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The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Mediaeval Mind (Volume
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Title: The Mediaeval Mind (Volume 2 of 2)

Author: Henry Osborn Taylor

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE
MEDIAEVAL MIND (VOLUME 2 OF 2) ***

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THE MEDIAEVAL MIND

MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
London · Bombay · Calcutta
Melbourne

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
New York · Boston · Chicago
Atlanta · San Francisco

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO

THE

MEDIAEVAL MIND

A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THOUGHT AND EMOTION
IN THE MIDDLE AGES

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BY

HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON
1911

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CONTENTS
BOOK IV
THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL: SOCIETY (continued)
PAGE
CHAPTER XXV
The Heart of Heloïse 3

CHAPTER XXVI
German Considerations: Walther von der Vogelweide 28

BOOK V
SYMBOLISM

CHAPTER XXVII
Scriptural Allegories in the Early Middle Ages; Honorius of
41
Autun

CHAPTER XXVIII
The Rationale of the Visible World: Hugo of St. Victor 60

CHAPTER XXIX
Cathedral and Mass; Hymn and Imaginative Poem 76
I. Guilelmus Durandus and Vincent of Beauvais.
The Hymns of Adam of St. Victor and the Anticlaudianus of
II.
Alanus of Lille.

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BOOK VI
LATINITY AND LAW

CHAPTER XXX
The Spell of the Classics 107
I. Classical Reading.
II. Grammar.
III. The Effect upon the Mediaeval Man; Hildebert of Lavardin.

CHAPTER XXXI
Evolution of Mediaeval Latin Prose 148

CHAPTER XXXII
Evolution of Mediaeval Latin Verse 186
I. Metrical Verse.
II. Substitution of Accent for Quantity.
III. Sequence-Hymn and Student-Song.
IV. Passage of Themes into the Vernacular.

CHAPTER XXXIII
Mediaeval Appropriation of the Roman Law 231
I. The Fontes Juris Civilis.
II. Roman and Barbarian Codification.
III. The Mediaeval Appropriation.
IV. Church Law.
V. Political Theorizing.

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BOOK VII
ULTIMATE INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS OF THE TWELFTH
AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES

CHAPTER XXXIV
Scholasticism: Spirit, Scope, and Method 283

CHAPTER XXXV
Classification of Topics; Stages of Evolution 311
I. Philosophic Classification of the Sciences; the Arrangement of
Vincent’s
Encyclopaedia, of the Lombard’s Sentences, of Aquinas’s
Summa theologiae.
II. The Stages of Development: Grammar, Logic, Metalogics.

CHAPTER XXXVI
Twelfth-Century Scholasticism 338
I. The Problem of Universals: Abaelard.
II. The Mystic Strain: Hugo and Bernard.
III. The Later Decades: Bernard Silvestris; Gilbert de la Porrée;
William of Conches;
John of Salisbury, and Alanus of Lille.

CHAPTER XXXVII
The Universities, Aristotle, and the Mendicants 378

CHAPTER XXXVIII
Bonaventura 402

CHAPTER XXXIX

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Albertus Magnus 420

CHAPTER XL
Thomas Aquinas 433
I. Thomas’s Conception of Human Beatitude.
II. Man’s Capacity to know God.
III. How God knows.
IV. How the Angels know.
V. How Men know.
VI. Knowledge through Faith perfected in Love.

CHAPTER XLI
Roger Bacon 484

CHAPTER XLII
Duns Scotus and Occam 509

CHAPTER XLIII
The Mediaeval Synthesis: Dante 525

INDEX 561

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BOOK IV
THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUAL: SOCIETY
(Continued)

CHAPTER XXV

THE HEART OF HELOÏSE
The romantic growth and imaginative shaping of chivalric love having been
followed in the fortunes of its great exemplars, Tristan, Iseult, Lancelot,
Guinevere, Parzival, a different illustration of mediaeval passion may be
had by turning from these creations of literature to an actual woman, whose
love for a living man was thought out as keenly and as tragically felt as any
heart-break of imagined lovers, and was impressed with as entire a self-
surrender as ever ravished the soul of nun panting with love of the God-
man.
There has never been a passion between a man and woman more famous
than that which brought happiness and sorrow to the lives of Abaelard and
Heloïse. Here fame is just. It was a great love, and its course was a perfect
soul’s tragedy. Abaelard was a celebrity, the intellectual glory of an active-
minded epoch. His love-story has done as much for his posthumous fame as
all his intellectual activities. Heloïse became known in her time through her
relations with Abaelard; in his songs her name was wafted far. She has
come down to us as one of the world’s love-heroines. Yet few of those who
have been touched by her story have known that Heloïse was a great
woman, possessed of an admirable mind, a character which proved its
strength through years, and, above all, a capacity for loving—for loving out
to the full conclusions of love’s convictions, and for feeling in their full
range and power whatever moods and emotions could arise from an

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unhappy situation and a passion as deeply felt as it was deeply thought
upon.
Abaelard was not a great character—aside from his intellect. He was vain
and inconsiderate, a man who delighted in confounding and supplanting his
teachers, and in being a thorn in the flesh of all opponents. But he became
chastened through his misfortunes and through Heloïse’s high and self-
sacrificing love. In the end, perhaps, his love was worthy of the love of
Heloïse. Yet her love from the beginning was nobler and deeper than his
love of her. Love was for him an incident in his experience, then an element
in his life. Love made the life of Heloïse; it remained her all. Moreover, in
the records of their passion, Heloïse’s love is unveiled as Abaelard’s is not.
For all these reasons, the heart of Heloïse rather than the heart of Abaelard
discloses the greatness of a love that wept itself out in the twelfth century,
and it is her love rather than his that can teach us much regarding the
mediaeval capacity for loving. Hers is a story of mediaeval womanhood,
and sin, and repentance perhaps, with peace at last, or at least the lips shut
close and further protest foregone.
Abaelard’s stormy intellectual career[1] and the story of the love between
him and the canon’s niece are well known. Let us follow him in those parts
of his narrative which disclose the depth and power of Heloïse’s love for
him. We draw from his Historia calamitatum, written “to a friend,”
apparently an open letter intended to circulate.
“There was,” writes he, referring to the time of his sojourn in Paris, when
he was about thirty-six years old, and at the height of his fame as a lecturer
in the schools—
“There was in Paris a young girl named Heloïse, the niece of a canon,
Fulbert. It was his affectionate wish that she should have the best
education in letters that could be procured. Her face was not unfair, and
her knowledge was unequalled. This attainment, so rare in women, had
given her great reputation.
“I had hitherto lived continently, but now was casting my eyes about,
and I saw that she possessed every attraction that lovers seek; nor did I
regard my success as doubtful, when I considered my fame and my
goodly person, and also her love of letters. Inflamed with love, I

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thought how I could best become intimate with her. It occurred to me to
obtain lodgings with her uncle, on the plea that household cares
distracted me from study. Friends quickly brought this about, the old
man being miserly and yet desirous of instruction for his niece. He
eagerly entrusted her to my tutorship, and begged me to give her all the
time I could take from my lectures, authorizing me to see her at any
hour of the day or night, and punish her when necessary. I marvelled
with what simplicity he confided a tender lamb to a hungry wolf. As he
had given me authority to punish her, I saw that if caresses would not
win my object, I could bend her by threats and blows. Doubtless he was
misled by love of his niece and my own good reputation. Well, what
need to say more: we were united first by the one roof above us, and
then by our hearts. Our hours of study were given to love. The books
lay open, but our words were of love rather than philosophy, there were
more kisses than aphorisms; and love was oftener reflected in our eyes
than the lettered page. To avert suspicion, I struck her occasionally—
very gentle blows of love. The joy of love, new to us both, brought no
satiety. The more I was taken up with this pleasure, the less time I gave
to philosophy and the schools—how tiresome had all that become! I
became unproductive, merely repeating my old lectures, and if I
composed any verses, love was their subject, and not the secrets of
philosophy; you know how popular and widely sung these have
become. But the students! what groans and laments arose from them at
my distraction! A passion so plain was not to be concealed; every one
knew of it except Fulbert. A man is often the last to know of his own
shame. Yet what everybody knows cannot be hid forever, and so after
some months he learned all. Oh how bitter was that uncle’s grief! and
what was the grief of the separated lovers! How ashamed I was, and
afflicted at the affliction of the girl! And what a storm of sorrow came
over her at my disgrace. Neither complained for himself, but each
grieved at what the other must endure.”
Although Abaelard was moved at the plight of Heloïse, he bitterly felt his
own discomfiture in the eyes of the once admiring world. But the sentence
touching Heloïse is a first true note of her devoted love: what a storm of
sorrow (moeroris aestus) came over her at my disgrace. Through this

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trouble and woe, Heloïse never thought of her own pain save as it pained
her to be the source of grief to Abaelard.
Abaelard continues:
“The separation of our bodies joined our souls more closely and
inflamed our love. Shame spent itself and made us unashamed, so small
a thing it seemed compared with satisfying love. Not long afterwards
the girl knew that she was to be a mother, and in the greatest exultation
wrote and asked me to advise what she should do. One night, as we
agreed on, when Fulbert was away I bore her off secretly and sent her to
my own country, Brittany, where she stayed with my sister till she gave
birth to a son, whom she named Astralabius.
“The uncle, on his return to his empty house, was frantic. He did not
know what to do to me. If he should kill or do me some bodily injury,
he feared lest his niece, whom he loved, would suffer for it among my
people in Brittany. He could not seize me, as I was prepared against all
attempts. At length, pitying his anguish, and feeling remorse at having
caused it, I went to him as a suppliant and promised whatever
satisfaction he should demand. I assured him that nothing in my conduct
would seem remarkable to any one who had felt the strength of love or
would take the pains to recall how many of the greatest men had been
thrown down by women, ever since the world began. Whereupon I
offered him a satisfaction greater than he could have hoped, to wit, that
I would marry her whom I had corrupted, if only the marriage might be
kept secret so that it should not injure me in the minds of men. He
agreed and pledged his faith, and the faith of his friends, and sealed
with kisses the reconciliation which I had sought—so that he might
more easily betray me!”
It will be remembered that Abaelard was a clerk, a clericus, in virtue of his
profession of letters and theology. Never having taken orders, he could
marry; but while a clerk’s slip could be forgotten, marriage might lead
people to think he had slighted his vocation, and would certainly bar the
ecclesiastical preferment which such a famous clericus might naturally look
forward to. Nevertheless, he at once set out to fetch Heloïse from Brittany,
to make her his wife.

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The stand which she now took shows both her mind and heart:
“She strongly disapproved, and urged two reasons against the marriage,
to wit, the danger and the disgrace in which it would involve me. She
swore—and so it proved—that no satisfaction would ever appease her
uncle. She asked how she was to have any glory through me when she
should have made me inglorious, and should have humiliated both
herself and me. What penalties would the world exact from her if she
deprived it of such a luminary; what curses, what damage to the Church,
what lamentations of philosophers, would follow on this marriage. How
indecent, how lamentable would it be for a man whom nature had made
for all, to declare that he belonged to one woman, and subject himself to
such shame. From her soul, she detested this marriage which would be
so utterly ignominious for me, and a burden to me. She expatiated on
the disgrace and inconvenience of matrimony for me and quoted the
Apostle Paul exhorting men to shun it. If I would not take the apostle’s
advice or listen to what the saints had said regarding the matrimonial
yoke, I should at least pay attention to the philosophers—to
Theophrastus’s words upon the intolerable evils of marriage, and to the
refusal of Cicero to take a wife after he had divorced Terentia, when he
said that he could not devote himself to a wife and philosophy at the
same time. ‘Or,’ she continued, laying aside the disaccord between
study and a wife, ‘consider what a married man’s establishment would
be to you. What sweet accord there would be between the schools and
domestics, between copyists and cradles, between books and distaffs,
between pen and spindle! Who, engaged in religious or philosophical
meditations, could endure a baby’s crying and the nurse’s ditties stilling
it, and all the noise of servants? Could you put up with the dirty ways of
children? The rich can, you say, with their palaces and apartments of all
kinds; their wealth does not feel the expense or the daily care and
annoyance. But I say, the state of the rich is not that of philosophers; nor
have men entangled in riches and affairs any time for the study of
Scripture or philosophy. The renowned philosophers of old, despising
the world, fleeing rather than relinquishing it, forbade themselves all
pleasures, and reposed in the embraces of philosophy.’”
Speaking thus, Heloïse fortified her argument with quotations from Seneca,
and the examples of Jewish and Gentile worthies and Christian saints, and

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continued:
“It is not for me to point out—for I would not be thought to instruct
Minerva—how soberly and continently all these men lived who,
according to Augustine and others, were called philosophers as much
for their way of life as or their knowledge. If laymen and Gentiles,
bound by no profession of religion, lived thus, surely you, a clerk and
canon, should not prefer low pleasures to sacred duties, nor let yourself
be sucked down by this Charybdis and smothered in filth inextricably. If
you do not value the privilege of a clerk, at least defend the dignity of a
philosopher. If reverence for God be despised, still let love of decency
temper immodesty. Remember, Socrates was tied to a wife, and through
a nasty accident wiped out this blot upon philosophy, that others
afterwards might be more cautious; which Jerome relates in his book
against Jovinianus, how once when enduring a storm of Xanthippe’s
clamours from the floor above, he was ducked with slops, and simply
said, ‘I knew such thunder would bring rain.’
“Finally she said that it would be dangerous for me to take her back to
Paris; it was more becoming to me, and sweeter to her, to be called my
mistress, so that affection alone might keep me hers and not the binding
power of any matrimonial chain; and if we should be separated for a
time, our joys at meeting would be the dearer for their rarity. When at
last with all her persuasions and dissuasions she could not turn me from
my folly, and could not bear to offend me, with a burst of tears she
ended in these words: ‘One thing is left: in the ruin of us both the grief
which follows shall not be less than the love which went before.’ Nor
did she here lack the spirit of prophecy.”
Heloïse’s reasonings show love great and true and her absolute devotion to
Abaelard’s interests. None the less striking is her clear intelligence. She
reasoned correctly; she was right, the marriage would do great harm to
Abaelard and little good to her. We see this too, if we lay aside our sense of
the ennobling purity of marriage—a sentiment not commonly felt in the
twelfth century. Marriage was holy in the mind of Christ. But it did not
preserve its holiness through the centuries which saw the rise of
monasticism and priestly celibacy. A way of life is not pure and holy when
another way is holier and purer; this is peculiarly true in Christianity, which

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demands the ideal best with such intensity as to cast reflection on whatever
falls below the highest standard. From the time of the barbarian inroads, on
through the Carolingian periods, and into the later Middle Ages, there was
enough barbarism and brutality to prevent the preservation, or impede the
development, of a high standard of marriage. Not monasticism, but his own
half-barbarian, lustful heart led Charlemagne to marry and remarry at will,
and have many mistresses besides. It was the same with the countless
barons and mediaeval kings, rude and half civilized. This was barbarous
lust, not due to the influence of monasticism. But, on the other hand, it was
always the virgin or celibate state that the Church held before the eyes of all
this semi-barbarous laity as the ideal for a Christian man or woman. The
Church sanctioned marriage, but hardly lauded it or held it up as a condition
in which lives of holiness and purity could be led. Such were the sentiments
in which Heloïse was born and bred. They were subconscious factors in her
thoughts regarding herself and her lover. Devoted and unselfish was her
love; undoubtedly Heloïse would have sacrificed herself for Abaelard under
any social conditions. Nevertheless, with her, marriage added little to love;
it was a mere formal and binding authorization; love was no purer for it. To
her mind, for a man in Abaelard’s situation to be entangled in a temporary
amour was better than to be chained to his passion, with his career
irrevocably ruined, in marriage. In so far as her thoughts or Abaelard’s were
influenced by the environment of priestly thinking, marriage would seem a
rendering permanent of a passionate and sinful state, which it were best to
cast off altogether. For herself, as she said truly, the marriage would bring
obloquy rather than reinstatement. She had been mistress to a clerk;
marriage would make her the partner of his abandonment of his vocation,
the accomplice of broken purposes if not of broken vows. And finally, as
there was then no line of disgrace as now between bastard and lawful issue,
Heloïse had no thought that the interests of her son demanded that his
mother should become his father’s wife.
“Leaving our son in my sister’s care, we stole back to Paris, and shortly
after, having in the night celebrated our vigils in a certain church, we
were married at dawn in the presence of her uncle and some of his and
our friends. We left at once separately and with secrecy, and afterwards
saw each other only in privacy, so as to conceal what we had done. But
her uncle and his household began at once to announce the marriage and

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violate his word; while she, on the contrary, protested vehemently and
swore that it was false. At that he became enraged and treated her vilely.
When I discovered this I sent her to the convent of Argenteuil, near
Paris, where she had been educated. There I had her take the garb of a
nun, except the veil. Hearing this, the uncle and his relations thought
that I had duped them, ridding myself of Heloïse by making her a nun.
So having bribed my servant, they came upon me by night, when I was
sleeping, and took on me a vengeance as cruel and irretrievable as it
was vile and shameful. Two of the perpetrators were pursued and
vengeance taken.
“In the morning the whole town was assembled, crying and lamenting
my plight, especially the clerks and students; at which I was afflicted
with more shame than I suffered physical pain. I thought of my ruined
hopes and glory, and then saw that by God’s just judgment I was
punished where I had most sinned, and that Fulbert had justly avenged
treachery with treachery. But what a figure I should cut in public! how
the world would point its finger at me! I was also confounded at the
thought of the Levitical law, according to which I had become an
abomination to the Church.[2] In this misery the confusion of shame—I
confess it—rather than the ardour of conversion drove me to the cover
of the cloister, after she had willingly obeyed my command to take the
veil. I became a monk in the abbey of St. Denis, and she a nun in the
convent of Argenteuil. Many begged her not to set that yoke upon her
youth; at which, amid her tears, she broke out in Cornelia’s lament: ‘O
great husband! undeserving of my couch! Has fortune rights over a head
so high? Why did I, impious, marry thee to make thee wretched? Accept
these penalties, which I gladly pay.’[3] With these words, she went
straight to the altar, received the veil blessed by the bishop, and took the
vows before them all.”
Abaelard’s Historia calamitatum now turns to troubles having no
connection with Heloïse: his difficulties with the monks of St. Denis, with
other monks, with every one, in fact, except his scholars; his arraignment
before the Council of Soissons, the public burning of his book, De Unitate
et Trinitate divina, and various other troubles, till, seeking a retreat, he
constructed an oratory on the bank of the Ardisson. He named it the
Paraclete, and there he taught and lectured. He was afterwards elected abbot

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of a monastery in Brittany, where he discovered that those under him were
savage beasts rather than monks. Here the Historia calamitatum was
written.
The monks of St. Denis had never ceased to hate Abaelard for his assertion
that their great Saint was not really Dionysius the Areopagite who heard
Paul preach. Their abbot now brought forward and proved an ancient title to
the land where stood the convent of Argenteuil, “in which,” to resume
Abaelard’s account,
“she, once my wife, now my sister in Christ, had taken the veil, and was
at this time prioress. The nuns were rudely driven out. News of this
came to me as a suggestion from the Lord to bethink me of the deserted
Paraclete. Going thither, I invited Heloïse and her nuns to come and
take possession. They accepted, and I gave it to them. Afterward Pope
Innocent II. confirmed this grant to them and their successors in
perpetuity. There for a time they lived in want; but soon the Divine Pity
showed itself the true Paraclete, and moved the people of the
neighbourhood to take compassion on them, and they soon knew no
lack. Indeed as women are the weaker sex, their need moves men more
readily to pity, and their virtues are the more grateful to both God and
man. And on our sister the Lord bestowed such favour in the eyes of all,
that the bishops loved her as a daughter, the abbots as a sister, the laity
as a mother; and all wondered at her piety, her wisdom, and her gentle
patience in everything. She rarely let herself be seen, that she might
devote herself more wholly to prayers and meditations in her cell; but
all the more persistently people sought her spiritual counsel.”
What were those meditations and those prayers uttered or unuttered in that
cell? They did not always refer to the kingdom of heaven, judging from the
abbess’s first letter to her former lover. After the installation of Heloïse and
her nuns, Abaelard rarely visited the Paraclete, although his advice and
instruction was desired there. His visits gave rise to too much scandal. In
the course of time, however, the Historia calamitatum came into the hands
of Heloïse, and occasioned this letter, which seems to issue forth out of a
long silence; ten years had passed since she became a nun. The
superscription is as follows:

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“To her master, rather to a father, to her husband, rather to a brother, his
maid or rather daughter, his wife or rather sister, to Abaelard, Heloïse.
“Your letter, beloved, written to comfort a friend, chanced recently to
reach me. Seeing by its first lines from whom it was, I burned to read it
for the love I bear the writer, hoping also from its words to recreate an
image of him whose life I have ruined. Those words dropped gall and
absinthe as they brought back the unhappy story of our intercourse and
thy ceaseless crosses, O my only one. Truly the letter must have
convinced the friend that his troubles were light compared with yours,
as you showed the treachery and persecutions which had followed you,
the calumnies of enemies and the burning of your glorious book, the
machinations of false brothers, and the vile acts of those worthless
monks whom you call your sons. No one could read it with dry eyes.
Your perils have renewed my griefs; here we all despair of your life and
each day with trembling hearts expect news of your death. In the name
of Christ, who so far has somehow preserved thee for himself, deign
with frequent letters to let these weak servants of Him and thee know of
the storms overwhelming the swimmer, so that we who alone remain to
thee may be participators of thy pain or joy. One who grieves may gain
consolation from those grieving with him; a burden borne by many is
more lightly borne. And if this tempest abates, how happy shall we be to
know it. Whatever the letters may contain they will show at least that
we are not forgotten. Has not Seneca said in his letter to Lucilius, that
the letters of an absent friend are sweet? When no malice can stop your
giving us this much of you, do not let neglect prove a bar.
“You have written that long letter to console a friend with the story of
your own misfortunes, and have thereby roused our grief and added to
our desolation. Heal these new wounds. You owe to us a deeper debt of
friendship than to him, for we are not only friends, but friends the
dearest, and your daughters. After God, you alone are the founder of
this place, the builder of this oratory and of this congregation. This new
plantation for a holy purpose is your own; the delicate plants need
frequent watering. He who gives so much to his enemies, should
consider his daughters. Or, leaving out the others here, think how this is
owing me from thee: what thou owest to all women under vows, thou
shalt pay more devotedly to thine only one. How many books have the

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holy fathers written for holy women, for their exhortation and
instruction! I marvel at thy forgetfulness of these frail beginnings of our
conversion. Neither respect of God nor love of us nor the example of
the blessed fathers, has led thee by speech or letter to console me, cast
about, and consumed with grief. This obligation was the stronger,
because the sacrament of marriage joined thee to me, and I—every one
sees it—cling to thee with unmeasured love.
“Dearest, thou knowest—who knows not?—how much I lost in thee,
and that an infamous act of treachery robbed me of thee and of myself
at once. The greater my grief, the greater need of consolation, not from
another but from thee, that thou who art alone my cause of grief may be
alone my consolation. It is thou alone that canst sadden me or gladden
me or comfort me. And thou alone owest this to me, especially since I
have done thy will so utterly that, unable to offend thee, I endured to
wreck myself at thy command. Nay, more than this, love turned to
madness and cut itself off from hope of that which alone it sought, when
I obediently changed my garb and my heart too in order that I might
prove thee sole owner of my body as well as of my spirit. God knows, I
have ever sought in thee only thyself, desiring simply thee and not what
was thine. I asked no matrimonial contract, I looked for no dowry; not
my pleasure, not my will, but thine have I striven to fulfil. And if the
name of wife seemed holier or more potent, the word mistress (amica)
was always sweeter to me, or even—be not angry!—concubine or
harlot; for the more I lowered myself before thee, the more I hoped to
gain thy favour, and the less I should hurt the glory of thy renown. This
thou didst graciously remember, when condescending to point out in
that letter to a friend some of the reasons (but not all!) why I preferred
love to wedlock and liberty to a chain. I call God to witness that if
Augustus, the master of the world, would honour me with marriage and
invest me with equal rule, it would still seem to me dearer and more
honourable to be called thy strumpet than his empress. He who is rich
and powerful is not the better man: that is a matter of fortune, this of
merit. And she is venal who marries a rich man sooner than a poor man,
and yearns for a husband’s riches rather than himself. Such a woman
deserves pay and not affection. She is not seeking the man but his
goods, and would wish, if possible, to prostitute herself to one still

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richer. Aspasia put this clearly when she was trying to effect a
reconciliation between Xenophon and his wife: ‘Until you come to
think that there is nowhere else a better man or a woman more
desirable, you will be continually looking for what you think to be the
best, and will wish to be married to the man or woman who is the very
best.’ This is indeed a holy, rather than a philosophical sentiment, and
wisdom, not philosophy, speaks. This is the holy error and blessed
deception between man and wife, when affection perfect and
unimpaired keeps marriage inviolate not so much by continency of body
as by chastity of mind. But what with other women is an error, is, in my
case, the manifest truth: since what they suppose in their husbands, I—
and the whole world agrees—know to be in thee. My love for thee is
truth, being free from all error. Who among kings or philosophers can
vie with your fame? What country, what city does not thirst to see you?
Who, I ask, did not hurry to see you appearing in public and crane his
neck to catch a last glimpse as you departed? What wife, what maid did
not yearn for you absent, and burn when you were present? What queen
did not envy me my joys and couch? There were in you two qualities by
which you could draw the soul of any woman, the gift of poetry and the
gift of singing, gifts which other philosophers have lacked. As a
distraction from labour, you composed love-songs both in metre and in
rhyme, which for their sweet sentiment and music have been sung and
resung and have kept your name in every mouth. Your sweet melodies
do not permit even the illiterate to forget you. Because of these gifts
women sighed for your love. And, as these songs sung of our loves, they
quickly spread my name in many lands, and made me the envy of my
sex. What excellence of mind or body did not adorn your youth? No
woman, then envious, but now would pity me bereft of such delights.
What enemy even would not now be softened by the compassion due
me?
“I have brought thee evil, thou knowest how innocently. Not the result
of the act but the disposition of the doer makes the crime; justice does
not consider what happens, but through what intent it happens. My
intent towards thee thou only hast proved and alone canst judge. I
commit everything to thy weighing and submit to thy decree.

Page 22

“Tell me one thing: why, after our conversion, commanded by thee, did
I drop into oblivion, to be no more refreshed by speech of thine or
letter? Tell me, I say, if you can, or I will say what I feel and what every
one suspects: desire rather than friendship drew you to me, lust rather
than love. So when desire ceased, whatever you were manifesting for its
sake likewise vanished. This, beloved, is not so much my opinion as the
opinion of all. Would it were only mine and that thy love might find
defenders to argue away my pain. Would that I could invent some
reason to excuse you and also cover my cheapness. Listen, I beg, to
what I ask, and it will seem small and very easy to you. Since I am
cheated of your presence, at least put vows in words, of which you have
a store, and so keep before me the sweetness of thine image. I shall
vainly expect you to be bountiful in acts if I find you a miser in words.
Truly I thought that I merited much from you, when I had done all for
your sake and still continue in obedience. When little more than a girl I
took the hard vows of a nun, not from piety but at your command. If I
merit nothing from thee, how vain I deem my labour! I can expect no
reward from God, as I have done nothing from love of Him. Thee
hurrying to God I followed, or rather went before. For, as you
remembered how Lot’s wife turned back, you first delivered me to God
bound with the vow, and then yourself. That single act of distrust, I
confess, grieved me and made me blush. God knows, at your command
I would have followed or preceded you to fiery places. For my heart is
not with me, but with thee; and now more than ever, if not with thee it is
nowhere, for it cannot exist without thee. That my heart may be well
with thee, see to it, I beg; and it will be well if it finds thee kind,
rendering grace for grace—a little for much. Beloved, would that thy
love were less sure of me so that it might be more solicitous; I have
made you so secure that you are negligent. Remember all I have done
and think what you owe. While I enjoyed carnal joy with you, many
people were uncertain whether I acted from love or lust. Now the end
makes clear the beginning; I have cut myself off from pleasure to obey
thy will. I have kept nothing, save to be more than ever thine. Think
how wicked it were in thee where all the more is due to render less,
nothing almost; especially when little is asked, and that so easy for you.
In the name of God to whom you have vowed yourself, give me that of
thee which is possible, the consolation of a letter. I promise, thus

Page 23

refreshed, to serve God more readily. When of old you would call me to
pleasures, you sought me with frequent letters, and never failed with thy
songs to keep thy Heloïse on every tongue; the streets, the houses re-
echoed me. How much fitter that you should now incite me to God than
then to lust? Bethink thee what thou owest; heed what I ask; and a long
letter I will conclude with a brief ending: farewell only one!”
Remarks upon this letter would seem to profane a shrine—had the man
profaned that shrine? He had not always worshipped there. Heloïse knew
this, for all her love. She said it too, writing in phraseology which had been
brutalized through the denouncing spirit of Latin monasticism. How truly
she puts the situation and how clearly she thinks withal, discerning as it
were the beautiful and true in love and marriage. The whole letter is well
arranged, and written in a style showing the writer’s training in Latin
mediaeval rhetoric. It was not the less deeply felt because composed with
care and skill. Evidently the writer is of the Middle Ages; her occasional
prolixity was not of her sex but of her time; and she quotes the ancients so
naturally; what they say should be convincing. How the letter bares the
motives of her own conduct: not for God’s sake, or the kingdom of heaven’s
sake, but for Abaelard’s sake she became a nun. She had no inclination
thereto; her letters do not indicate that she ever became really and
spontaneously devoted to her calling. Abaelard was her God, and as her
God she held him to the end; though she applied herself to the consideration
of religious topics, as we shall see. Moreover, her position as nun and
abbess could not fail to force such topics on her consideration.
Is there another such love-letter, setting forth a situation so triple-barred and
hopeless? And the love which fills the letter, which throbs and burns in it,
which speaks and argues in it, how absolute is this love. It is love carried
out to its full conclusions; it includes the whole woman and the whole of
her life; whatever lies beyond its ken and care is scorned and rejected. This
love is extreme in its humility, and yet realizes its own purity and worth; it
is grieved at the thought of rousing a feeling baser than itself. Heloïse had
been and still was Heloïse, devoted and self-sacrificing in her love. But the
situation has become torture; her heart is filled with all manner of pain, old
and new, till it is driven to assert its right at least to consolation. Thus
Heloïse’s love becomes insistent and requiring. Was it possibly burdensome
to the man who now might wish to think no more of passion? who might

Page 24

wish no longer to be loved in that way? In his reply Abaelard does not
unveil himself; he seems to take an attitude which may have been the most
faithful expression that he could devise of his changed self.
“To Heloïse his beloved sister in Christ, Abaelard her brother in the
Same.”
This superscription was a gentle reminder of their present relationship—in
Christ. The writer begins: his not having written since their conversion was
to be ascribed not to his negligence, but to his confidence in her wisdom; he
did not think that she who, so full of grace, had consoled her sister nuns
when prioress, could as abbess need teaching or exhortation for the
guidance of her daughters; but if, in her humility, she felt the need of his
instruction in matters pertaining to God, she might write, and he would
answer, as the Lord should grant. Thanks be to God who had filled their
hearts—hers and her nuns—with solicitude for his perils, and had made
them participators in his afflictions; through their prayers the divine pity
had protected him. He had hastened to send the Psalter, requested by his
sister, formerly dear to him in the world and now most dear in Christ, to
assist their prayers. The potency of prayer, with God and the saints, and
especially the prayer of women for those dear to them, is frequently
declared in Scripture; he cites a number of passages to prove it. May these
move her to pray for him. He refers with affectionate gratitude to the
prayers which the nuns had been offering for him, and encloses a short
prayer for his safety, which he begs and implores may be used in their daily
canonical hours. If the Lord, however, delivers him into the hands of his
enemies to kill him, or if he meet his death in any way, he begs that his
body may be brought to the Paraclete for burial, so that the sight of his
sepulchre may move his daughters and sisters in Christ to pray for him; no
place could be so safe and salutary for the soul of one bitterly repenting of
his sins, as that consecrated to the true Paraclete—the Comforter; nor could
fitter Christian burial be found than among women devoted by their vows to
Christ. He begs that the great solicitude which they now have for his bodily
safety, they will then have for the salvation of his soul, and by the suffrage
of their prayer for the dead man show how they had loved him when alive.
The letter closes, not with a personal word to Heloïse, but with this distich:

Page 25

“Vive, vale, vivantque tuae valeantque sorores,
Vivite, sed Christo, quaeso, mei memores.”

Thus as against Heloïse’s beseeching love, Abaelard lifted his hands, palms
out, repelling it. His letter ignored all that filled the soul and the letter of
Heloïse. His reply did not lack words of spiritual affection, and its tone was
not as formal then as it now seems. When Abaelard asked for the prayers of
Heloïse and her nuns, he meant it; he desired the efficacy of their prayers.
Then he wished to be buried among them. We are touched by this; but,
again, Abaelard meant it, as he said, for his soul’s welfare; it was no love
sentiment. The letter stirred the heart of Heloïse to a rebellious outcry
against the cruelty of God, if not of Abaelard, a soul’s cry against life and
the calm attitude of one who no longer was—or at least meant to be no
longer—what he had been to her.
“To her only one, next to Christ, his only one in Christ.
“I wonder, my only one, that contrary to epistolary custom and the
natural order of things, in the salutation of your letter you have placed
me before you, a woman before a man, a wife before a husband, a
servant before her lord, a nun before a monk and priest, a deaconess
before an abbot. The proper order is for one writing to a superior to put
his own name last, but when writing to an inferior, the writer’s name
should precede. We also marvelled, that where you should have
afforded us consolation, you added to our desolation, and excited the
tears you should have quieted. How could we restrain our tears when
reading what you wrote towards the end: ‘If the Lord shall deliver me
into the hand of my enemies to slay me’! Dearest, how couldst thou
think or say that? May God never forget His handmaids, to leave them
living when you are no more! May He never allot to us that life, which
would be harder than any death! It is for you to perform our obsequies
and commend our souls to God, and send before to God those whom
you have gathered for Him—that you may have no further anxiety, and
follow us the more gladly because assured of our safety. Refrain, my
lord, I beg, from making the miserable most miserable with such words;
destroy not our life before we die. ‘Sufficient unto the day is the evil

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thereof’—and that day will come to all with bitterness enough. ‘What
need,’ says Seneca, ‘to add to evil, and destroy life before death?’
“Thou askest, only one, that, in the event of thy death when absent from
us, we should have thy body brought to our cemetery, in order that,
being always in our memory, thou shouldst obtain greater benefit from
our prayers. Did you think that your memory could slip from us? How
could we pray, with distracted minds? What use of tongue or reason
would be left to us? When the mind is crazed against God it will not
placate Him with prayer so much as irritate Him with complaints. We
could only weep, pressing to follow rather than bury you. How could
we live after we had lost our life in you? The thought of your death is
death to us; what would be the actuality? God grant we shall not have to
pay those rites to one from whom we look for them; may we go before
and not follow! A heart crushed with grief is not calm, nor is a mind
tossed by troubles open to God. Do not, I beg, hinder the divine service
to which we are dedicated.
“What remains of hope for me when thou art gone? Or what reason to
continue in this pilgrimage, where I have no solace save thee? and of
thee I have but the bare knowledge that thou dost live, since thy
restoring presence is not granted me. Oh!—if it is right to say it—how
cruel has God been to me! Inclement Clemency! Fortune has emptied
her quiver against me, so that others have nothing to fear! If indeed a
single dart were left, no place could be found in me for a new wound.
Fortune fears only lest I escape her tortures by death. Wretched and
unhappy! in thee I was lifted above all women; in thee am I the more
fatally thrown down. What glory did I have in thee! what ruin have I
now! Fortune made me the happiest of women that she might make me
the most miserable. The injury was the more outrageous in that all ways
of right were broken. While we were abandoned to love’s delights, the
divine severity spared us. When we made the forbidden lawful and by
marriage wiped out fornication’s stains, the Lord’s wrath broke on us,
impatient of an unsullied bed when it long had borne with one defiled.
A man taken in adultery would have been amply punished by what
came to you. What others deserved for adultery, that you got from the
marriage which you thought had made amends for everything.
Adulteresses bring their paramours what your own wife brought you.

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Not when we lived for pleasure, but when, separated, we lived in
chastity, you presiding at the Paris schools, I at thy command dwelling
with the nuns at Argenteuil; you devoted to study, I to prayer and holy
reading; it was then that you alone paid the penalty for what we had
done together. Alone you bore the punishment, which you deserved less
than I. When you had humiliated yourself and elevated me and all my
kin, you little merited that punishment either from God or from those
traitors. Miserable me, begotten to cause such a crime! O womankind
ever the ruin of the noblest men![4]
“Well the Tempter knows how easy is man’s overthrow through a wife.
He cast his malice over us, and the man whom he could not throw down
through fornication, he tried with marriage, using a good to bring about
an evil where evil means had failed. I thank God at least for this, that
the Tempter did not draw me to assent to that which became the cause
of the evil deed. Yet, although in this my mind absolves me, too many
sins had gone before to leave me guiltless of that crime. For long a
servant of forbidden joys, I earned the punishment which I now suffer
of past sins. Let the evil end be attributed to ill beginnings! May my
penitence be meet for what I have done, and may long remorse in some
way compensate for the penalty you suffered! What once you suffered
in the body, may I through contrition bear to the end of life, that so I
may make satisfaction to thee if not to God. To confess the infirmities
of my most wretched soul, I can find no penitence to offer God, whom I
never cease to accuse of utter cruelty towards you. Rebellious to His
rule, I offend Him with indignation more than I placate Him with
penitence. For that cannot be called the sinner’s penitence where,
whatever be the body’s suffering, the mind retains the will to sin and
still burns with the same desires. It is easy in confession to accuse
oneself of sins, and also to do penance with the body; but hard indeed to
turn the heart from the desire of its greatest joys![5] Love’s pleasures,
which we knew together, cannot be made displeasing to me nor driven
from my memory. Wherever I turn, they press upon me, nor do they
spare my dreams. Even in the solemn moments of the Mass, when
prayer should be the purest, their phantoms catch my soul. When I
should groan for what I have done, I sigh for what I have lost. Not only
our acts, but times and places stick fast in my mind, and my body

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quivers. O truly wretched me, fit only to utter this cry of the soul:
‘Wretched that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?’
Would I could add with truth what follows:—‘I thank God through
Jesus Christ our Lord.’ Such thanksgiving, dearest, may be thine, by one
bodily ill cured of many tortures of the soul, and God may have been
merciful where He seemed against you; like a good physician who does
not spare the pain needed to save life. But I am tortured with passion
and the fires of memory. They call me chaste, who do not know me for
a hypocrite. They look upon purity of the flesh as virtue—which is of
the soul, not of the body. Having some praise from men, I merit none
from God, who knows the heart. I am called religious at a time when
most religion is hypocrisy, and when whoever keeps from offence
against human law is praised. Perhaps it seems praiseworthy and
acceptable to God, through decent conduct,—whatever the intent—to
avoid scandalizing the Church or causing the Lord’s name to be
blasphemed or the religious Order discredited. Perhaps it may be of
grace just to abstain from evil. But the Scripture says, ‘Refrain from evil
and do good’; and vainly he attempts either who does not act from love
of God. God knows that I have always feared to offend thee more than I
feared to offend Him; and have desired to please thee rather than Him.
Thy command, not the divine love, put on me this garb of religion.
What a wretched life I lead if I vainly endure all this here and am to
have no reward hereafter. My hypocrisy has long deceived you, as it has
others, and therefore you desire my prayers. Have no such confidence; I
need your prayers; do not withdraw their aid. Do not take away the
medicine, thinking me whole. Do not cease to think me needy; do not
think me strong; do not delay your help. Cease from praising me, I beg.
No one versed in medicine will judge of inner disease from outward
view. Thy praise is the more perilous because I love it, and desire to
please thee always. Be fearful rather than confident regarding me, so
that I may have the help of your care. Do not seek to spur me on, by
quoting, ‘For strength is made perfect in weakness,’ or ‘He is not
crowned unless he have contended lawfully.’ I am not looking for the
crown of victory; enough for me to escape peril;—safer to shun peril
than to wage war! In whatever little corner of heaven God puts me, that
will satisfy me. Hear what Saint Jerome says: ‘I confess my weakness; I

Page 29

do not wish to fight for the hope of victory, lest I lose.’ Why give up
certainties to follow the uncertain?”
This letter gives a view of Heloïse’s mind, its strong grasp and its capacity
for reasoning, though its reasoning is here distraught with passion.
Scathingly, half-blinded by her pain, she declares the perversities of
Providence, as they glared upon her. Such a disclosure of the woman’s mind
suggests how broadly based in thought and largely reared was that great
love into which her whole soul had been poured, the mind as well as heart.
Her love was great, unique, not only from its force of feeling, but from the
power and scope of thought by which passion and feeling were carried out
so far and fully to the last conclusions of devotion. The letter also shows a
woman driven by stress of misery to utter cries and clutch at remedies that
her calmer self would have put by. It is not hypocrisy to conceal the desires
or imaginings which one would never act upon. To tell these is not true
disclosure of oneself, but slander. Torn by pain, Heloïse makes herself more
vile and needy than in other moments she knew herself to be. Yet the letter
also uncovers her, and in nakedness there is some truth. Doubtless her nun’s
garb did clothe a hypocrite. Whatever she felt—and here we see the worst
she felt—before the world she had to act the nun. We shall soon see how
she forced herself to act, or be, the nun toward Abaelard.
Abaelard replied in a letter filled with religious argument and consolation. It
was self-controlled, firm, authoritative, and strong in those arguments
regarding God’s mercy which have stood the test of time. If they sometimes
fail to satisfy the embittered soul, at least they are the best that man has
known. And withal, the letter is calmly and nobly affectionate—what place
was there for love’s protestations? They would have increased the evil,
adding fuel to Heloïse’s passionate misery.
The master-note is struck in the address: “To the spouse of Christ, His
servant.” The letter seeks to turn Heloïse’s thoughts to her nun’s calling and
her soul’s salvation. It divides her expressions of complaint under four
heads. First, he had put her name first, because she had become his superior
from the moment of her bridal with his master Christ. Jerome writing to
Eustochium called her Lady, when she had become the spouse of Jerome’s
Lord. Abaelard shows, with citations from the Song of Songs, the glory of
the spouse, and how her prayers should be sought by one who was the

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servant of her Husband. Second, as to the terrors roused in her by his
mention of his peril and possible death, he points out that in her first letter
she had bidden him write of those perils; if they brought him death, she
should deem that a kind release. She should not wish to see his miseries
drawn out, even for her sake. Third, he shows that his praise of her was
justified even by her disclaimer of merit—as it is written, Who humbles
himself shall be exalted. He warns her against false modesty which may be
vanity.
He turns at last to the old and ceaseless plaint which she makes against God
for cruelty, when she should rather glorify Him; he had thought that that
bitterness had departed, so dangerous for her, so painful to him. If she
wished to please him, let her lay it aside; retaining it, she could not please
him or advance with him to blessedness; let her have this much religion, not
to separate herself from him hastening to God; let her take comfort in their
journeying to the same goal. He then shows her that his punishment was
just as well as merciful; he had deserved it from God and also from Fulbert.
If she will consider, she will see in it God’s justice and His mercy; God had
saved them from shipwreck; had raised a barrier against shame and lust. For
himself the punishment was purification, not privation; will not she, as his
inseparable comrade, participate in the workings of this grace, even as she
shared the guilt and its pardon? Once he had thought of binding her to him
in wedlock; but God found a means to turn them both to Him; and the Lord
was continuing His mercy towards her, causing her to bring forth spiritual
daughters, when otherwise she would only have borne children in the flesh;
in her the curse of Eve is turned to the blessing of Mary. God had purified
them both; whom God loveth He correcteth. Oh! let her thoughts dwell with
the Son of God, seized, dragged, beaten, spit upon, crowned with thorns,
hung on a vile cross. Let her think of Him as her spouse, and for Him let her
make lament; He bought her with himself, He loved her. In comparison
with His love, his own (Abaelard’s) was lust, seeking the pleasure it could
get from her. If he, Abaelard, had suffered for her, it was not willingly nor
for her sake, as Christ had suffered, and for her salvation. Let her weep for
Him who made her whole, not for her corrupter; for her Redeemer, not for
her defiler; for the Lord who died for her, not for the living servant, himself
just freed from the death. Let his sister accept with patience what came to
her in mercy from Him who wounded the body to save the soul.

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“We are one in Christ, as through marriage we were one flesh. Whatever
is thine is not alien to me. Christ is thine, because thou art His spouse.
And now thou hast me for a servant, who formerly was thy master—a
servant united to thee by spiritual love. I trust in thy pleading with Him
for such defence as my own prayers may not obtain. That nothing may
hinder this petition I have composed this prayer, which I send thee: ‘O
God, who formed woman from the side of man and didst sanction the
sacrament of marriage; who didst bestow upon my frailty a cure for its
incontinence; do not despise the prayers of thy handmaid, and the
prayers which I pour out for my sins and those of my dear one. Pardon
our great crimes, and may the enormity of our faults find the greatness
of thy ineffable mercy. Punish the culprits in the present; spare, in the
future. Thou hast joined us, Lord, and hast divided us, as it pleased thee.
Now complete most mercifully what thou hast begun in mercy; and
those whom thou hast divided in this world, join eternally in heaven,
thou who art our hope, our portion, our expectation, our consolation,
Lord blessed forever. Amen.’
“Farewell in Christ, spouse of Christ; in Christ farewell and in Christ
live. Amen.”
In her next letter Heloïse obeys, and turns her pen if not her thoughts to the
topics suggested by Abaelard’s admonitions. The short scholastically
phrased address cannot be rendered in any modern fashion: “Domino
specialiter sua singulariter.”
“That you may have no further reason to call me disobedient, your
command shall bridle the words of unrestrained grief; in writing I will
moderate my language, which I might be unable to do in speech.
Nothing is less in our power than our heart; which compels us to obey
more often than it obeys us. When our affections goad us, we cannot
keep the sudden impulse from breaking out in words; as it is written,
‘From the fulness of the heart the mouth speaketh.’ So I will withhold
my hand from writing whenever I am unable to control my words.
Would that the sorrowing heart were as ready to obey as the hand that
writes! You can afford some remedy to grief, even when unable to
dispel it quite. As one nail driven in drives out another, a new thought
pushes away its predecessor, and the mind is freed for a time. A thought,

Page 32

moreover, takes the mind up and leads it from others more effectually, if
the subject of the thought is excellent and of great importance.”
The rest of this long letter shows Heloïse putting her principles in practice.
She is forcing her mind to consider and her pen to discourse upon topics
which might properly occupy an abbess’s thoughts—topics, moreover,
which would satisfy Abaelard and call forth long letters in reply. Whether
she cared really for these matters or ever came to care for them; or whether
she turned to them to distract her mind and keep up some poor makeshift of
intercourse with one who would and could no longer be her lover; or
whether all these motives mingled, and in what proportion, perhaps may
best be left to Him who tries the heart.
The abbess writes:
“All of us here, servants of Christ and thy daughters, make two requests
of thy fathership which we deem most needful. The one is, that you
would instruct us concerning the origins of the order of nuns and the
authority for our calling. The other is, that you would draw up a written
regula, suitable for women, which shall prescribe and set the order and
usages of our convent. We do not find any adequate regula for women
among the works of the holy Fathers. It is a manifest defect in monastic
institutions that the same rules should be imposed upon both monks and
nuns, and that the weaker sex should bear the same monastic yoke as
the stronger.”
Heloïse, having set this task for Abaelard, proceeds to show how the
various monastic regulae, from Benedict’s downward, failed to make
suitable provision for the habits and requirements and weaknesses of
women, the regulae hitherto having been concerned with the weaknesses of
men. She enters upon matters of clothing and diet, and everything
concerning the lives of nuns. She writes as one learned in Scripture and the
writings of the Fathers, and sets the whole matter forth, in its details, with
admirable understanding of its intricacies. She concludes, reminding
Abaelard that it is for him in his lifetime to set a regula for them to follow
forever; after God, he is their founder. They might thereafter have some
teacher who would build in alien fashion; such a one might have less care

Page 33

and understanding, and might not be as readily obeyed as himself; it is for
him to speak, and they will listen. Vale.
The first of Heloïse’s letters is a great expression of a great love; in the
second, anguish drives the writer’s hand; in the third, she has gained self-
control; she suppresses her heart, and writes a letter which is discursive and
impersonal from the beginning to the little Vale at the end.
Abaelard returned a long epistle upon the Scriptural origin of the order of
nuns, and soon followed it with another, still longer, containing instruction,
advice, and rules for the nuns of the Paraclete. He also wrote them a letter
upon the study of Scripture. From this time forth he proved his devotion to
Heloïse and her nuns by the large body of writings which he composed for
their edification. Heloïse sent him a long list of questions upon obscure
phrases and knotty points of Scripture, which he answered diligently in
detail.[6] He then sent her a collection of hymns written or “rearranged” by
himself for the use of the nuns, accompanied by a prefatory letter: “At thy
prayers, my sister Heloïse, once dear to me in the world, now most dear in
Christ, I have composed what in Greek are called hymns, and in Hebrew
tillim.” He then explains why, yielding to the requests of the nuns, he had
written hymns, of which the Church had such a store.
Next he composed for them a large volume of sermons, which he also sent
with a letter to Heloïse: “Having completed the book of hymns and
sequences, revered in Christ and loved sister Heloïse, I have hastened to
compose some sermons for your congregation; I have paid more attention to
the meaning than the language. But perhaps an unstudied style is well suited
to simple auditors. In composing and arranging these sermons I have
followed the order of Church festivals. Farewell in the Lord, servant of His,
once dear to me in the world, now most dear in Christ: in the flesh then my
wife, now my sister in the spirit and partner in our sacred calling.”
At a subsequent period, when his opinions were condemned by the Council
of Sens, he sent to Heloïse a confession of faith. Shortly afterward his
stormy life found a last refuge in the monastery of Cluny. His closing years
(of peace?) are described in a letter to Heloïse from the good and revered
abbot, Peter the Venerable. He writes that he had received with joy the letter
which her affection had dictated,[7] and now took the first opportunity to

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express his recognition of her affection and his reverence for herself. He
refers to her keenly prosecuted studies (so rare for women) before taking
the veil, and then to the glorious example of her sage and holy life in the
nun’s sacred calling—her victory over the proud Prince of this World. His
admiration for her was deep; his expression of it was extreme. A learned,
wise, and holy woman could not be praised more ardently than Heloïse is
praised by this good man. He had spoken of the advantages his monastery
would have derived from her presence, and then continued:
“But although God’s providence denied us this, it was granted us to
enjoy the presence of him—who was yours—Master Peter Abaelard, a
man always to be spoken of with honour as a true servant of Christ and
a philosopher. The divine dispensation placed him in Cluny for his last
years, and through him enriched our monastery with treasure richer than
gold. No brief writing could do justice to his holy, humble, and devoted
life among us. I have not seen his equal in humility of garb and manner.
When in the crowd of our brethren I forced him to take a first place, in
meanness of clothing he appeared as the last of all. Often I marvelled,
as the monks walked past me, to see a man so great and famous thus
despise and abase himself. He was abstemious in food and drink,
refusing and condemning everything beyond the bare necessities. He
was assiduous in study, frequent in prayer, always silent unless
compelled to answer the question of some brother or expound sacred
themes before us. He partook of the sacrament as often as possible.
Truly his mind, his tongue, his act, taught and exemplified religion,
philosophy, and learning. So he dwelt with us, a man simple and
righteous, fearing God, turning from evil, consecrating to God the latter
days of his life. At last, because of his bodily infirmities, I sent him to a
quiet and salubrious retreat on the banks of the Saone. There he bent
over his books, as long as his strength lasted, always praying, reading,
writing, or dictating. In these sacred exercises, not sleeping but
watching, he was found by the heavenly Visitor; who summoned him to
the eternal wedding-feast not as a foolish but as a wise virgin, bearing
his lamp filled with oil—the consciousness of a holy life. When he
came to pay humanity’s last debt, his illness was brief. With holy
devotion he made confession of the Catholic Faith, then of his sins. The
brothers who were with him can testify how devoutly he received the

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viaticum of that last journey, and with what fervent faith he commended
his body and soul to his Redeemer. Thus this master, Peter, completed
his days. He who was known throughout the world by the fame of his
teaching, entered the school of Him who said, ‘Learn of me, for I am
meek and lowly of heart’; and continuing meek and lowly he passed to
Him, as we may believe.
“Venerable and dearest sister in the Lord, the man who was once joined
to thee in the flesh, and then by the stronger chain of divine love, him in
thy stead, or as another thee, the Lord holds in His bosom; and at the
day of His coming, His grace will restore him to thee.”
The abbot afterwards visited the Paraclete, and on returning to Cluny
received this letter from the abbess:
“God’s mercy visiting us, we have been visited by the favour of your
graciousness. We are glad, kindest father, and we glory that your
greatness condescended to our insignificance. A visit from you is an
honour even to the great. The others may know the great benefit they
received from the presence of your highness. I cannot tell in words, or
even comprehend in thought, how beneficial and how sweet your
coming was to me. You, our abbot and our lord, celebrated mass with us
the sixteenth of the Calends of last December; you commended us to the
Holy Spirit; you nourished us with the Divine Word;—you gave us the
body of the master, and confirmed that gift from Cluny. To me also,
unworthy to be your servant, though by word and letter you have called
me sister, you gave as a pledge of sincere love the privilege of a
Tricenarium, to be performed by the brethren of Cluny, after my death,
for the benefit of my soul. You have promised to confirm this under
your seal. May you fulfil this, my lord. Might it please you also to send
to me that other sealed roll, containing the absolution of the master, that
I may hang it on his tomb. Remember also, for the love of God, our—
and your—Astralabius, to obtain for him a prebend from the bishop of
Paris or another. Farewell. May God preserve you, and grant to us
sometime your presence.”
The good abbot replied with a kind and affectionate letter, confirming his
gift of the Tricenarium, promising to do all he could for Astralabius, and

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sending with his letter the record of Abaelard’s absolution, as follows:
“I, Peter, Abbot of Cluny, who received Peter Abaelard to be a monk in
Cluny, and granted his body, secretly transported, to the Abbess Heloïse
and the nuns of the Paraclete, absolve him, in the performance of my
office (pro officio) by the authority of the omnipotent God and all the
saints, from all his sins.”
Abaelard died in the year 1142, aged sixty-three. Twenty-one years
afterward Heloïse died at the same age, and was buried in the same tomb
with him at the Paraclete:

“Hoc tumulo abbatissa jacet prudens Heloïssa.”

CHAPTER XXVI

GERMAN CONSIDERATIONS: WALTHER VON
DER VOGELWEIDE
A criticism of the world of feudalism, chivalry, and love may be had from
the impressions and temperamental reactions of a certain thinking atom
revolving in the same. The atom referred to was Walther von der
Vogelweide, a German, a knight, a Minnesinger, and a national poet whose
thoughts were moved by the instincts of his caste and race.
In language, temperament, and character, the Germans east of the Rhine
were Germans still in the thirteenth century. They had accepted, and even
vitally appropriated, Latin Christianity; those of them who were educated
had received a Latin education. Yet their natures, though somewhat
tempered, showed largely and distinctly German. Moreover, through the

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centuries, they had acquired—or rather they had never lost—a national
antipathy toward those Roman papal well-springs of authority, which
seemed to suck back German gold and lands in return for spiritual
assurance and political betrayal.
A different and already mediaevalized element had also become part of
German culture, to wit, the matter of the French Arthurian romances and the
lyric fashions of Provence, which, working together, had captivated modish
German circles from the Rhine to the Danube. Nevertheless the German
character maintained itself in the Minnelieder which followed Provençal
poetry, and in the höfisch (courtly) epics which were palpable translations
from the French.[8] The distinguished group of German poets whose lives
fall around the year 1200, were as German as their language, although they
borrowed from abroad the form and matter of their compositions.
There could be no better Germans than the two most thoughtful of this
group, Wolfram von Eschenbach and Walther von der Vogelweide. Most
Germanically the former wrestled with that ancient theme, “from suffering,
wisdom,” which he pressed into the tale of Parzival. His great poem,
achieved with toil and sweat, was mighty in its climaxes, and fit to
strengthen the hearts of those men who through sorrow and loneliness and
despair’s temptations were growing “slowly wise.”
The virtues which Wolfram praised and embodied in his hero were those
praised in the verses, and even, one may think, strugglingly exemplified in
the conduct, of Walther von der Vogelweide,[9] most famous of
Minnesingers, and a power in the German lands through his Sprüche, or
verses personal and political. Less is known of his life than of his whole and
manly views, his poetic fancies, his musings, his hopes, and great
depressions. Many places have claimed the honour of his birth, which took
place somewhat before 1170. He was poor, and through his youth and
manhood moved about from castle to castle, and from court to court,
seeking to win some recompense for his excellent verses and good
company. Thus he learned much of men, “climbing another’s stairs,” with
his fellows, at the Landgraf Hermann’s Wartburg, or at the Austrian ducal
Court.

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Walther’s Sprüche render his moods most surely, and reflect his outlook on
the world. His charming Minnelieder bear more conventional evidence. The
courtly German love-songs passing by this name were affected by the
conceits and conventions of the Provençal poetry upon which they were
modelled. A strong nature might use such with power, or break with their
influence. Walther made his own the high convention of trouvère and
troubadour, that love uplifts the lover’s being. Besides this, and besides the
lighter forms and phrases current in such poetry, his Lieder carry natural
feeling, joy, and moral levity, according to the theme; they also may express
Walther’s convictions.
To take examples: Walther’s Tagelied[10] imitates the Provençal alba
(dawn), in which knight and truant lady bewail the coming of the light and
the parting which it brings. Far more joyous, and as immoral as one pleases,
is Unter der Linde, most famous of his songs. Marvellously it gives the
mood of love’s joy remembered—and anticipated too. The immorality is
complete (if we will be serious), and is rendered most alluring by the utter
gladness of the girl’s song—no repentance, no regret; only joy and roguish
laughter.
Walther was young, he was a knight and a Minnesinger; he had doubtless
loved, in this way! His love-songs have plenty to say of the red mouth,
good for kissing—I care not who knows it either. But he also realizes, and
greatly sings, the height and breadth and worth of love the true and stable,
the blessing and completion of two lives, which comes to a false heart
never.[11] He seems to feel it necessary to defend love for itself, perhaps
because marriage was taken more seriously in this imitative German
literature than in the French and Provençal originals: “Who says that love is
sin, let him consider well. Many an honour dwells with her, and troth and
happiness. If one does ill to the other, love is grieved. I do not mean false
love; that were better named un-love. No friend of that, am I.” But his
thoughts turn quickly to love as a lasting union: “He happy man, she happy
woman, whose hearts are to each other true; both lives increased in price
and worth; blessed their years and all their days.”[12]
Giving play to his caustic temper, Walther puts scorn upon the light of love:
“Fool he who cannot understand what joy and good, love brings. But the
light man is ever pleased with light things, as is fit!”[13] This Minnesinger

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applied most earnest standards to life; lofty his praise of the qualities of
womanhood, which are better than beauty or riches: “woman” is a higher
word than “lady”[14]—it took a German to say this. “He who carries hidden
sorrow in his heart, let him think upon a good woman—he is freed.”[15]
With a burst of patriotism, in one of his greatest poems Walther praises
German women as the best in all the world.[16]
But even in the Minnelieder, Walther has his despondencies. One of the
most definite, and possibly conventional, was regret for love’s labour lost,
and the days of youth spent in service of an ungracious fair. The poet
wonders how it is that he who has helped other men is tongue-tied before
his lady. Again, his reflections broaden from thoughts of unresponsive fair
ones to a conviction of life’s thanklessness. “I have well served the World
(Frau Welt, Society), and gladly would serve her more, but for her evil
thanks and her way of preferring fools to me.... Come, World, give me
better greeting—the loss is not all mine.” He knows his good unbending
temper which will not endure to hear ill spoken of the upright. But he
thinks, what is the use? why speak so sweetly, why sing, when virtue and
beauty are so lightly held, and every one does evil, fearing nought? The
verse which carries these reflections is tossing in the squally haven of
Society; soon the poet will encounter the wild sea without. Still from the
windy harbour comes one grand lament over art’s decline: “The worst songs
please, frogs’ voices! Oh, I laugh from anger! Lady World, no score of mine
is on your devil’s slate. Many a life of man and woman have I made glad—
might I so have gladdened mine! Here, I make my Will, and bequeath my
goods—to the envious my ill-luck, my sorrows to the liars, my follies to
false lovers, and to the ladies my heart’s pain.”[17] He makes a solemn
offering of his poems: “Good women, worthy men, a loving greeting is my
due. Forty years have I sung fittingly of love; and now, take my songs
which gladden, as my gift to you. Your favour be my return. And with my
staff I will fare on, still wooing worth with undisheartened work, as from
my childhood. So shall I be, in lowly lot, one of the Noble—for me
enough.”
To relish Walther’s love-songs, one need not know whether she was dark or
fair, kept forest-tryst or listened by some castle’s hearth, or in what German
land that castle stood. Likewise in his Sprüche, which have other bearing,
the roll of his protesting voice carries the universal human. To comprehend

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them it were well to know that life was then as now niggardly in rewarding
virtue; beyond this, one needs to have the type-idea of the Empire and the
Papacy, those two powers which were set, somewhat antagonistically, on
the decree of God; both claiming the world’s headship; the one, Roman in
tradition, but in strength and temper German, and of this world decidedly.
The other, Roman in the genius of its organization, and Christian in its
subordination of the life below to the life to come, if not in the methods of
establishing this consummation; Christian too, but more especially
mediaeval, in its formal disdain for whatever belonged to earth. In Germany
these two partial opposites were further antagonized, since the native
resources recoiled from the foreign drain upon them, and the struggling
patriotism of a broken land resented the pressure of a state within and above
the state of duke and king and emperor.
In Walther’s time Innocent III. swayed the nations from Peter’s throne. Just
before Innocent’s accession, Germany’s able emperor, Henry VI., died
suddenly in Sicily (September 1197), leaving an heir not two years old. The
queen-mother, dying the next year, bequeathed this child, Frederick, to the
paternal care of Innocent, his feudal as well as ghostly lord, since the queen,
for herself and child, had accepted the Pope as the feudal suzerain of their
kingdom of Sicily. In Germany (using that name loosely and broadly) Philip
Hohenstauffen, Henry’s brother and Duke of Suabia, claimed the throne.
His unequal opponent was Otto of Brunswick, of the ever-rebellious house
of Henry the Lion. The Pope opposed the Hohenstauffen; but was obliged
to acknowledge him when the course of the ten years of wasting civil war in
Germany decided in his favour—whereupon, alack! Philip was murdered
(1207). Quickly the Pope turned back to Otto; but the latter, after he had
been crowned king and emperor, became intolerable to Innocent through the
compulsion of his position as the head of an empire inherently hostile to the
papacy. To thwart him Innocent set up his own ward, Frederick. Soon this
precocious youth began to make head against pope-forsaken Otto; and then
the excommunicated emperor was overthrown in 1214 by Philip Augustus
of France, who had intervened in Frederick’s favour. So Otto passed away,
and, some time after, Frederick was crowned German king at Aix-la-
Chapelle.[18] In the meanwhile Innocent died (1216), and amity followed
between Frederick and the gentle Honorius III., who crowned Frederick

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emperor at Rome in 1220. This peace ended quickly when the sterner
Gregory IX. ascended the papal throne on the death of Honorius in 1227.
Walther’s life extended through these events. Though apparently changing
sides under the stress of his necessities, he was patriotically German to the
end. First he clave to the Hohenstauffen, Philip, as the true upholder of
German interests against Otto and the Pope. On Philip’s death, he turned to
Otto; but with all the world left him at last for Frederick. It is known that
Walther, an easily angered man, felt himself ill-used by Otto and justified in
turning to the open-handed Frederick, who finally gave him a small fief. To
the last, Walther upheld him as Germany’s sovereign. Probably the poet
died in the year 1228, just as Gregory was succeeding Honorius, and the
death-struggle of the Empire with the Papacy was opening.
With no light heart, as well may be imagined, had Walther looked about
him on the death of the emperor Henry in 1197. “I sat upon a rock, crossed
knee on knee, and with elbow so supported, chin on hand I leaned.
Anxiously I pondered. I could see no way to win gain without loss. Honour
and riches do not go hand in hand, both of less value than God’s favour.
Would I have them all? Alas! riches and worldly honour and God’s favour
come not within the closure of one heart’s wishes. The ways are barred;
perfidy lurks in secret, and might walks the highroads. Peace and law are
wounded.”[19]
The personal dilemma of the poet with his fortune to make, but desirous of
doing right, mirrors the desperate situation of the State: “Woe is thee,
German tongue; ill stand thy order and thy honour!—I hear the lies of
Rome betraying two kings!” And in verses of wrath Walther inveighs
against the Pope. The sweeping nature of his denunciation raises the
question whether he merely attacked the supposed treachery of the reigning
pope, or was opposed to the papacy as an institution hostile to the German
nation.
The answer is not clear. Mediaeval denunciations of the Church range from
indictments of particular abuses, on through more general invectives, to the
clear protests of heretics impugning the ecclesiastical system. It is not
always easy to ascertain the speaker’s meaning. Usually the abuse and not
the system is attacked. Hostility to the latter, however sweeping the

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language of satirist or preacher, is not lightly to be inferred. The invectives
of St. Bernard and Damiani are very broad; but where had the Church more
devoted sons? Even the satirists composing in Old French rarely intended
an assault upon her spiritual authority. It would seem as if, at least in the
Romance countries, one must look for such hostility to heretical circles, the
Waldenses for example. And from the orthodox mediaeval standpoint, this
was their most accursed heresy.
It would have been hard for any German to use broader language than some
of the French satirists and Latin castigators. If there was a difference, it
must be sought in the specific matter of the German disapproval viewed in
connection with the political situation. Was a position ever taken
incompatible with the Church’s absolute spiritual authority? or one
intrinsically irreconcilable with the secular power of the papacy? At any
time, in any country, papal claims might become irreconcilable with the
royal prerogative—as William the Conqueror had held those of Gregory
VII. in England, and as, two centuries afterwards, Philip the Fair was to
hold those of Boniface VIII. in France. But in neither case was there such
sheer and fundamental antagonism as men felt to exist between the Empire
and the Papacy. Perhaps it was possible in the early thirteenth century for a
German whose whole heart was on the German side to dispute even the
sacerdotal principle of papal authority. It is hard to judge otherwise of
Freidank, the very German composer or collector of trenchant sayings in
the early thirteenth century. Many of these sneer at Rome and the Pope, and
some of them strike the gist of the matter: “Sunde nieman mac vergeben
wan Got alein” (“God alone can forgive sins”). This is the direct statement;
he gives its scornful converse: “Could the Pope absolve me from my oaths
and duties, I’d let other sureties go and fasten to him alone.”[20] Such words
mean denial of the Church’s authority to forgive, and the Pope’s to grant
absolution from oaths of allegiance. Freidank is very near rejecting the
principles of the ecclesiastical system.
Walther, Freidank’s contemporary, is more picturesque: “King Constantine,
he gave so much—as I will tell you—to the Chair of Rome: spear, cross,
and crown. At once the angels cried: ‘Alas! Alas! Alas! Christendom before
stood crowned with righteousness. Now is poison fallen on her, and her
honey turned to gall—sad for the world henceforth!’ To-day the princes all
live in honour; only their highest languishes—so works the priest’s election.

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Be that denounced to thee, sweet God! The priests would upset laymen’s
rights: true is the angels’ prophecy.”[21]
On Constantine’s apocryphal gift, symbolized by the emblems of Christ’s
passion, rested the secular authority of the popes, which Walther laments
with the angels. “The Chair of Rome was first set up by Sorcerer Gerbert!
[Queer history this, but we see what he means.] He destroyed his own soul
only; but this one would bring down Christendom with him to perdition.
When will all tongues call Heaven to arms, and ask God how long He will
sleep? They bring to nought His work, distort His Word. His steward steals
His treasure; His judge robs here and murders there; His shepherd has
become a wolf among His sheep.”[22] The clergy point their fingers
heavenward while they travel fast to hell.[23] How laughs the Pope at us,
when at home with his Italians, at the way he empties our German pockets
into his “poor boxes.”[24] Walther’s hatred of the foreign Pope is roused at
every point. And at last, in a Spruch full of implied meaning, he declares
that Christ’s word as to the tribute money meant that the emperor should
receive his royal due.[25]
These utterances, considered in the light of the political and racial situation,
seem to deny, at least implicitly, the secular power of the papacy. Yet in
matters of religion Walther apparently was entirely orthodox, and a pious
Christian. He has left a sweet prayer to Christ, with ample recognition of
the angels and the saints, and a beautiful verse of penitent contrition, in
which he confesses his sins to God very directly—how that he does the
wrong, and leaves the right, and fails in love of neighbour. “Father, Son,
may thy Spirit lighten mine; how may I love him who does me ill? Ever
dear to me is he who treats me well!”[26] Walther’s questing spirit also
pondered over God’s greatness and incomprehensibility.[27] His open mind
is shown by the famous line: “Him (God) Christians, Jews, and heathen
serve,”[28] a breadth of view shared by his friend Wolfram von Eschenbach,
who speaks of the chaste virtue of a heathen lady as equal to baptism.[29]
The personal lot of this proud heart was not an easy one; homelessness
broke him down, and the bitterness of eating others’ bread. Too well had he
learned of the world and all its changing ways, and how poor becomes the
soul that follows them. Mortality is a trite sorrow; there are worse: “We all
complain that the old die and pass away; rather let us lament taints of

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another hue, that troth and seemliness and honour are dead.”[30] At the last
Walther’s grey memory of life and his vainly yearning hope took form in a
great elegy. After long years he seemed, with heavy steps, and leaning on
his wanderer’s staff, to be returning to a home which was changed forever:
“Alas! whither are they vanished, my many years! Did I dream my life, or
is it real? what I once deemed it, was it that? And now I wake, and all the
things and people once familiar, strange! My playmates, dull and old! And
the fields changed; only that the streams still flow as then they flowed, my
heart would break with thinking on the glad days, vanished in the sea. And
the young people! slow and mirthless! and the knights go clad as peasants!
Ah! Rome! thy ban! Our groans have stilled the song of birds. Fool I, to
speak and so despair,—and the earth looks fair! Up knights again: your
swords, your armour! would to God I might fare with your victor band, and
gain my pay too—not in lands of earth! Oh! might I win the eternal crown
from that sweet voyage beyond the sea, then would I sing O joy! and never
more, alas—never more, alas.”[31]

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BOOK V
SYMBOLISM

CHAPTER XXVII

SCRIPTURAL ALLEGORIES IN THE EARLY
MIDDLE AGES; HONORIUS OF AUTUN
Words, pictures, and other vehicles of expression are symbols of whatever
they are intended to designate. A certain unavoidable symbolism also
inheres in human mental processes; for the mind in knowing “turns itself to
images,” as Aquinas says following Aristotle; and every statement or
formulation is a casting together of data in some presentable and
representative form. An example is the Apostles’ Creed, called also by this
very name of Symbol, being a casting together, an elementary formula, of
the essentials of the Christian Faith. In the same sense the “law of
gravitation” or a moral precept is a deduction, induction, or gathering
together into a representative symbol, of otherwise unassembled and
uncorrelated experience. In the present and following chapters, however,
the term symbol will be used in its common acceptation to indicate a thing,
an act, or a word invested with an adventitious representative significance.
All statements or expressions (through language or by means of pictures)
which are intended to carry, besides their palpable meaning, another which
is veiled and more spiritual, are symbolical or figurative, and more
specifically are called allegories.[32]
These devices of the mind have a history as old as humanity. From
inscrutable beginnings, in time they become recognized as makeshifts; yet
they remain prone to enter new stages of confusion. The mind seeking to
express the transcendental, avails itself of symbols. All religions have
teemed with them, in their primitive phases scarcely distinguishing between

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symbol and fact; then a difference becomes evident to clearer-minded men,
while perhaps at the same time others are elaborately maintaining that the
symbol magically is, or brings to pass, that which it represents. Such
obscuring mysticism existed not merely in confused Egypt and Brahminical
India, but everywhere—in antique Greece and Rome, and then afterwards
through the times of the Christian Church Fathers and the entire Middle
Ages. Fact and symbol are seen constantly closing together and becoming
each other like the serpent-souls in the twenty-fifth canto of Dante’s
Inferno.
Allegory properly speaking, which involves a conscious and sustained
effort to invest concrete or material statements with more general or
spiritual meaning, played an interesting rôle in epochs antecedent to the
patristic and mediaeval periods. Even before Plato’s time the personal
myths of the gods shocked the Greek ethical intellect, which thereupon
proceeded to convert them into allegories. Greek allegorical interpretation
of ancient myth was apologetic to both the critical mind and the moral
sense.
With Philo, the Hellenizing Jew of Alexandria, whose philosophy revolted
from the literal text of Genesis, the motive for allegorical interpretation was
similar. But the document before him was most unlike the Iliad and
Odyssey. Genesis contained no palpably immoral stories of Jehovah to be
explained away. Its account of divine creation and human beginnings
merely needed to be invested with further ethical meaning. So Philo made
cardinal virtues of the four rivers of Eden, and through like allegorical
conceits transformed the Book of Genesis into a system of Hellenistic
ethics. Not cosmogonic myths, but moral meanings, he had discovered in
his document.
Advancing along the path which Philo found, Christian allegorical
interpretation undertook to substantiate the validity of the Gospel. To this
end it fixed special symbolical meanings upon the Old Testament
narratives, so as to make them into prefigurative testimonies to the truth of
Christian teachings.[33] Allegory was also called on to justify, as against
educated pagans, certain acts of that heroic but peccant “type” of Christ,
David, the son of Jesse. Such special apologetic needs hardly affected the
allegorical interpretation of the Gospel itself, which began at an early day,

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and from the first was spiritual and anagogic, constantly straining on to
educe further salutary meaning from the text.
The Greek and Latin Church Fathers created the mass of doctrine, including
Scriptural interpretation,[34] upon which mediaeval theologians were to
expend their systematizing and reconstructive labours. Through the Middle
Ages, the course of allegory and symbolism strikingly illustrates the
mediaeval way of using the patristic heritage—first painfully learning it,
then making it their own, and at last creating by means of that which they
had organically appropriated. Allegory and symbolism were to impress the
Middle Ages as perhaps no other element of their inheritance. The
mediaeval man thought and felt in symbols, and the sequence of his thought
moved as frequently from symbol to symbol as from fact to fact.
The allegorical faculty with the Fathers was dogmatic and theological;
ingenious in devising useful interpretations, but oblivious to all reasonable
propriety in the meaning which it twisted into the text: controversial
necessities readily overrode the rational and moral requirements of the
“historical” or “literal” meaning. For the deeply realized allegorical
significance was a law unto itself. These characteristics of patristic allegory
passed over to the Middle Ages, which in the course of time were to
impress human qualities upon the patristic material.
The Bathsheba and Uriah episode in the life of David was of course taken
allegorically, and affords a curious example of a patristic interpretation
originating in the exigencies of controversy, and then becoming
authoritative for later periods when the echoes of the old controversy had
long been silent. Augustine was called upon to answer the book of the
clever Manichaean, Faustus, the stress of whose attacks was directed
against the Old Testament. Faustus declared that he did not blaspheme “the
law and the prophets,” but rejected merely the special Hebrew customs and
the vile calumnies of the Old Testament writers, imputing shameful acts to
prophets and patriarchs. In his list of shocking narratives to be rejected, was
the story “that David after having had such a number of wives, defiled the
little woman of Uriah his soldier, and caused him to be slain in battle.”[35]
Augustine responds with a general exclamation at the Manichaean’s failure
to understand the sacramental symbols (sacramenta) of the Law and the

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deeds of the prophets. He then speaks of certain Old Testament statements
regarding God and His demands, and proceeds to consider the nature of sin
and the questionable deeds of the prophets. Some of the reprehended deeds
he justifies, as, for instance, Abraham’s intercourse with Hagar and his
deceit in telling Abimelech that Sara was his sister when she was his wife.
He also declares that Sara typifies the Church, which is the secret spouse of
Christ. Proceeding further, he does not justify, but palliates, the conduct of
Lot and his daughters, and then introduces its typological significance. At
length he comes to David. First he gives a noble estimate of David’s
character, his righteousness, his liability to sin, and his quick penitence.[36]
Afterwards he considers, briefly as he says, what David’s sin with
Bathsheba signifies prophetically.[37] The passage may be given to show
what a mixture of banality and disregard of moral propriety in drawing
analogies might emanate from the best mind among the Latin Fathers, and
be repeated by later transitional and mediaeval commentators.
“The names themselves when interpreted indicate what this deed
prefigured. David is interpreted ‘Strong of hand’ or ‘Desirable.’ And
what is stronger than that Lion of the tribe of Judah that overcame the
world? and what is more desirable than him of whom the prophet says:
‘The desired of all nations shall come’ (Hag. ii. 7)? Bathsheba means
‘well of satiety,’ or ‘seventh well.’ Whichever of these interpretations
we adopt will suit. For in Canticles the Bride who is the Church is
called a well of living water (Cant. iv. 15); and to this well the name of
the seventh number is joined in the sense of Holy Spirit; and this
because of Pentecost (the fiftieth), the day on which the Holy Spirit
came. For that same festival is of the weeks (de septimanis constare) as
the Book of Tobit testifies. Then to forty-nine, which is seven times
seven, one is added, whereby unity is commended. By this spiritual, that
is ‘Seven-natured’ (septenario) gift the Church is made a well of satiety;
because there is made in her a well of living water springing up unto
everlasting life, which whoso has shall never thirst (John iv. 14). Uriah,
indeed, who had been her husband, what but devil does his name
signify? In whose vilest wedlock all those were bound whom the grace
of God sets free, that the Church without spot or wrinkle may be
married to her own Saviour. For Uriah is interpreted, ‘My light of God’;
and Hittite means ‘cut off,’ or he who does not stand in truth, but by the

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guilt of pride is cut off from the supernal light which he had from God;
or it means, he who in falling away from his true strength which was
lost, nevertheless fashioneth himself into an angel of light (2 Cor. xi.
14), daring to say: ‘My light is of God.’ Therefore this David gravely
and wickedly sinned; and God rebuked his crime through the prophet
with a threat; and he himself washed it away by repenting. Yet likewise
He, the desired of all nations, was enamoured of the Church bathing
upon the roof, that is cleansing herself from the filth of the world, and in
spiritual contemplation surmounting and trampling on her house of
clay; and knowledge of her having been had at their first meeting, He
afterwards killed the devil, apart from her, and joined her to himself in
perpetual marriage. Therefore we hate the sin but will not quench the
prophecy. Let us love that (illum) David, who is so greatly to be loved,
who through mercy freed us from the devil; and let us also love that
(istum) David who by the humility of penitence healed in himself so
deep a wound of sin.”[38]
Augustine’s interpretation of the story of David and Bathsheba was
embodied verbatim in a work upon the Old Testament by Isidore of Seville.
[39] The voluminous commentator Rabanus Maurus took the same, also
verbatim, either from Isidore or Augustine.[40] His pupil, Walafrid Strabo, in
his famous Glossa ordinaria, cited, probably from Rabanus, the first part of
the passage as far as the reference to the well of living water from John’s
Gospel. He abridged the matter somewhat, thus showing the smoothing
compiler’s art which was to bring his Glossa ordinaria into such general
use. Walafrid omitted the lines declaring that Uriah signified the devil. He
did cite, however, again probably from Rabanus, part of a long passage,
taken by Rabanus from Gregory the Great, where Bathsheba is declared to
be the letter of the Law, united to a carnal people, which David (Christ)
joins to himself in a spiritual sense. Uriah is that carnal people, to wit, the
Jews.[41]
Thus far as to the comments on the narrative from the eleventh chapter of
the Second Book of Samuel, otherwise called the Second Book of Kings.
When Rabanus came to explain the sixth verse of the first chapter of
Matthew—“And David begat Solomon from her who was the wife of
Uriah”—he said: “Uriah indeed, that is interpreted ‘My light of God,’
signifies the devil, who fashions himself into an angel of light, daring to say

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to God: ‘My light of God,’ and ‘I will be like unto the Most High’ (Isaiah
xiv.).”[42] Here pupil Walafrid follows his master, but adds: “Whose
bewedded Church Christ became enamoured of from the terrace of His
paternal majesty and joined her, made beautiful, to himself in
matrimony.”[43]
With Rabanus and Walafrid, as with Isidore and the Venerable Bede who
were the links between these Carolingians and the Fathers, the interest in
Scripture relates to its allegorical significance. Unmindful of the obvious
and literal meaning of the text, they were unabashed by the incongruity of
their allegorical interpretations.[44] Rabanus, for instance, had unbounded
enthusiasm for Exodus, because of its rich symbolism:
“Among the Scriptures embraced in the Pentateuch of the Law, the
Book of Exodus excels in merit; in it almost all the sacraments by
which the present Church is founded, nourished, and ruled, are
figuratively set forth. For there, through the corporeal exit of the
children of Israel from the terrestrial Egypt, our exit from the spiritual
Egypt is made clear. There again, through the crossing of the Red Sea
and the submersion of Pharaoh and the Egyptians, the mystery of
Baptism and the destruction of spiritual enemies are figured. There the
immolation of the typifying lamb and the celebration of the Passover
suggest the passion of the true Lamb and our redemption. There manna
from heaven and drink from a rock are given in order to teach us to
desire the heavenly bread and the drink of life. There precepts and
judgments are delivered to the people of God upon a mountain in order
that we may learn to be subject to supernal discipline. There the
construction of the tabernacle and its vessels is ordered to take place
with worship and sacrifices, that therein the adornment of the
marvellous Church and the rites of spiritual sacrifices may be indicated.
There the perfumes of incense and anointment are prepared, in order
that the sanctification of the Holy Spirit and the mystery of sacred
prayers may be commended to us.”[45]
The same commentator compiled a dictionary of allegories entitled
Allegoriae in universam sacram scripturam,[46] saying in his lumbering
Preface:

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“Whoever desires to arrive at an understanding of Holy Scripture should
consider when he should take the narrative historically, when
allegorically, when anagogically, and when tropologically. For these
four ways of understanding, to wit, history, allegory, tropology,
anagogy, we call the four daughters of wisdom, who cannot fully be
searched out without a prior knowledge of these. Through them Mother
Wisdom feeds her adopted children, giving to tender beginners drink in
the milk of history; to those advancing in faith, the food of allegory; to
the strenuous and sweating doers of good works, satiety in the savoury
refection of tropology; and finally, to those raised from the depths
through contempt of the earthly and through heavenly desire
progressing towards the summit, the sober intoxication of theoretical
contemplation in the wine of anagogy.... History, through the ensample
which it gives of perfect men, incites the reader to the imitation of
holiness; allegory, in the revelation of faith, leads to a knowledge of
truth; tropology, in the instruction of morals, to a love of virtue;
anagogy, in the display of everlasting joys, to a desire of eternal felicity.
In the house of our soul, history lays the foundation, allegory erects the
walls, anagogy puts on the roof, while tropology provides ornament,
within through the disposition, without through the effect of the good
work.”[47]
This work, alphabetically arranged, gave the allegorical significations of
words used in the Vulgate, with examples; for instance:
“Ager (field) is the world, as in the Gospel: ‘To the man who sowed
good seed in his field,’ that is to Christ, who sows preaching through the
world.
“Amicus (friend) is Christ, as in Canticles: ‘He is my friend, daughters
of Jerusalem,’ for He loved His Church so much that He would die for
her....
“Ancilla (handmaid) is the Church, as in the Psalms: ‘Make safe the son
of thine handmaid,’ that is me, who am a member of the Church.
Ancilla, corruptible flesh, as in Genesis: ‘Cast out the handmaid and her
son,’ that is, despise the flesh and its carnal fruit. Ancilla, preachers of
the Church, as in Job: ‘He will bind her with his handmaids,’[48]

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because the Lord through His preachers conquered the devil. Ancilla,
the effeminate minds of the Jews, as in Job: ‘Thy handmaids hold me as
a stranger,’ because the effeminate minds of the Jews knew me through
faith.[49] Ancilla, the lowly, as in Genesis, ‘and meal for his handmaids,’
because Holy Church affords spiritual refection to the lowly.
“Aqua is the Holy Spirit, Christ, subtle wisdom, loquacity, temporal
greed, baptism, the hidden speech of the prophets, the holy preaching of
Christ, compunction, temporal prosperity, adversity, human knowledge,
this world’s wealth, the literal meaning carnal pleasure, eternal
reflection, holy angels, souls of the blessed, saints, humility’s lament,
the devotions of the saints, sins of the elect which God condones,
knowledge of the heretics, persecutions, unstable thoughts, the
blandishments of temptations, the pleasures of the wicked, the
punishments of hell.
“Mons, mountain (in the singular) the Virgin Mary, montes (in the
plural) angels, apostles, sublime precepts, the two Testaments, inner
meditations, proud men, the Gentiles, evil spirits.”[50]
Thus Rabanus dragged into his compilation every meaning that had ever
been ascribed to the words defined. In him and his contemporaries, the
allegorical material, apart from its utility for salvation, seems void of
human interest or poetic quality, as yet unstirred by a breath of life. That
was to enter, as allegory and all manner of symbolism began to form the
temper of mediaeval thought, and became a chosen vessel of the mediaeval
spirit in poetry and art. The vital change had taken place before the twelfth
century had turned its first quarter.[51]
There flourished at this time a worthy monk named Honorius of Autun, also
called “the Solitary.” It has been argued, and vehemently contradicted, that
he was of German birth. At all events, monk he was and teacher at Autun.
Those about him sought his instruction, and also requested him to put his
discourses into writing for their use; their request reads as if at that time
Honorius had retired from among them.[52] This is all that is known of the
man who composed the most popular handbook of sermons in the Middle
Ages. It was called the Speculum ecclesiae. Honorius may never have
preached these sermons; but still his book exists with sermons for Sundays,

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saints’ days, and other Church festivals; a sermon also to be preached at
Church dedications, and one “sermo generalis,” very useful, since it
touched up all orders of society in succession, and a preacher might take or
omit according to his audience. Before beginning, the preacher is directed
to make the sign of the cross and invoke the Holy Spirit: he is admonished
first to pronounce his text of Scripture in the Latin tongue, and then
expound it in the vernacular;[53] he is instructed as to what portions of
certain sermons should be used under special circumstances, and what parts
he may omit in winter when the church is cold, or when in summer it is too
hot; or this is left quite to his discretion: “Here make an end if you wish; but
if time permits, continue thus.”
Most of these sermons are short, and contain much excellent moral advice
put simply and directly. They also make constant use of allegory, and
evidently Honorius’s chief care in their composition was to expound his text
allegorically and point the allegory’s application to the needs of his
supposed audience. Neither he nor any man of his time devised many novel
allegorical interpretations; but the old ones had at length become part of the
mediaeval spirit and the regular means of apprehending the force and
meaning of Scripture. Consequently Honorius handles his allegories more
easily, and makes a more natural human application of them, than Rabanus
or Walafrid had done. Sometimes the allegory seems to ignore the moral
lesson of the literal facts; but while a smile may escape us in reading
Honorius, the allegories in his sermons are rarely strained and shocking,
likewise rarely dull. A general point from which he regards the narratives
and institutions of the Old Testament is summed up in his statement, that for
us Christ turned all provisions of the law into spiritual sacraments.[54] The
whole Old Testament has pre-figurative significance and spiritual meaning;
and likewise every narrative in the Gospels is spiritual.
Two or three examples will illustrate Honorius’s edifying way of using
allegory. His sermon for the eleventh Sunday after Pentecost is typical of
his manner. The text is from the thirty-first[55] Psalm: “Blessed is the man to
whom the Lord will not impute sin.” Opening with an exhortation to
penitence and tears and almsgiving, the preacher turns to the self-righteous
“whose obstinacy the Lord curbs in the Gospel for the day, telling how two
went up into the temple to pray, the one a Pharisee, to wit, one of the Jewish

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clergy, the other a Publican.” After proceeding for a while with sound and
obvious comment on the situation, Honorius says:
“By the two men who went up into the temple to pray, two peoples, the
Jewish and the Gentile, are meant. The Pharisee who went close to the
altar is the Jewish people, who possessed the Sanctuary and the Ark. He
tells aloud his merits in the temple, because in the world he boasts of his
observance of the law.
“The Publican who stands afar off is the Gentile people, who were far
off from the worship of God. He did not lift up his eyes to heaven,
because the Gentile was agape at the things of earth. He beat his breast
when he bewailed his error through penitence; and because he humbled
himself in confession, God exalted him through pardon. Let us also,
beloved, thus stand afar off, deeming ourselves unworthy of the holy
sacraments and the companionship of the saints. Let us not lift up our
eyes to heaven, but deem ourselves unworthy of it. Let us beat our
breasts and punish our misdeeds with tears. Let us fall prostrate before
God; and let us weep in the presence of the Lord who made us, so that
He may turn our lament to joy, rend asunder our garb of mourning, and
clothe us with happiness.”
Honorius lingers a moment with some further exhortations suggested by his
parable, and then turns to the edification to be found in fables wisely
composed by profane writers. Let not the congregation be scandalized; for
the children of Israel despoiled the Egyptians of gold and gems and
precious vesture, which they afterwards devoted to completing the
tabernacle. Pious Christians spoil the Egyptians when they turn profane
studies to spiritual account. The philosophers tell of a woman bound to a
revolving wheel, her head now up now down. The wheel is this world’s
glory, and the woman is that fortune which depends on it. Again, they tell of
one who tries to roll a stone to the top of a mountain; but, near the top, it
hurls the wretch prostrate with its weight and crashes back to the bottom;
and again, of one whose liver is eaten by a vulture, and, when consumed,
grows again. The man who pushes up the stone is he who toilsomely
amasses dignities, to be plunged by them to hell; and he of the liver is the
man upon whose heart lust feeds. From that pest, they say, Medusa sprang,
with noble form exciting many to lust, but with her look turning them to

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stone. She is wantonness, who turns to stone the hearts of the lewd through
their lustful pleasure. Perseus slew her, covering himself with his crystalline
shield; for the strong man, gazing into virtue’s mirror, averts his heart’s
countenance (i.e. from wantonness). The sword with which he kills her is
the fear of everlasting fire.
Then, continues Honorius, we read of a boy brought up by one of the
Fathers in a hermitage; but as he grew to youth he was tickled with lust. The
Father commanded him to go alone into the desert and pass forty days in
fasting and prayer. When some twenty days had passed, there appeared a
naked woman foul and stinking, who thrust herself upon him, and he,
unable to endure her stench, began to repel her. At which she asked: “Why
do you shudder at the sight of me for whom you burned? I am the image of
lust, which appears sweet to men’s hearts. If you had not obeyed the Father,
you would have been overthrown by me as others have been.” So he
thanked God for snatching him from the spirit of fornication. Many other
examples lead us to the path of life.
Honorius closes with the story of the “Three Fools,” observed by a certain
Father: the first an Ethiopian who was unable to move a faggot of wood,
which he would continually unbind and make still heavier by adding further
sticks; the second, a man pouring water into a vase which had no bottom;
and, thirdly, the two men who came bearing before them crosswise a beam
of wood; as they neared the city gate neither would let the other precede
him even a little, and so both remained without. The Ethiopian who adds to
his insupportable faggot is he who continually increases his weight of sin,
adding new sins to old ones unrepented of; he who pours water into the
vase with no bottom is he who by his uncleanness loses the merit of his
good acts; and the two who bear the beam crosswise are those bound by the
yoke of Pride.[56]
Such are good examples of the queer stories to which preachers resorted.
One notices that whatever be the source from which Honorius draws, his
interest is always in the allegory found in the narratives. Another very apt
example of his manner is his treatment of the story of the Good Samaritan,
so often depicted on Gothic church windows. For us this parable carries an
exhaustless wealth of direct application in human life; it was regarded very

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differently by Honorius and the glass painters, whose windows are a
pictorial transcription of the first half of his sermon.[57]
“Blessed is the man who walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly”—this is
the text; and Honorius proceeds:
“Adam was the unhappy man who through the counsel of the wicked
departed from his native land of Paradise and dragged all his
descendants into this exile. He thus stood in the way of sinners, because
he remained stable in sin. He sat ‘in the seat of the scornful,’ because by
evil example he taught others to sin. But Christ arose, the blessed man
who walketh in the counsel of the Father from the hall of heaven into
prison after the lost servant. He did not walk in the counsel of the
ungodly when the devil showed Him all the kingdoms of the world; He
did not stand in the way of sinners, because He committed no sin; He
did not sit in the seat of the scornful, since neither by word nor deed did
He teach evil. Thus as that unhappy man drew all his carnal children
into death, this blessed man brought all His sons to life. As He himself
sets forth in the Gospel: ‘A certain man went down from Jerusalem to
Jericho, and robbers attacked and wounded him, stripped him and went
away. And by chance there came that way a certain priest, who seeing
him half-dead, crossed to the other side. Likewise a Levite passed by
when he had seen him. But a Samaritan coming that same way, had
compassion on the poor wretch, bound up his wounds and poured in oil
and wine, and setting him on his own beast, brought him to an inn. The
next day he gave the innkeeper two pence and asked that he care for
him, and if more was needed He promised to repay the innkeeper on His
return.’
“Surely man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho when our first parent
from the joys of Paradise entered death’s eclipse. For Jericho, which
means moon, designates the eclipse of our mortality. Whereby man fell
among thieves, since a swarm of demons at once surrounded the exile.
Wherefore also they despoiled him, since they stripped him of the riches
of Paradise and the garment of immortality. They gave him wounds, for
sins flowed in upon him. They left him half-dead, because dead in soul.
The priest passed down the same way, as the Order of Patriarchs
proceeded along the path of mortality. The priest left him wounded,

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having no power to aid the human race while himself sore wounded
with sins. The Levite went that way, inasmuch as the Order of Prophets
also had to tread the path of death. He too passed by the wounded man,
because he could bear no human aid to the lost while himself groaning
under the wounds of sin. The wretch half-dead was healed by the
Samaritan, for the man set apart through Christ is made whole.
“Samaria was the chief city of the Israelitish kingdom whose chiefs
were led away to idolatry in Nineveh, and Gentiles were placed in her.
The Jews abhorred their fellowship, making them a byword of
malediction. So when reviling the Lord, they called Him a Samaritan.
The Lord was the true Samaritan, being called guardian (custos) since
the human race is guarded by Him. He went down this way when from
heaven He came into this world. He saw the wounded traveller,
inasmuch as He saw man held in misery and sin. He was moved with
compassion for him, since for man He undergoes all pains.
Approaching, He bound his wounds when, proclaiming eternal life, He
taught man to cease from sin. He bound his wounds together with the
two parts of the bandage when He quelled sins through two fears—the
servile fear which forbids through penalties, and the filial fear which
exhorts the holy to good works. He drew tight the lower part of the
bandage when He struck men’s hearts with fear of hell. Their worm, He
said, does not die, and their fire is not quenched. He drew tight the
upper part when He taught the fear which belongs to the study of good.
‘The children of the kingdom,’ said He, ‘shall be cast into outer
darkness, where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth.’ He poured in
wine and oil when He taught repentance and pardon. He poured in wine
when He said, ‘Repent ye’; He added oil when He said, ‘for the
kingdom of heaven is at hand.’ He set him upon His beast when He bore
our sins in His body on the Cross. He led him to the inn when He joined
him to the supernal Church. The inn, in which living beings are
assembled at night, is the present Church, where the just are harboured
amid the darkness of this life until the Day of Eternity blows and the
shadows of mortality give way.
“The next day He tendered the two pence. The first day was of death,
the next of life. The day of death began with Adam, when all die. The
day of life took its beginning from Christ, in whom all shall be made

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alive. Before Christ’s resurrection all men were travelling to death;
since His resurrection all the faithful have been rising to life. He
tendered the two pence the next day—when after His resurrection He
taught that the two Testaments were fulfilled by the two precepts of
love. He gave the pence to the innkeeper when He committed the
doctrine of the law of life to the Order of Doctors. He directed him to
tend the sick man when He commanded that the human race should be
saved from sin. The stench drove the sick man from the inn, because
this world’s tribulation drives the righteous to seek the things celestial.
Two pence are given to the innkeeper when the Doctors are raised on
high by Scriptural knowledge and temporal honour. If they should
require more, He repays them on His return; for if they exemplify good
preaching with good works, when the true Samaritan returns to
judgment and leads him, aforetime wounded but now healed, from the
inn to the celestial mansion, He will repay the zealous stewards with
eternal rewards.”[58]
Here Honorius proceeds to expound the allegory contained in the healing of
the dumb man and the ten lepers, and closes his sermon with two narratives,
one of a poor idiot who sang the Gloria without ceasing, and was seen in
glory after death; the other of a lay nun (conversa) around whose last hours
were shed sweet odours and a miraculous light, while those present heard
the chant of heavenly voices.
The parables of Christ present types which we may apply in life according
to circumstances. In the concrete instance of the parable we find the
universal, and we deem Christ meant it so. Thus we also view the parables
as symbols, which they were. Honorius, with the vast company of
mediaeval and patristic expounders, ordinarily directs the symbolism of the
parables in a special mode, whereby—like the stories of the Old Testament
—they become figurative of Christ and the needy soul of man, or figurative
of the Christian dispensation with its historical antecedents and its Day of
Judgment at the end.
The like may be said of Honorius’s allegorical interpretation of Greek
legends. These ancient stories have the perennial youth of human charm and
meaning ever new. They had been good old stories to the Greeks, and then
acquired further intendment as later men discerned a broader symbolism in

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them. Even in classic times, Homer’s stories had been turned to allegories,
philosophers and critics sometimes finding in them a spiritual significance
not unlike that which the same tales may bear for us. But with this
difference: the later Greeks usually were trying to explain away the
somewhat untrammelled ways of the Homeric pantheon, and therefore
maintained that Homer’s stories were composed as allegories, the wise and
mystic poet choosing thus to veil his meaning. To-day we find the clarity of
daybreak in Homer’s tales, and if we make symbols of them we know the
symbolism is not his but ours. Honorius chooses to think that allegory had
always lain in the old story; he will not deem it the invention of himself or
other Christian writers. Here his attitude is not unlike that of the apologetic
Greek critics. But his interpretations are apt to differ from theirs as well as
from our own. For his symbolism tends to abandon the broadly human, and
to become, like the mediaeval Biblical interpretations, figurative of the
tenets of the Christian Faith.
There is an interesting example of this in the sermon for Septuagesima
Sunday, which was written on a somewhat blind text from the twenty-
eighth chapter of Job. Honorius proceeds expounding it through a number
of strained allegories, which he doubtless drew from Gregory’s Moralia; for
that great pope was the recognized expositor of Job, and the Book of Job
was simply Gregory through all the Middle Ages. Perhaps Honorius felt
that this sermon was rather soporific. At all events he stops in the middle to
give a piece of advice to the supposed preacher: “Often put something of
this kind in your sermon; for so you will relieve the tedium.” And he
continues thus:

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“Brethren, on this holy day there is much to say which I must pass over
in silence, lest disgusted you should wish to leave the church before the
end. For some of you have come far and must go a long way to reach
your houses. Or perhaps, some have guests at home, or crying babies; or
others are not swift and have to go elsewhere, while to some a bodily
infirmity brings uneasiness lest they expose themselves. So I omit much
for everybody’s sake, but still would say a few words.
“Because to-day, beloved, we have laid aside the song of gladness and
taken up the song of sadness, I would briefly tell you something from
the books of the pagans, to show how you should reject the melody of
this world’s pleasures in order that hereafter with the angels you may
make sweet harmonies in heaven. For one should pick up a gem found
in dung and set it as a kingly ornament; thus if we find anything useful
in pagan books we should turn it to the building up of the Church,
which is Christ’s spouse. The wise of this world write that there were
three Syrens in an island of the sea, who used to chant the sweetest song
in divers tones. One sang, another piped, the third played upon a lyre.
They had the faces of women, the talons and wings of birds. They
stopped all passing ships with the sweetness of their song; they rent the
sailors heavy with sleep; they sank the ships in the brine. When a
certain duke, Ulysses, had to sail by their island, he ordered his
comrades to bind him to the mast and stuff their ears with wax. Thus he
escaped the peril unharmed, and plunged the Syrens in the waves.
These, beloved, are mysteries, although written by the enemies of
Christ. By the sea is to be understood this age which rolls beneath the
unceasing blasts of tribulations. The island is earth’s joy, which is
intercepted by crowding pains, as the shore is beat upon by crowding
waves. The three Syrens who with sweet caressing song overturn the
navigators in sleep, are three delights which soften men’s hearts for vice
and lead them into the sleep of death. She who sings with human voice
is Avarice, and to her hearers thus she tunes her song: ‘Thou shouldst
get together much, so as to be able to spread wide thy fame, and also
visit the Lord’s sepulchre and other places, restore churches, aid the
poor and thy relatives as well.’ With such baneful song she charms the
miser’s heart, until the sleep of death oppresses him. Then she tears his
flesh, the wave devours the ship, and the wretch by fierce pains is

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waked from his riches and plunged in eternal flame. She who plays
upon the pipe is Vainglory (Jactantia), and thus she pipes her lay for
hers: ‘Thou art in thy youth, and noble; make thyself appear glorious.
Spare no enemies, but kill them all when able. Then people will call
thee a good knight.’ Again will she chant: ‘Thou shouldst win
Jerusalem, and give great alms. Then thou wilt be famous, and wilt be
called good by all.’ To the lay brethren (conversis) she sings: ‘Thou
must fast and pray always, singing with loud voice. Then wilt thou hear
thyself lauded as a saint by all.’ Such song with vain heart she makes
resound till the whirlpool of death devours the wretch emptied of worth.
“She who sings to a lyre is Wantonness (Luxuria), and she chants
melodies like these to her parasites: ‘Thou art in thy youth; now is the
time to sport with the girls—old age will do to reform in. Here is one
with a fine figure; this one is rich; from this one you would gain much.
There is plenty of time to save your soul.’ In such way she melts the
hearts of the wanton till Cocytus’s waves engulf them suddenly tripped
by death.
“They have the faces of women, because nothing so estranges man from
God as the love of women. They have wings of birds, because the desire
of worldlings is always unstable, their appetites now craving one thing,
and again their lust flying to another object. They have also the talons of
birds, because they tear their victims as they snatch them away to the
torments of hell. Ulysses is called Wise. Unharmed he steers his course
by the island, because the truly wise Christian swims over the sea of this
world, in the ship of the Church. By the fear of God he binds himself to
the mast of the ship, that is, to the cross of Christ; with wax, that is with
the incarnation of Christ, he seals the ears of his comrades, that they
may turn their hearts from lusts and vices and yearn only for heavenly
things. The Syrens are submerged, because he is protected from their
lusts by the strength of the Spirit. Unharmed the voyagers avoid the
peril, inasmuch as through victory they reach the joys of the saints.”[59]

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CHAPTER XXVIII

THE RATIONALE OF THE VISIBLE WORLD:
HUGO OF ST. VICTOR
Just as the Middle Ages followed the allegorical interpretation of Scripture
elaborated by the Church Fathers, so they also accepted, and even made
more precise, the patristic inculcation of the efficacy of such most potent
symbols as the water of baptism and the bread and wine transubstantiated in
the Eucharist.[60] Passing onward from these mighty bases of conviction,
the mediaeval genius made fertile use of allegory in the polemics of Church
and State, and exalted the symbolical principle into an ultimate explanation
of the visible universe.
Notable was the career of allegory in politics. Throughout the long struggle
of the Papacy with the Empire and other secular monarchies, arguments
drawn from allegory never ceased to carry weight. A very shibboleth was
the witness of the “two swords” (Luke xxii. 38), both of which, the
temporal as well as spiritual, the Church held to have been entrusted to her
keeping for the ordering of earthly affairs, to the end that men’s souls
should be saved. Still more fluid was the argumentative nostrum of
mankind conceived as an Organism, or animate body (unum corpus, corpus
mysticum). This metaphor was found in more than one of the Latin classics;
but patristic and mediaeval writers took it from the works of Paul.[61] The
likeness of the human body to the body politic or ecclesiastic was carried
out in every imaginable detail, and used acutely or absurdly by politicians
and schoolmen from the eleventh century onward.[62]
We turn to the symbolical explanation of the universe. In the first half of the
twelfth century, a profoundly meditative soul, Hugo of St. Victor by name,
attempted a systematic exposition of the symbolical or sacramental plan
inhering in God’s scheme of creation. Of the man, as with so many monks
and schoolmen whose names and works survive, little is known beyond the
presentation of his personality afforded by his writings. He taught in the
monastic school of St. Victor, a community that had a story, with which
may be connected the scanty facts of the short and happy pilgrimage to
God, which made Hugo’s life on earth.[63]

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When William of Champeaux, according to Abaelard’s account, was routed
from his logical positions in the cathedral school of Paris,[64] he withdrew
from the school and from the city to the quiet of a secluded spot on the left
bank of the Seine, not far distant from Notre-Dame. Here was an ancient
chapel dedicated to Saint-Victor, and here William, with some companions,
organized themselves into a monastic community according to the rule of
the canons of St. Augustine. This was in 1108. If for a time William laid
aside his studies and lecturing, he soon resumed them at the solicitations of
his scholars, joined to those of his friend Hildebert, Bishop of Le Mans.[65]
And so the famous school of Saint-Victor began. William remained there
only four years, being made Bishop of Chalons in 1112, and thereafter
figuring prominently in Church councils, frequent in France at this epoch.
Under William’s disciple and successor, Gilduin, the community flourished
and increased. King Louis VI., whose confessor was Gilduin himself,
endowed it liberally, and other donors were not lacking. Saint-Victor
became rich, and its fame for learning and holiness spread far and wide.[66]
Abbot Gilduin lived to see more than forty houses of monks or regular
canons[67] flourishing as dependencies of Saint-Victor. He died in 1155,
some years after the death of the young man whose scholarship and genius
was the pride of the Victorine community.
Notwithstanding a statement in an old manuscript, that Hugo was born near
Ypres in Flanders, the ancient tradition of Saint-Victor, confirmed by the
records of the cathedral of Halberstadt, shows him to have been a son of the
Count of Blankemberg, and born at Hartingam in Saxony.[68] His uncle
Reinhard was Bishop of Halberstadt, where his great-uncle, named Hugo
like himself, was archdeacon. Reinhard had been a pupil of William of
Champeaux at Saint-Victor, and after becoming bishop continued to cherish
a profound esteem for him. The young Hugo renounced his inheritance and
entered a monastery not far from Halberstadt; but soon, in view of the
disturbed affairs of Saxony, his uncle Reinhard urged him to go and pursue
his studies at Saint-Victor. The young man persuaded his great-uncle Hugo
to accompany him. By circuitous routes, visiting various places of pious
interest on the way, the two reached Saint-Victor, where they were received
with all honour by the abbot Gilduin. This was not far from the year 1115,
and Hugo was about twenty at the time. He was already an accomplished
scholar, and doubtless it is to his previous studies that he refers when he

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speaks as follows in his book of elementary instruction, called the
Didascalicon:
“I dare say that I never despised anything pertaining to learning, and
learned much that might strike others as light and vain. I practised
memorizing the names of everything I saw or heard of, thinking that I
could not properly study the nature of things unless I knew their names.
Daily I examined my notes of topics, that I might hold in my memory
every proposition, with the questions, objections, and solutions. I would
inform myself as to controversies and consider the proper order of the
argument on either side, carefully distinguishing what pertained to the
office of rhetoric, oratory, and sophistry. I set problems of numbers; I
drew figures on the pavement with charcoal, and with the figure before
me I demonstrated the different qualities of the obtuse, the acute and the
right angle, and also of the square. Often I watched out the nocturnal
horoscope through winter nights. Often I strung my harp (Saepe ad
numerum protensum in ligno magadam ducere solebam) that I might
perceive the different sounds and likewise delight my mind with the
sweet notes. All these were boyish occupations (puerilia) but not
useless. Nor does it burden my stomach to know them now.”[69]
Not long after Hugo’s arrival at Saint-Victor he began to teach at the
monastery school, and upon the death of its director, in 1133, succeeded to
the office, which he held until his death in 1141.[70] Colourless and grey are
the outer facts of a monk’s life, counting but little. The soul of a Hugo of
Saint-Victor did not soil itself with any interest in the pleasures of the
world: “He is not solitary with whom is God, nor is the power of joy
extinguished because his appetite is kept from things abject and vile. He
rather does himself an injustice who admits to the society of his joy what is
disgraceful or unworthy of his love.”[71]
Hugo belonged to the aristocracy of contemplative piety, with its scorn of
whatever lies without the pale of the soul’s companionship with God. In his
independent way he followed Augustine, and Augustine’s Platonism, which
was so largely the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus and Porphyry. He also
followed the real Plato speaking in the Timaeus, with which he was
acquainted. Plato would have nothing to do with allegorical interpretation
as a defence of Homer’s gods; but he could himself make very pretty

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allegories, and his theory of ideas as at once types and creative intelligences
lent itself to Christian systems of symbolism. In this way he was a spiritual
ancestor of Hugo, who found in God the type-ideas of all things that He
created. Moreover, if not Plato, at least his spiritual children—Clement of
Alexandria, Origen, Plotinus—recognized that the highest truths must be
known in modes transcending reason and its syllogisms, although these
were the necessary avenues of approach. Hugo likewise regarded rational
knowledge as but the path by which the soul ascends to the plateau of
contemplation. The general aspects of his philosophy will be considered in
a later chapter. Here he is to be viewed as a mediaeval symbolist, upon
whom pressed a sense of the symbolism of all visible things. An
examination of his great De sacramentis Christianae fidei will disclose that
with Hugo the material creation in its deepest verity is a symbol; that
Scripture, besides its literal meaning, is allegory from Genesis to
Revelation; that the means of salvation provided by the Church are
sacramental, and thus essentially symbolical, consisting of perfected and
potent symbols which have been shadowed forth in the unperfected
sacramental character of all God’s works from the beginning.[72]
Hugo’s little Preface (praefatiuncula) mentions certain requests made to
him to write a book on the Sacraments. In undertaking it, he proposes to
present in better form many things dictated from time to time rather
negligently. Whatever he has taken from his previous writings he has
revised as seemed best. Should there appear any inconsistency between
what he may have said elsewhere and the language of the present work, he
begs the reader to regard the present as the better form of statement. His
method will be to treat his matter in the order of time; and to this end his
work is divided into two Books. The first discusses the subject from the
Beginning of the World until the Incarnation of the Word; the second
continues it from the Incarnation to the final Consummation of all things.
He explains that as he has elsewhere spoken at length upon the primary or
historical meaning of Holy Writ,[73] he will devote himself here rather to its
secondary or allegorical significance.
Hugo further explains the subject of his treatise in a Prologue:
“The work of man’s restoration is the subject-matter (materia) of all the
Scriptures. There are two works, the work of foundation and the work

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of restoration, which include everything whatsoever. The former is the
creation of the world with all its elements; the latter is the incarnation of
the Word with all its sacraments, those which went before from the
beginning and those which follow even to the end of the world. For the
incarnate Word is our King, who came into this world to fight the devil.
And all the saints who were before His coming, were as soldiers going
before His face; and those who have come and will come after, until the
end of the world, are as soldiers who follow their king. He is the King
in the centre of His army, advancing girt by His troops. And although in
such a multitude divers shapes of arms appear in the sacraments and
observances of those who precede and come after, yet all are soldiers
under one king and follow one banner; they pursue one enemy and with
one victory are crowned. In all of this may be observed the work of
restoration.
“Scripture gives first a brief account of the work of creation. For it
could not aptly show how man was restored unless it had previously
explained how he had fallen; nor could it show how he had fallen,
without first showing how God had made him, for which in turn it was
necessary to set forth the creation of the whole world, because the world
was made for man. The spirit was created for God’s sake; the body for
the spirit’s sake, and the world for the body’s sake, so that the spirit
might be subject to God, the body to the spirit, and the world to the
body. In this order, therefore, Holy Scripture describes first the creation
of the world which was made for man; then it tells how man was made
and set in the way of righteousness and discipline; after that, how man
fell; and finally how he was restored (reparatus).”
In these first little chapters of his Prologue, Hugo has grouped his topics
suggestively. The world was made for man, and therefore the account of its
creation is needed in order to understand man. Moreover, that man’s body
exists for his spirit’s sake, at once suggests that a significance beyond the
literal meaning is likely to dwell in that account of the material creation
which enables us to understand man. The soul needs instruction and
guidance; and God in creating the world for man surely had in view his
most important interests, which were not those of his mortal body, but those
of his soul. So the creation of the world subserves man’s spiritual interests,
and the divine account of it carries spiritual instruction. The allegorical

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significance of the world’s creation, which answers to man’s spiritual needs,
is as veritable and real as the facts of the world’s material foundation, which
answers to the needs of his body. Thus symbolism is rooted in the character
and purpose of the material creation; it lies in the God-implanted nature of
things; therefore the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures corresponds
to their deepest meaning and the revealed plan of God.
These principles underlie Hugo’s exposition of the Christian sacraments,
whose unperfected prototypes existed in the work of the Creation. No fact
of sacred history, no single righteous pre-Christian observance, was
unaffiliated with them. An adequate understanding of their nature involves a
full knowledge not only of Christian doctrine, but of all other knowledge
profitable to men—as Hugo clearly indicates in the remaining portion of his
Prologue:
“Whence it appears how much divine Scripture in subtle profundity
surpasses all other writings, not only in its matter but in the way of
treating it. In other writings the words alone carry meaning: in Scripture
not only the words, but the things may mean something. Wherefore just
as a knowledge of the words is needed in order to know what things are
signified, so a knowledge of the things is needed in order to determine
their mystical signification of other things which have been or ought to
be done. The knowledge of words falls under two heads: expression,
and the substance of their meaning. Grammar relates only to expression,
dialectic only to meaning, while rhetoric relates to both. A knowledge of
things requires a knowledge of their form and of their nature. Form
consists in external configuration, nature in internal quality. Form is
treated as number, to which arithmetic applies; or as proportion, to
which music applies; or as dimension, to which geometry applies; or as
motion, to which pertains astronomy. But physics (physica) looks to the
inner nature of things.
“It follows that all the natural arts serve divine science, and the lower
knowledge rightly ordered leads to the higher. History, i.e. the historical
meaning, is that in which words signify things, and its servants, as
already said, are the three sciences, grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric.
When, however, things signify facts mystically, we have allegory; and
when things mystically signify what ought to be done, we have

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tropology. These two are served by arithmetic, music, geometry,
astronomy, and physics. Above and beyond all is that divine something
to which divine Scripture leads, either in allegory or tropology. Of this
the one part (which is in allegory) is right faith, and the other (which is
in tropology) is good conduct: in these consist knowledge of truth and
love of virtue, and this is the true restoration of man.”[74]
Hugo has now stated his position. The rationale of the world’s creation lies
in the nature of man. The Seven Liberal Arts, and incidentally all human
knowledge, in handmaidenly manner, promote an understanding of man as
well as of the saving teaching contained in Scripture. This was the common
mediaeval view; but Hugo proves it through application of the principles of
symbolism and allegorical interpretation. By these instruments he orders the
arts and sciences according to their value in his Christian system, and
makes all human knowledge subserve the intellectual economy of the soul’s
progress to God.
An exposition of the Work of the Six Days opens the body of Hugo’s
treatise. God created all things from nothing, and at once. His creation was
at first unformed; not absolutely formless, but in the form of confusion, out
of which in the six days He wrought the form of ordered disposition. The
first creation included the matter of corporeal things and (in the angelic
nature) the essence of things invisible; for the rational creature may be said
to be unformed until it take form through turning unto its Creator, whereby
it gains beauty and blessedness from Him through the conversion which is
of love. Thus the matter of every corporeal thing which God afterwards
made, existed from the time of His first creation, and likewise the image of
everything invisible. For although new souls are still created every day,
their image existed previously in the angelic spirits.
Then God made light, the unformed material of which He had created in the
beginning.
“And at the very moment when light was visibly and corporeally
separated from darkness, the good angels were invisibly set apart from
the wicked angels who were falling in the darkness of sin. The good
were illumined and converted to the light of righteousness, that they
might be light and not darkness. Thus we ought to perceive a

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consonance in the works of God, the visible work conforming to the
issue of the invisible in such wise that the Wisdom which worked in
both may in the former instruct by an example and in the latter execute
judgment.”
The severance of light from darkness is the material example of how God
executes judgment in dividing the good from the evil. In this visible work
of God a “sacrament” is discernible, since every soul, so long as it is in sin,
is in darkness and confusion. All the visible works of God offer spiritual
lessons (spiritualia praeferunt documenta). They have sacramental
qualities, and yet are not perfected and completed sacraments, as will
hereafter appear from Hugo’s definition.
Following the order of creation, Hugo now speaks of the firmament which
God set in the midst of the waters to divide them:
“He who believes that this was made for his sake will not look for the
reason of it outside of himself. For it all was made in the image of the
world within him; the earth which is below, is the sensual nature of
man, and the heaven above is the purity of his intelligence quickening
to immortal life.”
The rational and unseen are a world as well as the material and visible. The
sacramental quality of the material world lies in its correspondence to the
unseen world. When Hugo speaks of the “sacramenta” in the creation of
light and the waters divided by the firmament, he means that in addition to
their material nature as light and water, they are essentially symbols. Their
symbolism is as veritably part of their nature as the symbolical character of
the Eucharist is part of the nature of the consecrated bread and wine. The
sacraments are among the deepest verities of the Christian Faith. And the
same representative verity that exists in them, exists, in less perfected
mode, throughout God’s entire creation. So the argument carries out the
principles of the sacraments and the principles of symbolism to a full
explanation of the world; and Hugo’s work upon the Sacraments presents
his theory of the universe.
“Many other mysteries,” says Hugo, closing the first “Part” of his first
Book, “could be pointed out in the work of the creation. But we briefly
speak of these matters as a suitable approach to the subject set before

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us. For our purpose is to treat of the sacrament of man’s redemption.
The work of creation was completed in six days, the work of restoration
in six ages. The latter work we define as the Incarnation of the Word
and what in and through the flesh the Word performed, with all His
sacraments, both those which from the beginning prefigured the
Incarnation and those which follow to declare and preach it till the end.”
It is unnecessary to follow Hugo through the discussion, upon which he
now enters, of the will, knowledge, and power of the Trinity, or through his
consideration of the knowledge which man may have of God. In Part V. of
the first Book, he considers the creation of angels, their qualities and nature,
and the reasons why a part of them fell. With Part VI. the creation of man is
reached, which Hugo shows to have been causally prior, though later in
time, to the creation of the world which God made for man. From love God
created rational creatures, the angels purely spiritual, and man a spirit
clothed with earth.[75] Hugo considers the corporeal as well as the spiritual
nature and qualities of man, and his condition before the Fall. The seventh
Part is devoted to the Fall itself, and discusses its character and sinfulness.
At length, in the eighth Part, Hugo reaches the true subject of his treatise,
the restoration of man. Man’s first sin of pride was followed by a triple
punishment, consisting in a penalty, and two entailed defects, the penalty
being bodily mortality, the defects carnal concupiscence and mental
ignorance.
“Regarding his reparation three matters are to be considered, the time,
the place, the remedy. The time is the present life, from the beginning to
the end of the world. The place is this world.[76] The remedy is
threefold, and consists in faith, the sacraments, and good works. Long is
the time, that man may not be taken unprepared. Hard is the place, that
the transgressor may be castigated. Efficacious is the remedy, that the
sick one may be healed.”
Hugo then sets forth the situation, the case in court as it were, to which
God, the devil, and man, are the three parties. In this trial
“... the devil is convicted of an injury to God in that he seduced God’s
servant by fraud and holds him by violence. Man also is convicted of an
injury to God in that he despised His command and wickedly gave

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himself to evil servitude. Likewise the devil is convicted of an injury
toward man, in first deceiving him and then bringing evil upon him. The
devil holds man unjustly, though man is justly held.”
Since the devil’s case against man was unjust, man might defeat his
lordship; but he needed an advocate (patronus), which could be only God.
God, angry at man’s sin, did not wish to undertake man’s cause. He must be
placated; and man had no equivalent to offer for the injury he had done
Him; for he had deserted God when rational and innocent, and could deliver
himself back to God only as an irrational and sinful creature. Therefore, in
order that man might have wherewithal to placate God, God through mercy
gave man a man whom man might give in place of him who had sinned.
God became man for man and as man gave himself for man. Thus He who
had been man’s Creator became also his Redeemer. God might have
redeemed man in some other way, but took the way of human nature as best
suited to man’s weakness.
After our first parent had been exiled from Paradise for his sin, the devil
possessed him violently. But God’s providence tempered justice with
mercy, and from the penalty itself prepared a remedy.
“He set for man as a sign the sacraments of his salvation, in order that
whoever would apprehend them with right faith and firm hope, might,
though under the yoke, have some fellowship with freedom. He set His
edict informing and instructing man, so that whoever should elect to
expect a saviour, should prove his vow of election in observance of the
sacraments. The devil also set his sacraments, that he might know and
possess his own more surely. The human race was at once divided into
opposite parties, some accepting the devil’s sacraments and some the
sacraments of Christ.... Hence it is clear, that from the beginning there
were Christians in fact, if not in name.”
Hugo proceeds to show that the time of the institution of the sacraments
began when our first parent, expelled from Paradise, was subjected to the
exile of this mortal life, with all his posterity until the end.
“As soon as man had fallen from his first state of incorruption, he began
to be sick, in body through his mortality, in mind through his iniquity.
Forthwith God prepared the medicine of his reparation through His

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sacraments. In divers times and places God presented these for man’s
healing, as reason and the cause demanded, some of them before the
Law, some under the Law and some under grace. Though different in
form they had the one effect and accomplished the one health. If any
one inquires the period of their appointment he may know that as long
as there is disease so long is the time of the medicine. The present life,
from the beginning to the end of the world, is the time of sickness and
the time of the remedy. When a sacrament has fulfilled its time it ceases,
and others take its place, to bring about that same health. These in turn
have been succeeded at last by others, which are not to be superseded.”
Having followed Hugo’s plan thus far, one sees why it is only at the
commencement of the ninth Part of his first Book that he reaches the
definition and discussion of those final and enduring sacraments which
followed the Incarnation. He has hitherto been developing his theme, and
now takes up its very essence. Laying out the matter scholastically, he says
“there are four things to consider: first, what is a sacrament; second, why
they were instituted; third, what may be the material of each sacrament, in
which it is made and sanctified; and fourth, how many sacraments there are.
This is the definition, cause, material, and classification.”
Proceeding to the definition, he says that the doctors have briefly described
a sacrament as the token of the sacred substance (sacrae rei signum).
“For as there is body and soul in man, and in Scripture the letter and the
sense, so in every sacrament there is the visible external which may be
handled and the invisible within, which is believed and taught. The
material external is the sacrament, and the invisible and spiritual is the
sacrament’s substance (res) or virtus. The external is handled and
sanctified; that is the signum of the spiritual grace, which is the
sacrament’s res and is invisibly apprehended.”
Having thus explained the old definition, Hugo objects to it on the ground
that not every signum rei sacrae is a sacrament; the letters of the sacred text
and the pictures of holy things are signa rei sacrae, and yet are not
sacraments. He therefore offers the following definition as adequate:
“The sacrament is the corporeal or material element set out sensibly,
representing from its similitude, signifying from its institution, and

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containing from its sanctification, some invisible and spiritual
grace.”[77]
This, he maintains, is a perfect definition, since all sacraments possess these
three qualities, and whatever lacks them cannot properly be called a
sacrament. As an example he instances the baptismal water:
“There is the visible element of water, which is the sacrament; and these
three are found in one: representation from similitude, significance from
appointment, virtue from sanctification. The similitude is from creation,
the appointment from dispensation, the sanctification from benediction.
The first is imparted to it through the Creator, the second is added
through the Saviour, the third is given through the administrator.”[78]
Passing to the second consideration, Hugo finds that the sacraments were
instituted with threefold purpose, for man’s humiliation, instruction, and
discipline or exercise. The man contemning them cannot be saved. Yet God
has saved many without them, as Jeremiah was sanctified in the womb, and
John the Baptist, and those who were righteous under the natural law. “For
those who under the natural law possessed the substance (res) of the
sacrament in right faith and charity, did not to their damnation lack the
sacrament.” And Hugo warns whoever might take a narrower view, to
beware lest in honouring God’s sacraments, His power and goodness be
made of no avail. “Dost thou tell me that he who has not the sacraments of
God cannot be saved? I tell thee that he who has the virtue of the
sacraments of God cannot perish. Which is greater, the sacrament or the
virtue of the sacrament—water or faith? If thou wouldst speak truly, answer,
‘faith.’” One notes that the twelfth century had its broad-mindedness, as
well as the twentieth.
While passing on discursively to consider the classification of the
sacraments, Hugo considers many matters,[79] and then opens his treatment
of the sacraments of the natural law with a recapitulation:
“The sacraments from the beginning were instituted for the restoration
and healing of man, some under the natural law, some under the written
law, and others under grace. Those which are later in time will be found
more worthy means of spiritual grace. For all those sacraments of the
former time, under the natural or the written law, were signs and figures

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of those now appointed under grace. The spiritual effect of the former in
their time was wrought through the virtue and sanctification drawn from
the latter. If any one therefore would deny that those prior sacraments
were effectual for sanctification, he does not seem to me to judge
aright.”[80]
The sacraments of the natural law were as the umbra veritatis; those of the
written law as the imago vel figura veritatis; but those under grace are the
corpus veritatis.[81] The written law, though given fully only through
Moses, began with Abraham, upon whom circumcision was enjoined as a
sacrament and sign of separation from the heathen peoples. In obedience to
its precepts lies the merit, in its promises lies the reward, while its
sacraments aid men to fulfil its precepts and obtain its reward. Hugo
discusses the sacraments of circumcision and burnt-offerings which were
necessary for the remission of sins; then those which exercised the faithful
people in devotion—the peace-offering is an example; and again those
which aided the people to cultivate piety, as the tabernacle and its utensils.
Hugo’s second Book, which makes the second half of his work, is devoted
to the “time of grace” inaugurated by the Incarnation. It treats in detail the
Christian sacraments and other topics of the Faith, down to the Last
Judgment, when the wicked are cast into hell, and the blessed enter upon
eternal life, where God will be seen eternally, praised without weariness,
and loved without satiety. This blessed lot flows from the grace of the
salvation brought by Christ, and is dependent on the sacraments, the
enduring means of grace. On their part, the sacraments, whatever more they
are, are symbols, in essence and function connected with the symbolical
nature of God’s creation, with the prefigurative significance of the fortunes
of God’s chosen people until the coming of Christ, with the import and
symbolism of Christ’s life and teachings, and with the symbolism inherent
in the organization and building up of Christ’s holy Church. Symbolism and
allegory are made part of the constitution of the world and man; they
connect man’s body and environment with his spirit, and link the life of this
world with the life to come. Hugo has thus grounded and established
symbolism in the purposes of God, in the universal scheme of things, and in
the nature and destinies of man.[82]

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CHAPTER XXIX

CATHEDRAL AND MASS; HYMN AND
IMAGINATIVE POEM

I. Guilelmus Durandus and Vincent of Beauvais.
II. The Hymns of Adam of St. Victor and the Anticlaudianus
of Alanus of Lille.

Under sanction of Scriptural interpretation and the sacraments, allegory and
symbolism became accepted principles of spiritual verity, sources of
political argument, and modes of transcendental truth. They penetrated the
Liturgy, charging every sentence and ceremonial act with saving
significance and power; and as plastic influences they imparted form and
matter to religious art and poetry, where they had indeed been potent from
the beginning.

I
In the early Church the office of the Mass, the ordination of priests, and the
dedication of churches were not charged with the elaborate symbolism
carried by these ceremonies in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,[83] when
the Liturgy, or speaking more specifically, the Mass, had become
symbolical from the introit to the last benediction; and Gothic sculpture and
glass painting, which were its visible illustration, had been impressed with
corresponding allegory. Mediaeval liturgic lore is summed up by Guilelmus
Durandus in his Rationale divinorum officiorum, which was composed in
the latter part of the thirteenth century, and contains much that is mirrored
in the art of the French cathedrals. It is impossible to review the elaborate

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symbolical significance of the Mass as set forth in the authoritative work of
one who was a bishop, theologian, jurist, and papal regent.[84] But a little of
it may be given.
The office of the Mass, says Durandus, is devised with great forethought, so
as to contain the major part of what was accomplished by and in Christ
from the time when He descended from heaven to the time when He
ascended into heaven. In the sacrifice of the Mass all the sacrifices of the
Ancient Law are represented and superseded. It may be celebrated at the
third hour, because then, according to Mark, Christ ascended the cross, and
at that hour also the Holy Spirit descended upon the Apostles in tongues of
fire; or at the sixth hour, when, according to Matthew, Christ was crucified;
or at the ninth hour, when on the cross He gave up His spirit.
The first part of the Mass begins with the introit. Its antiphonal chanting
signifies the aspirations and deeds, the prayers and praises of the patriarchs
and prophets who were looking for the coming of the Son of God. The
chorus of chanting clergy represents this yearning multitude of saints of the
Ancient Law. The bishop, clad in his sacred vestments,[85] at the end of the
procession, emerging from the sacristy and advancing to the altar,
represents Christ, the expected of the nations, emerging from the Virgin’s
womb and entering the world, even as the Spouse from His secret chamber.
The seven lights borne before him on the chief festivals are the seven gifts
of the Holy Spirit descending upon the head of Christ. The two acolytes
preceding him signify the Law and the Prophets, shown in Moses and Elias
who appeared with Christ on Mount Tabor. The four who bear the canopy
are the four evangelists, declaring the Gospel. The bishop takes his seat and
lays aside his mitre. He is silent, as was Christ during His early years. The
Book of the Gospels lies closed before him. Around him in the company of
clergy are represented the Magi and others.
The services proceed, every word and act filled with symbolic import. The
reading of the Epistle is reached—that is the preaching of John the Baptist,
who preaches only to the Jews; so the reader turns to the north, the region
of the Ancient Law. The reading ended, he bows before the bishop, as the
Baptist humbled himself before Christ.

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After the Epistle comes the Gradual or responsorium, which relates to
penitence and the works of the active life. The Baptist is still the main
figure, until the solemn moment when the Gospel is read, which signifies
the beginning of Christ’s preaching. The Creed follows the Gospel, as faith
follows the preaching of the truth. Its twelve parts refer to the calling of the
twelve apostles. Then the bishop begins his sermon; that is to say, after the
calling of the Twelve, the Word of God is preached to the people, and it
henceforth behoves the Church to hold fast to the Creed which has just been
recited.[86]
The authoritative allegorizing of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
extended the symbolism of the Mass to the edifice in which it was
celebrated; as the Rationale sets forth in its opening chapter entitled “De
ecclesia et eius partibus.” There it is shown that the corporeal church is the
edifice, while the Church, spiritually taken, signifies the faithful people
drawn together from all sorts of men as the edifice is constructed of all sorts
of stones. The various names ecclesia, synagogue, basilica, and tabernacle
are explained; and then why the Church is called the Body of Christ, and
also Virgin, also Spouse, Mother, Daughter, Widow, and indeed Meretrix, as
it shuts its bosom against no one seeking it. The form of the church
conforms to that of Solomon’s temple, in the anterior part of which the
people heard and prayed, while the clergy prayed and preached, gave thanks
and ministered, in the sanctuary or sacred place. Solomon’s temple in turn
was modelled on the Tabernacle of the Exodus, which, because it was
constructed on a journey, is the type of the world which passes away and
the lust thereof. It was made with the four colours of the arch of heaven, as
the world consists of the four elements. Since God is in the world, He is in
the tabernacle (which also means the Church militant) and in the midst of
the faithful congregation. The anterior part of the tabernacle, where the
people sacrificed, is also the Vita activa, in which the laity labour in
neighbourly love; and the portion where the Levites ministered is the Vita
contemplativa.
The church should be erected in the following manner: the place of its
foundation should be made ready—well-founded is the house of the Lord
upon a rock—and the bishop or licensed priest should sprinkle it with holy
water to dispel the demons, and should lay the first stone, on which should
be carved a cross. The head of the church, that is the chancel, should be set

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toward the rising sun at the time of the equinox. Now if the Jews were
commanded to build walls for Jerusalem, how much more ought we to build
the walls of our churches? The material church signifies the Holy Church
built of living stones in heaven, with Christ the corner-stone, upon which
are set the foundations of Apostles and Prophets. The walls above are the
Jews and Gentiles, who believing come to Christ from the four quarters of
the world. The faithful people predestined to life are the stones thereof.
The mortar in which the stones are set is made of lime, sand, and water.
Lime is fervent love, which takes to itself the sand, that is, earthly toil; then
water, which is the Spirit, unites the lime and sand. As the stones of the wall
would have no stability without the mortar, so men cannot be set in the
walls of the heavenly Jerusalem without love, which the Holy Spirit brings.
The stones of the wall are hewn and squared, which means sanctified and
made clean. Some stones are borne, but do not themselves bear any burden,
and these are the feeble in the Church. Other stones are borne, yet also bear;
while still others bear, but are not borne, save by Christ alone, the one
foundation; and the last are the perfect.
The Jews were subject to hostile attack while building the walls of
Jerusalem,[87] so that with one hand they set stones, while they fought with
the other. Likewise are we surrounded by hostile vices as we build the walls
of the Church; but we oppose them with the shield of faith and the
breastplate of righteousness, and the sword of the Word of God in our
hands.
The church edifice is disposed like the human body. The chancel, where the
altar is, represents the head, and the cross (transept) the arms and hands.
The western portion (nave and aisles) is the rest of the body. But indeed
Richard of St. Victor deems that the three parts of the edifice represent in
order of sanctity, first the virgins, then the continent, and lastly married
people.
Again, the Church is built with four walls; that is, by the teaching of the
four evangelists it rises broad and high into the altitude of the virtues. Its
length is the long-suffering with which it endures adversity; its breadth is
love, with which it embraces its friends in God, and loves its enemies for
His sake; its height is the hope of future reward. Again, in God’s temple the

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foundation is faith, which is as to what is not seen; the roof is charity, which
covers a multitude of sins. The door is obedience—keep the
commandments if thou wilt enter into life.[88] The pavement is humility.
The four walls are the four virtues, righteousness, (justitia), fortitude,
prudence, and temperance. The windows are glad hospitality and free-
handed pity.
Some churches are cruciform, to teach us that we are crucified to the world,
or should follow the Crucified. Some are circular, which signifies that the
Church is spread through the circle of the world.
The apse signifies the faithful laity; the crypts, the hermits. The nave
signifies Christ, through whom lies the way to the heavenly Jerusalem; the
towers are the preachers and prelates, and the pinnacles represent the
prelates’ minds which soar on high. Also a weather-cock on top of the
church signifies the preachers, who rouse the sleeping from the night of sin,
and turning ever to the wind, resist the rebellious. The iron rod upholding
the cock is the preacher’s sermon; and because this rod is placed above the
cross on the church, it indicates the word of God finished and confirmed, as
Christ said in His passion, “It is finished.” The lofty dome on which the
cross is set, signifies how perfect and inviolate should be the preaching and
observance of the Catholic Faith.
The glass windows of the church are the divine Scriptures, which repel the
wind and rain, but admit the light of the true sun, to wit God, into the
church, that is, into the hearts of the faithful. The windows also signify the
five senses of the body.[89]
The door of the church (again) is Christ—“I am the Door”; the doors are
also the Apostles. The pillars are the bishops and doctors; their bases are the
apostolic bishops; their capitals are the minds of the doctors and bishops.
The pavement is the foundation of faith, and also signifies the “poor in
spirit,” also the common crowd by whose labours the church is upheld. The
rafters are the princes and preachers in the world, who defend the church by
deed and word. The seats in a church are the contemplative in whom God
rests without offence. The panels in the ceiling are also preachers who
adorn and strengthen.

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The chancel, the head of the church, by being lower than the rest, indicates
how great should be the humility of the clergy. The screens by which the
altar is separated from the choir signify the separation of heavenly beings
from things of earth. The choir stalls indicate the body’s need of recreation.
The pulpit is the life of the perfect. The horologe signifies the diligence
with which the priests should say the canonical hours. The tiles of the roof
are the knights who protect the church from pagans. The spiral stairways
concealed within the walls are the secret knowledge had only by those who
ascend to the heavenly places. The sacristy, where the holy utensils are kept
and the priest puts on his vestments, signifies the womb of the most holy
Virgin, in which Christ put on His sacred garb of flesh. From thence the
priest emerges before the public, as Christ went forth from the Virgin’s
womb into the world. The lamp signifies Christ, who is the light of the
world; or the lamps signify the Apostles and other doctors, whose doctrine
lights the church. Moses also made seven lights, which are the seven gifts
of the Holy Spirit.
Durandus next devotes a whole chapter to the symbolism of the altar, and
another to the significance and function of ornaments, pictures, and
sculpture. The latter opens with the words: “The pictures and ornaments in
a church are the texts and scriptures (lectiones et scripturae) of the laity.”
This chapter is long; it explains how Christ and the angels, also saints,
Apostles and others, should be represented, and describes the proper kinds
of church ornament and utensils. Much of the detail is symbolical.
Thus Durandus devised or brought together meanings to fit each bit of the
church edifice, its materials and furnishings. In the work of a contemporary
are stored the allegorical meanings of the subjects of Gothic sculpture and
painted glass. The thirteenth century had a weakness for the word
“Speculum,” and the idea it carried of a mirror or compendium of all human
knowledge. The chief of mediaeval encyclopaedists was Vincent of
Beauvais, a protégé of the saintly King Louis IX. An analysis of his huge
Speculum majus is given elsewhere.[90] It was made up of the Mirror of
Nature, the Mirror of human Knowledge and Ethics, and the Mirror of
History. The compiler and his assistants laboured during the best period of
Gothic art, and from their work, industry may draw an exhaustive
commentary upon the series of topics presented by the sculpture and glass
of a cathedral.[91]

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The Mirror of Nature appears carved in the sculpture of Chartres or
Bourges. In rendering the work of the Six Days, the Creator is shown
(under the form of Christ)[92] contemplating His work, or resting from His
toil; here and there a lion, sheep, or goat, suggests the animal creation, and
a few trees the vegetable world. This is the necessary symbolism of the
sculptor’s art. But Gothic animals and plants sometimes have other definite
symbolic meanings, as in the instance of the well-known signs of the four
Evangelists, the man, the lion, the ox, the eagle. The allegorical
interpretations of Scripture were an exhaustless source of symbolism for
Gothic sculptors; another was the Physiologus and its progeny of Bestiaries,
with their symbolic explanations of the legendary attributes of animals.
Intentional symbolism, however, did not inhere in all this carving, much of
which is sheer fancy and decoration. Such was the character of the splendid
Gothic flora, of the birds and beasts that move in it, and of the grotesque
monsters. They were not out of place, since the Gothic cathedral was itself a
Speculum or Summa, and should include the whole of God’s creation, not
omitting even the devils who beset men’s souls.
Vincent may have drawn from Hugo of St Victor the current doctrine that
the arts have part in the work of man’s restoration; a doctrine abundantly
justifying the presence of the sciences and crafts (composing the Mirror of
Knowledge) in the sculpture and painting of the cathedral. There the Seven
Liberal Arts are rendered, through allegorical figures; and the months of the
year are symbolized in the Zodiac and the labours of the field which make
up man’s annual toil. Philosophy is shown and Fortune’s wheel; the Virtues
and Vices are represented in personifications, and even their conflict, the
Psychomachia, may be shown.
At last the Mirror of History is reached. This will teach in concrete
examples what has been learned from the figures of the abstract Virtues and
Vices. Its chief source is the Bible. Those Old Testament incidents were
selected which for centuries had been interpreted as prefigurements of the
life of Christ; and each was presented as a pendant to the Gospel scene
which it typified. These make the chief subjects of the coloured glass of
Chartres and Bourges and other cathedrals where the windows are
preserved. Here may be seen the Passion of Christ, surrounded by scenes
from the Old Testament typifying it; likewise His Resurrection and its
ancient types; and other significant incidents in the life of the Saviour and

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His virgin mother.[93] The latter is typified by the burning bush, by the
fleece of Gideon, by the rod of Aaron, even as in the hymns of Adam of
Saint-Victor.[94] Besides these incidents, leading personages of the Old
Testament are presented as prefigurative of Christ, as in the great series of
statues of Melchizedek, Abraham, Moses, Samuel, David, on the north
portal of Chartres; while the four greater and twelve minor prophets are
shown as types of the four Evangelists and the twelve Apostles. Christ
himself is depicted on a window at St. Denis, between the allegorical
figures of the Ancient Law and the Gospel,—figures which are allied to
those of the uncrowned and blinded Synagogue and the triumphant Church,
so frequently seen together upon cathedrals. Everywhere the tendency to
symbolize is strong. Parts of the Crucifixion scene are rendered
symbolically, and many of the parables. That of the Good Samaritan
constantly appears upon the windows, and is always designed so as to
convey the allegorical teaching drawn from it in Honorius’s sermon.[95]
Obviously this Mirror of History was chiefly sacred history. Pagan antiquity
was scantily suggested by the Sibyls, who stand for the dumb pagan
prophecy of Christ. Scenes from the history of Christian nations were more
frequent; but they always told of some victory for Christ, like the baptism
of Clovis, or the crusading deeds of Charlemagne, Roland or Godfrey of
Bouillon. God’s drama closed with the Last Judgment, the damnation of the
damned and the beatitude of the elect. The Last Judgments, usually over-
arching the tympanums above cathedral doors, are known to all—as at
Rheims, at Chartres, at Bourges. They are full of symbolism, and full of
“historic” reality as well. The treatment becomes entirely allegorical when
the sculptor enters Paradise with the redeemed, and portrays in lovely
personifications the beatitudes of the blessed, as on the north portal of
Chartres.
Those bands of nameless men who carved the statues and designed the
coloured glass which were to make Gothic cathedrals speak, faithfully
presented the teachings of the Church. They rendered the sacred drama of
mankind’s creation, fall, redemption, and final judgment unto hell or
heaven: they rendered it in all its dogmatic symbolism, and with a plastic
adequacy showing how completely they thought and felt in the allegorical
medium in which they worked. They also created matchless ideals of
symbolism in art. The statuary of the portals and façades of Rheims and

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Chartres are in their way comparable to the sculptures of the pediment of
the Parthenon. But unlike those masterpieces of antique idealism, these
Christian masterpieces do not seek to set forth mortal man in his natural
strength and beauty and completeness. Rather they seek to show the
working of the human spirit held within the power and grace of God. Theirs
is not the strength and beauty of the flesh, or the excellence of the
unconquerable mind of man; but in them man’s mind and spirit are palpably
the devout creatures of God’s omnipotence, obedient to His will, sustained
and redeemed by His power and grace. Attitude, form, feature, alike
designed to express the sacred beauty of the soul, are not invested with
physical excellence for its own sake; but every physical quality of these
statues is a symbol of some holy and beautiful quality of spirit. These
statues attain a symbolic, and not a natural, ideal in art. Yet many of them
possess the physical beauty of form and feature, inasmuch as such may be
the proper envelope for the chaste and eager soul.[96]
On the other hand, in the filling out of the illustrative detail of life on earth,
of handicraft and art, the sculptor showed how he could carve these
actualities, and present earth’s beauty in the cathedral’s wealth of vine and
flower and leaf. The level commonplace of humanity is deftly rendered, the
daily doings of the forge and field and market-place, the tugging labourer,
the merchant with his stuffs, the scholar with his scrolls. He knew life well,
this artist, and had an eye for every catching scene, also for Nature’s subtle
beauties. Sometimes a certain passing show was represented because a
window was given by some drapers’ guild, desirous of seeing its craft
shown in a place of honour; and the artist loved his scenes from busy life,
as he loved his ornament from Nature. Such scenes (which rarely held
specific allegory) were not unconnected with the rest of the drama of
creation and redemption mirrored in the cathedral, nor was the exquisitely
cut leaf and rose without its suggestion of the grace incarnate in the Virgin
and her Son. Daily life and natural ornament had at least an illustrative
pertinency to the whole, of which they were unobtrusive and lovely
elements; and since that whole was primarily a visible symbol of the unseen
and divine power, these humble elements had part in its unutterable
mystery, and were likewise symbols.
Finally, have not these nameless artists—even as Dante and our English
Bunyan—presented by their art a synthesis of life’s realities? Their feet

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were on the earth; with sympathy and knowledge their hands worked in the
media of things seen and handled, and fashioned the little human matters
which are bounded by the cradle and the grave. Such were the materials
from which Dante formed his Commedia, and Bunyan drew the Progress of
his Pilgrim soul to God. Yet as with Bunyan and Dante, so with these artists
in stone and coloured light, the mortal and the tangible were but the
elements through which the poem or story, or the carved or painted picture,
was made the realizing symbol of the unseen and eternal Spirit.

II
Beneath the Abbey Church of Saint-Victor there was a crypt consecrated to
the Mother of God. Here a certain monk was wont to retire and compose
hymns in her honour. One day his lips uttered the lines:

“Salve, mater pietatis,
Et totius Trinitatis
Nobile triclinium;
Verbi tamen incarnati
Speciale majestati
Praeparans hospitium!”

Whereupon a flood of light filled the crypt, and the Virgin, appearing to
him, inclined her head.
The monk’s name was Adam,[97] and he is deemed the best of Latin hymn-
writers. Breton born, he entered Saint-Victor in his youth, about the year
1130. He was favoured with the instruction of Hugo till the master’s death
in 1141. Adam must have been of nearly the same age as Richard of Saint-
Victor, that other pupil of Hugo who makes the third member of the great
Victorine trio. Their works have been the monastery’s fairest fame. Hugo
was a Saxon; Adam a Breton; Richard was Scotch. So Saint-Victor drew her
brilliant sons from many lands. Richard, whose writings worthily
supplemented those of his master Hugo,[98] died in 1173; his friend Adam
outlived him, and died an old man as the twelfth century was closing. He

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was buried in the cloister, and over him was placed an elegiac epitaph upon
human vanity and sin, in part his own composition.
Adam’s hymns were Sequences[99] intended for church use. Their author
was learned in Christian doctrine, skilled in the Liturgy, and saturated with
the spirit of devotional symbolism. His symbolism, which his gift of verse
made into imagery, was that of the mediaeval church and its understanding
of the Liturgy; he also shows the special influence of Hugo. Adam’s hymns,
with their powerful Latin rhymes, cannot be reproduced in English; but a
translation may give the contents of their symbolism. The hymn for Easter,
beginning “Zyma vetus expurgetur,”[100] is an epitome of the symbolic
prefiguration of Christ in the Old Testament. Each familiar allegorical
interpretation flashes in a phrase. Literally translated, or rather maltreated, it
is as follows:
“Let the old leaven be purged away that a new resurrection may be
celebrated purely. This is the day of our hope; wonderful is the power of
this day by the testimony of the law.
“This day despoiled Egypt, and liberated the Hebrews from the fiery
furnace; for them in wretched straits the work of servitude was mud and
brick and straw.[101]
“Now as praise of divine virtue, of triumph, of salvation, let the voice
break free! This is the day which the Lord made, the day ending our
grief, the day bringing salvation.
“The Law is the shadow of things to come, Christ the goal of promises,
who completes all. Christ’s blood blunts the sword the guardians
removed.[102]
“The Boy, type of our laughter, in whose stead the ram was slain, seals
life’s joy.[103] Joseph issues from the pit;[104] Christ returns above after
death’s punishment.
“This serpent devours the serpents of Pharaoh secure from the serpent’s
spite.[105] Whom the fire wounded, them the brazen serpent’s presence
freed.[106]

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“The hook and ring of Christ pierce the dragon’s jaw;[107] the sucking
child puts his hand into the cockatrice’s den, and the old tenant of the
world flees affrighted.[108]
“The mockers of Elisha ascending the house of God, feel the bald-
head’s wrath;[109] David, feigning madness, the goat cast forth, and the
sparrow escape.[110]
“With a jaw-bone Samson slays a thousand and spurns the marriage of
his tribe. Samson bursts the bars of Gaza, and, carrying its gates, scales
the mountain’s crest.[111]
“So the strong Lion of Judah, shattering the gates of dreadful death,
rises the third day; at His father’s roaring voice, He carries aloft His
spoils to the bosom of the supernal mother.[112]
“After three days the whale gives back from his belly’s narrow house
Jonas the fugitive, type of the true Jonas. The grape of Cyprus[113]
blooms again, opens and grows apace. The synagogue’s flower withers,
while flourishes the Church.[114]
“Death and life fought together: truly Christ arose, and with Him many
witnesses of glory. A new morn, a glad morn shall wipe away the tears
of evening: life overcame destruction; it is a time of joy.
“Jesu victor, Jesu life, Jesu life’s beaten way, thou whose death quelled
death, bid us to the paschal board in trust. O Bread of life, O living
Wave, O true and fruitful Vine, do thou feed us, do thou cleanse us, that
thy grace may save us from the second death. Amen.”
From the time of that old third-century hymn ascribed to Clement of
Alexandria,[115] hymns to Christ had been filled with symbolism, the
symbolism of loving personification of His attributes, as well as with the
more formal symbolism of His Old Testament prefigurements. Adam’s
symbolism is of both kinds. It has feeling even when dogmatic,[116] and
throbs with devotion as its theme approaches the Gospel Christ. Prevailing
modes of thought and feeling may prescribe topics for verse which a
succeeding age will find curiously unpoetic. Yet if the later time have a
sympathetic understanding for the past, it will recognize how fervid and

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how songful was that bygone verse—the verse of Adam’s hymns, for
instance. In one for Christmas Day, beginning:

“Potestate, non natura,
Fit Creator creatura,”[117]

a stanza touches on the reason why the Creator thus became creature. It
would be impossible to render its feeling in English, and much
circumlocution would be needed to express even its literal meaning in any
language but mediaeval Latin. This stanza has twelve lines:

“Causam quaeris, modum rei:
Causa prius omnes rei,
Modus justum velle Dei,
Sed conditum gratia.”

