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Title: The Histories of Polybius, Vol. 1 (of 2)

Author: Polybius

Contributor: Fridericus Hultsch

Translator: Evelyn S. Shuckburgh

Release date: November 8, 2013 [eBook #44125]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44125

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORIES
OF POLYBIUS, VOL. 1 (OF 2) ***

Transcriber’s note:

This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the first. The
second volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #44126,
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44126. Where possible,
references to the second volume in the text are linked to the version at
Project Gutenberg.

Following entries in the Index in Vol. II. are erroneous, as there is no
Chapter 15 in Book XXXIV and no Chapter 59 in Book VI.:

Sallentini, a tribe in Calabria. 34, 15, Rhyncus, in Aetolia, 6, 59,
Morini, a Gallic tribe, 34, 15, Mauretania, 34, 15, Lugdunum, a town
in Gaul, 34, 15. and there are no references in the text related to these
entries.

THE

HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH

BY
EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A.
LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I

London
MACMILLAN AND CO.
AND NEW YORK
1889

All rights reserved

TO

F. M. S.

IN GRATITUDE FOR MUCH PATIENT HELP

PREFACE

This is the first English translation of the complete works of Polybius as far
as they are now known. In attempting such a task I feel that I ought to state
distinctly the limits which I have proposed to myself in carrying it out. I
have desired to present to English readers a faithful copy of what Polybius
wrote, which should at the same time be a readable English book. I have not
been careful to follow the Greek idiom; and have not hesitated to break up
and curtail or enlarge his sentences, when I thought that, by doing so, I
could present his meaning in more idiomatic English. Polybius is not an
author likely to be studied for the sake of his Greek, except by a few
technical scholars; and the modern complexion of much of his thought
makes such a plan of translation both possible and desirable. How far I have
succeeded I must leave my readers to decide. Again, I have not undertaken
to write a commentary on Polybius, nor to discuss at length the many
questions of interest which arise from his text. Such an undertaking would
have required much more space than I was able to give: and happily, while
my translation was passing through the press, two books have appeared,
which will supply English students with much that I might have felt bound
to endeavour to give—the Achaean league by Mr. Capes, and the
sumptuous Oxford edition of extracts by Mr. Strachan-Davidson.
The translation is made from the text of Hultsch and follows his
arrangement of the fragments. If this causes some inconvenience to those
who use the older texts, I hope that such inconvenience will be minimised
by the full index which I have placed at the end of the second volume.
I have not, I repeat, undertaken to write a commentary. I propose rather to
give the materials for commentary to those who, for various reasons, do not
care to use the Greek of Polybius. I have therefore in the first five complete
books left him to speak for himself, with the minimum of notes which
seemed necessary for the understanding of his text. The case of the
fragments was different. In giving a translation of them I have tried, when
possible, to indicate the part of the history to which they belong, and to

connect them by brief sketches of intermediate events, with full references
to those authors who supply the missing links.
Imperfect as the performance of such a task must, I fear, be, it has been one
of no ordinary labour, and has occupied every hour that could be spared
during several years of a not unlaborious life. And though I cannot hope to
have escaped errors, either of ignorance or human infirmity, I trust that I
may have produced what will be found of use to some historical students, in
giving them a fairly faithful representation of the works of an historian who
is, in fact, our sole authority for some most interesting portions of the
world’s history.
It remains to give a brief account of the gradual formation of the text of
Polybius, as we now have it.
The revival of interest in the study of Polybius was due to Pope Nicholas V
(1447-1455), the founder of the Vatican Library. Soon after his election he
seems to have urged Cardinal Perotti to undertake a Latin translation of the
five books then known to exist. When Perotti sent him his translation of the
first book, the Pope thus acknowledges it in a letter dated 28th August
1452:—1

“Primus Polybii liber, quem ad nos misisti, nuper a te de Graeca in Latinam
translatus, gratissimus etiam fuit et jucundissimus: quippe in ea
translatione nobis cumulatissime satisfacis. Tanta enim facilitate et
eloquentia transfers, ut Historia ipsa nunquam Graeca, sed prorsus Latina
semper fuisse videatur. Optimum igitur ingenium tuum valde commendamus
atque probamus, teque hortamur ut velis pro laude et gloria tua, et pro
voluptate nimia singulare opus inchoatum perficere, nec labori parcas.
Nam et rem ingenio et doctrina tua dignam, et nobis omnium gratissimam
efficies; qui laborum et studiorum tuorum aliquando memores erimus.... Tu
vero, si nobis rem gratam efficere cupis, nihil negligentiae committas in hoc
opere traducendo. Nihil enim nobis gratius efficere poteris. Librum primum
a vertice ad calcem legimus, in cujus translatione voluntati nostrae
amplissime satisfactum est.”

On the 3d of January 1454 the Pope writes again to Perotti thanking him for
the third book; and in a letter to Torelli, dated 13th November 1453, Perotti
says that he had finished his translation of Polybius in the preceding
September. This translation was first printed in 1473. The Greek text was
not printed till 1530, when an edition of the first five books in Greek, along
with Perotti’s translation, was published at the Hague, opera Vincentii
Obsopaei, dedicated to George, Marquess of Brandenburg. Perotti’s
translation was again printed at Basle in 1549, accompanied by a Latin
translation of the fragments of books 6 to 17 by Wolfgang Musculus, and
reprinted at the Hague in 1598.
The chief fragments of Polybius fall into two classes; (1) those made by
some unknown epitomator, who Casaubon even supposed might be Marcus
Brutus, who, according to Plutarch, was engaged in this work in his tent the
night before the battle of Pharsalus. The printing of these began with two
insignificant fragments on the battle between the Rhodians and Attalus
against Philip, Paris, 1536; and another de re navali, Basle, 1537. These
fragments have continually accumulated by fresh discoveries. (2) The other
class of fragments are those made by the order of Constantinus
Porphyrogenitus (911-959), among similar ones from other historians,
which were to be digested under fifty-three heads or tituli; one of which
(the 27th) has come down to us, discovered in the sixteenth century,
containing the selecta de legationibus; and another (the 50th) de virtute et
vitio. The printing of the first of these begins with the edition of Fulvius
Ursinus, published at Antwerp in 1582. This was supplemented in 1634
(Paris) by an edition by Valesius of excerpta ex collectaneis Constantini
Augusti Porphyrogeneti. The first edition of something like a complete text
of Polybius, containing the five entire books, the excerptae legationes, and
fragments of the other books, was that of Isaac Casaubon, Paris, 1609, fo. It
was accompanied by a new and very brilliant Latin translation, and a
preface which has been famous among such works. It contains also a Latin
translation of Aeneas Tacticus. Altogether it is a splendid book. Some
additional annotationes of Casaubon’s were published after his death in
1617, Paris.2 Other editions followed; that of Gronovius, Amsterdam, 1670:
of Ernesti, Leipsic, 1764, containing Casaubon’s translation more or less
emended, and additional fragments. But the next important step in the
bibliography of Polybius was the publication of the great edition of

Schweighaeuser, Leipsic, 1789-1795, in nine volumes, with a new Latin
translation,—founded, however, to a great extent on Casaubon,—a new
recension of the text, and still farther additions to the fragments;
accompanied also by an excellent Lexicon and Onomasticon. This great
work has been the foundation from which all modern commentaries on
Polybius must spring. Considerable additions to the fragments, collected
from MSS. in the Vatican by Cardinal Mai, were published in 1827 at
Rome. The chief modern texts are those of Bekker, 1844; Duebner (with
Latin translation), 1839 and 1865; Dindorf, 1866-1868, 1882 (Teubner). A
new recension of the five books and all the known fragments—founded on
a collation of some twelve MSS. and all previous editions, as well as all the
numerous works of importance on our Author that have appeared in
Germany and elsewhere—was published by F. Hultsch, Berlin, 1867-1872,
in four volumes. This must now be considered the standard text. A second
edition of the first volume appeared in 1888, but after that part of my
translation had passed through the press.
Of English translations the earliest was by Ch. Watson, 1568, of the first
five books. It is entitled The Hystories of the most famous Cronographer
Polybios; Discoursing of the warres betwixt the Romanes and
Carthaginenses, a rich and goodly work, conteining holsome counsels and
wonderful devices against the inconstances of fickle Fortune. Englished by
C[hristopher] W[atson] whereunto is annexed an Abstract, compendiously
coarcted out of the life and worthy Acts perpetrate by oure puissant Prince
King Henry the fift. London, Imprinted by Henry Byneman for Tho. Hacket,
1568, 8vo. See Herbert’s Ames, p. 895. Another translation of the five books
was published by Edward Grimestone, London, 1634, of which a second
and third edition appeared in 1648 and 1673. A translation of the Mercenary
War from the first book was made by Sir Walter Raleigh, and published
after his death in 1647 (London, 4to). Next, a new translation of the five
books was published in London, 1693 (2 vols. 8vo), by Sir H[enry]
S[hears], with a preface by Dryden. In 1741 (London, 4to) appeared “A
fragment of the 6th book containing a dissertation on government,
translated from the Greek of Polybius, with notes, etc., by A Gentleman.”
This was followed by the first English translation, which contained any part
of the fragments, as well as the five books, by the Rev. James Hampton,
London, 4to, 1756-1761, which between that date and 1823 (2 vols.,

Oxford) went through at least seven editions. Lastly, a translation of
Polybius’s account of Hannibal’s passage of the Alps is appended by
Messrs. Church and Brodribb to their translation of Livy, 21-22. There is a
German translation by A. Haakh and Kraz, Stuttgart, 1858-1875. And a
French translation by J. A. C. Buchon, Paris, 1842, Orléans, 1875. For the
numerous German essays and dissertations on the text, and particular
questions arising from the history, I must refer my readers to Engelmann’s
Bibliotheca. In England such studies are rare. Mr. Strachan-Davidson
published an essay on Polybius in Hellenica; and his edition of extracts of
the text (Oxford, 1888) contains several dissertations of value. Mr. Capes
(London, 1888) has published an edition of extracts referring to the
Achaean league, with an introductory essay on the author and his work.
And a very admirable article on Polybius appears in the recent edition of the
Encyclopædia Britannica by Mr. H. F. Pelham. There is also a good paper
on Polybius in the Quarterly Review for 1879, No. 296. Criticisms on
Polybius, and estimates of his value as an historian, will be found in
Thirlwall’s History of Greece, vol. viii.; Arnold’s History of Rome;
Mommsen’s History of Rome, book iv. c. xiii.; Freeman’s History of
Federal Government and Essays; Bunbury’s Ancient Geography, vol. ii. p.
16; Law’s Alps of Hannibal. For the Roman side of his history, besides the
works mentioned by Mr. Strachan-Davidson, a good list of the literature on
the 2d Punic war is given by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition of Dr. Arnold’s
history of that period [London, Macmillan, 1886].
Finally, I have to express my warm thanks to Dr. Warre, Head Master of
Eton, for aiding me with his unique knowledge of ancient and modern
tactics in clearing up many points very puzzling to a civilian. To Mr. W.
Chawner, Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, for reading part of the
translation in proof, and making valuable corrections and suggestions. And
to Professor Ridgway, of Queen’s College, Cork, for corrections in the
geographical fragments of book 34.

CONTENTS

pages
Introduction xvii-lx
Books I to IX 1-602

INTRODUCTION

I. POLYBIUS

Fortune cast the life of Polybius in stirring times. His special claim to our
admiration is that he understood the importance in the history of the world
of the changes which were passing under his eyes, and exerted himself to
trace the events which immediately preceded them, and from which they
sprang, while it was yet possible to see and question surviving participators
in them; to examine places, before they had lost all marks of the great
events of which they had been the scene; and records or monuments before
time had cast a doubt upon their meaning or authenticity. Nor is this
ordinary praise. Men are apt to turn their eyes upon the past, as holding all
that is worthy of contemplation, while they fail to take note of history “in
the making,” or to grasp the importance of the transactions of their own day.
But as every year has its decisive influence on the years which succeed it,
the greatest benefactor of posterity is the man who understands and records
events as they pass with care and sincerity. Laborious compilation, from the
study and comparison of ancient records and monuments, has its value: it
may often be all that it is possible to obtain; it may not unfrequently even
serve to correct statements of contemporaries which have been deformed by
carelessness or coloured by prejudice. But the best compilation is infinitely
inferior in interest and instructiveness to the barest report of a
contemporary. And when such a man is also an eye-witness of much that he
relates; when he knew and conversed with many of the chief actors in the
great events which he records; when again he tells us of transactions so
remote in time, that all written documents have necessarily perished, and
those in more durable bronze and stone all but followed in their train, then
indeed the interest rises to the highest pitch. Like Herodotus and
Thucydides, then, Polybius tells us of his own times, and of the generations
immediately preceding them. It is true that the part of his work which has
survived in a complete form deals with a period before his own day, just as
the greater part of the history of Herodotus does, but in the larger part of the
fragments he is writing with even more complete personal knowledge than
Thucydides. He had, again, neither the faculty for story-telling possessed by

Herodotus nor the literary and dramatic force of Thucydides. The language
which he spoke and wrote had lost the magic of style; had lost the lucidity
and grace of Sophocles, and the rugged vigour and terseness of Thucydides.
Nor had he apparently acquired any of those artifices which, while they
sometimes weary us in the later rhetoricians, yet generally serve to make
their writings the easiest and pleasantest of reading. Equally remote again is
his style from the elaborate and involved manner of Plutarch, with its huge
compound words built up of intricate sentences, more like difficult German
than Greek. Polybius had no tricks of this sort;3 but his style lacks logical
order and clearness. It seems rather the language of a man of affairs, who
had had neither leisure to study style, nor taste to read widely with a view to
literature as such. But after all it is Greek, and Greek that still retained its
marvellous adaptability to every purpose, to every shade of thought, and
every form of literature. Nor is his style in the purely narrative parts of his
work wanting in a certain force, derived from singleness and directness of
purpose. He “speaks right on,” and turns neither to the right hand nor the
left. It is when he reflects and argues and moralises, that his want of literary
skill sometimes makes him difficult and involved; and though the thought is
essentially just, and his point of view wonderfully modern, we continually
feel the want of that nameless charm which the Greeks called χάρις.
His bent for historical composition was fortunately encouraged by the
circumstances of his life, which gave Polybius special opportunities of
satisfying his curiosity and completing his knowledge. Not only was he the
son of a man who had held the highest office in the league, and so must
have heard the politics and history of Achaia discussed from his earliest
youth; not only from early manhood was he himself in the thick of political
business; but he knew the sovereigns of Egypt and Pergamus, of Macedonia
and Syria, and the Roman generals who conquered the latter. He had visited
a Roman camp and witnessed its practical arrangements and discipline. And
his enforced residence of sixteen years in Italy and Rome was, by the good
fortune of his introduction to Aemilius Paullus and his sons, turned into an
opportunity of unrivalled advantage for studying the laws, military
discipline, and character of the imperial people whose world conquest he
chronicles. Unlike his fellow-exiles, he did not allow his depressing
circumstances to numb his faculties, exasperate his temper, or deaden his
curiosity. He won the confidence of the leading men at Rome; and seems,

while pushing on his inquiries with untiring vigour, to have used his
influence for the benefit of his countrymen, and of all Greek subjects of
Rome.
But, like so many of the writers of antiquity, he has had no one to perform
for him the service he had done for others in rescuing their achievements
and the particulars of their career from oblivion. Of the many testimonia
collected by Schweighaeuser and others from ancient writers, scarcely one
gives us any details or anecdotes of the writer, whose work they briefly
describe or praise. We are reduced as usual to pick out from his own
writings the scattered allusions or statements which help us to picture his
character and career.
Polybius of Megalopolis was the son of Lycortas, the friend and partisan of
Philopoemen, who had served the Achaean league in several capacities: as
Birth of Polybius. ambassador to Rome in b.c. 189, along with Diophanes,
on the question of the war with Sparta,4 and to Ptolemy
Epiphanes in b.c. 186, 5 and finally as Strategus in b.c. 184-183. Of the year
of his birth we cannot be certain. He tells us that he was elected to go on
embassy from the league to Ptolemy Epiphanes in the year of the death of
that monarch (b.c. 181), although he was below the legal age.6 But we do
not know for certain what that age was; although it seems likely that it was
thirty, that apparently being the age at which a member of the league
exercised his full privileges.7 But assuming this, we do not know how much
under that age he was. Two years previously (b.c. 183) he had carried the
urn at Philopoemen’s funeral. This was an office usually performed by quite
young men (νεανίσκοι)8, probably not much over twenty years old. As we
know that he lived to write a history of the Numantine war, which ended
9 10
b.c. 133 , and that he was eighty-two at the time of his death , we shall
not, I think, be probably far wrong if we place his birth in b.c. 203 and his
death in b.c. 121 as Casaubon does, who notes that the latter is just sixteen
years before the birth of Cicero. But though this is a good working
hypothesis, it is very far from being a demonstrated fact.
Between b.c. 181-168 he was closely allied with his father in politics; and if
we wish to have any conception of what he was doing, it is necessary to
form some idea of the state of parties in the Peloponnese at the time.

The crowning achievement of Philopoemen’s career had been the uniting of
Sparta to the Achaean league, after the murder of the tyrant Nabis by the
Aetolians who had come to Sparta as his allies (b.c. 192). In b.c. 191 the
Achaeans were allowed to add Messene and Elis to their league, as a reward
for their services to Rome in the war against Antiochus. The Aetolian
league, the chief enemy and opponent of Achaia, was reduced to a state of
humble dependence on Rome in b.c. 189, after the defeat of Antiochus at
Thermopylae (b.c. 191) and the Aetolian war (b.c. 191-189). From b.c. 190
then begins the time during which Polybius says that the “name of the
Achaeans became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the
Peloponnese” (2, 42). But though Sparta was included in the league she was
always a restive and dissatisfied member; and the people of Elis and
Messene, who were not very willing members either, were told by
Flamininus that if they had any reason to complain of the federal
government they were to appeal to him.11 Now, by a treaty of alliance with
Rome, decreed at Sikyon in b.c. 198, it was provided that Rome should
receive no envoys from separate states of the league, but only from the
league itself.12 Flamininus, therefore, if he said what Livy reports him to
have said, was violating this treaty. And this will be a good instance to
illustrate the divisions of parties existing during the period of Polybius’s
active political life (b.c. 181-169). We have seen that in b.c. 198 the
Achaean league became an ally of Rome as a complete and independent
state; that this state was consolidated by the addition of Sparta (192) and
Elis and Messene (191) so as to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese; that
its chief enemy in Greece, the Aetolian league, was rendered powerless in
b.c. 189. The Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had been abolished
after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) by the proclamation of Greek
freedom by Flamininus (196). But all this seeming liberty and growth in
power really depended upon the favour of Rome, and was continually
endangered not only by the appeals to the Senate from separate states in the
league, who conceived themselves wronged, but by treasonable
representations of her own envoys, who preferred a party triumph to the
welfare and independence of their country13. In these circumstances, there
were naturally differences of opinion as to the proper attitude for the league
government to assume towards a state, which was nominally an equal ally,
but really an absolute master. There was one party who were for
submissively carrying out the will of the Roman officers who from time to

time visited the Peloponnese; and for conciliating the Senate by displaying
a perpetual readiness to carry out its wishes, without putting forward in any
way the rights which the treaty of 198 had secured to them. The leaders of
this party, in the time of Philopoemen, were Aristaenos and Diophanes. The
other party, headed till his death by Philopoemen, equally admitting that the
Roman government could not be safely defied, were yet for aiming at
preserving their country’s independence by strictly carrying out the terms of
the Roman alliance, and respectfully but firmly resisting any encroachment
upon those terms by the officers representing the Roman government. On
Philopoemen’s death (b.c. 183) Lycortas, who had been his most devoted
follower, took, along with Archon, the lead of the party which were for
carrying out his policy; while Callicrates became the most prominent of the
Romanising party. Lycortas was supported by his son Polybius when about
b.c. 181 he began to take part in politics. Polybius seems always to have
consistently maintained this policy. His view seems to have been that
Rome, having crushed Philip and Antiochus, was necessarily the supreme
power. The Greeks must recognise facts; must avoid offending Rome; but
must do so by keeping to a position of strict legality, maintaining their
rights, and neither flattering nor defying the victorious Commonwealth. He
believed that the Romans meant fairly by Greece, and that Greek freedom
was safe in their hands14. But the straightforward policy of the Senate, if it
was ever sincere, was altered by the traitor Callicrates in b.c. 179; who,
being sent to Rome to oppose what the league thought the unconstitutional
restitution of certain Spartan exiles, advised the Senate to use the
Romanising party in each state to secure a direct control in Achaia15. Acting
on this insidious advice, the Roman government began to view with
suspicion the legal and independent attitude of the other party, and to
believe or affect to believe that they were enemies of the Roman
supremacy. Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, finding themselves the objects
of suspicion, not less dangerous because undeserved, to the Roman
government, appear to have adopted an attitude of reserve, abstaining from
taking an active or prominent part in the business of the assemblies. This,
however, did not succeed in averting Roman jealousy; and the
commissioners, Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who visited the
Peloponnese in b.c. 169, gave out that those who held aloof were as
displeasing to the Senate as those who openly opposed it. They were said to
have resolved on formally impeaching the three statesmen before the

Achaean assembly as being enemies of Rome; but when the assembly met
at Aegium, they had failed to obtain any reasonable handle against them,
and contented themselves with a speech of general exhortation.16 This was
during the war with Perseus, when the Romans kept a vigilant eye on all
parts of Greece, and closely inquired which politicians in the several states
ventured to display the least sympathy with the Macedonian king, or were
believed to secretly nourish any wish for his success. It speaks strongly both
for the independent spirit still surviving in the league, as well as for the
character of Archon and Polybius, that they were elected, apparently in the
same assembly, the one Strategus and the other Hipparch for the year
17
b.c. 169-168. In this office Polybius doubtless hoped to carry out the
principles and discipline of Philopoemen, under whom he had probably
served in the cavalry, and whose management of this branch of the service
he had at any rate minutely studied.18 But there was little occasion for the
use of the Achaean cavalry in his year. Being sent on a mission to Q.
Marcius Philippus at Heracleia to offer the league’s assistance in the war
with Perseus, when their help was declined, he remained behind after the
other ambassadors had returned, to witness the campaign.19 After spending
some time in the Roman camp, he was sent by Q. Marcius to prevent the
Achaeans from consenting to supply five thousand men to Appius Claudius
Cento in Epirus. This was a matter of considerable delicacy. He had to
choose between offending one or the other powerful Roman. But he
conducted the affair with prudence, and on the lines he had always laid
down, those, namely, of strict legality. He found the Achaean assembly in
session at Sicyon; and he carried his point by representing that the demand
of Appius Claudius did not bear on the face of it the order of the Senate,
without which they were prohibited from supplying the requisitions of
Roman commanders.20 He thus did not betray that he was acting on the
instigation of Quintus Marcius, and put himself and the league in an attitude
of loyalty toward the Senate.21 In the same cautious spirit he avoided
another complication. Certain complimentary statues or inscriptions had
been put up in various cities of the league in honour of Eumenes, king of
Pergamus, and on some offence arising had been taken down. This seems to
have annoyed Eumenes exceedingly; and Polybius persuaded the people
that it had been ordered by Sosigenes and Diopeithes, as judges, from
feelings of personal spite, and without any act of Eumenes unfriendly to the

league. He carried his point, and thus avoided offending a king who at that
time was on very friendly terms with Rome.22 But while thus minded to
avoid unnecessary offence, Polybius and his party were in favour of
strengthening the league by alliances which could be entered upon with
safety. Egypt at this time was under the joint government of two Ptolemies,
Philometor and Physcon, who were being threatened with an invasion by
Antiochus Epiphanes. The friendship of the league with the kings of Egypt
had been of long standing, as far back as the time of Aratus; and though that
friendship had been afterwards interrupted by the Macedonian policy of
Aratus, just before his death the father of these kings had presented the
league with ten ships and a sum of money. The two kings now sent to beg
for aid; and asked that Lycortas should come as commander-in-chief, and
Polybius as hipparch. Lycortas and Polybius were in favour of supplying
the assistance asked.23 But the measure was opposed by Callicrates and his
partisans, on the specious ground that their whole efforts should be directed
to aid the Romans against Perseus. Lycortas and Polybius replied that the
Romans did not require their help; and that they were bound, by gratitude,
as well as by treaty, to help the Ptolemies. They carried with them the
popular feeling: but Callicrates outwitted them by obtaining a dispatch from
Q. Marcius, urging the league to join the senate in effecting a reconciliation
between Antiochus and the kings of Egypt. Polybius gave in, and advised
compliance. Ambassadors were appointed to aid in the pacification; and the
envoys from Alexandria were obliged to depart without effecting their
object. They contented themselves with handing in to the magistrates the
Royal letters, in which Lycortas and Polybius were invited by name to come
to Alexandria.24
Careful, however, as he had ever been to avoid giving just offence to Rome,
b.c. 167. he and his party had long been marked by the Senate as
opponents of that more complete interference in the
details of Achaean politics which it wished to exercise. This was partly
owing to the machinations of Callicrates; but it was also the result of the
deliberate policy of the Senate: and it was doubtless helped by the report of
every Roman officer who had found himself thwarted by the appeal to
legality, under the influence of the party in the league with which Polybius
was connected.25 Accordingly, soon after the final defeat of Perseus by
Aemilius Paulus in b.c. 168, and the consequent dismemberment of

Macedonia, the Senate proceeded to execute its vengeance upon those
citizens in every state in Greece who were believed to have been opposed to
the Roman interests. The commissioners entrusted with the settlement and
division of Macedonia were directed to hold an inquiry into this matter also.
From every city the extreme partisans of Rome were summoned to assist
them, men who were only too ready to sacrifice their political opponents to
the vengeance of the power to which they had long been paying a servile
and treacherous court. From Boeotia came Mnasippus; from Acarnania,
Chremes; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus and
Tisippus; and from Achaia, Callicrates, Agesias, and Philippus.26 Instigated
by these advisers, the commissioners ordered the supposed covert enemies
of Rome in the several states to proceed to Italy to take their trial. To Achaia
two commissioners, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius, were sent. An
Achaean assembly being summoned to meet them, they announced that
there were certain men of influence in the league who had helped Perseus
by money and other support. They required that a vote should be passed
condemning them all to death; and said that, when that was done, they
would publish the names. Such a monstrous perversion of justice was too
much for the assembly, who refused to vote until they knew the names. The
commissioners then said that all the Strategi who had been in office since
the beginning of the war were involved. One of them, Xeno, came forward,
declared his innocence, and asserted that he was ready to plead his cause
before any tribunal, Achaean or Roman. Upon this the commissioners
required that all the accused persons should go to Rome. A list of one
thousand names was drawn up, under the guidance of Callicrates, of those
who were at once to proceed to Italy27 (b.c. 167). The court of inquiry,
before which they were to appear, was never held. They were not allowed
even to stay in Rome, but were quartered in various cities of Italy, which
were made responsible for their safe custody: and there they remained until
b.c. 151, when such of them as were still alive, numbering then somewhat
less than three hundred, were contemptuously allowed to return.28 Among
these detenus was Polybius. We do not hear that Lycortas was also one,
from which it has been with some probability supposed that he was dead.
More fortunate than the rest, Polybius was allowed to remain at Rome. He
had made, it seems, the acquaintance of Aemilius Paulus and his two sons
in Macedonia, and during the tour of Aemelius through Greece after the
Macedonian war.29 And on their return to Italy he was allowed by their

influence to remain in Rome; and, acting as tutor to the two boys,30 became
well acquainted with all the best society in the city. The charming account
which he gives31 of the mutual affection existing between him and the
younger son of Aemilius (by adoption now called Publius Scipio Africanus
Aemilianus) bears all the marks of sincerity, and is highly to the credit of
both. To it we may add the anecdote of Plutarch, that “Scipio, in observance
of the precept of Polybius, endeavoured never to leave the forum without
having made a close friend of some one he met there.”
But much as he owed to the friendship of the sons of Aemilius, he owed it
also to his own energy and cheerful vigour that these sixteen years of exile
were not lost time in his life. He employed them, not in fruitless indulgence
in homesickness, or in gloomy brooding over his wrongs, but in a careful
and industrious study of the history and institutions of the people among
whom he was compelled to reside32; in ingratiating himself with those
members of the Senate who he thought might be useful to his countrymen;
and in forming and maturing his judgment as to the course of policy they
ought to pursue. Nor was he without means of gratifying lighter tastes. He
was an active sportsman: and the boar-hunting in the district of Laurentum
not only diverted his attention from the distressing circumstances of his
exile, and kept his body in vigorous health, but obtained for him the
acquaintance of many men of rank and influence. Thus for instance his
intimacy with the Syrian prince Demetrius, afterwards king Demetrius
Soter, was made in the hunting-field33: and the value which this young man
attached to his advice and support is some measure of the opinion
entertained generally of his wisdom, moderation, and good judgment. We
have no further details of his life in Rome; but we have what is better,—its
fruits, in the luminous account of its polity, the constitution of its army, and
the aims of its statesmen.
At last the time came when he was once more free to visit his own country,
b.c. 151. Release of the or to extend his knowledge by visiting the countries
detenus. which he wished to describe. After repeated
applications to the Senate by embassies from Achaia, made without avail, in
b.c. 151 Polybius appeared in person to plead the cause before the Fathers.
There was now, it was thought, no reason for retaining these unfortunate
men. The original thousand had shrunk to less than three hundred; middle-

aged men had become in sixteen years old and decrepit; they had lost
connexions and influence in the Peloponnese; they had learnt by bitter
experience the impossibility of resisting the power of Rome, and were no
longer likely to venture on organising any opposition. Their longer
detention could only be a measure of vengeance, and useless vengeance.
Still the debate in the Senate was long and doubtful, until it was brought to
a conclusion by the contemptuous exclamation of Cato: “Are we to sit here
all day discussing whether some old Greek dotards are to be buried by
Italian or Achaean undertakers?” Polybius, elated by a concession thus
ungraciously accorded, wished to enter the Senate once more with a further
request for a restitution of their property in Achaia. But Cato bluntly bade
him “remember Ulysses, who wanted to go back into the cave of the
Cyclops to fetch his cap and belt.”34
Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese at once, and to have
Coss. L. Marcius remained there until b.c. 149, when he was suddenly
Censornius, Manius summoned to serve the government whose enforced
Manilius, b.c. 149.
Polybius sent for to guest he had been so long. It was the year in which the
Lilybaeum. Senate had determined to commence their proceedings
against Carthage, which were not to be stayed until she
was levelled with the ground. In b.c. 150 the victory of Massanissa had
restored the oligarchs, who had been superseded by the popular anti-Roman
party in Carthage. These men hastened to make every possible offer of
submission to Rome. The Senate had made up its mind for war; and yet did
not at once say so. After demanding that full satisfaction should be made to
Massanissa, it next decreed that the Carthaginians must at once give three
hundred of their noblest youths as hostages to the Roman consuls Manilius
and Censorinus, who had sailed to Lilybaeum with secret orders to let no
concession induce them to stop the war until Carthage was destroyed.35
There was naturally some hesitation in obeying this demand at Carthage;
for the hostages were to be given to the Romans absolutely without any
terms, and without any security. They felt that it was practically a surrender
of their city. To overcome this hesitation Manilius sent for Polybius,
perhaps because he had known and respected him at Rome, and believed
that he could trust him; perhaps because his well-known opinion, as to the
safety in trusting the Roman fides, might make him a useful agent. But also
probably because he was known to many influential Carthaginians, and

perhaps spoke their language.36 He started for Lilybaeum at once. But when
he reached Corcyra he was met with the news that the hostages had been
given up to the consul: he thought, therefore, that the chance of war was at
an end, and he returned to the Peloponnese.37
He must soon have learnt his mistake. The Consul, in accordance with his
secret instructions,—first to secure the arms in Carthage, and then to insist
on the destruction of the town,—gradually let the wretched people know the
extent of the submission required of them. These outrageous demands
resulted in the Carthaginians taking the desperate resolution of standing a
siege. Censorinus and his colleague accordingly began operations; but they
were not capable of so great an undertaking. The eyes of the whole army
were turned upon Scipio Aemilianus, who was serving as a military tribune.
The siege lingered through the summer of b.c. 148 without any result; and
when in the autumn Scipio left for Rome, to stand for the Aedileship, he
started amidst loud expressions of hope that he might return as Consul,
though below the legal age.38
The loss of so much of Polybius’s narrative at this point leaves us uncertain
when he arrived in Africa: but as he met and conversed with Massanissa,39
who died in b.c. 148, it seems likely that he did join the army after all in
b.c. 149. At any rate he was in Scipio’s train in b.c. 147-146, when he was
in chief command of the army, first as consul, and then as proconsul;
advised him on sundry points in the formation of his siege works; stood by
his side when Carthage was burning; and heard him, as he watched the
dreadful sight, utter with tearful eyes the foreboding of what might one day
befall Rome.40 Scipio is also said to have supplied him with ships for an
exploring expedition round the coast of Africa;41 and it seems most likely
that this was in his year of consulship (147), as after the fall of Carthage
Polybius went home.
The destruction of Carthage took place in the spring of b.c. 146. When
Scipio went back to celebrate his triumph, Polybius seems to have returned
to the Peloponnese, there to witness another act of vengeance on the part of
Rome, and to do what he could to lighten the blow to his countrymen, and
to preserve the fragments of their shattered liberties.

