intellect at once to the only point of view which is
really universal. Doubtless, the method of pure science leads up to it also;
but only by a long and toilsome process, which exhausts the power of
thought, and leaves little energy for following out the new results to which
this great principle gives rise. The stimulation of affection under feminine
influence is necessary, therefore, for the acceptance of Positivism, not
merely in those classes for whom a long preliminary course of scientific
study would be impossible. It is equally necessary for the systematic
teachers of Positivism, in whom it checks the tendency, which is
encouraged by habits of abstract speculation, to deviate into useless
digressions; these being always easier to prosecute than researches of real
value.
Superiority of the new Under this aspect the new spiritual system is
obviously superior to the old. By the institution of
spiritual power to the
old. Self-regarding
celibacy, which was indispensable to Catholicism, its
tendencies of Catholic
doctrine priests were entirely removed from the beneficial
influence exercised by women. Only those could profit
from it who did not belong to the ecclesiastical body; the members of that

body, as Ariosto has remarked in his vigorous satire, were excluded. Nor
could the evil be remedied, except in very rare cases, by irregular
attachment, which inevitably corrupted the priest’s character by involving
the necessity of perpetual hypocrisy.
And when we look at the difference of the spirit by which the two
systems are pervaded, we shall find still more striking evidence that the new
system offers a far larger sphere of moral influence to women than the old.
Both are based upon the principle of affection; but in Positivism the
affection inculcated is social, in Catholicism it is essentially personal. The
object of Catholic devotion is one of such stupendous magnitude, that
feelings which are unconnected with it are in danger of being crushed. The
priesthood, it is true, wise interpreters in this respect of a general instinct,
brought all the more important social obligations within the compass of
religion, and held them out as necessary for salvation. Indirectly, the nobler
feelings were thus called into action; but at the same time they were
rendered far less spontaneous and pure. There could be no perfectly
disinterested affection under a system which promised eternal rewards for
all acts of self-denial. For it was impossible, and indeed it would have been
thought sinful, to keep the future out of sight; and thus all spontaneous
generosity was unavoidably tainted by self-interest. Catholicism gave rise
to an ignoble theory of morals which became very mischievous when it was
adopted by the metaphysicians; because, while retaining the vicious
principle, they swept away the checks by which the priesthood had
controlled it. But even when we look at the purest form in which the love of
God was exhibited, we cannot call it a social feeling, except in so far as the
same object of worship was held out simultaneously to all. Intrinsically, it is
anti-social, since, when attained in absolute perfection, it implies the entire
sacrifice of all other love. And in the best representatives of Christian
thought and feeling, this tendency is very apparent. No one has portrayed
the Catholic ideal with such sublimity and pathos as the author of the
Imitation, a work which so well deserved the beautiful translation of
Corneille. And yet, reading it as I do daily, I cannot help remarking how
grievously the natural nobleness of Thomas A’Kempis was impaired by the
Catholic system, although in spite of all obstacles he rises at times to the
purest ardour. Certainly those of our feelings which are purely unselfish
must be far stronger and more spontaneous than ever has yet been

supposed, since even the oppressive discipline of twelve centuries could not
prevent their growth.
The spirit of Positivism, from the fact of its conformity with the
Positivism, on the constitution of our nature, is the only system calculated
contrary, is essentially
social. The Heart and
to develop, both in public and in private life, those high
the Intellect mutuallyattributes of Humanity which, for want of adequate
strengthen each other systematic culture, are still in their rudimentary stage.
Catholicism, while appealing to the Heart, crushed
Intellect, and Intellect naturally struggled to throw off the yoke. Positivism,
on the contrary, brings Reason into complete harmony with Feeling,
without impairing the activity of either.
Scientific study of the relation which each individual bears to the whole
race is a continual stimulus to social sympathy. Without a theory of society,
it is impossible to keep this relation distinctly and constantly in view. It is
only noticed in a few exceptional cases, and unconnected impressions are
soon effaced from the memory. But the Positivist teacher, taking the social
point of view invariably, will make this notion far more familiar to us than
it has ever been before. He will show us the impossibility of understanding
any individual or society apart from the whole life of the race. Nothing but
the bewilderment caused by theological and metaphysical doctrines can
account for the shallow explanations of human affairs given by our
teachers, attributing as they do to Man what is really due to Humanity. But
with the sounder theory that we now possess, we can see the truth as it
really stands. We have but to look each of us at our own life under its
physical, intellectual, or moral aspects, to recognize what it is that we owe
to the combined action of our predecessors and contemporaries. The man
who dares to think himself independent of others, either in feelings,
thoughts, or actions, cannot even put the blasphemous conception into
words without immediate self-contradiction, since the very language he
uses is not his own. The profoundest thinker cannot by himself form the
simplest language; it requires the co-operation of a community for several
generations. Without further illustration, the tendency of Positive doctrine is
evident. It appeals systematically to our social instincts, by constantly
impressing upon us that only the Whole is real; that the Parts exist only in
abstraction.