“Thou askest cause and modus of the fact: the causa rei was before all,
the modus was God’s righteous willing, but seasoned with grace.”
These lines are scholastic. In the next four, the feeling begins to rise, yet the
phrases repel rather than attract us:

“O quam dulce condimentum
Nobis mutans in pigmentum,
Cum aceto fel cruentum
Degustante Messya!”

“Oh! how sweet the condiment changing for us into juice, as the
Messiah tastes the bloody gall and vinegar.”
The feeling touches its climax with the four concluding lines, in which the
parable of the Good Samaritan is invested with the special allegorical
significance set forth in the sermon of Honorius:[118]

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“O salubre sacramentum,
Quod nos ponit in jumentum
Plagis nostris dans unguentum
Ille de Samaria.”

“O health-giving sacrament which sets us on a beast, giving ointment
for our stripes,—he of Samaria.”[119]
Two stanzas from another of Adam’s Christmas hymns will show how
curiously intricate could be his symbolism. Having spoken of the ineffable
wonder of the Incarnation, he proceeds:

“Frondem, florem, nucem sicca
Virga profert, et pudica
Virgo Dei Filium.
Fert coelestem vellus rorem,
Creatura creatorem,
Creaturae pretium.

“Frondis, floris, nucis, roris
Pietati Salvatoris
Congruunt mysteria.
Frons est Christus protegendo,
Flos dulcore, nux pascendo,
Ros coelesti gratia.”[120]

“A dry rod puts forth leafage, flower, nut,[121] and a chaste Virgin brings
forth the Son of God. A fleece bears heavenly dew,[122] a creature the
Creator, the creature’s price.
“The mysteries of leafage, flower, nut, dew are suited to the Saviour’s
tender love (pietas). The foliage by its protecting is Christ, the flower is
Christ by its sweetness, the nut as it yields food, the dew by its celestial
grace.”
One observes that here the symbolism first touches Christ’s birth, the dry
rod and the fleece representing the Virgin. Then the leafage, flower, nut and

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dew typify His qualities. The remaining stanzas of this hymn carry out in
further detail the symbolism of the nut.
Besides the hymns devoted to the Saviour, the greater part of Adam’s
hymns are symbolical throughout. Those written for the dedication of
churches are among the most interesting. One beginning “Quam dilecta
tabernacula”[123] sketches the Old Testament facts which prefigure Christ’s
holy Church. The keynote is in the lines:

“Quam decora fundamenta
Per concinna sacramenta
Umbra praecurrentia!”

“How seemly the foundations through the appropriate sacraments, the
forerunning shadow.”
The shadow is the Old Testament, and these three lines sum up the teaching
of Hugo as to the sacramental nature of the Old Testament narratives.
Throughout this hymn Adam follows Hugo closely.[124] In another
dedicatory hymn[125] Adam gives the prefigurative meaning of the parts of
Solomon’s temple. There is likewise much symbolism in the grand hymns
addressed to the Virgin. One for the festival of the Assumption[126] gives the
figures of the Virgin in the Old Testament—the throne of Solomon, the
fleece of Gideon, the burning bush. Then with more feeling the
metaphorical epithets pour forth, voicing the heart’s gratitude to the Virgin’s
saving aid to man. A still more splendid example of like symbolism and
ardent metaphor is the great hymn beginning:

“Salve mater Salvatoris,
Vas electum, vas honoris,”

which won the Virgin’s greeting for the poet.[127]
The lives of Honorius, of Hugo, of Adam, from whose works we have been
drawing illustrations of mediaeval symbolism, vie with each other in
obscurity; and properly enough since they were monks, for whom self-
effacement is becoming. This personal obscurity culminates with one last

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example to be drawn from monastic sources. The man himself was an
impressive figure in his time; a sight of him was not to be forgotten: he was
called magnus and doctor universalis. Nevertheless it has been questioned
whether he lived in the twelfth or the thirteenth century, and whether one
man or two bore the name of Alanus de Insulis.
There was in fact but one, and he belongs to the twelfth century, dying
almost a centenarian, in the year 1202. The cognomen de Insulis has also
been an enigma. From it he has been dubbed a Sicilian, and then a Scot,
born on the island of Mona. But the name in reality refers to the chief town
of Flanders, which is called Lisle; and Alanus doubtless was a Fleming.
He became a learned man, and lectured at Paris. That he was possessed with
no small opinion of his talents would appear from the legend told of him as
well as of St. Augustine. He had announced that on a certain day in a single
lecture he would set forth the complete doctrine of the mystery of the most
Holy Trinity. The afternoon before the day appointed, he walked by the
river, thinking how he should arrange his subject so as to include it all. He
chanced upon a child who was dipping up the river water with a snail shell
and dropping it into a little trench. Smiling, he asked what should be the
object of this; and the child told him that he was putting the whole river into
his trench. As the great scholar was explaining that this could not be done,
he suddenly felt himself chidden and taught—how much less might he
perform what he had set for the next morning. He stood speechless at his
presumption, and burst into tears. The next day ascending the platform he
said to the crowd of auditors, “Let it suffice you to have seen Alanus”;[128]
and with that he left them all astonished, and himself hastily set out for
Citeaux. On arrival he asked to be admitted as a conversus, and was given
charge of the monastery’s sheep. Patient and unknown, he long plied this
humble vocation. But at length it chanced that the abbot took him to a
council at Rome, in the capacity of hostler. And there he beat down the
arrogance of a heretic with such arguments that the latter cried out that he
was disputing either with the devil or Alanus, and would say no more.
Such is one story. By another he is made to seek the monastery of
Clairvaux, and there become a monk under St. Bernard. It is also written
that he became an abbot, and then a bishop, but afterwards resigned his
bishopric. However all this may have been, he died and was buried, and

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was subjected to many epitaphs. On what purports to be an old copy of his
tomb at Citeaux, he is shown with St. Bernard, and called Alanus Magnus.
The title Doctor universalis has always clung to his memory, which will not
altogether fade. For if Adam of Saint-Victor was the greatest of Latin
mediaeval hymn-writers, Alanus has good claim to be called the greatest of
mediaeval Latin poets in the field of didactic and narrative poetry.[129]
The many works ascribed to Alanus include an allegorical Commentary on
Canticles, a treatise on the art of preaching, a book of sententiae, another of
theologicae regulae, sundry sermons, and a lengthy work “contra
haereticos”; also a large dictionary of Biblical allegorical interpretations,
entitled Liber in distinctionibus dictionum theologicalium.[130] All these are
prose. He composed besides his Liber de planctu naturae,[131] and his
Anticlaudianus, a learned and profound, and likewise highly imaginative
allegorical poem upon man.[132] Its Preface in prose casts a curious light
upon the author’s enigmatical personality, which combined the wonted or
conventional humility of a monk with the towering self-consciousness of a
man of genius.
“The lightning scorns to spend its force on twigs, but breaks the proud
tops of exalted trees. The wind’s imperious rage passes over the reed
and drives the assaults of its wild blasts against the highest summits.
Wherefore let not envy’s flame strike the pinched humility of my work,
nor detraction’s breath overwhelm the driven poverty of my little book,
where misery’s wreck demands a port of pity, far more than felicity
provokes the sting of spite.”
More sentences of turgid deprecation follow, and the author begs the reader
not to approach his book with disgust and irritation, but with pleasant
anticipations of novelty (not all a monk speaks here!).
“For although the book may not bloom with the purple vestment of
flowering speech, nor shine with the constellated light of the flashing
period, still in the tenuity of the fragile reed the honey’s sweetness may
be found, and parched thirst can be tempered with the scant water of a
rill. In this book let nothing be made vulgar (plebescat) with ribaldry,
nor let anything be open to biting reproof, as if it smacked of the
coarseness of the moderns [to whom does he refer?]; but let the flower

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of my talent be presented, and the dignity of diligence; for pigmy
humility, thus raised upon a height, may overtop the giant. Let not those
dare to tire of this work, who are squalling in the cradles of elementary
instruction, sucking milk from nurses’ paps; nor let those seek to cry it
down, who are pledged to the service of the higher learning; nor those
presume to discredit it, who strike heaven from the top-notch of
philosophy. For in this work, the sweetness of the literal meaning will
tickle the puerile ear; moral teaching will instruct the more proficient
understanding; and the finer subtilty of allegory will sharpen the
finished intellect. Wherefore let all those be kept from ingress who,
abandoned to the mirrors of the senses, are not charioteered by reason,
and, pursuing the sense-image, have no appetite for reason’s truth,—lest
indeed what is holy be defiled by dogs, and the pearl be trampled by the
feet of swine. But such as will not suffer the things of reason to rest
with the base images, and dare to lift their view to forms divine, may
thread the narrow passes of my book, while they weigh with discretion’s
scales what is suited to the common ear, and what should be buried in
silence.”
This Preface of strained sentence and laboured metaphor, of forced humility
and overweening self-consciousness, hardly augurs well for the poem of
which it is the prelude. But prefaces are authors’ pitfalls, and, moreover,
many writers have floundered in one medium of speech while in another
they have moved with ease. From the ungainly prose of the Persones Tale,
no one would expect the ease and force of Chaucer’s verse. And the reader
of Alanus’s Preface need not be discouraged from entering upon his poem.
Its subject is man; its philosophic or religious purpose is to expound the
functions of God, of Nature, of Fortune, of Virtue and Vice, in making man
and shaping his career. The poem is an allegory, original in its general
scheme of composition, but in many of its parts following earlier allegorical
writings.
The opening lines tell of Nature’s solicitude to bestow her gifts so that the
finished work may present a fair harmony: as a patient workman she forges,
trims and files, and fashions with reason’s chisel. But when she seeks to
invest her work with qualities beyond her giving, she is obliged to call on
the Celestial Council of her Sisters. Responding, pilgrim-like the Crown of

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Heaven’s soldiery comes from on high, brightens the earth with its light,
and clothes the ground with blessed footprints.
Leading this galaxy, Concord advances, foster-child of Peace; then Plenty
comes, and Favour, and Youth with favour anointed, and Laughter, banisher
of mental mists; then Shame and Modesty, and Reason the measure of
good, and Honesty, Reason’s happy comrade; then Dignity (decus) and
Prudence balancing her scales, and Piety and true Faith, and Virtue. Last of
all Nobility (nobilitas), in grace not quite the others’ equal.[133]
In the midst of a great wood blessed with fountains and multitudinous bird-
song, a cloud-kissing mountain rose with level top. Nature’s palace was
erected here, gemmed and golden; and within was a great hall hung upon
bronze columns. Here the painter’s art had rendered the ways of men, and
inscriptions made plain the pictured story. “O new wonders of painting,”
exclaims the poet; “what cannot be, comes into being; and painting, the ape
of truth, deluding with novel art, turns shadows to realities, and transforms
particular falsehood into (general) truth.”[134] There might be seen the
power of logic pressing its arguments and conquering sophistry. There
Aristotle was preparing his arms, and, more divinely, Plato mused on
heaven’s secrets. There Seneca moralized, and Ptolemy explained the stars
in their times and courses. There spoke the word of Tully, while Virgil’s
muse painted many lies, and put truth’s garb on falsehood. There was also
shown the might of Alcides and Ulysses’ wisdom, Turnus’s valour prodigal
of life, and Hippolytus’s shame, undone by Venus’s reins.[135] Such and
many other tropes of things and dreams of truth, this royal art set forth.
Here, standing in the midst of her Council, Nature, with bowed head, spoke
her solemn words: “Painfully I remake what my hand’s solicitude has
wrought. But the hand’s penitence does not wipe out the flaws. The
shortcomings of our works must be repaired by some perfect model, some
man divine, not smelling of the earth and earthly, but whose mind shall hold
to heaven while his body walks the earth. Let him be the mirror in which
we may see what our faith, our potency, and virtue ought to be. As it is, our
shame is over all the earth.”
When the Council had approved these words, Prudence arose in all her
beauty.[136] She discoursed upon man’s dual nature, spirit and body. Nature

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and her helpers may be the artificers of his mortal body, but the soul
demands its heavenly Artificer, and laughs at our rude arts. God’s wisdom
alone can create the soul, as Prudence shows by an exposition of its
qualities.
Now Reason raised his reverend form, holding his triple glass in which
appear the causes and effects and qualities of things. He humbly disclaimed
the power to instruct Minerva,[137] and applauded the plan by which a new
Lucifer should sojourn in the world. May he unite all the gifts which they
can bestow, and be their champion against the Vices. Now let their suppliant
vows be sped to Him who alone can create the divine mind. A legate should
be despatched above, bearing their request. For this office none is so fit as
Prudence, to whom the secrets of Heaven are known, and whose energy and
wisdom will surmount the difficulties of the way.
Prudence at first refuses; but Concordia rises, the inspirer of chaste loves,
she who knit the souls of David and Jonathan, Pirithous and Theseus, Nisus
and Euryalus, Orestes and Pylades. Persuasively she speaks, and points out
all the ills the world had suffered by disobedience to her behests. Prudence
is won over to the task, and now wills only as her sisters will. She thinks
upon the means and way. Wisdom orders a chariot to be made, in which the
sea, the stars, the heavens may be traversed. Its artificers are her seven
daughters, wise and fair, who unite the skill and knowledge of all those
wise ancients who had excelled in any Art. First Grammar (her functions
and great writers being told) forms the pole which goes before the axle-tree
(temo praeambulus axis). Then Logic makes the axle-tree; and Rhetoric
adorns the pole with gems and the axle with flowers. Arithmetic constructs
one wheel of the chariot, and Music the second, Geometry the third, and the
fourth wheel is made by Astronomy.[138]
Now Reason, at Nature’s nod, yokes to the chariot the five horses, to wit,
the Senses disciplined and controlled, Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, and
Touch. He himself mounts as charioteer, and bids Prudence follow. Amid
the farewells and plaudits of all, the chariot soars aloft. As it speeds along,
Prudence investigates atmospheric phenomena, and then the spirits of evil
who wander through the air. They passed on through the upper ether,
reached the citadel and fount of light, where the Sun holds sway; next was
reached the region where Venus and the star of Mercury sing together and

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Lucifer exults, the herald of the day. Then to their rapid flight appeared
Mars’ flaming palace, seething with fire and wrath. Onward they passed to
the glad light and unhurtful flames of Jupiter, and then to Saturn’s sphere.
At length they ascended the stellar region where the Pole stars contend in
brightness, where are seen Hercules and Orion, Leda’s twins, the fiery Crab,
the Lion, and the rest of the Zodiac’s constellations.[139]
Here at heaven’s entrance the chariot halted. Those five horses of the
Senses, charioteered by Reason, could ascend no farther. But a damsel was
seen, seated upon the summit of the Pole. She scrutinizes the hidden Cause
and End of all things, holding scales in her right hand and in her left a
sceptre. On her vestments a subtile point traces God’s secrets, and the
formless is figured in form. Reverently Phronesis, that is Prudence, saluted
this Queen of the Pole, and set forth the purpose of her journey, telling of
Nature’s desire and her limitations. In reply Theology, for it is she,[140]
offered herself as a companion, and bade Prudence leave her chariot, but
keep the second courser (Hearing) to bear her on. Prudence now
surmounted the starry citadels, and marvelled at heaven’s nodes, where the
four ways begin and the crystalline waters flow, shot with agreeing fires; for
here, in universal harmony transcending Nature’s laws and Reason’s power,
Concord unites those elements which war below. Onward leads the way
among those joys celestial which know no tears, where there is peace
without hate, and light above all brightness. Here dwell the angel bands, the
Thunderer’s princes, regulators of the world; here glow the seraphim, and
cherubim drain draughts from the mind of God; and here are the Thrones
whereon God balances His weighed decrees, and with His band of Powers
conquers the tyrants.[141] Here also rest the saints, freed from earth’s dross
and passion, clothed in virgin white or martyr’s purple, or wearing the
Doctor’s laurel. Joyful alike are they, yet diverse in merit, shining with
unequal splendour.[142] Here finally, in honour surpassing all, is the Virgin
Mother, clad in the garb of our salvation—Star of the Sea, Way of Life, Port
of Salvation, Limit of Piety, Mother of Pity, Garden closed, Sealed Font,
Fruitful Olive, Sweet Paradise, Rose without Thorn, Guiltless Grace, Way
of the Wanderer, Light of the Blind, Rest of the Tired—untold,
unnumbered, and unspeakable are her praises.[143]
Phronesis cannot bear the sight. Queen Theology calls to her sister Faith to
aid the fainting one. Faith comes and holds her Mirror before the eyes of

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Phronesis; and in this glass her eyes can endure the shaded glory of the
overpowering vision. She staggers on, her trembling steps supported by
Faith and Theology. In the glass she sees the eternal and divine, the
enduring, moveless, sure; species unborn, celestial ideas, the forms of men
and principles of things, causes of causes and the course of fate, the
Thunderer’s mind; why God condemns some, predestines others, prepares
that one for life and from this one withdraws His rewards; why poverty
presses upon some and want is filled only with tears; why riches pour on
others, why one is wise, another lacking, and why the worthies of the past
have been endowed each with his several gifts.[144]
Marvelling at all these sights, Prudence, supported by the sisters, reached at
last the palace of the King, and fell prostrate before God himself. He bade
her rise, and speak. Humbly she set forth Nature’s plight and the evil upon
earth, and presented her petition. God accedes benignantly. He will not
destroy the earth again, but will send a human spirit endowed with heavenly
gifts, a pilgrim to the earth, a medicine for the world. Prudence worships.
God summons Mind, and orders him to fashion the type-form, the idea of
the human mind. Mind searches among existing beings for the traces of this
new idea or type.[145] His difficult search succeeds at last, and in the Mirror
which he constructs, every grace takes its abode: Joseph’s form, the
intelligence of Judith, the patience of righteous Job, the modesty of Moses,
Jacob’s simplicity, Abraham’s faith, Tobias’s piety. He presents this pattern-
type to God, who sets an accordant soul therein, and then entrusts the new-
made being to Phronesis, while Mind anoints it with an unguent against the
attacks of the Vices. Phronesis, with her prize, turned to the way by which
she had ascended, regained her chariot and Reason her charioteer. Together
they sped back to the congratulations of Nature and her Council.
For this perfect soul Nature now forms a beautiful body. Concord unites the
two, and a new man is formed, perfect and free from flaw. Chastity and
guardian Modesty endow him with their gifts; Reason adds his, and
Honesty. These Logic follows, with her gift of skill in argument; Rhetoric
brings her stores, then Arithmetic, next Music, next Geometry, next
Astronomy;[146] while Theology and Piety are not behind with theirs; and to
these Faith joins her gifts of fidelity and truth. Last of all comes Nobility,
Fortune’s daughter. But because she has nothing of her own to give, and
must receive all from her mother, she betakes herself to Fortune’s house of

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splendid mutability. What will Fortune give? The two return to Nature’s
palace, and Fortune’s magnificence is proffered by her daughter; but
Reason, standing by, will allow only a measured acceptance.[147]
The report of this richly endowed creature reached Alecto. Raging she
summoned her pests, the chiefs of Tartarus, doers of ill, masters of every sin
—Injury, Fraud, Perjury, Theft, Rapine, Fury and Anger, Hate, Discord,
Strife, Disease and Melancholy, Lust, Wantonness and Need, Fear and Old
Age. She roused them with a harangue: their rule is threatened by this
upstart Creature, whom Parent Nature has prepared for war; but what can
his untried imbecility do against them in arms?
All clamour assent, and in a tumult of rage make ready for the strife. The
hostile ranks approach. The first attack is made by Folly (Stultitia) and her
comrades, Sloth, Gaming, Idle Jesting, Ease and Sleep. But faithful Virtues
protect the constant youth against these foes. Next Discord leads its
mutinous band, but only to defeat. Onslaughts follow from Poverty, next
from Ill-Repute, from Old Age and Disease. Then Grieving advances, and is
overthrown by Laughter. More deadly still are the attacks of Venus and
Lust; then Excess and Wantonness take up the fray; and at the end Impiety
and Fraud and Avarice. But still the man conquers with the aid of his
Virtues ever true.
The fight is over. The Virtues triumph and receive their Kingdoms; Vice
succumbs; Love reigns instead of Discord; the man is blessed; and the
earth, adorned with flowers in a new spring of youth, brings forth
abundance. The Poet sums up his poem’s teaching: From God must
everything begin and in Him end. But our genius may not stand inert; ours
is the strife as well, according to our strength and faculty. Let the mind
attach itself to the things which are and do not pass, even as Plato sings,
from things of sense reaching on ever to the grades Angelic and Olympus’s
steeps. Then it shall behold the universal praise of God and the true
ascription of all good to Him. He in himself is perfect, Part and likewise
Whole, and everywhere uncircumscribed. Nothing has power in itself, but
all would fall to nothing, did He close the flux of hidden power.
Alanus, a good Christian Doctor, is also an eclectic in his thought. A
consistent system is hardly to be drawn from his poem. It suggests Christ.

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But its hero is not the God-man of the Incarnation. Its figures are semi-
pagan. The virtue Faith, for example, is the Fides, the Good Faith, of the
antique Roman, though it is the Christian virtue Faith as well. In language
the poem is antique; its verse has vigorous flow; its imagery lacks neither
beauty nor sublimity. It is in fact a poem, a creation, having a scheme and
unity of its own, although the author borrows continually. Martianus
Capella is there and Dionysius the Areopagite; there also is the
Psychomachia of Prudentius and its progeny of symbolic battles between
the Virtues and the Vices.[148] Yet Alanus has achieved; for he has woven
his material into a real poem and has reared his own lofty allegory. His
work is another grand example of mediaeval symbolism.
Thus we see the ceaseless sweep of allegory through men’s minds. They felt
and thought and dreamed in allegories; and also spent their dry ingenuity on
allegorical constructions. It was reserved for one supreme poet to create, out
of this atmosphere, a supreme poem which is as complete an allegory as the
Anticlaudianus. But the Divina Commedia has also the power of its human
realities of actually experienced pain and joy, and hate and love. Compared
with it, the Anticlaudianus betrays the vapourings of monk and doctor,
imaginative indeed, but thin. The author’s feet were not planted on the earth
of human life.
But the Middle Ages did not demand that allegory should have its feet
planted on the earth, so long as its head nodded high among the clouds—or
its sentiments wandered sweetly in fancy’s gardens. In one of these dwelt
that lovely Rose, whose Roman once had vogue. In structure the Roman de
la rose is an allegory from the beginning of the first part by De Lorris to the
very end of that encyclopaedic sequel added by De Meun. The story is well
known.[149] One may recall the fact that in De Lorris’s poem and De
Meun’s sequel every quality and circumstance of Love’s sentiment and
fortunes are figured in allegorical personifications—all the lover’s hopes
and fears and the wavering chances of his quest.
In this respect the poem is the courtly and romantic counterpart of such a
philosophical or religious allegory as the Anticlaudianus. Personifications
of the arts and sciences, the vices and virtues, current since the time of
Prudentius’s Psychomachia and Capella’s Nuptials of Philology, were all in
the Anticlaudianus, while in the Roman de la rose figure their secular and

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romantic kin: in De Lorris’s part, Love, Fair-Welcome, Danger, Reason,
Franchise, Pity, Courtesy, Shame, Fear, Idleness, Jealousy, Wicked-Tongue;
then, with De Meun, others besides: Richesse, False-Seeming, Hypocrisy,
Nature, and Genius.[150] The figures of the Roman de la rose have diverse
antecedents scattered through the entire store of knowledge and classic
literature possessed by the Middle Ages; perhaps their immediate source of
inspiration was the scheme of courtly love which the mediaeval imagination
elaborated and revelled in.[151] The poem of De Lorris was a veritable
romantic allegory. De Meun, in his sequel, rather plays with the allegorical
form, which he continues; it has become a frame for his stores of learning,
his knowledge of the world, his views of life, his wit and satire, and his
great literary and poetic gifts. Yet it ends in a regular Psychomachia, in
which Love’s barons are hard beset by all the foes of Love’s delight, though
Love has its will at last.

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BOOK VI
LATINITY AND LAW

CHAPTER XXX

THE SPELL OF THE CLASSICS

I. Classical Reading.
II. Grammar.
III. The Effect upon the Mediaeval Man; Hildebert of Lavardin.

I
During all the mediaeval centuries, men approached the Classics expecting
to learn from them. The usual attitude toward the classical heritage was that
of docile pupils looking for instruction. One may recall the antecedent
reasons of this, which have already been stated at length. In Italy, letters
survived as the most impressive legacy from an overshadowing past. In the
north, save where they lingered on from the antique time, they came in the
train of Latin Christianity, and were offered to men under the same
imposing conditions of a higher civilization authoritatively instructing ruder
peoples. Moreover, between the ancient times which produced the classic
literature and the Carolingian period there intervened centuries of
degeneracy and transition, when the Classics were used pedagogically to
teach grammar and rhetoric. Then grammars were composed or revised, and
other handbooks of elementary instruction. The Classics still were loved;
but how shall men love beyond their own natures? Gifted Jerome, great
Augustine, loved them with an ardour bringing its own misgivings. Other
lovers, like Ausonius and Apollinaris Sidonius, were pedantic imitators.

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Both north and south of the Alps another and obviously enduring cause
fostered the habit of regarding the Classics as storehouses of knowledge:
the fact that they were such for all the mediaeval centuries. They included
not only poetry and eloquence, but also history, philosophy, natural
knowledge, law and polity. The knowledge contained in them exceeded
what the men of western Europe otherwise possessed. As century after
century passed, mediaeval men learned more for themselves, and also drew
more largely on the classic store. Yet it remained unexhausted. The twelfth
and thirteenth centuries constitute the great mediaeval epoch. Men were
then opening their eyes a little to observe the natural world, and were
thinking a little for themselves. Nevertheless the chief increase in
knowledge issued from the gradual discovery and mastering of the works of
Aristotle. These centuries, like their predecessors, make clear that men who
inherit from a greater past a universal literature containing the best they can
conceive and more knowledge than they can otherwise attain, will be likely
to regard every part of this literature as in some way a source of knowledge,
physical or metaphysical, historical or ethical. And the Classics merited
such regard; for where they did not instruct in science, they imparted
knowledge of life, and norms and instances of conduct, from which men
still may draw guidance. We have outlearned the physics, and perhaps the
metaphysics of the Greeks; their knowledge of nature, in comparison with
ours, was but as a genial beginning; their polities and their formal ethics we
have tried and tested; but we have not risen above the power and inspiration
of the story of Greece and Rome, and the exemplifications of life in the
Greek and Latin Classics. It has not ceased to be true that he who best loves
the Classics, and most deeply feels and glories in their unique excellence as
literature, is he who still draws life from them, and discipline and
knowledge. Their true lovers, like the true lovers of all noble literature, are
always in a state of pupilage to the poems and the histories they love.
Obviously then no final word lies in the statement that through the Middle
Ages men turned to the Classics for instruction. They did indeed turn to
them for all kinds of knowledge, and for discipline. Often they looked for
instruction from Ovid or Virgil in a way to make us smile. Often they were
like schoolboys, dully conning words which they did not feel and so did not
understand. But in the tenth century, and in the twelfth, some men admired

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and loved the Latin Classics, and drew from them, as we may, lessons
which are learned only by those who love aright.
It would be hard to say what the men of the Middle Ages did not thus gain.
The pagan classical literature was one of humanity in its full range of
interests. This was true of the Greek; and from the Greek, the universal
human passed to the Latin, which the Middle Ages were to know. In both
literatures, man was a denizen of earth. The laws of mortality and fate were
held before his eyes; and the action of the higher powers bore upon mortal
happiness, rather than upon any life to come. When reflecting upon the use
and influence of the Classics through the Middle Ages, it is always to be
kept in mind that the antique literature was the literature of this life and of
this world; that it was universal in its humanity, and still in the Middle Ages
might touch every human love and human interest not directly connected
with the hopes and terrors of the Judgment Day.
So whenever educated mediaeval men were drawn by the ambitions or
moved by the finer joys of human life, it lay in their path to seek instruction
or satisfaction from some antique source. If a man wished the common
education of a clerk, he drew it from antique text-books and their
commentaries. Grammar and rhetoric meant Latin grammar and Latin
rhetoric; dialectic also was Latin and antique. Likewise the quadrivium of
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music, could be studied only in Latin.
These ordinary branches of education having been mastered, if then the
man’s tastes or ambitions turned to the interests of earth (and who except
the saintly recluse was not so drawn?) he would still look to the antique. A
civilian or an ecclesiastic would need some knowledge of law, which for the
most part was Roman, even when disguised as Canon law.[152] Did a man
incline toward philosophy, and the scrutiny of life’s deeper problems, again
the source was the antique; and when he lifted his mind to theology, he
would still find himself reasoning in categories of antique dialectic. Finally,
and this was a broad field of humane inclination, if a clerkly educated man
loved poetry, eloquence, and history, for their own sakes, he also would turn
to the antique.
There is scarcely need to revert again to the use of the Classics in the earlier
Middle Ages. We have seen that in Italy they never ceased to form the
conscious background to all intellectual life; and that in the north, letters

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came a handmaid in the train of Latin Christianity—a handmaid that was
apt to assert her own value, and also charm the minds of men. From the
first, it was the orthodox view that Latin letters should provide the
education enabling men to understand the Christian religion adequately.
This is the object set forth in Charlemagne’s Capitularies upon education.
[153] Three hundred years later Honorius of Autun says in his sermonizing
way:
“Not only, beloved, do the sacred writings lead us to eternal life, but
profane letters also teach us; for edifying matter may be drawn from
them. In view of sacred examples no one should be scandalized at this.
For the children of Israel spoiled the Egyptians; they took gold and
silver, gems and precious vestments, which they afterwards turned into
God’s treasury to build the tabernacle.”[154]
Honorius used Augustine’s reference to the Egyptians, and followed this
Augustinian view, always recognized as orthodox in the Middle Ages. It
was narrower than the practice among those who followed letters. Gerbert
at the close of the tenth century loved to teach and read the pagan writers,
and drew from them training and discipline.[155] In the next century, the
German monk Froumund of Tegernsee, with Bernward and Godehard,
bishops of Hildesheim, are instances of German love of antique letters.[156]
Yet lofty souls might choose to limit their reading of the Classics, at least in
theory, to the needs of their Latinity. Such a one was Hugo of St.-Victor,
scholar, theologian, man of genius;[157] he professed to care more for the
Christian ardours of the soul than for learning even as a means of
righteousness, and chose to take the side of those who would read the
classic authors only so far as the needs of education demanded:
“There are two kinds of writings, first those which are termed the artes
proper, secondly, those which are the supplements (appendentia) of the
artes. Artes comprise the works grouped under (supponuntur)
philosophy, those which contain some fixed and determined matter of
philosophy, as grammar, dialectic and the like. Appendentia artium are
those [writings] which touch philosophy less nearly and are occupied
with some subject apart from it; and yet sometimes offer flotsam and
jetsam from the artes, or simply as narratives smooth the road to
philosophy. All the songs of poets are such—tragedies, comedies,

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satires, heroics, and lyrics too, and iambics, besides certain didactic
works (didascalica); tales likewise, and histories; also the writings of
those nowadays called philosophers, who extend a brief matter with
lengthy circumlocution, and thus darken a simple meaning.
“Note then well the distinction I have drawn for thee: distinct and
different (duo) are the artes and their appenditia, ... and often from the
latter the student will gain much labour and little fruit. The artes,
without their appenditia, may make the reader perfect; but the latter,
without the artes, can bring no whit of perfection. Wherefore one
should first of all devote himself to the artes, which are so fundamental,
and to the aforesaid seven above all, which are the means and
instruments (instrumenta) of all philosophy. Then let the rest be read, if
one has leisure, since sometimes the playful mingled with the serious
especially delights us, and we are apt to remember a moral found in a
tale.”[158]
Temperament affected Hugo’s view. He was of the spiritual aristocracy,
who may be somewhat disdainful of the common means by which men get
their education and round out their natures. The mechanical monotony of
pedagogy grated on him and evoked the ironical sketch of a school-room,
which he put in his dialogue on the Vanity of the World. The little
Discipulus, directed by his Magister, is surveying human things.
“Turn again, and look,” says the latter, “and what do you see?”
“I see the schools of learners. There is a great crowd, and of all ages,
boys and youths, men young and old. They study various things. Some
practise their rude tongue at the alphabet and at words new to them.
Others listen to the inflection of words, their composition and
derivation; then by reciting and repeating them they try to commit them
to memory. Others furrow the waxen tablets with a stylus. Others,
guiding the calamus with learned hand, draw figures of different shapes
and colours on parchments. Still others with sharper zeal seem to
dispute on graver matters and try to trip each other with twistings and
impossibilities (gryphis?). I see some also making calculations, and
some producing various sounds upon a cord stretched on a frame.
Others, again, explain and demonstrate geometric figures; and yet

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others with various instruments show the positions and courses of the
stars and the movement of the heavens. Others, finally, consider the
nature of plants, the constitution of men, and the properties and powers
of things.”
The Disciple is captivated with this many-coloured show of learning; but
the Master declares it to be mostly foolishness, distracting the student from
understanding his own nature, his Creator, and his future lot.[159]
These are examples, which might be multiplied indefinitely, of the pious
mediaeval view that the artes, with a very little reading of the auctores,
were proper for the educated Christian, whose need was to understand
Scripture. Sometimes, stung, at least rhetorically, by fear of the lust and
idolatry of the antique, mediaeval souls cry out against its lures, even as
Jerome’s Christianly protesting nature dreamed that famous dream of
exclusion from heaven as a “Ciceronian.” Alcuin, who led the educational
movement under Charlemagne, gently chides one whose fondness for Virgil
made him forget his friend—“would that the Gospels rather than the Aeneid
filled thy breast.”[160] Three hundred years later, St. Peter Damiani, himself
a virtuoso in letters and a sometime teacher of rhetoric, arraigns the monks
for teaching grammar rather than things spiritual.[161] Damiani speaks with
the harshness of one who fears what he loves. In France, about the same
time, our worthy sermon-writer, Honorius of Autun, liked the profanities
well enough, and drew from them apt moral tales, which preachers might
introduce to rouse drowsy congregations. Yet he directs his pulpit-thunder
at the cives Babyloniae, the superbi, who after their several tastes finger
profane literature to their peril: “Those delighting in quibbling learn
Aristotle: the lovers of war have Maro, and the lustful idlers their Naso.
Lucan and Statius incite discords, while Horace and Terence equip the pert
and wanton (petulantes)—but since the names of these are blotted from the
book of life, I shall not commemorate them with my lips.”[162]
This with the excellent Honorius was pious rhetoric. Yet the love and fear of
antique letters caused anxiety in many a mediaeval soul, deflected by them
from its narrow path to the heavenly Jerusalem. Indeed the love of letters
and of knowledge was to play its part, and might take one side or the other,
according to the motive of their pursuit, in the great mediaeval
psychomachia between the cravings of mortal life and the militant

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insistencies of the soul’s salvation. This conflict, not confined to mediaeval
monks, has its universal aspects. It echoes in the sigh of Michelangelo over
the

“affectuosa fantasia,
Che l’ arte si fece idolo e monarca,”

—which had so long drawn his heart from Eternity.[163]
Commonly, however, this conflict did not greatly disturb scholars who felt
in some degree the classic spell so manifold of delight in themes delightful,
of pleasure somehow drawn from clear statement and convincing sequence
of thought, of even deeper happiness springing from the stirring of those
faculties through which man rejoices in knowledge. To be sure, readers of
the Classics, who drew joy from them or satisfaction, or humane
instruction, were comparatively few in the mediaeval centuries, as they are
to-day. And undoubtedly in the Middle Ages the Classics usually were read
in unenlightened schoolboy fashion. Yet making these reservations, we may
be sure that letters yielded up their joys to the chosen few in every
mediaeval century. “Amor litterarum ab ipso fere initio pueritiae mihi est
innatus,” wrote Lupus in the ninth.[164] Gerbert might have said the same,
and many of the men who taught at Chartres in the generations following.
So likewise might have said John of Salisbury. In studying the Classics he
certainly looked to them for instruction. But he also loved them, and found
companionship and solace in them, as he says, and as Cicero before him
had said of letters.
We may ask ourselves what sort of pleasure do we get from reading the
Classics? not necessarily a light distracting of the mind, but rather a deeper
gratification: thought is aroused and satisfied, and our nature is appeased by
the admirable presentation of things admirable. At the same time we may be
conscious of discipline and benefit. There is good reason to suppose that a
like pleasure, or satisfaction, with discipline and instruction, came to this
exceedingly clever John from reading Terence, Virgil and Ovid, Horace,
Juvenal, Lucan, Persius and Statius, Cicero, Seneca and Quintilian—for he
read them all.[165] John is affected, impressed, and trained by his classic
reading; he has absorbed his authors; he quotes from them as spontaneously

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and aptly as he quotes from Scripture. A quotation from the one or the other
may give final point to an argument, and have its own eloquent suggestions.
Sometimes the tone of one of his own letters—which usually are excellent
in form and language—may agree with that of the pithy antique quotation
garnishing it. A mediaeval writer was not likely to say just what we should
when expressing ourselves on the same matter. Yet John makes quite clear
to us how he cared for antique letters, in the Prologue to his Polycraticus,
his chief work on philosophy and life; and we may take his word as to the
satisfaction which he drew from them, since his own writings prove his
assiduity in their cult. This prologue is somewhat cherché, and imbued with
a preciosity of sentiment putting one in mind of Cicero’s oration Pro Archia
poeta.
“Most delightful in many ways, but in this especially, is the fruit of
letters, that banishing the reserve of intervening place and time, they
bring friends into each other’s presence, and do not suffer noteworthy
things to be obliterated by dust. For the arts would have perished, laws
would have vanished, the offices of faith and religion would have fallen
away, and even the correct use of language would have failed, had not
the divine pity, as a remedy for human infirmity, provided letters for the
use of mortals. Ancient examples, which incite to virtue, would have
corrected and served no one, had not the pious solicitude of writers
transmitted them to posterity.... Who would know the Alexanders and
the Caesars, or admire Stoics and Peripatetics, had not the monuments
of writers signalized them? Triumphal arches promote the glory of
illustrious men from the carved inscription of their deeds. Thereby the
observer recognizes the Liberator of his Country, the Establisher of
Peace. The light of fame endures for no one save through his own or
another’s writing. How many and how great kings thinkest thou there
have been, of whom there is neither speech nor cogitation? Vainly have
men stormed the heights of glory, if their fame does not shine in the
light of letters. Other favour or distinction is as fabled Echo, or the
plaudits of the Play, ceasing the moment it has begun.
“Besides all this, solace in grief, recreation in labour, cheerfulness in
poverty, modesty amid riches and delights, faithfully are bestowed by
letters. For the soul is redeemed from its vices, and even in adversity
refreshed with sweet and wondrous cheer, when the mind is intended

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upon reading or writing what is profitable. Thou shalt find in human life
no more pleasing or more useful employment; unless perchance when,
with heart dilated through prayer and divine love, the mind perceives
and arranges within itself, as with the hand of meditation, the great
things of God. Believe one who has tried it, that all the sweets of the
world, compared with these exercises, are wormwood.”[166]
Hereupon, still addressing himself to his friend and patron, Thomas à
Becket, John suggests that these recreations are peculiarly beneficial to men
in their circumstances, burdened with affairs; and he puts his principles in
practice, by launching forth upon his lengthy work of learned and
philosophic disquisition.
To supplement this outline of John’s appreciation of the Classics, it will be
interesting to look into the literary interpretation of a classical poem, from
the pen of one of his contemporaries. So little is known of the author,
Bernard Silvestris, that he usually has been confused with his more famous
fellow, Bernard of Chartres. We may refer to both of them again.[167] Here
our business is solely with the Commentum Bernardi Silvestris super sex
libros Aeneidos Virgilii.[168] The writer draws from the Saturnalia of the
fifth-century grammarian, Macrobius; but his allegorical interpretation of
the Aeneid seems to be his own. He finds in the Aeneid a twofold
consideration, in that its author meant to teach philosophic truth, and at the
same time was not inattentive to the poetic plot.
“Since then Virgil in this poem is both philosopher and poet, we shall
first expound the purpose and method of the poet.... His aim is to unfold
the calamities of Aeneas and other Trojans, and the labours of the exiles.
Herein disregarding the truth of history as told by Dares the Phrygian,
[169] and seeking to win the favour of Augustus, he adorns the facts with
figments. For Virgil, greatest of Latin poets, wrote in imitation of
Homer, greatest of Greek poets. As Homer in the Iliad narrates the fall
of Troy and in the Odyssey the exile of Ulysses; so Virgil in the second
Book briefly relates the overthrow of Troy, and in the rest the labours of
Aeneas. Consider the twin order of narration, the natural and the artistic
(artificialem). The natural is when the narrative proceeds according to
the sequence of events, telling first what happened first. Lucan and
Statius keep to this order. The artistic is when we begin in the middle of

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the story, and thence revert to the commencement. Terence writes thus,
and Virgil in this work. It would have been the natural order to have
described first the destruction of Troy, and then brought the Trojans to
Crete, from Crete to Sicily, and from Sicily to Libya. But he first brings
them to Dido, and introduces Aeneas relating the overthrow of Troy and
the other things that he has suffered.[170]
“Up to this point we show how he proceeds: next let us observe why he
does it so. With poets there is the reason of usefulness, as with a satirist;
the reason of pleasure, as with a writer of comedies; and again these two
combined, as with the historical poet. As Horace says:

‘Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae,
Aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae.’

“This kind of a historical poem is shown by its figurative and polished
diction and in the various mischances and deeds narrated. If any one
will study to imitate it he will gain skill in writing. The narrative also
contains instances and arguments for following the right and avoiding
what is evil. Hence a twofold profit to the reader: skill in writing,
gained through imitation, and prudence in conduct, drawn from
example and precept. For instance, in the labours of Aeneas we have an
example of endurance; and one of piety, in his affection for Anchises
and Ascanius. From the reverence which he shows the gods, from the
oracles which he supplicates, from the sacrifices which he offers, from
the vows and prayers which he pours forth, we feel drawn to religion:
while through Dido’s unbridled love, we are recalled from desire for the
forbidden.”
The above is excellent, but not particularly original. It shows, however, that
Bernard could appreciate the Aeneid in this way. His allegorical
interpretation is of a piece with current mediaeval methods. Yet to take a
poem allegorically was not distinctively mediaeval; for Homer and other
poets had been thus expounded from the days of Plato, who did not himself
approve. With Bernard, each Book of the Aeneid represents one of the ages
of man, the first Book betokening infancy, the second boyhood, and so
forth. Allegorical etymologies are applied to the names of the personages;

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and in general the whole natural course and setting of the poem is taken
allegorically. “The sea is the human body moved and tossed by drunkenness
and lusts, which are represented by waves.” Aeneas, to wit, the human soul
joined to its body, comes to Carthage, the mundane city where Dido reigns,
which is lust; this allegory is unfolded in detail. So the interpretation ambles
on, not more and not less jejune than such ingenuities usually are.

Classical studies reached their zenith in the twelfth century. For in every
way that century surpassed its predecessors; and in classical studies it
excelled the thirteenth, which devoted to them a smaller portion of its
intellectual energies. The twelfth century, to be sure, was prodigiously
interested in dialectic and theology. Yet these had not quite engulfed the
humanities; nor had any newly awakened interest in physical or
experimental science distracted the eyes of men from the charms of the
ancient written page. The change took place in the thirteenth century. Its
best intellectual efforts, north of the Alps at least, were directed to the study
and theological appropriation of the Aristotelian encyclopaedia of
metaphysics and universal knowledge.[171] The effect of Aristotle was
totally unliterary. And the minds of men, absorbed in mastering this giant
mass of knowledge and argument, ceased to regard literary form and the
humane aspects of Latin literature.
Until the thirteenth century, dialectic and theology were not completely
severed from belles lettres. The Platonic-Augustinian theology of the
twelfth century had been idealizing and imaginative, not to say poetical.
Such an interesting exponent of it as Hugo of St. Victor appears as a literary
personage, despite his stinted advocacy of classical study. One notes that for
his time the chief single source of physical knowledge was the Latin
version of the Timaeus, certainly not a prosaic composition. Thus, for the
twelfth century, an effective cause of the continuance of the study of letters
lay herein: whatever branch of natural knowledge might allure the student,
he could not draw it bodily from a serious but unliterary repository, like the
Physics or De animalibus of Aristotle, which were not yet available; he
must follow his bent through the writings of various Latin poets as well as
prose-writers. In fine, the sources of profane knowledge open to the twelfth

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century were literary in their nature, and might form part of the literature
which would be read by a student of grammar or rhetoric.
One sees this in John of Salisbury. There may have been a few men who
knew more than he did of some particular topic. But his range and readiness
of knowledge were unique. And it is evident from his writings that his
knowledge (except in logic) had no special or scientific source, but was
derived from a promiscuous reading of Latin literature. As a result, he is
himself a literary man. One may say much the same of his younger
contemporary, Alanus de Insulis.[172] He too has gathered knowledge from
literary sources, and he himself is one of the best Latin poets of the Middle
Ages. Another extremely poetic philosopher was Bernard Silvestris, the
interpreter of Virgil. His De mundi unitate is a Pantheistic exposition of the
Universe; it is also a poem; and incidentally it affords another illustration of
the general fact, that before the works of Aristotle were made known and
expounded in the thirteenth century, all kinds of natural and quasi-
philosophic knowledge were drawn from a variety of writings, some of
them poor enough from any point of view, but none of them distinctly
scientific and unliterary, like the works of Aristotle. Formal logic or
dialectic, as cultivated by Abaelard for example, appears as an exception. It
had been specialized and more scientifically treated than any branch of
substantial knowledge; for indeed it was based on the logical treatises of
Aristotle, most of which were in use before Abaelard’s death, and all of
which were known to Thierry of Chartres and John of Salisbury.[173]
The contrast between the cathedral school of Chartres and the University of
Paris illustrates the change from the twelfth to the thirteenth century. The
former has been spoken of in a previous chapter, where its story was
brought down to the times of its great teachers, Bernard and Thierry, of
whom we shall have to speak in connection with the teaching of grammar
and the reading of classical authors. The school flourished exceedingly until
the middle of the twelfth century.[174] By that time the schools of Paris had
received an enormous impetus from the popularity of Abaelard, and
scholars had begun to push thither from all quarters. But it was not till the
latter part of the century that the University, with its organization of Masters
and Faculties, began visibly to emerge out of the antecedent cathedral
school.[175] Chartres was a home of letters; and there Latin literature was
read enthusiastically. But in Paris Abaelard was pre-eminently a

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dialectician; and after he died, through those decades when the University
was coming into existence, the tide of study set irresistibly toward theology
and metaphysics. Students and masters of the Faculty of Arts outnumbered
all the other Faculties; nevertheless, counting not by tumultuous numbers,
but by intellectual strength, the great matter was Theology, and the majority
of the Masters in the Arts were students in the divine science. The Arts were
regarded as a preparatory discipline. So through its great period, which
roughly coincides with the thirteenth century, the University of Paris was
for all Europe the supreme seat of Dialectic, Metaphysics, and Theology,
and yet no kindly nurse of belles lettres.
The tendencies of Oxford were not quite the same as those of Paris, yet
Latin literature as such does not seem to have been cultivated there for its
own fair sake. This apparently was unaffected by the fact that a movement
for “close” or exact scholarship existed at the English university.
Grosseteste, its first great chancellor, teacher and inspirer, unquestionably
introduced, or encouraged, the study of Greek; and his famous pupil, Roger
Bacon, was a serious Greek scholar, and wrote a grammar of that tongue.
But neither Grosseteste nor Bacon appears to have been moved by any
literary interest in Greek literature; both one and the other urged the
importance of Greek, and of Hebrew too and Arabic, in order to reach a
surer knowledge of Scripture and Aristotle. They sought to open the
veritable founts of theology and natural knowledge, an intelligent aim
indeed, but quite unliterary. In spirit both these men belong to the thirteenth
century, not to the twelfth.[176]
In Italy, one does not find that the passage from the twelfth to the thirteenth
century displays the decline in classical studies which is apparent north of
the Alps. The reasons seem obvious. The passion for metaphysical theology
did not invade this land of practical ecclesiasticism and urban living, where
pagan antiquity, dumb, broken, and defaced, yet everywhere surviving, was
the medium of life and thought and temperamental inclination in the
thirteenth as well as in the twelfth century. Nor was Italy as yet becoming
scientific, or greatly interested in physical hypothesis; although medicine
was cultivated in various centres, Salerno, for example, and Bologna. But
for the twelfth, and for the thirteenth century as well, Italy’s great
intellectual achievement was in the two closely neighbouring sciences of
canon and civil law. These made the University of Bologna as pre-eminent

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in law as Paris was in theology. There had been schools of grammar and
rhetoric at Bologna and Ravenna, before the lecturing of Irnerius on the
Pandects drew to the first-named town the concourse of mature and seemly
students who were gradually to organize themselves into a university.[177]
Thus at Bologna law flourished and grew great, springing upward from an
antecedent base of grammatical if not literary studies. The study of the law
never cut itself away from this foundation. For the exigencies of legal
business demanded training in the scrivener’s and notarial arts of inditing
epistles and drawing documents, for which the ars dictaminis, to wit, the art
of composition was of primary utility. This ars, teaching as it did both the
general rules of composition and the more specific forms of legal or other
formal documents, pertained to law as well as grammar. Of the latter study
it was perhaps in Italy the main element, or, rather, end. But even without
this hybrid link of the dictamen, grammar was needed for the interpretation
of the Pandects; and indeed some of the glosses of Irnerius and other early
glossators are grammatical rather than legal explanations of the text. We
should bear in mind that this august body of jurisprudential law existed not
in the inflated statutory Latin of Justinian’s time, but in the sonorous and
correct language of the earlier empire, when the great Jurists lived, as well
as Quintilian. Accordingly a close study of the Pandects required, as well as
yielded, a knowledge of classical Latinity. Thus law tended to foster, rather
than repress, grammar and rhetoric; and had no unfavourable effect on
classical studies. And even as such studies “flourished” in Italy in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, they did not cease to “flourish,” there in the
thirteenth, in the same general though rather dull and uncreative way. For it
will hereafter appear that the productions of the Latin poets and rhetoricians
of Italy were below the literary level of those composed north of the Loire
in France, or in England.

II
From the days of the Roman Empire, the study of grammar was, and never
ceased to be, the basis of the conscious and rational knowledge of the Latin
tongue. The Roman boys studied it at Rome; the Latin-speaking provincials
studied it, and all people of education who remained in the lands of western
Europe which once had formed part of the Empire; its study was renewed

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under Charlemagne; he and Alcuin and all the scholars of the ninth century
were deeply interested in what to them represented tangible Latinity, and in
fact was to be a chief means by which their mediaeval civilization should
maintain its continuity with its source. For grammar was most instrumental
in preserving mediaeval Latin from violent deflections, which would have
left the ancient literature as the literature of a forgotten tongue. Had
mediaeval Latin failed to keep itself veritable Latin; had it instead suffered
transmutation into local Romance dialects, the Latin classics, and all that
hung from them, might have become as unknown to the Middle Ages as the
Greek, and even have been lost forever. It was the study of Latin grammar,
with classic texts to illustrate its rules, that kept Latin Latin, and preserved
standards of universal usage throughout western Europe, by which one
language was read and spoken everywhere by educated people. From
century to century this language suffered modification, and varied
according to the knowledge and training of those who used it; yet its
changes were never such as to destroy its identity as a language, or prevent
the Latin writer of one age or country from understanding whatever in any
land or century had been written in that perennial tongue.
Therefore fortunately, as the Carolingian scholars studied Latin grammar, so
likewise did those of all succeeding mediaeval generations, thereby holding
themselves to at least a homogeneity, though not an unvarying uniformity,
of usage. Evidently, however, the method of grammatical instruction had to
vary with the needs of the learners and the teachers’ skill. The Romans
prattled Latin on their mothers’ knees; and so, with gradually widening
deflections, did the Latinized provincials. Neither Roman nor Provincial
prattled Ciceronian periods, or used quite the vocabulary of Virgil; yet it
was Latin that they talked. Thenceforward there was to be a difference
between the people who lived in countries where Romance dialects had
emerged from the spoken Latin and prevailed, and those people who spoke
a Teuton speech. Although always drawing away, the natal speech of
Romance peoples was so like Latin, that in learning it they seemed rather to
correct their vulgar tongue than to acquire a new language. So it was in the
Christian parts of Spain, in Gaul, and, above all, in Italy, where the vulgar
dialects were tardiest in taking distinctive form. Nevertheless, as the
Romance dialects, for instance in the country north of the Loire, developed
into the various forms of what is called Old French, young people at school

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would have to learn Latin as a quasi-foreign tongue. Across the Rhine in
Germany boys ordinarily had to learn it at school, as a strange language,
just as they must to-day; and every effort was devoted to this end.[178] It
was not likely that the grammars composed for Roman boys, or at least for
boys who spoke Latin from their infancy, would altogether meet the needs
of German, or even French, youth. Yet only gradually and slowly in the
Middle Ages were grammars put together to make good the insufficiencies
of Donatus and Priscian.
The former was the teacher of St. Jerome. He composed a short work, in the
form of questions and answers, explaining the eight parts of speech, but
giving no rules of gender, or forms of declension and conjugation, needed
for the instruction of those who, unlike the Roman youth, could not speak
the language. This little book went by the name of the Ars minor. The same
grammarian composed a more extensive work, the third book of which was
called the Barbarismus, after its opening chapter. It defined the figures of
speech (figurae, locutiones), and was much used through the mediaeval
period.
The Ars minor explained in simple fashion the elements of speech. But the
Institutiones grammaticae of Priscian, a contemporary of Cassiodorus,
offered a mine of knowledge. Of its eighteen books the first sixteen were
devoted to the parts of speech and their forms, considered under the
variations of gender, declension, and conjugation. The remaining two
treated of constructio or syntax. As early as the tenth century Priscian was
separated into these two parts, which came to be known as Priscianus
major and minor. The Priscian manuscripts, whose name is legion, usually
present the former. Diffuse in language, confused in arrangement, and
overladen perhaps with its thousands of examples, it was berated for its
labyrinthine qualities even in the Middle Ages; yet its sixteen books
remained the chief source of etymological knowledge. Priscianus minor
was less widely used.
The grammarians of the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries followed
Donatus and Priscian, making extracts from their works, or abridgements,
and now and then introducing examples of deviation from the ancient
usage. The last came usually from the Vulgate text of Scripture, which
sometimes departed from the idioms or even word-forms approved by the

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old authorities.[179] The Ars minor of Donatus became enveloped in
commentaries; but Priscian was so formidable that in these early centuries
he was merely glossed, that is, annotated in brief marginal fashion.
It would be tedious to dwell upon mediaeval grammatical studies. But the
tendencies characterizing them in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries may
be indicated briefly. The substance of the Priscianus major was followed by
mediaeval grammarians. That is to say, while admitting certain novelties,
[180] they adhered to its rules and examples relating to the forms of words,
their declension and conjugation. But the Priscianus minor, although used,
was departed from. In the first place its treatment of its subject (syntax) was
confused and inadequate. There was, however, a broader reason for seeking
rules elsewhere. Mediaeval Latin, in its progress as a living or quasi-living
language, departed from the classical norms far more in syntax and
composition than in word-forms. The latter continued much the same as in
antiquity. But the popular and so to speak Romance tendencies of
mediaeval Latin brought radical changes of word-order and style, which
worked back necessarily upon the rules of syntax. These had been but
hazily stated by the old writers, and the task of constructing an adequate
Latin syntax remained undone. It was a task of vital importance for the
preservation of the Latin tongue. Word-forms alone will not preserve the
continuity of a language; it is essential that their use in speech and writing
should be kept congruous through appropriate principles of syntax. Such
were intelligently formulated by mediaeval grammarians. The result was
not exactly what it would have been had the task been carried out in the
fourth century: yet it has endured in spite of the attacks, pseudo-attacks
indeed, of the cinquecento; and the mediaeval treatment of Latin syntax is
the basis of the modern treatment. One may add that syntax or constructio
was taken broadly as embracing not only the agreements of number and
gender, and the governing[181] of cases, but also the order of words in a
sentence, which had changed so utterly between the time of Cicero and
Thomas Aquinas.
These general statements find illustration in the famous Doctrinale of
Alexander de Villa-Dei, whose author was born in Normandy in the latter
half of the twelfth century. He studied at Paris, and in course of time was
summoned by the Bishop of Dol to instruct his nepotes in grammar. While
acting as their tutor, he appears to have helped their memory by setting his

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rules in rhyme; and the bishop asked him to write a Summa of grammar in
some such fashion. Complying, he composed the Doctrinale in the year
1199, putting his work into leonine or rhyming hexameter, to make it easier
to memorize. Rarely has a school-book met with such success. It soon came
into use in Paris and elsewhere, and for some three hundred years was the
common manual of grammatical teaching throughout western Europe. It
was then attacked and apparently driven from the field by the so-called
Humanists, who, however, failed to offer anything better in its place, and
plagiarized from the work which they professed to execrate.[182]
The etymological portions of the Doctrinale follow the teachings of the
Priscianus major; the part devoted to syntax, or constructio, shows traces of
the influence of the Priscianus minor. But Alexander’s treatment of syntax
is more systematic and elaborate than Priscian’s; and he did not hesitate to
defer to the Vulgate and other Christian Latin writings. Thus he made his
work conform to contemporary usage, which its purpose was to set forth.
He did the same in the section on Prosody, in which he says that the ancient
metricians distinguished a number of feet no longer used, and he will
confine himself to six—the dactyl, spondee, trochee, anapaest, iambus, and
tribrach.[183] In contradiction to classical usage he condemns elision;[184]
and in his chapter on accent he throws over the ancient rules:

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“Accentus normas legitur posuisse vetustas;
Non tamen has credo servandas tempore nostro.”[185]

Alexander was not really an innovator. He followed previous grammarians
in condemning elision, and in what he says of quantity and accent. In his
syntax he endeavoured to set forth rules conforming to the best Latin usage
of his time, like other mediaeval grammarians before him. He was indeed
vehement in his advocacy of recent and Christian authors as standards of
writing, and he inveighed against the scholars of Orleans, who read the
Classics, and would have us sacrifice to the gods and observe the indecent
festivals of Faunus and Jove.[186] But others defended the Orleans school,
and perhaps still regarded the Classics as the best arbiters of grammar and
eloquence. There exist thirteenth-century grammars which follow Priscian
more closely than Alexander does.[187] Yet his work represents the dominant
tendencies of his time.
Twelfth and thirteenth century grammarians recommended to their pupils a
variety of reading, in which mediaeval and early Christian compositions
held as large a place as Virgil and Ovid. The Doctrinale advocates no work
more emphatically than Petrus Riga’s Aurora, a versified paraphrase of
Scripture. Its author was a chorister in Rheims, and died in 1209.[188] The
works of scholastic philosophers were not cited as frequently as the
compositions of verse-writers; yet mediaeval grammarians were influenced
by the language of philosophy, and drew from its training principles which
they applied to their own science. Grammar could not help becoming
dialectical when the intellectual world was turning to logic and
metaphysics. Commencing in the twelfth century, overmasteringly in the
thirteenth, logic penetrated grammar and compelled an application of its
principles. Often grammarians might better have looked to linguistic usage
than to dialectic; yet if grammar was to become a rational science, it had to
systematize itself through principles of logic, and make use of dialectic in
its endeavour to state a reason for its rules. Those who applied logic to
grammar at least endeavoured to distinguish between the two, not always
fruitfully. But a real difference could not fail to assert itself inasmuch as
logic was in truth of universal application, while mediaeval grammar never

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ceased to be the grammar of the Latin language. Nevertheless its
terminology was largely drawn from logic.[189]
So dialectic brought both good and ill, proving itself helpful in the
regulation of syntax, but banefully affecting grammarians with the
conviction that language was the creature of reason, and must conform to
principles of logic. One likewise notes with curious interest, that, from their
dialectic training apparently, grammarians first found as many species of
grammar as languages,[190] and then forsook this idea for the view that, in
order to be a science, grammar must be universal, or, as they phrased it,
one, and must possess principles not applicable specially to Greek or Latin,
but to congruous construction in the abstract; “de constructione congrua
secundum quod abstrahit ab omni lingua speciali,” are the words of the
English thirteenth-century philosopher and grammarian, Robert Kilwardby.
[191] A like idea affected Roger Bacon, who composed a Greek grammar,
[192] which appears to have been intended as the first part of a work upon
the grammars of the learned languages other than Latin. It was adapted to
afford a grounding in the elements of Greek: yet it touches matters in a way
showing that the writer had thought deeply on the affinities of languages
and the common principles of grammar. Of this the following passage is
evidence:
“Therefore, because I wish to treat of the properties of Greek grammar,
it should be known that there are differences in the Greek language, to
be hereafter noted in giving the names of these dialects (idiomata). And
I call them idiomata and not linguas, because they are not different
languages, but different properties which are peculiarities (idiomata) of
the same language.[193] Wishing to set forth Greek grammar, for the use
of the Latins, it is necessary to compare it with Latin grammar, because
I commonly speak Latin myself, seeing that the crowd does not know
Greek; also because grammar is of one and the same substance in all
languages, although varying in its non-essentials (accidentaliter), also
because Latin grammar in a certain special way is derived from Greek,
as Priscian says, and other grammarians.”[194]
The dialecticizing of grammar took place in the north, under influences
radiating from Paris, the chief dialectic centre. These did not deeply affect
grammatical studies in Italy, or in the Midi of France, which in some

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respects exhibited like intellectual tendencies. Grammar was zealously
studied in Italy, but it did not there become either speculative or dialectical.
To be sure northern manuals were used, especially the Doctrinale; but the
study remained practical, an art rather than a science, and its chief element,
or end, was the ars dictaminis or dictandi. The grammatical treatises of
Italians were treatises upon this art of epistolary composition and the proper
ways of drawing documents. These works were studied also in the North,
where the ars dictaminis was by no means neglected.[195]
Latin grammar, although over-dialecticized in the North, and in Italy made
very practical, remained of necessity the foundation of classical studies, and
of mediaeval literary effort, in prose and verse. As the basis of liberal
studies, it had no truer home than the cathedral school of Chartres.[196]
Contemporary writers picture the manner in which this study was there
made to perform its most liberal office, under favourable mediaeval
conditions, in the first half of the twelfth century. The time antedates the
Doctrinale, and one notes at once that the Chartrian masters used the
ancient grammatical authorities. This is shown by the Eptateuchon of
Thierry, who was headmaster (scholasticus) and then Chancellor there for a
number of years between 1120 and 1150. As its name implies, the work was
a manual, or rather an encyclopaedia, of the Seven Arts. Thierry compiled it
from the writings of the “chief doctors on the arts.” He transcribed the Ars
minor of Donatus and then portions of his larger work. Having commended
this author for his conciseness and subtilty, Thierry next copied out the
whole of Priscian. As text-books for the second branch of the Trivium, he
gives Cicero’s De inventione rhetorica libri 2, Rhetoricorum ad Herennium
libri 4, De partitione oratoria dialogus, and concludes with the rhetorical
writings of Martianus Capella and J. Severianus.[197]
So much for the books. Now for the method of teaching as described by
John of Salisbury. He gives the practice of Bernard of Chartres, Thierry’s
elder brother, who was scholasticus and Chancellor before him, in the first
quarter of the twelfth century. John has been advocating the study of
grammar as the fundamentum atque radix of those exercises by which
virtue and philosophy are reached; and he is advising a generous reading of
the Classics by the student, and their constant use by the professor, to
illustrate his teaching.

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“This method was followed by Bernard of Chartres, exundissimus
modernis temporibus fons litterarum in Gallia. By citations from the
authors he showed what was simple and regular; he brought into relief
the grammatical figures, the rhetorical colours, the artifices of sophistry,
and pointed out how the text in hand bore upon other studies; not that he
sought to teach everything in a single session, for he kept in mind the
capacity of his audience. He inculcated correctness and propriety of
diction, and a fitting use of congruous figures. Realizing that practise
strengthens memory and sharpens faculty, he urged his pupils to imitate
what they had heard, inciting some by admonitions, others by whipping
and penalties. Each pupil recited the next day something from what he
had heard on the preceding. The evening exercise, called the declinatio,
was filled with such an abundance of grammar that any one, of fair
intelligence, by attending it for a year, would have at his fingers’ ends
the art of writing and speaking, and would know the meaning of all
words in common use. But since no day and no school ought to be
vacant of religion, Bernard would select for study a subject edifying to
faith and morals. The closing part of this declinatio, or rather
philosophical recitation, was stamped with piety: the souls of the dead
were commended, a penitential Psalm was recited, and the Lord’s
Prayer.
“For those boys who had to write exercises in prose or verse, he
selected the poets and orators, and showed how they should be imitated
in the linking of words and the elegant ending of passages. If any one
sewed another’s cloth into his garment, he was reproved for the theft,
but usually was not punished. Yet Bernard gently pointed out to
awkward borrowers that whoever imitated the ancients (majores) should
himself become worthy of imitation by posterity. He impressed upon his
pupils the virtue of economy, and the values of things and words: he
explained where a meagreness and tenuity of diction was fitting, and
where copiousness or even excess should be allowed, and the advantage
of due measure everywhere. He admonished them to go through the
histories and poems with diligence, and daily to fix passages in their
memory. He advised them, in reading, to avoid the superfluous, and
confine themselves to the works of distinguished authors. For, he said
(quoting from Quintilian) that to follow out what every contemptible

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person has said, is irksome and vainglorious, and destructive of the
capacity which should remain free for better things. To the same effect
he cited Augustine, and remarked that the ancients thought it a virtue in
a grammarian to be ignorant of something. But since in school exercises
nothing is more useful than to practise what should be accomplished by
the art, his scholars wrote daily in prose and verse, and proved
themselves in discussions.”[198]
This passage indicates with what generous use of the auctores Bernard
expounded grammar and explained the orators and poets; how he assigned
portions of their works for memorizing, and with what care he corrected his
pupils’ prose and metrical compositions, criticizing their knowledge and
their taste. He was a man mindful of his Christian piety toward the dead and
living, but caring greatly for the Classics, and loving study. “The old man of
Chartres (senex Carnotensis),” says John of Salisbury, meaning Bernard,
“named wisdom’s keys in a few lines, and though I am not taken with the
sweetness of the metre, I approve the sense:

‘Mens humilis, studium quaerendi, vita quieta,
Scrutinium tacitum, paupertas, terra aliena....’”[199]

Bernard, Thierry, and other masters and scholars of their school, as the
advocates of classical education, detested the men called by John of
Salisbury Cornificiani, who were for shortening the academic course, as
one would say to-day, so that the student might finish it up in two or three
years, and proceed to the business of life. A good many in the twelfth
century adopted this notion, and turned from the pagan classics, not as
impious, but as a waste of time. Some of the good scholars of Chartres lost
heart, among them William of Conches and a certain Richard, both teachers
of John of Salisbury. They had followed Bernard’s methods; “but when the
time came that so many men, to the great prejudice of truth, preferred to
seem, rather than be, philosophers and professors of the arts, engaging to
impart the whole of philosophy in less than three years, or even two, then
my masters vanquished by the clamour of the ignorant crowd, stopped.
Since then, less time has been given to grammar. So it has come about that
those who profess to teach all the arts, both liberal and mechanical, are

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ignorant of the first of them, without which vainly will one try to get the
rest.”[200]
Upon these people who seemed charlatans, and yet may have represented
tendencies of the coming time, Thierry, Gilbert de la Porrèe,[201] and John
of Salisbury poured their sarcasms. The controversy may have clarified
Bernard’s consciousness of the value of classical studies and deepened his
sense of obligation to the ancients, until it drew from him perhaps the finest
of mediaeval utterances touching the matter: “Bernard of Chartres used to
say that we were like dwarfs seated on the shoulders of giants. If we see
more and further than they, it is not due to our own clear eyes or tall bodies,
but because we are raised on high and upborne by their gigantic
bigness.”[202]
Echoes of this same controversy—have they ever quite died away?—are
heard in letters of the scholarly Peter of Blois, who was educated at Paris in
the middle of the twelfth century, became a secretary of Henry Plantagenet
and spent the greater part of his life in England, dying about the year 1200.
He writes to a friend:
“You greatly commend your nephew, saying that never have you found
a man of subtler vein: because, forsooth, skimming over grammar, and
skipping the reading of the classical authors, he has flown to the
trickeries of the logicians, where not in the books themselves but from
abstracts and note-books, he has learned dialectic. Knowledge of letters
cannot rest on such, and the subtilty you praise may be pernicious. For
Seneca says, nothing is more odious than subtilty when it is only
subtilty. Some people, without the elements of education, would discuss
point and line and superficies, fate, chance and free-will, physics and
matter and the void, the causes of things and the secrets of nature and
the sources of the Nile! Our tender years used to be spent in rules of
grammar, analogies, barbarisms, solecisms, tropes, with Donatus,
Priscian, and Bede, who would not have devoted pains to these matters
had they supposed that a solid basis of knowledge could be got without
them. Quintilian, Caesar, Cicero, urge youths to study grammar. Why
condemn the writings of the ancients? it is written that in antiquis est
scientia. You rise from the darkness of ignorance to the light of science
only by their diligent study. Jerome glories in having read Origen;

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Horace boasts of reading Homer over and over. It was much to my
profit, when as a little chap I was studying how to make verses, that, as
my master bade me, I took my matter not from fables but from truthful
histories. And I profited from the letters of Hildebert of Le Mans, with
their elegance of style and sweet urbanity; for as a boy I was made to
learn some of them by heart. Besides other books, well known in the
schools, I gained from keeping company with Trogus Pompeius,
Josephus, Suetonius, Hegesippus, Quintus Curtius, Tacitus and Livy, all
of whom throw into their histories much that makes for moral
edification and the advance of liberal science. And I read other books,
which had nothing to do with history—very many of them. From all of
them we may pluck sweet flowers, and cultivate ourselves from their
urbane suavity of speech.”[203]
In another letter Peter writes to his bishop of Bath, as touching the
accusation of some “hidden detractor,” that he, Peter, is but a useless
compiler, who fills letters and sermons with the plunder of the ancients and
Holy Writ:
“Let him cease, or he will hear what he does not like; for I am full of
cracks, and can hold in nothing, as Terence says. Let him try his hand at
compiling, as he calls it.—But what of it! Though dogs may bark and
pigs may grunt, I shall always pattern on the writings of the ancients;
with them shall be my occupation; nor ever, while I am able, shall the
sun find me idle.”[204]
It is evident how broadly Peter of Blois, or John of Salisbury, or the
Chartrians, were read in the Latin Classics. Peter mentions even Tacitus, a
writer not thought to have been much read in the Middle Ages. We have
been looking at the matter rather in regard to poetry and eloquence—belles
lettres. But one may also note the same broad reading (among the few who
read at all) on the part of those who sought for the ethical wisdom of the
ancients. This is apparent (perhaps more apparent than real) with Abaelard,
who is ready with a store of antique ethical citations.[205] It is also borne
witness to by the treatise Moralis philosophia de honesto et utili, placed
among the works of Hildebert of Le Mans,[206] but probably from the pen of
William of Conches, grammaticus post Bernardum Carnotensem
opulentissimus, as John of Salisbury calls him.[207] In some manuscripts it

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is entitled Summa moralium philosophorum, quite appropriately. One might
hardly compare it for organic inclusiveness with the Christian Summa of
Thomas Aquinas; but it may very well be likened to the more compact
Sentences of the Lombard[208] which were so solidly put together about the
same time. The Lombard drew his Sentences from the writings of the
Church Fathers; William’s work consists of moral extracts, mainly from
Cicero, Seneca, Sallust, Terence, Horace, Lucan, and Boëthius. The first
part, De honesto, reviews Prudentia, Justitia, Fortitudo, and under these a
number of particular virtues in correspondence with which the extracts are
arranged. The De utili considers the adventitious goods of circumstance and
fortune.
The extracts forming the substance of this work were intelligently selected
and smoothly joined; and the treatise was much used by those who studied
the antique philosophy of life. It was drawn upon, for instance, by that
truculent and well-born Welshman, Giraldus Cambrensis, in his De
instructione principum, which the author wrote partly to show how evilly
Henry Plantagenet performed the functions of a king. This irrepressible
claimant of St. David’s See had been long a prickly thorn for Henry’s side.
[209] But he was a scholar, and quotes from the whole range of the Latin
Classics.

III
When a man is not a mere transcriber, but puts something of himself into
the product of his pen, his work will reflect his personality, and may
disclose the various factors of his spiritual constitution. To discover from
the writings of mediaeval scholars the effect of their classical studies upon
their characters is of greater interest than to trace from their citations the
authors read by them. Such a compilation as the Summa moralium which
has just been noticed, while plainly disclosing the latter information, tells
nothing of the personality of him who strung the extracts together. Yet he
had read writings which could hardly have failed to influence him. Cicero
and Seneca do not leave their reader unchanged, especially if he be seeking
ethical instruction. And there was a work known to this particular compiler
which moved men in the Middle Ages. Deep must have been the effect of

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that book so widely read and pondered on and loved, the De consolatione of
Boëthius with its intimate consolings, its ways of reasoning and looking
upon life, its setting of the intellectual above the physical, its insistence that
mind rather than body makes the man. Imagine it brought home to a
vigorous struggling personality—imagine Alfred reading and translating it,
and adding to it from the teachings of his own experience.[210] The study of
such a book might form the turning of a mediaeval life; at least could not
fail to temper the convulsions of a soul storm-driven amid unreconcilable
spiritual conflicts.
One may look back even to the time of Alfred or Charlemagne and note
suggestions coming from classical reading. For instance, the antique
civilization being essentially urban, words denoting qualities of disciplined
and polished men had sprung from city life, as contrasted with rustic
rudeness. Thus the word urbanitas passed over into mediaeval use when the
quality itself hardly existed outside of the transmitted Latin literature. For
an Anglo-Saxon or a Frank to use and even partly comprehend its
significance meant his introduction to a new idea. Alcuin writes to
Charlemagne that he knows how it rejoices the latter to meet with zeal for
learning and church discipline, and how pleasing to him is anything which
is seasoned with a touch of wit—urbanitatis sale conditum.[211] And again,
in more curious phrase, he compliments a certain worthy upon his metrical
exposition of the creed, “wherein I have found gold-spouting whirlpools
(aurivomos gurgites) of spiritual meanings abounding with gems of
scholastic wit (scholasticae urbanitatis).”[212] Though doubtless this
“scholastic wit” was flat enough, it was something for these men to get the
notion of what was witty and entertaining through a word so vocalized with
city life as urbanitas, a word that we have seen used quite knowingly by the
more sophisticated scholar, Peter of Blois.
Again, it is matter of common observation that a feeling for nature’s
loveliness depends somewhat on the growth of towns. But mediaeval men
constantly had the idea suggested to them by the classic poetry of city-
dwelling poets. Here are some lines by Alcuin or one of his friends,
expressing sentiments which never came to them from the woods with
which they were disagreeably familiar:

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“O mea cella, mihi habitatio, dulcis, amata,
Semper in aeternum, o mea cella, vale.
Undique te cingit ramis resonantibus arbos,
Silvula florigeris semper onusta comis.”[213]

These are little hints of the effect of the antique literature upon men who
still were somewhat rough-hewn. Advancing a century and a half, the
influence of classic study is seen, as it were, “in the round” in Gerbert.[214]
It is likewise clear and full in John of Salisbury, of whom we have spoken,
and shall speak again.[215] For an admirable example, however, of the subtle
working of the antique literature upon character and temperament, we may
look to that scholar-prelate whose letters the youthful Peter of Blois studied
with profit, Hildebert of Lavardin, Bishop of Le Mans, and Archbishop of
Tours. He shows the effect of the antique not so strikingly in the knowledge
which he possessed or the particular opinions which he entertained, as in
the balance and temperance of his views, and incidentally in his fine facility
of scholarship.
Hildebert was born at Lavardin, a village near the mouth of the Loire, about
the year 1055. He belonged to an unimportant but gentle family. Dubious
tradition has it that one of his teachers was Berengar of Tours, and that he
passed some time in the monastery of Cluny, of whose great abbot, Hugh,
he wrote a life. It is more probable that he studied at Le Mans. But whatever
appears to have been the character of his early environment, Hildebert
belongs essentially to the secular clergy, and never was a monk. While
comparatively young, he was made head of the cathedral school of Le
Mans, and then archdeacon. In the year 1096, the old bishop of Le Mans
died, and Hildebert, then about forty years of age, was somewhat quickly
chosen his successor, by the clergy and people of the town, in spite of the
protests of certain of the canons of the cathedral. The none too happy
scholar-bishop found himself at once a powerless but not negligible element
of a violently complicated feudal situation. There was the noble Helias,
Count of Maine, who was holding his domain against Robert de Bellesme,
the latter slackly supported by William Rufus of England, who claimed the
overlordship of the land. Helias reluctantly acquiesced in Hildebert’s
election. Not so Rufus, who never ceased to hate and persecute the man that

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had obtained the see which had been in the gift of his father, William the
Conqueror. It happened soon after that Count Helias was taken prisoner by
his opponent, and was delivered over to Rufus at Rouen. But Fulk of Anjou
now thrust himself into this feudal mêlée, appeared at Le Mans, entered,
and was acknowledged as its lord. He left a garrison, and departed before
the Red King reached the town. The latter began its siege, but soon made
terms with Fulk, by which Le Mans was to be given to Rufus, Helias was to
be set free, and many other matters were left quite unsettled.
Now Rufus entered the town (1098), where Hildebert nervously received
him; Helias, set free by the King, offered to become his feudal retainer;
Rufus would have none of him; so Helias defied the King, and was
permitted to go his way by that strange man, who held his knightly honour
sacred, but otherwise might commit any atrocity prompted by rage or greed.
It was well for Helias that trouble with the French King now drew Rufus to
the north. The next year, 1099, Rufus in England heard that the Count had
renewed the war, and captured Le Mans, except the citadel. He hurried
across the channel, rushed through the land, entered Le Mans, and passed
on through it, chasing Helias. But the war languished, and Rufus returned to
Le Mans, or to what was left of it. Hildebert had cause to tremble. He had
met the King on the latter’s hurried arrival from England for the war. Rufus
had spoken him fair. But now, at Le Mans, he was accused before the
monarch of complicity in the revolt. Quickly flared the King’s anger against
the man whom he never had ceased to detest. He ordered him to pull down
the towers of his cathedral, which rose threatening and massive over the
city’s ruins and the citadel of the King. What could the defenceless bishop
do to avert disgrace and the desolation of his beloved church? Words were
left him, but they did not prove effectual. Rufus commanded him to choose
between immediate compliance and going to England, there to submit
himself to the judgment of the English bishops. He accepted the latter
alternative, and followed the King, leaving his diocese ruined and his
people dispersed. In England, Rufus dangled him along between fear and
hope, till at last the disheartened prelate returned to the Continent, having
ambiguously consented to pull down those towers. But instead, he set to
work to repair the devastation of his diocese. The reiterated mandate of the
King was not long in following him, and this time coupled with an
accusation of treason. Hildebert’s state was desperate. His clergy were

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forbidden to obey him, his palace was sacked, his own property destroyed.
Such were William’s methods of persuasion. Then the King proposed that
the bishop should purge himself by the ordeal of hot iron. Hildebert, the
bishop, the theologian, the scholar, was almost on the verge of taking up the
challenge, when a letter from Yves, the saintly Bishop of Chartres,
dissuaded him. At this moment, with ruin for his portion, and no escape, an
arrow ended the Red King’s life in the New Forest. It was the year of grace
1100.
Now, what a change! Henry Beauclerc was from the first his friend, as
William Rufus to the last had been his enemy. Hitherto Hildebert has
appeared weakly endeavouring to elude destruction, and perhaps with no
unshaken loyalty in his bosom toward any cause except his dire necessities.
Henceforth, sailing a calmer sea, he repays Henry’s favour with adherence
and admiration. He has no support to offer Anselm of Canterbury, still
struggling with the English monarchy over investitures; nor has he one
word of censure for the clever cold-eyed scholar King who kept his brother,
Robert of Normandy, a prisoner for twenty-eight years till he died.
Hildebert had still thirty years of life before him; nor were they all to be
untroubled. Shortly after the Red King’s death, he made a voyage to Rome,
to obtain the papal benediction. To judge from his poems, he was deeply
impressed with the ruins of the ancient city. Returning he devoted himself
to the affairs of his diocese and to rebuilding the cathedral and other
churches of Le Mans. In 1125, in spite of his unwillingness, for he was
seventy years old, he was enthroned Archbishop of Tours, where he was to
be worried by disputes with Louis le Gros of France over investitures. But
he acquitted himself with vigour, especially through his letters. A famous
one relates to this struggle of his closing years:
“In adversity it is a comfort to hope for happier times. Long has this
hope flattered me; and as the harvest in the fields cheers the
countryman, the expectation of a fair season has comforted my soul.
But now I no longer hope for the clearing of the cloudy weather, nor see
where the storm-driven ship, on whose deck I sit, may gain the harbour
of rest.

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“Friends are silent; silent are the priests of Jesus Christ. And those also
are silent through whose prayers I thought the king would be reconciled
with me. I thought indeed, but in their silence the king has added to the
pain of my wounds. Yet it was theirs to resist the injury to the canonical
institutes of the Church. Theirs was it, if the matter had demanded it, to
raise a wall before the house of Israel. Yet with the most serene king
there is call for exhortation rather than threat, for advice rather than
command, for instruction rather than the rod. By these he should have
been drawn to agree, by these reverently taught not to sheath his arrows
in an aged priest, nor make void the canonical laws, nor persecute the
ashes of a church already buried, ashes in which I eat the bread of grief,
in which I drink the cup of mourning, from which to be snatched away
and escape is to pass from death to life.
“Yet amid these dire straits, anger has never triumphed over me, that I
should raise a hue and cry against the anointed of the Lord, or wrest
peace from him with the strong hand and by the arm of the Church.
Suspect is the peace to which high potentates are brought not by love,
but by force. Easily is it broken, and sometimes the final state is worse
than the first. There is another way by which, Christ leading, I can
better reach it. I will cast my thought upon the Lord, and He will give
me the desire of my heart. The Lord remembered Joseph, forgotten by
Pharaoh’s chief butler when prosperity had returned to him; He
remembered David abandoned by his own son. Perhaps He will
remember even me, and bring the tossing ship to rest on the desired
shore. He it is who looks upon the petition of the meek, and does not
spurn their prayers. He it is in whose hand the hearts of kings are wax.
If I shall have found grace in His eyes, I shall easily obtain the grace of
the king or advantageously lose it. For to offend man for the sake of
God is to win God’s grace.”[216]
Hildebert was a classical scholar, and in his time unmatched as a writer of
Latin prose and verse. Many of his elegiac poems survive, some of them so
antique in sentiment and so correct in metre as to have been taken for
products of the pagan period. One of the best is an elegy on Rome
obviously inspired by his visit to that city of ruins:

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“Par tibi, Roma, nihil, cum sis prope tota ruina.”

Its closing lines are interesting:

“Hic superûm formas superi mirantur et ipsi,
Et cupiunt fictis vultibus esse pares.
Non potuit natura deos hoc ore creare
Quo miranda deûm signa creavit homo.
Vultus adest his numinibus, potiusque coluntur
Artificum studio quam deitate sua.
Urbs felix, si vel dominis urbs illa careret,
Vel dominis esset turpe carere fide!”

Such phrases, such frank admiration for the idols of pagan Rome, are
startling from the pen of a contemporary of St. Bernard. The spell of the
antique lay on Hildebert, as on others of his time. “The gods themselves
marvel at their own images, and desire to equal their sculptured forms.
Nature was unable to make gods with such visages as man has created in
these wondrous images of the gods. There is a look (vultus) about these
deities, and they are worshipped for the skill of the sculptor rather than for
their divinity.”[217] Hildebert was not only a bishop, he was a Christian; but
the sense and feeling of ancient Rome had entered into him. Besides the
poem just quoted, he wrote another, either in Rome or after his return,
Christian in thought but most antique in sympathy and turn of phrase.

“Dum simulacra mihi, dum numina vana placerent,
Militia, populo, moenibus alta fui;
· · · · · · · ·
ruit alta senatus
Gloria, procumbunt templa, theatra jacent.”

The antique feeling of these lines is hardly balanced by the expressed
sentiment: “plus Caesare Petrus!”[218] And again we hear the echo of the
antique in

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“Nil artes, nil pura fides, nil gloria linguae,
Nil fons ingenii, nil probitas sine re.”[219]

Hildebert has also a poem “On his Exile,” perhaps written while in England
with the Red King. Quite in antique style it sings the loss of friends and
fields, gardens and granaries, which the writer possessed while prospera
fata smiled. Then

“Jurares superos intra mea vota teneri!”

—a very antique sentiment. But the Christian faith of the despoiled and
exiled bishop reasserts itself as the poem closes.[220] Did Hildebert also
write the still more palpably “antique” elegiacs on Hermaphrodite, and
other questionable subjects?[221] That is hard to say. He may or may not
have been the author of a somewhat scurrilous squib against a woman who
seems to have sent him verses:

“Femina perfida, femina sordida, digna catenis.

“O miserabilis, insatiabilis, insatiata,
Desine scribere, desine mittere, carmina blandia,
Carmina turpia, carmina mollia, vix memoranda,
Nec tibi mittere, nec tibi scribere, disposui me.

“Mens tua vitrea, plumbea, saxea, ferrea, nequam,
Fingere, fallere, prodere, perdere, rem putat aequam.”[222]

With all his classical leanings, the major part of Hildebert was Christian.
His theological writings which survive, his zeal against certain riotous
heretics, and in general his letters, leave no doubt of this. It is from the
Christian point of view that he gives his sincerest counsels; it is from that
that he balances the advantages of an active or contemplative life, the
claims of the Christian vita activa and vita contemplativa. Yet his classic
tastes gave temperance to his Christian views, and often drew him to sheer
scholarly pleasures and to an antique consideration of the incidents of life.

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How sweetly the elements were mixed in him appears in a famous letter
written to William of Champeaux, that Goliath of realism whom Abaelard
discomfited in the Paris schools. The unhappy William retreated a little way
across the Seine, and laid the foundations of the abbey of St. Victor in the
years between 1108 and 1113. He sought to abandon his studies and his
lectures, and surrender himself to the austere salvation of his soul, and yet
scarcely with such irrevocable purpose as would rebuff the temperate
advice of Hildebert’s letter proffered with tactful understanding.
“Over thy change of life my soul is glad and exults, that at length it has
come to thee to determine to philosophize. For thou hadst not the true
odour of a philosopher so long as thou didst not cull beauty of conduct
from thy philosophic knowledge. Now, as honey from the honeycomb,
thou hast drawn from that a worthy rule of living. This is to gather all of
thee within virtue’s boundaries, no longer huckstering with nature for
thy life, but attending less to what the flesh is able for, than to what the
spirit wills. This is truly to philosophize; to live thus is already to enter
the fellowship of those above. Easily shalt thou come to them if thou
dost advance disburdened. The mind is a burden to itself until it ceases
to hope and fear. Because Diogenes looked for no favour, he feared the
power of no one. What the cynic infidel abhorred, the Christian doctor
far more amply must abhor, since his profession is so much more
fruitful through faith. For such are stumbling-blocks of conduct,
impeding those who move toward virtue.
“But the report comes that you have been persuaded to abstain from
lecturing. Hear me as to this. It is virtue to furnish the material of virtue.
Thy new way of life calls for no partial sacrifice, but a holocaust. Offer
thyself altogether to the Lord, since so He sacrificed Himself for thee.
Gold shines more when scattered than when locked up. Knowledge also
when distributed takes increase, and unless given forth, scorning the
miserly possessor, it slips away. Therefore do not close the streams of
thy learning.”[223]
Eventually William followed this, or other like advice. One sees Hildebert’s
sympathetic point of view; he entirely approves of William’s renunciation
of the world—a good bishop of the twelfth century might also have wished
to renounce its troublous honours! Yes, William has at last turned to the true

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and most disburdened way of living. But this abandonment of worldly ends
entails no abandonment of Christian knowledge or surrender of the cause of
Christian learning. Nay, let William resume, and herein give himself to
God’s will without reserve.
So the letter presents a temperate and noble view of the matter, a view as
sound in the twentieth century as in the twelfth. And a like broad
consideration Hildebert brings to a more particular discussion of the two
modes of Christian living, the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, Leah
and Rachel, Martha and Mary. He amply distinguishes these two ways of
serving God from any mode of life with selfish aims. It happened that a
devout monk and friend of Hildebert was made abbot of the monastery of
St. Vincent, in the neighbourhood of Le Mans. The administrative duties of
an abbot might be as pressing as a bishop’s, and this good man deplored his
withdrawal from a life of more complete contemplation. So Hildebert wrote
him a long discursive letter, of which our extracts will give the thread of
argument:
“You bewail the peace of contemplation which is snatched away, and
the imposed burden of active responsibilities. You were sitting with
Mary at the feet of the Lord Jesus, when lo, you were ordered to serve
with Martha. You confess that those dishes which Mary receives, sitting
and listening, are more savoury than those which zealous Martha
prepares. In these, indeed, is the bread of men, in those the bread of
angels.”
And Hildebert descants upon the raptures of the vita contemplativa, of
which his friend is now bereft.
“The contemplative and the active life, my dearest brother, you
sometimes find in the same person, and sometimes apart. As the
examples of Scripture show us. Jacob was joined to both Leah and
Rachel; Christ teaches in the fields, anon He prays on the mountains;
Moses is in the tents of the people, and again speaks with God upon the
heights. So Peter, so Paul. Again, action alone is found, as in Leah and
Martha, while contemplation gleams in Mary and Rachel. Martha, as I
think, represents the clergy of our time, with whom the press of

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business closes the shrine of contemplation, and dries up the sacrifice of
tears.
“No one can speak with the Lord while he has to prattle with the whole
world. Such a prattler am I, and such a priest, who when I spend the
livelong day caring for the herds, have not a moment for the care of
souls. Affairs, the enemies of my spirit, come upon me; they claim me
for their own, they thieve the private hour of prayer, they defraud the
services of the sanctuary, they irritate me with their stings by day and
infest my sleep; and what I can scarcely speak of without tears, the
creeping furtive memory of disputes follows me miserable to the altar’s
sacraments,—all such are even as the vultures which Abraham drove
away from the carcases (Gen. xv. 11).
“Nay more, what untold loss of virtue is entailed by these occupations
of the captive mind! While under their power we do not even serve with
Martha. She ministered, but to Christ; she bustled about, but for Christ.
We truly, who like Martha bustle about, and, like Martha, minister,
neither bustle about for Christ nor minister to Him. For if in such
bustling ministry thou seekest to win thine own desire, art taken with
the gossip of the mob, or with pandering to carnal pleasures, thou art
neither the Martha whom thou dost counterfeit nor the Mary for whom
thou dost sigh.
“In that case, dearest brother, you would have just cause for grief and
tears. But if you do the part of Martha simply, you do well; if, like
Jacob, you hasten to and fro between Leah and Rachel, you do better; if
with Mary you sit and listen, you do best. For action is good, whose
pressing instancy, though it kill contemplation, draws back the brother
wandering from Christ. Yet it is better, sometimes seated, to lay aside
administrative cares, and amid the irksome nights of Leah, draw fresh
life from Rachel’s loved embrace. From this intermixture the course to
the celestials becomes more inclusive, for thereby the same soul now
strives for the blessedness of men and anon participates in that of the
angels. But of the zeal single for Mary, why should I speak? Is not the
Saviour’s word enough, ‘Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall
not be taken from her.’”

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And in closing, Hildebert shows his friend the abbot that for him the true
course is to follow Jacob interchanging Leah and Rachel; and then in the
watches of his pastoral duties the celestial vision shall be also his.[224]
Could any one adjust more fairly this contest, so insistent throughout the
annals of mediaeval piety, between active duties and heavenly
contemplation? The only solution for abbot and bishop was to join Leah
with Rachel. And how clearly Hildebert sees the pervasive peril of the
active life, that the prelate be drawn to serve his pleasures and not Christ.
Many souls of prelates had that cast into hell!
In theory Hildebert is clear as day, and altogether Christian, so far as we
have followed the counsels of these letters. But in fact the quiet life had for
him a temptation, to which he yielded himself more generously than to any
of the grosser lures of his high prelacy. This temptation, so alluring and
insidious, so fairly masked under the proffer of learning leading to fuller
Christian knowledge, was of course the all too beloved pagan literature, and
the all too humanly convincing plausibilities of pagan philosophy.
Hildebert’s writings evince that kind of classical scholarship which springs
only from great study and great love. His soul does not appear to have been
riven by a consciousness of sin in this behoof. Sometimes he passes so
gently from Christian to pagan ethics, as to lead one to suspect that he did
not deeply feel the inconsistency between them. Or again, he seems
satisfied with the moral reasonings of paganism, and sets them forth
without a qualm. For there was the antique pagan side of our good bishop;
and how pagan thoughts and views of life had become a part of Hildebert’s
nature, appears in a most interesting letter written to King Henry, consoling
him upon the loss of his son and the noble company so gaily sailing from
Normandy in that ill-starred White Ship in the year 1120.
Hildebert begins reminding the King how much more it is for a monarch to
rule himself than others. Hitherto he has triumphed over fortune, if fortune
be anything; now she has wounded him with her sharpest dart. Yet that
cannot penetrate the well-guarded mind. It is wisdom not to vaunt oneself in
prosperity, nor be overwhelmed with grief in adversity. Hildebert then
reasons on the excellence of man’s nature and will; he speaks of the effect
of Adam’s sin in loss of grace and entailment of misery on the human race.
He quotes from the Old Testament and from Virgil. Then he proceeds more

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specifically with his fortifying arguments. Their sum is, let the breast of
man abound in weapons of defence and contemn the thrusts of fortune;
there is nothing over which the triumphant soul may not triumph.
“Unhappy he who lacks this armament; and most unhappy he who
besides does not know it. Here Democritus found matter for laughter,
Demosthenes (sic) matter for tears. Far be it from thee that the chance
cast of things should affect thee so, and the loss of wisdom follow the
loss of offspring. Thou hast suffered on dry land more grievous
shipwreck than thy son in the brine, if fortune’s storm has wrested
wisdom from the wise.”
After a while Hildebert passes on to consider what is man, and wherein
consists his welfare:
“To any one carefully considering what man is, nothing will seem more
probable than that he is a divine animal, distinguished by a certain share
of divinity (numinis). By bone and flesh he smacks of the earth. By
reason his affinity to God is shown. Moses, inspired, certifies that by
this prerogative man was created in the image of God. Whence it also
follows for man, that he should through reason recognize and love his
true good. Now reason teaches that what pertains to virtue is the true
good, and that it is within us. The things we temporally possess are
good only by opinion (opinione, i.e. not ratione), and these are about us.
What is about us is not within our jus but another’s (alterius juris sunt).
Chance directs them; they neither come nor stand under our
arbitrament. For us they are at the lender’s will (precaria), like a slave
belonging to another.[225] Through such, true felicity is neither had nor
lost. Indeed no one is happy, no one is wretched by reason of what is
another’s. It is his own that makes a man’s good or ill, and whatever is
not within him is not his own.”
Then Hildebert speaks of dignities, of wife and child, of the fruits of the
earth and riches—bona vaga, bona sunt pennata haec omnia. Men quarrel
and struggle about all these things—ecce vides quanta mundus laboret
insania.[226]
No one need point out how much more natural this reasoning would have
been from the lips of Seneca than from those of an archiepiscopal

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contemporary of St. Bernard. One may, however, comment on the patent
fact that this reflection of the antique in Hildebert’s ethical consolation
reflects a manner of reasoning rather than an emotional mood, and in this it
is an instance of the general fact that mediaeval methods of reasoning
consciously or unconsciously followed the antique; while the emotion, the
love and yearning, of mediaeval religion was more largely the gift of
Christianity.

CHAPTER XXXI

EVOLUTION OF MEDIAEVAL LATIN PROSE
Classical antiquity lay far back of the mediaeval period, while in the nearer
background pressed the centuries of transition, the time of the Church
Fathers. The patristic material and a crude knowledge of the antique passed
over to the early Middle Ages. Mediaeval progress was to consist, very
largely, in the mastery and appropriation of the one and the other.
The varied illustration of these propositions has filled a large portion of this
work. In this and the next chapter we are concerned with literature, properly
speaking; and with the effect of the Classics, the pure literary antique, upon
mediaeval literary productions. The latter are to be viewed as literature; not
considering their substance, but their form, their composition, style, and
temperamental shading, qualities which show the faculties and temper of
their authors. We are to discover, if we can, wherein the qualities of
mediaeval literature reflect the Latin Classics, or in any way betray their
influence.
It is an affair of dull diligence to learn what Classics were read by the
various mediaeval writers; and likewise is it a dull affair to note in
mediaeval writings the direct borrowing from the Classics of fact, opinion,

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sentiment, or phrase. Such borrowing was incessant, resorted to as of course
wherever opportunity offered and the knowledge was at hand. It would not
commonly occur to a mediaeval writer to state in his own way what he
could take from an ancient author, save in so far as change of medium—
from prose to verse, or from Latin to the vernacular—compelled him. So
the church builders in Rome never thought of hewing new blocks of stone,
or making new columns, when some ancient palace or temple afforded a
quarry. The details of such spoliations offer little interest in comparison
with the effect of antique architecture upon later styles. So we should like to
discover the effect of the ancient compositions upon the mediaeval, and
observe how far the faculties and mental processes of classic authors,
incorporate in their writings, were transmitted to mediaeval men, to become
incorporate in theirs.
Unless you are Virgil or Cicero, you cannot write like Virgil or Cicero.
Writing, real writing, that is to say, creative self-expressive composition, is
the personal product and closely mirrored reflex of the writer’s
temperament and mentality. It gives forth indirectly the influences which
have blended in him, education and environment, his past and present. His
personality makes his style, his untransmittable style. Yet a group of men
affected by the same past, and living at the same time and place, or under
like spiritual influences, may show a like faculty and taste. Having more in
common with one another than with men of other time, their mental
processes, and therefore their ways of writing, will present more common
qualities. Around and above them, as well as through their natal and
acquired faculties, sweeps the genius of the language, itself the age-long
product of a like-minded race. In harmony with it, not in opposition and
repugnancy, each writer must, if he will write that language, shape his more
personal diction.
Obviously the personal elements in classic writings were no more capable
of transmission than the personal qualities of the writers. Likewise, the
genius of the Latin language, though one might think it fixed in approved
compositions, changed with the spiritual fortune of the Roman people, and
constantly transmitted an altered self and novel tenets of construction to
control the linguistic usages of succeeding men. None but himself could
have written Cicero’s letters. No man of Juvenal’s time could have written
the Aeneid, nor any man of the time of Diocletian the histories of Tacitus.

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There were, however, common elements in these compositions, all of them
possessing certain qualities which are associated with classical writing.
These may be difficult to formulate, but they become clear enough in
contrast with the qualities of mediaeval Latin literature. The mediaeval man
did not feel and reason like a contemporary of Virgil or Cicero; he had not
the same training in Greek literature; he did not have the same definitude of
conception, did not care so much that a composition should have limit and
the unity springing from adherence to a single topic; he did not, in fine,
stand on the same level of attainment and faculty and taste with men of the
Augustan time. He had his own heights and depths, his own temperament
and predilections, his own capacities. Reading the Classics had not
transformed him into Cicero or Seneca, or set his feet in the Roman Forum.
His feet wandered in the ways of the Middle Ages, and whatever he wrote
in prose or verse, in Latin or in his own vernacular, was himself and of
himself, and but indirectly due to the antecedent influences which had been
transmuted even in entering his nature and becoming part of his temper and
faculty.
Any consideration of the knowledge and appreciation of the Classics in the
Middle Ages would be followed naturally by a consideration of their effect
upon mediaeval composition; which in turn forms part of any discussion of
the literary qualities of mediaeval Latin literature. But inasmuch as
mediaeval form and diction tend to remove further and further from
classical standards, the whole discussion may seem a lucus a non lucendo
for all the light it throws upon the effect of the Classics on mediaeval
literature. Our best plan will be to note the beginnings of mediaeval Latinity
in that post-Augustan and largely patristic diction which had been enriched
and reinvigorated with many phrases from daily speech; and then to follow
the living if sluggish river as it moves on, receiving increment along its
course, its currents mottled with the silt of mediaeval Italy, France,
Germany. We shall suppose this flood to divide in rivers of Latin prose and
verse; and we may follow them, and see where they overflow their
channels, carrying antique flotsam into the ample marshes of vernacular
poetry.
There has always been a difference in diction between speech and literature.
At Rome, Cicero and Caesar, and of course the poets, did not, in writing,
use quite the language of the people. All the words of daily speech were not

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taken into the literary or classical vocabulary, which had often quite other
words of its own. Moreover the writers, in forming their prose and verse
and constructing their compositions, were affected deeply by their study of
Greek literature.[227] If Caesar, Cicero, Virgil, and their friends spoke
differently from the Roman shopkeepers, there was a still greater difference
between their writings and the parlance of the town.
No one need be told that it was the spoken, and not the classical Latin,
which in Italy, Spain, Provence, and Northern France developed into Italian,
Spanish, Provençal, and French. On the other hand, the descent of written
mediaeval Latin from the classical diction or the popular speech, or both, is
not so clear, or at least not so simple. It cannot be said that mediaeval Latin
came straight from the classical; and manifestly it cannot have sprung from
the popular spoken Latin, like the Romance tongues, without other
influence or admixture; because then, instead of remaining Latin, it would
have become Romance; which it did not. Evidently mediaeval Latin, the
literary and to some extent the spoken medium of educated men in the
Middle Ages, must have carried classic strains, or have kept itself Latin by
the study of Latin grammar and a conscious adherence to a veritable, if not
classical, Latin diction. The mediaeval reading of the Classics, and the
earnest and constant study of Latin grammar spoken of in the previous
chapter, were the chief means by which mediaeval Latin maintained its
Latinity. Nevertheless, while it kept the word forms and inflections of
classical Latin, with most of the classical vocabulary, it also took up an
indefinite supplement of words from the spoken Latin of the late imperial or
patristic period.
In order to understand the genesis and qualities of mediaeval Latin, one
must bear in mind (as with most things mediaeval) that its immediate
antecedents lie in the transitional fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, and not
in the classical period.[228] Those centuries went far toward declassicizing
Latin prose, by departing from the balanced structure of the classic
sentences and introducing words from the spoken tongue. The style became
less correct, freer, and better suited to the expression of the novel thoughts
and interests coming with Christianity. The change is seen in the works of
the men to whom it was largely due, Tertullian, Jerome, and other great
patristic writers.[229] Such men knew the Classics well, and regarded them
as literary models, and yet wrote differently. For a new spirit was upon

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them and new necessities of expression, and they lived when, even outside
of Christian circles, the classic forms of style were loosening with the
falling away of the strenuous intellectual temper, the poise, the self-reliance
and the self-control distinguishing the classical epoch.
The stylistic genius of Augustine and Jerome was not the genius of the
formative beginnings of the Romance tongues, with, for instance, its
inability to rely on the close logic of the case ending, and its need to help
the meaning by the more explicit preposition. Yet the spirit of these two
great men was turning that way. They were not classic writers, but students
of the Classics, who assisted their own genius by the study of what no
longer was themselves. So in the following centuries the most careful Latin
writers are students of the Classics, and do not study Jerome and Augustine
for style. Yet their writings carry out the tendencies beginning (or rather not
beginning) with these two.
It was not in diction alone that the Fathers were the forerunners of
mediaeval writers. Classic Latin authors, both from themselves and through
their study of Greek literature, had the sense and faculty of form. Their
works maintain a clear sequence of thought, along with strict pertinency to
the main topic, or adherence to the central current of the narrative, avoiding
digression and refraining from excessive amplification. The classic writer
did not lose himself in his subject, or wander with it wherever it might lead
him. But in patristic writings the subject is apt to dominate the man, draw
him after its own necessities, or by its casual suggestions cause him to
digress. The Fathers in their polemic or expository works became prolix and
circumstantial, intent, like a lawyer with a brief, on proving every point and
leaving no loophole to the adversary. In their works literary unity and strict
sequence of argument may be cast to the winds. Above all, as it seems to us,
and as it would have seemed to Caesar or Cicero or Tacitus, allegorical
interpretation carries them at its own errant and fantastic will into footless
mazes.
Yet whoever will understand and appreciate the writings of the Fathers and
of the mediaeval generations after them, should beware of inelastic notions.
The question of unity hangs on what the writer deems the veritable topic of
his work, and that may be the universal course of the providence of God,
which was the subject of Augustine’s Civitas Dei. Indeed, the infinite

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relationship of any Christian topic was like enough to break through
academic limits of literary unity. Likewise, the proper sequence of thought
depends on what constitutes the true connection between one matter and
another; it must follow what with the writer are the veritable relationships
of his topics. If the visible facts of a man’s environment and the narratives
of history are to him primarily neither actual facts nor literal narratives, but
symbols and allegories of spiritual things, then the true sequence of thought
for him is from symbol to symbol and from allegory to allegory. He is
justified in ignoring the apparent connection of visible facts and the logic of
the literal story, and in surrendering himself to that sequence of thought
which follows what is for him the veritable significance of the matter.
Yet here we must apply another standard besides that of the writer’s
conception of his subject’s significance. He should be wise, and not foolish.
Other men and later ages will judge him according to their own best
wisdom. And with respect to the writings of the Fathers viewed as
literature, the modern critic cannot fail to see them entering upon that
course of prolixity which in mediaeval writings will develop into the
endless; looking forward, he will see their errant habits resolving into the
mediaeval lack of determined topic, and their symbolically driven
sequences of thought turning into the most ridiculous topical transitions, as
the less cogent faculties of later men permit themselves to be suggested
anywhither.
The Fathers developed their distinguishing qualities of style and language
under the demands of the topics absorbing them, and the influence of modes
of feeling coming with Christianity. They were compelling an established
language to express novel matter. In the centuries after them, further
changes were to come through the linguistic tendencies moulding the
evolution of the Romance tongues, through the counter influence of the
study of grammar and rhetoric, and also through the ignorance and
intellectual limitations of the writers. But as with the Latin of the Fathers,
so with the Latin of the Middle Ages, the change of style and language was
intimately and spiritually dependent upon the minds and temperaments of
the writers and the qualities of the subjects for which they were seeking an
expression. A profound influence in the evolution of mediaeval Latin was
the continual endeavour of the mediaeval genius to express the thoughts and
feelings through which it was becoming itself. With impressive adequacy

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and power the Christian writers of the Middle Ages moulded their inherited
and acquired Latin tongue to utter the varied matters which moved their
minds and lifted up their hearts. We marvel to see a language which once
had told the stately tale of Rome here lowered to fantastic incident and dull
stupidity, then with almost gospel simplicity telling the moving story of
some saintly life; again sonorously uttering thoughts to lift men from the
earth and denunciations crushing them to hell; quivering with hope and fear
and love, and chanting the last verities of the human soul.
As to the evolution of various styles of written Latin from the close of the
patristic period on through the following centuries, one may premise the
remark that there would commonly be two opposite influences upon the
writer; that of the genius of his native tongue, and that of his education in
Latinity. If he lived in a land where Teutonic speech had never given way to
the spoken Latin of the Empire, his native tongue would be so different
from the Latin which he learned at school, that while it might impede, it
could hardly draw to its own genius the learned language. But in Romance
countries there was no such absolute difference between the vernacular and
the Latin, and the analytic genius of the growing Romance dialects did not
fail to affect the latter. Accordingly in France, for example, the spoken Latin
dialect, or one may say the genius that was forming the old French dialects
to what they were to be, tends to break up the ancient periods, to introduce
the auxiliary verb in the place of elaborate inflections, and rely on
prepositions instead of case endings, which were disappearing and whose
force was ceasing to be felt. One result was to simplify the order of words
in a sentence; for it was not possible to move a noun with its accompanying
preposition wherever it had been feasible to place a noun whose relation to
the rest of the sentence was felt from its case ending. Gregory of Tours is
the famous example of these tendencies, with his Historia francorum, an
ideal forerunner of Froissart. He became Bishop of Tours in the year 573. In
his writings he followed the instincts of the inchoate Romance tongues. He
acknowledges and perhaps overstates his ignorance of Latin grammar and
the rules of composition. Such ignorance was destined to become still
blanker; and ignorance in itself was a disintegrating influence upon written
Latin, and also gave freer play to the gathering tendencies of Romance
speech.

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Evidently, had all these influences worked unchecked, they would have
obliterated Latinity from mediaeval Latin. Grammatical and rhetorical
education countered them effectively, and the mighty genius of the ancient
language endured in the extant masterpieces. Nevertheless the spirit of
classical Latinity was never again to be a spontaneous creative power. The
most that men thenceforth could do was to study, and endeavour to imitate,
the forms in which it had embodied its living self.
In brief, some of the chief influences upon the writing of Latin in the
Middle Ages were: the classical genius dead, leaving only its works for
imitation; the school education in Latin grammar and rhetoric; endeavour to
follow classic models and write correctly; inability to do so from lack of
capacity and knowledge; conscious disregard of classicism; the spirit of the
Teutonic tongues clogging Latinity, and that of the Romance tongues
deflecting it from classical constructions; and finally, the plastic faculties of
advancing Christian mediaeval civilization educing power from confusion,
and creating modes of language suited to express the thoughts and feelings
of mediaeval men.
The life, that is to say the living development, of mediaeval Latin prose,
was to lie in the capacity of successive generations of educated men to
maintain a sufficient grammatical correctness, while at the same time
writing Latin, not classically, but in accordance with the necessities and
spirit of their times. There resulted an enormous literature which was not
dead, nor altogether living, and lacked throughout the spontaneity of
writings in a mother tongue; for Latin was not the speech of hearth and
home, nor everywhere the tongue of the market-place and camp. But it was
the language of mediaeval education and acquired culture; it was the
language also of the universal church, and, above all other tongues,
expressed the thoughts by which men were saved or damned. More
profoundly than any vernacular mediaeval literature, the Latin literature of
the Middle Ages expresses the mediaeval mind. It thundered with the
authority that held the keys of heaven; it was resonant with feeling, and
through long centuries gave voice to emotions, shattering, terror-stricken,
convulsively loving. When, say with the close of the eleventh century, the
mediaeval peoples had absorbed with power the teachings of patristic
Christianity, and had undergone some centuries of Latin schooling, and
when under these two chief influences certain distinctive and homogeneous

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ways of thinking, feeling, and looking upon life, had been reached; when, in
fine, the Middle Ages had become themselves and had evolved a genius that
could create,—then and from that time appears the adaptability and power
of mediaeval Latin to serve the ends of intellectual effort and the expression
of emotion.
To estimate the literary qualities of classical Latin is a simpler task than to
judge the Latinity and style of the Latin literature of the Middle Ages.
Classic Latin prose has a common likeness. In general one feels that what
Cicero and Caesar would have rejected, Tacitus and Quintilian would not
have admitted. The syntax of these writers shows still greater uniformity.
No such common likeness, or avoidance of stylistic aberration and
grammatical solecism, obtains in mediaeval prose or verse. The one and the
other include many kinds of Latin, and vary from century to century,
diversified in idiom and deflected from linguistic uniformity by influences
of race and native speech, of ignorance and knowledge. He who would
appreciate mediaeval Latin will be diffident of academic standards, and
mistrust his classical predilections lest he see aberration and barbarism
where he might discover the evolution of new constructions and novel
styles; lest he bestow encomium upon clever imitations of classical models,
and withhold it from more living creations of the mediaeval spirit. He will
realize that to appreciate mediaeval Latin literature, he must shelve his
Virgil and his Cicero.[230]
The following pages do not offer themselves even as a slight sketch of
mediaeval Latin literature. Their purpose is to indicate the stages of
development of the prose and the phases of evolution of the verse; and to
illustrate the way in which antique themes and antique knowledge passed
into vernacular poetry. Classical standards will supply us less with a point
of view than with a point of departure. Nothing more need be said of the
Latin of the Church Fathers and Gregory of Tours. But one must refer to the
Carolingian period, in order to appreciate the Latin styles of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries.
The revival of education and classical scholarship under the strong rule and
fostering care of the greatest of mediaeval monarchs has not always been
rightly judged. The vision of that prodigious personality ruling,
christianizing, striving to civilize masses of barbarians and barbarized

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descendants of Romans and provincials; at the same time with eager interest
endeavouring to revive the culture of the past, and press it into the service
of the Christian faith; the striking success of his endeavours, men of
learning coming from Ireland, England, Spain, and Italy, creating a
peripatetic centre of knowledge at the imperial court, and establishing
schools in many a monastery and episcopal residence—all this has never
failed to arouse enthusiasm for the great achievement, and has veiled the
creative deadness of it all, a deadness which in some provinces of
intellectual endeavour was quite veritably moribund, while in others it
betokened the necessary preparation for creative epochs to come.[231]
Carolingian scholarship was directed to the mastery of Latin. Grammar was
taught, and the rules of composition. Then the scholars were bidden, or
bade themselves, do likewise. So they wrote verse or prose according to
their school lessons. They might write correctly; but they had no style of
their own. This was hopelessly true as to their metrical verses;[232] it was
only somewhat less tangibly true of their prose. The “classic” of the period,
in the eyes of modern classical scholars and also in the opinion of the
mediaeval centuries, is Einhard’s Life of Charlemagne. Numberless
encomiums have been passed on it, and justly too. It was an excellent
imitation of Suetonius’s Life of Augustus; and the writer had made a careful
study of Caesar and Livy.[233] There is no need to quote from a writing so
accessible and well known. Yet one remark may be added to what others
have said: if Einhard’s composition was an excellent copy of classical Latin
it was nothing else; it has no stylistic individuality.[234]
Turning from this famous biography, we will illustrate our point by quoting
from the letters of him who stands as the type of the Carolingian revival, the
Anglo-Saxon Alcuin. All praise to this noble educational coadjutor of
Charlemagne; his learning was conscientious; his work was important, his
character was lovable. His affectionate nature speaks in a letter to his
former brethren at York, where his home had been before he entered
Charlemagne’s service. Here is a sentence:
“O omnium dilectissimi patres et fratres, memores mei estote; ego
vester ero, sive in vita, sive in morte. Et forte miserebitur mei Deus, ut
cujus infantiam aluistis, ejus senectutem sepeliatis.”[235]

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It were invidious to find fault with this Latin, in which the homesick man
expresses his hope of sepulture in his old home. Note also the balance of the
following, written to a sick friend:
“Gratias agamus Deo Jesu, vulneranti et medenti, flagellanti et
consolanti. Dolor corporis salus est animae, et infirmitas temporalis,
sanitas perpetua. Libenter accipiamus, patienter feramus voluntatem
Salvatoris nostri.”[236]
This too is excellent, in language as in sentiment. So is another, and last,
sentence from our author, in a letter congratulating Charlemagne on his
final subjugation of the Huns, through which the survivors were brought to
a knowledge of the truth:
“Qualis erit tibi gloria, O beatissime rex, in die aeternae retributionis,
quando hi omnes qui per tuam sollicitudinem ab adolatriae cultura ad
cognoscendum verum Deum conversi sunt, te ante tribunal Domini
nostri Jesu Christi in beata sorte stantem sequentur!”[237]
Again, the only trouble is stylelessness. In fine, an absence of quality
characterizes Carolingian prose, of which a last example may be taken from
the Spaniard Theodulphus, Bishop of Orleans, “an accomplished Latin
poet,” and an educator yielding in importance to Alcuin alone. The sentence
is from an official admonition to the clergy, warning them to attach more
value to salvation than to lucre:
“Admonendi sunt qui negotiis ac mercationibus rerum invigilant, ut non
plus terrenam quam viam cupiant sempiternam. Nam qui plus de rebus
terrenis quam de animae suae salute cogitat, valde a via veritatis
aberrat.”[238]
Evidently there was a good knowledge of Latin among these Carolingians,
who laboured for the revival of education and the preservation of the
Classics. The nadir of classical learning falls in the succeeding period of
break-up, confusion, and dawning re-adjustment. In the century or two
following the year 850, the writers were too unskilled in Latin and often too
cumbered by it, to manifest in their writings that unhampered and
distinctive reflex of a personality which we term style. A rare exception
would appear in such a potent scholar as Gerbert, who mastered whatever

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he learned, and made it part of his own faculties and temperament. His
letters, consequently, have an individual style, however good or bad we
may be disposed to deem it.[239]
Accordingly, until after the millennial year Latin prose shows little beyond
a clumsy heaviness resulting from the writer’s insufficient mastery of his
medium; and there are many instances of barbarism and corruption of the
tongue without any compensating positive qualities. A dreadful example is
afforded by the Chronicon of Benedictus, a monk of St. Andrews in Monte
Soracte, who lived in the latter part of the tenth century. He relates, as
history, the fable of Charlemagne’s journey to the Holy Land; and his own
eyes may have witnessed the atrocious times of John XII., of whom he
speaks as follows:
“Inter haec non multum tempus Agapitus papa decessit (an. 956).
Octabianus in sede sanctissima susceptus est, et vocatus est Johannes
duodecimi pape. Factus est tam lubricus sui corporis, et tam audaces,
quantum nunc in gentilis populo solebat fieri. Habebat consuetudinem
sepius venandi non quasi apostolicus sed quasi homo ferus. Erat enim
cogitio ejus vanum; diligebat collectio feminarum, odibiles
aecclesiarum, amabilis juvenis ferocitantes. Tanta denique libidine sui
corporis exarsit, quanta nunc (non?) possumus enarrare.”[240]
No need to draw further from this writing, which is characterized
throughout by crass ignorance of grammar and all else pertaining to Latin.
It has no individual qualities; it has no style. Leaving this example of
illiteracy, let us turn to a man of more knowledge, Odo, one of the greatest
of the abbots of Cluny, who died in the year 943. He left lengthy writings,
one of them a bulky epitome of the famous Moralia of Gregory the Great.
[241] More original were his three dull books of Collationes, or moral
comments upon the Scriptures. They open with a heavy note which their
author might have drawn from the dark temperament of that great pope
whom he so deeply admired; but the language has a leaden quality which is
not Gregory’s, but Odo’s.
“Auctor igitur et judex hominum Deus, licet ab illa felicitate paradisi
genus nostrum juste repulerit, suae tamen bonitatis memor, ne totus reus

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homo quod meretur incurrat, hujus peregrinationis molestias multis
beneficiis demulcet.”
And, again, a little further on:
“Omnis vero ejusdem Scripturae intentio est, ut nos ab hujus vitae
pravitatibus compescat. Nam idcirco terribilibus suis sententiis cor
nostrum, quasi quibusdam stimulis pungit, ut homo terrore pulsatus
expavescat, et divina judicia quae aut voluptate carnis aut terrena
sollicitudine discissus oblivisci facile solet, ad memoriam reducat.”[242]
One feels the dull heaviness of this. Odo, like many of his contemporaries,
knew enough of Latin grammar, and had read some of the Classics. But he
had not mastered what he knew, and his knowledge was not converted into
power. The tenth century was still painfully learning the lessons of its
Christian and classical heritage. A similar lack of personal facility may be
observed in Ruotger’s biography of Bruno, the worthy brother of the great
emperor Otto I., and Archbishop of Cologne. Bruno died in 965, and
Ruotger, who had been his companion, wrote his Life without delay. It has
not the didactic ponderousness of Odo’s writing, but its language is clumsy.
The following passage is of interest as showing Bruno’s education and the
kind of learned man it made him.
“Deinde ubi prima grammaticae artis rudimenta percepit, sicut ab ipso
in Dei omnipotentis gloriam hoc saepius ruminante didicimus,
Prudentium poetam tradente magistro legere coepit. Qui sicut est et fide
intentioneque catholicus, et eloquentia veritateque praecipuus, et
metrorum librorumque varietate elegantissimus, tanta mox dulcedine
palato cordis ejus complacuit, ut jam non tantum exteriorum verborum
scientiam, verum intimi medullam sensus, et nectar ut ita dicam
liquidissimum, majori quam dici possit aviditate hauriret. Postea nullum
penitus erat studiorum liberalium genus in omni Graeca vel Latina
eloquentia, quod ingenii sui vivacitatem aufugeret. Nec vero, ut solet,
aut divitiarum affluentia, aut turbarum circumstrepentium assiduitas, aut
ullum aliunde subrepens fastidium ab hoc nobili otio animum ejus
unquam avertit.... Saepe inter Graecorum et Latinorum doctissimos de
philosophiae sublimitate aut de cujuslibet in illa florentis disciplinae
subtilitate disputantes doctus interpres medius ipse consedit, et

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disputantibus ad plausum omnium, quo nihil minus amaverat,
satisfecit.”[243]
The gradual improvement in the writing of Latin in the Middle Ages, and
the evolution of distinctive mediaeval styles, did not result from a larger
acquaintance with the Classics, or a better knowledge of grammar and
school rhetoric. The range of classical reading might extend, or from time to
time contract, and Donatus and Priscian were used in the ninth century as
well as in the twelfth. It is true that the study of grammar became more
intelligent in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and its teachers deferred
less absolutely to the old rules and illustrations. They recognized Christian
standards of diction: first of all the Vulgate; next, early Christian poets like
Prudentius; and then gradually the mediaeval versifiers who wrote and won
approval in the twelfth century. Thus grammar sought to follow current
usage.[244] This endeavour culminated at the close of the twelfth century in
the Doctrinale of Alexander of Villa Dei.[245] Before this, much of the best
mediaeval Latin prose and verse had been written, and the period most
devoted to the Classics had come and was already waning. That period was
this same twelfth century. During its earlier half, Latinity gained doubtless
from such improvement in the courses of the Trivium as took place at
Chartres, for example, an improvement connected with the intellectual
growth of the time. But the increase in the knowledge of Latin was mainly
such as a mature man may realize within himself, if he has kept up his Latin
reading, however little he seem to have added to his knowledge since
leaving his Alma Mater.
So the development of mediaeval Latin prose (and also verse) advanced
with the maturing of mediaeval civilization. That which was at the same
time a living factor in this growth and a result of it, was the more organic
appropriation of the classical and Christian heritages of culture and religion.
As intellectual faculties strengthened, and men drew power from the past,
they gained facility in moulding their Latin to their purposes. Writings
begin to reflect the personalities of the writers; the diction ceases to be that
of clumsy or clever school compositions, and presents an evolution of
tangible mediaeval styles. Henceforth, although a man be an eager student
of the Classics, like John of Salisbury for example, and try to imitate their
excellences, he will still write mediaeval Latin, and with a personal style if

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he be a strong personality. The classical models no longer trammel, but
assist him to be more effectively himself on a higher plane.
If mediaeval civilization is to be regarded as that which the peoples of
western Europe attained under the two universal influences of Christianity
and antique culture, then nothing more mediaeval will be seen than
mediaeval Latin. To make it, the antique Latin had been modified and
reinspired and loosed by the Christian energies of the Fathers; and had then
passed on to peoples who never had been, or no longer were, antique. They
barbarized the language down to the rudeness of their faculties. As they
themselves advanced, they brought up Latin with them, as it were, from the
depths of the ninth and tenth centuries, but a Latin which in the crude
natures of these men had been stripped of classical quality; a Latin
barbarous and naked, and ready to be clothed upon with novel qualities
which should make it a new creature. Throughout all this process, while
Latin was sinking and re-emerging, it was worked upon and inspired by the
spirit of the uses to which it was predominantly applied, which were those
of the Roman Catholic Church and of the intimacies of the Christian soul,
pressing to expression in the learned tongue which they were transforming.
In considering the Latin writings of the Middle Ages one should bear in
mind the differences between Italy and the North with respect to the ancient
language. These were important through the earlier Middle Ages, when
modes of diction sufficiently characteristic to be called styles, were
forming. The men of Latin-sodden Italy might have a fluent Latin when
those of the North still had theirs to learn. Thus there were Italians in the
eleventh century who wrote quite a distinctive Latin prose.[246] Among
them were St. Peter Damiani, and St. Anselm of Aosta, Bec, and
Canterbury.
The former died full of virtue in the year 1072. We have elsewhere
observed his character and followed his career.[247] He was, to his great
anxiety, a classical scholar, who had earned large sums as a teacher of
rhetoric before natural inclination and fears for his soul drove him to an
ascetic life. He was a master of the Latin which he used. His style is
intense, eloquent, personal to himself as well as suited to his matter, and
reflects his ardent character and keen perceptions. The following is a

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rhetorical yet beautiful description of a “last leaf,” taken from one of his
compositions in praise of the hermit way of salvation.
“Videamus in arbore folium sub ipsis pruinis hiemalibus lapsabundum,
et consumpto autumnalis clementiae virore, jamjam pene casurum, ita
ut vix ramusculo, cui dependet, inhaereat, sed apertissima levis ruinae
signa praetendat: inhorrescunt flabra, venti furentes hic inde concutiunt,
brumalis horror crassi aeris rigore densatur: atque, ut magis stupeas,
defluentibus reliquis undique foliis terra sternitur, et depositis comis
arbor suo decore nudatur; cum illud solum nullo manente permaneat, et
velut cohaeredum superstes in fraternae possessionis jura succedat.
Quid autem intelligendum in hujus rei consideratione relinquitur, nisi
quia nec arboris folium potest cadere, nisi divinum praesumat
imperium?”[248]
Anselm’s diction, in spite of its frequent cloister rhetoric, has a simple and
modern word-order. An account has already been given of his life and of his
thoughts, so beautifully sky-blue, unpurpled with the crimson of human
passion, which made the words of Augustine more veritably incandescent.
[249] The great African was the strongest individual influence upon
Anselm’s thought and language. But the latter’s style has departed further
from the classical sentence, and of itself indicates that the writer belongs
neither to the patristic period nor to the Carolingian time, busied with its
rearrangement of patristic thought. The following is from his Proslogion
upon the existence of God. Through this discourse, Deity and the Soul are
addressed in the second person after the manner of Augustine’s
Confessions.
“Excita nunc, anima mea, et erige totum intellectum tuum, et cogita
quantum potes quale et quantum sit illud bonum (i.e. Deus). Si enim
singula bona delectabilia sunt, cogita intente quam delectabile sit illud
bonum quod continet jucunditatem omnium bonorum; et non qualem in
rebus creatis sumus experti, sed tanto differentem quanto differt Creator
a creatura. Si enim bona est vita creata, quam bona est vita creatrix! Si
jucunda est salus facta, quam jucunda est salus quae fecit omnem
salutem! Si amabilis est sapientia in cognitione rerum conditarum, quam
amabilis est sapientia quae omnia condidit ex nihilo! Denique, si multae

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et magnae delectationes sunt in rebus delectabilibus, qualis et quanta
delectatio est in illo qui fecit ipsa delectabilia!”[250]
In a more emotional passage Anselm arouses in his soul the terror of the
Judgment. It is from a “Meditatio”:
“Taedet animam meam vitae meae; vivere erubesco, mori pertimesco.
Quid ergo restat tibi, o peccator, nisi ut in tota vita tua plores totam
vitam tuam, ut ipsa tota se ploret totam? Sed est in hoc quoque anima
mea miserabiliter mirabilis et mirabiliter miserabilis, quia non tantum
dolet quantum se noscit; sed sic secura torpet, velut quid patiatur
ignoret. O anima sterilis, quid agis? quid torpes, anima peccatrix? Dies
judicii venit, juxta est dies Domini magnus, juxta et velox nimis, dies
irae dies illa, dies tribulationis et angustiae, dies calamitatis et miseriae,
dies tenebrarum et caliginis, dies nebulae et turbinis, dies tubae et
clangoris. O vox diei Domini amara! Quid dormitas, anima tepida et
digna evomi?”[251]
Damiani wrote in the middle of the eleventh century, Anselm in the latter
part. The northern lands could as yet show no such characteristic styles,[252]
although the classically educated German, Lambert of Hersfeld, wrote as
correctly and perspicuously as either. His Annals have won admiration for
their clear and correct Latinity, modelled upon the styles of Sallust and
Livy. He died in 1077, the year of Canossa, his Annals covering the conflict
between Henry IV. and Hildebrand up to that event. The narrative moves
with spirit, as one may see by reading his description of King Henry and his
consort struggling through Alpine ice and snow to reach that castle never to
be forgotten, and gain absolution from the Pope before the ban should have
completed Henry’s ruin.[253]
For the North, the best period of mediaeval Latin, prose as well as verse,
opens with the twelfth century. It was indeed the great literary period of the
Middle Ages. For the vernacular literatures flourished as well as the Latin.
Provençal literature began as the eleventh century closed, and was stifled in
the thirteenth by the Albigensian Crusade. So the twelfth was its great
period. Likewise with the Old French literature: except the Roland which is
earlier, the chief chansons de geste belong to the twelfth century; also the
romances of antiquity, to be spoken of hereafter; also the romances of the

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Round Table, and a great mass of chansons and fabliaux. The Old German
—or rather, Mittel Hochdeutsch—literature touches its height as the century
closes and the next begins, in the works of Heinrich von Veldeke, Gottfried
von Strassburg, Wolfram von Eschenbach, and Walther von der Vogelweide.
The best Latin writers of the century lived, or sojourned, or were educated,
for the most part in the France north of the Loire. Not that all of them were
natives of that territory; for some were German born, some saw the light in
England, and the birthplace of many is unknown. Yet they seem to belong
to France. Nearly all were ecclesiastics, secular or regular. Many of them
were notables in theology, like Hugo of St. Victor, Abaelard, Alanus de
Insulis (Lille); many were poets as well, like Alanus and Hildebert and John
of Salisbury too; one was a thunderer on the earth, and a most deft
politician, Bernard of Clairvaux. Some again are known only as poets,
sacred or profane, like Adam of St. Victor, and Walter of Chatillon—but of
these hereafter. The best Latin prose writing of this, or any other, mediaeval
period, had its definite purpose, metaphysical, theological, or pietistic; and
the writers have been or will be spoken of in connection with their specific
fields of intellectual achievement or religious fervour. Here, without
discussing the men or their works, some favourable examples of their
writing will be given.
In the last passage quoted from Anselm, the reader must have felt the
working of cloister rhetoric, and have noticed the antitheses and rhymes, to
which mediaeval Latin lent itself so readily. Yet it is a slight affair
compared with the confounding sonorousness, the flaring pictures, and
terrifying climaxes of St. Bernard when preaching upon the same topic—
the Judgment Day. In one of his famous sermons on Canticles, the saint has
been suggesting to his audience, the monks of Clara Vallis, that although the
Father might ignore faults, not so the Dominus and Creator: “et qui parcit
filio, non parcet figmento, non parcet servo nequam.” Listen to the carrying
out and pointing of this thought:
“Pensa cujus sit formidinis et horroris tuum atque omnium
contempsisse factorem, offendisse Dominum majestatis. Majestatis est
timeri, Domini est timeri, et maxime hujus majestatis, hujusque Domini.
Nam si reum regiae majestatis, quamvis humanae, humanis legibus
plecti capite sancitum sit, quis finis contemnentium divinam

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omnipotentiam erit? Tangit montes, et fumigant; et tam tremendam
majestatem audet irritare vilis pulvisculus, uno levi flatu mox
dispergendus, et minime recolligendus? Ille, ille timendus est, qui
postquam acciderit corpus, potestatem habet mittere et in gehennam.
Paveo gehennam, paveo judicis vultum, ipsis quoque tremendum
angelicis potestatibus. Contremisco ab ira potentis, a facie furoris ejus, a
fragore ruentis mundi, a conflagratione elementorum, a tempestate
valida, a voce archangeli, et a verbo aspero. [Feel the climax of this
sentence, which tells the end of the sinner.] Contremisco a dentibus
bestiae infernalis, a ventre inferi, a rugientibus praeparatis ad escam.
Horreo vermem rodentem, et ignem torrentem, fumum, et vaporem, et
sulphur, et spiritum procellarum; horreo tenebras exteriores. Quis dabit
capiti meo aquam, et oculis meis fontem lacrymarum ut praeveniam
fletibus fletum, et stridorem dentium, et manuum pedumque dura
vincula, et pondus catenarum prementium, stringentium, urentium, nec
consumentium? Heu me, mater mea! utquid me genuisti filium doloris,
filium amaritudinis, indignationis et plorationis aeternae? Cur exceptus
genibus, cur lactatus uberibus, natus in combustionem, et cibus
ignis?”[254]
As one recovers from the sound and power of this high-wrought passage, he
notices how readily it might be turned into the form of a Latin hymn; and
also how very modern is its sequence of words. Bernard’s Latin could
whisper intimate love, as well as thunder terror. He says, preaching on the
medicina, the healing power, of Jesu’s name:
“Hoc tibi electuarium habes, o anima mea, reconditum in vasculo
vocabuli hujus quod est Jesus, salutiferum, certe, quodque nulli unquam
pesti tuae inveniatur inefficax.”[255]
With the music of this prose one may compare the sweet personal plaint of
the following:
“Felices quos abscondit in tabernaculo suo in umbra alarum suarum
sperantes, donec transeat iniquitas. Caeterum ego infelix, pauper et
nudus, homo natus ad laborem, implumis avicula pene omni tempore
nidulo exsulans, vento exposita et turbini, turbatus sum et motus sum
sicut ebrius, et omnis conscientia mea devorata est.”[256]

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Extracts can give no idea of Bernard’s literary powers, any more than a
small volume could tell the story of that life which, so to speak, was magna
pars of all contemporary history. But since he was one of the best of Latin
letter-writers, one should not omit an example of his varied epistolary style,
which can be known in its compass only from a large reading of his letters.
The following is a short letter, written to win back to the cloister a
delicately nurtured youth whose parents had lured him out into the world.
“Doleo super te, fili mi Gaufride, doleo super te. Et merito. Quis enim
non doleat florem juventutis tuae, quem laetantibus angelis Deo
illibatum obtuleras in odorem suavitatis, nunc a daemonibus conculcari,
vitiorum spurcitiis, et saeculi sordibus inquinari? Quomodo qui vocatus
eras a Deo, revocantem diabolum sequeris, et quem Christus trahere
coeperat post se, repente pedem ab ipso introitu gloriae retraxisti? In te
experior nunc veritatem sermonis Domini, quem dixit: Inimici hominis,
domestici ejus (Matt. x. 36). Amici tui et proximi tui adversum te
appropinquaverunt, et steterunt. Revocaverunt te in fauces leonis, et in
portis mortis iterum collocaverunt te. Collocaverunt te in obscuris, sicut
mortuos saeculi: et jam parum est ut descendas in ventrem inferi; jam te
deglutire festinat, ac rugientibus praeparatis ad escam tradere
devorandum.
“Revertere, quaeso, revertere, priusquam te absorbeat profundum, et
urgeat super te puteus os suum; priusquam demergaris, unde ulterius
non emergas; priusquam ligatis manibus et pedibus projiciaris in
tenebras exteriores, ubi est fletus et stridor dentium; priusquam
detrudaris in locum tenebrosum, et opertum mortis caligine. Erubescis
forte redire, quia ad horam cessisti. Erubesce fugam, et non post fugam
reverti in proelium, et rursum pugnare. Necdum finis pugnae, necdum
ab invicem dimicantes acies discesserunt: adhuc victoria prae manibus
est. Si vis, nolumus vincere sine te, nec tuam tibi invidemus gloriae
portionem. Laeti occuremus tibi, laetis te recipiemus amplexibus,
dicemusque: Epulari et gaudere oportet, quia hic filius noster mortuus
fuerat, et revixit; perierat, et inventus est” (Luc. xv. 32).[257]
The argument of this letter is, from the standpoint of Bernard’s time, as
resistless as the style. Did it win back the little monk? Many wonderful
examples of loving expression could be drawn from Bernard’s letters;[258]

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but instead an instance may be given of his none too subtle way of uttering
his hate: “Arnaldus de Brixia, cujus conversatio mel et doctrina venenum,
cui caput columbae, cauda scorpionis est, quem Brixia evomuit, Roma
exhorruit, Francia repulit, Germania abominatur, Italia non vult recipere,
fertur esse vobiscum.”[259] And then he proceeds to warn his correspondent
of the danger of intercourse with this arch-enemy of the Church.
Considering that Latin was a tongue which youths learned at school rather
than at their mothers’ knees, such writing as Bernard’s is a triumphant
recasting of an ancient language. One notices in him, as generally with
mediaeval religious writers, the influence of the Vulgate, which was mainly
in the language of St. Jerome—of Jerome when not writing as a literary
virtuoso, but as a scholar occupied with rendering the meaning, and willing
to accept such linguistic innovations as served his purpose.[260] But beyond
this influence, one sees how masterful is Bernard’s diction, quite freed from
observance of classical principles, quite of the writer and his time, adapting
itself with ease and power to the topic and character of the composition, and
always expressive of the personality of the mighty saint.
Hildebert of Le Mans was a few years older than St. Bernard. As an
example of his prose a letter may be cited, of which the translation has been
given. It was written in 1128, when he was Archbishop of Tours, in protest
against the encroachments of the royal power of the French king, Louis the
Fat, upon the rights of the Archiepiscopacy of Tours in the matter of
ecclesiastical appointments within that diocese:
“In adversis nonnullum solatium est, tempora sperare laetiora. Diutius
spes haec mihi blandita est, et velut agricolam messis in herba, sic
animum meum prosperitatis expectatio confortavit. Caeterum jam nihil
est quo serenitatem nimbosi temporis exspectem, nihil est quo navis, in
cujus puppi sedeo, crebris agitata turbinibus, portum quietis attingat.
“Silent amici, silent sacerdotes Jesu Christi. Denique silent et illi
quorum suffragio credidi regem mecum in gratiam rediturum. Credidi
quidem, sed super dolorem vulnerum meorum rex, illis silentibus,
adjecit. Eorum tamen erat gravamini ecclesiae canonicis obviare
institutis. Eorum erat, si res postulasset, opponere murum pro domo
Israel. Verum apud serenissimum regem opus est exhortatione potius

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quam increpatione, consilio quam praecepto, doctrina quam virga. His
ille conveniendus fuit, his reverenter instruendus, ne sagittas suas in
sene compleret sacerdote, ne sanctiones canonicas evacuaret, ne
persequeretur cineres Ecclesiae jam sepultae, cineres in quibus ego
panem doloris manduco, in quibus bibo calicem luctus, de quibus eripi
et evadere, de morte ad vitam transire est.
“Inter has tamen angustias, nunquam de me sic ira triumphavit, ut
aliquem super Christo Domini clamorem deponere vellem, seu pacem
ipsius in manu forti et brachio Ecclesiae adipisci. Suspecta est pax ad
quam, non amore sed vi, sublimes veniunt potestates. Ea facile
rescindetur, et fiunt aliquando novissima pejora prioribus. Alia est via
qua compendiosius ad eam Christo perducente pertingam. Jactabo
cogitatum meum in Domino, et ipse dabit mihi petitionem cordis mei.
Recordatus est Dominus Joseph, cujus pincerna Pharaonis oblitus, dum
prospera succederent, interveniendi pro eo curam abjecit.... Fortassis
recordabitur et mei, atque in desiderato littore navem sistet fluctuantem.
Ipse enim est qui respicit in orationem humilium, et non spernit preces
eorum. Ipse est in cujus manu corda regum cerea sunt. Si invenero
gratiam in oculis ejus, gratiam regis vel facile consequar, vel utiliter
amittam. Siquidem offendere hominem proper Deum lucrari est gratiam
Dei.”[261]
John of Salisbury (1110-1180), much younger than Hildebert and a little
younger than Bernard, seems to have been the best scholar of his time. With
the Classics he is as one in the company of friends; he cites them as readily
as Scripture; their sententiae have become part of his views of life. John
was an eager humanist, who followed his studies to whatever town and to
the feet of whatsoever teacher they might lead him. So he listened to
Abaelard and many others. His writing is always lively and often forcible,
especially when vituperating the set who despised classic reading. His most
vivacious work, the Metalogicus, was directed against their unnamed
prophet, whom he dubs “Cornificus.”[262] Its opening passage is of interest
as John’s exordium, and because a somewhat consciously intending stylist
like our John is likely to exhibit his utmost virtuosity in the opening
sentences of an important work:

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“Adversus insigne donum naturae parentis et gratiae, calumniam
veterem et majorum nostrorum judicio condemnatam excitat improbus
litigator, et conquirens undique imperitiae suae solatia, sibi proficere
sperat ad gloriam, si multos similes sui, id est si eos viderit imperitos;
habet enim hoc proprium arrogantiae tumor, ut se commetiatur aliis,
bona sua, si qua sunt, efferens, deprimens aliena; defectumque proximi,
suum putet esse profectum. Omnibus autem recte sapientibus indubium
est quod natura, clementissima parens omnium, et dispositissima
moderatrix, inter caetera quae genuit animantia, hominem privilegio
rationis extulit, et usu eloquii insignivit: id agens sedulitate officiosa, et
lege dispositissima, ut homo qui gravedine faeculentioris naturae et
molis corporeae tarditate premebatur et trahebatur ad ima, his quasi
subvectus alis, ad alta ascendat, et ad obtinendum verae beatitudinis
bravium, omnia alia felici compendio antecebat. Dum itaque naturam
fecundat gratia, ratio rebus perspiciendis et examinandis invigilat;
naturae sinus excutit, metitur fructus et efficaciam singulorum: et
innatus omnibus amor boni, naturali urgente se appetitu, hoc, aut solum,
aut prae caeteris sequitur, quod percipiendae beatitudini maxime videtur
esse accommodum.”[263]
One perceives the effect of classical studies; yet the passage is good
twelfth-century Latin, quite different from the compositions of the
Carolingian epoch, those, for example, from the pen of Alcuin, who had
studied the Classics like John, but unlike him had no personal style. One
gains similar impressions from the diction of the Polycraticus, a lengthy,
discursive work in which John surprises us with his classical equipment.
Although containing many quoted passages, it is not made of extracts
strung together; but reflects the sentiments or tells the opinions of ancient
philosophers in the writer’s own way. The following shows John’s
knowledge of early Greek philosophers, and is a fair example of his
ordinary style:
“Alterum vero philosophorum genus est, quod Ionicum dicitur et a
Graecis ulterioribus traxit originem. Horum princeps fuit Thales
Milesius, unus illorum septem, qui dicti sunt sapientes. Iste cum rerum
naturam scrutatus, inter caeteros emicuisset, maxime admirabilis
exstitit, quod astrologiae numeris comprehensis, solis et lunae defectus
praedicebat. Huic successit Anaximander ejus auditor, qui Anaximenem

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discipulum reliquit et successorem. Diogenes quoque ejusdem auditor
exstitit, et Anaxagoras, qui omnium rerum quas videmus, effectorem
divinum animum docuit. Ei successit auditor ejus Archelaüs, cujus
discipulus Socrates fuisse perhibetur, magister Platonis, qui, teste
Apuleio, prius Aristoteles dictus est, sed deinde a latitudine pectoris
Plato, et in tantam eminentiam philosophiae, et vigore ingenii, et studii
exercitio, et omnium morum venustate, eloquii quoque suavitate et
copia subvectus est, ut quasi in throno sapientiae residens, praecepta
quadam auctoritate visus est, tam antecessoribus quam successoribus
philosophis, imperare. Et primus quidem Socrates universam
philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque mores flexisse
memoratur, cum ante illum omnes physicis, id est rebus naturalibus
perscrutandis, maximam operam dederint.”[264]
These extracts from the writings of saints and scholars may be
supplemented by two extracts from compositions of another class. The
mediaeval chronicle has not a good reputation. Its credulity and uncritical
spirit varied with the time and man. Little can be said in favour of its
general form, which usually is stupidly chronological, or annalistic. The
example of classical historical composition was lost on mediaeval annalists.
Yet their work is not always dull; and, by the twelfth century, their diction
had become as mediaeval as that of the theologian rhetoricians, although it
rarely crystallizes to personal style by reason of the insignificance of the
writers. A well-known work of this kind is the Gesta Dei per Francos, by
Guibert of Nogent, who wrote his account of the First Crusade a few years
after its turmoil had passed by. The following passage tells of proceedings
upon the conclusion of Urban’s great crusading oration at the Council of
Clermont in 1099:
“Peroraverat vir excellentissimus, et omnes qui se ituros voverant, beati
Petri potestate absolvit, eadem, ipsa apostolica auctoritate firmavit, et
signum satis conveniens hujus tam honestae professionis instituit, et
veluti cingulum militiae, vel potius militaturis Deo passionis Dominicae
stigma tradens, crucis figuram, ex cujuslibet materiae panni, tunicis,
byrris et palliis iturorum, assui mandavit. Quod si quis, post hujus signi
acceptionem, aut post evidentis voti pollicitationem ab ista
benevolentia, prava poenitudine, aut aliquorum suorum affectione
resileret, ut exlex perpetuo haberetur omnino praecepit, nisi resipisceret;

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idemque quod omiserat foede repeteret. Praeterea omnes illos atroci
damnavit anathemate, qui eorum uxoribus, filiis, aut possessionibus, qui
hoc Dei iter aggrederentur, per integrum triennii tempus, molestiam
auderent inferre. Ad extremum, cuidam viro omnimodis laudibus
efferendo, Podiensis urbis episcopo, cujus nomen doleo quia neque
usquam reperi, nec audivi, curam super eadem expeditione regenda
contulit, et vices suas ipsi, super Christiani populi quocunque venirent
institutione, commisit. Unde et manus ei, more apostolorum, data
pariter benedictione, imposuit. Quod ille quam sagaciter sit exsecutus,
docet mirabilis operis tanti exitus.”[265]
This Frenchman Guibert is almost vivacious. A certain younger
contemporary of his, of English birth, could construct his narrative quite as
well. Ordericus Vitalis (d. 1142) is said to have been born at Wroxeter,
though he spent most of his life as monk of St. Evroult in Normandy. There
he wrote his Historia Ecclesiastica of Normandy and England. His account
of the loss of the White Ship in 1120 tells the story:
“Thomas, filius Stephani, regem adiit, eique marcum auri offerens, ait:
‘Stephanus, Airardi filius, genitor meus fuit, et ipse in omni vita sua
patri tuo in mari servivit. Nam illum, in sua puppe vectum, in Angliam
conduxit, quando contra Haraldum pugnaturus, in Angliam perrexit.
Hujusmodi autem officio usque ad mortem famulando ei placuit, et ab
eo multis honoratus exeniis, inter contribules suos magnifice floruit.
Hoc feudum, domine rex, a te requiro, et vas quod Candida-Navis
appellatur, merito ad regalem famulatum optime instructum habeo.’ Cui
rex ait: ‘Gratum habeo quod petis. Mihi quidem aptam navim elegi,
quam non mutabo; sed filios meos, Guillelmum et Richardum, quos
sicut me diligo, cum multa regni mei nobilitate, nunc tibi commendo.’
“His auditis, nautae gavisi sunt, filioque regis adulantes, vinum ab eo ad
bibendum postulaverunt. At ille tres vini modios ipsis dari praecepit.
Quibus acceptis, biberunt, sociisque abundanter propinaverunt,
nimiumque potantes inebriati sunt. Jussu regis multi barones cum filiis
suis puppim ascenderunt, et fere trecenti, ut opinor, in infausta nave
fuerunt. Duo siquidem monachi Tironis, et Stephanus comes cum
duobus militibus, Guillelmus quoque de Rolmara, et Rabellus
Camerarius, Eduardus de Salesburia, et alii plures inde exierunt, quia

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nimiam multitudinem lascivae et pompaticae juventutis inesse
conspicati sunt. Periti enim remiges quinquaginta ibi erant, et feroces
epibatae, qui jam in navi sedes nacti turgebant, et suimet prae ebrietate
immemores, vix aliquem reverenter agnoscebant. Heu! quamplures
illorum mentes pia devotione erga Deum habebant vacuas

‘Qui maris immodicas moderatur et aeris iras.’