Among the restored Achaean exiles were Diaeus, Damocritus, Alcamenes,
Theodectes, and Archicrates. They had returned with feelings embittered by
their exile; and without any of the experience of active life, which might
have taught them to subordinate their private thirst for revenge to the safety
of their country. Callicrates died in b.c. 148, and Diaeus was Strategus in
b.c. 149-148, 147-146. The appearance of the pseudo-Philip (Andriscus) in
Macedonia, and the continued resistance of Carthage during his first year of
office (148), encouraged him perhaps to venture on a course, and to
recommend the people to adopt a policy, on which he would otherwise not
have ventured. Troubles arising out of a disgraceful money transaction
between the Spartan Menalchidas, Achaean Strategus, and the Oropians,
who had bribed him to aid them against the Athenians, had led to a violent
quarrel with Callicrates, who threatened to impeach him for treason to the
league in the course of an embassy to Rome. To save himself he gave half
the Oropian money to Diaeus, his successor as Strategus (b.c. 149-148).
This led to a popular clamour against Diaeus: who, to save himself, falsely
reported that the Senate had granted the Achaeans leave to try and condemn
certain Spartans for the offence of occupying a disputed territory. Sparta
was prepared to resist in arms, and a war seemed to be on the point of
breaking out. Callicrates and Diaeus, however, were sent early in b.c. 148 to
place the Achaean case before the Senate, while the Spartans sent
Menalchidas. Callicrates died on the road. The Senate heard, therefore, the
two sides from Diaeus and Menalchidas, and answered that they would
send commissioners to inquire into the case. The commissioners, however,
were slow in coming; so that both Diaeus and Menalchidas had time to
misrepresent the Senate’s answer to their respective peoples. The Achaeans
believed that they had full leave to proceed according to the league law
against the Spartans; the Spartans believed that they had permission to
b.c. 148. break off from the league. Once more, therefore, war
was on the point of breaking out.42 Just at this time Q.
Caecilius Metellus was in Macedonia with an army to crush Andriscus. He
was sending some commissioners to Asia, and ordered them to visit the
Peloponnese on their way and give a friendly warning. It was neglected,
and the Spartans sustained a defeat, which irritated them without crushing
their revolt. When Diaeus succeeded Damocritus as Strategus in b.c. 147,
b.c. 147. he answered a second embassy from Metellus by a
promise not to take any hostile steps until the Roman

commissioners arrived. But he irritated the Spartans by putting garrisons
into some forts which commanded Laconia; and they actually elected
Menalchidas as a Strategus in opposition to Diaeus. But finding that he had
no chance of success Menalchidas poisoned himself.43

Then followed the riot at Corinth.44 Marcus Aurelius Orestes at the head of
a commission arrived at last at Corinth, and there informed the magistrates
in council that the league must give up Argos, Corinth, and Sparta. The
magistrates hastily summoned an assembly and announced the message
from the Senate; a furious riot followed, every man in Corinth suspected of
being a Spartan was seized and thrown into prison; the very residence of the
Roman commissioners was not able to afford such persons any protection,
and even the persons of Orestes and his colleagues were in imminent
danger.
Some months afterwards a second commission arrived headed by Sextus
Julius Caesar, and demanded, without any express menace, that the authors
of the riot should be given up. The demand was evaded; and when Caesar
returned to Rome with his report, war was at once declared.
The new Strategus, elected in the autumn of b.c. 147, was Critolaus. He was
b.c. 147-146. a bitter anti-Romanist like Diaeus: and these statesmen
and their party fancied that the Romans, having already
two wars on hand, at Carthage and in Spain, would make any sacrifice to
keep peace with Achaia. They had not indeed openly declined the demands
of Sextus, but, to use Polybius’s expressive phrase, “they accepted with the
left hand what the Romans offered with the right.”45 While pretending to be
preparing to submit their case to the Senate, they were collecting an army
from the cities of the league. Inspired with an inexplicable infatuation,
which does not deserve the name of courage, Critolaus even advanced
northwards towards Thermopylae, as if he could with his petty force bar the
road to the Romans and free Greece. He was encouraged, it was said, by a
party at Thebes which had suffered from Rome for its Macedonising policy.
But, rash as the march was, it was managed with at least equal imprudence.
Instead of occupying Thermopylae, they stopped short of it to besiege
Trachinian Heracleia, an old Spartan colony,46 which refused to join the
league. While engaged in this, Critolaus heard that Metellus (who wished to
anticipate his successor Mummius) was on the march from Macedonia. He

beat a hasty retreat to Scarpheia in Locris,47 which was on the road leading
to Elateia and the south; here he was overtaken and defeated with
considerable slaughter. Critolaus appears not to have fallen on the field; but
he was never seen again. He was either lost in some marshes over which he
attempted to escape, as Pausanias suggests, or poisoned himself, as Livy
says. Diaeus, as his predecessor, became Strategus, and was elected for the
following year also. Diaeus exerted himself to collect troops for the defence
of Corinth, nominally as being at war with Sparta. He succeeded in getting
as many as fourteen thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry, consisting
partly of citizens and partly of slaves; and sent four thousand picked men
under Alcamenes to hold Megara, while he himself occupied Corinth. When
Metellus approached, however, this outpost at Megara hastily retreated into
Corinth. Metellus took up his position in the Isthmus, and offered the
Achaeans the fairest terms. Diaeus, however, induced them to reject all
offers; and Metellus was kept some time encamped before Corinth.
It was now late in the spring of b.c. 146, and the new Consul, Lucius
b.c. 146. Arrival of Mummius, arrived at the Roman camp. He at once sent
Mummius. Metellus back to Macedonia, and quietly awaited the
arrival of fresh troops, which he had sent for from Crete and Pergamum, as
well as from Italy.48 He eventually had an army of about thirty thousand
men, nearly double of the Greek army in Corinth. Nothing apparently was
done till the late summer, or autumn. But then the final catastrophe was
rapid and complete. The Roman officers regarded the Achaean force with
such contempt, that they did not take proper precautions, so that Diaeus
won a slight advantage against one of the Roman outposts. Flushed with
this success, he drew out for a pitched battle, in which he was totally
defeated. He made his way to Megalopolis, where, after killing his wife, he
poisoned himself.
Thus by a series of imprudent measures, which Polybius denounces, but
was not at home to oppose, the Achaean league had drifted into downright
war with Rome; and, almost without a struggle, had fallen helplessly at her
feet, forced to accept whatever her mercy or contempt might grant. Mercy,
however, was to be preceded by stern punishment. Corinth was given up to
plunder and to fire, and Polybius returned from Africa in time to witness
it.49 The destruction or deportation of works of art, of pictures, statues, and

Polybius saves some costly furniture, he could not prevent; but he spoke a
statues of nationalsuccessful word to preserve the statues of Philopoemen
interest.
in the various cities from destruction; and also begged
successfully for the restoration of some of the Eponymous hero Achaeus,
and of Philopoemen and Aratus, which had already been transported as far
as Acarnania on their way to Italy.50 He also dissuaded his friends from
rushing to take their share in the plunder by purchasing the confiscated
goods of Diaeus, which were put to auction and could be bought at low
rates; and he refused to accept any of them himself.51
The settlement of the territories of the league was put into the hands of a
commission of ten men who were sent out after the sack of Corinth; while
The new settlement of Mummius, after seeing that such towns in the
the Peloponnese, Peloponnese as had joined in the war were deprived of
b.c. 146-145.
their fortifications and arms, and after inflicting
punishment upon other towns in Greece which had shown active sympathy
with Perseus, especially Thebes and Chalcis, returned home to celebrate his
triumph, which was adorned with marble and bronze statues and pictures
from Corinth.52 The commissioners who had been sent out to make a final
settlement of Greece, or Achaia, as it was henceforth to be called in official
language, settled the general plan in conjunction with Mummius; but the
commissioners continued their labours for six months, at the end of which
time they departed, leaving Polybius to settle with each town the details of
their local legislation. The general principles which the commissioners laid
down were first, the entire abolition of all the leagues, and consequently of
the league assemblies; each town, with its surrounding district, which had
once formed a canton in the league, was to be separate and independent: its
magistrates, secondly, were to be selected according to a fixed assessment
of property, the old equality or democracy being abolished: thirdly, no
member of one canton might own property in another: fourthly, the
Boeotians were ordered to pay a heavy compensation to the Heracleots and
Euboeans, and the Achaeans to the Spartans: lastly, a fixed tribute to Rome
was imposed on all states in Greece.53 Some of these measures were in a
few years’ time relaxed, the fines were mitigated, the rule against inter-
possession of property was abolished, and the league assemblies were again
allowed for certain local purposes. But this was the end of the league as a
free federation. It is often said that “Greece was now reduced to the form of

a Roman province under the name of Achaia.” This is true in a sense, and
yet is misleading. Achaia did not become a province like the other
provinces, yearly allotted to a proconsul or propraetor or legatus, until the
time of Augustus. Such direct interference from a Roman magistrate as was
thought necessary was left to the governor of Macedonia.54 Yet in a certain
sense Achaia was treated as a separate entity, and had a “formula,” or
constitution, founded on the separate local laws which the commissioners
found existing, or imposed, with the help of Polybius, on the several states;
it paid tribute like other provinces, and was in fact, though called free,
subject to Rome.
Polybius performed his task of visiting the various towns in the
Peloponnese, explaining when necessary the meaning of the new
arrangements, and advising them, when they had to make others for
themselves, so much to the satisfaction of every one, that there was a
universal feeling that he had been a benefactor to his country, and had made
the best of their situation that could be made. Statues of him are mentioned
by Pausanias in several places in the Peloponnese: in Mantinea55 and at
Megalopolis,56 with an inscription in elegiacs to the effect that “he had
travelled over every land and sea; was an ally of the Romans, and mitigated
their wrath against Greece.” Another in the temple of Persephone, near
Acacesium,57 under which was a legend stating that “Greece would not
have erred at all if she had obeyed Polybius; and that when she did err, he
alone proved of any help to her.” There were others also at Pallantium,58
Tegea,59 and Olympia.60
In these services to his country Polybius was occupied in b.c. 145. Of his
life after that we have no detailed record. He is believed to have visited
Scipio while engaged on the siege of Numantia (b.c. 134-132), on which he
wrote a separate treatise.61 We know also that he visited Alexandria in the
reign of Ptolemy Physcon (b.c. 146-117), and expressed his contempt for
the state of the people and their rulers.62 These years must have been also
much occupied with the extension of his history, which he originally
intended should end with the fall of the Macedonian kingdom (b.c. 168),63
but which was afterwards continued to the fall of Carthage and Greece
(b.c. 146);64 for even if the history had been completed up to its originally
intended limit, and the notice of extension afterwards inserted, there still

was enough to do to occupy some years of a busy life; especially as he
seems to have carried out his principle that an historian ought to be a
traveller, visiting the localities of which he speaks, and testing by personal
inspection the possibility of the military evolutions which he undertakes to
describe. His travels appear certainly to have embraced the greater part of
Gaul, and it even seems possible from one passage that he visited Britain.65
His explorations on the African coast were doubtless extensive, and he
appears to have visited Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Asia Minor. We hear of him
at Sardis, though we cannot fix the date of the visit.66 Lastly, Lucian tells us
that, “returning from the country, he had a fall from his horse, from the
effects of which he died at the age of eighty-two.” No place is given, and no
clue which may help us to be certain of the date.67 Polybius, besides the
general history, had written a treatise on Tactics,68 a panegyric on
Philopoemen,69 a history of the Numantine war,70 and perhaps a treatise on
public speaking (δημηγορία).71

§ 2.—THE SOURCES OF POLYBIUS’S HISTORY

Polybius always maintains that the study of documents is only one, and not
the most important, element in the equipment of an historian. The best is
personal experience and personal inquiry.
Of the sources of his own history, then, the first and best may be set down
Personal knowledge. as knowledge acquired by being actually present at
great events, such as the destruction of Carthage and the
sack of Corinth; visits to the Roman army in camp; assisting at actual
debates in his own country; personal knowledge of and service under men
of the first position in Achaia; personal visits to famous localities; voyages
and tours undertaken for the definite object of inspection and inquiry; and,
lastly, seeing and questioning the survivors of great battles, or the men who
had played a leading part in conspicuous political transactions.
From his earliest youth Polybius had enjoyed some special advantages in
these respects. As he himself says, “the events in Greece fell within his own
generation, or that immediately preceding his own,—and he therefore could
relate what he had seen, or what he had heard from eye-witnesses” (4, 2).
And of the later period he “was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases

an actor, and in others the chief actor” (3, 4). When he was probably under
twenty we hear of his being present at an important interview between
Philopoemen and Archon;72 and his election as hipparch in b.c. 169, soon
after he reached the legal age, was in consequence of his having thrown
himself with vigour into the practical working of the cavalry under
Philopoemen. In regard to Roman history and polity, we have Cicero’s
testimony that he was bonus auctor in primis,73 and more particularly in
regard to chronology, quo nemo fuit in exquirendis temporibus diligentius.74
Nor is this praise undeserved, as is shown by his energy in pushing minute
and personal inquiries. Thus he learnt the details of the Hannibalic war from
some of the survivors of those actually engaged; visited the localities, and
made the pass of the Alps used by Hannibal;75 studied and transcribed the
stele or bronze tablet placed by Hannibal on the Lacinian promontory;76
travelled through Libya, Spain, Gaul, and the seas which washed their
shores (perhaps even as far as Britain), in order to give a true account of
them.77 Conversed with Massanissa on the character of the Carthaginians,
as well as with many of the Carthaginians themselves.78 Carefully observed
Carthagena.79 Inspected the records at Rhodes,80 and the Archives at
Rome;81 and studied and transcribed the treaties preserved there.82 Visited
Sardis,83 Alexandria,84 and Locri Epizephyrii.85 To this, which is by no
means an exhaustive account of his travels and inquiries, may be added the
fact that his intimacy with the younger Africanus, grandson by adoption and
nephew by marriage of the elder Scipio, must have placed at his disposal a
considerable mass of information contained in the family archives of the
Scipios, as to the Hannibalian war, and especially as to the campaigns in
Spain.86
Such were some of the means by which Polybius was enabled to obtain
accurate and trustworthy information.
It remains to inquire how far Polybius availed himself of the writings of
Use of previous writers others. He looks upon the study of books as an
by Polybius. important part of an historian’s work, but, as we have
seen, not the most important. His practice appears to have been
conformable to his theory. The greater part of his information he gained
from personal observation and personal inquiry. Nevertheless, some of his

history must have been learnt from books, and very little of it could have
been entirely independent of them. Still, as far as we have the means of
judging from the fragments of his work that have come down to us, his
obligations to his predecessors are not as extensive as that of most of those
who wrote after him; nor is the number of those to whom he refers great.87

The Punic wars. Of his preliminary sketch contained in books 1 and 2,
the first book, containing the account of the first Punic
war and the Mercenary war, appears to have been derived mainly from the
writings of Fabius Pictor (b. circ. b.c. 260), and Philinus of Agrigentum
(contemporary and secretary of Hannibal). He complains that they were
violent partisans, the one of Rome, the other of Carthage.88 But by
comparing the two, and checking both by documents and inscriptions at
Rome, he, no doubt, found sufficient material for his purpose.
The second book contains an account of the origin of the war between
Illyrians and Gauls. Rome and Illyricum; of the Gallic or Celtic wars from
the earliest times; and a sketch of Achaean history to
the end of the Cleomenic war. The first two of these must have been
compiled with great labour from various public documents and family
Achaia. records, as well as in part from Pictor. The sketch of
Achaean history rested mainly, as far as it depends on
books, on the Memoirs of Aratus; while he studied only to refute the
writings of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes. He complains of the
partiality of Phylarchus: but in this part of the history it was perhaps
inevitable that his own views should have been coloured by the prejudices
and prepossessions of a politician, and one who had been closely connected
from boyhood with the patriotic Achaean party, led by Philopoemen, which
was ever at enmity with all that Cleomenes did his utmost to establish.
For his account of Sicilian affairs he had studied the works of Timaeus of
Sicilian history. Tauromenium. Although he accuses him bitterly, and at
excessive length,89 of all the faults of which an
historian can be guilty, he yet confesses that he found in his books much
that was of assistance to him90 in regard both to Magna Graecia and Sicily;
for which he also consulted the writings of Aristotle, especially it appears
the now lost works on Polities (πολιτείαι), and Founding of Cities (κτίσεις).
The severity of his criticism of Timaeus is supported by later authors. He

was nicknamed ἐπιτίμαιος, in allusion to the petulance of his criticism of
others;91 and Plutarch attacks him for his perversion of truth and his foolish
and self-satisfied attempts to rival the best of the ancient writers, and to
diminish the credit of the most famous philosophers.92

Greek history. As far as we possess his writings, we find little trace in
Polybius of a reference to the earliest historians.
Herodotus is not mentioned, though there may be some indications of
acquaintance with his work;93 nor the Sicilian Philistus who flourished
about b.c. 430. Thucydides is mentioned once, and Xenophon three times.
Polybius was engaged in the history of a definite period, and had not much
occasion to refer to earlier times; and perhaps the epitomator, in extracting
what seemed of value, chose those parts especially where he was the sole or
best authority.
For the early history of Macedonia, he seems to have relied mostly on two
Macedonia. pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus of Cumae and Theopompus
of Chios; though the malignity of the latter deprived his
authority of much weight.94 He also studied the work of Alexander’s friend
and victim, Callisthenes; and vehemently assailed his veracity, as others
have done. More important to him perhaps were the writings of his own
contemporaries, the Rhodians Antisthenes and Zeno; though he detects
them in some inaccuracies, which in the case of Zeno he took the trouble to
correct: and of Demetrius of Phalerum, whose writings he seems to have
greatly admired.
For the contemporary history of Egypt and Syria he seems to have trusted
Egypt and Syria. principally to personal inquiry. He expressly (2, 37)
declines entering on the early history of Egypt on the
ground of its having been fully done by others (referring, perhaps, to
Herodotus, Manetho, and Ptolemy of Megalopolis). For the Seleucid
dynasty of Syria he quotes no authorities.
On no subject does Polybius seem to have read so widely as on geography:
Geography. doubtless as preparing himself not only for writing, but
for being able to travel with the knowledge and
intelligence necessary to enable him to observe rightly. He had studied
minutely and criticised freely the writings of Dicaearchus, Pytheas,

Eudoxus, and Eratosthenes. He was quick to detect fallacies in these
writers, and to reject their dogmatising on the possibilities of nature; yet he
does not seem to have had in an eminent degree the topographical faculty,
or the power of giving a graphic picture of a locality. Modern research has
tended rather to strengthen than weaken our belief in the accuracy of his
descriptions, as in the case of Carthagena and the site of the battle of
Cannae; still it cannot be asserted that he is to be classed high in the list of
topographers, whether scientific or picturesque.

General Literature.He appears to have been fairly well acquainted with the
poets; but his occasions for quoting them, as far as we
have his work, are not very frequent. He seems to have known his Homer,
as every Greek was bound to do. He quotes the Cypria of Stasinus, who,
according to tradition, was son-in-law of Homer; Hesiod, Simonides of
Ceos, Pindar, Euripides, and Epicharmus of Cos. He quotes or refers to
Plato, whom he appears chiefly to have studied for his political theories;
and certain technical writers, such as Aeneas Tacticus, and Cleoxenos and
Democlitus, inventors of a new system of telegraphy, if they wrote it rather
than taught it practically.
Even allowing for the loss of so great a part of his work, the list of authors
is not a long one: and it suggests the remark, which his style as well as his
own professions tend to confirm, that he was not primarily a man of letters,
but a man of affairs and action, who loved the stir of political agitation, and
unbent his mind by the excitement of travel and the chase. Nothing moves
his contempt more than the idea of Timaeus living peaceably for fifty years
at Athens, holding aloof from all active life, and poring over the books in
the Athenian libraries as a preparation for writing history; which, according
to him, can only be worth reading when it springs, not from rummaging
Record offices, but from taking a personal share in the political strife of the
day; studying military tactics in the camp and field; witnessing battles;
questioning the actors in great events; and visiting the sites of battles, the
cities and lands which are to be described.

§ 3. THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE95

To the student of politics the history of Greece is chiefly interesting as
offering examples of numerous small states enjoying complete local

autonomy, yet retaining a feeling of a larger nationality founded in a
community of blood, language, and religion; a community, that is, in the
sense that, fundamentally united in these three particulars, they yet
acknowledged variations even in them, which distinguished without entirely
separating them. From some points of view the experiment may be regarded
as having been successful. From others it was a signal failure. Local
jealousies and mutual provocations not only continually set city against city,
clan against clan, but perpetually suggested invitations sent by one city, or
even one party in a city, to foreign potentates or peoples to interfere in their
behalf against another city or party, which they hated or feared, but were
too weak to resist. Thus we find the Persians, Macedonians, Syrians, and
Romans successively induced to interfere in Greek politics with the
assurance that there were always some states, or some party in each state,
who would welcome them. From time to time men of larger views had
conceived the idea of creating a united Empire of Hellas, which might
present an unbroken front to the foreigner. From time to time philosophers
had preached the impossibility of combining complete local independence
with the idea of a strong and vigorous nationality. But the true solution of
the problem had never been successfully hit upon: and after various
abortive attempts at combination, Greece was left, a helpless collection of
disjointed fragments, to fall under the intrigues of Macedonia and Rome.
The Achaean league was not the first attempt at such a formation; though it
was the first that ever arrived at anything like a complete scheme of
federalism (unless the Aetolian preceded it); and was in many respects a
fresh departure in Hellenic policy, and the first experiment in federation
which seemed to contain the elements of success. From the earliest times
certain Greek states had combined more or less closely, or loosely, for
certain specific purposes. Such were the various Amphictyonies, and
especially the Amphictyonic league of Thermopylae and Delphi. The object
of these was primarily religious: the worship of a particular deity, the care
of a particular temple; the first condition of membership being therefore
community of blood. But though this was the origin of their being, there
were elements in their constitution which might have developed into some
form of federalism, had it not been for the centrifugal forces that always
tended to keep Greek states apart. Thus we can conceive the idea of the
Pylagorae from the various states gradually giving rise to the notion of a

central parliament of elected representatives; and the sphere of its activity
gradually extending to matters purely political, beginning with those which
were on the borderland of religion and politics. And, indeed, the action of
the great Amphictyonic league at times seemed to be approaching this.96
But the forces tending to decentralisation were always the stronger: and
though the league continued to exist for many centuries, it became less and
less political, and less and less influential in Greece. So too with other
combinations in Greece. The community (τὸ κοινὸν) of the Ionians,
beginning with a common meeting for worship at the Panionium, on one
memorable occasion at least seemed for a brief space to promise to develop
into a federation for mutual succour and defence. In the Ionian revolt in
b.c. 500, the deputies (πρόβουλοι) of the Ionian states met and determined
to combine against the enemy; they even went so far as to appoint a
common general or admiral. But the instinct of separation was too strong; at
the first touch of difficulty and hardship the union was resolved into its
elements.97
The constitution of the Boeotian league was somewhat more regular and
permanent. The Boeotarchs appear to have met at regular intervals, and now
and again to have succeeded in mustering a national levy. There were also
four regularly constituted “Senates” to control them, though we know
nothing of their constitution.98 But the league had come to nothing; partly
from the resistance of the towns to the overweening pretensions of Thebes,
and later from the severity of the treatment experienced by it at the hands of
Alexander and his successors.
Thessaly, again, was a loose confederacy of towns or cantons, in which
certain great families, such as the Aleuadae and Scopadae, held the
direction of their local affairs; or some tyrannus, as Alexander of Pherae,
obtained sovereign powers. Still, for certain purposes, a connexion was
acknowledged, and a Tagus of Thessaly was appointed, with the power of
summoning a general levy of men. For a short time prior to the Roman
conquest these officers appear to have gained additional importance; but
Thessaly never was united enough to be of importance, in spite of its
famous cavalry, even among Greek nations, far less to be capable of
presenting a firm front to the foreigner.

One other early attempt at forming something like a Panhellenic union
ought to be noticed. When the Persian invasion of b.c. 480 was threatening,
deputies (πρόβουλοι) met at the Isthmus, sat there in council for some
months, and endeavoured to unite Greece against the foreigner.99 But the
one expedition which was sent solely by their instigation proved a
failure.100 And when the danger was over, principally by the combined
exertion of Athens and Sparta, this council seems to have died a natural
death. Still for a time it acted as a supreme parliament of Greece, and
assumed the power to punish with fine or death those Greeks who had
medised.101
Besides these rudimentary leagues, which might, but did not, issue in some
form of Panhellenic government, there were periods in Greek history in
which the Hegemone of one state did something towards presenting the
appearance of union. Thus Polycrates of Samos seemed at one time to be
likely to succeed in forming a great Ionian Empire. And in continental
Greece, before the Persian wars, we find Sparta occupying the position of
an acknowledged court of reference in international questions,102—a
position in which she probably had been preceded by Argos. And after those
wars, by means of the confederacy of Delos, formed at first for one specific
purpose—that of keeping the Aegean free of the Persians—Athens
gradually rose to the position of an imperial city, claiming active control
over the external politics of a considerable portion of Greece and nearly all
the islands (b.c. 478-404). But this proved after all but a passing episode in
Greek history. Athens perhaps misused her power; and Sparta took up the
task with great professions, but in a spirit even less acceptable to the Greek
world than that of Athens; and by the peace of Antalcidas (b.c. 387) the
issue of the hundred years’ struggle with Persia left one of the fairest
portions of Hellas permanently separated from the main body. Asiatic
Greece never became Hellenic again. The fall of the Persian empire before
the invasion of Alexander for a while reunited it to a semi-Greek power; but
Alexander’s death left it a prey to warring tyrants. It lost its prosperity and
its commerce; and whatever else it became, it was never independent, or
really Hellenic again.
For a few years more Sparta and then Thebes assumed to be head of
Greece, but the Macedonian supremacy secured at Chaeronea (b.c. 338),

still more fully after the abortive Lamian war (b.c. 323), left Greece only a
nominal freedom, again and again assured to it by various Macedonian
monarchs, but really held only on sufferance. The country seemed to settle
down without farther struggle into political insignificance. The games and
festivals went on, and there was still some high talk of Hellenic glories. But
one after another of the towns submitted to receive Macedonian garrisons
and governors; and Athens, once the brilliant leader in national aspirations,
practically abandoned politics, and was content to enjoy a reputation partly
founded on her past, and partly on the fame of the philosophers who still
taught in her gardens and porches, and attracted young men from all parts
of the world to listen to their discourses, and to sharpen their wits by the
acute if not very useful discussions which they promoted.103 Sparta, far
from retaining her old ascendency, had been losing with it her ancient
constitution, which had been the foundation of her glory, as well perhaps as
in some respects the source of her weakness; and for good or evil had
ceased to count for much in Hellenic politics.
In the midst of this general collapse two portions of the Hellenic race
gradually formed or recovered some sort of united government, which
enabled them to play a conspicuous part in the later history of Greece, and
which was essentially different from any of the combinations of earlier
times of which I have been speaking. These were the Aetolians and
Achaeans.
With regard to the former our information is exceedingly scanty. They were
Aetolian league. said to have been an emigration from Elis originally;104
but they were little known to the rest of Greece. Strange stories were told of
them, of their savage mode of life, their scarcely intelligible language, their
feeding on raw flesh, and their fierceness as soldiers. They were said to live
in open villages, widely removed from each other, and without effective
means of combination for mutual protection. Their piracies, which were
chiefly directed to the coasts of Messenia, caused the Messenians to seize
the opportunity of Demosthenes being in their neighbourhood in b.c. 426,
with a considerable Athenian army, to persuade him to invade the Aetolians,
who were always on the look-out to attack Naupactus, a town which the
Athenians had held since b.c. 455,105 and which was naturally an object of
envy to them as commanding the entrance to the Corinthian gulf. But when

Demosthenes attempted the invasion, he found to his cost that the Aetolians
knew how to combine, and he had to retire beaten with severe loss.106 The
separate tribes in Aetolia seem soon afterwards to have had, if they had not
already, some form of central government; for we find them negotiating
with Agesilaus in b.c. 390, with the same object of obtaining Naupactus,107
when the Athenians had lost it, and it had fallen into the hands of the
Locrians.108 The Aetolians appear to have gradually increased in
importance: for we find Philip making terms with them and giving them the
coveted Naupactus in b.c. 341, which had at some time previous come into
the possession of the Achaeans.109 But their most conspicuous achievement,
which caused them to take a position of importance in Greece, was their
brilliant defeat of the invading Gauls at Delphi in b.c. 279.110 By this time
their federal constitution must in some shape have been formed. The people
elected a Strategus in a general meeting, usually held at Thermus, at the
autumn equinox, to which apparently all Aetolians were at liberty to come,
and at which questions of peace and war and external politics generally
were brought forward; though meanwhile the Strategus appears to have had
the right of declaring and carrying on war as he chose. There was also a
hipparch and a secretary (21, 22); and a senate called Apocleti (20, 1); and a
body called Synedri (C. I. G. 2350), which seem to have been judicial, and
another called Nomographi (13, 1, C. I. G. 3046), who were apparently an
occasional board for legislation. They produced some writers, but their
works are lost. Accordingly, as Professor Mahaffy observes, “we know
them entirely from their enemies.” Still the acknowledged principle on
which they acted, ἄγειν λάφυρον ἀπὸ λαφύρου111—that is, that where spoils
were going, whether from friend or foe, they were justified in taking a part,
speaks for itself, and is enough to stamp them as at least dangerous and
unpleasant neighbours.

Achaean league. The Achaeans have a different and more interesting
history.
The original Achaean league consisted of a federation of twelve cities and
their respective territory (μέρος): Pellene, Aegira, Aegae, Bura, Helice,
Aegium, Rhypes, Patrae, Pharae, Olenus, Dyme, Tritaea.112 This league was
of great antiquity, but we know nothing of its history, or how it differed
from other leagues, such as I have already mentioned, in adding political to

religious unity. In b.c. 454 it submitted to Athens; but was restored to its
original position in the same year on the signing of the thirty years’ truce
between Sparta and Athens;113 and though the Athenians demanded that
their authority over it should be restored to them in b.c. 425, when they had
caught the Spartan army at Sphacteria, no change appears to have been
made.114 Thucydides certainly seems to speak of it, not as entirely free, but
as in some special manner subject to the supremacy of Sparta. Polybius,
however, claims for them, at an early period, a peculiar and honourable
place in Greek politics, as being distinguished for probity and honour. Thus
they were chosen as arbitrators in the intestine of Magna Graecia (about
b.c. 400-390); and again, after the battle of Leuctra (b.c. 371) to mediate
between Sparta and Thebes.115 They must therefore, between b.c. 425-390,
have obtained a virtual independence. They shared, however, in the
universal decline of Hellenic activity during the Macedonian period (b.c.
359 to about b.c. 285), and Polybius complains that they were
systematically depressed by the intrigues of Sparta and Macedonia; both
which powers took care to prevent any Achaean of promising ability from
attaining influence in the Peloponnese.116 The same influence was exerted
to estrange the Achaean cities from each other. They were garrisoned by
Macedonian troops, or fell under the power of tyrants; and to all appearance
the league had fared as other such combinations had fared before, and had
been resolved into its original elements.
But the tradition of the old union did not die out entirely. Eight of the old
Revival of the league, cities still existed in a state of more or less vigour.
b.c. 284-280. Olenus and Helice had long ago disappeared by
encroachments of the sea (before b.c. 371), and their places had not been
filled up by others. Two other towns, Rhypes and Aegae, had from various
causes ceased to be inhabited, and their places had been taken in the league
(before the dissolution) by Leontium and Caryneia. There were therefore
ten cities which had once known the advantages and disadvantages of some
sort of federal union; as well as the misfortunes which attached to disunion,
aggravated by constant interference from without.
The first step in an attempt to resuscitate the league was taken in the 124th
Olympiad (b.c. 284-280). Macedonia was at the time weakened by the
troubles of a disputed succession: Pyrrhus was absorbed in his futile Italian

b.c. 284. First union of expedition: a change in the sovereign of Egypt opened a
Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, way to a possible change of policy at Alexandria: and
Pharae.
the death of Lysimachus gave the monarchs something
else to do than to trouble themselves about the Peloponnese. At this period
four of the Achaean towns, Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, formed a
Adherence of Aegium, league for mutual help. This proving, after a trial of five
b.c. 279. years, to have some stability, it was joined by Aegium,
from which the Macedonian garrison was expelled. At intervals, of which
we are not informed, this was again joined by Bura and Caryneia. These
b.c. 279-255. seven cities continued to constitute the entire league for
twenty-five years; the federal magistrates consisting of
two Strategi, elected by each city in turns, and a secretary. As to the doings
of the league during this period we are entirely in the dark. The next step
Margos of Caryneia first that we hear of is the abolition of the dual presidency
sole Strategus, b.c. 255. and the election of Margos of Caryneia as sole
Strategus. We are not told the reasons of the change; but it is clear that a
divided command might often give room for delay, when delay was fatal;
and for the conflict of local interests, where the interests of the community
should be the paramount consideration. At any rate the change was made:
and Margos, who had been a loyal servant of the league, was the first sole
Strategus. His immediate successors we do not know. The next fact in the
history of the league was the adherence of Sicyon, a powerful town and the
first of any, not in the number of the old Achaean federation, to join. This
therefore was a great step in the direction of extending the federation over
the Peloponnese; and it was the work of the man destined to do much in
moulding the league into the shape in which it attained its greatest
effectiveness, Aratus of Sicyon. He found it weak; its cities poor and
insignificant; with no aid from rich soil or good harbourage to increase its
wealth or property;117 he left it, not indeed free from serious dangers and
difficulties,—in part the result of his own policy in calling in the aid of the
Macedonians, in part created by the persistent hostility of Aetolia and
Sparta,—but yet possessed of great vitality, and fast becoming the most
powerful and influential of all the Greek governments; although at no time
can it be spoken of as Panhellenic without very considerable exaggeration.
Aratus had been brought up in exile at Argos, after the murder of his father
Cleinias (b.c. 271); and, when twenty years of age, by a gallant and
romantic adventure, had driven out the tyrant Nicocles from Sicyon

(b.c. 251). He became the chief magistrate of his native town, which he
induced to join the Achaean league, thus causing, as I have said, the league
to take its first step towards embracing all the Peloponnese. It seems that for
five years Aratus remained chief magistrate of Sicyon, but a private citizen
of the league. In b.c. 245 (though of the exact year we have no positive
information), he appears to have been first elected Strategus of the league.
But it was not until his second year of office, b.c. 243-242, that he began
putting in practice the policy which he proposed to himself,—the expulsion
of the Macedonian garrisons and the despots from the cities of the
Peloponnese, with the view of their joining the league. He began with the
Acrocorinthus. Corinth, freed from the foreign garrison, joined the league,
and was followed soon after by Megara118 (b.c. 240). From this time Aratus
was Strategus of the league in alternate years to the time of his death, the
federal law not allowing two consecutive years of office.119
The death of Antigonus Gonatas (b.c. 239) led to a new departure. Hitherto
the Aetolians had been in league with the Macedonians to vex and harry the
Achaeans. The two leagues now made peace, and the Aetolians aided the
Achaeans in their resistance to Gonatas’s successor, Demetrius (b.c. 239-
229). Still the despots in many of the Peloponnesian towns held out,
trusting to the support of Demetrius. When he died (b.c. 229) there was a
general movement among them to abdicate and join their cities to the
league. Lydiades of Megalopolis had done so during Demetrius’s lifetime;
and now Aristomachus of Argos, Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of
Phlius did the same. The rapid extension of the Achaean league, however,
could not fail to excite the jealousy of the Aetolians, to whose league
belonged certain Arcadian cities such as Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus.
These they imagined to be threatened by the policy of Aratus, which was
apt to proceed on the line that even a forcible attachment of a
Peloponnesian town to the league was in reality a liberation of its people
from a constraining power. The Spartan jealousy was aroused by the same
fear. And then, as Polybius puts it, the Aetolians connived at the extension
of Spartan power, even at the expense of cities in league with themselves, in
order to strengthen Cleomenes in his attitude of opposition to the
Achaeans.120 Aratus, however, resolved to wait for some definite act of
hostility before moving. This was supplied by Cleomenes building a fort
(the Athenaeum) at Belbina, in the territory of Megalopolis, a league city.

