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Title: Second Treatise of Government

Author: John Locke

Release date: January 1, 2005 [eBook #7370]
Most recently updated: December 25, 2021

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ***

S E C O N D T R E AT I S E O F
GOVERNMENT

by JOHN LOCKE

Digitized by Dave Gowan. John Locke’s “Second Treatise of
Government” was published in 1690. The complete
unabridged text has been republished several times in edited
commentaries. This text is recovered entire from the
paperback book, “John Locke Second Treatise of
Government”, Edited, with an Introduction, By C.B.
McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and
Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition is
included in the Etext below; only the original words
contained in the 1690 Locke text is included. The 1690
edition text is free of copyright.

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

BY IOHN LOCKE

SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO
LONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIII
REPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A. MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1.
WHISTON AND B. WHITE, 1. RIVINGTON, L. DAVIS AND C.
REYMERS, R. BALDWIN, HAWES CLARKE AND COLLINS; W.
IOHNSTON, W. OWEN, 1. RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T.
LONGMAN, B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E. DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R.
WARE, S. BAKER, T. PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN
MDCCLXIII
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE
FALSE PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER
AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND OVERTHROWN. THE
LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL
EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
1764 EDITOR’S NOTE The present Edition of this Book has not only
been collated with the first three Editions, which were published during the
Author’s Life, but also has the Advantage of his last Corrections and
Improvements, from a Copy delivered by him to Mr. Peter Coste,
communicated to the Editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge.

Contents

CHAPTER I.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER IV.
CHAPTER V.
CHAPTER VI.
CHAPTER VII.
CHAPTER VIII.
CHAPTER IX.
CHAPTER X.
CHAPTER XI.
CHAPTER XII.
CHAPTER XIII.
CHAPTER XIV.
CHAPTER XV.
CHAPTER XVI.
CHAPTER XVII.
CHAPTER XVIII.
CHAPTER XIX.

PREFACE

Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning
government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should
have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth
while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the
throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his
title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful
governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in
Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love
of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved
the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers
have that evidence, I flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no
great miss of those which are lost, and my reader may be satisfied without
them: for I imagine, I shall have neither the time, nor inclination to repeat
my pains, and fill up the wanting part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert
again, through all the windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in
the several branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the
nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his Hypothesis, that I suppose no
body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our
common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be
deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, and well-turned
periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in those parts, which are
here untouched, to strip Sir Robert’s discourses of the flourish of doubtful
expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, positive,
intelligible propositions, and then compare them one with another, he will
quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib nonsense put together in
well-sounding English. If he think it not worth while to examine his works
all thro’, let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of
usurpation; and let him try, whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir
Robert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I should

not speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the
pulpit, of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current
divinity of the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be
teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of
what authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed,
that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have vented,
and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which they
preached up for gospel; though they had no better an author than an English
courtier: for I should not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to
shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of (what he so much boasts of,
and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were there not men
amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his doctrine, save
me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been
so zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope
they should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the public
wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just weight to this
reflection, viz. that there cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and
people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning government; that so
at last all times might not have reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic.
If any one, concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation of my
Hypothesis, I promise him either to recant my mistake, upon fair
conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two things.
First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident
of my discourse, is not an answer to my book.
Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of
these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as bound to
give satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be conscientiously
scrupulous in the point, and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples.
I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations stands
for Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pages
always means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680.

Book II

CHAPTER. I.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT
Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,
(1). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by
positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or
dominion over the world, as is pretended:
(2). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:
(3). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of
God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the
right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been
certainly determined:
(4). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is
the eldest line of Adam’s posterity, being so long since utterly lost, that in
the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one
above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the
right of inheritance:
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is
impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive
any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain
of all power, Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he
that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is
the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no
other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a
foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and

rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out
against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another
original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the
persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I
take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a
subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a
MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over
his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the
same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us
to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a family, and a
captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making
laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the
regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the
community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the
commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

CHAPTER. II.

OF THE STATE OF NATURE.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its
original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a
state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more
evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously
born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties,
should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or
subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest
declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and
sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon
as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the
foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he
builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the
great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,

The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is
no less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those
things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot
but wish to receive good, even as much at every man’s hands, as any
man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part
of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the

like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the
same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this
desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that
if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others
should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me
shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in
nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty
of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation
of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what
several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of
life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.

Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence:
though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much
as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it,
which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind,
who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all
the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about
his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to
last during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like
faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed
any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of
creatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and
not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own
preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an
offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of
the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights,
and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed,
which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of
the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every

one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as
may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that
concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state
of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent
and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish
another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of
perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of
one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one
must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over
another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he
has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm
reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression,
which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two
are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which
is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender
declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common
equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their
mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is
to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him.
Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety
of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the
right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is
necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on
any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing
of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like
mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A
RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF
THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some
men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right
any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he
commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction
they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a
stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to
them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects

of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the
supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an
Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore,
if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences
against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the
magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country;
since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every
man naturally may have over another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and
varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and
to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or
other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which
case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment
common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from
him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join
with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so
much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime
for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in
every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the
injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate
hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the
public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of
criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction
due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone
can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself
the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every
man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again,
by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable
things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state
of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the
like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the
punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the
attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and
measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and

slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind,
and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild
savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon
this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by
man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every
one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his
brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was
it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the
lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I
answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so
much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give
him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence,
that can be committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be
also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for
though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the
particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is
certain there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational
creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths;
nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the
fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden
interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of
countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of
nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every
one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be
objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases,
that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on
the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow,
and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must
certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is
easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an
injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire
those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but

men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men’s being judges in their own cases, and the state
of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of
government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where
one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own
case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least
liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure?
and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must
be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not
bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges
amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were
there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an
answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent
governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the
world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I
have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or
are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to
the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together
mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other
promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in
the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the
two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his
history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America,
are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in
reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as
men, and not as members of society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of
nature, I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl.
Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says,

The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of
nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they
have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement
amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we

are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent
store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a
life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects and
imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and
fellowship with others: this was the cause of men’s uniting
themselves at first in politic societies.

But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain
so, till by their own consents they make themselves members of some
politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it
very clear.

CHAPTER. III.

OF THE STATE OF WAR.
Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and
therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a
sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a state of war
with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has
exposed his life to the other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one
that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being
reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me
with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be
preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved, the safety of
the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who makes war
upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that
he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the
commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence,
and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious
creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their
power.
Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his
absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it
being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life: for I have
reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my
consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy
me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can desire to have me in his
absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against
the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is
the only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an
enemy to my preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the
fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts

himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would
take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must
necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing else, that
freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of
society, would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or
commonwealth, must be supposed to design to take away from them every
thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.
Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the
least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than, by
the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away his money, or
what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to
get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to
suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not, when he had
me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful for
me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e.
kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever
introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of
nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are
as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and
preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction,
are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a
common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is
properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon
the person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal
to for relief, is the state of war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a
man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho’ he be in society and a
fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law,
for having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob
me but of my horse or coat; because the law, which was made for my
preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force,
which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and
the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows
not time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for
remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common
judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right,

upon a man’s person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a
common judge.
Sect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases
between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides subjected to
the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open the remedy of
appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such
appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges
with authority to appeal to, the state of war once begun, continues, with a
right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the
aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may
repair any wrongs he has already done, and secure the innocent for the
future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted judges, lies open,
but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a
barefaced wresting of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or
injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard to imagine any thing
but a state of war: for wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by
hands appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however
coloured with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being
to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to all
who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the
sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the
only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to
heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where there is
no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great reason of men’s
putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where
there is an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by
appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded, and the
controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any
superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and
the Ammonites, they had never come to a state of war: but we see he was
forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says he) be judge this day
between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and
then prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle:
and therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be
judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one
knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge.

Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That
question then cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put
himself in a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal
to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as
I will answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.

CHAPTER. IV.

OF SLAVERY.
Sect. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior
power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man,
but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in
society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by
consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or
restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the
trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us,
Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he
pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but freedom of men under
government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of
that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to
follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to
be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another
man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of
nature.
Sect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to,
and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but
by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the
power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave
himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of
another, to take away his life, when he pleases. No body can give more
power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life,
cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his
own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it,
may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it, and make use of him
to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds

the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power,
by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires.
Sect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else,
but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive:
for, if once compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a
limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war
and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no
man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in
himself, a power over his own life.
I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did
sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery:
for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary,
despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any
time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his
service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an
arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as
maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.

CHAPTER. V.

OF PROPERTY.
Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men,
being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to
meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence:
or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the
world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king
David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given
it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a very
great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any
thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out
property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam, and his
posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal
monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the
world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his
posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men might come to have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common,
and that without any express compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also
given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and
convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the
support and comfort of their being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally
produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are
produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a
private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they
are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must
of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they
can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The fruit, or
venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is

still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that
another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for
the support of his life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we
may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it
hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right
of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at
least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or
the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly
appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the nourishment is his.
I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he
eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked
them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing
else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that
added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had
done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no
right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the
consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume
to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was
necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.
We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any
part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in,
which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the
taking of this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the
commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut;
and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in
common with others, become my property, without the assignation or
consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that
common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to
any one’s appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common,
children or servants could not cut the meat, which their father or master had
provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar
part. Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who can
doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour hath
taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and belonged
equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath
killed it; it is allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it,
though before it was the common right of every one. And amongst those
who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and
multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law of nature,
for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still takes place;
and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and
still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up
here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it
in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us,
the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the
chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man’s
private possession; whoever has employed so much labour about any of that
kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of
nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns,
or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may
ingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of
nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that
property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice
of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To
enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before
it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is
beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was
made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty
of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few
spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man
could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially
keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use;

there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so
established.
Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the
earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which
takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that property in that
too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves,
cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his
labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate
his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it; and therefore he
cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his fellow-
commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all
mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition
required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth,
i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it
that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this command of God,
subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something
that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury
take from him.
Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving
it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good
left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there
was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he
that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take
nothing at all. No body could think himself injured by the drinking of
another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the
same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water,
where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.
Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it
them for their benefit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they were
capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always
remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious
and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left
for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought
not to meddle with what was already improved by another’s labour: if he
did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another’s pains, which he had no

right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common with
others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already
possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry could
reach to.
Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other
country, where there is plenty of people under government, who have
money and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without
the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by
compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated. And though
it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind; but is the
joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after
such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the
whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas in the
beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was quite
otherwise. The law man was under, was rather for appropriating. God
commanded, and his wants forced him to labour. That was his property
which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it. And hence
subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined
together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to
subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the condition of human
life, which requires labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduces
private possessions.
Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of
men’s labour and the conveniencies of life: no man’s labour could subdue,
or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part;
so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the right of
another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour,
who would still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the
other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measure did
confine every man’s possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as
he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the first ages
of the world, when men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from
their company, in the then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be straitened
for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed still
without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing a
man, or family, in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the
children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland, vacant places of

America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon
the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day,
prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think
themselves injured by this man’s incroachment, though the race of men
have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do
infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of
ground is of so little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that
in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without
being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use
of it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him,
who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has
increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which
I lay no stress on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety,
(viz.) that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would
hold still in the world, without straitening any body; since there is land
enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention
of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced
(by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done,
I shall by and by shew more at large.
Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having
more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which
depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a
little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay,
should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men
had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of
the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the
prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would
use the same industry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land
to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of
mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced
by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within
compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of
an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses
land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres,
than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give
ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions
out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in

common. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making its
product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for I
ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to
nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres
yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as
ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well
cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild
fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so
imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any
way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of
his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they
perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the
venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common
law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s
share, for he had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and
they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.
Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too:
whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and
make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of
his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished
without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his
enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of
any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he
could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to Abel’s sheep to
feed on; a few acres would serve for both their possessions. But as families
increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with
the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in
the ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves
together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out
the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and
their neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of
those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the world which
was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down
as Abraham’s time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which
was their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country

where he was a stranger. Whence it is plain, that at least a great part of the
land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed property
in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room enough in
the same place, for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as
Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and inlarged their pasture,
where it best liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his
father, and his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and
property in Adam, over all the world, exclusive of all other men, which can
no way be proved, nor any one’s property be made out from it; but
supposing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we
see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for
their private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of right, no room for
quarrel.
Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may
appear, that the property of labour should be able to over-balance the
community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value
on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is between an
acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and
an acre of the same land lying in common, without any husbandry upon it,
and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part
of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of
the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects
of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use,
and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely owing
to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine
hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.
Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than
several nations of the Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and poor
in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any
other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce
in abundance, what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want
of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies
we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges,
and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England.