Unde sacerdotes, qui ad benedicendos illos illuc accesserant, aliosque
ministros qui aquam benedictam deferebant, cum dedecore et cachinnis
subsannantes abigerunt; sed paulo post derisionis suae ultionem
receperunt.
“Soli homines, cum thesauro regis et vasis merum ferentibus, Thomae
carinam implebant, ipsumque ut regiam classem, quae jam aequora
sulcabat, summopere prosequeretur, commonebant. Ipse vero, quia
ebrietate desipiebat, in virtute sua, satellitumque suorum confidebat, et
audacter, quia omnes qui jam praecesserant praeiret, spondebat. Tandem
navigandi signum dedit. Porro schippae remos haud segniter
arripuerunt, et alia laeti, quia quid eis ante oculos penderet nesciebant,
armamenta coaptaverunt, navemque cum impetu magno per pontum
currere fecerunt. Cumque remiges ebrii totis navigarent conatibus, et
infelix gubernio male intenderet cursui dirigendo per pelagus, ingenti
saxo quod quotidie fluctu recedente detegitur et rursus accessu maris
cooperitur, sinistrum latus Candidae-Navis vehementer illisum est,
confractisque duabus tabulis, ex insperato, navis, proh dolor! subversa
est. Omnes igitur in tanto discrimine simul exclamaverunt; sed aqua
mox implente ora, pariter perierunt. Duo soli virgae qua velum pendebat
manus injecerunt, et magna noctis parte pendentes, auxilium quodlibet
praestolati sunt. Unus erat Rothomagensis carnifex, nomine Beroldus, et
alter generosus puer, nomine Goisfredus, Gisleberti de Aquila filius.
“Tunc luna in signo Tauri nona decima fuit, et fere ix horis radiis suis
mundum illustravit, et navigantibus mare lucidum reddidit. Thomas
nauclerus post primam submersionem vires resumpsit, suique memor,
super undas caput extulit, et videns capita eorum qui ligno utcunque
inhaerebant, interrogavit: ‘Filius regis quid devenit?’ Cumque naufragi

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respondissent illum cum omnibus collegis suis deperisse: ‘Miserum,’
inquit, ‘est amodo meum vivere.’ Hoc dicto, male desperans, maluit illic
occumbere, quam furore irati regis pro pernicie prolis oppetere, seu
longas in vinculis poenas luere.”[266]
Our examples thus far belong to the twelfth century. As touching its
successor, it will be interesting to observe the qualities of two opposite
kinds of writing, the one springing from the intellectual activities, and the
other from the religious awakening, of the time. In the thirteenth century,
scientific and scholastic writing was of representative importance, and
deeply affected the development of Latin prose. Very different in style were
the Latin stories and vitae of the blessed Francis of Assisi and other saints,
composed in Italy.
Roger Bacon, of whom there will be much to say, composed most of his
extant works about the year 1267.[267] His language is often rough and
involved, from his impetuosity and eagerness to utter what was in him. But
it is always vigorous. He took pains to say just what he meant, and what
was worth saying; and frequently rewrote his sentences. His writings show
little rhetoric; yet they are stamped with a Baconian style, which has a
cumulative force. The word-order is modern with scarcely a trace of the
antique. Perhaps we may say that he wrote Latin like an Englishman of
vehement temper and great intellect. He is powerful in continuous
exposition; yet instances of his general, and very striking statements, will
illustrate his diction at its best. In the following sentence he recognizes the
progressiveness of knowledge, a rare idea in the Middle Ages:
“Nam semper posteriores addiderunt ad opera priorum, et multa
correxerunt, et plura mutaverunt, sicut maxime per Aristotelem patet,
qui omnes sententias praecedentium discussit.”[268]
Again, he animadverts upon the duty of thirteenth-century Christians to
supply the defects of the old philosophers:
“Quapropter antiquorum defectus deberemus nos posteriores supplere,
quia introivimus in labores eorum, per quos, nisi simus asini, possumus
ad meliora excitari; quia miserrimum est semper uti inventis et
nunquam inveniendis.”[269]

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Speaking of language, he says:
“Impossibile est quod proprietas unius linguae servetur in alia.”[270]
(“The idioms of one language cannot be preserved in a translation.”)
And again: “Omnes philosophi fuerunt post patriarchas et prophetas ...
et legerunt libros prophetarum et patriarcharum qui sunt in sacro
textu.”[271] (“The philosophers of Greece came after the prophets of the
Old Testament and read their works contained in the sacred text.”)
In the first of these sentences Bacon shows his linguistic insight; in the
second he reflects an uncritical view entertained since the time of the
Church Fathers; in both, he writes with an order of words requiring no
change in an English translation.
In his time, Bacon had but a sorry fame, and his works no influence. The
writings of his younger contemporary Thomas Aquinas exerted greater
influence than those of any man after Augustine. They represent the
culmination of scholasticism. He was Italian born, and his language,
however difficult the matter, is lucidity itself. It is never rhetorical; but
measured, temperate, and balanced; properly proceeding from the mind
which weighed every proposition in the scales of universal consideration.
Sometimes it gains a certain fervour from the clarity and import of the
statement which it so lucidly conveys. In article eighth, of the first Questio,
of Pars Prima of the Summa theologiae, Thomas thus decides that Theology
is a rational (argumentativa) science:
“Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut aliae scientiae non argumentantur ad
sua principia probanda, sed ex principiis argumentantur ad ostendendum
alia in ipsis scientiis; ita haec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua
principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei; sed ex eis procedit ad
aliquid aliud ostendendum; sicut Apostolus i ad Cor. xv., ex
resurrectione Christi argumentatur ad resurrectionem communem
probandam.
“Sed tamen considerandum est in scientiis philosophicis, quod
inferiores scientiae nec probant sua principia, nec contra negantem
principia disputant, sed hoc relinquunt superiori scientiae: suprema vero
inter eas, scilicet metaphysica, disputat contra negantem sua principia,
si adversarius aliquid concedit: si autem nihil concedit, non potest cum

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eo disputare, potest tamen solvere rationes ipsius. Unde sacra scriptura
(i.e. Theology), cum non habeat superiorem, disputat cum negante sua
principia: argumentando quidem, si adversarius aliquid concedat eorum
quae per divinam revelationem habentur; sicut per auctoritates sacrae
doctrinae disputamus contra hereticos, et per unum articulum contra
negantes alium. Si vero adversarius nihil credat eorum quae divinitus
revelantur, non remanet amplius via ad probandum articulos fidei per
rationes, sed ad solvendum rationes, si quas inducit, contra fidem. Cum
enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit de vero
demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est probationes quae contra fidem
inducuntur, non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta.”[272]
Of a different intellectual temperament was John of Fidanza, known as St.
Bonaventura.[273] He also was born and passed his youth in Italy. This
sainted General of the Franciscan Order was a few years older than the
great Dominican, who was his friend. Both doctors died in the year 1274.
Bonaventura’s powers of constructive reasoning were excellent. His diction
is clear and beautiful, and eloquent with a spiritual fervour whenever the
matter is such as to evoke it. His account of how he came to write his
famous little Itinerarium mentis in Deum is full of temperament.
“Cum igitur exemplo beatissimi patris Francisci hanc pacem anhelo
spiritu quaererem, ego peccator, qui loco ipsius patris beatissimi post
eius transitum septimus in generali fratrum ministerio per omnia
indignus succedo; contigit, ut nutu divino circa Beati ipsius transitum,
anno trigesimo tertio ad montem Alvernae tanquam ad locum quietum
amore quaerendi pacem spiritus declinarem, ibique existens, dum mente
tractarem aliquas mentales ascensiones in Deum, inter alia occurrit illud
miraculum, quod in praedicto loco contigit ipsi beato Francisco, de
visione scilicet Seraph alati ad instar Crucifixi. In cuius consideratione
statim visum est mihi, quod visio illa praetenderet ipsius patris
suspensionem in contemplando et viam, per quam pervenitur ad
eam.”[274]
And Bonaventura at the end of his Itinerarium speaks of the perfect passing
of Francis into God through the very mystic climax of contemplation,
concluding thus:

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“Si autem quaeras, quomodo haec fiant, interroga gratiam, non
doctrinam; desiderium, non intellectum; gemitum orationis, non
studium lectionis; sponsum, non magistrum; Deum, non hominem;
caliginem, non claritatem; non lucem, sed ignem totaliter inflammantem
et in Deum excessivis unctionibus et ardentissimis affectionibus
transferentem.”[275]
Bonaventura’s fervent diction will serve to carry us over from the more
unmitigated intellectuality of Bacon and Thomas to the simpler matter of
those personal and pious narratives from which may be drawn concluding
illustrations of mediaeval Latin prose. Some of the authors will show the
skill which comes from training; others are quite innocent of grammar, and
their Latin has made a happy surrender to the genius of their vernacular
speech, which was the lingua vulgaris of northern Italy.
One of the earliest biographers of St. Francis of Assisi was Thomas of
Celano, a skilled Latinist, who was enraptured with the loveliness of
Francis’s life. His diction is limpid and rhythmical. A well-known passage
in his Vita prima (for he wrote two Lives) tells of Francis’s joyous
assurance of the great work which God would accomplish through the
simple band who formed the beginnings of the Order. This assurance
crystallized in a vision of multitudes hurrying to join. Francis speaks to the
brethren:
“Confortamini, charissimi, et gaudete in Domino, nec, quia pauci
videmini, efficiamini tristes. Ne vos deterreat mea, vel vestra
simplicitas, quoniam sicut mihi a Domino in veritate ostensum est, in
maximam multitudinem faciet vos crescere Deus, et usque ad fines
orbis multipliciter dilatabit. Vidi multitudinem magnam hominum ad
nos venientium, et in habitu sanctae conversationis beataeque religionis
regula nobiscum volentium conversari; et ecce adhuc sonitus eorum est
in auribus meis, euntium, et redeuntium secundum obedientiae sanctae
mandatum: vidique vias ipsorum multitudine plenas ex omni fere
natione in his partibus convenire. Veniunt Francigenae, festinant
Hispani, Teuthonici, et Anglici currunt, et aliarum diversarum
linguarum accelerat maxima multitudo.

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“Quod cum audissent fratres, repleti sunt gaudio Salvatoris sive propter
gratiam, quam dominus Deus contulerat sancto suo, sive quia
proximorum lucrum sitiebant ardenter, quos desiderabant ut salvi essent,
in idipsum quotidie augmentari.”[276]
We feel the flow and rhythm, and note the agreeable balancing of clauses.
Francis died in 1226. The Vita prima by Celano was approved by Gregory
IX. in 1229. Already other matter touching the saint was gathering in
anecdote and narrative. Much of it was brought together in the so-called
Speculum perfectionis, which has been confidently but very questionably
ascribed to Francis’s personal disciple, Brother Leo. Brother Leo, or
whoever may have been the narrator or compiler, was no scholar; his Latin
is naively incorrect, and has also the simplicity of Gospel narrative. Indeed
this Latin is as effectively “vulgarized” as the Greek of Matthew’s Gospel.
An interesting passage tells with what loving wisdom Francis interpreted a
text of Scripture:

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“Manente ipso apud Senas venit ad eum quidam doctor sacrae
theologiae de ordine Praedicatorum, vir utique humilis et spiritualis
valde. Quum ipse cum beato Francisco de verbis Domini simul
aliquamdiu contulissent interrogavit eum magister de illo verbo
Ezechielis: Si non annuntiaveris impio impietatem suam animam ejus
de manu tua requiram. Dixit enim: ‘Multos, bone pater, ego cognosco
in peccato mortali quibus non annuntio impietatem eorum, numquid de
manu mea ipsorum animae requirentur?’
“Cui beatus Franciscus humiliter dixit se esse idiotam et ideo magis
expedire sibi doceri ab eo quam super scripturae sententiam respondere.
Tunc ille humilis magister adjecit: ‘Frater, licet ab aliquibus sapientibus
hujus verbi expositionem audiverim, tamen libenter super hoc vestrum
perciperem intellectum.’ Dixit ergo beatus Franciscus: ‘Si verbum
debeat generaliter intelligi, ego taliter accipio ipsum quod servus Dei sic
debet vita et sanctitate in seipso ardere vel fulgere ut luce exempli et
lingua sanctae conversationis omnes impios reprehendat. Sic, inquam,
splendor ejus et odor famae ipsius annuntiabit omnibus iniquitates
eorum.’
“Plurimum itaque doctor ille aedificatus recedens dixit sociis beati
Francisci: ‘Fratres mei, theologia hujus viri puritate et contemplatione
subnixa est aquila volans, nostra vero scientia ventre graditur super
terram.’”[277]
Another passage has Francis breaking out in song from the joy of his love
of Christ:
“Ebrius amore et compassione Christi beatus Franciscus quandoque
talia faciebat, nam dulcissima melodia spiritus intra se ipsum ebulliens
frequenter exterius gallice dabat sonum et vena divini susurrii quam
auris ejus suscipiebat furtive gallicum erumpebat in jubilum.
“Lignum quandoque colligebat de terra ipsumque sinistro brachio
superponens aliud lignum per modum arcus in manu dextera trahebat
super illud, quasi super viellam vel aliud instrumentum atque gestus ad
hoc idoneos faciens gallice cantabat de Domino Jesu Christo.

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Terminabatur denique tota haec tripudiatio in lacrymas et in
compassionem passionis Christi hic jubilus solvebatur.
“In his trahebat continue suspiria et ingeminatis gemitibus eorum quae
tenebat in manibus oblitus suspendebatur ad caelum.”[278]
This Latin is as childlike as the Old Italian of the Fioretti of St. Francis; it
has a like word-order, and one might almost add, a like vocabulary. The
simple, ignorant writer seems as if held by a direct and personal inspiration
from the familiar life of the sweet saint. His language reflects that
inspiration, and mirrors his own childlike character. Hence he has a style,
direct, effective, moving to tears and joy, like his impression of the blessed
Francis.
A not dissimilar kind of childlike Latin could attain to a remarkable
symmetry and balance. The Legenda aurea is before us, written by the
Dominican Jacobus à Voragine, by race a Genoese, and living toward the
close of the thirteenth century. This book was the most popular compend of
saints’ lives in use in the later Middle Ages. Its stories are told with
fascinating naïveté. We cite the opening sentences from its chapter on the
Annunciation, just to show the harmony and balance of its periods. The
passage is exceptional and almost formal in these qualities:
“Annunciatio dominica dicitur, quia in tali die ab angelo adventus filii
Dei in carnem fuit annuntiatus, congruum enim fuit, ut incarnationem
praecederet angelica annuntiatio, triplici ratione. Primo ratione ordinis
connotandi, ut scilicet ordo reparationis responderet ordini
praevaricationis. Unde sicut dyabolus tentavit mulierem, ut eam
pertraheret ad dubitationem et per dubitationem ad consensum et per
consensum ad lapsum, sic angelus nuntiavit virgini, ut nuntiando
excitaret ad fidem et per fidem ad consensum et per consensum ad
concipiendum Dei filium. Secundo ratione ministerii angelici, quia enim
angelus est Dei minister et servus et beata virgo electa erat, ut esset Dei
mater, et congruum est ministrum dominae famulari, conveniens fuit, ut
beatae virgini annuntiatio per angelum fieret. Tertio ratione lapsus
angelici reparandi. Quia enim incarnatio non tantum faciebat ad
reparationem humani lapsus, sed etiam ad reparationem ruinae
angelicae, ideo angeli non debuerunt excludi. Unde sicut sexus mulieris

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non excluditur a cognitione mysterii incarnationis et resurrectionis, sic
etiam nec angelicus nuntius. Imo Deus utrumque angelo mediante
nuntiat mulieri, scilicet incarnationem virgini Mariae et resurrectionem
Magdelenae.”[279]
These extracts bring us far into the thirteenth century. Two hundred years
later, mediaeval Latin prose, if one may say so, sang its swan song in that
little book which is a last, sweet, and composite echo of all mellifluous
mediaeval piety. Yet perhaps this De imitatione Christi of Thomas à Kempis
can scarcely be classed as prose, so full is it of assonances and rhythms fit
for chanting.

CHAPTER XXXII

EVOLUTION OF MEDIAEVAL LATIN VERSE

I. Metrical Verse.
II. Substitution of Accent for Quantity.
III. Sequence-Hymn and Student-Song.
IV. Passage of Themes into the Vernacular.

In mediaeval Latin poetry the endeavour to preserve a classical style and
the irresistible tendency to evolve new forms are more palpably
distinguishable than in the prose. For there is a visible parting of the ways
between the retention of the antique metres and their fruitful abandonment
in verses built of accentual rhyme. Moreover, this formal divergence
corresponds to a substantial difference, inasmuch as there was usually a
larger survival of antique feeling and allusion in the mediaeval metrical
attempts than in the rhyming poems.

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As in the prose, so in the poetry, the lines of development may be followed
from the Carolingian time. But a difference will be found between Italy and
the North; for in Italy the course was quicker, but a less organic evolution
resulted in verse less excellent and less distinctly mediaeval. By the end of
the eleventh century Latin poetry in Italy, rhyming or metrical, seems to
have drawn itself along as far as it was destined to progress; but in the
North a richer growth culminates a century later. Indeed the most
originative line of evolution of mediaeval Latin verse would seem to have
been confined to the North, in the main if not exclusively.
The following pages offer no history of mediaeval Latin poetry, even as the
previous chapter made no attempt to sketch the history of the prose. Their
object is to point out the general lines along which the verse-forms were
developed, or were perhaps retarded. Three may be distinguished. The first
is marked by the retention of quantity and the endeavour to preserve the
ancient measures. In the second, accent and rhyme gradually take the place
of metre within the old verse-forms. The third is that of the Sequence,
wherein the accentual rhyming hymn springs from the chanted prose, which
had superseded the chanting of the final a of the Alleluia.[280]

I
The lover of classical Greek and Latin poetry knows the beautiful fitness of
the ancient measures for the thought and feeling which they enframed. If his
eyes chance to fall on some twelfth-century Latin hymn, he will be struck
by its different quality. He will quickly perceive that classic forms would
have been unsuited to the Christian and romantic sentiment of the
mediaeval period,[281] and will realize that some vehicle besides metrical
verse would have been needed for this thoroughly declassicized feeling,
even had metrical quantity remained a vital element of language, instead of
passing away some centuries before. Metre was but resuscitation and
convention in the time of Charlemagne. Yet it kept its sway with scholars,
and could not lack votaries so long as classical poetry made part of the Ars
grammatica or was read for delectation. Metrical composition did not cease
throughout the Middle Ages. But it was not the true mediaeval style, and
became obviously academic as accentual verse was perfected and made fit

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to carry spiritual emotion. Nevertheless the simpler metres were cultivated
successfully by the best scholars of the twelfth century.
Most of the Latin poetry of the Carolingian period was metrical, if we are to
judge from the mass that remains. Reminiscence of the antique enveloped
educated men, with whom the mediaeval spirit had not reached distinctness
of thought and feeling. So the poetry resembled the contemporary sculpture
and painting, in which the antique was still unsuperseded by any new style.
Following the antique metres, using antique phrase and commonplace, often
copying antique sentiment, this poetry was as dull as might be expected
from men who were amused by calling each other Homer, Virgil, Horace, or
David. Usually the poets were ecclesiastics, and interested in theology;[282]
but many of the pieces are conventionally profane in topic, and as
humanistic as the Latin poetry of Petrarch.[283] Moreover, just as Petrarch’s
Latin poetry was still-born, while his Italian sonnets live, so the Carolingian
poetry, when it forgets itself and falls away from metre to accentual verse,
gains some degree of life. At this early period the Romance tongues were
not a fit poetic vehicle, and consequently living thoughts, which with Dante
and Petrarch found voice in Italian, in the ninth century began to stammer
in Latin verses that were freed from the dead rules of quantity, and were
already vibrant with a vital feeling for accent and rhyme.[284]
Through the tenth century metrical composition became rougher, yet
sometimes drew a certain force from its rudeness. A good example is the
famous Waltarius, or Waltharilied, of Ekkehart of St. Gall, composed in the
year 960 as a school exercise.[285] The theme was a German story found in
vernacular poetry. Ekkehart’s hexameters have a strong Teuton flavour, and
doubtless some of the vigour of his paraphrase was due to the German
original.
The metrical poems of the eleventh century have been spoken of already,
especially the more interesting ones written in Italy.[286] Most of the Latin
poetry emanating from that classic land was metrical, or so intended.
Frequently it tells the story of wars, or gives the Gesta of notable lives,
making a kind of versified biography. One feels as if verse was employed as
a refuge from the dead annalistic form. This poetry was a semi-barbarizing
of the antique, without new formal or substantial elements. Italy, one may
say, never became essentially and creatively mediaeval: the pressure of

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antique survival seems to have barred original development; Italians took
little part in the great mediaeval military religious movements, the
Crusades; no strikingly new architecture arose with them; their first
vernacular poetry was an imitation or a borrowing from Provence and
France; and by far the greater part of their Latin poetry presents an
uncreative barbarizing of the antique metres.
These remarks find illustration in the principal Latin poems composed in
Italy in the twelfth century. Among them one observes differences in skill,
knowledge, and tendency. Some of the writers made use of leonine
hexameters, others avoided the rhyme. But they were all akin in lack of
excellence and originality both in composition and verse-form. There was
the monk Donizo of Canossa, who wrote the Vita of the great Countess
Matilda;[287] there was William of Apulia, Norman in spirit if not in blood,
who wrote of the Norman conquests in Apulia and Sicily;[288] also the
anonymous and barbarous De bello et excidio urbis Comensis, in which is
told the destruction of Como by Milan between 1118 and 1127;[289] then the
metrically jingling Pisan chronicle narrating the conquest of the island of
Majorca, and beginning (like the Aeneid!) with

“Arma, rates, populum vindictam coelitus octam
Scribimus, ac duros terrae pelagique labores.”[290]

We also note Peter of Ebulo, with his narrative in laudation of the emperor
Henry VI., written about 1194; Henry of Septimella and his elegies upon
the checkered fortunes of divers great men;[291] and lastly the more famous
Godfrey of Viterbo, of probable German blood, and notary or scribe to three
successive emperors, with his cantafable Pantheon or Memoria saecularum.
[292] Godfrey’s poetry is rhymed after a manner of his own.

In the North, or more specifically speaking in the land of France north of
the Loire, the twelfth century brought better metrical poetry than in Italy.
Yet it had something of the deadness of imitation, since the vis vivida of
song had passed over into rhyming verse. Still from the academic point of
view, metre was the proper vehicle of poetry; as one sees, for instance, in
the Ars versificatoria of Matthew of Vendome,[293] written toward the close
of the twelfth century. “Versus est metrica descriptio,” says he, and then

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elaborates his, for the most part borrowed, definition: “Verse is metrical
description proceeding concisely and line by line through the comely
marriage of words to flowers of thought, and containing nothing trivial or
irrelevant.” A neat conception this of poetry; and the same writer denounces
leonine rhyming as unseemly, but praises the favourite metre of the Middle
Ages, the elegiac; for he regards the hexameter and pentameter as together
forming the perfect verse. It was in this metre that Hildebert wrote his
almost classic elegy over the ruins of Rome. A few lines have been quoted
from it;[294] but the whole poem, which is not long, is of interest as one of
the very best examples of a mediaeval Latin elegy:

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“Par tibi, Roma, nihil, cum sis prope tota ruina;
Quam magni fueris integra fracta doces.
Longa tuos fastus aetas destruxit, et arces
Caesaris et superum templa palude jacent.
Ille labor, labor ille ruit quem dirus Araxes
Et stantem tremuit et cecidisse dolet;
Quem gladii regum, quem provida cura senatus,
Quem superi rerum constituere caput;
Quem magis optavit cum crimine solus habere
Caesar, quam socius et pius esse socer,
Qui, crescens studiis tribus, hostes, crimen, amicos
Vi domuit, secuit legibus, emit ope;
In quem, dum fieret, vigilavit cura priorum:
Juvit opus pietas hospitis, unda, locus.
Materiem, fabros, expensas axis uterque
Misit, se muris obtulit ipse locus.
Expendere duces thesauros, fata favorem,
Artifices studium, totus et orbis opes.
Urbs cecidit de qua si quicquam dicere dignum
Moliar, hoc potero dicere: Roma fuit.
Non tamen annorum series, non flamma, nec ensis
Ad plenum potuit hoc abolere decus.
Cura hominum potuit tantam componere Romam
Quantam non potuit solvere cura deum.
Confer opes marmorque novum superumque favorem,
Artificum vigilent in nova facta manus,
Non tamen aut fieri par stanti machina muro,
Aut restaurari sola ruina potest.
Tantum restat adhuc, tantum ruit, ut neque pars stans
Aequari possit, diruta nec refici.
Hic superum formas superi mirantur et ipsi,
Et cupiunt fictis vultibus esse pares.
Non potuit natura deos hoc ore creare
Quo miranda deum signa creavit homo.
Vultus adest his numinibus, potiusque coluntur
Artificum studio quam deitate sua.
Urbs felix, si vel dominis urbs illa careret,

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, ,
Vel dominis esset turpe carere fide.”[295]
The elegiac metre was used by Abaelard in his didactic poem to his son
Astralabius,[296] and by John of Salisbury in his Entheticus. The hexameter
also was a favourite measure, used, for instance, by Alanus of Lille in the
Anticlaudianus, perhaps the noblest of mediaeval narrative or allegorical
poems in Latin.[297] Another excellent composition in hexameter was the
Alexandreis of Walter, born, like Alanus, apparently at Lille, but commonly
called of Chatillon. As poets and as classical scholars, these two men were
worthy contemporaries. Walter’s poem follows, or rather enlarges upon the
Life of Alexander by Quintus Curtius.[298] He is said to have written it on
the challenge of Matthew of Vendome, him of the Ars versificatoria. The
Ligurinus of a certain Cistercian Gunther is still another good example of a
long narrative poem in hexameters. It sets forth the career of Frederick
Barbarossa, and was written shortly after the opening of the thirteenth
century. Its author, like Walter and Alanus, shows himself widely read in the
Classics.[299]
The sapphic was a third not infrequently attempted metre, of which the De
planctu naturae of Alanus contains examples. This work was composed in
the form of the De consolatione philosophiae of Boëthius, where lyrics
alternate with prose. The general topic was Nature’s complaint over man’s
disobedience to her laws. The author apostrophizes her in the following
sapphics:

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“O Dei proles, genitrixque rerum,
Vinculum mundi, stabilisque nexus,
Gemma terrenis, speculum caducis,
Lucifer orbis.
Pax, amor, virtus, regimen, potestas,
Ordo, lex, finis, via, dux, origo,
Vita, lux, splendor, species, figura
Regula mundi.
Quae tuis mundum moderas habenis,
Cuncta concordi stabilita nodo
Nectis et pacis glutino maritas
Coelica terris.
Quae noys (νοῦς) plures recolens ideas
Singulas rerum species monetans,
Res togas formis, chlamidemque formae
Pollice formas.
Cui favet coelum, famulatur aer,
Quam colit Tellus, veneratur unda,
Cui velut mundi dominae tributum
Singula solvunt.
Quae diem nocti vicibus catenans
Cereum solis tribuis diei,
Lucido lunae speculo soporans
Nubila noctis.
Quae polum stellis variis inauras,
Aetheris nostri solium serenans
Siderum gemmis, varioque coelum
Milite complens.
Quae novis coeli faciem figuris
Protheans mutas aridumque vulgus
Aeris nostri regione donans,
Legeque stringis.
Cujus ad nutum juvenescit orbis,
Silva crispatur folii capillo,
Et tua florum tunicata veste,
Terra superbit.
Quae minas ponti sepelis, et auges,

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Q p p , g ,
Syncopans cursum pelagi furori
Ne soli tractum tumulare possit
Aequoris aestus.”[300]
Practically all of our examples have been taken from works composed in
the twelfth century, and in the land comprised under the name of France.
The pre-excellence of this period will likewise appear in accentual rhyming
Latin poetry, which was more spontaneous and living than its loftily
descended relative.

II
The academic vogue of metre in the early Middle Ages did not prevent the
growth of more natural poetry. The Irish had their Gaelic poems; people of
Teutonic speech had their rough verse based on alliteration and the count of
the strong syllables. The Romance tongues emerging from the common
Latin were as yet poetically untried. But in the proper Latin, which had
become as unquantitative and accentual as any of its vulgar forms, there
was a tonic poetry that was no longer unequipped with rhyme.
Three rhythmic elements made up this natural mode of Latin versification:
the succession of accented and unaccented syllables; the number of
syllables in a line; and that regularly recurring sameness of sound which is
called rhyme. The source of the first of these seems obvious. Accent having
driven quantity from speech, came to supersede it in verse, with the
accented syllable taking the place of the long syllable and the unaccented
the place of the short. In the Carolingian period accentual verse followed
the old metrical forms, with this exception: the metrical principle that one
long is equivalent to two shorts was not adopted. Consequently the number
of syllables in the successive lines of an accentual strophe would remain the
same, where in the metrical antecedent they might have varied. This is also
sufficient to account for the second element, the observance of regularity in
the number of syllables. For this regularity seems to follow upon the
acceptance of the principle that in rhythmic verse an accented syllable is not
equal to two unaccented ones. The query might perhaps be made why this
Latin accentual verse did not take up the principle of regularity in the
number of strong syllables in a line, like Old High German poetry for

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example, where the number of unaccented syllables, within reasonable
limits, is indifferent. A ready answer is that these Latin verses were made by
people of Latin speech who had been acquainted with metrical forms of
poetry, in which the number of syllables might vary, but was never
indifferent; for the metrical rule was rigid that one long was equivalent to
two short; and to no more and no less. Hence the short syllables were as
fixed in number as the long.[301]
The origin of the third element, rhyme, is in dispute. In some instances it
may have passed into Greek and Latin verses from Syrian hymns.[302] But
on the other hand it had long been an occasional element in Greek and Latin
rhetorical prose. Probably rhyme in Latin accentual verse had no specific
origin. It gradually became the sharpening, defining element of such verse.
Accentual Latin lent itself so naturally to rhyme, that had not rhyme
become a fixed part of this verse, there indeed would have been a fact to
explain.
These, then, were the elements: accent, number of syllables, and rhyme.
Most interesting is the development of verse-forms. Rhythmic Latin poetry
came through the substitution of accent for quantity, and probably had
many prototypes in the old jingles of Roman soldiers and provincials,
which so far as known were accentual, rather than metrical. Christian
accentual poetry retained those simple forms of iambic and trochaic verse
which most readily submitted to the change from metre to accent, or
perhaps one should say, had for centuries offered themselves as natural
forms of accentual verse. Apparently the change from metre to accent
within the old forms gradually took place between the sixth and the tenth
centuries. During this period there was slight advance in the evolution of
new verses; nor was the period creative in other respects, as we have seen.
But thereafter, as the mediaeval centuries advanced from the basis of a
mastered patristic and antique heritage, and began to create, there followed
an admirable evolution of verse-forms: in some instances apparently issuing
from the old metrico-accentual forms, and in others developing
independently by virtue of the faculty of song meeting the need of singing.
This factor wrought with power—the human need and cognate faculty of
song, a need and faculty stimulated in the Middle Ages by religious
sentiment and emotion. In the fusing of melody and words into an utterance

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of song—at last into a strophe—music worked potently, shaping the
composition of the lines, moulding them to rhythm, insisting upon
sonorousness in the words, promoting their assonance and at last
compelling them to rhyme so as to meet the stress, or mark the ending, of
the musical periods. Thus the exigencies of melody helped to evoke the
finished verse, while the words reciprocating through their vocal
capabilities and through the inspiration of their meaning, aided the
evolution of the melodies. In fine, words and melody, each quickened by
the other, and each moulding the other to itself, attained a perfected strophic
unison; and mediaeval musician-poets achieved at last the finished verses of
hymns or Sequences and student-songs.
There were two distinct lines of evolution of accentual Latin verse in the
Middle Ages; and although the faculty of song was a moving energy in
both, it worked in one of them more visibly than in the other. Along the one
line accentual verse developed pursuant to the ancient forms, displacing
quantity with accent, and evolving rhyme. The other line of evolution had
no connection with the antique. It began with phrases of sonorous prose,
replacing inarticulate chant. These, under the influence of music, through
the creative power of song, were by degrees transformed to verse. The
evolution of the Sequence-hymn will be the chief illustration. With the
finished accentual Latin poetry of the twelfth century it may become
impossible to tell which line of rhythmic evolution holds the antecedent of a
given poem. In truth, this final and perfected verse may often have a double
ancestry, descending from the rhythms which had superseded metre, and
being also the child of mediaeval melody. Yet there is no difficulty in
tracing by examples the two lines of evolution.
To illustrate the strain of verse which took its origin in the displacement of
metre by accent and rhyme, we must look back as far as Fortunatus. He was
born about the year 530 in northern Italy, but he passed his eventful life
among Franks and Thuringians. A scholar and also a poet, he had a fair
mastery of metre; yet some of his poems evince the spirit of the coming
mediaeval time both in sentiment and form. He wrote two famous hymns,
one of them in the popular trochaic tetrameter, the other in the equally
simple iambic dimeter. The first, a hymn to the Cross, begins with the
never-to-be-forgotten

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“Pange, lingua, gloriosi proelium certaminis”;

and has such lines as

“Crux fidelis, inter omnes arbor una nobilis
· · · · · · · ·
Dulce lignum, dulce clavo dulce pondus sustinens!”

In these the mediaeval feeling for the Cross shows itself, and while the
metre is correct, it is so facile that one may read or sing the lines
accentually. In the other hymn, also to the Cross, assonance and rhyme
foretell the coming transformation of metre to accentual verse. Here are the
first two stanzas:

“Vexilla regis prodeunt,
Fulget crucis mysterium,
Quo carne carnis conditor
Suspensus est patibulo.

Confixa clavis viscera
Tendens manus, vestigia
Redemtionis gratia
Hic immolata est hostia.”

Passing to the Carolingian epoch, some lines from a poem celebrating the
victory of Charlemagne’s son Pippin over the Avars in 796, will illustrate
the popular trochaic tetrameter which had become accentual, and already
tended to rhyme:

“Multa mala iam fecerunt ab antico tempore,
Fana dei destruxerunt atque monasteria,
Vasa aurea sacrata, argentea, fictilia.”[303]

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Next we turn to a piece by the persecuted and interesting Gottschalk,
written in the latter part of the ninth century. A young lad has asked for a
poem. But how can he sing, the exiled and imprisoned monk who might
rather weep as the Jews by the waters of Babylon?[304] yet he will sing a
hymn to the Trinity, and bewail his piteous lot before the highest pitying
Godhead. The verses have a lyric unity of mood, and are touching with their
sad refrain. Their rhyme, if not quite pure, is abundant and catching, and
their nearest metrical affinity would be a trochaic dimeter.

Page 184

“1. Ut quid iubes, pusiole,
quare mandas, filiole,
carmen dulce me cantare,
cum sim longe exul valde
intra mare?
o cur iubes canere?

2. Magis mihi, miserule,
fiere libet, puerule,
plus plorare quam cantare
carmen tale, iubes quale,
amor care,
o cur iubes canere?

3. Mallem scias, pusillule,
ut velles tu, fratercule,
pio corde condolere
mihi atque prona mente
conlugere.
o cur iubes canere?

4. Scis, divine tyruncule,
scis, superne clientule,
hic diu me exulare,
multa die sive nocte
tolerare.
o cur iubes canere?

5. Scis captive plebicule
Israheli cognomine
praeceptum in Babilone
decantare extra longe
fines Iude.
o cur iubes canere?

6. Non potuerunt utique,
nec debuerunt itaque

Page 185

q
carmen dulce coram gente
aliene nostri terre
resonare.
o cur iubes canere?

7. Sed quia vis omnimode,
consodalis egregie,
canam patri filioque
simul atque procedente
ex utroque.
hoc cano ultronee.

8. Benedictus es, domine,
pater, nate, paraclite,
deus trine, deus une,
deus summe, deus pie,
deus iuste.
hoc cano spontanee.

9. Exul ego diuscule
hoc in mare sum, domine:
annos nempe duos fere
nosti fore, sed iam iamque
miserere.
hoc rogo humillime.

10. Interim cum pusione
psallam ore, psallam mente,
psallam voce (psallam corde),
psallam die, psallam nocte
carmen dulce
tibi, rex piissime.”[305]
Gottschalk (and for this it is hard to love him) was one of the initiators of
the leonine hexameter, in which a syllable in the middle of the line rhymes
with the last syllable.

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“Septeno Augustas decimo praeeunte Kalendas”

is the opening hexameter in his Epistle to his friend Ratramnus.[306] To what
horrid jingle such verses could attain may be seen from some leonine
hexameter-pentameters of two or three hundred years later, on the Fall of
Troy, beginning:

Page 187

“Viribus, arte, minis, Danaum clara Troja ruinis,
Annis bis quinis fit rogus atque cinis.”[307]

Hector and Troy, and the dire wiles of the Greeks never left the mediaeval
imagination. A poem of the early tenth century, which bade the watchers on
Modena’s walls be vigilant, draws its inspiration from that unfading
memory, and for us illustrates what iambics might become when accent had
replaced quantity. The lines throughout end in a final rhyming a.

“O tu, qui servas armis ista moenia,
Noli dormire, moneo, sed vigila.
Dum Hector vigil extitit in Troia,
Non eam cepit fraudulenta Graecia.”[308]

And from a scarcely later time, for it also is of the tenth century, rise those
verses to Roma, that old “Roma aurea et eterna,” and forever “caput
mundi,” sung by pilgrim bands as their eyes caught the first gleam of tower,
church, and ruin:

“O Roma nobilis, orbis et domina,
Cunctarum urbium excellentissima,
Roseo martyrum sanguine rubea,
Albis et virginum liliis candida:
Salutem dicimus tibi per omnia,
Te benedicimus: salve per secula.”[309]

This verse, which still lifts the heart of whosoever hears or reads it, may
close our examples of mediaeval verses descended from metrical forms. It
will be noticed that all of them are from the early mediaeval centuries; a
circumstance which may be taken as a suggestion of the fact that by far the
greater part of the earlier accentual Latin poetry was composed in forms in
which accent simply had displaced the antique quantity.

III

Page 188

We turn to that other genesis of mediaeval Latin verse, arising not out of
antique forms, but rather from the mediaeval need and faculty of song. In
the chief instance selected for illustration, this line of evolution took its
inception in the exigencies and inspiration of the Alleluia chant or
jubilation. During the celebration of the Mass, as the Gradual ended in its
last Alleluia, the choir continued chanting the final syllable of that word in
cadences of musical exultings. The melody or cadence to which this final a
of the Alleluia was chanted, was called the sequentia. The words which
came to be substituted for its cadenced reiteration were called the prosa. By
the twelfth century the two terms seem to have been used interchangeably.
Thus arose the prose Sequence, so plastic in its capability of being moulded
by melody to verse. Its songful qualities lay in the sonorousness of the
words and in their syllabic correspondence with the notes of the melody to
which they were sung.[310]
In the year 860, Norsemen sacked the cloister of Jumièges in Normandy,
and a fleeing brother carried his precious Antiphonary far away to the safe
retreat of St. Gall. There a young monk named Notker, poring over its
contents, perceived that words had been written in the place of the
repetitions of the final a of the Alleluia. Taking the cue, he set to work to
compose more fitting words to correspond with the notes to which this final
a was sung. So these lines of euphonious and fitting words appear to have
had their beginning in Notker’s scanning of that fugitive Antiphonary, and
his devising labour. Their primary purpose was a musical one; for they were
a device—mnemotechnic, if one will—to facilitate the chanting of cadences
previously vocalized with difficulty through the singing of one simple
vowel sound. Notker showed his work to his master, Iso, who rejoiced at
what his gifted pupil had accomplished, and spurred him on by pointing out
that in his composition one syllable was still sometimes repeated or drawn
out through several successive notes. One syllable to each note was the
principle which Notker now set himself to realize; and he succeeded.
He composed some fifty Sequences. In his work, as well as in that of others
after him, the device of words began to modify and develop the melodies
themselves. Sometimes Notker adapted his verbal compositions to those
cadences or melodies to which the Alleluia had long been sung; sometimes
he composed both melody and words; or, again, he took a current melody,
sacred or secular, to which the Alleluia never had been sung, and composed

Page 189

words for it, to be chanted as a Sequence. In these borrowed melodies, as
well as in those composed by Notker, the musical periods were more
developed than in the Alleluia cadences. Thus the musical growth of the
Sequences was promoted by the use of sonorous words, while the improved
melodies in turn drew the words on to a more perfect rhythmic ordering.
Notker died in 912. His Sequences were prose, yet with a certain
parallelism in their construction; and, even with Notker in his later years,
the words began to take on assonances, chiefly in the vowel sound of a.
Thereafter the melodies, seizing upon the words, as it were, by the principle
of their syllabic correspondence to the notation, moulded them to rhythm of
movement and regularity of line; while conversely with the better ordering
of the words for singing, the melodies in turn made gain and progress, and
then again reacted on the words, until after two centuries there emerged the
finished verses of an Adam of St. Victor.
Thus these Sequences have become verse before our eyes, and we realize
that it is the very central current of the evolution of mediaeval Latin poetry
that we have been following. How free and how spontaneous was this
evolution of the Sequence. It was the child of the Christian Middle Ages,
seeing the light in the closing years of the ninth century, but requiring a
long period of growth before it reached the glory of its climacteric. It was
born of musical chanting, and it grew as song, never unsung or conceived of
as severable from its melody. Only as it attained its perfected strophic
forms, it necessarily made use of trochaic and other rhythms which long
before had changed from quantity to accent and so had passed on into the
verse-making habitudes of the Middle Ages.[311] If there be any Latin
composition in virtue of origin and growth absolutely un-antique, it is the
mediaeval Sequence, which in its final forms is so glorious a representative
of the mediaeval Hymn. And we shall also see that much popular Latin
poetry, “Carmina Burana” and student-songs, were composed in verses and
often sung to tunes taken—or parodied—from the Sequence-hymns of the
Liturgy.
There were many ways of chanting Sequences. The musical phrases of the
melodies usually were repeated once, except at the beginning and the close;
and the Sequence would be rendered by a double choir singing
antiphonally. Ordinarily the words responded to the repetition of the

Page 190

musical phrases with a parallelism of their own. The lines (after the first)
varied in length by pairs, the second and third lines having the same number
of syllables, the fourth and fifth likewise equal to each other, but differing
in length from the second and third; and so on through the Sequence, until
the last line, which commonly stood alone and differed in length from the
preceding pairs. The Sequence called “Nostra tuba” is a good example.
Probably it was composed by Notker, and in his later years; for it is filled
with assonances, and exhibits a regular parallelism of structure.

“Nostra tuba
Regatur fortissime Dei dextra et preces audiat
Aura placatissima et serena; ita enim nostra
Laus erit accepta, voce si quod canimus, canat pariter et pura conscientia.
Et, ut haec possimus, omnes divina nobis semper flagitemus adesse auxilia.
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
O bone Rex, pie, juste, misericors, qui es via et janua,
Portas regni, quaesumus, nobis reseres, dimittasque facinora
Ut laudemus nomen nunc tuum atque per cuncta saecula.”[312]

Here, after the opening, the first pair has seventeen syllables, and the next
pair twenty-six. The last pair quoted has twenty; and the final line of
seventeen syllables has no fellow. A further rhythmical advance seems
reached by the following Sequence from the abbey of St. Martial at
Limoges. It may have been written in the eleventh century. It is given here
with the first and second line of the couplets opposite to each other, as
strophe and antistrophe; and the lines themselves are divided to show the
assonances (or rhymes) which appear to have corresponded with pauses in
the melody:

“(1) Canat omnis turba
(2a) Fonte renata (2b) Laude jucunda
Spiritusque gratia et mente perspicua
(3a) Jam restituta (3b) Sicque jactura
pars est decima coelestis illa
fuerat quae culpa completur in laude
perdita. divina.

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(4a) Ecce praeclara (4b) Enitet ampla
dies dominica per orbis spatia,
(5a) Exsultat in qua (5b) Quia destructa
plebs omnis redempta, mors est perpetua.”[313]

A Sequence of the eleventh century will afford a final illustration of
approach to a regular strophic structure, and of the use of the final one-
syllable rhyme in a, throughout the Sequence:

1
“Alleluia,
Turma, proclama leta;
Laude canora,
Facta prome divina,
Jam instituta
Superna disciplina,

2
Christi sacra
Per magnalia
Es quia de morte liberata
Ut destructa
Inferni claustra
Januaque celi patefacta!

3
Jam nunc omnia
Celestia
Terrestria
Virtute gubernat eterna.
In quibus sua
Judicia
Semper equa
Dat auctoritate paterna.”
· · · · [314]

Page 192

As the eleventh century closed and the great twelfth century dawned, the
forces of mediaeval growth quickened to a mightier vitality, and
distinctively mediaeval creations appeared. Our eyes, of course, are fixed
upon the northern lands, where the Sequence grew from prose to verse, and
where derivative or analogous forms of popular poetry developed also. Up
to this time, throughout mediaeval life and thought, progress had been
somewhat uncrowned with palpable achievement. Yet the first brilliant
creations of a master-workman are the fruit of his apprentice years, during
which his progress has been as real as when his works begin to make it
visible. So it was no sudden birth of power, but rather faculties ripening
through apprentice centuries, which illumine the period opening about the
year 1100. This period would carry no human teaching if its
accomplishment in institutions, in philosophy, in art and poetry, had been a
heaven-blown accident, and not the fruit of antecedent discipline.
The poetic advance represented by the Sequences of Adam of St. Victor
may rouse our admiration for the poet’s genius, but should not blind our
eyes to the continuity of development leading to it. Adam is the final artist
and his work a veritable creation; yet his antecedents made part of his
creative faculty. The elements of his verses and the general idea and form of
the sequence were given him;—all honour to the man’s holy genius which
made these into poems. The elements referred to consisted in accentual
measures and in the two-syllabled Latin rhyme which appears to have been
finally achieved by the close of the eleventh century.[315] In using them
Adam was no borrower, but an artist who perforce worked in the medium of
his art. Trochaic and iambic rhythms then constituted the chief measures for
accentual verse, as they had for centuries, and do still. For, although
accentual rhythms admit dactyls and anapaests, these have not proved
generally serviceable. Likewise the inevitable progress of Latin verse had
developed assonances into rhymes; and indeed into rhymes of two syllables,
for Latin words lend themselves as readily to rhymes of two syllables as
English words to rhymes of one.
There existed also the idea and form of the Sequence, consisting of pairs of
lines which had reached assonance and some degree of rhythm, and varied
in length, pair by pair, following the music of the melodies to which they
were sung. For the Sequence-melody did not keep to the same recurring
tune throughout, but varied from couplet to couplet. In consequence, a

Page 193

Sequence by Adam of St. Victor may contain a variety of verse-forms.
Moreover, a number of the Sequences of which he may have been the
author show survivals of the old rhythmical irregularities, and of assonance
as yet unsuperseded by pure rhyme.
Before giving examples of Adam’s poems, a tribute should be paid to his
great forerunner in the art of Latin verse. Adam doubtless was familiar with
the hymns[316] of the most brilliant intellectual luminary of the departing
generation, one Peter Abaelard, whom he may have seen in the flesh. Those
once famous love-songs, written for Heloïse, perished (so far as we know)
with the love they sang. Another fate—and perhaps Abaelard wished it so—
was in store for the many hymns which he wrote for his sisters in Christ, the
abbess and her nuns. They still exist,[317] and display a richness of verse-
forms scarcely equalled even by the Sequences of Adam. In the
development of Latin verse, Abaelard is Adam’s immediate predecessor; his
verses being, as it were, just one stage inferior to Adam’s in sonorousness of
line, in certainty of rhythm, and in purity of rhyme.
The “prose” Sequences were not the direct antecedents of Abaelard’s
hymns. Yet both sprang from the freely devising spirit of melody and song;
and therefore those hymns are of this free-born lineage more truly than they
are descendants of antique forms. To be sure, every possible accentual
rhythm, built as it must be of trochees, iambics, anapaests, or dactyls, has
unavoidably some antique quantitative antecedent; because the antique
measures exhausted the possibilities of syllabic combination. Yet
antecedence is not source, and most of Abaelard’s verses by their form and
spirit proclaim their genesis in the creative exigencies of song as loudly as
they disavow any antique parentage.
For example, there may be some far echo of metrical asclepiads in the
following accentual and rhyme-harnessed twelve-syllable verse:

“Advenit veritas, umbra praeteriit,
Post noctem claritas diei subiit,
Ad ortum rutilant superni luminis
Legis mysteria plena caliginis.”

But the echo if audible is faint, and surely no antique whisper is heard in

Page 194

“Est in Rama
Vox audita
Rachel flentis
Super natos
Interfectos
Ejulantis.”

Nor in

“Golias prostratus est,
Resurrexit Dominus,
Ense jugulatus est
Hostis proprio;
Cum suis submersus est
Ille Pharao.”

The variety of Abaelard’s verse seems endless. One or two further examples
may or may not suggest any antecedents in those older forms of accentual
verse which followed the former metres:

“Ornarunt terram germina,
Nunc caelum luminaria.
Sole, luna, stellis depingitur,
Quorum multus usus cognoscitur.”

In this verse the first two lines are accentual iambic dimeters; while the last
two begin each with two trochees, and close apparently with two dactyls.
The last form of line is kept throughout in the following:

“Gaude virgo virginum gloria,
Matrum decus et mater, jubila,
Quae commune sanctorum omnium
Meruisti conferre gaudium.”

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Next come some simple five-syllable lines, with a catching rhyme:

“Lignum amaras
Indulcat aquas
Eis immissum.
Omnes agones
Sunt sanctis dulces
Per crucifixum.”

In the following lines of ten syllables a dactyl appears to follow a trochee
twice in each line:

“Tuba Domini, Paule, maxima,
De caelestibus dans tonitrua,
Hostes dissipans, cives aggrega.

Doctor gentium es praecipuus,
Vas in poculum factus omnibus,
Sapientiae plenum haustibus.”

These examples of Abaelard’s rhythms may close with the following
curiously complicated verse:

“Tu quae carnem edomet
Abstinentiam,
Tu quae carnem decoret
Continentiam,
Tu velle quod bonum est his ingeris
Ac ipsum perficere tu tribuis.
Instrumenta
Sunt his tua
Per quos mira peragis,
Et humana
Moves corda
Signis et prodigiis.”

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In general, one observes in these verses that Abaelard does not use a pure
two-syllable rhyme. The rhyme is always pure in the last syllable, and in the
penult may either exist as a pure rhyme or simply as an assonance, or not at
all.[318]
Probably Abaelard wrote his hymns in 1130, perhaps the very year when
Adam as a youth entered the convent of St. Victor, lying across the Seine
from Paris. The latter appears to have lived until 1192. Many Sequences
have been improperly ascribed to him, and among the doubtful ones are a
number having affinities with the older types. These may be anterior to
Adam; for the greater part of his unquestionable Sequences are perfected
throughout in their versification. Yet, on the other hand, one would expect
some progression in works composed in the course of a long life devoted to
such composition—a life covering a period when progressive changes were
taking place in the world of thought beyond St. Victor’s walls. We take
three examples of these Sequences. The first contains occasional assonance
in place of rhyme, and uses many rhymes of one syllable. It appears to be
an older composition improperly ascribed to Adam. The second is
unquestionably his, in his most perfect form; the third may or may not be
Adam’s; but is given for its own sake as a lovely lyric.[319]
The first example, probably written not much later than the year 1100, was
designed for the Mass at the dedication of a church. The variety in the
succession of couplets and strophes indicates a corresponding variation in
the melody.

Page 197

1
“Clara chorus dulce pangat voce nunc alleluia,
Ad aeterni regis laudem qui gubernat omnia!

2
Cui nos universalis sociat Ecclesia,
Scala nitens et pertingens ad poli fastigia;

3
Ad honorem cujus laeta psallamus melodia,
Persolventes hodiernas laudes illi debitas.

4
O felix aula, quam vicissim
Confrequentant agmina coelica,
Divinis verbis alternatim
Jungentia mellea cantica!

5
Domus haec, de qua vetusta sonuit historia
Et moderna protestatur Christum fari pagina:
‘Quoniam elegi eam thronum sine macula,
‘Requies haec erit mea per aeterna saecula.

6
Turris supra montem sita,
Indissolubili bitumine fundata
Vallo perenni munita,
Atque aurea columna
Miris ac variis lapidibus distincta,
Stylo subtili polita!

7
Ave, mater praeelecta,
Ad quam Christus fatur ita
Prophetae facundia:
‘Sponsa mea speciosa,

Page 198

p p ,
‘Inter filias formosa,
‘Supra solem splendida!

8
‘Caput tuum ut Carmelus
‘Et ipsius comae tinctae regis uti purpura;
‘Oculi ut columbarum,
‘Genae tuae punicorum ceu malorum fragmina!

9
‘Mel et lac sub lingua tua, favus stillans labia;
‘Collum tuum ut columna, turris et eburnea!’

10
Ergo nobis Sponsae tuae
Famulantibus, o Christe, pietate solita
Clemens adesse dignare
Et in tuo salutari nos ubique visita.

11
Ipsaque mediatrice, summe rex, perpetue,
Voce pura
Flagitamus, da gaudere Paradisi gloria.
Alleluia!”[320]
The second example is Adam’s famous Sequence for St. Stephen’s Day,
which falls on the day after Christmas. It is throughout sustained and
perfect in versification, and in substance a splendid hymn of praise.

Page 199

Page 200

1
“Heri mundus exultavit
Et exultans celebravit
Christi natalitia;
Heri chorus angelorum
Prosecutus est coelorum
Regem cum laetitia.

2
Protomartyr et levita,
Clarus fide, clarus vita,
Clarus et miraculis,
Sub hac luce triumphavit
Et triumphans insultavit
Stephanus incredulis.

3
Fremunt ergo tanquam ferae
Quia victi defecere
Lucis adversarii:
Falsos testes statuunt,
Et linguas exacuunt
Viperarum filii.

4
Agonista, nulli cede,
Certa certus de mercede,
Persevera, Stephane;
Insta falsis testibus,
Confuta sermonibus
Synagogam Satanae.

5
Testis tuus est in coelis,
Testis verax et fidelis,
Testis innocentiae.
Nomen habes coronati:

Page 201

Te tormenta decet pati
Pro corona gloriae.

6
Pro corona non marcenti
Perfer brevis vim tormenti;
Te manet victoria.
Tibi fiet mors natalis,
Tibi poena terminalis
Dat vitae primordia.

7
Plenus Sancto Spiritu,
Penetrat intuitu
Stephanus coelestia.
Videns Dei gloriam,
Crescit ad victoriam,
Suspirat ad praemia.

8
En a dextris Dei stantem,
Jesum pro te dimicantem,
Stephane, considera:
Tibi coelos reserari,
Tibi Christum revelari,
Clama voce libera.

9
Se commendat Salvatori,
Pro quo dulce ducit mori
Sub ipsis lapidibus.
Saulus servat omnium
Vestes lapidantium,
Lapidans in omnibus.

10
Ne peccatum statuatur
His a quibus lapidatur

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His a quibus lapidatur,
Genu ponit, et precatur,
Condolens insaniae.
In Christo sic obdormivit,
Qui Christo sic obedivit,
Et cum Christo semper vivit,
Martyrum primitiae.”
· · · · [321]
The last example, in honour of St. Nicholas’s Day, is a lovely poem by
whomsoever written. Its verses are extremely diversified. It begins with
somewhat formal chanting of the saint’s virtues, in dignified couplets.
Suddenly it changes to a joyful lyric, and sings of a certain sweet sea-
miracle wrought by Nicholas. Then it spiritualizes the conception of his
saintly aid to meet the call of the sin-tossed soul. It closes in stately manner
in harmony with its liturgical function.

Page 203

1
“Congaudentes exultemus vocali concordia
Ad beati Nicolai festiva solemnia!

2
Qui in cunis adhuc jacens servando jejunia
A papilla coepit summa promereri gaudia.

3
Adolescens amplexatur litterarum studia,
Alienus et immunis ab omni lascivia.

4
Felix confessor, cujus fuit dignitatis vox de coelo nuntia!
Per quam provectus, praesulatus sublimatur ad summa fastigia.

5
Erat in ejus animo pietas eximia,
Et oppressis impendebat multa beneficia.

6
Auro per eum virginum tollitur infamia,
Atque patris earumdem levatur inopia.

7
Quidam nautae navigantes,
Et contra fluctuum saevitiam luctantes,
Navi pene dissoluta,
Jam de vita desperantes,
In tanto positi periculo, clamantes
Voce dicunt omnes una:

8
‘O beate Nicolae,
Nos ad maris portum trahe
De mortis angustia.
Trahe nos ad portum maris,

Page 204

p ,
Tu qui tot auxiliaris,
Pietatis gratia.’

9
Dum clamarent, nec incassum,
‘Ecce’ quidam dicens, ‘assum
Ad vestra praesidia.’
Statim aura datur grata
Et tempestas fit sedata:
Quieverunt maria.

10
Nos, qui sumus in hoc mundo,
Vitiorum in profundo
Jam passi naufragia,
Gloriose Nicolae
Ad salutis portum trahe,
Ubi pax et gloria.

11
Illam nobis unctionem
Impetres ad Dominum,
Prece pia,
Qua sanavit laesionem
Multorum peccaminum
In Maria.

12
Hujus festum celebrantes gaudeant per saecula,
Et coronet eos Christus post vitae curricula!”[322]
The foregoing examples of religious poetry may be supplemented by
illustrations of the parallel evolution of more profane if not more popular
verse. Any priority in time, as between the two, should lie with the former;
though it may be the truer view to find a general synchronism in the secular
and religious phases of lyric growth. But priority of originality and
creativeness certainly belongs to that line of lyric evolution which sprang

Page 205

from religious sentiments and emotions. For the vagrant clerkly poet of the
Court, the roadside, and the inn, used the forms of verse fashioned by the
religious muse in the cloister and the school. Thus the development of
secular Latin verse presents a derivative parallel to the essentially primary
evolution of the Sequence or the hymn.
It was in Germany that the composition of Sequences was most zealously
cultivated during the century following Notker’s death; and it was in
Germany that the Sequence, in its earlier forms, exerted most palpable
influence upon popular songs.[323] In these so-called Modi (Modus ==
song), as in the Sequence, rhythmical compositions may be seen
progressing in the direction of regular rhythm, rhyme, and strophic form. As
in the Sequences, the tune moulded the words, which in turn influenced the

Page 206

melody. The following is from the Modus Ottinc, a popular song composed
about the year 1000 in honour of a victory of Otto III. over the Hungarians:

“His incensi bella fremunt, arma poscunt, hostes vocant, signa secuntur,
tubis canunt.
Clamor passim oritur et milibus centum Theutones inmiscentur.

Pauci cedunt, plures cadunt, Francus instat, Parthus fugit; vulgus exangue
undis obstat;
Licus rubens sanguine Danubio cladem Parthicam ostendebat.”

Another example is the Modus florum of approximately the same period, a
song about a king who promised his daughter to whoever could tell such a
lie as to force the king to call him a liar. It opens as follows:

“Mendosam quam cantilenam ago,
puerulis commendatam dabo,
quo modulos per mendaces risum
auditoribus ingentem ferant.

Liberalis et decora
cuidam regi erat nata
quam sub lege hujusmodi
procis opponit quaerendam.”
· · · · [324]

Here the rhyme still is rude and the rhythm irregular. The following dirge,
written thirty or forty years later on the death of the German emperor,
Henry II., shows improvement:

“Lamentemur nostra, Socii, peccata,
amentemur et ploremus! Quare tacemus?
Pro iniquitate corruimus late;
scimus coeli hinc offensum regem immensum.
Heinrico requiem, rex Christe, dona perennem.”[325]

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We may pass on into the twelfth century, still following the traces of that
development of popular verse which paralleled the evolution of the
Sequence. We first note some catchy rhymes of a German student setting
out for Paris in quest of learning and intellectual novelty:

“Hospita in Gallia nunc me vocant studia.
Vadam ergo; flens a tergo socios relinquo.
Plangite discipuli, lugubris discidii tempore propinquo.
Vale, dulcis patria, suavis Suevorum Suevia!
Salve dilecta Francia, philosophorum curia!
Suscipe discipulum in te peregrinum,
Quem post dierum circulum remittes Socratinum.”[326]

This Suabian, singing his uncouth Latin rhymes, and footing his way to
Paris, suggests the common, delocalized influences which were developing
a mass of student-songs, “Carmina Burana,” or “Goliardic” poetry. The
authors belonged to that large and broad class of clerks made up of any and
all persons who knew Latin. The songs circulated through western Europe,
and their home was everywhere, if not their origin. Some of them betray, as
more of them do not, the author’s land and race. Frequently of diabolic
cleverness, gibing, amorous, convivial, they show the virtuosity in rhyme of
their many makers. Like the hymns and later Sequences, they employed of
necessity those accentual measures which once had their quantitative
prototypes in antique metres. But, again like the hymns and Sequences, they
neither imitate nor borrow, but make use of trochaic, iambic, or other
rhythms as the natural and unavoidable material of verse. Their strophes are
new strophes, and not imitations of anything in quantitative poetry. So these
songs were free-born, and their development was as independent of antique
influence as the melodies which ever moulded them to more perfect music.
Many and divers were their measures. But as that great strophe of Adam’s
Heri mundus exultavit (the strophe of the Stabat Mater) was of mightiest
dominance among the hymns, so for these student-songs there was also one
measure that was chief. This was the thirteen-syllable trochaic line, with its
lilting change of stress after the seventh syllable, and its pure two-syllable
rhyme. It is the line of the Confessio poetae, or Confessio Goliae, where
nests that one mediaeval Latin verse which everybody still knows by heart:

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“Meum est propositum in taberna mori,
Vinum sit appositum morientis ori,
Tunc cantabunt laetius angelorum chori,
‘Sit Deus propitius huic potatori.’”

It is also the line of the quite charming Phyllis and Flora of the Carmina
Burana:

“Erant ambae virgines et ambae reginae,
Phyllis coma libera, Flora compto crine:
Non sunt formae virginum, sed formae divinae,
Et respondent facie luci matutinae.”[327]

Another common measure is the twelve-syllable dactylic line of the famous
Apocalypsis Goliae Episcopi:

“Ipsam Pythagorae formam aspicio,
Inscriptam artium schemate vario.
An extra corpus sit haec revelatio,
Utrum in corpore, Deus scit, nescio.
In fronte micuit ars astrologica;
Dentium seriem regit grammatica;
In lingua pulcrius vernat rhetorica,
Concussis aestuat in labiis logica.”

An example of the not infrequent eight-syllable line is afforded by that
tremendous satire against papal Rome, beginning:

“Propter Sion non tacebo,
Sed ruinam Romae flebo,
Quousque justitia
Rursus nobis oriatur,
Et ut lampas accendatur
Justus in ecclesia.”

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Here the last line of the verse has but seven syllables, as is the case in the
following verse of four lines:

“Vinum bonum et suave,
Bonis bonum, pravis prave,
Cunctis dulcis sapor, ave,
Mundana laetitia!”

But the eight-syllable lines may be kept throughout, as in the following
lament over life’s lovely, pernicious charm, so touching in its expression of
the mortal heartbreak of mediaeval monasticism:

“Heu! Heu! mundi vita,
Quare me delectas ita?
Cum non possis mecum stare,
Quid me cogis te amare?
· · · · ·
Vita mundi, res morbosa,
Magis fragilis quam rosa,
Cum sis tota lacrymosa,
Cur es mihi graciosa?”[328]

IV
Our consideration of the different styles of mediaeval Latin prose and the
many novel forms of mediaeval Latin verse has shown how radical was the
departure of the one and the other from Cicero and Virgil. Through such
changes Latin continued to prove itself a living language. Yet its vitality
was doomed to wane before the rivalry of the vernacular tongues. The
vivida vis, the capability of growth, had well-nigh passed from Latin when
Petrarch was born. In endeavouring to maintain its supremacy as a literary
vehicle he was to hold a losing brief, nor did he strengthen his cause by
attempting to resuscitate a classic style of prose and metre. The victory of
the vernacular was announced in Dante’s De vulgari eloquentia and
demonstrated beyond dispute in his Divina Commedia.

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A long and for the most part peaceful and unconscious conflict had led up
to the victory of what might have been deemed the baser side. For Latin
was the sole mediaeval literature that was born in the purple, with its stately
lineage of the patristic and the classical back of it. Latin was the language
of the Roman world and the vehicle of Latin Christianity. It was the
language of the Church and its clergy, and the language of all educated
people. Naturally the entire contents of existing and progressive Christian
and antique culture were contained in the mediaeval Latin literature, the
literature of religion and of law and government, of education and of all
serious knowledge. It was to be the primary literature of mediaeval thought;
from which passed over the chief part of whatever thought and knowledge
the vernacular literatures were to receive. For scholars who follow, as we
have tried to, the intellectual and the deeper emotional life of the Middle
Ages, the Latin literature yields the incomparably greater part of the
material of our study. It has been our home country, from which we have
made casual excursions into the vernacular literatures.
These existed, however, from the earliest mediaeval periods, beginning, if
one may say so, in oral rather than written documents. We read that
Charlemagne caused a book to be made of Germanic poems, which till then
presumably had been carried in men’s memories. The Hildebrandslied is
supposed to have been one of them.[329] In the Norse lands, the Eddas and
the matter of the Sagas were repeated from generation to generation, long
before they were written down. The habit, if not the art, of writing came
with Christianity and the Latin education accompanying it. Gradually a
written literature in the Teutonic languages was accumulated. Of this there
was the heathen side, well represented in Anglo-Saxon and the Norse; while
in Old High German the Hildebrandslied remains, heathen and savage.
Thereafter, a popular and even national or rather racial poetry continued,
developed, and grew large, notwithstanding the spread of Latin Christianity
through Teutonic lands. Of this the Niebelungenlied and the Gudrun are
great examples. But individual still famous poets, who felt and thought as
Germans, were also composing sturdily in their vernacular—a lack of
education possibly causing them to dictate (dictieren, dichten) rather than to
write. Of these the greatest were Wolfram von Eschenbach and Walther von
der Vogelweide. With them and after them, or following upon the
Niebelungenlied, came a mass of secular poetry, some of which was popular

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and national, reflecting Germanic story, while some of it was courtly,
transcribing the courtly poetry which by the twelfth century flourished in
Old French.
Thus bourgeoned the secular branches of German literature. On the other
hand, from the time of Christianity’s introduction, the Germans felt the need
to have the new religion presented to them in their own tongues. The labour
of translation begins with Ulfilas, and is continued with conscientious
renderings of Scripture and Latin educational treatises, and also with such
epic paraphrase as the Heliand and the more elegiac poems of the Anglo-
Saxon Cynewulf.[330] Also, at least in Germany, there comes into existence
a full religious literature, not stoled or mitred, but popular, non-academic,
and non-liturgical; of which quantities remain in the Middle High German
of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[331]
Obviously the Romance vernacular literatures had a different
commencement. The languages were Latin, simply Latin, in their inception,
and never ceased to be legitimate continuations and developments of the
popular or Vulgar Latin of the Roman Empire. But as the speech of
children, women, and unlettered people, they were not thought of as literary
media. All who could write understood perfectly the better Latin from
which these popular dialects were slowly differentiating themselves. And as
they progressed to languages, still their life and progress lay among peoples
whose ancestral tongue was the proper Latin, which all educated men and
women still understood and used in the serious business of life.
But sooner or later men will talk and sing and think and compose in the
speech which is closest to them. The Romance tongues became literary
through this human need of natural expression. There always had been
songs in the old Vulgar Latin; and such did not cease as it gradually became
what one may call Romance. Moreover, the clergy might be impelled to use
the popular speech in preaching to the laity, or some unlearned person
might compose religious verses. Almost the oldest monument of Old French
is the hymn in honour of Ste. Eulalie. Then as civilization advanced from
the tenth to the twelfth century, in southern and northern France for
example, and the langue d’oc and the langue d’oil became independent and
developed languages, unlearned men, or men with unlearned audiences,
would unavoidably set themselves to composing poetry in these tongues. In

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the North the chansons de geste came into existence; in the South the
knightly Troubadours made love-lyrics. Somehow, these poems were
written down, and there was literature for men’s eyes as well as for men’s
ears.
In the twelfth century and the thirteenth, the audiences for Romance poetry,
especially through the regions of southern and northern France, increased
and became diversified. They were made up of all classes, save the brute
serf, and of both sexes. The chansons de geste met the taste of the feudal
barons; the Arthurian Cycle charmed the feudal dames; the coarse fabliaux
pleased the bourgeoisie; and chansons of all kinds might be found diverting
by various people. If the religious side was less strongly represented, it was
because the closeness of the language to the clerkly and liturgical Latin left
no such need of translations as was felt from the beginning among peoples
of Germanic speech. Still the Gospels, especially the apocryphal, were put
into Old French, and miracles de Notre Dame without number; also legends
of the saints, and devout tales of many kinds.
The accentual verses of the Romance tongues had their source in the
popular accentual Latin verse of the later Roman period. Their development
was not unrelated to the Latin accentual verse which was superseding
metrical composition in the centuries extending, one may say, from the fifth
to the eleventh. Divergences between the Latin and Romance verse would
be caused by the linguistic evolution through which the Romance tongues
were becoming independent languages. Nor was this divergence
uninfluenced by the fact that Romance poetry was popular and usually
concerned with topics of this life, while Latin poetry in the most striking
lines of its evolution was liturgical; and even when secular in topic tended
to become learned, since it was the product of the academically educated
classes. Much of the vernacular (Romance as well as Germanic) poetry in
the Middle Ages was composed by unlearned men who had at most but a
speaking acquaintance with Latin, and knew little of the antique literature.
This was true, generally, of the Troubadours of Provence, of the authors of
the Old French chansons de geste, and of such a courtly poet as Chrétien de
Troies; true likewise of the great German Minnesingers, epic poets rather,
Gottfried von Strassburg, Wolfram von Eschenbach, and Walther von der
Vogelweide.

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On the other hand, vernacular poetry might be written by highly learned
men, of whom the towering though late example would be Dante Alighieri.
An instance somewhat nearer to us at present is Jean Clopinel or de Meun,
the author of the second part of the Roman de la rose. His extraordinary
Voltairean production embodies all the learning of the time; and its scholar-
author was a man of genius, who incorporated his learning and the fruit
thereof very organically in his poem.
But here, at the close of our consideration of the mediaeval appreciation of
the Classics, and the relations between the Classics and mediaeval Latin
literature, we are not occupied with the very loose and general question of
the amount of classical learning to be found in the vernacular literatures of
western Europe. That was a casual matter depending on the education and
learning, or lack thereof, of the author of the given piece. But it may be
profitable to glance at the passing over of antique themes of story into
mediaeval vernacular literature, and the manner of their refashioning. This
is a huge subject, but we shall not go into it deeply, or pursue the various
antique themes through their endless propagations.
Antique stories aroused and pointed the mediaeval imagination; they made
part of the never-absent antique influence which helped to bring the
mediaeval peoples on and evoke in them an articulate power to fashion and
create all kinds of mediaeval things. But with antique story as with other
antique material, the Middle Ages had to turn it over and absorb it, and also
had to become themselves with power, before they could refashion the
antique theme or create along its lines. All this had taken place by the
middle of the twelfth century. As to choice of matter, twelfth-century
refashioners would either select an antique theme suited to their handling,
or extract what appealed to them from some classic story. In the one case as
in the other they might recast, enlarge, or invent as their faculties permitted.
Mediaeval taste took naturally to the degenerate productions of the late
antique or transition centuries. The Greek novels seem to have been
unknown, except the Apollonius of Tyre.[332] But the congenially
preposterous story of Alexander by the Pseudo-Callisthenes was available
in a sixth-century Latin version, and was made much of. Equally popular
was the debasement and intentional distortion of the Tale of Troy in the
work of “Dares” and “Dictys”; other tales were aptly presented in Ovid’s

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Metamorphoses; and the stories of Hero and Leander, of Pyramus and
Thisbe, of Narcissus, Orpheus, Cadmus, Daedalus, were widely known and
often told in the Middle Ages.
The mediaeval writers made as if they believed these tales. At least they
accepted them as they would have their own audiences accept their
recasting, with little reflection as to whether truth or fable. But was the
work of the refashioners conscious fiction? Scarcely, when it simply recast
the old story in mediaevalizing paraphrase; but when the poet went on and
wove out of ten lines a thousand, he must have known himself devising.
The mediaeval treatment of classic themes of history and epic poetry shows
how the Middle Ages refashioned and reinspired after their own image
whatever they took from the antique. If it was partly their fault, it was also
their unavoidable misfortune that they received these great themes in the
literary distortions of the transition centuries. Doubtless they preferred
encyclopaedic dulness to epic unity; they loved fantasy rather than history,
and of course delighted in the preposterous, as they found it in the Latin
version of the Life and Deeds of Alexander. As for the Tale of Troy, the real
Homer never reached them: and perhaps mediaeval peoples who were
pleased, like Virgil’s Romans, to draw their origins from Trojan heroes,
would have rejected Homer’s story just as “Dares” and “Dictys,” whoever
they were, did.[333] The true mediaeval rifacimenti, to wit, the retellings of
these tales in the vernacular, mirror the mediaeval mind, the mediaeval
character, and the whole panorama of mediaeval life and fantasy.
The chief epic themes drawn from the antique were the Tales of Troy and
Thebes and the story of Aeneas. In verse and prose they were retold in the
vernacular literatures and also in mediaeval Latin.[334] We shall, however,
limit our view to the primary Old French versions, which formed the basis
of compositions in German, Italian, English, as well as French. They were
composed between 1150 and 1170 by Norman-French trouvères. The names
of the authors of the Roman de Thebes and the Eneas are unknown; the
Roman de Troie was written by Benoit de St. More.
These poems present a universal substitution of mediaeval manners and
sentiment. For instance, one observes that the epic participation of the
pagan gods is minimized, and in the Roman de Troie even discarded;

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necromancy, on the other hand, abounds. A more interesting change is the
transformation of the love episode. That had become an epic adjunct in
Alexandrian Greek literature as early as the third century before Christ. It
existed in the antique sources of all these mediaeval poems. Nevertheless
the romantic narratives of courtly love in the latter are mediaeval creations.
The Eneas relates the love of Lavinia for the hero, most correctly
reciprocated by him. The account of it fills fourteen hundred lines, and has
no precedent in Virgil’s poem, which in other respects is followed closely.
Lavinia sees Aeneas from her tower, and at once understands a previous
discourse of her mother on the subject of love. She utters love’s plaints, and
then faints because Aeneas does not seem to notice her. After which she
passes a sleepless night. The next morning she tells her mother, who is
furious, since she favours Turnus as a suitor. The girl falls senseless, but
coming to herself when alone, she recalls love’s stratagems, and attaches a
letter to an arrow which is shot so as to fall at Aeneas’s feet. Aeneas reads
the letter, and turns and salutes the fair one furtively, that his followers may
not see. Then he enters his tent and falls so sick with love that he takes to
his bed. The next day Lavinia watches for him, and thinks him false, till at
last, pale and feeble, he appears, and her heart acquits him; amorous glances
now fly back and forth between them.[335]
To have this jaded jilt grow sick with love is a little too much for us, and
Aeneas is absurd; but the universal human touches us quite otherwise in the
sweet changing heart of Briseida in the Roman de Troie. There is no ground
for denying to Benoit of St. More his meed of fame for creating this
charming person and starting her upon her career. Following “Dares,”
Benoit calls her Briseida; but she becomes the Griseis of Boccaccio’s
Filostrato; and what good man does not sigh and love her under the name
of Cressid in Chaucer’s poem, though he may deplore her somewhat brazen
heartlessness in Shakespeare’s play.
It is not given to all men, or women, in presence or absence, in life and
death, to love once and forever. One has the stable heart, another’s fancy is
quickly turned. Sometimes, of course, our moral sledge-hammers should be
brought to bear; but a little hopeless smile may be juster, as we sigh “she (it
is more often “he”) couldn’t help it.” Such was Briseida, the sweet, loving,
helpless—coquette? jilt? flirt? these words are all too belittling to tell her

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truly. Benoit knew better. He took her dry-as-dust characterization from
“Dares”; he gave it life, and then let his fair creature do just the things she
might, without ceasing to be she.
The abject “Dares” (Benoit may have had a better story under that name) in
his catalogue of characters has this: “Briseidam formosam, alta statura,
candidam, capillo flavo et molli, superciliis junctis, oculis venustis, corpore
aequali, blandam, affabilem, verecundam, animo simplici [O ye gods!],
piam.” He makes no other mention of this tall, graceful girl, with her lovely
eyes and eyebrows meeting above, her modest, pleasant mien, and simple
soul; for simple she was, and therein lies the direst bit of truth about her.
For it is simple and uncomplex to take the colour of new scenes and faces,
and of new proffered love when the old is far away.
Now see what Benoit does with this dust: Briseida is the daughter of
Calchas, a Trojan seer who had passed over to the Greeks, warned by
Apollo. He is in the Grecian host, but his daughter is in Troy. Benoit says,
she was engaging, lovelier and fairer than the fleur de lis—though her
eyebrows grew rather too close together. “Beaux yeux” she had, “de grande
manière,” and charming was her talk, and faultless her breeding as her
dress. Much was she loved and much she loved, although her heart
changed; and she was very loving, simple, and kind:

“Molt fu amée et molt ameit,
Mes sis corages li changeit;
Et si esteit molt amorose,
Simple et almosniere et pitose.”[336]

Calchas wants his daughter, and Priam decides to send her. There is truce
between the armies. Troilus, Troy’s glorious young knight, matchless in
beauty, in arms second only to his brother Hector, is beside himself. He
loves Briseida, and she him. What tears and protestations, and what vows!
But the girl must go to her father.
On the morrow the young dame has other cares—to see to the packing of
her lovely dresses and put on the loveliest of them; over all she threw a
mantle inwoven with the flowers of Paradise. The Trojan ladies add their
tears to the damsel’s; for she is ready to die of grief at leaving her lover.

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Benoit assures us that she will not weep long; it is not woman’s way, he
continues somewhat mediaevally.
The brilliant cortège is met by one still more distinguished from the Grecian
host. Troilus must turn back, and the lady passes to the escort of Diomede.
She was young; he was impetuous; he looks once, and then greets her with
a torrential declaration of love. He never loved before!! He is hers, body
and soul and high emprize. Briseida speaks him fair:
“At this time it would be wrong for me to say a word of love. You
would deem me light indeed! Why, I hardly know you! and girls so
often are deceived by men. What you have said cannot move a heart
grieving, like mine, to lose my—friend, and others whom I may never
see again. For one of my station to speak to you of love! I have no mind
for that. Yet you seem of such rank and prowess that no girl under
heaven ought to refuse you. It is only that I have no heart to give. If I
had, surely I could hold none dearer than you. But I have neither the
thought nor power, and may God never give it to me!”[337]
One need not tell the flash of joy that then was Diomede’s, nor the many
troubles that were to be his before at last Briseida finds that her heart has
indeed turned to this new lover, always at hand, courting danger for her
sake, and at last wounded almost to death by Troilus’s spear. The end of the
story is assured in her first discreetly halting words.
Enough has been said to show how far Benoit was from Omers qui fu clers
merveillos, and what a story in some thirty thousand lines he has made of
the dry data of “Dares” and “Dictys.” His Briseida, with her changing heart,
was to rival steadier-minded but not more lovable women of mediaeval
fiction—Iseult or Guinevere. And although the far-off echo of Briseid’s
name comes from the ancient centuries, none the less she is as entirely a
mediaeval creation as Lancelot’s or Tristram’s queen. Thus the Middle Ages
took the antique narrative, and created for themselves within the altered
lines of the old tale.[338]
The transformation of themes of epic story in vernacular mediaeval
versions is paralleled by mediaeval refashionings of historical subjects
which had been fictionized before the antique period closed. A chief
example is the romance of Alexander the Great. The antique source was the

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conqueror’s Life and Deeds, written by one who took the name of
Alexander’s physician, Callisthenes. The author was some Egyptian Greek
of the first century after Christ. His work is preposterous from the
beginning to the end, and presents a succession of impossible marvels
performed by the somewhat indistinguishable heroes of the story. Its
qualities were reflected in the Latin versions, which in turn were drawn
upon by the Old French rhyming romancers. The latter mediaevalized and
feudalized the tale. Nor were they halted by any absurdity, or conscious of
the characterlessness of the puppets of the tale.[339]
Further to pursue the fortunes of antique themes in mediaeval literature
would lead us beyond bounds. Yet mention should be made of the handling
of minor narratives, as the Metamorphoses of Ovid. They were very
popular, and from the twelfth century on, paraphrases or refashionings were
made of many of them. These added to the old tale the interesting
mediaeval element of the moral or didactic allegory. The most prodigious
instance of this moralizing of Ovid was the work of Chrétien Légouais, a
French Franciscan who wrote at the beginning of the fourteenth century. In
some seventy thousand lines he presented the stories of the Metamorphoses,
the allegories which he discovered in them, and the moral teaching of the
same.[340]
Equally interesting was the application of allegory to Ovid’s Ars amatoria.
The first translators treated this frivolous production as an authoritative
treatise upon the art of winning love. So it was perhaps, only Ovid was
amusing himself by making a parable of his youthful diversions. Mediaeval
imitators changed the habits of the gilded youth of Rome to suit the society
of their time. But they did more, being votaries of courtly love. Such love in
the Middle Ages had its laws which were prone to deduce their lineage from
Ovid’s verses. But its uplifted spirit revelled in symbolism; and tended to
change to spiritual allegory whatever authority it imagined itself based
upon, even though the authority were a book as dissolute, when seriously
considered, as the Ars amatoria. It is strange to think of this poem as the
very far off street-walking prototype of De Lorris’s Roman de la rose.

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CHAPTER XXXIII

MEDIAEVAL APPROPRIATION OF THE ROMAN
LAW

I. The Fontes Juris Civilis.
II. Roman and Barbarian Codification.
III. The Mediaeval Appropriation.
IV. Church Law.
V. Political Theorizing.

Classical studies, and the gradual development of mediaeval prose and
verse, discussed in the preceding chapters, illustrate modes of mediaeval
progress. But of all examples of mediaeval intellectual growth through the
appropriation of the antique, none is more completely illuminating than the
mediaeval use of Roman law. As with patristic theology and antique
philosophy, the Roman law was crudely taken and then painfully learned,
till in the end, vitally and broadly mastered, it became even a means and
mode of mediaeval thinking. Its mediaeval appropriation illustrates the
legal capacity of the Middle Ages and their concern with law both as a
practical business and an intellectual interest.

I
Primitive law is practical; it develops through the adjustment of social
exigencies. Gradually, however, in an intelligent community which is
progressing under favouring influences, some definite consciousness of
legal propriety, utility, or justice, makes itself articulate in statements of
general principles of legal right and in a steady endeavour to adjust legal
relationships and adjudicate actual controversies in accordance. This
endeavour to formulate just and useful principles, and decide novel
questions in accordance with them, and enunciate new rules in harmony

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with the body of the existing law, is jurisprudence, which thus works
always for concord, co-ordination, and system.
There was a jurisprudential element in the early law of Rome. The Twelve
Tables are trenchant announcements of rules of procedure and substantial
law. They have the form of the general imperative: “Thus let it be; If one
summons [another] to court, let him go; As a man shall have appointed by
his Will, so let it be; When one makes a bond or purchase,[341] as the tongue
shall have pronounced it, so let it be.” These statements of legal rules are far
from primitive; they are elastic, inclusive, and suited to form the foundation
of a large and free legal development. And the consistency with which the
law of debt was carried out to its furthest cruel conclusion, the permitted
division of the body of the defaulting debtor among several creditors,[342]
gave earnest of the logic which was to shape the Roman law in its humaner
periods. Moreover, there is jurisprudence in the arrangement of the Laws of
the Twelve Tables. Nevertheless the jurisprudential element is still but
inchoate.
The Romans were endowed with a genius for law. Under the later Republic
and the Empire, the minds of their jurists were trained and broadened by
Greek philosophy and the study of the laws of Mediterranean peoples;
Rome was becoming the commercial as well as social and political centre
of the world. From this happy combination of causes resulted the most
comprehensive body of law and the noblest jurisprudence ever evolved by a
people. The great jurisconsults of the Empire, working upon the prior
labours of long lines of older praetors and jurists, perfected a body of law of
well-nigh universal applicability, and throughout logically consistent with
general principles of law and equity, recognized as fundamental. These
were in part suggested by Greek philosophy, especially by Stoicism as
adapted to the Roman temperament. They represented the best ethics, the
best justice of the time. As principles of law, however, they would have
hung in the air, had not the practical as well as theorizing genius of the
jurisconsults been equal to the task of embodying them in legal
propositions, and applying the latter to the decision of cases. Thus was
evolved a body of practical rules of law, controlled, co-ordinated, and, as
one may say, universalized through the constant logical employment of
sound principles of legal justice.[343]

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The Roman law, broadly taken, was heterogeneous in origin, and complex
in its modes of growth. The great jurisconsults of the Empire recognized its
diversity of source, and distinguished its various characteristics accordingly.
They assumed (and this was a pure assumption) that every civilized people
lived under two kinds of law, the one its own, springing from some
recognized law-making source within the community; the other the jus
gentium, or the law inculcated among all peoples by natural reason or
common needs.
The supposed origin of the jus gentium was not simple. Back in the time of
the Republic it had become necessary to recognize a law for the many
strangers in Rome, who were not entitled to the protection of Rome’s jus
civile. The edict of the praetor Peregrinus covered their substantial rights,
and sanctioned simple modes of sale and lease which did not observe the
forms prescribed by the jus civile. So this edict became the chief source of
the jus gentium so-called, to wit, of those liberal rules of law which ignored
the peculiar formalities of the stricter law of Rome. Probably foreign laws,
that is to say, the commercial customs of the Mediterranean world, were in
fact recognized; and their study led to a perception of elements common to
the laws of many peoples. At all events, in course of time the jus gentium
came to be regarded as consisting of universal rules of law which all
peoples might naturally follow.
The recognition of these simple modes of contracting obligations, and
perhaps the knowledge that certain rules of law obtained among many
peoples, fostered the conception of common or natural justice, which
human reason was supposed to inculcate everywhere. Such a conception
could not fail to spring up in the minds of Roman jurists who were educated
in Stoical philosophy, the ethics of which had much to say of a common
human nature. Indeed the idea naturalis ratio was in the air, and the thought
of common elements of law and justice which naturalis ratio inter omnes
homines constituit, lay so close at hand that it were perhaps a mistake to try
to trace it to any single source. Practically the jus gentium became identical
with jus naturale, which Ulpian imagined as taught by nature to all animals;
the jus gentium, however, belonged to men alone.[344]
Thus rules which were conceived as those of the jus gentium came to
represent the principles of rational law, and impressed themselves upon the

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development of the jus civile. They informed the whole growth and
application of Roman law with a breadth of legal reason. And conceptions
of a jus naturale and a jus gentium became cognate legal fictions, by the aid
of which praetor and jurisconsult might justify the validity of informal
modes of contract. In their application, judge and jurist learned how and
when to disregard the formal requirements of the older and stricter Roman
law, and found a way to the recognition of what was just and convenient.
These fictions agreed with the supposed nature and demands of aequitas,
which is the principle of progressive and discriminating legal justice. Law
itself (jus) was identical with aequitas conceived (after Celsus’s famous
phrase) as the ars boni et aequi.
The Roman law proper, the jus civile, had multifarious sources. First the
leges, enacted by the people; then the plebiscita, sanctioned by the Plebs;
the senatus consulta, passed by the Senate; the constitutiones and
rescripta[345] principum, ordained by the Emperor. Excepting the rescripta,
these (to cover them with a modern expression) were statutory. They were
laws announced at a specific time to meet some definite exigency. Under
the Empire, the constitutiones principum became the most important, and
then practically the only kind of legal enactment.
Two or three other sources of Roman law remain for mention: first, the
edicta of those judicial magistrates, especially the praetors, who had the
authority to issue them. In his edict the praetor announced what he held to
be the law and how he would apply it. The edict of each successive praetor
was a renewal and expansion or modification of that of his predecessor.
Papinian calls this source of law the “jus praetorium, which the praetors
have introduced to aid, supplement, or correct the jus civile for the sake of
public utility.”
Next, the responsa or auctoritas jurisprudentium, by which were intended
the judicial decisions and the authority of the legal writings of the famous
jurisconsults. Imperial rescripts recognized these responsa as authoritative
for the Roman courts; and some of the emperors embodied portions of them
in formally promulgated collections, thereby giving them the force of law.
Justinian’s Digest is the great example of this method of codification.[346]
One need scarcely add that the authoritative writings and responsa of the
jurisconsults extended and applied the jus gentium, that is to say, the rules

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and principles of the best-considered jurisprudence, freed so far as might be
from the formal peculiarities of the jus civile strictly speaking. And the
same was true of the praetorian edict. The Roman law also gave legal effect
to inveterata consuetudo, the law which is sanctioned by custom: “for since
the laws bind us because established by the decision of the people, those
unwritten customs which the people have approved are binding.”[347]
Simply naming the sources of Roman law indicates the ways in which it
grew, and the part taken by the jurisconsults in its development as a
universal and elastic system. It was due to their labours that legal principles
were logically carried out through the mass of enactments and decisions;
that is, it was due to their large consideration of the body of existing law,
that each novel decision—each case of first impression—should be a true
legal deduction, and not a solecism; and that even the new enactments
should not create discordant law. And it was due to their labours that as
rules of law were called forth, they were stated clearly and in terms of well-
nigh universal applicability.
The Laws of the Twelve Tables showed the action of legal intelligence and
the result of much experience. They sanctioned a large contractual freedom,
if within strict forms; they stated broadly the right of testamentary
disposition. Many of their provisions, which commonly were but
authoritative recognitions, were expressions of basic legal principles, the
application of which might be extended to meet the needs of advancing
civic life. And through the enlargement of this fundamental collection of
law, or deviating from it in accordance with principles which it implicitly
embodied, the jurists of the Republic and the first centuries of the Empire
formed and developed a body of private and public law from which the
jurisprudence of Europe and America has never even sought to free itself.
Roman jurisprudence was finally incorporated in Justinian’s Digest, which
opens with a statement of the most general principles, even those which
would have hung in the air but for the Roman genius of logical and
practical application to the concrete instance. “Jus est ars boni et aequi”—it
is better to leave these words untranslated, such is the wealth of significance
and connotation which they have acquired. “Justitia est constans et perpetua
voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi. Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste

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vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. Jurisprudentia est
divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, justi atque injusti scientia.”
The first pregnant phrase is from the older jurist Celsus; the longer passage
is by the later Ulpian, and may be taken as an expansion of the first. Both
the one and the other expressed the most advanced and philosophic ethics
of the ancient world. They are both in the first chapter of the Digest,
wherein they become enactments. An extract from Paulus follows: “Jus has
different meanings; that which is always aequum ac bonum is called jus, to
wit, the jus naturale: jus also means the jus civile, that which is expedient
(utile) for all or most in any state. And in our state we have also the
praetorian jus.” This passage indicates the course of the development of the
Roman law: the fundamental and ceaselessly growing core of specifically
Roman law, the jus civile; its continual equitable application and
enlargement, which was the praetor’s contribution; and the constant
application of the aequum ac bonum, observed perhaps in legal rules
common to many peoples, but more surely existing in the high reasoning of
jurists instructed in the best ethics and philosophy of the ancient world, and
learned and practised in the law.
Now notice some of the still general, but distinctly legal, rather than ethical,
rules collected in the Digest: The laws cannot provide specifically for every
case that may arise; but when their intent is plain, he who is adjudicating a
cause should proceed ad similia, and thus declare the law in the case.[348]
Here is stated the general and important formative principle, that new cases
should be decided consistently and eleganter, which means logically and in
accordance with established rules. Yet legal solecisms will exist, perhaps in
a statute or in some rule of law evoked by a special exigency. Their
application is not to be extended. For them the rule is: “What has been
accepted contra rationem juris, is not to be drawn out (producendum) to its
consequences,”[349] or again: “What was introduced not by principle, but at
first through error, does not obtain in like cases.”[350]
These are true principles making for the consistent development of a body
of law. Observe the scope and penetration of some other general rules:
“Nuptias non concubitus, sed consensus facit.”[351] This goes to the legal
root of the whole conception of matrimony, and is still the recognized
starting-point of all law upon that subject. Again: “An agreement to perform

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what is impossible will not sustain a suit.”[352] This is still everywhere a
fundamental principle of the law of contracts. Again: “No one can transfer
to another a greater right than he would have himself,”[353] another
principle of fundamental validity, but, of course, like all rules of law subject
in its application to the qualifying operation of other legal rules.
Roman jurisprudence recognized the danger of definition: “Omnis definitio
in jure civili periculosa est.”[354] Yet it could formulate admirable ones; for
example: “Inheritance is succession to the sum total (universum jus) of the
rights of the deceased.”[355] This definition excels in the completeness of its
legal view of the matter, and is not injured by the obvious omission to
exclude those personal privileges and rights of the deceased which
terminate upon his death.
Thus we note the sources and constructive principles of the Roman law. We
observe that while certain of the former might be called “statutory,” the
chief means and method of development was the declarative edict of the
praetor and the trained labour of the jurisconsults. In these appears the
consummate genius of Roman jurisprudence, a jurisprudence matchless in
its rational conception of principles of justice which were rooted in a
philosophic consideration of human life; matchless also in its carrying
through of such principles into the body of the law and the decision of
every case.

II
The Roman law was the creation of the genius of Rome and also the
product of the complex civilization of which Rome was the kinetic centre.
As the Roman power crumbled, Teutonic invaders established kingdoms
within territories formerly subject to Rome and to her law—a law, however,
which commonly had been modified to suit the peoples of the provinces.
Those territories retained their population of provincials. The invaders,
Burgundians, Visigoths, and Franks, planting themselves in the different
parts of Gaul, brought their own law, under which they continued to live,
but which they did not force upon the provincial population. On the
contrary, Burgundian and Visigothic kings promulgated codes of Roman
law for the latter. And these represent the forms in which the Roman law

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“We therefore command you to read and sift out from the books
pertaining to the jus Romanum composed by the ancient learned jurists
(antiqui prudentes) to whom the most sacred emperors granted
authority to indite and interpret the laws, so that the material may all be
taken from these writers, and incongruity avoided—for others have
written books which have been neither used nor recognized. When by
the favour of the Deity this material shall have been collected, it should
be reared with toil most beautiful, and consecrated as the own and most
holy temple of justice, and the whole law (totum jus) should be arranged
in fifty books under specific titles.”[358]
The language of the ancient jurists was to be preserved even critically, that
is to say, the compilers were directed to emend apparent errors and restore
what seemed “verum et optimum et quasi ab initio scriptum.” It was not the
least of the providential mercies connected with the compilation of this
great body of jurisprudential law, that Justinian and his commission did not
abandon the phrasing of the old jurisconsults, and restate their opinions in
such language as we have a sample of in the constitution from which the
above extract is taken. This jurisprudential part of Justinian’s Codification
was named the Digest or Pandects.[359]
Inasmuch as Justinian’s brief reconquest of western portions of the Roman
Empire did not extend north of the Alps, his codification was not
promulgated in Gaul or Germany. Even in Italy his legislation did not
maintain itself in general dominance, especially in the north where the
Lombard law narrowed its application. Moreover, throughout the peninsula,
the Pandects quickly became as if they were not, and fell into desuetude, if
that can be said of a work which had not come into use. This body of
jurisprudential law was beyond the legal sense of those monarchically-
minded and barbarizing centuries, which knew law only as the command of
a royal lawgiver. The Codex and the Novellae were of this nature. They, and
not the Digest, represent the influence upon Italy of Justinian’s legislation
until the renewed interest in jurisprudence brought the Pandects to the front
at the close of the eleventh century. But Codex and Novellae were too bulky
for a period that needed to have its intellectual labours made easy. From the
first, the Novellae were chiefly known and used in the condensed form
given them in the excellent Epitome of Julianus, apparently a Byzantine of

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the last part of Justinian’s reign.[360] The cutting down and epitomizing of
the Codex is more obscure; probably it began at once; the incomplete or
condensed forms were those in common use.[361]
It is, however, with the Theodosian Code and certain survivals of the works
of the great jurists that we have immediately to do. For these were the
sources of the codes enacted by Gothic and Burgundian kings for their
Roman or Gallo-Roman subjects. Apparently the earliest of them was
prepared soon after the year 502, at the command of Gondebaud, King of
the Burgundians. This, which later was dubbed the Papianus,[362] was the
work of a skilled Roman lawyer, and seems quite as much a text-book as a
code. It set forth the law of the topics important for the Roman provincials
living in the Burgundian kingdom, not merely making extracts from its
sources, but stating their contents and referring to them as authorities. These
sources were substantially the same as those used by the Visigothic
Breviarium, which was soon to supersede the Papianus even in Burgundy.
Breviarium was the popular name of the code enacted by the Visigothic
king Alaric II. about the year 506 for his provinciales in the south of Gaul.
[363] It preserved the integrity of its sources, giving the texts in the same
order, and with the same rubrics, as in the original. The principal source
was the Theodosian Code; next in importance the collections of Novellae of
Theodosius and succeeding emperors: a few texts were taken from the
Codes of “Gregorianus” and “Hermogenianus.” These parts of the
Breviarium consisted of leges, that is, of constitutions of the emperors. Two
sources of quite a different character were also drawn upon. One was the
Institutes of Gaius, or rather an old epitome which had been made from it.
The other was the Sententiae of Paulus, the famous “Five Books of
Sentences ad filium.” This work of elementary jurisprudence deserved its
great repute; yet its use in the Breviarium may have been due to the special
sanction which had been given it in one of the constitutions of the
Theodosian Code, also taken over into the Breviarium: “Pauli quoque
sententias semper valere praecipimus.”[364] The same constitution
confirmed the Institutes of Gaius, among other great jurisconsults.
Presumably these two works were the most commonly known as well as the
clearest and best of elementary jurisprudential compositions.

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An interesting feature of the Breviarium, and destined to be of great
importance, was the Interpretatio accompanying all its texts, except those
drawn from the epitome of Gaius. This was not the work of Alaric’s
compilers, but probably represents the approved exposition of the leges,
with the exposition of the already archaic Sentences of Paulus, current in
the law schools of southern Gaul in the fifth century. The Interpretatio thus
taken into the Breviarium had, like the texts, the force of royal law, and
soon was to surpass them in practice by reason of its perspicuity and
modernity. Many manuscripts contain only the Interpretatio and omit the
texts.
The Breviarium became the source of Roman law, indeed the Roman law
par excellence, for the Merovingian and then the Carolingian realm, outside
of Italy. It was soon subjected to the epitomizing process, and its epitomes
exist, dating from the eighth to the tenth century: they reduced it in bulk,
and did away with the practical inconvenience of lex and interpretatio.
Further, the Breviarium, and even the epitomes, were glossed with
numerous marginal or interlinear notes made by transcribers or students.
These range from definitions of words, sometimes taken from Isidore’s
Etymologiae, to brief explanations of difficulties in the text.[365] In like
manner in Italy, the Codex and Novellae of Justinian were, as has been said,
reduced to epitomes, and also equipped with glosses.
These barbaric codes of Roman law mark the passage of Roman law into
incipiently mediaeval stages. On the other hand, certain Latin codes of
barbarian law present the laws of the Teutons touched with Roman
conceptions, and likewise becoming inchoately mediaeval.
Freedom, the efficient freedom of the individual, belongs to civilization
rather than to barbarism. The actual as well as imaginary perils surrounding
the lives of men who do not dwell in a safe society, entail a state of close
mutual dependence rather than of liberty. Law in a civilized community has
the twofold purpose of preserving the freedom of the individual and of
maintaining peace. With each advance in human progress, the latter
purpose, at least in the field of private civil law, recedes a little farther,
while the importance of private law, as compared with penal law, constantly
increases.

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The law of uncivilized peoples lacks the first of these purposes. Its sole
conscious object is to maintain, or at least provide a method of maintaining
peace; it is scarcely aware that in maintaining peace it is enhancing the
freedom of every individual.
The distinct and conscious purpose of early Teutonic law was to promote
peace within the tribe, or among the members of a warband. Thus was law
regarded by the people—as a means of peace. Its communication or
ordainment might be ascribed to a God or a divine King. But in reality its
chief source lay in slowly growing regulative custom.[366] The force of law,
or more technically speaking the legal sanction, lay in the power of the tribe
to uphold its realized purpose as a tribe; for the power to maintain its
solidarity and organization was the final test of its law-upholding strength.
Primarily the old Teutonic law looked to the tribe and its sub-units, and
scarcely regarded the special claims of an individual, or noticed mitigating
or aggravating elements in his culpability—answerability rather. It
prescribed for his peace and protection as a member of a family, or as one
included within the bands of Sippe (blood relationship); or as one of a
warband or a chief’s close follower, one of his comitatus. On the other
hand, the law was stiff, narrow, and ungeneralized in its recognized rules.
The first Latin codifications of Teutonic law are not to be compared for
breadth and elasticity of statement to the Law of the Twelve Tables. And
their substance was more primitive.[367]
The earliest of these first codifications was the Lex Salica, codified under
Clovis near the year 500. Unquestionably, contact with Roman institutions
suggested the idea, even as the Latin language was the vehicle, of this code.
Otherwise the Lex Salica is un-Christian and un-Roman, although probably
it was put together after Clovis’s baptism. It was not a comprehensive
codification, and omitted much that was common knowledge at the time;
which now makes it somewhat enigmatical. One finds in it lists of thefts of
every sort of object that might be stolen, and of the various injuries to the
person that might be done, and the sum of money to be paid in each case as
atonement or compensation. Such schedules did not set light store on life
and property. On the contrary, they were earnestly intended as the most
available protection of elemental human rights, and as the best method of
peaceful redress. The sums awarded as Wergeld were large, and were

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reckoned according to the slain man’s rank. By committing a homicide, a
man might ruin himself and even his blood relatives (Sippe) and of course
on failure to atone might incur servitude or death or outlawry.
The Salic law is scarcely touched by the law of Rome. From this piece of
intact Teutonism the codes of other Teuton peoples shade off into bodies of
law partially Romanized, that is, affected by the provincialized Roman law
current in the locality where the Teutonic tribe found a home. The codes of
the Burgundians and the Visigoths in southern France are examples of this
Teutonic-Romanesque commingling. On the other hand, the Lombard
codes, though later in time, held themselves even harshly Teutonic, as
opposed to any influence from the law of the conquered Italian population,
for whom the Lombards had less regard than Burgundians and Visigoths
had for their subject provincials. Moreover, as the Frankish realm extended
its power over other Gallo-Teuton states, the various Teuton laws modified
each other and tended toward uniformity. Naturally the law of the Franks,
first the Salic and then the partly derivative Ribuarian code, exerted a
dominating influence.[368]
These Teuton peoples regarded law as pertaining to the tribe. There was
little conscious intention on their part of forcing their laws on the
conquered. When the Visigoths established their kingdom in southern
France they had no idea of changing the law of the Gallo-Roman
provincials living within the Visigothic rule; and shortly afterwards, when
the Franks extended their power over the still Roman parts of Gaul, and
then over Alemanni, Burgundians, and Visigoths, they likewise had no
thought of forcing their laws either upon Gallo-Romans or upon the Teuton
people previously dominant within a given territory. This remained true
even of the later Frankish period, when the Carolingians conquered the
Lombard kingdom in upper Italy.
Indeed, to all these Teutons and to the Roman provincials as well, it seemed
as a matter of course that tribal or local laws should be permitted to endure
among the peoples they belonged to. These assumptions and the conditions
of the growing Frankish Empire evoked, as it were, a more acute
mobilization of the principle that to each people belonged its law. For
provincials and Teuton peoples were mingling throughout the Frankish
realm, and the first obvious solution of the legal problems arising was to

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hold that provincials and Teutons everywhere should remain amenable and
entitled to their own law, which was assumed to attend them as a personal
appurtenance. Of course this solution became intolerable as tribal blood and
delimitations were obscured, and men moved about through the territories
of one great realm. Archbishop Agobard of Lyons remarks that one might
see five men sitting together, each amenable to a different law.[369] The
escape from this legal confusion was to revert to the idea of law and custom
as applying to every one within a given territory. The personal principle
gradually gave way to this conception in the course of the ninth, tenth, and
eleventh centuries.[370] In the meanwhile during the Merovingian, and more
potently in the Carolingian period, king’s law, as distinguished from
people’s law, had been an influence making for legal uniformity throughout
that wide conglomerate empire which acknowledged the authority of the
Frankish king or emperor. The king’s law might emanate from the delegated
authority, and arise from the practices, of royal functionaries; it was most
formally promulgated in Capitularies, which with Charlemagne reach such
volume and importance. Some of these royal ordinances related to a town or
district only. Others were for the realm, and the latter not only were
instances of law applying universally, but also tended to promote, or
suggest, the harmonizing of laws which they did not modify directly.

III
The Roman law always existed in the Middle Ages. Provincialized and
changed, it was interwoven in the law and custom of the land of the langue
d’oc and even in the customary law of the lands where the langue d’oil was
spoken. Through the same territory it existed also in the Breviarium and its
epitomes. There was very little of it in England, and scarcely a trace in the
Germany east of the Rhine. In Italy it was applied when not superseded by
the Lombard codes, and was drawn from works based on the Codex and
Novels of Justinian. But the jurisprudential law contained in Justinian’s
Digest was as well forgotten in Italy as in any land north of the Alps, where
the Codification of Justinian had never been promulgated. The extent to
which the classic forms of Roman law were known or unknown,
unforgotten or forgotten, was no accident as of codices or other writings
lost accidentally. It hung upon larger conditions—whether society had

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reached that stage of civilized exigency demanding the application of an
advanced commercial law, and whether there were men capable of
understanding and applying it. This need and the capacity to understand
would be closely joined.[371]
The history of the knowledge and understanding of Roman law in the
Middle Ages might be resolved into a consideration of the sources drawn
upon, and the extent and manner of their use, from century to century. In the
fifth century, when the Theodosian Code was promulgated, law was thought
of chiefly as the mandate of a ruler. The Theodosian Code was composed of
constitutiones principum. Likewise the Breviarium, based upon it, and other
barbarian codes of Roman law, were ordained by kings; and so were the
codes of Teutonic law. For law, men looked directly to the visible ruler. The
jus, reasoned out by the wisdom of trained jurists, had lost authority and
interest. To be sure, a hundred years later Justinian’s Commission put
together in the Digest the body of jurisprudential law; but even in Italy
where his codification was promulgated, the Digest fell still-born. Never
was an official compilation of less effect upon its own time, or of such
mighty import for times to come.
The Breviarium became par excellence the code of Roman law for the
countries included in the present France. With its accompanying
Interpretatio it was a work indicating intelligence on the part of its
compilers, whose chief care was as to arrangement and explanation. But the
time was not progressive, and a gathering mental decadence was shown by
the manner in which the Breviarium was treated and used, to wit,
epitomized in many epitomes, and practically superseded by them. Here
was double evidence of decay; for the supersession of such a work by such
epitomes indicates a diminishing legal knowledge in the epitomizers, and
also a narrowing of social and commercial needs in the community, for
which the original work contained much that was no longer useful.
There were, of course, epitomes and epitomes. Such a work as the Epitome
Juliani, in which a good Byzantine lawyer of Justinian’s time presented the
substance of the Novellae, was an excellent compendium, and deserved the
fame it won. Of a lower order were the later manipulations of Justinian’s
Codex, by which apparently the Codex was superseded in Italy. One of

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these was the Summa Perusina of the ninth or tenth century, a wretched
work, and one of the blindest.[372]
Justinian’s Codex and Julian’s Epitome were equipped with glosses, some
of which are as early as Justinian’s time; but the greater part are later. The
glosses to Justinian’s legislation resemble those of the Breviarium before
referred to. That is to say, as the centuries pass downward toward the tenth,
the glosses answer to cruder needs: they become largely translations of
words, often taken from Isidore’s Etymologiae.[373] Indeed many of them
appear to have had merely a grammatical interest, as if the text was used as
an aid in the study of the Latin language.
The last remark indicates a way in which a very superficial acquaintance
with the Roman law was kept up through the centuries prior to the twelfth:
it was commonly taught in the schools devoted to elementary instruction,
that is to say, to the Seven Liberal Arts. In many instances the instructors
had only such knowledge as they derived from Isidore, that friend of every
man. That is, they had no special knowledge of law, but imparted various
definitions to their pupils, just as they might teach them the names of
diseases and remedies, a list of which (and nothing more) they would also
find in Isidore. It was all just as one might have expected. Elementary
mediaeval education was encyclopaedic in its childish way; and, in
accordance with the methods and traditions of the transition centuries, all
branches of instruction were apt to be turned to grammar and rhetoric, and
made linguistic, so to speak—mere subjects for curious definition. Thus it
happened to law as well as medicine. Yet some of the teachers may have
had a practical acquaintance with legal matters, with an understanding for
legal documents and skill to draw them up.
The assertion also is warranted that at certain centres of learning substantial
legal instruction was given; one may even speak of schools of law.
Scattered information touching all the early mediaeval periods shows that
there was no time when instruction in Roman law could not be obtained
somewhere in western Europe. To refer to France, the Roman law was very
early taught at Narbonne; at Orleans it was taught from the time of Bishop
Theodulphus, Charlemagne’s contemporary, and probably the teaching of it
long continued. One may speak in the same way of Lyons; and in the
eleventh century Angers was famed for the study of law.

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Our information is less broken as to an Italy where through the early Middle
Ages more general opportunities offered for elementary education, and
where the Roman law, with Justinian’s Codification as a base, made in
general the law of the land. There is no reason to suppose that it was not
taught. Contemporary allusions bear witness to the existence of a school of
law in Rome in the time of Cassiodorus and afterwards, which is confirmed
by a statement of the jurist Odofredus in the thirteenth century. At Pavia
there was a school of law in the time of Rothari, the legislating Lombard
king; this reached the zenith of its repute in the eleventh century. Legal
studies also flourished at Ravenna, and succumbed before the rising star of
the Bologna school at the beginning of the twelfth century.[374] In these and
doubtless many other cities[375] students were instructed in legal practices
and formulae, and some substance of the Roman law was taught. Extant
legal documents of various kinds afford, especially for Italy, ample
evidence of the continuous application of the Roman law.[376]
As for the merits and deficiencies of legal instruction in Italy and in France,
an idea may be gained from the various manuals that were prepared either
for use in the schools of law or for the practitioner. Because of the
uncertainty, however, of their age and provenance, it is difficult to connect
them with a definite foyer of instruction.
Until the opening of the twelfth century, or at all events until the last quarter
of the eleventh, the legal literature evinces scarcely any originality or
critical capacity. There are glosses, epitomes, and collections of extracts,
more or less condensed or confused from whatever text the compiler had
before him. Little jurisprudential intelligence appears in any writings which
are known to precede the close of the eleventh century; none, for instance,
in the epitomes of the Breviarium and the glosses relating to that code; none
in those works of Italian origin the material for which was drawn directly or
indirectly from the Codex or Novels of Justinian, for instance the Summa
Perusina and the Lex Romana canonice compta, both of which probably
belong to the ninth century. Such compilations were put together for
practical use, or perhaps as aids to teaching.
Thus, so far as inference may be drawn from the extant writings, the legal
teaching in any school during this long period hardly rose above an
uncritical and unenlightened explanation of Roman law somewhat

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mediaevalized and deflected from its classic form and substance. There was
also practical instruction in current legal forms and customs. Interest in the
law had not risen above practical needs, nor was capacity shown for
anything above a mechanical handling of the matter. Legal study was on a
level with the other intellectual phenomena of the period.
In an opusculum[377] written shortly after the middle of the eleventh
century, Peter Damiani bears unequivocal, if somewhat hostile, witness to
the study of law at Ravenna; and it is clear that in his time legal studies
were progressing in both France and Italy. It is unsafe to speak more
definitely, because of the difficulty in fixing the time and place of certain
rather famous pieces of legal literature, which show a marked advance upon
the productions to be ascribed with certainty to an earlier time. The
reference is to the Petri exceptiones and the Brachylogus. The critical
questions relating to the former are too complex even to outline here. Both
its time and place are in dispute. The ascribed dates range from the third
quarter of the eleventh century to the first quarter of the twelfth, a matter of
importance, since the opening of the twelfth century is marked by the rise
of the Bologna school. As for the place, some scholars still adhere to the
south of France, while others look to Pavia or Ravenna. On the whole, the
weight of argument seems to favour Italy and a date not far from 1075.[378]
The Petrus, as it is familiarly called, is drawn from immediately prior and
still extant compilations. The compiler wished to give a compendious if not
systematic presentation of law as accepted and approved in his time, that is
to say, of Roman law somewhat mediaevalized in tone, and with certain
extraneous elements from the Lombard codes. The ultimate Roman sources
were the Codification of Justinian, and indeed all of it, Digest, Codex, and
Novels, the last in the form to which they had been brought in Julian’s
Epitome. The purpose of the compilation is given in the Prologue,[379]
which in substance is as follows:
“Since for many divers reasons, on account of the great and manifold
difficulties in the laws, even the Doctors of the laws cannot without
pains reach a certain opinion, we, taking account of both laws, to wit,
the jus civile and the jus naturale, unfold the solution of controversies
under plain and patent heads. Whatever is found in the laws that is
useless, void, or contrary to equity, we trample under our feet. Whatever

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has been added and surely held to, we set forth in its integral meaning
so that nothing may appear unjust or provocative of appeal from thy
judgments, Odilo;[380] but all may make for the vigour of justice and the
praise of God.”
The arrangement of topics in the Petrus hardly evinces any clear design.
The substance, however, is well presented. If there be a question to be
solved, it is plainly stated, and the solution arrived at may be interesting.
For example, a case seems to have arisen where the son of one who died
intestate had seized the whole property to the exclusion of the children of
two deceased daughters. The sons of one daughter acquiesced. The sons of
the other per placitum et guerram forced their uncle to give up their share.
Thereupon the supine cousins demanded to share in what had so been won.
The former contestants resisted on the plea that the latter had borne no aid
in the contest and that they had obtained only their own portion. The
decision was that the supine cousins might claim their heritage from
whoever held it, and should receive their share in what the successful
contestants had won; but that the latter could by counter-actions compel
them to pay their share of the necessary expenses of the prior contest.[381]
Sometimes the Petrus seems to draw a general rule of law from the
apparent instances of its application in Justinian’s Codification. Therein
certain formalities were prescribed in making a testament, in adopting a
son, or emancipating a slave. The Petrus draws from them the general
principle that where the law prescribes formalities, the transaction is not
valid if they are omitted.[382] In fine, unsystematized as is the arrangement
of topics, the work presents an advance in legal intelligence over mediaeval
law-writings earlier than the middle of the eleventh century.
If the Petrus was adapted for use in practice, the Brachylogus, on the other
hand, was plainly a book of elementary instruction, formed on the model of
Justinian’s Institutes. But it made use of his entire codification, the Novels,
however, only as condensed in Julian’s Epitome. The influence of the
Breviarium is also noticeable; which might lead one to think that the treatise
was written in Orleans or the neighbourhood, since the Breviarium was not
in use in Italy, while the Codification of Justinian was known in France by
the end of the eleventh century. The beginning of the twelfth is the date
usually given to the Brachylogus. It does not belong to the Bologna school

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of glossators, but rather immediately precedes them, wherever it was
composed.[383]
The Brachylogus, as a book of Institutes, compares favourably with its
model, from the language of which it departed at will. Both works are
divided into four libri; but the libri of the Brachylogus correspond better to
the logical divisions of the law. Again, frequently the author of the
Brachylogus breaks up the chapters of Justinian’s Institutes and gives the
subject-matter under more pertinent headings. Sometimes the statements of
the older work are improved by rearrangement. The definitions of the
Brachylogus are pithy and concise, even to a fault. Often the exposition is
well adapted to the purposes of an elementary text-book,[384] which was
meant to be supplemented by oral instruction. On the whole, the work
shows that the author is no longer encumbered by the mass or by the
advanced character of his sources. He restates their substance intelligently,
and thinks for himself. He is no compiler, and his work has reached the rank
of a treatise.
The merits of the Brachylogus as an elementary text-book are surpassed by
those of the so-called Summa Codicis Irnerii, a book which may mark the
beginning of the Bologna school of law, and may even be the composition
of its founder. Many arguments are adduced for this authorship.[385] The
book has otherwise been deemed a production of the last days of the school
of law at Rome just before the school was broken up by some catastrophe
as to which there is little information. In that case the work would belong to
the closing years of the eleventh century, whereas the authorship of Irnerius
would bring it to the beginning of the twelfth. At all events, its lucid
jurisprudential reasoning precludes the likelihood of an earlier origin.
This Summa is an exposition of Roman law, following the arrangement and
titles of Justinian’s Codex, but making extensive use of the Digest. It thus
contains Roman jurisprudential law, and may be regarded as a compendious
text-book for law students, forming apparently the basis of a course of
lectures which treated the topics more at length.[386] The author’s command
of his material is admirable, and his presentation masterly. Whether he was
Irnerius or some one else, he was a great teacher. His work may be also
called academic, in that his standpoint is always that of the Justinianean
law, although he limits his exposition to those topics which had living

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interest for the twelfth century. Private substantial law forms the chief
matter, but procedure is set forth and penal law touched upon. The author
appreciates the historical development of the Roman law and the character
of its various sources—praetorian law, constitutiones principum, and
responsa prudentium. He also shows independence, and a regard for legal
reasoning and the demands of justice. While he sets forth the jus civile, his
exposition and approval follow the dictates of the jus naturale.
“The established laws are to be understood benignly, so as to preserve
their spirit, and prevent their departure from equity; for the Judge
recognizes ordainments as legitimate when they conform to the
principles of justice (ratio equitatis).... Interpretation is sometimes
general and imperative, as when the lawgiver declares it: then it must be
applied not only to the matter for which it is announced, but in all like
cases. Sometimes an interpretation is imperative, but only for the
special case, like the interpretation which is declared by those
adjudicating a cause. It is then to be accepted in that cause, but not in
like instances; for not by precedents, but by the laws are matters to be
adjusted. There is another kind of interpretation which binds no one,
that made by teachers explaining an ambiguous law, for although it may
be admissible because sound, still it compels no one. For every
interpretation should so be made as not to depart from justice, and that
all absurdity may be avoided and no door opened to fraud.”[387]
One must suppose that such concise statements were explained and
qualified in the author’s lectures. But even as they stand, they afford an
exposition of Roman principles of interpretation. Not only under the Roman
Empire, but subsequently in mediaeval times, the Roman lawyer or the
canonist did not pay the deference to adjudicated precedent which is felt by
the English or American judge. The passage in the Codex which “Irnerius”
was expounding commands that the judge, in deciding a case, shall follow
the laws and the reasoning of the great jurists, rather than the decision of a
like controversy.
Since the author of this Summa weighs the justice, the reason, and the
convenience of the laws, and compares them with each other, his book is a
work of jurisprudence. Its qualities may be observed in its discussion of
possession and the rights arising therefrom. The writer has just been

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expounding the usucapio, an institution of the jus civile strictly speaking,
whereby the law of Rome in certain instances protected and, after three
years, perfected, the title to property which one had in good faith acquired
from a vendor who was not the owner:
“Now we must discuss the ratio possessionis. Usucapio in the jus civile
hinges on possession, and ownership by the jus naturale may take its
origin in possession. There are many differences in the ways of
acquiring possession, which must be considered. And since in the
constitutiones and responsa prudentium divers reasons are adduced
regarding possession, my associates have begged that I would expound
this important and obscure subject in which is mingled the ratio both of
the civil and the natural law. So I will do my best. First one must
consider what possession is, how it is acquired, maintained, or lost.
Possession (here the author follows Paulus and Labeo in the Digest) is
as when one’s feet are set upon a thing, when body naturally rests on
body. To acquire possession is to begin to possess. Herein one considers
both the fact and the right. The fact arises through ourselves or our
representative. It is understood differently as to movables and as to
land; for the movable we take in our hand, but we take possession of a
farm by going upon it with this intent and laying hold of a sod. The
intent to possess is crucial. Thus a ring put in the hand of a sleeper is not
possessed for lack of intent on his part. You possess naturally when with
mind and body (yours or another’s who represents you) you hold or sit
upon with intent to possess. Corporeal things you properly possess, and
acquire possession of, by your own or your agent’s hand. In the same
manner you retain. Incorporeal things cannot be possessed properly
speaking, but the civil law accords a quasi possession of them.”
Then follows a discussion of the persons through whom another may have
possession, and of the various modes of possessing longa manu without
actual touch:
“It is one thing when the possession begins with you, and another when
it is transferred to you by a prior possessor: for possession begins in
three ways, by occupation, accession, and transfer. You occupy the thing
that belongs to no one. By accession you acquire possession in two
ways. Thus the increment may be possessed, as the fruit of thy

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handmaid; or the accession consists in the union with a larger thing
which is yours, as when alluvium is deposited on your land. Again
possession is transferred to you,”
voluntarily or otherwise. He now discusses the various modes in which
possession is acquired by transfer, then the nature of the justa or injusta
causa with which possession may begin, and the effect on the rights of the
possessor, and then some matters more peculiar to the time of Justinian.
After which he passes to the loss of possession, and concludes with saying
that he has endeavoured to go over the whole subject, and whatever is
omitted or insufficiently treated, he begs that it be laid to the fault of
humanae imbecillitatis. The discussion reads like a carefully drawn outline
which his lecture should expand.[388]
The knowledge and understanding of the Roman law in the mediaeval
centuries should be viewed in conjunction with the general progress of
intellectual aptitude during the same periods. The growth of legal
knowledge will then show itself as a part of mediaeval development, as one
phase of the flowering of the mediaeval intellect. For the treatment of
Roman law presents stages essentially analogous to those by which the
Middle Ages reached their understanding and appropriation of other
portions of their great inheritance from classical antiquity and the
Christianity of the Fathers. Let us recapitulate: the Roman law, adapted, or
corrupted if one will, epitomized and known chiefly in its later enacted
forms, was never unapplied nor the study of it quite abandoned. It
constituted a great part of the law of Italy and southern France; in these two
regions likewise was its study least neglected. We have observed the
superficial and mainly linguistic nature of the glosses which this early
mediaeval period interlined or wrote on the margins of the source-books
drawn upon, also the rude and barbarous nature of the earlier summaries
and compilations. They were helps to a crude practical knowledge of the
law. Gradually the treatment seems to become more intelligent, a little
nearer the level of the matter excerpted or made use of. Through the
eleventh century it is evident that social conditions were demanding and
also facilitating an increase in legal knowledge; and at that century’s close a
by no means stupid compilation appears, the Petri exceptiones, and perhaps
such a fairly intelligent manual for elementary instruction as the
Brachylogus. These works indicate that the instruction in the law was

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improving. We have also the sparse references to schools of law, at Rome,
at Ravenna, at Orleans. Then we come upon the Summa Codicis called of
Irnerius, of uncertain provenance, like the Petrus and Brachylogus. But
there is no need to be informed specifically of its place and date in order to
recognize its advance in legal intelligence, in veritable jurisprudence. The
writer was a master of the law, an adept in its exposition, and his oral
teaching must have been of a high order. With this book we have
unquestionably touched the level of the strong beginnings of the greatest of
mediaeval schools of Roman law.
Its seat was Bologna, one of the chief centres of the civic and commercial
life of Lombardy. The Lombards themselves had shown a persistent legal
genius: their own Teutonic codes, enacted in Italy, had maintained
themselves in that land of Roman law and custom. Lombard codification
had almost reached a jurisprudence of its own, at Pavia, the juridical centre
of Lombardy. The provisions of various codes had been compared and put
together in a sort of Concordia, as early as the ninth century.[389] Possibly
the rivalry of Lombard law might stimulate those learned in the law of
Rome to sharper efforts to expound it and prove its superiority. Moreover,
all sides of civic life and culture were flourishing in that region where novel
commercial relations were calling for a corresponding progress in the law,
and especially for a better knowledge of the Roman law which alone
afforded provision for their regulation.
As some long course of human development approaches its climax, the
advance apparently becomes so rapid as to give the impression of
something suddenly happening, a sudden leap upward of the human spirit.
The velocity of the movement seems to quicken as the summit is neared.
One easily finds examples, for instance the fifth century before Christ in
Greek art, or the fourth century in Greek philosophy, or again the excellence
so quickly reached apparently by the Middle High German poetry just about
the year 1200. But may not the seeming suddenness of the phenomenon be
due to lack of information as to antecedents? and the flare of the final
achievement even darken what went before? Yet, in fact, as a movement
nears its climax, it may become more rapid. For, as the promoting energies
and favouring conditions meet in conjunction, their joint action becomes
more effective. Forces free themselves from cumbrances and draw aid from
one another. Thus when the gradual growth of intellectual faculty effects a

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conjunction with circumstances which offer a fair field, and the prizes of
life as a reward, a rapid increase of power may evince itself in novel and
timely productivity.
This may suggest the manner of the apparently sudden rise of the Bologna
school of Roman law, which, be it noted, took place but a little before the
time of Gratian’s achievement in the Canon law, itself contemporaneous
with the appearance of Peter Lombard’s novel Books of Sentences.[390] The
preparation, although obscure, existed; and the school after its
commencement passed onward through stages of development, to its best
accomplishment, and then into a condition of stasis, if not decline. Irnerius
apparently was its first master; and of his life little is known. He was a
native of Bologna. His name as causidicus is attached to a State paper of the
year 1113. Thereafter he appears in the service of the German emperor
Henry V. We have no sure trace of him after 1118, though there is no reason
to suppose that he did not live and labour for some further years. He had
taught the Arts at Ravenna and Bologna before teaching, or perhaps
seriously studying, the law. But his career as a teacher of the law doubtless
began before the year 1113, when he is first met with as a man of affairs.
Accounts agree in ascribing to him the foundation of the school.
Unless the Summa Codicis already mentioned, and a book of Quaestiones,
be really his, his glosses upon Justinian’s Digest, Codex, and Novels, are all
we have of him;[391] of the rest we know by report. The glosses themselves
indicate that this jurist had been a grammarian, and used the learning of his
former profession in his exposition of the law. His interlinear glosses are
explanations of words, and would seem to represent his earlier, more
tentative, work when he was himself learning the meaning of the law. But
the marginal glosses are short expositions of the passages to which they are
attached, and perhaps belong to the time of his fuller command over the
legal material. They indicate, besides, a critical consideration of the text,
and even of the original connection which the passage in the Digest held in
the work of the jurisconsult from which it had been taken. Some of them
show an understanding of the chronological sequence of the sources of the
Roman law, e.g. that the law-making power had existed in the people and
then passed to the emperors. These glosses of Irnerius represent a clear
advance in jurisprudence over any previous legal comment subsequent to
the Interpretatio attached to the Breviarium. It was also part of his plan to

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equip his manuscripts of the Codex with extracts taken from the text of the
Novels, and not from the Epitome of Julian. He appears also as a lawyer
versed in the practice of the law. For he wrote a book of forms for notaries
and a treatise on procedure, neither of which is extant.[392]
The accomplishment of the Bologna school may be judged more fully from
the works, still extant, of some of its chief representatives in the generations
following Irnerius. A worthy one was Placentinus, a native of Piacenza. The
year of his birth is unknown, but he died in 1192, after a presumably full
span of life, passed chiefly as a student and teacher of the law. He taught in
Mantua and Montpellier, as well as in Bologna. He was an accomplished
jurist and a lover of the classic literature. His work entitled De varietate
actionum was apparently the first attempt to set forth the Roman law in an
arrangement and form that did not follow the sources.[393] He opens his
treatise with an allegory of a noble dame, hight Jurisprudentia, within the
circle of whose sweet and honied utterances many eager youths were
thronging. Placentinus drew near, and received from her the book which he
now gives to others.[394] This little allegory savours of the De consolatione
of Boëthius, or, if one will, of Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae.
The most admirable surviving work of Placentinus is his Summa of the
Codex of Justinian. His autobiographical proemium shows him not lacking
in self-esteem, and tells why he undertook the work. He had thought at first
to complete the Summa of Rogerius, an older glossator, but then decided to
put that book to sleep, and compose a full Summa of the Codex himself,
from the beginning to the end. This by the favour of God he has done; it is
the work of his own hands, from head to heel, and all the matter is his own
—not borrowed. Next he wrote for beginners a Summa of the Institutes.
After which he returned to his own town, and shortly proceeded thence to
Bologna, whither he had been called. “There in the citadel (in castello) for
two years I expounded the laws to students; I brought the other teachers to
the threshold of envy; I emptied their benches of students. The hidden
places of the law I laid open, I reconciled the conflicts of enactments, I
unlocked the secrets most potently.” His success was great, and he was
besought to continue his course of lectures. He complied, and remained two
years more, and then returned to Montpellier, in order to compose a Summa
of the Digest.[395] If indeed Placentinus speaks bombastically of his work,

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its excellence excuses him. His well-earned reputation as a jurist and
scholar long endured.
Quaestiones, Distinctiones, Libri disputationum, Summae of the Codex or
the Institutions, and other legal writings, are extant in goodly bulk and
number from the Bologna school. The names of the men are almost legion,
and many were of great repute in their day both as jurists and as men of
affairs. We may mention Azo and Accursius, of a little later time. Azo’s
name appears in public documents from the year 1190 to 1220—and he
may have survived the latter date by some years. His works were of such
compass and excellence as to supersede those of his predecessors. His
glosses still survive, and his Lectura on the Codex, his Summae of the
Codex and the Institutes, and his Quaestiones, and Brocarda, the last a sort
of work stating general legal propositions and those contradicting them.
Azo’s glosses were so complete as to constitute a continuous exposition of
the entire legislation of Justinian. His Summae of the Codex and Institutes
drove those of Placentinus out of use, which we note with a smile.[396]
None of the glossators is better known than Accursius. He comes before us
as a Florentine, and apparently a peasant’s son. He died an old man rich and
famous, about the year 1260. Azo was his teacher. In 1252 he was Podesta
of Bologna, which indicates the respect in which men held him. Villani, the
Florentine historian, describes him as of martial form, grave, thoughtful,
even melancholy in aspect, as if always meditating; a man of brilliant
talents and extraordinary memory, sober and chaste in life, but delighting in
noble vesture. His hearers drank in the laws of living from his mien and
manners no less than from the dissertations of his mouth.[397] Late in life he
retired to his villa, and there in quiet worked on his great Glossa till he died.
This famous, perhaps all too famous, Glossa ordinaria was a digest and, as
it proved, a final one, of the glosses of his predecessors and contemporaries.
He drew not only from their glosses, but also on their Summae and other
writings. He added a good deal of his own. Great as was the feat, the
somewhat deadened talent of a compiler shows in the result, which
flattened out the individual labours of so many jurists. It came at once into
general use in the courts and outside of them; for it was a complete
commentary on the Justinianean law, so compendious and convenient that
there was no further need of the glosses of earlier men. This book marked

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the turning-point of the Bologna school, after which its productivity
lessened. Its work was done: Codex, Novels, and above all the Pandects
were rescued from oblivion, and fully expounded, so far as the matter in
them was still of interest. When the labours of the school had been
conveniently heaped together in one huge Glossa, there was no vital
inducement to do this work again. The school of the glossators was functus
officio. Naturally with the lessening of the call, productivity diminished.
Little was left to do save to gloss the glosses, an epigonic labour which
would not attract men of talent. Moreover, treating the older glosses, instead
of the original text, as the matter to be interpreted was unfavourable to
progress in the understanding of the latter.
Yet, for a little, the breath of life was still to stir in the school of the
glossators. There was a man of fame, a humanist indeed, named Cino,
whose beautiful tomb still draws the lover of things lovely to Pistoia. Cino
was also a jurist, and it came to him to be the teacher of one whose name is
second to none among the legists of the Middle Ages. This was Bartolus,
born probably in the year 1314 at Sassoferrato in the duchy of Urbino. He
was a scholar, learned in geometry and Hebrew, also a man of affairs. He
taught the law at Pisa and Perugia, and in the last-named town he died in
1357, not yet forty-four years old. Bartolus wrote and compiled full
commentaries on the entire Corpus juris civilis; and yet he produced no
work differing in kind from works of his predecessors. Moreover, between
him and the body of the law rose the great mass of gloss and comment
already in existence, through which he did not always penetrate to the
veritable Corpus. Yet his labours were inspired with the energy of a
vigorous nature, and he put fresh thoughts into his commentaries.[398]
The school of glossators presented the full Roman law to Europe. The
careful and critical interpretation of the text of Justinian’s Codification, of
the Digest above all, was their great service. In performing it, these jurists
also had educated themselves and developed their own intelligence. They
had also put together in Summae the results of their own education in the
law. These works facilitated legal study and sharpened the faculties of
students and professors. Books of Quaestiones, legal disputations, works
upon legal process and formulae, served the same ends.[399] These men
were deficient in historical knowledge. Yet they compared Digest, Codex,
and Novels; they tried to re-establish the purity of the text; they weighed

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and they expounded. Theirs was an intellectual effort to master the
jurisprudence of Rome: their labours constituted a renaissance of
jurisprudence; and the fact that they were often men of affairs as well as
professors, kept them from ignoring the practical bearings of the matters
which they taught.
The work of the glossators may be compared with that of the theologian
philosophers of the thirteenth century—Alexander of Hales, Albertus
Magnus, Thomas Aquinas—who were winning for the world a new and
comprehensive knowledge of Aristotle. Both jurists and philosophers, in
their different spheres, carried through a more profound study, and reached
a more comprehensive knowledge, of a great store of antique thought, than
previous mediaeval centuries conceived of. Moreover, the interpretation of
the Corpus juris was quite as successful as the interpretation of Aristotle. It
was in fact surer, because freer from the deflections of religious motive. No
consideration of agreement or disagreement with Scripture troubled the
glossators’ interpretation of the Digest, though indeed they may have been
interested in finding support for whatever political views they held upon the
claims of emperor and pope. But this did not disturb them as much as
Aristotle’s opinion that the universe was eternal, worried Albertus and
Aquinas.

IV
The Church, from the time of its first recognition by the Roman Empire,
lived under the Roman law;[400] and the constitutions safeguarding its
authority were large and ample before the Empire fell. Constantine, to be
sure, never dreamed of the famous “Donation of Constantine” forged by a
later time, yet his enactments fairly launched the great mediaeval Catholic
Church upon the career which was to bring it more domination than was
granted in this pseudo-charter of its power. A number of Constantine’s
enactments were preserved by the Theodosian Code, in which the powers
and privileges of Church and clergy were portentously set forth.
The Theodosian Code freed the property of the Church from most fiscal
burdens, and the clergy from taxes, from public and military service, and
from many other obligations which sometimes the Code groups under the

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head of sordida munera. The Church might receive all manner of bequests,
and it inherited the property of such of its clergy as did not leave near
relatives surviving them. Its property generally was inalienable; and the
clergy were accorded many special safeguards. Slaves might be manumitted
in a church. The church edifices were declared asylums of refuge from
pursuers, a privilege which had passed to the churches from the heathen
fanes and the statues of the emperors. Constitution after constitution was
hurled against the Church’s enemies. The Theodosian Code has one chapter
containing sixty-six constitutions directed against heretics, the combined
result of which was to deprive them, if not of life and property, at least of
protected legal existence.
Of enormous import was the sweeping recognition on the Empire’s part of
the validity of episcopal jurisdiction. No bishop might be summoned before
a secular court as a defendant, or compelled to give testimony. Falsely to
accuse one of the clergy rendered the accuser infamous. All matters
pertaining to religion and church discipline might be brought only before
the bishop’s court, which likewise had plenary jurisdiction over
controversies among the clergy. It was also open to the laity for the
settlement of civil disputes. The command not to go to law before the
heathen came down from Paul (1 Cor. vi.), and together with the severed
and persecuted condition of the early Christian communities, may be
regarded as the far source of the episcopal jurisdiction, which thus divinely
sanctioned tended to extend its arbitrament to all manner of legal
controversies.[401] To be sure, under the Christian Roman Empire the
authority of the Church as well as its privileges rested upon imperial law.
Yet the emperors recognized, rather than actually created, the ecclesiastical
authority. And when the Empire was shattered, there stood the Church erect
amid the downfall of the imperial government, and capable of supporting
itself in the new Teutonic kingdoms.
The constitutions of Christian emperors did not from their own force and
validity become Ecclesiastical or Canon law—the law relating to Christians
as such, and especially to the Church and its functions. The source of that
law was God; the Church was its declarative organ. Acceptance on the
Church’s part was requisite before any secular law could become a law of
the Church.

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Canon law may be taken to include theology, or may be limited to the law
of the organization and functions of the Church taken in a large sense as
inclusive of the laity in their relations to the religion of Christ.[402]
Obviously part comes from Christ directly, through the Old Testament as
well as New. The other part, and in bulk far greater, emanates from His
foundation, the Church, under the guidance of His Spirit, and may be added
to and modified by the Church from age to age. It is expressed in custom,
universal and established, and it is found in written form in the works of the
Fathers, in the decrees of Councils, in the decretals of the popes, and in the
concordats and conventions with secular sovereignties. From the beginning,
canon law tacitly or expressly adopted the constitutions of the Christian
emperors relating to the Church, as well as the Roman law generally, under
which the Church lived in its civil relations.
The Church arose within the Roman Empire, and who shall say that its
wonderfully efficient and complete organization at the close of the patristic
period was not the final creation of the legal and constructive genius of
Rome, newly inspired by the spirit of Christianity? But the centre of interest
had been transferred from earth to heaven, and human aims had been recast
by the Gospel and the understanding of it reached by Christian doctors.
Evidently since the ideals of the Church were to be other than those of the
Roman Empire, the law which it accepted or evolved would have ideals
different from those of the Roman law. If the great Roman jurists created a
legal formulation and rendering of justice adequate for the highly developed
social and commercial needs of Roman citizens, the law of the Church,
while it might borrow phrases, rules, and even general principles, from that
system, could not fail to put new meaning in them. For example, the
constant will to render each his due, which was justitia in the Roman law,
might involve different considerations where the soul’s salvation, and not
the just allotment of the goods of this world, was the law’s chief aim. Again,
what new meaning might attach to the honeste vivere and the alterum non
laedere of pagan legal ethics. Honeste vivere might mean to do no sin
imperilling the soul; alterum non laedere would acquire the meaning of
doing nothing to another which might impede his progress toward salvation.
Injuries to a man in his temporalities were less important.
Further, Christianity although conceived as a religion for all mankind, was
founded on a definite code and revelation. The primary statement was

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contained in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments. These
were for all men, universal in application and of irrefragable validity and
truth. Here was some correspondence to the conception of the jus gentium
as representative of universal principles of justice and expediency, and
therefore as equivalent to the jus naturale. There was something of logical
necessity in the transference of this conception to the law of Christ. Says
Gratian at the beginning of his Decretum: “It is jus naturae which is
contained in the Law and the Gospel, by which every one is commanded to
do to another as he would be done by, and forbidden to inflict on him what
he does not wish to happen to himself.” Since the Law and the Gospel
represent the final law of life for all men, they are par excellence the jus
naturae, as well as lex divina. Gratian quotes from Augustine: “Divinum jus
in scripturis divinis habemus, humanum in legibus regum.”[403] And then
adds: “By its authority the jus naturale prevails over custom and
constitution. Whatever in customs or writings is contrary to the jus naturale
is to be held vain and invalid.” Again he says more explicitly: “Since
therefore nothing is commanded by natural law other than what God wills
to be, and nothing is forbidden except what God prohibits, and since
nothing may be found in the canonical Scripture except what is in the divine
laws, the laws will rest divinely in nature (divine leges natura consistent). It
is evident, that whatever is proved to be contrary to the divine will or
canonical Scripture, is likewise opposed to natural law. Wherefore whatever
should give way before divine will or Scripture or the divine laws, over that
ought the jus naturale to prevail. Therefore whatever ecclesiastical or
secular constitutions are contrary to natural law are to be shut out.”[404]
The canon law is a vast sea. Its growth, its age-long agglomerate accretion,
the systematization of its huge contents, have long been subjects for
controversialists and scholars. Its sources were as multifarious as those of
the Roman law. First the Scriptures and the early quasi-apostolic and
pseudo-apostolic writings; then the traditions of primitive Christianity and
also the writings of the Fathers; likewise ecclesiastical customs, long
accepted and legitimate, and finally the two great written sources, the
decretals or decisions of the popes and the decrees of councils. From
patristic times collections were made of the last. These collections from a
chronological gradually acquired a topical and more systemic arrangement,
which the compilers followed more completely after the opening of the

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tenth century. The decisions of the popes also had been collected, and then
were joined to conciliar compilations and arranged after the same topical
plan.
In all of them there was unauthentic matter, accepted as if its pseudo-
authorship or pseudo-source were genuine. But in the stormy times of the
ninth century following the death of Charlemagne, the method of argument
through forged authority was exceptionally creative. It produced two
masterpieces which won universal acceptance. The first was a collection of
false Capitularies ascribed to Charlemagne and Louis the Pious, and
ostensibly the work of a certain Benedictus Levita, deacon of the Church of
Mainz, who worked in the middle of the century. Far more famous and
important was the book of False Decretals, put together and largely written,
that is forged, about the same time, probably in the diocese of Rheims, and
appearing as the work of Saint Isidore of Seville. This contained many
forged letters of the early popes and other forged matter, including the
Epistle or “Donation” of Constantine; also genuine papal letters and
conciliar decrees. These false collections were accepted by councils and
popes, and formed part of subsequent compilations.
From the tenth century onward many such compilations were made, all of
them uncritical as to the genuineness of the matter taken, and frequently ill-
arranged and discordant. They were destined to be superseded by the great
work in which appears the better methods and more highly trained
intelligence developing at the Bologna School in the first part of the twelfth
century. Its author was Gratianus, a monk of the monastery of St. Felix at
Bologna. He was a younger contemporary of Irnerius and of Peter
Lombard. Legend made him the latter’s brother, with some propriety; for
the compiler of those epoch-making Sentences represents the same stage in
the appropriation of the patristic theological heritage of the Middle Ages,
that Gratian represents in the handling of the canon law. The Lombard’s
Sentences made a systematic and even harmonizing presentation of the
theology of the Fathers in their own language; and the equally immortal
Decretum of Gratian accomplished a like work for the canon law. This is
the name by which his work is known, but not the name he gave it. That
appears to have been Concordia discordantium canonum, which indicates
his methodical presentation of his matter and his endeavour to reconcile
conflicting propositions.