Cleomenic war, b.c. 227- Upon this the league necessarily proclaimed war with
221. Sparta. Thus does Polybius, a warm friend of the
league, state the case in its behalf. The league, he argues, had been growing
by the voluntary adherence of independent towns: it had shown no sign of
an intention to attack Laconian territory, or towns in league with Aetolia:
while Cleomenes had committed an act of wanton aggression and
provocation by building a hostile fort in its territory. But what the other side
had to say may be gathered from Plutarch’s life of Cleomenes, founded
principally on the work of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.121 Here
the case is put very differently. Aratus, according to him, had made up his
mind that a union of the Peloponnesus was the one thing necessary for the
safety of the league. In a great measure he had been already successful; but
the parts which still stood aloof were Elis, Laconia, and the cities of Arcadia
which were under the influence of Sparta.122 He therefore harassed these
last by every means in his power; and the erection or fortification of the
Athenaeum at Belbina by Cleomenes was in truth only a measure of
necessary defence. Aratus, indeed, held that some of these Arcadian cities
had been unfairly seized by Cleomenes, with the connivance of the
Aetolians;123 but to this Cleomenes might reply that, if the league claimed
the right of extending its connexion with the assent, often extorted, of the
various cities annexed, the same right could not justly be denied to himself.
b.c. 226-221. A series of military operations took place during the
next five years, in which Cleomenes nearly always got
the better of Aratus; who, able and courageous in plots and surprises, was
timid and ineffective in the field. The one important blow struck by Aratus,
that of seizing Mantinea, was afterwards nullified by a counter-occupation
of it by the Lacedaemonians; and in spite of troubles at home, caused by his
great scheme of reform, Cleomenes was by b.c. 224 in so superior a
position that he could with dignity propose terms to the league. He asked to
be elected Strategus, therefore.124 At first sight this seemed a means of
effecting the desired union of the Peloponnese; and as such the Achaeans
were inclined to accept the proposal. Aratus, however, exerted all his
influence to defeat the measure: and, in spite of all his failures, his services
to the league enabled him to convince his countrymen that they should
reject the offer; and he was himself elected Strategus for the twelfth time in
the spring of b.c. 223. Aratus has been loudly condemned for allowing a
selfish jealousy to override his care for the true interests of his country, in

thus refusing a prospect of a united Achaia, in which some one besides
himself should be the leading man.125 But I think there is something to be
said on the other side. What Aratus had been working for with a passionate
eagerness was a union of free democratic states. Cleomenes, in spite of his
liberal reforms at home, was a Spartan to the back bone. Aratus would have
no manner of doubt that a league, with Sparta supreme in it, would
inevitably become a Spartan kingdom. The forces of Sparta would be used
to crush dissenting cities; and soon to put down the free institution which
would always be disliked and feared by the Spartan government. Security
from Macedonian influence, if it were really obtained,—and that was far
from certain,—would be dearly purchased at the price of submission to
Spartan tyranny, which would be more galling and oppressive in proportion
as it was nearer and more unremitting. With these views Aratus began to
turn his eyes to the Macedonian court, as the only possible means of
resisting the encroaching policy of Cleomenes. The character of Antigonus
Doson, who was then administering Macedonia, gave some encouragement
to hope for honest and honourable conduct on his part; and after some
hesitation Aratus took the final step of asking for his aid.126 I do not expect
to carry the assent of many readers when I express the opinion that he was
right; and that the Greek policy towards Macedonia had been from the first
a grievous error,—fostered originally by the patriotic eloquence of
Demosthenes, and continued ever since by that ineradicable sentiment for
local autonomy which makes Greek history so interesting, but inevitably
tended to the political annihilation of Greece. Had some modus vivendi
been found with the series of very able sovereigns who ruled Macedonia, a
strong Greek nation might have been the result, with a central government
able to hold its own even in the face of the great “cloud in the West,” which
was surely overshadowing Greek freedom. But this was not to be. The taste
for local freedom was too strong; and showed itself by constant appeals to
an outside power against neighbours, which yet the very men who appealed
to it would not recognise or obey. The Greeks had to learn that nations
cannot, any more than individuals, eat their cake and have it too. Local
autonomy, and the complete liberty of every state to war with its neighbours
as it chooses, and of every one to speak and act as he pleases, have their
charms; but they are not compatible with a united resistance to a great
centralised and law-abiding power. And all the eloquence of all the Greek
orators rolled into one could not make up for the lack of unity, or enable the

distracted Greeks to raise an army which might stand before a volley of
Roman pila or a charge of Roman legionaries.
The help asked of Antigonus Doson was given with fatal readiness; but it
had to be purchased by the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the
Acrocorinthus, one of those “fetters of Greece,” the recovery of which had
been among Aratus’s earliest and most glorious triumphs. The battle of
Sellasia (b.c. 221) settled the question of Spartan influence. Cleomenes fled
to Alexandria and never returned. Sparta was not enslaved by Antigonus;
who on the contrary professed to restore her ancient constitution,—
probably meaning that the Ephoralty destroyed by Cleomenes was to be
reconstituted, and the exiles banished by him recalled. Practically she was
left a prey to a series of unscrupulous tyrants who one after the other
managed to obtain absolute power, Lycurgus (b.c. 220-210), Machanidas,
b.c. 210-207; Nabis, b.c. 207-192; who, though differing in their home
administrations, all agreed in using the enmity of the Aetolians in order to
harass and oppress the Achaeans in every possible way.

b.c. 213. Death of Aratus died in b.c. 213. The last seven years of his life
Aratus. were embittered by much ill success in his struggles
with the Aetolians; and by seeing Philip V., of whose presence in the
Peloponnese he was the main cause, after rendering some brilliant services
to the league, both in the Peloponnese and the invasion of Aetolia, develop
some of the worst vices of the tyrant; and he believed himself, whether
rightly or wrongly, to be poisoned by Philip’s order: “This is the reward,”
he said to an attendant when he felt himself dying, “of my friendship for
Philip.”127
The history of the league after his death followed the same course for some
years. The war with the Aetolians went on, sometimes slackly, sometimes
vigorously, as Philip V. was or was not diverted by contests with his
barbarian neighbours, or by schemes for joining the Carthaginian assaults
upon the Roman power.
The next phase of vigorous action on the part of the league is that which
b.c. 208-183, corresponds with the career of Philopoemen, who had
Philopoemen. already shown his energy and skill at the battle of
Sellasia. He was elected Hipparch in b.c. 210, and Strategus in b.c. 209. In

his first office he did much to reorganise the Achaean cavalry and restore
them to some discipline,128 and he extended this as Strategus to the whole
army.129 His life’s work, however, was the defeating and either killing or
confining to their frontier the tyrants of Sparta. But while he was absent
from the country after b.c. 200 a new element appeared in the Peloponnese.
In 197 the battle of Cynoscephalae put an end for ever to Macedonian
influence, and Flamininus proclaimed the liberty of all Greece in b.c. 195 at
b.c. 195-194. the Nemean festival. But Nabis was not deposed; he
was secured in his power by a treaty with Rome; and
when Philopoemen returned from Crete (b.c. 193), he found a fresh war on
the point of breaking out owing to intrigues between that tyrant and the
b.c. 193. Aetolians. They suggested, and he eagerly undertook to
make, an attempt to recover the maritime towns of
which he had been deprived by the Roman settlement.130Nabis at once
193-192. attacked Gythium: and seemed on the point of taking it
and the whole of the coast towns, which would thus
have been lost to the league. Philopoemen, now again Strategus (b.c. 192),
failed to relieve Gythium; but by a skilful piece of generalship inflicted so
severe a defeat on Nabis, as he was returning to Sparta, that he did not
venture on further movements beyond Laconia; and shortly afterwards was
assassinated by some Aetolians whom he had summoned to his aid.
But the comparative peace in the Peloponnese was again broken in b.c. 189
189-187. by the Spartans seizing a maritime town called Las; the
object being to relieve themselves of the restraint which
shut them from the sea, and the possible attacks of the exiles who had been
banished by Nabis, and who were always watching an opportunity to effect
their return. Philopoemen (Strategus both 189 and 188 b.c.) led an army to
the Laconian frontier in the spring of b.c. 188, and after the execution of
eighty Spartans, who had been surrendered on account of the seizure of Las,
and of the murder of thirty citizens who were supposed to have Achaean
proclivities—Sparta submitted to his demand to raze the fortifications,
dismiss the mercenaries, send away the new citizens enrolled by the tyrants,
and abolish the Lycurgean laws, accepting the Achaean institutions instead.
This was afterwards supplemented by a demand for the restoration of the
exiles banished by the tyrants. Such of the new citizens (three thousand) as

did not leave the country by the day named were seized and sold as
slaves.131
Sparta was now part of the Achaean league, which at this time reached its
b.c. 188. highest point of power; and its alliance was solicited by
the most powerful princes of the east. It is this period
188-183. which Polybius seems to have in mind in his description
of the league at its best, as embracing the whole of the
Lycortas Strategus, Peloponnese.132was in this third period of the existence
b.c. 184-182.
of the renewed league that his father Lycortas came to
the front, and he himself at an early age began taking part in politics.
But the terms imposed on Sparta were essentially violent and unjust, and, as
it turned out, impolitic. Cowed into submission, she proved a thorn in the
side of the league. The exiles continually appealed to Rome; and after
Philopoemen’s death (b.c. 183) the affairs of the league began more and
more to come before the Roman Senate. As usual, traitors were at hand
ready to sell their country for the sake of the triumph of their party; and
b.c. 179. Callicrates, sent to Rome to plead the cause of the
league,133 employed the opportunity to support himself
and his party by advising the Senate to give support to “the Romanisers” in
every state. This Polybius regards as the beginning of the decline of the
league. And the party of moderation, to which he and his father Lycortas
belonged, and which wished to assert the dignity and legal rights of their
country while offering no provocation to the Romans, were eventually
included under the sweeping decree which caused them, to the number of a
thousand, to be deported to Italy. We have already seen, in tracing the life of
Polybius, how the poor remnants of these exiles returned in b.c. 151,
embittered against Rome, and having learnt nothing and forgotten nothing.
And how the old quarrels were renewed, until an armed interference of
Rome was brought upon them; and how the victory of Mummius at Corinth
(b.c. 146), and the consequent settlement of the commissioners, finally
dissolved the league into separate cantons, nominally autonomous, but
really entirely subject to Rome.134
The constitution of the league presents many points of interest to the
student of politics, and has been elaborately discussed by more than one

English scholar. I shall content myself here with pointing out some of the
main features as they are mentioned by Polybius.135
The league was a federation of free towns, all retaining full local autonomy
of some form or other of democracy, which for certain purposes were under
federal laws and federal magistrates, elected in a federal assembly which all
citizens of the league towns might if they chose attend. All towns of the
league also used the same standards in coinage and weights and measures
(2, 37). The assembly of the league (σύνοδος) met for election of the chief
magistrate in May of each year, at first always at Aegium, but later at the
other towns of the league in turn (29, 23); and a second time in the
autumn.136 And besides these annual meetings, the Strategus, acting with
his council of magistrates, could summon a meeting at any time for three
days (e.g. at Sicyon, 23, 17); and on one occasion we find the assembly
delegating its powers to the armed levy of league troops, who for the nonce
were to act as an assembly (4, 7). Side by side with this general assembly
was a council (βουλή), the functions and powers of which we cannot clearly
ascertain. It seems to have acted as representing the general assembly in
foreign affairs (4, 26; 22, 12); and, being a working committee of the whole
assembly, it sometimes happened that when an assembly was summoned on
some subject which did not rouse popular interest, it practically was the
assembly (29, 24). Its numbers have been assumed to be one hundred and
twenty, from the fact that Eumenes offered them a present of one hundred
and twenty talents, the interest of which was to pay their expenses. But this,
after all, is not a certain deduction (22, 10).
The officers of the league were: First, a President or Strategus who kept the
seal of the league (4, 7), ordered the levy of federal troops, and commanded
it in the field. He also summoned the assemblies, and brought the business
to be done before them, which was in the form of a proposal to be accepted
or rejected, not amended. He was not chairman of the assembly, but like an
English minister or a Roman consul brought on the proposals. He was
assisted by a kind of cabinet of ten magistrates from the several towns, who
were called Demiurgi (δημιουργοὶ 23, 5).137 This was their technical name:
but Polybius also speaks of them under the more general appellation of οἱ
ἄρχοντες (5, 1), οἱ συνάρχοντες (23, 16), αἱ ἀρχαὶ (22, 13), αἱ συναρχίαι
(27, 2). Whether the number ten had reference to the ten old towns of the

league or not, it was not increased with the number of the towns; and,
though we are not informed how they were elected, it seems reasonable to
suppose that they were freely selected without reference to the towns from
which they came, as the Strategus himself was. There was also a vice-
president, or hypo-strategus, whose position was, I think, wholly military.
He did not rule in absence of the Strategus, or succeed him in case of death,
that being reserved for the Strategus of the previous year; but he took a
certain command in war next the Strategus (5, 94; 4, 59). Besides these we
hear of a Hipparch to command the league cavalry (5, 95; 7, 10, 22), an
office which seems to have been regarded as stepping-stone to that of
Strategus. This proved a bad arrangement, as its holder was tempted to seek
popularity by winking at derelictions of duty among the cavalry who were
voters.138 There was also a Navarch to command the regular squadron of
federal ships (5, 94), who does not seem to have been so important a
person. There are also mentioned certain judges (δίκασται) to administer the
federal law. We hear of them, however, performing duties closely bordering
on politics; for they decided whether certain honorary inscriptions, statues,
or other marks of respect to king Eumenes should be allowed to remain in
the Achaean cities (28, 7).
The Strategus, on the order of the assembly, raised the federal army (4, 7).
The number of men raised differed according to circumstances. A fairly full
levy seems to have been five thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry (4,
15). But the league also used mercenaries to a great extent. And we hear of
one army which was to consist of eight thousand mercenary infantry, with
five hundred mercenary cavalry; and in this case the Achaean levy was only
to be three thousand infantry, with three hundred cavalry (5, 91).
The pay of the mercenaries and other league expenses were provided for by
an εἰσφορά or contribution from all the states (5, 31, 91). The contributing
towns appear to have been able to recover their payments as an
indemnification for damage which the federal forces had failed to avert (4,
60).
The regular federal squadron of ships for guarding the sea-coasts appears to
have consisted of ten triremes (2, 9; δεκαναία μακρῶν πλοίων 22, 10).

Such was the organisation of the Federal Government. It was in form purely
democratic, all members of thirty years old being eligible for office, as well
as possessing a vote in the assemblies. But a mass assembly where the
members are widely scattered inevitably becomes oligarchic. Only the well-
to-do and the energetic will be able or will care to come a long journey to
attend. And as the votes in the assembly were given by towns, it must often
have happened that the votes of many towns were decided by a very small
number of their citizens who were there. No doubt, in times of great
excitement, the attendance would be large and the vote a popular one. But
the general policy of the league must have been directed by a small number
of energetic men, who made politics their profession and could afford to do
so.

ROMAN CAMP FOR TWO LEGIONS

CONTAINING 4,068,289 SQUARE FEET

P*. Praetorium.
T T’. Tents of the Tribuni Militum of two legions.
E E’. Equites of two legions.
P P’. Principes ” ”
H H’. Hastati ” ”
T T’. Triarii ” ”
ES ES’. Equites of Socii of two legions.
PS PS’. Pedites ” ” ”
PE PE’. Equites of the Praetorian Cohort of two legions.
PP PP’. Pedites ” ” ” ”
EP EP’. Pedites extraordinarii of two legions.
EE EE’. Equites ” ”
Q. Quaestorium.
F. Forum or market-place.
V V’. Foreigners or volunteers.

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK I

1. Had the praise of History been passed over by former Chroniclers it
Introduction. The would perhaps have been incumbent upon me to urge
importance and the choice and special study of records of this sort, as
magnitude of the subject.
the readiest means men can have of correcting their
knowledge of the past. But my predecessors have not been sparing in this
respect. They have all begun and ended, so to speak, by enlarging on this
theme: asserting again and again that the study of History is in the truest
sense an education, and a training for political life; and that the most
instructive, or rather the only, method of learning to bear with dignity the
vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the catastrophes of others. It is evident,
therefore, that no one need think it his duty to repeat what has been said by
many, and said well. Least of all myself: for the surprising nature of the
events which I have undertaken to relate is in itself sufficient to challenge
and stimulate the attention of every one, old or young, to the study of my
work. Can any one be so indifferent or idle as not to care to know by what
means, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world
was conquered and brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome,
and that too within a period of not quite fifty-three years? Or who again can
b.c. 219-167. be so completely absorbed in other subjects of
contemplation or study, as to think any of them superior
in importance to the accurate understanding of an event for which the past
affords no precedent.
2. We shall best show how marvellous and vast our subject is by comparing
Immensity of the Roman the most famous Empires which preceded, and which
Empire shown by have been the favourite themes of historians, and
comparison with Persia,
Sparta, Macedonia. 1.
measuring them with the superior greatness of Rome.
Persia. There are but three that deserve even to be so compared
and measured: and they are these. The Persians for a
certain length of time were possessed of a great empire and dominion. But
2. Sparta. b.c. 405-394. every time they ventured beyond the limits of Asia, they
found not only their empire, but their own existence
also in danger. The Lacedaemonians, after contending for supremacy in

Greece for many generations, when they did get it, held it without dispute
3. Macedonia. for barely twelve years. The Macedonians obtained
dominion in Europe from the lands bordering on the
Adriatic to the Danube,—which after all is but a small fraction of this
continent,—and, by the destruction of the Persian Empire, they afterwards
added to that the dominion of Asia. And yet, though they had the credit of
having made themselves masters of a larger number of countries and states
than any people had ever done, they still left the greater half of the
inhabited world in the hands of others. They never so much as thought of
attempting Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya: and as to Europe, to speak the plain
truth, they never even knew of the most warlike tribes of the West. The
Roman conquest, on the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole
inhabited world was reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind
them an empire not to be paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future.
Students will gain from my narrative a clearer view of the whole story, and
of the numerous and important advantages which such exact record of
events offers.
3. My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it
b.c. 220-217. The starts are these. In Greece, what is called the Social
History starts from the war: the first waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and
140th Olympiad, when
the tendency towards
father of Perseus, in league with the Achaeans against
unity first shows itself. the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator
carried on against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the
conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian war.
My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off. Now up to
this time the world’s history had been, so to speak, a series of disconnected
transactions, as widely separated in their origin and results as in their
localities. But from this time forth History becomes a connected whole: the
affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and
the tendency of all is to unity. This is why I have fixed upon this era as the
starting-point of my work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in
this war, and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most
essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged
the Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and to
cross with an army into Greece and Asia.

Now, had the states that were rivals for universal empire been familiarly
A sketch of their known to us, no reference perhaps to their previous
previous history history would have been necessary, to show the purpose
necessary to explain the
success of the Romans.
and the forces with which they approached an
undertaking of this nature and magnitude. But the fact
is that the majority of the Greeks have no knowledge of the previous
constitution, power, or achievements either of Rome or Carthage. I
therefore concluded that it was necessary to prefix this and the next book to
my History. I was anxious that no one, when fairly embarked upon my
actual narrative, should feel at a loss, and have to ask what were the designs
entertained by the Romans, or the forces and means at their disposal, that
they entered upon those undertakings, which did in fact lead to their
becoming masters of land and sea everywhere in our part of the world. I
wished, on the contrary, that these books of mine, and the prefatory sketch
which they contained, might make it clear that the resources they started
with justified their original idea, and sufficiently explained their final
success in grasping universal empire and dominion.
4. There is this analogy between the plan of my History and the marvellous
The need of a spirit of the age with which I have to deal. Just as
comprehensive view of Fortune made almost all the affairs of the world incline
history as well as a close
study of an epoch.
in one direction, and forced them to converge upon one
and the same point; so it is my task as an historian to
put before my readers a compendious view of the part played by Fortune in
bringing about the general catastrophe. It was this peculiarity which
originally challenged my attention, and determined me on undertaking this
work. And combined with this was the fact that no writer of our time has
undertaken a general history. Had any one done so my ambition in this
direction would have been much diminished. But, in point of fact, I notice
that by far the greater number of historians concern themselves with
isolated wars and the incidents that accompany them: while as to a general
and comprehensive scheme of events, their date, origin, and catastrophe, no
one as far as I know has undertaken to examine it. I thought it, therefore,
distinctly my duty neither to pass by myself, nor allow any one else to pass
by, without full study, a characteristic specimen of the dealings of Fortune
at once brilliant and instructive in the highest degree. For fruitful as Fortune
is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men,

yet never assuredly before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a
drama, as that which we have witnessed. And of this we cannot obtain a
comprehensive view from writers of mere episodes. It would be as absurd
to expect to do so as for a man to imagine that he has learnt the shape of the
whole world, its entire arrangement and order, because he has visited one
after the other the most famous cities in it; or perhaps merely examined
them in separate pictures. That would be indeed absurd: and it has always
seemed to me that men, who are persuaded that they get a competent view
of universal from episodical history, are very like persons who should see
the limbs of some body, which had once been living and beautiful, scattered
and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as actually
beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself. But if some
one could there and then reconstruct the animal once more, in the perfection
of its beauty and the charm of its vitality, and could display it to the same
people, they would beyond doubt confess that they had been far from
conceiving the truth, and had been little better than dreamers. For indeed
some idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate knowledge
and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we must conclude that
episodical history contributes exceedingly little to the familiar knowledge
and secure grasp of universal history. While it is only by the combination
and comparison of the separate parts of the whole,—by observing their
likeness and their difference,—that a man can attain his object: can obtain a
view at once clear and complete; and thus secure both the profit and the
delight of History.
5. I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which
b.c. 264-261. I begin my the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This is just
preliminary account in where the History of Timaeus left off; and it falls in the
the 129th Olympiad, and
with the circumstances
129th Olympiad. I shall accordingly have to describe
which took the Romans what the state of their affairs in Italy was, how long that
to Sicily. settlement had lasted, and on what resources they
reckoned, when they resolved to invade Sicily. For this was the first place
outside Italy in which they set foot. The precise cause of their thus crossing
I must state without comment; for if I let one cause lead me back to another,
my point of departure will always elude my grasp, and I shall never arrive
at the view of my subject which I wish to present. As to dates, then, I must
fix on some era agreed upon and recognised by all: and as to events, one

that admits of distinctly separate treatment; even though I may be obliged to
go back some short way in point of time, and take a summary review of the
intermediate transactions. For if the facts with which one starts are
unknown, or even open to controversy, all that comes after will fail of
approval and belief. But opinion being once formed on that point, and a
general assent obtained, all the succeeding narrative becomes intelligible.
6. It was in the nineteenth year after the sea-fight at Aegospotami, and the
b.c. 387-386. The rise of sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra; the year in which
the Roman dominion the Lacedaemonians made what is called the Peace of
may be traced from the
retirement of the Gauls
Antalcidas with the King of Persia; the year in which
from the city. From that the elder Dionysius was besieging Rhegium after
time one nation after beating the Italian Greeks on the River Elleporus; and
another in Italy fell into
their hands. in which the Gauls took Rome itself by storm and were
occupying the whole of it except the Capitol. With these
Gauls the Romans made a treaty and settlement which they were content to
accept: and having thus become beyond all expectation once more masters
of their own country, they made a start in their career of expansion; and in
the succeeding period engaged in various wars with their neighbours. First,
The Latini. by dint of valour, and the good fortune which attended
them in the field, they mastered all the Latini; then they
The Etruscans, Gauls, went to war with the Etruscans; then with the Celts; and
and Samnites. next with the Samnites, who lived on the eastern and
northern frontiers of Latium. Some time after this the Tarentines insulted
the ambassadors of Rome, and, in fear of the consequences, invited and
Pyrrhus, b.c. 280. obtained the assistance of Pyrrhus. This happened in the
year before the Gauls invaded Greece, some of whom
perished near Delphi, while others crossed into Asia. Then it was that the
Romans—having reduced the Etruscans and Samnites to obedience, and
conquered the Italian Celts in many battles—attempted for the first time the
Southern Italy. reduction of the rest of Italy. The nations for whose
possessions they were about to fight they affected to
regard, not in the light of foreigners, but as already for the most part
belonging and pertaining to themselves. The experience gained from their
contests with the Samnites and the Celts had served as a genuine training in
Pyrrhus finally quits the art of war. Accordingly, they entered upon the war
Italy, b.c. 274. with spirit, drove Pyrrhus from Italy, and then

undertook to fight with and subdue those who had taken part with him.
They succeeded everywhere to a marvel, and reduced to obedience all the
tribes inhabiting Italy except the Celts; after which they undertook to
besiege some of their own citizens, who at that time were occupying
Rhegium.
7. For misfortunes befell Messene and Rhegium, the cities built on either
The story of the side of the Strait, peculiar in their nature and alike in
Mamertines at Messene, their circumstances.
and the Roman garrison
at Rhegium, Dio. Not long before the period we are now describing some
Cassius fr.
Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles, having for some
time cast greedy eyes upon Messene, owing to its beauty and wealth, no
sooner got an opportunity than they made a treacherous attempt upon that
1. Messene. city. They entered the town under guise of friendship,
and, having once got possession of it, they drove out
Agathocles died, some of the citizens and put others to the sword. This
b.c. 289. done, they seized promiscuously the wives and children
of the dispossessed citizens, each keeping those which fortune had assigned
him at the very moment of the lawless deed. All other property and the land
they took possession of by a subsequent division and retained.
The speed with which they became masters of a fair territory and city found
2. Rhegium, Livy Ep. 12. ready imitators of their conduct. The people of
Rhegium, when Pyrrhus was crossing to Italy, felt a
double anxiety. They were dismayed at the thought of his approach, and at
the same time were afraid of the Carthaginians as being masters of the sea.
Pyrrhus in Sicily, They accordingly asked and obtained a force from
b.c. 278-275. Rome to guard and support them. The garrison, four
thousand in number, under the command of a Campanian named Decius
Jubellius, entered the city, and for a time preserved it, as well as their own
faith. But at last, conceiving the idea of imitating the Mamertines, and
having at the same time obtained their co-operation, they broke faith with
the people of Rhegium, enamoured of the pleasant site of the town and the
private wealth of the citizens, and seized the city after having, in imitation
of the Mamertines, first driven out some of the people and put others to the
sword. Now, though the Romans were much annoyed at this transaction,
they could take no active steps, because they were deeply engaged in the

wars I have mentioned above. But having got free from them they invested
b.c. 271. C. Quintus and besieged the troops. They presently took the place
Claudius, L. Genucius and killed the greater number in the assault,—for the
Clepsina, Coss.
men resisted desperately, knowing what must follow,—
but took more than three hundred alive. These were sent to Rome, and there
the Consuls brought them into the forum, where they were scourged and
beheaded according to custom: for they wished as far as they could to
vindicate their good faith in the eyes of the allies. The territory and town
they at once handed over to the people of Rhegium.
8. But the Mamertines (for this was the name which the Campanians gave
Effect of the fall of the themselves after they became masters of Messene), as
rebellious garrison of long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Roman captors
Rhegium on the
Mamertines.
of Rhegium, not only exercised absolute control over
their own town and district undisturbed, but about the
neighbouring territory also gave no little trouble to the Carthaginians and
Syracusans, and levied tribute from many parts of Sicily. But when they
were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now invested
and besieged, they were themselves promptly forced back into the town
again by the Syracusans, under circumstances which I will now detail.
Not long before this the military forces of the Syracusans had quarrelled
with the citizens, and while stationed near Merganè elected commanders
The rise of Hiero. He is from their own body. These were Artemidorus and
elected General by the Hiero, the latter of whom afterwards became King of
army, b.c. 275-274.
Syracuse. At this time he was quite a young man, but
had a certain natural aptitude for kingcraft and the politic conduct of affairs.
Having taken over the command, and having by means of some of his
connexions made his way into the city, he got his political opponents into
his hands; but conducted the government with such mildness, and in so
lofty a spirit, that the Syracusans, though by no means usually acquiescing
in the election of officers by the soldiers, did on this occasion unanimously
approve of Hiero as their general. His first step made it evident to close
observers that his hopes soared above the position of a mere general.
9. He noticed that among the Syracusans the despatch of troops, and of
magistrates in command of them, was always the signal for revolutionary
movements of some sort or another. He knew, too, that of all the citizens

Secures support of Leptines enjoyed the highest position and credit, and
Leptines by marrying his that among the common people especially he was by far
daughter.
the most influential man existing. He accordingly
contracted a relationship by marriage with him, that he might have a
representative of his interests left at home at such times as he should be
himself bound to go abroad with the troops for a campaign. After marrying
the daughter of this man, his next step was in regard to the old mercenaries.
His device for getting rid He observed that they were disaffected and mutinous:
of mutinous mercenaries. and he accordingly led out an expedition, with the
ostensible purpose of attacking the foreigners who were in occupation of
Messene. He pitched a camp against the enemy near Centuripa, and drew
Fiume Salso. up his line resting on the River Cyamosorus. But the
cavalry and infantry, which consisted of citizens, he
kept together under his personal command at some distance, on pretence of
intending to attack the enemy on another quarter: the mercenaries he thrust
to the front and allowed them to be completely cut to pieces by the
foreigners; while he seized the moment of their rout to affect a safe retreat
for himself and the citizens into Syracuse. This stroke of policy was skilful
and successful. He had got rid of the mutinous and seditious element in the
army; and after enlisting on his own account a sufficient body of
mercenaries, he thenceforth carried on the business of the government in
Hiero next attacks the security. But seeing that the Mamertines were
Mamertines and defeats encouraged by their success to greater confidence and
them near Mylae,
b.c. 268.
recklessness in their excursions, he fully armed and
energetically drilled the citizen levies, led them out, and
engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near the River Longanus. He
inflicted a severe defeat upon them: took their leaders prisoners: put a
complete end to their audacious proceedings: and on his return to Syracuse
was himself greeted by all the allies with the title of King.
10. Thus were the Mamertines first deprived of support from Rhegium, and
then subjected, from causes which I have just stated, to a complete defeat
Some of the conquered on their own account. Thereupon some of them betook
Mamertines appeal to themselves to the protection of the Carthaginians, and
Rome for help.
were for putting themselves and their citadel into their
hands; while others set about sending an embassy to Rome to offer a
surrender of their city, and to beg assistance on the ground of the ties of

race which united them. The Romans were long in doubt. The inconsistency
of sending such aid seemed manifest. A little while ago they had put some
of their own citizens to death, with the extreme penalties of the law, for
having broken faith with the people of Rhegium: and now so soon
The motives of the afterwards to assist the Mamertines, who had done
Romans in acceding to precisely the same to Messene as well as Rhegium,
this prayer,—jealousy of
the growing power of
involved a breach of equity very hard to justify. But
Carthage. while fully alive to these points, they yet saw that
Carthaginian aggrandisement was not confined to
Libya, but had embraced many districts in Iberia as well; and that Carthage
was, besides, mistress of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian
seas: they were beginning, therefore, to be exceedingly anxious lest, if the
Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find them very
dangerous and formidable neighbours, surrounding them as they would on
every side, and occupying a position which commanded all the coasts of
Italy. Now it was clear that, if the Mamertines did not obtain the assistance
they asked for, the Carthaginians would very soon reduce Sicily. For should
they avail themselves of the voluntary offer of Messene and become
masters of it, they were certain before long to crush Syracuse also, since
they were already lords of nearly the whole of the rest of Sicily. The
Romans saw all this, and felt that it was absolutely necessary not to let
Messene slip, or allow the Carthaginians to secure what would be like a
bridge to enable them to cross into Italy.
11. In spite of protracted deliberations, the conflict of motives proved too
The Senate shirk the strong, after all, to allow of the Senate coming to any
responsibility of decision; for the inconsistency of aiding the Messenians
decision. The people
vote for helping the
appeared to them to be evenly balanced by the
Mamertines. advantages to be gained by doing so. The people,
however, had suffered much from the previous wars,
and wanted some means of repairing the losses which they had sustained in
every department. Besides these national advantages to be gained by the
war, the military commanders suggested that individually they would get
manifest and important benefits from it. They accordingly voted in favour
b.c. 264. Appius of giving the aid. The decree having thus been passed
Claudius Caudex. M. by the people, they elected one of the consuls, Appius
Fulvius Flaccus, Coss.
Claudius, to the command, and sent him out with

instructions to cross to Messene and relieve the Mamertines. These latter
managed, between threats and false representations, to oust the
Carthaginian commander who was already in possession of the citadel,
invited Appius in, and offered to deliver the city into his hands. The
Carthaginians crucified their commander for what they considered to be his
cowardice and folly in thus losing the citadel; stationed their fleet near
Pelorus; their land forces at a place called Synes; and laid vigorous siege to
Hiero joins Carthage in Messene. Now at this juncture Hiero, thinking it a
laying siege to the favourable opportunity for totally expelling from Sicily
Mamertines in Messene.
Appius comes to the
the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene,
relief of the besieged, made a treaty with the Carthaginians. Having done this,
b.c. 264. he started from Syracuse upon an expedition against
that city. He pitched his camp on the opposite side to the Carthaginians,
near what was called the Chalcidian Mount, whereby the garrison were cut
off from that way out as well as from the other. The Roman Consul Appius,
for his part, gallantly crossed the strait by night and got into Messene. But
he found that the enemy had completely surrounded the town and were
vigorously pressing on the attack; and he concluded on reflection that the
siege could bring him neither credit nor security so long as the enemy
commanded land as well as sea. He accordingly first endeavoured to relieve
the Mamertines from the contest altogether by sending embassies to both of
After vain attempts at the attacking forces. Neither of them received his
negotiation, Appius proposals, and at last, from sheer necessity, he made up
determines to attack
Hiero.
his mind to hazard an engagement, and that he would
begin with the Syracusans. So he led out his forces and
drew them up for the fight: nor was the Syracusan backward in accepting
the challenge, but descended simultaneously to give him battle. After a
Hiero is defeated, and prolonged struggle, Appius got the better of the enemy,
returns to Syracuse. and chased the opposing forces right up to their
entrenchments. The result of this was that Appius, after stripping the dead,
retired into Messene again, while Hiero, with a foreboding of the final
result, only waited for nightfall to beat a hasty retreat to Syracuse.
12. Next morning, when Appius was assured of their flight, his confidence
was strengthened, and he made up his mind to attack the Carthaginians
Encouraged by this without delay. Accordingly, he issued orders to the
success, he attacks and soldiers to despatch their preparations early, and at

drives off the daybreak commenced his sally. Having succeeded in
Carthaginians.
engaging the enemy, he killed a large number of them,
and forced the rest to fly precipitately to the neighbouring towns. These
successes sufficed to raise the siege of Messene: and thenceforth he scoured
the territory of Syracuse and her allies with impunity, and laid it waste
without finding any one to dispute the possession of the open country with
him; and finally he sat down before Syracuse itself and laid siege to it.
Such was the nature and motive of the first warlike expedition of the
Such preliminary Romans beyond the shores of Italy; and this was the
sketches are necessary period at which it took place. I thought this expedition
for clearness, and my
readers must not be
the most suitable starting-point for my whole narrative,
surprised if I follow the and accordingly adopted it as a basis; though I have
same system in the case made a rapid survey of some anterior events, that in
of other towns.
setting forth its causes no point should be left obscure. I
thought it necessary, if we were to get an adequate and comprehensive view
of their present supreme position, to trace clearly how and when the
Romans, after the disaster which they sustained in the loss of their own city,
began their upward career; and how and when, once more, after possessing
themselves of Italy, they conceived the idea of attempting conquests
external to it. This must account in future parts of my work for my taking,
when treating of the most important states, a preliminary survey of their
previous history. In doing so my object will be to secure such a vantage-
ground as will enable us to see with clearness from what origin, at what
period, and in what circumstances they severally started and arrived at their
present position. This is exactly what I have just done with regard to the
Romans.
13. It is time to have done with these explanations, and to come to my
subject, after a brief and summary statement of the events of which my
Subjects of the two first introductory books are to treat. Of these the first in
books of the Histories. order of time are those which befell the Romans and
1. War in Sicily or first
Punic War, b.c. 264-241.
Carthaginians in their war for the possession of Sicily.
2. The Mercenary or Next comes the Libyan or Mercenary war; immediately
“inexpiable” war, following on which are the Carthaginian achievements
b.c. 240-237.
3. Carthaginian in Spain, first under Hamilcar, and then under
movements in Spain, Hasdrubal. In the course of these events, again,
b.c. 241-218. occurred the first expedition of the Romans into Illyria