But independently of the beneficial influence which, in this final state
of Humanity, the mind will exercise upon the heart, the direct culture of the
heart itself will be more pure and more vigorous than under any former
system. It offers us the only means of disengaging our benevolent affections
from all calculations of self-interest. As far as the imperfection of man’s
nature admits, these affections will gradually become supreme, since they
give deeper satisfaction than all others, and are capable of fuller
development. Setting the rewards and punishments of theology aside, we
shall attain at last to that which is the real happiness of man, pure and
disinterested love. This is truly the Sovereign Good, sought for so long by
former systems of philosophy in vain. That it surpasses all other good one
fact will show, known to the tender-hearted from personal experience; that
it is even better to love than to be loved. Overstrained as this may seem to
many, it is yet in harmony with a general truth, that our nature is in a
healthier state when active than when passive. In the happiness of being
loved, there is always some tinge of self-love; it is impossible not to feel
pride in the love of one whom we prefer to all others. Since, then, loving
gives purer satisfaction than being loved, the superiority of perfectly
disinterested affection is at once demonstrated. It is the fundamental defect
of our nature, that intrinsically these affections are far weaker than the
selfish propensities connected with the preservation of our own existence.
But when they have been once aroused, even though the original stimulus
may have been personal, they have greater capacity of growth, owing to the
peculiar charm inherent in them. Besides, in the exercise of these feelings,
all of us can co-operate with and encourage one another, whereas the
reverse is the case with the selfish instincts. There is, therefore, nothing
unreasonable in supposing that Positivism, by regulating and combining
these natural tendencies, may rouse our sympathetic instincts to a condition
of permanent activity hitherto unknown. When the heart is no longer
crushed by theological dogmas, or hardened by metaphysical theories, we
soon discover that real happiness, whether public or private, consists in the
highest possible development of the social instincts. Self-love comes to be
regarded as an incurable infirmity, which is to be yielded to only so far as is
absolutely necessary. Here lies the universal adaptability of Positivism to
every type of character and to all circumstances. In the humblest relations
of life, as in the highest, regenerate Humanity will apply the obvious truth,
It is better to give than to receive.

The Heart thus aroused will in its turn react beneficially upon the
Intellect; and it is especially from women that this reaction will proceed. I
have spoken of it so fully before, that I need not describe it further. It is in
Feeling that I find the basis on which the whole structure of Positivism,
intellectually as well as morally considered, rests. The only remark I have
now to add is, that by following out this principle, philosophical difficulties
of the most formidable kind are at once surmounted. From moral
considerations, the intellect may be readily induced to submit to scientific
restrictions, the propriety of which would remain for a long time matter of
debate, were philosophical discussions the only means of indicating it.
Attempt, for instance, to convince a pure mathematician, however
conscientious and talented, that Sociology is both logically and
scientifically superior to all other studies. He would not readily admit this;
and severe exertion of the inductive and deductive faculties can alone
convince him of it. But by the aid of Feeling, an artisan or a woman can,
without education, readily grasp this great encyclopædic principle, and
apply it practically to the common affairs of life. But for this, the larger
conceptions of philosophy would have but a limited range, and very few
would be capable of the course of study which is yet so important on social
grounds for all. Comprehensiveness of mind is no doubt favourable to
sympathy, but is itself more actively stimulated by it. When the Positivist
method of education is accepted, moral excellence will be very generally
regarded as a guarantee of real intellectual capacity. The revolutionist
leaders of the Convention showed their sense of this connexion by
allowing, as they did sometimes, republican ardour to outweigh scientific
attainment. Of course, so long as men remain without a systematic theory of
morals, such policy would be likely to fail of its object, and indeed would
become positively mischievous. But the reproach is usually that it was a
retrograde policy, a reproach far more applicable to the present system, in
which the standard of fitness for any office is regulated exclusively by
intellectual considerations, the heart being altogether disregarded.
Historically we can explain this practice by the fact that the religious faith
in which our moral nature has hitherto been trained has been of a most
oppressive character. Ever since the Middle Ages, the intellect and the heart
have been unavoidably at issue. Positivism is the only system which can put
an end to their antagonism, because, as I have before explained, while
subordinating Reason to Feeling, it does so in such a way as not to impair

the development of either. With its present untenable claims to supremacy,
Intellect is in reality the principal source of social discord. Until it abdicates
in favour of the Heart, it can never be of real service in reconstruction. But
its abdication will be useless, unless it is entirely voluntary. Now this is
precisely the result which Positivism attains, because it takes up the very
ground on which the claims of intellect are defended, namely, scientific
demonstration, a ground which the defenders of intellect cannot repudiate
without suspicion at once attaching to their motives. But theological or
metaphysical remedies can only exasperate the disease. By oppressing the
intellect they provoke it to fresh insurrection against the heart.
Intellectual and moral For all these reasons, women, who are better judges
affinities of women of moral questions than ourselves, will admit that
with Positivism
Positivism, incontestably superior as it is to other
systems intellectually, surpasses them yet more in dealing with the
affections. Their only objection arises from confounding Positive
Philosophy itself with its preliminary course of scientific study.
Women’s minds no doubt are less capable than ours of generalizing
very widely, or of carrying on long processes of deduction. They are, that is,
less capable than men of abstract intellectual exertion. On the other hand,
they are generally more alive to that combination of reality with utility
which is one of the characteristics of Positive speculation. In this respect
they have much in common intellectually with the working classes; and
fortunately they have also the same advantage of being untrammelled by the
present absurd system of education. Nor is their position far removed from
what it should be normally; being less engaged than men in the business of
life, their contemplative faculties are called into activity more easily. Their
minds are neither preoccupied nor indifferent; the most favourable
condition for the reception of philosophical truth. They have far more
affinity intellectually with philosophers who truly deserve the name, than
we find in the scientific men of the present day. Comprehensiveness of
thought they consider as important as positivity, whereas our savants care
for nothing but the latter quality, and even that they understand imperfectly.
Molière’s remarkable expression, des clartés de tout, which I applied in the
last chapter to popular education, was used by him in reference to women.
Accordingly we find that women took a vivid interest in the very first
attempt made to systematize Positive speculation, the Cartesian philosophy.