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The first part of the Decretum was entitled “De jure naturae et
constitutionis.” It presents the sources of the law, the Church’s organization
and administration, the ordination and ranking of the clergy, the election
and consecration of bishops, the authority of legates and primates. The
second part treats of the procedure of ecclesiastical courts, also the law
regulating the property of the Church, the law of monks and the contract of
marriage. The third part is devoted to the Sacraments and the Liturgy.
Gratian’s usual method is as follows: He will open with an authoritative
proposition. If he finds it universally accepted, it stands as valid. But if
there are opposing statements, he tries to reconcile them, either pointing out
the difference in date (for the law of the Church may be progressive), or
showing that one of the discordant rules had but local or otherwise limited
application, or that the first proposition is the rule, while the others make
the exceptions. If he still fails to establish concord, he searches to find
which rule had been followed in the Roman Church, and accepts that as
authoritative. A rule being thus made certain, he proceeds with subdivisions
and distinctions, treating them as deductions from the main rule and
adjusting the supporting texts. Or he will suppose a controversy (causa) and
discuss its main and secondary issues. Throughout he accompanies his
authoritative matter with his own commentary—commonly cited as the
Dicta Gratiani.[405] The Decretum was characterized by sagacity of
interpretation and reconcilement, by vast learning, and clear ordering of the
matter. Only it was uncritical as to the genuineness of its materials; and a
number of Gratian’s own statements were subsequently disapproved in
papal decretals. The Dicta Gratiani never received such formal sanction by
pope or council as the writings of Roman jurists received by being taken
into Justinian’s Digest.
The papal decretals had become the great source of canonical law. Gratian’s
work was soon supplemented by various compilations known as
Appendices ad Decretum or Decretales extravagantes, to wit, those which
the Decretum did not contain. These, however, were superseded by the
collection, or rather codification, made at the command of the great
canonist Gregory IX. and completed in the year 1234. This authoritative
work preserved Gratian’s Decretum intact, but suppressed, or abridged and
reordered, the decretals contained in subsequent collections. Arranged in
five books, it forms the second part of the Corpus juris canonici. In 1298

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Boniface VIII. promulgated a supplementary book known as the Sextus of
Boniface. This with a new collection promulgated under the authority of
Clement V. in 1313, called the Clementinae, and the Extravagantes of his
successor John XXII. and certain other popes, constitute the last portions of
the Corpus juris canonici.[406]
According to the law of the Empire the emperor’s authority extended over
the Church, its doctrine, its discipline, and its property. Such authority was
exercised by the emperors from Constantine to Justinian. But the Church
had always stood upon the principle that it was better to obey God rather
than man. This had been maintained against the power of the pagan Empire,
and was not to be sunned out of existence by imperial favour. It was still
better to obey God rather than the emperor. The Church still should say who
were its members and entitled to participate in the salvation which it
mediated. Ecclesiastical authorities could excommunicate; that was their
engine of coercion. These principles were incarnate in Ambrose, Bishop of
Milan, withstanding and prohibiting Theodosius from Christian fellowship
until he had done penance for the massacre at Thessalonica. Of necessity
they inhered in the Church; they were of the essence of its strength to fulfil
its purpose; they stood for the duly constituted power of Christian
resolution to uphold and advance the peremptory truth of Christ.
So such principles persisted through the time of the hostile and then the
favouring Roman Empire. And when the Empire in fact crumbled and fell,
what de facto and de jure authority was best fitted to take the place of the
imperial supremacy? The Empire represented a universal secular dominion;
the Church was also universal, and with a universality now reaching out
beyond the Empire’s shrinking boundaries. In the midst of political
fragments otherwise disjoined, the Church endured as the universal unity.
The power of each Teutonic king was great in fact and law within his realm.
Yet he was but a local potency, while the Church existed through his and
other realms. And when the power of one Teutonic line (the Carolingian)
reached something like universal sway, the Church was also there within
and without. It held the learning of the time, and the culture which large-
minded seculars respected; and quite as much as the empire of
Charlemagne, it held the prestige of Rome. Witness the attitude of Charles
Martel and Pippin toward Boniface the great apostle, and the attitude of
Boniface toward the Gregories whose legate he proclaimed himself, and

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upon whose central authority he based his claims to be obeyed. Through the
reforms of the Frankish Church, carried out by him with the support of
Charles Martel and Pippin, the ecclesiastical supremacy of Rome was
established. Charlemagne, indeed, from the nature and necessities of his
own transcendent power, possessed in fact the ecclesiastical authority of the
Roman emperors, whom men deemed his predecessors. But after him the
secular power fell again into fragments scarcely locally efficient, while the
Church’s universality of authority endured.
In the unstable fragmentation of secular rule in the ninth century, the
Isidorean Decretals presented the truth of the situation as it was to be,
although not as it had been in the times of the Church dignitaries whose
names were forged for that collection. And thereafter, as the Church
recovered from its tenth-century disintegration, it advanced to the pragmatic
demonstration of the validity of those false Decretals, on through the
tempests of the age of Hildebrand to the final triumph of Innocent III. at the
opening of the thirteenth century. Evidently the canon law, whatever might
be its immediate or remote source, drew its authority from the sanction of
the Roman Catholic Church, which enunciated it and made it into a body
corresponding to the Church’s functions. It was what the Church
promulgated as the law of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the kingdom of
God on earth. It should be the temporal and legal counterpart of the
Church’s spiritual purposes. Its general tendency and purpose was the
promotion of the Church’s saving aim, which regarded all things in the light
of their relationship to life eternal. Therefore the Church’s law could not but
define and consider all worldly interests, all personal and property rights
and secular authority, with constant regard to men’s need of salvation. The
advancement of that must be the final appellate standard of legal right.
Such was the event. The entire canon law might be lodged within those
propositions which Hildebrand enunciated and Innocent III. realized. For
the salvation of souls, all authority on earth had been entrusted by Christ to
Peter and his successors. Theirs was the spiritual sword; secular power, the
sword material, was to be exercised under the pope’s mandate and
permission. No king or emperor, no layman whatsoever, was exempt from
the supreme authority of the pope, who also was the absolute head of the
Church, which had become a monarchy. “The Lord entrusted to Peter not
only the universal Church, but the government of the whole world,” writes

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Innocent III., whose pontificate almost made this principle a fact. In private
matters no member of the clergy could be brought before a secular court;
and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over the laity threatened to
reduce the secular jurisdiction to narrow functions.[407] The property of the
Church might not be taxed or levied on by any temporal ruler or
government; nor could the Church’s functions and authority be controlled
or limited by any secular decree. Universally throughout every kingdom the
Church was a sovereignty, not only in matters spiritual, but with respect to
all the personal and material relationships that might be connected in any
way with the welfare of souls.[408]

V
The exposition of the Corpus juris civilis in the school of the glossators was
of great moment in the evolution of mediaeval political theory, which in its
turn yields one more example of the mediaeval application of thoughts
derived from antique and patristic sources. Political thinking in the Middle
Ages sought its surest foundation in theology; then it built itself up with
concepts drawn from the philosophy and social theory of the antique world;
and lastly it laid hold on jurisprudence, using the substance and reasoning
of the Roman and the Canon law.
Mediaeval ideas upon government and the relations between the individual
and his earthly sovereign, started from theological premises, of patristic
origin: e.g. that the universe and man were made by God, a miraculous
creation, springing from no other cause, and subject to no other
fundamental law, than God’s unsearchable will, which never ceases to direct
the whole creation to the Creator’s ends. A further premise was the
Scriptural revelation of God’s purpose as to man, with all the contents of
that revelation touching the overweening importance of man’s deathless
soul.
Unity—the unity of the creation—springs from these premises, or is one of
them. The principle of this unity is God’s will. Within the universal whole,
mankind also constitutes a unit, a community, specially ordained and
ordered. The Middle Ages, following the example of the patristic time, were
delivered over to allegory, and to an unbridled recognition of the deductions

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of allegorical reasoning. Mankind was a community. Mankind was also an
organism, the mystical body whereof the head was Christ. Here was an
allegory potent for foolishness or wisdom. It was used to symbolize the
mystery of the oneness of all mankind in God, and the organic co-
ordination of all sorts and conditions of men with one another in the divine
commonwealth on earth; it was also drawn out into every detail of banal
anthropomorphic comparison. From John of Salisbury to Nicholas Cusanus,
Occam and Dante, no point of fancied analogy between the parts and
members of the body and the various functions of Church and State was left
unexploited.[409]
Mankind then is one community; also an organism. But within the human
organism abides the duality of soul and body; and the Community of
Mankind on earth is constituted of two orders, the spiritual and temporal,
Church and State.[410] There must be either co-ordination between State and
Church, body and soul, or subordination of the temporal and material to the
eternal and spiritual. To evoke an adjustment of what was felt to be an
actually universal opposition, was the chief problem of mediaeval polity,
and forms the warp and woof of conflicting theories. The Church asserted a
full spiritual supremacy even in things temporal, and, to support the claim,
brought sound arguments as well as foolish allegory—allegory pretending
to be horror-stricken at the vision of an animal with two heads, a bicephalic
monstrosity. But does not the Church comprise all mankind? Did not God
found it? Is not Christ its head, and under Him his vicegerent Peter and all
the popes? Then shall not the pope who commands the greater, which is the
spiritual, much more command the less, the temporal? And all the
argumentation of the two swords, delivered to Peter, comes into play. That
there are two swords is but a propriety of administration. Secular rulers
wield the secular sword at the pope’s command. They are instruments of the
Church. Fundamentally the State is an ecclesiastical institution, and the
bounds of secular law are set by the law spiritual: the canon law overrides
the laws of every State. True, in this division, the State also is ordained of
God, but only as subordinate. And divinely ordained though it be, the origin
of the State lies in sin; for sin alone made government and law needful for
man.[411]
On the other hand, the partisans of the State upheld co-ordination as the true
principle.[412] The two swords represent distinct powers, Sacerdotium and

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Imperium. The latter as well as the former is from God; and the two are co-
ordinates, although of course the Church which wields the spiritual sword is
the higher. This theory creates no bicephalic monster. God is the universal
head. And even as man is body as well as soul, the human community is
State as well as Church; and the State needs the emperor for its head, as the
Church has the pope. The Roman Dominion, imperium mundi, was
legitimate, and by divine appointment has passed over to the Roman-
German emperor. Other views sustaining the scheme of co-ordination
upheld a plurality of states, rather than one universal Imperium. Of course
these opposing views of subordination or co-ordination of State and Church
took on every shade of diversity.
As to both Church and State, mediaeval political theory was predominantly
monarchical. Ideally this flowed from the thought of God as the true
monarch of the universe. Practically it comported with mediaeval social
conditions. Under Innocent III., if not under Gregory VII., the Church had
become a monarchy well-nigh absolute.[413] The pope’s power continued
plenary until the great schism and the age of councils evoked by it. For the
secular state, the common voice likewise favoured monarchy. The unity of
the social organism is best effected by the singleness of its head. Thomas
Aquinas authoritatively reasons thus, and Dante maintains that as the
unifying principle is Will, the will of one man is the best means to realize it.
[414] But monarchy is no absolute right existing for the ruler’s benefit, rather
it is an office to be righteously exercised for the good of the community.
The monarch’s power is limited, and if his command outrages law or right,
it is a nullity; his subjects need not obey, and the principle applies, that it is
better to obey God than man. Even when, as in the days of the
Hohenstaufen, the civil jurists claimed for the emperor the plenitudo
potestatis of a Roman Caesar, the opposite doctrine held strong, which gave
him only a limited power, in its nature conditioned on its rightful exercise.
Moreover, rights of the community were not unrecognized, and indeed were
supported by elaborate theories as the Middle Ages advanced to their
climacteric. The thought of a contract between ruler and people frequently
appears, and reference to the contract made at Hebron between David and
the people of Israel (2 Sam. v. 3). The civil jurist also looked back to the
principle of the jus gentium giving to every free people the right to choose a
ruler; also to that famous text of the Digest, where, through the lex regia,

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the people were said to have conferred their powers upon the princeps.[415]
With such thoughts of the people’s rights came theories of representation
and of the monarch as the people’s representative; and Roman corporation
law supplied the rules for mediaeval representative assemblies, lay and
clerical.[416]
The old Germanic state was a conglomerate of positive law and specific
custom, having no existence beyond the laws, which were its formative
constituents. Such a conception did not satisfy mediaeval publicists, imbued
with antique views of the State’s further aims and potency. Nor were all
men satisfied with the State’s divinely ordered origin in human sinfulness.
An ultimate ground for its existence was sought, commensurate with its
broadest aims. Such was found, not in positive, but in natural law—again an
antique conception. That a veritable natural law existed, all men agreed;
also that its source lay back of human conventions, somehow in the nature
of God. All admitted its absolute supremacy, binding alike upon popes and
secular monarchs, and rendering void all acts and positive laws
contravening it. It must be the State’s ultimate constituent ground.
God was the source of natural law. Some argued that it proceeded from His
will, as a command, others that its source was eternal Reason announcing
her necessary and unalterable dictates; again its source was held to lie more
definitely in the Reason that was identical with God the summa ratio in Deo
existens, as Aquinas puts it. From that springs the Lex naturalis, ordained to
rest on the participation of man, as a rational creature, in the moral order
which he perceives by the light of natural reason. This lex naturalis (or jus
naturale) is a true promulgated law, since God implants it for recognition in
the minds of men.[417] Absolute unconditional supremacy was ascribed to it,
and also to the jus divinum, which God revealed supernaturally for a
supramundane end. A cognate supremacy was ascribed to the jus commune
gentium, which was composed of rules of the jus naturale adapted to the
conditions of fallen human nature.
Such law was above the State, to which, on the other hand, positive law was
subject. Whenever the ruler was conceived as sovereign or absolute, he
likewise was deemed above positive law, but bound by these higher laws.
They were the source and sanction of the innate and indestructible rights of
the individual, to property and liberty and life as they were formulated at a

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later period. It is evident how the recognition of such rights fell in with the
Christian revelation of the absolute value of every individual in and for
himself and his immortal life. On the other hand, certain rights of the State,
or the community, were also indestructible and inalienable by virtue of the
nature of their source in natural law.[418]
This abstract of political theory has been stated in terms generalized to
vagueness, and with no attempt to follow the details or trace the historical
development. The purpose has been to give the general flavour of
mediaeval thought concerning Church and State, and the Individual as a
member of them both. One observes how the patristic and mediaeval
Christian thought mingles with the antique; and one may assume the
intellectual acumen applied by legist, canonist, and scholastic theologian to
the discussion and formulation of these high arguments. The mediaeval
genius for abstractions is evident, and the mediaeval faculty of linking them
to the affairs of life; clear also is the baneful effect of mediaeval allegory.
Even as men now-a-days are disposed to rest in the apparent reality of the
tangible phenomenon, so the mediaeval man just as commonly sought for
his reality in what the phenomenon might be conceived to symbolize.
Therefore in the higher political controversies, even as in other interests of
the human spirit, argument through allegory was accepted as legitimate, if
not convincing; and a proper sequence of thought was deemed to lie from
one symbolical meaning to another, with even a deeper validity than from
one palpable fact to that which followed from it.

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BOOK VII
ULTIMATE INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS OF
THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH
CENTURIES

CHAPTER XXXIV

SCHOLASTICISM: SPIRIT, SCOPE, AND
METHOD
The religious philosophy or theology of the Middle Ages is commonly
called scholasticism, and its exponents are called the scholastics. The name
applies most properly to the respectable academic thinkers. These, in the
early Middle Ages, usually were monks living in monasteries, like St.
Anselm, for instance, who was Abbot of Bec in Normandy before, to his
sorrow, he was made Archbishop of Canterbury. In the thirteenth century,
however, while these respected thinkers still were monks, or rather
mendicant friars, they were also university professors. Albertus Magnus and
St. Thomas Aquinas, the great Dominicans, and their friend St.
Bonaventura, who became the head of the Franciscan Order, all lectured at
the University of Paris, the chief university of the Middle Ages in the
domain of philosophy and theology. Moreover, as the scholastics were
respectable and academic, so they were usually orthodox Churchmen, good
Roman Catholics. The conduct or opinions of some of them, Abaelard for
example, became suspect to the Church authorities; yet Abaelard, although
his book had been condemned, kept within the Church’s pale, and died a
monk of Cluny. There were plenty of obdurate heretics in the Middle Ages;
but their bizarre ideas, sometimes coming down from Manichaean sources,
were scarcely germane to the central lines of mediaeval thought.[419]

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One hears of scholastic philosophy and scholastic theology; and assuredly
these mediaeval theologian-philosophers endeavoured to distinguish
between the one and the other phase of the matters which occupied their
minds. The distinction was intelligibly drawn and, in many treatises,
doubtless affected the choice and ordering of topics. Whether it was
consistently observed in the handling of those topics, is another question,
which perhaps should be answered in the negative. At all events, to attempt
to observe this distinction in considering the ultimate intellectual interests
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, might sap the matter of the human
interest attaching to it, to wit, that interest and validity possessed by all
serious effort to know—and to be saved. These were the motives of the
scholastics, whether they used their reason, or clung to revelation, or did
both, as they always did.
Mediaeval methods of thinking and topics of thought are no longer in
vogue. For the time, men have turned from the discussion of universals and
the common unity or separate individuality of mind, and are as little
concerned with transubstantiation as with the old dispute over investitures.
But the scholastics were men and so are we. Our humanity is one with
theirs. Men are still under the necessity of reflecting upon their own
existence and the world without, and still feel the need to reach conclusions
and the impulse to formulate consistently what seem to them vital
propositions. Herein we are blood kin to Gerbert and Anselm, to Abaelard
and Hugo of St. Victor, to Thomas Aquinas as well as Roger Bacon: and our
highest nature is one with theirs in the intellectual fellowship of human
endeavour to think out and present that which shall appease the mind.
Because of this kinship with the scholastics, and the sympathy which we
feel for the struggle which is the same in us and them, their intellectual
endeavours, their achieved conclusions, although now appearing as but apt
or necessitated phrases, may have for us the immortal interest of the eternal
human.
Let us then approach mediaeval thought as man meets man, and seek in it
for what may still be valid, or at least real to us, because agreeing with what
we find within ourselves. Being men as well as scholars, we would win
from its parchment-covered tomes those elements which if they do not
represent everlasting verities, are at least symbols of the permanent
necessities of the human mind. Whatever else there is in mediaeval thought,

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as touching us less nearly, may be considered by way of historical setting
and explanation.
In different men the impulse to know bears different relationships to the rest
of life. It sometimes seems self-impelled, and again palpably inspired by a
motive beyond itself. In some form, however, it winds itself into every
action of our mental faculties, and no province of life appears untouched by
this craving of the mind. Nevertheless to know is not the whole matter; for
with knowledge comes appetition or aversion, admiration or contempt, love
or abhorrence; and other impulses—emotional, desiderative, loving—impel
the human creature to realize its nature in states of heightened
consciousness that are not palpable modes of knowing, though they may be
replete with all the knowledge that the man has gained.
These ultimate cravings which we recognize in ourselves, inspired
mediaeval thought. Its course, its progress, its various phases, its contents
and completed systems, all represent the operation of human faculty
pressing to expression and realization under the accidental or “historical”
conditions of the mediaeval period. We may be sure that many kinds of
human craving and corresponding faculty realized themselves in mediaeval
philosophy, theology, piety and mysticism—the last a word used
provisionally, until we succeed in resolving it into terms of clearer
significance. And we also note that in these provinces, realization is
expression. Every faculty, every energy, in man seeks to function, to realize
its power in act. The sheer body—if there be sheer body—acts bodily,
operates, and so makes actual its powers. But those human energies which
are informed with mind, realize themselves in ardent or rational thought, or
in uttered words, or in products of the artfully devising hand. All this clearly
is expression, and corresponds, if it is not one and the same, with the
passing of energy from potency to the actuality which is its end and
consummation. Thus love, seeking its end, thereby seeks expression,
through which it is enhanced, and in which it is realized. Likewise, impelled
by the desire to know, the faculties of cognition and reason realize
themselves in expression; and in expression each part of rational knowledge
is clarified, completed, rendered accordant with the data of observation and
the laws or necessities of the mind.

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Human faculties form a correlated whole; and this composite human nature
seeks to act, to function. Thus the whole man strives to realize the fullest
actuality of his being, and satisfy or express the whole of him, and not alone
his reason, nor yet his emotions, or his appetites. This uttermost realization
of human being—man’s summum bonum or summa necessitas—cannot
unite the incompatible within its synthesis. It must be kept a consistent
ideal, a possible whole. Here the demiurge is the discriminating and
constructive intelligence, which builds together the permanent and valuable
elements of being, and excludes whatever cannot coexist in concord with
them. Yet the intelligence does not always set its own rational activities as
man’s furthest goal of realization. It may place love above reason. And, of
course, its discriminating judgment will be affected by current knowledge
and by dominant beliefs as to man and his destiny, the universe and God.
Manifestly whatever the thoughtful idealizing man in any period (and our
attention may at once focus itself upon the Middle Ages) adjudges to belong
to the final realization of his nature, will become an object of intellectual
interest for him; and he will deem it a proper subject for study and
meditation. The rational, spiritual, or even physical elements, which may
enter and compose this, his summum bonum, represent those intellectual
interests which may be termed ultimate, for the very reason, that they relate
to what the thinker deems his beatitude. These ultimate intellectual interests
possess an absolute sanction, for the lack of which whatever lies outside of
them tends to adjudge itself vain.
The philosophy, theology, and the profoundly felt and reasoned piety, of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries made up that period’s ultimate intellectual
interests. We are not concerned with other matters occupying its attention,
save as they bore on man’s supreme beatitude, which was held to consist in
his everlasting salvation and all that might constitute his bliss in that
unending state. The elements of this blessedness were not deemed to lie
altogether in rational cognition and its processes; for the conception of the
soul’s beatitude was catholic; and while with some men the intellectual
elements were dominant, with others salvation’s summit was attained along
the paths of spiritual emotion.
Obviously, from the side of the emotions, there could come no large and
lasting happiness, unless emotional desire and devotion were directed to

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that which might also satisfy the mind, or at all events, would not conflict
with its judgment. Hence the emotional side of the ultimate mediaeval ideal
was pietistic; because the mediaeval dogmatic faith regarded the emotional
impulses between one human being and another as distracting, if not
wicked. Such mortal impulses were so very difficult to harmonize with the
eternal beatitude which consisted in the cognition and love of God. This
principle was proclaimed by monks and theologians, or philosophers; it was
even recognized (although not followed) in the literature which glorified the
love of man and woman, but in which the lover-knight so often ends a
hermit, and the convent at last receives his sinful mistress. On the other
hand, reason, with its practical and speculative knowledge, is sterile when
unmixed with piety and love. This is the sum of Bonaventura’s fervid
arguments, and is as clearly, if more quietly, recognized by Aquinas, with
whom fides without caritas is informis, formless, very far indeed from its
true actuality or realization.
Thus, for the full realization of man’s highest good in everlasting salvation,
the two complementary phases of the human spirit had to act and function
in concord. Together they must realize themselves in such catholic
expression as should exclude only the froward or evil elements, non-
elements rather, of man’s nature. Both represent ultimate mediaeval
interests and desires; and perhaps deep down and very intimately, even
inscrutably, they may be one, even as they clearly are complementary
phases of the human soul. Yet with certain natures who perhaps fail to hold
the balance between them, the two phases seem to draw apart, or, at least, to
evince themselves in distinct expression, and indeed in all men they are
usually distinguishable.
Generally speaking, the conception of man’s divinely mediated salvation,
and of the elements of human being which might be carried on, and realized
in a state of everlasting beatitude, prescribed the range of ultimate
intellectual interests for the Middle Ages. The same had been despotically
true of the patristic period. Augustine would know God and the soul;
Ambrose expressed equally emphatic views upon the vanity of all
knowledge that did not contribute to an understanding of the Christian
Faith. This view was held with temperamental and barbarizing narrowness
by Gregory the Great. It was admitted, as of course, throughout the
Carolingian period, although humanistically-minded men played with the

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pagan literature. Nor was it seriously disputed in the eleventh or twelfth
century, when men began to delight in dialectic, and some cared for pagan
literature; nor yet in the thirteenth when an increasing number were asking
many things from philosophy and natural knowledge, which had but distant
bearing on the soul’s salvation. One of these men was Roger Bacon, whose
scientific studies were pursued with ceaseless energy. But he could also
state emphatically the principle of the worthlessness of whatever does not
help men to understand the divine truths by which they are saved. In
Bacon’s time, the love of knowledge was enlarging its compass, while,
really or nominally as the individual case might be, the criterion of
relevancy to the Faith still obtained, and set the topics with which men
should occupy themselves. All matters of philosophy or natural science had
to relate themselves to the summum bonum of salvation in order to possess
ultimate human interest. Therefore, if philosophy was to preserve the
strongest reason for its existence, it had to remain the handmaid of
theology. Still, to be sure, the conception of man’s beatitude would become
more comprehensive with the expansion and variegation of the desire for
knowledge.
As the summum bonum of salvation prescribed the topics of ultimate
intellectual interest for the Middle Ages, so the stress which it laid upon one
topic rather than another tended to direct their ordering or classification, as
well as the proportion of attention devoted to each one. Likewise the form
or method of presentation was controlled by the authority of the Scriptural
statement of the way and means of salvation, and the well-nigh equally
authoritative interpretation of the same by the beatified Fathers. Thus the
nature of the summum bonum and the character of its Scriptural statement
and patristic exposition suggested the arrangement of topics, and set the
method of their treatment in those works of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries which afford the most important presentations of the ultimate
intellectual interests of that time. Obvious examples will be Abaelard’s Sic
et non and his Theologia, Hugo of St. Victor’s De sacramentis, the
Lombard’s Books of Sentences, and the Summa theologiae of Thomas
Aquinas.
It will be seen in the next chapter that the arrangement of topics in these
comprehensive treatises differed from what would have been evolved
through the requirements of a systematic presentation of human knowledge.

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Aquinas sets forth the reasons why one mode of treatment is suitable to
philosophy and another to sacred science, and why the latter may omit
matters proper for the former, or treat them from another point of view. The
supremacy of sacred science is incidentally shown by the argument. In his
Contra Gentiles[420] chapter four, book second, bears the title: “Quod aliter
considerat de creaturis Philosophus et aliter Theologus” (“That the
philosopher views the creation in one way and the theologian in another”).
In the text he says:
“The science (doctrina) of Christian faith considers creatures so far as
there may be in them some likeness of God, and so far as error
regarding them might lead to error in things divine.... Human
philosophy considers them after their own kind, and its parts are so
devised as to correspond with the different classes (genera) of things;
but the faith of Christ considers them, not after their own kind, as for
example, fire as fire, but as representing the divine altitude.... The
philosopher considers what belongs to them according to their own
nature; the believer (fidelis) regards in creatures only what pertains to
them in their relationship to God, as that they are created by Him and
subject to Him. Wherefore the science of the Faith is not to be deemed
incomplete, if it passes over many properties of things, as the shape of
the heaven or the quality of motion.... It also follows that the two
sciences do not proceed in the same order. With philosophy, which
regards creatures in themselves, and from them draws on into a
knowledge of God, the first consideration is in regard to the creatures
and the last is as to God. But in the science of faith, which views
creatures only in their relationship to God (in ordine ad Deum), the first
consideration is of God, and next of the creatures.”
Obviously sacra doctrina, which is to say, theologia, proceeds differently
from philosophia humana, and evidently it has to do with matters of
ultimate importance, and therefore of ultimate intellectual interest. The
passage quoted from the Contra Gentiles may be taken as introductory to
the more elaborate statement at the beginning of his Summa theologiae,
where Thomas sets forth the principles by which sacra doctrina is
distinguished from the philosophicae disciplinae, to wit, the various
sciences of human philosophy:

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“It was necessary to human salvation that there should be a science
(doctrina) according with divine revelation, besides the philosophical
disciplines which are pursued by human reason. Because man was
formed (ordinatur) toward God as toward an end exceeding reason’s
comprehension. That end should be known to men, who ought to
regulate their intentions and actions toward an end. Wherefore it was
necessary for salvation that man should know certain matters through
revelation, which surpass human reason.”
Thomas now points out that, on account of many errors, it also was
necessary for man to be instructed through divine revelation as to those
saving truths concerning God which human reason was capable of
investigating. He next proceeds to show that sacra doctrina is science.
“But there are two kinds of sciences. There are those which proceed
from the principles known by the natural light of the mind, as arithmetic
and geometry. There are others which proceed from principles known
by the light of a superior science: as perspective proceeds from
principles made known through geometry, and music from principles
known through arithmetic. And sacra doctrina is science in this way,
because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a superior
science or knowledge which is the knowledge belonging to God and the
beatified. Thus as music believes the principles delivered to it by
arithmetic, so sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed to it from
God.”
The question then is raised whether sacra doctrina is one science, or many.
And Thomas answers, that it is one, by reason of the unity of its formal
object. For it views everything discussed by it as divinely revealed; and all
things which are subjects of revelation (revelabilia) have part in the formal
conception of this science; and so are comprehended under sacra doctrina,
as under one science. Nevertheless it extends to subjects belonging to
various departments of knowledge so far as they are knowable through
divine illumination. As some of these may be practical and some
speculative, it follows that sacred science includes both the practical and the
speculative, even as God with the same knowledge knows himself and also
the things He makes.

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“Yet this science is more speculative than practical, because on
principle it treats of divine things rather than human actions, which it
treats in so far as man by means of them is directed (ordinatur) to
perfect cognition of God, wherein eternal beatitude consists. This
science in its speculative as well as practical functions transcends other
sciences, speculative and practical. One speculative science is said to be
worthier than another, by reason of its certitude, or the dignity of its
matter. In both respects this science surpasses other speculative
sciences, because the others have certitude from the natural light of
human reason, which may err; but this has certitude from the light of the
divine knowledge, which cannot be deceived; likewise by reason of the
dignity of its matter, because primarily it relates to matters too high for
reason, while other sciences consider only those which are subjected to
reason. It is worthier than the practical sciences, which are ordained for
an ulterior end; for so far as this science is practical, its end is eternal
beatitude, unto which as an ulterior end all other ends of the practical
sciences are ordained (ordinantur).
“Moreover although this science may accept something from the
philosophical sciences, it requires them merely for the larger
manifestation of the matters which it teaches. For it takes its principles,
not from other sciences, but immediately from God through revelation.
So it does not receive from them as from superiors, but uses them as
servants. Even so, it uses them not because of any defect of its own, but
because of the defectiveness of our intellect which is more easily
conducted (manuducitur) by natural reason to the things above reason
which this science teaches.”
Thomas now shows, with scholastic formalism, that God is the subjectum of
this science; since all things in it are treated with reference to God (sub
ratione Dei), either because they are God himself, or because they bear
relationship (habent ordinem) to God as toward their cause and end
(principium et finem). The final question is whether this science be
argumentativa, using arguments and proofs; and Thomas thus sets forth his
masterly solution:
“I reply, it should be said that as other sciences do not prove their first
principles, but argue from them in order to prove other matters, so this

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science does not argue to prove its principles, which are articles of
Faith, but proceeds from them to prove something else, as the Apostle,
in 1 Corinthians xv., argues from the resurrection of Christ to prove the
resurrection of us all. One should bear in mind that in the philosophic
sciences the lower science neither proves its own first principles nor
disputes with him who denies them, but leaves that to a higher science.
But the science which is the highest among them, that is metaphysics,
does dispute with him who denies its principles, if the adversary will
concede anything; if he concede nothing it cannot thus argue with him,
but can only overthrow his arguments. Likewise sacra Scriptura (or
doctrina or sacred science, theology), since it owns no higher science,
disputes with him who denies its principles, by argument indeed, if the
adversary will concede any of the matters which it accepts through
revelation. Thus through Scriptural authorities we dispute against
heretics, and adduce one article against those who deny another. But if
the adversary will give credence to nothing which is divinely revealed,
sacred science has no arguments by which to prove to him the articles of
faith, but has only arguments to refute his reasonings against the Faith,
should he adduce any. For since faith rests on infallible truth, its
contrary cannot be demonstrated: manifestly the proofs which are
brought against it are not proofs, but controvertible arguments.
“To argue from authority is most appropriate to this science; for its
principles rest on revelation, and it is proper to credit the authority of
those to whom the revelation was made. Nor does this derogate from
the dignity of this science; for although proof from authority based on
human reason may be weak, yet proof from authority based on divine
revelation is most effective.
“Yet sacred science also makes use of human reason; not indeed to
prove the Faith, because this would take away the merit of believing;
but to make manifest other things which may be treated in this science.
For since grace does not annul nature, but perfects it, natural reason
should serve faith, even as the natural inclination conforms itself to love
(caritas). Hence sacred science uses the philosophers also as authority,
where they were able to know the truth through natural reason. It uses
authorities of this kind as extraneous arguments having probability. But
it uses the authorities of the canonical Scriptures arguing from its own

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premises and with certainty. And it uses the authorities of other doctors
of the Church, as arguing upon its own ground, yet only with
probability. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the Apostles
and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books; and not upon the
revelation, if there was any, made to other doctors.”[421]
Mediaeval thought was beset behind and before by the compulsion of its
conditions. Its mighty antecedents lived in it, and wrought as moulding
forces. Well we know them, two in number, the one, of course, the antique
philosophy; the other, again of course, the dogmatic Christian Faith, itself
shot through and through with antique metaphysics, in the terms of which it
had been formulated. These two, very dual and yet joined, antagonistic and
again united, constituted the form-giving principles of mediaeval thinking.
They were, speaking in scholastic phrase, the substantial as well as
accidental forms of mediaeval theology, philosophy, and knowledge. Which
means that they set the lines of mediaeval theology or philosophy, and
caused the one and the other to be what it became, rather than something
else; and also that they supplied the knowledge which mediaeval men
laboured to acquire, and attempted to adjust their thinking to. Thus, through
the twelfth, the thirteenth, and the fourteenth centuries, they remained the
inworking formal causes of mediaeval thought; while, on the other hand,
the moving and efficient causes (still speaking in scholastic-Aristotelian
phrase) were the human impulses which those formal causes moulded, or
indeed suggested, and the faculties which they trained.
The patristic system of dogma with the antique philosophy, set the forms of
mediaeval expression, fixed the distinctive qualities of mediaeval thought,
furnished its topics, and even necessitated its problems—in two ways: First,
through the specific substance which passed over and filled the mediaeval
productions; and secondly, simply by reason of the existence of such a vast
authoritative body of antique and patristic opinion, knowledge, dogma,
which the Middle Ages had to accept and master, and beyond which the
substance of mediaeval thinking was hardly destined to advance.
The first way is obvious enough, inasmuch as patristic and antique matter
palpably make the substance of mediaeval theology and philosophy. The
second is less obvious, but equally important. This mass of dogma,
knowledge, and opinion, existed finished and complete. Men imperfectly

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equipped to comprehend it were brought to it by the conviction that it was
necessary to their salvation, and then gradually by the persuasion also that it
offered the only means of intellectual progress. The struggle to master such
a volume of knowledge issuing from a more creative past, gave rise to
novel problems, or promoted old ones to a novel prominence. The problem
of universals was taken directly from the antique dialectic. It played a
monstrous rôle in the twelfth century because it was in very essence a
fundamental problem of cognition, of knowing, and so pressed upon men
who were driven by the need to master continually unfolding continents of
thought.[422] This is an instance of a problem transmitted from the past, but
blown up to extraordinary importance by mediaeval intellectual conditions.
So throughout the whole scholastic range, attitude and method alike are
fixed by the fact that scholasticism was primarily an appropriation of
transmitted propositions.
In considering the characteristics of mediaeval thought, it is well to bear in
mind these diverse ways in which its antecedents made it what it was:
through their substance transmitted to it; through the receptive attitude
forced upon men by existing accumulations of authoritative doctrine, and
the method entailed upon mediaeval thought by its scholastic rather than
originative character. Also one will not omit to notice which elements came
from the action of the patristic body of antecedents, rather than from the
antique group, and vice versa.
Since the antique and patristic constituted well-nigh the whole substance of
philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages, a separate consideration of
what was thus transmitted would amount to a history of mediaeval thought
from a somewhat unilluminating point of view. On the other hand, one may
learn much as to the qualities of mediaeval thought from observing the
attitudes of various men in successive centuries toward Greek philosophy
and patristic theology. The Fathers had used the concepts of the former in
the construction of their systems of acceptance of the Christian Faith. But
the spirit of inquiry from which Greek philosophy had sprung, was very
different from the spirit in which the Fathers used its concepts and
arguments, in order to substantiate what they accepted on the authority of
Scripture and tradition. It is true that Greek philosophy in the Neo-
Platonism of Porphyry and Iamblicus was not far from the patristic attitude
toward knowledge. But the spirit of these declining moods of Neo-

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Platonism was not the spirit which had carried the philosophy of the Greeks
to its intellectual culmination in Plato and Aristotle, and to its attainment of
the ethically rational in Stoicism and the system of Epicurus.
Thus patristic thinking was essentially different in purpose and method
from the philosophy which it forced to serve its uses; and the two differed
by every difference of method, spirit, and intent which were destined to
appear among the various kinds of mediaeval thinkers. But the difference
between Greek philosopher and Church Father was deeper than any that
ever could exist among mediaeval men. Some of the last might be
conventionally orthodox and passionately pious, while others cared more
distinctly for the fruits of knowledge. But even these could not be as Greek
philosophers, because they were accustomed to rely on authority, and
because they who drew their knowledge from an existing store would not
have the independence and originality distinguishing the Greeks, who had
created so much of that store from which they drew.[423] Moreover, while
neither Plato’s inquiry for truth, nor Aristotle’s catholic search for
knowledge, was isolated from its bearing on either the conduct or the event
of life, nevertheless with them rational inquiry was a final motive
representing in itself that which was most divinely human, and so the best
for man.[424] But with the philosophers of the Middle Ages, it never was
quite so. For the need of salvation had worked in men’s blood for
generations. And salvation, man’s highest good, did not consist in humanly-
attained knowledge or in virtue won by human strength; but was divinely
mediated and had to be accepted upon authority. Hence, even in the great
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, intellectual inquiry was never unlimbered
from bands of deference, nor ever quite dispassionately rational or
unaffected by the mortal need to attain a salvation which was bestowed or
withheld by God according to His plan authoritatively declared.
Accordingly all mediaeval variances of thought show common similitudes:
to wit, some consciousness of need of super-rational and superhuman
salvation; deference to some authority; and finally a pervasive
scholasticism, since mediaeval thought was of necessity diligent, acceptant,
reflective, rather than original. One will be impressed with the formal
character of mediaeval thought. For being thus scholastic, it was occupied
with devising forms through which to express, or re-express, the mass of
knowledge proffered to it. Besides, formal logic was a prominent part of the

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transmitted contents of antique philosophy; and became a chief discipline
for mediaeval students; because they accepted it along with all the rest, and
found its training helpful for men burdened with such intellectual tasks as
theirs.
Within the lines of these universal qualities wind the divergencies of
mediaeval thought; and one will notice how they consist in leanings toward
the ways of Greek philosophy, or a reliance more or less complete upon the
contents and method of patristic theology. One common quality, of which
we note the variations, is that of deference to the authority of the past. The
mediaeval scholar could hardly read a classic poet without finding
authoritative statements upon every topic brushed by the poet’s fancy, and
of course the matter of more serious writings, history, logic, natural science,
was implicitly accepted. If the pagan learning was thus regarded, how much
more absolute was the deference to sacred doctrine. Here all was authority.
Scripture was the primary source; next came the creed, and the dogmas
established by councils; and then the expositions of the Fathers. Thus the
meaning of the authoritative Scripture was pressed into authoritative
dogma, and then authoritatively systematized. The process had been
intellectual and rational, yet with the driven rationality of Church Fathers
struggling to formulate and express the accepted import of the Faith
delivered to the saints. Authority, faith, held the primacy, and in two senses,
for not only was it supreme and final, but it was also prior in initiative
efficiency. Tertullian’s certum est, quia impossibile est, was an extreme
paradox. But Augustine’s credimus ut cognoscamus was fundamental, and
remained unshaken. Anselm lays it at the basis of his arguments; with
Bernard and many others it is credo first of all, let the intelligere come as it
may, and as it will according to the fulness of our faith. The same principle
of faith’s efficient primacy is temperamentally as well as logically
fundamental with Bonaventura.
Here then was a first general quality of mediaeval thought: deference to
authority. Now for the variances. Scarcely diverging, save in emphasis,
from Augustine and Bonaventura, are the greatest of the schoolmen, Albert
and Thomas. They defer to authority and recognize the primacy of faith,
and yet they will, with abundant use of reason, deliminate the respective
provinces of grace and human knowledge, and distinguish the absolute
authority of Scripture from the statements even of the saints, which may be

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weighed and criticized. In secular philosophy, these two will, when their
faith admits, accept the views of the philosophers—Aristotle above all—yet
using their own reason. They are profoundly interested in knowledge and
metaphysical dialectic, but follow it with deferential tempers and believing
Christian souls.
Outside the company of such, are men of more independent temper, whose
attitude tends to weaken the principle of acceptance of authority in sacred
doctrine. The first of these was Eriugena with his explicit statement that
reason is greater than authority; yet we may assume that he was not
intending to impugn Scripture. Centuries later another chief example is
Abaelard, whose dialectic temper leads him to wish to prove everything by
reason. Not that he stated, or would have admitted this; yet the extreme
rationalizing tendency of the man is projected through such a passage as the
following from his Historia calamitatum, where he alludes to the
circumstances of the composition of his work upon the Trinity. He had
become a monk in the monastery of St. Denis, but students were still
thronging to hear him, to the wrath of some of his superiors.
“Then it came about that I was brought to expound the very foundation
of our faith by applying the analogies of human reason, and was led to
compose for my pupils a theological treatise on the divine Unity and
Trinity. They were calling for human and philosophical arguments, and
insisting upon something intelligible, rather than mere words, saying
that there had been more than enough of talk which the mind could not
follow; that it was impossible to believe what was not understood in the
first place; and that it was ridiculous for any one to set forth to others
what neither he nor they could rationally conceive (intellectu capere).”
And Abaelard cites the verse from Matthew about the blind leaders of the
blind, and goes on to tell of the success of his treatise, which pleased
everybody, yet provoked the greater envy because of the difficulty of the
questions which it elucidated; and at last envy blew up the condemnation of
his book, at the Council of Soissons, in the year of grace 1121.[425]
Here one has the plain reversal. We must first understand in order to
believe. Doubtless the demands of Abaelard’s students to have the
principles of the Christian Faith explained, that they might be understood

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and accepted rationally, echoed the master’s imperative intellectual need.
Not that Abaelard would breathe the faintest doubt of these verities; they
were absolute and unquestionable. He accepted them upon authority just as
implicitly (he might think) as St. Bernard. Herein he shows the mediaeval
quality of deference. But he will understand with his mind the profoundest
truths enunciated by authority; he will explain them rationally, that the mind
may rationally comprehend them.
Men of an opposite cast of mind foresaw the outcome of this rationalization
of dogma more surely than the subtle dialectician for whom this process
was both peremptory and proper. And the Church acted with a true instinct
in condemning Abaelard in spite of his protestations of belief, just as with a
like true instinct Friar Bacon’s own Franciscan Order looked askance on
one whose mind was suspiciously set upon observation and experiment—
and cavilling at others. Celui-ci tuera cela! The ultra-scientific spirit is
dangerous to faith—and Bacon’s asseverations that no knowledge was of
value save as it helped the soul’s salvation, was doubtless regarded as a
conventional insincerity. Yet Roger Bacon had his mediaeval deferences, as
will appear.[426]
Neither one extreme view nor the other was to represent the attitude of
thoughtful and believing Christendom; not William of St. Thierry and St
Bernard, nor yet (on these points) Abaelard and Friar Bacon should prevail;
but the all-balancing and all-considering Aquinas. He will draw the lines
between faith and reason, and bulwark them with arguments which shall
seem to render unto reason the things of reason, and unto faith its due. Yet it
is actually Roger Bacon who accuses Thomas of making his Theology out
of dialectic and very human reasonings. It was true; and we are again
reminded how variant views shaded into each other in the Middle Ages, and
all within certain lines of similarity. Practically all mediaeval thinkers defer
to authority—more or less; and all hold to some principle of faith, to the
necessity of believing something, for the soul’s salvation. There is likewise
some similarity in their attitudes toward intellectual interests. For all
recognized their propriety, and gave credit to the human desire to know.
Likewise all saw that salvation, the summum bonum for man, included more
than intellection; and felt that it held some consummation of other human
impulses; that it held love—the love of God along with the intellectual
ardour of contemplation; and well-nigh all recognized also that the faith

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held mystery, not to be solved by reason. Thus all were rational—some
more, some less; and all were devotional and believing, pietistic, ardent—
some more, some less; according as the intellectual nature dominated over
the emotional, or the emotions quelled the conscious exercise of reason, yet
reached out and upward from what knowledge and reason had given as a
base to spring from.
Thus the mediaeval spirit, variant within its lines of likeness; and of a piece
with it was the field it worked in, which made its range and scope. Here as
well, a saving knowledge of God and the soul was central and chief among
all intellectual interests. None denied this. Augustine, the universal
prototype of the mediaeval mind, had cried, “God and the soul, these will I
know, and these are all.” But wide had been the scope of his knowledge of
God and the soul; and in the centuries which hung upon his words, wide
also was the range of knowledge subsumed under those capitals. How
would one know God and the soul? Might one not know God in all His
universe, in the height and breadth thereof, and backwards and forwards
through the reach of time? Might not one also know the soul in all its
operations, all its queries and desires; would not it and they, and their
activities, make up the complementary side of knowledge—complementary
to the primal object, God, known in His eternity, in His temporal creation,
in His everlasting governance? Wide or narrow might be the intellectual
interests included within a knowledge of God and the soul. And while many
men kept close to the centre and saving nexus of these potentially universal
themes, others might become absorbed with data of the creature-world, or
with the manifold actions of the mind of man, so as to forget to keep all
duly ordered and connected with the central thought.
So the search for knowledge might roam afield. Likewise as to its motive;
practically with many men it was, in itself, a joy and end; although they
might continue to connect this end formally with the salvation of the soul.
Roger Bacon of a surety was such a one. Another was Albertus Magnus.
The laborious culling of twenty tomes of universal knowledge surely had
the joy of knowing as the active motive. And Aquinas too; no one could be
such an acquisitive and reasoning genius, without the love of knowledge in
his soul. Yet Thomas never let this love point untrue to its goal of research
and devotion, to wit, sacred doctrine, theology, the Christian Faith in its
very widest compass, yet in its unity of saving purpose.

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In Thomas Aquinas the certitude of faith, the sense of grace, the ardour of
love, never quenched the conscious action of the reasoning and knowing
mind; nor did reasoning quench devotion. A balance too, though perhaps
with one scale higher than the other, was kept by Bonaventura, whose mind
had reason’s faculty, but whose heart burned perpetually toward God.
Another rationally ardent soul was Bonaventura’s intellectual forerunner,
Hugo of St. Victor. In these men intellect did not outstrip the fervours of
contemplation. But such catholic balance did not hold with Abaelard and
Bacon, who lacked the pietistic temperament. With others, conversely, the
strength of the pietistic and emotional nature overbore the intellect; the
mind was less exacting; and devotional ardour used reason solely for its
purposes. The mightiest of these were Bernard and Francis. To the same key
might chime the woman, St. Hildegard of Bingen. We narrow down from
these to hectic souls content with a few thoughts which serve as a basis for
the heart’s fervours.
The varying attitudes of mediaeval thinkers toward reason and authority,
and even their different views upon the limits of the field of salutary
knowledge, are exemplified in their methods, or rather in the variations of
their common method. Here the factors were again authority and the
intellect which considers the authority, and in terms of its own rational
processes reacts upon the proposition under view. The intellect might
simply accept authority; or, on the other hand, it might, through dialectic,
seek a conclusion of its own. But midway between a mere acceptance of
authority, and the endeavour of dialectic for a conclusion of its own, there is
the reasoning process which perceives divergence among authorities,
compares, discriminates, interprets, and at last acts as umpire. This was the
combined and catholic scholastic method. It contained the two factors of its
necessary duality; and its variations (besides the gradual perfecting of its
form from one generation to another) consisted in the predominant
employment of one factor or the other.
The beginning was in the Carolingian time, when Rabanus compiled his
authorities from sources sacred and profane, scarcely discriminating except
to maintain the pre-eminence of the sacred matter. His younger
contemporary, Eriugena, was a translator of his own chief source, Pseudo-
Dionysius, him of the Hierarchies, Celestial and Ecclesiastical. Yet he
composed also a veritable book, De divisione naturae, in which he put his

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matter together organically and with argument. And while professing to
hold to the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, he not only took upon
himself to select from their statements, but propounded the proposition that
the authority which is not confirmed by reason appears weak. Eriugena
made his authorities yield him what his reason required. His argumentative
method became an independent rehandling of matter drawn from them. It
was very different from the plodding excerpt-gathering of Rabanus.
We pass down the centuries to Anselm. Contemplative and religious, his
reverence for authority was unimpaired by any conscious need to refashion
its meaning. Though he possessed creative intellectual powers, they were
incited and controlled by his deep piety. Hence his works were constructed
of original and lofty arguments, but such as did not infringe upon either the
efficient or the final priority of faith.
With Abaelard of many-sided fame the duality of method becomes explicit,
and is, if one may say so, set by the ears. On the one hand, he advances in
his constructive theological treatises toward a portentous application of
reason to explain the contents of the Christian Faith; on the other, somewhat
sardonically, he devises a scheme for the employment and presentation of
authorities upon these sacred matters, a scheme so obviously apt that once
made known it could not but be followed and perfected.
The divers works of a man are likely to bear some relation and resemblance
to each other. Abaelard was a reasoner, more specifically speaking, a
dialectician according to the ways of Aristotelian logic. And in categories of
formal logic he sought to rationalize every matter apprehended by his mind.
Swayed by the master-interest of the time, he turned to theology; and his
own nature impelled him to apply a constructive dialectic to its systematic
formulation. The result is exemplified in the extant portion of his Theologia
(mis-called Introductio ad Theologiam), which was condemned by the
Council of Sens in 1141, the year before the master’s death. The spirit of
this work appears in the passage already quoted from the Historia
calamitatum, referring to what was substantially an earlier form of the
Theologia.[427] The Theologia argues for a free use of dialectic in
expounding dogma, especially in order to refute those heretics who will not
listen to authority, but demand reasons. Like Abaelard’s previous
theological treatises, it is filled with citations of authority, principally

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Augustine; and the reader feels the author’s hesitancy to reveal that
dialectic is the architect. Nor, in fact, is the work an exclusively dialectic
structure; yet it illustrates (if it does not always inculcate) the application of
the arguments of human reason to the exposition and substantiation of the
fundamental and most deeply hidden contents of the Christian Faith.
Obviously Abaelard was not an initiator here. Augustine had devoted his
life to fortifying the Faith with argument and explanation; Eriugena, with a
far weaker realization of its contents, had employed a more distorting
metaphysics in its presentation; and saintly Anselm had flown his veritable
eagle flights of reason. But Abaelard’s more systematic work represents a
further stage in the application of independent dialectic to dogma, and an
innovating freedom in the citation of pagan philosophers to demonstrate its
philosophic reasonableness. Nevertheless his statement that he had gathered
these citations from writings of the Fathers, and not from the books of the
philosophers (quorum pauca novi),[428] shows that he was only using what
the Fathers had made use of before him, and also indicates the slightness of
his independent knowledge of Greek philosophy.
On the other hand, Abaelard’s way of presenting authorities for and against
a theological proposition was more distinctly original. He seems to have
been the first purposefully to systematize the method of stating the problem,
and then giving in order the authorities on one side and the other—sic et
non; as he entitled his famous work. But the trail of his nature lay through
this apparently innocent composition, the evident intent of which was to
emphasize, if not exaggerate, the opposition among the patristic authorities,
and without a counterbalancing attempt to show any substantial accord
among them. This, of course, is not stated in the Prologue, which however,
like everything that Abaelard wrote, discloses his fatal facility of putting his
hand on the raw spot in the matter; which unfortunately is likely to be the
vulnerable point also. In it he remarks on the difficulty of interpreting
Scripture, upon the corruption of the text (a perilous subject), and the
introduction of apocryphal writings. There are discrepancies even in the
sacred texts, and contradictions in the writings of the Fathers. With a
profuse backing of authority he shows that the latter are not to be read cum
credendi necessitate, but cum judicandi libertate. Assuredly, as to anything
in the canonical Scriptures, “it is not permitted to say: ‘The Author of this
book did not hold the truth’; but rather ‘the codex is false or the interpreter

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errs, or thou dost not understand.’ But in the works of the later ones
(posteriorum, Abaelard’s inclusive designation of the Fathers), which are
contained in books without number, if passages are deemed to depart from
the truth, the reader is at liberty to approve or disapprove.”
This view was supported by Abaelard’s citations from the Fathers
themselves; and yet, so abruptly made, it was not a pleasant statement for
the ears of those to whom the writings of the holy Fathers were sacred.
Nothing was sacred to the man who wrote this prologue—so it seemed to
his pious contemporaries. And who among them could approve of the
Prologue’s final utterance upon the method and purpose of the book?

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“Wherefore we decided to collect the diverse statements of the holy
Fathers, as they might occur to our memory, thus raising an issue from
their apparent repugnancy, which might incite the teneros lectores to
search out the truth of the matter, and render them the sharper for the
investigation. For the first key to wisdom is called interrogation,
diligent and unceasing.... By doubting we are led to inquiry; and from
inquiry we perceive the truth.”
To use the discordant statements of the Fathers to sharpen the wits of the
young! Was not that to uncover their shame? And the character of the work
did not salve the Prologue’s sting. Abaelard selected and arranged his
extracts from pagan as well as Christian writers, and prepared sardonic
titles for the questions under which he ordered his material. Time and again
these titles flaunt an opposition which the citations scarcely bear out. For
example, title iv.: “Quod sit credendum in Deum solum, et contra”—
certainly a flaming point; yet the excerpts display merely the verb credere,
used in the palpably different senses borne by the word “believe.” There is
no real repugnancy among the citations. And again, in title lviii.: “Quod
Adam salvatus sit, et contra”—there is no citation contra. And the longest
chapter in the book (cxvii.) has this bristling title: “De sacramento altaris,
quod sit essentialiter ipsa veritas carnis Christi et sanguinis, et contra.”
Because of such prickly traits the Sic et non did not itself come into
common use. But the suggestions of its method once made, were of too
obvious utility to be abandoned. First, among Abaelard’s own pupils the
result appears in Books of Sentences, which, in the arrangement of their
matter, followed the topical division not of the Sic et non, but of Abaelard’s
Theologia, with its threefold division of Theology into Fides, Caritas, and
Sacramentum.[429] But the arrangement of the Theologia was not made use
of in the best and most famous of these compositions, Peter Lombard’s
Sententiarum libri quatuor. This work employed the method (not the
arrangement) of the Sic et non, and expounded the contents of Faith
methodically, “Distinctio” after “Distinctio,” stating the proposition, citing
the authorities bearing upon it, and ending with some conciliating or
distinguishing statement of the true result. In canon law the same method
was applied in Gratian’s Decretum, of which the proper name was
Concordia discordantium canonum.

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These Books of Sentences have sometimes been called Summae, inasmuch
as their scope embraced the entire contents of the Faith. But the term
Summa may properly be confined to those larger and still more
encyclopaedic compositions in which this scholastic method reached its
final development. The chief makers of these, the veritable Summae
theologiae, were, in order of time, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus,
and Thomas Aquinas. The Books of Sentences were books of sentences. The
Summa proceeded by the same method, or rather issued from it, as its
consummation and perfect logical form; thus the scholastic method arrived
at its highest constructive energy. In the Sentences one excerpted opinion
was given and another possibly divergent, and at the end an adjustment was
presented. This comparative formlessness attains in the Summa a serried
syllogistic structure. Thomas, who finally perfects it, presents his connected
and successive topics divided into quaestiones, which are subdivided into
articuli, whose titles give the point to be discussed. He states first, and
frequently in his own syllogistic terms, the successive negative arguments;
and then the counter-proposition, which usually is a citation from Scripture
or from Augustine. Then with clear logic he constructs the true positive
conclusion in accordance with the authority which he has last adduced. He
then refutes each of the adverse arguments in turn.
Thus the method of the Sentences is rendered dialectically organic; and with
the perfecting of the form of quaestio and articulus, and the logical linking
of successive topics, the whole composition, from a congeries, becomes a
structure, organic likewise, a veritable Summa, and a Summa of a science
which has unity and consistency. This science is sacra doctrina, theologia.
Moreover, as compared with the Sentences, the contents of the Summa are
enormously enlarged. For between the time of the Lombard and that of
Thomas, there has come the whole of Aristotle, and what is more, the
mastery of the whole of Aristotle, which Thomas incorporates in a complete
and organic statement of the Christian scheme of salvation.[430]

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CHAPTER XXXV

CLASSIFICATION OF TOPICS; STAGES OF
EVOLUTION

I. Philosophic Classification of the Sciences; the Arrangement
of Vincent’s Encyclopaedia, of the Lombard’s Sentences, of
Aquinas’s Summa theologiae.
II. The Stages of Development: Grammar, Logic, Metalogics.

I
Having considered the spirit, the field, and the dual method, of mediaeval
thought, there remain its classifications of topics. The problem of
classification presented itself to Gerbert as one involved in the rational
study of the ancient material.[431] But as scholasticism culminated in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the problem became one of arrangement
and presentation of the mass of knowledge and argument which the Middle
Ages had at length made their own, and were prepared to re-express. This
ordering was influenced by a twofold principle of classification; for, as
abundantly shown by Aquinas,[432] theology in which all is ordered with
reference to God, will properly follow an arrangement of topics quite
unsuitable to the natural or human sciences, which treat of things with
respect to themselves. But the mediaeval practice was more confused than
the theory; because the interest in human knowledge was apt to be touched
by motives sounding in the need of divine salvation; and speculation could
not free itself of the moving principles of Christian theology. On the other
hand, an enormous quantity of human dialectic, and a prodigious mass of
what strikes us as profane information, or misinformation, was carried into
the mediaeval Summa, and still more into those encyclopaedias, which
attempted to include all knowledge, and still were influenced in their aim by
a religious purpose.[433]

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As the human sciences came from the pagan antique, the accepted
classifications of them naturally were taken from Greek philosophy. They
followed either the so-called Platonic division, into Physics, Ethics, and
Logic,[434] or the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and
practical. The former scheme, of which it is not certain that Plato was the
author, passed on through the Stoic and Epicurean systems of philosophy,
was recognized by the Church Fathers, and received Augustine’s approval.
It was made known to the Middle Ages through Cassiodorus, Isidore,
Alcuin, Rabanus, Eriugena and others.
Nevertheless the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and
practical was destined to prevail. It was introduced to the western Middle
Ages through Boëthius’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge,[435] and
adopted by Gerbert; later it passed over through translations of Arabic
writings. It was accepted by Hugo of St. Victor, by Albertus Magnus and by
Thomas, to mention only the greatest names; and was set forth in detail
with explanation and comment in a number of treatises, such as
Gundissalinus’s De divisione philosophiae, and Hugo of St. Victor’s
Eruditio didascalica,[436] which were formal and schematic introductions to
the study of philosophy and its various branches.
The usual subdivisions of these two general parts of philosophy were as
follows. Theoretica (or Theorica) was divided into (1) Physics, or scientia
naturalis, (2) Mathematics, and (3) Metaphysics or Theology, or divina
scientia, as it might be called. Physics and Mathematics were again divided
into more special sciences. Practica was divided commonly into Ethics,
Economics, Politics, or into Ethics and Artes mechanicae. There was a
difference of opinion as to what to do with Logic. It had, to be sure, its
position in the current Trivium, along with grammar and rhetoric. But this
was merely current, and might not approve itself on deeper reflection.
Gundissalinus speaks of three propaedeutic sciences, the scientiae
eloquentiae, grammar, poetics, and rhetoric, and then puts Logic after them
as a scientia media between these primary educational matters and
philosophy, i.e. the whole range of knowledge, theoretical and practical.
Again, over against philosophia realis, which contains both the theoretica
(or speculativa) and the practica, Thomas Aquinas sets the philosophia
rationalis, or logic; and Richard Kilwardby opposes logica, the scientia
rationalis, to practica, in his division.[437]

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The last-named philosopher was the pupil and then the hostile critic of
Aquinas, and also became Archbishop of Canterbury. He was the author of
a careful and elaborate classification of the parts of philosophy, entitled De
ortu et divisione philosophiae.[438] In it, following the broad distinction
between res divinae and res humanae, Kilwardby divides philosophy into
speculativa and practica. Speculativa is divided into naturalis (physics),
mathematica, and divina (metaphysics). He does not divide the first and
third of these; but he divides mathematica into those sciences which treat of
quantity in continuity and separation respectively (quantitas continua and
quantitas discreta). The former embrace geometry, astronomy and
astrology, and perspective; the latter, music and arithmetic. Practica, which
is concerned with res humanae, is divided into activa and sermocinalis:
because res humanae consist either of operationes or locutiones. The activa
embraces Ethics and mechanics; the scientia sermocinalis embraces
grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Such are Kilwardby’s bare captions; his
treatise lengthily treats of the interrelations of these various branches of
knowledge.
An idea of the scholastic discussion of the classification of sciences may be
had by following Albertus Magnus’s ponderous approach to a consideration
of logic: whether it be a science, and, if so, what place should be allotted it.
We draw from the opening of his liber on the Predicables,[439] that is to say,
his exposition of Porphyry’s Introduction. Albert will consider “what kind
of a science (qualis scientia) logic may be, and whether it is any part of
philosophy; what need there is of it, and what may be its use; then of what it
treats, and what are its divisions.” The ancients seem to have disagreed,
some saying that logic is no science, since it is rather a modus (mode,
manner or method) of every science or branch of knowledge. But these,
continues Albertus, have not reflected that although there are many
sciences, and each has its special modus, yet there is one modus common to
all sciences, pertaining to that which is common to them all: the principle,
to wit, that through reason’s inquiry, from what is known one arrives at
knowledge of the unknown. This mode or method common to every science
may be considered in itself, and so may be the subject of a special science.
After further balancing of the reasons and authorities pro and con, Albertus
concludes:

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“It is therefore clear that logic is a special science just as in ironworking
there is the special art of making a hammer, yet its use pertains to
everything made by the ironworker’s craft. So this process of
discovering the unknown through the known, is something special, and
may be studied as a special art and science; yet the use of it pertains to
all sciences.”
He next considers whether logic is a part of philosophy. Some say no, since
there are (as they say) only three divisions of philosophy, physics,
mathematics, and metaphysics; others say that logic is a modus of
philosophy and not one of its divisions. But, on the contrary, it is shown by
others that this view of philosophy omits the practical side, for philosophy’s
scope comprehends the truth of everything which man may understand,
including the truth of that which is in ourselves, and strives to comprehend
both truth and the process of advancing from the known to a knowledge of
the unknown. These point out that
“... the Peripatetics divided philosophy first into three parts, to wit, into
physicam generaliter dictam, and ethicam generaliter dictam and
rationalem likewise taken broadly. I call physica generaliter dicta that
which embraces scientia naturalis, disciplinalis, and divina (i.e. physics
in a narrower sense, mathematics which is called scientia disciplinalis,
and metaphysics which is scientia divina). And I call ethica, that which,
broadly taken, contains the scientia monastica, oeconomica and civilis.
And I call that the scientia rationalis, broadly taken, which includes
every mode of proceeding from the known to the unknown. From which
it is evident that logic is a part of philosophy.”
And finally it may be shown that
“if anything is within the scope of philosophy it must be that without
which philosophy cannot reach any knowledge. He who is ignorant of
logic can acquire no perfect cognition of the unknown, because he is
ignorant of the way in which he should proceed from the known to the
unknown.”
From these latter arguments, approved by him and in part stated as his own,
Albertus advances to a classification of the parts of logic, which he makes
to include rhetoric, poetics, and dialectic, and to be demonstrative,

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sophistical or disputatious, according to the use to which logic (broadly
taken) is applied and the manner in which it may in each case proceed, in
advancing from the known to some farther ascertainment or demonstration.
[440] Soon after this, in discussing the subject of this science, Albertus points
out how logic differs from rhetoric and poetics, although with them it may
treat of sermo, or speech, and be called a scientia sermonalis; for, unlike
them, it treats of sermo merely as a means of drawing conclusions, and not
in and for itself.
From the purely philosophical division of the sciences we pass to the hybrid
arrangement adopted by Vincent of Beauvais, who died in 1264. This man
was a prodigious devourer of books, and for a sufficient pabulum, St. Louis
set before him his collection of twelve hundred volumes. Thereupon
Vincent compiled the most famous of mediaeval encyclopaedias, employing
in that labour enormous diligence and a number of assistants. His
ponderous Speculum majus is drawn from the most serviceable sources,
including the works of Albertus, his contemporary, and great scholastics
like Hugo of St. Victor, who were no more. It consisted of the Speculum
naturale, doctrinale, and historiale; and a fourth, the Speculum morale, was
added by a later hand.[441] Turning its leaves, and reading snatches here and
there, especially from its Prologues, we shall gain a sufficient illustration of
the arrangement of topics followed by this writer, whose faculties seem to
drown in his shoreless undertaking.[442]
In his turgid generalis prologus to the Speculum naturale, Vincent presents
his motives for collecting in one volume
“... certain flowers according to my modicum of faculty, gathered from
every one I have been able to read, whether of our Catholic Doctors or
the Gentile philosophers and poets. Especially have I drawn from them
what seemed to pertain either to the building up of our dogma, or to
moral instruction, or to the incitement of charity’s devotion, or to the
mystic exposition of divine Scripture, or to the manifest or symbolical
explanation of its truth. Thus by one grand opus I would appease my
studiousness, and perchance, by my labours, profit those who, like me,
try to read as many books as possible, and cull their flowers. Indeed of
making many books there is no end, and neither is the eye of the curious
reader satisfied, nor the ear of the auditor.”

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He then refers to the evils of false copying and the ascription of extracts to
the wrong author. And it seems to him that Church History has been rather
neglected, while men have been intent on expounding knotty problems. And
now considering how to proceed and group his various matters, Vincent
could find no better method than the one he has chosen, “to wit, that after
the order of Holy Scripture, I should treat first of the Creator, next of the
creation, then of man’s fall and reparation, and then of events (rebus gestis)
chronologically.” He proposes to give a summary of titles at the end of the
work. Sometimes he may state as his own, things he has had from his
teachers or from very well-known books; and he admits that he did not have
time to collate the gesta martyrum, and so some of the abstracts which he
gives of these are not by his own hand, but by the hand of scribes
(notariorum).
Vincent proposes to call the whole work Speculum majus, a Speculum
indeed, or an Imago mundi, “containing in brief whatever, from
unnumbered books, I have been able to gather, worthy of consideration,
admiration, or imitation as to things which have been made or done or said
in the visible or invisible world from the beginning until the end, and even
of things to come.” He briefly adverts to the utility of his work, and then
gives his motive for including history. This he thinks will help us to
understand the story of Christ; and from a perusal of the wars which took
place “before the advent of our pacific King, the reader will perceive with
what zeal we should fight against our spiritual foes, for our salvation and
the eternal glory promised us.” From the great slaughter of men in many
wars, may be realized also the severity of God against the wicked, who are
slain like sheep, and perish body and soul.[443]
As to nature, Vincent says:
“Moreover I have diligently described the nature of things, which, I
think, no one will deem useless, who, in the light of grace, has read of
the power, wisdom and goodness of God, creator, ruler and preserver, in
that same book of the Creation appointed for us to read.”
Moreover, to know about things is useful for preachers and theologians, as
Augustine says. But Vincent is conscious of another motive also:

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“Verily how great is even the humblest beauty of this world, and how
pleasing to the eye of reason diligently considering not only the modes
and numbers and orders of things, so decorously appointed throughout
the universe, but also the revolving ages which are ceaselessly uncoiled
through abatements and successions, and are marked by the death of
what is born. I confess, sinner as I am, with mind befouled in flesh, that
I am moved with spiritual sweetness toward the creator and ruler of this
world, and honour Him with greater veneration, when I behold at once
the magnitude, and beauty and permanence of His creation. For the
mind, lifting itself from the dunghill of its affections, and rising, as it is
able, into the light of speculation, sees as from a height the greatness of
the universe containing in itself infinite places filled with the divers
orders of creatures.”
Here Vincent feels it well to apologize for the limitlessness of his matter,
being only an excerptor, and not really knowing even a single science; and
he refers to the example of Isidore’s Etymologiae. He proceeds to
enumerate the various sources upon which he relies, and then to summarize
the headings of his work; which in brief are as follows:
The Creator.
The empyrean heaven and the nature of angels; the state of the good,
and the ruin of the proud, angels.
The formless material and the making of the world, and the nature and
properties of each created being, according to the order of the Works of
the Six Days.
The state of the first man.
The nature and energies of the soul, and the senses and parts of the
human body.
God’s rest and way of working.
The state of the first man and the felicity of Paradise.
Man’s fall and punishment.
Sin.

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The reparation of the Fall.
The properties of faith and other virtues in order, and the gifts of the
Holy Spirit, and the beatitudes.
The number and matter of all the sciences.
Chronological history of events in the world, and memorable sayings,
from the beginning to our time, with a consideration of the state of souls
separated from their bodies, of the times to come, of Antichrist, the end
of the World, the resurrection of the dead, the glorification of the saints
and the punishments of the wicked.
One may stand aghast at the programme. Yet practically all of it would go
into a Summa theologiae, excepting the human history, and the matter of
what we should call the arts and sciences! A programme like this might be
handled summarily, according to the broad captions under which it is stated;
or it might be carried out in such detail as to include all available
information, or opinion, touching every part of every topic included under
these universal heads. The latter is Vincent’s way. Practically he tries to
include all knowledge upon everything. The first of his tomes (the
Speculum naturale) is to be devoted to a full description of the forms and
species of created beings, which make up the visible world. Yet it includes
much relating to beings commonly invisible; for Vincent begins with a
treatment of the angels. He then passes to a consideration of the seven
heavens; and then to the physical phenomena of nature; then on to every
known species of plant, the cultivation of trees and vines, and the making of
wine; then to the celestial bodies, and after this to living things, birds,
fishes, savage beasts, reptiles, the anatomy of animals,—and at last comes
to man. He discusses him body and soul, his psychology, and the
phenomena of sleep and waking; then human anatomy—nor can he keep
from considerations touching the whole creation; then human generation,
and a description of the countries and regions of the earth, with a brief
compendium of history until the time of Antichrist and the Last Judgment.
Of course he is utterly uncritical, even the pseudo-Turpin’s fictions as to
Charlemagne serving him for authority.
Vincent’s Prologue to his second tome, the Speculum doctrinale, briefly
mentions the topics of the tota naturalis historia, contained in his first giant

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tome. In that he had brought his matter down to God’s creation of humana
natura, omnium rerum finis ac summa—and its spoliation (destitutio)
through sin. Humana natura as constituted by God, was a universitas of all
nature or created being, corporeal and spiritual. Now
“in this second part, in like fashion we propose to treat of the plenary
restitution of that destitute nature.... And since that restitution, or
restoration, is effected and perfected by doctrina (imparted knowledge,
science), this part not improperly is called the Speculum doctrinale. For
of a surety everything pertaining to recovering or defending man’s
spiritual or temporal welfare (salutem) is embraced under doctrina. In
this book, the sciences (doctrinae) and arts are treated thus: First
concerning all of them in general, to wit, concerning their invention,
origin, and species; and concerning the method of acquiring them. Then
concerning the singular arts and sciences in particular. And here first
concerning those of the Trivium, which are devoted to language
(grammar, rhetoric, logic); for without these, the others cannot be
learned or communicated. Next concerning the practical ones
(practica), because through them, the eyes of the mind being clarified,
one ascends to the speculative (theorica). Then also concerning the
mechanical ones; since, as they consist in making (operatio), they are
joined by affinity to the practica. Finally concerning the speculative
sciences (theorica), because the end and aim (finis) of all the rest is
placed by the wise in them. And since (as Jerome says) one cannot
know the power (vis) of the antidote unless the power of the poison first
is understood, therefore to the reparatio doctrinalis of the human race,
the subject of the book, something is prefixed as a brief epilogue from
the former book, concerning the fall and misery of man, in which he
still labours, as the penalty for his sin, in lamentable exile.”
So Vincent begins with the fall and misery of man; the peccatum and the
supplicium. Then he proceeds to discuss the goods (bona) which God
bestows, like the mental powers, by which man may learn wisdom, and how
to strive against error and vice, and be overcome solely by the desire of the
highest and immutable good. He speaks also of the corporeal goods
bestowed on man, and the beauty and utility of visible things; and then of
the principal evils;—ignorance which corrupts the divine image in man,
concupiscence which destroys the divine similitude, sickness which

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destroys his original bodily immortality. “And the remedies are three by
which these three evils may be repelled, and the three goods restored, to
wit, Wisdom, Virtue, and Need.”
Here we touch the gist of the ordering of topics in the Speculum doctrinale,
which treats of all the arts and sciences:
“For the obtaining of these three remedies every art and every disciplina
was invented. In order to gain Wisdom, Theorica was devised; and
Practica for the sake of virtue; and for Need’s sake, Mechanica.
Theorica driving out ignorance, illuminates Wisdom; Practica shutting
out vice, strengthens Virtue; Mechanica providing against penury,
tempers the infirmities of the present life. Theorica, in all that is and
that is not, chooses to investigate the true. Practica determines the
correct way of living and the form of discipline, according to the
institution of the virtues. Mechanica occupied with fleeting things,
strives to provide for the needs of the body. For the end and aim of all
human actions and studies, which reason regulates, ought to look either
to the reparation of the integrity of our nature or to alleviating the needs
to which life is subjected. The integrity of our nature is repaired by
Wisdom, to which Theorica relates, and by Virtue, which Practica
cultivates. Need is alleviated by the administration of temporalities, to
which Mechanica attends. Last found of all is Logic, source of
eloquence, through which the wise who understand the aforesaid
principal sciences and disciplines, may discourse upon them more
correctly, truly and elegantly; more correctly, through Grammar; more
truly through Dialectic; more elegantly through Rhetoric.”[444]
Thus the entire round of arts and sciences is connected with man’s
corporeal and spiritual welfare, and is made to bear directly or indirectly on
his salvation. All constitutes doctrina, and by doctrina man is saved. This is
the reason for including the arts and sciences in one tome, rightly called the
Speculum doctrinale. We need not follow the detail, but may view as from
afar the long course ploughed by Vincent through his matter. He first
sketches the history of antique philosophy, and then turns to books and
language, and presents a glossary of Latin synonyms. Book II. treats of
Grammar, Book III. of Logic, Book IV. of Practica scientia or Ethica, first
giving pagan ethics and then passing on to the virtues of the monastic life.

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Book V. is a continuation of this subject. Book VI. concerns the Scientia
oeconomica, treating of domestic economy, then of agriculture. Books VII.
and VIII. take up Politica, and, having discussed political institutions,
proceed to a treatment of law—the law of persons, things, and actions,
according to the canon and the civil law. Books IX. and X. consider Crimes
—simony, heresy, perjury, sacrilege, homicide, rape, adultery, robbery,
usury. Book XI. is more cheerful, De arte mechanica, and tells of building,
the military art, navigation, alchemy, and metals. Book XII. is Medicine,
and Books XIII. and XIV. discuss Physics, in connection with the healing
art. Book XV. is Natural Philosophy—animals and plants. Book XVI., De
mathematica, treats of arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, and
metaphysics cursorily. Book XVII. likewise thins out in a somewhat slight
discussion of Theology, which was to form the topic of the tome that
Vincent did not write.
But Vincent did complete another tome, the Speculum historiale. It is a
loosely chronological compilation of tradition, myth, and history, with
discursions upon the literary works of the characters coming under review.
It would be tedious to follow its excerpted presentation of the profane and
sacred matter.
We may leave Vincent, with the obvious reflection that his work is a
conglomerate, both in arrangement and contents. It has the pious aim of
contributing to man’s salvation, and yet is an attempted universal
encyclopaedia of human knowledge, much of which is plainly secular and
mundane. The monstrous scope and dual purpose of the work prevented any
unity in method and arrangement. More single in aim, and better arranged
in consequence, are the Sentences of Peter Lombard and the Summa
theologiae of Aquinas. For although their scope, at least the scope of the
Summa, is wide, all is ordered with respect to the true aim of sacra
doctrina, just as Thomas explained in the passage which we have already
given.
The alleged principle of the Lombard’s division strikes one as curious; yet
he got it from Augustine: Signum and res—the symbol and the thing: verily
an age-long play of spiritual tendency lay back of these contrasted concepts.
Christian doctrina related, perhaps chiefly, to the significance of signa,
signs, symbols, allegories, mysteries, sacraments. It was not so strange that

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the Lombard made this antithesis the ground of his arrangement. Quite as of
course he begins by saying it is clear to any one who considers, with God’s
grace, that the “contents of the Old and New Law are occupied either with
res or signa. For as the eminent doctor Augustine says in his Doctrina
Christiana, all teaching is of things or signs; but things also are learned
through signs. Properly those are called res which are not employed in
order to signify something; while signa are those whose use is to signify.”
Then the Lombard separates the sacraments from other signa, because they
not only signify, but also confer saving aid; and he points out that evidently
a signum is also some sort of a thing; but not everything is a signum. He
will treat first of res and then of signa.
As to res, one must bear in mind, as Augustine says, that some things are to
be enjoyed (fruendum), as from love we cleave to them for their own sake;
and others are to be used (utendum) as a means; and still others to be both
enjoyed and used.
“Those which are to be enjoyed make us blessed (beatos); those which
are to be used, aid us striving for blessedness.... We ourselves are the
things which are both to be enjoyed and used, and also the angels and
the saints.... The things which are to be enjoyed are Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit; and so the Trinity is summa res.”
So the Lombard’s first two Books consider res in the descending order of
their excellence; the third considers the Incarnation, which, if not itself a
sacrament, and the chief and sum of all sacraments, is the source of those of
the New Law, considered in the fourth Book. The scheme is single and
orderly; the difficulty will be in actually arranging the various topics within
it. Endeavouring to do so, the Lombard in Book I. puts together the doctrine
of the Trinity, the three Persons composing it, and their attributes and
qualities. Book II. considers in order, the Angels, and very briefly, the work
of the Six Days down to the creation of man; then the Christian doctrina as
to man is presented: his creation and its reasons; the creation of his anima;
the creation of woman; the condition of man and woman before the Fall;
their sin; next free-will and grace. Book III. treats of the Incarnation, in all
the aspects in which it may be known, and of the nature of Christ, His
saving merit, and the grace which was in Him; also of the virtues of faith,
hope, and charity, the seven gifts of the Spirit, and the existence of them all

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in Christ. Book IV. considers the Sacraments of the New Law: Baptism,
Confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, ordination to holy
orders, marriage. It concludes with setting forth the Resurrection and the
Last Judgment.
The first chapters of Genesis were the ultimate source of the Lombard’s
actual arrangement. And the Summa will follow the same order of
treatment. One may perceive how naturally the adoption of this order came
to Christian theologians by glancing over Augustine’s De Genesi ad
litteram.[445] This Commentary was partially constructive, and not simply
exegetical; and afforded a cadre, or frame, of topical ordering, which could
readily be filled out with the contents of the Sentences or even of the
Summa: God, in His unity and trinity, the Creation, man especially, his fall,
the Incarnation as the saving means of his restoration, and then the
Sacraments, and the final Judgment unto heaven and hell. One may say that
this was the natural and proper order of presenting the contents of the
Christian sacra doctrina.
So the great Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas adopts the same order
which the Lombard had followed. The Pars prima begins with defining
sacra doctrina.[446] It then proceeds to consider God—whether He exists;
then treats of His simplicitas and perfectio; next of His attributes; His
bonitas, infinitas, immutabilitas, aeternitas, unitas; then of our knowledge
of Him; then of His knowledge, and therein of truth and falsity; thereupon
are considered the divine will, love, justice, and pity; the divine providence
and predestination; the divine power and beatitude.
All this pertains to the unitas of the divine essence; and now Thomas passes
on to the Trinitas personarum, or the more distinctive portions of Christian
theology. He treats of the processio and relationes of the divinae Personae,
and then of themselves—Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and then of their essential
relationship and properties. Next he discusses the missio of the divine
Persons, and the relations between God and His Creation. First comes the
consideration of the principle of creation, the processio creaturarum a Deo,
and of the nature of created things, with some discussion of evil, whether it
be a thing.

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Among created beings, Thomas treats first of angels, and at great length;
then of the physical creation, in its order—the work of the six days, but
with no great detail. Then man, created of spiritual and corporeal substance
—his complex nature is to be analysed and fathomed to its depths. Thomas
discusses the union of the anima ad corpus; then the powers of the anima,
in generali and in speciali—the intellectual faculties, the appetites, the will
and its freedom of choice; how the anima knows—the full Aristotelian
theory of cognition is given. Next, more specifically as to the creation of the
soul and body of the first man, and the nature of the image and similitude of
God within him; then as to man’s condition and faculties while in a state of
innocence; also as to Paradise.
This closes the treatment of the creatio et distinctio rerum; and Thomas
passes to their gubernatio, and the problem of how God conserves and
moves the corporeal and spiritual; then concerning the action of one
creature on another, and how the angels are ranged in hierarchies, and
although purely spiritual beings, minister to men and guard them; then
concerning the action of corporeal things, concerning fate, and the action of
men upon men.
Here ends Pars prima. The first section of the second part (Prima
secundae) begins. In a short Prologue Thomas says:
“Because man is made in the image of God, that is, free in his thought
and will, and able to act through himself (per se potestativum), after
what has been said concerning the Exemplar, God, and everything
proceeding from the divine power according to His will, it remains for
us to consider His image, to wit, man, in so far as he is the source or
cause (principium) of his own works, having free-will and power over
them.”
Hereupon Thomas takes up in order: the ultimate end of man; the nature of
man’s beatitude, and wherein it consists, and how it may be attained; then
voluntary and involuntary acts, and the nature and action of will; then
fruition, intention, election, deliberation, consent, and actions good and bad,
flowing from the will; then the passions; concupiscence and pleasure,
sadness, hope and despair, fear, anger; next habits (habitus) and the virtues,
intellectual, cardinal, theological; the gifts of the Spirit, and the beatitudes;

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the vices, and sin, and penalty. Thereupon it becomes proper to consider the
external causes (principia) of acts: “The external cause (principium)
moving toward good is God; who instructs us through law, and aids us
through grace. Therefore we must speak, first of law, then of grace.” So
Thomas discusses: the essentia of law, and the different kinds of law—lex
aeterna, lex naturalis, lex humana—their effect and validity; then the
precepts of the Old Law (of the Old Testament); then as to the law of the
Gospel and the need of grace; and lastly, concerning grace and human
merit.
The Secunda secundae (the second division of the second part) opens with a
Prologue, in which the author says that, having considered generally the
virtues and vices, and other things pertaining to the matter of ethics, it is
needful to consider these same matters more particularly, each in turn; “for
general moral statements (sermones morales universales) are less useful,
inasmuch as actions are always in particularibus.” A more special statement
of moral rules may proceed in two ways: the one from the side of the moral
material, discussing this or that virtue or vice; the other considers what
applies to special orders (speciales status) of men, for instance prelates and
the lower clergy, or men devoted to the active or contemplative religious
life. “We shall, therefore, consider specially, first what applies to all
conditions of men, and then what applies to certain orders (determinatos
status).” Thomas adds that it will be best to consider in each case the virtue
and corresponding gift, and the opposing vice, together; also that “virtues
are reducible to seven, the three theological,[447] and the four cardinal
virtues. Of the intellectual virtues, one is Prudence, which is numbered with
the cardinal virtues; but ars does not pertain to morals, which relate to what
is to be done, while ars is the correct faculty of making things (recta ratio
factibilium).[448] The other three intellectual virtues, sapientia, intellectus,
et scientia, bear the names of certain gifts of the Holy Spirit, and are
considered with them. Moral virtues are all reducible to the cardinal virtues;
and therefore, in considering each cardinal virtue, all the virtues related to it
are considered, and the opposite vices.”
This classification of the virtues seems anything but clear. And perhaps the
weakest feature of the Summa is this scarcely successful ordering, or
combination, of the Aristotelian virtues with those more germane to the
Christian scheme. However this may be, the author of the Summa proceeds

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to consider in order: fides, and the gifts (dona) of intellectus and scientia
which correspond to the virtue faith; next the opposing vices: infidelitas,
haeresis, apostasia, blasphemia, and caecitas mentis (spiritual blindness).
Next in order come the virtue spes, and the corresponding gift of the Spirit,
timor, and the opposing vices of desperatio and praesumptio.[449] Next,
caritas, with its dilectio, its gaudium, its pax, its misericordia, its
beneficentia and eleemosyna, and its correctio fraterna; then the opposite
vices, odium, acedia, invidia, discordia, contentio, schisma, bellum, rixa,
seditio, scandalum. Next the donum sapientiae, and its opposite, stultitia;
next, prudentia, and its correspondent gift, consilium; and its connected
vices, imprudentia, negligentia, and its evil semblances, dolus and fraus.
Says Thomas: Consequenter post prudentiam considerandum est de
Justitia. Whereupon follows a juristic treatment of jus, justitia, judicium,
restitutio, acceptio personarum; then homicide and other crimes recognized
by law. Then come the virtues, connected with justitia, to wit, religio, and
its acts, devotio, oratio, adoratio, sacrificium, oblatio, decimae, votum,
juramentum; then the vices opposed to religio: superstitio, idolatria,
tentatio Dei, perjurium, sacrilegium, simonia. Next is considered the virtue
of pietas; then observantia, with its parts, i.e. dulia (service), obedientia,
and its opposite, inobedientia. Next, gratia (thanks) or gratitudo, and its
opposite, ingratitudo; next, vindicatio (punishment); next, veritas, with its
opposites, hypocrisis, jactantia (boasting), and ironia; next, amicitia, with
the vices of adulatio and litigium. Next, the virtue of liberalitas, and its
vices, avaritia and prodigalitas; next, epieikeia (aequitas). Finally, closing
this discussion of all that is connected with Justitia, Thomas speaks of its
corresponding gift of the Spirit, pietas.
Now comes the third cardinal virtue, Fortitudo—under which martyrium is
the type of virtuous act; intimiditas and audacia are the two vices. Then the
parts of Fortitudo, to wit, magnanimitas, magnificentia, patientia,
perseverantia, and the obvious opposing vices. Next, the fourth cardinal
virtue, Temperantia, its obvious opposing vices, and its parts, to wit,
verecundia, honestas, abstinentia, sobrietas, castitas, clementia, modestia,
humilitas, and the various appropriate acts and opposing vices related to
these special virtues.

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So far,[450] Thomas has been considering the virtues proper for all men; and
now he comes to those specially pertaining to certain kinds of men,
according to their gifts of grace, their modes of life, or the diversity of their
offices, or stations. Of the special virtues related to gifts of grace, the first is
prophetia, next raptus (vision), then gratia linguarum, and gratia
miraculorum. After this, the vita activa and contemplativa, with their
appropriate virtues, are considered. And then Thomas proceeds to speak De
officiis et statibus hominum, and their respective virtues.
Here ends the Secunda secundae, and Pars tertia opens with this Prologue:
“Inasmuch as our Saviour Jesus Christ (as witnesseth the Angel,
populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum) has shown in himself
the way of truth, through which we are able to come to the beatitude of
immortal life by rising again, it is necessary, for the consummation of
the whole theological matter, after the consideration of the final end of
human life, and of the virtues and vices, that our attention should be
fixed upon the Saviour of all and His benefactions to the human race.
“As to which, first one must consider the Saviour himself; secondly, His
sacraments, by which we obtain salvation; thirdly, concerning the end
(finis), immortal life, to which we come by rising again through Him.
“As to the first, one has to consider the mystery of the Incarnation, in
which God was made man for our salvation, and then those things that
were done and suffered by our Saviour, that is, God incarnate.”
This Prologue indicates sufficiently the order of topics in the Pars tertia of
the Summa, through Quaestio xc., at which point the hand of the Angelic
Doctor was folded to eternal rest. He was then considering penance, the
fourth in his order of Sacraments. All that he had to say as to the person,
and attributes, and acts and passion of Christ had been written; and he had
considered the Sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and the eucharist; he
was occupied with poenitentia; and still other sacraments remained, as well
as his final treatment of the matters which lie beyond the grave. So he left
his work unfinished, and, in spite of many efforts, unfinishable by any of
his pupils or successors.[451]

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II
Inasmuch as the matter of their thoughts was transmitted to the men of the
Middle Ages, and was not drawn from their own observation or
constructive reasoning, the fundamental intellectual endeavour for
mediaeval men was to apprehend and make their own, and re-express. Their
intellectual progress followed this process of appropriation, and falls into
three stages—learning, organically appropriating, and re-expressing with
added elements of thought. Logically, and generally in time, these three
stages were successive. Yet, of course, they overlapped, and may be
observed progressing simultaneously. Thus, for example, what was known
of Aristotle at the beginning of the twelfth century was slight compared
with the knowledge of his philosophy that was opened to western Europe in
the latter part of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth. And while,
by the middle of the twelfth century, the elements of Aristotle’s logic had
been thoroughly appropriated, the substantial Aristotelian philosophy had
still to be learned and mastered, before it could be reformulated and re-
expressed as part of mediaeval thought.
Looking solely to the outer form, the three stages of mediaeval thought are
exemplified in the Scriptural Commentary of the later Carolingian time, in
the twelfth-century Books of Sentences, and at last in the more organic
Summa theologiae. With this significant evolution and change of outer
form, proceeded the more substantial evolution consisting in learning,
appropriating, and re-expressing the inherited material. In both cases, these
three stages were necessitated by the greatness of the transmitted matter; for
the intellectual energies of the mediaeval period were fully occupied with
mastering the data proffered so pressingly, with presenting and re-
presenting this superabundant material, and recasting it in new forms of
statement, which were also expressions, or realizations, of the mediaeval
genius. So the mediaeval product may be regarded as given by the past, and
by the same token necessitated and controlled. But, on the other hand, each
stage of intellectual progress rendered possible the next one.
The first stage of learning is represented by the Carolingian period, which
we have considered. It was then that the patristic material was extracted
from the writings of the Fathers, and rearranged and reapplied, to meet the
needs of the time. The mastery of this material had scarcely made such vital

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progress as to enable the men of the ninth and tenth and eleventh centuries
to re-express it largely in terms of their own thinking. In the ninth century,
Eriugena affords an extraordinary exception with his drastic restatement of
what he had drawn from Pseudo-Dionysius and others; and at the end
comes Anselm, whose genius is metaphysically constructive. But Anselm
touches the coming time; and the springs of Eriugena’s genius are hidden
from us.
As for the antique thought during these Carolingian centuries, Eriugena
dealt in his masterful way with what he knew of it through patristic and
semi-patristic channels. But let us rather seek it in the curriculum of the
Trivium and Quadrivium. What progress Gerbert made in the Quadrivium,
that is, in the various branches of mathematics which he taught, has been
noted, and to what extent his example was followed by his pupil Fulbert, at
the cathedral school of Chartres.[452] The courses of the Trivium—grammar,
rhetoric, logic—demand our closer attention; for they were the key of the
situation. We must keep in mind that we are approaching mediaeval thought
from the side of the innate human need of intellectual expression—the
impulse to know and the need to formulate one’s conceptions and express
them consistently. For mediaeval men the first indispensable means to this
end was grammar, including rhetoric, and the next was logic or dialectic.
The Latin language contained the sum of knowledge transmitted to the
Middle Ages. And it had to be learned. This was true even in Italy and
Spain and France, where each year the current ways of Romance speech
were departing more definitely from the parent stock; it was more patently
true in the countries of Teutonic speech. Centuries before, the Roman youth
had studied grammar that they might speak and write correctly. Now it was
necessary to study Latin grammar, to wit, the true forms and literary usages
of the Latin tongue, in order to acquire any branch of knowledge
whatsoever, and express one’s corresponding thoughts. And men would not
at first distinguish sharply between the mediating value of the learned
tongue and the learning which it held.[453]
Thus grammar, the study of the Latin language, represented the first stage
of knowledge for mediaeval men. This was to remain true through all the
mediaeval centuries; since all youths who became scholars had to learn the
language before they could study what was contained in it alone. One may
also say, and yet not speak fantastically, that grammar, the study of the

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correct use of the language itself, corresponded spiritually with the main
intellectual labour of the Carolingian period. Alcuin’s attention is
commonly fixed upon the significance of language, Latin of course. And the
labours of his pupil Rabanus, and the latter’s pupil Walafrid, are as it were
devoted to the grammar of learning. That is to say, they read and endeavour
to understand the works of the Fathers; they compare and collate, and make
volumes of extracts, which they arrange for the most part as Scripture
commentaries; commentaries, that is, upon the significance of the canonical
writings which were the substance of all wisdom, but needed much
explication. Such works were the very grammar of knowledge, being
devoted to the exposition of the meaning of the Scriptures and the vast
burden of patristic thought. A like purpose was evinced in the efforts of the
great emperor himself to re-establish schools of grammar, in order that the
Scriptures might be more correctly understood, and the expositions of the
holy Fathers. In fine, just as knowledge of the Latin tongue was the end and
aim of grammar, so a correct understanding of what was contained in Latin
books was the aim of the intellectual labours of this period. It all
represented the first stage in the mediaeval acquisition of knowledge, or in
the presentation or expression of the same; and thus the first stage in the
mediaeval endeavour to realize the human impulse to know.
The next course of the Trivium was logic; and likewise its study will
represent truly the second stage in the mediaeval realization of the human
impulse to know, to wit, the second stage in the appropriation and
expression of the knowledge transmitted from the past. We have spoken at
some length of the logical studies of Gerbert, and his endeavours to adjust
his thinking and classify the branches of knowledge by means of formal
logic.[454] Those discussions of his which seem somewhat puerile to us,
were essential to his endeavours to formulate what he had learned, and
present it as rational and ordered knowledge. Logic is properly the stage
succeeding grammar in the formulation of rational knowledge. At least it
was for men of Gerbert’s time, and the following centuries. Rightly enough
they looked on logic as a scientia sermotionalis, which on one side touched
sheer linguistics, and on the other, had for its field the further processes of
reason. Thus Hugo of St. Victor, Abaelard’s very great contemporary, says:
“Logic is named from the Greek word logos, which has a twofold
interpretation. For logos means either sermo or ratio; and therefore

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logic may be termed either a scientia sermotionalis or a scientia
rationalis. Logica rationalis embraces dialectic and rhetoric, and is
called discretiva (argumentative and exercising judgment); logica
sermotionalis is the genus which includes grammar, dialectic and
rhetoric, to wit, discursive science (disertiva).”[455]
The close connection between grammar and logic is evident. Logic treats of
language used in rational expression, as well as of the reasoning processes
carried on in language. Its elementary chapters teach a rational use of
language, whereby men may reach a more deeply consistent expression of
their thoughts than is gained from grammar. Yet grammar also is logic, and
based on logical principles. All this is exemplified in the logical treatises
composing the Aristotelian Organon, which the Middle Ages used. First
comes Porphyry’s Isagoge, which clearly is bound up in language. Likewise
Aristotle’s Categories treat of the rational and consistent use of language, or
of what may be stated in language. Next it is obvious that the De
interpretatione treats of language used to express thought, its generic
function. The more advanced treatises of the Organon, the Prior and
Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and Sophistical Elenchi, treat directly and
elaborately of the reasoning processes themselves. So one perceives the
grammatical affinities of the simpler treatises in the Organon. The more
advanced ones seem to stand to them as oratorical rhetoric stands to
elementary grammar. For the Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Elenchi are
a kind of eristic, training the student to use the processes of thought and
their expression in order to attain an end, commonly argumentative. The
prior treatises have taught the elements, as it were the orthography and
etymology of the rational expression of thought in language; the latter (even
as syntax and rhetoric), train the student in the use of these elements. And
one observes a nice historical fitness in the fact that only the simpler
treatises of the Organon were in common use in the early Middle Ages,
since they alone were necessary to the first stage in the appropriation of the
substance of patristic and antique thought. The full Organon was
rediscovered, and retaken into use in the middle or latter part of the twelfth
century, when men had progressed to a more organic appropriation of the
patristic material and what they knew of the antique philosophy.
Thus in mediaeval education, and in the successive order of appropriating
the patristic and the antique, logic stood on grammar’s shoulders. It was

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grammar’s rationalized stage, and treated language as the means of
expressing thought consistently and validly; that is, so as not to contravene
the necessities of that whereof it was the vehicle. And since language thus
treated was in accord with rational thought, it would accord with the
realities to which thought corresponds; and might be taken as expressing
them. This last reflection introduces metaphysics.
And properly. For the three stages in the mediaeval appropriation and
expression of knowledge were grammar, logic, metaphysics. Logic has to
do with the processes of thought; with the positing of premises and the
drawing of the conclusion. It does not necessarily consider whether the
contents of its premises represent realities. This is matter for ontology,
metaphysics. Now mediaeval metaphysics, which were those of Greek
philosophy, were extremely pre-Kantian, in assuming a correspondence
between the necessities or conclusions of thought and the supreme realities,
God and the Universe. Nor did mediaeval logic doubt that its processes
could elucidate and express the veritable natures of things. So mediaeval
logic readily wandered into the province of metaphysics, and ignored the
line between the two.
Yet there is little metaphysics in the Organon; none in its simpler treatises.
So there was none in the elementary logical instruction of the schools
before the twelfth century at least.[456] One may always distinguish between
logic and metaphysics; and it is to our purpose to do so here. For as we have
taken logic to represent the second stage in the mediaeval appropriation of
knowledge, so metaphysics, poised in turn on logic’s shoulders, is very
representative of the third stage, to wit, the stage of systematic and organic
re-expression of the ancient matter, with elements added by the great
schoolmen.
Metaphysics was very properly the final stage. The grammatical represented
an elementary learning of what the past had transmitted; the logical a
further retrying of the matter, an attempt to understand and express it,
formulate parts of it anew, with deeper consistency of expression. Then
follows the attempt for final and universal consistency: final inasmuch as
thought penetrates to the nature of things and expresses realities and the
relationships of realities; and universal, in that it seeks to order and
systematize all its concepts, and bring them to unity in a Summa—a

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perfected scheme of rational presentation of God and His creation. This will
be, largely speaking, the final endeavour of the mediaeval man to ease his
mind, and realize his impulse to know and express himself with uttermost
consistency.
So for mediaeval men, metaphysics stood on logic’s shoulders and
represented the final completion of their thought, in a universal system and
scheme of God and man and things.[457] But the first part of this proposition
had not been true with Greek philosophy. Metaphysics is properly occupied
with being, in its ultimate essence and relationships; with the consistent
putting together of things, to wit, the presentation or expression of them so
as not to disagree with any of the data recognized as pertinent. The thinker
considers profoundly, seeking to penetrate the ultimate reality and
relationships of things, through which a universal whole is constituted. This
makes ontology, metaphysics—the science of being, of causes, and so the
science of the first Cause, God. Aristotle called this the “first” philosophy,
because lying at the base of all branches of knowledge, and depending on
nothing beyond itself. Some time after his death, the Peripatetics and then
the Neo-Platonists called this first science by the name of Metaphysics,
“after” or “beyond” physics, if one will, perhaps because of the actual order
of treatment in the schools.
The term Metaphysics is vague enough; either “first” philosophy or
“ontology” is preferable. Yet as to Greek philosophy the term has apt
historical suggestiveness. For it did come after physics in time, and was in
fact evoked by the imperfect method and consequent contradictions of the
earlier philosophies. From the beginning, Greek philosophy drove straight
at the cause or origin of things—surely the central problem of metaphysics.
Thales and the other Ionians began with rational, though crude, hypotheses
as to the sources of the universe. These were first attempts to reach a
consistent expression of its origin and nature. Each succeeding philosopher
considered further, from the vantage-ground of the recognized
inconsistencies or inadequacies in the theories of his predecessors. He was
thus led on to consider more profoundly the essential relationships of
things, the very truth of their relationships, and on and on into the problem
of their being. For the verity of relations must be according to the verity of
being of the things related. The world about us consists in relationships, of
antecedents and sequences, of cause and effect; and our thought of it is

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made up of consistencies or contradictions, which last we struggle to
eliminate, or to transform to consistencies.
These early philosophers looked only to the Aristotelian material cause for
the origin and cause of things; yet reflection plunged them deeper into a
consideration of the nature of being and relationships. The other causes
were evoked by Anaxagoras and then by Plato, and by them were led into
the arena of debate; and philosophers discussed the efficient and final cause
as well as the material. Such discussions are recognized by Plato, and
finally by Aristotle as relating to the first principles of cognition and being,
and so as constituting metaphysics. The constant search for a deeper
consistency of explanation had led on and on through a manifold
consideration of those palpable relationships which make up the visible
world; it had disclosed the series of necessary assumptions required by
those visible relationships; and thus the search for causality and origins, and
essential relationships, became one and the same—metaphysics.
Metaphysics was not ineptly called so, since it had in time come after the
cruder physical hypotheses. But such was not the order of mediaeval
intellectual progress. The Middle Ages passed through no preliminary
course of physical hypotheses, explanatory of the universe. Not physics, but
logic (introduced by grammar) led up to the final construction—or rather
adoption and reconstruction—of ultimate hypotheses as to God and man,
led up to the all-ordering and all-compassing Theologia. Metalogics, rather
than Metaphysics, would be the proper name for these final expressions or
actualizations of the mediaeval impulse to know.

CHAPTER XXXVI

TWELFTH-CENTURY SCHOLASTICISM

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I. The Problem of Universals: Abaelard.
II. The Mystic Strain: Hugo and Bernard.
III. The Later Decades: Bernard Silvestris; Gilbert de la Porrée;
William of Conches; John of Salisbury, and Alanus of Lille.

I
From the somewhat elaborate general considerations which have occupied
the last two chapters, we turn to the representative manifestations of
mediaeval thought in the twelfth century. These belong in part to the second
or “logical,” and in part to the third or “meta-logical,” stage of the
mediaeval mind. The first or “grammatical” stage was represented by the
Carolingian period; and in reviewing the mental aspects of the eleventh
century, we entered upon the second stage, that of logic, or dialectic, to use
the more specific mediaeval term. Toward the close of the tenth century
Gerbert was found strenuously occupying himself with logic, and using it as
a means of ordering the branches of knowledge. At the end of the eleventh,
Anselm has not only considered certain logical problems, but has vaulted
over into constructive metaphysical theology. Looking back over Anselm’s
work, from the vantage-ground of the twelfth century’s further reflections,
one may be conscious of a certain genial youthfulness in his reliance upon
single arguments, noble and beautiful soarings of the spirit, which however
pay little regard to the firmness of the premises from which they spring, and
still less to a number of cognate and pertinent considerations, which the
twelfth century was to analyze.
Anselm’s thoughts perhaps overleaped logic. At all events he appears only
occasionally absorbed with its formal problems. Yet he lived in a time of
dawning logical controversy. Roscellin was even then blowing up the
problem of universals, a problem occasioned by the entering of mediaeval
thought upon the “logical” stage of its appropriation of the patristic and
antique.
The problem of universals, or general ideas, from the standpoint of logic,
lies at the basis of consistent thinking. It reverts to the time when Aristotle’s
assertion of the pre-eminently real existence of individuals broke away

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from the Platonic doctrine of Ideas. For the early mediaeval philosophers, it
took its rise in a famous passage in Porphyry’s Introduction to the
Categories, the concluding sentence of which, as translated into Latin by
Boëthius, puts the question thus: “Mox de generibus et speciebus illud
quidem sive subsistant sive in nudis intellectibus posita sint, sive
subsistentia corporalia sint an incorporalia, et utrum separata a sensibilibus
an in sensibilibus posita et circa haec consistentia, dicere recusabo.” “Next
as to genera and species, do they actually exist or are they merely in
thought; are they corporeal or incorporeal existences; are they separate from
sensible things or only in and of them?—I refuse to answer,” says
Porphyry; “it is a very lofty business, unsuited to an elementary work.”
Thus, in three pairs of crude alternatives, the question came over to the
early Middle Ages. The men of the Carolingian period took one position or
another, without sensing its difficulties, or observing how it lay athwart the
path of knowledge. Students were not as yet attempting such a dynamic
appropriation of the ancient material as would evoke this veritable problem
of cognition. Even Gerbert at the close of the tenth century was still so busy
with the outer forms and figments of logic that he had no time to enter on
those ulterior problems where logic links itself to metaphysics. One
Roscellin, living and teaching apparently at Besançon in the latter part of
the eleventh century, seems to have been the first to attack the currently
accepted “realism” with some sense of the matter’s thorny intricacies. With
his own “nominalistic” position we are acquainted only through his
adversaries, who imputed to him views which a thoughtful person could
hardly have entertained—that universals were merely words and breath
(flatus vocis). Roscellin seems at all events to have been a man strongly
held by the reality of individuals, and one who found it difficult to ascribe a
sufficient intellectual actuality to the general idea as distinguished from the
perception of things and the demands of the concepts of their individual
existences. His logical difficulties impelled him to theological heresy. The
unity in the Trinity became an impossibility; he could only conceive of
three beings, just as he might think of three angels; and he would have
spoken of three Gods had usage not forbidden it, says St. Anselm.[458] As it
was, he said enough to draw on him the condemnation of a Council held at
Soissons in 1092, before which he quailed and recanted. For the remainder

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of his life he so constrained the expression of his thoughts as to ensure his
safety.
One may say that Plato’s theory of ideas was a metaphysical presentation of
the universe, sounding in conceptions of reality. But for the Middle Ages,
the problem whether genera and species exist when abstracted from their
particulars, sprang from logical controversy. It was a problem of cognition,
cognizance, understanding: how should one understand and analyze the
contents of a statement, e.g. Socrates is a man. Moreover, it was a
fundamental and universal problem of cognition; for it was not merely
occupied, like all mental processes, with bringing data to consistent
formulation, but pertained to those processes themselves by which any and
all data are stated or formulated. It touched every formulation of truth,
asking, in fine, how are we to think our statements? The philosophers of the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, did not view this problem as one
pertaining to the mind’s processes, and as having to do solely with the
understanding of the contents of a statement. Rather, even as Plato had
done, they approached it as if it were a problem of modes of existence; and
for this very reason it had pushed Roscellin into theological error.
The discussion was to pass through various stages; and each stage may
seem to us to represent the point reached by the thinker in his analysis of his
conscious meaning in stating a proposition. Moreover, each solution may be
valid for him who gives it, because of its correspondence to the meaning of
his utterances so far as he has analyzed them. But mediaeval men could not
take it in this way. Their intellectual task lay in appropriating, and in their
own way re-expressing, all that had come to them from an authoritative
past. The problem of universals had been stated by a great authority, who
put it as pertaining to the objective reality of genera and species. How then
might mediaeval men take it otherwise, especially when at all events it
pertained in all verity to their endeavour to grasp and re-express the
contents of transmitted truth? It became for a while the crucial problem, the
answer to which might indicate the thinker’s general intellectual attitude.
Far from keeping to logic, to the organon or instrumental part of the
mediaeval endeavour to know, it wound itself through metaphysics and
theology. Obviously the thinker’s answer to the problem would bear
relation to his thoughts upon the transcendent reality of spiritual essences.

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The men who first became impressed with the importance of this problem,
gave extreme answers to it, sometimes crassly denying the real existence of
universals, but more often hailing them as antecedent and all-permeating
realities. If Roscellinus took the former position, a pupil of his, William of
Champeaux, held the extreme opposite view, when both he and the twelfth
century were still young. One may, however, bear in mind that as the views
of the older nominalist are reported only by his enemies, so our knowledge
of William’s lucubrations comes mainly from the exacerbated pen of Peter
Abaelard.
William held apparently “that the same thing, in its totality and at the same
time, existed in its single individuals, among which there was no essential
difference, but merely a variety of accidents.”[459] Abaelard appears to have
performed a reductio ad absurdum upon this view that the total genus exists
in each individual. He pointed out that in such case the total genus homo
would at the same time exist in Socrates and also in Plato, when one of
them might be in Rome and the other in Athens. “At this William changed
his opinion,” continues Abaelard, “and taught that the genus existed in each
individual not essentialiter but indifferenter or [as some texts read]
individualiter.” Which seems to mean that William no longer held that the
total genus existed in each individual actually, but “indistinguishably,” or
“individually.”
And the students flocked away with Abaelard, he also says; and William
fled the lecture chair. William and Peter; shall we say of them arcades
ambo? This would be but a harmless depreciation of Abaelard, in the face of
the universal and correct tradition as to his epoch-making intellectual
progressiveness. Indeed it might be well to let the phrase sound in our ears,
just for the reminder’s sake, that Abaelard was, like William, a man of
logic, although far more expert both in manipulating the dialectic processes
and in applying them to theology.
Before endeavouring briefly to reconstruct the intellectual qualities of
Abaelard from his writings, let us see how the famous open letter to a
friend, in giving an apologetic story of the writer’s life, discloses the
fatalities of his character. This Historia calamitatum suarum makes it plain
enough why the crises of his life were all of them catastrophes—even
leaving out of view his liaison with Heloïse and its penalty. A fatal impulse

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to annoy seems to drive him from fate to fate; the old word of Heraclitus
ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (character is a man’s genius) was so patently true of
him. Much that he said was to receive orthodox approval after his time.
Quite true. It has often been remarked, that the heresy of one age is the
accepted doctrine of the next, even within the Church. But would the
heretic have been persona grata to the later time? Perhaps not. Peter
Abaelard at all events would have led others and himself a life of thorns in
the thirteenth century, or the fourteenth had he been born again, when some
of his methods and opinions had become accepted commonplace. Did he
have an eye for logical and human truth more piercing than his twelfth-
century fellows? Apparently. Was his need to speak out his truth so much
the more imperative than theirs? Possibly. At all events, he was certainly
possessed with an inordinate impulsion to undo his rivals. He sits down
before their fortress walls by night, and when they see him there, they know
not whether they look on friend or foe—in this auditor. They will find out
soon enough. He studied dialectic under William of Champeaux at Paris, as
all men were to know. He got what William had to teach, and moved on, to
lecture in Melun and elsewhere. Then he returned and sat at William’s feet
awhile to learn rhetoric, as he announced. But quickly he rose up, and
assailed his master’s doctrine of universals, and overthrew him, as we have
seen. The victim’s friends made Abaelard’s eristically won lecturer’s seat a
prickly one. He left Paris for a while, and then returned and taught on
Mount St. Geneviève, outside the city.
Up to this time he had not been known to study theology. But in 1113, at the
age of thirty-four, he went to Laon to listen to a famous theologian named
Anselm, who himself had studied at Bec under a greater Anselm. Says
Abaelard in his Historia calamitatum: “So I came to this old man, whose
repute was a tradition, rather than merited by talent or learning. Any one
who brought his uncertainties to him, went away more uncertain still! He
was a marvel in the eyes of his hearers, but a nobody before a questioner.
He had a wonderful wordflow, but the sense was contemptible and the
reasoning abject.” Well, I didn’t listen to him long, Abaelard intimates; but
began to absent myself from his lectures, and was brought to task by his
auditors, to whom jokingly I said, I, too, could lecture on Scripture; and I
was taken up. Nothing loath, the next day I lectured to them on the passage
they had chosen from Ezekiel’s obscure prophecies. So, all unprepared, and

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trusting in my genius, I began to lecture, at first to sparse audiences, but
they quickly grew. Such is the substance of Abaelard’s own account, and he
goes on to tell how “the old man aforesaid was violently moved with envy,”
and shortly Abaelard had to take his lecturings elsewhere. He returned to
Paris, and we have the episode of Heloïse, for whom, as his life went on, he
evinced a devoted affection.[460]
Now he is monk in the abbey of St. Denis; and there again he lectures, and
takes up certain themes against Roscellinus, whom he seems to resurrect
from the quiet of old age to make a target of. This old man, too, hits back,
and other vicious people blow up a cloud of envy, until the gifted lecturer
finds himself an accused before the Council of Soissons, and his book
condemned. Untaught by the burning of his book, Abaelard returns to his
convent, and proceeds to unearth statements of the Venerable Bede showing
that Dionysius the Areopagite who heard Paul preach, was not the St. Denis
who became patron saint of France, and founder of the great abbey which
even now was sheltering a certain Abaelard, and drawing power and
revenue from the fame of its reputed almost apostolic founder. Its abbot and
monks did not care to have the abbey walls undermined by truth, and
Abaelard was hunted forth from among them.
It was after this that he made for himself a lonely refuge, which he named
the Paraclete, not far from Troyes, and thither again his pupils followed him
in swarms, and built their huts around him in the wilderness. But still
mightier foes—or their phantoms—rise against this hunted head. The
Historia seems to allude to St. Norbert and to St. Bernard. Whatever the
storm was, it was escaped by flight to a remote Breton convent which—still
for his sins!—had chosen Abaelard its abbot. There in due course they tried
to murder him, and again he fled, this time back to his congenial sphere, the
schools of Paris, where he lectured, now at the summit of fame, to
enthusiastic multitudes of students. Some years pass, and then the pious
jackal, William of St. Thierry, rouses his lion Bernard to contend with
Abaelard and crush him, not with dialectic, at the Council of Sens in 1141.
In a year he died, a broken man, in Cluny’s shelter. The conflict had not
been of his seeking. Perhaps, had he been less vain, he might have avoided
it. When it was upon him, the unhappy athlete of the schools found himself
a pigmy matched against the giant of Clairvaux—the Thor and Loki of the
Church! Whether or not the unequal battle raises Abaelard in our esteem, its

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outcome commends him to our pity; and all our sympathy stays with him to
the last days of a life that was, as if physically, crushed. This accumulation
of sad fortune bears witness enough to the character of the man on whose
neck it did not fall by accident. Now let us try to reconstruct him
intellectually.
We have heretofore observed the genius and noted the somewhat swaddling
dialectic categories of a certain eager intellect bearing the name of Gerbert.
[461] Abaelard’s mental processes have advanced beyond such logical
stammerings. He and his time are in the fulness of youth, and feel the
strength and joyful assurance of an intellectual progress, to be brought
about by a new-found proficiency in dialectic. In the first half of the twelfth
century, the intellectual genius of the time—and Abaelard was its
quintessence—knew itself advancing by this means in truth. A like
intellectual consciousness had rejoiced the disputants in Plato’s academy,
under the inspiration of that beautiful reasoner’s exquisite dialectic. The one
time, like the other, was justified in its confidence. For in such epochs,
language, reasoning, and knowledge advance with equal step; thought
clears up with linguistic and logical analysis; it becomes clear and
illuminated because more distinctly conscious of the character of its
processes, and the nature of statement. There is thus a veritable progress, at
least in the methodology of truth.
In Abaelard’s time men had already studied grammar, the grammar of the
Latin tongue, and the quasi-grammar of rearrangement and first painful
learning of the knowledge which it held. They had studied logic too, its
simpler elements, those which consist mainly in a further clearing up of the
meanings of language. Some men—Anselm of Canterbury—had already
made sudden flights beyond grammar, and out of logic’s pale. And the
labour of logical and organic appropriation, with some reconstruction of the
ancient material, was to go on in this first half of the twelfth century, when
Hugo of St. Victor lived as well as Abaelard. Progress by means of dialectic
controversy, and first attempts at systematic construction, mark this period
intellectually. Abaelard lived and moved and had his being in dialectic. The
further interest of Theology was lent him by the spirit of his time. Through
the medium of the one he reasoned analytically; and in the province of the
other he applied his reasoning constructively, using patristic materials and
the fragments of Greek philosophy scattered through them. Thus Abaelard,

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a true man of the twelfth century, passes on through logic to theology or
metaphysics.
For the completeness of his logical knowledge he lived and worked twenty
or thirty years too soon. He was unacquainted with the more elaborate
logical treatises of Aristotle, to wit, the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the
Topics, and Sophistical Elenchi. The sources of his own treatises upon
Dialectic are Porphyry’s Introduction, Aristotle’s Categories and De
interpretatione, and certain treatises of Boëthius.[462] A first result of the
elementary and quasi-grammatical character of the sources of logic upon
which he drew, is that the connection between logic and grammar is very
plain with him. Note, for example, this paragraph of his, the substance of
which is drawn from Aristotle’s Categories:
“But neither can substances be compared,[463] since comparison relates
to attribute, and not to substance; so it is shown that comparison lies not
as to nouns, but as to their attributes. Thus we say whiter but not
whitenesser. Much more are substances which have no attribute
(adjacentiam) immune from comparison. More or less cannot be
predicated of nouns (nomina substantiva). For one cannot say more man
or less man, as more or less white.”[464]
Evidently this elementary sort of logic, whether with Aristotle or Abaelard,
represents a clearing up of the mind on current modes of expression. And
sometimes from such studies men make discoveries like that of Molière’s
Bourgeois Gentilhomme, who discovered that he had always been talking
prose. Some of the points on which the minds of Abaelard’s contemporaries
required clarification, would be foolish word-play to ourselves, as, for
instance, whether the significance of the sentence homo est animal is
contained in the subject, copula, or predicate, or only in all three; and
whether when a word is spoken, the very same word and the whole of it
comes to the ears of all the hearers at the same time: “utrum ipsa vox ad
aures diversorum simul et tota aequaliter veniat.”[465] Such questions, as
was observed regarding the problems of logical arrangement in Gerbert’s
mind, may be pertinent and reasonable enough, if viewed in connection
with the intellectual conditions of a period; just as many questions now
make demand on us for solution, being links in the chain of our knowledge,

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or manner of reasoning. But future men may pass them by as not lying in
their path to progressive knowledge of the universe and man.
So the problem of universals was still cardinal with Abaelard and his
fellow-logicians, who through logic were advancing, as they believed,
along the path of objective truth. Its solution would determine the nature of
the categories into which logic was fitting whatever might be enunciated or
expressed. The inquiry represented an ultimate analysis of statement, of the
general nature of propositions; and also related to their assumed
correspondence with realities. What William of Champeaux had
unqualifiedly alleged, Abaelard tried to determine more analytically, to wit,
the value of the proposition “si aliquid sit ea res quae est species, id est vel
homo vel equus et caetera, sit quaelibet res quae eorum genus est, veluti
animal aut corpus aut substantia,”—if species be something, as man, horse,
and so forth, then that which is the genus of these may be something, as
animal, body, or substance.[466]
Abaelard’s discussion of this matter is a discussion of the true content of
propositions. His conclusion is not so clear as to have occasioned no
dispute. One must not think of him as an Aristotelian—for he knew little of
the substantial philosophy of Aristotle. Our dialectician had absorbed more
of Plato, through turbid patristic channels and the current translation of the
Timaeus. So his solution of the question of genus and species may prove an
analytic bit of eclecticism, an imagined reconcilement of the two great
masters. The universal or general is, says he, “quod natum est de pluribus
praedicari,” that which is by its nature adapted to be predicated of a number
of things. The universal consists neither in things as such nor in words as
such; it consists rather in general predicability; it is sermo, sermo
praedicabilis, that which may be stated, as a predicate, of many. As such it
is not a mere word: sermo is not merely vox; that is not the true general
predicable. On the other hand, one thing cannot be the predicate of another;
res de re non praedicatur: therefore sermo is not res. Yet Abaelard does not
limit the existence of the universal to the concept of him who thinks it. It
surely exists in the individuals, since substantia specierum is not different
from the essentia individuorum. But does not the general concept exist as an
objective unity? Apparently Abaelard would answer: Yes, it does thus exist
as a common sameness (consimilitudo).

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All this is anything but clear. And the various twelfth-century opinions on
universals no longer possess human interest. It is hard for us to distinguish
between them, or understand them clearly, or state them intelligibly. They
are bound up in a phraseology untranslatable into modern language,
because the discussion no longer corresponds to modern ways of thought.
But one is interested in the human need which drove Abaelard and his
fellows upon the horns of this problem, and in the nature of their
endeavours to formulate their thought so as to escape those opposing horns
—of an extreme realism which might issue in pantheism, and an extreme
nominalism which seemed to deprive predication of substance and validity.
[467]

So much for Abaelard as sheer logician, formal adjuster of the instrumental
processes of thinking. Dialectic was for him a first stage in the actualization
of the impulse to know, and bring knowledge to consistent expression. It
was also his way of approach to the further systematic presentation of his
thoughts upon God and man, human society and justice, divine and human.
“A new calumny against me, have my rivals lately devised, because I
write upon the dialectic art; affirming that it is not lawful for a Christian
to treat of things which do not pertain to the Faith. Not only they say
that this science does not prepare us for the Faith, but that it destroys
faith by the implications of its arguments. But it is wonderful if I must
not discuss what is permitted them to read. If they allow that the art
militates against faith, surely they deem it not to be science (scientia).
For the science of truth is the comprehension of things, whose species is
the wisdom in which faith consists. Truth is not opposed to truth. For
not as falsehood may be opposed to falsity, or evil to evil, can the true
be opposed to the true, or the good to the good; but rather all good
things are in accord. All knowledge is good, even that which relates to
evil, because a righteous man must have it. Since he should guard
against evil, it is necessary that he should know it beforehand: otherwise
he could not shun it. Though an act be evil, knowledge regarding it is
good; though it be evil to sin, it is good to know the sin, which
otherwise we could not shun. Nor is the science mathematica to be
deemed evil, whose practice (astrology) is evil. Nor is it a crime to
know with what services and immolations the demons may be
compelled to do our will, but to use such knowledge. For if it were evil

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to know this, how could God be absolved, who knows the desires and
cogitations of all His creatures, and how the concurrence of demons
may be obtained? If therefore it is not wrong to know, but to do, the evil
is to be referred to the act and not to the knowledge. Hence we are
convinced that all knowledge, which indeed comes from God alone and
from His bounty, is good. Wherefore the study of every science should
be conceded to be good, because that which is good comes from it; and
especially one must insist upon the study of that doctrina by which the
greater truth is known. This is dialectic, whose function is to distinguish
between every truth and falsity: as leader in all knowledge it holds the
primacy and rule of all philosophy. The same also is shown to be
needful to the Catholic Faith, which cannot without its aid resist the
sophistries of schismatics.”[468]
In this passage the man himself is speaking, and disclosing his innermost
convictions. For Abaelard’s nature was set upon understanding all things
through reason, even the mysteries of the Faith. He does not say, or quite
think, that he will disbelieve whatever he cannot understand; but his
reasoning and temper point to the conclusion. This was obviously true of
Abaelard’s ethical opinions; his enemies said it was true of his theology.
Such a man would naturally plead for freedom of discussion, even for
freedom of conclusion; but within certain bounds; for who in the twelfth
century could maintain that heretics or infidels did rightly in rejecting the
Christian Faith? Yet Abaelard says heretics should be compelled (coercendi)
by reason rather than force.[469] And he could at least conceive of the
rejection of the Faith upon, say, imperfect rational grounds. In his dialogue
between Philosopher, Jew, and Christian, the Christian says to the
Philosopher: One cannot argue against you from the authority of Scripture,
which you do not recognize; for no one can be refuted save with arguments
drawn from what he admits: Nemo quippe argui nisi ex concessis potest.
[470] However this sounded in Abaelard’s time, the same was enunciated by
Thomas Aquinas after him, in a passage already given.[471] But it is
doubtful whether Thomas would have cared to follow Abaelard in some of
the arguments of his Ethics or Book called, Know Thyself, in which he
maintains that no act is a sin unless the actor was conscious of its
sinfulness; and therefore that killing the martyrs could not be imputed as sin

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to those persecutors who deemed themselves thereby to be doing a service
acceptable to God.[472]
The titles given by Abaelard to his various treatises are indicative of the
critical insistency of his nature. He called his Ethica, Scito te ipsum, Know
Thyself: understand thy good and ill intentions, and what may be vice or
virtue in thee. Through the book, the discussion of right and wrong directs
itself as pertinaciously to considerations of human nature as was possible in
an age when theological dogma held the final criteria of human conduct.
And Abaelard is capable of a lofty insight touching the relationship between
God and man.
“Penitence,” says he, “is truly fruitful when grief and contrition proceed
from love of God, regarded as benignant, rather than from fear of
penalties. Sin cannot endure with this groaning and contrition of heart:
for sin is contempt of God, or consent to evil, and the love of God in
inspiring our groaning, suffers no ill.”[473]
Possibly when reading the Scito te ipsum one is conscious of a dialectician
drawing distinctions, rather than of a moralist searching the heart of the
matter. Everything is set forth so reasonably. Yet Abaelard’s impartial
delight in a rational view of belief and conduct shows nowhere quite as
obviously as in his Dialogue between Philosopher and Jew and Christian.
Each in turn is made to set forth the best arguments his position admits of.
The author does his best for each, and perhaps seems temperamentally
drawn to the position of the Philosopher, whom he permits to call the Jews
stultos and the Christians insanos. This philosopher naturally is no Greek of
Plato’s or Aristotle’s time, but a good Roman, who regards moralis
philosophia as the finis omnium disciplinarum, and hangs all intellectual
considerations upon a discussion of the summum bonum. His well-worn
arguments are put with earnestness. He deprecates the blind acceptance of
beliefs by children from their fathers, and the narrowness of mind which
keeps men from perceiving the possible truth in others’ opinions:
“so that whomsoever they see differing from themselves in belief, they
deem alien from the mercy of God. Thus condemning all others, they
vaunt themselves alone as blessed. Long reflecting on this blindness and
pride of the human race, I have unceasingly besought the Divine Pity

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that He would deign to draw me forth from this miserable Charibdian
whirlpool of error, and guide me to a port of safety. So you [addressing
both Jew and Christian] behold me solicitous and attentive as a disciple,
to the documents of your arguments.”[474]
The qualities cultivated by dialectic, and the impartial rational temper, here
displayed, reappear in the works of Abaelard devoted to sacred doctrine.
Enough has been said of the method and somewhat captious qualities of the
Sic et non.[475] Unquestionably its manner of presenting the contradictory
opinions of the Fathers, without any attempt to reconcile them, tended to
bring into view the difficulties inhering in the formulation of Christian
belief. And indeed the book made prominent all the diabolic insoluble
problems of the Faith, or rather of life itself and any view of God and man:
Predestination, for example; whether God causes evil; whether He is
omnipotent; whether He is free. The Lombard’s Sentences and Thomas’s
Summa considered all these questions; but they strove to solve them; and
Thomas did solve every one, leaving no loose ends to his theology. More
potently than Abaelard did the Angelic Doctor employ dialectic in his
finished scheme. With him, this propaedeutic discipline, this tool of truth,
perfectly performs its task of construction. So also Abaelard intended to
work with it; but his somewhat unconsidered use of the tool did not meet
the approval of his contemporaries. Accordingly, in his more constructive
theological treatises his impulse to know and state appears finally
actualized in the systematic formulation of convictions upon topics of
ultimate interest, to wit, theology, the contents of the Christian Faith, the
full relationship of God and man. Did he sever theology from philosophy?
Nay, rather, with him theology was ultimate philosophy.
Several times Abaelard rewrote what was substantially the same general
work upon Theology. In one of its earliest forms it was burnt by the Council
of Soissons in 1121.[476] In another form it exists under the title Theologia
Christiana;[477] and the first part of its apparently final revision is now
improperly entitled, Introductio ad theologiam.[478]
The first Book of the Theologia Christiana is an exposition of the Trinity,
not clinched in syllogisms, but consisting mainly of an orderly presentation
of the patristic authorities supporting the author’s view of the matter. The
testimonies of profane writers are also given. Liber II. opens by saying that

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in the former part of the work “we have collected the testimonia of prophets
and philosophers, in support of the faith of the Holy Trinity.” Hereupon, by
the same method of adducing authorities, Abaelard proceeds to refute those
who had blamed him for citing the pagan philosophers. He marshals his
supporting excerpts from the Fathers, and remarks: “That nothing is more
needful for the defence of our faith than that as against the importunities of
all the infidels we should have witness from themselves wherewith to refute
them.” Then he points to the moral worth of some of the philosophers, to
their true teaching of the soul’s immortality, and quotes Horace’s

“Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore.”

He continues at some length setting forth their well-nigh evangelical virtue,
and speaks of the Gospel as reformatio legis naturalis.
At the beginning of Liber III. comes the statement: “We set the faith of the
blessed Trinity as the foundation of all good.” Whereupon Abaelard breaks
out in a denunciation of those who misuse dialectic; but again he passes to a
defence of the art as an art and branch of knowledge, and shows its need as
a weapon against those wranglers who will be quieted neither by the
authority of the saints nor the philosophers: against whom, he, Abaelard,
trusting in the divine aid, will turn this weapon as David did the sword of
Goliath. He now states the true object of his work: “First then is to be set
forth the theme of our whole labour, and the sum of faith; the unity of the
divine substance and the Trinity of persons, which are in God, and are one
God. Next we state the objections to our theses, and then the solutions of
those objections.” And he gives the substance of the Athanasian Creed.
From this point, his work becomes more dialectical and constructive,
although of course continuing to quote authorities. He is emboldened to
discuss the deepest mysteries, the very penetralia of the Trinity, and in a
way which might well alarm men like Bernard, who desired acceptance of
the Faith, with rhetoric, but without discussion. To be sure Abaelard pauses
to justify himself by reverting to his apologetic purpose: “Heretics must be
coerced with reason rather than by force.” However this may be, the work
henceforth shows the passing on of logic to the exercise of its architectonic
functions in constructing a systematic theological metaphysics.

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The miscalled Introductio ad theologiam, as might be expected of a last
revision of the author’s Theology, is a more organic work. In the Prologue,
Abaelard speaks of it as a Summa sacrae eruditionis or an Introductio to
Divine Scripture. And again he states the justifying purpose of his labour, or
rather puts it into the mouths of his disciples who have asked for such a
work from him: “Since our faith, the Christian Faith, seems entangled in
such difficult questions, and to stand apart from human reason (et ab
humana ratione longius absistere), it should be fortified by so much the
stronger arguments, especially against the attacks of those who call
themselves philosophers.” Continuing, Abaelard protests that if in any way,
for his sins, he should deviate from the Catholic understanding and
statement, he will on seeing his error revise the same, like the blessed
Augustine.
The work itself opens with a statement of its intended divisions: “In three
matters, as I judge, rests the sum of human salvation: Fides, caritas, and
sacramentum”; and he gives his definition of faith, which was so obnoxious
to Bernard and others, as the existimatio rerum non apparentium. The three
extant Books do not conclude the treatment even of the first of these three
topics. But one readily sees that were the work complete, its arrangement
might correspond with that of Thomas’s Summa.[479] One may reiterate that
it was more constructively argumentative than the Theologia Christiana,
even in the manner of using the cited authorities. For instance, Abaelard’s
mind is fixed on the analogy between the Neo-Platonic Trinity of Deus,
nous, and anima mundi, and that of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The nous
fitly represents Christ, who is the Sapientia Dei—which Abaelard sets forth;
but then with even greater insistency he identifies the Holy Spirit with the
world-soul. Nothing gave a stronger warrant to the accusations of heresy
brought against him than this last doctrine, with which he was obsessed. Yet
what roused St. Bernard and his jackals was not so much any particular
opinion of Abaelard, as his dialectic and critical spirit, which insisted upon
understanding and explaining, before believing. “The faith of the righteous
believes; it does not dispute. But that man, suspicious of God (Deum
habens suspectum), has no mind to believe what his reason has not
previously argued.”[480]
Still, when Bernard says that faith does not discuss, but believes, he states a
conviction of his mind, a conviction corresponding with an inner need of

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his own to formulate and express his thought. Only, with Abaelard the need
to consider and analyse was more consciously imperative. He could not
avoid the constant query: How shall I think this thing—this thing, for
example, which is declared by revelation? Just as other questioning spirits
in other times might be driven upon the query: How shall we think these
things which are disclosed by the variegated walls of our physical
environment? Those yield data, or refuse them, and force the mind to put
many queries, and come to some adjustment. So experience presents data
for adjustment, just as dogma, Scripture, revelation present that which
reason must bring within the action of its processes, and endeavour to find
rational expression for.

II
The greatest dialectician of the early twelfth century felt no problems put
him by the physical world. That did not attract his inquiry; it did not touch
the reasonings evolved by his self-consciousness, any more than it
impressed the fervid mind of his great adversary, St. Bernard. The natural
world, however, stirred the mind of Abaelard’s contemporary, Hugo of St.
Victor.[481] Its colours waved before his reveries, and its visible sublimities
drew his mind aloft to the contemplation of God: for him its things were all
the things of God—opus conditionis or opus restaurationis;[482] the work of
foundation, whereby God created the physical world for the support and
edification of its crowning creature man; and the work of restoration, to wit,
the incarnation of the Word, and all its sacraments.
Hugo was a Platonic and very Christian theologian. He would reason and
expound, and yet was well aware that reason could not fathom the nature of
God, or bring man to salvation. “Logic, mathematics, physics teach some
truth, yet do not reach that truth wherein is the soul’s safety, without which
whatever is is vain.”[483] So Hugo was not primarily a logician, like
Abaelard; nor did he care chiefly for the kind of truth which might be had
through logic. Nevertheless the productions of his short life prove the
excellence of his mind and his large enthusiasm for knowledge.
As Hugo was the head of the school of St. Victor for some years before his
death, certain of his works cover topics of ordinary mediaeval education,

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secular and religious; while others advance to a more profound expression
of the intellectual, or spiritual, interests of their author. For elementary
religious instruction, he composed a veritable book of Sentences,[484] which
preceded the Lombard’s in time, but was later than Abaelard’s Sic et non.
Without striking features, it lucidly and amiably carried out its general
purpose of setting forth the authoritative explanations of the elements of the
Christian Faith. The writer did not hesitate to quote opposing views, which
were not heralded, however, by such danger-signals of contradiction as flare
from the chapter headings of the Sic et non.
The corresponding treatise upon profane learning—the Eruditio didascalica
—is of greater interest.[485] It commences in elementary fashion, as a
manual of study: “There are two things by which we gain knowledge, to
wit, reading and meditation; reading comes first.” The book is to be a guide
to the student in the study both of secular and divine writings; it teaches
how to study the artes, and then how to study the Scriptures.[486] Even in
this manual, Hugo shows himself a meditative soul, and one who seeks to
base his most elementary expositions upon the nature and needs of man.
The mind, says he, is distracted by things of sense, and does not know
itself. It is renewed through study, so that it learns again not to look without
for what itself affords. Learning is life’s solace, which he who finds is
happy, and he who makes his own is blessed.[487]
For Hugo, philosophy is that which investigates the rationes of things
human and divine, seeking ever the final wisdom, which is knowledge of
the primaeva ratio: this distinguishes philosophy from the practical
sciences, like agriculture: it follows the ratio, and they administer the
matter. Again and again, Hugo returns to the thought that the object of all
human actiones and studia is to restore the integrity of our nature or
mitigate its weaknesses, restore the image of the divine similitude in us, or
minister to the needs of life. This likeness is renewed by speculatio
veritatis, or exercitium virtutis.[488]
Such is a pretty broad basis of theory for a high school manual. Hugo
proceeds to set forth the scheme, rather than the substance, of the arts and
sciences, pausing occasionally to admonish the reader to hold no science
vile, since knowledge always is good; and he points out that all knowledge
hangs together in a common coherency. He sketches[489] the true student’s

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life: Whoever seeks learning, must not neglect discipline! He must be
humble, and not ashamed to learn from any one; he must observe decent
manners, and not play the fool and make faces at lecturers on divinity, for
thereby he insults God. Yea, and let him mind the example of the ancient
sages, who for learning’s sake spurned honours, rejected riches, rejoiced in
insults, deserted the companionship of men, and gave themselves up to
philosophy in desert solitudes, that they might be more free for meditation.
Diligent search for wisdom in quietude becomes a scholar; and likewise
poverty, and likewise exile: he is very delicate who clings to his fatherland;
“He is brave to whom every land is home (patria); and he is perfect to
whom the whole world is an exile!”[490]
Hugo has much to say of the pulchritudo and the decor of the creature-
world. But with him the world and its beauty point to God. One should
observe it because of its suggestiveness, the visible suggesting the invisible.
Hugo has already been followed in his argument that the world, in its
veriest reality, is a symbol.[491] Here we follow him along his path of
knowledge, which leads on and upward from cogitatio, through meditatio,
to contemplatio. The steps in Hugo’s scheme are rational, though the
summit lies beyond. This path to truth, leading on from the visible symbol
to the unseen power, is for him the reason and justification of study;
drawing to God it makes for man’s salvation.
Hugo has put perhaps his most lucid exposition of the three grades of
knowledge into the first of his Nineteen Sermons on Ecclesiastes.[492] He is
fond of certain numbers, and here his thought revolves in categories of the
number three. Solomon composed three works, the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes,
and Canticles. In the first, he addresses his son paternally, admonishing him
to pursue virtue and shun vice; in the second, he shows the grown man that
nothing in the world is stable; finally, in Canticles, he brings the
consummate one, who has spurned the world, to the Bridegroom’s arms.
“Three are the modes of cognition (visiones) belonging to the rational
soul: cogitation, meditation, contemplation. It is cogitation when the
mind is touched with the ideas of things, and the thing itself is by its
image presented suddenly, either entering the mind through sense or
rising from memory. Meditation is the assiduous and sagacious revision
of cogitation, and strives to explain the involved, and penetrate the

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hidden. Contemplation is the mind’s perspicacious and free attention,
diffused everywhere throughout the range of whatever may be explored.
There is this difference between meditation and contemplation:
meditation relates always to things hidden from our intelligence;
contemplation relates to things made manifest, either according to their
nature or our capacity. Meditation always is occupied with some one
matter to be investigated; contemplation spreads abroad for the
comprehending of many things, even the universe. Thus meditation is a
certain inquisitive power of the mind, sagaciously striving to look into
the obscure and unravel the perplexed. Contemplation is that acumen of
intelligence which, keeping all things open to view, comprehends all
with clear vision. Thus contemplation has what meditation seeks.
“There are two kinds of contemplation: the first is for beginners, and
considers creatures; the kind which comes later, belongs to the perfect,
and contemplates the Creator. In the Proverbs, Solomon proceeds as
through meditation. In Ecclesiastes he ascends to the first grade of
contemplation. In the Song of Songs he transports himself to the final
grade. In meditation there is a wrestling of ignorance with knowledge;
and the light of truth gleams as in a fog of error. So fire is kindled with
difficulty in a heap of green wood; but then fanned with stronger breath,
the flame burns higher, and we see volumes of smoke rolling up, with
flame flashing through. Little by little the damp is exhausted, and the
leaping fire dispels the smoke. Then victrix flamma darting through the
heap of crackling wood, springs from branch to branch, and with
lambent grasp catches upon every twig; nor does it rest until it
penetrates everywhere and draws into itself all that it finds which is not
flame. At length the whole combustible material is purged of its own
nature and passes into the similitude and property of fire; then the din is
hushed, and the voracious fire having subdued all, and brought all into
its own likeness, composes itself to a high peace and silence, finding
nothing more that is alien or opposed to itself. First there was fire with
flame and smoke; then fire with flame, without smoke; and at last pure
fire with neither flame nor smoke.”
So the victrix flamma achieves the three stages of spiritual insight, fighting
its way through the smoke of cogitation, through the smoke and flame of
meditation, and at last through the flame of creature contemplation, to the

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high peace of God, where all is love’s ardent vision, without flame or
smoke. It is thus through the grades of knowledge that the soul reaches at
last that fulness of intelligence which may be made perfect and inflamed
with love, in the contemplation of God. All knowledge is good according to
its grade; only let it always lead on to God, and with humility. Hugo makes
his principles clear at the opening of his commentary on the Celestial
Hierarchy of Dionysius.[493]
“The Jews seek a sign, and the Greeks wisdom. There was a certain
wisdom which seemed such to them who knew not the true wisdom.
The world found it, and began to be puffed up, thinking itself great in
this. Confiding in its wisdom, it presumed, and boasted that it would
attain the highest wisdom.... And it made itself a ladder of the face of
the creation, shining toward the invisible things of the Creator.... Then
those things which were seen were known, and there were other things
which were not known; and through those which were manifest they
expected to reach those which were hidden; and they stumbled and fell
into the falsehoods of their own imaginings.... So God made foolish the
wisdom of this world; and He pointed out another wisdom, which
seemed foolishness, and was not. For it preached Christ crucified, in
order that truth might be sought in humility. But the world despised it,
wishing to contemplate the works of God, which He had made to be
marvelled at, and it did not wish to venerate what He had set for
imitation. Neither did it look to its own disease, and seek a medicine
with piety; but presuming on a false health, it gave itself over with vain
curiosity to the study of alien matters.”
This study made the wisdom of the world, whereby it devised the arts and
sciences which we still learn. But the world in its pride did not read aright
the great book of nature. It had not the knowledge of the true Exemplar, for
the sanitation of its inner vision, to wit, the flesh of the eternal Word in the
humanity of Jesus.
“There were two images (simulacra) set for man, in which he might
perceive the unseen: one consisting of nature, the other of grace. The
former image was the face of this world; the latter was the humanity of
the Word. And God is shown in both, but He is not understood in both;

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since the appearance of nature discloses the artificer, but cannot
illuminate the eyes of him who contemplates it.”
Hugo then classifies the sciences in the usual Aristotelian way, and shows
that Christian theology is the end of all philosophy. The first part of
philosophia theorica is mathematics, which speculates as to the visible
forms of visible things. The second is physics, which scrutinizes the
invisible causes of visible things. The third, theology, alone contemplates
invisible substances and their invisible natures. Herein is a certain
progression; and the mind mounts to knowledge of the true. Through the
visible forms of visible things, it comes to invisible causes of visible things;
and through the invisible causes of visible things, it ascends to invisible
substances, and to knowing their natures. This is the summit of philosophy
and the perfection of truth. In this, as already said, the wise of this world
were made foolish; because proceeding by the natural document alone,
making account only of the elements and appearance of the world, they
missed the instructive instances of Grace: which in spite of humble guise
afford the clearer insight into truth.
This is Hugo’s scheme of knowledge; it begins with cogitatio, then
proceeds through meditatio to contemplatio of the creature world, and
finally of the Creator. The arts and sciences, as well as the face of nature,
afford a simulacrum of the unseen Power; but all this knowledge by itself
will not bring man to the perfect knowledge of God. For this he needs the
exemplaria of Grace, shown through the incarnation of the Word. Only by
virtue of this added means, may man attain to perfect contemplation of the
truth of God. That end and final summit is beyond reason’s reach; but the
attainment of rational knowledge makes part of the path thither. Keen as
was Hugo’s intellectual nature, his interest in reason was coupled with a
deeper interest in that which reason might neither include nor understand.
The intellect does not include the emotional and immediately desiderative
elements of human nature; neither can it comprehend the infinite which is
God; and Hugo drew toward God not only through his intellect, but
likewise through his desiderative nature, with its yearnings of religious
love. That love with him was rational, since its object satisfied his mind as
far as his mind could comprehend it.

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So Hugo’s intellectual interests were connected with the emotional side of
human nature, and also led up to what transcended reason. Thus they led to
what was a mystery because too great for human reason, and they included
that which also was somewhat of a mystery to reason because lying partly
outside its sphere. Hugo is an instance of the intellectual nature which will
not rest in reason’s province, but feels equally impelled to find expression
for matters that either exceed the mind, or do not altogether belong to it.
Such an intellect is impelled to formulate its convictions in regard to these;
its negative conviction that it cannot comprehend them, and why it cannot;
and its more positive conviction of their value—of the absolute worth of
God, and of man’s need of Him, and of the love and fear by which men may
come close to Him, or avoid His wrath.
What Hugo has had to say as to cogitation, meditation, and contemplation,
represents his analysis of the stages by which a sufficing sense may be
reached of the Creator and His world of creature-kind. In this final wisdom
and ardour of contemplation, both human reason and human love have part.
The intellect advances along its lines, considering the world, and drawing
inferences as to the unseen Being who created and sustains it. Mind’s
unaided power will not reach. But by the grace of God, supremely
manifested in the Incarnation, the man is humbled, and his heart is touched
and drawn to love the power of the divine pity and humility. The lesson of
the Incarnation and its guiding grace, emboldens the heart and enlightens
the mind; and the man’s faculties are strengthened and uplifted to the
contemplation of God, wherein the mind is satisfied and the heart at rest.
We have here the elements of piety, intellectual and devotional. Hugo is an
example of their union; they also preserve their equal weight in Aquinas.
But because Hugo emphasizes the limitations of the intellect, and so
ardently recognizes the heart’s yearning and immediacy of apperception, he
is what is styled a mystic; a term which we are now in a position to
consider, and to some extent exchange for other phrases of more definite
significance.[494]
Quite to avoid the term is not possible, inasmuch as the conception certainly
includes what is mysterious because unknowable through reason. For it
includes a sense of the supreme, a sense of God, who is too great for human
reason to comprehend, and therefore a mystery. And it includes a yearning

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toward God, the desire of Him, and the feeling of love. The last is also
mysterious, in that it has not exclusive part with reason, but springs as well
from feeling. Yet the essence or nature of this spirit of piety which we
would analyse, consists in consciousness of the reality of the object of its
yearning or devotion. Not altogether through induction or deduction, but
with an irrational immediacy of conviction, it feels and knows its object. In
place of the knowledge which is mediated through rational processes, is
substituted a conviction upheld by yearning, love’s conviction indeed, of
the reality and presence of that which is all the greater and more worthy
because it baffles reason. And the final goal attainable by this mystic love
is, even as the goal of other love, union with the Beloved.
The mystic spirit is an essential part of all piety or religion, which relates
always and forever to the rationally unknown, and therefore mysterious.
Without a consciousness of mystery, there can be neither piety nor religion.
Nor can there be piety without some devotion to God, nor the deepest and
most ardent forms of piety, without fervent love of God. This devotion and
this love supply strength of conviction, creating a realness of communion
with the divine, and an assurance of the soul’s rest and peace therein. But
that the intellect has part, Hugo abundantly demonstrates. One must have
perceptions, and thought’s severest wrestlings—cogitatio and meditatio—
before reaching that first stage of wide and sure intelligence, which relates
to the creature world, and affords a broad basis of assurance, whence at last
the soul shall spring to God. Intellectual perceptions and rational
knowledge, and all the mind’s puttings together of its data in inductions and
deductions and constructions, form a basis for contemplation, and yield
material upon which the emotional side of human nature may exercise itself
in yearning and devotion. Herein the constructive imagination works; which
is intellectual faculty illuminated and impelled by the emotions.
This spirit actualizes itself in the power and scope of its resultant
conviction, by which it makes real to itself the qualities, attributes, and
actions of its object, God, and the nature of man’s relationship or union with
the divine. In its final energy, when only partly conscious of its intellectual
inductions, it discards syllogisms, quite dissatisfied with their devious and
hesitating approach. Instead, by the power of love, it springs directly to its
God. Nevertheless the soul which feels the inadequacy of reason even to
voice the soul’s desires, will seek means of expression wherein reason still

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will play a submerged part. The soul is seeking to express what is not
altogether expressible in direct and rational statement. It seeks
adumbrations, partial unveilings of its sentiments, which shall perhaps
make up in warmth of colour what they lack in definiteness of line. In fine,
it seeks symbols. Such symbolism must be large and elastic, in order to
shadow forth the soul’s relations with the Infinite; it must also be capable of
carrying passion, that it may satisfy the soul’s craving to give voice to its
great love.
In Greek thought as well as in the Hellenizing Judaism of a Philo,
symbolism, or more specifically speaking, allegorical interpretation, was
obviously apologetic, seeking to cloud in naturalistic interpretations the
doings of the rather over-human gods of Greece.[495] But it sprang also from
the unresting need of man to find expression for that sense of things which
will not fit definite statement. This was the need which became creative,
and of necessity fancifully creative, with Plato. Though he would have
nothing to do with falsifying apologetics, all the more he felt the need of
allegories, to suggest what his dialectic could not formulate. In the early
times of the Church militant of Christ, allegorical interpretation was
exploited to defend the Faith; in the later patristic period, the Faith had so
far triumphed, that allegory as a sword of defence and attack might be
sheathed, or just allowed to glitter now and then half-drawn. But piety’s
other need, with increasing energy, compelled the use of symbols and
articulate allegory to express the directly inexpressible. Thereafter through
the Middle Ages, while the use of allegory as a defence against the Gentiles
slumbered, so much more the other need of it, and the sense of the universal
symbolism of material things, filled the minds of men; and in age-long
answer to this need, allegory, symbolism, became part of the very spirit of
the mediaeval time.
Thus it became the universal vehicle of pious expression: it may be said
almost to have co-extended with all mediaeval piety. It was ardently loving,
as with St. Bernard; it might be filled with scarlet passion, as with
Mechthild of Magdeburg; or it might be used in the self-conscious, and yet
inspired vision-pictures of Hildegard of Bingen. And indeed with almost
any mediaeval man or woman, it might keep talking, as a way of speech,
obtrusively, conventionally, ad nauseam. For indeed in treatise after treatise
even of the better men, allegory seems on the one hand to become very

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foolish and perverse, banal, intolerably talking on and on beyond the point;
or again we sense its mechanism, hear the creaking of its jaws, while no
living voice emerges,—and we suspect that the mystery of life, if it may not
be compassed by direct statement, also lies deeper than allegorical
conventions.
Hugo’s great De sacramentis showed the equipoise of intellectual and
pietistic interests in him, and the Platonic quality of his mind’s sure sense of
the reality of the supersensual.[496] Other treatises of his show his yearning
piety, and the Augustinian quality of his soul, “made toward thee, and
unquiet till it rests in thee.” The De arca Noe morali,[497] that is to say, the
Ark of Noah viewed in its moral significance, is charming in its spiritual
refinement, and interesting in its catholic intellectual reflections. The
Prologue presents a situation:

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“As I was sitting once among the brethren, and they were asking
questions, and I replying, and many matters had been cited and
adduced, it came about that all of us at once began to marvel
vehemently at the unstableness and disquiet of the human heart; and we
began to sigh. Then they pleaded with me that I would show them the
cause of such whirlings of thought in the human heart; and they
besought me to set forth by what art or exercise of discipline this evil
might be removed. I indeed wished to satisfy my brethren, so far as God
might aid me, and untie the knot of their questions, both by authority
and by argument. I knew it would please them most if I should compose
my matter to read to them at table.
“It was my plan to show first whence arise such violent changes in
man’s heart, and then how the mind may be led to keep itself in stable
peace. And although I had no doubt that this is the proper work of grace,
rather than of human labour, nevertheless I know that God wishes us to
co-operate. Besides it is well to know the magnitude of our weakness
and the mode of its repairing, since so much the deeper will be our
gratitude.
“The first man was so created, that if he had not sinned, he would
always have beheld in present contemplation his Creator’s face, and by
always seeing Him, would have loved Him always, and, by loving,
would always have clung close to Him, and by clinging to Him who
was eternal, would have possessed life without end. Evidently the one
true good of man was perfect knowledge of his Creator. But he was
driven from the face of the Lord, since for his sin he was struck with the
blindness of ignorance, and passed from that intimate light of
contemplation; and he inclined his mind to earthly desires, as he began
to forget the sweetness of the divine. Thus he was made a wanderer and
fugitive over the earth. A wanderer indeed, because of disordered
concupiscence; and a fugitive, through guilty conscience, which feels
every man’s hand against it. For every temptation will overcome the
man who has lost God’s aid.
“So man’s heart which had been kept secure by divine love, and one by
loving one, afterwards began to flow here and there through earthly

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desires. For the mind which knows not to love its true good, is never
stable and never rests. Hence restlessness, and ceaseless labour, and
disquiet, until the man turns and adheres to Him. The sick heart wavers
and quivers; the cause of its disease is love of the world; the remedy, the
love of God.”
Hugo’s object is to give rest to the restless heart, by directing its love to
God. One still bears in mind his three plains of knowledge, forming perhaps
the three stages of ascent, at the top of which is found the knowledge that
turns to divine contemplation and love. There may be a direct and simple
love of God for simple souls; but for the man of mind, knowledge precedes
love.
“In two ways God dwells in the human heart, to wit, through knowledge
and through love; yet the dwelling is one, since every one who knows
Him, loves, and no one can love without knowing. Knowledge through
cognition of the Faith erects the structure; love through virtue, paints the
edifice with colour.”[498]
Then make a habitation for God in thy heart. This is the great matter, and
indeed all: for this, Scripture exists, and the world was made, and God
became flesh, through His humility making man sublime. The Ark of Noah
is the type of this spiritual edifice, as it is also the type of the Church.
The piety and allegory of this work rise as from a basis of knowledge. The
allegory indeed is drawn out and out, until it seems to become sheer
circumlocution. This was the mediaeval way, and Hugo’s too, alas! We will
not follow further in this treatise, nor take up his De arca Noe mystica,[499]
which carries out into still further detail the symbolism of the Ark, and
applies it to the Church and the people of God. Hugo has also left a
colloquy between man and his soul on the true love, which lies in spiritual
meditation.[500] But it is clear that the reaches of Hugo’s yearning are still
grounded in intellectual considerations, though these may be no longer
present in the mind of him whose consciousness is transformed to love.
One may discern the same progression, from painful thought to surer
contemplation, and thence to the heart’s devoted communion, in him whom
we have called the Thor and Loki of the Church. No twelfth-century soul
loved God more zealously than St. Bernard. He was not strong in abstract

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reasoning. His mind needed the compulsion of the passions to move it to
sublime conclusions. Commonly he is dubbed a mystic. But his piety and
love of God poise themselves on a basis of consideration before springing
to soar on other wings. In his De consideratione,[501] Bernard explains that
word in the sense given by Hugo to meditatio, while he uses contemplatio
very much as Hugo does. It applies to things that have become certain to the
mind, while “consideratio is busy investigating. In this sense contemplatio
may be defined as the true and certain intuition of the mind (intuitus animi)
regarding anything, or the sure apprehension of the true: while consideratio
is thought intently searching, or the mind’s endeavour to track out the
true.”[502]
Contemplatio, even though it forget itself in ecstasy, must be based on prior
consideration; then it may take wings of its own, or rather (with orthodox
Hugo and Bernard) wings of grace, and fly to the bosom of its God. This
flight is the immediacy of conviction and the ecstasy which follows. One
may even perceive the thinking going on during the soul’s outpour of love.
For the mind still supports the soul’s ardour with reasonings, original or
borrowed, as appears in the second sermon of that long series preached by
Bernard on Canticles to his own spiritual élite of Clairvaux.[503] The saintly
orator is yearning, yearning for Christ Himself; he will have naught of
Moses or Isaiah; nor does he desire dreams, or care for angels’ visits: ipse,
ipse me osculetur, cries his soul in the words of Canticles—let Him kiss me.
The phrasing seems symbolical; but the yearning is direct, and at least
rhetorically overmastering. The emotion is justified by its reasons. They lie
in the personality of Christ and Bernard’s love of Him, rising from all his
knowledge of Him, even from his experience of Jesus’ whisperings to the
soul. He knows how vastly Jesus surpasses the human prophets who
prefigured or foretold Him: ipsos longe superat Jesus meus—the word
meus is love’s very articulation. The orator cries: “Listen! Let the kissing
mouth be the Word assuming flesh; and the mouth kissed be the flesh which
is assumed; then the kiss which is consummated between them is the
persona compacted of the two, to wit, the mediator of God and men, the
man Christ Jesus.”
This identical allegory goes back to Origen’s Commentary on Canticles.
Bernard has kindled it with an intimate love of Jesus, which is not Origen’s.
But the thought explains and justifies Bernard’s desire to be kissed by the

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kiss of His mouth, and so to be infolded in the divine love which “gave His
only-begotten Son,” and also became flesh. Os osculans signifies the
Incarnation: one realizes the emotional power which that saving thought
would take through such a metaphor. At the end of his sermon, Bernard
sums up the conclusion, so that his hearers may carry it away:
“It is plain that this holy kiss was a grace needed by the world, to give
faith to the weak, and satisfy the desire of the perfect. The kiss itself is
none other than the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus,
who with the Father and the Holy Spirit lives and reigns God, per omnia
saecula saeculorum, Amen.”