4. Illyrian war, b.c. 229- and the Greek side of Europe; and, besides that, their
228.
5. Gallic war, b.c. 225- struggles within Italy with the Celts. In Greece at the
221. same time the war called after Cleomenes was in full
6. Cleomenic war, action. With this war I design to conclude my prefatory
b.c. 227-221.
sketch and my second book.
To enter into minute details of these events is unnecessary, and would be of
no advantage to my readers. It is not part of my plan to write a history of
them: my sole object is to recapitulate them in a summary manner by way
of introduction to the narrative I have in hand. I will, therefore, touch
lightly upon the leading events of this period in a comprehensive sketch,
and will endeavour to make the end of it dovetail with the commencement
of my main history. In this way the narrative will acquire a continuity; and I
shall be shown to have had good reason for touching on points already
treated by others: while by such an arrangement the studiously inclined will
find the approach to the story which has to be told made intelligible and
The first Punic war easy for them. I shall, however, endeavour to describe
deserves more detailed with somewhat more care the first war which arose
treatment, as furnishing a
better basis for
between the Romans and Carthaginians for the
comparing Rome and possession of Sicily. For it would not be easy to
Carthage than mention any war that lasted longer than this one; nor
subsequent wars.
one in which the preparations made were on a larger
scale, or the efforts made more sustained, or the actual engagements more
numerous, or the reverses sustained on either side more signal. Moreover,
the two states themselves were at the precise period of their history when
their institutions were as yet in their original integrity, their fortunes still at
a moderate level, and their forces on an equal footing. So that those who
wish to gain a fair view of the national characteristics and resources of the
two had better base their comparison upon this war rather than upon those
which came after.
14. But it was not these considerations only which induced me to undertake
This is rendered more the history of this war. I was influenced quite as much
necessary by the partisan by the fact that Philinus and Fabius, who have the
misrepresentations of
Philinus and Fabius
reputation of writing with the most complete knowledge
Pictor. about it, have given us an inadequate representation of
the truth. Now, judging from their lives and principles, I
do not suppose that these writers have intentionally stated what was false;

but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love.
Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the
actions of the Carthaginians were characterised by wisdom, honour, and
courage: those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact
opposite. Now in other relations of life one would hesitate to exclude such
warmth of sentiment: for a good man ought to be loyal to his friends and
patriotic to his country; ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds
and likings. But directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he
ought to forget all considerations of that kind. There will be many occasions
on which he will be bound to speak well of his enemies, and even to praise
them in the highest terms if the facts demand it: and on the other hand many
occasions on which it will be his duty to criticise and denounce his own
side, however dear to him, if their errors of conduct suggest that course. For
as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if
you take truth from History what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale.
Therefore, one must not shrink either from blaming one’s friends or
praising one’s enemies; nor be afraid of finding fault with and commending
the same persons at different times. For it is impossible that men engaged in
public affairs should always be right, and unlikely that they should always
be wrong. Holding ourselves, therefore, entirely aloof from the actors, we
must as historians make statements and pronounce judgment in accordance
with the actions themselves.
15. The writers whom I have named exemplify the truth of these remarks.
Philinus’s Philinus, for instance, commencing the narrative with
misrepresentations. his second book, says that the “Carthaginians and
Syracusans engaged in the war and sat down before Messene; that the
Romans arriving by sea entered the town, and immediately sallied out from
it to attack the Syracusans; but that after suffering severely in the
engagement they retired into Messene; and that on a second occasion,
having issued forth to attack the Carthaginians, they not only suffered
severely but lost a considerable number of their men captured by the
enemy.” But while making this statement, he represents Hiero as so
destitute of sense as, after this engagement, not only to have promptly burnt
his stockade and tents and fled under cover of night to Syracuse, but to have
abandoned all the forts which had been established to overawe the
Messenian territory. Similarly he asserts that “the Carthaginians

immediately after their battle evacuated their entrenchment and dispersed
into various towns, without venturing any longer even to dispute the
possession of the open country; and that, accordingly, their leaders seeing
that their troops were utterly demoralised determined in consideration not to
risk a battle: that the Romans followed them, and not only laid waste the
territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but actually sat down before
Syracuse itself and began to lay siege to it.” These statements appear to me
to be full of glaring inconsistency, and to call for no refutation at all. The
very men whom he describes to begin with as besieging Messene, and as
victorious in the engagements, he afterwards represents as running away,
abandoning the open country, and utterly demoralised: while those whom
he starts by saying were defeated and besieged, he concludes by describing
as engaging in a pursuit, as promptly seizing the open places, and finally as
besieging Syracuse. Nothing can reconcile these statements. It is
impossible. Either his initial statement, or his account of the subsequent
events, must be false. In point of fact the latter part of his story is the true
one. The Syracusans and Carthaginians did abandon the open country, and
the Romans did immediately afterwards commence a siege of Syracuse and
of Echetla, which lies in the district between the Syracusan and
Carthaginian pales. For the rest it must necessarily be acknowledged that
the first part of his account is false; and that whereas the Romans were
victorious in the engagements under Messene, they have been represented
by this historian as defeated. Through the whole of this work we shall find
Philinus acting in a similar spirit: and much the same may be said of Fabius,
as I shall show when the several points arise.
I have now said what was proper on the subject of this digression.
Returning to the matter in hand I will endeavour by a continuous narrative
of moderate dimensions to guide my readers to a true knowledge of this
war.
16. When news came to Rome of the successes of Appius and his legions,
b.c. 264. the people elected Manius Otacilius and Manius
Valerius Consuls, and despatched their whole army to
(Continuing from chap. Sicily, and both Consuls in command. Now the Romans
xii.), b.c. 263, Manius have in all, as distinct from allies, four legions of
Valerius Maximus,
Manius Otacilius
Roman citizens, which they enrol every year, each of
Crassus, Coss. The which consists of four thousand infantry and three

Consuls with four hundred cavalry: and on their arrival most of the cities
legions are sent to Sicily.
A general move of the revolted from Syracuse as well as from Carthage, and
Sicilian cities to join joined the Romans. And when he saw the terror and
them. Hiero submits. dismay of the Sicilians, and compared with them the
number and crushing strength of the legions of Rome, Hiero began, from a
review of all these points, to conclude that the prospects of the Romans
were brighter than those of the Carthaginians. Inclining therefore from these
considerations to the side of the former, he began sending messages to the
Consuls, proposing peace and friendship with them. The Romans accepted
his offer, their chief motive being the consideration of provisions: for as the
Carthaginians had command of the sea, they were afraid of being cut off at
every point from their supplies, warned by the fact that the legions which
had previously crossed had run very short in that respect. They therefore
gladly accepted Hiero’s offers of friendship, supposing that he would be of
signal service to them in this particular. The king engaged to restore his
prisoners without ransom, and to pay besides an indemnity of a hundred
talents of silver. The treaty being arranged on these terms, the Romans
thenceforth regarded the Syracusans as friends and allies: while King Hiero,
having thus placed himself under the protection of the Romans, never failed
to supply their needs in times of difficulty; and for the rest of his life
reigned securely in Syracuse, devoting his energies to gaining the gratitude
and good opinion of the Greeks. And in point of fact no monarch ever
acquired a greater reputation, or enjoyed for a longer period the fruits of his
prudent policy in private as well as in public affairs.
17. When the text of this treaty reached Rome, and the people had approved
The Carthaginians and confirmed the terms made with Hiero, the Roman
alarmed at Hiero’s government thereupon decided not to send all their
defection make great
efforts to increase their
forces, as they had intended doing, but only two
army in Sicily. legions. For they thought that the gravity of the war was
lessened by the adhesion of the king, and at the same
time that the army would thus be better off for provisions. But when the
Carthaginian government saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that
the Romans were taking a more decided part in Sicilian politics, they
conceived that they must have a more formidable force to enable them to
confront their enemy and maintain their own interests in Sicily.
They select Agrigentum Accordingly, they enlisted mercenaries from over sea—
as their headquarters.

a large number of Ligurians and Celts, and a still larger number of Iberians
—and despatched them to Sicily. And perceiving that Agrigentum
possessed the greatest natural advantages as a place of arms, and was the
most powerful city in their province, they collected their supplies and their
forces into it, deciding to use this city as their headquarters for the war.
On the Roman side a change of commanders had now taken place. The
b.c. 262. Consuls who made the treaty with Hiero had gone
home, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and
Quintus Mamilius, were come to Sicily with their legions. Observing the
The new Consuls, Lucius measure which the Carthaginians were taking, and the
Postumius Megellus and forces they were concentrating at Agrigentum, they
Quintus Mamilius
Vitulus, determined to
made up their minds to take that matter in hand and
lay siege to Agrigentum. strike a bold blow. Accordingly they suspended every
other department of the war, and bearing down upon
Agrigentum itself with their whole army, attacked it in force; pitched their
camp within a distance of eight stades from the city; and confined the
The Carthaginians make Carthaginians within the walls. Now it was just harvest-
an unsuccessful sally. time, and the siege was evidently destined to be a long
one: the soldiers, therefore, went out to collect the corn with greater
hardihood than they ought to have done. Accordingly the Carthaginians,
seeing the enemy scattered about the fields, sallied out and attacked the
harvesting-parties. They easily routed these; and then one portion of them
made a rush to destroy the Roman entrenchment, the other to attack the
pickets. But the peculiarity of their institutions saved the Roman fortunes,
as it had often done before. Among them it is death for a man to desert his
post, or to fly from his station on any pretext whatever. Accordingly on this,
as on other occasions, they gallantly held their ground against opponents
many times their own number; and though they lost many of their own men,
they killed still more of the enemy, and at last outflanked the foes just as
they were on the point of demolishing the palisade of the camp. Some they
put to the sword, and the rest they pursued with slaughter into the city.
18. The result was that thenceforth the Carthaginians were somewhat less
forward in making such attacks, and the Romans more cautious in foraging.
Finding that the Carthaginians would not come out to meet them at close
quarters any more, the Roman generals divided their forces: with one

The Romans form two division they occupied the ground round the temple of
strongly-entrenched Asclepius outside the town; with the other they
camps.
encamped in the outskirts of the city on the side which
looks towards Heracleia. The space between the camps on either side of the
city they secured by two trenches,—the inner one to protect themselves
against sallies from the city, the outer as a precaution against attacks from
without, and to intercept those persons or supplies which always make their
way surreptitiously into cities that are sustaining a siege. The spaces
between the trenches uniting the camps they secured by pickets, taking care
in their disposition to strengthen the several accessible points. As for food
and other war material, the other allied cities all joined in collecting and
bringing these to Herbesus for them: and thus they supplied themselves in
abundance with necessaries, by continually getting provisions living and
dead from this town, which was conveniently near. For about five months
then they remained in the same position, without being able to obtain any
decided advantage over each other beyond the casualties which occurred in
the skirmishes. But the Carthaginians were beginning to be hard pressed by
hunger, owing to the number of men shut up in the city, who amounted to
no less than fifty thousand: and Hannibal, who had been appointed
commander of the besieged forces, beginning by this time to be seriously
alarmed at the state of things, kept perpetually sending messages to
Carthage explaining their critical state, and begging for assistance.
A relief comes from Thereupon the Carthaginian government put on board
Carthage to Agrigentum. ship the fresh troops and elephants which they had
collected, and despatched them to Sicily, with orders to join the other
commander Hanno. This officer collected all his war material and forces
into Heracleia, and as a first step possessed himself by a stratagem of
Hanno seizes Herbesus. Herbesus, thus depriving the enemy of their provisions
and supply of necessaries. The result of this was that the
Romans found themselves in the position of besieged as much as in that of
besiegers; for they were reduced by short supplies of food and scarcity of
necessaries to such a condition that they more than once contemplated
The Romans faithfully raising the siege. And they would have done so at last
supported by Hiero. had not Hiero, by using every effort and contrivance
imaginable, succeeded in keeping them supplied with what satisfied, to a
tolerable extent, their most pressing wants. This was Hanno’s first step. His
next was as follows.

19. He saw that the Romans were reduced by disease and want, owing to an
epidemic that had broken out among them, and he believed that his own
forces were strong enough to give them battle: he accordingly collected his
Hanno tempts the elephants, of which he had about fifty, and the whole of
Roman cavalry out and the rest of his army, and advanced at a rapid pace from
defeats them.
Heracleia; having previously issued orders to the
Numidian cavalry to precede him, and to endeavour, when they came near
the enemies’ stockade, to provoke them and draw their cavalry out; and,
having done so, to wheel round and retire until they met him. The
Numidians did as they were ordered, and advanced up to one of the camps.
Immediately the Roman cavalry poured out and boldly charged the
Numidians: the Libyans retired, according to their orders, until they reached
Hanno’s division: then they wheeled round; surrounded, and repeatedly
charged the enemy; killed a great number of them, and chased the rest up to
their stockade. After this affair Hanno’s force encamped over against the
Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of about a mile
After two months, and a quarter from their opponents. For two months
Hanno is forced to try to they remained in position without any decisive action,
relieve Agrigentum,
though skirmishes took place daily. But as Hannibal all
this time kept signalling and sending messages from the town to Hanno,—
telling him that his men were impatient of the famine, and that many were
even deserting to the enemy owing to the distress for food,—the
Carthaginian general determined to risk a battle, the Romans being equally
but is defeated in a ready, for the reasons I have mentioned. So both parties
pitched battle, and his advanced into the space between the camps and
army cut to pieces.
engaged. The battle lasted a long time, but at last the
Romans turned the advanced guard of Carthaginian mercenaries. The latter
fell back upon the elephants and the other divisions posted in their rear; and
thus the whole Punic army was thrown into confusion. The retreat became
general: the larger number of the men were killed, while some effected their
escape into Heracleia; and the Romans became masters of most of the
elephants and all the baggage. Now night came on, and the victors, partly
from joy at their success, partly from fatigue, kept their watches somewhat
Hannibal escapes by more carelessly than usual; accordingly Hannibal,
night; and the Romans having given up hope of holding out, made up his mind
enter and plunder
Agrigentum.
that this state of things afforded him a good opportunity
of escape. He started about midnight from the town

with his mercenary troops, and having choked up the trenches with baskets
stuffed full of chaff, led off his force in safety, without being detected by
the enemy. When day dawned the Romans discovered what had happened,
and indeed for a short time were engaged with Hannibal’s rear; but
eventually they all made for the town gates. There they found no one to
oppose them: they therefore threw themselves into the town, plundered it,
and secured a large number of captives, besides a great booty of every sort
and description.
20. Great was the joy of the Roman Senate when the news of what had
This success inspires the taken place at Agrigentum arrived. Their ideas too were
Senate with the idea of so raised that they no longer confined themselves to
expelling the
Carthaginians from
their original designs. They were not content with
Sicily. having saved the Mamertines, nor with the advantages
gained in the course of the war; but conceived the idea
that it was possible to expel the Carthaginians entirely from the island, and
that if that were done their own power would receive a great increase: they
accordingly engaged in this policy and directed their whole thoughts to this
subject. As to their land forces they saw that things were going on as well as
b.c. 261. they could wish. For the Consuls elected in succession
to those who had besieged Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius
Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, appeared to be managing the Sicilian
business as well as circumstances admitted. Yet so long as the Carthaginians
were in undisturbed command of the sea, the balance of success could not
incline decisively in their favour. For instance, in the period which
followed, though they were now in possession of Agrigentum, and though
consequently many of the inland towns joined the Romans from dread of
their land forces, yet a still larger number of seaboard towns held aloof from
them in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Seeing therefore that it was ever
more and more the case that the balance of success oscillated from one side
to the other from these causes; and, moreover, that while Italy was
repeatedly ravaged by the naval force, Libya remained permanently
uninjured; they became eager to get upon the sea and meet the
Carthaginians there.
It was this branch of the subject that more than anything else induced me to
give an account of this war at somewhat greater length than I otherwise
should have done. I was unwilling that a first step of this kind should be

unknown,—namely how, and when, and why the Romans first started a
navy.
It was, then, because they saw that the war they had undertaken lingered to
The Romans boldly a weary length, that they first thought of getting a fleet
determine to build ships built, consisting of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty
and meet the
Carthaginians at sea.
triremes. But one part of their undertaking caused them
much difficulty. Their shipbuilders were entirely
unacquainted with the construction of quinqueremes, because no one in
Italy had at that time employed vessels of that description. There could be
no more signal proof of the courage, or rather the extraordinary audacity of
the Roman enterprise. Not only had they no resources for it of reasonable
sufficiency; but without any resources for it at all, and without having ever
entertained an idea of naval war,—for it was the first time they had thought
of it,—they nevertheless handled the enterprise with such extraordinary
audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial, they took upon
themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians at sea, on which they
had for generations held undisputed supremacy. Proof of what I say, and of
their surprising audacity, may be found in this. When they first took in hand
to send troops across to Messene they not only had no decked vessels but
no war-ships at all, not so much as a single galley: but they borrowed
quinqueremes and triremes from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea
and Neapolis; and having thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across
A Carthaginian ship used upon it. It was on this occasion that, the Carthaginians
as a model. having put to sea in the Strait to attack them, a decked
vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it ran aground, and falling into the
hands of the Romans served them as a model on which they constructed
their whole fleet. And if this had not happened it is clear that they would
have been completely hindered from carrying out their design by want of
constructive knowledge.
21. Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding
were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others collected
crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land: which they
contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men sit on rower’s
benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit on the benches in
actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed the Celeustes, and trained
them to get back and draw in their hands all together in time, and then to

swing forward and throw them out again, and to begin and cease these
movements at the word of the Celeustes. By the time these preparations
were completed the ships were built. They therefore launched them, and,
after a brief preliminary practice of real sea-rowing, started on their
coasting voyage along the shore of Italy, in accordance with the Consul’s
b.c. 260. Cn. Cornelius order. For Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been
Scipio Asina, C. Duilius, appointed by the Roman people a few days before to
Coss.
command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders
that as soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits,
had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to
Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for the
naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for the
Cornelius captured with surrender of the town of Lipara. Snatching at the
the loss of his ships. prospect somewhat too eagerly, he sailed with the
above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. But having been
informed in Panormus of what had taken place, the Carthaginian general
Hannibal despatched Boōdes, a member of the Senate, with a squadron of
twenty ships. He accomplished the voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and
his men within the harbour. When day dawned the crews made for the shore
and ran away, while Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least
what to do, eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having
thus possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their
The rest of the Roman enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. Yet a few days
fleet arrive and nearly afterwards, though the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal
capture Hannibal.
and recent, Hannibal himself was within an ace of
falling into the same glaring mistake. For having been informed that the
Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of Italy was close at hand, he
conceived a wish to get a clear view of the enemy’s number and disposition.
He accordingly set sail with fifty ships, and just as he was rounding the
“Italian Headland” he fell in with the enemy, who were sailing in good
order and disposition. He lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected
his own escape in a manner beyond hope or expectation.
22. When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the disaster
which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for Gaius Duilius,
who was in command of the land forces. Until he should come they stayed
where they were; but at the same time, hearing that the enemy’s fleet was

no great way off, they busied themselves with preparations for a sea-fight.
Now their ships were badly fitted out and not easy to manage, and so some
one suggested to them as likely to serve their turn in a fight the construction
The “corvi” or of what were afterwards called “crows.” Their
#8220;crows” for mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in the
boarding.
prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter
of four palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made
with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet long,
was made to swing round it. Now the hole in the gangway was oval shaped,
and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the gangway, which
had also a wooden railing running down each side of it to the height of a
man’s knee. At the extremity of this gangway was fastened an iron spike
like a miller’s pestle, sharpened at its lower end and fitted with a ring at its
upper end. The whole thing looked like the machines for braising corn. To
this ring the rope was fastened with which, when the ships collided, they
hauled up the “crows,” by means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and
dropped them down upon the deck of the enemy’s ship, sometimes over the
prow, sometimes swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides.
And as soon as the “crows” were fixed in the planks of the decks and
grappled the ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the
men leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to
prow, they used the “crow” itself for boarding, and advanced over it two
abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them their
shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by placing the
rims of their shields upon the top of the railing. Such were the preparations
which they made; and having completed them they watched an opportunity
of engaging at sea.
23. As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which had
Victory of Duilius at befallen the commander of the navy than handing over
Mylae, b.c. 260. his legions to the military Tribunes he transferred
himself to the fleet. There he learnt that the enemy was plundering the
territory of Mylae, and at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No
sooner did the Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to
sea with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the Roman
ignorance of seamanship. Accordingly they all sailed with their prows
directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement worth

even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but advanced as though
to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their commander was that
same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from Agrigentum by a secret
night movement, and he was on board a galley with seven banks of oars
which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. When they neared the enemy,
and saw the “crows” raised aloft on the prows of the several ships, the
Carthaginians were for a time in a state of perplexity; for they were quite
strangers to such contrivances as these engines. Feeling, however, a
complete contempt for their opponents, those on board the ships that were
in the van of the squadron charged without flinching. But as soon as they
came to close quarters their ships were invariably tightly grappled by these
machines; the enemy boarded by means of the “crows,” and engaged them
on their decks; and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down,
while others surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they
found themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land
fight. The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and
all. Among them was captured the commander’s ship also, though Hannibal
himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring effected
his escape in the ship’s boat. The rest of the Carthaginian squadron were
sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were coming near they saw
what had happened to the ships which were sailing in the front, and
accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the engines. Yet trusting
to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to sail round and charge the
enemy, some on their broadside and others on their stern, expecting by that
method to avoid danger. But the engines swung round to meet them in
every direction, and dropped down upon them so infallibly, that no ships
could come to close quarters without being grappled. Eventually the
Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at the novelty of the occurrence,
and with a loss of fifty ships.
24. Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes
the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. For
Further operations in the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised
Sicily. the siege of Segesta when it was reduced to the last
Segesta and Macella.
extremity, and on their way back from Segesta carried
the town Macella by assault. But Hamilcar, the
Hamilcar. commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened,

after the naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus
that the allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of
honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped by
themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden
attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed almost
Hannibal in Sardinia. four thousand of them. After this action Hannibal sailed
across to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and
thence before very long crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships,
and accompanied by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders
stood high. But before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by
the Romans, and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon
summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came
about because the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try
to become masters of Sardinia.
During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy of
b.c. 259. mention. In the next, after the arrival of the new
Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started
to attack Panormus because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there.
b.c. 258. Coss. A. Atilius The Consuls advanced close up to the city with their
Calatinus, G. Sulpicius, whole force, and drew up in order of battle. But the
Paterculus.
enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they
marched away and attacked the town of Hippana. This they carried by
assault: but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood
Hippana and a lengthened siege owing to the strength of its situation.
Myttistratum. It was at this time, too, that they recovered Camarina,
which had revolted a short time previously. They threw up works against it,
Camarina. and captured it after making a breach in its walls. They
treated Henna, and sundry other strong places which
had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the same way; and when they
had finished these operations they undertook to lay siege to Lipara.
25. Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor off
Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by in a straggling
Coss. C. Atilius Regulus, manner. He passed the word to the crews of his own
Cn. Cornelius, Blasio II. ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started
b.c. 257.
himself before the rest with ten ships of equal sailing
Fighting off Tyndaris. powers. When the Carthaginians became aware that

while some of the enemy were still embarking, others were already putting
out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were considerably ahead of the
rest, they stood round and went to meet them. They succeeded in
surrounding and destroying all of them except the Consul’s ship, and that
they all but captured with its crew. This last, however, by the perfection of
its rowers and its consequent speed, effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile
the remaining ships of the Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing
close together. Having got into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships
with their crews, and sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired
to the Liparean Islands.
The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were now
fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to secure a
Winter of b.c. 257-256. naval force, and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While
these things were going on, the land forces effected
nothing worth recording; but wasted all their time in such petty operations
as chance threw in their way. Therefore, after making the preparations I
b.c. 256. Coss. L. have mentioned for the approaching summer, the
Manlius, Vulso Longus, Romans, with three hundred and thirty decked ships of
M. Atilius Regulus II.
(Suff.)
war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping
Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland
Pachynus passed on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that
district. The Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred
and fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at
Heracleia Minoa.
26. Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and
Preparations for the transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians
Battle of Ecnomus. might find the danger affecting themselves and their
own country rather than Sicily. But the Carthaginians were determined to
prevent this. They knew that Libya was easily invaded, and that the
invaders if they once effected a landing would meet with little resistance
from the inhabitants; and they therefore made up their minds not to allow it,
and were eager rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at
sea. The one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their
crossing; and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle.
The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an
engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly

they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the whole
force which they meant to take on board into four divisions. Each division
Roman forces. 330 ships, had alternative titles; the first was called the “First
with average of 420 men Legion” or the “First Squadron,”—and so on with the
(300 rowers + 120
marines) = 138,600 men.
others. The fourth had a third title besides. They were
called “Triarii,” on the analogy of land armies. The total
number of men thus making up the naval force amounted to nearly one
hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred
rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians, on the
other hand, made their preparations almost exclusively with a view to a
Carthaginian numbers, naval engagement. Their numbers, if we reckon by the
150,000 men. number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty
thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine,
strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and the
vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them itself could
hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the number of men
and ships.

The Roman order at Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that
Ecnomus. circumstances compelled them to face the open sea;
and, secondly, that their enemies had the advantage of fast sailing vessels.
They therefore took every precaution for keeping their line unbroken and
difficult to attack. They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those,
namely, on which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius
respectively were sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a
line with each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind
the other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second
squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship came
to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from each other; the
vessels being also stationed one behind the other with their prows inclining
outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in single file
so as to form a wedge, they stationed the third division in a single line at its
base; so that the whole finally presented the appearance of a triangle.
Behind this base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by
towing-ropes to the ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they
placed the fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as
to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these

dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak or
wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; while the
whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time difficult to
break up.
27. Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their
The disposition of the men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle
Carthaginian fleet. would ensure the war in the future being confined to the
question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would
have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear.
With these words they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed
with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them
the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited
gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When
their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted
their own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single
line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of
outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the
enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the
whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore.
The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. The former
ch. 19. was the general who had been defeated in the
engagement at Agrigentum. He now commanded the
right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing
ch. 25. quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy. The latter,
who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had
charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the
entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now
The battle. describe. The battle began by the Romans charging the
centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that
it was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian
centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view
of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed,
and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that,
while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying
enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become detached and were left
behind,—the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the

“Triarii” because they kept their station with them and helped them to form
a reserve. But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first
and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was
hoisted on board Hamilcar’s ship, and they all simultaneously swung their
ships round and engaged their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The
Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they
manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the
enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the
Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining
hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest
became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all that
once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in
person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.
28. This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with
the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place,
crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great
difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had
been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships
straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These
latter let go the towing-ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a
desperate struggle.
So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there were
three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now in these
Three separate battles. three engagements the opposing parties were in each
case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of
the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested.
However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be
expected where forces were so equal. The first to engage were the first to
First with Hamilcar’s separate: for Hamilcar’s division at last were
squadron. overpowered and fled. But while Lucius was engaged in
securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and
horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance,
taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were
Second squadron under undamaged. As soon as he had reached and engaged
Regulus. Hanno’s division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage,
though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with

renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be
in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found to their
surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at
once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea.
While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his
colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the
Third squadron relieved Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and
by Regulus and Manlius. Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the
transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades,
who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is
that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the
Carthaginians been afraid of the “crows,” and confined themselves to
surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to
charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came
up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships
with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape
by keeping close to the shore.
Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of
General result. the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-
four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the
Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-
four of the Carthaginians were so taken.
29. After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual, repaired
and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the crews the
attention which they had deserved by their victory, and then put to sea with
a view of continuing their voyage to Libya. Their leading ships made the
shore just under the headland called the Hermaeum, which is the extreme
point on the east of the Gulf of Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in
the direction of Sicily. There they waited for the rest of the ships to come
up, and having got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to
Siege of Aspis. (Clupea.) the city called Aspis. Here they disembarked, beached
their ships, dug a trench, and constructed a stockade
round them; and on the inhabitants of the city refusing to submit without
compulsion, they set to work to besiege the town. Presently those of the
Carthaginians who had survived the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling

sure that the enemy, in the flush of their victory, intended to sail straight
against Carthage itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards
at outlying points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces.
But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without
resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea of
watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their forces, and
devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs.
Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison to hold
it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to announce the
Aspis taken. events which had taken place and to ask for instructions
as to the future,—what they were to do, and what
arrangements they were to make. Having done this they made active
preparations for a general advance and set about plundering the country.
They met with no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling
houses of remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great
number of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom
they took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers
arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an
adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome. Accordingly
M. Atilius Regulus Marcus was left behind with forty ships, fifteen
remains in Africa, winter thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry; while
of b.c. 256-255.
Lucius put the crowd of captives on board, and having
embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without encountering
any danger, and reached Rome.
30. The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a
lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first of all
to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno, and Bostarus, to
the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a pressing summons to
Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at Carthage with five
hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was forthwith appointed
general in conjunction with the other two, and entered into consultation
with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the measures necessary to be taken
in the present crisis. They decided to defend the country and not to allow it
to be devastated without resistance.

A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding
expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and
b.c. 256-255. The plundered, and such as were walled he besieged.
operations of Regulus in Among others he came to the considerable town of
Libya.
Adys, and having placed his troops round it was
beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians were both
eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the possession of the
open country. They therefore led out their army; but their operations were
not skilfully conducted. They indeed seized and encamped upon a piece of
rising ground which commanded the enemy; but it was unsuitable to
themselves. Their best hopes rested on their cavalry and their elephants, and
yet they abandoned the level plain and cooped themselves up in a position
at once steep and difficult of access. The enemy, as might have been
expected, were not slow to take advantage of this mistake. The Roman
commanders were skilful enough to understand that the best and most
formidable part of the forces opposed to them was rendered useless by the
nature of the ground. They did not therefore wait for them to come down to
the plain and offer battle, but choosing the time which suited themselves,
began at daybreak a forward movement on both sides of the hill. In the
Defeat of the battle which followed the Carthaginians could not use
Carthaginians near Adys. their cavalry or elephants at all; but their mercenary
troops made a really gallant and spirited sally. They even forced the first
division of the Romans to give way and fly: but they advanced too far, and
were surrounded and routed by the division which was advancing from the
other direction. This was immediately followed by the whole force being
dislodged from their encampment. The elephants and cavalry as soon as
they gained level ground made good their retreat without loss; but the
infantry were pursued by the Romans. The latter however soon desisted
from the pursuit. They presently returned, dismantled the enemy’s
entrenchment, and destroyed the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the
whole country-side and sacked the towns without opposition.
Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many
natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were
Tunes. engaged, and was so situated as to form a convenient
base of operations against the capital and its immediate
neighbourhood. They accordingly fixed their headquarters in it.

31. The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long since
they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with one on land,
Distress at Carthage, not from any failure of courage on the part of their
which is heightened by soldiers, but from the incompetency of their
an inroad of Numidians.
commanders. Simultaneously with these misfortunes,
they were suffering from an inroad of the Numidians, who were doing even
more damage to the country than the Romans. The terror which they
inspired drove the country folk to flock for safety into the city; and the city
itself had to face a serious famine as well as a panic, the former from the
numbers that crowded into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a
Spring of b.c. 255. siege. But Regulus had different views. The double
Regulus proposes harsh defeat sustained by the Carthaginians, by land as well
terms.
as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage
was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great anxiety
lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome in time to rob
him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore invited the Carthaginians
to make terms. They were only too glad of the proposal, and sent their
leading citizens to meet him. The meeting took place: but the
commissioners could not bring their minds to entertain his proposals; they
were so severe that it was almost more than they could bear to listen to
them at all. Regulus regarded himself as practically master of the city, and
considered that they ought to regard any concession on his part as a matter
The terms rejected. of favour and pure grace. The Carthaginians on the
other hand concluded that nothing worse could be
imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined. They
therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus, and
extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the
Carthaginian Senate heard the conditions offered by the Roman general,
though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to the
gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that they
would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather than
submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past history.

32. Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting agents,
who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived home. He
Arrival of the Spartan brought a large number of men with him, and among
Xanthippus in Carthage. them a certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a
man trained in the Spartan discipline, and of large experience in war. When
this man was informed of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and
when he had reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians,
and the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to come
to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends that the
Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority of the Romans,
but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders. The dangerous state of
their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get abroad quickly among
the people and to reach the ears of the generals; and the men in authority
determined to summon and question him. He appeared, and laid his views
before the magistrates; in which he showed to what they owed their present
disasters, and that if they would take his advice and keep to the flat parts of
the country alike in marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be
able with perfect ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their
opponents in the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to
follow his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command.
Among the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from
mouth to mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of
popular rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once
handled the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had
led them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate
detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due
conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with the
contrast to the blundering of their former generals. The multitude expressed
their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging the enemy without
delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them as long as Xanthippus
was their leader. The generals took advantage of this circumstance, and of
the extraordinary recovery which they saw had taken place in the spirits of
the people. They addressed them some exhortations befitting the occasion,
and after a few days’ delay got their forces on foot and started. Their army
consisted of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a
hundred elephants.

33. The Romans at once noticed a change. They saw that the Carthaginians
The new strategy of the chose level country for their line of march, and flat
Carthaginians. places for their encampments. This novelty puzzled and
rather alarmed them, yet their prevailing feeling was an eager desire to
come to close quarters with the enemy. They therefore advanced to a
position about ten stades from them and employed the first day in pitching a
camp there. Next day, while the chief officers of the Carthaginians were
discussing in a council of war what dispositions were called for, and what
line of strategy they were to adopt, the common soldiers, in their eagerness
for the engagement, collected in groups, shouted out the name of
Xanthippus, and showed that their opinion was in favour of an immediate
forward movement. Influenced by the evident enthusiasm and eagerness of
the army, and by the appeals of Xanthippus that they should not let the
opportunity slip, the generals gave orders to the men to get ready, and
resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of affairs, with full authority to
act as he thought most advantageous. He at once acted upon this authority.
The dispositions for the He ordered out the elephants, and placed them in a
battle. single line in front of the whole army. The heavy
phalanx of the Carthaginians he stationed at a moderate interval in the rear
of these. He divided the mercenaries into three corps. One he stationed on
the right wing; while the other two, which consisted of the most active, he
placed with the cavalry on both wings. When the Romans saw that the
enemy were drawn up to offer them battle they readily advanced to accept
it. They were however alarmed at the elephants, and made special
arrangements with a view to resist their charge. They stationed the velites in
the van, and behind them the legionaries, many maniples deep, while they
divided the cavalry between the two wings. Their line of battle was thus less
extended than usual, but deeper. And though they had thereby made a
sufficient provision against the elephants, yet being far out-numbered in
cavalry, their provision in that part of the field was altogether inadequate.
At length both sides had made their dispositions according to their
respective plans of operation, and had placed their several men in the posts
assigned to them: and now they were standing drawn up in order, and were
each of them watching for the right moment for beginning the attack.
34. No sooner had Xanthippus given the order to the men on the elephants
The battle. to advance and disperse the lines in front of them, and

to his cavalry to outflank both wings and charge the enemy, than the Roman
army—clashing their shields and spears together after their usual custom,
and simultaneously raising their battle-cry—charged the enemy. The Roman
cavalry being far out-numbered by the Carthaginians were soon in full
retreat on both wings. But the fortune of the several divisions of the infantry
was various. Those stationed on the left wing—partly because they could
avoid the elephants and partly because they thought contemptuously of the
mercenaries—charged the right wing of the Carthaginians, succeeded in
driving them from their ground, and pursued them as far as their
entrenchment. Those stationed in front of the elephants were less fortunate.
The maniples in front were thrown into utter confusion by the crushing
weight of the animals: knocked down and trampled upon by them they
perished in heaps upon the field; yet owing to its great depth the main body
The Romans are beaten remained for a time unbroken. But it was not for long.
and annihilated. The maniples on the rear found themselves outflanked
by the cavalry, and were forced to face round and resist them: those on the
other hand who forced their way to the front through the elephants, and had
now those beasts on their rear, found themselves confronted by the phalanx
of Carthaginians, which had not yet been in action and was still in close
unbroken order, and so were cut to pieces. This was followed by a general
rout. Most of the Romans were trampled to death by the enormous weight
of the elephants; the rest were shot down in their ranks by the numerous
cavalry: and there were only a very few who attempted to save themselves
by flight. But the flatness of the country was unfavourable to escape in this
manner. Some of the fugitives were destroyed by the elephants and cavalry;
Regulus made prisoner. while only those who fled with the general Regulus,
amounting perhaps to five hundred, were after a short
pursuit made prisoners with him to a man.
On the Carthaginian side there fell about eight hundred of the mercenaries,
those namely who had been stationed opposite the left wing of the Romans.
On the part of the Romans about two thousand survived. These were those
whom I have already described as having chased the Carthaginian right
wing to their entrenchment, and who were thus not involved in the general
engagement. The rest were entirely destroyed with the exception of those
who fled with Regulus. The surviving maniples escaped with considerable
difficulty to the town of Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and

taking with them the Roman general and the rest of their prisoners, returned
to the capital in a high state of exultation at the turn their affairs had now
taken.
35. This event conveys many useful lessons to a thoughtful observer. Above
all, the disaster of Regulus gives the clearest possible warning that no one
should feel too confident of the favours of Fortune, especially in the hour of
Eurip. fr. success. Here we see one, who a short time before
refused all pity or consideration to the fallen, brought
incontinently to beg them for his own life. Again, we are taught the truth of
that saying of Euripides—
One wise man’s skill is worth a world in arms.