Sect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary
provisions of life, through their several progresses, before they come to our
use, and see how much they receive of their value from human industry.
Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet
notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread,
drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us with these more useful
commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns, wine than
water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing to
labour and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which
unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry
and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value,
when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the
far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the
ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or
at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that
is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or
planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it
amount to little more than nothing.
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of
dominions; and that the increase of lands, and the right employing of them,
is the great art of government: and that prince, who shall be so wise and
godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and
encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of
power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours:
but this by the by.
To return to the argument in hand.
Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and
another in America, which, with the same husbandry, would do the like, are,
without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but yet the benefit
mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other
possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were
to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not one thousandth. It
is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without
which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greatest
part of all its useful products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre
of wheat, is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land, which

lies waste, is all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man’s
pains, the reaper’s and thresher’s toil, and the baker’s sweat, is to be
counted into the bread we eat; the labour of those who broke the oxen, who
digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and framed the timber
employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a
vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its
being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labour, and
received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost
worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of
things, that industry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread,
before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark,
timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes,
and all the materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the
commodities made use of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work;
all which it would be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
Sect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are
given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of
his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great
foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he
applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had
improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not
belong in common to others.
Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property,
wherever any one was pleased to employ it upon what was common, which
remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more than mankind
makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with
what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards,
in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and stock, with
the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the several
communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws
within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their
society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which
labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between
several states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim
and right to the land in the others possession, have, by common consent,
given up their pretences to their natural common right, which originally
they had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a

property amongst themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet
there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants
thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use
of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell
on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common; tho’ this can scarce
happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of
money.
Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and
such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world
look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of short
duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of
themselves: gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement
hath put the value on, more than real use, and the necessary support of life.
Now of those good things which nature hath provided in common, every
one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and property
in all that he could effect with his labour; all that his industry could extend
to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a
hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they
were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them
before they spoiled, else he took more than his share, and robbed others.
And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more
than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that
it perished not uselesly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if
he also bartered away plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that
would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not
the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged
to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands. Again, if he
would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its colour; or
exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond,
and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others, he
might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding
of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his
possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it.
Sect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men
might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in
exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.

Sect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men
possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them
the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for supposing an island,
separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein
there were but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses and cows,
with other useful animals, wholsome fruits, and land enough for corn for a
hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either because
of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money;
what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the
use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what
their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful
commodities, with others? Where there is not some thing, both lasting and
scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be apt to
enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never so free for
them to take: for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred
thousand acres of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with
cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes
of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the
sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see
him give up again to the wild common of nature, whatever was more than
would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there for him and his
family.
Sect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so
than that is now; for no such thing as money was any where known. Find
out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his
neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his
possessions.
Sect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in
proportion to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value only from the
consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the measure, it is
plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of
the earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way
how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the
product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which
may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or
decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things in an
inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the

bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold
and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use of money: for in governments, the
laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land is determined
by positive constitutions.
Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any
difficulty, how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common
things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it. So that
there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about
the largeness of possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together;
for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had
no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no
room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of
others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was
useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more than
he needed.

CHAPTER. VI.

OF PATERNAL POWER.
Sect. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a
discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names, that have
obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new
ones, when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal
power probably has done, which seems so to place the power of parents
over their children wholly in the father, as if the mother had no share in it;
whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she hath an equal
title. This may give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more
properly called parental power? for whatever obligation nature and the right
of generation lays on children, it must certainly bind them equal to both the
concurrent causes of it. And accordingly we see the positive law of God
every where joins them together, without distinction, when it commands the
obedience of children, Honour thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12.
Whosoever curseth his father or his mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear every
man his mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c.
Eph. vi. 1. is the stile of the Old and New Testament.
Sect. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking
any deeper into the matter, it might perhaps have kept men from running
into those gross mistakes, they have made, about this power of parents;
which, however it might, without any great harshness, bear the name of
absolute dominion, and regal authority, when under the title of paternal
power it seemed appropriated to the father, would yet have founded but
oddly, and in the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed absolute
power over children had been called parental; and thereby have discovered,
that it belonged to the mother too: for it will but very ill serve the turn of
those men, who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of
the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it;

and it would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for, when by
the very name it appeared, that that fundamental authority, from whence
they would derive their government of a single person only, was not placed
in one, but two persons jointly. But to let this of names pass.
Sect. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are
equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue
may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place
others above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or
benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or
other respects, may have made it due: and yet all this consists with the
equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one
over another; which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the
business in hand, being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural
freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.
Sect. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality,
though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction
over them, when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it is
but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling
clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their
infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they
drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.
Sect. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full
possession of their strength and reason, and so was capable, from the first
instant of his being to provide for his own support and preservation, and
govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which God
had implanted in him. From him the world is peopled with his descendants,
who are all born infants, weak and helpless, without knowledge or
understanding: but to supply the defects of this imperfect state, till the
improvement of growth and age hath removed them, Adam and Eve, and
after them all parents were, by the law of nature, under an obligation to
preserve, nourish, and educate the children they had begotten; not as their
own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own maker, the Almighty,
to whom they were to be accountable for them.
Sect. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to
govern all his posterity, the law of reason. But his offspring having another
way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a natural birth, that

produced them ignorant and without the use of reason, they were not
presently under that law; for no body can be under a law, which is not
promulgated to him; and this law being promulgated or made known by
reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason, cannot be said to be
under this law; and Adam’s children, being not presently as soon as born
under this law of reason, were not presently free: for law, in its true notion,
is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent
to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good
of those under that law: could they be happier without it, the law, as an
useless thing, would of itself vanish; and that ill deserves the name of
confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that,
however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but
to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings
capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to
be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where
there is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to
do what he lists: (for who could be free, when every other man’s humour
might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his
person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance
of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the
arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.
Sect. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises
from that duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring,
during the imperfect state of childhood. To inform the mind, and govern the
actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease
them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound
to: for God having given man an understanding to direct his actions, has
allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as properly belonging
thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an
estate, wherein he has not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is
not to have any will of his own to follow: he that understands for him, must
will for him too; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate his actions; but
when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the son is a
freeman too.
Sect. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or
civil. Is a man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law?
what gave him a free disposing of his property, according to his own will,

within the compass of that law? I answer, a state of maturity wherein he
might be supposed capable to know that law, that so he might keep his
actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that state, he is
presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may
make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till then, some body else
must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty.
If such a state of reason, such an age of discretion made him free, the same
shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law of England? What made
him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and
possessions according to his own will, within the permission of that law? A
capacity of knowing that law; which is supposed by that law, at the age of
one and twenty years, and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free,
it shall make the son free too. Till then we see the law allows the son to
have no will, but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian,
who is to understand for him. And if the father die, and fail to substitute a
deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to govern his son, during
his minority, during his want of understanding, the law takes care to do it;
some other must govern him, and be a will to him, till he hath attained to a
state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the government of his
will. But after that, the father and son are equally free as much as tutor and
pupil after nonage; equally subjects of the same law together, without any
dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of his son, whether
they be only in the state and under the law of nature, or under the positive
laws of an established government.
Sect. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary
course of nature, any one comes not to such a degree of reason, wherein he
might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living within the
rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to
the disposure of his own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not
understanding, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and
government of others, all the time his own understanding is uncapable of
that charge. And so lunatics and ideots are never set free from the
government of their parents;

children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they
may have; and innocents which are excluded by a natural defect
from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the present cannot

possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have for
their guide, the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over
them, to seek and procure their good for them,

says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that
duty, which God and nature has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to
preserve their offspring, till they can be able to shift for themselves, and
will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority.
Sect. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have
actually the exercise of either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other
too. And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may
consist together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free
by his father’s title, by his father’s understanding, which is to govern him
till he hath it of his own. The freedom of a man at years of discretion, and
the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of that age, are so
consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for
monarchy, by right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most
obstinate cannot but allow their consistency: for were their doctrine all true,
were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch
in his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert
Filmer talks of; if he should die as soon as his heir were born, must not the
child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much sovereign, be
in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and
education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The
necessities of his life, the health of his body, and the information of his
mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his
own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were
inconsistent with, or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right
to, or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his
nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner
for it. If any body should ask me, when my son is of age to be free? I shall
answer, just when his monarch is of age to govern. But at what time, says
the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 6. a man may be said to have
attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of
those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal
more easy for sense to discern, than for any one by skill and learning to
determine.

Sect. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that
there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men, and therefore till
that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other public owning
of, or submission to the government of their countries.
Sect. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his
own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in
that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to
the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty,
before he has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of
his nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst brutes, and abandon him
to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their’s. This is
that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority
of their children. God hath made it their business to employ this care on
their offspring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness
and concern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to
the children’s good, as long as they should need to be under it.
Sect. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due
to their off-spring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whose
power reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as he finds most
effectual, to give such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and
rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to
themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to his condition, to make them
work, when they are able, for their own subsistence. But in this power the
mother too has her share with the father.
Sect. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar
right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children, that when he quits
his care of them, he loses his power over them, which goes along with their
nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed; and it
belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural
father of another. So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man
over his issue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the
name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal
power in that part of the world, where one woman hath more than one
husband at a time? or in those parts of America, where, when the husband
and wife part, which happens frequently, the children are all left to the
mother, follow her, and are wholly under her care and provision? If the

father die whilst the children are young, do they not naturally every where
owe the same obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their
father were he alive? and will any one say, that the mother hath a legislative
power over her children? that she can make standing rules, which shall be
of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of
their property, and bound their liberty all the course of their lives? or can
she inforce the observation of them with capital punishments? for this is the
proper power of the magistrate, of which the father hath not so much as the
shadow. His command over his children is but temporary, and reaches not
their life or property: it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of
their nonage, a discipline necessary to their education: and though a father
may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, when his children are out
of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives or
goods, which either their own industry, or another’s bounty has made
their’s; nor to their liberty neither, when they are once arrived to the
infranchisement of the years of discretion. The father’s empire then ceases,
and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son,
than that of any other man: and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual
jurisdiction, from which a man may withdraw himself, having license from
divine authority to leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife.
Sect. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free
from subjection to the will and command of his father, as the father himself
is free from subjection to the will of any body else, and they are each under
no other restraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the
law of nature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts
not a son from that honour which he ought, by the law of God and nature, to
pay his parents. God having made the parents instruments in his great
design of continuing the race of mankind, and the occasions of life to their
children; as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and
bring up their offspring; so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation
of honouring their parents, which containing in it an inward esteem and
reverence to be shewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from
any thing that may ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the happiness
or life of those from whom he received his; and engages him in all actions
of defence, relief, assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he
entered into being, and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life:
from this obligation no state, no freedom can absolve children. But this is

very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an
authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties.
It is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude and assistance; another to
require an absolute obedience and submission. The honour due to parents, a
monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet this lessens not his
authority, nor subjects him to her government.
Sect. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary
government, which terminates with the minority of the child: and the
honour due from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to respect,
reverence, support and compliance too, more or less, as the father’s care,
cost, and kindness in his education, has been more or less. This ends not
with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of a man’s life. The want
of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the
right of tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may
perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter: for to
speak properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of children,
and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The
nourishment and education of their children is a charge so incumbent on
parents for their children’s good, that nothing can absolve them from taking
care of it: and though the power of commanding and chastising them go
along with it, yet God hath woven into the principles of human nature such
a tenderness for their off-spring, that there is little fear that parents should
use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe
side, the strong byass of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God
almighty when he would express his gentle dealing with the Israelites, he
tells them, that though he chastened them, he chastened them as a man
chastens his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and affection, and kept
them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them,
and had been less kindness to have slackened. This is that power to which
children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of their parents
may not be increased, or ill rewarded.
Sect. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which gratitude
requires to return for the benefits received by and from them, is the
indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the parents. This
is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child’s; though
education, the parents duty, seems to have most power, because the
ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and

correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind of dominion. And
that duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires less
obedience, though the obligation be stronger on grown, than younger
children: for who can think the command, Children obey your parents,
requires in a man, that has children of his own, the same submission to his
father, as it does in his yet young children to him; and that by this precept
he were bound to obey all his father’s commands, if, out of a conceit of
authority, he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy?
Sect. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which is
education, belongs so to the father, that it terminates at a certain season;
when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself, and is also
alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands;
and he that has made his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him,
during that time, of a great part of his obedience both to himself and to his
mother. But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains never the less
entire to them; nothing can cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both,
that the father’s authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right, nor can
any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him. But both these
are very far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties,
that may reach estate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding
ends with nonage; and though, after that, honour and respect, support and
defence, and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest
benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents;
yet all this puts no scepter into the father’s hand, no sovereign power of
commanding. He has no dominion over his son’s property, or actions; nor
any right, that his will should prescribe to his son’s in all things; however it
may become his son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his
family, to pay a deference to it.
Sect. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man;
defence to his child or friend; relief and support to the distressed; and
gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he has, all he can do,
cannot sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right to any
one, of making laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain,
all this is due not only to the bare title of father; not only because, as has
been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because these obligations to
parents, and the degrees of what is required of children, may be varied by

the different care and kindness, trouble and expence, which is often
employed upon one child more than another.
Sect. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in
societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their
children, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in the
state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power were only
paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all
paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none of
it. But these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and
separate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so different
ends, that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over
his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents,
owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects
do to their’s; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of
dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over his subject.
Sect. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children,
and the obligation on children to honour their parents, contain all the power
on the one hand, and submission on the other, which are proper to this
relation, yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has
a tie on the obedience of his children; which tho’ it be common to him with
other men, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost constantly happening to
fathers in their private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare,
and less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal
jurisdiction. And this is the power men generally have to bestow their
estates on those who please them best; the possession of the father being the
expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain
proportions, according to the law and custom of each country; yet it is
commonly in the father’s power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal
hand, according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with
his will and humour.
Sect. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there
being always annexed to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the
government of the country, of which that land is a part; it has been
commonly supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that
government, of which he himself was a subject, and that his compact held
them; whereas, it being only a necessary condition annexed to the land, and

the inheritance of an estate which is under that government, reaches only
those who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie or
engagement, but a voluntary submission: for every man’s children being by
nature as free as himself, or any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst they
are in that freedom, choose what society they will join themselves to, what
commonwealth they will put themselves under. But if they will enjoy the
inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on the same terms their
ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a
possession. By this power indeed fathers oblige their children to obedience
to themselves, even when they are past minority, and most commonly too
subject them to this or that political power: but neither of these by any
peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands to
inforce and recompence such a compliance; and is no more power than
what a French man has over an English man, who by the hopes of an estate
he will leave him, will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience: and if,
when it is left him, he will enjoy it, he must certainly take it upon the
conditions annexed to the possession of land in that country where it lies,
whether it be France or England.
Sect. 74. To conclude then, tho’ the father’s power of commanding
extends no farther than the minority of his children, and to a degree only fit
for the discipline and government of that age; and tho’ that honour and
respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensably
owe to their parents all their life-time, and in all estates, with all that
support and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of governing,
i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this
he has no dominion over the property or actions of his son: yet it is obvious
to conceive how easy it was, in the first ages of the world, and in places
still, where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into
unpossessed quarters, and they have room to remove or plant themselves in
yet vacant habitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of
it;* he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children:
and since without some government it would be hard for them to live
together, it was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the
children when they were grown up, be in the father, where it seemed
without any change barely to continue; when indeed nothing more was
required to it, than the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family,
that executive power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally

hath, and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power,
whilst they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right, but
only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence, that no body
doubts, but if a stranger, whom chance or business had brought to his
family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other fact, he
might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished him, as
well as any of his children; which it was impossible he should do by virtue
of any paternal authority over one who was not his child, but by virtue of
that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right
to: and he alone could punish him in his family, where the respect of his
children had laid by the exercise of such a power, to give way to the dignity
and authority they were willing should remain in him, above the rest of his
family.
(*It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was
of, that the chief person in every houshold was always, as it were, a king: so
when numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil societies together,
kings were the first kind of governors amongst them, which is also, as it
seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued still in them, who,
of fathers, were made rulers; as also the ancient custom of governors to do
as Melchizedec, and being kings, to exercise the office of priests, which
fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this is
not the only kind of regiment that has been received in the world. The
inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be devised; so that
in a word, all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to
have risen from the deliberate advice, consultation and composition
between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no
impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that man might have lived
without any public regiment, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit, and
scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father’s authority and
government. They had been accustomed in their childhood to follow his
direction, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they were
men, who fitter to rule them? Their little properties, and less covetousness,
seldom afforded greater controversies; and when any should arise, where
could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had every one
been sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for them all? It is
no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age; nor

looked after one and twenty, or any other age that might make them the free
disposers of themselves and fortunes, when they could have no desire to be
out of their pupilage: the government they had been under, during it,
continued still to be more their protection than restraint; and they could no
where find a greater security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in
the rule of a father.
Sect. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change,
became the politic monarchs of them too: and as they chanced to live long,
and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or otherwise; so
they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under several
constitutions and manners, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions
happened to mould them. But if princes have their titles in their fathers
right, and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political
authority, because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de
facto, the exercise of government: I say, if this argument be good, it will as
strongly prove, that all princes, nay princes only, ought to be priests, since it
is as certain, that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as
that he was ruler in his own houshold.

CHAPTER. VII.

OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.
Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own
judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong
obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into
society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue
and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave
beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that
between master and servant came to be added: and though all these might,
and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the
master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each of
these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we
consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.
Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man
and woman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in
one another’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it
draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests
too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also
necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be nourished, and
maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not
barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction
betwixt male and female ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is
necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be
sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for
themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of
his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous
animals which feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts

no longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam being
sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only
begets, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose
sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction
lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and
nourish her numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious,
as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the
assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common
family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by
the joint care of male and female. The same is to be observed in all birds,
(except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from
feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in
the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their
wing, and provide for themselves.
Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the
male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other
creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is
commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before
the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able
to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents:
whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is
under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman
longer than other creatures, whose young being able to subsist of
themselves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond
dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual
anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates. Wherein one
cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator, who having given to
man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply
the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife
should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures;
that so their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united,
to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which
uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would
mightily disturb.
Sect. 81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal
bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it
would give one reason to enquire, why this compact, where procreation and

education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made
determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain
conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no
necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should
always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive
law, which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.
Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common
concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes
have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last
determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls
to the man’s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the
things of their common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and
free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the
husband no more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the
husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in
many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their
contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themselves in the state
of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live in; and the
children upon such separation fall to the father or mother’s lot, as such
contract does determine.
Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic
government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate doth not
abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz.
procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but
only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about
them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and power of life
and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the
society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those
countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the
ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of
conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state.
Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it; nay,
community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and
maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be
varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that
society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of

children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any
society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights
and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in
the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I
think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society.
Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to
those of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to
another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he undertakes to do,
in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him
into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet
it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater than
what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of
servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken
in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion
and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited
their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the
state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be
considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the
preservation of property.
Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these
subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under
the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance soever it may have
in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very
far from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a
monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in it, absolute
monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain,
by what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very
distinct and differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those
several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as
much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be
any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death
over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as
well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole
family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how
a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly

political society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political society
itself consists.
Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect
freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of
the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the
world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his
life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to
judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded
the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the
heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political
society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve
the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that
society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the
members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the
community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection
to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every
particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by
settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men
having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules,
decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that
society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which
any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the
law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not,
in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a
common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to
decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil
society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I
mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no
other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed
it, the perfect state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down
what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think
worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the
power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done
unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of
war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the
members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who

has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any
commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against
the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the
judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases,
where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the
commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of
the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his
own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And
herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil
society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be
punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to
determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances
of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both
these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one
society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to
resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society.
And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature,
enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme
government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with
any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or
which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public
good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own
assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of
nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with
authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that
may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the
legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any
number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to
appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men
is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with
civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end
of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the
state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in
his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that
society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise,

and which every one of the society ought to obey;* where-ever any persons
are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any
difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature;
and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his
dominion.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the
same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all
that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be
reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of
God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and
executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal
lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority
decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any
injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order:
so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you
please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he
is with the rest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no
standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the
determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in
the state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this
woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that
whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his
right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever
his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not
only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded
from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of,
or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and
inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the
unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with
power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such
as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing
into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some
kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto,
that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the

peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men
always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be
defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own
commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be
suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they
knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own
right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance
thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he
greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be
endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some,
whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no
reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another,
Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s blood, and
corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or
any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been
insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be
much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found
out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently
silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute
monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be
and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where
this sort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late
relation of Ceylon, may easily see.
Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of
the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any
controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the
subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary,
and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and
mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a
true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to
another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man,
who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do,
keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and
drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out
of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they
bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a

state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very
question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves
death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant,
there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and
security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such
circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right
when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on
that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of
faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered
into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the
restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of
nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to
think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs
may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it
safety, to be devoured by lions.
Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s
understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive,
that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society
which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm,
they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of
nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon
as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was
first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore,
though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the
following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having
got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his
goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule,
with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his
hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his
uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men
would persuade us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and
unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of
another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the
government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the
preservation of* property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think
themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective
bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which

means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest
men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had
established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of the
law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption,
thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.**
No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man
may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or
security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still
in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society;
unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the
same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of
anarchy as to affirm.
(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it
may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of
goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were
to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so
as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase
the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s
will, became the cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come
unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the
penalties of transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore over-
rule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)

CHAPTER. VIII.

OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL
SOCIETIES.
Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the
political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby
any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil
society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community
for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a
secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that
are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the
freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of
nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one
community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and
make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and
conclude the rest.
Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one
body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being
only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which
is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that
way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the
majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one
community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed
that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by
the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by
positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers

them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course
determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the
whole.
Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one
body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to
every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and
to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others
incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if
he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of
nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? what new
engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he
himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great
a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state
of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he
thinks fit.
Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be
received as the act of the whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but
the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the
whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we
consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of business, which in a
number, though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily
keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety
of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all
collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be only
like Cato’s coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a constitution
as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the
feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot
be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and
constitute societies only to be dissolved: for where the majority cannot
conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will
be immediately dissolved again.
Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a
community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the
ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community,
unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And
this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is

all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into,
or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually
constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of
freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into such a society.
And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any
lawful government in the world.
Sect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are no
instances to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal
one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a
government.
Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all
men being born under government, they are to submit to that, and are not at
liberty to begin a new one.
Sect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all to be
wondered, that history gives us but a very little account of men, that lived
together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that condition, and the
love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together,
but they presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue
together. And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of
nature, because we hear not much of them in such a state, we may as well
suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because
we hear little of them, till they were men, and imbodied in armies.
Government is every where antecedent to records, and letters seldom come
in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society has, by other
more necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and plenty: and then
they begin to look after the history of their founders, and search into their
original, when they have outlived the memory of it: for it is with
commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of
their own births and infancies: and if they know any thing of their original,
they are beholden for it, to the accidental records that others have kept of it.
And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world,
excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed, and
which favours not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain instances of
such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of
it.