III
There is small propriety in speaking of these men of the first half of the
twelfth century as Platonists or Aristotelians; nor is there great interest in
trying to find in Plato or Aristotle or Plotinus the specific origin of any of
their thoughts. They were apt to draw on the source nearest and most
convenient; and one must remember that their immediate philosophic
antecedents were not the distinct systems of Plato and Aristotle and
Plotinus, but rather the late pagan eras of eclecticism, followed by that
strongly motived syntheticism of the Church Fathers which selected
whatever might accord with their Christian scheme. So Abaelard must not
be called an Aristotelian. Neither he nor his contemporaries knew what an
Aristotelian was, and when they called Abaelard Peripateticus, they meant
one skilled in the logic which was derived from the simpler treatises of
Aristotle’s Organon. Nor will we call Hugo a Platonist, in spite of his fine
affinities with Plato; for many of Hugo’s thoughts, his classification of the
sciences for example, pointed back to Aristotle.
Abaelard, Hugo, St. Bernard suggest the triangulation of the epoch’s
intellectual interests. Peter Lombard, somewhat their junior, presents its
compend of accepted and partly digested theology. He took his method
from Abaelard, and drew whole chapters of his work from Hugo; but his
great source, which was also theirs, was Augustine. The Lombard was, and
was to be, a representative man; for his Sentences brought together the

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ultimate problems which exercised the minds of the men of his time and
after.
The early and central decades of the twelfth century offer other persons who
may serve to round out our general notion of the character of the intellectual
interests which occupied the period before the rediscovery of Aristotle, that
is, of the substantial Aristotelian encyclopaedia of knowledge. Among such
Adelard of Bath (England) was somewhat older than Abaelard. His keen
pursuit of knowledge made him one of its early pilgrims to Spain and
Greece. He compiled a book of Quaestiones naturales, and another called
De eodem et diverso,[504] in which he struggled with the problem of
universals, and with palpable problems of psychology. His cosmology
shows a genial culling from the Timaeus fragment of Plato, and such other
bits of Greek philosophy as he had access to.
Adelard was influenced by the views of men who taught or studied at
Chartres. Bernard of Chartres, the first of the great Chartrian teachers of the
early twelfth century,[505] wrote on Porphyry, and after his death was called
by John of Salisbury perfectissimus inter Platonicos saeculi nostri. He was
one of those extreme realists whose teachings might bear pantheistic fruit in
his disciples; he had also a Platonistic imagination, leading him to see in
Nature a living organism. Bernard’s younger brother, Thierry, also called of
Chartres, extended his range of studies, and compiled numerous works on
natural knowledge, indicating his wide reading and receptive nature. His
realism brought him very close to pantheism, which indeed flowered
poetically in his admirer or pupil, Bernard Silvestris of Tours.
If we should analyze the contents of the latter’s De mundi universitate, it
might be necessary to affirm that the author was a dualistic thinker, in that
he recognized two first principles, God and matter; and also that he was a
pantheist, because of the way in which he sees in God the source of Nature:
“This mind (nous) of the supreme God is soul (intellectus), and from its
divinity Nature is born.”[506] One should not, however, drive the
heterogeneous thoughts of these twelfth-century people to their opposite
conclusions. A moderate degree of historical insight should prevent our
interpreting their gleanings from the past by formulas of our own greater
knowledge. Doubtless their books—Hugo’s as well as Thierry’s and
Bernard Silvester’s—have enough of contradiction if we will probe for it

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with a spirit not their own. But if we will see with their eyes and perceive
with their feelings, we shall find ourselves resting with each of them in
some unity of personal temperament; and that, rather than any half-
borrowed thought, is Hugo or Thierry or Bernard Silvestris. Silvester’s
book, De mundi universitate, sive Megacosmus et microcosmus, is a half
poem, like Boëthius’s De consolatione and a number of mediaeval
productions to which there has been occasion to allude. It is fruitless to
dissect such a composite of prose and verse. In it Natura speaks to Nous,
and then Nous to Natura; the four elements come into play, and nine
hierarchies of angels; the stars in their firmaments, and the genesis of things
on earth; Physics and her daughters, Theorica and Practica, and all the
figures of Greek mythology. An analysis of such a book will turn it to
nonsense, and destroy the breath of that twelfth-century temperament which
loved to gather driftwood from the wreckage of the ancient world of
thought. Thus perhaps they expected to draw to themselves, even from the
pagan flotsam, some congenial explanation of the universe and man.
A far more acute thinker was Gilbert de la Porrée,[507] who taught at
Chartres for a number of years, before advancing upon Paris in 1141. He
next became Bishop of Poictiers, and died in 1154. Like Abaelard, he was
primarily a logician, and occupied himself with the problem of universals,
taking a position not so different from Abaelard’s. Like Abaelard also,
Gilbert was brought to task before a council, in which St Bernard sought to
be the guiding, scilicet, condemning spirit. But the condemnation was
confined to certain sentences, which when cut from their context and
presented in distorting isolation, the author willingly sacrificed to the
flames. He refused, some time afterwards, to discuss his views privately
with the Abbot of Clairvaux, saying that the latter was too inexpert a
theologian to understand them. Gilbert’s most famous work, De sex
principiis, attempted to complete the last six of Aristotle’s ten Categories,
which the philosopher had treated cursorily; it was almost to rival the work
of the Stagirite in authority, for instance, with Albertus Magnus, who wrote
a Commentary upon it in the same spirit with which he commented on the
logical treatises of the Organon.
In the same year with Gilbert (1154) died a man of different mental
tendencies, William of Conches,[508] who likewise had been a pupil of
Bernard of Chartres. He was for a time the tutor of Henry Plantagenet.

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William was interested in natural knowledge, and something of a humanist.
He made a Commentary on the Timaeus, and wrote various works on the
philosophy of Nature, in which he wavered around an atomistic explanation
of the world, yet held fast to the Biblical Creation, to save his orthodoxy.
He also pursued the study of medicine, which was a specialty at Chartres;
through the treatises of Constantinus Africanus[509] he had some knowledge
of the pathological theories of Galen and Hippocrates. For his interest in
physical knowledge, he may be regarded as a precursor of Roger Bacon. On
the other hand, he was a humanist in his strife against those “Cornificiani”
who would know no more Latin than was needful;[510] and he compiled
from the pagan moralists a sort of Summa. It is called, in fact, a Summa
moralium philosophorum (an interesting title, connecting it with the
Christian Summae sententiarum).[511] It treats the virtues under the head of
de honesto; and under that of de utile, reviews the other good things of
mind, body, and estate. It also discusses whether there may be a conflict
between the honestum and the utile.
These men of the first half of the twelfth century lived before the new
revealing of the Aristotelian philosophy and natural knowledge coming at
the century’s close. Their muster is finally completed by two younger men,
the one an Englishman and the other a Lowlander. The youthful years of
both synchronize with the old age of the men of whom we have been
speaking. For John of Salisbury was born not far from the year 1115, and
died in 1180; and Alanus de Insulis (Lille) was probably born in 1128, and
lived to the beginning of the next century. They are spiritually connected
with the older men because they were taught by them, and because they had
small share in the coming encyclopaedic knowledge. But they close the
group: John of Salisbury closing it by virtue of his critical estimate of its
achievement; Alanus by virtue of his final rehandling of the body of
intellectual data at its disposal, to which he may have made some slight
addition. Abaelard knew and used the simpler treatises of the Aristotelian
Organon of logic. He had not studied the Analytics and the Topics, and of
course was unacquainted with the body of Aristotle’s philosophy outside of
logic. John of Salisbury and Alanus know the entire Organon; but neither
one nor the other knows the rest of Aristotle, which Alexander of Hales was
the first to make large use of.

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John of Salisbury, Little John, Johannes Parvus, as he was called, was the
best classical scholar of his time.[512] His was an acute and active intellect,
which never tired of hearing and weighing the views of other men. He was,
moreover, a man of large experience, travelling much, and listening to all
the teachers prominent in his youth. Also he was active in affairs, being at
one time secretary to Thibaut, Archbishop of Canterbury, and then the
intimate of Becket, of Henry II., and Pope Adrian IV.! A finished scholar,
who knew not one thing, but whatever might be known, and was
enlightened by the training of the world, Little John critically estimates the
learning and philosophy of the men he learns from. Having always an
independent point of view he makes acute remarks upon it all, and
admirable contributions to the sum of current thought. But chiefly he seems
to us as one who looks with even eye upon whatsoever comes within his
vision. He knows the weaknesses of men and the limitations of branches of
discipline; knows, for instance, that dialectic is sterile by itself, but efficient
as an aid to other disciplines. So, as to logic, John keeps his own point of
view, and is always reasonable and practical.[513] Likewise, with open mind,
he considers what there may be in the alleged science of the
Mathematicians, i.e. diviners and astrologers. He uses such phrases as
“probabilia quidem sunt haec ... sed tamen the venom lies under the
honey!” For this science sets a fatal necessity on things, and would even
intrude into the knowledge of the future reserved for God’s majesty. And as
John considers the order of events to come, and the diviner’s art, cornua
succrescunt—the horns of more than one dilemma grow.[514]
John knew more than any man of the ancient philosophies.[515] For himself,
of course he loved knowledge; yet he would not dissever it from its value in
the art of living. “Wisdom indeed is a fountain, from which pour forth the
streams which water the whole earth; they fill not alone the garden of
delights of the divine page, but flow on to the Gentiles, and do not
altogether fail even the Ethiopians.... It is certain that the faithful and wise
reader, who from love keeps learning’s watch, escapes vice and draws near
to life.”[516] Philosophy is the moderatrix omnium (a favourite phrase with
John); the true philosopher, as Plato says, is a lover of God: and so
philosophia is amor divinitatis. Its precept is to love God with all our
strength, and our neighbour as ourselves: “He who by philosophizing has
reached charitas, has attained philosophy’s true end.”[517] John goes on to

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show how deeply they err who think philosophy is but a thing of words and
arguments: many of those who multiply words, by so doing burden the
mind. Virtue inseparably accompanies wisdom; this is John’s sum of the
matter. Clearly he is not always, or commonly, wrestling with ultimate
metaphysical problems; he busies himself, acutely but not metaphysically,
with the wisdom of life. He too can use the language of piety and
contemplation. In the sixth chapter of his De septem septenis (The seven
Sevens) he gives the seven grades of contemplation—meditatio,
soliloquium, circumspectio, ascensio, revelatio, emissio, inspiratio.[518] He
presents the matter succinctly, thus perhaps giving clarity to current pietistic
phraseology.
Alanus de Insulis was a man of renown in his life-time, and after his death
won the title of Doctor Universalis. Although the fame of scholar,
philosopher, theologian, poet, may have uplifted him during his years of
strength, he died a monk at Citeaux, in the year 1202. Fame came justly to
him, for he was learned in the antique literature, and a gifted Latin poet,
while as thinker and theologian he made skilful and catholic use of his
thorough knowledge of whatever the first half of the twelfth century had
achieved in thought and system. Elsewhere he has been considered as a
poet;[519] here we merely observe his position and accomplishment in
matters of salvation and philosophy.[520]
Alanus possessed imagination, language, and a faculty of acute exposition.
His sentences, especially his definitions, are pithy, suggestive, and vivid. He
projected much thought as well as fantasy into his poem, Anticlaudianus,
and his cantafable, De planctu naturae. He showed himself a man of might,
and insight too, in his Contra haereticos. His suggestive pithiness of diction
lends interest to his encyclopaedia of definitions, Distinctiones dictionum
theologicalium; and his keen power of reasoning succinctly from axiomatic
premises is evinced in his De arte fidei catholicae.
The intellectual activities of Alanus fell in the latter decades of the twelfth
century, when mediaeval thought seemed for the moment to be mending its
nets, and preparing for a further cast in the new waters of Aristotelianism.
Alanus is busy with what has already been won; he is unconscious of the
new greater knowledge, which was preparing its revelations. He is not even
a man of the transition from the lesser to the greater intellectual estate; but

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is rather a final compendium of the lesser. Himself no epoch-making
reasoner, he uses the achievements of Abaelard and Hugo, of Gilbert de la
Porrée and William of Conches, and others. Neither do his works unify and
systematize the results of his studies. He is rather a re-phraser. Yet his
refashioning is not a mere thing of words; it proceeds with the vitalizing
power of the man’s plastic and creative temperament. One may speak of
him as keen and acquisitive intellectually, and creative through his
temperament.
Alanus shows a catholic receptivity for all the mingled strains of thought,
Platonic, Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic and Pythagorean, which fed the labours
of his predecessors. He has studied the older sources, the Timaeus fragment,
also Apuleius and Boëthius of course. His chief blunder is his
misconception of Aristotle as a logician and confuser of words (verborum
turbator)—a phrase, perhaps, consciously used with poetic license. For he
has made use of much that came originally from the Stagirite. Within his
range of opportunity, Alanus was a universal reader, and his writings
discover traces of the men of importance from Pseudo-Dionysius and
Eriugena down to John of Salisbury and Gundissalinus.
These remarks may take the place of any specific presentation of Alanus’s
work in logic, of his view of universals, of his notions of physics, of nature,
of matter and form, of man’s mind and body, and of the Triune Godhead.
[521] In his cosmology, however, we may note his imaginatively original
employment of the conception or personification of Nature. God is the
Creator, and Nature is His creature, and His vice-regent or vicarious maker,
working the generation and decay of things material and changeable.[522]
This thought, imaginatively treated, makes a good part of the poetry of the
De planctu and the Anticlaudianus. The conception with him is full of
charming fantasy, and we look back through Bernardus Silvestris and other
writers to Plato’s divine fooling in the Timaeus, not as the specific, but
generic, origin of such imaginative views of the contents and generation of
the world. Such imaginings were as fantasy to science, when compared with
the solid and comprehensive consideration of the material world which was
to come a few years after Alanus’s death through the encyclopaedic
Aristotelian knowledge presented in the works of Alexander of Hales and
Albertus Magnus.

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CHAPTER XXXVII

THE UNIVERSITIES, ARISTOTLE, AND THE
MENDICANTS
Intellectually, the thirteenth century in western Europe is marked by three
closely connected phenomena: the growth of Universities, the discovery
and appropriation of Aristotle, and the activities of Dominicans and
Franciscans. These movements were universal, in that the range of none of
them was limited by racial or provincial boundaries. Yet a line may still be
drawn between Italy, where law and medicine were cultivated, and the
North, where theology with logic and metaphysics were supreme.
Absorption in these subjects produced a common likeness in the intellectual
processes of men in France, England, and Germany, whose writings were to
be no longer markedly affected by racial idiosyncrasies. This was true of
the logical controversy regarding universals, so prominent in the first part
of the twelfth century. It was very true of the great intellectual movement of
the later twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, to wit, the coming of Aristotle
to dominance, in spite of the counter-currents of Platonic Augustinianism.
The men who followed the new knowledge had slight regard for ties of
home, and travelled eagerly in search of learning. So, even as from far and
wide those who could study Roman law came to Bologna, the study of
theology and all that philosophy included drew men to Paris. Thither came
the keen-minded from Italy and from England; from the Low Countries and
from Germany; and from the many very different regions now covered by
the name of France. Wherever born and of whatever race, the devotees of
philosophy and theology at some period of their career reached Paris,
learned and taught there, and were affected by the universalizing influence
of an international aggregate of scholarship. So had it been with Breton

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Abaelard, with German Hugo, and with Lombard Peter; so with English
John, hight of Salisbury. And in the following times of culmination,
Albertus Magnus comes in his maturity from Germany; and his marvellous
pupil Thomas, born of noble Norman stock in southern Italy, follows his
master, eventually to Paris. So Bonaventura of lowly mid-Italian birth
likewise learns and teaches there; and that unique Englishman, Roger
Bacon, and after him Duns Scotus. These few greatest names symbolize the
centralizing of thought in the crowded and huddled lecture-rooms of the
City on the Seine.
The origins of the great mediaeval Universities can scarcely be
accommodated to simple statement. Their history is frequently obscure, and
always intricate; and the selection of a specific date or factor as determining
the inception, or distinctive development, of these mediaeval creations is
likely to be but arbitrary. They had no antique prototype: nothing either in
Athens or Rome ever resembled these corporations of masters and students,
with their authoritative privileges, their fixed curriculum, and their grades
of formally certified attainment. Even the Alexandria of the Ptolemies, with
all the pedantry of its learned litterateurs and their minute study of the past,
has nothing to offer like the scholastic obsequiousness of the mediaeval
University, which sought to set upon one throne the antique philosophy and
the Christian revelation, that it might with one and the same genuflection
bow down before them both. It behoves us to advert to the conditions
influencing the growth of Universities, and give a little space to those which
were chief among them.
The energetic human advance distinguishing the twelfth century in western
Europe exhibits among its most obvious phenomena an increased mobility
in all classes of society, and a tendency to gather into larger communities
and form strong corporate associations for profit or protection. New towns
came into being, and old ones grew apace. Some of them in the north of
Europe wrested their freedom from feudal lords; and both in the north and
south, municipalities attained a more complex organization, while within
them groups of men with common interests formed themselves into
powerful guilds. As strangers of all kinds—merchants, craftsmen, students
—came and went, their need of protection became pressing, and was met in
various ways.

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No kind of men were more quickly touched by the new mobility than the
thousands of youthful learners who desired to extend their knowledge, or, in
some definite field, perfect their education. In the eleventh century, such
would commonly have sought a monastery, near or far. In the twelfth and
then in the thirteenth, they followed the human currents to the cities, where
knowledge flourished as well as trade, and tolerable accommodation might
be had for teachers and students. Certain towns, some for more, some for
less, obvious reasons, became homes of study. Bologna, Paris, Oxford are
the chief examples. Irnerius, famed as the founder of the systematic study
of the Roman law, and Gratian, the equally famous orderer of the Canon
law, taught or wrote at Bologna when the twelfth century was young. Their
fame drew crowds of laymen and ecclesiastics, who desired to equip
themselves for advancement through the business of the law, civil or
ecclesiastical. At the same time, hundreds, which grew to thousands, were
attracted to the Paris schools—the school of Notre Dame, where William of
Champeaux held forth; the school of St. Victor, where he afterwards
established himself, and where Hugo taught; and the school of St.
Geneviève, where Abaelard lectured on dialectic and theology. These were
palpable gatherings together of material for a University. What first brought
masters and students to Oxford a few decades later is not so clear. But
Oxford had been an important town long before a University lodged itself
there.
In the twelfth century, citizenship scarcely protected one beyond the city
walls. A man carried but little safety with him. Only an insignificant
fraction of the students at Bologna, and of both masters and students at
Paris and Oxford, were citizens of those towns. The rest had come from
everywhere. Paris and Bologna held an utterly cosmopolitan, international,
concourse of scholar-folk. And these scholars, turbulent enough themselves,
and dwelling in a turbulent foreign city, needed affiliation there, and
protection and support. Organization was an obvious necessity, and if
possible the erection of a civitas within a civitas, a University within a none
too friendly town. This was the primal situation, and the primal need.
Through somewhat different processes, and under different circumstances,
these exigencies evoked a University in Bologna, Paris, and Oxford.[523]
In Italy, where the instincts of ancient Rome never were extinguished,
where some urban life maintained itself through the early helpless

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mediaeval centuries, where during the same period an infantile humanism
did not cease to stammer; where “grammar” was studied and taught by
laymen, and the “ars dictaminis” practised men in the forms of legal
instruments, it was but natural that the new intellectual energies of the
twelfth century should address themselves to the study of the Roman law,
which, although debased and barbarized, had never passed into desuetude.
And inasmuch as abstract theology did not attract the Italian temperament
or meet the conditions of papal politics in Italy, it was likewise natural that
ecclesiastical energies should be directed to the equally useful and closely
related canon law. Such studies with their practical ends could best be
prosecuted at some civic centre. In the first part of the twelfth century,
Irnerius lectured at Bologna upon the civil law; a generation later, Gratian
published his Decretum there. The specific reasons inducing the former to
open his lectures in that city are not known; but a large and thrifty town set
at the meeting of the great roads from central Italy to the north and east,
was an admirable place for a civil doctor and his audience, as the event
proved. Gratian was a monk in a Bologna convent, and may have listened to
Irnerius. The publication of his Decretum from Bologna, by that time (cir.
1142) famous for jurisprudence, lent authority to this work, whose universal
recognition was to enhance in turn Bologna’s reputation.
From the time of this inception of juristic studies, the talents of the doctors,
and the city’s fame, drew a prodigious concourse of students from all the
lands of western Europe. The Doctors of the Civil and Canon Laws
organized themselves into one, and subsequently into two, Colleges.
Apparently they had become an efficient association by the third quarter of
the twelfth century. But the University of Bologna was to be constituted par
excellence, not of one or more colleges of doctors, but of societies of
students. The persons who came for legal instruction were not boys getting
their first education in the Arts. They were men studying a profession, and
among them were many individuals of wealth and consequence, holding
perhaps civil or ecclesiastic office in the places whence they came. The vast
majority had this in common, that they were foreigners, with no civil rights
in Bologna. It behoved them to organize for their protection and mutual
support, and for the furtherance of the purposes for which they had come.
That a body of men in a foreign city should live under the law of their own
home, or the law of their own making, did not appear extraordinary in the

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twelfth century. It was not so long since the principle that men carried the
law of their home with them, had been widely recognized, and in all
countries the clergy still lived under the law of the Church. The gains
accruing from the presence of a great number of foreign students might
induce the authorities of Bologna to permit them to organize as student
guilds, and regulate their affairs by rules of their own, even as was done by
other guilds in most Italian cities. At Bologna the power of Guelf and
Ghibeline clubs, and of craftsmen’s guilds, rivalled that of the city
magistrates.
There is some indirect evidence that these students first divided themselves
into four Nationes. If so, the arrangement did not last. For by the middle of
the thirteenth century they are found organized in two Universitates, or
corporations, a Universitas Citramontanorum and a Universitas
Ultramontanorum; each under its own Rector. These two corporations of
foreign students constituted the University. The Professors did not belong to
them, and therefore were not members of the University. Indeed they fought
against the recognition of this University of students, asserting that the
students were but their pupils. But the students prevailed, strong in their
numbers, and in the weapon which they did not hesitate to use, that of
migration to another city, which cut off the incomes of the Professors and
diminished the repute and revenue of Bologna. So great became the power
of the student body, that it brought the Professors to complete subjection,
paying them their salaries, regulating the time and mode of lecturing, and
compelling them to swear obedience to the Rectors. The Professors
protested, but submitted. To make good its domination over them, and its
independence as against the city, the student University migrated to Arezzo
in 1215 and to Padua in 1222.[524]
In origin as well as organization, the University of Paris differed from
Bologna. It was the direct successor of the cathedral school of Notre Dame.
This had risen to prominence under William of Champeaux. But Abaelard
drew to Paris thousands of students for William’s hundreds (or at least
hundreds for William’s tens); and Abaelard at the height of his popularity
taught at the school of St. Geneviève, across the Seine. Therefore this
school also, although fading out after Abaelard’s time, should be regarded
as a causal predecessor of the Paris University. So, for that matter, should
the neighbouring school of St. Victor, founded by the discomfited William;

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for its reputation under Hugo and Richard drew devout students from near
and far, and augmented the scholastic fame of Paris.
It was both the privilege and duty of the Chancellor of Notre Dame to
license competent Masters to open schools near the cathedral. In the course
of time, these Masters formed an Association, and assumed the right to
admit to their Society the licentiates of the Chancellor, to wit, the new
Masters who were about to begin to teach. In the decades following
Abaelard’s death, the Masters who lectured in the vicinity of Notre Dame
increased in number. They spread with their schools beyond the island, and
taught in houses on the bridges. They were Masters, that is, teachers, in the
Arts. As the twelfth century gave way to the thirteenth, interest in the Arts
waned before the absorbing passion for metaphysical theology. This was a
higher branch of study, for which the Arts had come to be looked on as a
preparation. So the scholars of the schools of Arts became impatient to
graduate, that is, to reach the grade of Master, in order to pass on to the
higher study of theology. A result was that the course of study in the Arts
was shortened, while Masters multiplied in number. Their Society seems to
have become a definite and formal corporate body or guild, not later than
the year 1175. Herein was the beginning of the Paris University. It had
become a studium generale, like Bologna, because there were many
Masters, and students from everywhere were admitted to study in their
schools.
Gradually the University came to full corporate existence. From about
1210, written statutes exist, passed by the Society of Masters; at the same
date a Bull of Innocent III. recognizes the Society as a Corporation. Then
began a long struggle for supremacy, between the Masters and the
Chancellor: it was the Chancellor’s function to grant the licence to become
a Master; but it was the privilege of the Society to admit the licentiate to
membership. The action of both being thus requisite, time alone could tell
with whom the control eventually should rest. Was the self-governing
University to prevail, or the Chancellor of the Cathedral? The former won
the victory.
The Masters in Arts constituted par excellence the University, because they
far outnumbered the Masters in the upper Faculties of Theology, Law, and
Medicine. They were the dominant body; what they decided on, the other

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Faculties acquiesced in. These Masters in Arts, besides being numerous,
were young, not older than the law students at Bologna. With their still
younger students,[525] they made the bulk of the entire University, and were
the persons who most needed protection in their lawful or unlawful
conduct. At some indeterminate period they divided themselves into the
four Nationes, French, Normans, Picards, and English. They voted by
Nationes in their meetings; but from a period apparently as early as their
organization, a Rector was elected for all four Nationes, and not one Rector
for each. There were, however, occasional schisms or failures to agree. It
was to be the fortune of the Rector thus elected to supplant the Chancellor
of the Cathedral as the real head of the University.
The vastly greater number of the Masters in Arts were actually students in
the higher Faculties of Theology, Law,[526] or Medicine, for which
graduation in the Arts was the ordinary prerequisite. The Masters or Doctors
of these three higher Faculties, at least from the year 1213, determined the
qualifications of candidates in their departments. Nevertheless the Rector of
the Faculty of Arts continued his advance toward the headship of the whole
University. The oath taken by the Bachelors in the Arts, of obedience to that
Faculty and its Rector, was strengthened in 1256, so as to bind the oath-
taker so long as he should continue a member of the University.
The University had not obtained its privileges without insistence, nor
without the protest of action as well as word. Its first charter of privileges
from the king was granted in 1200, upon its protests against the conduct of
the Provost of Paris in attacking riotous students. Next, in combating the
jurisdiction of the Chancellor, it obtained privileges from the Pope; and in
1229, upon failure to obtain redress for an attack from the Provost’s
soldiers, ordered by the queen, Blanche of Castile, the University dispersed.
Thus it resorted to the weapon by which the University of Bologna had won
the confirmation of its rights. In the year 1231 the great Papal Bull, Parens
scientiarum, finally confirmed the Paris University in its contentions and
demands: the right to suspend lectures was sanctioned, whenever
satisfaction for outrage had been refused for fifteen days; likewise the
authority of the University to make statutes, and expel members for a
breach of them. The Chancellor of Notre Dame and the Bishop of Paris
were both constrained by the same Bull.

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A different struggle still awaited the University, in which it was its good
fortune not to be altogether successful; for it was contending against
instruments of intellectual and spiritual renovation, to wit, the Mendicant
Orders. The details are difficult to unravel at this distance of time. But the
Dominicans and Franciscans, in the lifetime of their founders, established
themselves in Paris, and opened schools of theology. Their Professors were
licensed by the Chancellor, and yet seem to have been unwilling to fall in
with the customs of the University, and, for example, cease from teaching
and disperse, when it saw fit to do so. The doctors of the theological Faculty
became suspicious, and opposed the admission of Mendicants to the
theological Faculty. The struggle lasted thirty years, until the Dominicans
obtained two chairs in that Faculty, and the Franciscans perhaps the same
number, on terms which looked like a victory for the Orders, but in fact
represented a compromise; for the Mendicant doctors in the end apparently
submitted to the statutes of the University.[527]
The origin of Oxford University was different, and one may say more
adventitious than that of Paris or Bologna. For Oxford was not the capital of
a kingdom, nor is it known to have been an ancient seat of learning. The
city was not even a bishop’s seat, a fact which had a marked effect upon the
constitution of the University. The old town lay at the edge of Essex and
Mercia, and its position early gave it importance politically, or rather
strategically, and as a place of trade. How or whence came the nucleus of
Masters and students that should grow into a University is unknown. An
interesting hypothesis[528] is that it was a colony from Paris, shaken off by
some academic or political disturbance. This surmise has been connected
with the year 1167. Some evidence exists of a school having existed there
before. Next comes a distinct statement from the year 1185, of the reading
of a book before the Masters and students.[529] After this date the references
multiply. In 1209, one has a veritable “dispersion,” in protest against the
hanging of some scholars. A charter from the papal legate in 1214 accords
certain privileges, among others that a clerk arrested by the town should be
surrendered on demand of the Bishop of Lincoln[530] or the Archdeacon, or
the Chancellor, whom the Bishop shall set over the scholars. This document
points to the beginning of the chancellorship. The title probably was copied
from Paris; but in Oxford the office was to be totally different. The Paris
Chancellor was primarily a functionary of a great cathedral, who naturally

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maintained its prerogatives against the encroachments of university
privilege. But at Oxford there was no cathedral; the Chancellor was the
head of the University, probably chosen from its Masters, and had chiefly
its interests at heart.
Making allowance for this important difference in the Chancellor’s office,
the development of the University closely resembled that of Paris. Its first
extant statute, of the year 1252, prescribes that no one shall be licensed in
Theology who has not previously graduated in the Arts. To the same year
belongs a settlement of disputes between the Irish and northern scholars.
The former were included in the Australes or southerners, one of the two
Nationes composing the Faculty of Arts. The Australes included the natives
of Ireland, Wales, and England south of the Trent; the other Natio, the
Boreales, embraced the English and Scotch coming from north of that river.
But the division into Nationes was less important than in the cosmopolitan
University of Paris, and soon ceased to exist. The Faculty of Arts, however,
continued even more dominant than at Paris. There was no serious quarrel
with the Mendicant Orders, who established themselves at Oxford—the
Dominicans in 1221, and the Franciscans three years later.
The curriculum of studies appears much the same at both Universities, and,
as followed in the middle of the thirteenth century, may be thus
summarized. For the lower degree of Bachelor of Arts, four or five years
were required; and three or four years more for the Master’s privileges. The
course of study embraced grammar (Priscian), also rhetoric, and in logic the
entire Organon of Aristotle, preceded by Porphyry’s Isagoge, and with the
Sex principia of Gilbert de la Porrée added to the course. The mathematical
branches of the Quadrivium also were required: arithmetic, music,
geometry, and astronomy. And finally a goodly part of the substantial
philosophy of Aristotle was studied, with considerable choice permitted to
the student in his selection from the works of the philosopher. At Oxford he
might choose between the Physics or the De coelo et mundo, or the De
anima or the De animalibus. The Metaphysics and Ethics or Politics were
also required before the Bachelor could be licensed as a Master.
In Theology the course of study was extremely lengthy, especially at Paris,
where eight years made the minimum, and the degree of Doctor was not
given before the candidate had reached the age of thirty-five. The chief

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subjects were Scripture and the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Besides
which, the candidate had to approve himself in sermons and disputations.
The latter might amount to a trial of nerve and endurance, as well as
proficiency in learning, since the candidate was expected to militare in
scholis, against a succession of opponents from six in the morning till six in
the evening, with but an hour’s refreshment at noon.[531]
In spite of the many resemblances of Oxford to Paris in organization and
curriculum, the intellectual tendencies of the two Universities were not
altogether similar. At Paris, speculative theology, with metaphysics and
other branches of “philosophy,” regarded as its adjuncts, were of absorbing
interest. At Oxford, while the same matters were perhaps supreme, a closer
scholarship in language or philology was cultivated by Grosseteste, and his
pupils, Adam of Marsh and Roger Bacon. The genius of observation was
stirring there; and a natural science was coming into being, which was not
to repose solely upon the authority of ancient books, but was to proceed by
the way of observation and experiment. Yet Roger Bacon imposed upon
both his philology and his natural science a certain ultimate purpose: that
they should subserve the surer ascertainment of divine and saving truth, and
thus still remain handmaids of theology, at least in theory.

The year 1200 may be taken to symbolize the middle of a period notable for
the enlargement of knowledge. If one should take the time of this increase
to extend fifty years on either side of the central point, one might say that
the student of the year 1250 stood to his intellectual ancestor of the year
1150, as a man in the full possession and use of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica would stand toward his father who had saved up the purchase
money for the same. The most obvious cause of this was an increasing
acquaintance with the productions of the so-called Arabian philosophy, and
more especially with the works of Aristotle, first through translations from
the Arabic, and then through translations from the Greek, which were made
in order to obviate the insufficiency of the former.
It would need a long excursus to review the far from simple course of so-
called Arabian thought, philosophic and religious. It begins in the East, and

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follows the setting sun. Even before the Hegira (622) the Arabs had rubbed
up against the inhabitants of Syria, Christian in name, eastern or Hellenic in
culture and proclivity. Then in a century or two, when the first impulsion of
Mohammedan conquest was spent, the works of Aristotle and his later
Greek commentators were translated into Arabic from Syrian versions,
under the encouragement of the rulers of Bagdad. The Syrian versions, as
we may imagine, were somewhat eclecticized and, more especially, Neo-
Platonized. So it was not the pure Aristotle that passed on into Arabic
philosophy, but the Aristotelian substance interpreted through later phases
of Greek and Oriental thought. Still, Aristotle was the great name, and his
system furnished the nucleus of doctrine represented in this Peripatetic
eclecticism which was to constitute, par excellence, Arabic philosophy.
Also Greek mathematical and medical treatises were translated into Arabic
from Syrian versions. El-Farabi (d. 950) and Avicenna (980-1036) were the
chief glories of the Arabic philosophy of Bagdad. These two gifted men
were commentators upon the works of the Stagirite, and authors of many
interesting lucubrations of their own.[532] Arabian philosophy declined in
the East with Avicenna’s death; but only to revive in Mussulman Spain.
There its great representative was Averroes, whose life filled the last three
quarters of the twelfth century. So great became his authority as an
Aristotelian, with the Scholastics, that he received the name of
Commentator, par excellence, even as Aristotle was par excellence,
Philosophus. We need not consider the ideas of these men which were their
own rather than the Stagirite’s; nor discuss the pietistic and fanatical sects
among the Mussulmans, who either sought to harmonize Aristotle with the
Koran, or disapproved of Greek philosophy. One readily perceives that in
its task of acquisition and interpretation, with some independent thinking,
and still more temperamental feeling, Arabic philosophy was the analogue
of Christian scholasticism, of which it was, so to speak, the collateral
ancestor.[533]
And in this wise. The Commentaries of Averroes, for example, were
translated into Latin; and, throughout all the mediaeval centuries, the
Commentary tended to supplant the work commented on, whether that work
was Holy Scripture or a treatise of Aristotle. By the middle of the thirteenth
century all the important works of Averroes had been translated into Latin,
and he had many followers at Paris; and before then, from the College of

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Toledo, had come translations of the principal works of the other chief
Arabian philosophers. Of still greater importance for the Christian West was
the work of Jews and Christians in Spain and Provence, in translating the
Arabic versions of Aristotle into Latin, sometimes directly, and sometimes
first into Hebrew and then into Latin. They attempted a literal translation,
which, however, frequently failed to give the significance even of the
Arabic version. These Arabic-Latin translations were of primary importance
for the first introduction of Aristotle to the theologian philosophers of
Christian Europe.
They were not to remain the only ones. In the twelfth century, a number of
Western scholars made excursions into the East; and the capture of
Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 enlarged their opportunities of
studying the Greek language and philosophy. Attempts at direct translation
into Latin began. One of the first translators was the sturdy Englishman,
Robert Grosseteste. He was born in Suffolk about 1175; studied at Lincoln,
then at Oxford, then at Paris, whence he returned to become Chancellor of
the University of Oxford. He was made Bishop of Lincoln in 1236, and died
seventeen years later. It was he who laid the foundation of the study of
Greek at Oxford, and Roger Bacon was his pupil. But the most important
and adequate translations were the work of two Dominicans, the Fleming,
William of Moerbeke, and Henry of Brabant, who translated the works of
Aristotle at the instance of Thomas Aquinas, possibly all working together
at Rome, in 1263 and the years following. Aquinas recognized the
inadequacy of the older translations, and based his own Aristotelian
Commentaries upon these made by his collaborators, learned in the Greek
tongue. The joint labour of translation and commentary seems to have been
undertaken at the command of Pope Urban IV., who had renewed the
former prohibitions put upon the use of Aristotle at the Paris University, in
the older, shall we say, Averroistic versions.
If these prohibitions, which did not touch the logical treatises, were meant
to be taken absolutely, such had been far from their effect. In 1210 and
again in 1215, an interdict was put upon the naturalis philosophia and the
methafisica of the Stagirite. It was not revoked, but rather provisionally
renewed, in 1231, until those works should be properly expurgated. A
Commission was appointed which accomplished nothing; and the old
interdict still hung in the air, unrescinded, yet ignored in practice. So Pope

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Urban referred to it as still effective—which it was not—in 1263. For
Aristotle had been more and more thoroughly exploited in the Paris
University, and by 1255 the Faculty of Arts formally placed his works upon
the list of books to be studied and lectured upon.[534]
So the founding of Universities and the enlarged and surer knowledge
brought by a study of the works of Aristotle were factors of power in the
enormous intellectual advance which took place in the last half of the
twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth century. Yet these factors could
not have operated as they did, but for the antecedent intellectual
development. Before the first half of the twelfth century had passed, the
patristic material had been mastered, along with the current notions of
antique philosophy, for the most part contained in it. Strengthened by this
discipline, men were prepared for an extension and solidifying of their
knowledge of the universe and man. Not only had they appropriated what
the available sources had to offer, but, when we think of Abaelard and Hugo
of St. Victor, we see that organic restatements had been made of what had
been acquired. Still, men really knew too little. It is very well to exploit
logic, and construct soul-satisfying schemes of cosmogonic symbolism, in
order to represent the deepest truth of the material world. But the evident
sense-realities of things are importunate. The minds even of spiritual men
may, in time, crave explanation of this side of their consciousness. Abaelard
seems to have been oblivious to natural phenomena; Hugo recognizes them
in order to elicit their spiritual meaning; and Alanus de Insulis, a generation
and more afterwards, takes a poet’s view of Nature. Other men had a more
hard-headed interest in these phenomena; but they knew too little to attempt
seriously to put them together in some sense-rational scheme. The natural
knowledge presented by the writings of the Church Fathers was little more
than foolishness; the early schoolmen were their heirs. They observed a
little for themselves; but very little.
There is an abysmal difference in the amount of natural knowledge
exhibited by any writing of the twelfth century, and the works of Albertus
Magnus belonging say to the middle of the thirteenth. The obvious reason
of this is, that the latter had drawn upon the great volume of natural
observation and hypothesis which for the preceding five hundred years had
been actually closed to western Europe, and for five hundred years before
that had been spiritually closed, because of the ineptitude of men to read

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therein. That volume was of course the encyclopaedic Natural Philosophy
of Aristotle, completed, and treated in its ultimate causal relationships, by
his Metaphysics. The Metaphysics, the First Philosophy, gave completeness
and unity to the various provinces of natural knowledge expounded in his
special treatises. For this reason, one finds in the works of Albertus a fund
of natural knowledge solid with the solidity of the earth upon which one
may plant his feet, and totally unlike the beautiful dreaming which drew its
prototypal origins from the skyey mind of Plato.
The utilization of Aristotle’s philosophy by the Englishman, Alexander of
Hales, who became a Franciscan near the year 1230, when he had already
lectured for some thirty years at Paris; its far more elaborate and complete
exposition by the very Teutonic Dominican, Albertus Magnus; and its even
closer exposition and final incorporation within the sum of Christian
doctrine, by Thomas,—this three-staged achievement is the great mediaeval
instance of return to a genuine and chief source of Greek philosophy. These
three schoolmen went back of the accounts and views of Greek philosophy
contained in the writings of the Fathers. And in so doing they also went
back of what was transmitted to the Middle Ages by Boëthius and other
“transmitters.”[535]
But the achievement of these schoolmen had other import. Their work
represents the culmination of the third stage of mediaeval thought: that of
systematic and organic restatement of the substance of the patristic and
antique, with added elements; for there can be no organic restatement which
does not hold and present something from him who achieves it. The result,
attained at least by Thomas, was even more than this. Based upon the data
and assumptions of scholasticism, it was a complete and final statement of
the nature of God so far as that might be known, of the creature world,
corporeal and incorporeal, and especially of man, his nature, his qualities,
his relationship to God and final destiny. And herein, in its completeness, it
was satisfying. The human mind in seeking explanation of the phenomena
of its consciousness—presumably a reflex of the universe without—tends to
seek a unity of explanation. A unity of explanation requires a completeness
in the mental scheme of what is to be explained. Thoughtful men in the
Middle Ages craved a scheme of life complete even in detail, which should
educe life’s currents from a primal Godhead, and project them compacted,

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with none left straying or pointing nowhither, on toward universal
fulfilment of His will.
Mediaeval thought had been preceded by whole views, entire schemes of
life. Greek philosophy had held only such from the time when Thales said
that water was the cause of all things. Plato’s view or scheme also was
beautiful in its ideally pyramided structure, with the Idea of the Good at the
apex. For Aristotle, knowledge was to be a syllogistic, or at least rational
and jointed, encyclopaedia, rounded, unified, complete. After the pagan
times, another whole scheme was that of Augustine, or again, that of
Gregory the Great, though barbarized and hardened. Thus as patterns for
their own thinking, mediaeval men knew only of entire schemes of thought.
Their creed was, in every sense, a symbol of a completed scheme. And no
mediaeval philosopher or theologian suspected himself of fragmentariness.
Yet, in fact, at first they did but select and compile. After a century and
more of this, they began to make organic statements of parts of Christian
doctrine. So we have Anselm’s Proslogium and Cur Deus Homo. Abaelard’s
Theologia is far more complete; and so is Hugo’s De sacramentis, which
offers an entire scheme, symbolical, sacramental, Christian, of God and the
world and man. Hugo’s scheme might be ideally satisfying; but little
concrete knowledge was represented in it. And when in the generations
following his death, the co-ordinated Aristotelian encyclopaedia was
brought to light and studied, then and thereafter any whole view of the
world must take account of this new volume of argument and concrete
knowledge. Alexander of Hales begins the labour of using it in a Christian
Summa; Albertus makes prodigious advance, at least in the massing and
preparation of the full Aristotelian material. Both try for whole views and
comprehensive results. Then Thomas, most highly favoured in his master
Albert, and gifted with a genius for acquisition and synthetic exposition,
incorporates Aristotle, and Aristotle’s whole views, into the whole view
presented by the Catholic Faith.
Thomas’s view, to be satisfying, had to be complete. It was knowledge
united and amalgamated into a scheme of salvation. But a scheme of
salvation is a chain, which can hold only in virtue of its completeness;
break one link, and it snaps; leave one rivet loose, and it may also snap. A
scheme of salvation must answer every problem put to it; a single
unanswered problem may imperil it. The problem, for example, of God’s

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foreknowledge and predestination—that were indeed an open link, which
Thomas will by no means leave unwelded. Hence for us modern men also,
whose views of the universe are so shamelessly partial, leaving so much
unanswered and so much unknown, the philosophy of Thomas may be
restful, and charm by its completeness.
It is of great interest to observe the apparently unlikely agencies by which
this new volume of knowledge was made generally available. In fact, it was
the new knowledge and the demand for it that forced these agencies to fulfil
the mission of exploiting it. For they had been created for other purposes,
which they also fulfilled. Verily it happened that the chief means through
which the new knowledge was gained and published were the two new
unmonastic Orders of monks, friars rather we may call them. Francis of
Assisi was born in 1182 and died in 1226; Dominic was born in 1177 and
died in 1221. The Orders of Minorites and Preachers were founded by them
respectively in 1209 and 1215. Neither Order was founded to promote
secular knowledge. Francis organized his Minorites that they might imitate
the lives of Christ and His apostles, and preach repentance to the world.
Dominic founded his Order to save souls through preaching: “For our Order
is known from the beginning to have been instituted especially for
preaching and the saving of souls, and our study (studium nostrum) should
have as the chief object of its labour to enable us to be useful to our
neighbours’ souls (ut proximorum animabus possimus utiles esse).”[536]
Within an apparent similarity of aim, each Order from the first reflected the
temper of its founder; and the temper of Francis was not that of Dominic.
For our purpose here, the difference may perhaps be symbolized by the
Dominican maxim to preach the Gospel throughout the world equally by
word and example (verbo pariter et exemplo); and the Franciscan maxim, to
exhort all plus exemplo quam verbo.[537] A generation later St Bonaventura
puts it thus: “Alii (scilicet, Praedicatores) principaliter intendunt
speculationi ... et postea unctioni. Alii (scilicet, Minores) principaliter
unctioni et postea speculationi.”[538]
It is safe to say that St Francis had no thought of secular studies; and as for
the Order of Preachers, the Constitutions of 1228 forbade the Dominicans
to study libros gentilium and seculares scientias. They are to study libros
theologicos.[539] Francis, also, recognized the necessity of Scriptural study

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for those Minorites who were allowed to preach. In these views the early
Franciscans and Dominicans were not peculiar; but rather represented the
attitude of the older monastic Orders and of the stricter secular clergy. The
Gospel teaching of Christ had nothing to do with secular knowledge—
explicitly. But the first centuries of the Church perceived that its defenders
should be equipped with the Gentile learning, into which indeed they had
been born. And while Francis was little of a theologian, and Dominic’s
personality and career remain curiously obscure, one can safely say that
both founders saw the need of sacred studies, and left no authoritative
expression prohibiting their Orders from pursuing them to the best
advantage for the cause of Christ. Yet we are not called on to suppose that
either founder, in founding his Order for a definite purpose, foresaw all the
means which after his death might be employed to attain that purpose—or
some other!
The new Order cometh, the old rusteth. So has it commonly been with
Monasticism. Undoubtedly these uncloistered Orders embodied novel
principles of efficiency for the upholding of the Faith: their soldiers
marched abroad evangelizing, and did not keep within their fastnesses of
holiness. The Mendicant Orders were still young, and fresh from the
inspiration of their founders. In those years they moved men’s hearts and
drew them to the ideal which had been set for themselves. The result was,
that in the first half of the thirteenth century the greater part of Christian
religious energy girded its loins with the cords of Francis and Dominic.
At the commencement of that century, when the Orders of Minorites and
Preachers were founded, the world of Western thought was prepared to
make its own the new Aristotelian volume of knowledge and applied
reason. Once that was opened and its contents perceived, the old
Augustinian-Neo-Platonic ways of thinking could no longer proceed with
their idealizing constructions, ignoring the pertinence of the new data and
their possible application to such presentations of Christian doctrine as
Hugo’s De sacramentis or the Lombard’s Sentences. The new knowledge,
with its methods, was of such insistent import, that it had at once to be
considered, and either invalidated by argument, or accepted, and perhaps
corrected, and then accommodated within an enlarged Christian Philosophy.

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The spiritual force animating a new religious movement attracts the
intellectual energies of the period, and furnishes them a new reality of
purpose. This was true of early Christianity, and likewise true of the fresh
religious impulse which proceeded from Francis’s energy of love and the
organizing zeal of Dominic. From the very years of their foundation, 1209
and 1215, the rapid increase of the two Orders realized their founders’
visions of multitudes hurrying from among all nations to become Minorites
or Preachers. And more and more their numbers were recruited from among
the clergy. The lay members, important in the first years of Francis’s
labours, were soon wellnigh submerged by the clericals; and the educated or
learned element became predominant in the Franciscan Order as it was from
the first in the Dominican.
Consider for an instant the spread of the former. In 1216, Cardinal Jacques
of Vitry finds the Minorites in Lombardy, Tuscany, Apulia, and Sicily. The
next year five thousand are reported to have assembled at the general
meeting of the Order. Two years later Francis proceeds to carry out his plan
of world-conquest by apportioning the Christian countries, and sending the
brethren into France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, and throughout Italy.[540] It
was a period when in the midst of general ignorance on the part of the
clergy as well as laity, Universities (generalia studia) were rising in Italy,
France, and England. The popes, Innocent III. (died 1216), Honorius III.
(died 1221), and Gregory IX. (died 1241), were seeking to raise the
education and even the learning of the Church. Their efforts found in the
zeal of the Mendicants a ready response which was not forthcoming from
the secular clergy. The Mendicants were zealous for the Faith, and loyal
liegemen of the popes, who were their sustainers and the guarantors of their
freedom from local ecclesiastical interference. What more fitting
instruments could be found to advance the cause of sacred learning at the
Universities, and enlarge it with the new knowledge which must either
serve the Faith or be its enemy. If all this was not evident in the first
decades of the century, it had become so by the middle of it, when the
Franciscan Bonaventura and the Dominicans Albertus and Thomas were the
intellectual glories of the time. And thus, while the ardour of the new
Orders drew to their ranks the learning and spiritual energy of the Church,
the intellectual currents of the time caught up those same Brotherhoods,

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which had so entrusted their own salvation to the mission of saving other
souls abroad in the world, where those currents flowed.
The Universities, above all the University par excellence, were in the hands
of the secular clergy; and long and intricate is the story of their jealous
endeavours to exclude the Mendicants from Professors’ chairs. The
Dominicans established themselves at Paris in 1217, the Franciscans two
years later. The former succeeded in obtaining one chair of theology at the
University in 1229, and a second in 1231; and about the same time the
Franciscans obtained their first chair, and filled it with Alexander of Hales.
When he died an old man, fifteen years later, they wrote upon his tomb:

“Gloria Doctorum, decus et flos Philosophorum,
Auctor scriptorum vir Alexander variorum,”

closing the epitaph with the words: “primus Doctor eorum,” to wit, of the
Minorites. He was the author of the first Summa theologiae, in the sense in
which that term fits the work of Albert and Thomas. And there is no harm in
repeating that this Summa of Alexander’s was the first work of a mediaeval
schoolman in which use was made of the physics, metaphysics, and natural
history, of Aristotle.[541] He died in 1245, when the Franciscans appear to
have possessed two chairs at the University. One of them was filled in 1248
by Bonaventura, who nine years later was taken from his professorship, to
become Minister-General of his Order. It was indeed only in this year 1257
that the University itself had been brought by papal injunctions formally to
recognize as magister this most eloquent of the Franciscans, and the
greatest of the Dominicans, Thomas Aquinas. The latter’s master, Albert,
had been recognized as magister by the University in 1245.
Before the intellectual achievements of these two men, the Franciscan fame
for learning paled. But that Order went on winning fame across the
Channel, which the Dominicans had crossed before them. In 1224 they
came to Oxford, and were received as guests by an establishment of
Dominicans: this was but nine years after the foundation of the preaching
Order! Perhaps the Franciscan glories overshone the Dominican at Oxford,
where Grosseteste belongs to them and Adam of Marsh and Roger Bacon.
But whichever Order led, there can be no doubt that together they included

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the greater part of the intellectual productivity of the maturing thirteenth
century. Nevertheless, in spite of the vast work of the Orders in the field of
secular knowledge, it will be borne in mind that the advancement of sacra
doctrina, theology, the saving understanding of Scripture, was the end and
purpose of all study with Dominicans and Franciscans, as it was universally
with all orthodox mediaeval schoolmen; although for many the nominal
purpose seems a mere convention. Few men of the twelfth or thirteenth
century cared to dispute the principle that the Carmina poetarum and the
Dicta philosophorum “should be read not for their own sake, but in order
that we may learn holy Scripture to the best advantage: I say they are to be
offered as first-fruits, for we should not grow old in them, but spring from
their thresholds to the sacred page, for whose sake we were studying them
for a while.”[542]
Within the two Orders, especially the Franciscan, men differed sharply as to
the desirability of learning. So did their contemporaries among the secular
clergy, and their mediaeval and patristic predecessors as far back as
Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian. On this matter a large variance of
opinion might exist within the compass of orthodoxy; for Catholicism did
not forbid men to value secular knowledge, provided they did not cleave to
opinions contradicting Christian verity. This was heresy, and indeed was the
sum of what was called Averroism, the chief intellectual heresy of the
thirteenth century. It consisted in a sheer following of Aristotle and his
infidel commentator, wheresoever the opinions of the Philosopher, so
interpreted, might lead. They were not to be corrected in the interest of
Christian truth. A representative Averroist, and one so important as to draw
the fire of Aquinas, as well as the censures of the Church, was Siger de
Brabant. He followed Aristotle and his commentator in maintaining: The
universal oneness of the (human) intelligence, the anima intellectiva, an
opinion which involved the denial of an individual immortality, with its
rewards and punishments; the eternity of the visible world,—uncreated and
everlasting; a rational necessitarianism which precluded freedom of human
action and moral responsibility.
It would be hard to find theses more fundamentally opposed to the Christian
Faith. Yet Siger may have deemed himself a Christian. With other
Averroists, he sought to preserve his religious standing by maintaining that
these opinions were true according to philosophy, but not according to the

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Catholic Faith: “Dicunt enim ea esse vera secundum philosophiam, sed non
secundum fidem catholicam.”[543] With what sincerity Siger held this
untenable position is hard to say.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

BONAVENTURA
The range and character of the ultimate intellectual interests of the
thirteenth century may be studied in the works of four men: St.
Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas, and lastly, Roger Bacon.
The first and last were as different as might be; and both were Franciscans.
Albertus and Thomas represent the successive stages of one achievement,
the greatest in the course of mediaeval thought. In some respects, their
position is intermediate between Bonaventura and Bacon. Bonaventura
reflects many twelfth-century ways of thinking; Albert and Thomas embody
par excellence the intellectual movement of the thirteenth century in which
they all lived; and Roger Bacon stands for much, the exceeding import of
which was not to be recognized until long after he was forgotten. The four
were contemporaries, and, with the possible exception of Bacon, knew each
other well. Thomas was Albert’s pupil; Thomas and Bonaventura taught at
the same time in the Faculty of Theology at Paris, and stood together in the
academic conflict between their Orders and the Seculars. Albertus and
Bonaventura also must have known each other, teaching at the same time in
the theological faculty. As for Bacon, he was likewise at Paris studying and
teaching, when the others were there, and may have known them.[544]
Albert and Thomas came of princely stock, and sacrificed their fortune in
the world for theology’s sake. Bacon’s family was well-to-do; Bonaventura
was lowly born.

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John of Fidanza, who under the name of Bonaventura was to become
Minister-General of his Order, Cardinal, Saint, and Doctor Seraphicus, saw
the light in the Tuscan village of Bagnorea. That he was of Italian, half
Latin-speaking, stock is apparent from his own fluent Latin. Probably in the
year 1238, when seventeen years old, he joined the Franciscan Order; and
four years later was sent to Paris, where he studied under Alexander of
Hales. In 1248 he was licensed to lecture publicly, and thenceforth devoted
himself at Paris to teaching and writing, and defending his Order against the
Seculars, until 1257, when, just as the University conferred on him the title
of Magister, he was chosen Minister-General of his Order, in the thirty-
seventh year of his age. The greater part of his writings were composed
before the burdens of this primacy drew him from his studies. He was still
to become Prince of the Church, for he was made Cardinal of Albano in
1273, the year before his death.
For all the Middle Ages the master in theology was Augustine. Either he
was studied directly in his own writings, or his views descended through the
more turbid channels of the works of men he influenced. Mediaeval
theology was overwhelmingly Augustinian until the middle of the thirteenth
century; and since theology was philosophy’s queen, mediaeval philosophy
conformed to that which Augustine employed in his theology. This, if traced
backward to its source, should be called Platonism, or Neo-Platonism if we
turn our mind to the modes in which Augustine made use of it. His Neo-
Platonism was not unaffected by Peripatetic and later systems of Greek
philosophy; yet it was far more Platonic than Stoical or Aristotelian.
Those first teachers, who in the maturity of their powers became Brothers
Minorites, were Augustinians in theology, and consequently Platonists, in
so far as Platonism made part of Augustine’s doctrines. Thus it was with the
first great teacher at the Minorites school in Oxford, Robert Grosseteste,
and with the first great Minorite teacher at Paris, Alexander of Hales. Both
of these men were promoters of the study of Aristotle; yet neither became
so imbued with Aristotelianism as to revise either his theological system or
the Platonic doctrines which seemed germane to it. Moreover, in so far as
we may imagine St. Francis to have had a theology, we must feel that
Augustine, with his hand on Plato’s shoulder, would have been more
congenial to him than Aristotle. And so in fact it was to be with his Order.
Augustine’s fervent piety, his imagination and religious temperament, held

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the Franciscans fast. Surely he was very close to the soul of that eloquent
Franciscan teacher, who called Alexander of Hales “master and father,” sat
at his feet, and never thought of himself as delivering new teachings. It
would have been strange indeed if Bonaventura had broken from the
influences which had formed his soul, this Bonaventura whose most
congenial precursor lived and wrote and followed Augustine far back in the
twelfth century, and bore the name of Hugo of St. Victor. Bonaventura’s
writings did much to fix Augustinianism upon his Order; rivalry with the
Dominicans doubtless helped to make it fast; for the latter were following
another system under the dominance of their two Titan leaders, who had
themselves come to maturity with the new Aristotelian influences, whereof
they were magna pars.
But just as Grosseteste and Alexander made use of what they knew of
Aristotle, so Bonaventura had no thought of misprizing him who was
becoming in western Europe “the master of those who know.” In specific
points this wise Augustinian might prefer Aristotle to Plato. For example, he
chose to stand, with the former, upon the terra firma of sense perception,
rather than keep ever on the wing in the upper region of ideal concepts.
“Although the anima, according to Augustine, is linked to eternal
principles (legibus aeternis), since somehow it does reach the light of
the higher reason, still it is unquestionable, as the Philosopher says, that
cognition originates in us by the way of the senses, of memory, and of
experience, out of which the universal is deduced, which is the
beginning of art and knowledge (artis et scientiae). Hence, since Plato
referred all certain cognition to the intelligible or ideal world, he was
rightly criticized by Aristotle. Not because he spoke ill in saying that
there are ideas and eternal rationes; but because, despising the world of
sense, he wished to refer all certain cognition to those Ideas. And thus,
although Plato seems to make firm the path of wisdom (sapientiae)
which proceeds according to the eternal rationes, he destroys the way of
knowledge, which proceeds according to the rationes of created things
(rationes creatas). So it appears that, among philosophers, the word of
wisdom (sermo sapientiae) was given to Plato, and the word of
knowledge (scientiae) to Aristotle. For that one chiefly looked to the
things above, and this one considered things below.[545] But both the

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word of wisdom and of knowledge, through the Holy Spirit, was given
to Augustine, as the pre-eminent declarer of the entire Scripture.”[546]
So there is Aristotelian ballast in Bonaventura’s Platonic-Augustinian
theology. His chief divergence from Albert and Thomas (who, of course,
likewise held Augustine in honour, and drew on Plato when they chose) is
to be found in his temperamental attitude, toward life, toward God, or
toward theology and learning. His Augustinian soul held to the pre-
eminence of the good above the true, and tended to shape the second to the
first. So he maintained the primacy of willing over knowing. Man attains
God through goodness of will and through love. The way of knowledge is
less prominent with Bonaventura than with Aquinas. Surely the latter, and
his master Albert, saw the main sanction of secular knowledge in its
ministry to sacra doctrina; but their hearts may seem to tarry with the
handmaid. Bonaventura’s position is the same; but his heart never tarries
with the handmaid; for with him heart and mind are ever constant to the
queen, Theology. Yet he recognizes the queen’s need of the handmaid. Holy
Writ is not for babes; the fulness of knowledge is needed for its
understanding: “Non potest intelligi sacra Scriptura sine aliarum
scientiarum peritia.”[547] And without philosophy many matters of the Faith
cannot be intelligently discussed. There is no knowledge which may not be
sanctified to the purpose of understanding Scripture; only let this purpose
really guide the mind’s pursuits.
Bonaventura wrote a short treatise to emphasize these universally admitted
principles, and to show how every form of human knowledge conformed to
the supreme illumination afforded by Scripture, and might be reduced to the
terms and methods of Theology, which is Scripture rightly understood. He
named the tract De reductione artium ad theologiam[548] (The leading back
of the Arts to Theology).
“‘Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the
Father of lights,’ says James. This indicates the source of all
illumination, and the streaming of all enlightenment from that fontal
light. While every illumination is inner knowledge (omnis illuminatio
cognitio interna sit) we may distinguish the external light, (lumen
exterius), to wit, the light of mechanical art; the lower light, to wit, the
light of sense perception; the interior light, to wit, the light of

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philosophical cognition; the superior light, to wit, the light of grace and
Holy Scripture. The first illuminates as to the arts and crafts; the second
as to natural form; the third as to intellectual truth; the fourth as to
saving truth.”
He enumerates the mechanical arts, drawing from Hugo of St. Victor; then
he follows with Augustine’s explanation of the second lumen, as that which
discerns corporeal things. He next speaks of the third lumen which lightens
us to the investigation of truths intelligible, scrutinizing the truth of words
(Logic), or the truth of things (Physics), or the truth of morals (Ethics). The
fourth lumen, of Holy Scripture, comes not by seeking, but descends
through inspiration from the Father of lights. It includes the literal, the
spiritual, moral and anagogic signification of Scripture, teaching the eternal
generation and incarnation of Christ, the way to live, and the union of God
and the soul. The first of these branches pertains to faith, the second to
morals, and the third to the aim and end of both.
“Let us see,” continues Bonaventura, “how the other illuminations have to
be reduced to the light of Holy Scripture. And first as to the illumination
from sense cognition, as to which we consider its means, its exercise, and
its delight (oblectamentum).” Its means is the Word eternally generated, and
incarnated in time; its exercise is in the sense perception of an ordered way
of living, following the suitable and avoiding the nocuous; and as for its
object of delight, as every sense pursues that which delights it, so the sense
of our heart should seek the beautiful, harmonious, and sweet-smelling. In
this way divine wisdom dwells hidden in sense cognition.
Next, as to the illumination of mechanical art, which is concerned with the
production of the works of craft. Herein likewise may be observed
analogies with the light from Holy Scripture, which reveals the Word, the
order of living, and the union of God and the soul. No creature proceeds
from the great Artificer, save through the Word; and the human artificer
works to produce a beautiful, useful, and enduring work; which corresponds
to the Scriptural order of living. Each human artificer makes his work that it
may bring him praise or use or delight; as God made the rational soul, to
praise and serve and take delight in Him, through love.

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By similar methods of reasoning Bonaventura next “reduces,” or leads
back, Logic, and Natural and Moral Philosophy to the ways and purposes of
Theology, and shows how “the multiform wisdom of God, which is set
forth lucidly by Scripture, lies hidden in every cognition, and in every
nature. It is also evident that all kinds of knowledge minister to Theology;
and that Theology takes illustrations, and uses phrases, pertaining to every
kind of knowledge (cognitionis). It is also plain how ample is the
illuminating path, and how in every thing that is sensed or perceived, God
himself lies concealed.”[549]
Ways of reasoning change, while conclusions sometimes endure.
Bonaventura’s reasoning in the above treatise is for us abstruse and fanciful;
yet many will agree with the conclusion, that all kinds of knowledge may
minister to our thought of God, and of man’s relationship to Him. And with
Bonaventura, all his knowledge, his study of secular philosophy, his logic
and powers of presentation, had theology unfailingly in view, and
ministered to the satisfaction, the actualization (to use our old word) of his
religious nature. He belongs among those intellectually gifted men—
Augustine, Anselm, Hugo of St. Victor—whose mental and emotional
powers draw always to God, and minister to the conception of the soul’s
union with the living spring of its being. The life, the labours of
Bonaventura were as the title of the little book we have just been worrying
with, a reductio artium ad theologiam, a constant adapting of all knowledge
and ways of meditation, to the sense of God and the soul’s inclusion in the
love divine. No one should expect to find among his compositions any
independent treatment of secular knowledge for its own sake. Rather
throughout his writings the reasonings of philosophy are found always
ministering to the sovereign theme.
The most elaborate of Bonaventura’s doctrinal works was his Commentary
upon the Lombard’s Sentences. In form and substance it was a Summa
theologiae.[550] He also made a brief and salutary theological compend,
which he called the Breviloquium.[551] The note of devotional piety is struck
by the opening sentence, taken from the Epistle to the Ephesians, and is
held throughout the work:
“‘I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom
the whole fatherhood in heaven and earth is named, that He would grant

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you according to the riches of His glory to be strengthened by His Spirit
in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; that
ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with
all saints, what is the breadth and length and height and depth; and to
know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye might be
filled in all the fulness of God.’ The great doctor of the Gentiles
discloses in these words the source, progress, and state (ortus,
progressus, status) of Holy Scripture, which is called Theology;
indicating that the source is to be thought upon according to the grace
(influentiam) of the most blessed Trinity; the progress with reference to
the needs of human capacity; and the state or fruit with respect to the
superabundance of a superplenary felicity.
“For the Source lies not in human investigation, but in divine revelation,
which flows from the Father of lights, from whom all fatherhood in
heaven and earth is named, from whom, through His Son Jesus Christ,
the Holy Spirit flows in us; and through the Holy Spirit bestowing, as
He wills, gifts on each, faith is given, and through faith Christ dwells in
our hearts. This is the knowledge of Jesus Christ, from which, as from a
source, comes the certitude and understanding of the whole Scripture.
Wherefore it is impossible that any one should advance in its
knowledge, unless he first has Christ infused in him....
“The Progress of Holy Scripture is not bound to the laws of reasonings
and definitions, like the other sciences; but, conformably to supernatural
light, proceeds to give to man the wayfarer (homini viatori) a
knowledge of things sufficing for his salvation, by plain words in part,
and in part mystically: it presents the contents of the universe as in a
Summa, in which is observed the breadth; it describes the descent (from
above) in which is considered the length; it describes the goodness of
the saved, in which is considered the height; it describes the misery of
the damned, in which consists the depth not only of the universe itself
but of the divine judgment....
“The State or fruit of Holy Scripture is the plentitude of eternal felicity.
For the Book containing words of eternal life was written not only that
we might believe, but that we might have eternal life, in which we shall
see, we shall love, and all our desires shall be filled, whereupon we

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shall know the love which passeth knowledge, and be filled in all the
fulness of God....
“As to the progress of Scripture, first is to be considered the breadth,
which consists in the multitude of parts.... Rightly is Holy Scripture
divided into the Old and New Testament, and not in theorica and
practica, like philosophy; because since Scripture is founded on the
knowledge of faith, which is a virtue and the basis of morals, it is not
possible to separate in Scripture the knowledge of things, or of what is
to be believed, from the knowledge of morals. It is otherwise with
philosophy, which handles not only the truth of morals, but the true,
speculatively considered. Then as Holy Scripture is knowledge (notitia)
moving to good and recalling from evil, through fear and love, so it is
divided into two Testaments, whose difference, briefly, is fear and
love....
“Holy Scripture has also length, which consists in the description of
times and ages from the beginning to the day of Judgment.... The
progress of the whole world is described by Scripture, as in a beautiful
poem, wherein one may follow the descent of time, and contemplate the
variety, manifoldness, equity, order, righteousness, and beauty of the
multitude of divine judgments proceeding from the wisdom of God
ruling the world: and as with a poem, so with this ordering of the world,
one cannot see its beauty save by considering the whole....
“No less has Sacred Scripture height (sublimitatem), consisting in
description of the ranged hierarchies, the ecclesiastical, angelic, and
divine.... Even as things have being in matter or nature, they have also
being in the anima through its acquired knowledge; they have also
being in the anima through grace, also through glory; and they have
also being in the way of the eternal—in arte aeterna. Philosophy treats
of things as they are in nature, or in the anima according to the
knowledge which is naturally implanted or acquired. But theology as a
science (scientia) founded upon faith and revealed by the Holy Spirit,
treats of those matters which belong to grace and glory and to the
eternal wisdom. Whence placing philosophic cognition beneath itself,
and drawing from nature (de naturis rerum) as much as it may need to
make a mirror yielding a reflection of things divine, it constructs a

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ladder which presses the earth at the base, and touches heaven at the
top: and all this through that one hierarch Jesus Christ, who through his
assumption of human nature, is hierarch not in the ecclesiastical
hierarchy alone, but also in the angelic; and is the medial person in the
divine hierarchy of the most blessed Trinity.”[552]
The depth (profunditas) of Scripture consists in its manifold mystic
meanings. It reveals these meanings of the creature world for the edification
of man journeying to his fatherland. Scripture throughout its breadth,
length, height, and depth uses narrative, threat, exhortation, and promise all
for one end. “For this doctrina exists in order that we may become good
and be saved, which comes not through naked consideration, but rather
through inclination of the will.... Here examples have more effect than
arguments, promises are more moving than ratiocinations, and devotion is
better than definition.” Hence Scripture does not follow the method and
divisions of other sciences, but uses its own diverse means for its saving
end. The Prologue closes with rules of Scriptural interpretation.[553]
In our plan of following what is of human interest in mediaeval philosophy
or theology, prologues and introductions are sometimes of more importance
than the works which they preface; for they disclose the writer’s intent and
purpose, and the endeavour within him, which may be more intimately
himself, than his performance. So more space has been given to
Bonaventura’s Prologue than the body of the treatise will require. The order
of topics is that of the Lombard’s Sentences or Aquinas’s Summa. Seven
successive partes consider the Trinity, the creation, the corruption from sin,
the Incarnation, the grace of the Holy Spirit, the sacramental medicine, and
the Last Judgment. Each pars is divided into chapters setting forth some
special topic. Bonaventura’s method, pursued in every chapter, is to state
first the scriptural or dogmatic propositions, and then give their reason,
which he introduces with such words as: Ratio autem ad praedictorum
intelligentiam haec est. The work is a complete systematic compend of
Christian theology; its conciseness and lucidity of statement are admirable.
For an example of its method and quality, the first chapter of the sixth part
may be given, upon the origin of Sacraments.
“Having treated of the Trinity of God, of the creation of the world, the
corruption of sin, the incarnation of the Word, and the grace of the Holy

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Spirit, it is time to treat of the sacramental medicine, regarding which
there are seven matters to consider: the origin of the sacraments, their
variation, distinction, appointment, dispensation, repetition, and the
integrity of each.
“Concerning[554] the origin of the Sacraments this is to be held, that
sacraments are sensible signs divinely appointed as medicaments, in
which under cover of things sensible, divine virtue secretly operates;
also that from likeness they represent, from appointment they signify,
from sanctification they confer, some spiritual grace, through which the
soul is healed from the infirmities of vice; and for this as their final end
they are ordained; yet they avail for humility, instruction, and exercise
as for a subsidiary end.
“The reason and explanation of the aforesaid is this: The reparative
principle (principium), is Christ crucified, to wit, the Word incarnate,
that directs all things most compassionately because divine, and most
compassionately heals because divinely incarnate. It must repair, heal,
and save the sick human race, in a way suited to the sick one, the
sickness and the occasion of it, and the cure of the sickness. The
physician is the incarnate Word, to wit, God invisible in a visible nature.
The sick man is not simply spirit, nor simply flesh, but spirit in mortal
flesh. The disease is original sin, which through ignorance infects the
mind, and through concupiscence infects the flesh. While the origin of
this fault primarily lay in reason’s consent, yet its occasion came from
the senses of the body. Consequently, in order that the medicine should
correspond to these conditions, it should be not simply spiritual, but
should have somewhat of sensible signs; for as things sensible were the
occasion of the soul’s falling, they should be the occasion of its rising
again. Yet since visible signs of themselves have no efficiency ordained
for grace, although representative of its nature, it was necessary that
they should by the author of grace be appointed to signify and should be
blessed in order to sanctify; so that there should be a representation
from natural likeness, a signification from appointment, and a
sanctification and preparedness for grace from the added benediction,
through which our soul may be cured and made whole.

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“Again, since curative grace is not given to the puffed up, the
unbelieving, and disdainful, so these sensible signs divinely given,
ought to be such as not only would sanctify and confer grace, and heal,
but also would instruct by their signification, humble by their
acceptance, and exercise through their diversity; that thus through
exercise despondency (acedia) should be shut out from the desiderative
[nature], through instruction ignorance be shut out from the rational
[nature], through humiliation pride be shut out from the irascible
[nature], and the whole soul become curable by the grace of the Holy
Spirit, which remakes us according to these three capacities (potentias)
[555] into the image of the Trinity and Christ. Finally, whereas the grace
of the Holy Spirit is received through these sensible signs divinely
appointed, it is found in them as an accident. Hence sacraments of this
kind are called the vessels and cause of grace: not that grace is of their
substance or produced by them as by a cause; for its place is in the soul,
and it is infused by God alone; but because it is ordained by divine
decree, that in them and through them we shall draw the grace of cure
from the supreme physician, Christ; although God has not fettered His
grace to the sacraments.[556]
“From the premises, therefore, appears not only what may be the origin
of the sacraments, but also the use and fruit. For their origin is Christ
the Lord; their use is the act which exercises, teaches, and humbles;
their fruit is the cure and salvation of men. It is also evident that the
efficient cause of the sacraments is the divine appointment; their
material cause is the figurement of the sensible sign; their formal cause
the sanctification by grace; their final cause the medicinal healing of
men. And because they are named from their form and end they are
called sacraments, as it were medicamenta sanctificantia. Through them
the soul is led back from the filth of vice to perfect sanctification. And
so, although corporeal and sensible, they are medicinal, and to be
venerated as holy because they signify holy mysteries, and make ready
for the holy gifts (charismata) given by most holy God; and they are
divinely consecrated by holy institution and benediction for the holiest
worship of God appointed in holy church, so that rightly they should be
called sacraments.”

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The Breviloquium was Bonaventura’s rational compendium of Christian
theology. It offered in brief compass as complete a system as the bulkiest
Summa could carry out to doctrinal elaboration. Quite different in method
and intent was his equally famous Itinerarium mentis in Deum,[557] the
praise of which, according to the great Chancellor Gerson, could not fitly be
uttered by mortal mouth. We have seen how in the Reductio artium ad
theologiam Bonaventura conformed all modes of perception and knowledge
to the uses and modes of theology; the final end of which is man’s
salvation, consisting in the union of the soul with God, through every form
of enlightenment and all the power of love. The Breviloquium has given the
sum of Christian doctrine, an intelligent and heart-felt understanding of
which leads to salvation. And now the Itinerarium—well, it is best to let
Bonaventura tell how he came to compose it, and of its purpose and
character.
“Since, after the example of our most blessed father Francis, I pant in
spirit for the peace which he preached in the manner of our Lord Jesus
Christ, I a sinner who am the seventh, all unworthy, Minister-General of
the Brethren,—it happened that by God’s will in the thirty-third year
after our blessed father’s death, I turned aside to the mountain of
Alverna, as to a quiet place, seeking the spirit’s peace. While I lingered
there my mind dwelt on the ascensions of the spirit, and, among others,
on the miracle which in that very spot came to blessed Francis, when he
saw the winged Seraph in the likeness of the Crucified. And it seemed
to me his vision represented the suspension of our father in
contemplation, and the way by which he came to it. For by those six
wings may be understood the suspensions of the six illuminations, by
which the soul, as by steps and journeys, through ecstatic outpourings
of Christian wisdom, is prepared to pass beyond to peace. For the way
lies only through love of the Crucified, which so transformed Paul
carried to the third heaven, that he could say: ‘I am crucified with
Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.’ So the
image of the six seraph’s wings represents the six rungs of illumination,
which begin with the creatures and lead on to God, to whom no one can
come save through the Crucified....
“For one is not prepared for the divine contemplations, which lead to
the rapt visions of the mind, unless he be with Daniel, a man of desires.

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[558] Desires are stirred within us by the cry of prayer and the bright
light of speculation. I shall invite the reader first to the sighings of
prayer through Christ crucified, lest perchance he believe that study
might suffice without unction, or diligence without piety, knowledge
without charity, zeal without divine grace, or the mirror (speculum)
without the wisdom divinely inspired. Then to those humble and devout
ones, to whom grace first has come, to those lovers of the divine
wisdom, who burn with desire of it, and are willing to be still, for the
magnifying of God, I shall propose pertinent speculations, showing how
little or nothing is it to turn the mirror outward unless the mirror of our
mind be rubbed and polished.”
Thus Bonaventura writes his prologue to this devotional tract, which will
also hold “pertinent speculations.” Remarkable is the intellectuality and
compacted thought which he fuses in emotional expression. He will write
seven chapters, on the seven steps, or degrees, in the ascent to God, which
is the mind’s true itinerarium. Since we cannot by ourselves lift ourselves
above ourselves, prayer is the very mother and source of our upward
struggle. Prayer opens our eyes to the steps in the ascent. Placed in the
universe of things, we find in it the corporeal and temporal footprint
(vestigium) leading into the way of God. Then we enter our mind, which is
the everlasting and spiritual image of God; and this is to enter the truth of
God. Whereupon we should rise above us to the eternal most spiritual first
cause; and this is to rejoice in the knowledge of God’s majesty. This is the
threefold illumination, by which we recognise the triple existence of things,
in matter, in the intelligence, and in the divine way—in arte divina. And
likewise our mind has three outlooks, one upon the corporeal world
without, which is called sense, another into and within itself, which is called
spiritus, and a third above itself, which is called mens. By means of all
three, man should set himself to rising toward God, and love Him with the
whole mind, and heart, and soul.
Then Bonaventura makes further analysis of his triple illumination into
“six degrees or powers of the soul, to wit, sense, imagination, reason,
intellect, intelligence, and apex mentis seu synteresis scintilla. These
degrees are planted within us by nature, deformed through fault,
reformed through grace, purged through righteousness, exercised

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through knowledge, perfected through wisdom.... Whoever wishes to
ascend to God should shun the sins which deform nature, and stretch
forth his natural powers, in prayer, toward reforming grace, in mode of
life, toward purifying righteousness, in meditation, toward illuminating
knowledge, in contemplation toward the wisdom which makes perfect.
For as no one reaches wisdom except through grace, righteousness, and
knowledge, so no one reaches contemplation, except through
meditation, a holy life, and devout prayer.”
Chapter one closes with little that is novel; for we seem to be retracing the
thoughts of Hugo of St. Victor. The second chapter is on the
“Contemplation of God in His Footprints in the Sensible World.” This is the
next grade of speculation, because we shall now contemplate God not only
through His footprints, but in them also, so far as He is in them through
essence, power, or presence. The sensible world, the macrocosmus, enters
the microcosmus, which is the anima, through the gates of the five senses.
The author sketches the processes of sense-perception, through which outer
facts are apprehended according to their species, and delighted in if
pleasing, and then adjudged according to the ratio of their delightfulness, to
wit, their beauty, sweetness, salubrity, and proportion. Such are the
footprints in which we may contemplate our God. All things knowable
possess the quality of generating their species in our minds, through the
medium of our perceptions; and thus we are led to contemplate the eternal
generation of the Word—image and Son—from the Father. Likewise
sweetness and beauty point on to their fontal source. And from speculation
on the local, the temporal, and mutable, our reason carries us to the thought
of the immutable, the uncircumscribed and eternal. Then from the beauty
and delightfulness of things, we pass to the thought of number and
proportion, and judge of their irrefragable laws, wherein are God’s wisdom
and power.
“The creatures of this sensible world signify the invisible things of God;
in part because God is the source and exemplar and end of every
creature; in part through their proper likeness; in part from their
prophetic prefiguring; in part from angelic operations; and in part
through superadded ordainment. For every creature by nature is an
effigy of the eternal wisdom; especially whatever creature in Scripture
is taken by the spirit of prophecy as a type of the spiritual; but more

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especially those creatures in the likeness of which God willed to appear
by an angelic minister; and most especially that creature which he chose
to mark as a sacrament.”
From these first grades of speculation, which contemplate the footprints of
God in the world, we are led to contemplate the divine image in the natural
powers of our minds. We find the image of the most blessed Trinity in our
memory, our rational intelligence, and our will; the joint action of which
leads on to the desire of the summum bonum. Next we contemplate the
divine image in our minds remade by the gifts of grace upon which we must
enter by the door of the faith, hope, and love of the Mediator of God and
men, Jesus Christ. As philosophy helped us to see the image of God in the
natural qualities of our mind, so Scripture now is needed to bring us to these
three theological virtues (faith, hope, and love), which enable the mind of
fallen man to be repaired and made anew through grace.
From this fourth grade, in which God is still contemplated in his image, we
rise to consider God as pure being, wherein there is neither privation, nor
bound, nor particularity; and next in his goodness, the highest
communicability (summam communicabilitatem) of which may be
contemplated, but not comprehended, in the mystery of the most blessed
Trinity. “In whom [the persons of the Trinity] it is necessary because of the
summa bonitas that there should be the summa communicabilitas, and
because of the latter, the summa consubstantialitas, and because of this the
summa configurabilitas, and from these the summa coaequalitas, and
through this the summa coaeternitas, and from all the preceding the summa
cointimitas, by which each is in the other, and one works with the other
through every conceivable indivisibility (indivisionem) of the substance,
virtue, and operation of the same most blessed Trinity....” “And when thou
contemplatest this,” adds Bonaventura, “do not think to comprehend the
incomprehensible.”
From age to age the religious soul finds traces of its God in nature and in its
inmost self. Its ways of finding change, varying with the prevailing currents
of knowledge; yet still it ever finds these vestigia, which represent the
widest deductions of its reasoning, the ultimate resultants of its thought, and
its own brooding peace. Therefore may we not follow sympathetically the
Itinerarium of Bonaventura’s mind as it traces the footprints of its God?

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Thus far the way has advanced by reason, uplifted by grace, and yet still
reason. This reason has comprehended what it might comprehend of the
traces and evidences of God in the visible creation and the soul of man; it
has sought to apprehend the being of God, but has humbly recognized its
inability to penetrate the marvels of his goodness in the mystery of the most
blessed Trinity. There it stops at the sixth grade of contemplation; yet not
baffled, or rendered vain, for it has performed its function and brought the
soul on to where she may fling forth from reason’s steeps, and find herself
again, buoyant and blissful, in a medium of super-rational contemplation.
This makes the last chapter of the mind’s Itinerarium; it is the apex mentis,
the summit of all contemplations in which the mind has rest. Henceforth
“Christ is the way and door, the ladder and the vehicle, as the
propitiation placed on the Ark of God, and the sacrament hidden from
the world. He who looks on this propitiation, with his look full fixed on
him who hangs upon the cross, through faith, hope, and charity, and all
devotion, he makes his Passover, and through the rod of the cross shall
pass through the Red Sea, out of Egypt entering the desert, and there
taste the hidden manna, and rest with Christ in the tomb, dead to all
without; and shall realize, though as one still on the way, the word of
Christ to the believing thief: ‘To-day thou shalt be with me in Paradise.’
Which was also revealed to the blessed Francis when in ecstasy of
contemplation on the high mountain, the Seraph with six wings, nailed
on a cross, appeared to him. There, as we have heard from his
companion, he passed into God through ecstasy of contemplation, and
was set as an exemplar of perfect contemplation, whereby God should
invite all truly spiritual men to this transit and ecstasy, by example
rather than by word. In this passing over, if it be perfect, all the ways of
reason are relinquished, and the apex affectus is transferred and
transformed into God. This is the mystic secret known by no one who
does not receive it, and received by none who does not desire it, and
desired only by him whose heart’s core is aflame from the fire of the
Holy Spirit, whom Christ sent on earth.... Since then nature avails
nothing here, and diligence but little, we should give ourselves less to
investigation and more to unction; little should be given to speech, and
most to inner gladness; little to the written word, and all to God’s gift

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the Holy Spirit; little or nothing is to be ascribed to the creature, and all
to the creative essence, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”
Here Bonaventura loses himself in an untranslatable extract from
Eriugena’s version of the Areopagite, and then proceeds:
“If thou askest how may these things be, interrogate grace and not
doctrine, desire and not knowledge, the groaning of prayer rather than
study, the Spouse rather than the teacher, God and not man, mist rather
than clarity, not light but fire all aflame and bearing on to God by
devotion and glowing affection. Which fire is God, and the man Christ
kindles it in the fervour of his passion, as only he perceives who says:
‘My soul chooseth strangling and my bones, death.’ He who loves this
death shall see God. Then let us die and pass into darkness, and silence
our solicitudes, our desires, and phantasies; let us pass over with Christ
crucified from this world to the Father; that the Father shown us, we
may say with Philip: ‘it sufficeth us.’ Let us hear with Paul: ‘My grace
is sufficient for thee.’ Let us exult with David, saying: ‘Defecit caro
mea et cor meum, Deus cordis mei et pars mea Deus in aeternum’.”[559]
It is best to leave the saint and doctor here, and not follow in other treatises
the current of his yearning thought till it divides in streamlets which press
on their tortuous ways through allegory and the adumbration of what the
mind disclaims the power to express directly. Those more elaborate treatises
of his, which are called mystic, are difficult for us to read. As with Hugo of
St. Victor, from whom he drew so largely, Bonaventura’s expression of his
religious yearnings may interest and move us; but one needs perhaps the
cloister’s quiet to follow on through the allegorical elaboration of this
pietism. Bonaventura’s Soliloquium might weary us after the Itinerarium,
and we should read his De septem itineribus aeternitatis with no more
pleasure than Hugo’s Mystic Ark of Noah. It is enough to witness the
spiritual attitude of these men without tracking them through the “selva
oscura” to their lairs of meditation.

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CHAPTER XXXIX

ALBERTUS MAGNUS
Albert the Great was prodigious in the mass of his accomplishment. Therein
lay his importance for the age he lived in; therein lies his interest for us. For
him, substantial philosophy, as distinguished from the instrumental rôle of
logic, had three parts, set by nature, rather than devised by man; they are
physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. “It is our intention,” says Albert at
the beginning of his exposition of Aristotle’s Physics, “to make all the said
parts intelligible to the Latins.” And he did. Perhaps the world has had no
greater purveyor of a knowledge not his own. He is comparable with
Boëthius, who gave the Latin world the Aristotelian Organon, a gift but half
availed of for many centuries. Albert gave his Latin world the rest of
Aristotle, the philosophia realis. His world was as ready to receive this
great donation, as the time of Boëthius was unready to profit by any
intellectual gift demanding mental energies for its assimilation. Boëthius
stood alone in his undertaking; if his hand failed there was none to take up
his task. Fate stayed his hand; and the purpose that was his, to render the
whole of Plato and Aristotle intelligible to the Latin world, perished with
him, the Latin world being by no means eager for the whole of Aristotle and
Plato, and unfit to receive it had it been proffered. But Albert’s time was
eager; it was importunate for the very enlargement of knowledge which
Albert, more than any other man, was bringing it. An age obtains what it
demands. Albert had fellow-labourers, some preceding, some assisting, and
others following him, to perfect the knowledge in which he worked, and
build it into the scholastic Christian scheme. But in this labour of
purveyorship he overtopped the rest, the giant of them all.
He was born Count of Bollstadt, in Suabia, probably in the year 1193.
Whether his youth was passed in the profession of arms, or in study, is not
quite clear. But while still young he began his years of studious travel, and
at Padua in 1223 he joined the Dominican Order. He became a miracle of
learning, reputed also as one who could explain the phenomena of nature.
From 1228 to 1245 he taught in German cities, chiefly at Cologne. Then the
scene changed to Paris, where he lectured and won fame from 1245 to
1248. With this period begins the publication of his philosophical

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encyclopaedia. Perhaps it was first completed in 1256. But Albert kept
supplementing and revising it until his death. In 1248 he was remanded to
Cologne to establish a school there. His life continued devoted to study and
teaching, yet with interruptions. For he filled the office of Provincial of his
Order for Germany from 1254 to 1257, and was compelled to be Bishop of
Regensburg from 1260 to 1262. Then he insisted on resigning, and retired
to a cloister at Cologne. Naturally he was engaged in a number of learned
controversies, and was burdened with numerous ecclesiastical affairs. In
1277 for the last time he set his face toward Paris, to defend the doctrines
and memory of his great pupil, who had died three years before. His own
illustrious life closed at Cologne on the fifteenth of November, 1280. Albert
was a man of piety, conforming strictly to the rules of his Order. It is said
that he refused to own even the manuscripts which he indited; and as
Dominican Provincial of Germany he walked barefoot on his journeys
through the vast territory set under his supervision. Tradition has him
exceeding small of stature.
Albert’s labours finally put within reach of his contemporaries the sum of
philosophy and science contained in the works of Aristotle, and his ancient,
as well as Arabian, commentators. The undertaking was grandly conceived;
it was carried out with tireless energy and massive learning. Let us observe
the principles which informed the mind of this mighty Teuton scholar. He
transcribed approvingly the opinion expressed by Aristotle at the opening of
the Metaphysics, that the love of knowledge is natural to man; and he
recognized the pleasure arising from knowledge of the sensible world, apart
from considerations of utility.[560] He took this thought from Aristotle; but
the proof that he made it his own with power lay in those fifty years of
intellectual toil which produced the greatest of all mediaeval storehouses of
knowledge.
In his reliance on his sources, Albert is mediaeval; his tendency is to accept
the opinion which he is reproducing, especially when it is the opinion of
Aristotle. Yet he protested against regarding even him as infallible. “He
who believes that Aristotle was God, ought to believe that he never erred. If
one regards him as a man, then surely he may err as well as we.”[561] Albert
was no Averroist to adhere to all the views of the Philosopher; he pointedly
differed from him where orthodoxy demanded it, maintaining, for instance,
the creation of the world in time, contrary to the opinion of the Peripatetics.

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Albert, and with him Aquinas, had not accepted merely the task of
expounding Aristotle, but also that of correcting him where Truth (with a
large Christian capital) required it. Albert held that Aristotle might err, and
that he did not know everything. The development of science was not
closed by his death: “Dicendum quod scientiae demonstrativae non omnes
factae sunt, sed plures restant adhuc inveniendae.”[562] This is not Roger
Bacon speaking, but Albertus; and still more might one think to hear the
voice of the recalcitrant Franciscan in the words: “Oportet experimentum
non in uno modo, sed secundum omnes circumstantias probare.”[563] Yet
these words too are Albert’s, and he is speaking of the observation of
nature’s phenomena; regarding which one shall not simply transcribe the
ancient statement; but observe with his own eyes and mind.
This was in the spirit of Aristotle; Albert recognizes and approves. But did
he make the experimental principle his own with power, as he did the
thought that the desire to know is inborn? This is a fundamental question as
to Albert. No one denies his learning, his enormous book-diligence. But
was he also an observer of natural phenomena? One who sought to test
from his own observation the statements of the books he read? It is best
here to avoid either a categorical affirmation or denial. The standard by
which one shapes one’s answer is important. Are we to compare Albert with
a St. Bernard, whose meditations shut his eyes to mountains, lakes, and
woods? Or are we to apply the standards of a natural science which looks
always to the tested results of observation? There is sufficient evidence in
Albert’s writings to show that he kept his eyes open, and took notice of
interesting phenomena, seen, for instance, on his journeys. But, on the other
hand, it is absurd to imagine that he dreamed of testing the written matter
which he paraphrased, or of materially adding to it, by systematic
observation of nature. Accounts of his observations do not always raise our
opinion of his science. He transcribes the description of certain worms, and
says that they may come from horse-hairs, for he has seen horse-hairs, in
still water, turning into worms.[564] The trouble was that Albert had no
general understanding of the processes of nature. Consequently, in his De
animalibus for instance, he gives the fabulous as readily as the more
reasonable. Nevertheless let no one think that natural knowledge did not
really interest and delight him. His study of plants has led the chief
historian of botany to assert that Albert was the first real botanist, after the

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ancient Theophrastus, inasmuch as he studied for the sake of learning the
nature of plants, irrespective of their medical or agricultural uses.[565]
The writings of Albertus Magnus represent, perhaps more fully than those
of any other man, the round of knowledge and intellectual interest attracting
the attention of western Europe in the thirteenth century. At first glance they
seem to separate into those which in form and substance are paraphrases of
Aristotelian treatises, or borrowed expositions of Aristotelian topics; and
those which are more independent compositions. Yet the latter, like the
Summa de creaturis, for example, will be found to consist largely of
borrowed material; the matter is rearranged, and presented in some new
connection, or with a purpose other than that of its source.
In his Aristotelian paraphrases, which were thickly sown with digressive
expositions, Albert’s method, as he states at the beginning of the Physica, is
“to follow the order and opinions of Aristotle, and to give in addition
whatever is needed in the way of explanation and support; yet without
reproducing Aristotle’s text (tamen quod textus eius nulla fiat mentio). And
we shall also compose digressiones to expound whatever is obscure.” The
titles of the chapters will indicate whether their substance is from Aristotle.
Thus instead of giving the Aristotelian text, with an attached commentary,
Albert combines paraphrase and supplementary exposition. Evidently the
former method would have presented Aristotle’s meaning more surely, and
would have thus subserved a closer scholarship. But for this the Aristotelian
commentaries of Aquinas must be awaited.
The compass of Albert’s achievement as a purveyor of ancient knowledge
may be seen from a cursory survey of his writings; which will likewise
afford an idea of the quality of his work, and how much there was of Albert
in it.[566] To begin with, he sets forth with voluminous exposition the entire
Aristotelian Organon. The preliminary questions as to the nature of logic
were treated in the De praedicabilibus,[567] which expanded the substance
of Porphyry’s Isagoge. In this treatise Albert expounds his conclusions as to
universals, the universal being that which is in one yet is fit (aptum) to be in
many, and is predicable of many. “Et hoc modo prout ratio est
praedicabilitatis, ad logicam pertinet de universali tractare; quamvis
secundum quod est natura quaedam et differentia entis, tractare de ipso
pertineat ad metaphysicam.” That is to say, It pertains to logic to treat of the

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universal in respect to its predicability; but in so far as the question relates
to the nature and differences of essential being, it pertains to metaphysics.
This sentence is an example of Albert’s awkward Latin; but it shows how
firmly he distinguishes between the logical and the metaphysical material.
His treatment of logic is exhaustive, rather than acutely discriminating. He
works constantly with the material of others, and the result is more
inclusive than organic.[568] In his ponderous treatment of logical themes, no
possible consideration is omitted.
The De praedicabilibus is followed by the De praedicamentis, Albert’s
treatise on the Categories. Next comes his Liber de sex principiis, which is
a paraphrasing exposition of the work of Gilbert de la Porrée. Then comes
his Perihermenias, which keeps the Greek title of the De interpretatione.
These writings are succeeded by elaborate expositions of the more
advanced logical treatises of Aristotle, all of them, of course, Analytics
(Prior and Posterior), Topics, and Elenchi. The total production is detailed,
exhaustive, awful; it is ingens truly, only not quite informis; and
Teutonically painstaking and conscientious.
Thus logic makes Tome I. of the twenty-one tomes of Albert’s Opera. Tome
II. contains his expository paraphrases of Aristotle’s Physics and lesser
treatises upon physical topics, celestial and terrestrial. From the opening
chapter we have already taken the programme of his large intention to make
known all Aristotle to the Latins. In this chapter likewise he proceeds to lay
out the divisions of philosophia realis into Aristotelian conceptions of
metaphysica, mathematica, and physica. With chapter two he falls into the
first of his interminable digressions, taking up what were called “the
objections of Heracleitus” to any science of physics. Another digressive
chapter considers the proper subject of physical science, to wit, corpus
mobile, and another considers its divisions. After a while he takes up the
opinions of the ancients upon the beginnings (principia) of things, and then
reasons out the true opinion in the matter. Liber II. of his Physica is devoted
to Natura, considered in many ways, but chiefly as the principium
intrinsecum omnium eorum quae naturalia sunt. It is the principle of
motion in the mobile substance. Next he passes to a discussion of causes;
and in the succeeding books he considers movement, place, time, and
eternity. Albert’s paraphrase is replete with logical forms of thinking; it
seems like formal logic applied in physical science. The world about us still

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furnishes, or is, data for our thoughts; and we try to conceive it consistently,
so as to satisfy our thinking; so did Aristotle and Albertus. But they
avowedly worked out their conceptions of the external world according to
the laws determining the consistency of their own mental processes; and
deemed this a proper way of approach to natural science. Yet the work of
Aristotle represents a real consideration of the universe, and a tremendous
mass of natural knowledge. The achievement of Albertus in rendering it
available to the scholar-world of the thirteenth century was an extension of
knowledge which seems the more prodigious as we note its enormous
range. This continues to impress us as we turn over Albert’s next treatises,
paraphrasing those of Aristotle, as their names indicate: De coelo et mundo;
De generatione et corruptione; Libri IV. meteorum; De mineralibus, which
ends Tome II. and the physical treatises proper.
Tome III. introduces us to another region, opening with Albert’s exhaustive
paraphrase, De anima. It is placed here because the scientia de anima is a
part of naturalis scientia, and comes after minerals and other topics of
physics, but precedes the science of animate bodies—corporum
animatorum; for the last cannot be known except through knowing their
animae. In this, as well as in other works of Albert, psychological material
is gathered from many sources. One may hardly speak of the psychology of
Albertus Magnus, since his matter has no organic unity. It is largely
Aristotelian, with the thoughts of Arab commentators taken into it, as in
Albert’s Aristotelian paraphrases generally. But it is also Augustinian, and
Platonic and Neo-Platonic. Albert is capable of defending opposite views in
the same treatise; and in spite of best intentions, he does not succeed in
harmonizing what he draws from Aristotle, with what he takes from
Augustine. Hence his works nowhere present a system of psychology which
might be called Albert’s, either through creation or consistent selection. But
at least he has gathered, and bestowed somewhere, all the accessible
material.[569]
Tome III. of Albert’s Opera contains also his Aristotelian paraphrase,
Metaphysicorum libri XIII. In this vera sapientia philosophiae, he follows
Aristotle closely, save where orthodoxy compels deviation.[570] Tome IV.
contains his paraphrasing expositions, Ethica and In octo libros politicorum
Aristotelis commentarii. Tome V. contains paraphrases of Aristotle’s minor
natural treatises,—parva naturalia; to wit, the Liber de sensu et sensato,

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treating problems of sense-perception; next the Liber de memoria et
reminiscentia, in which the two are thus distinguished: “Memoria motus
continuus est in rem, et uniformis. Reminiscibilitas autem est motus quasi
interceptus et abscissus per oblivionem.” Treatises follow: De somno et
vigilia; De motibus animalium; De aetate, sive de juventute et senectute; De
spiritu et respiratione; De morte et vita; De nutrimento et nutribile; De
natura et origine animae; De unitate intellectus contra Averroem (a
controversial tract); De intellectu et intelligibile (an important
psychological writing); De natura locorum; De causis proprietatum
elementorum; De passionibus aeris, sive de vaporum impressionibus; and
next and last, saving some minor tracts, Albert’s chief botanical work, De
vegetabilibus.
Aristotle’s Botany was lost, and Albert’s work was based on the De plantis
of Nicolas of Damascus, a short compend vulgarly ascribed to Aristotle, but
really made in the first century, and passing through numerous translations
from one language to another, before Albert accepted it as the composition
of the Stagirite. It consisted of two short books; Albert’s work contained
seven long ones, and made the most important work on botany since the
times of Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus. In opening, Albert says that
generalities applicable to all animate things have been already presented,
and now it is time to consider more especially and in turn, vegetabilia,
sensibilia, rationabilia. In the first eight chapters of his first book, Albert
follows his supposed Aristotelian source, and then remarks that the
translation of the Philosopher’s treatise is so ignorantly made that he will
himself take up in order the six problems thus far incompetently discussed.
So he considers whether plants have souls; whether plant-souls feel and
desire; whether plants sleep; as to sex in plants; whether without sex they
can propagate their species; and as to their hidden life.
In the second book, having again bewailed the insufficiency of his source,
Albert takes up the classification of plants, and proceeds with a description
of their various parts, then passes on to the shape of leaves, the generation
and nature of flowers, their colour, odour, and shape. Liber III., still as an
independent digressio, discusses seeds and fruit. In Liber IV. Albert returns
to his unhappy source, and his matter declines in interest; but again, in
Liber V., he frees himself in a digressio on the properties and effects of
plants, gathered from many sources, some of which are foolish enough. His

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sixth book is a description of trees and other plants in alphabetical order.
The last and seventh is devoted to agriculture.[571]
In the De vegetabilibus, Albert, as an expounder of natural knowledge, is at
his best. A less independent and intelligent production is his enormous
treatise De animalibus libri XXVI., which fills the whole of Tome IV. of
Albert’s Opera. A certain Thomas of Cantimpré, an admiring pupil of
Albert, may have anticipated the above-named work of his teacher by his
own compilation, De naturis rerum, which appears to have been composed
shortly before the middle of the thirteenth century. Its descriptions of
animals, although borrowed and uncritical, were at least intended to
describe them actually, and were not merely fashioned for the moral’s sake,
after the manner of the Physiologus,[572] and many a compilation of the
early Middle Ages. Yet the work contains moralities enough, and plenty of
the fabulous. But Thomas diligently gathered information as he might, and
from Aristotle more than any other. Thus, in his lesser way, he, as well as
Albert, represents the tendency of the period to interest itself in the realities,
as well as in the symbolisms, of the natural world.
Albert’s work is not such an inorganic compilation as Thomas’s. He has
paraphrased the ten books of Aristotle’s natural histories, his four books on
the parts of animals, and his five books on their generation. To these
nineteen, he has added seven books on the nature of animal bodies and on
their grades of perfection; and then on quadrupeds, birds, aquatic animals,
snakes, and small bloodless creatures. Besides Aristotle, he draws on
Avicenna, Galen, Ambrose (!), and others, including Thomas of Cantimpré.
Thus, his work is made up mainly of the ancient written material. Moreover,
Albert is kept from a natural view of his subject through the need he feels to
measure animals by the standards of human capacity, and learn to know
them through knowing man. His digressiones usually discuss abstract
problems, as, for instance, whether beyond the four elements, any fifth
principle enters the composition of animal bodies. As for his anatomy, he
describes the muscles, and calls the veins nerves, having no real knowledge
of the latter. He corrects few ancient errors, either anatomical or
physiological; and his own observations, occasionally referred to in his
work, scarcely win our respect. Nor does he exclude fabulous stories, or the
current superstitions as to the medicinal or magical effect of parts of certain
animals. On the whole, Albert’s merit in the province of Zoology lies in his

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introduction of the Aristotelian data and conceptions to the mediaeval Latin
West.[573]
After Tome IV. of Albert’s Opera, follow many portly tomes, the contents
of which need not detain us. There are enormous commentaries on the
Psalms and Prophets, and the Gospels (Tomes VII.-XI.); then a tome of
sermons, then a tome of commentaries on the Hierarchies of Pseudo-
Dionysius; and three tomes of commentaries on the Lombard’s Sentences,
—commentaries, that is to say, upon works which stood close to Scripture
in authority. With these we reach the end of Albert’s labours in paraphrase
and commentary, and pass to his more constructive work. Of course, the
first and chief is his Summa theologiae, contained in Tomes XVII. and
XVIII. of the Opera. With Albert, theology is a science, a branch of
systematic knowledge, the highest indeed, and yet one among others. This
science, says he in the Prologue to his Summa,

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“... is of all sciences the most entitled to credence—certissimae
credulitatis et fidei. Other sciences, concerning creatures, possess
rationes immobiles, yet those rationes are mobiles because they are in
created things. But this science founded in rationibus aeternis is
immutable both secundum esse and secundum rationem. And since it is
not constituted of the sensible and imaginable, which are not quite
cleared of the hangings of matter, plainly it, alone or supremely, is
science: for the divine intellect is altogether intellectual, being the light
and cause of everything intelligible; and from it to us is the divine
science.”
Albert’s dialectic is turgid enough, and lacks the lucidity of his pupil. Yet
his reasoning may be weighty and even convincing. Intellect, Reason and
its realm of that which is known through Reason, is higher than sense
perceptions and imaginations springing from them: it affords the surest
knowledge; the science that treats of pure reason, which is in God, is the
surest and noblest of sciences. Albert clearly defines the province and
nature of theology.
“It is scientia secundum pietatem; it is not concerned with the knowable
(scibile) simply as such, nor with the knowable universally; but only as
it inclines us to Piety. Piety, as Augustine says, is the worship of God,
perfected by faith, hope, charity, prayer, and sacrifices. Thus theology is
the science of what pertains to salvation; for piety conduces to
salvation.”[574]
The Summa theologiae treats of the encyclopaedic matter of the sacred
science, in the order and arrangement with which we are familiar.[575] It is
followed (Tome XIX.) by Albert’s Summa de creaturis, a presentation of
God’s creation, omitting the special topics set forth in the De vegetabilibus
and De animalibus. It treats of creation, of matter, of time and eternity, of
the heavens and celestial bodies, of angels, their qualities and functions, and
the hierarchies of them; of the state of the wicked angels, of the works of
the six days, briefly; and then of man, soul and body, very fully; of man’s
habitation and the order and perfection of the universe. Thus the Summa de
creaturis treats of the world and man as God’s creation; but it is not directly

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concerned with man’s salvation, which is the distinguishing purpose of a
Summa theologiae, however encyclopaedic such a work may be.
Two tomes remain of Albert’s opera, containing much that is very different
from anything already considered. Tome XX. is devoted to the Virgin Mary,
and is chiefly made up of two prodigious tracts: De laudibus beatae Mariae
Virginis libri XII., and the Mariale, sive quaestiones super evangelium,
Missus est angelus Gabriel. These works—it is disputed whether Albert
was their author—are a glorification, indeed a deification, of Mary. They
are prodigious; they are astounding. The worship of Mary is gathered up in
them, of Mary the chief and best beloved religious creation of the Middle
Ages; only not a creation, strictly speaking, for the Divine Virgin, equipped
with attribute and quality, sprang from the fecund matrix of the early
Church. The works before us represent a simpler piety than Albert’s Summa
theologiae. They contain satisfying, consoling statements, not woven of
dialectic. And the end is all that the Mary-loving soul could wish. “Christ
protects the servants of His genetrix:—and so does Mary, as may be read in
her miracles, protect us from our bodily enemies, and from the seducers of
souls.”[576] The praises of Mary will seem marvellous indeed to anyone
turning over the tituli of books and chapters. There is here a whole
mythology, and a universal symbolism. Symbolically, Mary is everything
imaginable; she has every virtue and a mass of power and privileges. She is
the adorable and chief efficient Goddess mediating between the Trinity and
the creature man.
Tome XXI., last tome of all, has a variety of writings, some of which may
not be Albert’s. Among them is a work of sweet and simple piety, a work of
turning to God as a little child; and one would be loath to take it away from
this man of learning. De adhaerendo Deo is its title, which tells the story.
Albert wished at last to write something presenting man’s ultimate
perfection, so far as that might be realized in this life. So he writes this little
tract of chamber-piety, as to how one should cling to Christ alone. Yet he
cannot disencumber himself of his lifelong methods of composition. He
might conceive and desire; but it was not for him to write a tract to move
the heart. The best he can say is that the end of all our study and discipline
is intendere et quiescere in Domino Deo intra te per purissimum
intellectum, et devotissimum affectum sine phantasmatibus et

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implicationibus. The great scholar would come home at last, like a little
child, if he only could.

CHAPTER XL

THOMAS AQUINAS

I. Thomas’s Conception of Human Beatitude.
II. Man’s Capacity to know God.
III. How God knows.
IV. How the Angels know.
V. How Men know.
VI. Knowledge through Faith perfected in Love.

I
With Albert it seemed most illuminating to outline the masses of his work
of Aristotelian purveyorship and inchoate reconstruction of the Christian
encyclopaedia in conformity with the new philosophy. Such a treatment will
not avail for Thomas. His achievement, even measured by its bulk, was as
great as Albert’s. But its size and encyclopaedic inclusiveness do not
represent its integral excellences. The intellectual qualities of Thomas,
evinced in his work, are of a higher order than those included in intelligent
diligence, however exceptional. They must be disengaged from out of the
vast product of their energies, in order that they may be brought together,
and made to appear in the organic correlation which they held in the mind
of the most potent genius of scholasticism.

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We are pleased to find some clue to a man’s genius in the race and place
from which he draws his origin. So for whatever may be its explanatory
value as to Thomas, one may note that he came of Teutonic stocks, which
for some generations had been domiciled in the form-giving Italian land.
The mingled blood of princely Suabian and Norman lines flowed in him;
the nobility of his father’s house, the Counts of Aquinum, was equalled by
his mother’s lineage. Probably in 1225 he was born, in Southern Italy, not
far from Monte Cassino. Thither, as a child, he was sent to school to the
monks, and stayed with them through childhood’s formative period. His
education did not create the mind which it may have had part in directing to
sacred study. Near his tenth year, the extraordinary boy was returned to
Naples, there to study the humanities and philosophy under selected
masters. When eighteen, he launched himself upon the intellectual currents
of the age by joining the Dominican Order. Stories have come down of the
violent, but fruitless opposition of his family. In two years, with true
instinct, Thomas had made his way from Naples to the feet of Albert in
Cologne. Thenceforth the two were to be together, as their tasks permitted,
and the loyal relationship between master and scholar was undisturbed by
the latter’s transcendent genius. Plato had the greatest pupil, and Aristotle
the greatest master, known to fame. That pupil’s work was a redirecting of
philosophy. The work of pupil Thomas perfected finally the matter upon
which his master laboured; and the master’s aged eyes beheld the finished
structure that was partly his, when the pupil’s eyes had closed. Thomas,
dying, left Albert to defend the system that was to be called “Thomist,”
after him who constructed and finished it to its very turret points, rather
than “Albertist,” after him who prepared the materials.
To return to the time when both still laboured. Thomas in 1245
accompanied his master to Paris, and three years later went back with him
to Cologne. Thereafter their duties often separated them. We know that in
1252 Thomas was lecturing at Paris, and that he there received with
Bonaventura the title of magister in 1257. After this he is found south of the
Alps; it was in the year 1263 that Urban IV. at Rome encouraged him to
undertake a critical commentary upon Aristotle, based on a closer rendering
into Latin of the Greek. In 1268, at the height of his academic fame, he is
once more at Paris; which he leaves for the last time in 1272, having been

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directed to establish a studium generale at Naples. Two years later he died,
on his way to advise the labours of the Council assembled at Lyons.[577]
Thomas wrote commentaries upon the Aristotelian De interpretatione and
Posterior Analytics; the Physics, the De coelo et mundo, the Meteorum, the
Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and certain other Aristotelian treatises. His
work shows such a close understanding of Aristotle as the world had not
known since the days of the ancient Peripatetics. Of course, he lectured on
the Sentences, and the result remains in his Commentaries on them. He
lectured, and the resulting Commentaries exist in many tomes, on the
greater part of both the Old and New Testaments. It would little help our
purpose to catalogue in detail his more constructive and original works,
wherein he perfected a system of philosophy and sacred knowledge. Chief
among them were the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologiae,
the latter the most influential work of all western mediaeval scholasticism.
Many of his more important shorter treatises are included in the
Quaestiones disputatae, and the Quodlibetalia. They treat of many matters
finally put together in the Summa theologiae. De malo in communi, de
peccatis, etc.; De anima; De virtutibus in communi, etc.; De veritate; De
ideis; De cognitione angelorum; De bono; De voluntate; De libero arbitrio;
De passionibus animae; De gratia;—such are titles drawn from the
Quaestiones. The Quodlibetalia were academic disputations held in the
theological faculty, upon any imaginable thesis having theological bearing.
Some of them still appear philosophical, while many seem bizarre to us; for
example: Whether an angel can move from one extreme to the other without
passing through the middle. One may remember that such questions had
been put, and put again, from the time of the Church Fathers. This question
answered by Thomas whether an angel may pass from one extreme to the
other without traversing the middle is pertinent to the conception of angels
as completely immaterial beings,—a conception upon the elaboration of
which theologians expended much ingenious thought.
In the earlier Middle Ages, when men were busy putting together the
ancient matter, the personalities of the writers may not clearly appear. It is
different in the twelfth century, and very different in the thirteenth, when
the figures of at least its greater men are thrown out plainly by their written
works. Bonaventura is seen lucidly reasoning, but with his ardently
envisioning piety ever reaching out beyond; the personality of Albert most

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Teutonically wrestles itself into salience through the many-tomed results of
his very visible efforts; when we come to Roger Bacon, we shall find
wormwood, and many higher qualities of mind, flowing in his sentences.
And the consummate fashioning faculty, the devout and intellectual
temperament of Thomas, are writ large in his treatises. His work has unity;
it is a system; it corresponds to the scholastically creative personality, from
the efficient concord of whose faculties it proceeded. The unity of Thomas’s
personality lay in his conception of man’s summum bonum, which sprang
from his Christian faith, but was constructed by reason from foundation to
pinnacle; and it is evinced in the compulsion of an intellectual temperament
that never let the pious reasoner’s energies or appetitions stray loitering or
aberrant from that goal. Likewise the unity of his system consists in its
purpose, which is to present that same summum bonum, credited by faith,
empowered, if not empassioned, by piety, and constructed by reason. To
fulfil this purpose in its utmost compass, reason works with the material of
all pertinent knowledge; fashioning the same to complete logical
consistency of expression.
Therefore, it is from his conception of this summum bonum as from a centre
of illumination, that we may trace the characteristic qualities alike of
Thomas and his work. His faith, his piety, and his intellectual nature are
revealed in his thought of supreme felicity. Man’s chief good being the
ground of the system, the thought and study which Thomas puts upon the
created universe and upon God, regarded both as Creator and in the
relationships of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, conduce to make large and
sure and ample this same chief good of man. To it likewise conduce the
Incarnation, and the Sacraments springing therefrom; in accord with it,
Thomas accepts or constructs his metaphysics, his psychology, his entire
thought of human capacity and destiny, and sets forth how nearly man’s
reason may bring him to this goal, and where there is need of divine grace.
In this goal, moreover, shall be found the sanction of human knowledge,
and the justification of the right enjoyment of human faculties; it determines
what elements of mortal life may be gathered up and carried on, to form
part of the soul’s eternal beatitude.
Thomas’s intellectual powers work together in order to set his thought of
man’s summum bonum on its surest foundations, and make clear its scope:
his faculty of arrangement, and serious and lucid presentation; his careful

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reasoning, which never trips, never overlooks, and never either hurries or is
taken unprepared; his marvellous unforgetfulness of everything which
might remotely bear on the subject; his intellectual poise, and his just
weighing of every matter that should be taken into the scales of his
determination. Observing these, we may realize how he seemed to his time
a new intellectual manifestation of God’s illuminating grace. There was in
him something unknown before; his argument, his exposition, was new in
power, in interest, in lucidity. On the quality of newness the wretched old
biographer rings his reiteration:
“For in his lectures he put out new topics (articulos), inventing a new
and clear way of drawing conclusions and bringing new reasons into
them, so that no one, who had heard him teach new doubts and allay
them by new arguments, would have doubted that God had illumined
with rays of new light one who became straightway of such sure
judgment, that he did not hesitate to teach and write new opinions,
which God had deigned newly to inspire.”[578]
His biographer’s view is justified. Thomas was the greatest of the
schoolmen. His way of teaching, his translucent exposition, came to his
hearers as a new inspiration. Only Bonaventura (likewise Italian-born) may
be compared with him for clearness of exposition—of solution indeed; and
Thomas is more judicial, more supremely intellectual; his way of treatment
was a stronger incitement and satisfaction to at least the minds of his
auditors. Albert, with his mass of but half-conquered material, could not fail
to show, whether he would or not, the doubt-breeding difficulties of the new
philosophy, which was yet to be worked into Christian theology. Thomas
exposed every difficulty and revealed its depths; but then he solved and
adjusted everything with an argumentation from whose careful
inclusiveness no questions strayed unshepherded. Placed with Thomas,
Albert shows as the Titan whose strength assembles the materials, while
Thomas is the god who erects the edifice. The material that Thomas works
with, and many of his thoughts and arguments, are to be found in Albert;
and the pupil knew his indebtedness to the great master, who survived him
to defend his doctrines. But what is not in Albert, is Thomas, Thomas
himself, with his disentangled reasoning, his clarity, his organic exposition,
his final construction of the mediaeval Christian scheme.[579]

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In the third book of his Summa philosophica contra Gentiles, and in the
beginning of Pars prima secundae of his Summa theologiae, Thomas
expounds man’s final end, ultimus finis, which is his supreme good or
perfect beatitude. The exposition in the former work, dating from the earlier
years of the author’s academic activities, seems the simpler at first reading;
but the other includes more surely Thomas’s last reasoning, placed in the
setting of argument and relationship which he gave it in his greatest work.
We shall follow the latter, borrowing, however, from the former when its
phrases seem to present the matter more aptly to our non-scholastic minds.
The general position of the topic is the same in both Summae; and Thomas
gives the reason in the Prologus to Pars prima secundae of the Summa
theologiae. His way of doing this is significant:
“Man is declared to be made in the image of God in this sense (as
Damascenus[580] says) that by ‘image’ is meant intellectual, free to
choose, and self-potent to act. Therefore, after what has been said of the
Exemplar God, and of those things which proceed from the divine
power according to its will, there remains for us to consider His image,
to wit, man, in so far as he is himself the source (principium) of his acts,
possessing free will and power over them.”
Thereupon Thomas continues, opening his first Quaestio:[581]
“First one must consider the final end (ultimus finis) of human life, and
then those things through which man may attain this end, or deviate
from it. For one must accept from an end the rationale of those things
which are ordained to that end.”
Assuming the final end of human life to be beatitude, Thomas considers
wherein man as a rational creature may properly have one final end, on
account of which he wills all that he wills. Quaestio ii. shows that man’s
beatitude cannot consist in riches, honours, fame, power, pleasures of the
body, or in any created good, not even in the soul. Man gains his beatitude
through the soul; but in itself the soul is not man’s final end. The next
Quaestio is devoted to the gist of the matter: what beatitude is, and what is
needed for it. Thomas first shows in what sense beatitude is something
increate (increatum). He has already pointed out that end (finis) has a

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twofold meaning: the thing itself which we desire to obtain, and the fruition
of it.
“In the first sense, the final end of man is an increate good, to wit God,
who alone with His infinite goodness can perfectly fulfil the wish
(voluntas) of man. In the second sense the final end of man is something
created existing in himself; which is nought else than attainment or
fruition (adeptio vel fruitio) of the final end. The final end is called
beatitude. If then man’s beatitude is viewed as cause or object, it is
something increate; but if it is considered in its beatific essence
(quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis) it is something created.”
Thomas next shows:
“... that inasmuch as man’s beatitude is something created existing in
himself, it is necessary to regard it as action (operatio). For beatitude is
man’s ultimate perfection. But everything is perfect in so far as it is
actually (actu, i.e. in realized actuality): for potentiality without
actuality is imperfect. Therefore beatitude should consist in man’s
ultimate actuality. But manifestly action (operatio) is the final actuality
of the actor (operantis); as the Philosopher shows, demonstrating that
everything exists for its action (propter suam operationem). Hence it
follows of necessity that man’s beatitude is action.”
The next point to consider is whether beatitude is the action of man’s senses
or his intellect. Drawing distinctions, Thomas points out that
“the action of sense cannot pertain to beatitude essentially; because
man’s beatitude essentially consists in uniting himself to the increate
good; to which he cannot be joined through the action of the senses. Yet
sense-action may pertain to beatitude as an antecedent or consequence:
as an antecedent, for the imperfect beatitude attainable in this life,
where the action of the senses is a prerequisite to the action of the mind;
as a consequence, in that perfect beatitude which is looked for in
heaven; because, after the resurrection, as Augustine says, from the very
beatitude of the soul, there may be a certain flowing back into the body
and its senses, perfecting them in their actions. But not even then will
the action by which the human mind is joined to God depend on sense.”

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Beatitude then is the action of man’s intellectual part; and Thomas next
inquires, whether it is an action of the intelligence or will (intellectus aut
voluntatis). With this inquiry we touch the pivot of Thomas’s attitude,
wherein he departs from Augustine, in apparent reliance on the word of
John: “This is eternal life that they should know thee, the one true God.”
Life eternal is man’s final end; and therefore man’s beatitude consists in
knowledge of God, which is an act of mind. Thomas argues this at some
length. He refers to the distinction between what is essential to the existence
of beatitude, and what is joined to it per accidens, like enjoyment
(delectatio).
“I say then, that beatitude in its essence cannot consist in an act of will.
For it has appeared that beatitude is the obtaining (consecutio) of the
final end. But obtaining does not consist in any act of will; for will
attaches to the absent when one desires it, as well as to the present in
which one rests delighted. It is evident that the desire for an end is not
an obtaining of it, but a movement toward it. Enjoyment attaches to will
from the presence of the end; but not conversely does anything become
present because the will shall delight in it. Therefore there must be
something besides an act of will, through which the end may become
present to the will. This is plain respecting the ends of sense (fines
sensibiles). For if to obtain money were an act of will, the miser would
have obtained it from the beginning. And so it comes to pass with
respect to an end conceived by the mind; we obtain it when it becomes
present to us through an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will
rests in the end obtained. Thus, therefore, the essence of beatitude
consists in an act of mind. But the delight which follows beatitude
pertains to will, even in the sense in which Augustine says: ‘beatitudo
est gaudium de veritate,’ because indeed joy is the consummation of
beatitude.”
The supremely intellectual attitude of the Angelic Doctor, shows at once,
and as it were universally, in his conviction of the primacy of the true over
the good, and of knowledge over will. Sometimes he argues these points
directly; and again, his temperamental attitude appears in the course of
argument upon other points. For example, Quaestio xvi. of Pars prima has
for its subject Veritas. And in the first article, which discusses whether truth
is in the thing (in re) or only in the mind, he argues thus:

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“As good signifies that upon which desire (appetitus) is bent, so true
signifies that at which understanding aims. There is this difference
between desire and understanding or any kind of cognition: cognition
exists in so far as what is known (cognitum) is in the knower; but desire
is as the desirous inclines toward the desired. Thus the end (terminus ==
finis) of desire, which is the good, is in the desirable thing; but the end
of knowing, which is the true, is in mind itself.”
In Articulus 4, Thomas comes to his point: that the true secundum rationem
(i.e. according to its formal nature) is prior to the good.
“Although both the good and the true have been taken as convertible
with being, yet they differ in their conception (ratione); and that the true
is prior to the good appears from two considerations: First, the true is
more closely related to being, which is prior to the good; for the true
regards being itself, simply and directly; while the ratio of the good
follows being as in some way perfect, and therefore desirable. Secondly,
cognition naturally precedes desire. Therefore, since the true regards
cognition, and the good regards desire, the true is prior to the good
secundum rationem.”
This argument, whatever validity it may have, is significant of its author’s
predominantly intellectual temperament, and consistent with his conception
of man’s supreme beatitude as the intellectual vision of God. Obviously,
moreover, the setting of the true above the good is another way of stating
the primacy of knowledge over will, which is also maintained: “Will and
understanding (intellectus) mutually include each other: for the
understanding knows the will; and the will wills that the understanding
should know.”[582] Evidently all rational beings have will as well as
understanding; God wills, the Angels will, man wills. Indeed, how could
knowledge progress but for the will to know? Yet of the two, considered in
themselves, understanding is higher than will—
“for its object is the ratio, the very essential nature, of the desired good,
while the object of will is the desired good whose ratio is in the
understanding.... Yet will may be the higher, if it is set upon something
higher than the understanding.... When the thing in which is the good is
nobler than the soul itself, in which is the rational cognizance (ratio

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intellecta), the will, through relation to that thing, is higher than the
understanding. But when the thing in which is the good, is lower than
the soul, then in relation to that thing, the understanding is higher than
the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the cognizance
(cognitio); but the cognizance of corporeal things is better than the love.
Yet taken absolutely, the understanding is higher than the will.”[583]
These positions of the Angelic Doctor were sharply opposed in his lifetime
and afterwards. Without entering the lists, let us rather follow him on his
evidently Aristotelian path, which quickly brings him to his next
conclusion: “That beatitude consists in the action of the speculative rather
than the practical intellect, as is evident from three arguments:
“First, if man’s beatitude is action, it ought to be the man’s best
(optima) action. But man’s best action is that of his best faculty in
respect to the best object. The best faculty is intelligence, whose best
object is the divine good, which is not an object of the practical, but of
the speculative intelligence. Wherefore, in such action, to wit, in
contemplation of things divine, beatitude chiefly consists. And because
every one seems to be that which is best in him, as is said in the Ethics,
so such action is most proper to man and most enjoyable.
“Secondly, the same conclusion appears from this, that contemplation
above all is sought on account of itself. The perfection (actus, full
realization) of the practical intelligence is not sought on account of
itself, but for the sake of action: the actions themselves are directed
toward some end. Hence it is evident that the final end cannot consist in
the vita activa, which belongs to the practical intelligence.
“Thirdly, it is plain from this, that in the vita contemplativa man has
part with those above him, to wit, God and the Angels, unto whom he is
made like through beatitude; but in those matters which belong to the
vita activa, other animals, however imperfectly, have somehow part
with him.
“And so the final and perfect beatitude which is looked for in the life to
come, in principle consists altogether in contemplation. But the
imperfect beatitude which may be had here, consists first and in
principle in contemplation, and secondly in the true operation of the

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practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as is said in the
tenth book of the Ethics.”
It being thus shown that perfect beatitude lies in the action of the
speculative intelligence, Thomas next shows that it cannot consist in
consideration of the speculative sciences—
“for the consideration of a science does not reach beyond the potency
(virtus) of the principles of that science, seeing that the whole science is
contained potentially (virtualiter) in its principles. But the principles of
speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher
makes clear. Therefore the entire consideration of the speculative
sciences cannot be extended beyond that to which a cognition of sense-
objects (sensibilium) is able to lead. Man’s final beatitude, which is his
perfection, cannot consist in the cognition of sense-objects. For no thing
is perfected by something inferior, except as there may be in the inferior
some participation in a superior. Evidently the nature (forma) of a stone,
or any other sensible thing, is inferior to man, save in so far as
something higher than the human intelligence has part in it, like the
light of reason.... But since there is in sensible forms some participation
in the similitude of spiritual substances, the consideration of the
speculative sciences is, in a certain way, participation in true and perfect
beatitude.”
Neither can perfect beatitude consist in knowledge of the higher, entirely
immaterial, or, as Thomas calls them, separate (separatae) substances, to
wit, the Angels. Because it cannot consist in that which is the perfection of
intelligence only from participation. The object of the intelligence is the
true. Whatever has truth only through participation in something else cannot
make the contemplating intelligence perfect with a final perfection. But the
angels have their being (esse) as they have their truth, from the participation
of the divine in them. Whence it remains that only the contemplation of
God, Who alone is truth through His essential being, can make perfectly
blessed. “But,” adds Thomas, “nothing precludes the expectation of some
imperfect beatitude from contemplating the angels, and even a higher
beatitude than lies in the consideration of the speculative sciences.”

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So the conclusion is that “the final and perfect beatitude can be only in the
vision of the divine essence. The proof of this lies in the consideration of
two matters: first, that man is not perfectly blessed (beatus) so long as there
remains anything for him to desire or seek; secondly, that the perfection of
every capacity (potentiae), is adjudged according to the nature (ratio) of its
object.” And a patent line of argument leads to the unavoidable conclusion:
“For perfect beatitude it is necessary that the intellect should attain to the
very essence of the first cause. And thus it will have its perfection through
union with God as its object.”
There are few novel thoughts in Thomas’s conception of man’s supreme
beatitude. But he has taken cognizance of all pertinent considerations, and
put the whole matter together with stable coherency. He continues,
discussing in the succeeding Quaestiones a number of important matters
incidental to his central determination of the nature of man’s supreme good.
Thus he shows how joy (delectatio) is a necessary accompaniment of
beatitude, which, however, in principle consists in the action of the mind,
which is visio, rather than in the resulting delectatio. The latter consists in a
quieting or satisfying of the will, through the goodness of that in which it is
satisfied. When the will is satisfied in any action, that results from the
goodness of the action; and the good lies in the action itself rather than in
the quieting of the will.[584] Here Thomas’s reasoning points to an active
ideal, an ideal of energizing, rather than repose. But he concludes that for
beatitude “there must be a concurrence of visio, which is the perfect
cognizance of the intelligible end; the getting it, which implies its presence;
and the joy or fruition, which implies the quieting of that which loves in
that which is loved.”[585] Thomas also shows how rectitude of will is
needed, and discusses whether a body is essential; his conclusion being that
a body is not required for the perfect beatitude of the life to come; yet he
gives the counter considerations, showing the conduciveness of the
perfected body to the soul’s beatitude even then. Next he follows Aristotle
in pointing out how material goods may be necessary for the attainment of
the imperfect beatitude possible on earth, while they are quite impertinent
to the perfect beatitude of seeing God; and likewise he shows how the
society of friends is needed here, but not essential hereafter, and yet a
concomitant to our supreme felicity.

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The course of argument of the Liber iii. of the Contra Gentiles is not
dissimilar. A number of preliminary chapters show how all things tend to an
end; that the end of all is God; and that to know God is the end of every
intellectual being. Next, that human felicitas does not consist in all those
matters, in which the Summa theologiae also shows that beatitude does not
lie; but that it consists in contemplation of God. He puts his argument
simply:
“It remains that the ultimate felicity of man lies in contemplation of
truth. For this is the sole action (operatio) of man which is proper to
man alone. This alone is directed to nothing else, as an end; since the
contemplation of truth is sought for its own sake. Through this action,
likewise, man is joined to higher substances (beings) through likeness
of action, and through knowing them in some way. For this action,
moreover, man is most sufficient by himself, needing but little external
aid. To this also all other human acts seem to be directed as to an end.
For to the perfection of contemplation, soundness of body is needed, to
which all the arts of living are directed. Also quiet from the disturbance
of passions is required, to which one comes through the moral virtues,
and prudence; and quiet also from tumults, to which end all rules of
civil life are ordained; and so, if rightly conceived, all human business
seems to serve the contemplation of truth. Nor is it possible for the final
felicity of man to consist in the contemplation which is confined to an
intelligence of beginnings (principiorum), which is most imperfect and
general (universalis), containing a knowledge of things potentially: it is
the beginning, not the end of human study. Nor can that felicity lie in
the contemplation of the sciences, which pertain to the lowest things,
since felicity ought to lie in the action of the intelligence in relationship
to the noblest intelligible verities. It remains that man’s final felicity
consists in the contemplation of wisdom pursuant to a consideration of
things divine. From which it also is evident by the way of induction,
what was before proved by arguments, that the final felicity of man
consists only in contemplation of God.”[586]
Having reached this central conclusion of the Contra Gentiles, as well as of
the Summa theologiae, Thomas proceeds to trim it further, so as clearly to
differentiate that knowledge of God in which lies the ultimate felicity of
intelligent beings from other ways of knowing God, which do not fully

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represent this supreme and final bliss. He first excludes the sort of common
and confused knowledge of God, which almost all men draw from
observing the natural order of things; then he shuts out the knowledge of
God derived from logical demonstration, through which, indeed, one rather
approaches a proper knowledge of Him;[587] next, he will not admit that
supreme felicity lies in the cognition of God through faith; since that is still
imperfect. This felicity consists in seeing[588] the divine essence, an
impossibility in this life, when we see as in a glass. The supreme felicity is
attainable only after death. Hereupon Thomas continues with the very
crucial discussion of the capacity of the rational creature to know God. But
instead of following him further in the Contra Gentiles, we will rather turn
to his final presentation of this question in his Summa theologiae.

II
The great Summa, having opened with an introductory consideration of the
character of sacra doctrina,[589] at once fixes its attention upon the
existence and attributes of God. These having been reviewed, Thomas
begins Quaestio xii. by saying, that “as we have now considered what God
is in His own nature (secundum se ipsum) it remains to consider what He is
in our cognition, that is, how He is known by creatures.” The first question
is whether any created intelligence whatsoever may be able to see God per
essentiam. Having stated the counter arguments, and relying on John’s “we
shall see Him as He is,” Thomas proceeds with his solution thus:
“Since everything may be knowable so far as it exists in actuality,[590]
God, who is pure actuality, without any mingling of potentiality, is in
Himself, most knowable. But what is most knowable in itself, is not
knowable to every intelligence because of the exceeding greatness of
that which is to be known (propter excessum intelligibilis supra
intellectum); as the sun, which is most visible, may not be seen by a bat,
because of the excess of light. Mindful of this, some have asserted that
no created intelligence could behold the essential nature (essentiam) of
God.
“But this is a solecism. For since man’s final beatitude consists in his
highest action, which is the action of the intelligence, if the created

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intelligence is never to be able to see the essential nature of God, either
it will never obtain beatitude, or its beatitude will consist in something
besides God: which is repugnant to the faith. For the ultimate perfection
of a rational creature lies in that which is the source or principle
(principium) of its being. Likewise the argument is against reason. For
there is in man a natural desire to know the cause, when he observes the
effect; and from this, wonder rises in men. If then the intelligence of the
rational creature is incapable of attaining to the first cause of things, an
inane desire must be ascribed to nature.
“Wherefore it is simply to be conceded that the blessed may see the
essential nature of God.”
So this general conclusion, or assumption, is based on faith, and also leaps,
as from the head of Jove, the creature of unconquerable human need, which
never will admit the inaneness of its yearnings. And now, assuming the
possibility of seeing God in his true nature, Thomas proves that He cannot
be seen thus through the similitude of any created thing: in order to behold
God’s essence some divine likeness must be imparted from the seeing
power (ex parte visivae potentiae), to wit, the light of divine glory (which is
consummated grace) strengthening the intelligence that it may see God.
And he next shows that it is impossible to see God by the sense of sight, or
any other sense or power of man’s sensible nature. For God is incorporeal.
Therefore He cannot be seen through the imagination, but only through the
intelligence. Nor can any created intelligence through its natural faculties
see the divine essence. “Cognition takes place in so far as the known is in
the knower. But the known is in the knower according to the mode and
capacity (modus) of the knower. Whence any knower’s knowledge is
according to the measure of his nature. If then the being of the thing to be
known exceeds the measure of the knowing nature, knowledge of it will be
beyond the nature of that knower.” In order to see God in His essential
nature, the created intellect needs light created by God: In lumine tuo
videbimus lumen. And it may be given to one created intellect to see more
perfectly than another.
Do those who see God per essentiam, comprehend Him? No.

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“To comprehend God is impossible for any created intelligence. To have
any true thought of God is a great beatitude.... Since the created light of
glory received by any created intelligence, cannot be infinite, it is
impossible that any created intelligence should know God infinitely, and
comprehend Him.”
Again he reasons; They who shall see God in His essence will see what they
see through the divine essence united to their intelligence; they will see
whatever they see at once, and not successively; for the contents of this
intellectual, God-granted vision are not apprehended by means of the
respective species or general images, but in and through the one divine
essence. But in this life, man may not see God in His essential nature:
“The mode of cognition conforms to the nature of the knower. But our
soul, so long as we live in this life, has its existence (esse) in corporeal
matter. Wherefore, by nature, it knows only things that have material
form, or may through such be known. Evidently the divine essence
cannot be known through the natures of material things. Any cognition
of God through any created likeness whatsoever, is not a vision of His
essence.... Our natural cognition draws its origin from sense; it may
extend itself so far as it can be conducted (manuduci) by things of sense
(sensibilia). But from them our intelligence may not attain to seeing the
divine essence.... Yet since sensible creatures are effects, dependant on a
cause, we know from them that God exists, and that as first cause He
exceeds all that He has caused. From which we may learn the difference
between Himself and His creatures, to wit, that He is not any of those
things which He has caused....
“Through grace a more perfect knowledge of God is had than through
natural reason. For cognition through natural reason needs both images
(phantasmata) received from things of sense, and the natural light of
intelligence, through whose virtue we abstract intelligible conceptions
from them. In both respects human cognition is aided through the
revelation of grace. For the natural light of the intellect is strengthened
through the infusion of light graciously given (luminis gratuiti); while
the images in the man’s imagination are divinely formed so that they are
expressive of things divine, rather than of what naturally is received
through the senses, as appears from the visions of the prophets.”[591]

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Natural reason stops with the unity of God, and can give no knowledge of
the Trinity of divine Persons. Says Thomas:[592]
“It has been shown that through natural reason man can know God only
from His creatures. Creatures lead to knowledge of God as effects lead
to some knowledge of a cause. Only that may be known of God by
natural reason which necessarily belongs to Him as the source of all
existences. The creative virtue of God is common to the whole Trinity;
it pertains to the unity of essence, not to the distinction of persons.
Through natural reason, therefore, those things concerning God may be
known which pertain to the unity of essence, but not those which
pertain to the distinction of persons.... Who strives to prove the Trinity
of Persons by natural reason, doubly disparages faith: first as regards
the dignity of faith itself, which concerns invisible things surpassing
human reason; secondly as derogating from its efficiency in drawing
men to it. For when any one in order to prove the faith adduces reasons
which are not cogent, he falls under the derision of the faithless; for
they think that we use such arguments, and that we believe because of
them. One shall not attempt to prove things of faith save by authorities,
and in discussion with those who receive the authorities. With others it
is enough to argue that what the faith announces is not impossible.”
Here Thomas seems rationally to recognize the limits upon reason in
discovering the divine nature. In the regions of faith, reason’s feet lack the
material footing upon which to mount. So Thomas would assert. But will he
stand to his assertion? The shadowy line between reason and faith wavers
with him. At least so it seems to us, for whom ontological reasoning has lost
reality, and who find proofs of God not so much easier than proofs of the
Trinity. But Thomas and the other scholastics dwelt in the region of the
metaphysically ideal. To them it was not only real, but the most real; and it
was so natural to step across the line of faith, trailing clouds of reason. The
feet of such as Thomas are as firmly planted on the one side of the line as
on the other. And now, as it might also seem, Thomas, having thus formally
reserved the realm of faith, quickly steps across the line, to undertake a
tremendous metaphysical exposition of the Trinity, of the distinctions
between its Persons, of their properties, respective functions, and
relationships; and all this is carried on largely in the categories of
Aristotelian philosophy. Yet is he not still consistent with himself? For he

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surely did not conceive the elements of his discussion to lie in the
lucubrations or discoveries of the natural reason; but in the data of
revelation, and their explanation by saintly doctors. And was not he also a
vessel of their inspiration, a son of faith, who might humbly hope for the
light of grace, to transfigure and glorify his natural powers in the service of
revealed truth?
Thomas’s ideal is intellectual, and yet ends in faith. His intellectual
interests, by faith emboldened, strengthened, and pointed heavenward,
make on toward the realisation of that intellectual beatitude which is to be
consummate hereafter, when the saved soul’s grace-illumined eye shall re-
awaken where it may see face to face.