For it was one man, one brain, that defeated the numbers which were
believed to be invincible and able to accomplish anything; and restored to
confidence a whole city that was unmistakably and utterly ruined, and the
spirits of its army which had sunk to the lowest depths of despair. I record
these things in the hope of benefiting my readers. There are two roads to
reformation for mankind—one through misfortunes of their own, the other
through those of others: the former is the most unmistakable, the latter the
less painful. One should never therefore voluntarily choose the former, for it
makes reformation a matter of great difficulty and danger; but we should
always look out for the latter, for thereby we can without hurt to ourselves
gain a clear view of the best course to pursue. It is this which forces us to
consider that the knowledge gained from the study of true history is the best
of all educations for practical life. For it is history, and history alone, which,
without involving us in actual danger, will mature our judgment and prepare
us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis or the posture of affairs.
36. To return to our narrative. Having obtained this complete success the
Xanthippus quits Carthaginians indulged in every sign of exultation.
Carthage. Thanksgivings were poured out to God, and joyful
congratulations interchanged among themselves. But Xanthippus, by whose
means such a happy change had been brought about and such an impulse
been given to the fortunes of Carthage, did not remain there long, but took
ship for home again. In this he showed his wisdom and discernment. For it
is the nature of extraordinary and conspicuous achievements to exasperate

jealousies and envenom slander; against which a native may perhaps stand
with the support of kinsfolk and friends, but a foreigner when exposed to
one or the other of them is inevitably overpowered before long and put in
danger. There is however another account sometimes given of the departure
of Xanthippus, which I will endeavour at a more suitable opportunity to set
forth.
Upon this unlooked-for catastrophe in the Libyan campaign, the Roman
The Romans prepare a government at once set to work to fit out a fleet to take
fleet to relieve their off the men who were still surviving there; while the
beaten army.
Carthaginians followed up their success by sitting down
before Aspis, and besieging it, being anxious to get the survivors of the
battle into their hands. But failing to capture the place, owing to the
gallantry and determined courage of these men, they eventually raised the
siege. When they heard that the Romans were preparing their fleet, and
were intending to sail once more against Libya, they set about shipbuilding
also, partly repairing old vessels and partly constructing new. Before very
long they had manned and launched two hundred ships, and were on the
b.c. 255. Coss. Ser. watch for the coming of their enemies. By the
Fulvius Paetinus beginning of the summer the Romans had launched
Nobilior, M. Aemilius
Paullus.
three hundred and fifty vessels. They put them under
the command of the Consuls Marcus Aemilius and
Servius Fulvius, and despatched them. This fleet coasted along Sicily; made
for Libya; and having fallen in with the Carthaginian squadron off
Hermaeum, at once charged and easily turned them to flight; captured a
hundred and fourteen with their crews, and having taken on board their men
who had maintained themselves in Libya, started from Aspis on their return
voyage to Sicily.
37. The passage was effected in safety, and the coast of Camarina was
reached: but there they experienced so terrible a storm, and suffered so
The fleet is lost in a dreadfully, as almost to beggar description. The disaster
storm. was indeed extreme: for out of their three hundred and
sixty-four vessels eighty only remained. The rest were either swamped or
driven by the surf upon the rocks and headlands, where they went to pieces
and filled all the seaboard with corpses and wreckage. No greater
catastrophe is to be found in all history as befalling a fleet at one time. And
for this Fortune was not so much to blame as the commanders themselves.

They had been warned again and again by the pilots not to steer along the
southern coast of Sicily facing the Libyan sea, because it was exposed and
yielded no safe anchorage; and because, of the two dangerous
Between June 28 and constellations, one had not yet set and the other was on
July 26. the point of rising (for their voyage fell between the
rising of Orion and that of the Dog Star). Yet they attended to none of these
warnings; but, intoxicated by their recent success, were anxious to capture
certain cities as they coasted along, and in pursuance of this idea
thoughtlessly exposed themselves to the full fury of the open sea. As far as
these particular men were concerned, the disaster which they brought upon
themselves in the pursuit of trivial advantages convinced them of the folly
of their conduct. But it is a peculiarity of the Roman people as a whole to
treat everything as a question of main strength; to consider that they must of
course accomplish whatever they have proposed to themselves; and that
nothing is impossible that they have once determined upon. The result of
such self-confidence is that in many things they do succeed, while in some
few they conspicuously fail, and especially at sea. On land it is against men
only and their works that they have to direct their efforts: and as the forces
against which they exert their strength do not differ intrinsically from their
own, as a general rule they succeed; while their failures are exceptional and
rare. But to contend with the sea and sky is to fight against a force
immeasurably superior to their own: and when they trust to an exertion of
sheer strength in such a contest the disasters which they meet with are
signal. This is what they experienced on the present occasion: they have
often experienced it since; and will continue to do so, as long as they
maintain their headstrong and foolhardy notion that any season of the year
admits of sailing as well as marching.
38. When the Carthaginians heard of the destruction which had befallen the
Roman fleet, they made up their minds that as their late victory had made
them a match for their enemy on land, so now the Roman catastrophe had
made them a match for him at sea. Accordingly they devoted themselves
with still greater eagerness than before to their naval and military
The Carthaginians renew preparations. And first, they lost no time in despatching
operations in Sicily. Hasdrubal to Sicily, and with him not only the soldiers
that they had already collected, but those also whom they had recalled from
Heracleia; and along with them they sent also a hundred and forty

elephants. And next, after despatching him, they began fitting out two
hundred ships and making all other preparations necessary for a naval
expedition. Hasdrubal reached Lilybaeum safely, and immediately set to
work to train his elephants and drill his men, and showed his intention of
striking a blow for the possession of the open country.
The Roman government, when they heard of this from the survivors of the
wreck on their arrival home, felt it to be a grievous misfortune; but being
absolutely resolved not to give in, they determined once more to put two
hundred and twenty vessels on the stocks and build afresh. These were
b.c. 254. Coss. Gn. finished in three months, an almost incredibly short
Cornelius Scipio Asina time, and the new Consuls Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus
II., Aulus Atilius,
Calatinus II.
Cornelius fitted out the fleet and put to sea. As they
passed through the straits they took up from Messene
those of the vessels which had been saved from the wreck; and having thus
arrived with three hundred ships off Panormus, which is the strongest town
of all the Carthaginian province in Sicily, they began to besiege it. They
threw up works in two distinct places, and after other necessary
preparations brought up their battering rams. The tower next the sea was
destroyed with ease, and the soldiers forced their way in through the breach:
and so what is called the New Town was carried by assault; while what is
called the Old Town being placed by this event in imminent danger, its
inhabitants made haste to surrender it. Having thus made themselves
masters of the place, the army sailed back to Rome, leaving a garrison in
the town.
39. But next summer the new Consuls Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius
Sempronius put again to sea with their full strength, and after touching at
b.c. 253. Coss. Gn. Sicily started thence for Libya. There, as they coasted
Servilius Caepio, G. along the shore, they made a great number of descents
Sempronius Blaesus.
upon the country without accomplishing anything of
importance in any of them. At length they came to the island of the
Lotophagi called Mēnix, which is not far from the Lesser Syrtis. There,
from ignorance of the waters, they ran upon some shallows; the tide
receded, their ships went aground, and they were in extreme peril. However,
after a while the tide unexpectedly flowed back again, and by dint of
throwing overboard all their heavy goods they just managed to float the
ships. After this their return voyage was more like a flight than anything

else. When they reached Sicily and had made the promontory of Lilybaeum
they cast anchor at Panormus. Thence they weighed anchor for Rome, and
rashly ventured upon the open sea-line as the shortest; but while on their
voyage they once more encountered so terrible a storm that they lost more
than a hundred and fifty ships.
The Romans after this misfortune, though they are eminently persistent in
b.c. 252. carrying out their undertakings, yet owing to the
severity and frequency of their disasters, now yielded to
the force of circumstances and refrained from constructing another fleet. All
the hopes still left to them they rested upon their land forces: and,
b.c. 251. Coss. Lucius accordingly, they despatched the Consuls Lucius
Caecilius Metellus, G. Caecilius and Gaius Furius with their legions to Sicily;
Furius Pacilus.
but they only manned sixty ships to carry provisions for
the legions. The fortunes of the Carthaginians had in their turn considerably
improved owing to the catastrophes I have described. They now
commanded the sea without let or hindrance, since the Romans had
abandoned it; while in their land forces their hopes were high. Nor was it
unreasonable that it should be so. The account of the battle of Libya had
reached the ears of the Romans: they had heard that the elephants had
broken their ranks and had killed the large part of those that fell: and they
were in such terror of them, that though during two years running after that
time they had on many occasions, in the territory either of Lilybaeum or
Selinus, found themselves in order of battle within five or six stades of the
enemy, they never plucked up courage to begin an attack, or in fact to come
down upon level ground at all, all because of their fear of an elephant
b.c. 252-251. charge. And in these two seasons all they did was to
reduce Therma and Lipara by siege, keeping close all
the while to mountainous districts and such as were difficult to cross. The
timidity and want of confidence thus displayed by their land forces induced
the Roman government to change their minds and once more to attempt
b.c. 250. success at sea. Accordingly, in the second consulship of
Caius Atilius and Lucius Manlius, we find them
ordering fifty ships to be built, enrolling sailors and energetically collecting
a naval armament.
40. Meanwhile Hasdrubal noticed the terror displayed by the Romans
whenever they had lately found themselves in the presence of the enemy.

b.c. 251. He learnt also that one of the Consuls had departed and
gone to Italy, and that Caecilius was lingering in
Skirmishing at Panormus with the other half of the army, with the view
Panormus. of protecting the corn-crops of the allies just then ripe
for the harvest. He therefore got his troops in motion, marched out, and
encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius saw well
enough that the enemy had become supremely confident, and he was
anxious to draw him on; he therefore kept his men within the walls.
Hasdrubal imagined that Caecilius dared not come out to give him battle.
Elated with this idea, he pushed boldly forward with his whole army and
marched over the pass into the territory of Panormus. But though he was
destroying all the standing crops up to the very walls of the town, Caecilius
was not shaken from his resolution, but kept persistently to it, until he had
induced him to cross the river which lay between him and the town. But no
sooner had the Carthaginians got their elephants and men across, than
Caecilius commenced sending out his light-armed troops to harass them,
until he had forced them to get their whole army into fighting order. When
he saw that everything was happening as he designed it, he placed some of
his light troops to line the wall and moat, with instructions that if the
elephants came within range they should pour volleys of their missiles upon
them; but that whenever they found themselves being forced from their
ground by them, they should retreat into the moat, rush out of it again, and
hurl darts at the elephants which happened to be nearest. At the same time
he gave orders to the armourers in the market-place to carry the missiles
and heap them up outside at the foot of the wall. Meanwhile he took up his
own position with his maniples at the gate which was opposite the enemy’s
left wing, and kept despatching detachment after detachment to reinforce
his skirmishers. The engagement commenced by them becoming more and
more general, a feeling of emulation took possession of the officers in
charge of the elephants. They wished to distinguish themselves in the eyes
of Hasdrubal, and they desired that the credit of the victory should be theirs:
they therefore, with one accord, charged the advanced skirmishing parties
of the enemy, routed them with ease, and pursued them up to the moat. But
no sooner did the elephants thus come to close quarters than they were
wounded by the archers on the wall, and overwhelmed with volleys of pila
and javelins which poured thick and fast upon them from the men stationed
on the outer edge of the moat, and who had not yet been engaged,—and

thus, studded all over with darts, and wounded past all bearing, they soon
got beyond control. They turned and bore down upon their own masters,
trampling men to death, and throwing their own lines into utter disorder and
confusion. When Caecilius saw this he led out his men with promptitude.
His troops were fresh; the enemy were in disorder; and he charged them
diagonally on the flank: the result was that he inflicted a severe defeat upon
them, killed a large number, and forced the rest into precipitate flight. Of
the elephants he captured ten along with their Indian riders: the rest which
had thrown their Indians he managed to drive into a herd after the battle,
and secured every one of them. This achievement gained him the credit on
all hands of having substantially benefited the Roman cause, by once more
restoring confidence to the army, and giving them the command of the open
country.
41. The announcement of this success at Rome was received with extreme
delight; not so much at the blow inflicted on the enemy by the loss of their
elephants, as at the confidence inspired in their own troops by a victory
over these animals. With their confidence thus restored, the Roman
government recurred to their original plan of sending out the Consuls upon
this service with a fleet and naval forces; for they were eager, by all means
in their power, to put a period to the war. Accordingly, in the fourteenth year
of the war, the supplies necessary for the despatch of the expedition were
got ready, and the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. They
b.c. 250. C. Caecilius dropped anchor at Lilybaeum; and the army having met
Regulus II., L. Manlius them there, they began to besiege it by sea and land.
Vulso II.
Their view was that if they could obtain possession of
this town they would have no difficulty in transferring the seat of war to
Libya. The Carthaginian leaders were of the same opinion, and entirely
agreed with the Roman view of the value of the place. They accordingly
subordinated everything else to this; devoted themselves to the relief of the
place at all hazards; and resolved to retain this town at any sacrifice: for
now that the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily, except Drepana,
it was the only foothold they had left in the island.
To understand my story a knowledge of the topography of the district is
necessary. I will therefore endeavour in a few words to convey a
comprehension to my readers of its geographical position and its peculiar
advantages.

42. Sicily, then, lies towards Southern Italy very much in the same relative
position as the Peloponnese does to the rest of Greece. The only difference
is that the one is an island, the other a peninsula; and consequently in the
former case there is no communication except by sea, in the latter there is a
land communication also. The shape of Sicily is a triangle, of which the
several angles are represented by promontories: that to the south jutting out
into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus; that which looks to the north forms
the western extremity of the Straits of Messene and is about twelve stades
from Italy, its name is Pelorus; while the third projects in the direction of
Libya itself, and is conveniently situated opposite the promontories which
cover Carthage, at a distance of about a thousand stades: it looks somewhat
south of due west, dividing the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and is called
Lilybaeum. On this last there is a city of the same name. It was this city that
the Romans were now besieging. It was exceedingly strongly fortified: for
besides its walls there was a deep ditch running all round it, and on the side
of the sea it was protected by lagoons, to steer through which into the
harbour was a task requiring much skill and practice.
The Romans made two camps, one on each side of the town, and connected
Siege of Lilybaeum, them with a ditch, stockade, and wall. Having done this,
b.c. 250. they began the assault by advancing their siege-works
in the direction of the tower nearest the sea, which commands a view of the
Libyan main. They did this gradually, always adding something to what
they had already constructed; and thus bit by bit pushed their works forward
and extended them laterally, till at last they had brought down not only this
tower, but the six next to it also; and at the same time began battering all the
others with battering-rams. The siege was carried on with vigour and terrific
energy: every day some of the towers were shaken and others reduced to
ruins; every day too the siege-works advanced farther and farther, and more
and more towards the heart of the city. And though there were in the town,
besides the ordinary inhabitants, as many as ten thousand hired soldiers, the
consternation and despondency became overwhelming. Yet their
commander Himilco omitted no measure within his power. As fast as the
enemy demolished a fortification he threw up a new one; he also
countermined them, and reduced the assailants to straits of no ordinary
difficulty. Moreover, he made daily sallies, attempted to carry or throw fire
into the siege-works, and with this end in view fought many desperate

engagements by night as well as by day: so determined was the fighting in
these struggles, that sometimes the number of the dead was greater than it
ordinarily is in a pitched battle.
43. But about this time some of the officers of highest rank in the
Attempted treason in mercenary army discussed among themselves a project
Lilybaeum. for surrendering the town to the Romans, being fully
persuaded that the men under their command would obey their orders. They
got out of the city at night, went to the enemy’s camp, and held a parley
with the Roman commander on the subject. But Alexon the Achaean, who
on a former occasion had saved Agrigentum from destruction when the
mercenary troops of Syracuse made a plot to betray it, was on this occasion
once more the first to detect this treason, and to report it to the general of
the Carthaginians. The latter no sooner heard it than he at once summoned a
meeting of those officers who were still in their quarters; and exhorted them
to loyalty with prayers and promises of liberal bounties and favours, if they
would only remain faithful to him, and not join in the treason of the officers
who had left the town. They received his speech with enthusiasm, and were
there and then commissioned by him, some to go to the Celts accompanied
by Hannibal, who was the son of the Hannibal killed in Sardinia, and who
had a previous acquaintance with that people gained in the expedition
against them; others to fetch the rest of the mercenary troops, accompanied
by Alexon, because he was liked and trusted by them. These officers then
proceeded to summon a meeting of their men and address them. They
pledged their own credit for the bounties promised them severally by the
General, and without difficulty persuaded the men to remain staunch. The
result was that when the officers, who had joined in the secret mission,
returned to the walls and tried to address their men, and communicate the
terms offered by the Romans, so far from finding any adherents, they could
not even obtain a hearing, but were driven from the wall with volleys of
stones and darts. But this treason among their mercenaries constituted a
serious danger: the Carthaginians had a narrow escape from absolute ruin,
and they owed their preservation from it to that same Alexon whose fidelity
had on a former occasion preserved for Agrigentum her territory,
constitution, and freedom.
44. Meanwhile the Carthaginians at home knew nothing of what was going
on. But they could calculate the requirements of a besieged garrison; and

Hannibal relieves they accordingly filled fifty vessels with soldiers,
Lilybaeum. furnished their commander Hannibal, a son of
Hamilcar, and an officer and prime favourite of Adherbal’s, with
instructions suitable to the business in hand, and despatched him with all
speed: charging him to be guilty of no delay, to omit no opportunity, and to
shrink from no attempt however venturesome to relieve the besieged. He
put to sea with his ten thousand men, and dropped anchor at the islands
called Aegusae, which lie in the course between Lilybaeum and Carthage,
and there looked out for an opportunity of making Lilybaeum. At last a
strong breeze sprang up in exactly the right quarter: he crowded all sail and
bore down before the wind right upon the entrance of the harbour, with his
men upon the decks fully armed and ready for battle. Partly from
astonishment at this sudden appearance, partly from dread of being carried
along with the enemy by the violence of the gale into the harbour of their
opponents, the Romans did not venture to obstruct the entrance of the
reinforcement; but stood out at sea overpowered with amazement at the
audacity of the enemy.
The town population crowded to the walls, in an agony of anxiety as to
what would happen, no less than in an excess of joy at the unlooked-for
appearance of hope, and cheered on the crews as they sailed into the
harbour, with clapping hands and cries of gladness. To sail into the harbour
was an achievement of great danger; but Hannibal accomplished it
gallantly, and, dropping anchor there, safely disembarked his soldiers. The
exultation of all who were in the city was not caused so much by the
presence of the reinforcement, though they had thereby gained a strong
revival of hope, and a large addition to their strength, as by the fact that the
Romans had not dared to intercept the course of the Carthaginians.
45. Himilco, the general in command at Lilybaeum, now saw that both
A sally from Lilybaeum. divisions of his troops were in high spirits and eager for
service,—the original garrison owing to the presence of
the reinforcement, the newly arrived because they had as yet had no
experience of the hardships of the situation. He wished to take advantage of
the excited feelings of both parties, before they cooled, in order to organise
an attempt to set fire to the works of the besiegers. He therefore summoned
the whole army to a meeting, and dwelt upon the themes suitable to the
occasion at somewhat greater length than usual. He raised their zeal to an

enthusiastic height by the magnitude of his promises for individual acts of
courage, and by declaring the favours and rewards which awaited them as
an army at the hands of the Carthaginians. His speech was received with
lively marks of satisfaction; and the men with loud shouts bade him delay
no more, but lead them into the field. For the present, however, he
contented himself with thanking them and expressing his delight at their
excellent spirit, and bidding them go early to rest and obey their officers,
dismissed them. But shortly afterwards he summoned the officers; assigned
to them severally the posts best calculated for the success of the
undertaking; communicated to them the watchword and the exact moment
the movement was to be made; and issued orders to the commanders to be
at the posts assigned with their men at the morning watch. His orders were
punctually obeyed: and at daybreak he led out his forces and made attempts
upon the siege-works at several points. But the Romans had not been blind
to what was coming, and were neither idle nor unprepared. Wherever help
was required it was promptly rendered; and at every point they made a stout
resistance to the enemy. Before long there was fighting all along the line,
and an obstinate struggle round the entire circuit of the wall; for the sallying
party were not less than twenty thousand strong, and their opponents more
numerous still. The contest was all the hotter from the fact that the men
were not fighting in their regular ranks, but indiscriminately, and as their
own judgment directed; the result of which was that a spirit of personal
emulation arose among the combatants, because, though the numbers
engaged were so great, there was a series of single combats between man
and man, or company and company. However, it was at the siege-works
themselves that the shouting was loudest and the throng of combatants the
densest. At these troops had been massed deliberately for attack and
defence. The assailants strove their utmost to dislodge the defenders, the
defenders exerted all their courage to hold their ground and not yield an
inch to the assailants,—and with such emulation and fury on both sides, that
they ended by falling at their posts rather than yield. But there were others
mingled with these, carrying torchwood and tow and fire, who made a
simultaneous attack upon the battering-rams at every point: hurling these
fiery missiles against them with such audacity, that the Romans were
reduced to the last extremity of danger, being quite unable to overpower the
attack of the enemy. But the general of the Carthaginians, seeing that he
It fails. was losing large numbers in the engagement, without

being able to gain the object of the sortie, which was to take the siege-
works, ordered his trumpeters to sound a recall. So the Romans, after
coming within an ace of losing all their siege-gear, finally kept possession
of the works, and were able to maintain them all without dispute.
46. After this affair Hannibal eluded the enemy’s watch, and sailed out of
the harbour by night with his ships to Drepana, to join the Carthaginian
Commander-in-Chief, Adherbal. Drepana is about one hundred and twenty
stades from Lilybaeum, and was always an object of special care to the
Carthaginians from the convenience of its position and the excellence of its
harbour.
Now the Carthaginian government were anxious to learn the state of affairs
at Lilybaeum, but could not do so because the garrison was strictly
Hannibal the Rhodian blockaded, and the Romans were exceedingly vigilant.
offers to run the In this difficulty a nobleman, called Hannibal the
blockade.
Rhodian, came to them, and offered to run the
blockade, to see what was going on in Lilybaeum with his own eyes, and to
report. The offer delighted them, but they did not believe in the possibility
of its fulfilment with the Roman fleet lying at the very entrance of the
channel. However, the man fitted out his own private vessel and put to sea.
He first crossed to one of the islands lying off Lilybaeum. Next day he
obtained a wind in the right quarter, and about ten o’clock in the morning
actually sailed into the harbour in the full view of the enemy, who looked
on with amazement at his audacity. Next day he lost no time in setting about
a return voyage. The Roman Consul had determined on taking extra
precautions for watching the sea near the channel: with this view he had
during the night got ready his ten fastest-sailing vessels, and taking up a
position on shore close to the harbour mouth, was watching with his own
eyes what would happen. The whole army was watching also; while the
ships on both sides of the mouth of the channel got as close to the shallows
as it was possible to approach, and there rested with their oars out, and
ready to run down and capture the ship that was about to sail out. The
Rhodian, on his side, attempted no concealment. He put boldly to sea, and
so confounded the enemy by his audacity, and the speed of his vessel, that
he not only sailed out without receiving any damage to ship or crew,
scudding along the bows of the enemy as though they were fixed in their
places, but even brought his ship to, after running a short way ahead, and,

with his oars out and ready, seemed to challenge the foe to a contest. When
none of them ventured to put out to attack him, because of the speed of his
rowing, he sailed away: having thus with his one ship successfully defied
the entire fleet of the enemy. From this time he frequently performed the
same feat, and proved exceedingly serviceable both to the government at
Carthage and the besieged garrison. To the former by informing them from
time to time of what was pressingly necessary; and to the latter by inspiring
them with confidence, and dismaying the Romans by his audacity.
47. What contributed most to encourage him to a repetition of the feat was
the fact that by frequent experience he had marked out the course for
himself by clear land marks. As soon as he had crossed the open sea, and
was coming into sight, he used to steer as though he were coming from
Italy, keeping the seaward tower exactly on his bows, in such a way as to be
in a line with the city towers which faced towards Libya; and this is the
only possible course to hit the mouth of the channel with the wind astern.
His example is followed The successful boldness of the Rhodian inspired several
by others. of those who were acquainted with these waters to
make similar attempts. The Romans felt themselves to be in a great
difficulty; and what was taking place determined them to attempt blocking
up the mouth of the harbour. The greater part of the attempted work was a
failure: the sea was too deep, and none of the material which they threw
into it would hold, or in fact keep in the least compact. The breakers and the
force of the current dislodged and scattered everything that was thrown in,
before it could even reach the bottom. But there was one point where the
water was shallow, at which a mole was with infinite labour made to hold
together; and upon it a vessel with four banks of oars and of unusually fine
build stuck fast as it was making the outward passage at night, and thus fell
The Rhodian is at length into the hands of the enemy. The Romans took
captured. possession of it, manned it with a picked crew, and used
it for keeping a look out for all who should try to enter the harbour, and
especially for the Rhodian. He had sailed in, as it happened, that very night,
and was afterwards putting out to sea again in his usual open manner. He
was, however, startled to see the four-banked vessel put out to sea again
simultaneously with himself. He recognised what ship it was, and his first
impulse was to escape her by his superior speed. But finding himself getting
overhauled by the excellence of her rowers, he was finally compelled to

bring to and engage at close quarters. But in a struggle of marines he was at
a complete disadvantage: the enemy were superior in numbers, and their
soldiers were picked men; and he was made prisoner. The possession of this
ship of superior build enabled the Romans, by equipping her with whatever
was wanted for the service she had to perform, to intercept all who were
adventurous enough to try running the blockade of Lilybaeum.
48. Meanwhile, the besieged were energetically carrying on counterworks,
having abandoned the hope of damaging or destroying the constructions of
A storm having damaged the enemy. But in the midst of these proceedings a
the siege-works, the storm of wind, of such tremendous violence and fury,
Lilybaeans succeed in
burning them.
blew upon the machinery of the engines, that it wrecked
the pent-houses, and carried away by its force the
towers erected to cover them. Some of the Greek mercenaries perceived the
advantage such a state of things offered for the destruction of the siege-
works, and communicated their idea to the commander. He caught at the
suggestion, and lost no time in making every preparation suitable to the
undertaking. Then the young men mustered at three several points, and
threw lighted brands into the enemy’s works. The length of time during
which these works had been standing made them exactly in the proper state
to catch fire easily; and when to this was added a violent wind, blowing
right upon the engines and towers, the natural result was that the spreading
of the fire became rapid and destructive; while all attempts on the Roman
side to master it, and rescue their works, had to be abandoned as difficult or
wholly impracticable. Those who tried to come to the rescue were so
appalled at the scene, that they could neither fully grasp nor clearly see
what was going on. Flames, sparks, and volumes of smoke blew right in
their faces and blinded them; and not a few dropped down and perished
without ever getting near enough to attempt to combat the fire. The same
circumstances, which caused these overwhelming difficulties to the
besiegers, favoured those who were throwing the fire-brands in exactly the
same proportion. Everything that could obscure their vision or hurt them
was blown clean away and carried into the faces of the enemy; while their
being able to see the intervening space enabled the shooters to take a good
aim at those of the enemy who came to the rescue, and the throwers of the
fire-brands to lodge them at the proper places for the destruction of the
works. The violence of the wind, too, contributed to the deadly effect of the

missiles by increasing the force of their blows. Eventually the destruction
was so complete, that the foundations of the siege-towers and the blocks of
the battering-rams were rendered unusable by the fire. In spite of this
disaster, though they gave up the idea of assaulting the place any longer by
means of their works, the Romans still persisted. They surrounded the town
with a ditch and stockade, threw up an additional wall to secure their own
encampment, and left the completion of their purpose to time. Nor were the
besieged less determined. They repaired the part of their walls which had
been thrown down, and prepared to endure the siege with good courage.
49. When the announcement of these events at Rome was followed by
The Roman army is reiterated tidings that the larger part of the crews of the
reinforced. fleet had been destroyed, either at the works, or in the
general conduct of the siege, the Roman government set zealously to work
to enlist sailors; and, having collected as many as ten thousand, sent them to
Sicily. They crossed the straits, and reached the camp on foot; and when
they had joined, Publius Claudius, the Consul, assembled his tribunes, and
said that it was just the time to sail to the attack of Drepana with the whole
b.c. 249. Coss. P. squadron: for that Adherbal,139 who was in command
Claudius Pulcher, L. there, was quite unprepared for such an event, because
Junius Pullus.
he as yet knew nothing of the new crews having
arrived; and was fully persuaded that their fleet could not sail, owing to
their loss of men in the siege. His proposition met with a ready assent from
the council of officers, and he immediately set about getting his men on
board, the old crews as well as those who had recently joined. As for
marines, he selected the best men from the whole army, who were ready
enough to join an expedition which involved so short a voyage and so
Claudius sails to attack immediate and certain an advantage. Having completed
Drepana. these preparations, he set sail about midnight, without
being detected by the enemy; and for the first part of the day he sailed in
close order, keeping the land on his right. By daybreak the leading ships
could be seen coming towards Drepana; and at the first sight of them
Adherbal was overwhelmed with surprise. He quickly recovered his self-
possession however: and, fully appreciating the significance of the enemy’s
attack, he determined to try every manœuvre, and hazard every danger,
rather than allow himself and his men to be shut up in the blockade which
threatened them. He lost no time in collecting his rowing-crews upon the

beach, and summoning the mercenary soldiers who were in the town by
proclamation. When the muster had taken place, he endeavoured to impress
upon them in a few words what good hopes of victory they had, if they
were bold enough to fight at sea; and what hardships they would have to
endure in a blockade, if they hesitated from any fear of danger and played
the coward. The men showed a ready enthusiasm for the sea-fight, and
demanded with shouts that he would lead them to it without delay. He
thanked them, praised their zeal, and gave the order to embark with all
speed, to keep their eyes upon his ship, and follow in its wake. Having
made these instructions clear as quickly as he could, he got under weigh
himself first, and guided his fleet close under the rocks, on the opposite side
of the harbour to that by which the enemy were entering.
50. When the Consul Publius saw, to his surprise, that the enemy, so far
Unexpected resistance of from giving in or being dismayed at his approach, were
Adherbal. The Roman determined upon fighting him at sea: while of his own
fleet checked.
ships some were already within the harbour, others just
in the very entrance channel, and others still on their way towards it; he at
once issued orders to all the ships to turn round and make the best of their
way out again. The result of this was that, as some of the ships were in the
harbour, and others at the entrance, they fouled each other when they began
reversing their course; and not only did a great confusion arise among the
men, but the ships got their oars broken also in the collisions which
occurred. However, the captains exerted themselves to get the ships into
line close under the shore, as they successively cleared the harbour, and
with their prows directed towards the enemy. Publius himself was originally
bringing up the rear of the entire squadron; but he now, while the movement
was actually in execution, turned towards the open sea and transferred
himself to a position on the left wing of the fleet. At the same moment
Adherbal succeeded in outflanking the left of his opponents with five
vessels furnished with charging beaks. He turned his own ship with its prow
towards the enemy, and brought to. As each of the others came up, and fell
into line with him, he sent orders to them by his staff officers to do the same
as he had done. Thus they all fell in and formed a complete line. The signal
which had been agreed upon before was given, and an advance was begun,
which was made at first without disarranging the line. The Romans were
still close in-shore, waiting for the coming out of their ships from the

harbour; and this proximity to the land proved of infinite disadvantage to
them in the engagement.
51. And now the fleets were within a short distance of each other: the
The battle. signals were raised from the ships of the respective
commanders; the charge was made; and ship grappled
with ship. At first the engagement was evenly balanced, because each fleet
had the pick of their land forces serving as marines on board. But as it went
on the many advantages which, taking it as a whole, the Carthaginians
possessed, gave them a continually increasing superiority. Owing to the
better construction of their ships they had much the advantage in point of
speed, while their position with the open sea behind them materially
contributed to their success, by giving them freer space for their
manœuvres. Were any of them hard pressed by the enemy? Their speed
secured them a sure escape, and a wide expanse of water was open to their
flight. There they would swing round and attack the leading ships which
were pursuing them: sometimes rowing round them and charging their
broadsides, at other times running alongside them as they lurched
awkwardly round, from the weight of the vessels and the unskilfulness of
the crews. In this way they were charging perpetually, and managed to sink
a large number of the ships. Or was one of their number in danger? They
were ready to come to the rescue, being out of danger themselves, and
being able to effect a movement to right or left, by steering along the sterns
of their own ships and through the open sea unmolested. The case of the
The Romans beaten. Romans was exactly the reverse. If any of them were
hard pressed, there was nowhere for them to retreat, for
they were fighting close to the shore; and any ship of theirs that was hard
driven by the enemy either backed into shallow water and stuck fast, or ran
ashore and was stranded. Moreover, that most effective of all manœuvres in
sea fights,—sailing through the enemy’s line and appearing on their stern
while they are engaged with others,—was rendered impossible for them,
owing to the bulk of their vessels; and still more so by the unskilfulness of
their crews. Nor, again, were they able to bring help from behind to those
who wanted it, because they were hemmed in so close to the shore that
there was not the smallest space left in which those who wished to render
such help might move. When the Consul saw how ill things were going for
him all along the line; when he saw some of his ships sticking fast in the

shallows, and others cast ashore; he took to flight. Thirty other ships which
happened to be near him followed him as he sailed from the left, and
coasted along the shore. But the remaining vessels, which amounted to
ninety-three, the Carthaginians captured with their crews, except in the case
of those who ran their ships ashore and got away.
52. The result of this sea fight gave Adherbal a high reputation at Carthage;
for his success was looked upon as wholly due to himself, and his own
foresight and courage: while at Rome Publius fell into great disrepute, and
was loudly censured as having acted without due caution or calculation, and
as having during his administration, as far as a single man could, involved
Rome in serious disasters. He was accordingly some time afterwards
brought to trial, was heavily fined, and exposed to considerable danger. Not
that the Romans gave way in consequence of these events. On the contrary,
The Romans not they omitted nothing that was within their power to do,
discouraged send the and continued resolute to prosecute the campaign. It
Consul L. Junius with a
large supply of
was now the time for the Consular elections: as soon as
provisions in 800 they were over and two Consuls appointed; one of
transports, convoyed by them, Lucius Junius,140 was immediately sent to convey
60 ships of war to
Lilybaeum. corn to the besiegers of Lilybaeum, and other
provisions and supplies necessary for the army, sixty
ships being also manned to convoy them. Upon his arrival at Messene,
Junius took over such ships as he found there to meet him, whether from the
army or from the other parts of Sicily, and coasted along with all speed to
Syracuse, with a hundred and twenty ships, and his supplies on board about
eight hundred transports. Arrived there, he handed over to the Quaestors
half his transports and some of his war-ships, and sent them off, being very
anxious that what the army needed should reach them promptly. He
remained at Syracuse himself, waiting for such of his ships as had not yet
arrived from Messene, and collecting additional supplies of corn from the
allies in the central districts of the island.
53. Meanwhile Adherbal sent the prisoners he had taken in the sea fight,
and the captured vessels, to Carthage; and giving Carthalo his colleague
thirty vessels, in addition to the seventy in command of which he had come,
despatched him with instructions to make a sudden attack upon the enemy’s
ships that were at anchor off Lilybaeum, capture all he could, and set fire to
the rest. In obedience to these instructions Carthalo accomplished his

Carthalo tries to passage just before daybreak, fired some of the vessels,
and towed off others. Great was the commotion at the
intercept the transports.
quarters of the Romans. For as they hurried to the rescue of the ships, the
attention of Himilco, the commander of the garrison, was aroused by their
shouts; and as the day was now beginning to break, he could see what was
happening, and despatched the mercenary troops who were in the town.
Thus the Romans found themselves surrounded by danger on every side,
and fell into a state of consternation more than usually profound and
serious. The Carthaginian admiral contented himself with either towing off
or breaking up some few of their vessels, and shortly afterwards coasted
along under the pretence of making for Heracleia: though he was really
lying in wait, with the view of intercepting those who were coming by sea
to the Roman army. When his look-out men brought him word that a
considerable number of vessels of all sorts were bearing down upon him,
and were now getting close, he stood out to sea and started to meet them:
for the success just obtained over the Romans inspired him with such
contempt for them, that he was eager to come to an engagement. The
vessels in question were those which had been despatched in advance under
the charge of the Quaestors from Syracuse. And they too had warning of
their danger. Light boats were accustomed to sail in advance of a squadron,
and these announced the approach of the enemy to the Quaestors; who
being convinced that they were not strong enough to stand a battle at sea,
dropped anchor under a small fortified town which was subject to Rome,
and which, though it had no regular harbour, yet possessed roadsteads, and
headlands projecting from the mainland, and surrounding the roadsteads, so
as to form a convenient refuge. There they disembarked; and having set up
some catapults and ballistae, which they got from the town, awaited the
approach of the enemy. When the Carthaginians arrived, their first idea was
to blockade them: for they supposed that the men would be terrified and
retreat to the fortified town, leaving them to take possession of the vessels
without resistance. Their expectations, however, were not fulfilled; and
finding that the men on the contrary resisted with spirit, and that the
situation of the spot presented many difficulties of every description, they
sailed away again after towing off some few of the transports laden with
provisions, and retired to a certain river, in which they anchored and kept a
look out for the enemy to renew their voyage.