No more striking proof could be given of their philosophical affinities; and
the more so that in the Cartesian system moral and social speculations were
necessarily excluded. Surely, then, we may expect them to receive
Positivism far more favourably, a system of which the principal subject of
speculation is the moral problem in which both sexes are alike interested.
Women, therefore, may, like the people, be counted among the future
supporters of the new philosophy. Without their combined aid it could never
hope to surmount the strong repugnance to it which is felt by our cultivated
classes, especially in France, where the question of its success has first to be
decided.
Catholicism purified But when women have sufficient acquaintance with
love, but did not Positivism, to see its superiority to Catholicism in
directly strengthen it
questions of feeling, they will support it from moral
sympathy even more than from intellectual adhesion. It will be the heart
even more than the mind which will incline them to the only system of
philosophy which has fully recognized the preponderance of Feeling. They
cannot fail to be drawn towards a system which regards women as the
embodiment of this principle; the unity of human nature, of which this
principle is the basis, being thus entrusted to their special charge. The only
reason of their regret for the past, is that the present fails to satisfy their
noblest social instincts. Not that Catholicism ever really satisfied them;
indeed in its general character it is even less adapted to women than to men,
since the dominant quality of woman’s nature is in direct contradiction with
it. Christianity, notwithstanding its claims to moral perfection, has always
confounded the quality of tenderness with that of purity. And it is true that
love cannot be deep unless it is also pure. But Catholicism, although it
purified love from the animal propensities which had been stimulated by
Polytheism, did nothing otherwise to strengthen it. It has given us indeed
too many instances of purity, pushed to the extent of fanaticism, without
tenderness. And this result is especially common now, because the austerity
of the Christian spirit is not corrected, as it used to be, by the inspiring
influences of Chivalry. Polytheism, deficient as it was in purity, was really
far more conducive than Christianity, to tenderness. Love of God, the
supreme affection round which Catholicism endeavoured to concentrate all
other feelings, was essentially a self-regarding principle, and as such
conflicted with woman’s noblest instincts. Not only did it encourage

monastic isolation, but if developed to the full extent, it became inconsistent
with love for our fellow men. It was impiety for the knight to love his Lady
better than his God; and thus the best feelings of his nature were repressed
by his religious faith. Women, therefore, are not really interested in
perpetuating the old system; and the very instincts by which their nature is
characterized, will soon incline them to abandon it. They have only been
waiting until social life should assume a less material character; so that
morality, for the preservation of which they justly consider themselves
responsible, may not be compromised. And on this head Positivism satisfies
their heart no less than their understanding with all the guarantees that they
can require. Based as it is upon accurate knowledge of our nature, it can
combine the simple affectionate spirit of Polytheism with the exquisite
purity of Catholicism, without fear of taint from the subversive sophisms
engendered by the spiritual anarchy of our times. Not however that purity is
to be placed on the same level with tenderness. Tenderness is the more
essential of the two qualities, because more closely connected with the
grand object of all human effort, the elevation of Social Feeling over Self-
love. In a woman without tenderness there is something even more
monstrous than in a man without courage. Whatever her talents and even
her energy may be, they will in most cases prove mischievous both to
herself and to others, unless indeed they should be nullified by the restraint
of theological discipline. If she has force of character it will be wasted in a
struggle against all legitimate authority; while her mental power will be
employed only in destructive sophisms. Too many cases of this kind present
themselves in the social anarchy of the present time.
Such is the Positivist theory on the subject of Women. It marks out for
them a noble field of social usefulness. It extends the scope of their
influence to public as well as private life, and yet in a way thoroughly in
harmony with their nature. Without leaving the family, they will participate
in the controlling power exercised by philosophers and workmen, seeking
even in their own domestic sphere rather to modify than to govern. In a
word, as I shall show more fully in the last chapter of this introductory
work, Woman is the spontaneous priestess of Humanity. She personifies in
the purest form the principle of Love upon which the unity of our nature
depends; and the culture of that principle in others is her special function.

Women’s influence
All classes, therefore, must be brought under
over the working women’s influence; for all require to be reminded
classes and their constantly of the great truth that Reason and Activity
teachers
are subordinate to Feeling. Of their influence upon
philosophers I have spoken. If they are men worthy of their mission, they
will be conscious of the tendency which their life has to harden them and
lead them into useless speculation; and they will feel the need of renewing
the ardour of their social sympathy at its native source. Feeling, when it is
pure and deep, corrects its own errors, because they clash with the good to
which it is ever tending. But erroneous use of the intellectual or practical
faculties, cannot be even recognized, much less corrected, without the aid
of Affection, which is the only part of our nature that suffers directly from
such errors. Therefore whenever either the philosopher or the people
deviate from duty, it will be the part of women to remonstrate with them
gently, and recall them to the true social principles which are entrusted to
their special charge.
With the working classes, the special danger to be contended against is
their tendency to abuse their strength, and to resort to force for the
attainment of their objects, instead of persuasion. But this danger is after all
less than that of the misuse of intellectual power to which philosophers are
so liable. Thinkers who try to make reasoning do the work of feeling can
very seldom be convinced of their error. Popular excitement, on the
contrary, has often yielded to feminine influence, exerted though it has been
hitherto without any systematic guidance. The difference is no doubt partly
owing to the fact that there are now few or none who deserve the name of
philosophers. For we cannot give that name to the superficial sophists and
rhetoricians of our time, whether psychologists or ideologists, men wholly
incapable of deep thought on any subject. Independently of this, however,
the difference is explained by the character of the two classes. Women will
always find it harder to deal with intellectual pride than with popular
violence. Appeals to social feeling are their only weapons; and the social
feelings of the workman are stronger than those of the philosopher.
Sophistry is far more formidable to them than passion. In fact, were it not
that the working classes are even now so amenable to female influence,
society would be in extreme danger from the disorder caused by intellectual
anarchy. There are many sophisms which maintain themselves in spite of
scientific refutation, and which would be destructive of all order, were it not