III
Knowledge, then, supplemented in this life by faith, is the primary element
of blessedness. We now turn our attention to the forms of knowledge and
modes of knowing appropriate to the three rational substances: God, angel,
man. The first is the absolute incorporeal being, the primal mover, in whom
there is no potentiality, but actuality simple and perfect. The second is the
created immaterial or “separated” substance, which is all that it is through
participation in the uncreate being of its Creator. The third is the composite
creature man, made of both soul and body, his capacities conditioned upon
the necessities of his dual nature, his sense-perception and imagination
being as necessary to his knowledge, as his rational understanding; for
whom alone it is true that sense-apprehension may lead to the intelligible
verities of God: “etiam sensibilia intellecta manuducunt ad intelligibilia
divinorum.”[593]
The earlier Quaestiones of Pars prima, on the nature of God, lead on to a
consideration of God’s knowledge and ways of knowing. Those
Quaestiones expounded the qualities of God quite as far as comported with
Thomas’s realization of the limitation of the human capacity to know God
in this life. Quaestio iii. upon the Simplicitas of God, shows that God is not
body (corpus); that in Him there is no compositeness of form and material;
that throughout His nature, He is one and the same, and therefore that He is
His Deitas, His vita, and whatever else may be predicated of Him. Next it is

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shown (Qu. iv.) that God is perfect; that in Him are the perfectiones of all
things, since whatever there may be of perfection in an effect, should be
found in the effective cause; and as God is self-existent being, He must
contain the whole perfection of being in Himself (totam perfectionem
essendi in se). Next, that God is the good (bonum) and the summum bonum;
He is infinite; He is in all things (Qu. viii. Art. 1) not as a part of their
essence, but as accidens, and as the doer is in his deeds; and not only in
their beginning, but so long as they exist; He acts upon everything
immediately, and nothing is distant from Him; God is everywhere: as the
soul is altogether in every part of the body, so God entire is in all things and
in each. God is in all things created by Him as the working cause; but He is
in the rational creature, through grace; as the object of action is in the actor,
as the known is in the knower, and the desired in the wishful. God is
immutable (Qu. ix.); for as final actuality (actus purus), with no admixture
of potentiality, He cannot change; nor can He be moved; since His
infinitude comprehends the plenitude of all perfection, there is nothing that
He can acquire, and no whither for Him to extend. God is eternal (Qu. x.);
for him there is no beginning, nor any succession of time; but an
interminable now, an all at once (tota simul), which is the essence of
eternity, as distinguished from the successiveness of even infinite time. And
God is One (Qu. xi.). “One does not add anything to being, save negation of
division. For One signifies nothing else than undivided being (ens
indivisum). And from this it follows that One is convertible with being.”
That God is One, is proved by His simplicitas; by the infiniteness of His
perfection; and by the oneness of the world.
“After a consideration,” now says Thomas, “of those matters which
pertain to the divine substance, we may consider those which pertain to
its action (operatio). And because certain kinds of action remain in the
doer, while others pass out into external effect, we first treat of
knowledge and will (for knowing is in the knower and willing in him
who wills); and then of God’s power, which is regarded as the source of
the divine action passing out into external effect. Then, since knowing is
a kind of living, after considering the divine knowledge, the divine life
will be considered. And because knowledge is of the true, there will be
need to consider truth and falsity. Again since every cognition is in the
knower, the rationes (types, essential natures) of things as they are in

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God the Knower (Deo cognoscente) are called ideas (ideae); and a
consideration of these will be joined to the consideration of
knowledge.”[594]
Thus clearly laying out his topic, Thomas begins his discussion of God’s
knowledge (scientia Dei); of the modes in which God knows and the
knowledge which He has. In God is the most perfect knowledge. God
knows Himself through Himself; in Him knowledge and Knower
(intellectum and intellectus) are the same.[595] He perfectly comprehends
Himself; for He knows Himself so far as He is knowable; and He is
absolutely knowable being utter reality (actus purus). Likewise He knows
things other than Himself. For He knows Himself perfectly, which implies a
knowledge of those things to which His power (virtus) extends. Moreover,
He knows all things in their special natures and distinctions from each
other: for the perfection, or perfected actuality, of everything is contained in
Him; and therefore God in Himself is able to know all things perfectly, and
the special nature of everything exists through some manner of participation
in the divine perfection. God knows all things in one, to wit, Himself; and
not successively, or by means of discursive reasoning. “God’s knowledge is
the cause of things. It stands to all created beings as the knowledge of the
artificer to the things he makes. God causes things through His knowledge,
since His being is His knowing (cum suum esse sit suum intelligere).” His
knowledge causes things when it has the will joined with it, and, in so far as
it is the cause of things, is called scientia approbationis. God knows things
which are not actually (actu). Whatever has been or will be, He knows by
the knowledge of sight (scientia visionis, which by implication is equivalent
to scientia approbationis). For God’s knowing, which is His being, is
measured by eternity; and eternity includes all time, as present, and without
succession; so the present vision (intuitus) of God embraces all time and all
things existing at any time, as if present. As for whatever is in the power of
God or creature, but which never has been or will be, God knows it not as
in vision, but simply knows it.
God also knows evil.
“Whoever knows anything perfectly should know whatever might
happen to it. There are some good things to which it may happen to be
corrupted through evils: wherefore God would not know the good

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perfectly, unless He also knew the evil. Everything is knowable so far as
it is; but the being (esse) of evil is the privation of good: hence
inasmuch as God knows good, He knows evil, as darkness is known
through light.”
Thomas now takes up a point curious perhaps to us, but of importance to
him and Aristotle: does God know individuals (singularia), the particular as
opposed to the universal? This point might seem disposed of in the
argument by which Thomas maintained that God knew things in their
special and distinct natures. But he now proves that God knows singularia
by an argument which bears on his contention that man does not know
singularia through the intelligence, but perceives them through sense; and
as we shall see, that the angels have no direct knowledge of individuals,
being immaterial substances.
“God knows individuals (cognoscit singularia). For all perfections
found in creatures pre-exist in higher mode in God. To know
(cognoscere) individuals pertains to our perfection. Whence it follows
that God must know them. The Philosopher (Aristotle) holds it to be
illogical that anything should be known to us, and not to God.... But the
perfections which are divided in inferior beings, exist simply and as one
in God. Hence, although through one faculty we know universals and
what is immaterial, and through another, individuals and what is
material; yet God simply, through His intelligence, knows both.... One
must hold that since God is the cause of things through His knowledge,
the knowledge of God extends itself as far as His causality extends.
Wherefore, since God’s active virtue extends itself not only to forms,
from which is received the ratio of the universal, but also to matter, it is
necessary that God’s knowledge should extend itself to individuals,
which are such through matter.”
And replying to a counter-argument Thomas continues:
“Our intelligence abstracts the intelligible species from the
individuating principles. Therefore the intelligible species of our
intelligence cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and, for
this reason, our intelligence does not know individuals. But the
intelligible species of the divine intelligence, which is the essence of

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God, is not immaterial through abstraction, but through itself; and exists
as the principle of all principles entering the composition of the thing,
whether principles of species or of the individual. Therefore through His
essence God knows both universals and individuals.”[596]
With these arguments still echoing, Thomas shows that God can know
infinite things; also future contingencies; also whatever may be stated
(enuntiabilia). His knowledge, which is His substance, does not change. It
is speculative knowledge, in so far as relating to His own unchangeable
nature, and to whatever He can do, but does not; it is practical knowledge
so far as it relates to anything which He does.
Thomas concludes his direct discussion of God’s knowledge, by an
application of the Platonic theory of ideas, in which he mainly follows
Augustine.
“It is necessary to place ideas in the divine mind. Idea is the Greek for
the Latin forma. Thus through ideas are understood the forms of things
existing beyond the things themselves. By which we mean the prototype
(exemplar) of that of which it is called the form; or the principle of its
cognition, in so far as the forms of things knowable are said to be in the
knower.”
There must be many ideas or (as Augustine phrases it) stable rationes of
things. There is a ratio in the divine mind corresponding to whatever God
does or knows.
“Ideas were set by Plato as the principles both of the cognition and the
generation of things, and in both senses they are to be placed in the
divine mind. So far as idea is the principle of the making of a thing, it
may be called the prototype (exemplar), and pertains to practical
knowledge (practicam cognitionem); but as the principle of cognition
(principium cognoscitivum), it is properly called ratio, and may also
pertain to speculative knowledge. In the signification of exemplar, it
relates to everything created at any time by God: but when it means
principium cognoscitivum, it relates to all things which are known by
God, although never coming into existence.”[597]

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Such are the divine modes of knowledge. Thomas proceeds to discuss other
aspects of the divine nature, the life and power, will and love, which may be
ascribed to God. He then passes on to a discussion of the Persons of the
Trinity. This completed, he turns to the world of created substances; into
which we will follow him so far as to observe the forms of knowledge and
ways of knowing proper to angels and mankind. We shall hereafter have to
speak of the divine and angelic love, and of man’s love of God; but here, as
our field is intellectual, we will simply recall to mind that Thomas applies a
like intellectual conception of beatitude to both God and His rational
creatures:
“Beatitude, as has been said, signifies the perfect good of the
intellectual nature; as everything desires its perfection, the intellectual
[substance] desires to be beata. That which is most perfect in every
intellectual nature, is the intellectual operation wherein, in a measure, it
grasps all things. Wherefore the beatitude of any created intellectual
nature consists in knowing (in intelligendo).”[598]

IV
Thomas regards the creation as a processio, a going out of all creatures
from God. Every being (ens) that in any manner (quocumque modo) is, is
from God.
“God is the prima causa exemplaris of all things.... For the production
of anything, there is needed a prototype (exemplar), in order that the
effect may follow a determined form.... The determination of forms
must be sought in the divine wisdom. Hence one ought to say that in the
divine wisdom are the rationes of all things: these we have called ideas,
to wit, prototypal forms existing in the divine mind. Although such may
be multiplied in respect to things, yet really they are not other than the
divine essence, according as its similitude can be participated in by
divers things in divers ways. Thus God Himself is the first exemplar of
all. There may also be said to be in created things certain exemplaria of
other things, when they are made in the likeness of such others, or
according to the same species or after the analogy of some
resemblance.”[599]

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God not only is the efficient and exemplary cause, but also the final cause
of all things (Divina bonitas est finis omnium rerum). “The emanation
(emanatio) of all being from the universal cause, which is God, we call
creation.”[600] God alone may be said to create. The function pertains not to
any Person, but to the whole Trinity in common. And there is found some
image of the Trinity in rational creatures in whom is intelligence and will;
and in all creatures may be found some vestiges of the creator.
Thomas, after a while, takes up the distinction between spiritual and
corporeal creatures, and considers first the purely spiritual, called Angels.
We enter with him upon the contemplation of these conceptions, which
scholasticism did not indeed create, but elaborated with marvellous logic,
and refined to a consistent intellectual beauty. None had larger share in
perfecting the logical conception of the angelic nature, as immaterial and
essentially intellectual, than our Angelic Doctor. A volume might well be
devoted to tracing the growth of these beings of the mind, from their not
unmilitant career in the Old Testament and the Jewish Apocrypha, their
brief but classically beautiful mention in the Gospels, and their storm-red
action in the Apocalypse; then through their treatment by the Fathers, to
their hierarchic ordering by the great Pseudo-Areopagite; and so on and on,
through the earlier Scholastics, the Lombard’s Sentences, and Hugo of St.
Victor’s appreciative presentation; up to the gathering of all the angelic
matter by Albertus Magnus, its further encyclopaedizing by Vincent of
Beauvais, and finally its perfect intellectual disembodiment by Thomas;—
while all the time the people’s mythopoeic love went on endowing these
guardian spirits with heart and soul, and fashioning responsive stories of
their doings. For men loved and feared them, and looked to them as God’s
peculiar messengers. Thus they flash past us in the Divina Commedia; and
their forms become lovely in Christian art.
As we enter upon the contemplation of the angelic nature, let us not as of
course regard angels simply as imaginative conceptions of Scripture and of
the patristic and mediaeval mind. Thomas will show his reasons for their
necessary existence, which may not convince us. Yet we may believe in
angels, inasmuch as any real conception of the world’s governance by God
requires the fulfilling of His thoughts through media that bring them down
to move and live and realize themselves with each of us. Who, in striving to

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express, can do more than symbolize, the ways of God? What symbols truer
than angels have been devised?
“It is necessary,” opens Thomas,[601] “to affirm (ponere) that there are
incorporeal creatures. For in created things God chiefly intends the
good, which consists in assimilation to Him. Perfect assimilation of the
effect to the cause is seen when the effect resembles the cause in that
through which the cause produces the effect. God produces the creature
through intelligence and will. Consequently the perfection of the
universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. To know
cannot be the act (actus) of the body or of any corporeal faculty (virtus);
because all body is limited to here and now. Therefore it is necessary, in
order that the universe may be perfect, that there should be incorporeal
creatures.”[602]
Thomas then argues that the intellectual substance is entirely immaterial.
“Angelic substances are above our understanding. So our understanding
cannot attain to apprehending them as they are in themselves; but only in its
own fashion as it apprehends composite things.” These immaterial
substances exist in exceeding great number, and each is a species, because
there cannot be several immaterial beings of one species, any more than
there could be separate whitenesses or many humanities. Angels in their
nature are imperishable. For nothing is corrupted save as its form is
separated from its matter. But these immaterial substances are not
composed of matter and form, being themselves subsisting forms and
indestructible. Brass may have and lose a circular shape; but the circular
shape cannot be separated from the circle, which it is.
Thomas next shows (Pars prima, Qu. li.) that angels have no bodies by
nature joined to them. Body is not of the ratio of intellectual substances.
These (when perfect and not like the human soul) have no need to acquire
knowledge through sensation. But though angels are intellectual substances,
separate (separatae) from bodies, they sometimes assume bodies. In these
they can perform those actions of life which have something in common
with other kinds of acts; as speech, a living act, has something in common
with inanimate sounds. Thus far only can physical acts be performed by
angels, and not when such acts essentially belong to living bodies. Angels
may appear as living men, but are not; neither are they sentient through the

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organs of their assumed bodies; they do not eat and digest food; they move
only per accidens, incidentally to the inanimate motion of their assumed
bodies; they do not beget, nor do they really speak; “but it is something like
speech, when these bodies make sounds in the air like human voices.”
Dropping the sole remark, that scholasticism has no sense of humour, we
pass on to Thomas’s careful consideration of the angelic relations to space
or locality (Qu. lii. and liii.). “Equivocally only may it be said that an angel
is in a place (in loco): through application of the angelic virtue to some
corporeal spot, the angel may be said in some sense to be there.” But, as
angels are finite, when one is said, in this sense, to be in a place, he is not
elsewhere too (like God). Yet the place where the angel is need not be an
indivisible point, but may be larger or smaller, as the angel wills to apply
his virtue to a larger or smaller body. Two angels may not be in the same
place at the same time, “because it is impossible that there should be two
complete immediate causes of one and the same thing.” Angels are said,
likewise equivocally, to move, in a sense analogous to that in which they
are said to be in a place. Such equivocal motion may be continuous or not.
If not continuous, evidently the angel may pass from one place to another
without traversing the intervening spaces. The angelic movement must take
place in time; there must be a before and after to it, and yet not necessarily
with any period intervening.
Now as to angelic knowledge: De cognitione Angelorum. Knowing is no
easy thing for man; and we shall see that it is not a simple matter to know,
without the senses to provide the data and help build up knowledge in the
mind. The function of sense, or its absence, conditions much besides the
mere acquisition of the elements from which men form their thoughts.
Thomas’s exposition of angelic knowledge and modes of knowing is a
logical and consistent presentation of a supersensual psychology and theory
of knowledge.
Entering upon his subject, Thomas shows (Qu. liv.) that knowing
(intelligere) is not the substantia or the esse of an angel. Knowing is actio,
which is the actuality of faculty, as being (esse) is the actuality of substance.
God alone is actus purus (absolute realized actuality), free from
potentiality. His substantia is His being and His action (suum esse and suum
agere). “But neither in an angel, nor in any creature, is virtus or the potentia

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operativa the same as the creature’s essentia,” or its esse or substantia. The
difficult scholastic-Aristotelian categories of intellectus agens and possibilis
do not apply to angelic cognition (for which the reader and the angels may
be thankful). The angels, being immaterial intelligences, have no share in
those faculties of the human soul, like sight or hearing, which are exercised
through bodily organs. They possess only intelligence and will. “It accords
with the order of the universe that the supreme intellectual creature should
be intelligent altogether, and not intelligent in part, like our souls.”
Quaestio lv., concerning the medium cognitionis angelicae, is a scholastic
discussion scarcely to be rendered in modern language. The angelic
intelligence is capable of knowing all things; and therefore an angel does
not know through the medium of his essentia or substantia, which are
limited. God alone knows all things through His essentia. The angelic
intellect is made perfect for knowing by means of certain forms or ideas
(species). These are not received from things, but are part of the angelic
nature (connaturales). The angelic intelligence (potentia intellectiva) is
completed through general concepts, of the same nature with itself (species
intelligibiles connaturales). These come to angels from God at the same
time with their being. Such concepts or ideas cover everything that they can
know by nature (naturaliter). And Thomas proves that the higher angels
know through fewer and more universal concepts than the lower.
“In God an entire plenitude of intellectual cognition is held in one, to
wit, in the divine essence through which God knows all things.
Intelligent creatures possess such cognition in inferior mode and less
simply. What God knows through one, inferior intelligences know
through many; and this many becomes more as the inferiority increases.
Hence the higher angel may know the sum total of the intelligible
(universitatem intelligibilium) through fewer ideas or concepts
(species); which, however, are more universal since each concept
extends to more [things]. We find illustration of this among our fellows.
Some are incapable of grasping intelligible truth, unless it be set forth
through particular examples. This comes from the weakness of their
intelligence. But others, of stronger mind, can seize many things from a
few statements” (Qu. lv. Art. 3).

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Through this argument, and throughout the rest of his exposition of the
knowledge of God, angel, and man, we perceive that, with Thomas,
knowledge is superior and more delightful, as it is abstract in character, and
universal in applicability. By knowing the abstract and the universal we
become like to God and the angels; knowledge of and through the particular
is but a necessity of our half-material nature.
Thomas turns now to consider the knowledge had by angels of immaterial
beings, i.e. themselves and God (Qu. lvi.): “An angel, being immaterial, is a
subsisting form, and therefore intelligible actually (actu, i.e. not
potentially). Wherefore, through its form, which is its substance, it knows
itself.” Then as to knowledge of each other: God from the beginning
impressed upon the angelic mind the likenesses of things which He created.
For in Him, from the beginning, were the rationes of all things, both
spiritual and corporeal. Through the impression of these rationes upon the
angelic mind, an angel knows other angels as well as corporeal creatures.
Their natures also yield them some knowledge of God. The angelic nature
is a mirror holding the divine similitude. Yet without the illumination of
grace the angelic nature knows not God in His essence, because no created
likeness may represent that.
As for material things (Qu. lvii.), angels have knowledge of them through
the intelligible species or concepts impressed by God on the angelic mind.
But do they know particulars—singularia? To deny it, says Thomas, would
detract from the faith which accords to angels the ministration of affairs.
This matter may be thought thus:
“Things flow forth from God both as they subsist in their own natures
and as they are in the angelic cognition. Evidently what flowed from
God in things pertained not only to their universal nature, but to their
principles of individuation.... And as He causes, so He also knows....
Likewise the angel, through the concepts (species) planted in him by
God, knows things not only according to their universal nature, but also
according to their singularity, in so far as they are manifold
representations of the one and simple essence.”
One observes that the whole scholastic discussion of universals lies back of
arguments like these.

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The main principles of angelic knowledge have now been set forth; and
Thomas pauses to point out to what extent the angels know the future, the
secret thoughts of our hearts, and the mysteries of grace. He has still to
consider the mode and measure of the angelic knowledge from other points
of view. Whatever the angels may know through their implanted natures,
they know perfectly (actu); but it may be otherwise as to what is divinely
revealed to them. What they know, they know without the need of
argument. And the discussion closes with remarks on Augustine’s phrase
and conception of the matutina and vespertina knowledge of angels: the
former being the knowledge of things as they are in the Word; the latter
being the knowledge of things as they are in their own natures.[603]

V
That the abstract and the universal is the noble and delectable, we learn
from this exposition of angelic knowledge. We may learn the same from
Thomas’s presentation of the modes and contents of human understanding.
The Summa theologiae follows the Scriptural order of presentation;[604]
which is doubtless the reason why Thomas, instead of passing from
immaterial creatures to the partly immaterial creature man, considers first
the creation of physical things—the Scriptural work of the six days. After
this he takes up the last act of the Creation—man. In the Summa he
considers man so far as his composite nature comes within the scope of
theology. Accordingly the principal topic is the human soul (anima); and
the body is regarded only in relation to the soul, its qualities and its fate.
Thomas will follow Dionysius (Pseudo-Areopagite) in considering first the
nature (essentia) of the soul, then its faculties (virtus sive potentiae), and
thirdly, its mode of action (operatio).
Under the first head he argues (Pars prima, Qu. lxxv.) that the soul, which
is the primum principium of life, is not body, but the body’s consummation
(actus) and forma. Further, inasmuch as the soul is the principium of mental
action, it must be an incorporeal principle existing by itself. It cannot
properly be said to be the man; for man is not soul alone, but a composite of
soul and body. But the soul, being immaterial and intellectual, is not a
composite of form and matter. It is not subject to corruption. Concerning its

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union with the body (Qu. lxxvi.), “it is necessary to say that the mind
(intellectus), which is the principle of intellectual action, is the form (forma)
of the human body.” One and the same intellectual principle does not
pertain to all human bodies: there is no common human soul, but as many
souls as there are men.[605] Yet no man has a plurality of souls. “If indeed
the anima intellectiva were not united to the body as form, but only as
motor (as the Platonists affirm), it would be necessary to find in man
another substantial form, through which the body should be set in its being.
But if, as we have shown, the soul is united to the body as substantial form,
there cannot be another substantial form beside it” (Qu. lxxvi. Art. 4). The
human soul is fitly joined to its body; for it holds the lowest grade among
intellectual substances, having no knowledge of truth implanted in it, as the
angels have; it has to gather knowledge per viam sensus. “But nature never
omits what is necessary. Hence the anima intellectiva must have not only
the faculty of knowing, but the faculty of feeling (sentiendi). Sense-action
can take place only through a corporeal instrument. Therefore the anima
intellectiva ought to be united to such a body, which should be to it a
convenient organ of sense” (Art. 5). Moreover, “since the soul is united to
the body as form, it is altogether in any and every part of the body” (Art. 8).
It is a cardinal point (Qu. lxxvii.) with Thomas that the soul’s essentia is not
its potentia: the soul is not its faculties. That is true only of God. In Him
there is no diversity. There is some diversity of faculty in an angel; and
more in man, a creature on the confines of the corporeal and spiritual
creation, in whom concur the powers of both. There is order and priority
among the powers of the soul: the potentiae intellectivae are higher than the
potentiae sensitivae, and control them; while the latter are above the
potentiae nutritivae. Yet the order of their generation is the reverse. The
highest of the sensitive faculties is sight. The anima is the subject in which
are the powers of knowing and willing (potentiae intellectivae); but the
subject in which are the powers of sensation is the combination of the soul
and body. All the powers of the soul, whether the subject be soul alone or
soul and body, flow from the essence of the soul, as from a source
(principium).
Thomas follows (Qu. lxxviii.) Aristotle in dividing the powers of the soul
into vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motor, and intellectual. In taking up
the last, he points out (Qu. lxxix.) that intelligence (intellectus) is a power

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of the soul, and not the soul itself. He then follows the Philosopher in
showing how intelligence (intelligere) is to be regarded as a passive power,
and he presents the difficult Aristotelian device of the intellectus agens, and
argues that memory and reason are not to be regarded as powers distinct
from the intelligence (intellectus).
How does the soul, while united to the body (the anima conjuncta), (1)
know corporeal things which are beneath it? (2) how does it know itself and
what is in itself? and (3) how does it know immaterial substances which are
above it? The exposition of these problems is introduced by (Qu. lxxxiv.) a
historical discussion of the primi philosophi who thought there was nothing
but body in the world. Then came Plato, seeking “to save some certain
cognition of truth” by means of his theory of Ideas. But Plato seems to have
erred in thinking that the form of the known must be in the knower as it is
in the known. This is not necessary. In sense-perception the form of the
thing is not in sense as it is in the thing. “And likewise the intelligence
receives the species (Ideas) of material and mobile bodies immaterially and
immutably, after its own mode; for the received is in the recipient after the
mode of the recipient. Hence it is to be held that the soul through the
intelligence knows bodies by immaterial, universal, and necessary
cognition.”
Thomas sets this matter forth in a manner very illuminating as to his general
position regarding knowledge:
“It follows that material things which are known must exist in the
knower, not materially, but immaterially. And the reason of this is that
the act of cognition extends itself to those things which are outside of
the knower. For we know things outside of us. But through matter, the
form of the thing is limited to what is single (aliquid unum). Hence it is
plain that the ratio (proper nature) of cognition is the opposite of the
ratio of materiality. And therefore things, like plants, which receive
forms only materially, are in no way cognoscitivae, as is said in the
second book of De anima. The more immaterially anything possesses
the form of the thing known, the more perfectly it knows. Wherefore the
intelligence, which abstracts the species (Idea) not only from matter, but
also from individualizing material conditions, knows more perfectly
than sense, which receives the form of the thing known without matter

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indeed, but with material conditions. Among the senses themselves,
sight is the most cognoscitivus, because least material. And among
intelligences, that is the more perfect which is the more immaterial”
(Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 2).
Then Thomas again differs from Plato, and holds with Aristotle, that the
intelligence through which the soul knows has not its ideas written upon it
by nature, but from the first is capable of receiving them all (sed est in
principio in potentia ad hujusmodi species omnes). Hereupon, and with
further arguments, Thomas shows “that the species intelligibiles, by which
our soul knows, do not arise from separate forms” or ideas.
To the converse question, whether intelligent cognition comes from things
of sense, Thomas answers, following Aristotle: “One cannot say that sense
perception is the whole cause of intellectual cognition, but rather in a
certain way is the matter of the cause (materia causae).” On the other hand,
“it is impossible that the mind, in the state of the present life, wherein it
is joined to the passive body (passibili corpori), should know anything
actually (actu) except by turning itself to images (phantasmata). And
this appears from two arguments. In the first place, since the mind itself
is a power (vis) using no bodily organ, its action would not be
interrupted by an injury to any bodily organ, if for its action there was
not needed the action of some faculty using a bodily organ. Sense and
imagination use a bodily organ. Hence as to what the mind knows
actually (actu), there is needed the action of the imagination and other
faculties, both in receiving new knowledge and in using knowledge
already acquired. For we see that when the action of the imaginative
faculty is interrupted by injury to an organ, as with the delirious, the
man is prevented from actually knowing those things of which he has
knowledge. Secondly (as any one may observe in himself), whenever he
attempts to know (intelligere) anything, he forms images by way of
example, in which he may contemplate what he is trying to know. And
whenever we wish to make any one else understand, we suggest
examples, from which he may make for himself images to know by.
“The reason of this is that the knowing faculty is suited to the knowable
(potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili). The appropriate

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object of the intelligence of an angel, who is separate from all body, is
intelligible immaterial substance (substantia intelligibilis a corpore
separata); through this kind of intelligible he cognizes also material
things. But the appropriate object of the human mind, which is joined to
a body, is the essence or nature (quidditas sive natura) existing in
material body; and through the natures of visible things of this sort it
ascends to some cognition of invisible things. It belongs to the idea
(ratio) of this nature that it should exist in some individual having
corporeal matter, as it is of the concept (ratio) of the nature of stone or
horse that it should be in this stone or this horse. Hence the nature of a
stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly,
unless it is known as existing in some particular [instance]. We
apprehend the particular through sense and imagination; and so it is
necessary, in order that the mind should know its appropriate object,
that it should turn itself to images, in order to behold the universal
nature existing in the particular. If, indeed, the appropriate object of our
intelligence were the separate form, or if the form of sensible things did
not subsist in the particular [instances], as the Platonists say, our mind
in knowing would have no need always to turn itself to images” (Qu.
lxxxiv. Art. 7).
It is next queried whether the judgment of the mind is impeded through
binding (per ligamentum) the senses. In view of the preceding argument the
answer is, that since “all that we know in our present state, becomes known
to us through comparison with sensible things, it is impossible that there
should be in us perfect mental judgment when the senses are tied, through
which we take cognizance of sensible things” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 8).
This entire argument shows in what firm Aristotelian manner, scholasticism,
in the person of Thomas, set itself upon a basis of sense perception; through
which it still pressed to a knowledge of the supersensible and abstract. In
this argument we also see, as always with Thomas, that knowledge is
perfect and blessed, the more immaterial and abstract are its modes. All of
which will continue to impress us as we follow Thomas, briefly, through his
exposition of the modus and ordo of knowing (intelligendi) (Qu. lxxxv.).
The first question is whether our mind knows corporeal things by
abstracting the species from the images—the type from the particular. There

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are three grades of the cognizing faculty (virtutis cognoscitivae). The lowest
is sensation, which is the act of a bodily organ. Its appropriate object is
form as existing in matter. And since matter is the principle of individuation
(i.e. the particularizing principle from which results the particular or
individual), sense perception is confined to the particular. The highest grade
of the cognitient faculty is that which is independent of bodily organs and
separate from matter, as the angelic intelligence; and its object is form
subsisting without matter. For though angels know material things, they
view them only in the immaterial, to wit, themselves or God. Between the
two is the human mind, which
“is the forma of the body. So it naturally knows form existing
individually in corporeal matter, and yet not as form is in such matter.
But to know form, which is in concrete matter, and yet know it not as it
is in such matter, is to abstract it from this particular matter which the
images represent. It follows that our intelligence knows material things
by abstracting them from images; and through reflecting on these
material abstractions we reach some cognition of the immaterial, just as
conversely the angels know the material through the immaterial” (Qu.
lxxxv. Art. 1).
It is next proved that the soul, through the intelligible species or forms
abstracted from particulars, knows things which are outside the soul. In a
way, intellection arises from sense perception; therefore the sense
perception of the particular precedes the intellectual knowledge of
universals. But, on the other hand, the intelligence, in coming to perfect
cognition, proceeds from the undistinguished to the distinguished, from the
more to the less general, and so knows animal before it knows homo, and
homo before it knows Socrates. The next conclusion reads very neatly in
scholastic Latin, but is difficult to paraphrase: it is that the intelligence may
know many things at once (simul) per modum unius, but not per modum
multorum; that is to say, the mind may grasp at once whatever it may grasp
under one species, but cannot know a number of things at once which fall
under different species.
Next as to what our mind knows in material things (Qu. lxxxvi.). It does not
know the particular or singular (singularia) in them directly; for the
principle of singularity in material things is the particular matter. But our

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mind knows by abstracting from such the species, that is, the universal. This
it knows directly. But it knows singularia indirectly, inasmuch as, when it
has abstracted the intelligible species, it must still, in order to know
completely (actu), turn itself to the images in which it knows the species.
How does the anima intellectiva know itself, and those things which are in
it (Qu. lxxxvii.)? Everything is knowable in so far as it is actually (in actu)
and not merely potentially. So the human intelligence knows itself not
through its essence, which is still but potential, but in so far as it has
actually realized itself; knows itself, that is, through its actuality. The
permanent qualities (habitus) of the soul exist in a condition between
potentiality and actuality. The mind knows them when they are actually
present or operative.
Does the human intelligence know its own act—know that it knows? In
God, knowing and being are one. Although this is not true of the angelic
intelligence, nevertheless with an angel the prime object of knowledge is
his own essence. With one and the same act an angel knows that it knows,
and knows its essence. But the primal object of the human intelligence is
neither its knowledge (knowing, intelligere) nor its essence, but something
extrinsic, to wit, the nature of the material thing. Hence that is the first
object known by the human intelligence; and next is known its own actus,
by which that first object is known. Likewise the human intelligence knows
the acts of will. An act of will is nothing but a certain inclination toward
some form of the mind (formam intellectam) as natural appetite is an
inclination toward a natural form. The act of will is in the knowing mind
and so is known by it.
So far as to how the soul knows material things, which are below it, and its
own nature and qualities. It is another question whether the soul knows
those things which are above it, to wit, the immaterial substances. Can the
soul in the state of the present life know the angels in themselves? With
lengthy argument, differing from Plato and adhering to Aristotle, Thomas
proves the negative: that in the present life we cannot know substantias
separatas immateriales secundum seipsas. Nor can we come to a
knowledge of the angelic substances through knowing material things.

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“For immaterial substances are altogether of another nature (ratio) from
the whatnesses (quidditates) of material things; and however much our
intelligence abstracts from matter the essence (quidditas) of the material
thing, it will never arrive at anything like an immaterial substance. And
so, through material substances, we cannot know immaterial substances
perfectly” (Qu. lxxxviii. Art. 2).
Much less can we thus know God.
The discussion hitherto has been confined to the intellectual capacities of
souls united to their bodies. As to the knowledge which the “separated” soul
may have, other considerations arise akin to those touching the knowledge
possessed by the separated substances called angels. Is the separated soul
able to know? Thomas has shown that so long as the soul is joined to the
body it cannot know anything except by turning itself to images. If this
were a mere accident of the soul, incidental to its existence in the body, then
with that impediment removed, it would return to its own nature and know
simply. But if, as we suppose, this turning to images is of the nature of the
soul, the difficulty grows. Yet the soul has one mode of existence when
united to the body, and another when separated, but with its nature
remaining. Souls united to bodies may know through resort to images of
bodies, which are in the bodily organs; but when separated, they may know
by turning to that which is intelligible simply, as other separate substances
do. Yet still this raises doubt; for why did not God appoint a nobler way for
the soul to know than that which is natural to it when joined to the body?
The perfection of the universe required that there should be diverse grades
among intellectual substances. The soul is the lowest of them. Its feeble
intelligence was not fit to receive perfect knowledge through universal
conceptions, save when assisted by concrete examples. Without these, souls
would have had but a confused knowledge. Hence, for their more perfect
knowledge of things, they are naturally united to bodies, and so receive a
knowledge from things of sense proper to their condition; just as rude men
can be led to know only through examples. So it was for a higher end that
the soul was united to the body, and knows through resort to images; yet,
when separated, it will be capable of another way of knowing.[606]
Separated from the body, the soul can know itself through itself. It can
know other separated souls perfectly, but the angels, who are higher

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natures, only imperfectly, at least through the knowledge which the
separated soul has from its nature; but that may be increased through grace
and glory. The separated soul will know natural objects through the species
(ideas) received from the inflowing divine light; yet less perfectly than the
angels. Likewise, less universally than angels, will separated souls, by like
means of species received from the divine light, know particular things, and
only such as they previously knew, or may know through some affection or
aptitude or the divine decree. For the habit and aptitude of knowledge, and
the knowledge already acquired, will remain in the separated soul, so far as
relates to the knowledge which is in the intellect, and no longer in the lower
perceptive faculties. Neither will distance from the object affect the soul’s
knowledge, since it will know through the influx of forms (species) from
the divine light.
“Yet through the cognition belonging to their nature, separated souls do
not know what is doing here below. For such souls know the particular
and concrete (singularia) only as from the traces (vestigia) of previous
cognition or affection, or by divine appointment. And the souls of the
dead by divine decree, and in accordance with their mode of existence,
are separated from the intercourse of the living and joined to the society
of spiritual substances. Therefore they are ignorant of those things
which are done among us.”
Nevertheless, it would seem, according to the opinions of Augustine and
Gregory, “that the souls of the saints who see God know all that is done
here. Yet, perfectly joined to the divine righteousness, they are not grieved,
nor do they take part in the affairs of the living, save as the divine
disposition requires.”
“Still the souls of the dead are able to care for the affairs of the living,
although ignorant of their condition; just as we have care for the dead,
though ignorant of their state, by invoking the suffrages of the Church.
And the souls of the dead may be informed of the affairs of the living
from souls lately departed hence, or through angels or demons, or by the
revealing spirit of God. But if the dead appear to the living, it is by
God’s special dispensation, and to be reckoned as a divine miracle”
(Qu. lxxxix. Art. 8).

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VI
We have thus traced Thomas’s view of the faculty of knowledge, the
primary constituent of beatitude in God, and in angels and men. There are
other elements which not only supplement the faculty of knowledge, but
even flow as of necessity from a full and true conception of that faculty and
its perfect energizing. These needful, yet supplementary, factors are the
faculties of will and love and natural appetite; though the last does not exist
in God or angel or in “separated soul.” The composite creature man shares
it with brutes: it is of enormous importance, since it may affect his spiritual
progress in this life, and so determine his state after death. Let us observe
these qualities in God, in the immaterial substances called angels, and in
man.
In God there is volition as well as intelligence; for voluntas intellectum
consequitur; and as God’s being (esse) is His knowing (intelligere), so
likewise His being is His will (velle).[607] Essentially alike in God and man
and angel are the constituents of spiritual beatitude and existence—
knowing, willing, loving. From Creator down to man, knowledge differs in
mode and in degree, yet is essentially the same. The like is true of will. As
to love, because passion is of the body, love and every mode of turning
from or to an object is passionless in God and the angels. Yet man through
love, as well as through willing and through knowing, may prove his
kinship with angels and with God.
God is love, says John’s Epistle. “It is necessary to place love in God,” says
Thomas. “For the first movement of will and any appetitive faculty
(appetitivae virtutis) is love (amor).” It is objected that love is a passion;
and the passionless God cannot love. Answers Thomas, “Love and joy and
delight are passions in so far as they signify acts (or actualities, actus) of the
appetitus sensitivi; but they are not passions when they signify the actus of
the appetitus intellectivi; and thus are they placed in God” (Pars prima, Qu.
xx. Art. 1).
God loves all existences. Now all existences, in so far as they are, are good.
For being itself (esse) is in a sense the good of any thing, and likewise its
perfection. It has been shown that God’s will is the cause of all things; and

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thus it is proper that a thing should have being, or good, in so far as it is
willed by God. God wills some good to every existent thing. And since to
love is nothing else than to will good to something, it is evident that God
loves all things that are, yet not in the way we love. For since our will is not
the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by an object, our
love by which we will good to anything is not the cause of its goodness; but
its goodness calls forth the love by which we wish to preserve and add to
the good it has; and for this we work. But God’s love imparts and creates
goodness in things.
The divine love embraces all things in one and the same act of will; but
inasmuch as His love creates goodness, there could be no greater goodness
in one thing than in another unless He willed greater good to one than to the
other: in this sense He may be said to love one creature more than another;
and in this way He loves the better things more. Besides love, the order of
the universe proves God’s justitia; an attribute which is to be ascribed to
Him, as Dionysius says, in that He grants to all things what is appropriate,
according to the dignity of the existence of each, and preserves the nature of
each in its own order and virtue. Likewise misericordia is to be ascribed to
God, not as if He were affected by pitying sadness, but in that He remedies
the misery or defects of others.
Thus far as to will and love in God. Next, as to these qualities in Angels.
Have angels will? (Pars prima, Qu. lix.). Thomas argues: All things
proceed from the divine will, and all per appetitum incline toward good. In
plants this is called natural appetite. Next above them come those creatures
who perceive the particular good as of the senses; their inclination toward it
is appetitus sensitivus. Still above them are such as know the ratio of the
good universally, through their intelligence. Such are the angels; and in
them inclination toward the good is will. Moreover, since they know the
nature of the good, they are able to form a judgment as to it; and so they
have free will: ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium. And as their
knowledge is above that of men, so in them free will exists more
excellently.
The angels have only the appetitus intellectivus which is will; they are not
irascible or concupiscent, since these belong to the appetitus sensitivus.
Only metaphorically can furor and evil concupiscence be ascribed to

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demons, as anger is to God—propter similitudinem effectus. Consequently
amor and gaudium do not exist as passions in angels. But in so far as these
qualities signify solely an act of will, they are intellectual. In this sense, to
love is to will good to anything, and to rejoice (gaudere) is to rest the will
in a good obtained. Similarly, caritas and spes, in so far as they are virtues,
lie not in appetite, but in will; and thus exist in angels. With man the virtues
of temperance and fortitude may relate to things of sense; but not so with
angels, who have no passions to be bridled by these virtues. Temperance is
ascribed to them when they temper their will according to the will divine,
and fortitude, when they firmly execute it (Qu. lix. Art. 4).
In a subsequent portion of Pars prima (Qu. cx.) Thomas has occasion to
point out that, as in human affairs, the more particular power is governed by
the more universal, so among the angels.
“The higher angels who preside over the lower have more universal
knowledge. It is likewise clear that the virtus of a body is more
particular than the virtus of a spiritual substance; for every corporeal
form is form particularized (individuata) through matter, and limited to
the here and now. But immaterial forms are unconditioned and
intelligible. And as the lower angels, who have forms less universal, are
ruled by the higher angels, so all corporeal things are ruled by angels.
And this is maintained not only by the holy Doctors, but by all
philosophers who have recognized incorporeal substances.”
Next Thomas considers the action of angels upon men, and shows that men
may have their minds illumined by the lower orders of angels, who present
to men intelligibilem veritatem sub similitudinibus sensibilium. God sends
the angels to minister to corporeal creatures; in which mission their acts
proceed from God as a cause (principio). They are His instruments. They
are sent as custodians of men, to guide and move them to good. “To every
man an angel is appointed for his guard: of which the reason is, that the
guardianship (custodia) of the angels is an execution of divine providence
in regard to men.” Every man, while as viator he walks life’s via non tuta,
has his guardian angel. And the archangels have care of multitudes of men
(Qu. cxiii.).

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Thus Thomas’s, or rather, say the Christian doctrine as to angels, becomes a
corollary necessary to Christian theism, and true at least symbolically. But
—and this is the last point as to these ministering spirits—do the angels
who love without passion, grieve and suffer when those over whom they
minister are lost?
“Angels grieve neither over the sins nor the punishment of men. For, as
says Augustine, sadness and grief arise only from what contravenes the
will. But nothing happens in the world that is contrary to the will of the
angels and other blessed ones. For their will is entirely fixed (totaliter
inhaeret) in the order of the divine righteousness (Justitiae); and
nothing takes place in the world, save what takes place and is permitted
by the same. And so, in brief, nothing takes place in the world contrary
to the will of the blessed” (Qu. cxiii. Art. 7).
We come to man. He has will, and free will or choice, as the angels have.
Will is part of the intellectual nature: it is as the intellectivus appetitus. But
man differs from the angels in possessing appetites which belong to his
sense-nature and do not perceive the good in its common aspects; because
sense does not apprehend the universal, but only the particular.[608]
Sometimes Thomas speaks of amor as including every form of desire,
intellectual or pertaining to the world of sense. “The first movement of will
and of any appetitive faculty (virtus) is amor.”[609] So in this most general
signification amor “is something belonging to appetite; for the object of
both is the good.”
“The first effect of the desirable (appetibilis) upon the appetitus, is
called amor; thence follows desiderium, or the movement toward the
desirable; and at last the quies which is gaudium. Since then amor
consists in an effect upon the appetitus, it is evidently passio; most
properly speaking when it relates to the yearning element
(concupiscibile), but less properly when it relates to will” (Pars prima,
Qu. xxvi. Art. 2).
Further distinguishing definitions are now in order:
“Four names are applied to what pertains to the same: amor, dilectio,
caritas, et amicitia. Of the three first, amor has the broadest meaning.
For all dilectio or caritas is amor; but not conversely. Dilectio adds to

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amor a precedent choice (electionem praecedentem) as its name
indicates. Hence dilectio is not in the concupiscent nature, but in the
will, and therefore in the rational nature. Caritas adds to amor a certain
perfectionem amoris, inasmuch as what is loved, is esteemed as very
precious, as the name shows” (Ibid. Art. 3).
Moreover, amor may be divided into amor amicitiae, whereby we wish
good to the amicus, and amor concupiscentiae, whereby properly we desire
a good to ourselves.
The Good is the object and, in that sense, the cause, of amor (Qu. xxvii.).
“But love requires a cognition of the good which is loved. Therefore the
Philosopher says, that bodily sight is the cause of amoris sensitivi.
Likewise contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the cause of
amoris spiritualis. Thus, therefore, cognition is the cause of love,
inasmuch as the good cannot be loved unless known.”
From this broad conception of amor the argument rises to amor in its purest
phases, which correspond to the highest modes of knowledge man is
capable of. They are considered in their nature, in their causes, and effects.
It is evident whither we are travelling in this matter.
“Love (amor) may be perfect or imperfect. Perfect love is that by which
some one is loved for himself, as a man loves a friend. Imperfect love is
that by which some one loves a thing, not for itself, but in order that that
good may come to him, as a man loves the thing he desires. The first
love pertains to caritas which cleaves to God (inhaeret Deo) for
Himself (secundum seipsum).”[610]
Caritas is one of the theological virtues, and as such Thomas treats it. To it
corresponds the “gift” of sapientia, likewise a virtue bestowed by God, but
more particularly regarded as the “gift” of the Holy Spirit. Caritas is set not
in the appetitus sensitivus, but in the will. Yet as it exceeds our natural
faculties, “it is not in us by nature, nor acquired through our natural powers;
but through the infusion of the Holy Spirit, who is the amor Patris et Filii.”
He infuses caritas according to His will; and it will increase as we draw
near to God; nor is there any bound to its augmentation. May caritas be

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perfect in this life? In one sense it never can be perfect, because no creature
ever can love God according to His infinite lovableness.
“But on the part of him who wills to love (ex parte diligentis), caritas is
perfect when he loves as much as he is able. Which may be taken in
three ways. In one way, as the whole heart of man is always borne
toward God; and this is the perfection of the love of home (caritas
patriae), unattainable here, where because of this life’s infirmities it is
impossible always actually to think upon God, and be drawn toward
Him by voluntary love (dilectione). In another way, as a man may strive
to keep himself free for God and things divine, laying other matters
aside, save as life’s need requires: and that is the perfection of caritas,
possible in this life, yet not for all who have caritas. And the third way,
when any one habitually sets his heart on God, so that he thinks and
wills nothing that is contrary to the divine love: this perfection is
common to all who have caritas.”[611]
The caritas with which we love God, extends to our neighbours, and even
to our enemies, for God’s sake; also to ourselves, including our bodies; it
embraces sinners, but not their sinfulness. It embraces the angels. There is
order and grade in caritas, according to its relationship to God, the source
of beatitude and voluntary love (dilectionis). God is to be loved ex caritate
above all; for He is loved as the cause of beatitude, while our neighbour is
loved as a participant with us in the beatitude from God. We should love
God more than ourselves; because beatitude is in God as in the common
and fontal source of all things that participate in beatitude.
“But, after God, man should love himself, in so far as he is spirit
(secundum naturam spiritualem), more than any one else. This is plain
from the very reason of loving. God is loved as the principle of good, on
which the dilectio caritatis is based. Man loves himself ex caritate for
the reason that he is a participator in that good. He loves his neighbour
because of his association (societas) in that good.... Participation in the
divine good is a stronger reason for loving, than association in this
participation. Therefore, man ex caritate should love himself more than
his neighbour; and the mark (signum) of this is, that man should not
commit any sin barring his participation in this beatitude, in order to

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free his neighbour from sin.... But one should love his neighbour’s
salvation more than his own body.”[612]
We may love some of our neighbours more than others; for those bound to
us by natural ties and proximity can be loved more and in more actual ways.
The order and grades of love will endure when our natures are perfected in
glory.
Love (caritas) is the supreme theological virtue. It comes to us in this life
through grace; it can be perfected only when grace is consummated in
glory. Likewise the highest knowledge possible in this life comes through
grace, to be perfected in glory. All is from God, and that which, of all the
rest, seems most freely given is the divine influence disposing the
intelligence and will toward good, and illuminating these best God-given
faculties. This, as par excellence, through the exceeding bounty of its free
bestowal, is called gratia (grace). It is a certain habitual disposition of the
soul; it is not the same as virtus, but a divinely implanted disposition, in
which the virtues must be rooted; it is the imparted similitude of the divine
nature, and perfects the nature of the soul, so far as that has part in likeness
to the divine: it is the medial state between nature and that further
consummation of the grace-illumined nature, which is glory; and so it is the
beginning, the inchoatio, of our glorified beatitude. Clearly, grace is no part
of our inborn nature, and does not belong to our natural faculties. It is a
divinely bestowed increment, directing our natural faculties toward God
and uplifting them to higher capacities of knowing and loving.
To follow Thomas’s exposition of grace a little more closely:[613] man,
through his natural powers, may know truth, but not the highest; and
without grace, our fallen nature cannot will all the good belonging to it
(connaturale), nor love God above all else, nor merit eternal life. “Grace is
something supernatural in man coming from God.” It
“is not the same as virtue; and its subject (i.e. its possessor, that in
which it is set) cannot be a faculty (potentia) of the soul; for the soul’s
faculties, as perfected, are conceived to be virtues. Grace, which is prior
to virtue, is set, not in the faculties, but in the essence of the soul. Thus,
as through his faculty of knowing (potentiam intellectivam), man shares
the divine knowledge by the virtue of faith, and through the faculty of

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will shares the divine love by the virtue of caritas, so by means of a
certain similitude he shares in the divine nature through some
regeneration or recreation” (Pars I. ii., Qu. cx. Art. 4).
Grace may be conceived either as “divine aid, moving us to willing and
doing right, or as a formative and abiding (habituale) gift, divinely placed
in us” (Qu. cxi. Art. 2). “The gift of grace exceeds the power of any created
nature; and is nothing else than a sharing (participatio) of the divine nature”
(Qu. cxii. Art. 1).
So it is clear that without grace man cannot rise to the highest knowledge
and the purest love of which he is capable in this life; far less can he reach
that final and perfected blessedness which is expected hereafter. For this he
must possess the virtue of Faith, which comes not without grace.
“The perfection of the rational creature consists not only in that which
may be his, in accordance with his nature; but also in that which may
come to him from some supernatural sharing in the divine goodness.
The final beatitude of man consists in some supernatural vision of God.
Man can attain to that only through some mode of learning from God
the Teacher, and he must believe God as a disciple believes his master”
(Pars II. ii., Qu. ii. Art. 3).
Within the province of the Christian Faith “it is necessary that man should
accept per modum fidei not only what is above reason, but also what may be
known through reason.” (Art. 4). He must believe explicitly the prima
credibilia, that is to say, the Articles of Faith; it is enough if he believes
other credibilia implicitly, by holding his mind prepared to accept whatever
Scripture teaches (Art. 5).
“To believe is an act of the intellect (actus intellectus) as moved by will
to assenting. It proceeds from the will and from the intellect.... Yet it is
the immediate act of the intellect, and therefore faith is in the intellect as
in a subject [i.e. possessor]” (Qu. iv. Art. 2).
And Thomas, having shown the function of will in any act of faith, passes
on by the same path to connect fides with caritas:
“Voluntary acts take their species from the end which is the object of
volition. That from which anything receives its species, occupies the

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place held by form in material things. Hence, as it were, the form of any
voluntary act is the end to which it is directed (ordinatur). Manifestly,
an act of faith is directed to the object willed (which is the good) as to
an end. But good which is the end of faith, to wit, the divine good, is the
proper object of caritas. And so caritas is called the form of faith, in so
far as through caritas the act of faith is perfected and given form” (Qu.
iv. Art. 3).
Thomas makes his conclusion more precise:
“As faith is the consummation of the intellect, that which pertains to the
intellect, pertains, per se, to faith. What pertains to will, does not, per
se, pertain to faith. The increment making the difference between the
faith which has form and faith which lacks it (fides formata, fides
informis), consists in that which pertains to will, to wit, to caritas, and
not in what pertains to intellect” (Qu. iv. Art. 4).
Only the fides which is formed and completed in caritas is a virtue (Art. 5).
And Thomas says concisely (Qu. vi. Art. 1) what in many ways has been
made evident before: For Faith, it is necessary that the credibilia should be
propounded, and then that there should be assent to them; but since man, in
assenting to those things which are of the Faith, is lifted above his nature,
his assent must proceed from a supernatural principle working within him,
which is God moving him through grace.
It is not hard to see why two gifts (dona) of the Holy Spirit should belong to
the virtue Faith, to wit, understanding and knowledge, intellectus et
scientia. Thomas gives the reasons in an argument germane to his
Aristotelian theory of cognition:
“The object of the knowing faculty is that which is.... Many kinds of
things lie hidden within, to which the intellectus of man should
penetrate. Beneath the accidens the substantial nature of the thing lies
hidden; beneath words lie their meanings; beneath similes and figures,
lies the figured truth—veritas figurata (for things intelligible are, as it
were, within things sensible); and in causes lie hidden the effects, and
conversely. Now, since human cognition begins with sense, as from
without, it is clear that the stronger the light of the intellect, the further
it will penetrate to the inmost depths. But the light of our natural

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intellect is of finite virtue, and may reach only to what is limited.
Therefore man needs the supernatural light, in order to penetrate to the
knowledge which through the natural light he is not able to know; and
that supernatural light given to man is called the donum intellectus”
(Qu. viii. Art. 1).
This gift follows grace. Grace is more perfect than nature. It does not
abrogate, but perfects the natural faculties. Nor does it fail in those matters
in which man’s natural power is competent (Qu. ix. Art. 1). So, besides the
donum intellectus, to Faith belongs the donum scientiae also, which brings
and guides knowledge of human things (Art. 2).
And now we shall not be surprised to find sapientia, the very highest gift of
the Spirit, attached to the grace-given virtue caritas. For caritas is the
informing principle of Faith, and the highest virtue of the grace-illumined
will. The will, be it remembered, belongs to man’s intellectual nature; its
object is the good which is known by the mind (bonum intellectum).
“Sapientia (wisdom, right knowledge as to the highest cause, which is God)
signifies rectitude of judgment in accordance with the rationes divinae,” the
ideas and reasons which exist in God. Rectitude of judgment regarding
things divine may arise from rational inquiry; in which case it pertains to
the sapientia which is an intellectual virtue. But it may also spring from
affinity to those things themselves; and then it is a gift of the Holy Spirit (II.
ii., Qu. xlv. Art. 2).
Says Thomas:
“By the name beatitude is understood the final perfection of the rational
or intellectual nature. This consists for this life in such contemplation as
we may have here of the highest intelligible good, which is God; but
above this felicity is that other felicity which we expect when we shall
see God as He is” (Pars I., Qu. lxii Art 1).
But mark: the perfection of the intellectual nature does not consist merely in
knowing, narrowly taken. The right action of will is also essential, of the
will directed toward the highest good, which is God: and this is caritas, of
which the corresponding gift from the Spirit is wisdom. In accord with this
full consummation of human nature, comprising the perfection of cognition

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and will, Thomas outlines his conception of the vita contemplativa, the life
of most perfect beatitude attainable on earth:
“The vita contemplativa is theirs whose resolve is set upon the
contemplation of truth. Resolve is an act of will; because resolve is with
respect to the end, which is the object of will. Thus the vita
contemplativa, according to the essence of its action, is of the
intelligence; but so far as it pertains to what moves us to engage in such
action, it is of the will, which moves all the other faculties, including the
intelligence, to act. Appetitive energy (vis appetitiva) moves toward
contemplating something, either sensibly or intellectually: sometimes
from love of the thing seen, and sometimes from love of the knowledge
itself, which arises from contemplation. And because of this, Gregory
sets the vita contemplativa in the love of God—in caritate Dei—to wit,
inasmuch as some one, from a willing love (dilectio) of God burns to
behold His beauty. And because any one is rejoiced when he attains
what he loves, the vita contemplativa is directed toward dilectio[614]
which lies in affect (in affectu); by which amor also is intended” (II. ii.,
Qu. clxxx. Art. 1).
The moral virtues, continues Thomas, do not pertain essentially to this vita.
But they may promote it, by regulating the passions and quieting the tumult
of outside affairs. In principle it is fixed upon the contemplation of truth,
which here we see but in a glass darkly; and so we help ourselves along by
contemplating the effects of the divine cause in the world.
Thus final beatitude, and its mortal approach in the vita contemplativa of
this earth, is of the mind, both in its knowledge and its love. Immateriality,
spirituality, is with Thomas primarily intellectual. Yet his beatitude is not
limited to the knowing faculties. It embraces will and love. The grace of
God and the gifts of the Holy Spirit touch love as well as knowledge,
raising one and both to final unison of aim. Thus far in this life, while in the
life to come, these grace-uplifted qualities of knowledge, and that choosing
love (dilectio) which rises from knowledge of the good, are perfected in
gloria.
Further than this we shall not go with Thomas, nor follow him, for example,
through his exposition of the means of salvation—the Incarnation and the

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sacraments. Nor need we further mark the prodigious range of his theology,
or his metaphysics, logic, or physics. To all this many books have been
devoted. We are but seeking to realise his intellectual interests and qualities,
in such way as to bring them within the compass of our sympathy. A more
encyclopaedic and systematic presentation of his teaching is proper for
those who would trace, or perhaps attach themselves to, particular
doctrines; or would find in scholasticism, even in Thomas, some special
authoritativeness. For us these doctrines have but the validity of all human
striving after truth. Moreover, perhaps a truer view of Thomas, the
theologian and philosopher, is gained from following a few typical forms of
his teaching presented in his own exposition, than by analyzing his thought
with later solvents which he did not apply, and presenting his matter
classified as he would not have ordered it, and in modern phrases, which
have as many meanings foreign to scholasticism as scholasticism has
thoughts not to be translated into modern ways of thinking.

CHAPTER XLI

ROGER BACON
Of all mediaeval men, Thomas Aquinas achieved the most organic and
comprehensive union of the results of human reasoning and the data of
Christian theology. He may be regarded as the final exponent of
scholasticism, perfected in method, universal in scope, and still integral in
purpose. The scholastic method was soon to be impugned and the scholastic
universality broken. The premature attack upon the method came from
Roger Bacon;[615] the fatal breach in the scholastic wholeness resulted from
the constructive, as well as critical, achievements of Duns Scotus and
Occam.

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Bacon is a perplexing personality. With other mediaeval thinkers one
quickly feels the point of view from which to regard them. Not so with this
most disparate genius of the Middle Ages. Reading his rugged statements,
and trying to form a coherent thought of him, we are puzzled at the
contradictions of his mind. One may not say that he was not of his time.
Every man is of his time, and cannot raise himself very far out of the mass
of knowledge and opinion furnished by it, any more than a swimmer can lift
himself out of the water that sustains him. Yet personal temper and
inclination may aline a man with less potent tendencies, which are obscured
and hampered by the dominant intellectual interests of the period.
Assuredly, through all the Middle Ages, there were men who noticed such
physical phenomena as bore upon their lives, even men who cared for the
dumb beginnings of what eventually might lead to natural science. But they
were not representative of their epoch’s master energies; and in the Middle
Ages, as always, the man of evident and great achievement will be one
who, like Aquinas, stands upon the whole attainment of his age. Roger
Bacon, on the contrary, was as one about whose loins the currents of his
time drag and pull; they did not aid him, and yet he could not extricate
himself. It was his intellectual misfortune that he was held by his time so
fatally, so fatally, at least, for the proper doing of the work which was to be
his contribution to human enlightenment, a contribution well ignored while
he lived, and for long afterward.
Bacon accepted the dominant mediaeval convictions: the entire truth of
Scripture; the absolute validity of the revealed religion, with its dogmatic
formulation; also (to his detriment) the universally prevailing view that the
end of all the sciences is to serve their queen, theology. Yet he hated the
ways of mediaeval natural selection and survival of the mediaeval fittest,
and the methods by which Albert or Thomas or Vincent of Beauvais were at
last presenting the sum of mediaeval knowledge and conviction. Well might
he detest those ways and methods, seeing that he was Roger Bacon, one
impelled by his genius to critical study, to observation and experiment. He
was impassioned for linguistics, for mathematics, for astronomy, optics,
chemistry, and for an experimental science which should confirm the
contents of all these, and also enlarge the scope of human ingenuity. Yet he
was held fast, and his thinking was confused, by what he took from his
time. Especially he was obsessed by the idea that philosophy, including

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every branch of knowledge, must serve theology, and even in that service
find its justification. But what has chemistry to do with theology? What has
mathematics? And what has the physical experimental method? By
maintaining the utility of these for theology, Bacon saved his mediaeval
orthodoxy, and it may be, his skin from the fire. But it wrecked the working
of his genius. His writings remain, such of them as are known, astounding
in their originality and insight, and almost as remarkable for their
inconsistencies; they are marked by a confusion of method and a distortion
of purpose, which sprang from the contradictions between Bacon’s genius
and the current views which he adopted.
The career of Bacon was an intellectual tragedy, conforming to the old
principles of tragic art: that the hero’s character shall be large and noble, but
not flawless, inasmuch as the fatal consummation must issue from
character, and not happen through chance. He died an old man, as in his
youth, so in his age, a devotee of tangible knowledge. His pursuit of a
knowledge which was not altogether learning had been obstructed by the
Order of which he was an unhappy and rebellious member; quite as fatally
his achievement was deformed from within by the principles which he
accepted from his time. But he was responsible for his acceptance of current
opinions; and as his views roused the distrust of his brother Friars, his
intractable temper drew their hostility (of which we know very little) on his
head. Persuasiveness and tact were needed by one who would impress such
novel views as his upon his fellows, or, in the thirteenth century, escape
persecution for their divulgence. Bacon attacked dead and living worthies,
tactlessly, fatuously, and unfairly. Of his life scarcely anything is known,
save from his allusions to himself and others; and these are insufficient for
the construction of even a slight consecutive narrative. Born; studied at
Oxford; went to Paris, studied, experimented; is at Oxford again, and a
Franciscan; studies, teaches, becomes suspect to his Order, is sent back to
Paris, kept under surveillance, receives a letter from the pope, writes,
writes, writes,—his three best-known works; is again in trouble, confined
for many years, released, and dead, so very dead, body and fame alike, until
partly unearthed after five centuries.
Inference and construction may fill out this sombre outline. England was
the land of Bacon’s birth, and Ilchester is said to have been the natal spot.
The approximate date may be guessed at from his reference to himself as

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senex in 1267, and his remark that he had then been studying forty years.
His family seems to have been wealthy. Besides the letter of Pope Clement,
hereafter to be quoted, there is one contemporary reference to him. Mathew
Paris has a story of a certain clericus de curia, scilicet Rogerus Bacum,
speaking up with bold wit to King Henry III. at Oxford in 1233. Bacon
when a young man studied there under Robert Grosseteste and Adam of
Marsh. He frequently refers to both, and always with respect. His chief
enthusiasm is for the former. For years this admirable man was chancellor
of Oxford; until made bishop of Lincoln in 1235. Although never a
Franciscan, he was the Order’s devoted friend, and lectured in its house at
Oxford. Grosseteste founded the study of Greek at Oxford, and collected
treatises upon Greek grammar. Bacon, following him, wrote a Greek
grammar. Grosseteste, before Bacon, devoted himself to physics and
mathematics, and all that these many-branched sciences might include.
Besides a taste for these studies Bacon may have had from him the idea that
they were useful for theology. “No one,” says Bacon, “knew the sciences
save Lord Robert, Bishop of Lincoln, from his length of life and experience,
and studiousness and industry, and because he knew mathematics and
optics, and was able to know all things; and he knew enough of the
languages to understand the saints and philosophers of antiquity; but not
enough to translate them, unless towards the end of his life when he invited
Greeks, and had books of Greek grammar gathered from Greece and
elsewhere.”[616] There is evidence that others at Oxford, besides
Grosseteste, were interested in the study of Greek and natural science.
From Oxford Bacon went to Paris, where apparently he remained for a
number of years; he was made a doctor there, and afterwards became a
Franciscan. Since a monk could own nothing, one may perhaps infer that
Bacon did not join the Order until after the lapse of certain twenty years of
scientific research, in which he spent much money, as he says in 1267, in an
often-quoted passage of the Opus tertium:

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“For now I have laboured from my youth in the sciences and languages,
and for the furtherance of study, getting together much that is useful. I
sought the friendship of all wise men among the Latins, and caused
youth to be instructed in languages, and geometric figures, in numbers
and tables and instruments, and many needful matters. I examined
everything useful to the purpose, and I know how to proceed, and with
what means, and what are the impediments: but I cannot go on for lack
of the funds which are needed. Through the twenty years in which I
laboured specially in the study of wisdom, careless of the crowd’s
opinion, I spent more than two thousand pounds in these pursuits on
occult books (libros secretos) and various experiments, and languages
and instruments, and tables and other things.”[617]
After his first stay at Paris Bacon returned to Oxford. There he doubtless
continued his researches, and divulged them, or taught in some way. For he
roused the suspicions of his Order, and in the course of time was sent or
conducted back to Paris, where constraint seems to have been put upon his
actions and utterances. Like the first, this second, possibly enforced, stay
was a long one; he speaks of himself in the first chapter of the Opus tertium
as “for ten years an exile.” Yet here as always, one is not quite certain how
literally to take Bacon’s personal statements, either touching himself or
others.
A short period of elation was at hand. He had evidently been forbidden to
write, or spread his ideas; he had been disciplined at times with a diet of
bread and water. All this had failed to sweeten his temper, or conform his
mind to current views. In 1265, an open-minded man who had been a jurist,
a warrior, and the counsellor of a king, before becoming an ecclesiastic, was
made Pope Clement IV. While living in Paris he had been interested in
Bacon’s work. Soon after the papal election our sore-bestead philosopher
managed to communicate with him, as appears by the pope’s reply, written
from Viterbo, in July 1266:
“To our beloved son, Brother Roger, called Bacon, of the Order of
Brothers Minorites. We have received with pleasure the letter of thy
devotion; and we have well considered what our beloved son called
Bonecor, Knight, has by word of mouth set forth to us, with fidelity and

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prudence. So then, that we may understand more clearly what thou
purposest, it is our will, and we command thee by our Apostolic
mandate that, notwithstanding the prohibition of any prelate, or any
constitution of thy Order, thou sendest to us speedily in good script that
work which, while we held a minor office, we requested thee to
communicate to our beloved son Raymond, of Laudunum. Also, we
command thee to set forth in a letter what remedies thou deemest should
be applied to those matters which thou didst recently speak of as fraught
with such peril. Do this as secretly as possible without delay.”[618]
Poor Bacon! The pope’s letter roused him to ecstasy, then put him in a
quandary, and elicited elaborate apologies, and the flood of persuasive
exposition which he poured forth with tremulous haste in the eighteen
months following. Delight at being solicited by the head of Christendom
breaks out in hyperbole, not to be wondered at: he is uplifted and cast
prone; that his littleness and multiple ignorance, his tongue-tied mouth and
rasping pen, and himself unlistened to by all men, a buried man delivered to
oblivion, should be called on by the pope’s wisdom for wisdom’s writings
(sapientales scripturas)!
“The Saviour’s vicar, the ruler of the orb, has deigned to solicit me, who
am scarcely to be numbered among the particles of the world—inter
partes universae! Yet, while my weakness is oppressed with the glory of
this mandate, I am raised above my own powers; I feel a fervour of
spirit; I rise up in strength. And indeed I ought to overflow with
gratitude since your beatitude commands what I have desired, what I
have worked out with sweat, and gleaned through great
expenditures.”[619]
The word “expenditures” touches one horn of Bacon’s dilemma. He is a
Franciscan; therefore penniless; and, besides that, apparently under the
restraining ban of his own Order. The pope has enjoined secrecy; therefore
Bacon cannot set up the papal mandate against the probable interference of
his own superiors. The pope has sent no funds; sitting in culmine mundi he
was too busy with high affairs to think of that.[620] And now comes the chief
matter for Bacon’s apologies: his Beatitude misapprehends, has been
misinformed: the work is not yet written; it is still to be composed.

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In spite of these obstacles the friendless but resourceful philosopher
somehow obtained opportunity to write, and the means needed for the fair
copy. And then in those great eighteen, or perhaps but fifteen, months, what
a flood of enlightenment, of reforming criticism, of plans of study and
methods of investigation, of examples and sketches of the matter to be
prepared or discovered, is poured forth. Four works we know of,[621] and
they may have made the greater part of all that Bacon ever actually wrote.
With variations of emphasis, of abridgement and elaboration, the four have
the one purpose to convince the pope of the enormous value of Bacon’s
scheme of useful and saving knowledge. To a great extent they set forth the
same matters; indeed the Opus tertium was intended to convey the
substance of the Opus majus, should that fail to reach the pope. So there is
much repetition and some disorder in these eager, hurried works, defects
which emphasise the dramatic situation of the impetuous genius whose
pent-up utterance was loosed at last. The Opus minus and the Vatican
Fragment are as from a man overpowered by the eagerness to say
everything at once, lest the night close in before he have chance of speech.
And when the Opus majus was at last sent forth, accompanied by the Opus
minus, as a battleship by a light armed cruiser, the Opus tertium was
despatched after them, filled with the same militant exposition, for fear the
former two should perish en voyage.
Did they ever reach the pope? We may presume so. Did he read any one of
them? Here there is no information. Popes were the busiest men in Europe,
and death was so apt to cut short their industry. Clement died the next year,
and so far as known, no syllable of acknowledgement from him ever
reached the feverishly expectant philosopher.
A few words will tell the rest. In 1271, apparently, Bacon wrote his
Compendium studii philosophiae, taking the occasion to denounce the
corruptions of Church and society in unmeasured terms. He rarely measured
his vituperation! His life was setting on toward its long last trial. In 1277,
Jerome of Ascoli, the General of the Franciscan Order, held a Chapter at
Paris, and Bacon was condemned to imprisonment (carceri condempnatus)
because of his teachings, which contained aliquas novitates suspectas.[622]
Jerome became Pope Nicholas IV. At a Chapter of the Order held in Paris in
1292, just after his death, certain prisoners condemned in 1277, were set
free. Roger Bacon probably was among the number. If so, it was in the year

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of his liberation that he wrote a tract entitled Compendium theologiae; for
that was written in 1292. This is the last we hear of him. But as he must
now have been hard on to eighty, probably he did not live much longer.
There seems to have been nothing exceptional in Bacon’s attitude toward
Scripture and the doctrines of the Church. He deemed, with other mediaeval
men, that Scripture held, at least implicitly, the sum of knowledge useful or
indeed possible for men. True, neither the Old Testament nor the New treats
of grammar, or physics, or of minerals, or plants, or animals. Nevertheless,
the statements in these revealed writings are made with complete
knowledge of every topic or thing considered or referred to—bird, beast,
and plant, the courses of the stars, the earth and its waters, yea, the arts of
song or agriculture, and the principles of every science. Conversely (and
here Bacon even gave fresh emphasis and novel pointings to the current
view) all knowledge whatsoever, every art and science, is needed for the
full understanding of Scripture, sacra doctrina, in a word, theology. This
opinion may hold large truth; but Bacon’s advocacy of it sometimes affects
us as a reductio ad absurdum, especially when he is proceeding on the
assumption that the patriarchs and prophets had knowledge of all sciences,
including astrology and the connection between the courses of the stars and
the truth of Christianity.
There was likewise nothing startling in Bacon’s view of the Fathers, and
their knowledge and authoritativeness. Thomas did not regard them as
inspired. Neither did Bacon; he respects them, yet discerns limitations to
their knowledge; by reason of their circumstances they may have neglected
certain of the sciences; but this is no reason why we should.[623]
As for the ancient philosophers, Bacon holds to their partial inspiration.
“God illuminated their minds to desire and perceive the truths of
philosophy. He even disclosed the truth to them.”[624] They received their
knowledge from God, indirectly as it were, through the prophets, to whom
God revealed it directly. More than once and with every detail of baseless
tradition, he sets forth the common view that the Greek philosophers
studied the prophets, and drew their wisdom from that source.[625] But their
knowledge was not complete; and it behoves us to know much that is not in
Aristotle.[626]

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“The study of wisdom may always increase in this life, because nothing
is perfect in human discoveries. Therefore, we later men ought to
supplement the defects of the ancients, since we have entered into their
labours, through which, unless we are asses, we may be incited to
improve upon them. It is most wretched always to be using what has
been attained, and never reach further for one’s self.”[627]
It may be that Bacon was suspected of raising the philosophers too near the
Christian level; and perhaps his argument that their knowledge had come
from the prophets may have seemed a vain excuse. Says he, for example:
“There was a great book of Aristotle upon civil science,[628] well
agreeing with the Christian law; for the law of Aristotle has precepts
like the Christian law, although much is added in the latter excelling all
human science. The Christian law takes whatever is worthy in the civil
philosophical law. For God gave the philosophers all truth, as the saints,
and especially Augustine, declare.... And what noble thoughts have they
expressed upon God, the blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, Christ, the
blessed Virgin, and the angels.”[629]
Possibly one is here reminded of Abaelard, and his thought of Christianity
as reformatio legis naturalis. Yet Christ had said, He came not to destroy,
but to fulfil; and the chief Christian theologians had followed Augustine in
“despoiling the Egyptians” as he phrased it; the very process which in fact
was making the authority of Aristotle supreme in Bacon’s time. So there
was little that was peculiar or suspicious in Bacon’s admiration of the
philosophers.
The trouble with Bacon becomes clearer as we turn to his views upon the
state of knowledge in his time, and the methods of contemporary doctors in
rendering it worse, rather than better. These doctors were largely engaged
upon sacra doctrina; they were primarily theologians and expounders of the
truth of revelation. Bacon’s criticism of their methods might disparage that
to which those methods were applied. His caustic enumeration of the four
everlasting causes of error, and the seven vices infecting the study of
theology, will show reason enough why his error-stricken and infected
contemporaries wished to close his mouth. The anxiousness of some might
sour to enmity under the acerbity of his attack; nor would their hearts be

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softened by Bacon’s boasting that these various doctors, of course including
Albert, could not write in ten years what he is sending to the pope.[630]
Bacon declares that there is at Paris a great man (was it Albert? was it
Thomas?), who is set up as an authority in the schools, like Aristotle or
Averroes; and his works display merely “infinite puerile vanity,” “ineffable
falsity,” superfluous verbiage, and the omission of the most needful parts of
philosophy.[631] Bacon is not content with abusing members of the rival
Dominican Order; but includes in his contempt the venerable Alexander of
Hales, the defunct light of the Franciscans. “Nullum ordinem excludo,” cries
he, in his sweeping denunciation of his epoch’s rampant sins. As for the
seculars, why, they can only lecture by stealing the copy-books of the
“boys” in the “aforesaid Orders.”[632] “Never,” says Bacon in the
Compendium studii from which the last phrases are taken, “has there been
such a show of wisdom, nor such prosecution of study in so many faculties
through so many regions as in the last forty years. Doctors are spread
everywhere, especially in theology, in every city, castle, and burg, chiefly
through the two student Orders. Yet there was never so great ignorance and
so much error—as shall appear from this writing.”[633]
Bacon never loses a chance of stating the four causes of the error and
ignorance about him. These causes preyed upon his mind—he would have
said they preyed upon the age. They are elaborately expounded in pars i. of
the Opus majus:[634]
“There are four principal stumbling blocks (offendicula) to
comprehending truth, which hinder well-nigh every one: the example of
frail and unworthy authority, long-established custom, the sense of the
ignorant crowd (vulgi sensus imperiti), and the hiding of one’s own
ignorance under the pretence of wisdom. In these, every man is
involved and every state beset. For in every act of life, or business, or
study, these three worst arguments are used for the same conclusion:
this was the way of our ancestors, this is the custom, this is the common
view: therefore should be held. But the opposite of this conclusion
follows much better from the premises, as I will prove through
authority, experience, and reason. If these three are sometimes refuted
by the glorious power of reason, the fourth is always ready, as a gloss
for foolishness; so that, though a man know nothing of any value, he
will impudently magnify it, and thus, soothing his wretched folly, defeat

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truth. From these deadly pests come all the evils of the human race; for
the noblest and most useful documents of wisdom are ignored, and the
secrets of the arts and sciences. Worse than this, men blinded by the
darkness of these four do not see their ignorance, but take every care to
palliate that for which they do not find the remedy; and what is the
worst, when they are in the densest shades of error, they deem
themselves in the full light of truth.”[635]
Therefore they think the true the false, and spend their time and money
vainly, says Bacon with many strainings of phrase.
“There is no remedy,” continues Bacon, “against the first three causes of
error save as with all our strength we set the sound authors above the weak
ones, reason above custom, and the opinions of the wise above the humours
of the crowd; and do not trust in the triple argument: this has precedent, this
is customary, this is the common view.” But the fourth cause of error is the
worst of all. “For this is a lone and savage beast, which devours and
destroys all reason,—this desire of seeming wise, with which every man is
born.” Bacon arraigns this cause of evil, through numerous witnesses,
sacred and profane. It has two sides: display of pretended knowledge, and
excusing of ignorance. Infinite are the verities of God and the creation: let
no one boast of knowledge. It is not for man to glory in his wisdom; faith
goes beyond man’s knowledge; and still much is unrevealed. In forty years
we learn no more than could be taught youth in one. I have profited more
from simple men “than from all my famous doctors.”
Bacon’s four universal causes of ignorance indicate his general attitude.
More specific criticisms upon the academic methods of his time are
contained in his septem peccata studii principalis quod est theologiae. This
is given in the Opus minus.[636] Bacon, it will be remembered, says again
and again that all sciences must serve theology, and find their value from
that service: the science of theology includes every science, and should use
each as a handmaid for its own ends. Accordingly, when Bacon speaks of
the seven vices of the studium principale quod est theologia, we may expect
him to point out vicious methods touching all branches of study, yet with an
eye to their common service of their mistress.

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“Seven are the vices of the chief study which is theology; the first is that
philosophy in practice dominates theology. But it ought not to dominate
in any province beyond itself, and surely not the science of God, which
leads to eternal life.... The greater part of all the quaestiones in a Summa
theologiae is pure philosophy, with arguments and solutions; and there
are infinite quaestiones concerning the heavens, and concerning matter
and being, and concerning species and the similitudes of things, and
concerning cognition through such; also concerning eternity and time,
and how the soul is in the body, and how angels move locally, and how
they are in a place, and an infinitude of like matters which are
determined in the books of the philosophers. To investigate these
difficulties does not belong to theologians, according to the main intent
and subject of their work. They ought briefly to recite these truths as
they find them determined in philosophy. Moreover, the other matter of
the quaestiones which concerns what is proper to theology, as
concerning the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the Sacraments, is
discussed principally through the authorities, arguments, and
distinctions of philosophy.”
Evidently, this first vice of theological study infected the method of Albert
and Thomas, and of practically all other theologians! Its correction might
call for a complete reversal of method. But the reversal desired by Bacon
would scarcely have led back to Gospel simplicity, as may be seen from
what follows.
“The second vice is that the best sciences, which are those most clearly
pertinent to theology, are not used by theologians. I refer to the
grammar of the foreign tongues from which all theology comes. Of
even more value are mathematics, optics, moral science, experimental
science, and alchemy. But the cheap sciences (scientiae viles) are used
by theologians, like Latin grammar, logic, natural philosophy in its
baser part, and a certain side of metaphysics. In these there is neither the
good of the soul, nor the good of the body, nor the good things of
fortune. But moral philosophy draws out the good of the soul, as far as
philosophy may. Alchemy is experimental and, with mathematics and
optics, promotes the good of the body and of fortune.... While the
grammar of other tongues gives theology and moral philosophy to the

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Latins.... Oh! what madness is it to neglect sciences so useful for
theology, and be sunk in those which are impertinent!
“The third vice is that the theologians are ignorant of those four
sciences which they use; and therefore accept a mass of false and futile
propositions, taking the doubtful for certain, the obscure for evident;
they suffer alike from superfluity and the lack of what is necessary, and
so stain theology with infinite vices which proceed from sheer
ignorance.” For they are ignorant of Greek and Hebrew and Arabic, and
therefore ignorant of all the sciences contained in these tongues; and
they have relied on Alexander of Hales and others as ignorant as
themselves. The fourth vice is that they study and lecture on the
Sentences of the Lombard, instead of the text of Scripture; and the
lecturers on the Sentences are preferred in honour, while any one who
would lecture on Scripture has to beg for a room and hour to be set him.
“The fifth fault is greater than all the preceding. The text of Scripture is
horribly corrupt in the Vulgate copy at Paris.”
Bacon goes at some length into the errors of the Vulgate, and gives a good
account of the various Latin versions of the Bible. Next, the “sextum
peccatum is far graver than all, and may be divided into two peccata
maxima: one is that through these errors the literal sense of the Vulgate has
infinite falsities and intolerable uncertainties, so that the truth cannot be
known. From this follows the other peccatum, that the spiritual sense is
infected with the same doubt and error.” These errors, first in the literal
meaning, and thence in the spiritual or allegorical significance, spring from
ignorance of the original tongues, and from ignorance of the birds and
beasts and objects of all sorts spoken of in the Bible. “By far the greater
cause of error, both in the literal and spiritual meaning, rises from ignorance
of things in Scripture. For the literal sense is in the natures and properties of
things, in order that the spiritual meaning may be elicited through
convenient adaptations and congruent similitudes.” Bacon cites Augustine
to show that we cannot understand the precept, Estote prudentes sicut
serpentes, unless we know that it is the serpent’s habit to expose his body in
defence of his head, as the Christian should expose all things for the sake of
his head, which is Christ. Alack! is it for such ends as these that Bacon
would have a closer scholarship fostered, and natural science prosecuted?

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The text of the Opus minus is broken at this point, and one cannot say
whether Bacon had still a seventh peccatum to allege, or whether the series
ended with the second of the vices into which he divided the sixth.
Bacon’s strictures upon the errors of his time were connected with his
labours to remedy them, and win a firmer knowledge than dialectic could
supply. To this end he advocated the study of the ancient languages, which
he held to be “the first door of wisdom, and especially for the Latins, who
have not the text, either of theology or philosophy, except from foreign
languages.”[637] His own knowledge of Greek was sufficient to enable him
to read passages in that tongue, and to compose a Greek grammar.[638] But
he shows no interest in the classical Greek literature, nor is there evidence
of his having studied any important Greek philosopher in the original. He
was likewise zealous for the study of Hebrew, Chaldee, and Arabic, the
other foreign tongues which held the learning so inadequately represented
by Latin versions. He spoke with some exaggeration of the demerits of the
existing translations;[639] but he recognised the arduousness of the
translator’s task, from diversity of idiom and the difficulty of finding an
equivalent in Latin for the statements, for example, in the Greek. The Latin
vocabulary often proved inadequate; and words had to be taken bodily from
the original tongue. Likewise he saw, and so had others, though none had
declared it so clearly, that the translator should not only be master of the
two languages, but have knowledge of the subject treated by the work to be
translated.[640]
After the languages, Bacon urged the pursuit of the sciences, which he
conceived to be interdependent and corroborative; the conclusions of each
of them susceptible of proof by the methods and data of the others.
“Next to languages,” says Bacon in chapter xxix. of the Opus tertium, “I
hold mathematics necessary in the second place, to the end that we may
know what may be known. It is not planted in us by nature, yet is
closest to inborn knowledge, of all the sciences which we know through
discovery and learning (inventionem et doctrinam). For its study is
easier than all other sciences, and boys learn its branches readily.
Besides, the laity can make diagrams, and calculate, and sing, and use
musical instruments. All these are the opera of mathematics.”

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Thus, with antique and mediaeval looseness, Bacon conceived this science.
He devotes to it the long Pars quarta of the Opus majus: saying at the
beginning that of—
“the four great sciences the gate and key is mathematics, which the
saints found out (invenerunt) from the beginning of the world, and used
more than all the other sciences. Its neglect for the past thirty or forty
years has ruined the studies (studium) of the Latins. For whoso is
ignorant of it cannot know the other sciences, nor the things of this
world. But knowledge of this science prepares the mind and lifts it to
the tested cognition (certificatam cognitionem) of all things.”
Bacon adduces authorities to prove the need of mathematics for the study of
grammar and logic; he shows that its processes reach indubitable certitude
of truth; and “if in other sciences we would reach certitude free from doubt,
and truth without error, we must set the foundations of cognition in
mathematics.”[641] He points out its obvious necessity in the study of the
heavens, and in everything pertaining to speculative and practical
astrologia; also for the study of physics and optics. Thus his interest lay
chiefly in its application. As human science is nought unless it may be
applied to things divine, mathematics must find its supreme usefulness in its
application to the matters of theology. It should aid us in ascertaining the
position of paradise and hell, and promote our knowledge of Scriptural
geography, and more especially, sacred chronology. Next it affords us
knowledge of the exact forms of things mentioned in Scripture, like the ark,
the tabernacle, and the temple, so that from an accurate ascertainment of the
literal sense, the true spiritual meaning may be deduced. It should not be
confused with its evil namesake magic,[642] yet the true science is useful in
determining the influence of the stars on the fortunes of states. Moreover,
mathematics, through astrology, is of great importance in the certification of
the faith, strengthening it against the sect of Antichrist;[643] then in the
correction of the Church’s calendar; and finally, as all things and regions of
the earth are affected by the heavens, astrology and mathematics are
pertinent to a consideration of geography. And Bacon concludes Pars
quarta with an elaborate description of the regions, countries, and cities of
the known world.

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Bacon likewise was profoundly interested in optics, the scientia
perspectiva, which he sets forth elaborately in Pars quinta of the Opus
majus. Much space would be needed to discuss his theories of light and
vision, and the propagation of physical force, treated in the De
multiplicatione specierum. He knew all that was to be learned from Greek
and Arabic sources, and, unlike Albert, who compiled much of the same
material, he used his knowledge to build with. Bacon had a genius for these
sciences: his Scientia perspectiva is no mere compilation, and no work used
by him presented either a theory of force or of vision, containing as many
adumbrations of later theorizing.[644] Yet he fails to cast off his obsession
with the “spiritual meaning” and the utility of science for theology. He
discussed the composition of Adam’s body while in a state of innocence,
[645] a point that may seem no more tangible than Thomas’s reasonings
upon the movements of Angels, which Bacon ridicules. Again in his Optics,
after an interesting discussion of refraction and reflection, he cannot forego
a consideration of the spiritual significations of refracted rays.[646] Even his
discussion of experimental science has touches of mediaevalism, which are
peculiarly dissonant in this most original and “advanced” product of
Bacon’s genius, which now must be considered more specifically.
The speculative intellect of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was so
widely absorbed with the matter and methods of the dominant
scholasticism, that no one is likely to think of the eminent scholastics as
isolated phenomena. Plainly they were but as the highest peaks which
somewhat overtop the other mountains, through whose aggregation and
support they were lifted to their supreme altitude. But with Bacon the
danger is real lest he seem separate and unsupported; for the influences
which helped to make him are not over-evident. Yet he did not make
himself. The directing of his attention to linguistics is sufficiently accounted
for by the influence of Grosseteste and others, who had inaugurated the
study of Greek, and perhaps Hebrew at Oxford. As for physics or optics,
others also were interested—or there would have been no translations of
Greek and Arabic treatises for him to use;[647] and in mathematics there was
a certain older contemporary, Jordanus Nemorarius (not to mention
Leonardo Fibonacci), who far overtopped him. It is safe to assume that in
the thirteenth, as in the twelfth and previous centuries, there were men who
studied the phenomena of nature. But they have left scant record. A period

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is remembered by those features of its main accomplishment which are not
superseded or obliterated by the further advance of later times. Nothing has
obliterated the work of the scholastics for those who may still care for such
reasonings; and Aquinas to-day holds sway in the Roman Catholic Church.
On the other hand, the sparse footprints of the mediaeval men who essayed
the paths of natural science have long since been trodden out by myriad feet
passing far beyond them, along those ways. Yet there were these wayfarers,
who made little stir in their own time, and have long been well forgotten.
Had it not been for the letter from Pope Clement, Bacon himself might be
among them; and only his writings keep from utter oblivion the name of an
individual who, according to Bacon, carried the practice of “experimental
science” further than he could hope to do. It may be fruitful to approach
Bacon’s presentation of this science, or scientific method, through his
references to this extraordinary Picard, named Peter of Maharncuria, or
Maricourt.
In the Opus tertium, Bacon has been considering optics and mathematics,
and has spoken of this Peter as proficient in them; and thus he opens
chapter xiii., which is devoted to the scientia experimentalis:
“But beyond these sciences is one more perfect than all, which all serve,
and which in a wonderful way certifies them all: this is called the
experimental science, which neglects arguments, since they do not make
certain, however strong they may be, unless at the same time there is
present the experientia of the conclusion. Experimental science teaches
experiri, that is, to test, by observation or experiment, the lofty
conclusions of all sciences.” This science none but Master Peter knows.
By following the text further, we may be able to appreciate what Bacon will
shortly say of him:
“Another dignity of this science is that it attests these noble truths in
terms of the other sciences, which they cannot prove or investigate: like
the prolongation of human life; for this truth is in terms of medicine, but
the art of medicine never extends itself to this truth, nor is there
anything about it in medical treatises. But the fidelis experimentator has
considered that the eagle, and the stag, and the serpent, and the phoenix
prolong life, and renew their youth, and knows that these things are

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given to brutes for the instruction of men. Wherefore he has thought out
noble plans (vias nobiles) with this in view, and has commanded
alchemy to prepare a body of like constitution (aequalis complexionis),
that he may use it.”
It may be pertinent to our estimate of Bacon’s experimental science to
query where the experimentator ever observed an eagle or a phoenix
renewing its youth, outside of the Physiologus?
“The third dignity of this science is that it does not accept truths in
terms of the other sciences, yet uses them as handmaids.... And this
science attests all natural and artificial data specifically and in the
proper province, per experientiam perfectam; not through arguments,
like the purely speculative sciences, and not through weak and
imperfect experientias, like the operative sciences (scientiae
operativae).[648] So this is the mistress of all, and the goal of all
speculation. But it requires great expenditures for its prosecution;
Aristotle, by Alexander’s authority, besides those whom he used at
home in experientia, sent many thousands of men through the world to
examine (ad experiendum) the natures and properties of all things, as
Pliny tells. And certainly to set on fire at any distance would cost more
than a thousand marks, before adequate glasses could be prepared; but
they would be worth an army against the Turks and Saracens. For the
perfect experimenter could destroy any hostile force by this combustion
through the sun’s rays. This is a marvellous thing, yet there are many
other things more wonderful in this science; but very few people are
devoted to it, from lack of money. I know but one, who deserves praise
for the prosecution of its works; he cares not for wordy controversies,
but prosecutes the works of wisdom, and in them rests. So what others
as purblind men try to see, like bats in the twilight, he views in the full
brightness of day, because he is dominus experimentorum. He knows
natural matters per experientiam, and those of medicine and alchemy,
and all things celestial and below. He is ashamed if any layman, or old
woman, or knight, or rustic, knows what he does not. He has studied
everything in metal castings, and gold and silver work, and the use of
other metals and minerals; he knows everything pertaining to war and
arms and hunting; he has examined into agriculture and surveying; also
into the experiments and fortune-tellings of old women, knows the

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spells of wizards; likewise the tricks and devices of jugglers. In fine,
nothing escapes him that he ought to know, and he knows how to
expose the frauds of magic.”
It is impossible to complete philosophy, usefully and with certitude, without
Peter; but he is not to be had for a price; he could have had every honour
from princes; and if he wished to publish his works, the whole world of
Paris would follow him. But he cares not a whit for honours or riches,
though he could get them any time he chose through his wisdom. This man
has worked at such a burning-glass for three years, and soon will perfect it
by the grace of God.
There is a great deal of Roger Bacon in these curious passages; much of his
inductive genius, much of his sanguine hopefulness, not to say inventive
imagination; and enough of his credulity. No one ever knew or could
perform all he ascribes to this astounding Peter, from whom, apparently,
there is extant a certain intelligent treatise upon the magnet.[649] And as for
those burning-glasses, or possibly reflectors, by which distant fleets and
armies should be set afire—did they ever exist? Did Archimedes ever burn
with them the Roman ships at Syracuse? Were they ever more than a myth?
It is, at all events, safe to say that no device from the hand and brain of
Peter of Maharncuria ever threatened Turk or Saracen.
It is knowledge that gives insight. Modern critical methods amount chiefly
to this, that we know more. Bacon did not have such knowledge of animal
physiology as would assure him of the absurdity of the notion that an eagle
or any animal could renew its youth. Nor did he know enough to realise the
vast improbability of Greek philosophers drawing their knowledge from the
books of Hebrew prophets. And one sees how loose must have been the
practice, or the dreams, of his “experimental science.” His fundamental
conception seems to waver: Scientia experimentalis, is it a science, or is it a
means and method universally applicable to all scientific investigation? The
sciences serve it as handmaids, says Bacon; and he also says, that it alone
can test and certify, make sure and certain, the conclusions of the other
sciences. Perhaps he thought it the master-key fitting all the doors of
knowledge; and held that all sciences, so far as possible, should proceed
from experience, through further observation and experiment. But he has
not said quite this.

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He is little to be blamed for his vagueness, and greatly to be admired for
having reached his possibly inconsistent conception. Observation and
experiment were as old as human thought upon human experience. And
Albert the Great says that the conclusions of all sciences should be tested by
them. But he evinces no formal conception of either an experimental
science or method; though he has much to say as to logic, and ponderously
considers whether it is a science or the means or method of all sciences.[650]
Herein he is discussing consciously with respect to logic, the very point as
to which Bacon, in respect to experimental science, rather unconsciously
wavers: is it a science, and almost the queen? Or is it the true scientific
method to be followed by all sciences when applicable?[651] Bacon had no
high regard for the study of logic, deeming that the thoughts of untaught
men naturally followed its laws.[652] This was doubtless true, and just as
true, moreover, of experimental science as of logic. The one and the other
were built up from the ways of the common man and universal processes of
thought. Yet the logic of the trained mind is the surer; and so experimental
science may reach out beyond the crude observations of unscientific men.
Manifestly with Roger Bacon the scientia experimentalis held the place
which logic held with Albert, or queenly dialectic with Abaelard. He repeats
himself continually in stating its properties and prerogatives, yet without
advancing to greater clearness of conception. Pars sexta of the Opus majus
is devoted to it: and we may take one last glance to see whether the
statements there throw any further light upon the matter.
“The roots of the wisdom of the Latins having been placed and set in
Languages, Mathematics, and Perspective, I now wish to re-examine
these radices from the side of scientia experimentalis; because, without
experientia nothing can be known adequately. There are two modes of
arriving at knowledge (cognoscendi), to wit, argument and
experimentum. Argument draws a conclusion and forces us to concede
it, but does not make it certain or remove doubt, so that the mind may
rest in the perception of truth, unless the mind find truth by the way of
experience.”
And Bacon says, as illustration, that you could never by mere argument
convince a man that fire would burn; also that “in spite of the demonstration

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of the properties of an equilateral triangle, the mind would not stick to the
conclusion sine experientia.”
After referring to Aristotle, and adducing some examples of foolish things
believed by learned and common men alike, because they had not applied
the tests of observation, he concludes: “Oportet ergo omnia certificari per
viam experientiae.” He continues with something unexpected:
“Sed duplex est experientia: one is through the external senses, and thus
those experimenta take place which are made through suitable
instruments in astronomy, and by the tests of observation as to things
below. And whatever like matters may not be observed by us, we know
from other wise men who have observed them. This experientia is
human and philosophical; but it is not sufficient for man, because it
does not give plenary assurance as to things corporeal; and as to things
spiritual it reaches nothing. The intellect of man needs other aid, and so
the holy patriarchs and prophets, who first gave the sciences to the
world, received inner illuminations and did not stand on sense alone.
Likewise many believers after Christ. For the grace of faith illuminates
much, and divine inspirations, not only in spiritual but corporeal things,
and in the sciences of philosophy. As Ptolemy says, the way of coming
to a knowledge of things is duplex, one through the experientia of
philosophy, and the other through divine inspiration, which is much
better.”[653]
Any doubt as to the religious and Christian meaning of the last passage is
removed by Bacon’s statement of the
“seven grades of this inner science: the first is through illuminationes
pure scientiales; the next consists in virtues, for the bad man is ignorant;
... the third is in the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, which Isaiah
enumerates; the fourth is in the beatitudes which the Lord defines in the
Gospel; the fifth is in the sensibus spiritualibus; the sixth is in fructibus,
from which is the peace of God which passes omnem sensum; the
seventh consists in raptures (in raptibus) and their modes, as in various
ways divers men have been enraptured, so that they saw many things
which it is not lawful for man to tell. And who is diligently exercised in

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these experiences, or some of them, can certify both to himself and
others not only as to spiritual things, but as to all human sciences.”[654]
These utterances are religious, and bring us back to the religious, or
practical, motive of Bacon’s entire endeavour after knowledge: knowledge
should have its utility, its practical bearing; and the ultimate utility is that
which promotes a sound and saving knowledge of God. The true method of
research, says Bacon in the Compendium studii,
“... is to study first what properly comes first in any science, the easier
before the more difficult, the general before the particular, the less
before the greater. The student’s business should lie in chosen and
useful topics, because life is short; and these should be set forth with
clearness and certitude, which is impossible without experientia.
Because, although we know through three means, authority, reason, and
experientia, yet authority is not wise unless its reason be given
(auctoritas non sapit nisi detur ejus ratio), nor does it give knowledge,
but belief. We believe, but do not know, from authority. Nor can reason
distinguish sophistry from demonstration, unless we know that the
conclusion is attested by facts (experiri per opera). Yet the fruits of
study are insignificant at the present time, and the secret and great
matters of wisdom are unknown to the crowd of students.”[655]
It is as with an echo of this thought, that Bacon begins the second chapter of
his exposition of experimental science in the sixth part of the Opus majus,
from which we have but now withdrawn our attention. He anxiously
reiterates what he has already said more than once, as to the properties and
prerogatives of this scientia experimentalis. Then he gives his most
interesting and elaborate example of its application in the investigation of
the rainbow, an example too lengthy and too difficult to reproduce. In
stating the three prerogatives, he makes but slight change of phrasing; yet
his restatement of the last of them:—“The third dignitas of this science is
that it investigates the secrets of nature by its own competency and out of
its own qualities, irrespective of any connection with the other sciences,”—
signifies an autonomous science, rather than a method applicable to all
investigation. The illustrations which Bacon now gives, range free indeed;
yet in the main relate to “useful discoveries” as one might say: to ever-
burning lamps, Greek fire, explosives, antidotes for poison, and matters

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useful to the Church and State. Along these lines of discovery through
experiment, Bacon lets his imagination travel and lead him on to surmises
of inventions that long after him were realised. “Machines for navigating
are possible without rowers, like great ships suited to river or ocean, going
with greater velocity than if they were full of rowers: likewise wagons may
be moved cum impetu inaestimabili, as we deem the chariots of antiquity to
have been. And there may be flying machines, so made that a man may sit
in the middle of the machine and direct it by some devise: and again,
machines for raising great weights.”[656] The modern reality has outdone
this mediaeval dream.

CHAPTER XLII

DUNS SCOTUS AND OCCAM
The thirteenth century was a time of potent Church unity, when the papacy,
triumphant over emperors and kings, was drawing further strength from the
devotion of the two Orders, who were renewing the spiritual energies of
Western Christendom. Scholasticism was still whole and unbroken, in spite
of Roger Bacon, who attacked its methods with weapons of his own
forging, yet asserting loudly the single-eyed subservience of all the sciences
to theology. This assertion from a man of Bacon’s views, was as vain as the
Unam sanctam of Pope Boniface VIII., fulminated in 1302, arrogating for
the papacy every power on earth. In earlier decades such pretensions had
been almost acquiesced in; but the Unam sanctam was a senile outcry from
a papacy vanquished by the new-grown power of the French king, sustained
by the awakening of a French nation.
The opening years of the fourteenth century, so fatal for the papacy, were
also portentous for scholasticism. The Summa of Thomas was impugned by
Joannes Duns Scotus, whose entire work, constructive as well as critical,

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was impressed with qualities of finality, signifying that in the forms of
reasoning represented by him as well as Thomas, thought should advance
no farther. Bacon’s attack upon scholastic methods had proved abortive
from its tactlessness and confusion, and because men did not care for, and
perhaps did not understand, his arguments. It was not so with the arguments
of Duns Scotus. Throughout the academic world, thought still was set to
chords of metaphysics; and although men had never listened to quite such
dialectic orchestration as Duns provided, they liked it, perceived its
motives, and comprehended the meaning of its themes. So his generation
understood and appreciated him. That he was the beginning of the end of
the scholastic system, could not be known until the manner of that ending
had disclosed itself more fully. We, however, discern the symptoms of
scholastic dissolution in his work. His criticism of his predecessors was
disintegrating, even when not destructive. His own dialectic was so
surpassingly intricate and dizzy that, like the choir of Beauvais, it might
some day collapse. With Duns Scotus, scholasticism reasoned itself out of
human reach. And with him also, the wholeness of the scholastic purpose
finally broke. For he no longer maintained the union of metaphysics and
theology. The latter, to be sure, was valid absolutely; but, from a
speculative, it has become a practical science. It neither draws its principles
from metaphysics, nor subordinates the other sciences—all human
knowledge—to its service. Although rational in content, it possesses proofs
stronger than dialectic, and stands on revelation.
There had always been men who maintained similar propositions. But it
was quite another matter that the severance between metaphysics and
theology should be demonstrated by a prodigious metaphysical theologian
after a different view had been carried to its farthest reaches by the great
Aquinas. Henceforth philosophy and theology were set on opposite
pinnacles, only with theology’s pinnacle the higher. In spite of the last
circumstance, the coming time showed that men cannot for long possess in
peace two standards of truth—philosophy and revelation; but will be driven
to hold to the one and ignore the other. By breaking the rational union of
philosophy and theology, Duns Scotus prepared the way for Occam. The
latter also asserts vociferously the superiority of the divine truth over
human knowledge and its reasonings. But the popes are at Avignon, and the
Christian world no longer bows down before those willing Babylonian

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captives. Under such a blasted condition of the Church, how should any
inclusive Christian synthesis of thought and faith be maintained?
Duns Scotus[657] could not have been what he was, had he not lived after
Thomas. He was indeed the pinnacle of scholasticism; set upon all the rest.
Yet this pinnacle had its more particular supports—or antecedents. And
their special line may be noted without intending thereby to suggest that the
influences affecting the thought of Duns Scotus did not include all the men
he heard or read, and criticised.
That Duns Scotus was educated at Oxford, and became a Franciscan, and
not a Dominican, had done much to set the lines of thought reflected in his
doctrines. Anselm of Aosta, of Bec, of Canterbury, had been an intellectual
force in England. Duns was strongly influenced by his bold realism, by his
emphasis upon the power and freedom of the will, and by his doctrine of the
atonement.[658] But Anselm also affected Scotus indirectly through the
English worthy who stands between them.
This, of course, was Robert Grosseteste, to whom we have had occasion to
refer, yet, despite of his intrinsic worth, always in relation to his effect on
others. He was a great man; in his day a many-sided force, strong in the
business of Church and State, strong in censuring and bridling the wicked,
strong in the guidance of the young university of Oxford, and a mighty
friend of the Franciscan Order, then establishing itself there. To his pupils,
and their pupils apparently, he was a fruitful inspiration; yet the historian of
thought may be less interested in the master than in certain of these pupils
who brought to explicit form divers matters which in Grosseteste seem to
have been but inchoate.[659] One thinks immediately of Roger Bacon, who
was his pupil; and then of Duns, the metaphysician, who possibly may have
listened to some aged pupil of Grosseteste. In different ways, Duns as well
as Bacon took much from the master. And it is possible to see how the great
teacher and bishop may have incited the genius of Scotus as well as that of
Bacon to perform its task. For Grosseteste was a rarely capable and clear-
eyed man, honest and resolute, who with the entire strength of a powerful
personality insisted upon going to the heart of every proposition, and testing
its validity by the surest means obtainable. By virtue of his training and
intellectual inheritance, he was an Augustinian and a Platonist; a successor
of Anselm, rather than a predecessor of the great Dominican Aristotelians.

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He was accordingly an emphatic realist, yet one who would co-ordinate the
reality of his “universals” with the reality of experience. Even had he not
been an Augustinian, such a masterful character would have realised the
power of the human will, and felt the practical insistencies of the art of
human salvation, which was the science of theology.
Views like these prevailed at Oxford. They may be found clearly stated by
Richard of Middleton, an Oxford Franciscan somewhat older than Duns
Scotus. He declares that theology is a practical science, and emphasises the
primacy and freedom of the will. Voluntas est nobilissima potentia in
anima. Again: Voluntas simpliciter nobilior est quam intellectus: the
intellect indeed goes before the Will, as the servant who carries the candle
before his lord. So the idea of the Good, toward which the Will directs
itself, is higher than that of the True, which is the object of the mind; and
loving is greater than knowing.[660] Roger Bacon had also held that Will
(Voluntas) was higher than the knowing faculty (intellectus); and so did
Henry of Ghent,[661] a man of the Low Countries, doctor solemnis hight,
and a ruling spirit at the Paris University in the latter part of the thirteenth
century. Many of his doctrines substantially resembled those of Scotus,
although attacked by him.
So we seem to see the pit in which Duns may have digged. This man, who
was no mere fossor, but a builder, and might have deserved the name of
Poliorcetes, as the overthrower of many bulwarks, has left few traces of
himself, beyond his twenty tomes of metaphysics, which contain no
personal references to their author. The birthplace of Johannes Duns Scotus,
whether in Scotland, England or Ireland, is unknown. The commonly
accepted date, 1274, probably should be abandoned for an earlier year. It is
known that he was a Franciscan, and that the greater part of his life as
student and teacher was passed at Oxford. In a letter of commendation,
written by the General of his Order in 1304, he is already termed
subtilissimus. He was then leaving for Paris, where, two or three years later,
in 1307, he was made a Doctor. The following year he was sent to Cologne,
and there he died an enigmatical death on November 8, 1308. Report has it
that he was buried alive while in a trance.[662] Probably there was little to
tell of the life of Duns Scotus. His personality, as well as his career, seems
completely included and exhausted in his works. Yet back of them, besides
a most acutely reasoning mind, lay an indomitable will. The man never

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faltered in his labour any more than his reasoning wavered in its labyrinthic
course to its conclusions. His learning was complete: he knew the Bible and
the Fathers; he was a master of theology, of philosophy, of astronomy, and
mathematics.
The constructive processes of his genius appear to issue out of the action of
its critical energies. Duns was the most penetrating critic produced by
scholasticism. Whatever he considered from the systems of other men he
subjected to tests that were apt to leave the argument in tatters. No logical
inconsequence escaped him. And when every point had been examined with
respect to its rational consistency, this dialectic genius was inclined to bring
the matter to the bar of psychological experience. On the other hand he was
a churchman, holding that even as Scripture and dogma were above
question, so were the decrees of the Church, God’s sanctioned earthly
Civitas.
Having thus tested whatever was presented by human reason, and accepting
what was declared by Scripture or the Church, Duns proceeds to build out
his doctrine as the case may call for. No man ever drove either constructive
logic or the subtilties of critical distinctions closer to the limits of human
comprehension or human patience than Duns Scotus. And here lies the
trouble with him. The endless ramification and refinement of his dialectic,
his devious processes of conclusion, make his work a reductio ad absurdum
of scholastic ways of reasoning. Logically, eristically, the argumentation is
inerrant. It never wanders aimlessly, but winding and circling, at last it
reaches a conclusion from some point unforeseen. Would you run a course
with this master of the syllogism? If you enter his lists, you are lost. The
right way to attack him, is to stand without, and laugh. That is what was
done afterwards, when whoever cared for such reasonings was called a
Dunce, after the name of this most subtle of mediaeval metaphysicians.
Thus a man is judged by his form and method, and by the bulk of his
accomplishment. Form, method, bulk of accomplishment, with Scotus were
preposterous. When the taste or mania for such dialectics passed away, this
kind of form, this maze of method, this hopelessness of bulk, made an unfit
vehicle for a philosophy of life. Men would not search it through to find the
living principles. Yet living principles were there; or, at least, tenable and
consistent views. The main positions of Duns Scotus, some of which he

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held in opposition to Thomas, may strike us as quite reasonable: we may be
inclined to agree with him. Perhaps it will surprise us to find sane doctrine
so well hidden in such dialectic.
He held, for example, that there is no real difference between the soul and
its faculties. Thomas never demonstrated the contrary quite satisfactorily.
Again, Duns Scotus was a realist: the Idea exists, since it is conceived. For
the intellect is passive, and is moved by the intelligible. Therefore the
Universal must be a something, in order to occasion the conception of it.
Thus the reality of the concept proves the actuality of the Idea.[663] Duns
adds further explanations and distinctions regarding the actuality of
universals, which are somewhat beyond the comprehension of the modern
mind. But one may remark that he reaches his views of the actuality of
universals through analysis of the processes of thought. Sense-perception
occasions the Idea in us; there must exist some objective correspondence to
our general concepts, as there must also be in things some objective
correspondence to our perception of them as individuals, whereby they
become to us this or that individual thing. Such individual objectivity is
constituted by the thisness of the thing, its haecceitas which is to be contra-
distinguished from its general essence, to wit, its whatness, or quidditas.
Duns holds that we think individual things directly as we think abstract
Ideas; and so their haecceitas is as true an object of our thought as their
quidditas. This seems a reasonable conclusion, seeing that the individual
and not the type is the final end of creation. So our conceptions prove for us
the actuality both of the universal and the concrete; and the proof of one
and the other is rooted in sense-perception.
Nothing was of greater import with Duns than the doctrine of the primacy
of the Will over the intellect. Duns supports it with intricate argument. The
soul in substance is identical with its faculties; but the latter are formally
distinguishable from it and from each other. Knowing and willing are
faculties or properties of the soul. The will is purely spiritual, and to be
distinguished from sense-appetite: the will, and the will alone, is free;
absolutely undetermined by any cause beyond itself. Even the intellect, that
is the knowing faculty, is determined from without. Although some
cognition precedes the act of willing, the will is not determined by
cognition, but uses it. So the will, being free, is higher than the intellect. It
is the will that constitutes man’s greatness; it raises him above nature, and

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liberates him from her coercions. Not the intellect, but the will directs itself
toward the goal of blessedness, and is the subject of the moral virtues. Such
seems to be Duns’s main position; but he distinguishes and refines the
matter beyond the limits of our comprehension.[664]
Another fundamental doctrine with Duns Scotus is that theology is not a
speculative, but a practical, science—a position which Duns unfortunately
disproved with his tomes of metaphysics! But in spite of the personal
reductio ad absurdum of his argument, the position taken by him betokens
the breaking up of the scholastic system. The subject of theology, at least
for men, is the revelation of God contained in Scripture. “Holy Scripture is
a kind of knowledge (quaedam notitia) divinely given in order to direct
men to a supernatural end—in finem supernaturalem.”[665] The knowledge
revealed in Scripture relates to God’s free will and ordainment for man;
which is, that man should attain blessedness. Therefore the truths of
Scripture are practical, having an end in view; they are such as are
necessary for Salvation. The Church has authority to declare the meaning of
Scripture, and supplement it through its Catholic tradition.
Is theology, then, properly a science? Duns will not deny it; but thinks it
may more properly be called a sapientia, since according to its nature, it is
rather a knowledge of principles than a method of conclusions. It consists in
knowledge of God directly revealed. Therefore its principles are not those
of the human sciences: for example, it does not accept its principles from
metaphysics, although that science treats of much that is contained in
theology. Nor are the sciences—we can hardly say the other sciences—
subordinated to it; since their province is natural knowledge obtained
through natural means. Theology, if it be a science, is one apart from the
rest. The knowledge which makes its substance is never its end, but always
means to its end; which is to say, that it is practical and not speculative. By
virtue of its primacy as well as character, theology pertains to the Will, and
works itself out in practice: practical alike are its principles and
conclusions. Apparently, with Duns, theology is a science only in this
respect, that its substance, which is most rational, may be logically treated
with a view to a complete and consistent understanding of it.[666]
In entire consistency with these fundamental views, Duns held that man’s
supreme beatitude lay in the complete and perfect functioning of his will in

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accordance with the will of God. This was a strong and noble view of man,
free to think and act and will and love, according to the will, and aided by
the Grace, of the Creator of his will and mind. The trouble lay, as said
before, in the method by which all was set forth and proved. The truly
consequent person who made theology a practical matter, was such a one as
Francis of Assisi, with his ceaselessly-burning Christlike love actualizing
itself in living act and word—or possibly such a one as Bonaventura with
his piety. But can it ever seem other than fantastic, to state this principle,
and then bulwark it with volumes of dialectic and a metaphysics beyond the
grasp of human understanding? Not from such does one learn to do the will
of God. This was scarcely the way to make good the ultimate practical
character of religion, as against Thomas’s frankly intellectual view. Duns is
as intellectual as Thomas; but Thomas is the more consistent. And shall we
say, that with Duns all makes toward God, as the final end, through the
strong action of the human will and love? So be it—Thomas said, through
intellection and through love. Again one queries, did the Scotian reasoning
ever foster love?
And then Duns set theology apart,—and supreme. Again, so be it. Let the
impulsive religion of the soul assert its primacy. But this was not the way of
Duns. Theology and philosophy do not rest on the same principles, says he;
but how does he demonstrate it? By substantiating this severance by means
of metaphysical dialectic, and using the same dialectic and the same
metaphysics to prove that theology can do without either. Not by dialectic
and metaphysics can theology free itself from them, and set itself on other
foundations.
Duns Scotus exerted great influence, both directly and through the reaction
occasioned by certain of his teachings. The next generations were full of
Scotists, who were proud if only they might be reputed more subtle than
their master. They succeeded in becoming more inane. There were other
men, whom the critical processes of Duns led to deny the validity of his
constructive metaphysics. Of those who profited by his teaching, yet
represented this reaction against parts of it, the ablest was the Franciscan,
William of Occam, a man but few years younger than Duns. He was born in
England, in the county of Surrey; and studied under Duns at Paris. It is
known that in 1320 he was lecturing with distinction at this centre of
intellectual life. Three years afterward, he quitted his chair, and in the

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controversies then rending his Order, hotly espoused the cause of the
Spirituales—the Franciscans who would carry out the precepts of Francis to
the letter. Next, he threw himself with all the ardour of his temper into the
conflict with the papacy, and became the literary champion of the rights of
the State. He was cited before the pope, and imprisoned at Avignon, but
escaped, in 1328, and fled to the Court of the emperor, Louis of Bavaria, to
whom, as the accounts declare, he addressed the proud word: Tu me
defendas gladio, ego te defendam calamo. He died about 1347.
The succession, as it were, of Occam to Duns Scotus, is of great interest. It
was portentous for scholasticism. The pupil, for pupil in large measure he
was, profited by the critical methods and negations of the master. But he
denied the validity of the metaphysical constructions whereby Duns sought
to rebuild what his criticism had cast down or shaken. Especially, Occam
would not accept the subtle Doctor’s fabrication of an external world in
accord with the apparent necessities of thought. For with all Duns’s critical
insistency, never did a man more unhesitatingly make a universe to fit the
syllogistic processes of his reason, projected into the external world. Here
Occam would not follow him, as Aristotle would not follow Plato.
It were well to consider more specifically these two sides of Occam’s
succession to Duns Scotus, shown in his acceptance and rejection of the
master’s teaching. He followed him, of course, in emphasising the functions
of the will; and accepted the conception of theology as practical, and not
speculative, in its ends; and, like Duns, he distinguished, nay rather,
severed, theology from philosophy, widening the cleft between them. If,
with Duns, theology was still, in a sense, a science; with Occam it could
hardly be called one. Although Duns denied that theology was to be
controlled by principles drawn from metaphysics, he laboured to produce a
metaphysical counterfeit, wherein theology, founded on revelation and
church law, should present a close parallel to what it would have been, had
its controlling principles been those of metaphysics. Occam quite as
resolutely as his master, proves the untenability of current theological
reasonings. More unreservedly than Duns, he interdicts the testing of
theology by reason: and goes beyond him in restricting the sphere of
rationally demonstrable truth, denying, for instance, that reason can
demonstrate God’s unity, infinity, or even existence. Unlike Duns, he would
not attempt to erect a quasi-scientific theology, in the place of the systems

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he rejects. To make up for this negative result, Occam asserted the verity of
Scripture unqualifiedly, as Duns also did. With Occam, Scripture,
revelation, is absolutely infallible, neither requiring nor admitting the proofs
of reason. To be sure he co-ordinates with it the Law of Nature, which God
has implanted in our minds. But otherwise theology, faith, stands alone,
very isolated, although on the alleged most certain of foundations. The
provinces of science and faith are different. Faith’s assent is not required for
what is known through evidence; science does not depend on faith. Nor
does faith or theology depend on scientia. And since, without faith, no one
can assent to those verities which are to be believed (veritatibus
credibilibus), there is no scientia proprie dicta respecting them. So the
breach in the old scholastic, Thomist, unity was made utter and irreparable.
Theology stands on the surest of bases, but isolated, unsupported;
philosophy, all human knowledge, extends around and below it, and is
discredited because irrelevant to highest truth.
Thus far as to Occam’s loyal and rebellious succession to the theology of
Duns. In philosophy, it was much the same. He accepted his critical
methods, but would not follow him in his constructive metaphysics.
Although the older man was pre-eminently a metaphysician, the critical side
of his intellect drew empiric processes within the sweep of its energies.
Occam, unconvinced of the correspondence between the logic of concepts
and the facts of the external world, seeks to limit the principles of the
former to the processes of the mind. Accordingly, he rejects the inferences
of the Scotian dialectic which project themselves outward, as proofs of the
objective existence of abstract or general ideas. It is thus from a more
thoroughgoing application of the Scotian analysis of mental processes, and
a more thoroughgoing testing of the evidence furnished by experience, that
Occam refuses to recognise the existence of universals save in the mind,
where evidently they are necessary elements of thinking. Manifestly, he is
striving very earnestly not to go beyond the evidence; and he is also striving
to eliminate all unevidenced and unnecessary elements, and those chimeras
of the mind, which become actual untruths when posited as realities of the
outer world.
Such were the motives of Occam’s far from simple theory of cognition. In
it, mental perceptions, or cognitions, were regarded as symbols (signa,
termini) of the objects represented by them. They are natural, as contrasted

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with the artificial symbols of speech and writing. They fall into three
classes; first, sense-perception of the concrete object, and thirdly, so to
speak, the abstract concept representative of many objects, or of some ideal
figment or quality. Intermediate between the two, Occam puts notitia
intuitiva, which relates to the existence of concrete things. It serves as a
basis for the cognition of their combinations and relationships, and forms a
necessary antecedent to abstract knowledge. Notitia abstractiva
praesupponit intuitivam.[667] Occam holds that notitia intuitiva presents the
concrete thing as it exists. Otherwise with abstract or general concepts.
They are signa of mental presentations, or processes; and there is no ground
for transferring them to the world of outer realities. Their existence is
confined to the mind, where they are formed from the common elements of
other signa, especially those of our notitia intuitiva. “And so,” says Occam,
“the genus is not common to many things through any sameness in them,
but through the common nature (communitatem) of the signum, by which
the same signum is common to many things signified.”[668] These universals
furnish predicates for our judgments, since through them we conceive of
realities as containing a common element of nature. They are not mere
words; but have a real existence in the mind, where they perform functions
essential to thinking. Indirectly, through their bases of notitiae intuitivae,
they even reflect outer realities. “The Universal is no mere figment, to
which there is no correspondence of anything like it (cui non correspondet
aliquod consimile) in objective being, as that is figured in the thinker.”
It results from the foregoing argument, that science, ordered knowledge,
which seeks co-ordination and unity, has not to do with things; but with
propositions, its object being that which is known, rather than that which is.
Things are singular, while science treats of general ideas, which are only in
the mind. “It should be understood, that any science, whether realis or
rationalis, is only concerned with propositions (propositionibus); because
propositions alone are known.”[669]
It was not so very great a leap from the realism of Duns, which ascribed a
certain objective existence to general ideas, to the nominalism, or rather
conceptualism, of Occam, which denied it, yet recognised the real existence
and necessary functions of universals, in the mind. The metaphysically
proved realities of Duns were rather spectral, and Occam’s universals,
subjective though they were, lived a real and active life. One feels that the

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realities of Duns’s metaphysics scarcely extended beyond the thinker’s
mind. In many respects Occam’s philosophy was a strenuous carrying out
of Duns’s teachings; and when it was not, we see the younger man pushed,
or rather repelled, to the positions which he took, by the unsatisfying
metaphysics of his teacher. History shows other rebounds of thought, which
seem abrupt, and yet were consequential in the same dual way that Occam’s
doctrine followed that of Duns. Out of the Brahmin Absolute came the
Buddhist wheel of change; even as Parmenides was followed hard by
Heraclitus. And how often Atheism steps on Pantheism’s heels!
Thus, developing, revising, and changing, Occam carried out the work of
Duns, and promulgated a theory of knowledge which pointed on to much
later phases of thinking. In his school he came to be called venerabilis
inceptor, a proper title for the man who shook loose from so much previous
thought, and became the source of so many novel views. He had, indeed,
little fear of novelty. “Novelties (novitates) are not altogether to be rejected;
but as what is old (vetusta), on becoming burdensome, should be abolished,
so novelties when, to the sound judgment, they are useful, fruitful,
necessary, expedient, are the more boldly to be embraced.”[670]
It is not, however, as the inceptor of new philosophies or of novel views on
the relations between State and Papacy that we are viewing Occam here at
the close of this long presentation of the ultimate intellectual interests of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But rather as the man who represented the
ways in which the old was breaking up, and embodied the thoughts rending
the scholastic system; who even was a factor in the palpable decadence of
scholastic thinking that had set in before his eyes were closed. For from him
came a new impulse to a renewed overstudy of formal logic—with Thomas,
for example, logic had but filled its proper rôle. Withdrawing from
metaphysics the matter pertaining to the problem of universals and much
more besides, Occam transferred the same to logic, which he called omnium
artium aptissimum instrumentum.[671] This reinstatement of logic as the
instrument and means of all knowledge was to be the perdition of emptier-
minded men, who felt no difference between philosophy and the war of
words. And in this respect at least the decadence of scholasticism took its
inception from this bold and virile mind which had small reverence for
popes or for the idols of the schools. We shall not follow the lines of this
decay, but simply notice where they start.

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In the growth and decline of thought, things so go hand in hand that it is
hard to say what draws and what is drawn. In the scholastic decadence, the
preposterous use of logic was a palpable element. Yet was it cause or effect?
Obviously both. Scholasticism was losing its grasp of life; and the
universities in the fourteenth century were crowded with men whose minds
mistook words for thoughts; and because of this they gave themselves to
hypertrophic logic. On the other hand, this windy study promoted the
increasing emptiness of philosophy.
Likewise, as cause and effect, inextricably bound together, the other factors
work, and are worked upon. The number of universities increases;
professors and students multiply; but there is an awful dearth of thinkers
among them. There ceases even to be a thorough knowledge of the
scholastic systems; men study from compendia; and thereby remain most
deeply ignorant, and unfecundated by the thoughts of their forbears. Cause
and effect again! We can hardly blame them, when tomes and
encyclopaedias were being heaped mountain high, with life crushed beneath
the monstrous pile, or escaping from it. But whether cause or effect, the
energies of study slackened, and even rotted, both at the universities and
generally among the members of the two Student Orders, from whom had
come the last creators—and perhaps destroyers—of scholasticism.
Next: the language of philosophy deteriorated, becoming turbid with the
barbarisms of hair-splitting technicalities. Likewise the method of
presentation lost coherence and clarity. All of which was the result of
academic decadence, and promoted it.
So decay worked on within the system, each failing element being both
effect and cause, in a general subsidence of merit. There were also causes,
as it were, from without; which possibly were likewise effects of this
scholastic decay As the life of the world once had gone out of paganism,
and put on the new vigour of Christianity, so the life of the world was now
forsaking scholasticism, and deriding, shall we say, the womb it had
escaped from. Was the embryo ripe, that the womb had become its mephitic
prison? At all events, the fourteenth century brought forth, and the next was
filled with, these men who called the readers of Duns Scotus Dunces—and
the word still lives. Men had new thoughts; the power of the popes was
shattered, and within the Church, popes and councils fought for supremacy;

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there was no longer any actual unity of the Church to preserve the unity of
thought; Wicliffe had risen; Huss and Luther were close to the horizon; a
new science of observation was also stirring, and a new humanism was
abroad. The life of men had not lessened nor their energies and powers of
thought. Yet life and power no longer pulsed and wrought within the old
forms; but had gone out from them, and disdainfully were flouting the
emptied husks.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE MEDIAEVAL SYNTHESIS: DANTE
It lies before us to draw the lines of mediaeval development together. We
have been considering the Middle Ages very largely, endeavouring to fix in
mind the more interesting of their intellectual and emotional phenomena.
We have found throughout a certain spiritual homogeneity; but have also
seen that the mediaeval period of western Europe is not to be forced to a
fictitious unity of intellectual and emotional quality—contradicted by a
disparity of traits and interests existing then as now. Yet just as certain ways
of discerning facts and estimating their importance distinguish our own
time, making it an “age” or epoch, so in spite of diversity and conflict, the
same was true of the mediaeval period. From the ninth to the fourteenth
century, inter-related processes of thought, beliefs, and standards prevailed
and imparted a spiritual colour to the time. While not affecting all men
equally, these spiritual habits tended to dominate the minds and tempers of
those men who were the arbiters of opinion, for example, the church
dignitaries, or the theologian-philosophers. Men who thought effectively, or
upon whom it fell to decide for others, or to construct or imagine for them,
such, whether pleasure-loving, secularly ambitious, or immersed in
contemplation of the life beyond the grave, accepted certain beliefs,

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recognized certain authoritatively prescribed ideals of conduct and well-
being, and did not reject the processes of proof supporting them.
The causes making the Middle Ages a characterizable period in human
history have been scanned. We observed the antecedent influences as they
finally took form and temper in the intellectual atmosphere of the latter-day
pagan world and the cognate mentalities of the Church Fathers. We
followed the pre-Christian Latinizing of Provence, Spain, Gaul, and the
diffusion of Christianity throughout the same countries, where, save for
sporadic dispossession, Christianity and Latin were to continue, and
become, in the course of centuries, mediaeval and Romance. As waves of
barbarism washed over the somewhat decadent society of Italy and her
Latin daughters, we saw a new ignorance setting a final seal upon the
inability of these epigoni to emulate bygone achievements. Plainly there
was need of effort to rescue the disjecta membra of the antique and
Christian heritages. The wreckers were famous men, young Boëthius, old
Cassiodorus, the great pope Gregory, and princely Isidore. For their own
people they were gatherers and conservers; but they proved veritable
transmitters for Franks, Anglo-Saxons and Germans, who were made
acquainted with Christianity and Latinity between the sixth and the ninth
centuries, the period in the course of which the Merovingian kingdoms
were superseded by the Carolingian Empire.
With the Carolingian period the Middles Ages unquestionably are upon us.
The factors and material of mediaeval development, howsoever they have
come into conjunction, are found in interplay. It was for the mediaeval
peoples, now in presence of their spiritual fortunes, to grow and draw from
life. Their task, as has appeared from many points of view, was to master
the Christian and antique material, and change its substance into personal
faculty. Under different guises this task was for all, whether living in Italy
or dwelling where the antique had weaker root or had been newly
introduced.
This Carolingian time of so much sheer introduction to the teaching of the
past presented little intellectual discrimination. That would come very
gradually, when men had mastered their lesson and could set themselves to
further study of the parts suited to their taste. Nevertheless, there was even
in the Carolingian period another sort of discrimination, towards which

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men’s consciences were drawn by the contrast between their antique and
Christian heritages, and because the latter held a criterion of selection and
rejection, touching all the elements of human life.
Whoever reflects upon his life and its compass of thought, of inclination, of
passion, action, and capacity for happiness or desolation, is likely to
consider how he may best harmonize its elements. He will have to choose
and reject; and within him may arise a conflict which he must bring to
reconcilement if he will have peace. He may need to sacrifice certain of his
impulses or even rational desires. As with a thoughtful individual, so with
thoughtful people of an epoch, among whom like standards of
discrimination may be found prevailing. The ninth century received, with
patristic Christianity, a standard of selection and rejection. In conformity
with it, men, century after century, were to make their choice, and try to
bring their lives to a discriminating unity and certain peace. Yet in every
mediaeval century the soul’s peace was broken in ways demanding other
modes of reconcilement.
What profiteth a man to gain the world and lose his eternal life? Here was
the Gospel basis of the matter. And, following their conception of Christ’s
teaching, the Fathers of the Church elaborated and defined the conditions of
attainment of eternal life with God, which was salvation. This was man’s
whole good, embracing every valid and righteous element of life. Thus it
had been with Christ; thus it was with Augustine; thus it was with Benedict
of Nursia and Gregory the Great; only in Benedict and Gregory the
salvation which represented the true and uncorrupt life of man on earth, as
well as the assured preparation for eternal life with God, had shrunken from
the universality of Christ, and even from the fulness of desire with which
Augustine sought to know God and the soul. In these later men the
conception of salvation had contracted through ascetic exclusion and
barbaric fear.
Yet with Benedict and Gregory, in whom there was much constructive
sanity, and indeed with all men who were not maniacally constrained, there
was recognition that salvation was of the mind as well as through faith and
love, or abhorrent fear. It is necessary to know the truth; and surely it is
absolutely good to desire to know the truth forever, without the cumbrances
of fleshly mortality. This desire is a true part of everlasting life. Through it

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Origen, Hilary of Poictiers, Augustine largely, and after them the great
scholastics with Dante at their close, achieved salvation.
But why should one desire to know the truth utterly and forever, were not
the truth desirable, lovable? Naturally one loves that which through desire
and effort one has come to know. Love is required and also faith by him
who will have and know the salvation which is eternal life; the emotions
must take active part. Yet salvation comes not through the unguided sense-
desiderative nature. It is for reason to direct passionate desire, and raise it to
desire rationally approved, which is volition.
Thus salvation not only requires the action of the whole man, but is in and
of his entire nature. It presents a unity primarily because of its agreement
with the will of God, and then because of its unqualified and universal
insistence that it, salvation, life eternal, be set absolutely first in man’s
endeavour. What indeed could be more irrational, and more loveless and
faithless, than that any desire should prevail over the entire good of man
and the will of God as well? Oneness and peace consist in singleness of
purpose and endeavour for salvation. Herein lies the standard of conduct
and of discrimination as touching every element of mortal life.
With mediaeval men, the application of the criterion of salvation depended
on how the will of God for man, and man’s accordant conduct, was
conceived. What kind of conduct, what elements of the intellectual and
emotional life were proper for the Kingdom of Heaven? What matters
barred the way, or were unfit for the eternal spiritual state? The history of
Christian thought lies within these queries. An authoritative consensus of
opinion was represented by the Church at large, holding from century to
century a juste milieu of doctrine, by no means lax and yet not going to
ascetic extremes. Seemingly the Church maintained varying standards of
conduct for different orders of men. Yet in truth it was applying one
standard according to the responsibilities of individuals and their vows.
The Church (meaning, for our purpose, the authoritative consensus of
mediaeval ecclesiastical or religious approvals) always upheld as the ideal
of perfect living the religious life, led under the sanction and guidance of
some recognized monastic regula. So lived monks and nuns, and in more
extreme or sporadic instances, anchorites and reclusae. The main peril of

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this strait and narrow path was its forsaking, the breaking of its vows. Less
austerely guarded and exposed to further dangers were the secular clergy,
living in the world, occupied with the care of lay souls, and with other cares
that hardly touched salvation. The world avowedly, the flesh in reality, and
the devil in all probability, beset the souls of bishops and other clergy. In
view of their exposed positions “in the world,” a less austerely ascetic life
was expected of the seculars, whose lapses from absolute holiness God
might—or perhaps might not—condone.
Around, and for the most part below, regulars and seculars were the laity of
both sexes, of all ages, positions, and degrees of instruction or ignorance.
They had taken no vows of utter devotion to God’s service, and were
expected to marry, beget children, fight and barter, and fend for themselves
amid the temptations and exigencies of affairs. Well for them indeed if they
could live in communion with the Church, and die repentant and absolved,
eligible for purgatory.
For all these kinds of men and women like virtues were prescribed,
although their fulfilment was looked for with varying degrees of
expectation. For instance, the distinctly theological virtues, faith, hope, and
charity, especially the first, could not be completely attained by the
ignorance and imperfect consecration of laymen. The vices, likewise, were
the same for all, pride, anger, hypocrisy, and the rest; only with married
people a venial unchastity was sacramentally declared not to constitute
mortal sin. For this one case, human weakness, also mankind’s necessity,
was recognized; while, in practice, the Church, through its boundless
opportunities for penitence and absolution, mercifully condoned all
delinquency save obstinate pride, impenitence, and disbelief.
These were the bare poles ethical of the orthodox mediaeval Christian
scheme. How as to its intellectual and emotional inclusiveness? The many-
phased interest of the mind, i.e. the desire to know, was in principle
accepted, but with the condition that the ultimate end of knowledge should
be the attainment of salvation. It was stated and re-emphasized by well-nigh
every type of mediaeval thinker, that Theology was the queen of sciences,
and her service alone justified her handmaids. All knowledge should make
for the knowledge of God, and enlarge the soul’s relationship to its Creator
and Judge. “He that is not with me is against me.” Knowledge which does

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not aid man to know his God and save his soul, all intellectual pursuits
which are not loyal to this end, minister to the obstinacy and vainglory of
man, stiff-necked, disobedient, unsubmissive to the will of God. Knowledge
is justified or condemned according to its ultimate purpose. Likewise every
deed, business, occupation, which can fill out the active life of man. As they
make for Christ and salvation, the functions of ruler, warrior, lawyer,
artisan, priest, are justified and blessed—or the reverse.
But how as to the appetites and the emotions? How as to love, between the
sexes, parent and child, among friends? The standard of discrimination is
still the same, though its application vary. Appetite for food, if unrestrained,
is gluttony; it must be held from hindering the great end. One must guard
against love’s obsession, against sense-passion, which is so forgetful of the
ultimate good: concupiscence is sinful. Through bodily begetting, the taint
of original sin is transmitted; and in all carnal desire, though sanctioned by
the marriage sacrament, is lust and spiritual forgetfulness. When in
fornication and adultery its acts contravene God’s law, they are mortal sins
which will, if unabsolved, cast the sinner into hell.
Few men in the Middle Ages were insensible to their future lot, and
therefore the criterion of salvation unto eternal life would rarely be rejected.
But often there was conflict within the soul before it acquiesced in what it
felt compelled to recognize; and sometimes there was clear revolt against
current convictions, or practical insistence that a larger volume of the
elements of human nature were fit for life eternal.
Conflict before acquiescence had agitated the natures of sainted Fathers of
the Church, who marked out the path to salvation which the Middle Ages
were to tread. One thinks at once of Jerome’s never-forgotten dream of
exclusion from Paradise because of too great delight in classic reading.
Another phase was Augustine’s, set forth somewhat retrospectively in his
Confessions. Therein, as would seem, the drawings of the flesh were most
importunate. Yet not without sighs and waverings did the mind of Augustine
settle to its purpose of knowing only God and the soul. At all events the
chafings of mortal curiosity, the promptings of cultivated taste, and the
cravings of the flesh, were the moving forces of the Psychomachia which
passed with Patristic Christianity to the Middle Ages. Thousands upon
thousands of ardent souls were to experience this conflict before convincing

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themselves that classic studies should be followed only as they led
heavenward, and that carnal love was an evil thing which, even when
sacramentally sanctioned, might deflect the soul.
The revolt against the authoritatively accepted standard declared itself along
the same lines of conflict, but did not end in acquiescence and renunciation.
It contended rather for a peace and reconcilement which should include
much that was looked upon askance. It was not always violent, and might
be dumb to the verge of unconsciousness, merely a tacit departure from
standards more universally recognized than followed.
There were countless instances of this silent departure from the standard of
salvation. With cultivated men, it realized itself in classical studies, as with
Hildebert of Le Mans or John of Salisbury. It does not appear that either of
them experienced qualms of conscience or suffered rebuke from their
brethren. No more did Gerbert, an earlier instance of catholic interest in
profane knowledge, though legends of questionable practices were to
encircle his fame.
Other men pursued knowledge, rational or physical, in such a way as to
rouse hostile attention to its irrelevancy or repugnancy to saving faith, and
this even in spite of formal demonstration by the investigator—Roger
Bacon is in our mind—of the advantage of his researches to the Queen
Theology. Bacon might not have been so suspect to his brethren, and his
demonstration of the theological serviceableness of natural knowledge
would have passed, had he not put forth bristling manifestos denouncing the
blind acceptance of custom and authority. Moreover, the obvious tendencies
of methods of investigation advocated by him countered methods of faith;
for the mediaeval and patristic conception of salvation, whatever collateral
supports it might find in reason, was founded on the authority of revelation.
Indeed it was the lifting up of the standard of rational investigation which
distinguished the veritable revolt from those preliminary inner conflicts
which often strengthened final acquiescence. And it was the obstinate
elevation of one’s individual wisdom (as it appeared to the orthodox) that
separated the accredited supporters of the Church among theologians and
philosophers, from those who were suspect. We mark the line of the latter
reaching back through Abaelard to Eriugena. Such men, although possibly

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narrower in their intellectual interests than some who more surely abode
within the Church’s pale, may be held as broader in principle. For inasmuch
as they tended to set reason above authority, it would seem that there was
no bound to their pursuit of rational knowledge, wherewith to expand and
fortify their reason.
But if the intellectual side of man pressed upon the absolutism of the
standard of salvation, more belligerent was the insistency of love—not of
the Crucified. To the Church’s disparagement of the flesh, love made
answer openly, not slinking behind hedges or closed doors, nor even
sheltering itself within wedlock’s lawfulness. It, love, without regard to
priestly sanction, proclaimed itself a counter-principle of worth. The love of
man for woman was to be an inspiration to high deeds and noble living as
well as a source of ennobling power. It presented an ideal for knights and
poets. It could confer no immortality on lovers save that of undying fame:
but it promised the highest happiness and worth in mortal life. If only
knights and ladies might not have grown old, the supremacy of love and its
emprize would have been impregnable. But age must come, and the ghastly
mediaeval fear of death was like to drive lover and mistress at the last
within some convent refuge. Fear brought compunction and perhaps its
tears. Renunciation of the joy of life seemed a fit penance to disarm the
Judge’s wrath. So at the end of life the ideal of love was prone to make
surrender to salvation. Asceticism even enters its literature, as with the
monkish Galahad. There was, however, another way of reconcilement
between the carnal and the spiritual, the secular and the eternal, by which
the secular and carnal were transformed to symbols of the spiritual and
eternal—the way of the Vita nuova and the Divina Commedia, as we shall
see.
So in spite of conflicts or silent treasons within the natures of many who
fought beneath the Christian banner, in spite of open mutinies of the mind
and declared revolts of the heart, salvation remained the triumphant
standard of discrimination by which the elements of mediaeval life were to
be esteemed or rejected. What then were these elements to which this
standard, or deflections from it, should apply? How specify their mediaeval
guise and character? It would be possible to pass in review synoptically the
contents of this work. We might return, and then once more travel
hitherward over the mediaeval path, the many paths and byways of

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mediaeval life. We might follow and again see applied—or unapplied—
these standards of discrimination, salvation over all, and the deviations of
pretended acquiescence or subconscious departure. We might perhaps make
one final attempt to draw the currents of mediaeval life together, or observe
the angles of their divergence, and note once more the disparity of taste and
interest making so motley the mediaeval picture. But this has been done so
excellently, in colours of life, and presented in the person of a man in whom
mediaeval thought and feeling were whole, organic, living—an
achievement by the Artist moving the antecedent scheme of things which
made this man Dante what he was. We shall find in him the conflict, the
silent departures, and the reconcilement at last of recalcitrant elements
brought within salvation as the standard of universal discrimination. Dante
accomplishes this reconcilement in personal yet full mediaeval manner by
transmuting the material to the spiritual, the mortal to the eternal, through
the instrumentality of symbolism. He is not merely mediaeval; he is the end
of the mediaeval development and the proper issue of the mediaeval genius.
Yes, there is unity throughout the diversity of mediaeval life; and Dante is
the proof. For the elements of mediaeval growth combine in him,
demonstrating their congruity by working together in the stature of the full-
grown mediaeval man. When the contents of patristic Christianity and the
surviving antique culture had been conceived anew, and had been felt as
well, and novel forms of sentiment evolved, at last comes Dante to possess
the whole, to think it, feel it, visualize its sum, and make of it a poem. He
had mastered the field of mediaeval knowledge, diligently cultivating parts
of it, like the Graeco-Arabian astronomy; he thought and reasoned in the
terms and assumptions of scholastic (chiefly Thomist-Aristotelian)
philosophy; his intellectual interests were mediaeval; he felt the mediaeval
reverence for the past, being impassioned with the ancient greatness of
Rome and the lineage of virtue and authority moving from it to him and
thirteenth-century Italy and the already shattered Holy Roman Empire. He
took earnest joy in the Latin Classics, approaching them from mediaeval
points of view, accepting their contents uncritically. He was affected with
the preciosity of courtly or chivalric love, which Italy had made her own
along with the songs of the Troubadours and the poetry of northern France.
His emotions flowed in channels of current convention, save that they
overfilled them; this was true as to his early love, and true as to his final

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range of religious and poetic feeling. His was the emotion and the cruelty of
mediaeval religious conviction; while in his mind (so worked the genius of
symbolism) every fact’s apparent meaning was clothed with the
significance of other modes of truth.
Dante was also an Italian of the period in which he lived; and he was a
marvellous poet. One may note in him what was mediaeval, what was
specifically Italian, and what, apparently, was personal. This scholar could
not but draw his education, his views of life and death, his dominant
inclinations and the large currents of his purpose, from the antecedent
mediaeval period and the still greater past which had worked upon it so
mightily. His Italian nature and environment gave point and piquancy and
very concrete life to these mediaeval elements; and his personal genius
produced from it all a supreme poetic creation.
The Italian part of Dante comes between the mediaeval and the personal, as
species comes between the genus and the individual. The tremendous
feeling which he discloses for the Roman past seems, in him, specifically
Italian: child of Italy, he holds himself a Latin and a direct heir of the
Republic. Yet often his attitude toward the antique will be that of mediaeval
men in general, as in his disposition to accept ancient myth for fact; while
his own genius appears in his beautifully apt appropriation of the Virgilian
incident or image; wherein he excels his “Mantuan” master, whose
borrowings from Homer were not always felicitous. Frequently the
specifically Italian in Dante, his yearning hate of Florence, for example,
may scarcely be distinguished from his personal temper; but its civic
bitterness is different from the feudal animosities or promiscuous rages
which were more generically mediaeval. As a lighter example, there are
three lines in the fourth canto of the Purgatorio which do not reflect the
Middle Ages, nor yet pertain to Dante’s character, but are, we feel, Italian.
They are these: “Thither we drew; and there were persons who were staying
in the shadow behind the rock, as one through indolence sets himself to
stay.”
Again, Dante’s arguments in the De monarchia[672] seem to be those of an
Italian Ghibelline. Yet beyond his intense realization of Italy’s direct
succession to the Roman past, his reasoning is scholastic and mediaeval, or
springs occasionally from his own reflections. The Italian contribution to

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the book tends to coalesce either with the general or the personal elements.
Dante argues that the rewards or fruits of virtue belonged to the Roman
people because of the pre-eminent virtue, high lineage, and royal marriage-
connections, of their ancestor Aeneas.[673] Here, of course, the statements of
Virgil are accepted literally, and one notes that while the argument is
mediaeval in its absurdity, it will be made Italian in its application.
Likewise his further arguments making for the same conclusion, however
Italianized in their pointing, are mediaeval, or patristic, in their provenance:
for example, that the Roman Empire was divinely helped by miracles; that
the divine arbitrament decided the world-struggle or duellum in its favour;
and that Christ was born and suffered legally to redeem mankind under the
Empire’s authority and jurisdiction.[674] Moreover, in refuting the very
mediaeval papal arguments from “the keys,” from “the two swords,” and
from the analogy of the sun and moon, Dante himself reasons scholastically.
[675]

The De vulgari eloquentia illustrates the difference between Dante
accepting and reproducing mediaeval views, and Dante thinking for
himself. In opening he speaks of mixing the stronger potions of others with
the water of his own talent, to make a beverage of sweetest hydromel—we
have heard such phrases before! Then the first chapters give the current
ideas touching the nature and origin of speech, and describe the confusion
of language at the building of Babel: each group of workmen engaged in the
same sort of work found themselves speaking a new tongue understood
only by themselves; while the sacred Hebrew speech endured with that seed
of Shem who had taken no part in the impious construction. After this
foolishness, the eighth chapter of Book I. becomes startlingly intelligent as
Dante discusses the contemporary Romance tongues of Europe and takes up
the idioma which uses the particle si. Out of its many dialects he detaches
his thought of a volgare, a mother tongue, which shall be the illustrious,
noble, and courtly speech in Latium, and shall seem to be of every Latian
city and yet of none, and afford a standard by which the speech of each city
may be criticized. The mediaeval period offers no such penetrating
linguistic observation; and in the De Vulgari Eloquentia, as in the Convito,
Dante is deeply conscious of the worth of the Romance vernacular.
Written in the volgare, the style of the latter nondescript work bears curious
likeness to scientific Latin writing. The Latin scholastic thought shows

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plainly through this involved and scholastic volgare, while the scholastic
substance is rendered in a scarcely altered medium. The Convito is indeed a
curious work which one need not lament that Dante did not carry out to its
mediaeval interminableness in fourteen books. The four that he wrote
suffice to show its futility and apparent confusion in conception and form.
Besides incidentally explaining the thought of the idyllic Vita nuova, it
professed to be a commentary upon fourteen of Dante’s canzone, the
meaning of which had been misunderstood. Indeed they had been suspected
of disclosing a passion bearing a morganatic relationship to the love of
Beatrice. Truly understood they referred to that love which is the love of
knowledge, philosophy to wit; and their commentary should expound that,
and might properly set forth the contents of the Seven Liberal Arts and the
higher divine reaches of knowledge. The Convito seems also to mark a
stage in Dante’s life: the time perhaps when he turned, or imagined himself
as turning, to philosophy for consolation in youthful grief, or the time
perhaps when his nature looked coldly upon its early faith and sought to
stay itself with rational knowledge. The book might thus seem a De
consolatione philosophiae, after the temper, if not the manner, of Boëthius’
work, which then was much in Dante’s mind. Yet it was to be a setting forth
of knowledge for the ignorant, a sort of Summa contra Gentiles, as is hinted
in the last completed chapter. These three purposes fall in with the fact that
the work was apparently the expression of Dante’s intellectual nature, and
of his spiritual condition between the experience of the Vita nuova and the
time or state of the Commedia.[676]
Certainly the Convito gives evidence touching the writer’s mental processes
and the interests of his mind. Except for its lofty advocacy of the volgare
and its personal apologetic references, it contains little that is not blankly
mediaeval. And had it kept on to its completion, so as to have become no
torso, but a full Summa or Tesoro of liberal knowledge, its whimsical form
as a commentary upon canzone would have made it one of the most bizarre
of mediaeval compositions. One should not take this most repellent of
Dante’s writings as an adequate expression of the intellectual side of his
nature; though a significant phrase may be drawn from it: “Philosophy is a
loving use of wisdom (uno amoroso uso di sapienza) which chiefly is in
God, since in Him is utmost wisdom, utmost love, and utmost
actuality.”[677] A loving use of wisdom—with Dante the pursuit of

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knowledge was no mere intellectual search, but a pilgrimage of the whole
nature, loving heart as well as knowing mind, and the working virtues too.
This pilgrimage is set forth in the Commedia, perhaps the supreme creation
of the Middle Ages, and a work that by reason of the beautiful affinity of its
speech with Latin,[678] exquisitely expressed the matters which in Latin had
been coming to formulation through the mediaeval centuries.
The Commedia (Inferno, Purgatorio, Paradiso) is a Summa, a Summa
salvationis, a sum of saving knowledge. It is such just as surely as the final
work of Aquinas is a Summa theologiae. But Aquinas was the supreme
mediaeval theologian-philosopher, while Dante was the supreme
theologian-poet; and with both Aquinas and Dante, theology includes the
knowledge of all things, but chiefly of man in relation to God. Such was the
matter of the divina scientia of Thomas, and such was the subject of the
Commedia, which was soon recognized as the Divina Commedia in the very
sense in which Theology was the divine science. The Summa of Thomas
was scientia not only in substance, but in form; the Commedia was scientia,
or sapientia, in substance, while in form it was a poem, the epic of man the
pilgrim of salvation. In every sense, Aristotelian and otherwise, it was a
work of art; and herein if we cannot compare it with a Summa, we may
certainly liken it to a Cathedral, which also was a work of art and a Summa
salvationis wrought in stone. For a Cathedral—it is the great French type
we have in mind—was a Summa of saving knowledge, as well as a place for
saving acts. And presenting the substance of knowledge in the forms of art,
very true art, the matter of which had long been pondered on and loved or
hated, the Cathedral in its feeling and beauty, as well as in the order of its
manifested thought, was a Commedia; for it too was a poem with a happy
ending, at least for those who should be saved.
The Cathedral had grown from dumb barrel-vaulted Romanesque to Gothic,
speaking in all the terms of sculpture and painted glass. It grew out of its
antecedents. The Commedia rested upon the entire evolution of the Middle
Ages. Therein had lain its spiritual preparation. To be sure it had its casual
forerunners (precursori): narratives, real or feigned, of men faring to the
regions of the dead.[679] But these signified little; for everywhere thoughts
of the other life pressed upon men’s minds: fear of it blanched their hearts;
its heavenly or hellish messengers had been seen, and not a few men

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dreamed that they had walked within those gates and witnessed clanging
horrors or purgatorial pain. Heaven they had more rarely visited.
Dante gave little attention to any so-called “forerunners,” save only two,
Paul and Virgil. The former was a warrant for the poet’s reticence as to the
manner of his ascent to Heaven;[680] the latter supplied much of his scheme
of Hell. Yet there were one or two others possessed of some affinity of soul
with the great Florentine, who perhaps knew nothing of them. One of these
was Hildegard of Bingen, with her vision of the spirits in the cloud, and her
pungent sights of the bitterness of the pains of hell.[681] Another sort of
affinity is disclosed in the allegorical Anticlaudianus of Alanus de Insulis,
in which Reason can take Prudentia just so far upon her heavenly journey,
and then gives place to Theology, even as Virgil, symbol of rational
wisdom, gives place to Beatrice at the summit of the Mount of Purgatory.
[682] Dante might have drawn still more enlightenment from the De
sacramentis of Hugo of St. Victor, in which the rational basis of the
universal scheme of things is shown to lie in the principle of allegorical
intendment. Yet one finds few traces of Hugo in Dante except through
Hugo’s pupil, Richard, whose works he had read. That such apt forerunners
should scarcely have affected him shows how he was taught and inspired,
not by individuals, but by the entire Middle Ages.
One observes mediaeval characteristics in the Commedia raised to a higher
power. The mediaeval period was marked by contrasts of quality and of
conduct such as cannot be found in the antique or the modern age. And
what other poem can vie with the Commedia in contrasts of the beautiful
and the loathsome, the heavenly and the hellish, exquisite refinement of
expression and lapses into the reverse,[683] love and hate, pity and cruelty,
reverence and disdain? These contrasts not only are presented by the story;
they evince themselves in the character of the author. Many scenes of the
Inferno are loathsome:[684] Dante’s own words and conduct there may be
cruel and hateful[685] or show tender pity; and every reader knows the
poetic beauty which glorifies the Paradiso, renders lovely the Purgatorio,
and ever and anon breaks through the gloom of Hell.
Another mediaeval quality, sublimated in Dante’s poem, is that of elaborate
plan, intended symmetry of composition, the balance of one incident or
subject against another.[686] And finally one observes the mediaeval

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inclusiveness which belongs to the scope and purpose of the Commedia as a
Summa of salvation. Dante brings in everything that can illuminate and fill
out his theme. Even as the Summa of St. Thomas, so the Commedia must
present a whole doctrinal scheme of salvation, and leave no loopholes,
loose ends, broken links of argument or explanation.
The substance of the Commedia, practically its whole content of thought,
opinion, sentiment, had source in the mediaeval store of antique culture and
the partly affiliated, if not partly derivative, Latin Christianity. The
mediaeval appreciation of the Classics, and of the contents of ancient
philosophy, is not to be so very sharply distinguished from the attitude of
the fifteenth or sixteenth, nay, if one will, the eighteenth, century, when the
Federalist in the young inchoately United States, and many an orator in the
revolutionary assemblies of France, quoted Cicero and Plutarch as arbiters
of civic expediency. Nevertheless, if we choose to recognize deference to
ancient opinion, acceptance of antique myth and poetry as fact,[687]
unbounded admiration for a shadowy and much distorted ancient world, as
characterizing the mediaeval attitude toward whatever once belonged to
Rome and Greece, then we must say that such also is Dante’s attitude,
scholar as he was;[688] and that in his use of the Classics he differed from
other mediaeval men only in so far as above them all he was a poet.
Lines of illustrative examples begin with the opening canto of the Inferno,
where Dante addresses Virgil as famoso saggio, an appellative strictly
corresponding with the current mediaeval view of the “Mantuan.”
Mediaeval also is the grouping of the great poets who rise to meet Virgil,
first Homer, then Orazio satiro, and Ovid and Lucan.[689] More narrowly
mediaeval, that is, pertaining particularly to the thirteenth century, is
Dante’s profound reverence for the authority of Aristotle, il maestro di color
che sanno.[690] It may be that the poet’s sense of the enormous, elect,
importance of Aeneas,[691] and his putting Rhipeus, most righteous of the
Trojans, as the fifth regal spirit in the Eagle’s eye,[692] belonged more
especially to Dante as the Ghibelline author of the De monarchia. But
generically mediaeval was his acceptance of antique myth for fact, a most
curious instance of which is his referring to the consuming of Meleager
with the consuming of the brand, to illustrate a point of physiological
psychology.[693] Antique heroes, even monsters, seem as real to him as the
people of Scripture and history. It is not, however, his mediaevalism, but his

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own greatness that enables him to lift his treatment of them to the level of
their presentation in the Classics. Noble as an antique demigod is the
damned Jason, silent and tearless, among the scourged;[694] and Ulysses is
as great in the tale he tells from out the lambent flame as he was in the
palace of Alcinoos, telling the tale which Dante never read.[695]
The poet, especially in the Purgatorio, constantly balances moral examples
alternately drawn from pagan and sacred story. This propensity was quite
mediaeval; for throughout the Middle Ages the antique authority was used
to fortify or parallel the Christian argument. Yet herein, as always, Dante is
Dante as well as a mediaeval man; and his moral examples, for the aid of
souls who are purging themselves for Heaven, are interesting and curious
enough. On the pavement of the first ledge of Purgatory, Lucifer is figured
falling from Heaven and Briareus transfixed by the bolt of Jove; then
Nimrod, Niobe, Saul, Arachne, Rehoboam, Eriphyle and Sennacherib, the
Assyrians routed after Holophernes’ death, and Troy in ashes.[696] On the
third ledge, as instances of gentle forgivingness, he sees in vision the Virgin
Mary, and then appear Peisistratus (tyrant of Athens) refusing to avenge
himself, and Stephen asking pardon for his slayers.[697] But the most
wonderful instance of this combining of the Christian and the antique, each
at its height of feeling, occurs in the thirtieth canto of the Purgatorio, where
angels herald the appearance of Beatrice with the chant, Benedictus qui
venis, and, as they scatter flowers, sing Manibus o date lilia plenis. This
unison of the hail to Christ upon His sacrificial entry into Jerusalem and the
Virgilian heartbreak over the young Marcellus, shows how Dante rose in his
combinings, and how potent an element of his imagination was the antique.
[698]

Of course the plan of Hell reflects the sixth Book of the Aeneid, and
throughout the whole Commedia the Virgilian phrase rises aptly to the
poet’s lips. “Thou wouldst that I renew the desperate grief which presses
my heart even before I put it into words,” says Ugolino, nearly as Aeneas
speaks to Dido.[699] And in the Paradiso the power of the Dantesque
reminiscence rouses the reader, spiritually as it were, to emulate the
glorious ones who passed to Colchos.[700] A more desperate passage was the
lot of those who must drop from Acheron’s bank into Charon’s boat;—the
whole scene here is quite reminiscent of Virgil. The simile:

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“Quam multa in silvis auctumni frigore primo
Lapsa cadunt folia,”

is even beautified and made more pregnant with significance in Dante’s

“Come d’autunno si levan le foglie
L’una appresso dell’altra....”[701]

On the other hand, the threefold attempt of Aeneas to embrace Anchises is
stripped of its beautiful dream-simile in Dante’s use.[702] A lovelier bit of
borrowing is that of the quick springing up again of the rush, the symbol of
humility, l’umile pianta, with which the poet is girt before proceeding up
the Mount of Purgatory.[703]
With Dante the pagan antique represented much that was philosophically
true, if not veritably divine. In his mind, apparently, the heathen good stood
for the Christian good, and the conflict of the heathen deities with Titan
monsters symbolized, if indeed it did not continue to make part of, the
Christian struggle against the power of sin.[704] We may be jarred by the
apostrophe:

“... O sommo Giove,
Che fosti in terra per noi crucifisso.”[705]

But this is a kind of Christian-antique phrase by no means unexampled in
mediaeval poetry. And we feel the poetic breadth and beauty of the
invocation in which Apollo symbolizes or represents, exactly what we will
not presume to say, but at all events some veritable spiritual power, as
Minerva does, apparently, in another passage.[706] In such instances the
antique image which beautifies the poem is transfigured to a Christian
symbol, if it does not present actual truth.
Yet however universally Dante’s mind was solicited by the antique matter
and his poet’s nature charmed, he was profoundly and mediaevally
Christian. The Commedia is a mediaeval Christian poem. Its fabric,
springing from the life of earth, enfolds the threefold quasi-other world of

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damned, of purging, and of finally purified, spirits. It is dramatic and
doctrinal. Its drama of action and suffering, like the narratives of Scripture,
offers literal fact, moral teaching, and allegorical or spiritual significance.
The doctrinal contents are held partly within the poem’s dramatic action and
partly in expositions which are not fused in the drama. Thus whatever else it
is, the poem is a Summa of saving doctrine, which is driven home by
illustrations of the sovereign good and abysmal ill coming to man under the
providence of God. One may perhaps discern a twofold purpose in it, since
the poet works out his own salvation and gives precepts and examples to aid
others and help truth and righteousness on earth. The subject is man as
rewarded or punished eternally by God—says Dante in the letter to Can
Grande. This subject could hardly be conceived as veritable, and still less
could it be executed, by a poet who had no care for the effect of his poem
upon men. Dante had such care. But whether he, who was first and always a
poet, wrote the Commedia in order to lift others out of error to salvation, or
even in order to work out his own salvation,—let him say who knows the
mind of Dante. No divination, however, is required to trace the course of
the saving teaching, which, whether dramatically exemplified or expounded
in doctrinal statement, is embodied in the great poem; nor is it hard to note
how Dante drew its substance from the mediaeval past.
The Inferno, which is the most dramatic and realistic, “Dantesque,” part of
the Commedia, and replete with terrestrial interest, is doctrinally the least
rich. Its doctrine chiefly lies in its scheme of punishment, or divine
vengeance, for different sins. Herein Dante followed no set series like the
seven deadly sins expiated in Purgatory. Neither the Church nor
authoritative writers had laid out the plan of Hell. Dante had in mind
Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, also Cicero’s De officiis,[707] and,
structurally, Virgil. His scheme also was affected by his own character,
situation, and aversions, and assuredly by the movement of its own
composition. At the mouth of Hell the worthless nameless ones and the
neutral angels receive their due. Then after the sad calm of the place of the
unbaptized and the great blameless heathen, the veritable Hell begins, and
the series of tortures unfold, the lightest being such as punish incontinence,
while the most awful are reserved for those fraudulent ones who have
betrayed a trust. Dante’s power of presenting the humanly loathsome does
not let the progress of hellish torment fail in climax even to the end, where

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Brutus, Cassius, and Judas are crunched in the dripping mouths of Lucifer
at the bottom of the lowest pit of Hell.
The general idea of hell torments came to the poet from current beliefs and
authoritative utterances, ranging from the “outer darkness” of the Gospel to
the lurid oratory of St. Bernard. Dante’s thoughts were drawn generically
from the stores of mediaeval convictions, approvals, and imaginings: they
were given to him by his epoch. Of necessity—innocently, one may say—
he made them into concrete realities because he was Dante. Terrifying
phrases and crude ghastliness were raised through his dramatic power to
living experiences. The reader goes through Hell, sees with his own eyes,
hears with his own ears, and stifles in the choking air. Doubtless the
narrative brought fear and contrition to the men of Dante’s time. But for us
the disproportion of the vengeance to the crime, the outrage of everlasting
torments for momentary, even impulsive sin, is shocking and preposterous.
[708] The torments themselves present conditions which become unthinkable
when we try to conceive them as enduring eternally. Human flesh, or
implicated spirit could not last beneath them. And as for our impulses, there
is many a tortured soul with whom we would keep company, for instance,
with the excellent band of Sodomites—Priscian (!) Brunetto Latini, and
those three Florentines whose “honoured names” the poet greets with
reverence and affection.[709] One might even wish to make a third in the
flame which enwraps Diomede and Ulysses. In fact, Dante’s dramatic
genius has brought the mediaeval hell to a reductio ad absurdum, to our
minds.
The poet is of it too. He can pity those who touch his pity. And how great he
can be, how absolute. There is compacted in the story of Francesca all that
can be thought or felt over unhappy love. Yet Dante never doubts the justice
of the punishment he describes; sometimes he calmly or cruelly approves.
Nel mio bel San Giovanni! How many thousands have quoted these
detached words to show the poet’s love of his beautiful baptistery. But, in
fact, he refers to the little cylindrical places where stood the baptizing
priests, in order to bring home to the reader the size of the holes in the
burning rock from which protruded the quivering feet of Simoniacs![710] It
appears that the souls of all the damned will suffer more when they shall
again be joined to their bodies after the resurrection.[711]

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The Inferno fully exemplifies the doctrinal statement obscurely set over the
gate which shut out hope: moved by justice, the Trinity, “divine power,
supreme wisdom, primal love, created me (Hell) to endure eternally.” Dante
follows this current authoritative opinion, stated by Aquinas. Here one may
repeat that Dante is the child of the Middle Ages, rather than a disciple of
any single teacher. If he follows Aquinas more than any other scholastic, he
follows Bonaventura also with breadth and balance. These two, however,
were themselves final results of lines of previous development. Both were
rational and also mystically contemplative, though the former quality
predominates in Thomas and the latter in Bonaventura. And in Dante’s
poem, at the end of the Paradiso, Theology, the rational apprehension of
divine truth, gives place to contemplation’s loftier insight. Dante is kin to
both these men; but when he thinks, more frequently he thinks like Thomas,
and the intellectual realization of life is dominant with him. This was
evident in the Convito; and that the intellectual vision constitutes the
substance of the Commedia, becomes luminously apparent in the Paradiso.
[712] It is even suggested at the gate of Hell, within which the wretched
people will be seen, who have lost the good of the Intellect,[713] by which is
meant knowledge of God.
The Purgatorio presents more saving doctrine than the cantica of
damnation. Its Mount with the earthly paradise at the top, may have been
his own, but might have been taken from the Venerable Bede or Albertus
Magnus.[714] The ante-purgatory appears as a creation of the poet,
influenced by certain passages of the Aeneid and by ancient disciplinary
practices which kept the penitents waiting outside the church.[715] The
teaching of the whole cantica relates to the purgation of pride, envy, anger,
accidia (sloth), avarice, gluttony, lust. These are the seven deadly sins
whose provenance is early monasticism.[716] Through their purgation man is
made pure and fit to mount to the stars.
We shall not follow Dante through the Purgatorio and Paradiso, or observe
in detail the teachings set forth and the sources whence they were derived.
[717] But a brief reference to the successive incidents and topics of
instruction will show how the Commedia touches every key of saving
doctrine. The soul entering Purgatory goes seeking liberty from sin,[718] and
as a first lesson learns to detach itself from memories of the damned.[719] It
receives some slight suggestion of the limits of human reason;[720] and is

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told that according to the correct teaching there is one soul in man with
several faculties.[721] It learns the risk of repentance in the hour of death;
[722] and the efficacy of the prayers of others to help souls through their
purifying expiation; also, that, after death, souls can advance only by the aid
of grace.[723] The symbolism of the gate of Purgatory teaches the need of
contrition and confession. Upon the first ledge, the proud do penance,
disciplined with examples of humility, and through the Lord’s Prayer are
taught man’s entire dependence upon God. It is fitting that Pride should be
the first sin expiated, since it lies at the base of all sins in the Christian
scheme. Much doctrine is inculcated by the treatment of the different sins
and the appositeness of the hymns sung by the penitents.[724]
Ascending the second ledge, Virgil, i.e. human reason, expounds the first
principles of the doctrine of that love which is of the Good.[725] Next is set
forth the theory of human free-will and the effect of the spheres in directing
human inclination—all in strict accord with the teaching of Thomas;[726]
and then, still in accord with Thomas, the fuller nature of love (or desire) is
expounded, and the allotment of purgatorial pains in expiation of the
various modes of evil desire or failure to love aright.[727] These fitting pains
are as a solace to the soul yearning to accomplish its purgation.[728] Next,
generation is explained, the creation of the soul, and the manner of its
existence after separation from the body, according to dominant scholastic
theories.[729] In the concluding cantos of the Purgatorio, much Church
doctrine is symbolically set forth by the Mystic Procession and the rivers of
the earthly paradise, Lethe and Eunoe—the latter representing sacramental
grace through which good works, killed by later sins, are made to live
again.[730] The earthly paradise symbolizes the perfect happiness of life in
the flesh, and the state wherein man is fit to pass to the heavenly Paradise.
Besides doctrine directly bearing on Salvation, the Commedia contains
explanations by the way, needed to understand Dante’s journey through the
earth and heavens, and give it verisimilitude. Apparently these explanations
were also intended to afford a sufficient knowledge of the structure of the
universe. The Paradiso abounds in this kind of information, largely
physical and astronomical. Its first canto offers a general statement,
beautifully put, of the ordering of created things. In this instance, the
instruction is not exclusively astronomical or physical,[731] but touches
upon animated creatures, and follows Thomist teaching. Another interesting

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instance is the explanation in the second canto of the spots on the moon and
then of the influence of the heavens. Here the astronomical matter runs on
into elucidations touching human nature, even that human nature which is
to be saved through saving doctrine. In this way the Christian-Thomist-
Dantesque scheme of knowledge holds together. The Commedia is the
pilgrimage of the soul after all wisdom, and includes, implicitly at least, the
matter of the Convito.
The Paradiso contains the chief store of saving knowledge. It sets forth the
ultimate problems of human life and divine salvation, with due emphasis
laid upon the limitations of human understanding. Dante, conscious of the
strenuousness of his high argument, warns off all but the chosen few.
A first point learned in the heavenly voyage is that no soul in Paradise
desires aught save what it has; since such desire would contravene the will
of God. Paradise is everywhere in Heaven, though the divine grace rains not
upon all in one mode.[732] Beatified souls do not dwell in any particular star,
though Plato seems to say so. Scripture condescends to figure the
intelligible under the guise of sensible forms, as Plato may have done.[733]
Broken vows and their reparation are now considered. Then the history of
the Roman Eagle brings out the fact that Christ was crucified under Tiberius
and His death avenged by Titus, which leads on to the explanation of the
Fall and the Redemption, occupying the seventh canto. The next offers
comment upon the divine goodness and the diversity of human lots; and
shows how the bitter may rise from the sweet. With deep consistency the
poet exclaims against the insensate toilsome reasonings through which
mortals beat their wings downward, away from God.[734]
In canto thirteen the reader is enlightened regarding the wisdom of Adam,
of Solomon, and of Christ; and then as to the existence of the beatified soul
before and after it is clothed with the glorified body of the Resurrection.[735]
Incidentally the justice of eternal punishment is adverted to.[736] The depth
of the divine righteousness is next presented,[737] and its application to the
heathen, with illustrations of God’s saving ways, in the instances of certain
princes who loved righteousness, including Trajan and the Trojan Rhipeus.
[738] The incomprehensibility of Predestination next receives attention.