54. In complete ignorance of what had happened to his advanced squadron,
the Consul, who had remained behind at Syracuse, after completing all he
meant to do there, put to sea; and, after rounding Pachynus, was proceeding
on his voyage to Lilybaeum. The appearance of the enemy was once more
signalled to the Carthaginian admiral by his look-out men, and he at once
put out to sea, with the view of engaging them as far as possible away from
their comrades. Junius saw the Carthaginian fleet from a considerable
distance, and observing their great numbers did not dare to engage them,
and yet found it impossible to avoid them by flight because they were now
too close. He therefore steered towards land, and anchored under a rocky
and altogether dangerous part of the shore; for he judged it better to run all
risks rather than allow his squadron, with all its men, to fall into the hands
of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral saw what he had done; and
determined that it was unadvisable for him to engage the enemy, or bring
his ships near such a dangerous place. He therefore made for a certain
headland between the two squadrons of the enemy, and there kept a look
out upon both with equal vigilance. Presently, however, the weather became
rough, and there was an appearance of an unusually dangerous disturbance
setting in from the sea. The Carthaginian pilots, from their knowledge of the
particular localities, and of seamanship generally, foresaw what was
coming; and persuaded Carthalo to avoid the storm and round the
promontory of Pachynus.141 He had the good sense to take their advice: and
The Roman fleet is accordingly these men, with great exertions and
wrecked. extreme difficulty, did get round the promontory and
anchored in safety; while the Romans, being exposed to the storm in places
entirely destitute of harbours, suffered such complete destruction, that not
one of the wrecks even was left in a state available for use. Both of their
squadrons in fact were completely disabled to a degree past belief.
55. This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up again and
The Romans abandon their hopes to revive. But the Romans, though they had
the sea. met with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered
a naval disaster so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and
confined themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians
remained masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land.
Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at
Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving out that

Lucius Junius perseveres town. The Roman government did not allow their
in the siege. b.c. 248. disasters to prevent their sending provisions into the
camp overland; and the besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they
possibly could. Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and,
being in a state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to
strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which had
befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that offered to
Eryx. surprise and seize Eryx; and became master both of the
temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain
close to the sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy,
between Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by
far the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which
is flat, stands the temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the most
splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general magnificence.
The town stands immediately below the summit, and is approached by a
very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and temple; and
established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot of the road to it
from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points, but more especially at
the foot of the ascent, believing that by so doing he should secure
possession of the whole mountain as well as the town.
56. Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians appointed
Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the fleet in his hands.
b.c. 247. He took over the command, and started to ravage the
Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri,
and the rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of
Occupation of Hercte by Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, which
Hamilcar. lies between Eryx and Panormus on the coast, and is
reputed the best situation in the district for a safe and permanent camp. For
it is a mountain rising sheer on every side, standing out above the
surrounding country to a considerable height. The table-land on its summit
has a circumference of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil
is rich in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it
healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the side
which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the central part of
the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices; while the spaces
between them require only slight fortifications, and of no great extent, to

make them secure. There is in it also an eminence, which serves at once as
an acropolis and as a convenient tower of observation, commanding the
surrounding district. It also commands a harbour conveniently situated for
the passage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always
abundant depth of water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways—two
from the land side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar
entrenched himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he
could count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and
though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy, he
nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and
dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the
seaboard of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans
had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus, within
about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of way, and forced
b.c. 247-244. them to engage in numerous skirmishes, for the space
of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible
to give a detailed account in writing.
57. It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their courage and
their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest for the prize. As the
match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged without intermission; but to
anticipate, or keep account of every feint or every blow delivered is
impossible for combatants and spectators alike. Still one may conceive a
sufficiently distinct idea of the affair by taking into account the general
activity of the men, the ambition actuating each side, and the amount of
their experience, strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two
generals. No writer could set down, and no reader would endure the
wearisome and profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the
transactions of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were
carried out. For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its
attack, or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with
the actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far
better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing was left
untried,—whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from history, or
plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the immediate
circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon an adventurous
spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for several reasons, could

not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first place, the forces on either side
were evenly matched: and in the second place, while the camps were in the
case of both equally impregnable, the space which separated the two was
very small. The result of this was that skirmishes between detached parties
on both sides were always going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive
occurred. For though the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from
time to time were cut to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had
only to wheel round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind
their own defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the
enemy.
58. Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the games,
transferred them by a bold stroke from the locality just described, and the
Siege of Eryx, b.c. 244. contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle of
greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions.
The Romans, as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx,
and had a guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the
town which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the
Romans who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary
hardihood and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding
themselves between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them
with difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only
one point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes
belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they put in
use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation was submitted
to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and finally they left the
combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from utter weakness and misery,
but like men still unbroken and unconquered. The fact is that before either
party had got completely the better of the other, though they had maintained
b.c. 243-242. the conflict for another two years, the war happened to
be decided in quite a different manner.
Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed there.
The obstinate persistence The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-
of the Romans and cocks that fight to their last gasp. You may see them
Carthaginians.
often, when too weak to use their wings, yet full of
pluck to the end, and striking again and again. Finally, chance brings them

the opportunity of once more grappling, and they hold on until one or other
of them drops down dead.
59. So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out by
the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought struggles
was at last driving them to despair; their strength had become paralysed,
and their resources reduced almost to extinction by war-taxes and expenses
extending over so many years. And yet the Romans did not give in. For the
last five years indeed they had entirely abandoned the sea, partly because of
the disasters they had sustained there, and partly because they felt confident
of deciding the war by means of their land forces; but they now determined
for the third time to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw
that their operations were not succeeding according to their calculations,
mainly owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They
therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means alone,
if their design were but well directed, would they be able to bring the war to
a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they had been compelled to
abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer bad luck; in their second by
the loss of the naval battle off Drepana. This third attempt was successful:
they shut off the Carthaginian forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by
sea, and eventually put a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was
The Romans once more essentially an effort of despair. The treasury was empty,
fit out a fleet. and would not supply the funds necessary for the
undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the patriotism and
generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook singly, or by two or three
combining, according to their means, to supply a quinquereme fully fitted
out, on the understanding that they were to be repaid if the expedition was
successful. By these means a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were
quickly prepared, built on the model of the ship of the Rhodian. Gaius
b.c. 242. Coss. C. Lutatius was then appointed to the command, and
Lutatius Catulus, A. despatched at the beginning of the summer. His
Postumius Albinus.
appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the
whole of the Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession
both of the harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He
then threw up works round the city on Drepana, and made other
preparations for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with
all his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of the

Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this expedition, that
it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of the whole war could be
decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time to be wasted or unemployed.
He practised and drilled his crews every day in the manœuvres which they
would be called upon to perform; and by his attention to discipline
generally brought his sailors in a very short time to the condition of trained
athletes for the contest before them.
60. That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and be again
bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly unexpected by the
The Carthaginians send Carthaginians. They at once set about fitting out their
Hanno with a fleet. ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and
despatched their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not
run short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command
the fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was eager
as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the enemy, to get
across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus lightened his ships,
take on board as marines those of the mercenary troops who were suitable
to the service, and Barcas with them; and not to engage the enemy until he
had thus reinforced himself. But Lutatius was informed of the arrival of
Hanno’s squadron, and correctly interpreted their design. He at once took
on board the best soldiers of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa,
which lies directly opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some
words suitable to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with
the understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. At daybreak
10th March b.c. 241. A the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze
strong breeze is blowing. had sprung up on the stern of the enemy, and that an
advance towards them in the teeth of it would be difficult for his ships. The
sea too was rough and boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his
mind what he had better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was
decided by the following considerations. If he boarded the enemy’s fleet
during the continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with
Hanno, and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could
be reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden
with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy to get
across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to contend with
ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more navigable condition,

and against the picked men of the land forces; and what was more
formidable than anything else, against the determined bravery of Hamilcar.
He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the present opportunity slip; and
Lutatius however when he saw the enemy’s ships crowding sail, he put to
decides to fight. sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent
physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea, and
Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to the foe.
61. When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting their
The battle of Aegusa. passage across, they lowered their masts, and after
some words of mutual exhortation had been uttered in
the several ships, closed with their opponents. But the respective state of
equipment of the two sides was exactly the converse of what it had been in
the battle off Drepana; and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally
reversed also. The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and
had eased their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the
battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well
together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and were
backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were all but
invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse. Their
ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in the engagement;
while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely put on board for the
emergency; and such marines as they had were raw recruits, who had never
had any previous experience of any difficult or dangerous service. The fact
is that the Carthaginian government never expected that the Romans would
again attempt to dispute the supremacy at sea: they had, therefore, in
contempt for them, neglected their navy. The result was that, as soon as they
closed, their manifold disadvantages quickly decided the battle against
Victory of the Romans. them. They had fifty ships sunk, and seventy taken with
their crews. The rest set their sails, and running before
the wind, which luckily for them suddenly veered round at the nick of time
to help them, got away again to Holy Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to
Lilybaeum to join the army, and there occupied himself in making
arrangements for the ships and men which he had captured; which was a
business of considerable magnitude, for the prisoners made in the battle
amounted to little short of ten thousand.

62. As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were concerned, this
unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of the Carthaginians to
carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up their resources they
Barcas makes terms. were at a complete standstill. On the one hand, they
could not any longer send supplies to their forces in
Sicily, because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon
and, as it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders
to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with all speed,
leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands. Nor was their
confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant general and a sensible
man. As long as there was any reasonable hope of success in the business he
had in hand, nothing was too adventurous or too dangerous for him to
attempt; and if any general ever did so, he put every chance of victory to the
fullest proof. But when all his endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable
expectation was left of saving his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and
sent ambassadors to treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this
he showed great good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the
duty of a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is the
time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the proposal,
because he was fully aware that the resources of Rome were at the lowest
ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his fortune to put an
end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give the terms. “Friendship is
The treaty, b.c. 242. established between the Carthaginians and Romans on
the following terms, provided always that they are
ratified by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole
of Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the
Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the Romans
all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the Romans in
twenty years 2200 Euboic talents of silver.”142
63. When this treaty was sent to Rome the people refused to accept it, but
sent ten commissioners to examine into the business. Upon their arrival
they made no change in the general terms of the treaty, but they introduced
some slight alterations in the direction of increased severity towards
Carthage. Thus they reduced the time allowed for the payment of the
indemnity by one half; they added a thousand talents to the sum demanded;

and extended the evacuation of Sicily to all islands lying between Sicily and
Italy.
Such were the conditions on which the war was ended, after lasting twenty-
Greatness of the war. four years continuously. It was at once the longest, most
continuous, and most severely contested war known to
us in history. Apart from the other battles fought and the preparations made,
which I have described in my previous chapters, there were two sea fights,
in one of which the combined numbers of the two fleets exceeded five
hundred quinqueremes, in the other nearly approached seven hundred. In
the course of the war, counting what were destroyed by shipwreck, the
Romans lost seven hundred quinqueremes, the Carthaginians five hundred.
Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles of an
Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of their fleets,
would we may well believe have been overwhelmed with astonishment at
the hugeness of these proportions if they had had to tell the story of this
war.143 If, further, we take into consideration the superior size of the
quinqueremes, compared with the triremes employed by the Persians
against the Greeks, and again by the Athenians and Lacedaemonians in their
wars with each other, we shall find that never in the whole history of the
world have such enormous forces contended for mastery at sea.
These considerations will establish my original observation, and show the
falseness of the opinion entertained by certain Greeks. It was not by mere
chance or without knowing what they were doing that the Romans struck
their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion, and justified their
boldness by its success. No: it was the natural result of discipline gained in
the stern school of difficulty and danger.
64. And no doubt the question does naturally arise here as to why they find
it impossible in our days to man so many ships, or take the sea with such
large fleets, though masters of the world, and possessing a superiority over
others many times as great as before. The explanation of this difficulty will
be clearly understood when we come to the description of their civil
constitution. I look upon this description as a most important part of my
work, and one demanding close attention on the part of my readers. For the
subject is calculated to afford pleasure in the contemplation, and is up to
this time so to speak absolutely unknown, thanks to historians, some of

whom have been ignorant, while others have given so confused an account
of it as to be practically useless. For the present it suffices to say that, as far
as the late war was concerned, the two nations were closely matched in the
character of the designs they entertained, as well as in the lofty courage
they showed in prosecuting them: and this is especially true of the eager
ambition displayed on either side to secure the supremacy. But in the
individual gallantry of their men the Romans had decidedly the advantage;
while we must credit the Carthaginians with the best general of the day both
for genius and daring. I mean Hamilcar Barcas, own father of Rome’s
future enemy Hannibal.
65. The confirmation of this peace was followed by events which involved
both nations in a struggle of an identical or similar nature. At Rome the late
war was succeeded by a social war against the Faliscans, which, however,
they brought to a speedy and successful termination by the capture of
War between Rome and Falerii after only a few days’ siege. The Carthaginians
Falerii. were not so fortunate. Just about the same time they
found themselves confronted by three enemies at once, their own
mercenaries, the Numidians, and such Libyans as joined the former in their
The mercenary war, revolt. And this war proved to be neither insignificant
b.c. 241. nor contemptible. It exposed them to frequent and
terrible alarms; and, finally, it became a question to them not merely of a
loss of territory, but of their own bare existence, and of the safety of the
very walls and buildings of their city. There are many reasons that make it
worth while to dwell upon the history of this war: yet I must give only a
summary account of it, in accordance with the original plan of this work.
The nature and peculiar ferocity of the struggle, which has been generally
called the “truceless war,” may be best learnt from its incidents. It conveys
two important lessons: it most conspicuously shows those who employ
mercenaries what dangers they should foresee and provide against; and
secondly, it teaches how wide the distinction is between the character of
troops composed of a confused mass of uncivilised tribes, and of those
which have had the benefit of education, the habits of social life, and the
restraints of law. But what is of most importance to us is, that we may trace
from the actual events of this period the causes which led to the war
between Rome and Carthage in the time of Hannibal. These causes have not
only been a subject of dispute among historians, but still continue to be so

among those who were actually engaged; it is therefore a matter of
importance to enable students to form an opinion on this matter as nearly as
possible in accordance with the truth.
66. The course of events at Carthage subsequent to the peace was as
Evacuation of Sicily. follows: As soon as possible after it was finally ratified
Barcas withdrew the troops at Eryx to Lilybaeum, and
then immediately laid down his command. Gesco, who was commandant of
the town, proceeded to transport the soldiers into Libya. But foreseeing
what was likely to happen, he very prudently embarked them in
detachments, and did not send them all in one voyage. His object was to
gain time for the Carthaginian government; so that one detachment should
come to shore, receive the pay due to them, and depart from Carthage to
their own country, before the next detachment was brought across and
joined them. In accordance with this idea Gesco began the transportation of
the troops. But the Government—partly because the recent expenses had
reduced their finances to a low ebb, partly because they felt certain that, if
they collected the whole force and entertained them in Carthage, they
would be able to persuade the mercenaries to accept something less than the
whole pay due to them—did not dismiss the detachments as they landed,
but kept them massed in the city. But when this resulted in the commission
of many acts of lawlessness by night and day, they began to feel uneasy at
their numbers and their growing licentiousness; and required the officers,
until such time as arrangements for discharging their pay should have been
made, and the rest of the army should have arrived, to withdraw with all
The mercenaries sent to their men to a certain town called Sicca, receiving each
Sicca. a piece of gold for their immediate necessities. As far as
quitting the city was concerned they were ready enough to obey; but they
desired to leave their heavy baggage there as before, on the ground that they
would soon have to return to the city for their wages. But the Carthaginian
government were in terror lest, considering the length of their absence and
their natural desire for the society of wives or children, they would either
not quit the city at all; or, if they did, would be sure to be enticed by these
feelings to return, and that thus there would be no decrease of outrages in
the city. Accordingly they forced them to take their baggage with them: but
it was sorely against the will of the men, and roused strong feelings of
animosity among them. These mercenaries being forced to retire to Sicca,

lived there as they chose without any restraint upon their lawlessness. For
they had obtained two things the most demoralising for hired forces, and
which in a word are in themselves the all-sufficient source and origin of
mutinies,—relaxation of discipline and want of employment.144 For lack of
something better to do, some of them began calculating, always to their
own advantage, the amount of pay owing to them; and thus making out the
total to be many times more than was really due, they gave out that this was
the amount which they ought to demand from the Carthaginians. Moreover
they all began to call to mind the promises made to them by the generals in
their harangues, delivered on various occasions of special danger, and to
entertain high hopes and great expectations of the amount of compensation
which awaited them. The natural result followed.
67. When the whole army had mustered at Sicca, and Hanno, now
The beginning of the appointed general in Libya, far from satisfying these
outbreak, b.c. 241. hopes and the promises they had received, talked on the
contrary of the burden of the taxes and the embarrassment of the public
finances; and actually endeavoured to obtain from them an abatement even
from the amount of pay acknowledged to be due to them; excited and
mutinous feelings at once began to manifest themselves. There were
constant conferences hastily got together, sometimes in separate
nationalities, sometimes of the whole army; and there being no unity of race
or language among them, the whole camp became a babel of confusion, a
scene of inarticulate tumult, and a veritable revel of misrule. For the
Carthaginians being always accustomed to employ mercenary troops of
miscellaneous nationalities, in securing that an army should consist of
several different races, act wisely as far as the prevention of any rapid
combinations for mutiny, or difficulty on the part of the commanders in
overawing insubordination, are concerned: but the policy utterly breaks
down when an outburst of anger, or popular delusion, or internal dissension,
has actually occurred; for it makes it impossible for the commander to
soothe excited feelings, to remove misapprehensions, or to show the
ignorant their error. Armies in such a state are not usually content with mere
human wickedness; they end by assuming the ferocity of wild beasts and
the vindictiveness of insanity.
This is just what happened in this case. There were in the army Iberians and
Celts, men from Liguria and the Balearic Islands, and a considerable

number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and slaves; while the main
body consisted of Libyans. Consequently it was impossible to collect and
address them en masse, or to approach them with this view by any means
whatever. There was no help for it: the general could not possibly know
their several languages; and to make a speech four or five times on the same
subject, by the mouths of several interpreters, was almost more impossible,
if I may say so, than that. The only alternative was for him to address his
entreaties and exhortations to the soldiers through their officers. And this
Hanno continually endeavoured to do. But there was the same difficulty
with them. Sometimes they failed to understand what he said: at others they
received his words with expressions of approval to his face, and yet from
error or malice reported them in a contrary sense to the common soldiers.
The result was a general scene of uncertainty, mistrust, and
misunderstanding. And to crown all, they took it into their heads that the
Carthaginian government had a design in thus sending Hanno to them: that
they purposely did not send the generals who were acquainted with the
services they had rendered in Sicily, and who had been the authors of the
promises made to them; but had sent the one man who had not been present
at any of these transactions. Whether that were so or not, they finally broke
off all negotiations with Hanno; conceived a violent mistrust of their several
commanders; and in a furious outburst of anger with the Carthaginians
started towards the city, and pitched their camp about a hundred and twenty
stades from Carthage, at the town of Tunes, to the number of over twenty
thousand.
68. The Carthaginians saw their folly when it was too late. It was a grave
mistake to have collected so large a number of mercenaries into one place
The mercenaries at without any warlike force of their own citizens to fall
Tunes. back upon: but it was a still graver mistake to have
delivered up to them their children and wives, with their heavy baggage to
boot; which they might have retained as hostages, and thus have had greater
security for concerting their own measures, and more power of ensuring
obedience to their orders. However, being thoroughly alarmed at the action
of the men in regard to their encampment, they went to every length in their
eagerness to pacify their anger. They sent them supplies of provisions in
Attempts to pacify them. rich abundance, to be purchased exactly on their own
terms, and at their own price. Members of the Senate

were despatched, one after the other, to treat with them; and they were
promised that whatever they demanded should be conceded if it were within
the bounds of possibility. Day by day the ideas of the mercenaries rose
higher. For their contempt became supreme when they saw the dismay and
The demands of the excitement in Carthage; their confidence in themselves
mercenaries. was profound; and their engagements with the Roman
legions in Sicily had convinced them, that not only was it impossible for the
Carthaginians to face them in the field, but that it would be difficult to find
any nation in the world who could. Therefore, when the Carthaginians
conceded the point of their pay, they made a further claim for the value of
the horses they had lost. When this too was conceded, they said that they
ought to receive the value of the rations of corn due to them from a long
time previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war. And in
short, the ill-disposed and mutinous among them being numerous, they
always found out some new demand which made it impossible to come to
terms. Upon the Carthaginian government, however, pledging themselves to
the full extent of their powers, they eventually agreed to refer the matter to
the arbitration of some one of the generals who had been actually engaged
in Sicily. Now they were displeased with Hamilcar Barcas, who was one of
those under whom they had fought in Sicily, because they thought that their
present unfavourable position was attributable chiefly to him. They thought
The dispute referred to this from the fact that he never came to them as an
the arbitration of Gesco. ambassador, and had, as was believed, voluntarily
resigned his command. But towards Gesco their feelings were altogether
friendly. He had, as they thought, taken every possible precaution for their
interests, and especially in the arrangements for their conveyance to Libya.
Accordingly they referred the dispute to the arbitration of the latter.
69. Gesco came to Tunes by sea, bringing the money with him. There he
held a meeting first of the officers, and then of the men, according to their
nationalities; rebuked them for their past behaviour, and endeavoured to
convince them as to their duty in the present: but most of all he dwelt upon
their obligation in the future to show themselves well-disposed towards the
people whose pay they had been so long enjoying. Finally, he proceeded to
discharge the arrears of pay, taking each nationality separately. But there
Spendius. was a certain Campanian in the army, a runaway
Roman slave named Spendius, a man of extraordinary

physical strength and reckless courage in the field. Alarmed lest his master
should recover possession of him, and he should be put to death with
torture, in accordance with the laws of Rome, this man exerted himself to
the utmost in word and deed to break off the arrangement with the
Carthaginians. He was seconded by a Libyan called Mathōs, who was not a
Mathōs. slave but free, and had actually served in the campaign.
But he had been one of the most active agitators in the
late disturbances: and being in terror of punishment for the past, he now
gave in his adhesion to the party of Spendius; and taking the Libyans aside,
suggested to them that, when the men of other races had received their pay,
and taken their departure to their several countries, the Carthaginians would
wreak upon them the full weight of the resentment which they had, in
common with themselves, incurred; and would look upon their punishment
as a means of striking terror into all the inhabitants of Libya. It did not take
long to rouse the men by such arguments, nor were they at a loss for a
pretext, however insignificant. In discharging the pay, Gesco postponed the
Spendius and Mathōs payment of the valuations of rations and horses. This
cause an outbreak. was enough: the men at once hurried to make a
meeting; Spendius and Mathōs delivered violent invectives against Gesco
and the Carthaginians; their words were received with every sign of
approval; no one else could get a hearing; whoever did attempt to speak was
promptly stoned to death, without the assembly so much as waiting to
ascertain whether he intended to support the party of Spendius or no.
A considerable number of privates as well as officers were killed in this
manner in the various émeutes which took place; and from the constant
repetition of this act of violence the whole army learnt the meaning of the
βάλλε. word “throw,” although there was not another word
which was intelligible to them all in common. The most
usual occasion for this to happen was when they collected in crowds
flushed with wine after their midday meal. On such occasions, if only some
one started the cry “throw,” such volleys were poured in from every side,
and with such rapidity, that it was impossible for any one to escape who
once ventured to stand forward to address them. The result was that soon no
one had the courage to offer them any counsel at all; and they accordingly
appointed Mathōs and Spendius as theirō commanders.

70. This complete disorganisation and disorder did not escape the
observation of Gesco. But his chief anxiety was to secure the safety of his
country; and seeing clearly that, if these men were driven to exasperation,
the Carthaginians would be in danger of total destruction, he exerted
himself with desperate courage and persistence: sometimes summoning
their officers, sometimes calling a meeting of the men according to their
nationalities and remonstrating with them. But on one occasion the Libyans,
not having received their wages as soon as they considered that they ought
to have been paid to them, approached Gesco himself with some insolence.
Gesco and his staff With the idea of rebuking their precipitancy he refused
seized and thrown into to produce the pay, and bade them “go and ask their
chains.
general Mathōs for it.” This so enraged them, that
without a moment’s delay they first made a raid upon the money that was
kept in readiness, and then arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians with him.
Mathōs and Spendius thought that the speediest way to secure an outbreak
of war was for the men to commit some outrage upon the sanctity of law
and in violation of their engagements. They therefore co-operated with the
mass of the men in their reckless outrages; plundered the baggage of the
Carthaginians along with their money; manacled Gesco and his staff with
every mark of insolent violence, and committed them into custody.
Thenceforth they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves
together by oaths which were at once impious and contrary to the principles
universally received among mankind.
This was the origin and beginning of the mercenary, or, as it is also called,
b.c. 240. the Libyan war. Mathōs lost no time after this outrage in
sending emissaries to the various cities in Libya, urging
them to assert their freedom, and begging them to come to their aid and join
them in their undertaking. The appeal was successful: nearly all the cities in
Libya readily listened to the proposal that they should revolt against
Carthage, and were soon zealously engaged in sending them supplies and
reinforcements. They therefore divided themselves into two parties; one of
which laid siege to Utica, the other to Hippo Zarytus, because these two
cities refused to participate in the revolt.
71. Three things must be noticed in regard to the Carthaginians. First,
among them the means of life of private persons are supplied by the
produce of the land; secondly, all public expenses for war material and

stores are discharged from the tribute paid by the people of Libya; and
thirdly, it is their regular custom to carry on war by means of mercenary
troops. At this moment they not only found themselves unexpectedly
deprived of all these resources at once, but saw each one of them actually
Despair at Carthage. employed against themselves. Such an unlooked-for
event naturally reduced them to a state of great
discouragement and despair. After the long agony of the Sicilian war they
were in hopes, when the peace was ratified, that they might obtain some
breathing space and some period of settled content. The very reverse was
now befalling them. They were confronted by an outbreak of war still more
difficult and formidable. In the former they were disputing with Rome for
the possession of Sicily: but this was a domestic war, and the issue at stake
was the bare existence of themselves and their country. Besides, the many
battles in which they had been engaged at sea had naturally left them ill
supplied with arms, sailors, and vessels. They had no store of provisions
ready, and no expectation whatever of external assistance from friends or
allies. They were indeed now thoroughly taught the difference between a
foreign war, carried on beyond the seas, and a domestic insurrection and
disturbance.
72. And for these overpowering miseries they had themselves to thank more
than any one else. During the late war they had availed themselves of what
they regarded as a reasonable pretext for exercising their supremacy over
the inhabitants of Libya with excessive harshness. They had exacted half of
all agricultural produce; had doubled the tribute of the towns; and, in
levying these contributions, had refused to show any grace or indulgence
whatever to those who were in embarrassed circumstances. Their
admiration and rewards were reserved, not for those generals who treated
the people with mildness and humanity, but exclusively for those who like
Hanno secured them the most abundant supplies and war material, though
at the cost of the harshest treatment of the provincials.
These people therefore needed no urging to revolt: a single messenger
Revolt of the country sufficed. The women, who up to this time had passively
people. looked on while their husbands and fathers were being
led off to prison for the non-payment of the taxes, now bound themselves
by an oath in their several towns that they would conceal nothing that they
possessed; and, stripping off their ornaments, unreservedly contributed

them to furnish pay for the soldiers. They thus put such large means into the
hands of Mathōs and Spendius, that they not only discharged the arrears due
to the mercenaries, which they had promised them as an inducement to
mutiny, but remained well supplied for future needs. A striking illustration
of the fact that true policy does not regard only the immediate necessities of
the hour, but must ever look still more keenly to the future.
73. No such considerations, however, prevented the Carthaginians in their
Hanno’s management of hour of distress from appointing Hanno general;
the war. because he had the credit of having on a former
occasion reduced the city called Hecatompylos, in Libya, to obedience.
They also set about collecting mercenaries; arming their own citizens who
were of military age; training and drilling the city cavalry; and refitting
what were left of their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the
pinnaces. Meanwhile Mathōs, being joined by as many as seventy thousand
Libyans, distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were
besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without let
or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the
encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from the
whole of outer Libya. For Carthage itself stands on a projecting peninsula in
a gulf, nearly surrounded by the sea and in part also by a lake. The isthmus
that connects it with Libya is three miles broad: upon one side of this
isthmus, in the direction of the open sea and at no great distance, stands the
city of Utica, and on the other stands Tunes, upon the shore of the lake. The
mercenaries occupied both these points, and having thus cut off the
Carthaginians from the open country, proceeded to take measures against
Utica itself. They made frequent excursions up to the town wall, sometimes
by day and sometimes by night, and were continually throwing the citizens
into a state of alarm and absolute panic.
74. Hanno, however, was busying himself with some success in providing
defences. In this department of a general’s duty he showed considerable
ability; but he was quite a different man at the head of a sally in force: he
was not sagacious in his use of opportunities, and managed the whole
business with neither skill nor promptitude. It was thus that his first
Fails to relieve Utica. expedition miscarried when he went to relieve Utica.
The number of his elephants, of which he had as many
as a hundred, struck terror into the enemy; yet he made so poor a use of this

advantage that, instead of turning it into a complete victory, he very nearly
brought the besieged, as well as himself, to utter destruction. He brought
from Carthage catapults and darts, and in fact all the apparatus for a siege;
and having encamped outside Utica undertook an assault upon the enemy’s
entrenchment. The elephants forced their way into the camp, and the enemy,
unable to withstand their weight and the fury of their attack, entirely
evacuated the position. They lost a large number from wounds inflicted by
the elephants’ tusks; while the survivors made their way to a certain hill,
which was a kind of natural fortification thickly covered with trees, and
there halted, relying upon the strength of the position. But Hanno,
accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who, once turned, never
stay their flight till they are two days removed from the scene of the action,
imagined that he had already put an end to the war and had gained a
complete victory. He therefore troubled himself no more about his men, or
about the camp generally, but went inside the town and occupied himself
with his own personal comfort. But the mercenaries, who had fled in a body
on to the hill, had been trained in the daring tactics of Barcas, and
accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian warfare to retreat and
return again to the attack many times in the same day. They now saw that
the general had left his army and gone into the town, and that the soldiers,
owing to their victory, were behaving carelessly, and in fact slipping out of
the camp in various directions: they accordingly got themselves into order
and made an assault upon the camp; killed a large number of the men;
forced the rest to fly ignominiously to the protection of the city walls and
gates; and possessed themselves of all the baggage and apparatus belonging
to the besieged, which Hanno had brought outside the town in addition to
his own, and thus put into the hands of the enemy.
But this was not the only instance of his incompetence. A few days
afterwards, near a place called Gorza, he came right upon the enemy, who
Hanno’s continued ill lay encamped there, and had two opportunities of
success. securing a victory by pitched battles; and two more by
surprising them, as they changed quarters close to where he was. But in
both cases he let the opportunities slip for want of care and proper
calculation.
75. The Carthaginians, therefore, when they saw his mismanagement of the
campaign, once more placed Hamilcar Barcas at the head of affairs; and

despatched him to the war as commander-in-chief, with
Hamilcar Barcas takes
the command. seventy elephants, the newly-collected mercenaries, and
the deserters from the enemy; and along with them the cavalry and infantry
enrolled from the citizens themselves, amounting in all to ten thousand
men. His appearance from the first produced an immediate impression. The
expedition was unexpected; and he was thus able, by the dismay which it
produced, to lower the courage of the enemy. He succeeded in raising the
siege of Utica, and showed himself worthy of his former achievements, and
of the confidence felt in him by the people. What he accomplished on this
service was this.
A chain of hills runs along the isthmus connecting Carthage with the
mainland, which are difficult of access, and are crossed by artificial passes
into the mainland; of these hills Mathōs had occupied all the available
points and posted guards there. Besides these there is a river called Macaras
(Bagradas), which at certain points interrupts the passage of travellers from
He gets his men across the city to the mainland, and though for the most part
the Macaras. impassable, owing to the strength of its stream, is only
crossed by one bridge. This means of egress also Mathōs was guarding
securely, and had built a town on it. The result was that, to say nothing of
the Carthaginians entering the mainland with an army, it was rendered
exceedingly difficult even for private individuals, who might wish to make
their way through, to elude the vigilance of the enemy. This did not escape
the observation and care of Hamilcar; and while revolving every means and
every chance of putting an end to this difficulty about a passage, he at
length hit upon the following. He observed that where the river discharges
itself into the sea its mouth got silted up in certain positions of the wind,
and that then the passage over the river at its mouth became like that over a
marsh. He accordingly got everything ready in the camp for the expedition,
without telling any one what he was going to do; and then watched for this
state of things to occur. When the right moment arrived, he started under
cover of night; and by daybreak had, without being observed by any one,
got his army across this place, to the surprise of the citizens of Utica as well
as of the enemy. Marching across the plain, he led his men straight against
the enemy who were guarding the bridge.
76. When he understood what had taken place Spendius advanced into the
plain to meet Hamilcar. The force from the city at the bridge amounted to

ten thousand men; that from before Utica to more than fifteen thousand
men; both of which now advanced to support each other. When they had
And defeats Spendius. effected a junction they imagined that they had the
Carthaginians in a trap, and therefore with mutual
words of exhortation passed the order to engage, and at once commenced.
Hamilcar was marching with his elephants in front, his cavalry and light
troops next, while his heavy armed hoplites brought up the rear. But when
he saw the precipitation of the enemy’s attack, he passed the word to his
men to turn to the rear. His instructions were that the troops in front should,
after thus turning to the rear, retire with all speed: while he again wheeled to
the right about what had been originally his rear divisions, and got them
into line successively so as to face the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries
mistook the object of this movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians
were panic-stricken and in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their
ranks and, rushing forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When,
however, they found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were
drawn up close to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being
brought up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned
and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance. In the
blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own rear-guard,
who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction or that of their
comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death by the cavalry and
elephants who immediately charged. As many as six thousand of the
Libyans and foreign troops were killed, and about two thousand taken
prisoners. The rest made good their escape, either to the town on the bridge
or to the camp near Utica. After this victory Hamilcar followed close upon
the heels of the enemy, carried the town on the bridge by assault, the enemy
there abandoning it and flying to Tunes, and then proceeded to scour the
rest of the district: some of the towns submitting, while the greater number
he had to reduce by force. And thus he revived in the breasts of the
Carthaginians some little spirit and courage, or at least rescued them from
the state of absolute despair into which they had fallen.
77. Meanwhile Mathōs himself was continuing the siege of Hippo Zarytus,
and he now counselled Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to
stick close to the skirts of the enemy, avoiding the plains, because the
Mathōs harasses enemy were strong in cavalry and elephants, but
Hamilcar’s march.

marching parallel with them on the slopes of the mountains, and attacking
them whenever they saw them in any difficulty. While suggesting these
tactics, he at the same time sent messengers to the Numidians and Libyans,
entreating them to come to their aid, and not to let slip the opportunity of
securing their own freedom. Accordingly, Spendius took with him a force of
six thousand men, selected from each of the several nationalities at Tunes,
and started, keeping along a line of hills parallel to the Carthaginians.
Besides these six thousand he had two thousand Gauls under Autaritus, who
were all that were left of the original number, the rest having deserted to the
Romans during the period of the occupation of Eryx. Now it happened that,
just when Hamilcar had taken up a position in a certain plain which was
surrounded on all sides by mountains, the reinforcements of Numidians and
Libyans joined Spendius. The Carthaginians, therefore, suddenly found a
Libyan encampment right on their front, another of Numidians on their rear,
and that of Spendius on their flank; and it seemed impossible to escape
from the danger which thus menaced them on every side.
78. But there was at that time a certain Narávas, a Numidian of high rank
and warlike spirit, who entertained an ancestral feeling of affection for the
Hamilcar is joined by the Carthaginians, rendered especially warm at that time by
Numidian Narávas. admiration for Hamilcar. He now thought that he had an
excellent opportunity for an interview and association with that general; and
accordingly came to the Carthaginian quarters with a body of a hundred
Numidians, and boldly approaching the out-works, remained there waving
his hand. Wondering what his object could be Hamilcar sent a horseman to
see; to whom Narávas said that he wished for an interview with the general.
The Carthaginian leader still showing hesitation and incredulity, Narávas
committed his horse and javelins to the care of his guards, and boldly came
into the camp unarmed. His fearlessness made a profound impression not
unmixed with surprise. No further objection, however, was made to his
presence, and the desired interview was accorded; in which he declared his
goodwill to the Carthaginians generally, and his especial desire to be friends
with Barcas. “This was the motive of his presence,” he said; “he was come
with the full intention of taking his place by his side and of faithfully
sharing all his actions and undertakings.” Hamilcar, on hearing these words,
was so immensely charmed by the young man’s courage in coming, and his
honest simplicity in the interview, that he not only consented to accept his

co-operation, but promised also with an oath that he would give him his
daughter in marriage if he kept faith with Carthage to the end. The
agreement having been thus made, Narávas came with his division of
Numidians, numbering two thousand. Thus reinforced Hamilcar offered the
enemy battle; which Spendius, having joined forces with the Libyans,
Again defeats Spendius. accepted; and descending into the plain engaged the
Carthaginians. In the severe battle which followed
Hamilcar’s army was victorious: a result which he owed partly to the
excellent behaviour of the elephants, but particularly to the brilliant services
rendered by Narávas. Autaritus and Spendius managed to escape; but of the
rest as many as ten thousand were killed and four thousand taken prisoners.
When the victory was complete, Hamilcar gave permission to those of the
prisoners who chose to enlist in his army, and furnished them with arms
from the spoils of the enemy’s slain: those who did not choose to accept this
offer he summoned to a meeting and harangued them. He told them that the
crimes committed by them up to that moment were pardoned, and they were
permitted to go their several ways, wheresoever they chose, but on
condition that none of them bore arms against Carthage again: if any one of
them were ever caught so doing, he warned them distinctly that he would
meet with no mercy.
79. This conspiracy of Mathōs and Spendius caused an outbreak about this
same time in another quarter. For the mercenaries who were in garrison in
Mutiny in Sardinia. Sardinia, inspired by their example, attacked the
Carthaginians in the island; beleaguered Bostarus, the
commander of the foreign contingent, in the citadel; and finally put him and
his compatriots to the sword. The Carthaginians thereupon sent another
army into the island under Hanno. But the men deserted to the mutineers;
who then seized Hanno and crucified him, and exercising all their ingenuity
in the invention of tortures racked to death every Carthaginian in the island.
Having got the towns into their power, they thenceforth kept forcible
possession of the island; until they quarrelled with the natives and were
driven by them into Italy. This was the way in which Carthage lost Sardinia,
an island of first rate importance from its size, the number of its inhabitants,
and its natural products. But as many have described it at great length, I do
not think that I need repeat statements about which there is no manner of
dispute.