for our moral instincts. Of this the Communists offer a striking example, in
avoiding, with that admirable inconsistency to which I have already called
attention, the extension of their principle to the Family. Surrounded by the
wildest theories, such as, if they were put in practice, would utterly destroy
or paralyse society, we see large numbers of working men showing in their
daily life a degree of affection and respect for women, which is unequalled
by any other class. It is well to reflect on facts like these, not only because
they lead us to judge the Communist school with more justice, but because,
occurring as they do in the midst of social anarchy, they show what
powerful agencies for good will be at our disposal in more settled times.
Certainly they cannot be attributed to theological teaching, which has rather
had the effect of strengthening the errors which it attacks by the absurdity
of its refutations. They are simply the result of the influence which women
have spontaneously exercised on the nobler feelings of the people. In
Protestant countries where their influence is less, the mischievous effects of
Communistic theories have been far greater. We owe it to women that the
Family has been so little injured by the retrograde spirit of those republican
reformers, whose ideal of modern society is to absorb the Family into the
State, as was done by a few small tribes in ancient Greece.
The readiness shown by women in applying practical remedies to
erroneous theories of morality is shown in other cases where the
attractiveness of the error would seem irresistible to the coarser nature of
men. The evils consequent on divorce, which has been authorized in
Germany for three centuries, have been much lessened by women’s
instinctive repugnance to it. The same may be said of recent attacks upon
marriage, which are still more serious because the anarchy of modern life
revives all the extravagances of the metaphysical spirit in ancient times. In
no one case has a scheme of society hostile to marriage met with any real
favour from women, plausible as many of them seemed. Unable in their
ignorance of social science to see the fallacy of such schemes themselves,
our revolutionary writers cannot conceive that women will not be
convinced by them. But happily women, like the people, judge in these
matters by the heart rather than by the head. In the absence of any guiding
principle to direct the understanding and prevent the deviations to which it
is always exposed, the heart is a far safer guide.

There is no need at present of pursuing these remarks farther. It is
abundantly clear that women are in every respect adapted for rectifying the
moral deviations to which every element in the social organism is liable.
And if we already feel the value of their influence, springing as it does from
the unaided inspirations of the heart, we may be sure it will become far
more consolidated and will be far more widely felt, when it rests on the
basis of a sound philosophical system, capable of refuting sophisms and
exposing fallacies from which their unassisted instinct is insufficient to
preserve us.
Their social influence Thus the part to be played by women in public life
in the salon is not merely passive. Not only will they give their
sanction individually and collectively to the verdicts of
public opinion as formed by philosophers and by the people; but they will
themselves interfere actively in moral questions. It will be their part to
maintain the primary principle of Positivism, which originated with
themselves, and of which they will always be the most natural
representatives.
But, how, it may be asked, can this be reconciled with my previous
remark that women’s life should still be essentially domestic?
For the ancients, and for the greater part of the human race at the
present time, it would be irreconcilable. But in Western Europe the solution
has long ago been found. From the time when women acquired, as they did
in the Middle Ages, a fair measure of domestic freedom, opportunities for
social intercourse arose, which combined most happily the advantages of
private and of public life, and in these women presided. The practice
afterwards extended, especially in France, and these meetings became the
laboratories of public opinion. It seems now as if they had died out, or had
lost their character. The intellectual and moral anarchy of our times is most
unfavourable to free interchange of thoughts and feelings. But a custom so
social, and which did such good service in the philosophical movement
preceding the Revolution, is assuredly not destined to perish. In the more
perfect social state to which we are tending, it will be developed more fully
than ever, when men’s minds and hearts have accepted the rallying point
offered by the new philosophy.

This is, then, the mode in which women can with propriety participate
in public life. Here all classes will recognize their authority as paramount.
Under the new system these meetings will entirely lose their old aristocratic
character, which is now simply obstructive. The Positivist salon will
complete the series of social meetings, in which the three elements of the
spiritual power will be able to act in concert. First, there is the religious
assemblage in the Temple of Humanity. Here the philosopher will naturally
preside, the other two classes taking on a secondary part. In the Club again
it is the people who will take the active part; women and philosophers
would support them by their presence, but without joining in the debate.
Lastly, women in their salons will promote active and friendly intercourse
between all three classes; and here all who may be qualified to take a
leading part will find their influence cordially accepted. Gently and without
effort a moral control will thus be established, by which acts of violence or
folly may be checked in their source. Kind advice, given indirectly but
earnestly, will often save the philosopher from being blinded by ambition,
or from deviating, through intellectual pride, into useless digressions.
Working men at these meetings will learn to repress the spirit of violence or
envy that frequently arises in them, recognizing the sacredness of the care
thus manifested for their interests. And the great and the wealthy will be
taught from the manner in which praise and blame is given by those whose
opinion is most valued, that the only justifiable use of power or talent is to
devote it to the service of the weak.
But the Family is their But, however important the public duties that
principal sphere of women will ultimately be called upon to perform, the
action
Family is after all their highest and most distinctive
sphere of work. It was in allusion to their domestic influence that I spoke of
them as the originators of spiritual power. Now the Family, although it is
the basis of all human society, has never been satisfactorily defended by any
received system of society. All the corrosive power of metaphysical analysis
has been employed upon it; and of many of the sophisms put forward no
rational refutation has been given. On the other hand, the protection of the
theologians is no less injurious. For they still persist in connecting the
institutions of the Family with their obsolete dogmas, which, however
useful they may have been formerly, are now simply dangerous. From the
close of the Middle Ages the priesthood has been powerless, as the
licentious songs of the troubadours prove, to protect the sanctity of