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Now intervenes the marvellous and illuminative beauty of canto twenty-
three, preceding Dante’s declaration of his creed, upon interrogatories from
the apostles, Peter, James, and John. In this way he states the dogmatic
fundamentals of the Christian Faith, and the substantiating rôles of
philosophic argument and authority.[739] After this, the vision of the
hierarchies of angels leads on to discourse upon their creation and nature,
the immediate fall of those who fell, the exaltation of the steadfast with
added grace, and the mode and measure of their knowledge. Thomas is
followed in this scholastic argument.
With the vision of the Rose, rational theology gives place to mystic
contemplation;[740] and further visions of the divine ordering precede the
prayer to the Virgin, with which the last canto opens—that prayer so
beautiful and so expressive of mediaeval thought and feeling as to the most
kind and blessed Lady of Heaven. This prayer or hymn is made of phrases
which the mediaeval mind and heart had been recasting and perfecting for
centuries. It is almost a great cento, like the Dies Irae. After the Lady’s
answering benediction, there comes to Dante, in grace, the final mystic
vision of the Trinity, enfolding all existence—substance, accidents and their
modes, bound with love in one volume. Supreme dogmatic truth is set forth,
and the furthest strainings of reason are stilled in supersensual and super-
rational vision, which satisfies all intellectual desire. This vision,
vouchsafed through the Virgin’s grace, assures the pilgrim soul: the goal is
reached alike of knowledge and salvation.
One may say that the Commedia begins and ends with the Virgin. It was she
who sent Beatrice into the gates of Hell to move Virgil—meaning human
reason—to go to Dante’s aid. The prayer which obtains her benediction, and
the vision following, close the Paradiso. So the teaching of the poem ends
in mediaeval strains. For the Virgin was the mediaeval goddess, beloved
and universally adored, helpful in every way, and the chief aid in bringing
man to Heaven. But no more with Dante than with other mediaeval men is
she the end of worship and devotion. Her eyes are turned on God. So are
those of Beatrice, of Rachel, and of all the saints in Paradise. As for man on
earth, he is viator, journeying on through discipline, in righteousness and
beneficence, but above all in faith and hope and love of God, with his eyes
of knowledge and desire set on God. God is the goal, even of the vita
activa, which is also training and enlightenment. Loving his brother whom

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he hath seen, man may learn to love God—practising himself in love. Even
Christ’s parable, “Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of the least of these,”
rightly interpreted, implies that the end of human charity is God: the human
charity is preparation, obedience, means of enlightenment. The brother for
whom Christ died—that is he whom thou shalt love, and that is why thou
shalt love him. In themselves human relationships are disciplinary,
ancillary, as all the sciences are ancillary to Theology. Mediaeval religion is
turned utterly toward God; the relationship of the soul to God is its whole
matter. It is not humanitarian: not human, but divina scientia, fides, et amor,
make mediaeval Christianity. Thus Dante’s doctrine is mediaeval. Toward
God moves the desire of the viatores in Purgatory, though they still are
incidentally mindful of earth’s memories. In Paradise the eyes of all the
blessed are set on Him. Because of the divine love they may for a moment
turn the eyes of their knowledge and desire to aid a fellow-creature; the
occasion past, they fix them again on God: thus the Virgin, thus Bernard,
thus Beatrice.
As a son of the Middle Ages, Dante was possessed with the spirit of
symbolism. Allegory, with him, was not merely a way of expressing that
which might transcend direct statement: it embodied a principle of truth.
The universally accepted allegorical interpretation of Scripture justified the
view that a deeper verity lay in allegorical significance than in literal
meaning. This principle applied to other writings also. “Now since the
literal sense [of the first canzone] is sufficiently explained, it is time to
proceed to the allegorical and true interpretation.”[741]
In the Vita Nuova and somewhat more lifelessly in the Convito, Dante
explains that it is his way to invest his poetry with a secondary or
allegorical sense. He proposes in the latter work to carry out the formal
notion of the four kinds of meaning contained in profound writings—literal,
allegorical, moral, anagogical.[742] He never holds himself, however, to the
lines of any such obsession, but is content in practice with the literal and the
broadly allegorical sense.[743] Even then the great Florentine occasionally
can be jejune enough. The conception of the ten heavens figuring the Seven
Liberal Arts along with metaphysics, ethics, and theology, as a plan of
composition for the Convito,[744] was on a level with the structural
symbolism of the De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii of Capella. Yet the
likening of Ethics to the primum mobile and Theology to the Empyrean has

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bearing on Dante’s, and the mediaeval, scheme of the sciences, among
which Theology is chief.
Allegory moulds the structure and permeates the substance of the
Commedia. For this Dante himself vouches in the famous dedicatory letter
to Can Grande, where his thoughts may be heard creaking scholastically, as
he describes the nature of his poem, and explains why he entitled it
Commedia:

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“Literally, the subject is the state of souls after death taken simply. If,
however, the work be accepted allegorically, the subject is man,
according as by merit or demerit through freedom of choice (arbitrii
libertatem) he is subject to Justice, rewarding or punitive.”
This is the positive statement emanating, in all probability, from the poet.
Perhaps it is as well that he did not live to inaugurate the series of
Commentaries upon his poem, which began within a few years of his death
and show no signs of ceasing.[745] So it has been left to others to determine
the metes and bounds and special features of the Commedia’s allegorical
intent. The task has proved hazardous, because Dante was such a great poet,
so realistic in his visualizing and so masterful in forcing the different phases
of his many-sided thoughts to combine in concrete creations. His drama is
so living that one can hardly think it an allegory.
Evidently certain matters, like the Mystic Procession and its apocalyptic
appurtenances in the last cantos of the Purgatorio, are sheer allegory. Such,
while suited to suggest theological tenets, are formal and lifeless, a little
like the hieratic allegorical mosaics of the fourth and fifth centuries, which
were composed before Christian art had become imbued with Christian
feeling.[746] Indeed, doffing for an instant one’s reverence for the great poet,
one may say that from the point of view of art and life, Dante’s symbolism
becomes jejune, or at least ceases to draw us, according as it becomes
palpable allegory.[747]
Beyond such incidents one recognizes that the general course of the poem,
its more pointed occurrences, together with its chief characters and the
scenes amid which they move, have commonly both literal and allegorical
meaning.[748] Usually it is wise not to press either side too rigorously. The
poet’s mind worked in the clearly imagined setting and dramatic action of
his poem, where fact and symbolism combined in that reality which is both
art and life. Surely the Commedia was completed and rendered real and
beautiful through many a touch and incident which had no allegorical
intent. Even as in a French cathedral, the main sculptured and painted
subjects have doctrinal, that is to say, allegorical, significance, besides their
literal truth; but there is also much lovely carving of scroll and flowered
ornament and beast and bird, which beautifies the building.

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For Dante’s purpose, to set out the state of disembodied spirits after death,
allegory might prove prejudicial, because of the intensity of his artist’s
vision. Much of the poem’s symbolism, especially in the Paradiso, belongs
to that unavoidable imagery to which every one is driven when attempting
to describe spiritual facts. Such symbolism, however, when constructed
with the plastic power of a Dante, may become itself so convincing or
compelling as to reduce the intended spiritual signification to the terms of
its concrete embodiment in the symbol. In view of the carnality of most sin,
one is not surprised to find the place of punishment a converging cavity
within the earth. With Dante, as with Hildegard, the sights and torments of
Hell are realistically given quite as of course. Perhaps Dante’s Mount of
Purgatory begins to give us pause, and its corniced mise en scène tends to
enflesh the idea of spirit and materialize its purgation. But the limiting
effect of symbolism is most keenly felt in the Paradiso, notwithstanding the
beauty of that cantica; for its very concrete symbolism seems sometimes to
ensphere the intended truths of spirit in a sort of crystalline translucency. It
is all a marvellously imagined description of the state of blessed souls. Yet
in the final pure and glorious image of a white rose (candida rosa) the
company of the glorified spirits is so visualized as to become, surely not
theatrical, but as if assembled upon the rounding tiers of seats occupied by
an audience.[749] There are topics in which the sheer ratiocination of
Thomas is more completely spiritual than the poetic vision of Dante.
Dante’s most admirable symbolic creation was also his dearest reality—
Beatrice. And while this being in which he has immortalized his fame and
hers, is eminently the creation of his genius, the elements were drawn from
the many-chambered mediaeval past. Some issued out of the vast matter of
chivalric love, with its high heart of service and sense of its own worth, its
science, its foolish and most wise reasoning, its preciosity of temper—
Dante and his literary friends were virtuosos in everything pertaining to its
understanding.[750] This love was of the fine-reasoning mind. The first
canzone of the Vita Nuova does not begin “Donne, che sentite amore,” but:
“Donne, ch’ avete intelletto d’ amore.” Through that book love is what it
never ceases to be with Dante, intelligenza:

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“Intelligenza nuova, che l’ Amore
Piangendo mette in lui....”

The piangendo, the tears, have likewise part; without them love is not had
or even understood. The enormous sense of love’s supreme worth—that too
is in Dante. It had all been with the Troubadours of Provence, with Chrétien
de Troies, and with the great Minnesingers, and had been reasoned on,
appreciated, felt and wept over, by ladies and knights who listened to their
poems. From France and Provence love and its reasonings had come to Italy
even before Dante’s eyes had opened to it and other matters.
This was one strain that entered the Beatrice of the Vita Nuova, of the
Convito, of the Commedia. But Beatrice is something else: she is, or
becomes, Theology, the God-given science of the divine and human. Long
had Theologia (divina scientia) been a queen; and even before her,
Philosophia, as with Boëthius, had been a queenly woman gowned with as
full symbolical particularity as ever the Beatrice of Dante. Indeed from the
time of the Psychomachia of Prudentius to the Roman de la Rose of De
Lorris and De Meun, every human quality, and many an aspect of human
circumstance, had been personified, for the most part under the forms of
gracious or seductive women. Above all of these rose, sweet, gracious, and
potent, the Virgin Queen of Heaven. It came as of course to Dante to
symbolize his conception of divine wisdom in a woman’s form. The
achievement of his genius was the transfusing combination of elements of
courtly love, didactic allegory, and divina scientia, in a creature before
whom the whole man Dante, heart and reason and religious faith, could
stand and gaze and love and worship.
Beatrice was his and of him always; but with the visions and experience of
that mature and grace-illuminated manhood, which expressed itself in the
Commedia, she comes to be much that she had not been when she lived on
earth or had just left it, and Dante was a maker of exquisite verses in
Florence; and much too that she had scarce become while the poet was
consoling himself with philosophy for his bereavement and the dulling of
his early faith. Beatrice lives and moves and has her ever more uplifted
being as the reality as well as symbol of Dante’s thoughts of life. With all
first love’s idealism, he loved a girl; then she, having passed from earth,

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becomes the inspiration and object of address of the young maker of
sonnets and canzoni, who with such intellectual preciosity was intent on
building these verses of fine-spun sentiment. Thereafter, when he is in
darker mood, she does not altogether leave him, whatever variant attitudes
his thought and temper take. And at last the yearning self-fulfilments of his
renewed life draw together in the Beatrice of the Commedia.
It is very beautiful, and the growth, as well as work, of genius; but it is not
strange. For there is no bound to the idealizing of the love which first
transfuses a youth’s nature with a mortal golden flame, and awakens it to
new understanding. Out of whatever of experience of life and joy and
sorrow may come to the man, this first love may still vivify itself anew—
often in dreams—and become again living and beautiful, in tears, and will
awaken new perceptions and disclose further vistas of the intelligenza
nuova which love never ceases to impart to him who has loved.
Dante’s mind was always turning from the obvious sense-actuality of the
fact to its symbolism; which held the truer reality. With such a man it is not
strange that the beloved and adored woman, the love of whom was virtue
and enlightenment, should, when dead to earth, become that divine wisdom
which opens Heaven to the lover who would follow, for all eternity, whither
his beloved has so surely gone. No, it was not strange, but only as
wonderful as all the works of God, that she who while living had been the
spring of virtue of all kinds and meanings in the poet’s breast, should after
death become the emblem, even the reality, of that whereby man is taught
how to win his heavenly salvation. Passage after passage in the Purgatorio
and Paradiso show that Beatrice is this divina scientia, and yet has never
ceased to be one whom the poet loves.[751]
Thus it is clear that mediaeval development converges at last in Dante. He,
or his Commedia, might be the final Summa, were not he, or rather it, the
final poem. Man and work include the emotions and the intellectual
interests of the Middle Ages, embracing what had been known,—Physics,
Astronomy, Politics, History, Pagan Mythology, Christian Theology,—all
bent and moulded at last to the matter of the book. Not the contents of the
Commedia is Dante’s own, but the poem itself—that is his creation.

Page 501

Yet even the poem itself was a climax long led up to. The power of its
feeling had been preparing in the conceptions, even in the reasonings,
which through the centuries had been gaining ardour as they became part of
the entire natures of men and women. Thus had mediaeval thought become
emotionalized and plastic and living in poetry and art. Otherwise, even
Dante’s genius could not have fused the contents of mediaeval thought into
a poem. How many passages in the Commedia illustrate this—like the
lovely picture of Lia moving in the flowering meadow, with her fair hands
making her a garland. The twenty-third canto of the Paradiso, telling of the
triumph of Christ and the Virgin, yields a larger illustration; and within it, as
a very concrete lyric instance, floats that flower of angelic love, the song of
Gabriel circling the Lady of Heaven with its melody, and giving
quintessential utterance to the love and adoration which the Middle Ages
had intoned to the Virgin. Yes, if it be Dante’s genius, it is also the gathering
emotion of the centuries, which lifts the last cantos of the Paradiso from
glory to glory, and makes this closing singing of the Commedia such
supreme poetry. Nor is it the emotional element alone that reaches its final
voice in Dante. Passage after passage of the Paradiso is the apotheosis of
scholastic thought and ways of stating it, the very apotheosis, for example,
of those harnessed phrases in which the line of great scholastics had
endeavoured to put in words the universalities of substance and accident
and the absolute qualities of God.
Yet one more feature of Dante’s typifying inclusiveness of the past. Its
elements exist in him at first without conscious opposition and yet not
subordinated one to another, the less worthy to those of eternal validity.
Then conflict arises; the mediaeval Psychomachia awakes in Dante.
Evidently he who wrote the Convito after the Vita Nuova, had not continued
spiritually undisturbed. Had there come dullings of his early faith? Did his
mind seek too exclusive satisfaction in knowledge? Had he possibly
swerved a little from some high intention? The facts are veiled. Dante wears
neither his mind nor his heart upon his sleeve. Yet a reconcilement was
attained by him, though perhaps he had to fetch it out of Hell. He achieved
it in his great poem, which in its long making made the poet into the
likeness of itself. Fitness for salvation is the ultimate criterion with Dante
respecting the elements of mortal life, as it had been through the Middle
Ages. And the Commedia—truly the Divina Commedia—while it presents

Page 502

the scheme of salvation for universal man, is the achieved salvation of the
poet.

Page 503

INDEX
Note.—Of several references to the same matter the more important are
shown by heavy type.

Page 504

Abaelard, Peter, career of, ii. 342-5;
at Paris, ii. 343, 344, 383;
popularity there, ii. 119;
love for Heloïse, ii. 4-5, 344;
love-songs, ii. 13, 207;
Heloïse’s love for, i. 585; ii. 3, 5, 8, 9, 15-16;
early relations with Heloïse, ii. 4-5;
suggestion of marriage opposed by her, ii. 6-9;
marriage, ii. 9;
suffers vengeance of Fulbert, ii. 9;
becomes a monk at St. Denis, ii. 10;
at the Paraclete, ii. 10, 344;
at Breton monastery, ii. 10;
St. Bernard’s denunciations of, i. 229, 401; ii. 344-5, 355;
letters to, from Heloïse quoted, ii. 11-15, 17-20, 23, 24;
letters from, to Heloïse quoted, ii. 16-17, 21-3, 24-5;
closing years at Cluny, ii. 25, 26, 345;
death of, ii. 27, 345;
estimate of, ii. 4, 342;
rationalizing temper, i. 229; ii. 298-9;
skill in dialectic, ii. 303, 345-6, 353;
not an Aristotelian, ii. 369;
works on theology, ii. 352-5;
De Unitate et Trinitate divina, ii. 10, 298-9, 352 and n. 3;
Theologia, ii. 303-4, 395;
Scito te ipsum, ii. 350-1;
Sic et non, i. 17; ii. 304-6, 352, 357;
Dialectica, ii. 346 and nn., 349-50;
Dialogue between Philosopher, Jew, and Christian, ii. 350, 351;
Historia calamitatum, ii. 4-11, 298-9, 343;
Carmen ad Astralabium filium, ii. 192;
hymns, ii. 207-9;
otherwise mentioned, ii. 134, 283 and n.

Abbo, Abbot, i. 294 and n., 324

Abbots:

Page 505

Armed forces, with, i. 473
Cistercian, position of, i. 362-3 and n.
Investiture of, lay, i. 244
Social class of, i. 473

Accursius, Glossa ordinaria of, ii. 262, 263

Adalberon, Abp. of Rheims, i. 240, 282-3, 287

Adam of Marsh, ii. 389, 400, 487

Adam of St. Victor, editions of hymns of, ii. 87 n. 1;
examples of the hymns, ii. 87 seqq.;
Latin originals, ii. 206, 209-15

Adamnan cited, i. 134 n. 2, 137

Adelard of Bath, ii. 370

Aedh, i. 132

Agobard, Abp. of Lyons, i. 215, 232-3;
cited, ii. 247

Aidan, St., i. 174

Aimoin, Vita Abbonis by, i. 294 and n.

Aix, Synod of, i. 359

Aix-la-Chapelle:
Chapel at, i. 212 n.
School at, see Carolingian period—Palace school

Alans, i. 113, 116, 119

Alanus de Insulis, career of, ii. 92-4;
estimate of ii 375 6;

Page 506

estimate of, ii. 375-6;
works of, ii. 48 n. 1, 94, 375 n. 5, 376;
Anticlaudianus, ii. 94-103, 192, 377, 539;
De planctu naturae, ii. 192-3 and n. 1, 376

Alaric, i. 112

Alaric II., i. 117; ii. 243

Alberic, Card., i. 252 n. 2

Alberic, Markgrave of Camerino, i. 242

Alberic, son of Marozia, i. 242-3

Albertus Magnus, career of, ii. 421;
estimate of, ii. 298, 301, 421;
estimate of work of, ii. 393, 395;
attitude toward Gilbert de la Porrée, ii. 372;
compared with Bacon, ii. 422;
with Aquinas, ii. 433, 438;
relations with Aquinas, ii. 434;
on logic, ii. 314-15;
method of, ii. 315 n.;
edition of works, ii. 424 n. 1;
De praedicabilibus, ii. 314 and n., 315, 424-5;
work on the rest of Aristotle, ii. 420-1;
analysis of this work, ii. 424 seqq.;
attitude toward the original, ii. 422;
Summa theologiae, ii. 430, 431;
Summa de creaturis, ii. 430-1;
De adhaerendo Deo, ii. 432;
otherwise mentioned, i. 17; ii. 82 n. 2, 283, 312, 402, 541 n. 2

Albigenses, i. 49;
persecution of, i. 366-7, 461, 481, 572; ii. 168

Alboin the Lombard, i. 115

Page 507

Alchemy, ii. 496-7

Alcuin of York, career of, i. 214;
works of, i. 216-21 and n. 2;
extracts from letters of, ii. 159;
stylelessness of, ii. 159, 174;
verses by, quoted, ii. 136-7;
on urbanitas, ii. 136;
otherwise mentioned, i. 212, 240, 343; ii. 112, 312, 332

Aldhelm, i. 185

Alemanni, i. 9, 121, 122, 145 n. 2, 174, 192

Alemannia, Boniface’s work in, i. 199

Alexander the Great, Pseudo-Callisthenes’ Life of, ii. 224, 225, 229-230;
Walter of Lille’s work on, ii. 230 n. 1

Alexander II., Pope, i. 262 n., 263 and n. 1

Alexander de Villa-Dei, Doctrinale of, ii. 125-7, 163

Alexander of Hales—at Paris, i. 476; ii. 399;
Bacon’s attack on, ii. 494, 497;
estimate of work of, ii. 393, 395, 399;
Augustinianism of, ii. 403-4

Alfred, King of England, i. 144 and n. 2, 187-90

Allegory (See also Symbolism):
Dictionaries of, ii. 47-8 and n. 1, 49
Greek examples of, ii. 42, 364
Metaphor distinguished from, ii. 41 n.
Politics, in, ii. 60-1, 275-6, 280
Roman de la rose as exemplifying, ii. 103
Scripture see under Scriptures

Page 508

Scripture, see under Scriptures
Two uses of, ii. 365

Almsgiving, i. 268

Alphanus, i. 253-4

Amadas, i. 565

Ambrose, St., Abp. of Milan, on miracles, i. 85-6;
attitude toward secular studies, i. 300; ii. 288;
Hexaëmeron of, i. 72-4;
De officiis, i. 96;
hymns, i. 347-8;
otherwise mentioned, i. 70, 75, 76, 104, 186, 354; ii. 45 n., 272

Anacletus II., Pope, i. 394

Anchorites, see Hermits

Andrew the Chaplain, Flos amoris of, i. 575-6

Angels:
Aquinas’ discussion of, ii. 324-5, 435, 457 seqq., 469, 473-5
Dante’s views on, ii. 551
Emotionalizing of conception of, i. 348 n. 4
Hugo of St. Victor on, ii. 68, 69
Symbols, regarded as, ii. 457
Vincent’s Speculum as concerning, ii. 319
Writings regarding, summary of, ii. 457

Angilbert, i. 234-5

Angles, i. 140

Anglo-Saxons:
Britain conquered by, i. 141
Characteristics of, i. 142, 196

Page 509

Christian missions by, i. 196, 197
Christian missions to, i. 172, 174, 180 seqq.
Customs of, i. 141
Poetry of, i. 142-4
Roman influence slight on, i. 32

Aniane monastery, i. 358-9

Annals, i. 234 and n. 1

Anselm (at Laon), ii. 343-4

Anselm, St., Abp. of Canterbury, dream of, i. 269-70;
early career, i. 270;
at Bec, i. 271-2;
relations with Rufus, i. 273, 275;
journey to Italy, i. 275;
estimate of, i. 274, 276-7; ii. 303, 330, 338;
style of, i. 276; ii. 166-7;
influence of, on Duns Scotus, ii. 511;
works of, i. 275 seqq.;
Cur Deus homo, i. 275, 277 n. 1, 279; ii. 395;
Monologion, i. 275-7;
Proslogion, i. 276-8; ii. 166, 395;
Meditationes, i. 276, 279;
De grammatico, i. 277 n. 2;
otherwise mentioned, i. 16, 19, 301-2; ii. 139, 283, 297, 340

Anselm of Besate, i. 259

Anthony, St., i. 365-6;
Life of, by Athanasius, i. 47, 52 and n.

Antique literature, see Greek thought and Latin classics

Antique stories, themes of, in vernacular poetry, ii. 223 seqq.

Apollinaris Sidonius, ii. 107

Page 510

Apollinaris Sidonius, ii. 107

Apollonius of Tyana, i. 44

Apollonius of Tyre, ii. 224 and n.

Aquinas, Thomas, family of, ii. 433-4;
career, ii. 434-5;
relations with Albertus Magnus, ii. 434;
translations of Aristotle obtained by, ii. 391;
Vita of, by Guilielmus de Thoco, ii. 435 n.;
works of, ii. 435;
estimate of, and of his work, i. 17, 18; ii. 301, 436-8, 484;
completeness of his philosophy, ii. 393-5;
pivot of his attitude, ii. 440;
present position of, ii. 501;
style, ii. 180;
mastery of dialectic, ii. 352;
compared with Eriugena, i. 231 n. 1;
with Albertus Magnus, ii. 433, 438;
with Bonaventura, ii. 437;
with Duns, ii. 517;
Dante compared with and influenced by, ii. 541 n. 2, 547, 549, 551, 555;
on monarchy, ii. 277;
on faith, ii. 288;
on difference between philosophy and theology, ii. 290;
on logic, ii. 313;
Summa theologiae, i. 17, 18; ii. 290 seqq.;
style of the work, ii. 180-1;
Bacon’s charge against it, ii. 300;
Peter Lombard’s work contrasted with it, ii. 307-10;
its method, ii. 307;
its classification scheme, ii. 324-9;
analysis of the work, ii. 438 seqq., 447 seqq.;
Summa philosophica contra Gentiles, ii. 290, 438, 445-6;
otherwise mentioned, i. 69 n. 2; ii. 283, 298, 300, 312, 402

Aquitaine, i. 29, 240, 573

Page 511

Arabian philosophy, ii. 389-90, 400-1

Arabs, Spanish conquest by, i. 9, 118

Archimedes, i. 40

Architecture, Gothic:
Evolution of, i. 305; ii. 539
Great period of, i. 346

Argenteuil convent, ii. 9, 10

Arianism:
Teutonic acceptance of, i. 120, 192, 194
Visigothic abandonment of, i. 118 nn.

Aristotle, estimate of, i. 37-8;
works of, i. 37-8;
unliterary character of writings of, ii. 118, 119;
philosophy as classified by, ii. 312;
attitude of, to discussions of final cause, ii. 336;
the Organon, i. 37, 71;
progressive character of its treatises, ii. 333-4;
Boëthius’ translation of the work, i. 71, 91-2;
advanced treatises “lost” till 12th cent., ii. 248 n., 334;
Porphyry’s Introduction to the Categories, i. 45, 92, 102; ii. 312, 314 n.,
333, 339;
Arabian translations of works, ii. 389-90;
introduction of complete works, i. 17;
Latin translations made in 13th cent., ii. 391;
three stages in scholastic appropriation of the Natural Philosophy and
Metaphysics, ii. 393;
Paris University study of, ii. 391-2 and n.;
Albertus Magnus’ work on, ii. 420-1, 424 seqq.;
Aquinas’ mastery of, i. 17, 18;
Dominican acceptance of system of, ii. 404;
Dante’s reverence for, ii. 542

Page 512

,

Arithmetic:
Abacus, the, i. 299
Boëthius’ work on, i. 72, 90
Music in relation to, ii. 291
Patristic treatment of, i. 72
Scholastic classification of, ii. 313

Arnold of Brescia, i. 401; ii. 171

Arnulf, Abp. of Rheims, i. 283-4

Art, Christian (For particular arts, see their names):
Demons as depicted in, ii. 540 n. 2
Early, i. 345 n.
Emotionalizing of, i. 345-7
Evolution of, i. 19-20
Germany, in (11th cent.), i. 312
Symbolism the inspiration of, i. 21; ii. 82-6

Arthur, King, story of youth of, i. 568-569;
relations with Lancelot and Guinevere, i. 584;
with Parzival, i. 592, 599-600, 612

Arthurian romances:
Comparison of, with Chansons de geste, i. 564-5
German culture influenced by, ii. 28
Origin and authorship of, question as to, i. 565-7
Universal vogue of, i. 565, 573, 577
otherwise mentioned, i. 531, 538

Arts, the (See also Latin classics):
Classifications of, ii. 312 seqq.
Course of, shortening of, ii. 132, 384
Dictamen, ii. 121, 129, 381
Grammar, see that heading
Masters in, at Paris and Oxford, ii. 384-5;
course for ii 388

Page 513

course for, ii. 388
Seven Liberal, see that heading

Asceticism:
Christian:
Carthusian, i. 384
Early growth of, i. 333-5
Manichean, i. 49
Women’s practice of, i. 444, 462-3
Neo-Platonic, i. 43, 44, 46, 50, 331, 334

Astralabius, ii. 6, 9, 27;
Abaelard’s poem to, ii. 191-2 and n. 1

Astrology, i. 44 and n.; ii. 374:
Bacon’s views on, ii. 499-500

Astronomy:
Chartres study of, i. 299
Gerbert’s teaching of, i. 288-9
Patristic attitude toward, i. 72

Ataulf, i. 112, 116

Athanasius, St., estimate of work of, i. 54, 68;
Life of St. Anthony by, i. 47, 52 and n., 84;
Orationes, i. 68

Atlantis, i. 36

Attila the Hun, i. 112-13;
in legend, i. 145-7

Augustine, Abp. of Canterbury, i. 6, 171, 180-2;
Gregory’s letters to, cited, i. 102

Augustine, St., Bp. of Hippo, Platonism of, i. 55;
personal affinity of, with Plotinus, i. 55-7;

Page 514

barbarization of, by Gregory the Great, i. 98, 102;
compared with Gregory the Great, i. 98-9;
with Anselm, i. 279;
with Guigo, i. 385, 390;
overwhelming influence of, in Middle Ages, ii. 403;
on numbers, i. 72 and n. 2, 105;
attitude toward physical science, i. 300;
on love of God, i. 342, 344;
allegorizing of Scripture by, ii. 44-5;
modification by, of classical Latin, ii. 152;
Confessions, i. 63; ii. 531;
De Trinitate, i. 64, 68, 74, 96;
Civitas Dei, i. 64-65, 69 n. 2, 81-82;
De moribus Ecclesiae, i. 65, 67-8;
De doctrina Christiana, i. 66-7;
classification scheme based on the Doctrina, ii. 322;
De spiritu et littera, i. 69;
De cura pro mortuis, i. 86;
De genesi ad litteram, ii. 324;
Alcuin’s compends of works of, i. 220;
otherwise mentioned, i. 5, 53, 71, 75, 82, 87, 89, 104, 186, 225, 340, 354,
366, 370; ii. 107, 269, 297, 312

Augustus, Emp., i. 26, 29

Aurillac monastery, i. 281

Ausonius, i. 126 n. 2; ii. 107

Austrasia:
Church organization in, i. 199
Feudal disintegration of, i. 240
Irish monasteries founded in, i. 174
Rise of, under Pippin, i. 209

Authority v. reason, see Reason

Auxerre i 506-7

Page 515

Auxerre, i. 506-7

Averroes, ii. 390

Averroism, ii. 400-1

Averroists, ii. 284 n., 296 n. 1

Avicenna, ii. 390

Avitus, Bp. of Vienne, i. 126 n. 2

Azo, ii. 262-3

Bacon, Roger, career of, ii. 486-7
tragedy of career, ii. 486;
relations with Franciscan Order, ii. 299, 486, 488, 490-1;
encouragement to, from Clement IV., ii. 489-90 and n. 1;
estimate of, ii. 484-6;
estimate of work of, ii. 402;
style of, ii. 179-80;
attitude toward the classics, ii. 120;
predilection for physical science, ii. 289, 486-7;
Albertus Magnus compared with, ii. 422;
on four causes of ignorance, ii. 494-5;
on seven errors in theological study, ii. 495-8;
on experimental science, ii. 502-8;
on logic, ii. 505;
on faith, ii. 507;
editions of works of, ii. 484 n.;
Greek Grammar by, ii. 128 and n. 5, 484 n., 487, 498;
Multiplicatio specierum, ii. 484 n., 500;
Opus tertium, ii. 488, 490 and nn., 491, 492, 498, 499;
Opus majus, ii. 490-1, 492, 494-5, 498, 499-500, 506-8;
Optics, ii. 500;
Opus minus, ii. 490-1, 495-8;
Vatican fragment, ii. 490 and n. 2, 505 n. 1;

Page 516

Compendium studii philosophiae, ii. 491, 493-4, 507-8;
Compendium theologiae, ii. 491;
otherwise mentioned, ii. 284 n., 335 n., 389, 531-2

Bartolomaeus, De proprietatibus rerum of, ii. 316 n. 2

Bartolus, ii. 264

Baudri, Abbot of Bourgueil, ii. 192 n. 1

Bavaria:
Irish monasteries founded in, i. 174
Merovingian rule in, i. 121
Otto’s relations with, i. 241
Reorganization of Church in, 198-9

Bavarians, i. 145 n. 2, 209, 210

Beauty, love of, i. 340

Bec monastery, i. 262 n., 270-2

Bede, estimate of, i. 185-6;
allegorizing of Scripture by, ii. 47 n. 1;
Church History of the English People, i. 172, 186, 234 n. 2;
De arte metrica, i. 187, 298;
Liber de temporibus, 300;
otherwise mentioned, i. 184, 212

Beghards of Liége, i. 365

Belgae, i. 126

Belgica, i. 29, 32

Benedict, Prior, i. 258

Benedict, St., of Nursia, i. 85 and n. 2, 94, 100 n. 4;

Page 517

Benedict, St., of Nursia, i. 85 and n. 2, 94, 100 n. 4;
Regula of, see under Monasticism

Benedictus, Chronicon of, ii. 160-1

Benedictus Levita, Deacon, ii. 270

Benoit de St. More, Roman de Troie by, ii. 225, 227-9

Beowulf, i. 141, 143-4 and n. 1

Berengar, King, i. 256

Berengar of Tours, i. 297, 299, 302-3; ii. 137

Bernard, Bro., of Quintavalle, i. 502

Bernard, disciple of St. Francis, i. 425-6

Bernard of Chartres, ii. 130-2, 370

Bernard, St., Abbot of Clairvaux, at Citeaux, i. 360, 393;
inspires Templars’ regula, i. 531;
denounces and crushes Abaelard, i. 229, 401; ii. 344-5, 355;
denounces Arnold of Brescia, i. 401; ii. 171;
relations with Gilbert de la Porrée, ii. 372;
Lives of, i. 392 n., 393 n. 1;
appearance and characteristics of, i. 392-3;
estimate of, i. 394; ii. 367-8;
love and tenderness of, i. 344, 345, 394 seqq.; ii. 365;
severity of, i. 400-1;
his love of Clairvaux, i. 401-2;
of his brother, i. 402-4;
Latin style of, ii. 169-71;
on church corruption, i. 474;
on faith, ii. 298;
unconcerned with physics, ii. 356;
St. Francis compared with, i. 415-16;
f l f i 395 ii 170 1

Page 518

extracts from letters of, i. 395 seqq.; ii. 170-1;
Sermons on Canticles—cited, 337 n.;
quoted, i. 409-13; ii. 169, 368-9;
De consideratione, ii. 368;
otherwise mentioned, i. 17, 20, 279, 302, 472, 501; ii. 34, 168

Bernard Morlanensis, De contemptu mundi by, ii. 199 n. 3

Bernard Silvestris, Commentum ... of, ii. 116-17 and n. 2;
De mundi universitate, ii. 119, 371 and n.

Bernardone, Peter, i. 419, 423-4

Bernward, Bp. of Hildesheim, i. 312 and n. 1

Bible, see Scriptures

Biscop, Benedict, i. 184

Bishops:
Armed forces, with, i. 473
Francis of Assisi’s attitude toward, i. 430
Gallo-Roman and Frankish, position of, i. 191-2, 194 and nn., 198, 201
n.
Investiture of, lay, i. 244-5 and n. 4; ii. 140
Jurisdiction and privileges of, ii. 266
Papacy’s ascendancy over, i. 304
Reluctance to be consecrated, i. 472
Social class of, i. 473
Vestments of, symbolism of, ii. 77 n. 2

Blancandrin, i. 565

Bobbio monastery, i. 178, 282-3

Boëthius, death of, i. 89, 93;
estimate of, i. 89, 92, 102;
Albertus Magnus compared with, ii. 420;

Page 519

g p , ;
works of, i. 90-3;
Gerbert’s familiarity with works of, i. 289;
works of, studied at Chartres, i. 298-9;
their importance, i. 298;
De arithmetica, i. 72, 90;
De geometria, i. 90;
commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, i. 92; ii. 312;
translation of the Organon, i. 71, 91-2;
“loss” of advanced works, ii. 248 n., 334;
De consolatione philosophiae, i. 89, 188, 189-90, 299;
mediaeval study of the work, i. 89; ii. 135-6

Bologna:
Clubs and guilds in, ii. 382
Fight of, against Parma, i. 497
Law school at, ii. 121, 251, 259-62, 378
Medical school at, ii. 121, 383 n.
University, Law, inception and character of, ii. 121, 381-3;
affiliated universities, ii. 383 n.

Bonaventura, St. (John of Fidanza), career of, ii. 403;
at Paris, ii. 399, 403;
estimate of, ii. 301;
style of, ii. 181-2;
contrasted with Albertus, ii. 405;
compared with Aquinas, ii. 405, 437;
with Dante, ii. 547;
on faith, ii. 298;
on Minorites and Preachers, ii. 396;
attitude toward Plato and Aristotle, ii. 404-5;
toward Scriptures, ii. 405 seqq.;
De reductione artium ad theologiam, ii. 406-8;
Breviloquium, ii. 408-13;
Itinerarium mentis in Deum, ii. 413-18;
otherwise mentioned, ii. 283, 288

Boniface, see Winifried-Boniface

Page 520

Boniface VIII., Pope, Sextus of, ii. 272;
Unam sanctam bull of, ii. 509

Books of Sentences, method of, ii. 307
(See also under Lombard)

Botany, ii. 427-8

Bretons, i. 113

Breviarium, i. 117, 239, 243-4

Britain:
Anglo-Saxon conquest of, i. 141
Antique culture in relation to, before Middle Ages, i. 10-11
Celts in, i. 127 n.
Christianity of, i. 171-2
Romanization of, i. 32

Brude (Bridius), King of Picts, i. 173

Brunhilde, i. 176, 178

Bruno, Abp. of Cologne, i. 309-10, 383-4;
Ruotger’s Life of, i. 310; ii. 162 and n. 1

Burgundians:
Christianizing of, i. 193
Church’s attitude toward, i. 120
Roman law code promulgated by (Papianus), ii. 239, 242
Roman subjects of, i. 121
otherwise mentioned, i. 9-10, 113, 145

Burgundy, i. 175, 243 n. 1

Byzantine architecture, 212 n.

Page 521

Byzantine Empire, see Eastern Empire

Cædmon, i. 183, 343

Caesar, C. Julius, cited, i. 27-9, 138, 296

Caesar of Heisterbach, Life of Engelbert by, i. 482-6 and n.;
Dialogi miraculorum, cited, i. 488 n., 491.

Canon law:
Authority of, ii. 274
Basis of, ii. 267-9
Bulk of, ii. 269
Conciliar decrees, collections of, ii. 269
Decretals:
Collections of, ii. 269, 271-2, 275 n.
False, ii. 270, 273
Gratian’s Decretum, ii. 268-9, 270-1, 306
Jus naturale in, ii. 268-9
Lex romana canonice compta, ii. 252
Scope of, ii. 267
Sources of, ii. 269
Supremacy of, ii. 277

Canossa, i. 244

Cantafables, i. 157 n. 1

Canticles, i. 350;
Origen’s interpretation of, 333;
St. Bernard’s Sermons on, i. 337 n., 409-13; ii. 169, 368-9

Capella, Martianus, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii of, i. 71 and n. 3; ii.
553

Caritas, ii. 476-8;
in relation to faith ii 479 81;

Page 522

in relation to faith, ii. 479-81;
to wisdom, ii. 481

Carloman, King of Austrasia, i. 199-200 and n., 209

Carloman (son of Pippin), i. 209-10

Carnuti, i. 296

Carolingian period:
Breviarium epitomes current during, ii. 244, 249
Continuity of, with Merovingian, i. 210-12
Criticism of records non-existent in, i. 234
Definiteness of statement a characteristic of, i. 225, 227
Educational revival in, 218-19, 222, 236; ii. 122, 158;
palace school, i. 214, 218, 229, 235
First stage of mediaeval learning represented by, ii. 330, 332
History as compiled in, i. 234-5
King’s law in, ii. 247
Latin poetry of, ii. 188, 194, 197
Latin prose of, ii. 158
Originality in, circumstances evoking, i. 232-3
Restatement of antique and patristic matter in, i. 237, 342-3

Carthaginians, i. 25

Carthusian Order, origin of, i. 383-4

Cassian’s Institutes and Conlocations, i. 335

Cassiodorus, life and works of, i. 93-7;
Chronicon, i. 94;
Variae epistolae, i. 94;
De anima, 94-5;
Institutiones divinarum et saecularium litterarum, i. 95-6; ii. 357 n. 2;
otherwise mentioned, i. 6, 88-9, 115; ii. 312

Cathari, i. 49; ii. 283 n.

Page 523

Catullus, i. 25

Cavallini, i. 347

Celsus cited, ii. 235, 237

Celtic language, date of disuse of, i. 31 and n.

Celts:
Gaul, in, i. 125 and n., 126-7, 129 n. 1
Goidelic and Brythonic, i. 127 n.
Ireland, in, see Irish
Italy invaded by (3rd cent. b.c.), i. 24
Latinized, i. 124
Teutons compared with, i. 125

Champagne, i. 240, 573

Chandos, Sir John, i. 554-5

Chanson de Roland, i. 12 n., 528 and n. 2, 559-62

Chansons de geste, i. 558 seqq.; ii. 222

Charlemagne, age of, see Carolingian period;
estimate of, i. 213;
relations of, with the Church, i. 201, 239; ii. 273;
relations with Angilbert, i. 234-5;
educational revival by, i. 213-14; ii. 110, 122, 158, 332;
book of Germanic poems compiled by order of, ii. 220;
Capitularies of, ii. 110, 248;
open letters of, i. 213 n.;
Einhard’s Life of, ii. 158-9;
poetic fame of, i. 210;
false Capitularies ascribed to, ii. 270;
empire of, non-enduring, i. 238;
otherwise mentioned i 9 115 153 562; ii 8

Page 524

otherwise mentioned, i. 9, 115, 153, 562; ii. 8

Charles Martel, i. 197, 198, 209; ii. 273

Charles II. (the Bald), King of France, i. 228, 235

Charles III. (the Simple), King of France, i. 239-40

Charles IV., King of France, i. 551

Chartres Cathedral, sculpture of, i. 20, 297; ii. 82-5

Chartres Schools:
Classics the study of, i. 298; ii. 119
Fulbert’s work at, i. 296-7, 299
Grammar as studied at, ii. 129-30
Medicine studied at, ii. 372
Orleans the rival of, ii. 119 n. 2
Trivium and quadrivium at, i. 298-9; ii. 163
mentioned, i. 287, 293

Chartreuse, La Grande, founding of, i. 384 (See also Carthusian)

Chaucer, ii. 95

Childeric, King, i. 119, 122

Chivalry:
Literature of:
Arthurian romances, see that heading
Aube (alba) poetry, i. 571; ii. 30
Chansons de geste, i. 558 seqq.
Nature of, i. 20
Pastorelle, i. 571
Pietistic ideal recognized in, ii. 288, 533
Poems of various nations cited, i. 570 n.
Religious phraseology in love poems, i. 350 n. 2
Romans d’aventure, i. 564-5, 571 n. 2
Th b h f i 558

Page 525

Three branches of, i. 558
Nature of, i. 522, 570 n.
Order of, evolution of, i. 524 seqq.
(See also Knighthood)

Chrétien de Troies, romances by, i. 566-7;
Tristan, i. 567;
Perceval, i. 567, 588-9;
Erec (Geraint), i. 567, 586; ii. 29 n.;
Lancelot or Le Conte de la charrette, i. 567, 569-70, 582-5;
Cligés, i. 567, 586 n. 2;
Ivain, i. 571 n. 2, 586 n. 3; ii. 29 n.;
translation of Ovid’s Ars amatoria, i. 574

Christianity:
Appropriation of, by mediaeval peoples, stages in, i. 17-18
Aquinas’ Summa as concerning, ii. 324
Art, in, see Art
Atonement doctrine, Anselm’s views on, i. 279
Basis of, ii. 268
Britain, in, i. 171-2
Buddhism contrasted with, i. 390
Catholic Church, see Church
Completeness of scheme of, ii. 394-5
Dualistic element in, i. 59
Eleventh century, position in, i. 16
Emotional elements in:
Fear, i. 103, 339, 342, 383
Hate, i. 332, 339
Love, i. 331, 345
Synthetic treatment of, i. 333
Emotionalizing of, angels as regarded in, i. 348 n. 4
Eternal punishment doctrine of, i. 65, 339, 486
Faith of, see Faith
Feudalism in relation to, i. 524, 527-9 and n. 2, 530
Fifth century, position in, i. 15
Gallo-Roman, i. 191-2
German language affected by, i. 202

Page 526

Ge a a guage a ected by, . 0
Greek Fathers’ contribution to, i. 5
Greek philosophic admixture in, i. 33-4
Hell-fear in, i. 103, 339, 342, 383
Hymns, see that heading
Ideal v. actual, i. 354-5
Incarnation doctrine of, ii. 369
Irish missionaries of, see under Irish
Latin as modified for expression of, ii. 152, 154, 156, 164, 171
Marriage as regarded by, ii. 8, 529
Martyrs for, see Martyrs
Mediaeval development in relation to, i. 11, 170
Mediation doctrine of, i. 54, 59-60
Militant character of, in early centuries, i. 69-70, 75
Miracles, attitude toward, i. 50-1
Monasticism, see that heading
Neo-Platonism compared with, i. 51
Pagan ethics inconsistent with, i. 66
Pessimism of, toward mortal life, i. 64
Saints, see that heading
Salvation:
Master motive, as, i. 59, 61, 79, 89
Scholasticism’s main interest, as, ii. 296-7, 300, 311
Standard of discrimination, as, ii. 530, 533, 559
Scriptures, see that heading
Teutonic acceptance of, see under Teutons
Trinity doctrine of:
Abaelard’s works on, ii. 10, 298-9, 352-3, 355
Aquinas on, ii. 449-50, 456
Bonaventura on, ii. 416-17
Dante’s vision, ii. 551
Peter Lombard’s Book on, ii. 323
Roscellin on, ii. 340
Vernacular presentation of, ii. 221
Visions, see that heading

Chronicles, mediaeval, ii. 175

Ch t i 53

Page 527

Chrysostom, i. 53

Church, Roman Catholic:
Authority of, Duns’ views on, ii. 516
Bishops, see that heading
British Church’s divergencies from, 171-2
Canon Law, see that heading
Charlemagne’s relations with, i. 201, 239; ii. 273
Classical study as regarded by, i. 260; ii. 110 seqq., 396-7
Clergy, see that heading
Confession doctrine of, i. 489
Constantine’s relations with, ii. 266
Creation of, i. 11, 68, 86-7
Decretals, etc., see under Canon Law
Denunciations of, i. 474-5; ii. 34-5
Diocesan organization of, among Germans, i. 196
Doctrinal literature of, i. 68-70
Duns’ attitude towards, ii. 513
East and West, solidarity of development of, i. 55
Empire’s relations with, see under Papacy
Eternal punishment doctrine of, i. 65, 339, 486; ii. 550
Eucharistic controversy, see that heading
Fathers of the, see Greek thought, patristic; Latin Fathers; and chiefly
Patristic thought
Feudalism as affected by, i. 524, 527-9 and n. 2, 530
Feudalism as affecting, i. 244, 473
Frankish, see under Franks
Gallo-Roman, i. 191-2, 194
Hildegard’s visions regarding, i. 457
Intolerance of, see subheading Persecutions
Investiture controversy, see under Bishops
Irish Church’s relations with, i. 172-4 and n. 1
Isidore’s treatise on liturgical practices of, i. 106
Knights’ vow of obedience to, i. 530
Mass, the:
Alleluia chant and Sequence-hymn, ii. 196, 201 seqq.
Symbolism of, ii. 77-8
Nicene Creed, i. 69

Page 528

,
Papacy, Popes, see those headings
Paschal controversy, see Eucharistic
Penance doctrine of, i. 101, 195
Persecutions by, i. 339;
of Albigenses, i. 366-7, 461, 481, 572; ii. 168;
of Jews, i. 118, 332;
of Montanists, i. 332
Popes, see that heading
Predestination, attitude toward, i. 228
Property of, enactments regarding, ii. 266
Rationalists in, i. 305
Reforms in (11th cent.), i. 304
Roman law for, ii. 265 and n. 2
Sacraments:
Definition of the word, ii. 72 and n. 1
Hugo of St. Victor on, ii. 64, 66, 68-9, 71, 72-4, 90 n. 2
Origin of, Bonaventura on, ii. 411-13
Pagan analogy with, i. 53, 59-60
Secularization of dignities of, i. 472
Simony in, i. 244, 475
Spain, in, see under Spain
Standards set by, ii. 528-9
Suspects to, estimate of, ii. 532
Synod of Aix (817), i. 359
Theodosian Code as concerning, ii. 266-7 and n. 1
Transubstantiation doctrine of, i. 226-227
“Truce of God” promulgated by, i. 529 n. 2

Churches:
Building of, symbolism in, ii. 78-82
Dedication of, sequence designed for, ii. 210-11

Cicero, i. 26 n. 3, 39, 78, 219

Cino, ii. 264

Cistercian Order:
Charta charitatis i 361 3

Page 529

Charta charitatis, i. 361-3
Clairvaux founded, i. 393
Cluniac controversies with, i. 360

Citeaux monastery:
Bernard at, i. 360, 393
Foundation and rise of, i. 360-3

Cities and towns:
Growth of, in 12th cent., i. 305; ii. 379-80
Italian, see under Italy

Cities (civitates) of Roman provinces, i. 29-30

Clairvaux (Clara Vallis):
Founding of, i. 360, 393
Position of, i. 362
St. Bernard’s love of, i. 401-2

Classics, see Latin classics

Claudius, Bp. of Turin, i. 215, 231-2 and n. 1

Claudius, Emp., i. 30

Clement II., Pope, i. 243

Clement IV., Pope, ii. 489-91

Clement V., Pope, Decretales Clementinae of, ii. 272

Clement of Alexandria, ii. 64

Clergy:
Accusations against, false, penalty for, ii. 266
Legal status of, ii. 382
Regular, see Monasticism
Secular:

Page 530

Concubinage of, i. 244
Francis of Assisi’s attitude toward, i. 430, 440
Marriage of, i. 472 n. 1
Reforms of, i. 359
Standard of conduct for, i. 471; ii. 529
Term, scope of, i. 356

Clerval, Abbé, cited, i. 300 n. 1

Clopinel, Jean, see De Meun

Clovis (Chlodoweg), i. 114, 117, 119-21, 122, 138, 193-4; ii. 245

Cluny monastery:
Abaelard at, ii. 25, 26, 345
Characteristics of, i. 359-60
Monastic reforms accomplished by, i. 293, 304

Cologne, i. 29, 31

Columba, St., of Iona, i. 133-7, 173

Columbanus, St., of Luxeuil and Bobbio, i. 6, 133, 174-9, 196;
Life and works of, 174 n. 2

Combat, trial by, i. 232

Commentaries, mediaeval:
Boëthius’, i. 93
Excerpts as characteristic of, i. 104
General addiction to, ii. 390, 553 n. 4
Originals supplanted by, ii. 390
Raban’s, i. 222-3

Compends:
Fourteenth century use of, ii. 523
Mediaeval preference for, i. 94
Medical in Italy i 251

Page 531

Medical, in Italy, i. 251
Saints’ lives, of (Legenda aurea), ii. 184

Conrad, Duke of Franconia, i. 241

Conrad II., Emp., i. 243

Constantine, Emp., ii. 266;
“Donation” of, ii. 35, 265, 270

Constantinus Africanus, i. 251 and n.; ii. 372

Cordova, i. 25

Cornelius Nepos, i. 25

Cornificiani, ii. 132, 373

Cosmogony:
Aquinas’ theory of, ii. 456
Mediaeval allegorizing of, ii. 65 seqq.
Patristic attitude toward, i. 72-4

Cosmology, Alan’s, in Anticlaudianus, ii. 377

Cremona, i. 24

Cross, Christian:
Magic safeguard, as, i. 294-5
Mediaeval feeling for, ii. 197

Crusades:
Constantinople, capture of, as affecting Western learning, ii. 391
First:
Chansons concerning, i. 537-8
Character of, i. 535-7
Guibert’s account of, ii. 175
Hymn concerning, quoted, i. 349 and n.

Page 532

Italians little concerned in, ii. 189
Joinville’s account of, quoted, i. 546-9
Language of, i. 531
Results of, i. 305
Second, i. 394
Spirit of, i. 535-7

Cuchulain, i. 129 and nn. 2, 3

Cynewulf’s Christ, i. 183

Cyprian quoted, i. 337 n.

Cyril of Alexandria, i. 227

Cyril of Jerusalem, i. 53

Da Romano, Alberic, i. 515-16

Da Romano, Eccelino, i. 505-6, 516

Dacia, Visigoths in, i. 112

Damiani, St. Peter, Card. Bp. of Ostia, career of, i. 262-4;
attitude of, to the classics, i. 260; ii. 112, 165;
on the hermit life, i. 369-70;
on tears, i. 371 and n.;
extract illustrating Latin style of, ii. 165 and n. 3;
works of, i. 263 n. 1;
writings quoted, i. 263-7;
Liber Gomorrhianus, i. 265, 474;
Vita Romualdi, i. 372 seqq.;
biography of Dominicus Loricatus, i. 381-2;
De parentelae gradibus, ii. 252;
otherwise mentioned, i. 17, 19, 20, 260, 343, 345, 391; ii. 34

Damianus, i. 262, 265

Page 533

Damianus, i. 262, 265

Danes, i. 142, 153

Dante, estimate of, ii. 534-5;
scholarship of, ii. 541 n. 2;
possessed by spirit of allegory, ii. 552-5;
compared with Aquinas and influenced by him, ii. 541 n. 2, 547, 549,
551, 555;
compared with Bonaventura, ii. 547;
attitude to Beatrice, ii. 555-8;
on love, ii. 555-6;
on monarchy, ii. 278;
De monarchia, ii. 535;
De vulgari eloquentia, ii. 219, 536;
Vita nuova, ii. 556, 559;
Convito, ii. 537-8, 553;
Divina Commedia, i. 12 n.; ii. 86, 99 n. 1, 103, 219;
commentaries on this work, ii. 553-4;
estimate of it, ii. 538, 540-1, 544, 553-4;
Inferno cited, ii. 42, 541-3, 545-7;
Purgatorio cited, ii. 535, 542-3, 548-9, 554, 558;
Paradiso cited, i. 395; ii. 542-3, 549-51, 558

Dares the Phrygian, ii. 116 and n. 3, 224-5 and nn., 226-7

De bello et excidio urbis Comensis, ii. 189-90

De Boron, Robert, i. 567

De casu Diaboli, i. 279

De consolatione philosophiae, see under Boëthius

De Lorris, Guillaume, Roman de la rose by, i. 586-7; ii. 103 and n. 1, 104

De Meun, Jean (Clopinel), Roman de la rose by, ii. 103 and n. 1, 104, 223

D i St i 230

Page 534

Dies irae, i. 348

Dionysius the Areopagite, ii. 10, 102, 344

Divina Commedia, see under Dante

Divination, ii. 374

Dominic, St., i. 366-7, 497; ii. 396

Dominican Order:
Aristotelianism of, ii. 404
Founding of, i. 366; ii. 396
Growth of, i. 498; ii. 398
Object of, ii. 396
Oxford University, at, ii. 387
Papacy, relations with, ii. 398, 509
Paris University, position in, ii. 386, 399

Dominicus Loricatus, i. 263, 381-3

Donatus, i. 71, 297;
Ars minor and Barbarismus of, ii. 123-4

Donizo of Canossa, ii. 189 and n. 2

Druids:
Gallic, i. 28, 296
Irish, i. 133

Du Guesclin, Bertrand, Constable of France, i. 554-6, 557 n.

Duns Scotus, education of, ii. 511;
career of, ii. 513;
estimate of, ii. 513;
intricacy of style of, ii. 510, 514, 516 n. 2;
on logic, ii. 504 n. 2;

Page 535

g , ;
Occam’s attitude toward, ii. 518 seqq.;
editions of works of, ii. 511 n. 1;
estimate of his work, ii. 509-10, 514

Dunstan, St., Abp. of Canterbury, i. 323-4

Durandus, Guilelmus, Rationale divinorum officiorum of, ii. 76 seqq.

Eadmer, i. 269, 273, 277

Eastern Empire:
Frankish relations with, i. 123
Huns’ relations with, i. 112-13
Norse mercenaries of, i. 153
Ostrogoths’ relations with, i. 114
Roman restoration by, i. 115

Ebroin, i. 209

Eckbert, Abbot of Schönau, i. 444

Ecstasy:
Bernard’s views on, ii. 368
Examples of, i. 444, 446

Eddas, ii. 220

Education:
Carolingian period, in, i. 213-14, 218-19, 222, 236; ii. 110, 122, 158, 332
Chartres method of, ii. 130-1
Grammar a chief study in, ii. 122 seqq., 331-2
Italy, in, see under Italy
Latin culture the means and method of, i. 12; ii. 109
Schools, clerical and monastic, i. 250 n. 2, 293
Schools, lay, i. 249-51
Seven Liberal Arts, see that heading
Shortening of academic course advocates of ii 132 373

Page 536

Shortening of academic course, advocates of, ii. 132, 373

Edward II., King of England, i. 551

Edward III., King of England, i. 550-1

Edward the Black Prince, i. 554-6

Einhard the Frank, i. 234 n. 1;
Life of Charlemagne by, i. 215; ii. 158-9

Ekkehart family, i. 309

Ekkehart of St. Gall, Waltarius (Waltharilied) by, ii. 188

El-Farabi, ii. 390

Eleventh century:
Characteristics of, i. 301;
in France, i. 301, 304, 328;
in Germany, i. 307-9;
in England, i. 324;
in Italy, i. 327
Christianity in, position of, i. 16

Elias, Minister-General of the Minorites, i. 499

Elizabeth, St., of Hungary, i. 391, 465 n. 1

Elizabeth, St., of Schönau, visions of, i. 444-6

Emotional development, secular, i. 349-50 and n. 2

Empire, the, see Holy Roman Empire

Encyclopaedias, mediaeval, ii. 316 n. 2;
Vincent’s Speculum majus, ii. 315-22

Page 537

Eneas, ii. 225, 226

Engelbert, Abp. of Cologne, i. 481-6;
estimate of, i. 482

England (See also Britain):
Danish Viking invasion of, i. 153
Eleventh century conditions in, i. 324
Law in, principles of, i. 141-2;
Roman law almost non-existent in Middle Ages, ii. 248
Norman conquest of, linguistic result of, i. 324

English language, character of, i. 324

Epicureanism, i. 41, 70; ii. 296, 312

Eriugena, John Scotus, estimate of, i. 215, 228-9, 231; ii. 330;
on reason v. authority, ii. 298, 302;
works of, studied at Chartres, i. 299;
De divisione naturae, i. 230-1; ii. 302;
otherwise mentioned, i. 16; ii. 282 n., 312

Essenes, i. 334

Ethelbert, King of Kent, i. 180-1

Etymologies of Isidore, i. 33, 105 and n. 1, 107-9; ii. 318;
law codes glossed from, ii. 250

Eucharistic (Paschal) controversy:
Berengar’s contribution to, i. 302-3
Paschasius’ contribution to, i. 225-7

Eucherius, Bp. of Lyons, ii. 48 n. 1

Euclid, i. 40

Eudemus of Rhodes i 38

Page 538

Eudemus of Rhodes, i. 38

Eunapius, i. 47, 52

Euric, King of the Visigoths, i. 117 and n. 1

Eusebius, i. 81 n. 2

Evil or sin:
Abaelard’s views concerning, ii. 350
Eriugena’s views concerning, i. 228
Original sin, realism in relation to, ii. 340 n.
Peter Lombard and Aquinas contrasted as to, ii. 308-10

Experimental science, Bacon on, ii. 502-8

Fabliaux, i. 521 n. 2; ii. 222

Facts, unlimited actuality of, i. 79-80

Faith:
Abaelard’s definition of, ii. 354
Bacon’s views on, ii. 507
Bernard of Clairvaux’s attitude toward, ii. 355
Caritas in relation to, ii. 479-81
Cognition through, Aquinas’ views on, ii. 446
Occam’s views on, ii. 519
Proof of matters of, Aquinas on, ii. 450
Will as functioning in, ii. 479

False Decretals, i. 104 n., 118 n. 1

Fathers of the Church (See also Patristic thought):
Greek, see Greek thought, patristic
Latin, see Latin Fathers

Faustus, ii. 44

Page 539

Felix, St., i. 86

Feudalism (See also Knighthood):
Anarchy of, modification of, i. 304
Austrasian disintegration by, i. 240
Chansons regarding, i. 559 seqq., 569
Christianity in relation to, i. 524, 527-9 and n. 2, 530
Church affected by, i. 244, 473
Italy not greatly under, i. 241
Marriage as affected by, i. 571, 586
Obligations of, i. 533-4
Origin of, 522-3
Principle and practice of, at variance, i. 522

Fibonacci, Leonardo, ii. 501

Finnian, i. 136

Flamenca, i. 565

Flore et Blanchefleur, i. 565

Florus, Deacon, of Lyons, i. 229 and n.

Fonte Avellana hermitage, i. 262-3, 381

Forms, new, creation of, see Mediaeval thought—Restatement

Fortunatus, Hymns by, ii. 196-7

Fourteenth century:
Academic decadence in, ii. 523
Papal position in, ii. 509-10

France (For particular districts, towns, etc., see their names):
Antique, the, in relation to, before Middle Ages, i. 9-10
Arthurian romances developed in, i. 566

Page 540

Arthurian romances developed in, i. 566
Cathedrals of, ii. 539, 554-5
Church in, secularization of, i. 472-3
Eleventh century conditions in, i. 301, 304, 328
History of, in 11th century, i. 300
Hundred Years’ War, i. 550 seqq.
Jacquerie in (1358), i. 556
Language modifications in, ii. 155
Literary celebrities in (12th cent.), ii. 168
Monarchy of, advance of, i. 305
North and South, characteristics of, i. 328
Rise of, in 14th century, ii. 509
Town-dwellers of, i. 495, 508

Francis, St., of Assisi, birth of, i. 415;
parentage, i. 419;
youth, i. 420-3;
breach with his father, i. 423-4;
monastic career, i. 427 seqq.;
French songs sung by, i. 419 and n. 2, 427, 432;
Lives of, i. 415 n.;
style of Thomas of Celano’s Life, ii. 182-3;
Speculum perfectionis, i. 415 n., 416 n., 438 n. 3; ii. 183;
literal acceptance of Scripture by, i. 365, 406-7;
on Scripture interpretation, i. 427 n. 1; ii. 183;
universality of outlook, i. 417;
mediaevalism, i. 417;
Christ-influence, i. 417, 418, 432-3;
inspiration, i. 419 n. 1, 441;
gaiety of spirit, i. 421, 427-8, 431-2;
poetic temperament, i. 422, 435;
love of God, man, and nature, i. 366, 428, 432-3, 435-7;
simplicity, i. 429;
obedience and humility, i. 365 n., 429-30;
humanism, i. 495;
St. Bernard compared with, i. 415-16;
St. Dominic contrasted with, ii. 396;
Fioretti, ii. 184;
C ti l f B th S i 433 4 439 40

Page 541

Canticle of Brother Sun, i. 433-4, 439-40;
last testament of, i. 440-1;
otherwise mentioned, i. 20, 21, 279, 344, 345, 355-6; ii. 302

Franciscan Order:
Attractiveness of, i. 498
Augustinianism of, ii. 404
Bacon’s relations with, ii. 486, 488, 490-1
Characteristics of, i. 366
Founding of, i. 427; ii. 396
Grosseteste’s relations, ii. 487, 511
Object of, ii. 396
Oxford University, at, ii. 387, 400
Papacy, relations with, ii. 398, 509
Paris University, in, ii. 386, 399
Rise of, ii. 398

Franconia, i. 241

Franks (See also Germans):
Christianity as accepted by, i. 193
Church among:
Bishops, position of, i. 194 and nn., 198, 201 n.
Charlemagne’s relations with, i. 201, 239; ii. 273
Clovis, under, i. 194
Lands held by, i. 194, 199-200;
immunities of, i. 201 and n.
Organization of, i. 199
Reform of, by Boniface, i. 196; ii. 273
Roman character of, i. 201
Division of the kingdom a custom of, i. 238-9
Gallo-Roman relations with, i. 123
Language of, i. 145 n. 2
Law of, ii. 245-6
Missi dominici, i. 211
Ripuarian, i. 119, 121; ii. 246
Romanizing of, partial, i. 9-10
Salian, i. 113, 119; Code, ii. 245-6

Page 542

, , ; ,
Saracens defeated by, i. 209-10 n. 1
Trojan origin of, belief as to, ii. 225 and n. 1

Frederic, Count of Isenburg, i. 483-6

Frederick I. (Barbarossa), Emp., i. 448

Frederick II., Emp., under Innocent’s guardianship, ii. 32-3;
crowned, ii. 33;
estimate of, i. 497;
otherwise mentioned, i. 250 n. 4, 417, 481, 505, 510, 517

Free, meaning of term, i. 526 n. 3

Free Companies, i. 556

Free will:
Angelic, ii. 473
Duns Scotus on, ii. 515
Human, ii. 475
Richard of Middleton on, ii. 512

Freidank, i. 475; ii. 35

Frescoes, i. 346-7

Friendship, chivalric, i. 561-2, 569-70, 583

Frisians, i. 169, 174;
missionary work among, i. 197, 200, 209

Froissart, Sir John, Chronicles of, i. 549 seqq.;
estimate of the work, i. 557

Froumund of Tegernsee, i. 312-13; ii. 110

Fulbert, Bp. of Chartres, i. 287, 296-7, 299

Page 543

Fulbert, Canon, ii. 4-6, 9

Fulco, Bp. of Toulouse, i. 461

Fulda monastery, i. 198, 221 n. 2

Fulk of Anjou, ii. 138

Gaius, Institutes of, ii. 241, 243

Galahad, i. 569-70, 583, 584 and n. 2

Galen of Pergamos, i. 40, 251

Gall, St., i. 6, 178, 196

Gallo-Romans:
Feudal system among, i. 523
Frankish rule over, i. 120, 123
Literature of, i. 126 n. 2

Gandersheim cloister, i. 311

Gaul (For particular districts, towns, etc., see their names):
Celtic inhabitants of, i. 125 and n., 126-7, 129 n. 1
Druidism in, i. 28, 296
Ethnology of, i. 126
Heathenism in, late survival of, i. 191 n. 1
Latinization of, i. 9-10, 29-32
Visigothic kingdom in south of, i. 112, 116, 117, 121

Gauls, characteristics and customs of, i. 27-8

Geoffrey of Beaulieu, Life of St. Louis by, i. 539-42

Gepidae, i. 113, 115

Page 544

Geraldus, St., i. 281

Gerard, brother of St. Bernard, i. 402-4

Gerbert of Aurillac, see Sylvester II.

German language:
Christianity as affecting, i. 202
High and Low, separation of, i. 145 n. 2
Middle High German literature, ii. 168, 221
Old High German poetry, ii. 194, 220

Germans (Saxons) (See also Franks):
Characteristics of, i. 138-40, 147, 151-2
Language of, see German language
Latin as studied by, i. 307-9; ii. 123, 155
Literature of, ii. 220-1 (See also subheading Poetry)
Marriage as regarded by, ii. 30
Nationalism of, in 13th cent., ii. 28
Poetry of:
Hildebrandslied, i. 145-7
Kudrun (Gudrun), i. 148, 149-52; ii. 220
Nibelungenlied, i. 145-6, 148-9, 152, 193, 203 n. 2; ii. 220
Waltarius, i. 147 and n., 148
otherwise mentioned, i. 113, 115, 119, 174, 209, 210

Germany:
Antique, the, in relation to, before Middle Ages, i. 10-11
Art in (11th cent.), i. 312
Church in, secularization of, i. 472
Italy contrasted with, as to culture, i. 249-50
Merovingian supremacy in, i. 121
Papacy as regarded by, ii. 28, 33, 34-5
Sequence-composition in, ii. 215

Gertrude of Hackeborn, Abbess, i. 466

Page 545

Gilbert de la Porrée, Bp. of Poictiers, ii. 132, 372

Gilduin, Abbot of St. Victor, ii. 62 and n. 2

Giraldus Cambrensis, ii. 135 and n.

Girard, Bro., of Modena, i. 498

Glaber, Radulphus, Histories of, i. 488 n.

Glass-painting, ii. 82-6

Gnosticism, i. 51 n. 1

Gnostics, Eriugena compared with, i. 231 and n. 1

Godehard, Bp. of Hildesheim, i. 312

Godfrey of Bouillon, i. 535-8

Godfrey of Viterbo, ii. 190 and n. 4

Gondebaud, King of the Burgundians, ii. 242

Good and the true compared, ii. 441, 512

Goths (See also Visigoths):
Christianity of, i. 192, 194
Roman Empire invaded by, i. 111 seqq.

Gottfried von Strassburg, i. 567; ii. 223;
Tristan of, i. 577-82

Gottschalk, i. 215, 221 n. 2, 224-5, 227-8;
verses by, ii. 197-9

Government:

Page 546

Church v. State controversy, ii. 276-7
(See also Papacy—Empire)
Ecclesiastical, see Canon Law
Monarchical, ii. 277-8
Natural law in relation to, ii. 278-9
Representative assemblies, ii. 278

Grace, Aquinas’ definition of, ii. 478-9

Grail, the, i. 589, 596-7, 607, 608, 613

Grammar:
Chartres studies in, i. 298; ii. 129-30
Current usage followed by, ii. 163 and n. 1
Hugo of St. Victor on, ii. 67
Importance and predominance of, in Middle Ages, i. 109 and n., 292; ii.
331-2
Italian study of, ii. 129, 381
Language continuity preserved by, ii. 122-3, 151, 155
Law studies in relation to, ii. 121
Logic in relation to, ii. 127 seqq., 333-4;
in Abaelard’s work, ii. 346
Raban’s view of, i. 222
Scholastic classification of, ii. 313
Syntax, connotation of term, ii. 125
Works on—Donatus, Priscian, Alexander, ii. 123 seqq.

Grammarian, meaning of term, i. 250

Gratianus, Decretum of, ii. 268-9, 270-1, 306, 380-2;
dicta, ii. 271

Greek classics, see Greek thought, pagan

Greek language:
Oxford studies in, ii. 120, 391, 487
Translations from, direct, in 13th cent., ii. 391

Page 547

Greek legends, mediaeval allegorizing of, ii. 52, 56-9

Greek novels, ii. 224 and n.

Greek thought, pagan:
Bacon’s attitude toward, ii. 492-3
Breadth of interest of, ii. 109
Christian standpoint contrasted with, i. 390; ii. 295-6
Church Fathers permeated by, i. 33-4
Completeness of schemes presented by, ii. 394
Limitless, the, abhorrent to, i. 353-4
Love as regarded by, i. 575
Metaphysics in, ii. 335-7
Scholasticism contrasted with, ii. 296
Summa moralium philosophorum, ii. 373
Symbolism in, ii. 42, 56
Transmutation of, through Latin medium, i. 4

Greek thought, patristic (See also Patristic thought):
Comparison of, with Latin, i. 68
Pagan philosophic thought contrasted with, ii. 295-6
Symbolism in, ii. 43
Transmutation of, through Latin medium, i. 5, 34 and n.

Gregorianus, ii. 240, 243

Gregory, Bp. of Tours, i. 121;
Historia Francorum by, i. 234 n. 2; ii. 155

Gregory I. (the Great), Pope, family and education of, i. 97;
Augustine of Hippo compared with, i. 98-9;
Augustinianism barbarized by, i. 98, 102;
sends mission to England, i. 6, 33, 180-1 and n. 1;
estimate of, i. 56, 89, 102-3, 342;
estimate of his writings, i. 354;
on miracles, i. 100, 182;
on secular studies, ii. 288;
l Th i i d i 102 1

Page 548

letter to Theoctista cited, i. 102 n. 1;
editions of works of, i. 97 n.;
works of, translated by King Alfred, i. 187;
Dialogues on the Lives and Miracles of the Italian Saints, i. 85 and n. 2,
100;
Moralia, i. 97, 100; ii. 57;
Odo’s epitome of this work, ii. 161;
Commentary on Kings, i. 100 n. 1;
Pastoral Rule, i. 102, 187-8;
otherwise mentioned, i. 16 and n. 4, 65, 87, 104, 116

Gregory II., Pope, i. 197-8; ii. 273

Gregory III., Pope, i. 198; ii. 273

Gregory VII., Pope (Hildebrand), claims of, i. 244-5; ii. 274;
relations with Damiani, i. 263;
exile of, i. 244, 253;
estimate of, i. 261;
otherwise mentioned, i. 17, 174 n. 1, 243, 304

Gregory IX., Pope, codification by, of Canon law, ii. 272;
efforts of, to improve education of the Church, ii. 398;
mentioned, i. 476; ii. 33

Gregory of Nyssa, i. 53, 80, 87, 340

Grosseteste, Robert, Chancellor of Oxford University and Bp. of Lincoln,
Greek studies promoted by, ii. 120, 391, 487;
estimate of, ii. 511-12;
Augustinianism of, ii. 403-4;
attitude toward the classics, ii. 120, 389;
relations with Franciscan Order, ii. 487, 511;
Bacon’s relations with, ii. 487

Gudrun (Kudrun), i. 148, 149-52; ii. 220

Guigo, Prior, estimate of, i. 390-1;

Page 549

g , , , ;
relations with St. Bernard, i. 405;
Consuetudines Carthusiae by, i. 384;
Meditationes of, i. 385-90

Guinevere, i. 569, 584 and n. 1, 585

Guiot de Provens, “Bible” of, i. 475-6 and n. 1

Guiscard, Robert, ii. 189 n. 2

Gumpoldus, Bp. of Mantua, Life of Wenceslaus by, ii. 162 n. 1

Gundissalinus, Archdeacon of Segovia, ii. 312 and n. 4, 313

Gunther, Ligurinus of, ii. 192 and n. 4

Gunzo of Novara, i. 257-8

Harding, Stephen, Abbot of Citeaux, i. 360, 361, 393

Harold Fairhair, i. 153

Hartmann von Aue, i. 348-9 and n., 567; ii. 29 n.

Harun al Raschid, Caliph, i. 210

Heinrich von Veldeke, i. 567; ii. 29 n.

Heliand, i. 203 and nn., 308

Helias, Count of Maine, ii. 138

Hell:
Dante’s descriptions of, ii. 546-7
Fear of, i. 103, 339, 342, 383
Visions of, i. 454-5, 456 n.

Page 550

Heloïse, Abaelard’s love for, ii. 4-5, 344;
his love-songs to, ii. 13, 207;
love of, for Abaelard, i. 585; ii. 3, 5, 8, 9, 15-16;
birth of Astralabius, ii. 6;
opposes marriage with Abaelard, ii. 6-9;
marriage, ii. 9;
at Argenteuil, ii. 9, 10;
takes the veil, ii. 10;
at the Paraclete, ii. 10 seqq.;
letters of, to Abaelard quoted, ii. 11-15, 17-20, 23, 24;
Abaelard’s letters to, quoted, ii. 16-17, 21-3, 24-5;
Peter the Venerable’s letter, ii. 25-7;
letter of, to Peter the Venerable, ii. 27;
death of, ii. 27;
intellectual capacity of, ii. 3

Henry the Fowler, i. 241

Henry II., Emp., i. 243;
dirge on death of, ii. 216

Henry IV., Emp., i. 244; ii. 167

Henry VI., Emp., ii. 32, 190

Henry I., King of England, ii. 139, 146, 176-8

Henry II., King of England, ii. 133, 135, 372

Henry of Brabant, ii. 391

Henry of Ghent, ii. 512

Henry of Huntington cited, i. 525

Henry of Septimella, ii. 190 and n. 3

Page 551

Heretics (For particular sects, see their names):
Abaelard’s views on coercion of, ii. 350, 354
Insignificance of, in relation to mediaeval thought, ii. 283 and n.
Theodosian enactments against, ii. 266
Twelfth century, in, i. 305

Herluin, Abbot of Bec, i. 271

Hermann, Landgraf of Thüringen, i. 589; ii. 29

Hermann Contractus, i. 314-15 and n. 1

Hermits:
Irish, i. 133
Motives of, i. 335, 363
Temper of, i. 368 seqq.

Hermogenianus, ii. 240, 243

Herodotus, i. 77

Hesse, Boniface’s work in, i. 197-8

Hilarion, St., i. 86

Hilary, Bp. of Poictiers, i. 63, 68, 70

Hildebert of Lavardin, Bp. of Le Mans and Abp. of Tours, career of, ii. 137-
40;
love of the classics, ii. 141-2, 146, 531;
letters of, quoted, ii. 140, 143, 144-5, 146-7;
Latin text of letter, ii. 172;
Latin elegy by, ii. 191;
otherwise mentioned, ii. 61, 134, 373 n. 2

Hildebrand, see Gregory VII.

Hildebrandslied ii 220

Page 552

Hildebrandslied, ii. 220

Hildegard, St., Abbess of Bingen, dedication of, i. 447;
visions of, i. 267, 449-59;
affinity of, with Dante, ii. 539;
correspondence of, i. 448;
works of, i. 446 n.;
Book of the Rewards of Life, i. 452-6;
Scivias, i. 457-9;
otherwise mentioned, i. 20, 345, 443; ii. 302, 365

Hildesheim, bishops of (11th cent.), i. 312

Hilduin, Abbot, i. 230

Hincmar, i. 215, 230, 233 n. 1

Hipparchus, i. 40

Hippocrates, i. 40

History:
Carolingian treatment of, i. 234-5
Classical attitude toward, i. 77-8
Eleventh century treatment of, i. 300
Historia tripartita of Cassiodorus, i. 96-7
Patristic attitude toward, i. 80-4
Seven Books of Histories adversum paganos by Orosius, i. 82-3

Holy Roman Empire:
Burgundy added to, i. 243 n. 1
German character of, ii. 32
Papacy, relations with, see under Papacy
Refounding of, by Otto, i. 243
Rise of, under Charlemagne, i. 212

Honorius II., Pope, i. 531

Page 553

Honorius III., Pope, i. 366, 482, 497; ii. 33, 385 n., 398

Honorius of Autun—on classical study, ii. 110, 112-13;
Speculum ecclesiae of, ii. 50 seqq.;
Gemma animae, ii. 77 n. 1

Hosius, Bp. of Cordova, i. 118 n. 1

Hospitallers, i. 531

Hrotsvitha, i. 311 and n. 2, ii. 215 n. 2

Huesca (Osca), i. 25

Hugh, Abbot of Cluny, ii. 137

Hugh Capet, i. 239-40 and n.

Hugh the Great, Count of Paris, i. 241

Hugh of Payns, i. 531

Hugo, Archdeacon of Halberstadt, ii. 62

Hugo, Bro., of Montpellier, i. 510-14

Hugo, King, i. 242

Hugo of St. Victor, estimate of, ii. 63, 111, 118, 301, 356;
allegorizing by, ii. 367;
on classical study, ii. 110-11;
on logic, ii. 333;
pupils of, ii. 87;
works of, ii. 61 n. 2;
Didascalicon, ii. 48 n. 2, 63, 111, 312, 357 and nn. 2-5;
De sacramentis Christianae fidei, ii. 48 n. 2, 64 seqq., 365, 395, 540;
Expositio in regulam beati Augustini, ii. 62 n. 2;
De arca Noë morali ii 75 n 365-7;

Page 554

De arca Noë morali, ii. 75 n., 365 7;
De arca Noë mystica, ii. 367;
De vanitate mundi, ii. 75 n., 111-12;
Summa sententiarum, ii. 356;
Sermons on Ecclesiastes, ii. 358-9;
otherwise mentioned, i. 17, 20, 457; ii. 404

Humanists, ii. 126

Humiliati of Lombardy, i. 365

Hungarians, i. 241-2

Huns, i. 112, 119, 193

Huon de Bordeaux, i. 564

Hy (Iona) Island, i. 136, 173

Hymns, Christian:
Abaelard, by, ii. 25, 207-9
Estimate of, i. 21
Evolution of, i. 347-9 and n.; ii. 196, 200 seqq.
Hildegard’s visions regarding, i. 459
Hugo of St. Victor, by, ii. 86 seqq.
Sequences, development of, ii. 196, 201-6;
Adam of St. Victor’s, ii. 209-15

Iamblicus, i. 42, 47, 51, 56-7; ii. 295

Iceland, Norse settlement in, i. 153

Icelanders, characteristics and customs of, i. 154

Icelandic Sagas, see Sagas

Ideal v. actual, i. 353 seqq.

Page 555

Innocent II., Pope, i. 394; ii. 10

Innocent III., Pope, i. 417, 481, 497; ii. 32, 274, 384, 398

Innocent IV., Pope, i. 506

Intellectus agens, ii. 464, 507 n. 2

Iona (Hy) Island, i. 136, 173

Ireland:
Celts in, see Irish
Church of, missionary zeal of, i. 133, 136, 172 seqq.
Danish settlements in, i. 153
Monasteries in, i. 153 n. 1, 173
Norse invasion of, i. 134
Scholarship in, i. 180 n., 184-5

Irenaeus, Bp. of Lyons, i. 225

Irish:
Art of, i. 128 n. 1
Characteristics of, i. 128, 130, 133, 179
History of, i. 127 and n.
Influence of, on mediaeval feeling, i. 179 and n.
Literature of, i. 128 and n. 2, 129 seqq., 134;
poetry, ii. 194
Missionary labours of, i. 133, 136, 172 seqq.;
defect of, i. 179, 196
Norse harryings of, i. 133-4;
intercourse with, i. 152 n. 3
Oxford University, at, ii. 387

Irnerius, ii. 121, 260, 380-1;
Summa codicis of, ii. 255-9

Irrationality (See also Miracles):

Page 556

at o a ty (See a so ac es):
Neo-Platonic teaching as to, i. 42-4, 48, 52
Patristic doctrine as to, i. 51-3

Isabella, Queen, wife of Edward II., i. 550-1

Isidore, Abp. of Seville, estimate of, i. 89, 103, 118 n. 1;
Bede compared with, i. 185-7;
False Decretals attributed to, i. 118 n. 1; ii. 270, 273;
works of, i. 104-9;
Etymologiae, see Etymologies of Isidore;
Origines, i. 236, 300;
otherwise mentioned, i. 6, 88; ii. 46, 312

Italian people in relation to the antique, i. 7-8

Italy (For particular districts, towns, etc., see their names):
Celtic inroads into (3rd cent. b.c.), i. 24
Church in, secularization of, i. 472
Cities in:
Continuity of, through dark ages, i. 248, 494-5; ii. 381
Fighting amongst, i. 497-8
Importance of, i. 241, 326, 494-5
Continuity of culture and character in, i. 326, 495; ii. 120-2
Dante as influenced by, ii. 534-5
Education in—lay, persistence of, i. 249-51;
clerical and monastic, i. 250 n. 2
Eleventh-century conditions in, i. 327
Feudalism not widely fixed in, i. 241
Feuds in, i. 515-16
Grammar as studied in, i. 250 and n. 2; ii. 129
Irish monasteries founded in, i. 174
Literature of, mediaeval, lack of originality in, ii. 189;
eleventh-century verse, i. 251 seqq.; ii. 165 n. 1, 186
Lombard kingdom of (6th cent.), i. 115-16
Medicine studied in, i. 250 and n. 4, 251; ii. 121
Unification of, under Rome, i. 23

Page 557

Jacobus à Voragine, Legenda aurea by, ii. 184

Jacques de Vitry, Bp. and Card. of Tusculum, i. 461 and n.;
Exempla of, i. 488 n., 490

Jerome, St., estimate of, i. 344, 354;
letter of, on asceticism, i. 335 and n. 1;
love of the classics, ii. 107, 112, 531;
modification by, of classical Latin, ii. 152, 171;
two styles of, ii. 171 and n. 4;
Life of Paulus by, i. 84, 86;
Life of Hilarion, i. 86;
Contra Vigilantium, i. 86;
otherwise mentioned, i. 56, 75, 76, 104

Jerome of Ascoli (Pope Nicholas IV.), ii. 491

Jews:
Agobard’s tracts against, i. 232-3
Gregory the Great’s attitude toward, i. 102
Louis IX.’s attitude toward, i. 545
Persecution of, i. 118, 332

Joachim, Abbot of Flora, Evangelicum eternum of, 502 n., 510, 512-13, 517

John, Bro., of Vicenza, i. 503-4

John X., Pope, i. 242

John XI., Pope, i. 242

John XII., Pope, i. 243; ii. 160-1

John XIII., Pope, i. 282

John XXII., Pope, Decretales extravaganes of, ii. 272

Page 558

John of Damascus, ii. 439 n. 1

John of Fidanza, see Bonaventura

John of Parma, Minister-General of Franciscans, i. 507, 508, 510-11

John of Salisbury, estimate of, ii. 118, 373-4;
Chartres studies described by, ii. 130-2;
attitude of, to the classics, ii. 114, 164, 173, 531;
Latin style of, ii. 173-4;
Polycraticus, ii. 114-15, 174-5;
Metalogicus, ii. 173-4;
Entheticus, ii. 192;
De septem septenis, ii. 375

John the Deacon, Chronicon Venetum by, i. 325-6

Joinville, Sire de, Histories of St. Louis by, i. 539, 542-9

Jordanes, compend of Gothic history by, i. 94

Jordanes of Osnabrück cited, ii. 276 n. 2

Joseph of Exeter, ii. 225 n. 2

Jotsaldus, Life of Odilo by, i. 295-6

Judaism, emotional elements in, i. 331-2

Julianus, Epitome of, ii. 242, 249, 254

Jumièges cloister, ii. 201

Jurisprudence (See also Roman law):
Irnerius an exponent of, ii. 256, 259
Mediaeval renaissance of, ii. 265
Roman law, in, beginnings of, ii. 232

Page 559

Justinian, Codex, Institutes, Novellae of, see under Roman law;
Digest of, see Roman law—Pandects

Jutes, i. 140

Jutta, i. 447

Keating quoted, i. 136

Kilwardby, Richard, Abp. of Canterbury, De ortu et divisione philosophiae
of, ii. 313

Kilwardby, Robert, ii. 128

Knighthood, order of:
Admission to, persons eligible for, i. 527
Code of, i. 524
Hospitallers, i. 531
Investiture ceremony, i. 525-8
Love the service of, i. 568, 573
Templars, i. 531-5
Virtues and ideals of, i. 529-31, 567-8

Knowledge:
Cogitation, meditation, contemplation (Hugo’s scheme), ii. 358 seqq.
Forms and modes of, Aquinas on—divine, ii. 451-5;
angelic, ii. 459-62;
human, ii. 463 seqq.
Grades of, Aquinas on, ii. 461, 467
Primacy of, over will maintained by Aquinas, ii. 440-1

La Ferté Monastery, i. 362

Lambert of Hersfeld, Annals of, i. 313; ii. 167

Page 560

Lambertus Audomarensis, Liber Floridus of, ii. 316 n. 2

Lancelot of the Lake, i. 567, 569-70, 582-5;
Old French prose version of, i. 583 seqq.

Land tenure, feudal, i. 523-4

Lanfranc, Primate of England, i. 174 n. 1, 261 n., 273

Langue d’oc, ii. 222, 248

Langue d’oil, ii. 222, 248

Languedoc, chivalric society of (11th and 12th centuries), i. 572

Latin classics:
Abaelard’s reference to, ii. 353
Alexandrian antecedents of the verse, ii. 152 n. 1
Artificial character of the prose, ii. 151 n.
Breadth of interest of, ii. 109
Characteristics of, ii. 153
Chartres a home of, i. 298; ii. 119
Common elements in, ii. 149, 157
Dante’s attitude toward, ii. 541, 544;
his quotations from, ii. 543 n. 1
Ecclesiastical attitude toward, i. 260; ii. 110 seqq., 396-7
Familiarity with, of Damiani, i. 260; ii. 165;
Gerbert, i. 287-8; ii. 110;
John of Salisbury, ii. 114, 164, 173, 531;
Bernard of Chartres, ii. 132-3;
Peter of Blois, ii. 133-4;
Hildebert, ii. 141-2, 146, 531
Knowledge-storehouses for the Middle Ages, as, ii. 108
Mastery of, complete, as affecting mediaeval writings, ii. 164
Reverential attitude of mediaevals toward, ii. 107-9
Scripture study as aided by study of, ii. 110, 112, 120
Suggestions of new ideas from, for Northern peoples, ii. 136
Themes of in vernacular poetry ii 223 seqq

Page 561

Themes of, in vernacular poetry, ii. 223 seqq.
Twelfth-century study of, ii. 117-18

Latin Fathers (See also their names and Patristic thought):
Comparison of, with Greek, i. 68
Style and diction of, ii. 150, 152 seqq.
Symbolism in, ii. 43-6
Transmutation by, of Greek thought, i. 5, 34 and n.

Latin language:
Britain, position in, i. 10, 32
Children’s letters in, ii. 123 n.
Christianity as modifying, ii. 152, 154, 156, 164, 171
Continuity of, preserved by universal study of grammar, ii. 122-3, 151,
155
“Cornificiani” in regard to, ii. 132, 373
Educational medium as, ii. 109
Genius of, susceptible of change, ii. 149
German acquisition of, i. 10, 32, 307-8, 313; ii. 123, 155
Grammar of, see Grammar
Mediaeval modifications in, ii. 125, 164
Patristic modifications of, ii. 150, 152 seqq.;
Jerome’s, ii. 152, 171
Spelling of, mediaeval, i. 219
Sphere of, ii. 219-20
Supremacy of (during Roman conquest period), i. 4, 23-4 and n. 1, 25,
30-1
Translations from, scanty nature of, ii. 331 n. 2
Translations into, difficulties of, ii. 498
Universality of, as language of scholars, ii. 219, 331 n. 2
Vernacular, developments of, ii. 151
Vitality of, in relation to vernacular tongues, ii. 219

Latin prose, mediaeval:
Antecedents of, ii. 151 seqq.
Best period of, ii. 167-8
Bulk of, ii. 157 n.
Carolingian, ii. 158-60
f

Page 562

Characteristics of, ii. 156
Estimation of, difficulties of, ii. 157 and n.
Influences upon, summary of, ii. 156
Prolixity and inconsequence of, ii. 154
Range of, ii. 154
Simplicity of word-order in, ii. 163 n. 1
Stages of development of, ii. 157 seqq.
Style in, beginnings of, ii. 164
Stylelessness of, in Carolingian period, ii. 158-60
Thirteenth-century styles, ii. 179
Value of, as expressing the mediaeval mind, ii. 156, 164

Latin verse, mediaeval:
Accentual and rhyming compositions, ii. 194;
two kinds of, ii. 196
Antecedents of, ii. 187 n. 1
Carmina Burana (Goliardic poetry), ii. 203, 217-19 and n.
Development of, stages in, ii. 187
Leonine hexameters, ii. 199 and n. 3
Metrical composition, ii. 187 seqq.;
elegiac verse, ii. 190-2 and n. 1;
hexameters, ii. 192;
Sapphics, ii. 192-3 and n. 1
Modi, ii. 215-16
Rhyme, development of, ii. 195, 206

Law:
Barbarian, Latin codes of, ii. 244 seqq.
Barbaric conception of, ii. 245, 248-9
Breviarium, see under Roman law
Canon, see Canon law
English, principles of, i. 141-2
Grammar in relation to, ii. 121
Lombard codes, i. 115; ii. 242, 246, 248, 253;
Concordia, ii. 259
Natural:
Gratian on, ii. 268-9
Jus gentium in relation to, ii. 234 and n., 268

Page 563

Jus gentium in relation to, ii. 234 and n., 268
Occam on, ii. 519
Sacraments of, ii. 74 and n. 1
Supremacy of, ii. 269, 279
Roman, see Roman law
Salic, ii. 245-6
Territorial basis of, i. 123; ii. 247
Tribal basis of, i. 123; ii. 245-7
Visigothic codification of, in Spain, i. 118

Leander, Bp. of Seville, i. 118 n. 1

Légonais, Chrétien, ii. 230 and n. 2

Leo, Brother, Speculum perfectionis by, ii. 183-4

Leo I. (the Great), Pope, i. 113, 116

Leo IX., Pope, i. 243

Leon, Sir Guy de, i. 552-3

Leon, Sir Hervé de, i. 552-3

Leowigild, i. 117 n. 2, 118 n. 1

Lerins monastery, i. 195

Lewis, Lord, of Spain, i. 552-3

Liberal arts, see Seven Liberal Arts

Liutgard of Tongern, i. 463-5

Liutprand, Bp. of Cremona i. 256-7; ii. 161 n. 1

Liutprand, King of Lombards, i. 115-16

L i (S l Di l ti )

Page 564

Logic (See also Dialectic):
Albertus Magnus on, ii. 313-15, 504, 506
Aristotelian, mediaeval apprehension of, ii. 329 (See also Aristotle—
Organon)
Bacon’s attitude toward, ii. 505
Gerbert’s preoccupation with, i. 282, 289, 292
Grammar in relation to, ii. 127 seqq., 333-4;
in Abaelard’s work, ii. 346
Importance of, in Middle Ages, i. 236; ii. 297
Nature of, ii. 333;
schoolmen’s views on, ii. 313-15, 333
Occam’s views on, ii. 522
Patristic attitude toward, i. 71
Raban’s view of, i. 222
Scholastic classification of, ii. 313 seqq.
Scholastic decay in relation to, ii. 523
Second stage of mediaeval development represented by, ii. 332-4
Specialisation of, in 12th cent., ii. 119
Theology in relation to, ii. 340 n., 346
Twofold interpretation of, ii. 333
Universals, problem of, ii. 339 seqq.;
Abaelard’s treatment of, ii. 342, 348

Lombard, Peter, estimate of, ii. 370;
Gratian compared with, ii. 270;
Bacon’s attitude toward, ii. 497;
Books of Sentences by, i. 17, 18; ii. 134, 370;
method of the work, ii. 306;
Aquinas’ Summa contrasted with it, ii. 307-10;
its classification scheme, ii. 322-4;
Bonaventura’s commentary on it, ii. 408

Lombards:
Italian kingdom of (6th cent.), i. 115-16
Italian influence on, i. 7, 249
Law codes of, see under Law

Louis of Bavaria, Emp., ii. 518

Page 565

, p,

Louis I. (the Pious), King of France, i. 233, 239, 359;
false capitularies ascribed to, ii. 270

Louis VI. (the Fat), King of France, i. 304-5, 394, 400; ii. 62;
Hildebert’s letter on encroachments of, ii. 140, 172

Louis IX. (the Saint), King of France, Geoffrey’s Vita of, i. 539-42;
Joinville’s Histoire of, i. 542-9;
Testament of, i. 540 n. 1;
otherwise mentioned, i. 476, 507-9, 515

Love, Aquinas on distinguishing definitions of, ii. 475-6

Love, chivalric:
Antique conception of love contrasted with, i. 575
Chansons de geste as concerned with, i. 564
Code of, by Andrew the Chaplain, i. 575-6
Dante’s exposition of, ii. 555-6
Estimate of, mediaeval, i. 568, 570
Literature of, see Chivalry—Literature
Marriage in relation to, i. 571 and n. 2
Minnelieder as depicting, ii. 30
Nature of, i. 572-5, 582-7
Stories exemplifying—Tristan, i. 577 seqq.;
Lancelot, 582 seqq.

Love, spiritual:
Aquinas’ discussion of, ii. 472-3, 476
Bernard of Clairvaux as exemplifying, i. 394 seqq.

Lupus, Servatus, Abbot of Ferrières, i. 215;
ii. 113

Luxeuil, i. 175-7

Lyons:
Diet of the “Three Gauls” at i 30

Page 566

ecclesiastical view, ii. 529
Feudalism as affecting, i. 571, 586
German view of, ii. 30

Marsilius of Padua, ii. 277 n. 2

Martin, St., of Tours, i. 334;
Life of, i. 52 and n., 84, 85 n. 2, 86

Martyrs:
Mediaeval view of, i. 483
Patristic attitude toward, i. 86

Mary, St., of Ognies, i. 462-3;
nature of visions of, i. 459

Massilia, i. 26

Mathematics:
Bacon’s views on, ii. 499-500
Gerbert’s proficiency in, i. 282, 288

Mathew Paris cited, ii. 487

Matthew of Vendome, Ars versificatoria by, ii. 190 and n. 5

Maurus, Rabanus, see Rabanus

Mayors of the palace, i. 240

Mechthild of Magdeburg, i. 20, 345; ii. 365;
Book of, i. 465 and n. 2-70

Mediaeval thought:
Abstractions, genius for, ii. 280
Characteristics of, i. 13
Commentaries characteristic of, ii. 390, 553 n. 4

Page 567

, ,
Conflict inherent in, i. 22; ii. 293-4
Deference of, toward the past, i. 13; ii. 534
Emotionalizing by, of patristic Christianity, i. 345
Metalogics rather than metaphysics the final stage of, ii. 337
Moulding forces of, i. 3, 5, 12; ii. 293-4
Orthodox character of, ii. 283 and n.
Political theorizing, ii. 275 seqq.
Problems of, origins of, ii. 294-5
Restatement and rearrangement of antique matter the work of, i. 13-15,
224, 237, 292, 342; ii. 297, 329, 341:
Culmination of third stage in, ii. 394
Emotional transformations of the antique, i. 18 seqq.
Intellectual transformations of the antique, i. 14 seqq.
Salvation the main interest of, i. 58-9, 334; ii. 296-7, 300
Scholasticism, see that heading
Superstitions accepted by, i. 487
Symbolism the great influence in, ii. 43, 102, 365
Three stages of, ii. 329 seqq.
Ultimate intellectual interests of, ii. 287 seqq.

Medicine:
Relics used in, i. 299
Smattering of, included in Arts course, ii. 250
Study of—in Italy, i. 250 and n. 4, 251; ii. 383 n.
at Chartres, i. 299; ii. 372

Mendicant Orders, see Dominican and Franciscan

Merovingian Kingdom:
Character of, i. 208
Church under, i. 194
Extent of, i. 210 n. 3
German conquests of, i. 121, 138

Merovingian period:
Barbarism of, i. 9
Continuity of, with Carolingian, i. 210-12
King’s law in ii 247

Page 568

King s law in, ii. 247

Merovingians, estimate of, i. 195

Metaphor distinguished from allegory, ii. 41 n. (See also Symbolism)

Metaphysics:
Final stage of mediaeval development represented by, ii. 335-7
Logic, mediaeval, in relation to, ii. 334
Theology dissociated from, by Duns, ii. 510, 516, 517

Michelangelo quoted, ii. 113

Middle Ages (See also Mediaeval thought):
Beginning of, i. 6
Extremes characteristic of, i. 355

Milan, lawyers in, ii. 251 n. 2

Miles, signification of word, i. 525-6 and n. 2

Minnelieder, ii. 28-31

Minorites, i. 430 (See also Franciscan Order)

Miracles (See also Irrationality):
Devil, concerned with, i. 488 seqq.
Nostre Dame, Miracles de, i. 491-2
Patristic attitude toward, i. 85-6, 100, 182
Roman Empire aided by, belief as to, ii. 536
Salimbene’s instance of, i. 516
Universal acceptance of, i. 74, 182
Vitae sanctorum in regard to, i. 85 and n. 2

Mithraism, i. 49

Modena (Mutina), i. 24

Page 569

Modi, ii. 215-16

Monasteries:
Immunities granted to, i. 523 and n.
Regula of, meaning of, ii. 62

Monasticism (For particular Monasteries, Orders, etc., see their names):
Abuses of, i. 357-8; Rigaud’s Register quoted, i. 477-481
Benedictine rule:
Adoption of—in England, i. 184;
among the Franks, i. 199, 201;
generally, i. 358
Papal approval of, i. 335
Cassiodorus a pioneer in literary functions of, i. 94
General mediaeval view regarding, i. 472; ii. 529
Ideal v. actual, i. 355
Ireland, in, i. 135 n. 1
Lament over deprivations of, ii. 218-19
Modifications of, by St. Francis, i. 366
Motives of, i. 357
Nature of, i. 336-7
Nuns, see Women—monastic life
Origin of, i. 335
Pagan literature condemned by, i. 260
Popularity of, in 5th and 6th centuries, i. 195-6
Poverty—of monks, i. 365;
of Orders, i. 366, 425, 430
Reforms of, i. 358 seqq.
Schools, monastic, in Italy, i. 250 n. 2
Sex-relations as regarded by, i. 338
Studies of, in 6th cent., i. 94, 95
Subordinate monasteries, supervision of, i. 361
Uncloistered, see Dominican and Franciscan
Vita activa accepted by, i. 363-6
Vita contemplativa, see that title
Women vilified by devotees of, i. 354 n., 521 n. 2, 532, 533; ii. 58

Montanists 332

Page 570

Montanists, 332

Monte Cassino, i. 250 n. 2, 252-3

Montfort, Countess of, i. 552-4

Moorish conquest of Spain, i. 9, 118

Morimond monastery, i. 362

Mosaics, i. 345-7

Music:
Arithmetic in relation to, ii. 291
Chartres studies in, i. 299
Poetry and, interaction of, ii. 195-6, 201-2
Scholastic classification of, ii. 313

Mysticism:
Hugo’s strain of, ii. 361-3
Nature of, i. 443 n. 1; ii. 363 and n. 4
Symbolism as expressing, see Symbolism

Narbo, i. 26

Narbonensis, see Provincia

Narbonne, law studies at, ii. 250

Natural history and science, see Physical science

Nemorarius, Jordanus, ii. 501

Neo-Platonism:
Arabian versions of Aristotle touched with, ii. 389
Augustinian, i. 55; ii. 403
Christianity compared with, i. 51;
f

Page 571

Patristic habit of mind compared, ii. 295
Ecstasy as regarded by, i. 331
Metaphysics so named by, ii. 336
Pseudo-Dionysian, i. 54 and n. 1
Tenets and nature of, i. 41-9;
a mediatorial system, i. 50, 54, 57-8, 70
Trinity of, ii. 355

Neustria, i. 200, 209, 239

Nibelungenlied, i. 145-6, 148-9, 152, 193, 203 n. 2; ii. 220

Nicholas II., Pope, i. 243 n. 2

Nicholas III., Pope, i. 504

Nicholas IV., Pope (Jerome of Ascoli), ii. 491

Nicholas, St., sequence for festival of, ii. 213-15

Nicolas of Damascus, ii. 427

Nilus, St., Abbot of Crypta-Ferrata, i. 374 n.

Nithard, Count, i. 234-5

Nominalism, i. 303

Norbert, ii. 344

Normandy, Norse occupation of, i. 153

Norsemen (Scandinavians, Vikings):
Characteristics of, i. 138, 154-5
Continental and insular holdings of, i. 153
Eddic poems of, i. 154-5 and n. 3
Irish harassed by, i. 133-4;
later relations, i. 152 n. 3

Page 572

later relations, i. 152 n. 3
Jumièges cloister sacked by, ii. 201
Metal-working among, i. 152 n. 3
Ravages by, in 8th and 9th centuries, i. 152-3
Sagas of, i. 155 seqq.
Settling down of, i. 240

Notker, i. 308-9 and n. 1; sequences of, ii. 201-2

Numbers, symbolic phantasies regarding, i. 72 and nn. 1, 2; ii. 49 n. 3

Oberon, fairy king, i. 564 and n.

Occam, William of, career of, ii. 518;
estimate of his work, ii. 522-3;
attitude toward Duns, ii. 518 seqq.;
on faith and reason, ii. 519;
on Universals, ii. 520-1

Odilo, Abbot of Cluny, i. 294-5, 359;
Jotsaldus’ biography of, quoted, i. 295-6

Odo, Abbot of Cluny, i. 343 and n. 3, 359;
Epitome by, of Gregory’s Moralia, i. 16 n. 4; ii. 161 and n. 2;
Latin style of Collationes, ii. 161-2

Odo of Tournai, ii. 340 n.

Odoacer, i. 114, 145

Olaf, St., i. 156, 160-1

Olaf Tryggvason, King, i. 156, 161-2

Old French:
Formation of, ii. 155
Latin as studied by speakers of, ii. 123
P t ii 222 225

Page 573

Poetry, ii. 222, 225 seqq.

Ontology, see Metaphysics

Ordeal, trial by, i. 232-3 and n. 1

Ordericus Vitalis, i. 525;
Historia ecclesiastica by, ii. 176-8

Organon, see under Aristotle

Origen, estimate of, i. 51, 62-3;
on Canticles, i. 333; ii. 369;
De principiis, i. 68;
otherwise mentioned, i. 53, 76, 80, 87, 104, 411; ii. 64

Orleans School:
Classical studies at, ii. 119 n. 2, 127
Law studies at, ii. 250
Rivalry of, with Chartres, ii. 119 n. 2

Orosius, i. 82 and n. 1, 188

Ostrogoths, i. 7, 113, 114-15, 120

Otfrid the Frank, i. 203-4, 308

Other world:
Irish beliefs as to, i. 131 and n. 2
Voyages to, mediaeval narratives of, i. 444 n. 1

Othloh, i. 315;
visions of, i. 443;
Book concerning the Temptations of a certain Monk, i. 316-23

Otric, i. 289-91

Otto I. (the Great), Emp., i. 241-3, 256-7, 309

Page 574

( ), p, , ,

Otto II., Emp., i. 243, 282-3, 289

Otto III., Emp., i. 243, 283, 284;
Modus Ottinc in honour of, ii. 215-216

Otto IV. (of Brunswick), Emp., i. 417; ii. 32-3

Otwin, Bp. of Hildesheim, i. 312

Ovid, Ars amatoria of, i. 574-5;
mediaeval allegorizing of, and of Metamorphoses, ii. 230

Oxford University:
Characteristics of, ii. 388-9
Curriculum at, ii. 387-8
Foundation of, ii. 380, 386-7
Franciscan fame at, ii. 400
Greek studies at, ii. 120, 391, 487

Palladius, Bp., i. 172

Pandects, see under Roman law

Papacy (See also Church and Popes):
Ascendancy of, over prelacy, i. 304
Character of, ii. 32
Denunciations against, i. 475; ii. 34-5, 218
Empire’s relations with:
Concordat of Worms, i. 245 n. 4
Conflict (11th cent.), i. 244;
(12th cent.), i. 245 n. 4; ii. 273;
(13th cent.), ii. 33, 34-5;
(14th cent.), ii. 518;
allegory as a weapon in, ii. 60
Recognition of ecclesiastical authority, ii. 265-7, 272-3
Reforms by Otto I i 243

Page 575

Reforms by Otto I., i. 243
Gregory VII.’s claims for, i. 245; ii. 274
Mendicant Orders’ relations with, ii. 398, 509
Nepotism of, i. 504-5, 511
Schisms of popes and anti-popes, i. 264
Temporal power of, rise of, i. 116;
claims advanced, i. 245;
realized, ii. 274, 276-7

Papinian cited, ii. 235

Paraclete oratory:
Abaelard at, ii. 10, 344
Heloïse at, ii. 10 seqq.

Paradise:
Dante’s Paradiso, see under Dante
Hildegard’s visions of, i. 455-6

Paris:
Schools:
Growth of, ii. 380
Notre Dame and St. Geneviève, ii. 383
St. Victor, ii. 61-3, 143, 383
University:
Aristotle prohibited at, ii. 391-2
Authorities on, ii. 381 n.
Bacon at, ii. 488
Bonaventura at, ii. 403
Curriculum at, ii. 387-8
Dominicans and Franciscans at, ii. 399
Prominence of, in philosophy and theology, ii. 283, 378-9
Rise, constitution, and struggles of, ii. 119-20, 383-6
Viking sieges of, i. 153

Parma, i. 497, 505-6

Parsival:

Page 576

Chrétien’s version of, i. 567, 588-9
Wolfram’s version of, i. 12 n., 571 n. 2, 589-613; ii. 29

Paschal controversy, see Eucharistic

Paschasius, Radbertus, Abbot of Corbie i. 215, 225-7

Patrick, St., i. 172-3

Patristic thought and doctrine (See also Greek thought, patristic, and Latin
Fathers):
Abaelard’s attitude toward, ii. 305
Achievement of exponents of, i. 86-7
Bacon’s attitude toward, ii. 492
Completeness of schemes presented by, ii. 394
Emotion as synthesized by, i. 340-2
Intellectual rather than emotional, i. 343-4;
emotionalizing of, by mediaeval thinkers, i. 345
Latin medium of, i. 5
Logic as regarded by, i. 71
Mediaeval attitude toward, i. 16
Miracle accepted by, i. 51-3, 85-6
Natural knowledge as treated by, i. 61 seqq., 72-3, 76-7, 99; ii. 393
Pagan philosophy permeating exponents of, i. 33-4, 58, 61
Philosophy as classified by, ii. 312
Rearrangement of, undertaken in Carolingian period, i. 224, 237
Symbolism of, see under Symbolism

Paulinus of Aquileia, i. 215

Paulinus, St., of Nola, i. 86, 126 n. 2

Paulus—on jus, ii. 237:
Sententiae of, ii. 243

Paulus, St., i. 84, 86

Paulus Diaconus i 214-15 252

Page 577

Paulus Diaconus, i. 214-15, 252

Pavia, law school at, ii. 251, 259

Pedro, Don, of Castille, i. 554-5

Pelagians, i. 225

Pelagius, i. 172 n.

Peripatetic School, i. 38-9
(See also Aristotle)

Peter, Bro., of Apulia, i. 512-14

Peter, disciple of St. Francis, i. 426

Peter Damiani, see Damiani

Peter of Blois, ii. 133-4

Peter of Ebulo, ii. 190

Peter of Maharncuria, ii. 502-4

Peter of Pisa, i. 214

Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, i. 360;
letter of, to Heloïse, ii. 25-7

Petrarch, ii. 188, 219

Petrus Riga, Aurora of, ii. 127

Philip VI., King of France, i. 551

Philip Augustus, King of France, ii. 33

Page 578

Philip Hohenstauffen, Duke of Suabia, i. 481; ii. 32, 33

Philo, i. 37, 231;
allegorizing of, ii. 42, 364

Philosophy:
Division of, schemes of, ii. 312 seqq.
End of:
Abaelard’s and Hugo’s views on, ii. 352, 361
John of Salisbury on, ii. 375

Philosophy, antique:
Divine source of, Bacon’s view as to, ii. 507 n. 2
“First” (Aristotelian), ii. 335
Position of, in Roman Empire (3rd-6th cent.), i. 34 (See also Greek
thought)

Philosophy, Arabian, ii. 389-90, 400-1

Philosophy, scholastic:
Completeness of, in Aquinas, ii. 395
Divisions of, ii. 312 seqq.
Importance of, as intellectual interest, ii. 287-8
Physical sciences included in, see Physical science
Theology as the end of (Abaelard’s and Hugo’s view), ii. 352, 361
Theology distinguished from, ii. 284, 288;
by Aquinas, ii. 290, 311;
by Bonaventura, ii. 410 and n.;
considered as superior to, by Aquinas, ii. 289-90, 292;
dominated by (Bacon’s contention), ii. 496;
dissociated from, by Duns and Occam, ii. 510, 517, 519

Physical science:
Albertus Magnus’ attitude toward, ii. 423;
his works on, ii. 425-9
Bacon’s predilection for, ii. 486-7
Classifications of, ii. 312 seqq.
Experimental science or method, ii. 502-8

Page 579

Experimental science or method, ii. 502 8
Mediaeval attitude toward, i. 300
Oxford school of, ii. 389
Patristic attitude toward, i. 63, 66-7, 72-3, 76-7, 99; ii. 393
Theology as subserved by, ii. 67, 111, 289, 486, 492, 496, 500, 530;
denial of the theory—by Duns, ii. 510;
by Occam, ii. 519-20

Physiologus, i. 76-7 and n., 300; ii. 83

Pippin of Heristal, i. 208-9; ii. 197

Pippin of Neustria, i. 115, 200, 209, 210 and n. 1; ii. 273

Pippin, son of Charlemagne, ii. 197

Placentia (Piacenza), i. 24

Placentinus, ii. 261-2

Plato, supra-rationalism of, i. 42;
allegorizing by, i. 36; ii. 364;
doctrine of ideas, i. 35; ii. 339-340;
Aquinas on this doctrine, ii. 455, 465;
Augustine of Hippo as influenced by, ii. 403;
“salvation” suggestion in, ii. 296 n. 2;
Republic, i. 36;
Timaeus, i. 35-6, 291; ii. 64, 69, 118, 348, 370, 372, 377

Platonism:
Alanus’ Anticlaudianus, in, ii. 100 n. 2
Augustinian, i. 55
Nature of, i. 35-6, 57, 59
Philosophy as classified by, ii. 312

Pliny the Elder, Historia naturalis by, i. 39-40, 75

Plotinus, estimate of, i. 43, 45;
l ffi i fA i i h i 55 7

Page 580

personal affinity of Augustine with, i. 55-7;
philosophic system of, i. 42-6, 50, 51;
Enneads of, i. 55;
otherwise mentioned, i. 50, 51; ii. 64

Plutarch, i. 44

Poetry, mediaeval:
Carmina Burana (Goliardic poetry), ii. 203, 217-19 and n.
Chivalric, see Chivalry—Literature
Hymns, see that heading
Italian, of 11th cent., i. 251 seqq.; ii. 186
Latin, see Latin verse
Modi, ii. 215-16
Music and, interaction of, ii. 195-6, 201-2
Old High German, ii. 194
Popular verse, see sub-headings Carmina and Modi; also Vernacular
Prosody, Alexander de Villa-Dei on, ii. 126
Vernacular:
Germanic, Norse, and Anglo-Saxon, ii. 220-1
Romance, ii. 221-3, 225 seqq.

Pontigny monastery, i. 362

Poor of Lyons (Waldenses), i. 364, 365 n.; ii. 34

Popes (See also Papacy; and for particular popes see their names):
Avignon, at, ii. 510
Decretals of, see under Canon law
Degradation of (10th cent.), i. 242
Election of, freed from lay control, i. 243 n. 2

Popular rights, growth of, in 12th cent., i. 305

Porphyry, i. 42, 44-7, 50, 51, 56; ii. 295;
Isagoge (Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle), i. 45, 92, 102; ii.
312, 314 n., 333, 339

Page 581

Preaching Friars, see Dominican Order

Predestination, Gottschalk’s controversy as to, i. 224-5, 227-8

Priscianus, i. 71; ii. 119 n. 2;
Institutiones grammaticae of (Priscianus major and minor), ii. 124-5

Prosper of Aquitaine, i. 106 n. 1

Provençal literature, i. 571; ii. 168;
Alba (aube) poetry, i. 20, 571; ii. 30

Provincia (Narbonensis):
Antique, the, in relation to, before Middle Ages, i. 9
Latinization of, i. 26-7 and n. 1
Ligurian inhabitants of, i. 126
Teutonic invasion of, i. 125

Prudentius, ii. 63;
Psychomachia of, ii. 102-4

Pseudo-Callisthenes, Life and Deeds of Alexander by, ii. 224, 225, 229-230

Pseudo-Dionysius, ii. 302;
Celestial Hierarchy by, i. 54 and n. 1

Pseudo-Turpin, ii. 319

Ptolemy of Alexandria, i. 40

Purgatory:
Dante’s Purgatorio, see under Dante
Hildegard’s visions as to, i. 456 n.
Popular belief as to, i. 486

Quadrivium, see under Seven Liberal Arts

Page 582

Rabanus Maurus, Abp. of Mainz, allegorizing of Scripture by, ii. 46-7;
interest in the vernacular, i. 308;
works of, i. 222-41;
De universo, i. 300; ii. 316 n. 2;
Allegoriae in universam sacram scripturam, ii. 48-9;
De laudibus sanctae crucis, ii. 49 n. 3;
otherwise mentioned, i. 16, 100, 215; ii. 302-303, 312, 332

Race, tests for determining, i. 124 n.

Radbertus, see Paschasius

Raoul de Cambrai, i. 563-4

Ratherius, i. 309 and n. 2

Ratramnus of Corbie, i. 215, 227; ii. 199

Ravenna:
Gerbert’s disputation in, i. 289-91
Grammar and rhetoric studies at, ii. 121
Law studies at, ii. 251, 252
S. Apollinaris in Classe, i. 373, 377

Raymond of Agiles quoted, i. 536

Realism, Duns’ exposition of, ii. 514 and n.

Reason v. authority controversy:
Berengar’s position in, i. 302-3
Eriugena’s contribution to, i. 229-30

Reccared, i. 118 nn.

Reinhard, Bp. of Halberstadt, ii. 62

Page 583

Relics of saints and martyrs:
Arms enshrining, i. 528
Curative use of, i. 299
Patristic attitude toward, i. 86, 101 n.

Renaissance, misleading nature of term, i. 211 n.

Renaud de Montaubon, i. 564

Rheims cathedral school, i. 293

Rhetoric:
Chartres study of, i. 298
Hugo of St. Victor on, ii. 67
Predominance of, i. 109 and n.

Richard, Abbot of Jumièges, i. 480-1

Richard of Middleton, ii. 512

Richard of St. Victor, ii. 80, 87 and n. 2, 367 n. 2, 540

Richer, Abbot of Monte Cassino, i. 252, 300 n. 2;
history of Gerbert by, quoted, i. 287-91

Ricimer, Count, i. 113

Riddles, didactic, i. 218-19 and n. 1

Rigaud, Eude (Oddo Rigaldus), Abp. of Rouen, i. 476, 508, 509;
Register of, quoted, i. 476-81

Robert, cousin of St. Bernard, i. 395-7

Robert of Normandy, ii. 139

Rollo, Duke, of Normandy, i. 153, 239-40

Page 584

Roman de la rose, i. 586-7; ii. 103 and nn., 104, 223

Roman de Thebes, ii. 227, 229 n.

Roman Empire:
Barbarization of, i. 5, 7, 111 seqq.
Billeting of soldiers, custom as to, i. 114 n., 117
Christianity accepted by, i. 345
Church, relations with, ii. 265-7, 272-3
Cities enjoying citizenship of—in Spain, i. 26 and n. 2;
in Gaul, i. 30
City life of, i. 27, 326
Clientage system under, i. 117 n. 2
Dante’s views on, ii. 536
Decadence of, i. 84, 97, 111
Eastern, see Eastern Empire
Enduring nature of, conditions of, i. 238 n.
Greek thought diffused by, i. 4
Italian people under, i. 7
Jurisconsults of, authority and capacity of, ii. 232-3 and n., 236
Latinization of Western Europe due to, i. 23 seqq., 110
Mediaeval attitude toward, i. 11
Scandinavians under influence of, i. 152 n. 3

Roman law:
Auditory, Imperial or Praetorian, ii. 233 n., 235 n. 1
Bologna famed for study of, ii. 121, 251, 259-62, 378
Brachylogus, ii. 254-5
Breviarium and its Interpretatio, i. 117; ii. 243-4;
Epitomes of, ii. 244, 249-50;
Brachylogus influenced by, ii. 254
Burgundian tolerance of, i. 121;
code (Papianus), ii. 239, 242
Church under, ii. 265 and n. 2
Codes of:
Barbaric, nature of, ii. 244
(See also sub-headings Breviarium and Burgundian)

Page 585

Gregorianus’, ii. 240, 243
Hermogenianus’, ii. 240, 243
Nature of, ii. 239-40
Theodosian, ii. 240 and n. 2, 241 n. 2, 242-3, 249, 266-7 and n. 1
Codex of Justinian, ii. 240, 242, 253:
Azo’s and Accursius’ work on, ii. 263-4
Glosses to, ii. 249-50
Placentinus’ Summa of, ii. 262
Summa Perusina an epitome of, ii. 249, 252
Constitutiones and rescripta principum, ii. 235 and n. 1, 239, 240
Custom recognized by, ii. 236
Digest of, by Justinian, see subheading Pandects
Elementary education including smattering of, ii. 250
Epitomes of, various, ii. 249-50;
Epitome of Julianus, ii. 242, 249, 254
Glosses:
Accursius’ Glossa ordinaria, ii. 263-4
Irnerius’, ii. 261 and n. 1
Justinian’s Codex, to, ii. 249-50
Gothic adoption of, i. 114
Institutes of Gaius, ii. 241, 243
Institutes of Justinian, ii. 241, 243, 254:
Azo’s Summa of, ii. 263
Placentinus’ Summa of, ii. 262
Jurisprudential element in early stages of, ii. 232
Jus identified with aequitas, ii. 235
Jus civile, ii. 237, 257
Jus gentium:
Jus naturale in relation to, ii. 234 and n.
Origin of, ii. 233-4
Popular rights as regarded by, ii. 278
Jus praetorium, ii. 235
Lex romana canonice compta, ii. 252
Lombard attitude toward, i. 115
Novellae of Justinian, ii. 240, 242
Pandects (Justinian’s Digest), ii. 235 and n. 2, 236-8, 241-2, 248, 253,
255:
Accursius’ Glossa on ii 264

Page 586

Accursius Glossa on, ii. 264
Glossators’ interpretation of, ii. 265
Permanence of, ii. 236
Petrus (Petri exceptiones), ii. 252-4
Placentinus’ work in, ii. 261-2
Principles of, examples of, ii. 237-8;
possession and its rights, ii. 256-8
Principles of interpretation of, ii. 256
Provincia, in, i. 27 n. 1
Responsa or auctoritas jurisprudentium, ii. 235-6
Sources of, multifarious, ii. 235
Sphere of, ii. 248
Study of, centres for—in France, ii. 250;
in Italy, ii. 121, 251 and n. 2, 259-62, 378
Summa codicis Irnerii, ii. 255
Theodosian Code, see under subheading Codes
Treatises on, mediaeval, ii. 252 seqq.
Twelve Tables, ii. 232, 236
Visigothic code of, see subheading Breviarium

Romance, spirit of, i. 418

Romance languages (See also Old French):
Characteristics of, ii. 152
Dante’s attitude toward, ii. 537
Latin as modified by, ii. 155
Literature of, ii. 221-3
(See also Provençal literature)
Strength of, i. 9

Romance nations, mediatorial rôle of, i. 110-11, 124

Romans d’aventure, i. 564-5, 571 n. 2

Rome:
Bishops of, see Popes
Factions in (10th cent.), i. 242
Law School in, ii. 251, 255
M i i i 347

Page 587

Mosaics in, i. 347
Verses to, i. 348; ii. 200

Romualdus, St., youth of, i. 373;
austerities of, i. 374, 379, 381;
relations with his father, i. 374-5;
harshness and egotism of, i. 375-7;
at Vallis de Castro, i. 376-7, 380;
at Sytrio, i. 378-9;
death of, i. 372 n. 3, 380;
Commentary of, on the Psalter, i. 379

Romulus Augustulus, Emp., i. 114

Roncesvalles, battle of, i. 559 n. 2-62

Roscellinus, i. 303-4; ii. 339-40

Rothari, King of Lombards, i. 115; ii. 251

Ruadhan, St., i. 132-3

Ruotger, Life of Abp. Bruno by, i. 310; ii. 162 and n. 1

Sacra doctrina, see Theology

Sacraments, see under Church

Sagas, Norse:
Character of, i. 12 n., 155 seqq.
Egil, i. 162-4
Gisli, i. 158
Heimskringla, i. 160-2 and n. 2
Njala, i. 157 and n., 159, 164-7
Oral tradition of, ii. 220

St. Denis monastery, ii. 10, 344

Page 588

St. De s o aste y, . 0, 3

St. Emmeram convent (Ratisbon), i. 315, 316

St. Gall monastery, i. 257-8;
Notker’s work at, ii. 201-2

St. Victor monastery and school, ii. 61-3, 143, 383

Saints:
Austerities of, i. 374 and n., 375
Interventions of, mediaeval beliefs as to, i. 487-8, 490
Irish clergy so called, i. 135 n. 2
Lives of:
Compend. of (Legenda Aurea), ii. 184
Conventionalized descriptions in, i. 393 n. 1
Defects of, i. 494
Estimate of, i. 84-5 and nn.
otherwise mentioned, i. 298, 300
Relics of, see Relics
Visions of, i. 444-5
Worship of, i. 101

Salerno medical school, i. 250 n. 4, 251; ii. 121

Salian Franks, see under Franks

Salimbene, i. 496-7, 499-500;
Chronica of, quoted and cited, i. 498 seqq.;
editions and translations of the work, i. 496 n.

Salvation, see under Christianity

Salvian, De gubernatione Dei by, i. 84

Saracens:
Crusades against, see Crusades
Frankish victories against, i. 209-10 n. 1
W ith it ti g t d i i 525

Page 589

Wars with, necessitating mounted warriors, i. 525
otherwise mentioned, i. 239, 252, 274, 332

Saxons, see Anglo-Saxons and Germans

Scandinavians, see Norsemen

Scholasticism:
Arab analogy with, ii. 390 and n. 2
Aristotle’s advanced works, stages of appropriation of, ii. 393-5
Bacon’s attack on, ii. 484, 493-4, 496, 509
Classification of topics by:
Schemes of, various, ii. 312 seqq.
Twofold principle of, ii. 311
Conceptualism, ii. 520-1
Content of, i. 301
Deference to authority a characteristic of, ii. 297, 300
Disintegration of—through Duns, ii. 510, 516;
through Occam, ii. 522-3
Elementary nature of discussions of, ii. 347
Evil, problem of, see Evil
Exponents of, ii. 283 and n.
Final exposition of, by Aquinas, ii. 484
Greek thought contrasted with, ii. 296
Humour non-existent in, ii. 459
Method of, ii. 302, 306-7, 315 n.;
prototype of, i. 95
Nominalism, ii. 340
Philosophy of, see Philosophy, scholastic
Phraseology of, untranslatable, ii. 348, 483
Praedicables, ii. 314 n.
Present interest of, ii. 285
Realism, ii. 340;
Pantheism in relation to, ii. 370
Salvation a main interest of, ii. 296-7, 300, 311
Scriptural authority, position of, ii. 289, 291-2
Secular studies as regarded by, ii. 349, 357
Stages of development of, ii. 333 seqq.

Page 590

g p , qq
Sympathetic study of, the key to contradictions, ii. 371
Theology of, see Theology
Universals, problem of:
Aquinas’ treatment of, ii. 462
Duns’ treatment of, ii. 515
Occam’s contribution toward, ii. 520-1
Roscellin’s views on, i. 303-4

Sciences, classifications of, ii. 312 seqq.
(See also Physical science)

Scotland, Christianizing of, i. 173

Scriptures, Christian:
Allegorizing of:
Examples of:
David and Bathsheba episode, ii. 44-6
Exodus, Book of, ii. 47
Good Samaritan parable, ii. 53-6, 84, 90
Hannah, story of, ii. 47 n. 1
Pharisee and Publican parable, ii. 51-2
Hugo of St. Victor’s view of, ii. 65 n.
Writers exemplifying—Philo, ii. 42-43;
the Fathers, ii. 43 seqq., 68-9 and n. 2;
Rabanus, ii. 46-50;
Bede, ii. 47 n. 1;
Honorius of Autun, ii. 51 seqq.;
Hugo of St. Victor, ii. 67 seqq.
Anglo-Saxon version of, i. 142 n. 2, 183
Authority of—in patristic doctrine, ii. 295;
acknowledged by Eriugena, i. 231;
by Berengar, i. 303;
in scholasticism, ii. 280, 291-2
Bacon’s attitude toward, ii. 491-2, 497
Bonaventura’s attitude toward, and writings on, ii. 405 seqq.
Canon law based on, ii. 267-9
Classical studies in relation to, see subheading Secular
Classification of topics based on ii 317 324

Page 591

Classification of topics based on, ii. 317, 324
Commentaries on—Alcuin’s, i. 220-1;
Raban’s, i. 222-3
Duns’ attitude toward, ii. 516
Francis of Assisi’s literal acceptance of, i. 365, 426-7;
his realization of spirit of, i. 427 n. 1; ii. 183
Gothic version of, i. 143 n.
Heliand, i. 203 and nn., 308
Hymns based on, ii. 88 seqq.
Interpretation of—by the Fathers, i. 43 seqq., 68-9 and n. 2;
by Eriugena, i. 231;
by Berengar, i. 303
Isidore’s writings on, i. 104-5
Love, human, as treated in Old Testament, i. 332-3
Scenes from, in Gothic art, ii. 82 seqq.
Secular knowledge in relation to, i. 63, 66; ii. 110, 112, 120, 499
Song of Songs, see Canticles
Study of, by monks, i. 94;
Cassiodorus’ Institutiones, i. 95-6
Theology identified with, ii. 406, 408
Vulgate, the:
Corruption in Paris copy of, ii. 497
Language of, ii. 171

Sculpture, Gothic:
Cathedrals, evolution of, ii. 538-9
Symbolism of, i. 457 n. 2; ii. 82-6

Sedulius Scotus, i. 215

Seneca, i. 26, 41

Sentences, Books of:
Isidore’s, i. 106 and n. 1
Paulus’ Sententiae, ii. 243
Peter Lombard’s, see under Lombard
Prosper’s, i. 106 n. 1

Page 592

Sequence-hymns, development of, ii. 196, 201-6;
Adam of St. Victor’s, ii. 209-215

Serenus, Bp. of Marseilles, i. 102

Sermons, allegorizing:
Bernard of Clairvaux, by, i. 337 n., 409-13; ii. 169, 368-9
Honorius of Autun, by, ii. 50 seqq.

Seven Liberal Arts (See also separate headings Grammar, Logic, etc.):
Alanus de Insulis on functions of, ii. 98 n. 1
Carolingian study of, i. 236
Clerical education in, i. 221-2
Compend of, by Cassiodorus, i. 96
De nuptiis as concerned with, i. 71 n. 3
Hugo of St. Victor on function of, ii. 67, 111
Latin the medium for, ii. 109
Law smattering included with, ii. 250
Quadrivium:
Boëthius on, i. 90 and n. 2
Chartres, at, i. 299
Thierry’s encyclopaedia of, ii. 130
Trivium:
Chartres, at, i. 298-9; ii. 163
Courses of, as representing stages of mediaeval development, ii. 331
seqq.
otherwise mentioned, i. 217; ii. 553

Severinus, St., i. 192

Severus, Sulpicius, i. 126 n. 2;
Life of St. Martin by, i. 52, 84, 85 n. 2, 86

Sidonius, Apollinaris, i. 126 n. 2;
cited, i. 117 n. 1, 140

Siger de Brabant, ii. 401 and n.

Page 593

Sippe, i. 122

Smaragdus, Abbot, i. 215

Socrates, i. 34-5; ii. 7

Songs, see Poetry

Sophists, Greek, i. 35

Sorbon, Robert de, i. 544-5

Sorcery, i. 46

Spain:
Antique, the, in relation to, before Middle Ages, i. 9
Arabian philosophy in, ii. 390
Church in, i. 9, 103, 118 and n.
Latinization of, i. 25-6 and n. 2
Moorish conquest of, i. 9, 118
Visigoths in, i. 113, 116-17 and n. 2, 118

Stabat Mater, i. 348

Statius, ii. 229 n.

Statius Caecilius, i. 25

Stephen IX., Pope, i. 263

Stephen, St., sequence for festival of, ii. 211-13

Stephen of Bourbon quoted, i. 365 n.

Stilicho, i. 112

Stoicism:

Page 594

Emotion as regarded by, i. 330
Nature of, i. 41, 57, 59
Neo-Platonism contrasted with, ii. 296
Philosophy as classified by, ii. 312
Roman law as affected by, ii. 232
otherwise mentioned, i. 40, 70

Strabo, Walafrid, see Walafrid

Suevi, i. 116-17 and n. 2, 139

Summae, method of, ii. 306-7
(See also under Theology)

Summum bonum, Aquinas’ discussion of, ii. 438 seqq., 456

Switzerland, Irish monasteries founded in, i. 174

Sylvester II., Pope (Gerbert of Aurillac), career of, i. 281-4;
disputation with Otric, i. 289-91;
estimate of, i. 281, 285-7;
love of the classics, i. 287-8; ii. 110;
Latin style of, ii. 160;
logical studies of, ii. 332, 338, 339, 345;
letters of, quoted, i. 283-7;
estimated, i. 284-5;
editions of works of, i. 280 n.;
Libellus de rationali et ratione uti, i. 292 n., 299;
otherwise mentioned, i. 249; ii. 35

Symbolism:
Alanus’ Anticlaudianus as exemplifying, ii. 94-103
Angels as symbols, ii. 457
Art, mediaeval, inspired by, i. 21
Augustine and Gregory compared as to, i. 56-7
Carolingian, nature and examples of, ii. 46-50
Church edifices, of, ii. 78-82
Dante permeated with, ii. 534, 552-5

Page 595

Dante permeated with, ii. 534, 552 5
Greek, nature of, ii. 56-7
Hildegard’s visions, in, i. 456 seqq.
Marriage relationship, in, i. 413-14
Mass, of the, ii. 77-8
Mediaeval thought deeply impressed by, ii. 43, 50 n. 1, 102, 365
Mysticism in relation to, ii. 364
Neo-Platonic, i. 52
Ovid’s works interpreted by, ii. 230
Patristic, i. 37, 43-6, 52, 53, 58, 80
Platonic, i. 36
Raban’s addiction to, i. 223 and n. 2
Signum et res classification, ii. 322-3
Twelfth century—in Honorius of Autun, ii. 51 seqq.;
in Hugo of St. Victor, ii. 64 seqq.
Universal in mental processes, ii. 41, 552 n.
Universe explained by, ii. 64, 66 seqq.
otherwise mentioned, i. 15, 22

Sytrio, Romualdus at, i. 378-9

Tacitus, i. 78; ii. 134

Tears, grace of, i. 370-1 and n., 462, 463

Templars, i. 531-5

Tenth century, see Carolingian period

Tertullian, i. 5, 58, 87, 99, 171, 332, 344, 354 n.; ii 152;
paradox of, i. 51; ii. 297;
Adversus Marcionem, i. 68

Teutons (See also Anglo-Saxons, Danes, Germans, Norsemen):
Celts compared with, i. 125
Characteristics of, i. 138
Christianizing of:
M f i 181 3 196 7 193

Page 596

Manner of, i. 181-3, 196-7, 193;
results of, i. 5, 170-1
Motives of converts, i. 193
Customs of, i. 122, 139, 141, 523
Law of, early, tribal nature of, ii. 245-7
Rôle of, in mediaeval evolution, i. 125
Roman Empire permeated by, i. 111 seqq.