To return to Libya. The indulgence shown by Hamilcar to the captives
b.c. 239. Plan of alarmed Mathōs and Spendius and Autaritus the Gaul.
Spendius for doing away They were afraid that conciliatory treatment of this sort
with the good impression
made by the leniency of
would induce the Libyans, and the main body of the
Barcas. mercenaries, to embrace with eagerness the impunity
thus displayed before their eyes. They consulted
together, therefore, how they might by some new act of infamy inflame to
the highest pitch of fury the feelings of their men against the Carthaginians.
They finally determined upon the following plan. They summoned a
meeting of the soldiers; and when it was assembled, they introduced a
bearer of a despatch which they represented to have been sent by their
fellow conspirators in Sardinia. The despatch warned them to keep a careful
watch over Gesco and all his fellow prisoners (whom, as has been stated,
they had treacherously seized in Tunes), as certain persons in the camp were
secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians for their release. Taking this as
his text, Spendius commenced by urging the men not to put any trust in the
indulgence shown by the Carthaginian general to the prisoners of war,
“For,” said he, “it is with no intention of saving their lives that he adopted
this course in regard to the prisoners; his aim was, by releasing them, to get
us into his power, that punishment might not be confined to some of us, but
might fall on all at once.” He went on to urge them to be on their guard, lest
by letting Gesco’s party go they should teach their enemies to despise them;
and should also do great practical damage to their own interests, by
suffering a man to escape who was an excellent general, and likely to be a
most formidable enemy to themselves. Before he had finished this speech
another courier arrived, pretending to have been sent by the garrison at
Tunes, and bearing a despatch containing warnings similar to that from
Sardinia.
80. It was now the turn of Autaritus the Gaul. “Your only hope,” he said, “of
safety is to reject all hopes which rest on the Carthaginians. So long as any
man clings to the idea of indulgence at their hands, he cannot possibly be a
genuine ally of yours. Never trust, never listen, never attend to anyone,
unless he recommend unrelenting hostility and implacable hatred towards
the Carthaginians: all who speak on the other side regard as traitors and
enemies.” After this preface, he gave it as his advice that they should put to
death with torture both Gesco and those who had been seized with him, as

well as the Carthaginian prisoners of war who had been captured since.
Now this Autaritus was the most effective speaker of any, because he could
make himself understood to a large number of those present at a meeting.
For, owing to his length of service, he knew how to speak Phoenician; and
Phoenician was the language in which the largest number of men, thanks to
the length of the late war, could listen to with satisfaction. Accordingly his
speech was received with acclamation, and he stood down amidst loud
applause. But when many came forward from the several nationalities at the
same time; and, moved by Gesco’s former kindnesses to themselves, would
have deprecated at least the infliction of torture, not a word of what they
said was understood: partly because many were speaking at the same time,
and partly because each spoke in his own language. But when at length it
was disclosed that what they meant was to dissuade the infliction of torture,
upon one of those present shouting out “Throw!” they promptly stoned to
death all who had come forward to speak; and their relations buried their
Murder of Gesco. bodies, which were crushed into shapeless masses as
though by the feet of elephants. Still they at least were
buried. But the followers of Spendius now seized Gesco and his fellow
prisoners, numbering about seven hundred, led them outside the stockade,
and having made them march a short distance from the camp, first cut off
their hands, beginning with Gesco, the man whom a short while before they
had selected out of all Carthage as their benefactor and had chosen as
arbitrator in their controversy. When they had cut off their hands, they
proceeded to lop off the extremities of the unhappy men, and having thus
mutilated them and broken their legs, they threw them still alive into a
trench.
81. When news of this dreadful affair reached the Carthaginians, they were
powerless indeed to do anything, but they were filled with horror; and in a
transport of agony despatched messengers to Hamilcar and the second
general Hanno, entreating them to rally to their aid and avenge the unhappy
victims; and at the same time they sent heralds to the authors of this crime
to negotiate for the recovery of the dead bodies. But the latter sternly
refused; and warned the messengers to send neither herald nor ambassador
to them again; for the same punishment which had just befallen Gesco
awaited all who came. And for the future they passed a resolution, which
they encouraged each other to observe, to put every Carthaginian whom

they caught to death with torture; and that whenever they captured one of
their auxiliaries they would cut off his hands and send him back to
Carthage. And this resolution they exactly and persistently carried out. Such
horrors justify the remark that it is not only the bodies of men, and the
ulcers and imposthumes which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and
completely incurable state of inflammation, but their souls also most of all.
For as in the case of ulcers, sometimes medical treatment on the one hand
only serves to irritate them and make them spread more rapidly, while if, on
the other hand, the medical treatment is stopped, having nothing to check
their natural destructiveness, they gradually destroy the substance on which
they feed; just so at times it happens that similar plague spots and gangrenes
fasten upon men’s souls; and when this is so, no wild beast can be more
wicked or more cruel than a man. To men in such a frame of mind if you
show indulgence or kindness, they regard it as a cover for trickery and
sinister designs, and only become more suspicious and more inflamed
against the authors of it; while if you retaliate, their passions are aroused to
a kind of dreadful rivalry, and then there is no crime too monstrous or too
cruel for them to commit. The upshot with these men was, that their
feelings became so brutalised that they lost the instincts of humanity: which
we must ascribe in the first place, and to the greatest extent, to uncivilised
habits and a wretchedly bad early training; but many other things
contributed to this result, and among them we must reckon as most
important the acts of violence and rapacity committed by their leaders, sins
which at that time were prevalent among the whole mercenary body, but
especially so with their leaders.
82. Alarmed by the recklessness displayed by the enemy, Hamilcar
summoned Hanno to join him, being convinced that a consolidation of the
two armies would give him the best chance of putting an end to the whole
war. Such of the enemy as he took in the field he put to execution on the
spot, while those who were made prisoners and brought to him he threw to
the elephants to be trampled to death; for he now made up his mind that the
Quarrels of Hanno and only possibility of finishing the war was to entirely
Hamilcar. destroy the enemy. But just as the Carthaginians were
beginning to entertain brighter hopes in regard to the war, a reverse as
complete as it was unexpected brought their fortunes to the lowest ebb. For
these two generals, when they had joined forces, quarrelled so bitterly with

each other, that they not only omitted to take advantage of chances against
the enemy, but by their mutual animosity gave the enemy many
opportunities against themselves. Finding this to be the case, the
Carthaginian government sent out instructions that one of the generals was
to retire, the other to remain, and that the army itself was to decide which of
them it should be. This was one cause of the reverse in the fortunes of
Carthage at this time. Another, which was almost contemporaneous, was
this. Their chief hope of furnishing the army with provisions and other
necessaries rested upon the supplies that were being brought from a place to
which they give the name of Emporiae: but as these supplies were on their
way, they were overtaken by a storm at sea and entirely destroyed. This was
all the more fatal because Sardinia was lost to them at the time, as we have
seen, and that island had always been of the greatest service to them in
difficulties of this sort. But the worst blow of all was the revolt of the cities
Revolt of Hippo Zarytus of Hippo Zarytus and Utica, the only cities in all Libya
and Utica. that had been faithful to them, not only in the present
war, but also at the time of the invasion of Agathocles, as well as that of the
Romans. To both these latter they had offered a gallant resistance; and, in
short, had never at any time adopted any policy hostile to Carthage. But
now they were not satisfied with simply revolting to the Libyans, without
any reason to allege for their conduct. With all the bitterness of turncoats,
they suddenly paraded an ostentatious friendship and fidelity to them, and
gave practical expression to implacable rage and hatred towards the
Carthaginians. They killed every man of the force which had come from
Carthage to their aid, as well as its commander, and threw the bodies from
the wall. They surrendered their town to the Libyans, while they even
refused the request of the Carthaginians to be allowed to bury the corpses of
their unfortunate soldiers. Mathōs and Spendius were so elated by these
events that they were emboldened to attempt Carthage itself. But Barcas
had now got Hannibal as his coadjutor, who had been sent by the citizens to
the army in the place of Hanno,—recalled in accordance with the sentence
of the army, which the government had left to their discretion in reference
to the disputes that arose between the two generals. Accompanied,
therefore, by this Hannibal and by Narávas, Hamilcar scoured the country
to intercept the supplies of Mathōs and Spendius, receiving his most
efficient support in this, as in other things, from the Numidian Narávas.

83. Such being the position of their forces in the field, the Carthaginians,
finding themselves hemmed in on every side, were compelled to have
recourse to the help of the free states in alliance with them.145 Now Hiero,
of Syracuse, had during this war been all along exceedingly anxious to do
everything which the Carthaginians asked him; and at this point of it was
Hiero of Syracuse. more forward to do so than ever, from a conviction that
it was for his interest, with a view alike to his own
sovereignty and to his friendship with Rome, that Carthage should not
perish, and so leave the superior power to work its own will without
resistance. And his reasoning was entirely sound and prudent. It is never
right to permit such a state of things; nor to help any one to build up so
preponderating a power as to make resistance to it impossible, however just
the cause. Not that the Romans themselves had failed to observe the
Friendly disposition of obligations of the treaty, or were showing any failure of
Rome. friendly dispositions; though at first a question had
arisen between the two powers, from the following circumstance. At the
beginning of the war, certain persons sailing from Italy with provisions for
the mutineers, the Carthaginians captured them and forced them to land in
their own harbour; and presently had as many as five hundred such persons
in their prisons. This caused considerable annoyance at Rome: but, after
sending ambassadors to Carthage and recovering possession of the men by
diplomatic means, the Romans were so much gratified that, by way of
returning the favour, they restored the prisoners made in the Sicilian war
whom they still retained; and from that time forth responded cheerfully and
generously to all requests made to them. They allowed their merchants to
export to Carthage whatever from time to time was wanted, and prohibited
those who were exporting to the mutineers. When, subsequently, the
mercenaries in Sardinia, having revolted from Carthage, invited their
interference on the island, they did not respond to the invitation; nor when
the people of Utica offered them their submission did they accept it, but
kept strictly to the engagements contained in the treaty.
84. The assistance thus obtained from these allies encouraged the
Carthaginians to maintain their resistance: while Mathōs and Spendius
found themselves quite as much in the position of besieged as in that of
besiegers; for Hamilcar’s force reduced them to such distress for provisions
that they were at last compelled to raise the siege. However, after a short

b.c. 238. Hamilcar, with interval, they managed to muster the most effective of
assistance from Sicily, the mercenaries and Libyans, to the number in all of
surrounds Mathōs and
Spendius.
fifty thousand, among whom, besides others, was
Zarzas the Libyan, with his division, and commenced
once more to watch and follow on the flank of Hamilcar’s march. Their
method was to keep away from the level country, for fear of the elephants
and the cavalry of Narávas; but to seize in advance of him all points of
vantage, whether it were rising ground or narrow pass. In these operations
they showed themselves quite a match for their opponents in the fury of
their assault and the gallantry of their attempts; but their ignorance of
military tactics frequently placed them at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, a
real and practical illustration of the difference between scientific and
unscientific warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical
movements of a soldier. Like a good draught-player, by isolating and
surrounding them, he destroyed large numbers in detail without coming to a
general engagement at all; and in movements of more importance he cut off
many without resistance by enticing them into ambushes; while he threw
others into utter dismay by suddenly appearing where they least expected
him, sometimes by day and sometimes by night: and all whom he took alive
he threw to the elephants. Finally, he managed unexpectedly to beleaguer
them on ground highly unfavourable to them and convenient for his own
force; and reduced them to such a pitch of distress that, neither venturing to
risk an engagement nor being able to run away, because they were entirely
surrounded by a trench and stockade, they were at last compelled by
starvation to feed on each other: a fitting retribution at the hands of
Providence for their violation of all laws human and divine in their conduct
to their enemies. To sally forth to an engagement they did not dare, for
certain defeat stared them in the face, and they knew what vengeance
awaited them if they were taken; and as to making terms, it never occurred
to them to mention it, they were conscious that they had gone too far for
that. They still hoped for the arrival of relief from Tunes, of which their
officers assured them, and accordingly shrank from no suffering however
terrible.
85. But when they had used up for food the captives in this horrible manner,
and then the bodies of their slaves, and still no one came to their relief from
Tunes, their sufferings became too dreadful to bear; and the common

soldiers broke out into open threats of violence against their officers.
Thereupon Autaritus, Zarzas, and Spendius decided to put themselves into
the hands of the enemy and to hold a parley with Hamilcar, and try to make
terms. They accordingly sent a herald and obtained permission for the
despatch of an embassy. It consisted of ten ambassadors, who, on their
Spendius and Autaritus arrival at the Carthaginian camp, concluded an
fall into the hands of agreement with Hamilcar on these terms: “The
Hamilcar.
Carthaginians may select any ten men they choose from
the enemy, and allow the rest to depart with one tunic a-piece.” No sooner
had these terms been agreed to, than Hamilcar said at once that he selected,
according to the terms of the agreement, the ten ambassadors themselves.
The Carthaginians thus got possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other
most conspicuous officers. The Libyans saw that their officers were
arrested, and not knowing the terms of the treaty, believed that some perfidy
was being practised against them, and accordingly flew to seize their arms.
Hamilcar thereupon surrounded them with his elephants and his entire
force, and destroyed them to a man. This slaughter, by which more than
forty thousand perished, took place near a place called the Saw, so named
from its shape resembling that tool.
86. This achievement of Hamilcar revived the hopes of the Carthaginians
who had been in absolute despair: while he, in conjunction with Narávas
Siege of Mathōs in and Hannibal, employed himself in traversing the
Tunes. country and visiting the cities. His victory secured the
submission of the Libyans; and when they had come in, and the greater
number of the towns had been reduced to obedience, he and his colleagues
advanced to attack Tunes, and commenced besieging Mathōs. Hannibal
pitched his camp on the side of the town nearest to Carthage, and Hamilcar
on the opposite side. When this was done they brought the captives taken
from the army of Spendius and crucified them in the sight of the enemy. But
observing that Hannibal was conducting his command with negligence and
Defeat and death of over-confidence, Mathōs assaulted the ramparts, killed
Hannibal. many of the Carthaginians, and drove the entire army
from the camp. All the baggage fell into the hands of the enemy, and
Hannibal himself was made a prisoner. They at once took him up to the
cross on which Spendius was hanging, and after the infliction of exquisite
tortures, took down the latter’s body and fastened Hannibal, still living, to

his cross; and then slaughtered thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank
round the corpse of Spendius. It seemed as though Fortune designed a
competition in cruelty, giving either side alternately the opportunity of
outdoing the other in mutual vengeance. Owing to the distance of the two
camps from each other it was late before Barcas discovered the attack made
from the town; nor, when he had discovered it, could he even then go to the
rescue with the necessary speed, because the intervening country was
rugged and difficult. He therefore broke up his camp, and leaving Tunes
marched down the bank of the river Macaras, and pitched his camp close to
its mouth and to the sea.
87. This unexpected reverse reduced the Carthaginians once more to a
By a final effort the melancholy state of despair. But though their recent
Carthaginians raise a elation of spirit was followed so closely by this
reinforcement for
Hamilcar.
depression, they did not fail to do what they could for
their own preservation. They selected thirty members of
the Senate; with them they associated Hanno, who had some time ago been
recalled; and, arming all that were left of military age in the city, despatched
them to Barcas, with the feeling that they were now making their supreme
effort. They strictly charged the members of the Senate to use every effort
to reconcile the two generals Hamilcar and Hanno, and to make them forget
their old quarrel and act harmoniously, in view of the imminence of the
danger. Accordingly, after the employment of many various arguments, they
induced the generals to meet; and Hanno and Barcas were compelled to
give in and yield to their representations. The result was that they ever
afterwards co-operated with each other so cordially, that Mathōs found
himself continually worsted in the numerous skirmishes which took place
round the town called Leptis, as well as certain other towns; and at last
became eager to bring the matter to the decision of a general engagement, a
desire in which the Carthaginians also shared in an equal degree. Both sides
therefore having determined upon this course: they summoned all their
allies to join them in confronting the peril, and collected the garrisons
stationed in the various towns, conscious that they were about to stake their
all on the hazard. All being ready on either side for the conflict, they gave
Mathōs beaten and each other battle by mutual consent, both sides being
captured. drawn up in full military array. When victory declared
itself on the side of the Carthaginians, the larger number of the Libyans

perished on the field; and the rest, having escaped to a certain town,
surrendered shortly afterwards; while Mathōs himself was taken prisoner by
his enemies.
88. Most places in Libya submitted to Carthage after this battle. But the
Reduction of Hippo and towns of Hippo and Utica still held out, feeling that
Utica, b.c. 238. they had no reasonable grounds for obtaining terms,
because their original acts of hostility left them no place for mercy or
pardon. So true is it that even in such outbreaks, however criminal in
themselves, it is of inestimable advantage to be moderate, and to refrain
from wanton acts which commit their perpetrator beyond all power of
forgiveness. Nor did their attitude of defiance help these cities. Hanno
invested one and Barcas the other, and quickly reduced them to accept
whatever terms the Carthaginians might determine.
The war with the Libyans had indeed reduced Carthage to dreadful danger;
but its termination enabled her not only to re-establish her authority over
Libya, but also to inflict condign punishment upon the authors of the revolt.
For the last act in the drama was performed by the young men conducting a
b.c. 241-238. triumphal procession through the town, and finally
inflicting every kind of torture upon Mathōs. For three
years and about four months did the mercenaries maintain a war against the
Carthaginians which far surpassed any that I ever heard of for cruelty and
inhumanity.
And about the same time the Romans took in hand a naval expedition to
Sardinia upon the request of the mercenaries who had deserted from that
The Romans interfere in island and come to Italy; and when the Carthaginians
Sardinia. expressed indignation at this, on the ground that the
lordship over Sardinia more properly belonged to them, and were preparing
to take measures against those who caused the revolt of the island, the
Romans voted to declare war against them, on the pretence that they were
making warlike preparations, not against Sardinia, but against themselves.
The Carthaginians, however, having just had an almost miraculous escape
from annihilation in the recent war, were in every respect disabled from
renewing their quarrel with the Romans. They therefore yielded to the
necessities of the hour, and not only abandoned Sardinia, but paid the

Romans twelve hundred talents into the bargain, that they might not be
obliged to undertake the war for the present.

BOOK II

1. In the previous book I have described how the Romans, having subdued
Recapitulation of the all Italy, began to aim at foreign dominion; how they
subjects treated in Book crossed to Sicily, and the reasons of the war which they
I.
entered into against the Carthaginians for the possession
of that island. Next I stated at what period they began the formation of a
navy; and what befell both the one side and the other up to the end of the
war; the consequence of which was that the Carthaginians entirely
evacuated Sicily, and the Romans took possession of the whole island,
except such parts as were still under the rule of Hiero. Following these
events I endeavoured to describe how the mutiny of the mercenaries against
Carthage, in what is called the Libyan War, burst out; the lengths to which
the shocking outrages in it went; its surprises and extraordinary incidents,
until its conclusion, and the final triumph of Carthage. I must now relate the
events which immediately succeeded these, touching summarily upon each
in accordance with my original plan.
As soon as they had brought the Libyan war to a conclusion the
b.c. 238, Hamilcar and Carthaginian government collected an army and
his son Hannibal sent to despatched it under the command of Hamilcar to Iberia.
Spain.
This general took over the command of the troops, and
with his son Hannibal, then nine years old, crossing by the Pillars of
Hercules, set about recovering the Carthaginian possessions in Iberia. He
b.c. 238-229. spent nine years in Iberia, and after reducing many
Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to obedience to
Carthage he died in a manner worthy of his great achievements; for he lost
his life in a battle against the most warlike and powerful tribes, in which he
showed a conspicuous and even reckless personal gallantry. The
Carthaginians appointed his son-in-law Hasdrubal to succeed him, who was
at the time in command of the fleet.
2. It was at this same period that the Romans for the first time crossed to
Illyricum. Illyricum and that part of Europe with an army. The
history of this expedition must not be treated as

immaterial; but must be carefully studied by those who wish to understand
clearly the story I have undertaken to tell, and to trace the progress and
consolidation of the Roman Empire.
Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and possessed the
b.c. 233-232. most powerful force, both by land and sea, of any of the
kings who had reigned in Illyria before him. By a bribe
received from Demetrius he was induced to promise help to the
Medionians, who were at that time being besieged by the Aetolians, who,
Siege of Medion in being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their
Acarnania. league, had determined to reduce the city by force.
They accordingly levied their full army, pitched their camp under the walls
of the city, and kept up a continuous blockade, using every means to force
their way in, and every kind of siege-machine. But when the time of the
annual election of their Strategus drew near, the besieged being now in
great distress, and seeming likely every day to surrender, the existing
Strategus made an appeal to the Aetolians. He argued that as he had had
during his term of office all the suffering and the danger, it was but fair that
when they got possession of the town he should have the apportioning of
the spoil, and the privilege of inscribing his name on such arms as should be
preserved for dedication. This was resisted by some, and especially by those
who were candidates for the office, who urged upon the Assembly not to
prejudge this matter, but to leave it open for fortune to determine who was
to be invested with this honour; and, finally, the Aetolians decided that
whoever was general when the city was taken should share the apportioning
of the spoils, and the honour of inscribing the arms, with his predecessor.
3. The decision was come to on the day before the election of a new
Strategus, and the transference of the command had, according to the
Aetolian custom, to take place. But on that very night a hundred galleys
The Illyrians relieve with five thousand Illyrians on board, sailed up to land
Medion. near Medion. Having dropped anchor at daybreak, they
effected a disembarkation with secrecy and despatch; they then formed in
the order customary in their country, and advanced in their several
companies against the Aetolian lines. These last were overwhelmed with
astonishment at the unexpected nature and boldness of the move; but they
had long been inspired with overweening self-confidence, and having full
reliance in their own forces were far from being dismayed. They drew up

the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry in front of their lines on the
level ground, and with a portion of their cavalry and their light infantry they
hastened to occupy some rising ground in front of their camp, which nature
had made easily defensible. A single charge, however, of the Illyrians,
whose numbers and close order gave them irresistible weight, served to
dislodge the light-armed troops, and forced the cavalry who were on the
ground with them to retire to the hoplites. But the Illyrians, being on the
higher ground, and charging down from it upon the Aetolian troops formed
up on the plain, routed them without difficulty; the Medionians at the same
time making a diversion in their favour by sallying out of the town and
charging the Aetolians. Thus, after killing a great number, and taking a still
greater number prisoners, and becoming masters also of their arms and
baggage, the Illyrians, having carried out the orders of their king, conveyed
their baggage and the rest of the booty to their boats, and immediately set
sail for their own country.
4. This was a most unexpected relief to the Medionians. They met in public
assembly and deliberated on the whole business, and especially as to the
inscribing the arms reserved for dedication. They decided, in mockery of
the Aetolian decree, that the inscription should contain the name of the
Aetolian commander on the day of battle, and of the candidates for
succession to his office. And indeed Fortune seems, in what happened to
them, to have designed a display of her power to the rest of mankind. The
very thing which these men were in momentary expectation of undergoing
at the hands of their enemies, she put it in their power to inflict upon those
enemies, and all within a very brief interval. The unexpected disaster of the
Aetolians, too, may teach all the world not to calculate on the future as
though it were the actually existent, and not to reckon securely on what may
still turn out quite otherwise, but to allow a certain margin to the
unexpected. And as this is true everywhere and to every man, so is it
especially true in war.
When his galleys returned, and he heard from his officers the events of the
Death of Agron, who is expedition, King Agron was so beside himself with joy
succeeded by his wife at the idea of having conquered the Aetolians, whose
Teuta, b.c. 231.
confidence in their own prowess had been extreme,
that, giving himself over to excessive drinking and other similar
indulgences, he was attacked by a pleurisy of which in a few days he died.

His wife Teuta succeeded him on the throne; and managed the various
details of administration by means of friends whom she could trust. But her
woman’s head had been turned by the success just related, and she fixed her
gaze upon that, and had no eyes for anything going on outside the country.
Her first measure was to grant letters of marque to privateers, authorising
them to plunder all whom they fell in with; and she next collected a fleet
and military force as large as the former one, and despatched them with
general instructions to the leaders to regard every land as belonging to an
enemy.
5. Their first attack was to be upon the coast of Elis and Messenia, which
had been from time immemorial the scene of the raids of the Illyrians. For
Teuta’s piratical fleet, owing to the length of their seaboard, and to the fact
b.c. 230. that their most powerful cities were inland, troops
raised to resist them had a great way to go, and were long in coming to the
spot where the Illyrian pirates landed; who accordingly overran those
districts, and swept them clean without having anything to fear. However,
when this fleet was off Phoenice in Epirus they landed to get supplies.
Takes Phoenice in There they fell in with some Gauls, who to the number
Epirus. of eight hundred were stationed at Phoenice, being in
the pay of the Epirotes; and contracted with them to betray the town into
their hands. Having made this bargain, they disembarked and took the town
and everything in it at the first blow, the Gauls within the walls acting in
collusion with them. When this news was known, the Epirotes raised a
general levy and came in haste to the rescue. Arriving in the neighbourhood
of Phoenice, they pitched their camp so as to have the river which flows
past Phoenice between them and the enemy, tearing up the planks of the
bridge over it for security. But news being brought them that Scerdilaidas
with five thousand Illyrians was marching overland by way of the pass near
Antigoneia, they detached some of their forces to guard that town; while the
main body gave themselves over to an unrestrained indulgence in all the
luxuries which the country could supply; and among other signs of
demoralisation they neglected the necessary precaution of posting sentries
and night pickets. The division of their forces, as well as the careless
conduct of the remainder, did not escape the observation of the Illyrians;
who, sallying out at night, and replacing the planks on the bridge, crossed
the river safely, and having secured a strong position, remained there

quietly for the rest of the night. At daybreak both armies drew up their
forces in front of the town and engaged. In this battle the Epirotes were
decidedly worsted: a large number of them fell, still more were taken
prisoners, and the rest fled in the direction of the country of the Atintanes.
6. Having met with this reverse, and having lost all the hopes which they
The Aetolian and had cherished, the Epirotes turned to the despatch of
Achaean leagues send a ambassadors to the Aetolians and Achaeans, earnestly
force to the relief of the
Epirotes. A truce is
begging for their assistance. Moved by pity for their
made. The Illyrians misfortunes, these nations consented; and an army of
depart. relief sent out by them arrived at Helicranum.
Meanwhile the Illyrians who had occupied Phoenice, having effected a
junction with Scerdilaidas, advanced with him to this place, and, taking up a
position opposite to this army of relief, wished at first to give it battle. But
they were embarrassed by the unfavourable nature of the ground; and just
then a despatch was received from Teuta, ordering their instant return,
because certain Illyrians had revolted to the Dardani. Accordingly, after
merely stopping to plunder Epirus, they made a truce with the inhabitants,
by which they undertook to deliver up all freemen, and the city of Phoenice,
for a fixed ransom. They then took the slaves they had captured and the rest
of their booty to their galleys, and some of them sailed away; while those
who were with Scerdilaidas retired by land through the pass at Antigoneia,
after inspiring no small or ordinary terror in the minds of the Greeks who
lived along the coast. For seeing the most securely placed and powerful city
of Epirus thus unexpectedly reduced to slavery, they one and all began
henceforth to feel anxious, not merely as in former times for their property
in the open country, but for the safety of their own persons and cities.
The Epirotes were thus unexpectedly preserved: but so far from trying to
retaliate on those who had wronged them, or expressing gratitude to those
who had come to their relief, they sent ambassadors in conjunction with the
Acarnanians to Queen Teuta, and made a treaty with the Illyrians, in virtue
of which they engaged henceforth to co-operate with them and against the
Achaean and Aetolian leagues. All which proceedings showed conclusively
the levity of their conduct towards men who had stood their friends, as well
as an originally short-sighted policy in regard to their own interests.

7. That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall into misfortunes
which defy calculation, is the fault not of the sufferers but of Fortune, and
of those who do the wrong; but that they should from mere levity, and with
their eyes open, thrust themselves upon the most serious disasters is without
dispute the fault of the victims themselves. Therefore it is that pity and
sympathy and assistance await those whose failure is due to Fortune:
reproach and rebuke from all men of sense those who have only their own
folly to thank for it.
It is the latter that the Epirotes now richly deserved at the hands of the
Greeks. For in the first place, who in his senses, knowing the common
report as to the character of the Gauls, would not have hesitated to trust to
The career of a body of them a city so rich, and offering so many opportunities
Gallic mercenaries, for treason? And again, who would not have been on his
guard against the bad character of this particular body of them? For they
had originally been driven from their native country by an outburst of
popular indignation at an act of treachery done by them to their own
kinsfolk and relations. Then having been received by the Carthaginians,
because of the exigencies of the war in which the latter were engaged, and
at Agrigentum, being drafted into Agrigentum to garrison it (being at
the time more than three thousand strong), they seized
the opportunity of a dispute as to pay, arising between the soldiers and their
generals, to plunder the city; and again being brought by the Carthaginians
at Eryx. into Eryx to perform the same duty, they first
endeavoured to betray the city and those who were shut
up in it with them to the Romans who were besieging it; and when they
failed in that treason, they deserted in a body to the enemy: whose trust they
also betrayed by plundering the temple of Aphrodite in Eryx. Thoroughly
convinced, therefore, of their abominable character, as soon as they had
made peace with Carthage the Romans made it their first business to disarm
them, put them on board ship, and forbid them ever to enter any part of
Disarmed by the Italy. These were the men whom the Epirotes made the
Romans. protectors of their democracy and the guardians of their
laws! To such men as these they entrusted their most wealthy city! How
then can it be denied that they were the cause of their own misfortunes?
My object, in commenting on the blind folly of the Epirotes, is to point out
that it is never wise to introduce a foreign garrison, especially of barbarians,

which is too strong to be controlled.
8. To return to the Illyrians. From time immemorial they had oppressed and
Illyrian pirates. pillaged vessels sailing from Italy: and now while their
fleet was engaged at Phoenice a considerable number of
them, separating from the main body, committed acts of piracy on a number
The Romans interfere, of Italian merchants: some they merely plundered,
b.c. 230. others they murdered, and a great many they carried off
alive into captivity. Now, though complaints against the Illyrians had
reached the Roman government in times past, they had always been
neglected; but now when more and more persons approached the Senate on
this subject, they appointed two ambassadors, Gaius and Lucius
Coruncanius, to go to Illyricum and investigate the matter. But on the
arrival of her galleys from Epirus, the enormous quantity and beauty of the
spoils which they brought home (for Phoenice was by far the wealthiest city
in Epirus at that time), so fired the imagination of Queen Teuta, that she was
doubly eager to carry on the predatory warfare on the coasts of Greece. At
the moment, however, she was stopped by the rebellion at home; but it had
not taken her long to put down the revolt in Illyria, and she was engaged in
besieging Issa, the last town which held out, when just at that very time the
Roman ambassadors arrived. A time was fixed for their audience, and they
proceeded to discuss the injuries which their citizens had sustained.
Queen Teuta’s reception Throughout the interview, however, Teuta listened with
of the Roman legates. an insolent and disdainful air; and when they had
finished their speech, she replied that she would endeavour to take care that
no injury should be inflicted on Roman citizens by Illyrian officials; but that
it was not the custom for the sovereigns of Illyria to hinder private persons
from taking booty at sea. Angered by these words, the younger of the two
ambassadors used a plainness of speech which, though thoroughly to the
point, was rather ill-timed. “The Romans,” he said, “O Teuta, have a most
excellent custom of using the State for the punishment of private wrongs
and the redress of private grievances: and we will endeavour, God willing,
before long to compel you to improve the relations between the sovereign
and the subject in Illyria.” The queen received this plain speaking with
womanish passion and unreasoning anger. So enraged was she at the speech
A Roman legate that, in despite of the conventions universally observed
assassinated. among mankind, she despatched some men after the

ambassadors, as they were sailing home, to kill the one who had used this
plainness. Upon this being reported at Rome the people were highly
incensed at the queen’s violation of the law of nations, and at once set about
preparations for war, enrolling legions and collecting a fleet.
9. When the season for sailing was come Teuta sent out a larger fleet of
b.c. 229. Another galleys than ever against the Greek shores, some of
piratical fleet sent out by which sailed straight to Corcyra; while a portion of
Teuta.
them put into the harbour of Epidamnus on the pretext
of taking in victual and water, but really to attack the town. The
Their treacherous attack Epidamnians received them without suspicion and
on Epidamnus, which is without taking any precautions. Entering the town
repulsed.
therefore clothed merely in their tunics, as though they
were only come to fetch water, but with swords concealed in the water
vessels, they slew the guards stationed at the gates, and in a brief space
were masters of the gate-tower. Being energetically supported by a
reinforcement from the ships, which came quickly up in accordance with a
pre-arrangement, they got possession of the greater part of the walls without
difficulty. But though the citizens were taken off their guard they made a
determined and desperate resistance, and the Illyrians after maintaining
their ground for some time were eventually driven out of the town. So the
Epidamnians on this occasion went near to lose their city by their
carelessness; but by the courage which they displayed they saved
themselves from actual damage while receiving a useful lesson for the
future. The Illyrians who had engaged in this enterprise made haste to put to
Attack on Corcyra. sea, and, rejoining the advanced squadron, put in at
Corcyra: there, to the terror of the inhabitants, they
disembarked and set about besieging the town. Dismayed and despairing of
The Corcyreans appeal their safety, the Corcyreans, acting in conjunction with
to the Aetolian and the people of Apollonia and Epidamnus, sent off envoys
Achaean leagues.
to the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, begging for
instant help, and entreating them not to allow of their being deprived of
their homes by the Illyrians. The petition was accepted, and the Achaean
and Aetolian leagues combined to send aid. The ten decked ships of war
belonging to the Achaeans were manned, and having been fitted out in a
few days, set sail for Corcyra in hopes of raising the siege.