marriage against the shallow but mischievous attacks which even then were
made against it. And afterwards, when these false principles became more
generally prevalent, and even royal courts disgraced themselves by giving
public approval to them, the weakness of the priests became still more
manifest. Thus nothing can be more monstrous than these ignorant
assertions that theological doctrines have been the safeguard of the Family.
They have done nothing to preserve it from the most subversive attacks,
under which it must have succumbed, but for the better instincts of society,
especially of the female portion of it. With the exception of a foolish fiction
about the origin of Woman, theology has put forward no systematic defence
of marriage; and as soon as theological authority itself fell into discredit, the
feeble sanction which it gave to domestic morality became utterly
powerless against sophistical attacks. But now that the Family can be
shown on Positive principles to rest on scientific laws of human nature or of
society, the danger of metaphysical controversy and theological feebleness
is past. These principles will be discussed systematically in the second
volume of the larger Treatise to which this work is the Introduction. But the
few remarks to which I must at present limit myself, will, I hope, at least
satisfy the reader as to the capability of Positivism to re-establish morality
upon a firm basis.
Woman’s mission as a According to the lower views of the subject, such
wife. Conjugal love as those coarsely expressed by the great hero of
an education for
universal sympathy
reaction, Napoleon, procreation and maternity are the
only social functions of Woman. Indeed many theorists
object even to her rearing her children, and think it preferable to leave them
to the abstract benevolence of the State. But in the Positivist theory of
marriage, the principal function of Woman is one quite unconnected with
procreation. It is a function dependent on the highest attributes of our
nature.
Vast as is the moral importance of maternity, yet the position of wife
has always been considered even more characteristic of woman’s nature; as
shown by the fact that the words woman and wife are in many languages
synonymous. Marriage is not always followed by children; and besides this,
a bad wife is very seldom indeed a good mother. The first aspect then, under
which Positivism considers Woman, is simply as the companion of Man,
irrespective of her maternal duties.

Viewed thus, Marriage is the most elementary and yet the most perfect
mode of social life. It is the only association in which entire identity of
interests is possible. In this union, to the moral completeness of which the
language of all civilized nations bears testimony, the noblest aim of human
life is realized, as far as it ever can be. For the object of human existence, as
shown in the second chapter, is progress of every kind; progress in morality,
that is to say in the subjection of Self-interest to Social Feeling, holding the
first rank. Now this unquestionable principle leads us by a very sure and
direct path to the true theory of marriage.
Different as the two sexes are by nature, and increased as that
difference is by the diversity which happily exists in their social position,
each is consequently necessary to the moral development of the other. In
practical energy and in the mental capacity which usually accompanies it,
Man is evidently superior to Woman. Woman’s strength, on the other hand,
lies in Feeling. She excels Man in love, as Man excels her in force. It is
impossible to conceive of a closer union than that which binds these two
beings to the mutual service and perfection of each other, saving them from
all danger of rivalry. The voluntary character too of this union gives it a still
further charm, when the choice has been on both sides a happy one. In the
Positive theory, then, of marriage, its principal object is considered to be
that of completing and confirming the education of the heart by calling out
the purest and strongest of human sympathies.
It is true that sexual instinct, which, in man’s case at all events, was the
origin of conjugal attachment, is a feeling purely selfish. It is also true that
its absence would in the majority of cases, diminish the energy of affection.
But woman with her more loving heart, has usually far less need of this
coarse stimulus than man. The influence of her purity reacts on man, and
ennobles his affection. And affection is in itself so sweet, that when once it
has been aroused by whatever agency, its own charm is sufficient to
maintain it in activity. When this is the case, conjugal union becomes a
perfect ideal of friendship; yet still more beautiful than friendship, because
each possesses and is possessed by the other. For perfect friendship,
difference of sex is essential, as excluding the possibility of rivalry. No
other voluntary tie can admit of such full and unrestrained confidence. It is
the source of the most unalloyed happiness that man can enjoy; for there
can be no greater happiness than to live for another.

But independently of the intrinsic value of this sacred union, we have
to consider its importance from the social point of view. It is the first stage
in our progress towards that which is the final object of moral education,
namely, universal love. Many writers of the so-called socialist school, look
upon conjugal love and universal benevolence, the two extreme terms in the
scale of affections, as opposed to each other. In the second chapter, I
pointed out the falseness and danger of this view. The man who is incapable
of deep affection for one whom he has chosen as his partner in the most
intimate relations of life, can hardly expect to be believed when he
professes devotion to a mass of human beings of whom he knows nothing.
The heart cannot throw off its original selfishness, without the aid of some
complete and enduring affection. And conjugal love, concentrated as it is
upon one object exclusively, is more enduring and complete than any other.
From personal experience of strong love we rise by degrees to sincere
affection for all mankind; although, as the scope of feeling widens, its
energy must decrease. The connexion of these two states of feeling is
instinctively recognized by all; and it is clearly indicated by the Positive
theory of human nature, which has now placed it beyond the reach of
metaphysical attacks. When the moral empire of Woman has been more
firmly established by the diffusion of Positivist principles, men will see that
the common practice of looking to the private life of a statesman as the best
guarantee of his public conduct had deep wisdom in it. One of the strongest
symptoms of the general laxity of morals to which mental anarchy has
brought us, is that disgraceful law passed in France thirty years ago, and not
yet repealed; the avowed object of which was to surround men’s lives with
a ‘wall’ of privacy; a law introduced by psychologist politicians who no
8
doubt needed such a wall.
Conditions of The purpose of marriage once clearly understood, it
becomes easy to define its conditions. The intervention
marriage. Indissoluble
monogamy
of society is necessary; but its only object is to confirm
and to develop the order of things which exists naturally.
It is essential in the first place to the high purposes for which marriage
has been instituted, that the union shall be both exclusive and indissoluble.
So essential indeed are both conditions, that we frequently find them even
when the connexion is illegal. That any one should have ventured to
propound the doctrine that human happiness is to be secured by levity and