Sect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of
fact, when it agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the
beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men
free and independent one of another, amongst whom there was no natural
superiority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta’s word may be taken, he
tells us, that in many parts of America there was no government at all.
There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men,
speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had neither kings nor
commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the
Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no
certain kings, but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they choose their
captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25.
If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the
head of his family; that the subjection due from a child to a father took not
away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit, has
been already proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were
actually free; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in
any of them, they themselves claimed it not, but by consent were all equal,
till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. So that their politic
societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of
men freely acting in the choice of their governors, and forms of
government.
Sect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus,
mentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been freemen
independent one of another, and to have set up a government over
themselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples, out
of history, of people free and in the state of nature, that being met together
incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if the want of such instances
be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not be so
begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone,
than urge it against natural liberty: for if they can give so many instances,
out of history, of governments begun upon paternal right, I think (though at
best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no
great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. But
if I might advise them in the case, they would do well not to search too
much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto, lest

they should find, at the foundation of most of them, something very little
favourable to the design they promote, and such a power as they contend
for.
Sect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are
naturally free, and the examples of history shewing, that the governments of
the world, that were begun in peace, had their beginning laid on that
foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little
room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or
practice of mankind, about the first erecting of governments.
Sect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will direct
us, towards the original of commonwealths, we shall generally find them
under the government and administration of one man. And I am also apt to
believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and
continued entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens,
where there is much land, and few people, the government commonly
began in the father: for the father having, by the law of nature, the same
power with every man else to punish, as he thought fit, any offences against
that law, might thereby punish his transgressing children, even when they
were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were very likely to submit to
his punishment, and all join with him against the offender, in their turns,
giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression,
and so in effect make him the law-maker, and governor over all that
remained in conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted;
paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the
custom of obeying him, in their childhood, made it easier to submit to him,
rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one to rule them, as
government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together; who so
likely to be the man as he that was their common father; unless negligence,
cruelty, or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it? But
when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of age, wisdom,
courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or where several families
met, and consented to continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but
they used their natural freedom, to set up him, whom they judged the ablest,
and most likely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the
people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords,
and spreading domination of the two great empires of Peru and Mexico)
enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus, they

commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any
way weak, or uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and
bravest man for their ruler.
Sect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any
account of peopling the world, and the history of nations, we commonly
find the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that which I
affirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of
the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus
incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit. But
this having given occasion to men to mistake, and think, that by nature
government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not be
amiss here to consider, why people in the beginning generally pitched upon
this form, which though perhaps the father’s pre-eminency might, in the
first institution of some commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the
beginning, the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that
continued the form of government in a single person, was not any regard, or
respect to paternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost all
monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon
occasion, elective.
Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father’s government
of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to the
rule of one man, and taught them that where it was exercised with care and
skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure
and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It
was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and naturally run into that form
of government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to;
and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if
we add, that monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom
neither experience had instructed in forms of government, nor the ambition
or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of
prerogative, or the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in
succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all
strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods
of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the
authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing
several parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt the oppression of
tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their possessions, or

way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition)
give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it is
no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government, as was not
only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their present
state and condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign
invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple
poor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each
man’s small property, made few controversies, and so no need of many laws
to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the process, or look
after the execution of justice, where there were but few trespasses, and few
offenders. Since then those, who like one another so well as to join into
society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship
together, and some trust one in another; they could not but have greater
apprehensions of others, than of one another: and therefore their first care
and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves against
foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of
government which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and
bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their
enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.
Sect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is
still a pattern of the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants
were too few for the country, and want of people and money gave men no
temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent
of ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they
command absolutely in war, yet at home and in time of peace they exercise
very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty, the
resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a
council. Tho’ the war itself, which admits not of plurality of governors,
naturally devolves the command into the king’s sole authority.
Sect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges, and
first kings, seems to have been to be captains in war, and leaders of their
armies; which (besides what is signified by going out and in before the
people, which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of
their forces) appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites making
war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear send to Jephtha, a bastard of their
family whom they had cast off, and article with him, if he will assist them
against the Ammonites, to make him their ruler; which they do in these

words, And the people made him head and captain over them, Judg. xi, 11.
which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge. And he judged Israel, judg.
xii. 7. that is, was their captain-general six years. So when Jotham upbraids
the Shechemites with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their
judge and ruler, he tells them, He fought for you, and adventured his life far,
and delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix. 17. Nothing
mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is
found in his history, or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech
particularly is called king, though at most he was but their general. And
when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel’s sons, the children of Israel
desired a king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go out before them,
and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii. 20. God granting their desire, says to
Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over
my people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the
Philistines, ix. 16. As if the only business of a king had been to lead out
their armies, and fight in their defence; and accordingly at his inauguration
pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that the Lord had anointed
him to be captain over his inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after
Saul’s being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were
unwilling to have him their king, made no other objection but this, How
shall this man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is unfit to
be our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to
defend us. And when God resolved to transfer the government to David, it
is in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not continue: the Lord hath
sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to
be captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority were
nothing else but to be their general: and therefore the tribes who had stuck
to Saul’s family, and opposed David’s reign, when they came to Hebron
with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other arguments
they had to submit to him as to their king, that he was in effect their king in
Saul’s time, and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their
king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul was king over us, thou
wast he that reddest out and broughtest in Israel, and the Lord said unto
thee, Thou shalt feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a captain over
Israel.
Sect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a
commonwealth, and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder

son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it, and
the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced,
till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by
prescription: or whether several families, or the descendants of several
families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business brought together,
uniting into society, the need of a general, whose conduct might defend
them against their enemies in war, and the great confidence the innocence
and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such as are almost all those
which begin governments, that ever come to last in the world) gave men
one of another, made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put
the rule into one man’s hand, without any other express limitation or
restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government
required: which ever of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands
of a single person, certain it is no body was intrusted with it but for the
public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infancies of
commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. And unless they had
done so, young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing
fathers tender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have
sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and
the people had soon perished together.
Sect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor
sceleratus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men’s minds into a
mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue, and consequently better
governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching
prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the
other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the
magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or
government: yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages* would retain
and increase the power, without doing the business for which it was given;
and aided by flattery, taught princes to have distinct and separate interests
from their people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the
original and rights of government; and to find out ways to restrain the
exorbitances, and prevent the abuses of that power, which they having
intrusted in another’s hands only for their own good, they found was made
use of to hurt them.
(*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it
may be nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing,

but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were to rule, till
by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing
which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore
which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will,
became the cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto
laws wherein all men might see their duty before hand, and know the
penalties of transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were
naturally free, and by their own consent either submitted to the government
of their father, or united together out of different families to make a
government, should generally put the rule into one man’s hands, and chuse
to be under the conduct of a single person, without so much as by express
conditions limiting or regulating his power, which they thought safe enough
in his honesty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy being
lure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed
to us by the divinity of this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to
have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all government. And
thus much may suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from
history, we have reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of
government have been laid in the consent of the people. I say peaceful,
because I shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which
some esteem a way of beginning of governments.
The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the
way I have mentioned, is this, viz.
Sect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it is
impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together,
and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government.
If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies
into the world? for if any body, upon this supposition, can shew me any one
man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be
bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite
and begin a new government under a regal, or any other form; it being
demonstration, that if any one, born under the dominion of another, may be
so free as to have a right to command others in a new and distinct empire,
every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too,
and may become a ruler, or subject, of a distinct separate government. And

so by this their own principle, either all men, however born, are free, or else
there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. And
then they have nothing to do, but barely to shew us which that is; which
when they have done, I doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay
obedience to him.
Sect. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that
it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against;
yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little
farther. All men, say they, are born under government, and therefore they
cannot be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his
father, or his prince, and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection
and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such
natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied
them, without their own consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.
Sect. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred
and profane, as those of men withdrawing themselves, and their obedience,
from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family or community
they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other places; from
whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of
ages, and which always multiplied, as long as there was room enough, till
the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those great ones
again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser dominions. All which are so
many testimonies against paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it
was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs, that made
governments in the beginning, since it was impossible, upon that ground,
there should have been so many little kingdoms; all must have been but
only one universal monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to separate
themselves from their families, and the government, be it what it will, that
was set up in it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other
governments, as they thought fit.
Sect. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning
to this day; nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind,
that they are born under constituted and ancient polities, that have
established laws, and set forms of government, than if they were born in the
woods, amongst the unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for
those, who would persuade us, that by being born under any government,

we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more any title or pretence to the
freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason (bating that of paternal
power, which we have already answered) to produce for it, but only,
because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty, and
thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to
the government, which they themselves submitted to. It is true, that
whatever engagements or promises any one has made for himself, he is
under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever, bind
his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free
as the father, any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the
son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed annex such conditions to
the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his
son to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were
his father’s; because that estate being his father’s property, he may dispose,
or settle it, as he pleases.
Sect. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this
matter; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions
to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community,
the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under the
same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby
he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established,
as much as any other subject of that commonwealth. And thus the consent
of freemen, born under government, which only makes them members of it,
being given separately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in
a multitude together; people take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at
all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.
Sect. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it
otherwise; they claim no power over the son, because of that they had over
the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their fathers
being so. If a subject of England have a child, by an English woman in
France, whose subject is he? Not the king of England’s; for he must have
leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king of France’s; for how
then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases?
and who ever was judged as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred
against a country, for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens
there? It is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as
by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or

government. He is under his father’s tuition and authority, till he comes to
age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he
will put himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an
Englishman’s son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident
there is no tie upon him by his father’s being a subject of this kingdom; nor
is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And why then hath not his
son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where
else? Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children, is the
same, where-ever they be born, and the ties of natural obligations, are not
bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.
Sect. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and
nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power, but only
his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be understood to be a
sufficient declaration of a man’s consent, to make him subject to the laws of
any government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit
consent, which will concern our present case. No body doubts but an
express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a perfect
member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what
ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far
any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any
government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say,
that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the
dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as
far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such
enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to
him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be
barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the
very being of any one within the territories of that government.
Sect. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every
man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by
his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the community,
those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong
to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one
to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property;
and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of
the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to
which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act

therefore, whereby any one unites his person, which was before free, to any
commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which were before
free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and possession,
subject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as
it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance,
purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed
to, and under the government of that commonwealth, must take it with the
condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of the
commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject of
it.
Sect. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over
the land, and reaches the possessor of it, (before he has actually
incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that;
the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to
the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the
owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government,
will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty
to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth; or to agree
with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world,
they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual
agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any
commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain
unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state
of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to
be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer
a member of it.
Sect. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and
enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member
of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from
all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories
belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws
extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that society, a
perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man a
subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some
time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the
laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we see, that
foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying

the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in
conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet
do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth.
Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive
engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think,
concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which
makes any one a member of any commonwealth.

CHAPTER. IX.

OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND
GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he
be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest,
and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give
up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any
other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of
nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as
he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity
and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,
very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however
free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that
he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already
united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives,
liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many
things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the
common measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the
law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men
being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it,
are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to
their particular cases.

Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to
the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and
executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion
and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in
their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them
too remiss in other men’s.
Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back
and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution, They who
by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to
make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the
punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of
nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly
driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number
of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are
therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power
every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take
sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the
preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up
every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as
shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community,
or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we
have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power,
as well as of the governments and societies themselves.
Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent
delights, a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself,
and others within the permission of the law of nature: by which law,
common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community,
make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for
the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need
of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and
natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and
divided associations.

The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish
the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he
joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and
incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the
preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated
by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and
the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many
things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and
engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution
of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist
the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for
being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from
the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well
as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his
natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety
of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the
other members of the society do the like.
Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the
equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into
the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the
good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every
one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational
creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be
worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can
never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged
to secure every one’s property, by providing against those three defects
above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And
so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is
bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to
the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright
judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the
force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or
abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community

from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but
the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

CHAPTER. X.

OF THE FORMS OF A COMMON-WEALTH.
Sect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men’s first
uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them,
may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to
time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then
the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the
power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or
successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man,
and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary
monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of
nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And so
accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed
forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at
first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or
any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when
it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what
hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the
form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which
is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power
should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according
as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the
commonwealth.
Sect. 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all along to mean,
not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent
community, which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the
word which best answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most
properly expresses such a society of men, which community or city in
English does not; for there may be subordinate communities in a

government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from
commonwealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the
word commonwealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James the
first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I
consent with him to change it for a better.

CHAPTER. XI.

OF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER.
Sect. 134. THE great end of men’s entering into society, being the
enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument
and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and
fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the
legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to
govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as
far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This
legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred
and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor
can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what
power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not
its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed:
for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary
to its being a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body can have
a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received
from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties
any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power,
and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any
foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge
any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting
pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws
so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one
can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the
supreme.