Theodora, i. 242

Theodore, Abp. of Canterbury, i. 184

Theodoric of Freiburg, ii. 501 n.

Theodoric the Ostrogoth, i. 89, 91 n. 2, 93, 114-15, 120-1, 138, 249;
in legend, i. 145-6;
Edict of, ii. 244 n.

Theodosius the Great, Emp., i. 112; ii. 272;
Code of, ii. 240 and n. 2, 241 n. 2, 242, 249, 266-7 and n. 1

Theodulphus, Bp. of Orleans, i. 9, 215;
Latin diction of, ii. 160

Theology, scholastic:
Abaelard’s treatises on, see under Abaelard
Aquinas’ Summa of, see under Aquinas
Argumentative nature of, ii. 292-3
Augustinian character of, ii. 403
Course of study in, ii. 388
Importance of, as intellectual interest, ii. 287-8
Logic in relation to, ii. 340 n., 346
Mysticism of, ii. 363-4
Natural sciences, etc., as handmaids to, ii. 67, 111, 289, 486, 492, 496,
500, 530;
denial of the theory—by Duns, ii. 510;
by Occam, ii. 519-520
(See also Physical science—Patristic attitude toward)

Page 597

Intellectual interests of, ultimate, ii. 287
Latin prose styles of, ii. 179
Papal position in, ii. 509
Personalities of writers emergent in, ii. 436
Theology and dialectic the chief studies of, ii. 118-20
Three phenomena marking, ii. 378

Thomas à Kempis, De imitatione Christi by, ii. 185

Thomas Aquinas, see Aquinas

Thomas of Brittany, Tristan fragment by, i. 582

Thomas of Cantimpré, ii. 428-9

Thomas of Celano, Life of St. Francis by, quoted, i. 435, 436-8;
style of the work, ii. 182-3

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War by, i. 77-8

Thuringia:
Boniface’s work in, i. 197-8
Merovingian rule in, i. 121

Thuringians, language of, i. 145 n. 2

Torriti, i. 347

Trance, see Ecstasy

Trèves, i. 30, 31, 192

Tristan:
Chrétien’s version of, i. 567
Gottfried von Strassburg’s version of, i. 577-82

Trivium, see under Seven Liberal Arts

Page 598

,

Troubadours (trouvères), i. 572-3 and nn.

Troy, tales of, in mediaeval literature, ii. 200, 224-5 and n. 2, 227-9

True and the good compared, ii. 441, 512

Truth, Guigo’s Meditationes as concerning, i. 385-6

Twelfth century:
Classical studies at zenith in, ii. 117-118
Growth in, various, i. 305-6
Intellectual interests of, ultimate, ii. 287
Literary zenith in, ii. 168, 205-6
Mobility increased during, ii. 379

Ulfilas, i. 192; ii. 221

Ulpian—on jus naturale and jus gentium, ii. 234 and n.;
on justitia, jus and jurisprudentia, ii. 237

Ulster Cycle, Sagas of, i. 128 and n. 2, 129 seqq.

Universals, see under Scholasticism

Universities, mediaeval (For particular universities see their names):
Increase in (14th cent.), ii. 523
Rise of, ii. 379, 381 seqq.
Studies at, ii. 388 and n.

Urban II., Pope, ii. 175

Urban IV., Pope, ii. 391-2, 434

Utrecht, bishopric of, i. 197

Page 599

Vallombrosa, i. 377

Vandals, i. 112, 113, 120

Varro, Terentius, i. 39, 71, 78

Vercingetorix, i. 28

Vernacular poetry, see under Poetry

Verse, see Poetry

Vikings, see Danes and Norsemen

Vilgard, i. 259-60

Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum majus of, ii. 82 and n. 2, 315-22

Virgil, Bernard Silvestris’ Commentum on, ii. 116-17 and n. 2;
Dante in relation to, ii. 535, 536, 539, 543

Virgin Mary:
Dante’s Paradiso as concerning, ii. 551
Hymns to, by Hugo of St. Victor, ii. 86-7, 92
Interventions of, against the devil, i. 487, 490-2
Mediaeval attitude toward, i. 53, 54 and n. 2; ii. 431, 551, 558

Virtues:
Aquinas’ classification of, ii. 326-8
Odilo’s Cardinales disciplinae, i. 295

Virtues and vices, poetic treatment of—by Alanus, ii. 102 n.;
by De Lorris and De Meun, ii. 103

Visigoths:
Arianism of, i. 120
Dacian settlement of, i. 112

Page 600

Gaul, Southern, kingdom in, i. 7, 112, 116;
Clovis’ conquest of, i. 121
Roman law code promulgated by, see Roman law—Breviarium
Spain, in, i. 9, 113, 116-17 and n. 2, 118

Visions:
Examples of, i. 444-6, 451, 452-9
Monastic atmosphere in, i. 184 and n. 2
Nature of, i. 443, 449 and n. 3, 450, 451 and n.

Vita contemplativa:
Aquinas’ views on, ii. 443, 481-2
Hildebert on, ii. 144-5

Vitae sanctorum, see Saints—Lives of

Walafrid Strabo, i. 100, 215; ii. 332;
Glossa ordinaria of, i. 16, 221 n. 2; ii. 46;
De cultura hortorum, ii. 188 n. 2

Waldenses, i. 365 n.; ii. 34

Walter of Lille (of Chatillon), Alexandreis of, ii. 192 and n. 3, 230 n. 1

Walther von der Vogelweide, political views of, ii. 33;
attitude of, toward Papacy, ii. 34-6;
piety and crusading zeal of, ii. 36;
melancholy, ii. 36-7;
Minnelieder of, ii. 29-31;
Sprüche, ii. 29, 32, 36;
Tagelied, ii. 30;
Unter der Linde, ii. 30;
otherwise mentioned, i. 475, 482, 589; ii. 223

Wergeld, i. 122, 139; ii. 246

Will primacy of over intellect ii 512 515

Page 601

Will, primacy of, over intellect, ii. 512, 515

William, Abbot of Hirschau, i. 315

William II. (Rufus), King of England, i. 273, 275; ii. 138-9

William of Apulia, ii. 189 and n. 3

William of Champeaux—worsted by Abaelard, ii. 342-3;
founds St. Victor, ii. 61, 143;
Hildebert’s letter to, quoted, ii. 143

William of Conches, ii. 132;
studies and works of, ii. 372-3;
Summa moralium philosophorum, ii. 134-5, 373 and n. 2

William of Malmsbury cited, i. 525

William of Moerbeke, ii. 391

William of Occam, see Occam

William of St. Thierry, ii. 300, 344

Willibrord, St., i. 197

Winifried-Boniface, St., i. 6, 197-200, 308; ii. 273

Wisdom, Aquinas on, ii. 481

Witelo, Perspectiva by, ii. 501 n.

Witiza of Aquitaine, i. 358-9

Wolfram von Eschenbach, ii. 223;
Parzival by, i. 12 n., 149 n. 1, 152, 567, 571 n. 2, 589-613; ii. 36;
estimate of the work, i. 588; ii. 29

Page 602

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Footnotes:
[1] See post, Chapter XXXVI., i.
[2] Lev. xxi. 20; Deut. xxiii. 1.
[3] Lucan, Pharsalia, viii. 94.
[4] Heloïse here in mediaeval fashion cites a number of examples from
Scripture showing the ills and troubles brought by women to men.
[5] Again she quotes to prove this, from Job and St. Gregory and Ambrose.

Page 604

[6] Heloïse’s last problema did not relate to Scripture, and may have been
suggested by her own life. “We ask whether one can sin in doing what is
permitted or commanded by the Lord?” Abaelard answers with a discussion
of what is permissible between man and wife.
[7] This letter of Heloïse is not extant.
[8] The Tristan of Gottfried von Strassburg and the Parzival of Wolfram
von Eschenbach have been given. One may also refer to works of older
contemporaries, e.g. to the Aeneid of Heinrich von Veldeke, translated
(1184) from a French rendering of Virgil; and the two courtly narrative
poems, the Erec and Ivain (Knight of the Lion) taken from Chrétien of
Troies by Hartmann von Aue, who flourished as the twelfth century was
passing into the thirteenth.
[9] On Walther von der Vogelweide, see Wilmann, Leben und Dichtung
Walthers, etc. (Bonn, 1882); Schönbach, Walther von der Vogelweide (2nd
ed., Berlin, 1895). The citations from his poems in this chapter follow the
Pfeiffer-Bartsch edition.
[10] No. 3 in the Pfeiffer-Bartsch edition.
[11] 184.
[12] 33.
[13] 22.
[14] 14, 16, 69.
[15] 18.
[16] 39.
[17] See Lieder, 46, 51, 56, 59, 61, 62, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77.
[18] A lucid account of this struggle is given in Luchaire, Innocent III., vol.
iii. (“La Papauté et l’Empire”), Paris, 1906.
[19] 81.

Page 605

[20] From “Freidank in Auswahl,” in Hildebrand’s Didaktik aus der Zeit
der Kreuzzüge, p. 336 (Deutsche Nat. Lit.).
[21] 85, cf. 164.
[22] 110.
[23] 113, cf. 111, 112.
[24] 115, 116.
[25] 133. My statement of the opposition to the papacy might be much
more analytical, and contain further apt distinctions. But this would remove
it too far from the anti-papal feeling of the common man; and the period,
moreover, is not yet that of Occam and Marsilius of Padua—as to whom see
Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. by Maitland
(Cambridge, 1900).
[26] 88, 137.
[27] 158. Walter shared the crusading spirit. The inference that he was
himself a Crusader is unsafe; but he wrote stirring crusading poems, one
opening with a line that in sudden power may be compared with Milton’s

“Avenge, O Lord, Thy slaughtered saints.”

“Rich, hêrre, dich und dine muoter, megede kint.”
167. See also 78, 79.

[28] 87.
[29] Parzival, i. 824.
[30] 186.
[31] 188.
[32] While an allegory is a statement having another consciously intended
meaning, metaphor is the carrying over or deflection of a meaning from its
primary application. According to good usage, which has kept these terms

Page 606

distinct, allegory implies a definite and usually a sustained intention, and
suggests the spiritual; while metaphor suggests figures of speech and
linguistic changes often unconscious. Language develops through the
metaphorical (not allegorical) extension or modification of the meanings of
words. The original meaning sometimes is obscured (e.g. in profane or
depend), and sometimes continues to exist with the new one. In a vast
number of languages, such words as straight, oblique, crooked, seem
always to have had both a direct and a metaphorical meaning. Moral and
intellectual conceptions necessarily are expressed in phrases primarily
applicable to physical phenomena.
[33] Cf. Taylor, Classical Heritage, p. 97 sqq.
[34] Ante, Chapters IV., V.
[35] Contra Faustum, xxii. 1-5.
[36] Contra Faustum, xxii. 66-68.
[37] Augustine’s method in this twenty-second Book is first to consider the
actual sinfulness or justification of these deeds, and afterwards to take up in
succession their typological significance. So, for example, he discusses the
blamefulness of Judah’s conduct with Tamar in par. 61-64 and its typology
in 83-86.
[38] Contra Faustum, xxii. 87. St. Ambrose, in his Apologia Prophetae
David, cap. iii. (Migne 14, col. 857), written some years before Augustine’s
treatise against Faustus, finds Bathsheba to signify the “congregatio
nationum quae non erat Christo legitimo quodam fidei copulata connubio.”
[39] Quaestiones in Vet. Testam. in Regum II. (Migne 83, col. 411). Isidore
died a.d. 636 (ante, Chapter V.)
[40] Comment. in Libros IV. Regum, in lib. ii. cap. xi.; Migne, Pat. Lat. 109,
col. 98 (written in 834). On Rabanus and Walafrid see ante, Chapter X.
[41] Glossa ordinaria, Lib. Regum, ii. cap. xi. (Migne 113, col. 571, 572).
[42] Comment. in Matthaeum (Migne 107, col. 734).
[43] Migne 114, col. 67.

Page 607

[44] It was the way of Bede in his commentaries to speak briefly of the
literal or historic meaning of the text, and then give the usual symbolical
interpretations, paying special attention to the significance of the Old
Testament narratives as types of the career of Christ (see e.g. the beginning
of the Commentary on Exodus, Migne 92, col. 285 sqq.; and Prologue to
the allegorical Commentary on Samuel, Migne 92, col. 501, 502). For
example, in the opening of the First Book of Samuel, Elkanah is a type of
Christ, and his two wives Peninnah and Hannah represent the Synagogue
and the Church. When Samuel is born to Hannah he also is a type of Christ;
and Bede says it need not astonish one that Hannah’s spouse and Hannah’s
son should both be types of Christ, since the Mediator between God and
man is at once the spouse and son of Holy Church: He is her spouse as He
aids her with His confidence and hope and love, and her son when by grace
He enters the hearts of those who believe and hope and love. In Samuelam,
cap. iii. (Migne 91, col. 508). Bede’s monastic mind balked at the literal
statement that Elkanah had two wives (see the Prologue, Migne 91, col.
499).
[45] Com. in Exodum, Praefatio (Migne 108, col. 9).
[46] Migne 112, col. 849-1088. A number of these dictionaries were
compiled, the earliest being the De formulis spiritalis intellegentiae of
Eucherius, Bishop of Lyons, who died in 450, ed. by Pauly 1884. In the
later Middle Ages Alanus de Insulis (post, Chapter XXIX.) compiled one.
[47] These distinctions, not commonly observed, are frequently reiterated.
Says Hugo of St. Victor (see post, Chapter XXVIII.) in the Prologue to his
De sacramentis: “Divine Scripture, with threefold meaning, considers its
matter historically, allegorically, and tropologically. History is the narrative
of facts, and follows the primary meaning of words; we have allegory when
the fact which is told signifies some other fact in the past, present, or future;
and tropology when the narrated fact signifies that something should be
done.” Cf. Hugo’s Didascalicon, v. cap. 2, where Hugo illustrates his
meaning, and points out that this threefold significance is not to be found in
every passage of Scripture. In ibid. v. cap. 4, he gives seven curious rules of
interpretation (Migne 176, col. 789-793). In his De Scripturis, etc.,
praenotatiunculae, cap. 3 (Migne 175, col. 11 sqq.), Hugo speaks of the
anagogical significance in the place of the tropological.

Page 608

[48] Raban’s Latin is “Ligabit earn ancillis suis”—the verse in Job xl. 24
reads “Ligabis earn ancillis tuis?” In the English version the verse is Job xli.
5, “Wilt thou bind him for thy maidens?”
[49] “Per fidem me cognoverunt”; I surmise a non is omitted.
[50] The Scriptural citations are omitted. Rabanus wrote an allegorical De
laudibus sanctae crucis (Migne 107, col. 133-294), composed in metre with
prose explanations, which explain very little. The metrical portion is a
puzzle consisting of twenty-eight “figures,” or lineal delineations
interwoven in hexameter verses; the words and letters contained within
each figure “make sense” when read by themselves, and form verses in
metres other than hexameters. The whole is as incomprehensible in
meaning as it is indescribable in form. Angels, cherubim and seraphim,
tetragons, the virtues, months, winds, elements, signs of the Zodiac, and
other twelvefold mysteries, the days of the year, the number seven, the five
books of Moses, the four evangelists, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the
eight beatitudes, the mystery of the number forty, the sacrament shown by
the number fifty,—all these and much besides contribute to the glory of the
Cross, and are delineated and arranged in cruciform manner, so as to be
included within the scope of the cross’s symbolical significance.
[51] Since allegory and the spirit of symbolism pervaded all mediaeval
thought, the present and two following chapters aim only at setting forth the
elements (with pertinent examples) of this quite limitless subject.
[52] See prefatory epistle to Speculum ecclesiae, Migne 172, col. 813.
Compare the prefatory epistle to the Gemma animae, ibid. col. 541, and the
Preface to the Elucidarium, ibid. col. 1109. Probably Honorius died about
1130.
[53] We have these sermons only in Latin. Presumably a preacher using
them, gave them in that language or rendered them in the vernacular as he
thought fit.
[54] “Ommia legalia Christus nobis convertit in sacramenta spiritualia” is
Honorius’s apt phrase (which may be borrowed!), Migne 172, col. 842. His
special reference is to circumcision.
[55] Ps. xxxi. Vulgate; Ps. xxxii. 2, Authorized Version.

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[56] Speculum ecclesiae, “Dominica XI.” (Migne 172, col. 1053 sqq.).
[57] Yet, curiously enough, near the time when I was making the following
translation, I heard an elderly country clergyman preach substantially this
sermon of Honorius—wherever he may have culled it, perhaps from some
useful “Homiletical” Commentary.
[58] Speculum ecclesiae, “Dominica XIII.” (Migne 172, col. 1059-1061).
[59] Speculum ecclesiae, “Dominica in Septuagesima” (Migne 172, col.
855-857). Honorius may have forgotten the weariness of his supposed
audience; for his sermon goes on with further admonition as to how the
victory is to be won.
The allegorical interpretation of Scripture is exemplified in the whole
limitless mass of mediaeval sermons. Illustrations from St. Bernard’s
sermons on Canticles are given in Chapter XVII., also post, in Chapter
XXXVI., ii.
[60] For the Eucharist in the Carolingian period see ante, Chapter X.
Berengar of Tours is spoken of in Chapter XII., iv.
[61] Many members in one body, one body in Christ (Rom. xii. 4, 5).
[62] Cf. post, Chapter XXXIII., v.
[63] The works of Hugo of Saint-Victor are contained in Migne’s
Patrologia Latina, 175-177 (Paris, 1854; the reprint of 1882 is full of
misprints). The Prolegomena (in French) of Mgr. Hugonin are elaborate and
valuable. Mignon, Les Origines de la scholastique et Hugues de Saint-
Victor (2 vols., Paris, 1895), follows Hugonin’s writing and adds little of
value. An exposition of Hugo’s philosophy is to be found in Stöckl,
Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band I. pp. 305-355 (Mainz,
1864). On the authenticity of the writings ascribed to him see Hauréau, Les
Œuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor (2nd ed., Paris, 1886). For Hugo’s
position in the history of scholasticism and mysticism see post, Chapter
XXXVI., ii.
[64] Post, Chapter XXXI., i.
[65] Hildebert’s letter is given post, Chapter XXX., iii.

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[66] On the neighbouring schools of Notre-Dame and St. Genevieve see
post, Chapter XXXVII.
[67] At the opening of his Expositio in regulam beati Augustini, Migne 176,
col. 881, Hugo explains that the precepts under which a monastic
community lives are called the regula, and what we call a regula is called a
canon by the Greeks; and those are called canonici or regulares, who “juxta
regularia praecepta sanctorum Patrum canonice atque apostolice vivunt.”
Thus the “regular canons” of St. Augustine were monks who lived
according to the rule ascribed to that saint. In the case of the Victorines the
rule was drawn up chiefly by Abbot Gilduin. See Prolegomena to the works
of Hugo, Migne 175, col. xxiv. sqq.
[68] See the Prolegomena to the works of Hugo de Saint-Victor, by
Hugonin, Migne 175, col. xl. sqq.
[69] Didascalicon, vi. 3 (Migne 176, col. 799). Other contents of this work
are given post, Chapter XXXVI., i.
[70] His death is touchingly described in a letter of Osbert, the canon in
charge of the infirmary. See Migne 175, col. xlvii and clxi.
[71] Hugo, De arrha animae, Migne 176, col. 954. Yet Hugo sometimes
was stung with an irrelevant pang for the German fatherland, which he had
left: “I have been an exile since my boyhood, and I know how the mind
grieves to forsake some poor hut’s narrow hearth, and how easily it may
then despise the marble hall and fretted roof” (Didascalicon, iii. 20; Migne
176, col. 778). Compare the single letter of Hugo that has a personal note,
Ep. i. (Migne 176, col. 1011).
[72] The De sacramentis Christianae fidei is printed in Migne 176, col.
174-618. It is thus a lengthy work.
[73] Hugo evidently refers to his De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris
praenotatiunculae, and his various Adnotationes elucidatoriae, which will
be found printed in vol. 175 of Migne’s Patrologia Latina. In chap. v. of the
work first mentioned (Migne 175, col. 13) he speaks sensibly of the folly of
those who profess not to care for the literal historical meaning of the sacred
text, but, in ignorance, spring at once to very inept allegorical
interpretations.

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[74] De sacramentis, Prologus (Migne 176, col. 183-185). A more
elementary statement may be found in De Scripturis, etc., cap. xiii. (Migne
175, col. 20).
[75] God is perfect and utterly good. His beatitude cannot be increased or
diminished, but it can be imparted. Therefore the primal cause for creating
rational creatures was God’s wish that there should be partakers of His
beatitude. This reasoning may be Christian; but it is also close to the
doctrine of Plato’s Timaeus, which Hugo had read.
[76] Hugo also takes a wider view of the “place” of mankind’s restoration,
and finds that it includes (1) heaven, where the good are confirmed and
made perfect; (2) hell, where the bad receive their deserts; (3) the fire of
purgatory, where there is correction and perfecting; (4) paradise the place of
good beginnings; and (5) the world, the place of pilgrimage for those who
need restoring.
[77] “Sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter
propositum ex similitudine repraesentans, et ex institutione significans, et
ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam”
(pars ix. 2; Migne 176, col. 317). In spite of Hugo the old definition held its
ground, being adopted by Peter Lombard and others after him.
[78] Here we see clearly that the works of the Creation have the
sacramental quality of similitude and, in a way, the quality of institution,
since their similitude to spiritual things was intended by the Creator for the
instruction of man. They lack, however, the third quality of sanctification,
which enables the material signum to convey its spiritual res.
[79] e.g. the material of the sacrament, which may consist in things, as in
bread and wine, or in actions (as in making the sign of the cross), or in
words, as in the invocation of the Trinity. He also shows how faith itself
may be regarded as a sacrament, inasmuch as it is that whereby we now see
in a glass darkly and behold but an image. But we shall hereafter see clearly
through contemplation. Faith then is the image, i.e. the sacrament, of the
future contemplation which is the sacrament’s real verity, the res.
[80] De sacr. lib. i. pars xi. cap. 1. The sacraments of the natural law
included tithes, oblations, and sacrifices. Hugo also considers the good

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works which the natural law prescribed. This period ceases with the written
law given implicitly through Abraham and explicitly through Moses. See
De sacr. lib. i. pars xii. cap. i. Hugo appears to me to vary his point of view
regarding the natural law and its time, for sometimes he regards it as the
law prevailing till the time of Abraham or Moses, and again as the law
under which pagan peoples lived, who did not know the Mosaic law.
[81] De sacr. lib. i. pars xi. cap. 6 (Migne 176, col. 346).
[82] Whoever should wish for further illustration of Hugo’s allegorical
methods may examine his treatises entitled De arca Noë morali and De
arca Noë mystica (Migne 176, col. 618-702), where every detail of the Ark,
which signifies the Church, is allegorically applied to the Christian scheme
of life and salvation. With these treatises, Hugo’s De vanitate mundi (Migne
176, col. 703-740) is connected. They will be referred to when considering
Hugo’s position in mediaeval philosophy, post, Chapter XXXVI., ii.
[83] See Duchesne, Origines du culte chrétien.
[84] See the epitaph from his tomb in S. Maria sopra Minerva in Rome,
given by Savigny, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, v. 571 sqq., who also
gives a sketch of his life. With the work of Durandus, the Gemma animae of
Honorius of Autun (Books I. II. III.; Migne 172, col. 541 sqq.) should be
compared, as marking a somewhat earlier stage in the interpretation of the
Liturgy. It also gives the symbolism of the church and its parts, its
ministers, and services.
[85] Every article worn or borne by the bishop (or celebrating priest) has
symbolic significance.
[86] All this (which is taken from Book IV. of the Rationale) is but the first
part of the Mass. The maze of symbolism increases in vastness and
intricacy as the office proceeds.
[87] Neh. iv.
[88] Matt. xix. 17.
[89] Many parts of the church have more than one significance. The
windows were said before to represent hospitality and pity.

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[90] Post, Chapter XXXV., i.
[91] The application of Vincent’s work to the sculpture and painting of a
Gothic cathedral is due to Didron, Iconographie chrétienne, histoire de
Dieu, Introduction (1843). Other writers have followed him, like Émile
Male in his L’Art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France (2nd ed., Paris, 1902),
to which the present writer is much indebted. It goes without saying, that
the sources from which Vincent drew (e.g. the works of Albertus Magnus)
likewise form a commentary upon the subjects of Gothic glass and
sculpture, and may even have suggested the manner of their presentation.
[92] The opening verses of John’s Gospel account for this. Christ, or God in
the person of Christ, is shown in Old Testament scenes as early as the fourth
century upon sarcophagi in the Lateran at Rome.
[93] These subjects illustrated the series of events celebrated in the calendar
of church services.
[94] Post, pp. 86 sqq.
[95] Ante, Chapter XXVII.
[96] So the composition and the arrangement of topics in the cathedral
sculpture and glass have scarcely the excellence of natural grouping. The
arrangement is intended to illustrate the series of successive acts making up
God’s own artist-composition, itself symbolical of His purpose in the
creation and redemption of man.
[97] Adam’s hymns are edited with notes and an introductory essay by L.
Gautier, Œuvres poétiques d’Adam de S.-Victor (3rd ed., Paris, 1894). A
number of his hymns will be found in Migne 196, col. 1422 sqq.; and also
in Clement’s Carmina e poetis christianis excerpta. On Adam’s verse see
post, Chapter XXXII., iii.
[98] Dante draws much from Richard of St. Victor.
[99] See post, Chapter XXXII., iii.
[100] Gautier, o.c. p. 46 (Migne 196, col. 1437).

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[101] The Hebrews in bondage to the Egyptians are the symbol of all men
in the bonds of sin.
[102] As Christ expires the cherubim at the gate of Eden lower the flaming
sword, so that the men bathed with His blood may pass in.
[103] Isaac was always a type of Christ; his name was interpreted laughter
(risus) from Gen. xxi. 6: “And Sarah said, God hath made me to laugh, so
that all that hear will laugh with me.”
[104] Joseph another type of Christ.
[105] This serpent, i.e. Christ the rod of Aaron, safe from the devil’s spite,
consumes the false idols.
[106] The Brazen Serpent, a type of Christ. Cf. John iii. 14.
[107] Cf. Job xli. 1. The hook (hamus) is Christ’s divinity, whereby He
pierces the devil’s jaw.
[108] Cf. Isa. xi. 8. The guiltless child is Christ, and the cockatrice is the
devil.
[109] The children who mocked Elisha represent the Jews mocking Christ
as He ascended Calvary; the bear is Vespasian and Titus who destroy
Jerusalem.
[110] These again are types of Christ: David feigning madness among the
Philistines, 1 Sam. xxi. 12-15; the goat cast forth for the people’s sins, Lev.
xvi. 21, 22; and the sparrow in the rite of cleansing from leprosy, Lev. xiv.
2-7.
[111] Samson a type of Christ, will not wed a woman of his tribe (Judges
xiv. 1-3) as Christ chooses the Gentiles; Samson bursts open Gaza’s gates as
Christ the gates of death and hell.
[112] The allusion here is to the statement of mediaeval Bestiaries that the
lion cub, when born, lies lifeless for three days, till awakened by his father’s
roar. The supernal mother is the Church triumphant.
[113] The body of Christ, i.e. the Church.

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[114] A topic everywhere represented in church windows and cathedral
sculpture.
[115] Printed at the end of his Paedagogus; see Taylor, Classical Heritage
of the Middle Ages, pp. 253-255, where it is translated.
[116] Although the dogmas of Christianity were formulated by reason, they
were cradled in love and hate. Nowadays, in a time when dogmas are apt to
be thought useless clogs to the spirit, it is well for the historically-minded to
remember the power of emotional devotion which they have inspired in
other times.
[117] Gautier, Œuvres d’Adam (1st ed., vol. i. p. 11); Gautier (3rd ed., p.
269) doubts whether this hymn is Adam’s. But for the purpose of
illustrating the symbolism of the twelfth-century hymn, the question of
authorship is not important.
[118] Ante, Chapter XXVII.
[119] In these closing lines the “salubre sacramentum” is in apposition to
“Ille de Samaria”—i.e. the “sacramentum” is the Saviour, who is also
typified by the Good Samaritan. In another hymn for Christmas, Adam
speaks of the concurrence in one persona of Word, flesh, and spirit, and
then uses the phrase “Tantae rei sacramentum” (Gautier, o.c. p. 5). Here the
sacramentum designates the visible human person of Christ, which was the
life-giving signum or symbol of so great a marvel (tantae rei) as the
Incarnation. Adam has Hugo’s teaching in mind, and the full significance of
his phrase will appear by taking it in connection with Hugo’s definition of
the Sacrament, ante, Chapter XXVIII.
[120] Gautier, o.c. p. 10.
[121] The reference is to Aaron’s rod in Numbers xvii.
[122] The reference is to Gideon’s fleece, Judges vi. 37, which is a type of
the Virgin Mary.
[123] Gautier, o.c. 1st ed., i. 155 (Migne 196, col. 1464). In his third
edition, Gautier is doubtful of Adam’s authorship of this hymn because of
its irregular rhyme.

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[124] Cf. Gautier’s notes to this hymn, Gautier, o.c. 1st ed., i. 159-167.
[125] Gautier, o.c. i. 168.
[126] Gautier, o.c. ii. 127.
[127] Gautier, 3rd ed., p. 186. This is in Migne 196, col. 1502.
[128] A charlatan in Salimbene’s Chronicle, ante, Chapter XXI., uses a like
phrase.
[129] For the data as to Alanus see the Prolegomena to Migne, Pat. Lat.
210, which volume contains his works. See also Hauréau, Mém. de l’acad.
des inscriptions et des belles lettres, tome 32 (1886), p. 1, etc.; also Hist. lit.
de France, tome 16, p. 396, etc. On Alanus and his place in scholastic
philosophy, see post, Chapter XXXVI., iii.
[130] Migne 210, col. 686-1012.
[131] Migne 210, col. 431-481. See post, Chapter XXXII., i.
[132] The significance of the title is not quite clear. The poem is written in
hexametre, and is not far from 4700 lines in length. It is printed in Migne
210, col. 486-576; also edited by Thos. Wright, Master of the Rolls Series,
vol. 59, ii. (1872).
[133] The poem is highly imaginative in the delineation of its allegorical
figures.
[134] These curious lines are as follows:

“O nova picturae miracula, transit ad esse
Quod nihil esse potest! picturaque simia veri,
Arte nova ludens, in res umbracula rerum
Vertit, et in verum mendacia singula mutat.”
Anticlaudianus, i. cap. iv.
(Migne 196, col. 491.)

[135] The allusion here is to the fate of Hippolytus, whose chariot-horses,
maddened by the wiles of Venus, dashed the chariot to pieces and caused

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their lord’s death.
[136] i. cap. vi. Her garb and attributes are elaborately told. In the latter part
of the poem she is usually called Phronesis.
[137] A favourite commonplace; Heloïse uses it.
[138] The functions of these virgins, the Seven Liberal Arts, are poetically
told. The Anticlaudianus is no text-book. But the poet apparently is
following the De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii of Martianus Capella,
ante, Chapter IV.
[139] Compare the succession of Heavens in Dante’s Paradiso.
[140] One may recall Raphael’s painting of Theology on the ceiling of the
Stanza del Segnatura in the Vatican. It is impossible not to compare the
rôles of Alan’s Reason and Theology with those of Virgil and Beatrice in
the Commedia.
[141] Here we are back in the Celestial Hierarchy of Dionysius the
Areopagite.
[142] As in Dante’s Paradiso.
[143] Most of these epithets of the Virgin come from allegorical
interpretations of the text of the Vulgate.
[144] Compare the final vision of Dante in Paradiso, xxxiii.
[145] The reader will notice the Platonism and Neo-Platonism of all this.
[146] Notice that the Arts are here equipping and perfecting the man for his
fight against sin;—which corresponds with the common mediaeval view of
the function of education.
[147] The poem gives a full description of Fortune and her house, and
unstable splendid gifts.
[148] But the different names of Alanus’s Virtues and Vices, and their novel
antagonisms, indicate an original view of morality with him. On the
Psychomachia see Taylor, Classical Heritage, pp. 278 sqq. and 379.
Allegorical combats and débats (both in Latin and in the vernacular

Page 618

tongues) are frequent in mediaeval literature. Cf. e.g. post, Chapter XXX.
Again, in certain parabolae ascribed to St. Bernard (Migne 183, col. 757
sqq.) the various virtues, Prudentia, Fortitude, Discretio, Temperantia, Spes,
Timor, Sapientia, are so naturally made to act and speak, that one feels they
had become personalities proper for poetry and art. Compare Hildegard’s
characterizations of the Vices, ante, Chapter XIX.
[149] The English reader will derive much pleasure from F. S. Ellis’s
admirable verse translation: The Romance of the Rose (Dent and Co.,
London, 1900). Each of the three little volumes of this translation has a
convenient synopsis of the contents. Those who would know what is known
of the tale and its authors should read Langlois’s chapter on it, in Histoire
de la langue et de la littérature française, edited by Petit de Julleville. It
may be said here, for those whose memories need refreshing, that William
de Lorris wrote the first part, some forty-two hundred lines, about the year
1237, and died leaving it unfinished; John de Meun took up the poem some
thirty years afterwards, and added his sequel of more than eighteen
thousand lines.
[150] The names are Englished after Ellis’s translation.
[151] See ante, Chapter XXIII.; De Meun took much from the De planctu
naturae of Alanus.
[152] Post, Chapter XXXIII.
[153] Ante, Vol. I. p. 213.
[154] Migne, Pat. Lat. 172, col. 1056.
[155] Ante, Chapter XII., i.
[156] Ante, Chapter XIII., i.
[157] Ante, Chapter XXVIII.
[158] Didascalicon, iii. 4 (Migne 176, col. 768-769).
[159] De vanitate mundi, i. (Migne 176, col. 709, 710).
[160] Ep. 169 (Migne, Pat. Lat. 100, col. 441).

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[161] Opusc. xiii.; De perfectione monachi, cap. xi. (Migne 144, col. 306).
See ante, Chapter XVI.
[162] Speculum ecclesiae (Migne 172, col. 1085).
[163] Sonnet 56.
[164] Ep. i. (Migne 119, col. 433).
[165] John approved of reading the auctores, for educational purposes, and
not confining the pupil to the artes. See Metalogicus, i. 23, 24 (Migne, Pat.
Lat. 199, col. 453). On John, cf. post, Chapter XXXI. and XXXVI., iii.
[166] Polycraticus, Prologus (Migne, Pat. Lat. 199, col. 385).
[167] Post, Chapter XXXVI., iii.
[168] I draw upon the extracts given in the thesis of M. Demimuid, De
Bernardo Carnotensi grammatico professore et interprete Virgilii (Paris,
1873), who, as appears by his title, confuses the two Bernards.
[169] The author of a bastard epitome on the Trojan War, see post, Chapter
XXXII., iv.
[170] The above, in substance, is taken from Macrobius.
[171] Post, Chapter XXXVII.
[172] Ante, Chapter XXIX., ii., and post, Chapter XXXVI., iii.
[173] Post, Chapter XXXVI., i.
[174] For a successor or friendly rival to Chartres, in the interest taken in
grammar and classical literature, one should properly look to Orleans,
where apparently those studies continued to flourish. Cf. L. Delisle, “Les
Écoles d’Orléans au douzième siècle,” Annuaire-Bulletin de la Societé de
l’Histoire de France, t. vii. (1869), p. 139 sqq. In a Bataille des septs arts,
by Henri d’Andeli, of the first half of the thirteenth century, Logic, from its
stronghold of Paris, vanquishes Grammar, whose stronghold is Orleans. In
the conflict, with much symbolic truth, Aristotle overthrows Priscian,
Histoire littéraire de la France, t. xxiii. p. 225.

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[175] Post, Chapter XXXVII.
[176] See post, Chapter XLI. and XLII. for the work of Grosseteste.
[177] Cf. post, Chapter XXXIII. and XXXVII.
[178] Cf. Specht, Geschichte des Unterrichtswesens in Deutschland, etc.
(Stuttgard, 1885), p. 75 and passim.
Yet how soon and with what childish prattle youths might begin to speak
and write Latin is touchingly shown by a boy’s letter, written from a
monastic school, to his parents. It just asks for various little things, and its
superscription is: “Parentibus suis A. agnus ablactatus pium balatum”:
which seems to mean: “To his parents, A, a weaned lamb, sends a loving
bah.” This and other curious little letters are ascribed to one Robertus
Metensis (cir. a.d. 900) (Migne 132, col. 533).
[179] See Thurot, Histoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen âge;
Notices et extraits des MSS. vol. 22, part 2, p. 85. For what is said in the
preceding and following pages the writer’s obligations are deep to this well-
known work of Thurot, and to Reichling’s edition of the Doctrinale of
Alexander de Villa-Dei (Mon. Germ. paedagogica, XII., Berlin, 1893).
Paetow’s Arts Course at Medieval Universities (University of Illinois,
1910) treats learnedly of these matters.
[180] See Thurot, o.c. p. 204 sqq.
[181] Regere, a mediaeval term not used in this sense by Priscian.
[182] See the Einleitung to Reichling’s edition of the Doctrinale already
referred to; also Thurot, De Alexandri de Villa-Dei doctrinali (Paris, 1850).
The chief mediaeval rival of the Doctrinale was the Graecismus of
Eberhard of Bethune, written a little later. See Paetow, o.c. p. 38.
[183] Doctrinale, line 1561 sqq.
[184] Doctrinale, 1603 sqq.
[185] Doctrinale, 2330-2331.
[186] See passage in Reichling’s Einleitung, p. xxvii.

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[187] See e.g. Une Grammaire latine inédite du XIIIe siècle, par Ch.
Fierville (Paris, 1886).
[188] See Reichling, o.c. Einleitung, p. xix; Thurot, Not. et extr. xxii. 2, p.
112 sqq.
[189] See e.g. Thurot, o.c. p. 176 sqq.; p. 216 sqq.
[190] Thurot, o.c. pp. 126-127.
[191] Thurot, o.c. p. 127.
[192] The Greek Grammar of Roger Bacon, ed. by Nolan and Hirsch
(Cambridge, 1902).
[193] Bacon defines idioma “as the determined peculiarity (proprietas) of
language, which one gens uses after its custom; and another gens uses
another idioma of the same language” (Greek Grammar, p. 26). Dialect is
the modern term.
[194] Greek Grammar, p. 27. Bacon appears to have followed Priscian
chiefly. As to whether he used Byzantine models, or other sources, see the
Introduction to Nolan and Hirsch’s edition of the Greek Grammar. These
thoughts inspiring Bacon’s Grammar became a veritable metaphysics in the
Grammatica speculativa ascribed to Duns Scotus, see post, Chapter XLII.
[195] Cf. L. Rockinger, “Die Ars Dictandi in Italien,” Sitzungsber.
bayerisch. Akad., 1861, pp. 98-151. For examples of these dictamina, see L.
Delisle, “Dictamina Magistri Berardi de Neapoli” (a papal notary equally
versed in law and rhetoric), Notices et extraits des MSS., etc., vol. 27, part
2, p. 87 sqq.; Ch. V. Langlois, “Formulaires de lettres,” etc., Not. et ext. vol.
32 (2), p. 1 sqq.; ibid. vol. 34 (1), p. 1 sqq. and p. 305 sqq. and vol. 35 (2),
p. 409 sqq.
[196] For the history of this school in the eleventh century, see ante,
Chapter XII. iii.
[197] The Eptateuchon exists in manuscript. I have taken the above from
Clerval, Les Écoles de Chartres au moyen âge (Chartres, 1895), p. 221 sqq.

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Thierry appears to have written a commentary on Cicero’s Rhetoric. See
Mélanges Graux, pp. 41-46.
[198] Metalogicus, i. cap. xxiv. (Migne, Pat. Lat. 199, col. 853-856).
[199] Polycraticus, vii. 13 (Migne 199, col. 666).
[200] Metalogicus, i. 24 (Migne 199, col. 856).
[201] Cf. Clerval, o.c. p. 211 sqq. and p. 227 sqq.
[202] Metalogicus, iii. 4 (Migne 199, col. 900).
[203] Petrus Blesensis, Epist. 101 (Migne 207, col. 312).
[204] Epist. 92 (Migne 207, col. 289). These letters are cited by Clerval.
[205] See post, Chapter XXXVI. i.
[206] Migne, Pat. Lat. 171, col. 1007-1056.
[207] Metalogicus, i. 5.
[208] See post, Chapter XXXV. i.
[209] The works of Giraldus Cambrensis are published in Master of Rolls
Series, 21, in eight volumes. The last contains the De instructione
principum. Giraldus lived from about 1147 to 1220.
[210] Ante, Chapter VIII.
[211] Alcuin, Ep. 80 (Migne 100, col. 260).
[212] Alcuin, Ep. 113, ad Paulinum patriarcham (Migne 100, col. 341).
[213] Traube, Poëtae Lat. Aevi Carolini (Mon. Germ.), 1, p. 243. Cf.
“Versus in laude Larii laci,” by Paulus Diaconus, ibid. p. 42.
[214] Ante, Chapter XII.
[215] Post, Chapter XXXVI. iii.
[216] Ep. ii. 33 (Migne 171, col. 256). For the Latin text of this letter see
post, Chapter XXXI.

Page 623

[217] For the entire poem, which is of interest throughout, see post, Chapter
XXXII. i.
[218] For the poem see Hauréau, Mélanges poétiques d’Hildebert de
Lavardin, p. 64 (Paris, 1882).
[219] Hauréau, o.c. p. 56.
[220] Ibid. p. 82.
[221] Ibid. p. 144.
[222] Migne, Pat. Lat. 171, col. 1428. This volume of Migne also contains
the poems criticized and (some of them) edited by Hauréau in the book
already referred to.
[223] Hildebert, Epis. i. 1 (Migne 171, col. 141).
[224] Hildebert, Ep. i. 22 (Migne 171, col. 197).
[225] A technical illustration from Roman law.
[226] Hildeberti, Ep. ii. 12 (Migne 171, col. 172-177). Compare Ep. i. 17,
consoling a friend on loss of place and dignities. Hildebert’s works are in
vol. 171 of Migne’s Pat. Lat. A number of his poems are more carefully
edited by Hauréau in Notices et extraits des MSS., etc., vol. 28, ii. p. 289
sqq.; and some of them in vol. 29, ii. p. 231 sqq. of the same series. The
matter is more conveniently given by Hauréau in his Mélanges poétiques
d’Hildebert de Lavardin. On the man and his writings see De servillers,
Hildebert et son temps (Paris, 1876); Hebert Duperron, De Venerabilis
Hildeberti vita et scriptis (Bajocis, 1855); also vol. xi. of Hist. lit. de la
France; and (best of all) Dieudonné, Hildebert de Lavardin, sa vie, ses
lettres, etc. (Paris, 1898).
[227] It is well known that the great Latin prose, in spite of variances of
stylistic intent and faculty among the individual writers, was an artistic, not
to say artificial creation, formed under the influence of Greek models.
Cicero is the supreme example of this, and he is also the greatest of all
Latin prose writers. After his time some great writers (e.g. Tacitus,
Quintilian) preserved a like tradition; others (e.g. Seneca) paid less attention
to it. And likewise on through the patristic period, and the Middle Ages too,

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some men endeavoured to preserve a classic style, while others wrote more
naturally.
[228] Even as it is necessary, in order to appreciate some of the methods of
the Latin classical poetry, to realize that their immediate antecedents lay in
Greek Alexandrian literature rather than in the older Greek Classics.
[229] See Taylor, Classical Heritage, chapter viii.
[230] A palpable difficulty in judging mediaeval Latin literature is its bulk.
The extant Latin classics could be tucked away in a small corner of it.
Every well-equipped student of the Classics has probably read them all.
One mortal life would hardly suffice to read a moderate part of mediaeval
Latin. And, finally, while there are histories of the classic literature in every
modern tongue, there exists no general work upon mediaeval Latin writings
regarded as literature. Ebert’s indispensable Allgemeine Geschichte der
Literatur des Mittelalters ends with the tenth century. The author died.
Within the scope of its purpose Dr. Sandys’ History of Classical
Scholarship is compact and good.
[231] Ante, Chapter X.
[232] Post, Chapter XXXII., i.
[233] See Sandys, History of Classical Scholarship, i. 463-464.
[234] There was no attempt at classicism in the narrative in which he
recounted the Translation of the relics of the martyrs Marcellinus and Peter
from Rome to his own new monastery at Seligenstadt (Migne 104, col. 537-
594). It was an entertaining story of a pious theft, and one may be sure that
he wrote it more easily, and in a style more natural to himself than that
shown in his consciously imitative masterpiece.
[235] Ep. vi. (Migne 100, col. 146).
[236] Ep. xxxii. (Migne 100, col. 187).
[237] Ep. xxxiii. (Migne 100, col. 187).
[238] Capitula ad Presbyteros (Migne 105, col. 202).

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[239] See ante, Chapter XII.
[240] Chronicon, cap. 35 (Migne 139, col. 46). The sense is easy to follow,
but the impossible constructions render an exact translation quite
impossible. It is doubtful whether this Benedictus was an Italian. The Italian
writing of this period, like that of Liutprand, is easier than among more
painful students north of the Alps. But otherwise its qualities are rarely
more pronounced. Ease is shown, however, in the Chronicon Venetum of
John the Deacon (d. cir. 1008). See ante, Chapter XIII., iii.
[241] Migne 133. This work fills four hundred columns in Migne. On Odo
see ante, Chapter XII., ii.
[242] Odo of Cluny, Collationes, lib. i. cap. i. (Migne 133, col. 519 and
520).
“Therefore God, Creator and Judge of mankind, although He have justly
driven our race from that felicity of Paradise, yet mindful of His goodness,
lest man all guilt should incur what he deserves, softens the sorrows of this
pilgrimage with many benefits.... Indeed the purpose of that same Scripture
is to press us from the depravities of this life. For to that end with its
dreadful utterances, as with so many goads, it pricks our heart, that man
struck by fear may shudder, and may recall to memory the divine judgments
which he is wont so easily to forget, cut off by lust of the flesh and the
solicitudes of earth.”
[243] Ruotgerus, Vita Brunonis, cap. 4 and 6; Pertz, Mon. Germ. Script. iv.
p. 254, and Migne 134, col. 944 and 946. A translation of this passage is
given ante, Vol. I., p. 310. See ibid., p. 314, for the scholarship and writings
of Hermannus Contractus, an eleventh-century German. Ruotger’s clumsy
Latin is outdone by the linguistic involutions of the Life of Wenceslaus, the
martyr duke of Bohemia, written toward the close of the tenth century by
Gumpoldus, Bishop of Mantua, who seems to have cultivated classical
rhetoric most disastrously (Pertz, Mon. Germ. Script. iv. p. 211, and in
Migne 135, col. 923 sqq.).
[244] From Thurot, Notices et extraits, etc., 22 (2), p. 87, and p. 341 sqq.,
one may see that the principles of construction stated by mediaeval
grammarians followed the usage of mediaeval writers in adopting a simpler

Page 626

or more natural order than that of classical prose. An extract, for example,
from an eleventh-century MSS. indicates the simple order which this
grammarian author approved: e.g. “Johannes hodie venit de civitate; Petrus,
quem Arnulfus genuit et nutrivit, intellexit multa” (Thurot, p. 87).
[245] Ante, Chapter XXX., ii.
[246] So likewise in regard to verse, the perfected two-syllable rhyme came
first in Italy, and more slowly in the North, although the North was to
produce better Latin poetry.
[247] Ante, Chapters XI., iv., and XVI.
[248] Opusc. xiv., De ordine erimitarum (Migne 145, col. 329).
“We may see upon a tree a leaf ready to succumb beneath the wintry frosts,
and, with the sap of autumnal clemency consumed, even now about to fall,
so that it barely cleaves to the twig it hangs from, but displays most evident
signs of (its) light ruin. The blasts are quivering, wild winds strike it from
all sides, the mid-winter horror of heavy air congeals with cold; and that
you may marvel the more, the ground is strewn with the rest of the leaves
everywhere flowing down, and, with its locks laid low, the tree is stripped
of its grace; yet that alone, none other remaining, endures, and, as the
survivor of co-heirs, succeeds to the rights of the brotherhood’s possession.
What then is left to be understood from consideration of this thing, save that
a leaf of a tree cannot fall unless it receive beforehand the divine
command?”
This description is rhetorically elaborated; but Damiani commonly wrote
more directly, as in this sentence from a letter to a nobleman, in which
Damiani urges him not to fail in his duty to his mother through affection for
his wife: “Sed forte dices: mater mea me frequenter exasperat, duris verbis
meum et uxoris meae corda perturbat; non possumus tot injuriarum probra
perferre, non valemus austeritatis ejus et severae correptionis molestias
tolerare” (Ep. vii. 3; Migne 144, col. 466). This needs no translation.
[249] Ante, Chapter XI., iv.
[250] Proslogion, cap. 24 (Migne 158, col. 239).

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“Awaken now, my soul, and rouse all thy mind, and consider, as thou art
able, of what nature and how great is that Good (God). For if single goods
are objects of delight, consider intently how delightful is that good which
contains the joy of all goods; and not such as in things created we have
tried, but differing as greatly as differs the Creator from the creature. For if
life created is good, how good is the life creatrix! If joyful is the salvation
wrought, how joyful is the salvation which wrought all salvation! If lovely
is wisdom in the knowledge of things created, how lovely is the wisdom
which created all from nothing. In fine, if there are many and great
delectations in things delightful, of what quality and greatness is delectation
(i.e. the delectation that we take) in Him who made the delights
themselves!”
The reader may observe that the word-order of Anselm’s Latin is preserved
almost unchanged in the translation.
[251] “Meditatio II.” (Migne 158, col. 722).
“My soul is offended with my life. I blush to live; I fear to die. What then
remains for thee, O sinner, save that all thy life thou weepest over all thy
life, that it all may lament its whole self. But in this also is my soul
miserably wonderful and wonderfully miserable, since it does not grieve as
much as it knows itself (i.e. to the full extent of its self-knowledge) but
secure, is listless as if it knew not what it may be suffering. O barren soul,
what art thou doing? why art thou drowsing, sinner soul? The Day of
Judgment is coming, near is the great day of the Lord, near and too swift the
day of wrath, (that day!) day of tribulation and distress, day of calamity and
misery, day of shades and darkness, day of cloud and whirlwind, day of the
trump and the roar! O voice of the day of the Lord—harsh! Why sleepest
thou, soul lukewarm and fit to be spewed out?”
[252] Perhaps it may seem questionable to treat Anselm as an Italian, since
he left Lombardy when a young man. Undoubtedly his theological interests
were affected by his northern environment. But his temperament and
language, his diction, his style, seem to me more closely connected with
native temperament.
[253] Annals for the year 1077 (Migne 146, col. 1234 sqq.); also in Mon.
Germ. Script. iii.

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[254] Sermo xvi. (Migne 183, col. 851). The power of this passage keeps it
from being hysterical. But the monkish hysteria, without the power, may be
found in the writings of St. Bernard’s jackal, William of St. Thierry, printed
in Migne, Pat. Lat. 180. Notice his Meditationes, for example; also his De
contemplando Deo, printed among St. Bernard’s works (Migne 184, col.
365 sqq.).
[255] Sermo xv. (Migne 183, col. 847). Translated ante, Vol. I., p. 411.
[256] Ep. xii., ad Guigonem (Migne 182, col. 116).
[257] Bernard, Ep. 112, ad Gaufridum (Migne 182, col. 255). For
translation see ante, Vol. I., p. 398.
[258] E.g. Ep. i. and 144 (Migne 182, col. 70 and 300).
[259] Ep. 196, ad Guidonem (Migne 182, col. 363). Translated ante, Vol. I.,
p. 401. See also the preceding letter, 195.
[260] As to Jerome’s two styles see Goelzer, La Latinité de St. Jerome,
Introduction.
[261] Ep. ii. 33 (Migne 171, col. 256). Translation ante, Chapter XXX., iii.
[262] See ante, Chapter XXX., i.
[263] “Against that signal gift of parent nature and grace, a shameless
wrangler has stirred up an old calumny, condemned by the judgment of our
ancestors; and, seeking everywhere comfort for his ignorance, he hopes to
advance himself toward glory, if he shall see many like himself, see them
ignorant, that is to say. For he has this special tumour of arrogance, that he
would be making himself the equal of others, exalting his own good
qualities (if they exist), and depreciating those of others. And he deems his
neighbour’s defect to be his own advancement.
“Now it is indubitable to all truly wise, that Nature, kindest parent of all,
and best-ordering directress, among the other living beings which she
brought forth, distinguished man with the prerogative of reason and
ennobled him with the exercise of eloquence (or ‘with the use of speech’):
executing this with unremitting zeal and best-ordering decree, in order that
man who was pressed and dragged to the lowest by the heaviness of a

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clodlike nature and the slowness of corporeal bulk, borne aloft as it were by
these wings might ascend to the heights, and by obtaining the crown of true
blessedness excel all others in happy reward. While Grace thus fecundates
Nature, Reason watches over the matters to be inspected and considered;
Nature’s bosom gives forth, metes out the fruits and faculty of individuals;
and the inborn love of good, stimulating itself by its natural appetite,
follows this (i.e. the good) either solely or before all else, since it seems
best adapted to the bliss descried” (Metal. i. 1; Migne 199, col. 825). These
translations are kept close to the original, in order to show the construction
of the sentences.
[264] “There is another class of philosophers called the Ionic, and it took its
origin from the more remote Greeks. The chief of these was Thales the
Milesian, one of those seven who were called ‘wise.’ He, when he had
searched out the nature of things, shone among his fellows, and especially
stood forth as admirable because, comprehending the laws of astrology, he
predicted eclipses of the sun and moon. To him succeeded his hearer,
Anaximander, who (in turn) left Anaximenes as disciple and successor.
Diogenes, likewise his hearer, arose and Anaxagoras who taught that the
divine mind was the author of all things that we see. To him succeeded his
pupil Archelaus, whose disciple is said to have been Socrates, the master of
Plato, who, according to Apuleius, was first called Aristotle, but then Plato
from his breadth of chest, and was borne aloft to such height of philosophy,
by vigour of genius, by assiduity of study, by graciousness in all his ways,
and by sweetness and force of eloquence, that, as if seated on the throne of
wisdom, he has seemed to command by a certain ordained authority the
philosophers before and after him. And indeed Socrates is said to have been
the first to have turned universal philosophy to the improvement and
ordering of manners; since before him all had devoted themselves chiefly to
physics, that is to examining the things of nature” (Polycraticus, vii. 5;
Migne 199, col. 643).
[265] “The most excellent man concluded his oration, and by the power of
the blessed Peter absolved all who had taken the vow to go, and by the
same apostolic authority confirmed it; and he instituted a suitable sign of
this so honourable vow; and as a badge of soldiering (or knighthood), or
rather, of being about to soldier, for God, he took the mark of the Lord’s
Passion, the figure of a cross, made from material of any kind of cloth, and

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ordered it to be sewed upon the tunics and cloaks of those about to go. But
if any one, after receiving this sign, or after making open promise, should
draw back from that good intent, by base repenting or through affection for
his kin, he ordained that he should be held an outlaw utterly and
perpetually, unless he turn and set himself again to the neglected
performance of his pledge.
“Furthermore, with terrible anathema he damned all who within the term of
three years should dare to do ill to the wives, children, or property of those
setting forth on this journey of God. And finally he committed to a certain
and praiseworthy man (a bishop of some city on the Po, whose name I am
sorry never to have found or heard) the care and regulation of the
expedition, and conferred his own authority upon him over the tribute (?) of
Christian people wherever they should come. Whereupon giving his
benediction, in the apostolic manner, he placed his hands upon him. How
sagaciously that one executed the behest, is shown by the marvellous
outcome of so great an undertaking” (Guibert of Nogent, Gesta Dei per
Francos, ii. 2; Migne 156, col. 702).
[266] Hist. ecclesiastica, pars iii. lib. xii. cap. 14 (Migne 188, col. 889-892).
“Thomas, son of Stephen, approached the king, and offering him a mark of
gold, said: ‘Stephen, son of Airard, was my sire, and all his life he served
thy father (William the Conqueror) on the sea. For him, borne on his ship,
he conveyed to England, when he proceeded to England in order to make
war on Harold. In this manner of service serving him until death he gave
him satisfaction, and honoured with many rewards from him, he flourished
grandly among his people. This privilege, lord king, I claim of thee, and the
vessel which is called White Ship I have ready, fitted out in the best manner
for royal needs.’ To whom the king said: ‘I grant your petition. For myself
indeed I have selected a proper ship, which I shall not change; but my sons,
William and Richard, whom I cherish as myself, with much nobility of my
realm, I commend now to thee.’
“Hearing these words the sailors were merry, and bowing down before the
king’s son, asked of him wine to drink. He ordered three measures of wine
to be given them. Receiving these they drank and pledged their comrades’
health abundantly, and with deep potations became drunk. At the king’s
order many barons with their sons went aboard the ship, and there were

Page 631

about three hundred, as I opine, in that fatal bark. Then two monks of Tiron,
and Count Stephen with two knights, also William of Rolmar, and Rabellus
the chamberlain, and Edward of Salisbury, and a number of others, went out
from it, because they saw such a crowd of wanton showy youth aboard. And
fifty tried rowers were there and insolent marines, who having seized seats
in the ship were brazening it, forgetting themselves through drunkenness,
and showed respect for scarcely any one. Alas! how many of them had
minds void of pious devotion toward God!—‘Who tempers the exceeding
rages of the sea and air.’ And so the priests, who had gone up there to bless
them, and the other ministrants who bore the holy water, they drove away
with derision and loud guffaws; but soon after they paid the penalty of their
mocking.
“Only men, with the king’s treasure and the vessels holding the wine, filled
the keel of Thomas; and they pressed him eagerly to follow the royal fleet
which was already cutting the waves. And he himself, because he was silly
from drink, trusted in his skill and that of his satellites, and rashly promised
to outstrip all who were now ahead of him. Then he gave the word to put to
sea. At once the sailors snatched their oars, and glad for another reason
because they did not know what hung before their eyes, they adjusted their
tackle, and made the ship start over the sea with a great bound. Now while
the drunken rowers were putting forth all their strength, and the wretched
pilot was paying slack attention to steering his course over the gulf, upon a
great rock which daily is uncovered by the ebbing wave and again is
covered when the sea is at flood, the left side of White Ship struck violently,
and with two timbers smashed, all unexpectedly the ship, alas! was
capsized. All cried out together in such a catastrophe; but the water quickly
filling their mouths, they perished alike. Two only cast their hands upon the
boom from which hung the sail, and clinging to it a great part of the night,
waited for some aid. One was a butcher of Rouen named Berold, and the
other a well-born lad named Geoffrey, son of Gislebert of Aquila.
“The moon was then at its nineteenth in the sign of the Bull, and lighted the
earth for nearly nine hours with its beams, making the sea bright for
navigators. Captain Thomas after his first submersion regained his strength,
and bethinking himself, pushed his head above the waves, and seeing the
heads of those clinging to some piece of wood, asked, ‘What has become of
the king’s son?’ When the shipwrecked answered that he had perished with

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all his companions, ‘Miserable,’ said he, ‘is my life henceforth.’ Saying this,
and evilly despairing, he chose to sink there, rather than meet the fury of the
king enraged for the destruction of his child, or undergo long punishment in
chains.”
[267] Post, Chapter XLI.
[268] Opus majus, pars i. cap. 6.
[269] Op. maj. ii. cap. 14.
[270] Op. maj. iii. 1.
[271] Op. maj. ii. 14.
[272] For translation see post, Chapter XXXIV.
[273] Post, Chapter XXXVIII.
[274] Itinerarium mentis in Deum, Prologus, 2.
[275] Ibid. cap. vii. 6. For translations see post, Chapter XXXVIII.
[276] Vita prima, cap. xi. Translated ante, Vol. I., p. 427, note 1.
[277] Spec. perfectionis, ed. Sabatier, cap. 53. Translated ante, Vol. I., p.
427.
[278] Ibid. cap. 93. Translated ante, Vol. I., p. 432.
[279] Cap. li., ed. Graesse.
“Annunciation Sunday (Advent) is so called, because on that day by an
angel the advent of the Son of God in the flesh was announced, for it was
fitting that the angelical annunciation should precede the incarnation, for a
threefold reason. For the first reason, of betokening the order, that to wit the
order of reparation should answer to the order of transgression. Accordingly
as the devil tempted the woman, that he should draw her to doubt and
through doubt to consent and through consent to fall, so the angel
announced to the Virgin, that by announcing he should arouse her to faith
and through faith to consent and through consent to conceiving God’s son.
For the second reason, of the angelic ministry, because since the angel is

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God’s minister and servant, and the blessed Virgin was chosen in order that
she might be God’s mother, and it is fitting that the minister should serve
the mistress, so it was proper that the annunciation to the blessed Virgin
should take place through an angel. For the third reason, of repairing the
angelical fall. Because since the incarnation was made not only for the
reparation of the human fall, but also for the reparation of the angelical
catastrophe, therefore the angels ought not to be excluded. Accordingly as
the sex of the woman does not exclude her from knowledge of the mystery
of the incarnation and resurrection, so also neither the angelical messenger.
Behold, God twice announces to a woman by a mediating angel, to wit the
incarnation to the Virgin Mary and the resurrection to the Magdalene.” The
order of the Latin words is scarcely changed in the translation.
[280] In order that no reader may be surprised by the absence of discussion
of the antique antecedents of the more particular genres of mediaeval poetry
(Latin and Vernacular), I would emphasize the impossibility of entering
upon such exhaustless topics. Probably the very general assumption will be
correct in most cases, that genres of mediaeval poetry (e.g. the Conflicts or
Débats in Latin and Old French) revert to antecedents sufficiently marked
for identification, in the antique Latin (or Greek) poetry, or in the (extant or
lost) productions of the “low” Latin period from the third century
downward. An idea of the difficulty and range of such matters may be
gained from Jeanroy, Les Origines de la poésie lyrique en France au moyen
âge (Paris, 1889), and the admirable review of this work by Gaston Paris in
the Journal des savants for 1891 and 1892 (four articles). Cf. also
Batiouchkof in Romania, xx. (1891), pages 1 sqq. and 513 sqq.
[281] Cf. Taylor, Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages, chap. ix.
[282] There is much verse from noted men, Alcuin, Paulus Diaconus,
Walafrid Strabo, Rabanus Maurus, Theodulphus. It is all to be found in the
collection of Dümmler and Traube, Poetae Latini aevi Carolini (Mon.
Germ. 1880-1896).
[283] It is amusing to find a poem by Walafrid Strabo turning up as a
favourite among sixteenth-century humanists. The poem referred to, “De
cultura hortorum” (Poet. Lat. aev. Car. ii. 335-350), is a poetic treatment of

Page 634

gardening, reminiscent of the Georgics, but not imitating their structure. It
has many allusions to pagan mythology.
[284] Post, p. 193 sqq.
[285] Ante, Vol. I., p. 147.
[286] Ante, Chapter XI., iii.
[287] The following leonine hexameters are attributed to Donizo:

“Chrysopolis dudum Graecorum dicitur usu,
Aurea sub lingua sonat haec Urbs esse Latina,
Scilicet Urbs Parma, quia grammatica manet alta,
Artes ac septem studiose sunt ibi lectae.”
Muratori, Antiquitates, iii. p. 912.

[288] William was a few years older than Donizo, and died about the year
1100. His hero is Robert Guiscard, and his poem closes with this bid for the
favour of his son, Roger:

“Nostra, Rogere, tibi cognoscis carmina scribi,
Mente tibi laeta studuit parere Poeta:
Semper et auctores hilares meruere datores;
Tu duce Romano Dux dignior Octaviano,
Sis mihi, quaeso, boni spes, ut fuit ille Maroni.”
Muratori, Scriptores, v. 247-248.

[289] Muratori, Script. v. 407-457.
[290] Muratori, Script. vi. 110-161; also in Migne.
[291] Written at the close of the twelfth century. On these people see Ronca,
Cultura medioevale e poesia Latina d’ Italia (Rome, 1892).
[292] Muratori, vii. pp. 349-482; Waitz, Mon. Germ. xxii. 1-338. Godfrey
lived from about 1120 to the close of the century. The Pantheon was

Page 635

completed in 1185. Cf. L. Delisle, Instructions du comité des travaux
historiques, etc.; Littérature latine, p. 41 (Paris, 1890).
[293] Matthaei Vindocinensis ars versificatoria, L. Bourgain (Paris, 1879).
[294] Ante, Chapter XXX., iii.
[295] Text from Hauréau, Les Mélanges poetiques d’Hildebert de Lavardin,
p. 60: also in Notices des manuscrits de la bib. nat. t. 28, 2nd part (1878), p.
331.
[296] Hauréau gives a critical text of the Carmen ad Astralabium filium, in
Notices et extraits, etc., 34, part ii., p. 153 sqq. Other not unpleasing
instances of elegiac verse are afforded by the poems of Baudri, Abbot of
Bourgueil (d. 1130). They are occasional and fugitive pieces—nugae, if we
will. See L. Delisle, Romania, i. 22-50.
[297] The substance of this poem has been given ante, Chapter XXIX. On
Alanus see also post, Chapter XXXVI., iii.
[298] It is printed in Migne 209. Cf. post, p. 230, note 1.
[299] The Ligurinus is printed in tome 212 of Migne’s Patrol. Lat. On its
author see Pannenborg, Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, Band ii. pp.
161-301, and Band xiii. pp. 225-331 (Göttingen, 1871 and 1873).
[300] Alanus de Insulis, De planctu naturae (Migne 210, col. 447). A
translation of the work has been made by D. M. Moffat (New York, 1908).
For other examples of Sapphic and Alcaic verses see Hauréau in Notices et
extraits, etc., 31 (2), p. 165 sqq.
[301] Wilhelm Meyer, a leading authority upon mediaeval Latin verse-
structure, derives the principle of a like number of syllables in every line
from eastern Semitic influence upon the early Christians. See Fragmenta
Burana (Berlin, 1901), pp. 151, 166. That may have had its effect; but I do
not see the need of any cause from afar to account for the syllabic regularity
of Latin accentual verse.
[302] Again Wilhelm Meyer’s view: see l.c. and the same author’s
“Anfänge der latein. und griech. rhythmischen Dichtung,” Abhand. der
Bairish. Akad. Philos., philol. Klasse, 1886.

Page 636

[303] Poet. Lat. aev. Car. i. 116. Cf. Ebert, Gesch. etc. ii. 86. For similar
verses see those on the battle at Fontanetum (a.d. 841), Poet. Lat. aev. Car.
ii. 138, and the carmen against the town of Aquilegia, ibid. p. 150.
[304] Cf. ante, Vol. I., pp. 227, 228.
[305] Traube, Poetae Lat. aevi Car. iii. p. 731. Cf. Ebert, Gesch. etc. ii. 169
and 325.
[306] Poet. Lat. aev. Car. iii. 733.
[307] Du Meril, Poésies populaires latines, i. 400.
Perhaps the most successful attempt to write hexameters containing rhymes
or assonances is the twelfth-century poem of Bernard Morlanensis, a monk
of Cluny, beginning with the famous lines:

“Hora novissima, tempora pessima sunt, vigilemus.
Ecce minaciter imminet arbiter ille supremus.”

Bernardi Morlanensis, De contemptu mundi, ed. by Thos. Wright, Master of
the Rolls Series, vol. 59 (ii.), 1872. Bernard says in his Preface, as to his
measures: “Id genus metri, tum dactylum continuum exceptis finalibus, tum
etiam sonoritatem leonicam servans....”
[308] “Carmina Mutinensia,” Poet. Lat. aev. Car. iii. 703. The poem has
forty-two lines, of which the above are the first four. The usual date
assigned is 924, but Traube in Poet. aev. Car. has put it back to 892.
[309] See further text and discussion in Traube, “O Roma nobilis,” Abhand.
Bairish. Akad. Philos., philol. Klasse, 1891.
[310] The verbal Sequence or prosa was thus a species of trope. Tropes
were interpolations or additions to the older text of the Liturgy. The
Sequences were the tropes appended to the last Alleluia of the Gradual, the
psalm chanted in the celebration of the Mass, between the reading of the
Epistle and the Gospel. Cf. Leon Gautier, Poésie liturgique au moyen âge,
chap. iii. (Paris, 1886); ibid. Œuvres poétiques d’Adam de Saint-Victor, p.
281 sqq. (3rd ed., Paris, 1894).

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[311] On the Sequence see Leon Gautier, Poésie liturgique au moyen âge
(Paris, 1886), passim, and especially the comprehensive summary in the
notes from p. 154 to p. 159. Also see Schubiger, Die Sängerschule St.
Gallus (1858), in which many of Notker’s Sequences are given with the
music; also v. Winterfeld, “Die Dichterschule St. Gallus und Reichenau,”
Neue Jahrbücher f. d. klassisch. Altertum, Bd. v. (1900), p. 341 sqq.
The present writer has found Wilhelm Meyer’s Fragmenta Burana (Berlin,
1901) most suggestive; and in all matters pertaining to mediaeval Latin
verse-forms, use has been made of the same writer’s exhaustive study:
“Ludus de Antichristo und über lat. Rythmen,” Sitzungsber. Bairisch. Akad.
Philos., philol. Klasse, 1882. See also Ch. Thurot, “Notices, etc., de divers
MSS. latins pour servir à l’histoire des doctrines grammaticales au moyen
âge,” in vol. xxii. (2) of Notices et extraits des MSS. pp. 417-457.
[312] “May our trumpet be guided mightily by God’s right hand, and may
He hear our prayers with gentle and tranquil ear: for our praise will be
accepted if what we sing with the voice a pure conscience sings likewise.
And that we may be able, let us all beseech divine aid to be always present
with us.... O good King, kind, just, and pitying, who art the way and the
door, unlock the gates of the kingdom for us, we beg, and pardon our
offences, that we may praise thy name now and through all the ages.”
[313] G. M. Dreves, “Die Prosen der Abtei St. Martial zu Limoges,” p. 59
(vol. vii. of Dreves’s Analecta hymnica medii aevi; Leipzig, 1889). “Let
every band sing with fount renewed and the Spirit’s grace with joyful praise
and clear mind. Now is made good the tenth part (i.e. the fallen angels),
undone by fault; and thus that celestial casting out is made good in divine
praise. Lo! the bright day of the Lord gleams through the broad spaces of
the world: in which all the redeemed people exult because everlasting death
is destroyed.”
[314] Published by Boucherie, “Mélanges Latins, etc.,” Revue des langues
romanes, t. vii. (1875), p. 35.
“Alleluia! O flock, proclaim joy; with melodious praise utter deeds divine
now fixed by revealed doctrine. Through the great sacrifice of Christ thou
art liberated from death; the gates of hell destroyed, opened are heaven’s

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doors. Now He rules all things celestial and terrestrial by eternal power;
wherein by the Father’s authority He gives judgment always just.”
[315] See Gautier, Poésie liturgique, p. 147 sqq. It came somewhat earlier
in Italy. See Ronca, Cultura medioevale, etc., p. 348 sqq. (Rome, 1892).
[316] While Sequences may be called hymns, all hymns are not Sequences.
For the hymn is the general term designating a verbal composition sung in
praise of God or His saints. A Sequence then would be a hymn having a
peculiar history and a certain place in the Liturgy.
[317] Contained in Migne 178, col. 1771 sqq. They have not been properly
edited or even fully published.
[318] Reference should also be made to the six laments (planctus)
composed by Abaelard (Migne 178, col. 1817-1823). They are powerful
elegies, and exhibit a richness and variety of poetic measures. It may be
mentioned that the pure two-syllable rhyme is found in hymns ascribed to
Saint Bernard.
[319] Leon Gautier, the editor of the Œuvres poétiques d’Adam de Saint-
Victor, in his third edition of 1894, has thrown out from among Adam’s
poems our first and third examples. On Adam see ante, Chapter XXIX., ii.
[320] Gautier, Œuvres poétiques d’Adam de Saint-Victor, i. 174.
[321] Gautier, o.c. 3rd edition, p. 87.
[322] Gautier, o.c. 1st edition, i. 201.
[323] Did the Sequence exert an influence upon Hrotsvitha, the tiresome
but unquestionably immortal nun of Gandersheim, who flourished in the
middle and latter part of the tenth century? She wrote narrative poems, like
the Gesta Ottonis (Otto I.) in leonine hexameters. Her pentameter lines also
commonly have a word in the middle rhyming with the last syllable of the
line. But it is in those famous pious plays of hers, formed after the models
of Terence, that we may look for a kind of writing corresponding to that
which was to progress to clearer form in the Sequence. Without discussing
to what extent the Latin of these plays may be called rhythmical, one or two
things are clear. It is filled with assonances and rude rhymes, usually of one

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syllable. It has no clear verse-structure, and the utterances of the dramatis
personae apparently observe no regularity in the number of syllables, such
as lines of verse require.
[324] For these and other songs, written after the manner of Sequences, see
Du Meril, Poésies pop. lat. i. p. 273 sqq. They are also printed by Piper in
Nachträge zur älteren deutschen Lit. (Deutsche Nat. Lit.) p. 206 sqq. and p.
234 sqq. See also W. Meyer, Fragmenta Burana, p. 174 sqq. and Ebert,
Allgemeine Gesch. etc. ii. 343 sqq.
[325] Du Meril, ibid. i. p. 285.
[326] Wil. Meyer, Fragmenta Burana, p. 180.
[327] The best text of the “Phillidis et Florae altercatio” is Hauréau’s in
Notices et extraits, 32 (1), p. 259 sqq. The same article has some other
disputes or causae, e.g. causa pauperis scholaris cum presbytero, p. 289.
[328] Du Meril, Poésies pop. lat. ii. p. 108 sqq. The piece is a cento, and its
tone changes and becomes brutal further on. The poems, from which are
taken the preceding citations, are to be found in Wright’s Latin Poems
commonly attributed to Walter Mapes (London, 1841, Camden Society);
Carmina Burana, ed. J. A. Schmeller; “Gedichte auf K. Friedrich I.
(archipoeta),” in vol. iii. of Grimm’s Kleinere Schriften. Cf. also Hubatsch,
Die lateinischen Vagantenlieder (Gorlitz, 1870). The best texts of many of
these and other “Carmina Burana,” and such like poems, are to be found in
the contributions of Hauréau to the Notices et extraits, etc.; especially in
tome 29 (2), pp. 231-368; tome 31 (1), p. 51 sqq.
[329] Ante, Vol. I., p. 145.
[330] Ante, Chapter IX., ii. and iii.
[331] For generous samples of it, see Geistliche Lit. des Mittelalters, ed. P.
Piper (Deutsche National Literatur).
[332] For this novel, a Greek original is usually assumed; but the Middle
Ages had it only in a sixth-century Latin version. It was copied in Jourdain
de Blaie, a chanson de geste. See Hagen, Der Roman von König Apollonius
in seinen verschiedenen Bearbeitungen (Berlin, 1878). The other Greek

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novels doubtless would have been as popular had the Middle Ages known
them. In fact, the Ethiopica of Heliodorus, and others of these novels, did
become popular enough through translations in the sixteenth century.
[333] Hugo of St. Victor says in the twelfth century: “Apud gentiles primus
Darhes Phrygius Trojanam historiam edidit, quam in foliis palmarum ab eo
scriptam esse ferunt” (Erud. didas. iii. cap. 3; Migne 176, col. 767).
On the Trojan origin of the Franks, Britons, and other peoples, see Joly in
his “Benoit de St. More et le Roman de Troie,” pp. 606-635 (Mem. de la
Soc. des Antiquaires de Normandie, vol. vii. 3me ser., 1869); also Graf,
Roma nella memoria, etc., del medio aevo. The Trojan origin of the Franks
was a commonplace in the early Middle Ages, see e.g. Aimoinus of Fleury
in beginning of his Historia Francorum, Migne 139, col. 637.
On Dares the Phrygian and Dictys the Cretan see “Dares and Dictys,” N. E.
Griffin (Johns Hopkins Studies, Baltimore, 1907); Taylor, Classical
Heritage, pp. 40 and 360 (authorities); also, generally, L. Constans,
“L’Épopée antique,” in Petit de Julleville’s Histoire de la langue et de la
littérature française, vol. i. (Paris, 1896).
[334] Joseph of Exeter or de Iscano, as he is called, at the close of the
twelfth century composed a Latin poem in six books of hexameters entitled
De bello Trojano. It is one of the best mediaeval productions in that metre.
The author followed Dares, but his diction shows a study of Virgil, Ovid,
Statius, and Claudian. See J. J. Jusserand, De Josepho Exoniensi vel Iscano
(Paris, 1877); A. Sarradin, De Josepho Iscano, Belli Trojani, etc.
(Versailles, 1878).
[335] Eneas, ed. by Salverda de Grave (Halle, 1891), lines 7857-9262.
[336] Roman de Troie, 5257-5270, ed. Joly; “Benoit de St. More et le
Roman de Troie, etc.,” Mem. de la Soc. des Antiquaires de Normandie, vol.
vii. 3me ser., 1869. On its sources see also L. Constans, in Petit de
Julleville’s Hist. de la langue et de la litt. française, vol. i. pp. 188-220.
[337] Roman de Troie, 13235 sqq.
[338] The Roman de Thebes, the third of these large poems, is temperate in
the adaptation and extension of its theme. Its ten thousand or more lines of

Page 641

eight-syllable rhyming verse are no longer than the Thebaid of Statius, and
as a narrative make quite as interesting reading. Statius, who lived under
Domitian, was a poet of considerable skill, but with no genius for the
construction of an epic. His work reads well in patches, but does not move.
Several books are taken up with getting the Argive army in motion, and
when the reader and Jove himself are wearied, it moves on—to the next
halt. And so forth through the whole twelve books. See Nisard, Études sur
les poètes latins de la décadence, vol. i. p. 261 sqq. (2nd ed., Paris, 1849);
Pichon, Hist. de la litt. lat. p. 606 (2nd ed., Paris, 1898). The Roman de
Thebes was not drawn directly from the work of Statius, but through the
channels, apparently, of intervening prose compendia. It also evidently
drew from other works, as it contains matters not found in Statius’s
Thebaid. It is easy, if not inspiring reading. The style is clear, and the
narrative moves. Of course it presents a general mediaevalizing of the
manners of Statius’s somewhat fustian antique heroes; it introduces courtly
love (e.g. the love between Parthonopeus and Antigone, lines 3793 sqq.),
mediaeval commonplaces, and feudal customs. It drops the antique
conception of accursed fate as a fundamental motive of the plot,
substituting in its place the varied play of romantic and chivalric sentiment.
Leopold Constans has made the Roman de Thebes his own. Having
followed the story of Oedipus through the Middle Ages in his Légende
d’Œdipe, etc. (Paris, 1881) he has corrected some of his views in his critical
edition of the poem, “Le Roman de Thèbes,” 2 vols., 1890 (Soc. des anciens
textes français), and has treated the same matters more popularly in Petit de
Julleville’s Hist. de la langue et de la litt. française, vol. i. pp. 170-188.
These works fully discuss the sources, date, and language of the poem, and
the later redactions in prose and verse through Europe.
[339] On Pseudo-Callisthenes see Paul Meyer, Alexandre le Grand dans la
littérature française du moyen âge (Paris, 1886); Taylor, Classical
Heritage, etc., pp. 38 and 360. In the last quarter of the twelfth century
Walter of Lille, called also Walter of Chatillon, wrote his Alexandreis in ten
books of easy-flowing hexameters. It is printed in Migne, Pat. Lat. 209, col.
463-572. Cf. ante, page 192. His work shows that a mediaeval scholar-poet
could reproduce a historical theme quite soberly. His poem was read by
other bookmen; but the Alexander of the Middle Ages remained the
Alexander of the fabulous vernacular versions.

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[340] See Gaston Paris, “Chrétien Légouais et autres imitateurs d’Ovide,”
Hist. litt. de la France, t. xxix., pp. 455-525.
[341] The words “nexum mancipiumque” are more formal and special than
the English given above.
[342] The early law had as yet devised no execution against the debtor’s
property.
[343] The jurisconsults whose opinions were authoritative flourished in the
second and third centuries. The great five were Gaius, Julian, Papinian,
Ulpian, Paulus. Inasmuch as these jurisconsults of the Empire were
members of the Imperial (or, later, Praetorian) Auditory, they were judges in
a court of last resort, and their “responsa” were decisions of actual cases.
They subsequently “digested” them in their books. See Munroe Smith,
“Problems of Roman Legal History,” Columbia Law Review, 1904, p. 538.
[344] Dig. i. 1 (“De Just. et jure”) 1. See Savigny, System des heutigen
römischen Rechts, i. p. 109 sqq. Apparently some of the jurists (e.g. Gaius,
Ins. i. 1) draw no substantial distinctions between the jus naturale and the
jus gentium. Others seem to distinguish. With the latter, jus naturale might
represent natural or instinctive principles of justice common to all men, and
jus gentium, the laws and customs which experience had led men to adopt.
For instance, libertas is jure naturali, while dominatio or servitus is
introduced ex gentium jure (Dig. i. 5, 4; Dig. xii. 6, 64). Jus gentium
represented common expediency, but its institutions (e.g. servitus) might or
might not accord with natural justice. For manumissio as well as servitus
was ex jure gentium (Dig. i. 1, 4), and so were common modes and
principles of contract. Ulpian’s notion of the jus naturale as pertaining to all
animals, and jus gentium as belonging to men alone, was but a catching
classification, and did not represent any commonly followed distinction.
[345] Constitutio is the more general term, embracing whatever the emperor
announces in writing as a law. The term rescript properly applies to the
emperor’s written answers to questions addressed to him by magistrates,
and to the decisions of his Auditory rendered in his name.
[346] For this whole matter, see vol. i. of Savigny’s System des heutigen
römischen Rechts; Gaius, Institutes, the opening paragraphs; and the first

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two chapters of the first Book of Justinian’s Digest.
[347] Dig. i. 3, 32.
[348] Dig. i. 3, 10, and 12.
[349] Dig. i. 3, 14.
[350] Ibid. 39.
[351] Dig. l. 17, 30.
[352] Dig. l. 17, 31.
[353] Ibid. 54.
[354] Ibid. 202.
[355] Dig. l. 16, 24; Ibid. 17, 62.
[356] Cod. Theod. (ed. by Mommsen and Meyer) i. 1, 5.
[357] With the Theodosian Code the word lex, leges, begins to be used for
the constitutiones or other decrees of a sovereign.
[358] From the constitution directing the compilation of the Digest, usually
cited as Deo auctore.
[359] The original plan of Theodosius embraced the project of a Codex of
the jurisprudential law. See his constitution of the year 429 in Theod. C. i. 1,
5. Had this been carried out, as it was not, Justinian’s Digest would have
had a forerunner.
[360] Juliani epitome Latina Novellarum Justiniani, ed. by G. Haenel
(Leipzig, 1873).
[361] Conrat, Ges. der Quellen und Lit. des röm. Rechts, pp. 48-59, and 161
sqq.; Mommsen, Zeitschrift für Rechtsges. 21 (1900), Roman. Abteilung,
pp. 150-155.
[362] Ed. by Bluhme, Mon. Germ. leges, iii. 579-630. Cf. Tardif, Sources
du droit français, 124-128. A code of Burgundian law had already been
made.

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[363] Edited by Haenel, with the epitomes of it in parallel columns, under
the name of Lex Romana Visigothorum (Leipzig, 1849). See Tardif, o.c.
129-143.
[364] Cod. Theod. i. 4, 3; Brev. i. 4, 1.
[365] On these epitomes and glosses see Conrat, Ges. der Quellen, etc., pp.
222-252. Mention should be made of the Edict of Theodoric the Ostrogoth,
a piece of legislation contemporary with the Breviarium and the Papianus.
In pursuance of Theodoric’s policy of amalgamating Goths and Romans,
the Edict was made for both (Barbari Romanique). Its sources were
substantially the same as those of the Breviarium, except that Gaius was not
used. The sources are not given verbatim, but their contents are restated,
often quite bunglingly. Naturally a Teutonic influence runs through this
short and incomplete code, which contains more criminal than private law.
No further reference need be made to it because its influence practically
ceased with the reconquest of Italy by Justinian. It is edited by Bluhme, in
Mon. Ger. leges, v. 145-169. See as to it, Savigny, Geschichte des röm.
Rechts, ii. 172-181; Salvioli, Storia del diritto italiano, 3rd ed., pp. 45-47.
[366] Cf. Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, i. p. 109 sqq.
[367] For the characteristics and elements of early Teutonic law see
Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, Bd. i.
[368] See Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, i. p. 254 sqq., and 338-340.
[369] “Adversus Gundobadi legem,” c. 4 (Mon. Germ. leges, iii. 504). As to
Agobard see ante, Vol. I. p. 232.
[370] The matter is suggested here only in its general aspects. The details
present every kind of complication (for some purposes to-day a court will
apply the law of the litigant’s domicile). The professio (professus sum or
professa sum), by which a man or woman formally declares by what law he
or she lives, remained common in Italy for five centuries after Pippin’s
conquest, and indicates the legal situation there, especially of the Teutonic
newcomers.
[371] One sees an analogy in the fortunes of the Boëthian translations of the
more advanced treatises of Aristotle’s Organon. They fell into disuse (or

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never came into use) and so were “lost” until they came to light, i.e. into
use, in the last part of the twelfth century.
[372] See Conrat, Ges. der Quellen, pp. 182-187.
[373] See Conrat, Ges. der Quellen, etc., pp. 162-166, 168-182, 192-202,
240-252.
[374] See Salvioli, Storia di diritto italiano, 3rd ed., 1899, pp. 84-90; ibid.
L’ Istruzione pubblica in Italia nei secoli VIII. IX. X.; Tardif, Hist. des
sources du droit français, p. 281 sqq.; Savigny, Geschichte, etc., iv. pp. 1-9;
Fitting, “Zur Geschichte der Rechtswissenschaft im Mittelalter,” Zeitschrift
für Rges. Sav. Stift., Roman. Abteil., Bd. vi., 1885, pp. 94-186; ibid.
Juristische Schriften des früheren Mittelalters, 108 sqq. (Halle, 1876).
[375] A contemporary notice speaks of the enormous number of judges,
lawyers, and notaries in Milan about the year 1000. Salvioli, L’ Istruzione
pubblica, etc., p. 78. It is hard to imagine that no legal instruction could be
had there.
[376] The evidence is gathered in different parts of Savigny’s Geschichte.
[377] De parentelae gradibus, see Savigny, Geschichte, Bd. iv. p. 1 sqq.
[378] See Savigny, Geschichte, Bd. ii. pp. 134-163 (the text is published in
an Appendix to that volume, pp. 321-428); Conrat, Ges. der Quellen, etc.,
pp. 420-549; Tardif, Hist. des sources du droit français, pp. 213-246.
[379] This follows the so-called Tübingen MSS., the largest immediate
source of the Petrus. As well-nigh the entire substance of the Petrus is
drawn from the immediately prior compilations (which are still
unpublished) its characteristics are really theirs.
[380] Apparently the chief magistrate of Valence: “Valentinae civitatis
magistro magnifico.”
[381] Petri exceptiones, iii. 69.
[382] Petrus, i. 66.

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[383] See Conrat, Ges. der Quellen, etc., 550-582; Tardif, Hist. des sources,
etc., pp. 207-213; Fitting, Zeitschrift für Rges. Bd. vi. p. 141. It is edited by
Bocking (Berlin, 1829) under the title of Corpus legum sive Brachylogus
juris civilis.
[384] For instance, Brach. ii. 12, “De juris et facti ignorantia,” is short and
clear. It follows mainly Digest xxii. 6.
[385] Summa Codicis des Irnerius, ed. by Fitting (Berlin, 1894). See
Introduction, and also Fitting in Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Bd. xvii.
(1896), Romanische Abteilung, pp. 1-96.
[386] Cf. Summa Codicis Irnerii, vii. 23, and vii. 31. 1.
[387] Summa Codicis Irnerii, i. 14. The corresponding passages in
Justinian’s Codification are Dig. i. 3, lex 12 and 38, and Codex vii. 45, lex
13.
[388] Summa Codicis Irnerii, vii. 22 and 23. The chief Justinianean sources
are Dig. xli. 2, and Cod. xii. 32.
[389] See Salvioli, Manuale, etc., pp. 65-68; ibid. L’ Istruzione pubblica in
Italia, pp. 72-75; Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, i. p. 387 sqq.
[390] Post, Chapter XXXV., i.
[391] The Bologna school is commonly called the school of the glossators.
Their work was to expound the law of Justinian; and their glosses, or
explanatory notes, were the part of their writings which had the most
permanent influence. The glosses were originally written between the lines
or on the margins of the codices of the Digest, Codex, Novels, and
Institutes.
[392] Savigny gives examples of Irnerius’s glosses in an appendix to the
fourth volume of his Geschichte. Pescatore (Die Glossen des Irnerius,
Greifswald, 1888) maintains that Savigny overstates the difference between
the interlinear and the marginal glosses of Irnerius.
[393] On Placentinus see Savigny, Geschichte, iv. pp. 244-285.
[394] Proemium to De var. actionum, given by Savigny, iv. p. 540.

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[395] This is from the proemium attached to one old edition, and is given in
Sav. Ges. iv. p. 245. In an appendix, p. 542, Savigny gives an even more
florid proemium to the Summa Codicis from a manuscript.
[396] On Azo, see Savigny, Ges. v. pp. 1-44.
[397] Quoted by Savigny. On Accursius see Sav. Ges. v. pp. 262-305.
[398] On Bartolus see Savigny, Ges. etc. vi. pp. 137-184.
[399] Cf. Savigny, Ges. v. pp. 222-261.
[400] “Ecclesia vivit lege Romana,” Lex Ribuaria, 58. This was universally
recognized, although the individual clericus might remain amenable to the
law of his birth.
[401] For these matters see primarily the sixteenth book of the Theodosian
Code, and book i. chap. 27. Also the suspected Constitutiones
Sirmondianae attached to that Code. Justinian’s Codex and Novellae add
much. Zorn, in his Kirchenrecht, p. 29 sqq., gives a convenient synopsis of
the matter.
[402] One observes that the opening chapter of Justinian’s Digest speaks of
jurisprudentia as knowledge of divine as well as human matters.
[403] Decretum, i. dist. viii. c. i.
[404] Decretum, i. dist. ix. c. xi.; see ibid. dist. xiii., opening.
[405] Tardif, Sources du droit canonique, p. 175 sqq., has been chiefly
followed here.
[406] On the above matters see (with the authorities and bibliographies
therein given) Maasen, Geschichte der Quellen, etc., der canonischen
Rechts (Bd. i., to the middle of the ninth century); Tardif, Sources du droit
canonique (Paris, 1887); Zorn, Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts (Stuttgart,
1888); Gerlach, Lehrbuch des catholischen Kirchenrechts (5th edition,
Paderborn, 1890); Hinschius, Decretales pseudo-Isidorianae (Leipzig,
1863); Corpus juris canonici, ed. by Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879-1881).

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[407] Jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts embraced marriage and
divorce, wills and inheritance, and, by virtue of their surveillance of usury
and vows and oaths, practically the whole relationship between debtor and
creditor.
[408] Volume ii. of R. W. and A. J. Carlyle’s History of Mediaeval Political
Theory in the West (1909) maintains that the statements of papal pretensions
which were incorporated in the recognized collections of Decretals were
less extreme than those emanating from the papacy under stress of
controversy.
[409] See Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. by Maitland
(Cambridge, 1900), p. 22 sqq. and notes. I would express my indebtedness
to this book for these pages on mediaeval political theories. Dunning’s
History of Political Theories is a convenient outline; Carlyle’s History of
Mediaeval Political Theory gives the sources carefully.
[410] Occasionally studium (knowledge, study, or science) is introduced as
a third part or element of the human community or of human life. Thus in
the famous statement of Jordanes of Osnabrück—the Romans received the
Sacerdotium, the Germans the Imperium, the French the Studium. See
Gierke, Political Theories, p. 104, note 8.
[411] Cf. Gierke, o.c. p. 109, note 16. But compare Carlyle, o.c. vol. ii. part
ii. chaps. vii.-xi.
[412] Even toward the close of the Middle Ages Marsilius of Padua was
almost alone in positing the absolute supremacy of the State, says Gierke.
[413] See Gierke, o.c. p. 144, note 131, and compare notes 132, 133, and
183 for attacks upon the plenary power of the pope.
[414] Gierke, o.c. pp. 31-32, and p. 139, notes 107 and 108.
[415] Dig. i. 4, 1; Gierke, o.c. p. 39 and pp. 146, 147.
[416] Gierke, o.c. p. 64.
[417] Gierke, o.c. p. 172, note 256. Cf. ante, p. 268.
[418] See Gierke, o.c. pp. 73-86, and corresponding notes.

Page 649

[419] Little will be said in these pages of palpable crass heretics like the
Cathari, for example. The philosophic ideas of such seem gathered from the
flotsam and jetsam of the later antique world; their stock was not of the
best, and bore little interesting fruit for later times. Such mediaeval heresies
present no continuous evolution like that of the proper scholasticism.
Progress in philosophy and theology came through academic personages,
who at all events laid claim to orthodoxy. All lines of advance leading on to
later phases of philosophic, scientific, and religious thought, lay within the
labours of such, some of whom, however, were suspected or even
condemned by the Church, like Eriugena, Abaelard, or Roger Bacon. But
these men did not stand apart from orthodox academic circles, and were
never cast out by the Church. Thought and learning in the Middle Ages
were domiciled in monastic, episcopal, or university circles; and these were
at least conventionally orthodox.
It has been said, to be sure, that the heresy of one generation becomes the
orthodoxy of another; but this is true only of tendencies like those of
Abaelard, which represent the gradual expansion and clearing up of
scholastic processes. For the time they may be condemned, perhaps because
of the vain and contentious character of the suspected thinker; but in the end
they are recognized as admissible.
The Averroists constitute an apparent exception. Yet they were a
philosophic and academic sect, whose heresy consisted in an implicit
following of Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes. Moreover, they sought to
save their orthodoxy by their doctrine of the two kinds of truth, philosophic
and theological or dogmatic. It is not clear that much fruitful thought came
from their school. The positions of Siger de Brabant, a prominent Averroist
and contemporary of Aquinas, are referred to post, Chapter XXXVII. The
best account of Averroism is Mandonnet’s Siger de Brabant et l’averroisme
latin au XIIIe siècle (a second edition, Louvain, is in preparation). See also
De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy (3rd. ed., Longmans, 1909) p. 379
sqq. with authorities cited.
[420] Called also his Summa philosophica, to distinguish it from his Summa
theologiae.
[421] Summa theologiae, i. i., quaestio i. art. 1-8.

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[422] Post, Chapter XXXVI., i.
[423] Even the Averroists were more mediaeval than Greek, inasmuch as
they professed to follow Aristotle implicitly. Cf. post, Chapter XXXVII., at
the end.
[424] A touch of “salvation,” or salvation’s need, is on Plato when his
“philosophy” becomes a consideration of death (μελέτη θανάτου) and a
process of growing as like to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) as man can. Phaedo, 80
e, and Theaetetus, 176 a.

[425] Historia calamitatum, cap. 9 and 10. Cf. post, p. 303.
[426] Post, Chapter XLI.
[427] Ante, p. 298. I cannot avoid referring to Abaelard several times before
considering the man and his work more specifically, and in the proper
place; post, Chapter XXXVI. i.
[428] Introductio ad theologiam, lib. ii. (Migne 178, col. 1039).
[429] See Denifle, “Die Sentenzen Abaelard’s und die Bearbeitungen seiner
Theologia,” Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte, i. p. 402 sqq. and
p. 584 sqq. Also Picavet, “Abélard et Alexander de Hales, créateurs de la
méthode scholastique,” Bib. de l’école des hautes études, sciences
religieuses, t. vii. p. 221 sqq.
[430] Two extracts, one from the Sentences and one from the Summa,
touching the same matter, will illustrate the stage in the scholastic process
reached by Peter Lombard, about the year 1150, and that attained by
Thomas Aquinas a hundred years later.
The Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences are divided into Distinctiones,
with sub-titles to the latter. Distinctio xlvi. of the first Book bears the
general title: “The opinion (sententia) declaring that the will of God which
is himself, cannot be frustrated, seems to be opposed by some opinions.”
The first subdivision of the text begins: “Here the question rises. For it is
said by the authorities above adduced [the preceding Distinctio had
discussed “The will of God which is His essence, one and eternal”] that the
will of God, which is himself, and is called His good pleasure

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(beneplacitum) cannot be frustrated, because by that will fecit quaecumque
voluit in caelo et in terra, which—witness the Apostle—nihil resistit. [I
leave the Scriptural quotations in Latin, so as to mark them.] It is queried,
therefore, how one should understand what the Apostle says concerning the
Lord, 1 Tim. 2: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri. For since all are not
saved, but many are damned, that which God wills to take place, seems not
to take place (become, fieri), the human will obstructing the will of God.
The Lord also in the Gospel reproaching the wicked city, Matt, xxiii., says:
Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub
alis, et noluisti. Thus it might seem from these, that the will of God may be
overcome by the will of men, and, resisted by the unwillingness of the
weakest, the Most Strong may prove unable to do what He willed. Where
then is that omnipotence by which in coelo et terra, according to the
Prophet, omnia quaecumque voluit fecit? And how does nothing withstand
His will, if He wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not? For
these sayings seem indeed to oppose what has been stated.”
The second paragraph proceeds: “But let us see the solution, and first hear
how what the Lord said should be understood. For it was not intended to
mean (as Augustine says, Enchiridion, c. 97, solving this question) that the
Lord wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not do what He
willed because she would not; but rather she did not wish her children to be
gathered by Him, yet in spite of her unwillingness (qua tamen nolente) He
gathered all He willed of her children.... And the sense is: As many as I
have gathered by my will, always effective, I have gathered, thou being
unwilling. Hence it is evident that these words of the Lord are not opposed
to the authorities referred to.”
(Paragraph 3) “Now it remains to see how the aforesaid words do not
contradict what the Apostle said of the Lord: Vult omnes homines salvos
fieri. Because of these words many have wandered from the truth, saying
that God willed many things which did not come to pass. But the saying is
not thus to be understood, as if God willed any to be saved, and they were
not. For who can be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot change
the evil wills of men to good when and where He will? Surely what is said
in Psalm 113, Quaecumque voluit fecit, is not true, if He willed anything
and did not accomplish it. Or,—(and this is still more shameful) for that
reason He did not do it, because what the Omnipotent willed to come to

Page 652

pass, the will of man obstructed. Hence when we read in Holy Scripture
velit omnes homines salvos fieri, we should not detract from the will of
omnipotent God, but understand the text to mean that no man is saved
except whom He wills to be saved: not that there is no man whom He does
not will to be saved, but that no man may be saved except whom He wills
should be saved.... Thus also is to be understood the text from John i.:
Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; not as if there is no
man who is not lighted, but that none is lighted save from Him....”
The next and fourth paragraph takes up the problem whether evil, that is
sin, takes place by the will of God, or He unwilling (eo nolente). “As to
this, divers men thinking diversely have been found in contradiction. For
some say that God wills evils to be or become (esse vel fieri) yet does not
will evils. But others say that He neither wills evils to be nor to become. Yet
these and those agree in declaring that God does not will evils. Yet each
with arguments as well as authorities strives to make good his assertion.”
We will not follow the Lombard through this thorny problem. He cuts his
way with passages from his chief patristic authority, Augustine, and in the
end concludes: “Leaving this and other like foolish opinions, and favouring
the sounder view, which is more fully sanctioned by the testimonies of the
Saints, we may say that God neither wills evils to become, nor wills that
they should not become, nor yet is He unwilling (nolle) that they should
become. All that He wills to become, becomes, and all that He wills not to
become does not become. Yet many things become which He does not will
to become, as every evil.”
Thus the Lombard. Now let us see how Thomas, in his Summa theologiae,
Pars Prima, Quaestio xix. Articulus ix. expounds the point: utrum voluntas
Dei sit malorum.
“As to the ninth articulus thus one proceeds. (1) It seems [Videtur, formula
for stating the initial argument which will not be approved] that the will of
God is [the cause] of evils. For God wills every good that becomes (i.e.
comes into existence). But it is good that evils should come; for Augustine
says in the Enchiridion: ‘Although those things which are evils, in so far as
they are evils, are not goods; yet it is good (bonum) that there should be not
only goods (bona) but evils.’ Therefore God wills evils.”

Page 653

“(2) Moreover [Praeterea, Thomas’s regular formula for introducing the
succeeding arguments, which he will not approve] Dionysius says, iv. cap.
de divinis nominibus: ‘There will be evil making for the perfection of the
whole.’ And Augustine says in the Enchiridion: ‘Out of all (things) the
admirable beauty of the universe arises; wherein even that which is called
evil, well ordered and set in its place, commends the good more highly;
since the good pleases more, and is the more praiseworthy, when compared
with evil.’ But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and grace
of the universe; since this is what God chiefly wills in His creation.
Therefore God wills evils.”
“(3) Moreover, the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils (mala fieri, et
non fieri) are contradictory opposites. But God does not will evils not to
occur; because since some evils do occur, the will of God would not be
fulfilled. Therefore God wills evils to occur.”
“Sed contra est [Thomas’s formula for stating the opinion which he will
approve] what Augustine says in his book of Eighty-three Questions: ‘No
wise man is the author of man’s deterioration; yet God is more excellent
than any wise man; much less then, is God the author of any one’s
deterioration. But He is said to be the author when He is spoken of as
willing anything. Therefore man becomes worse, God not willing it. But
with every evil, something becomes worse. Therefore God does not will
evils.’”
“Respondeo dicendum quod [Thomas’s formula for commencing his
elucidation] since the reason (or ground or cause, ratio) of the good is
likewise the reason of the desirable (as discussed previously), evil is
opposed to good: it is impossible that any evil, as evil, should be desired,
either by the natural appetite or the animal, or the intellectual, which is will.
But some evil may be desired per accidens, in so far as it conduces to some
good. And this is apparent in any appetite. For the natural impulse (agens
naturale) does not aim at privation or destruction (corruptio); but at form,
to which the privation of another form may be joined (i.e. needed,
conjungitur); and at the generation of one, which is the destruction of
another. Thus a lion, killing a stag, aims at food, to which is joined the
killing of an animal. Likewise the fornicator aims at enjoyment, to which is
joined the deformity of guilt.

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“Thus evil which is joined to some good, is privation of another good.
Never, therefore, is evil desired, not even per accidens, unless the good to
which the evil is joined appears greater than the good which is annulled
through the evil. But God wills no good more than His goodness; yet He
wills some one good more than some other good. Hence the evil of guilt,
which destroys relationship to divine good (quod privat ordinem ad bonum
divinum), God in no way wills. But the evil of natural defect, or the evil of
penalty, He wills in willing some good to which such evil is joined; as, in
willing righteousness He wills penalty; and in willing that the order of
nature be preserved, He wills certain natural corruptions.
“Ad primum ergo dicendum [Thomas’s formula for commencing his reply
to the first false argument] that certain ones have said that although God
does not will evils, He wills evils to be or become: because, although evils
are not goods, yet it is good that evils should be or become. They said this
for the reason that those things which are evil in themselves, are ordained
for some good; and they deemed this ordainment involved in saying mala
esse vel fieri. But that is not said rightly. Because evil is not ordained for
good per se but per accidens. For it is beyond the sinner’s intent, that good
should come of it; just as it was beyond the intent of the tyrants that from
their persecutions the patience of the martyrs should shine forth. And
therefore it cannot be said that such ordainment for good is involved in
saying that it is good for evil to be or become: because nothing is adjudged
according to what pertains to it per accidens but according to what pertains
to it per se.”
“Ad secundum dicendum that evil is not wrought for the perfection or
beauty of the whole except per accidens, as has been shown. Hence this
which Dionysius says that evil makes for the perfection of the whole may
lead to an illogical conclusion.”
“Ad tertium dicendum that although the occurrence and non-occurrence of
evils are opposed as contradictories; yet to will the occurrence and to will
the non-occurrence of evils, are not opposed as contradictories, since both
one and the other may be affirmative. God therefore neither wills the
occurrence nor the non-occurrence of evils; but wills to permit their
occurrence. And this is good.”

Page 655

[431] Ante, Chapter XII.
[432] Ante, pp. 289 sqq.
[433] The Speculum majus of Vincent of Beauvais will afford the principal
example of the resulting hybrid arrangement.
[434] Ludwig Baur, Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae
(Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903), p. 193 sqq., to which I am indebted
for what I have to say in the next few pages.
[435] Migne, Pat. Lat. 64, col. 10 sqq.
[436] These works were written near the middle of the twelfth century.
Gundissalinus was Archdeacon of Segovia and drew upon Arab writings.
[437] See L. Baur, Gundissalinus, etc., p. 376 sqq.
[438] The treatise is not printed. Its captions are given by L. Baur in his
Gundissalinus, pp. 368-375, from which I have borrowed what I give of
them.
[439] Liber de praedicabilibus (tome 1 of Albertus’s works), which in
scholastic logic means the five “universals,” genus, species, difference,
property, accident, (also called the quinque voces) discussed in Porphyry’s
Introduction to the Categories. The Categories themselves are called
praedicamenta.
[440] The above gives the arguments of chapters i. and ii. of the work. One
notices that Albertus in this exposition of the subject of Porphyry’s treatise,
is using the method which Thomas brings to syllogistic perfection in his
Summa.
[441] It was printed, more than once, in the late fifteenth century; the most
readable edition is that printed at Douai in 1624, in four huge folios.
[442] Boundless as the work appears, neither in mental powers, nor
learning, nor in massiveness of achievement, is its author to be compared
with Albertus Magnus. The De universo of Rabanus Maurus, Migne 111,
col. 9-612, is in its arrangement and method a forerunner of Vincent’s
Speculum. Later predecessors were the English Franciscan Bartolomaeus,

Page 656

whose encyclopaedic De proprietatibus rerum was written a little before the
middle of the twelfth century (see Felder, Studien in Franciscanerorder,
etc., pp. 251-253); and Lambertus Audomarensis (St. Omer) with his Liber
floridus, a general digest of knowledge, historical, ecclesiastical, and
natural, taken from many writers, an account of which is given in Migne
163, col. 1004 sqq.
[443] Here, of course, we have the hands of Esau, but the voice of
Augustine and Orosius!
[444] The above is from cap. 9 of liber i. of the Speculum doctrinale.
[445] Migne, Pat. Lat. 34, col. 246-485.
[446] Ante, p. 290.
[447] The three theological virtues are fides, spes, and caritas. They are
called thus because Deum habent pro objecto; and because they are poured
(infunduntur) into us by God alone. They are distinguished from the moral
and intellectual virtues because their object surpasses our reason, while the
object of the moral and intellectual virtues can be comprehended by human
reason (Summa, Pars prima secundae, Quaestio lxii., Art. 1-4).
[448] ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική, Arist. Nich. Ethics, vi. 4.
[449] One notes that these two, like many other of the vices enumerated, are
vices in that they are extremes, in the Aristotelian sense.
[450] We are at Quaestio clxxi. of Secunda secundae.
[451] The order which Thomas would have followed in the unfinished
conclusion of his Summa theologiae, may be inferred from the order of the
last half of Book IV. of his Contra Gentiles, or indeed from the last part of
the fourth Book of the Lombard’s Sentences.
[452] Ante, Chapter XII.
[453] There were, of course, attempts at translation, notably those of Notker
the German (see ante, Vol. I., p. 308) and Alfred’s translation of Boëthius’s
De consolatione. But such were made only of the popular parts of Scripture
(e.g. the Psalms) or of very elementary profane treatises. To what extent

Page 657

Notker’s translations were used, is hard to say. But at all events any one
really seeking learning, studied and worked and thought in the medium of
Latin; for the bulk of the patristic writings never were translated; and when
the works of Aristotle had at last reached the Middle Ages in the Latin
tongue, they were studied in that tongue. Because of the crudeness of the
vernacular tongues, the Latin classics were even more untranslatable in the
tenth or eleventh century than now.
One may add, that it was fortunate for the progress of mediaeval learning
that Latin was the one language used by all scholars in all countries. This
facilitated the diffusion of knowledge. How slow and painful would have
been that diffusion if the different vernacular tongues had been used in their
respective countries, for serious writing.
[454] Ante, Chapter XII., i.
[455] Eruditio didascalica, i. cap. 12 (Migne, Pat. Lat. 176, col. 750).
[456] Cf. Abelson, The Seven Liberal Arts (New York, 1906).
[457] I am speaking generally, that is to say, omitting for the present the
aberrant or special or intrusive tendencies found in a man like Roger Bacon,
for example. They were of importance for what was to come thereafter; but
are not broadly representative of the Middle Ages.
[458] St. Anselm, Epist. lib. iii. 41, ad Fulconem (Migne, Pat. Lat. 158, col.
1192). So Roscellin showed in his own case how problems primarily logical
could pass over to metaphysics or theology. Likewise, although on the other
side of the controversy, one, Odo of Tournai, a good contemporary realist,
found realism an efficient aid in explaining the transmission of original sin;
since for him all men formed but one substance, which was infected once
for all by the sin of the first parents. Cf. Hauréau, Hist. de la philosophie
scholastique, i. pp. 297-308; De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy, p. 156,
3rd ed.
[459] Abaelard, Hist. calamitatum, chap. 2.
[460] Ante, Chapter XXV.
[461] Ante, Chapter XII., i.

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[462] Abaelard’s Dialectica was published by Cousin, Ouvrages inédits
d’Abélard (Paris, 1836). For a thorough exposition of Abaelard’s logic see
Prantl, Ges. der Logik, ii. p. 160 sqq.
[463] I.e. as positive, comparative, and superlative.
[464] Cousin, Ouvr. inédits, p. 175. Cf. Aristotle’s Categories, ii. v. 20. The
opening of Pars tertia of Abaelard’s Dialectica (in Cousin’s edition, p. 324
sqq.) affords an interesting example of this logical analysis and
reconstruction of statement, which seems to originate in sheer grammar, and
then advance beyond it.
[465] Cousin, o.c. pp. 190, 192.
[466] Cousin, o.c. p. 331.
[467] Prantl’s Geschichte der Logik, vol. ii., contains an exhaustive
discussion of the various phases of this controversy: its language is little
less difficult than that of the twelfth-century word-twisters.
[468] Cousin, o.c. pp. 434, 435.
[469] Theologia Christiana, iv. (Migne 178, col. 1284).
[470] Migne, Pat. Lat. 178, col. 1641.
[471] Ante, p. 292.
[472] Scito te ipsum, cap. 13 (Migne 178, col. 653).
[473] Scito te ipsum, cap. 19 (Migne 178, col. 664).
[474] Migne 178, col. 1615.
[475] Ante, pp. 304 sqq.
[476] This has been published by Stölzle: Abaelards 1121 zu Soissons
verurteilter Tractatus de Unitate et Trinitate divina (1891).
[477] Migne 178, col. 1123-1330; Cousin and Jourdain, P. Abaelardi opera,
ii. pp. 357-566 (1859).
[478] Migne 178, col. 979-1114; Cousin and Jourdain, o.c. pp. 1-149.

Page 659

[479] Ante, Chapter XXXV., i.
[480] Bernard, Ep. 338 (Migne 182, col. 542).
[481] Whose sacramental theory of the Creation has already been given at
length, ante, Chapter XXVIII. For the incidents of Hugo’s life see the same
chapter. Bibliography, note to page 61. See also Ostler, “Die Psychologie
des Hugo von St. Viktor” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1906).
[482] De script. cap. 2 (Migne 175, col. 11).
[483] De script. cap. 2 (Migne 175, col. 10).
[484] Summa sententiarum (Migne 176, col. 42-174); also under title of
Tractatus theologicus, wrongly ascribed to Hildebert of Lavardin, in Migne
171, col. 1067-1150.
[485] Migne 176, col. 740-838.
[486] I think of no previous work so closely resembling the Erud. didas. as
the Institutiones divinarum et saecularum lectionum of Cassiodorus.
[487] Erud. did. i. 2.
[488] Here one sees the source of much that we quoted from Vincent de
Beauvais, ante, Chapter XXXV., 1.
[489] Lib. iii. cap. 13 sqq.
[490] Erud. did. iii. cap. 20. Cf. ante, p. 63.
[491] Ante, Chapter XXVIII.
[492] Migne, Pat. Lat. 175, col. 115 sqq.
[493] Migne, Pat. Lat. 175, col. 923 sqq.
[494] The following consideration of the mysticism of Christian theologians
is not intended to include other forms of “mysticism” (Pantheistic, poetical,
pathological, neurotic, intellectual, and sensuous) within or without the
Christian pale.
[495] Ante, p. 42 sqq.

Page 660

[496] Ante, Chapter XXVIII.
[497] Migne, Pat. Lat. 176, col. 617-680.
[498] De arca Noe morali, i. cap. 2 (Migne 176, col. 621).
[499] Migne 176, col. 681-703. With Hugo’s pupil, Richard of St. Victor,
this constant allegory, especially the constant allegorical use of Scripture
names, becomes pedantic, precieux, impossible. See e.g. his Benjamin
major in Migne 196, col. 64-202.
[500] De arrha animae, Migne 176, col. 951-970.
[501] Migne 182, col. 727-808. A translation is announced by George Lewis
in the Oxford Library of Translations.
[502] De consid. lib. ii. cap. 2.
[503] Migne 183, col. 789 sqq. Chapter XVII., ante, is devoted to Bernard,
and his letters and sermons.
[504] Ed. by Willner (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903).
[505] See ante, Chapter XXX., 1.
[506] Bernardus Silvestris, De mundi universitate, i. 2 (ed. by Barach and
Wrobel; Innsbrück, 1876). As to Bernard Silvestris, see Clerval, Écoles de
Chartres au moyen âge, p. 259 sqq. and passim; also Hauréau (who
confuses him with Bernard of Chartres), Hist. de la phil. scholastique, ii.
407 sqq.
[507] See Hauréau, Hist. etc. ii. 447-472; R. L. Poole, Illustrations of
Mediaeval Thought, chap. vi. His Liber de sex principiis is printed in Migne
188, col. 1257-1270.
[508] Werner, “Die Kosmologie und Naturlehre des scholastischen
Mittelalters, mit specialler Beziehung auf Wilhelm von Conches,”
Sitzungsb. K. Akad., philos. Klasse, 1873, Bd. lxxv.; Hauréau, Hist. etc. i.
431-446; ibid. Singularités littéraires, etc.
[509] Ante, Vol. I., p. 251.

Page 661

[510] Ante, Chapter XXX., i.
[511] Under another title, Moralis philosophia de honesto et utile, it has
been ascribed to Hildebert of Lavardin, Migne 171, col. 1007-1056.
[512] For examples of John’s Latin, see ante, p. 173.
[513] See e.g. his treatment of logic in Lib. III. and IV. of the Metalogicus
(Migne 199).
[514] Polycraticus, ii. 19-21 sqq. There is now a critical edition of this work
by C. C. J. Webb (Joannis Saresberiensis Policratici libri VIII.; Clarendon
Press, 1910).
[515] Polycraticus, lib. vii., is devoted to a history of antique philosophy.
[516] Polycraticus, vii. cap. 10.
[517] Polycrat. vii. cap. 11.
[518] Migne 199, col. 955.
[519] Ante, Chapter XXIX., 11. and XXXII., 1.
[520] The works of Alanus are collected in Migne, Pat. Lat. 210. What
follows in the text is much indebted to M. Baumgartner, “Die Philosophie
des Alanus de Insulis” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1896).
[521] All this is thoroughly done by Baumgartner, o.c.
[522] See Baumgartner, p. 76 sqq. and citations.
[523] What I have felt obliged to say upon the organization of mediaeval
Universities, I have largely drawn from Rashdall’s Universities of Europe in
the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1895). The subject is too large and complex for
independent investigation, except of the most lengthy and thorough
character. Extracts from illustrative mediaeval documents, with
considerable information touching mediaeval Universities, are brought
together by Arthur O. Norton in his Mediaeval Universities (Readings in the
History of Education, Harvard University, 1909). For the Paris University,
the most important source is the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed.
by Denifle and Chatelain (1889-1891). See also Ch. Thurot, L’Organisation

Page 662

de l’enseignement dans l’Université de Paris (Paris, 1850), and Denifle,
Die Universitäten des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1885).
[524] What has been said applies to the Bologna Law University. That had
been preceded by a school of Arts, and later there grew up a flourishing
school of Medicine, where surgery was also taught. These schools became
affiliated Universities, but never equalled the Law University in
importance.
[525] The Masters who taught were called Regentes.
[526] Both civil and canon law were studied till 1219, when a Bull of
Honorius III. forbade the study of the former at Paris.
[527] See post, p. 399.
[528] Mr. Rashdall’s.
[529] Rashdall, o.c. ii. p. 341.
[530] Oxford lay in the diocese of Lincoln.
[531] For the course of medicine and the list of books studied or lectured
on, especially at Montpellier, from which we have the most complete list,
see Rashdall, ii. p. 118 sqq. and ibid. p. 780. In Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology, vol. xx., 1909, C. H. Haskins publishes An
unpublished List of Text-books, belonging to the close of the twelfth
century, when classical studies had not as yet been overshadowed by
Dialectic. See also, generally, Paetow, The Arts Course at Medieval
Universities (Univ. of Illinois, 1910).
[532] See generally, Carra de Vaux, Avicenne (Paris, 1900); also Gazali, by
the same author.
[533] Whoever will read the two monographs of the Baron Carra de Vaux,
Avicenne and Gazali, will be struck by the closely analogous courses of
Moslem and Christian thought; each showing the parallel phases of
scholastic rationalism (reliant upon reason and rational authority) and
scholastic theological piety, or mysticism (reliant upon the authority of
Revelation and sceptical as to the validity of human reason).

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[534] See for this matter Mandonnet, O.P., Aristote et la mouvement
intellectuel du moyen âge, contained in his Siger de Brabant, and printed
separately; De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 3rd ed., pp. 243-253
and authorities; C. Marchesi, L’ Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione
medievale (Messina, 1904).
[535] Ante, Chapter V.
[536] Constitutiones des Prediger-Ordens vom Jahre 1228, Prologus; H.
Denifle, Archiv für Litt. und Kirchenges. des Mittelalters, Bd i. (1885), p.
194.
[537] See Felder, Wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franciskanerorden, p. 24
(Freiburg im Breisgau, 1904); a valuable work.
[538] See Felder, o.c. p. 29.
[539] Constitutiones, etc., cap. 28-31.
[540] Cf. Felder, o.c. p. 107 sqq.
[541] Cf. Felder, o.c. p. 177 sqq.
[542] From Denifle, Universitäten des Mittelalters, i. 99, note 192.
[543] See generally, Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l’averroisme latin au
moyen âge (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1899); Baeumker (Beiträge, 1898), Die
Impossibilia des Siger von Brabant; De Wulf, Hist. of Medieval Philosophy,
3rd ed., p. 379 sqq. (Longmans, 1909).
[544] Albert was born probably in 1193, and died in 1280; Bacon was born
some twenty years later, and died about 1292. Bonaventura was born in
1221, and Thomas in 1225 or 1227; they both died in 1274.
[545] So Raphael represents them in his “School of Athens.”

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[546] Bonaventura, Sermo IV., Quaracchi edition, tome v. p. 572 (cited by
De Wulf, Hist. etc. p. 304, note). With all their Augustinian-Platonism, the
Franciscans made a good second to the Dominicans in the study of
Aristotle, as is proved by the great number of commentaries upon his works
by members of the former Order. See Felder, o.c. p. 479.
[547] Epist. de tribus quaestionibus, § 12.
[548] Tome v. (Quaracchi ed.) pp. 319-325.
[549] This is from § 26, the last in the work. Bonaventura has already said
(§ 7): “Omnes istae cognitiones ad cognitionem Sacrae Scripturae
ordinantur, in ea clauduntur et in illa perficiuntur, et mediante illa ad
aeternam illuminationem ordinantur.” (“All kinds of knowledge are
ordained for the knowledge of Holy Scripture, are in it enclosed and thereby
are perfected; and through its mediation are ordered for eternal
illumination.”)
[550] It is contained in tomes i.-iv. of the Quaracchi edition.
[551] T. v. pp. 201-291.
[552] Breviloquium, Prologus.
[553] One feels the reality of Bonaventura’s distinctions here between
theology and philosophy. They are enunciations of his religious sense, and
possess a stronger validity than any elaborate attempt to distinguish by
argument between the two. Thomas distinguishes them with excellent
reasoning. It lacks convincingness perhaps from the fact that Thomas’s
theology is so largely philosophy, as Roger Bacon said.
[554] As this chapter opens a pars, it begins with a recapitulation of what
has preceded and a summary of what is to come. The specific topic of the
chapter commences here.
[555] I.e. the desiderative, rational, and irascible elements in man.
[556] Bonaventura closely follows Hugo of St. Victor’s De sacramentis, see
ante, Chap. XXVIII., especially p. 72.

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[557] Opera, t. v. pp. 295-313.
[558] Vir desideriorum, Dan. ix. 23 (Vulgate).
[559] The Breviloquium and Itinerarium are conveniently edited by Hefele
in a little volume (Tübingen, 1861).
[560] Albertus, Metaphysicorum libri XIII., lib. i. tract. 1, cap. 4.
[561] Physic. lib. viii. tract. 1, cap. 14.
[562] Poster. Analyt. lib. i. tract. 1, cap. 1. This and the previous citation are
from Mandonnet’s Siger de Brabant.
[563] Ethic. lib. vi. tract. 2, cap. 25.
[564] Carus, Ges. der Zoologie, p. 231.
[565] Ernst Meyer, Ges. der Botanik, Bd. iv. p. 77.
[566] The works of Albertus were edited by the Dominican Jammy in
twenty-one volumes (Lyons, 1651); they are reprinted by Borgnet (Paris,
1890 et seq.). My references to volumes follow Jammy’s edition.
[567] See ante, pp. 314 sqq.
[568] Prantl, Ges. der Logik, iii. 89 sqq., calls him an “unklarer Kopf,”
incapable of consistent thinking.
[569] This is the view of A. Schneider, Die Psychologie Alberts des
Grossen (Baeumker’s Beiträge, Münster, 1903). The author presents
analytically the disparate elements—Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, and
theological-Augustinian, which are found in Albert’s writings.
[570] See Endriss, Albertus Magnus als Interpret der Aristotelischen
Metaphysik (Munich, 1886).
[571] The above is mainly drawn from E. Meyer’s Ges. der Botanik, Bd. iv.
pp. 38-78.
[572] Ante, Volume I. p. 76.
[573] See Carus, Geschichte der Zoologie, pp. 211-239.

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[574] Sum. theol. pars prima, tract. I, quaest. ii.
[575] Ante, Chapter XXXV., I.
[576] Tome xx. p. 41a.
[577] The Vita of Thomas by Guilielmus de Thoco, Acta sanctorum,
Martius, tome i. folio 657 sqq. (March 7), is wretchedly confused.
[578] Vita, cap. iii. § 15.
[579] One may see the truth of this by comparing the treatment of a matter
in Albert’s Summa theologiae with the corresponding sections in Thomas.
For example, compare Albert’s Summa theol. prima, Tract. vii. Quaest.
xxx.-xxxiii., on generatio, processio, missio of the divine persons, with
Thomas, Sum. theol. prima, Quaest. xxvii. and xliii.
[580] John of Damascus, an important Greek theologian of the eighth
century, often cited by Thomas.
[581] Quaestiones are the larger divisions of the argument.
[582] Pars prima, Qu. xvi. Art. 3.
[583] Pars prima, Qu. lxxxii. Art. 3.
[584] Prima sec. Qu. iv. Art. 2.
[585] Prima sec. Qu. iv. Art. 3.
[586] Sum. Phil. contra Gentiles, iii. 37.
[587] One cannot avoid applying the masculine pronouns to God, and to the
angels also. But, of course, this is a mere convenience of speech. Thomas
ascribes no sex either to God or the angels.
[588] It will, of course, be borne in mind, that Thomas’s use of videre and
visio to express man’s perception of God’s essential nature, does not mean a
physical but an intellectual seeing.
[589] Given ante, pp. 290 sqq.

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[590] Secundum quod est in actu, i.e. in realized actuality as distinguished
from potentiality (Aristotelian conceptions).
[591] The foregoing is taken from the thirteen articuli into which Quaestio
xii. is divided.
[592] Pars prima, Quaestio xxxii. Art. 1.
[593] Quaestiones disputatae: De Veritate, x. 6. Citing Rom. i. 20.
[594] Prooemium to Qu. xiv. Pars prima.
[595] Qu. xiv. Art. 2—a point which Thomas reasons out in interesting
scholastic Aristotelian fashion, but in language too technical to translate.
[596] Pars prima, Qu. xiv. Art. 11.
[597] Pars prima, Qu. xv. Art. 1-3.
[598] Pars prima, Qu. xxvi. Art. 2.
[599] Pars prima, Qu. xliv. Art. 3.
[600] Pars prima, Qu. xlv. Art. 1.
[601] Summa theol. pars prima, Qu. l. As heretofore, I follow the exposition
of the Summa theologiae. But Thomas began a large and almost historical
treatment of angels in his unfinished Tract. de substantiis separatis, seu de
Angelorum natura (unfinished, in Opuscula theol.). He has another and
important tractatus, De cognitione Angelorum, Quaestiones disput. de
veritate, viii.
[602] Pars prima, Qu. l. Art. 1. Thomas goes on to contradict Aristotle, in
holding quod nullum ens esset nisi corpus.
[603] All that has been given concerning the knowledge of angels relates to
what they know through their own natures as created. Further
enlightenment (as with men) comes through grace as soon as they become
beati through turning to good. Pars prima, Qu. lxii. Art. 1 sqq.
[604] Ante, Chapter XXXV., 1.

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[605] A burning controversy between the Averroists and the orthodox
schoolmen.
[606] This is the substance of Qu. lxxxix. Art. 1.
[607] Pars prima, Qu. xix. Art. 1.
[608] Pars prima, Qu. lxxxii. and lxxxiii.
[609] Pars prima, Qu. xx. 1.
[610] Summa theol., Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xvii. Art 8.
[611] Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xxiv. Art. 8.
[612] Pars secunda secundae, Qu. xxvi. Art. 4 and 5.
[613] Pars prima secundae, Qu. cix. sqq.
[614] Another reading is delectatio, i.e. enjoyment.
[615] Bacon’s Opus majus was edited in incomplete form by Jebb in 1733,
and reprinted in 1750 at Venice. This edition is superseded by that of
Bridges, in two volumes, published with the Moralis philosophia and
Multiplicatio specierum by the Clarendon Press in 1897. The text of this
edition had many errors, which have been corrected by a third volume
published in 1900 by Williams and Norgate, who are now the publishers of
the three volumes. In 1859 Brewer edited the Opus tertium, the Opus minus,
and Compendium philosophiae for the Master of the Rolls Series.
“An unpublished Fragment of a work by Roger Bacon” was discovered by
F. A. Gasquet in the Vatican Library, and published in the English Historical
Review for July 1897. It appears to be a letter to Clement IV., written in
1267.
In 1861 appeared the excellent monograph by Émile Charles, entitled Roger
Bacon, sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines. To this one still must turn for
extracts from the Compendium theologiae, and the Communia naturalium.
The last-named work, with the Compendium philosophiae and the
Multiplicatio specierum (which appears not to be an intrinsic part of the
Opus majus), may have been composed as parts of what was to be the

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writer’s Opus principale. Bacon’s Greek Grammar has been edited by
Nolan and Hirsch (Cambridge, 1902).
[616] Opus tertium, chap. xxv. p. 91 (Brewer’s text).
[617] Opus tertium, chap. xvii. (pp. 58-59, Brewer’s ed.).
[618] Brewer, R. Bacon, Opera inedita, p. 1.
[619] Opus tertium, pp. 7 and 8.
[620] In Opus tertium, chap. iii. (Brewer, p. 15), Bacon plainly tells the
pope the difficulties in which he had been placed by this injunction of
secrecy: “The first cause of delay came through those who are over me.
Since you have written nothing to them in my excuse, and I could not reveal
to them your secret, they insisted with unspeakable violence that I should
obey their will; but I refused, because of the bond of your mandate, which
bound me to your work, notwithstanding any order from my prelates. And,
of a surety, as I was not excused by you, I met with obstacles too great and
many to enumerate.... And another obstacle, enough to defeat the whole
business, was the lack of funds.”
[621] These are, of course, the Opus majus, the Opus minus, and the Opus
tertium; also the Vatican Fragment, the position of which is not quite clear;
but it is part of the writings of this year, and constitutes apparently the
introductory letter to Clement.
[622] The authority for this is the Chronica XXIV., Generalium Ordinis
Minorum; see Bridges, vol. iii. p. 158.
[623] See Op. tertium, p. 26 sqq. (Brewer).
[624] Opus majus, pars ii. end of chap. v. and beginning of chap. vi.
(Bridges, iii. p. 49); see Op. tertium (Brewer), p. 81.
[625] Op. maj. pars ii. chap. xv. (Bridges, iii. p. 71).
[626] Op. tertium, p. 39.
[627] Op. maj. pars ii. (Bridges, iii. pp. 69-70). Cf. ante, p. 180.
[628] The reference seems to be to the Ethics and Politics.

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[629] Compendium studii, p. 424 (Brewer).
[630] Op. tertium, p. 14.
[631] Op. tertium, p. 30.
[632] Compendium studii phil., p. 429 (Brewer).
[633] Ibid. p. 398—written in 1271.
[634] I follow the paging of Bridges, vol. iii. These four causes of error are
also given in Opus tertium, p. 69, Compendium studii, p. 414 (Brewer), and
the Gasquet Fragment, p. 504.
[635] Op. maj. pp. 2 and 3.
[636] P. 322 sqq. (Brewer).
[637] Opus tertium, p. 102.
[638] Ante, p. 128.
[639] As, e.g. where he says that it would have been better for the Latins
“that the wisdom of Aristotle should not have been translated, than to have
been translated with such perverseness and obscurity.” Compend. studii, p.
469, (Brewer).
[640] See Opus majus, pars iii.
[641] Opus majus, Bridges, vol. i. p. 106.
[642] Commonly called “mathematica.”
[643] Opus majus (Bridges, i. p. 253). Bacon goes into this matter
elaborately.
[644] Cf. S. Vogl, Die Physik Roger Bacos (Erlangen, 1906). Gives Bacon’s
sources.
[645] Opus minus, pp. 367-371.
[646] Opus majus, pars v. dist. iii. (Bridges, ii. p. 159 sqq.).

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[647] A contemporary of Bacon named Witelo composed a Perspectiva
about 1270, following an Arab source; and a few years later a Dominican,
Theodoric of Freiburg, was devoted to optics, and wrote on light, colour,
and the rainbow. Baeumker, “Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des
XIII. Jahrh.” (Beiträge, etc., Münster, 1908); Krebs, “Meister Dietrich, sein
Leben, etc.” (Baeumker’s Beiträge, 1906).
[648] With Bacon, experientia does not always mean observation; and may
mean either experience or experiment.
[649] See Charles, Roger Bacon, pp. 17-18.
[650] Ante, pp. 313-315. Duns Scotus puts clearly the double aspect of
logic, which Albertus Magnus approached: “It should be understood that
logic is to be considered in two ways. First, in so far as it is docens
(instructs, holds its own school): and from its own necessary and proper
principles proceeds to necessary conclusions, and is therefore a science.
Secondly, in so far as we use it, by applying it to those matters in which it is
used: and then it is not a science” (Super universalia Porphyrii, Quaestrio
i., Duns Scotus, Opera, t. i. p. 51).
[651] The two aspects of the experimental science appear in the following
statement from the Gasquet Fragment: “The antepenultima science is called
experimental; and is the mistress of those which precede it; for it excels the
others in three chief prerogatives. One is that all the sciences except this
either use arguments alone to prove their conclusions, like the purely
speculative sciences, or possess general and imperfect experiences. But
only the perfect experience (experientia perfecta, i.e. the scientific
experiment or observation), sets the mind at rest in the light of truth; which
is certain and is proved in that part [of my work]. Wherefore it was
necessary that there should be one science which should certify for us, all
the magnificent truths of the other sciences, through the truth of experience,
and this is that whereof I say that it is called scientia experimentalis of its
own right from the truth of experience (per autonomasiam ab experienciae
veritate); and I show by the illustration of the rainbow and other things,
how this prerogative is reserved to that science.
“The second prerogative is the dignity which relates to those chief truths
which, although they are to be formulated (nominandae) in the terms

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(vocabulis) of the other sciences, yet the other sciences cannot furnish
(procurare) them; and of this character are the prolongation of life through
remedies to counteract the lack of a hygienic regimen from infancy, or
constitutional debility inherited from parents who have not followed such a
regimen. I shall show how it is possible thus to prolong life to the term set
by God. But men, through neglecting the rules of health, pass quickly to old
age, and die before reaching that term. The art of medicine is not able to
furnish (dare) these remedies, nor does it; but it says they are possible (sed
fatetur ea possibilia), and so experimental science has devised remedies
known to the wisest men alone, by which the ills of old age are delayed, or
are mitigated when they arrive.
“The third prerogative of this science belongs to it secundum se et absolute;
for here it leaves the two ways already touched on, and addresses itself to
all things which do not concern the other sciences, save that often it
requires the service of the others. As a mistress it commands the others as
servants ... and orders them to do its work, and furnish the wise instruments
which it uses; as navigation directs the art of carpentry, to make a ship for
it; and the military art directs the forger’s art to make it a breastplate and
other arms. In like manner, this science [the experimental], as a mistress,
directs geometry to make it a burning-glass, which shall set on fire things
near or far, one of the most sublime wonders that can come to pass through
geometry. So it commands the other sciences in all the wonderful and
hidden things of nature and art” (pp. 510-511).
[652] Opus tertium, chap. xxviii.
[653] Opus majus, pars vi. 1 (Bridges, ii. p. 169).
[654] Ibid. p. 171. Doubtless the meaning of the above is connected with
Bacon’s view of the Aristotelian intellectus agens, which he takes to signify
the direct illumination of the mind of man by God. “All the wisdom of
philosophy is revealed by God and given to the philosophers, and it is
Himself that illuminates the minds of men in all wisdom. That which
illuminates our minds is now called by the theologians intellectus agens.
But my position is that this intellectus agens is God principaliter, and
secondarily, the angels, who illuminate us” (Opus tertium, p. 74; cf. Op.
majus, pars i. chap. v.).

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[655] Compendium studii (Brewer), p. 397.
[656] De secretis operibus artis et naturae, et de nullitate magiae, p. 533
(Brewer). Cf. Charles, Roger Bacon, p. 296 sqq.
[657] The most convenient edition of the works of Joannes Duns Scotus is
that published by Vives, at Paris (1891 sqq.) in twenty-six volumes. It is
little more than a reprint of Wadding’s Edition.
[658] See Seeberg, Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus (Leipzig,
1900), p. 8 sqq., a work to which the following pages owe much.
[659] Grosseteste’s philosophical or theological works are still unpublished
or very difficult of access; and there is no sufficient exposition of his
doctrines.
[660] Seeberg, o.c. p. 16 sqq.
[661] See De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, p. 363 sqq.
[662] See Seeberg, o.c. p. 34 sqq.
[663] The kernel of Duns’s proof is contained in the following passage,
which is rather simple in its Scotian Latin: “Dicendum, quod Universale est
ens, quia sub ratione non entis, nihil intelligitur: quia intelligibile movet
intellectum. Cum enim intellectus sit virtus passiva (per Aristotelem 3, de
Anima, cont. 5 et inde saepe), non operatur, nisi moveatur ab objecto; non
ens non potest movere aliquid ut objectum; quia movere est entis in actu;
ergo nihil intelligitur sub ratione non entis. Quidquid autem intelligitur,
intelligitur sub ratione Universalis: ergo illa ratio non est omnino non ens”
(Super universalia Porphyrii, Quaestio iv.).
[664] Cf. the far from clear exposition in Seeberg, o.c. p. 86 sqq. and 660
sqq.
[665] Miscell. quaest. 6, 18, cited by Seeberg, o.c. p. 114.
[666] The last two or three pages have been drawn mainly from Seeberg,
o.c. p. 113 sqq. In discussing Duns Scotus, I have given less from his
writings than has been my wont with other philosophers. And for two
reasons. The first, as I frankly avow, is that I have read less of him than I

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have of his predecessors. With the exception of such a curious treatise as
the (doubtful) Grammatica speculativa (tome i. of the Paris edition); and the
elementary, and comparatively lucid, De rerum principio (tome iv. of the
Paris edition)—with these exceptions Duns is to me unreadable. My second
reason for omitting excerpts from his writings, is that I wished neither to
misrepresent their quality, nor to cause my reader to lay down my book,
which is heavy enough anyhow! If I selected lucid and simple extracts, they
would give no idea of the intricacy and prolixity of Duns. His commentary
on the Sentences fills thirteen tomes of the Paris edition! No short and
simple extract will illustrate that! On the other hand, I could not bring
myself by lengthy or impossible quotations to vilify Duns. It is unjust to
expose a man’s worst features, nakedly and alone, to those who do not
know his better side and the conditions which partly explain the rest of him.
[667] Quodlibetalia, i. Qu. 14, cited by De Wulf, o.c. p. 422.
[668] Expos. aurea, cited by De Wulf, o.c. p. 423, whose exposition of
Occam’s theory I have followed here.
[669] On Occam, see Seeberg’s article in Hauck’s Encyclopaedia; Siebeck,
“Occams Erkenntnislehre, etc.,” in Archiv für Ges. der Philosophie, Bd. x.,
Neue Folge (1897).
[670] Quoted by Seeberg.
[671] De Wulf, o.c. p. 425.
[672] In view of the enormous literature upon Dante, popular as well as
learned, it would be absurd to give any bibliographical, biographical or
historical information as to his works, himself, or his Italian circumstances.
[673] De mon. ii. 3.
[674] De mon. ii. chaps. 4, 10, 12.
[675] De mon. iii. 4 sqq.
[676] All this seems supported by Conv. i. 1, and ii. 13, the main
explanatory chapters of the work.
[677] Conv. iii. 12.

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[678] e.g. “benigna volontade,” Par. xv. 1.
[679] Cf. A. d’Ancona, I Precursori di Dante (Florence, 1874); M. Dods,
Forerunners of Dante (Edinburgh, 1903); A. J. Butler, Forerunners of
Dante (Oxford, 1910); Hettinger, Göttliche Komödie, p. 79 (2nd ed.,
Freiburg im Breisgau, 1889). Mussafia, “Monumenti antichi di dialetti
italiani,” Sitzungsber. philos. hist. Classe (Vienna Academy), vol. 45, 1864,
p. 136 sqq., gives two old Italian descriptions, one of the heavenly
Jerusalem, the other of the infernal Babylon.
[680] 2 Cor. xii. 2; Paradiso, i. 73-75.
[681] Ante, Chapter XIX.
[682] Ante, pp. 98-100.
[683] The coarseness of Inf. xxi. 137-139 is of a piece with the way of
mediaeval art in making demons horrible through a grotesquely indecent
rendering of their persons.
[684] e.g. Inf. xviii. 100 sqq.; and Inf. xxviii. and xxix.
[685] Inf. viii. 37 sqq.; xxxii. 97 sqq.; xxxiii. 116 and 149.
[686] Cf. Moore, Dante Studies, vol. ii. pp. 266-267.
[687] Any one who looks through the first volume of Tiraboschi’s great
Storia della letteratura italiana, written in the early part of the nineteenth
century, will find a generous acceptance of myth as fact; just as he would
find the same in the Histoire ancienne of the good Rollin, written a century
or more before.
[688] Dante has frequently been spoken of as the “first scholar” of his time.
I do not myself know enough regarding the scholarship of every scholar in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to confirm or deny this. Personally, I
do not regard him as a Titanic scholar, like Albertus Magnus for example.
He studied all the classic Latin authors available. Doubtless he had a
memory corresponding to his other extraordinary powers. His also was the
intellectual point of view, and the intellectual interest in knowledge and its
deductions. His view of life was as intellectual as that of Aquinas. But as
Dante’s powers of plastic visualization were unequalled, so also, it seems to

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me, were his faculties of using as a poet what he had acquired as a scholar.
Regarding the extent of Dante’s use and reading of the Classics, nothing
could be added to Dr. Moore’s Studies in Dante, First Series; though I think
what Dr. Moore has to say of “Dante and Aristotle” would have cast a more
direct light upon the matter, had he cited as far as possible from the Latin
translation probably used by Dante, instead of from the original Greek.
[689] Inf. iv. 88. Cf. Moore, Studies in Dante, i. p. 6. The application of the
term satirist to Horace is peculiarly mediaeval.
[690] Inf. iv. 131.
[691] Inf. ii. 20.
[692] Par. xx. 68.
[693] Purg. xxv. 22.
[694] Inf. xviii. 83 sqq.
[695] Inf. xxvi. 88 sqq.
[696] Purg. xii.
[697] Purg. xv.
[698] According to Dr. Moore, Dante quotes or refers to the “Vulgate more
than 500 times, to Aristotle more than 300, Virgil about 200, Ovid about
100, Cicero and Lucan about 50 each, Statius and Boëthius between 30 and
40 each, Horace, Livy, and Orosius between 10 and 20 each,”—and other
scattering references.
[699] Inf. xxxiii. 4; Aen. ii. 3.
[700] Par. ii. 16.
[701] Aen. vi. 309; Inf. iii. 112.
[702] Aen. vi. 700; Purg. ii. 80.
[703] Purg. i. 135; cf. Aen. vi. 143 “Primo avulso non deficit alter, etc.”
[704] See Inf. xxxi.; Purg. xii. 25 sqq.

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[705] Purg. vi. 118: “O highest Jove that wast on earth crucified for us.”
[706] Par. i. 13 sqq.; Par. ii. 8.
[707] The provenance, etc., of Dante’s classification of sins in the Inferno,
like everything else in Dante, has been interminably discussed. The
reference to the De officiis of Cicero is due to Dr. Moore. See
“Classification of Sins in the Inferno and Purgatorio,” Studies in Dante,
2nd Series. Also cf. Hettinger, Die göttliche Kömödie, pp. 159-162, and
notes 6 and 23 on p. 204 and 207 (2nd ed., Freiburg in Breisgau, 1889).
Dante’s main statement is in Inf. xi.
[708] In whom does not the awful anguish of the suicides (Inf. xiii.) arouse
grief and horror?
[709] Inf. xvi. 59. They are more respectable than the blessed denizens of
the Heaven of Venus, Par. ix.
[710] Inf. xix.
[711] Inf. vi. 103 sqq.
[712] The intellectual temperament finds voice in many great expressions,
which are very Dante and also very Thomas, as Par. xxviii. 106-114; xxix.
17; xxx. 40-42.
[713] Inf. iii. 18.
[714] Hettinger, o.c. p. 254.
[715] Aeneid vi. 327 sqq.; Hettinger, o.c. p. 226.
[716] See Taylor, Classical Heritage, p. 162.
[717] These are pointed out in the Commentaries (e.g. Scartazzini’s) and in
many monographs. Hettinger’s Göttliche Kömödie is serviceable: also
Moore’s Studies in Dante and Toynbee’s Dante Studies.
[718] Purg. i. 71; John viii. 36.
[719] Purg. i. 89.

Page 678

[720] Purg. iii. 34 sqq.
[721] Purg. iv. 4 sqq.
[722] Purg. v. 105 sqq.
[723] Purg. vii. 54; iv. 133-135.
[724] Cf. e.g. Purg. xii. 109.
[725] Purg. xv. 40 sqq.
[726] Purg. xvi. 64 sqq.
[727] Purg. xvii. 85 sqq., and xviii.; Hettinger, o.c. p. 235 sqq., and pp. 261-
264.
[728] Purg. xxiii. 72; xxvi. 14.
[729] Purg. xxv. The notes in Hettinger, o.c., are quite full in citations of
passages from Thomas and other scholastics.
[730] Thomas, Summa, iii. Qu. 89, Art. 5.
[731] As it is rather in Par. xxvii. 76 sqq.
[732] Par. iii. 52, 64, 89.
[733] Par. iv.
[734] Par. xi. 1 sqq.
[735] Par. xiv.
[736] Par. xv. 10.
[737] Par. xix. 40 sqq.
[738] Par. xx.
[739] Par. xxiv.-xxvi.
[740] Typified in St. Bernard, Par. xxxi. and following. Suitable reasons for
this choice may be suggested by the extracts from Bernard’s De deligendo

Page 679

Deo and Sermons on Canticles, ante, Chapter XVII.
[741] Conv. ii. 13. The symbolism inherent in all human mental processes
seems indicated by the argument of Aquinas (ante, p. 466) that the mind
knows “the particular through sense and imagination; ... it must turn itself to
images in order to behold the universal nature existing in the particular.”
This is a necessity of our half material nature.
[742] Convito ii. 1. Letter to Can Grande, par. 7.
[743] In the Can Grande letter, having stated this fourfold significance,
Dante does not proceed to exemplify it in the interpretation which follows
of the opening lines of the Paradiso. Possibly those lines did not admit of
the fourfold interpretation; yet, in general, Dante does not try to carry it out
in practice, any more than other mediaeval writers commonly.
[744] Convito ii. ch. 14 and 15.
[745] Doubtless the commentator habit is fixed in the nature of man; but it
was pre-eminently mediaeval. We have seen enough elsewhere of the
multiplication of Commentaries on the Sentences of the Lombard and other
scholastic works. Dante’s friend, Guido Cavalcanti, wrote a little poem
beginning Donna mi priego, upon which we have eight Commentaries, the
first from Egidio Colonna in 1316.
[746] Yet, however obvious the meaning, tying the pole of the Chariot to
the Tree of Life was a great stroke (Purg. xxxii. 49).
[747] There is a piece of allegory in the Paradiso which almost gets on
one’s nerves, i.e. the ceaseless whirling of the blessed spirits, usually in
wheel formations: e.g. Par. xii. 3; xxi. 81; xxiv. 10 sqq.: cf. x. 145; xiii. 20.
[748] One notes that all the symbolizing personages of the poem—Virgil,
Statius, Matilda, Lia, Beatrice—have literal reality, however subtle or far-
reaching may be the allegorical intendment with which the poet has
invested them.
[749] See e.g. Par. xxxi. 67.
[750] Cf. De Sanctis, Storia della letteratura italiana, i. p. 46 sqq.

Page 680

[751] Compare Purg. xxvii. 34 sqq.; xxx.; xxxi.; Par. xviii. 13 sqq.; xxiii.;
xxx.; xxxi.; xxxii. 8.

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