inconsistency in love, is a fact which nothing but the utter deficiency of
social and moral principles can explain. Love cannot be deep unless it
remains constant to a fixed object. The very possibility of change is a
temptation to it. So differently constituted as man and woman are, is their
short life too much for perfect knowledge and love of one another? Yet the
versatility to which most human affection is liable makes the intervention of
society necessary. Without some check upon indecision and caprice, life
might degenerate into a miserable series of experiments, each ending in
failure and degradation. Sexual love may become a powerful engine for
good: but only on the condition of placing it under rigorous and permanent
discipline. Those who doubt the necessity for this, have only to cast a
glance beyond Western Europe at the countries where no such discipline has
been established. It has been said that the adoption or rejection of
monogamy is a simple question of climate. But for this hypothesis there is
no ground whatever. It is as contrary to common observation as to
philosophic theory. Marriage, like every other human institution, has always
been improving. Beginning in all countries with unrestricted polygamy, it
tends in all to the purest monogamy. Tracing back the history of Northern
Europe, we find polygamy there as well as in the South; and Southern
nations, like Northern, adopt polygamy as their social life advances. We see
the tendency to it in those parts of the East which come into contact with
Western civilization.
Monogamy, then, is one of the most precious gifts which the Middle
Ages have bequeathed to Western Europe. The striking superiority of social
life in the West is probably due to it more than to any other cause.
Protestant countries have seriously impaired its value by their laws of
divorce. But this aberration will hardly be permanent. It is alien to the purer
feelings of women and of the people, and the mischief done by it is limited
to the privileged classes. France is now threatened with a revival of the
metaphysical delusions of the Revolution, and it is feared by some that the
disastrous example of Germany in this respect will be imitated. But all such
tendencies, being utterly inconsistent with the habits of modern life, will
soon be checked by the sounder philosophical principles which have now
arisen. The mode of resistance to these errors which Positivism adopts will
render the struggle most useful in hastening the adoption of the true theory
of marriage. The spirit of Positivism being always relative, concessions may
be made to meet exceptional cases, without weakening or contradicting the

principle; whereas the absolute character of theological doctrine was
incompatible with concession. The rules of morality should be general and
comprehensive; but in their practical application exceptions have often to
be made. By no philosophy but the Positive can these two conditions be
reconciled.
Perpetual widowhood To the spirit of anarchy, however, Positivism yields
nothing. The unity essential to marriage, it renders more
complete than ever. It develops the principle of monogamy, by inculcating,
not as a legal institution, but as moral duty, the perpetuity of widowhood.
Affection so firmly concentrated has always been regarded with respect
even on man’s side. But hitherto no religion has had sufficient purity or
influence to secure its adoption. Positivism, however, from the
completeness of its synthesis, and from the fact that its rules are invariably
based on the laws of nature, will gain such influence, and we find little
difficulty in inducing all natures of delicate feeling to accept this additional
obligation. It follows from the very principle which to the Positivist is the
object of all marriage, the raising and purifying of the heart. Unity of the tie
which is already recognized as necessary in life, is not less so in death.
Constancy in widowhood was once common among women; and if its
moral beauty is less appreciated now, it is because all systematic morality
has been forgotten. But it is none the less, as careful study of human nature
will show, a most precious source of moral good, and one which is not
beyond the reach of nobler natures, even in their youth. Voluntary
widowhood, while it offers all the advantages which chastity can confer on
the intellectual and physical as well as on the moral nature, is yet free from
the moral dangers of celibacy. Constant adoration of one whom Death has
implanted more visibly and deeply on the memory, leads all high natures,
and especially philosophers, to give themselves more unreservedly to the
service of Humanity; and thus their public life is animated by the ennobling
influence of their innermost feelings. Alike from a sense of their own truest
happiness and from devotion to public duty, they will be led to this result.
Deep as is the satisfaction in this prolongation of the sacredness of
marriage, it may be carried by those who recognize its value yet further. As
the death of one did not destroy the bond, so neither should the death of
both. Let, then, those whom death could not divide be laid in the same
grave together. A promise of this solemn act of perpetuation might be given

beforehand, when the organs of public opinion judged it merited. A man
would find a new motive for public exertion, if it were felt to be a pledge
that the memory of her whom he loved should be for ever coupled with his
own. We have a few instances where this union of memories has taken
place spontaneously, as in the case of Laura and Petrarch, and of Dante and
Beatrice. Yet these instances are so exceptional, that they hardly help us to
realize the full value of the institution proposed. There is no reason for
limiting it to cases of extraordinary genius. In the more healthy state of
society to which we are tending, where private and public life will be far
more closely connected than they have been hitherto, this recompense of
service may be given to all who have deserved it, by those who have come
within their circle of influence.
Such, then, are the consolations which Positivist sympathy can give.
They leave no cause to regret the visionary hopes held out by Christianity,
hopes which now are as enfeebling to the heart as to the intellect. Here, as
in all other respects, the moral superiority of Positivism is shown, for the
comfort which it gives to the bereaved implies a strengthening of the tie.
Christian consolation, of which so much has been said, rather encourages a
second union. By so doing it seriously impairs the value of the institution;
for a division of affection arises, which indeed seems hardly compatible
with the vague utopia of a future life. The institutions of perpetual
widowhood and of union in the tomb have found no place in any previous
system, though both were wanting to make monogamy complete. Here, as
elsewhere, the best reply which the new philosophy can give to ignorant
prejudice or malignant calumny, is to take new steps forward in the moral
advancement of Man.
Thus the theory of marriage, as set forward by the Positivist, becomes
totally independent of any physical motive. It is regarded by him as the
most powerful instrument of moral education; and therefore as the basis of
public or individual welfare. It is no overstrained enthusiasm which leads us
to elevate the moral purity of marriage. We do so from rigorous
examination of the facts of human nature. All the best results, whether
personal or social, of marriage may follow, when the union, though more
impassioned, is as chaste as that of brother and sister. The sexual instinct
has no doubt something to do in most cases with the first formation of the
passion; but it is not necessary in all cases to gratify the instinct.