(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies
of men, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any
prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of
himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally
received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their
consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere
tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not
made so. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.
Of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no
full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men,
therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man’s
commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that
society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without
revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Laws therefore
human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)
Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more,
whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme
power in every commonwealth; yet:
First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and
fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of
the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can
be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered
into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to
another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute
arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or
take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot
subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of
nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but
only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself,
and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the
commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can
have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to
the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but
preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or
designedly to impoverish the subjects.* The obligations of the law of nature
cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by

human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation.
Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as
well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions, must, as
well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of
nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the
fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human
sanction can be good, or valid against it.
(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a
natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the
other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of
their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a
common-weal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law
animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common
good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment
amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the
will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all
obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man
to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do
accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that
they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are
instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i.
sect. 10.)
Sect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume
to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to
dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated
standing laws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of nature being
unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who
through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be
convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it
serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of
those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and
executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right on his
side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to
defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these
inconveniences, which disorder men’s propperties in the state of nature,
men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole
society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules

to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that
men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and
the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit,
with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their
peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in
the state of nature.
(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must
direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be
measured by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of nature; so
that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature, and
without contradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill
made. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9.
To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable.
Ibid. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled
standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and
government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature
for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties
and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace
and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power
so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their
persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute his
unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a
worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to
defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms
of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in
combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the
absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed
themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he
being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of
one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the
arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will,
who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force
be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the
commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and
received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined

resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the
state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint
power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and
unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that
moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may
guide and justify their actions: for all the power the government has, being
only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at
pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws;
that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the
limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be
tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such
purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own
not willingly.
Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any
part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of
property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into
society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have
property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into
society, which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an
absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property,
they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are
their’s, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it
from them, without their own consent: without this they have no property at
all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take
from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to
think, that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth, can do
what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any
part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments
where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are
variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects
under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in
governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in
being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that
they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the
community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by
taking what they think fit from the people: for a man’s property is not at all
secure, tho’ there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between

him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power
to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use
and dispose of it as he thinks good.
Sect. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I
have before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men
might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it
may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the
subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to
themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, without their
own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all.
And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not
arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason, and confined
to those ends, which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look
no farther than the common practice of martial discipline: for the
preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an
absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly
death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them;
but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to
march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost
sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his
money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his
post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his
absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s
estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing,
and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is
necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the
preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do
with it.
Sect. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great
charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should
pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it
must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it
either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one
shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own
authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the
fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what

property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleases,
to himself?
Sect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making
laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people,
they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint
the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and
appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We
will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in
such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor
can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those
whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power
of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary
grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the
legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and
place it in other hands.
Sect. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the
society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of
every commonwealth, in all forms of government.
First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be
varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the
favourite at court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end
ultimately, but the good of the people.
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without
the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this
properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in
being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the
legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of
making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people
have.

CHAPTER. XII.

OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND
FEDERATIVE POWER OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH.
Sect. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how
the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the
community and the members of it. But because those laws which are
constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be
made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should
be always in being, not having always business to do. And because it may
be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the
same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their
hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves
from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making,
and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of
society and government: therefore in wellordered commonwealths, where
the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is
put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by
themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they
have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws
they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that
they make them for the public good.
Sect. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time
made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or
an attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power
always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are

made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power
come often to be separated.
Sect. 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one
may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man
naturally had before he entered into society: for though in a commonwealth
the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and
as such as governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of
mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was,
still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the
controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that
are out of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of
their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this
consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in
respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
Sect. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues
and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities
without the commonwealth, and may be called federative, if any one
pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
Sect. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be
really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the
municipal laws of the society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the
other the management of the security and interest of the public without,
with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are
always almost united. And though this federative power in the well or ill
management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much
less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the
executive; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of
those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the laws
that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions,
may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to
foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs
and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have
this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for
the advantage of the commonwealth.
Sect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every
community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be

separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons: for
both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not
subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be
placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public
would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or
other to cause disorder and ruin.

CHAPTER. XIII.

OF THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POWERS OF
THE COMMON-WEALTH.
Sect. 149. THOUGH in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its
own basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the
preservation of the community, there can be but one supreme power, which
is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the
legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there
remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in
them: for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited
by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust
must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those
that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their
safety and security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme
power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body,
even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as
to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the
subject: for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their
preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and
arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring
them into such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to
preserve, what they have not a power to part with; and to rid themselves of
those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-
preservation, for which they entered into society. And thus the community
may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not as
considered under any form of government, because this power of the people
can never take place till the government be dissolved.

Sect. 150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is
the supreme power: for what can give laws to another, must needs be
superior to him; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the
society, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every
member of the society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power
of execution, where they are transgressed, the legislative must needs be the
supreme, and all other powers, in any members or parts of the society,
derived from and subordinate to it.
Sect. 151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in
being, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in
the legislative; there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be
called supreme: not that he has in himself all the supreme power, which is
that of law-making; but because he has in him the supreme execution, from
whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers, or
at least the greatest part of them: having also no legislative superior to him,
there being no law to be made without his consent, which cannot be
expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative, he is
properly enough in this sense supreme. But yet it is to be observed, that tho’
oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme
legislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him
with others; allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law,
which when he violates, he has no right to obedience, nor can claim it
otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law, and so
is to be considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the
commonwealth, acted by the will of the society, declared in its laws; and
thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits this
representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he
degrades himself, and is but a single private person without power, and
without will, that has any right to obedience; the members owing no
obedience but to the public will of the society.
Sect. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that
has also a share in the legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to
it, and may be at pleasure changed and displaced; so that it is not the
supreme executive power, that is exempt from subordination, but the
supreme executive power vested in one, who having a share in the
legislative, has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and
accountable to, farther than he himself shall join and consent; so that he is

no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit, which one may
certainly conclude will be but very little. Of other ministerial and
subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not speak, they being so
multiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs and constitutions of
distinct commonwealths, that it is impossible to give a particular account of
them all. Only thus much, which is necessary to our present purpose, we
may take notice of concerning them, that they have no manner of authority,
any of them, beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to
them, and are all of them accountable to some other power in the
commonwealth.
Sect. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that the
legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the
executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to be
made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the
legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands,
they have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when they find
cause, and to punish for any maladministration against the laws. The same
holds also in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being
both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been
shewed, in a constituted commonwealth is the supreme. The legislative also
in this case being supposed to consist of several persons, (for if it be a
single person, it cannot but be always in being, and so will, as supreme,
naturally have the supreme executive power, together with the legislative)
may assemble, and exercise their legislature, at the times that either their
original constitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they
please; if neither of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way
prescribed to convoke them: for the supreme power being placed in them by
the people, it is always in them, and they may exercise it when they please,
unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or
by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and
when that time comes, they have a right to assemble and act again.
Sect. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of
representatives chosen for that time by the people, which afterwards return
into the ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in the legislature but
upon a new choice, this power of chusing must also be exercised by the
people, either at certain appointed seasons, or else when they are summoned
to it; and in this latter case the power of convoking the legislative is

ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one of these two limitations in
respect of time: that either the original constitution requires their
assembling and acting at certain intervals, and then the executive power
does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing and
assembling, according to due forms; or else it is left to his prudence to call
them by new elections, when the occasions or exigencies of the public
require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, or the redress or
prevention of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people.
Sect. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being
possessed of the force of the commonwealth, shall make use of that force to
hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the original
constitution, or the public exigencies require it? I say, using force upon the
people without authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that does so, is
a state of war with the people, who have a right to reinstate their legislative
in the exercise of their power: for having erected a legislative, with an
intent they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set
times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from
what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation
of the people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all
states and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to
oppose force to it. The use of force without authority, always puts him that
uses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him liable to be
treated accordingly.
Sect. 156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed
in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is a
fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in a case where
the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady
fixed rule: for it not being possible, that the first framers of the government
should, by any foresight, be so much masters of future events, as to be able
to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the
legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the exigencies
of the commonwealth; the best remedy could be found for this defect, was
to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present, and
whose business it was to watch over the public good. Constant frequent
meetings of the legislative, and long continuations of their assemblies,
without necessary occasion, could not but be burdensome to the people, and
must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet

the quick turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present
help: any delay of their convening might endanger the public; and
sometimes too their business might be so great, that the limited time of their
sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the public of that benefit
which could be had only from their mature deliberation. What then could be
done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed some time
or other to eminent hazard, on one side or the other, by fixed intervals and
periods, set to the meeting and acting of the legislative, but to intrust it to
the prudence of some, who being present, and acquainted with the state of
public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for the public good? and
where else could this be so well placed as in his hands, who was intrusted
with the execution of the laws for the same end? Thus supposing the
regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative, not
settled by the original constitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the
executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure, but
with this trust always to have it exercised only for the public weal, as the
occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whether settled
periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the
legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the least inconvenience
attending it, it is not my business here to inquire, but only to shew, that
though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and
dissolving such conventions of the legislative, yet it is not thereby superior
to it.
Sect. 157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing
remains long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change
their stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in times
neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into
populous countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not
always changing equally, and private interest often keeping up customs and
privileges, when the reasons of them are ceased, it often comes to pass, that
in governments, where part of the legislative consists of representatives
chosen by the people, that in tract of time this representation becomes very
unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon.
To what gross absurdities the following of custom, when reason has left it,
may lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of
which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much
housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found,

sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers, as a
whole county numerous in people, and powerful in riches. This strangers
stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy; tho’ most
think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the legislative being the
original and supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws in it,
and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it. And
therefore the people, when the legislative is once constituted, having, in
such a government as we have been speaking of, no power to act as long as
the government stands; this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy.
Sect. 158. Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental
a rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err. If therefore
the executive, who has the power of convoking the legislative, observing
rather the true proportion, than fashion of representation, regulates, not by
old custom, but true reason, the number of members, in all places that have
a right to be distinctly represented, which no part of the people however
incorporated can pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance which it
affords to the public, it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative,
but to have restored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders
which succession of time had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced:
For it being the interest as well as intention of the people, to have a fair and
equal representative; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted
friend to, and establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent
and approbation of the community; prerogative being nothing but a power,
in the hands of the prince, to provide for the public good, in such cases,
which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and
unalterable laws could not safely direct; whatsoever shall be done
manifestly for the good of the people, and the establishing the government
upon its true foundations, is, and always will be, just prerogative, The
power of erecting new corporations, and therewith new representatives,
carries with it a supposition, that in time the measures of representation
might vary, and those places have a just right to be represented which
before had none; and by the same reason, those cease to have a right, and be
too inconsiderable for such a privilege, which before had it. ’Tis not a
change from the present state, which perhaps corruption or decay has
introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the tendency of
it to injure or oppress the people, and to set up one part or party, with a
distinction from, and an unequal subjection of the rest. Whatsoever cannot

but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society, and people in
general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when done, justify
itself; and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just
and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original frame of the
government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society,
whoever permitted or caused them so to do.

CHAPTER. XIV.

OF PREROGATIVE.
Sect. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct
hands, (as they are in all moderated monarchies, and well-framed
governments) there the good of the society requires, that several things
should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power: for the
legislators not being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may
be useful to the community, the executor of the laws having the power in
his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for the
good of the society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no
direction, till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it.
Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and
those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive
power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage
shall require: nay, it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases
give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature
and government, viz. That as much as may be, all the members of the
society are to be preserved: for since many accidents may happen, wherein
a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm; (as not to pull down
an innocent man’s house to stop the fire, when the next to it is burning) and
a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law, which makes no
distinction of persons, by an action that may deserve reward and pardon;
’tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, to mitigate the severity
of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end of government being the
preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared,
where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent.
Sect. 160. This power to act according to discretion, for the public good,
without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that
which is called prerogative: for since in some governments the lawmaking

power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow,
for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to
foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may
concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are
executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons
that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive
power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.
Sect. 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community,
and suitably to the trust and ends of the government, is undoubted
prerogative, and never is questioned: for the people are very seldom or
never scrupulous or nice in the point; they are far from examining
prerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was
meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not manifestly against it: but
if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people,
about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such
prerogative to the good or hurt of the people, will easily decide that
question.
Sect. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when
commonwealths differed little from families in number of people, they
differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the governors,
being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the
government was almost all prerogative. A few established laws served the
turn, and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied the rest. But when
mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of this power
for private ends of their own, and not for the public good, the people were
fain by express laws to get prerogative determined in those points wherein
they found disadvantage from it: and thus declared limitations of
prerogative were by the people found necessary in cases which they and
their ancestors had left, in the utmost latitude, to the wisdom of those
princes who made no other but a right use of it, that is, for the good of their
people.
Sect. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government,
who say, that the people have encroached upon the prerogative, when they
have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws: for in so doing they
have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but
only declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his

ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a thing which they
intended him when he used it otherwise: for the end of government being
the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to
that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any body, since no body in
government can have a right tending to any other end: and those only are
encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good. Those who say
otherwise, speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the
good of the community, and was not made for it; the root and source from
which spring almost all those evils and disorders which happen in kingly
governments. And indeed, if that be so, the people under his government are
not a society of rational creatures, entered into a community for their
mutual good; they are not such as have set rulers over themselves, to guard,
and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior
creatures under the dominion of a master, who keeps them and works them
for his own pleasure or profit. If men were so void of reason, and brutish, as
to enter into society upon such terms, prerogative might indeed be, what
some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the
people.
Sect. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to
put himself into subjection to another, for his own harm; (though, where he
finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either necessary or
useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be
nothing but the people’s permitting their rulers to do several things, of their
own free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against the
direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in it when
so done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands,
and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative,
that is, power to do good; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that
power which his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law, as
a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may exercise
at his pleasure, to make or promote an interest distinct from that of the
public, gives the people an occasion to claim their right, and limit that
power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they were content
should be tacitly allowed.
Sect. 165. And therefore he that will look into the history of England,
will find, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and
best princes; because the people, observing the whole tendency of their

actions to be the public good, contested not what was done without law to
that end: or, if any human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men, made
as others) appeared in some small declinations from that end; yet ’twas
visible, the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the
public. The people therefore, finding reason to be satisfied with these
princes, whenever they acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law,
acquiesced in what they did, and, without the least complaint, let them
inlarge their prerogative as they pleased, judging rightly, that they did
nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws, since they acted conformable
to the foundation and end of all laws, the public good.
Sect. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power
by that argument, that would prove absolute monarchy the best government,
as that which God himself governs the universe by; because such kings
partake of his wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that saying, That
the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties
of their people: for when their successors, managing the government with
different thoughts, would draw the actions of those good rulers into
precedent, and make them the standard of their prerogative, as if what had
been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do, for the
harm of the people, if they so pleased; it has often occasioned contest, and
sometimes public disorders, before the people could recover their original
right, and get that to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was
never so; since it is impossible that any body in the society should ever
have a right to do the people harm; though it be very possible, and
reasonable, that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the
prerogative of those kings, or rulers, who themselves transgressed not the
bounds of the public good: for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing
public good without a rule.
Sect. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise
time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but still with
this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation, as the
exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall require: for it being
impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to
assemble in, and what the best season; the choice of these was left with the
executive power, as might be most subservient to the public good, and best
suit the ends of parliaments.

Sect. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative,
But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of one answer:
between an executive power in being, with such a prerogative, and a
legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no
judge on earth; as there can be none between the legislative and the people,
should either the executive, or the legislative, when they have got the power
in their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them. The people
have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge
on earth, but to appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising
a power the people never put into their hands, (who can never be supposed
to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm) do that
which they have not a right to do. And where the body of the people, or any
single man, is deprived of their right, or is under the exercise of a power
without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to
appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment. And
therefore, though the people cannot be judge, so as to have, by the
constitution of that society, any superior power, to determine and give
effective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a law antecedent and
paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination
to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on
earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to make their appeal to
heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a man’s
power so to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy
him; God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself, as to
neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life,
neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this lays
a perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates not, till the
inconveniency is so great, that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and
find a necessity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wise
princes, never need come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others,
they have most need to avoid, as of all others the most perilous.

CHAPTER. XV.

OF PATERNAL, POLITICAL, AND DESPOTICAL
POWER, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.
Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately
before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having, as I
suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, it
may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together.
Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that
which parents have over their children, to govern them for the children’s
good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, wherein
they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law
of nature, or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern
themselves by: capable, I say, to know it, as well as several others, who live
as freemen under that law. The affection and tenderness which God hath
planted in the breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that
this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the
help, instruction, and preservation of their offspring. But happen it as it will,
there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to extend to
life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body
else; neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep
the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to the will of his parents, any
farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges
him to respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both
father and mother. And thus, ’tis true, the paternal is a natural government,
but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is
political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the
child, which is only in his own disposing.

Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man
having in the state of nature, has given up into the hands of the society, and
therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over itself, with this
express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the
preservation of their property: now this power, which every man has in the
state of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases
where the society can secure him, is to use such means, for the preserving
of his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to
punish the breach of the law of nature in others, so as (according to the best
of his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the rest
of mankind. So that the end and measure of this power, when in every
man’s hands in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his
society, that is, all mankind in general, it can have no other end or measure,
when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that
society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an
absolute, arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which are as much
as possible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and annex such
penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting
off those parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the
sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful. And this power has
its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of
those who make up the community.
Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one
man has over another, to take away his life, whenever he pleases. This is a
power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no such distinction
between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man not having
such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such a
power over it; but it is the effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor
makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state of war with
another: for having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule
betwixt man and man, and the common bond whereby human kind is united
into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the way of peace
which that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust
ends upon another, where he has no right; and so revolting from his own
kind to that of beasts, by making force, which is their’s, to be his rule of
right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and
the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as

any other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom mankind can have
neither society nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful
war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not
from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war
continued: for what compact can be made with a man that is not master of
his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once allowed to
be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master
ceases. He that is master of himself, and his own life, has a right too to the
means of preserving it; so that as soon as compact enters, slavery ceases,
and he so far quits his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of war,
who enters into conditions with his captive.
(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that is
destructive to their being.)
Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents
for the benefit of their children during their minority, to supply their want of
ability, and understanding how to manage their property. (By property I
must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which
men have in their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the
second, viz. political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects, to
secure them in the possession and use of their properties. And forfeiture
gives the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those
who are stripped of all property.
Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the
different ends of these several powers, will plainly see, that paternal power
comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical exceeds it; and
that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of
civil society, that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property.
Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage
his property; political, where men have property in their own disposal; and
despotical, over such as have no property at all.

CHAPTER. XVI.

OF CONQUEST.
Sect. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than
that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent
of the people; yet such have been the disorders ambition has filled the world
with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of
mankind, this consent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have
mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon
conquest as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from
setting up any government, as demolishing an house is from building a new
one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a
commonwealth, by destroying the former; but, without the consent of the
people, can never erect a new one.
Sect. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with
another, and unjustly invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjust
war, never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed by
all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire
over whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that men are bound
by promises, which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber
break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to
convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by
his sword, has an unjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. The
injury and the crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a crown,
or some petty villain. The title of the offender, and the number of his
followers, make no difference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it.
The only difference is, great robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their
obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs,
because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world, and
have the power in their own possession, which should punish offenders.

What is my remedy against a robber, that so broke into my house? Appeal
to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and
cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away
all means of seeking remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my son,
when able, may seek the relief of the law, which I am denied: he or his son
may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their
children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may
appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have
recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, to have such a
legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freely acquiesce
in. If it be objected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, no more
than justice does, where she lies open to all that appeal to her. He that
troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the justice of
the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has
right on his side; and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the
appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived, and will be
sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to
his fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain,
that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the
subjection and obedience of the conquered.
Sect. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a
conqueror in a lawful war, and see what power he gets, and over whom.
First, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that
conquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the
conquest, but must at least be as much freemen as they were before. And
most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their
leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil, and other advantages that attend the
conquering sword; or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed
upon them. And the conquering people are not, I hope, to be slaves by
conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew they are sacrifices to their
leaders triumph. They that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the
sword, make their heroes, who are the founders of such monarchies, arrant
Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on
their side in the battles they won, or assisted them in the subduing, or
shared in possessing, the countries they mastered. We are told by some, that
the English monarchy is founded in the Norman conquest, and that our
princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as

by the history it appears otherwise) and that William had a right to make
war on this island; yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than
to the Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The
Normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended
from them, are freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let that give what
dominion it will. And if I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as derived
from them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law,
that has made no distinction between the one and the other, intends not
there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges.
Sect. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and
conquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and
freedom; let us see next what power a lawful conqueror has over the
subdued: and that I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power over
the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over
the lives or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war, nor over the
possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it.
Sect. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over
those who have actually assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust
force that is used against him: for the people having given to their
governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war,
(for they never had such a power in themselves) they ought not to be
charged as guilty of the violence and unjustice that is committed in an
unjust war, any farther than they actually abet it; no more than they are to
be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use
upon the people themselves, or any part of their fellow subjects, they
having empowered them no more to the one than to the other. Conquerors,
it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they
willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together: but yet this
alters not the right; for the conquerors power over the lives of the
conquered, being only because they have used force to do, or maintain an
injustice, he can have that power only over those who have concurred in
that force; all the rest are innocent; and he has no more title over the people
of that country, who have done him no injury, and so have made no
forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without any
injuries or provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.

Sect. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes
in a just war, is perfectly despotical: he has an absolute power over the lives
of those, who, by putting themselves in a state of war, have forfeited them;
but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not,
but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to
the practice of the world; there being nothing more familiar in speaking of
the dominion of countries, than to say such an one conquered it; as if
conquest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when
we consider, that the practice of the strong and powerful, how universal
soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however it be one part of the
subjection of the conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to
them by the conquering sword.
Sect. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force and
damage, and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when he uses
force against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet it is the use of
force only that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by force he
begins the injury, or else having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he
refuses to make reparation, and by force maintains it, (which is the same
thing, as at first to have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force that
makes the war: for he that breaks open my house, and violently turns me
out of doors; or having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in
effect the same thing; supposing we are in such a state, that we have no
common judge on earth, whom I may appeal to, and to whom we are both
obliged to submit: for of such I am now speaking. It is the unjust use of
force then, that puts a man into the state of war with another; and thereby he
that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life: for quitting reason, which is
the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he
becomes liable to be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage
ravenous beast, that is dangerous to his being.
Sect. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the
children, and they may be rational and peaceable, notwithstanding the
brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his miscarriages and
violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his
guilt or destruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preservation
of all mankind as much as is possible, hath made to belong to the children
to keep them from perishing, do still continue to belong to his children: for
supposing them not to have joined in the war, either thro’ infancy, absence,

or choice, they have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any
right to take them away, by the bare title of having subdued him that by
force attempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to
them, to repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of
his own right; which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered,
we shall see by and by. So that he that by conquest has a right over a man’s
person to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to
possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, that
gives his adversary a right to take away his life, and destroy him if he
pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that alone gives
him title to another man’s goods: for though I may kill a thief that sets on
me in the highway, yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money,
and let him go: this would be robbery on my side. His force, and the state of
war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his
goods. The right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who
joined in the war, not to their estates, but only in order to make reparation
for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and that too with
reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.
Sect. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could be
supposed, he has no right to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit:
his life is at the victor’s mercy; and his service and goods he may
appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his
wife and children; they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their
shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I in the state of nature (and
all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injured
another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war,
wherein my defending by force what I had gotten unjustly, makes me the
aggressor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at mercy, but not
my wife’s and children’s. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could
not forfeit their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in
my estate; that neither could I forfeit. And my children also, being born of
me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance. Here then is
the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and
the children have a title to their father’s estate for their subsistence: for as to
the wife’s share, whether her own labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it
is plain, her husband could not forfeit what was her’s. What must be done in
the case? I answer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as

may be, should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to
satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror’s losses, and children’s maintenance, he
that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction, and
give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to
perish without it.
Sect. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be
made up to the conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that the children of
the vanquished, spoiled of all their father’s goods, are to be left to starve
and perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the
conqueror, will scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for
the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract
of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is possessed, and none
lies waste. And if I have not taken away the conqueror’s land, which, being
vanquished, it is impossible I should; scarce any other spoil I have done
him can amount to the value of mine, supposing it equally cultivated, and of
an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his. The destruction
of a year’s product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost
spoil that usually can be done: for as to money, and such riches and treasure
taken away, these are none of nature’s goods, they have but a fantastical
imaginary value: nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more
account by her standard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an
European prince, or the silver money of Europe would have been formerly
to an American. And five years product is not worth the perpetual
inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be
taken up by him that is disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but
take away the imaginary value of money, the disproportion being more than
between five and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a year’s
product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being more land
than the inhabitants possess and make use of, any one has liberty to make
use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care to possess themselves
of the lands of the vanquished, No damage therefore, that men in the state
of nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to one another)
suffer from one another, can give a conqueror power to dispossess the
posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance, which
ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations.
The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very
condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right. But if that be

all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the
weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to
whatever he pleases to seize on.
Sect. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those
of the subdued country that opposed him not, and the posterity even of
those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath, by his conquest, no
right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their
former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect
another to themselves.
Sect. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over
them, compels them, with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his
conditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them;
but the enquiry is, what right he has to do so? If it be said, they submit by
their own consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary to
give the conqueror a title to rule over them. It remains only to be
considered, whether promises extorted by force, without right, can be
thought consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall say, they bind not
at all; because whatsoever another gets from me by force, I still retain the
right of, and he is obliged presently to restore. He that forces my horse from
me, ought presently to restore him, and I have still a right to retake him. By
the same reason, he that forced a promise from me, ought presently to
restore it, i.e. quit me of the obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e.
chuse whether I will perform it: for the law of nature laying an obligation
on me only by the rules she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of
her rules: such is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at all
alter the case to say, I gave my promise, no more than it excuses the force,
and passes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my
purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol at my breast.
Sect. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror,
imposed by force on the subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or
who joined not in the war against him, where he had right, has no obligation
upon them.
Sect. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being
all members of the same body politic, may be taken to have joined in that
unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at the mercy of
the conqueror.