Abstinence, in cases where there is real ground for it on both sides, will but
serve to strengthen mutual affection.
Woman’s mission as a We have examined the position of Woman as a
mother wife, without supposing her to be a mother. We shall
find that maternity, while it extends her sphere of moral
influence, does not alter its nature.
As a mother, no less than as a wife, her position will be improved by
Positivism. She will have, almost exclusively, the direction of household
education. Public education given subsequently, will be little but a
systematic development of that which has been previously given at home.
Education of children For it is a fundamental principle that education, in
belongs to mothers. the normal condition of society, must be entrusted to the
They only can guide
the development of
spiritual power; and in the family the spiritual power is
character represented by Woman. There are strong prejudices
against entrusting the education of children to mothers:
prejudices springing from the revolutionary spirit of modern times. Since
the close of the Middle Ages, the tendency has been to place the intellect
above the heart. We have neglected the moral side of education, and I have
given undue importance to its intellectual side. But Positivism having
superseded this revolutionary phase by demonstrating the preponderance of
the heart over the intellect, moral education will resume its proper place.
Certainly the present mode of instruction is not adopted for Woman’s
teaching. But their influence over the education of the future will be even
greater than it was in the Middle Ages. For in the first place, in every part of
it, moral considerations will be paramount; and moreover, until puberty,
nothing will be studied continuously except Art and Poetry. The knights of
old times were usually brought up in this way under feminine guidance, and
on them most assuredly it had no enervating influence. The training can
hardly be supposed less adapted to a pacific than to a warlike state of
society. For instruction, theoretical and practical, as distinguished from
education, masters are no doubt necessary. But moral education will be left
entirely to women, until the time arrives for systematic teaching of moral
science in the years immediately preceding majority. Here the philosopher
is necessary. But the chief duties of the philosopher lie with adults; his aim
being to recall them, individually or collectively, to principles impressed on
them in childhood, and to enforce the right application of these principles to

special cases as they may arise. That part of education which has the
greatest influence on life, what may be called the spontaneous training of
the feelings, belongs entirely to the mother. Hence it is, as I have already
observed, of the greatest importance to allow the pupil to remain with his
family, and to do away with the monastic seclusion of our public schools.
The peculiar fitness of women for inculcating these elementary
principles of morality is a truth which every true philosopher will fully
recognize. Women, having stronger sympathies than men, must be better
able to call out sympathies in others. Men of good sense have always felt it
more important to train the heart than the head; and this is the view adopted
by Positive Philosophy. There is a danger of exaggerating the importance of
system and of forgetting the conditions on which its utility depends; but the
Positivist is preserved from this danger by the peculiar reality of his
philosophy. In morals, even more than in other subjects, we can only
systematize what has existed previously without system. The feelings must
first be stimulated to free and direct action, before we attempt to bring them
under philosophic discipline. And this process, which begins with birth, and
lasts during the whole period of physical growth, should be left for women
to superintend. So specially are they adapted for it, that failing the mother, a
female friend, if well chosen, and if she can make herself sufficiently a
member of the family, will in most cases do better than the father himself.
The importance of the subject can only be appreciated by minds dominated,
as women’s minds are, by feeling. Women can see, what men can seldom
see, that most actions, and certainly the actions of youth and childhood,
ought not to be judged in themselves so much as by the tendencies which
they show or by the habits to which they lead. Viewed with reference to
their influence on character, no actions are indifferent. The simplest events
in a child’s life may serve as an occasion for enforcing the fundamental
principle by which the early as well as later stages of Positivist education
should be directed; the strengthening of Social Feeling, the weakening of
Self-love. In fact, actions of an unimportant kind are precisely those in
which it is easiest to appreciate the feelings which prompted them; since the
mind of the observer, not being occupied with the consequences of such
actions, is more free to examine their source. Moreover, it is only by
teaching the child to do right in small things that he can be trained for the
hard inward struggle that lies before him in life; the struggle to bring the
selfish instincts more and more completely under the control of his higher

sympathies. In these respects the best tutor, however sympathetic his nature,
will be always far inferior to a good mother. A mother may often not be able
to explain the reason of the principle on which she acts, but the wisdom of
her plans will generally show itself in the end. Without formal teaching, she
will take every opportunity of showing her children, as no other instructor
could show them, the joy that springs from generous feelings, and the
misery of yielding to selfishness.
From the relation of mother we return by a natural transition to
Woman’s position as a wife. The mother, though her authority of course
tends to decrease, continues to superintend the growth of character until the
ordinary age of marriage. Up to that time feminine influence over Man has
been involuntary on his part. By marriage he enters into a voluntary
engagement of subordination to Woman for the rest of his life. Thus he
completes his moral education. Destined himself for action, he finds his
highest happiness in honourable submission to one in whom the dominant
principle is affection.
Positivism holds out to woman a most important sphere of public and
private duty. This sphere, as we may now see, is nothing but a larger and
more systematic development of the qualities by which she is characterized.
Her mission is so uniform in its nature and so clearly defined, that there
seems hardly room for much uncertainty as to her proper social position. It
is a striking instance of the rule which applies universally to all human
effort; namely, that the order of things instituted by man ought to be simply
a consolidation and improvement of the natural order.
Modern sophisms In all ages of transition, as in our own, there have
been false and sophistical views of the social position of
about Women’s rights.
The domesticity of
Woman. But we find it to be a natural law that Woman
her life follows from
the principle of should pass the greater part of her life in the family; and
Separation of Powersthis law has never been affected to any important
extent. It has always been accepted instinctively, though
the sophistical arguments against it have never yet been adequately refuted.
The institution of the family has survived the subtle attacks of Greek
metaphysics, which then were in all the vigour of their youth, and which
were acting on minds that had no systematic principles to oppose to them.
Therefore, profound as the intellectual anarchy of the present day may be,
we need not be seriously alarmed when we see that nothing worse comes of