Sect. 189. I say this concerns not their children who are in their minority:
for since a father hath not, in himself, a power over the life or liberty of his
child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that the children, whatever
may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute power of
the conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were
subdued by him, and dies with them: and should he govern them as slaves,
subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such right of dominion
over their children. He can have no power over them but by their own
consent, whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull
authority, whilst force, and not choice, compels them to submission.
Sect. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom
to his person, which no other man has a power over, but the free disposal of
it lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other man, to inherit with his
brethren his father’s goods.
Sect. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection to
any government, tho’ he be born in a place under its jurisdiction; but if he
disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born in, he must also
quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessions
there descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made
by their consent.
Sect. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are
descended, and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued,
and had a government forced upon them against their free consents, retain a
right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to
the government, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the
possessors of that country: for the first conqueror never having had a title to
the land of that country, the people who are the descendants of, or claim
under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by
constraint, have always a right to shake it off, and free themselves from the
usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them, till their
rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of
choice consent to. Who doubts but the Grecian Christians, descendants of
the ancient possessors of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke,
which they have so long groaned under, whenever they have an opportunity
to do it? For no government can have a right to obedience from a people
who have not freely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to

do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government
and governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to which they
have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent, and
also till they are allowed their due property, which is so to be proprietors of
what they have, that no body can take away any part of it without their own
consent, without which, men under any government are not in the state of
freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war.
Sect. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the
estates, as well as power over the persons, of the conquered; which, it is
plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow from hence, in the
continuance of the government; because the descendants of these being all
freemen, if he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country,
(without which it would be worth nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they
have, so far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that without
a man’s own consent it cannot be taken from him.
Sect. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be
they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or
else it is no property. Supposing the conqueror gives to one man a thousand
acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for
his life, under the rent of 50£. or 500£. per ann. has not the one of these a
right to his thousand acres for ever, and the other, during his life, paying the
said rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over
and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said term,
supposing it be double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror,
after his grant, may by his power of conqueror take away all, or part of the
land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he paying the
rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got
upon the said land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and voluntary
contracts cease, and are void in the world; there needs nothing to dissolve
them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men
in power are but mockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more
ridiculous than to say, I give you and your’s this for ever, and that in the
surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised; and yet it is to
be understood, that I have right, if I please, to take it away from you again
to morrow?

Sect. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the
laws of their country; but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of
God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them from the obligations
of that eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of
promises, that omnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises,
and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty: whatever some flatterers say to
princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to them,
are, in comparison of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on
the balance, inconsiderable, nothing!
Sect. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he
have a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all, that actually
aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a right to make up his
damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of
any other. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not
to the war, and over the children of the captives themselves, or the
possessions of either, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of
conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his
posterity; but is an aggressor, if he attempts upon their properties, and
thereby puts himself in a state of war against them, and has no better a right
of principality, he, nor any of his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the
Danes, had here in England; or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would
have had; which is to have their yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give
those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus,
notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the
sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering
empire. And the lord was with Hezekiah, and he prospered; wherefore he
went forth, and he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not,
2 Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force,
and not right, hath set over any one, though it hath the name of rebellion,
yet is no offence before God, but is that which he allows and countenances,
though even promises and covenants, when obtained by force, have
intervened: for it is very probable, to any one that reads the story of Ahaz
and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz, and deposed
him, and made Hezekiah king in his father’s lifetime; and that Hezekiah by
agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.

CHAPTER. XVII.

OF USURPATION.
Sect. 197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation
is a kind of domestic conquest, with this difference, that an usurper can
never have right on his side, it being no usurpation, but where one is got
into the possession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is
usurpation, is a change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the
government: for if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right
belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it is
tyranny added to usurpation.
Sect. 198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who
are to bear rule, is as natural and necessary a part as the form of the
government itself, and is that which had its establishment originally from
the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at
all; or to agree, that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design
the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. Hence all
commonwealths, with the form of government established, have rules also
of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority, and
settled methods of conveying the right to them: for the anarchy is much
alike, to have no form of government at all; or to agree that it shall be
monarchical, but to appoint no way to know or design the person that shall
have the power, and be the monarch. Whoever gets into the exercise of any
part of the power, by other ways than what the laws of the community have
prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the
commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws have
appointed, and consequently not the person the people have consented to.
Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the
people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow,
and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped.

CHAPTER. XVIII.

OF TYRANNY.
Sect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a
right to; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body
can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his
hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private
separate advantage. When the governor, however intitled, makes not the
law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not directed to
the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his
own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.
Sect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes
from the obscure hand of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will make
it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to the parliament, 1603,
tells them thus,

I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole
commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions, to any
particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and
weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly
felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a
tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of
difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is
this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his
kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires
and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth by the
contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of
the wealth and property of his people.

And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words:

The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the
fundamental laws of his kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so
bound to protect as well the people, as the laws of his kingdom; and
expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just king, in a
settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his
people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto,
according to that paction which God made with Noah after the
deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and
summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease while the
earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a settled
kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon
as he leaves off to rule according to his laws.

And a little after,

Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad
to bound themselves within the limits of their laws; and they that
persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both against them
and the commonwealth.

Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes
the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one
makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of the public, the end
of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and
appetite.
Sect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies;
other forms of government are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the
power, that is put in any hands for the government of the people, and the
preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to
impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands
of those that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that
thus use it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as
well as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at
Rome was nothing better.

Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be
transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds the
power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has under his
command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not,
ceases in that to be a magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be
opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the right of another. This
is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize
my person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he
endeavours to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I
know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will impower
him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as
well as in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it
reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has the greatest part of his
father’s estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger
brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a whole country,
should from thence have a right to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and
garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great
power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of
Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and
oppression, which the endamaging another without authority is, that it is a
great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more
a right in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a
constable; but is so much the worse in him, in that he has more trust put in
him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren, and is
supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and
counsellors, to be more knowing in the measures of right and wrong.
Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be
resisted as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he
has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all polities, and,
instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.
Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to
unjust and unlawful force; whoever makes any opposition in any other case,
draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man; and so no
such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,
Sect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law
is sacred; and so, whatever he commands or does, his person is still free

from all question or violence, not liable to force, or any judicial censure or
condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any
inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actually
putting himself into a state of war with his people, dissolve the government,
and leave them to that defence which belongs to every one in the state of
nature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? and a
neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd example. In all other
cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies,
whereby he is secure, whilst the government stands, from all violence and
harm whatsoever; than which there cannot be a wiser constitution: for the
harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often, nor to
extend itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert the laws,
nor oppress the body of the people, should any prince have so much
weakness, and ill nature as to be willing to do it, the inconveniency of some
particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince
comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public, and
security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set
out of the reach of danger: it being safer for the body, that some few private
men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the
republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.
Sect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king’s
person, hinders not, but they may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who
use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from him, which the
law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king’s writ to
arrest a man, which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that has
it cannot break open a man’s house to do it, nor execute this command of
the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission
have no such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if
any one transgress, the king’s commission excuses him not: for the king’s
authority being given him only by the law, he cannot impower any one to
act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the
commission, or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority,
being as void and insignificant, as that of any private man; the difference
between the one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority
so far, and to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the
commission, but the authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the
laws there can be no authority. But, notwithstanding such resistance, the

king’s person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to
governor or government.
Sect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the
chief magistrate is not thus sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of
resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon every slight
occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured
party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there
can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is
intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted hostile
force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such
force alone, that puts him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful
to resist him. A man with a sword in his hand demands my purse in the
high-way, when perhaps I have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I
may lawfully kill. To another I deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I
alight, which he refuses to restore me, when I am got up again, but draws
his sword to defend the possession of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it.
The mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times
more than the other perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really
did me any); and yet I might lawfully kill the one, and cannot so much as
hurt the other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain; because the one using
force, which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law
to secure it: and when it was gone, it was too late to appeal. The law could
not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable; which to
prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who had put
himself into a state of war with me, and threatened my destruction. But in
the other case, my life not being in danger, I may have the benefit of
appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds that way.
Sect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be
maintained (by the power he has got), and the remedy which is due by law,
be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of resisting, even in such
manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb
the government: for if it reach no farther than some private men’s cases,
though they have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what
by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so will not easily
engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being as
impossible for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the government,
where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as for

a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled state; the
people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other.
Sect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of
the people; or if the mischief and oppression has lighted only on some few,
but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences seem to threaten all;
and they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them
their estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too;
how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force, used against them, I
cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments
whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally
suspected of their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly
put themselves in, wherein they are the less to be pitied, because it is so
easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really means
the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws
together, not to make them see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family,
not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of them.
Sect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and
actions of another; arts used to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative
(which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the prince’s hand to do
good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was
given: if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates
chosen suitable to such ends, and favoured, or laid by, proportionably as
they promote or oppose them: if they see several experiments made of
arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho’ publicly
proclaimed against) which is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it
supported, as much as may be; and when that cannot be done, yet approved
still, and liked the better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all
tending that way; how can a man any more hinder himself from being
persuaded in his own mind, which way things are going; or from casting
about how to save himself, than he could from believing the captain of the
ship he was in, was carrying him, and the rest of the company, to Algiers,
when he found him always steering that course, though cross winds, leaks
in his ship, and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn his
course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as
soon as the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him?

CHAPTER. XIX.

OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of
government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution
of the society and the dissolution of the government. That which makes the
community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic
society, is the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate,
and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth. The usual, and
almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign
force making a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to
maintain and support themselves, as one intire and independent body) the
union belonging to that body which consisted therein, must necessarily
cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to
shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some
other society. Whenever the society is dissolved, it is certain the
government of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords often
cut up governments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating
the subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence
on, that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The
world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way of
dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there
wants not much argument to prove, that where the society is dissolved, the
government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as for the frame of an
house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a
whirl-wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake.
Sect. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are
dissolved from within.

First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of peace,
amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the
umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending all
differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative, that
the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into
one coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to
the commonwealth: from hence the several members have their mutual
influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is
broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and
union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when
once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping
of that will. The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental
act of society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their
union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons
authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without
which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of
making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall
take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to
do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore
bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection,
and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think best, being
in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would
impose any thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own will,
when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the
public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no
such authority or delegation.
Sect. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the
commonwealth who misuse the power they have; it is hard to consider it
aright, and know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of
government in which it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed
in the concurrence of three distinct persons.
(1). A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executive
power, and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two
within certain periods of time.
(2). An assembly of hereditary nobility.

(3). An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people.
Such a form of government supposed, it is evident,
Sect. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his
own arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the society,
declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for that being in
effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and
required to be obeyed; when other laws are set up, and other rules
pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative, constituted by the
society, have enacted, it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever
introduces new laws, not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental
appointment of the society, or subverts the old, disowns and overturns the
power by which they were made, and so sets up a new legislative.
Sect. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from
assembling in its due time, or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends for
which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a certain
number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of
debating, and leisure of perfecting, what is for the good of the society,
wherein the legislative consists: when these are taken away or altered, so as
to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is
truly altered; for it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and
exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he,
who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its
due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the
government.
Sect. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the
electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the consent, and contrary
to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered:
for, if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do
chuse, or in another way than what the society hath prescribed, those
chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.
Sect. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of
a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a
change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the government: for the
end why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free,
independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever
they are given up into the power of another.

Sect. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the
government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; because
he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ, and often
persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate
he is uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great
advances toward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has
it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious, seditious, and
enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or
people, is capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative,
without open and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which,
when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign
conquest. Besides, the prince in such a form of government, having the
power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering
them private persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his
concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his consent being necessary to
give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet, so far as the other parts of
the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government, and
do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such designs, they are
guilty, and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest crime which men
can partake of one towards another.
Sec. 219.There is one way more whereby such a government may be
dissolved, and that is: When he who has the supreme executive power,
neglects and abandons that charge, so that the laws already made can no
longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy,
and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not being made for
themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the society, to keep
every part of the body politic in its due place and function; when that totally
ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become a confused
multitude, without order or connexion. Where there is no longer the
administration of justice, for the securing of men’s rights, nor any
remaining power within the community to direct the force, or provide for
the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left. Where
the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws; and a
government without laws is, I suppose, a mystery in politics, unconceivable
to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.
Sect. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved,
the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new

legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons, or form, or
both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good: for the society can
never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to
preserve itself, which can only be done by a settled legislative, and a fair
and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is
not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too
late to look for any. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by
erecting a new legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or being delivered
over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may
expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in effect no
more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty;
and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if
barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be secure from
tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and
therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent
it.
Sect. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby
governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince,
either of them, act contrary to their trust.
First, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they
endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or
any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives,
liberties, or fortunes of the people.
Sect. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of
their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is,
that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the
properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and
moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since
it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative
should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by
entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to
legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take
away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery
under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the
people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left
to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force

and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or
corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any
other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people;
by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their
hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a
right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new
legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and
security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said
here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the
supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part
in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both,
when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society.
He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force,
treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain
them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to
their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or
otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have
promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate
candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but
to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of
public security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of
their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other
end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act,
and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good
should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This,
those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed
the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an
assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own
will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the
society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of
a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. To which,
if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end,
and all the arts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that
stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to
betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing.
What power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary

to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine;
and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as
this, cannot any longer be trusted.
Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant,
and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the
unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to
certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people
may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To
this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old
forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to
amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to.
And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by
time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get them changed, even when
all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion
in the people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions
which have been seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us
to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to
our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations
have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never
carried the people so far as to place it in another line.
Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent
rebellion. To which I answer,
First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made
miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power,
cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them be
sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for
whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill
treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease
themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish, and seek
for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness and accidents of human
affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little
while in the world, who has not seen examples of this in his time; and he
must have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of
governments in the world.
Sect. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every
little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part,

many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty, will
be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of
abuses, prevarications and artifices, all tending the same way, make the
design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under,
and see whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, that they should
then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which
may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected; and
without which, ancient names, and specious forms, are so far from being
better, that they are much worse, than the state of nature, or pure anarchy;
the inconveniencies being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off
and more difficult.
Sect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of
providing for their safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their legislators
have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the best
fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellion
being an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in
the constitutions and laws of the government; those, whoever they be, who
by force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly
and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into society and civil-
government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation
of property, peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who set up force
again in opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back again the
state of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the
pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their
hands, and the flattery of those about them) being likeliest to do; the
properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice
of it, who are under the greatest temptation to run into it.
Sect. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative is
changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were
constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by
force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by
them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage,
which every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of all their
controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They, who
remove, or change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no
body can have, but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so
destroying the authority which the people did, and no body else can set up,

and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized, they actually
introduce a state of war, which is that of force without authority: and thus,
by removing the legislative established by the society, (in whose decisions
the people acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the
knot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who by
force take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has
been shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who were set up for the
protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties,
shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting
themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and
guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation,
rebellantes, rebels.
Sect. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean
that it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they are
absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their
liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who
were their magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the
trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being
so destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the
same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because
this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such
cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on
him that invades his neighbours. If the innocent honest man must quietly
quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I
desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world,
which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained
only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an
admirable peace betwix the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without
resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?
Polyphemus’s den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a
government, wherein Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but
quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who
was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and exhorted them to a
quiet submission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was
to mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they
should offer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.

Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is
best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the
boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to
be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and
employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of
their people?
Sect. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as
often as it shall please a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the
alteration of the government. It is true, such men may stir, whenever they
please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the
mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible,
or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the people, who are more
disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir.
The examples of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an
unfortunate man, moves them not. But if they universally have a persuation,
grounded upon manifest evidence, that designs are carrying on against their
liberties, and the general course and tendency of things cannot but give
them strong suspicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be
blamed for it? Who can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring
themselves into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have
the sense of rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as
they find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault, who put things into
such a posture, that they would not have them thought to be as they are? I
grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have
sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have
been fatal to states and kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath oftener
begun in the peoples wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful
authority of their rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and endeavours to get
and exercise an arbitrary power over their people; whether oppression, or
disobedience, gave the first rise to the disorder, I leave it to impartial history
to determine. This I am sure, whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes
about to invade the rights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation
for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government, is highly
guilty of the greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer for
all those mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to
pieces of governments bring on a country. And he who does it, is justly to

be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be treated
accordingly.
Sect. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the
properties of any people, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all hands.
But that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath of late
been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by
the law, had thereby a power to break those laws, by which alone they were
set in a better place than their brethren: whereas their offence is thereby the
greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law,
and breaking also that trust, which is put into their hands by their brethren.
Sect. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in
society, who does it without law, puts himself into a state of war with those
against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all
other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist
the aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay himself, that great assertor of
the power and sacredness of kings, is forced to confess, That it is lawful for
the people, in some cases, to resist their king; and that too in a chapter,
wherein he pretends to shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from
all manner of rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine,
that, since they may in some cases resist, all resisting of princes is not
rebellion. His words are these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus
tyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone multitude
civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, & liberos
fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae pericula
omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num illis quod
omni animantium generi est a natura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi
repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? Huic breviter responsum sit, Populo
universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis est, neque ultionem quae
praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere. Quapropter si rex non
in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus
etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est, i.e. totum populum, vel insignem
aliquam ejus partem immani & intoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet;
populo, quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas
competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in principem invadendi: &
restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a debita reverentia propter
acceptam injuriam. Praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim
praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. Horum enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam

scilicet corpusque tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior de
superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum
sit, impedire potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem
sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus
quispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto
Buchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest. Cum ille si
intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resistere cum
reverentia possit, Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8.
In English thus:
Sect. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always lay
themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny? Must they see their
cities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children exposed to the
tyrant’s lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king to
ruin, and all the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? Must men
alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force,
which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation
from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it
be denied the community, even against the king himself: but to revenge
themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed them; it being not
agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred, not only
to some particular persons, but sets himself against the body of the
commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and shall, with intolerable ill usage,
cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or a considerable part of the people, in this
case the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury: but
it must be with this caution, that they only defend themselves, but do not
attack their prince: they may repair the damages received, but must not for
any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may
repulse the present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it is
natural for us to defend life and limb, but that an inferior should punish a
superior, is against nature. The mischief which is designed them, the people
may prevent before it be done; but when it is done, they must not revenge it
on the king, though author of the villany. This therefore is the privilege of
the people in general, above what any private person hath; that particular
men are allowed by our adversaries themselves (Buchanan only excepted)
to have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may with
respect resist intolerable tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to
endure it.

Sect. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of
resistance.
Sect. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose:
First, He says, it must be with reverence.
Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason
he gives is, because an inferior cannot punish a superior. First, How to resist
force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need
some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a
shield to receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a
sword in his hand, to abate the confidence and force of the assailant, will
quickly be at an end of his resistance, and will find such a defence serve
only to draw on himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous a way of
resisting, as juvenal thought it of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum.
And the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there
describes it:
——-Libertas pauperis haec est:
Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat,
Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.
This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men
may not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to
strike. And then let our author, or any body else, join a knock on the head,
or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He
that can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, desire for his
pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it.
Secondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that is
true, generally speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to resist force with
force, being the state of war that levels the parties, cancels all former
relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the odds that
remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust agressor, has this superiority
over him, that he has a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both
for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay
therefore, in another place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be
lawful to resist a king in any case. But he there assigns two cases, whereby
a king may un-king himself. His words are,

Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere
atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo
suaque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex
divinis id obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei
ordinationi resisit: non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id
committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse
principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus &
superior efficitur, reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum
in interregno habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae
hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo perlustrem, duo tantum
invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se
facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit;
quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unus est, Si regnum disperdat,
quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is nempe senatum populumque
Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare, ac novas sibi
sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit se neque
civem neque principem senatui amplius fore, inque animo habuerit
interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare,
ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex
aliquis meditator & molitur serio, omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico
abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus servi pro
derelicto habiti dominium.
Sect. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, ac
regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae
ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo
plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis
amifit, ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo
inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus
libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem &
potestatem dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec
quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit,
juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis
populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant.
Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16.
Which in English runs thus:

Sect. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may
of right, and by their own authority, help themselves, take arms, and set
upon their king, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst he
remains a king. Honour the king, and he that resists the power, resists the
ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit it, The people
therefore can never come by a power over him, unless he does something
that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests himself of his crown
and dignity, and returns to the state of a private man, and the people become
free and superior, the power which they had in the interregnum, before they
crowned him king, devolving to them again. But there are but few
miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. After considering it well
on all sides, I can find but two. Two cases there are, I say, whereby a king,
ipso facto, becomes no king, and loses all power and regal authority over
his people; which are also taken notice of by Winzerus.
The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he
have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is
recorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of Rome,
lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some other place.
And of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head
to the people or senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the
worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he wisht that
the people had but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow, Such
designs as these, when any king harbours in his thoughts, and seriously
promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the
commonwealth; and consequently forfeits the power of governing his
subjects, as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath
abandoned.
Sect. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent of
another, and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the
people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another: for however
perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because he
has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and
immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom; and also because he
betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully
preserved, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as it
were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself loses the power he had in it
before, without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would

have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, and leaves them at
their own disposal. One example of this is to be found in the Scotch Annals.
Sect. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute
monarchy, is forced to allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases to be a
king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he has no
authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the
authority ceases, the king ceases too, and becomes like other men who have
no authority. And these two cases he instances in, differ little from those
above mentioned, to be destructive to governments, only that he has omitted
the principle from which his doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust,
in not preserving the form of government agreed on, and in not intending
the end of government itself, which is the public good and preservation of
property. When a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of
war with his people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is
no king, as they would any other man, who has put himself into a state of
war with them, Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us.
This farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says, The
mischief that is designed them, the people may prevent before it be done:
whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in design. Such designs
as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously
promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the
commonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect of the public good is
to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficient cause
of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these words, Because he
betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought carefully to have
preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion of a foreign nation,
signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty,
which he ought to have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons
to whose dominion they were subjected. The peoples right is equally
invaded, and their liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their
own, or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only
have they the right of defence. And there are instances to be found in all
countries, which shew, that it is not the change of nations in the persons of
their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence.
Bilson, a bishop of our church, and a great stickler for the power and
prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his treatise of Christian
subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title

to the obedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a case
where reason is so plain, I could send my reader to Bracton, Fortescue, and
the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be suspected to be
ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone
might be enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their
ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles
upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of
cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabric, they were best look.
This I am sure, their civil policy is so new, so dangerous, and so destructive
to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could bear the
broaching of it; so it may be hoped, those to come, redeemed from the
impositions of these Egyptian under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of
such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to serve their turn, resolved all
government into absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what
their mean souls fitted them for, slavery.
Sect. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who shall
be judge, whether the prince or legislative act contrary to their trust? This,
perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst the people,
when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The
people shall be judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy
acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, but he who deputes
him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him,
when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private
men, why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the
welfare of millions is concerned, and also where the evil, if not prevented,
is greater, and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?
Sect. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot mean,
that there is no judge at all: for where there is no judicature on earth, to
decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is
true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other
cases, so in this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with
him, and whether he should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.
Sect. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people,
in a matter where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great
consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a case, should be the
body of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in

him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if
any men find themselves aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary to, or
beyond that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the people, (who, at
first, lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if
the prince, or whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of
determination, the appeal then lies no where but to heaven; force between
either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits no
appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal
lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party must judge for
himself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself
upon it.
Sect. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the society,
when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as
the society lasts, but will always remain in the community; because without
this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the
original agreement: so also when the society hath placed the legislative in
any assembly of men, to continue in them and their successors, with
direction and authority for providing such successors, the legislative can
never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; because having
provided a legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up
their political power to the legislative, and cannot resume it. But if they
have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme
power in any person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when by the
miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at
the determination of the time set, it reverts to the society, and the people
have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or
erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think
good.

FINIS.

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