it than shallow plagiarisms from ancient utopias, against which the vigorous
satire of Aristophanes was quite enough to rouse general indignation. True,
there is a more complete absence of social principles now, than when the
world was passing from Polytheism to Monotheism; but our intellectual
powers are more developed than they were then, and in moral culture our
superiority is even greater. Women in those times were too degraded to
offer even the opposition of their silence to the pedants who professed to be
taking up their cause; the only resistance offered was of a purely intellectual
kind. But happily in modern times the women of the West have been free;
and have consequently been able to manifest such unmistakable aversion
for these ideas, and for the want of moral discipline which gives rise to
them, that, though still unrefuted philosophically, their mischievous effects
have been neutralized. Nothing but women’s antipathy has prevented the
practical outrages which seem logically to follow from these subversive
principles. Among our privileged classes the danger is aggravated by
indolence; moreover, the possession of wealth has a bad influence on
women’s moral nature. Yet even here the evil is not really very deep or
widely spread. Men have never been seriously perverted, and women still
less so, by flattery of their bad propensities. The really formidable
temptations are those which act upon our better instincts, and give them a
wrong direction. Schemes which are utterly offensive to female delicacy
will never really be adopted, even by the wealthier classes, who are less
averse to them than others. The repugnance shown to them by the people,
with whom the mischief that they would cause would be irreparable, is far
more decided. The life which working people lead makes it very clear to
both sexes what the proper position of each should be. Thus it will be in the
very class where the preservation of the institution of the family is of the
greatest importance, that Positivists will find the least difficulty in
establishing their theory of the social position of women, as consequent on
the sphere of public and private duty which has been here assigned to them.
Looking at the relation of this theory to other parts of the Positive
system, we shall see that it follows from the great principle which
dominates every other social problem, the principle of separating spiritual
and temporal power. That Woman’s life should be concentrated in her
family, and that even there her influence should be that of persuasion rather
than that of command, is but an extension of the principle which excludes
the spiritual power from political administration. Women, as the purest and

most spontaneous of the moral forces of society, are bound to fulfil with
rigorous exactness all the conditions which the exercise of moral force
demands. Effectually to perform their mission of controlling and guiding
our affections, they must abstain altogether from the practical pursuits of
the stronger sex. Such abstinence, even when the arrangements of society
may leave it optional, is still more desirable in their case than in the case of
philosophers. Active life, incompatible as it is with the clearness and
breadth of philosophic speculation, is even more injurious to delicacy of
feeling, which is women’s highest claim to our respect and the true secret of
their influence. The philosophic spirit is incompatible with a position of
practical authority, because such a position occupies the mind with
questions of detail. But to purity of feeling it is even more dangerous,
because it strengthens the instincts of power and of gain. And for women it
would be harder to avoid the danger of such a position than for men.
Abounding as they do in sympathy, they are generally deficient in energy,
and are therefore less able to withstand corrupting influences. The more we
examine this important subject, the clearer it becomes that the present
condition of women does not hamper them in their true work; that, on the
contrary, it is well calculated to develop and even improve their highest
qualities. The natural arrangements of society in this as in other respects are
far less faulty than certain blind declaimers would have us believe. But for
the existence of strong material forces, moral force would soon deteriorate,
because its distinctive purpose would be gone. Philosophers and proletaries
would soon lose their intellectual and moral superiority by the acquisition
of power. On women its effect would be still more disastrous. From
instances in the upper classes of society, where wealth gives them
independence, and sometimes unfortunately even power, we see but too
clearly what the consequences would be. And this is why we have to look to
the poorer classes for the highest type of womanly perfection. With the
people sympathy is better cultivated, and has a greater influence upon life.
Wealth has more to do with the moral degradation of women among the
privileged classes than even idleness and dissipation.
The position of the Progress, in this respect as in every other, is only a
sexes tends to more complete development of the pre-existing Order.
differentiation rather
than identity
Equality in the position of the two sexes is contrary to
their nature, and no tendency to it has at any time been
exhibited. All history assures us that with the growth of society the peculiar

features of each sex have become not less but more distinct. By Catholic
Feudalism the social condition of women in Western Europe was raised to a
far higher level. But it took away from them the priestly functions which
they had held under Polytheism; a religion in which the priesthood was
more occupied with Art than with Science. So too with the gradual decline
of the principle of Caste, women have been excluded more and more rigidly
from royalty and from every other kind of political authority. Again, there is
a visible tendency towards the removal of women from all industrial
occupations, even from those which might seem best suited to them. And
thus female life, instead of becoming independent of the Family, is being
more and more concentrated in it; while at the same time their proper
sphere of moral influence is constantly extending. The two tendencies so far
from being opposed, are inseparably connected.
Without discussing the absurd and retrograde schemes which have been
recently put forward on the subject, there is one remark which may serve to
illustrate the value of the order which now exists. If women were to obtain
that equality in the affairs of life which their so-called champions are
claiming for them without their wish, not only would they suffer morally,
but their social position would be endangered. They would be subject in
almost every occupation to a degree of competition which they would not
be able to sustain. Moreover, by rivalry in the pursuits of life, mutual
affection between the sexes would be corrupted at its source.

Woman to be
Leaving these subversive dreams, we find a natural
maintained by Man principle which, by determining the practical
obligations of the Active to the Sympathetic sex, averts
this danger. It is a principle which no philosophy but Positivism has been
sufficiently real and practical to bring forward systematically for general
acceptance. It is no new invention, however, but a universal tendency,
confirmed by careful study of the whole past history of Man. The principle
is, that Man should provide for Woman. It is a natural law of the human
race; a law connected with the essentially domestic character of female life.
We find it in the rudest forms of social life; and with every step in the
progress of society its adoption becomes more extensive and complete. A
still larger application of this fundamental principle will meet all the
material difficulties under which women are now labouring. All social
relations, and especially the question of wages, will be affected by it. The