10. But the Illyrians obtained a reinforcement of seven decked ships from
the Acarnanians, in virtue of their treaty with that people, and, putting to
sea, engaged the Achaean fleet off the islands called Paxi. The Acarnanian
and Achaean ships fought without victory declaring for either, and without
Defeat of the Achaean receiving any further damage than having some of their
ships. crew wounded. But the Illyrians lashed their galleys
four together, and, caring nothing for any damage that might happen to
them, grappled with the enemy by throwing their galleys athwart their
prows and encouraging them to charge; when the enemies’ prows struck
them, and got entangled by the lashed-together galleys getting hitched on to
their forward gear, the Illyrians leaped upon the decks of the Achaean ships
and captured them by the superior number of their armed men. In this way
they took four triremes, and sunk one quinquereme with all hands, on board
of which Margos of Caryneia was sailing, who had all his life served the
Achaean league with complete integrity. The vessels engaged with the
Acarnanians, seeing the triumphant success of the Illyrians, and trusting to
their own speed, hoisted their sails to the wind and effected their voyage
home without further disaster. The Illyrians, on the other hand, filled with
self-confidence by their success, continued their siege of the town in high
spirits, and without putting themselves to any unnecessary trouble; while
Corcyra submits. the Corcyreans, reduced to despair of safety by what
had happened, after sustaining the siege for a short time
longer, made terms with the Illyrians, consenting to receive a garrison, and
with it Demetrius of Pharos. After this had been settled, the Illyrian
admirals put to sea again; and, having arrived at Epidamnus, once more set
about besieging that town.
11. In this same season one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, started from
Rome with two hundred ships, and the other Consul, Aulus Postumius, with
b.c. 229. The Roman the land forces. The plan of Gnaeus was to sail direct to
Consuls, with fleet and Corcyra, because he supposed that he should find the
army, start to punish the
Illyrians.
result of the siege still undecided. But when he found
that he was too late for that, he determined nevertheless
to sail to the island because he wished to know the exact facts as to what
had happened there, and to test the sincerity of the overtures that had been
Demetrius of Pharos. made by Demetrius. For Demetrius, being in disgrace
with Teuta, and afraid of what she might do to him, had

been sending messages to Rome, offering to put the city and everything else
of which he was in charge into their hands. Delighted at the appearance of
the Romans, the Corcyreans not only surrendered the garrison to them, with
Corcyra becomes a the consent of Demetrius, but committed themselves
“friend of Rome.” also unconditionally to the Roman protection; believing
that this was their only security in the future against the piratical incursions
of the Illyrians. So the Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans into the
number of the friends of Rome, sailed for Apollonia, with Demetrius to act
as their guide for the rest of the campaign. At the same time the other
Aulus Postumius. Consul, Aulus Postumius, conveyed his army across
from Brundisium, consisting of twenty thousand
infantry and about two thousand horse. This army, as well as the fleet under
Gnaeus Fulvius, being directed upon Apollonia, which at once put itself
under Roman protection, both forces were again put in motion on news
being brought that Epidamnus was being besieged by the enemy. No sooner
did the Illyrians learn the approach of the Romans than they hurriedly broke
up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking the Epidamnians under their
protection, advanced into the interior of Illyricum, subduing the Ardiaei as
The Roman settlement of they went. They were met on their march by envoys
Illyricum. from many tribes: those of the Partheni offered an
unconditional surrender, as also did those of the Atintanes. Both were
accepted: and the Roman army proceeded towards Issa, which was being
besieged by Illyrian troops. On their arrival, they forced the enemy to raise
the siege, and received the Issaeans also under their protection. Besides, as
the fleet coasted along, they took certain Illyrian cities by storm; among
which was Nutria, where they lost not only a large number of soldiers, but
some of the Military Tribunes also and the Quaestor. But they captured
twenty of the galleys which were conveying the plunder from the country.
Of the Illyrian troops engaged in blockading Issa, those that belonged to
Pharos were left unharmed, as a favour to Demetrius; while all the rest
scattered and fled to Arbo. Teuta herself, with a very few attendants,
escaped to Rhizon, a small town very strongly fortified, and situated on the
river of the same name. Having accomplished all this, and having placed
the greater part of Illyria under Demetrius, and invested him with a wide
dominion, the Consuls retired to Epidamnus with their fleet and army.

12. Then Gnaeus Fulvius sailed back to Rome with the larger part of the
naval and military forces, while Postumius, staying behind and collecting
forty vessels and a legion from the cities in that district, wintered there to
guard the Ardiaei and other tribes that had committed themselves to the
b.c. 228. Teuta submits. protection of Rome. Just before spring in the next year,
Teuta sent envoys to Rome and concluded a treaty; in
virtue of which she consented to pay a fixed tribute, and to abandon all
Illyricum, with the exception of some few districts: and what affected
Greece more than anything, she agreed not to sail beyond Lissus with more
than two galleys, and those unarmed. When this arrangement had been
concluded, Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues,
who on their arrival first explained the reasons for the war and the Roman
invasion; and then stated what had been accomplished in it, and read the
treaty which had been made with the Illyrians. The envoys then returned to
Corcyra after receiving the thanks of both leagues: for they had freed
Greece by this treaty from a very serious cause for alarm, the fact being that
the Illyrians were not the enemies of this or that people, but the common
enemies of all alike.
Such were the circumstances of the first armed interference of the Romans
in Illyricum and that part of Europe, and their first diplomatic relations with
Greece; and such too were the motives which suggested them. But having
thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to Corinth and
Athens. And it was then that the Corinthians first admitted Romans to take
part in the Isthmian games.
13. We must now return to Hasdrubal in Iberia. He had during this period
been conducting his command with ability and success, and had not only
given in general a great impulse to the Carthaginian interests there, but in
Hasdrubal in Spain. The particular had greatly strengthened them by the
founding of New fortification of the town, variously called Carthage, and
Carthage, b.c. 228.
New Town, the situation of which was exceedingly
convenient for operations in Libya as well as in Iberia. I shall take a more
suitable opportunity of speaking of the site of this town, and pointing out
the advantages offered by it to both countries: I must at present speak of the
impression made by Hasdrubal’s policy at Rome. Seeing him strengthening
the Carthaginian influence in Spain, and rendering it continually more
formidable, the Romans were anxious to interfere in the politics of that

country. They discovered, as they thought, that they had allowed their
suspicions to be lulled to sleep, and had meanwhile given the Carthaginians
the opportunity of consolidating their power. They did not venture,
however, at the moment to impose conditions or make war on them,
because they were in almost daily dread of an attack from the Celts. They
Dread of the Gauls. determined therefore to mollify Hasdrubal by gentle
measures, and so to leave themselves free to attack the
Celts first and try conclusions with them: for they were convinced that, with
such enemies on their flank, they would not only be unable to keep their
hold over the rest of Italy, but even to reckon on safety in their own city.
Treaty with Hasdrubal. Accordingly, while sending envoys to Hasdrubal, and
making a treaty with him by which the Carthaginians,
without saying anything of the rest of Iberia, engaged not to cross the Iber
in arms, they pushed on the war with the Celts in Italy.
14. This war itself I shall treat only summarily, to avoid breaking the thread
of my history; but I must go back somewhat in point of time, and refer to
the period at which these tribes originally occupied their districts in Italy.
For the story I think is worth knowing for its own sake, and must absolutely
be kept in mind, if we wish to understand what tribes and districts they were
on which Hannibal relied to assist him in his bold design of destroying the
Roman dominion. I will first describe the country in which they live, its
nature, and its relation to the rest of Italy; for if we clearly understand its
peculiarities, geographical and natural, we shall be better able to grasp the
salient points in the history of the war.
Italy, taken as a whole, is a triangle, of which the eastern side is bounded by
The Geography of Italy. the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic Gulf, its southern and
western sides by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas; these
two sides converge to form the apex of the triangle, which is represented by
the southern promontory of Italy called Cocinthus, and which separates the
Ionian from the Sicilian Sea.146 The third side, or base of this triangle, is on
the north, and is formed by the chain of the Alps stretching right across the
country, beginning at Marseilles and the coast of the Sardinian Sea, and
with no break in its continuity until within a short distance of the head of
the Adriatic. To the south of this range, which I said we must regard as the
base of the triangle, are the most northerly plains of Italy, the largest and
most fertile of any with which I am acquainted in all Europe. This is the

district with which we are at present concerned. Taken as a whole, it too
forms a triangle, the apex of which is the point where the Apennines and
Col di Tenda. Alps converge, above Marseilles, and not far from the
coast of the Sardinian Sea. The northern side of this
triangle is formed by the Alps, extending for 2200 stades; the southern by
the Apennines, extending 3600; and the base is the seaboard of the Adriatic,
from the town of Sena to the head of the gulf, a distance of more than 2500
stades. The total length of the three sides will thus be nearly 10,000 stades.
15. The yield of corn in this district is so abundant that wheat is often sold
Gallia Cis-Alpina. at four obols a Sicilian medimnus, barley at two, or a
metretes of wine for an equal measure of barley. The
quantity of panic and millet produced is extraordinary; and the amount of
acorns grown in the oak forests scattered about the country may be gathered
from the fact that, though nowhere are more pigs slaughtered than in Italy,
for sacrifices as well as for family use, and for feeding the army, by far the
most important supply is from these plains. The cheapness and abundance
of all articles of food may also be clearly shown from the fact that travellers
in these parts, when stopping at inns, do not bargain for particular articles,
but simply ask what the charge is per head for board. And for the most part
the innkeepers are content to supply their guests with every necessary at a
charge rarely exceeding half an as (that is, the fourth part of an obol)147 a
day each. Of the numbers, stature, and personal beauty of the inhabitants,
and still more of their bravery in war, we shall be able to satisfy ourselves
from the facts of their history.
16. Such parts of both slopes of the Alps as are not too rocky or too
precipitous are inhabited by different tribes; those on the north towards the
The Alps. Rhone by the Gauls, called Transalpine; those towards
the Italian plains by the Taurisci and Agones and a
number of other barbarous tribes. The name Transalpine is not tribal, but
local, from the Latin proposition trans, “across.” The summits of the Alps,
from their rugged character, and the great depth of eternal snow, are entirely
The Apennines. uninhabited. Both slopes of the Apennines, towards the
Tuscan Sea and towards the plains, are inhabited by the
Ligurians, from above Marseilles and the junction with the Alps to Pisae on
the coast, the first city on the west of Etruria, and inland to Arretium. Next
to them come the Etruscans; and next on both slopes the Umbrians. The

distance between the Apennines and the Adriatic averages about five
hundred stades; and when it leaves the northern plains the chain verges to
the right, and goes entirely through the middle of the rest of Italy, as far as
the Sicilian Sea. The remaining portion of this triangle, namely the plain
along the sea coast, extends as far as the town of Sena. The Padus,
The Po. celebrated by the poets under the name of Eridanus,
rises in the Alps near the apex of the triangle, and flows
down to the plains with a southerly course; but after reaching the plains, it
turns to the east, and flowing through them discharges itself by two mouths
into the Adriatic. The larger part of the plain is thus cut off by it, and lies
between this river and the Alps to the head of the Adriatic. In body of water
it is second to no river in Italy, because the mountain streams, descending
from the Alps and Apennines to the plain, one and all flow into it on both
sides; and its stream is at its height and beauty about the time of the rising
15th July. of the Dog Star, because it is then swollen by the
melting snows on those mountains. It is navigable for
nearly two thousand stades up stream, the ships entering by the mouth
called Olana; for though it is a single main stream to begin with, it branches
off into two at the place called Trigoboli, of which streams the northern is
called the Padoa, the southern the Olana. At the mouth of the latter there is a
harbour affording as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The whole river
is called by the country folk the Bodencus. As to the other stories current in
Greece about this river,—I mean Phaethon and his fall, and the tears of the
poplars and the black clothes of the inhabitants along this stream, which
they are said to wear at this day as mourning for Phaethon,—all such tragic
incidents I omit for the present, as not being suitable to the kind of work I
have in hand; but I shall return to them at some other more fitting
opportunity, particularly because Timaeus has shown a strange ignorance of
this district.
17. To continue my description. These plains were anciently inhabited by
Etruscans,148 at the same period as what are called the Phlegraean plains
Gauls expel Etruscans round Capua and Nola; which latter, however, have
from the valley of the enjoyed the highest reputation, because they lay in a
Po.
great many people’s way and so got known. In speaking
then of the history of the Etruscan Empire, we should not refer to the
district occupied by them at the present time, but to these northern plains,

and to what they did when they inhabited them. Their chief intercourse was
with the Celts, because they occupied the adjoining districts; who, envying
the beauty of their lands, seized some slight pretext to gather a great host
and expel the Etruscans from the valley of the Padus, which they at once
took possession of themselves. First, the country near the source of the
Padus was occupied by the Laevi and Lebecii; after them the Insubres
settled in the country, the largest tribe of all; and next them, along the bank
of the river, the Cenomani. But the district along the shore of the Adriatic
was held by another very ancient tribe called Venĕti, in customs and dress
nearly allied to Celts, but using quite a different language, about whom the
tragic poets have written a great many wonderful tales. South of the Padus,
in the Apennine district, first beginning from the west, the Ananes, and next
them the Boii settled. Next them, on the coast of the Adriatic, the Lingones;
and south of these, still on the sea-coast, the Senones. These are the most
important tribes that took possession of this part of the country. They lived
Their character. in open villages, and without any permanent buildings.
As they made their beds of straw or leaves, and fed on
meat, and followed no pursuits but those of war and agriculture, they lived
simple lives without being acquainted with any science or art whatever.
Each man’s property, moreover, consisted in cattle and gold; as they were
the only things that could be easily carried with them, when they wandered
from place to place, and changed their dwelling as their fancy directed.
They made a great point, however, of friendship: for the man who had the
largest number of clients or companions in his wanderings, was looked
upon as the most formidable and powerful member of the tribe.149
18. In the early times of their settlement they did not merely subdue the
territory which they occupied, but rendered also many of the neighbouring
peoples subject to them, whom they overawed by their audacity. Some time
afterwards they conquered the Romans in battle, and pursuing the flying
legions, in three days after the battle occupied Rome itself with the
exception of the Capitol. But a circumstance intervened which recalled
Battle of the Allia, 18th them home, an invasion, that is to say, of their territory
July, b.c. 390. by the Venĕti. Accordingly they made terms with the
Romans, handed back the city, and returned to their own land; and
subsequently were occupied with domestic wars. Some of the tribes, also,
who dwelt on the Alps, comparing their own barren districts with the rich

territory occupied by the others, were continually making raids upon them,
Latin war, b.c. 349-340. and collecting their forces to attack them. This gave the
Romans time to recover their strength, and to come to
b.c. 360. terms with the people of Latium. When, thirty years
after the capture of the city, the Celts came again as far
b.c. 348. as Alba, the Romans were taken by surprise; and having
had no intelligence of the intended invasion, nor time to
collect the forces of the Socii, did not venture to give them battle. But when
another invasion in great force took place twelve years later, they did get
previous intelligence of it; and, having mustered their allies, sallied forth to
meet them with great spirit, being eager to engage them and fight a decisive
battle. But the Gauls were dismayed at their approach; and, being besides
weakened by internal feuds, retreated homewards as soon as night fell, with
b.c. 334. all the appearance of a regular flight. After this alarm
they kept quiet for thirteen years; at the end of which
period, seeing that the power of the Romans was growing formidable, they
made a peace and a definite treaty with them.
19. They abided by this treaty for thirty years: but at that time, alarmed by a
threatening movement on the part of the Transalpine tribes, and fearing that
b.c. 299. a dangerous war was imminent, they diverted the attack
of the invading horde from themselves by presents and
appeals to their ties of kindred, but incited them to attack the Romans,
joining in the expedition themselves. They directed their march through
Etruria, and were joined by the Etruscans; and the combined armies, after
taking a great quantity of booty, got safely back from the Roman territory.
But when they got home, they quarrelled about the division of the spoil, and
in the end destroyed most of it, as well as the flower of their own force.
This is the way of the Gauls when they have appropriated their neighbours’
property; and it mostly arises from brutal drunkenness, and intemperate
b.c. 297. feeding. In the fourth year after this, the Samnites and
Gauls made a league, gave the Romans battle in the
neighbourhood of Camerium, and slew a large number. Incensed at this
defeat, the Romans marched out a few days afterwards, and with two
Consular armies engaged the enemy in the territory of Sentinum; and,
having killed the greater number of them, forced the survivors to retreat in
b.c. 283. hot haste each to his own land. Again, after another

interval of ten years, the Gauls besieged Arretium with a great army, and the
Romans went to the assistance of the town, and were beaten in an
engagement under its walls. The Praetor Lucius150 having fallen in this
battle, Manius Curius was appointed in his place. The ambassadors, sent by
him to the Gauls to treat for the prisoners, were treacherously murdered by
them. At this the Romans, in high wrath, sent an expedition against them,
which was met by the tribe called the Senones. In a pitched battle the army
of the Senones were cut to pieces, and the rest of the tribe expelled from the
country; into which the Romans sent the first colony which they ever
Sena Gallica. planted in Gaul—namely, the town of Sena, so called
from the tribe of Gauls which formerly occupied it.
This is the town which I mentioned before as lying on the coast at the
extremity of the plains of the Padus.
20. Seeing the expulsion of the Senones, and fearing the same fate for
themselves, the Boii made a general levy, summoned the Etruscans to join
them, and set out to war. They mustered their forces near the lacus
Vadimonis, and there gave the Romans battle; in which the Etruscans
indeed suffered a loss of more than half their men, while scarcely any of the
b.c. 282. Boii escaped. But yet in the very next year the same
two nations joined forces once more; and arming even
those of them who had only just reached manhood, gave the Romans battle
again; and it was not until they had been utterly defeated in this engagement
that they humbled themselves so far as to send ambassadors to Rome and
make a treaty.151
These events took place in the third year before Pyrrhus crossed into Italy,
and in the fifth before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi. For at this
period fortune seems to have plagued the Gauls with a kind of epidemic of
war. But the Romans gained two most important advantages from these
events. First, their constant defeats at the hands of the Gauls had inured
them to the worst that could befall them; and so, when they had to fight
with Pyrrhus, they came to the contest like trained and experienced
gladiators. And in the second place, they had crushed the insolence of the
Gauls just in time to allow them to give an undivided attention, first to the
war with Pyrrhus for the possession of Italy, and then to the war with
Carthage for the supremacy in Sicily.

21. After these defeats the Gauls maintained an unbroken peace with Rome
for forty-five years. But when the generation which had witnessed the
actual struggle had passed away, and a younger generation of men had
taken their places, filled with unreflecting hardihood, and who had neither
experienced nor seen any suffering or reverse, they began, as was natural, to
b.c. 236. disturb the settlement; and on the one hand to let trifling
causes exasperate them against Rome, and on the other
to invite the Alpine Gauls to join the fray. At first these intrigues were
carried on by their chiefs without the knowledge of the tribesmen; and
accordingly, when an armed host of Transalpine Gauls arrived at Ariminum,
the Boii were suspicious; and forming a conspiracy against their own
leaders, as well as against the new-comers, they put their own two kings
Atis and Galatus to death, and cut each other to pieces in a pitched battle.
Just then the Romans, alarmed at the threatened invasion, had despatched
an army; but learning that the Gauls had committed this act of self-
destruction, it returned home again. In the fifth year after this alarm, in the
Consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans divided among their
citizens the territory of Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones
b.c. 232. when they conquered them: a democratic measure
introduced by Gaius Flaminius, and a policy which we
must pronounce to have been the first step in the demoralisation of the
people, as well as the cause of the next Gallic war. For many of the Gauls,
and especially the Boii whose lands were coterminous with the Roman
territory, entered upon that war from the conviction that the object of Rome
in her wars with them was no longer supremacy and empire over them, but
their total expulsion and destruction.
22. Accordingly the two most extensive tribes, the Insubres and Boii, joined
in the despatch of messengers to the tribes living about the Alps and on the
b.c. 231. Rhone, who from a word which means “serving for
hire,” are called Gaesatae. To their kings Concolitanus
and Aneroetes they offered a large sum of gold on the spot; and, for the
future, pointed out to them the greatness of the wealth of Rome, and all the
riches of which they would become possessed, if they took it. In these
attempts to inflame their cupidity and induce them to join the expedition
against Rome they easily succeeded. For they added to the above arguments
pledges of their own alliance; and reminded them of the campaign of their

own ancestors in which they had seized Rome itself, and had been masters
of all it contained, as well as the city itself, for seven months; and had at
last evacuated it of their own free will, and restored it by an act of free
grace, returning unconquered and scatheless with the booty to their own
land. These arguments made the leaders so eager for the expedition, that
there never at any other time came from that part of Gaul a larger host, or
one consisting of more notable warriors. Meanwhile, the Romans, informed
of what was coming, partly by report and partly by conjecture, were in such
a state of constant alarm and excitement, that they hurriedly enrolled
legions, collected supplies, and sent out their forces to the frontier, as
though the enemy were already in their territory, before the Gauls had
stirred from their own lands.
It was this movement of the Gauls that, more than anything else, helped the
Carthaginians to consolidate their power in Iberia. For the Romans, as I
have said, looked upon the Celtic question as the more pressing one of the
two, as being so near home; and were forced to wink at what was going on
in Iberia, in their anxiety to settle it satisfactorily first. Having, therefore,
put their relations with the Carthaginians on a safe footing by the treaty
with Hasdrubal, which I spoke of a short time back,152 they gave an
undivided attention to the Celtic war, convinced that their interest
demanded that a decisive battle should be fought with them.
23. The Gaesatae, then, having collected their forces, crossed the Alps and
descended into the valley of the Padus with a formidable army, furnished
b. c. 225. Coss. L. with a variety of armour, in the eighth year after the
Aemilius Papus. C. distribution of the lands of Picenum. The Insubres and
Atilius Regulus.
Boii remained loyal to the agreement they had made
with them: but the Venĕti and Cenomani being induced by embassies from
Rome to take the Roman side, the Celtic kings were obliged to leave a
portion of their forces behind, to guard against an invasion of their territory
by those tribes. They themselves, with their main army, consisting of one
hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse and chariots,
struck camp and started on their march, which was to be through Etruria, in
high spirits. As soon as it was known at Rome that the Celts had crossed the
Alps, one of the Consuls, Lucius Aemilius Papus, was sent with an army to
Ariminum to guard against the passage of the enemy, and one of the
Praetors into Etruria: for the other Consul, Gaius Atilius Regulus, happened

to be in Sardinia with his legions. There was universal terror in Rome, for
the danger threatening them was believed to be great and formidable. And
naturally so: for the old fear of the Gauls had never been eradicated from
their minds. No one thought of anything else: they were incessantly
occupied in mustering the legions, or enrolling new ones, and in ordering
up such of the allies as were ready for service. The proper magistrates were
ordered to give in lists of all citizens of military age; that it might at once be
known to what the total of the available forces amounted. And such stores
of corn, and darts, and other military equipments were collected as no one
could remember on any former occasion. From every side assistance was
eagerly rendered; for the inhabitants of Italy, in their terror at the Gallic
invasion, no longer thought of the matter as a question of alliance with
Rome, or of the war as undertaken to support Roman supremacy, but each
people regarded it as a danger menacing themselves and their own city and
territory. The response to the Roman appeal therefore was prompt.
24. But in order that we may learn from actual facts how great the power
The Roman resources. was which Hannibal subsequently ventured to attack,
and what a mighty empire he faced when he succeeded
in inflicting upon the Roman people the most severe disasters, I must now
state the amount of the forces they could at that time bring into the field.
The two Consuls had marched out with four legions, each consisting of five
thousand two hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry. Besides this there
were with each Consul allies to the number of thirty thousand infantry and
two thousand cavalry. Of Sabines and Etruscans too, there had come to
Rome, for that special occasion, four thousand horse and more than fifty
thousand foot. These were formed into an army and sent in advance into
Etruria, under the command of one of the Praetors. Moreover, the Umbrians
and Sarsinatae, hill tribes of the Apennine district, were collected to the
number of twenty thousand; and with them were twenty thousand Venĕti
and Cenomani. These were stationed on the frontier of the Gallic territory,
that they might divert the attention of the invaders, by making an incursion
into the territory of the Boii. These were the forces guarding the frontier. In
Rome itself, ready as a reserve in case of the accidents of war, there
remained twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse of citizens, and
thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse of the allies. Lists of men for
service had also been returned, of Latins eighty thousand foot and five

thousand horse; of Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand
horse; of Iapygians and Messapians together fifty thousand foot and sixteen
thousand horse; and of Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand
horse; of Marsi, and Marrucini, and Ferentani, and Vestini, twenty thousand
foot and four thousand horse. And besides these, there were in reserve in
Sicily and Tarentum two legions, each of which consisted of about four
thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred horse. Of the Romans and
Campanians the total of those put on the roll was two hundred and fifty
thousand foot and twenty-three thousand horse; so that the grand total of the
forces actually defending Rome was over 150,000 foot, 6000 cavalry:153
and of the men able to bear arms, Romans and allies, over 700,000 foot and
70,000 horse; while Hannibal, when he invaded Italy, had less than twenty
thousand to put against this immense force.
25. There will be another opportunity of treating the subject in greater
The Gauls enter Etruria. detail; for the present I must return to the Celts. Having
entered Etruria, they began their march through the
country, devastating it as they chose, and without any opposition; and
finally directed their course against Rome itself. But when they were
encamped under the walls of Clusium, which is three days’ march from
Rome, news was brought them that the Roman forces, which were on duty
in Etruria, were following on their rear and were close upon them; upon
which they turned back to meet them, eager to offer them battle. The two
The Praetor’s army armies came in sight of each other about sunset, and
defeated at Clusium. encamped for the night a short distance apart. But when
night fell, the Celts lit their watch fires; and leaving their cavalry on the
ground, with instructions that, as soon as daylight made them visible to the
enemy, they should follow by the same route, they made a secret retreat
along the road to Faesulae, and took up their position there; that they might
be joined by their own cavalry, and might disconcert the attack of the
enemy. Accordingly, when at daybreak the Romans saw that the cavalry
were alone, they believed that the Celts had fled, and hastened in pursuit of
the retreating horse; but when they approached the spot where the enemy
were stationed, the Celts suddenly left their position and fell upon them.
The struggle was at first maintained with fury on both sides: but the courage
and superior numbers of the Celts eventually gave them the victory. No less
than six thousand Romans fell: while the rest fled, most of whom made

their way to a certain strongly fortified height, and there remained. The first
impulse of the Celts was to besiege them: but they were worn out by their
previous night march, and all the suffering and fatigue of the day; leaving
therefore a detachment of cavalry to keep guard round the hill, they
hastened to procure rest and refreshment, resolving to besiege the fugitives
next day unless they voluntarily surrendered.
26. But meanwhile Lucius Aemilius, who had been stationed on the coast of
On the arrival of the Adriatic at Ariminum, having been informed that the
Aemilius the Gauls Gauls had entered Etruria and were approaching Rome,
retire.
set off to the rescue; and after a rapid march appeared
on the ground just at the critical moment. He pitched his camp close to the
enemy; and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his watch fires, and
understanding what had happened, quickly recovered their courage and sent
some of their men unarmed to make their way through the forest and tell the
Consul what had happened. This news left the Consul as he thought no
alternative but to fight. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to lead out the
infantry at daybreak, while he, taking command of the cavalry, led the way
towards the hill. The Gallic chieftains too had seen his watch fires, and
understood that the enemy was come; and at once held council of war. The
advice of King Aneroestes was, “that seeing the amount of booty they had
taken,—an incalculable quantity indeed of captives, cattle, and other spoil,
—they had better not run the risk of another general engagement, but return
home in safety; and having disposed of this booty, and freed themselves
from its incumbrance, return, if they thought good, to make another
determined attack upon Rome.” Having resolved to follow the advice of
Aneroestes in the present juncture, the chiefs broke up their night council,
and before daybreak struck camp, and marched through Etruria by the road
which follows the coast of the Ligurian bay. While Lucius, having taken off
the remnant of the army from the hill, and combined it with his own forces,
determined that it would not be by any means advantageous to offer the
enemy regular battle; but that it was better to dog their footsteps, watching
for favourable times and places at which to inflict damage upon them, or
wrest some of their booty from their hands.
27. Just at that time the Consul Gaius Atilius had crossed from Sardinia, and
Atilius landing at Pisa having landed at Pisae was on his way to Rome; and
intercepts the march of therefore he and the enemy were advancing to meet

the Gauls. each other. When the Celts were at Telamon in Etruria,
their advanced guard fell in with that of Gaius, and the men being made
prisoners informed the Consul in answer to questions of what had taken
place; and told him that both the armies were in the neighbourhood: that of
the Celts, namely, and that of Lucius close upon their rear. Though
somewhat disturbed at the events which he thus learnt, Gaius regarded the
situation as a hopeful one, when he considered that the Celts were on the
road between two hostile armies. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to
martial the legions and to advance at the ordinary pace, and in line as far as
the breadth of the ground permitted; while he himself having surveyed a
piece of rising ground which commanded the road, and under which the
Celts must march, took his cavalry with him and hurried on to seize the
eminence, and so begin the battle in person; convinced that by these means
he would get the principal credit of the action for himself. At first the Celts
not knowing anything about the presence of Gaius Atilius, but supposing
from what was taking place, that the cavalry of Aemilius had outmarched
them in the night, and were seizing the points of vantage in the van of their
route, immediately detached some cavalry and light armed infantry to
dispute the possession of this eminence. But having shortly afterwards
learnt the truth about the presence of Gaius from a prisoner who was
brought in, they hurriedly got their infantry into position, and drew them up
so as to face two opposite ways, some, that is, to the front and others to the
rear. For they knew that one army was following on their rear; and they
expected from the intelligence which had reached them, and from what they
saw actually occurring, that they would have to meet another on their front.
28. Aemilius had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisae, but had not
expected them to be already so far on their road; but the contest at the
eminence proved to him that the two armies were quite close. He
The battle of the horse. accordingly despatched his horse at once to support the
Atilius falls. struggle for the possession of the hill, while he
marshalled his foot in their usual order, and advanced to attack the enemy
who barred his way. The Celts had stationed the Alpine tribe of the
Gaesatae to face their enemies on the rear, and behind them the Insubres; on
their front they had placed the Taurisci, and the Cispadane tribe of the Boii,
facing the legions of Gaius. Their waggons and chariots they placed on the
extremity of either wing, while the booty they massed upon one of the hills

that skirted the road, under the protection of a guard. The army of the Celts
was thus double-faced, and their mode of marshalling their forces was
effective as well as calculated to inspire terror. The Insubres and Boii were
clothed in their breeches and light cloaks; but the Gaesatae from vanity and
bravado threw these garments away, and fell in in front of the army naked,
with nothing but their arms; believing that, as the ground was in parts
encumbered with brambles, which might possibly catch in their clothes and
impede the use of their weapons, they would be more effective in this state.
At first the only actual fighting was that for the possession of the hill: and
the numbers of the cavalry, from all three armies, that had joined in the
struggle made it a conspicuous sight to all. In the midst of it the Consul
Gaius fell, fighting with reckless bravery in the thick of the battle, and his
head was brought to the king of the Celts. The Roman cavalry, however,
continued the struggle with spirit, and finally won the position and
overpowered their opponents. Then the foot also came to close quarters.
29. It was surely a peculiar and surprising battle to witness, and scarcely
less so to hear described. A battle, to begin with, in which three distinct
armies were engaged, must have presented a strange and unusual
appearance, and must have been fought under strange and unusual
conditions. Again, it must have seemed to a spectator open to question,
whether the position of the Gauls were the most dangerous conceivable,
from being between two attacking forces; or the most favourable, as
enabling them to meet both armies at once, while their own two divisions
afforded each other a mutual support: and, above all, as putting retreat out
of the question, or any hope of safety except in victory. For this is the
peculiar advantage of having an army facing in two opposite directions. The
Romans, on the other hand, while encouraged by having got their enemy
between two of their own armies, were at the same time dismayed by the
ornaments and clamour of the Celtic host. For there were among them such
innumerable horns and trumpets, which were being blown simultaneously
in all parts of their army, and their cries were so loud and piercing, that the
noise seemed not to come merely from trumpets and human voices, but
from the whole country-side at once. Not less terrifying was the appearance
and rapid movement of the naked warriors in the van, which indicated men
in the prime of their strength and beauty: while all the warriors in the front
ranks were richly adorned with gold necklaces and bracelets. These sights

certainly dismayed the Romans; still the hope they gave of a profitable
victory redoubled their eagerness for the battle.
30. When the men who were armed with the pilum advanced in front of the
legions, in accordance with the regular method of Roman warfare, and
The infantry engage. hurled their pila in rapid and effective volleys, the inner
ranks of the Celts found their jerkins and leather
breeches of great service; but to the naked men in the front ranks this
unexpected mode of attack caused great distress and discomfiture. For the
Gallic shields not being big enough to cover the man, the larger the naked
body the more certainty was there of the pilum hitting. And at last, not
being able to retaliate, because the pilum-throwers were out of reach, and
their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their
distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and
reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death; while
others gave ground step by step towards their own friends, whom they
threw into confusion by this manifest acknowledgment of their panic. Thus
the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the preliminary attack
of the pilum. But when the throwers of it had rejoined their ranks, and the
whole Roman line charged, the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci received the
attack, and maintained a desperate hand-to-hand fight. Though almost cut to
pieces, they held their ground with unabated courage, in spite of the fact
that man for man, as well as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans
in point of arms. The shields and swords of the latter were proved to be
manifestly superior for defence and attack, for the Gallic sword can only
deliver a cut, but cannot thrust. And when, besides, the Roman horse
charged down from the high ground on their flank, and attacked them
vigorously, the infantry of the Celts were cut to pieces on the field, while
their horse turned and fled.
31. Forty thousand of them were slain, and quite ten thousand taken
Aemilius returns home. prisoners, among whom was one of their kings,
Concolitanus: the other king, Aneroestes, fled with a
few followers; joined a few of his people in escaping to a place of security;
and there put an end to his own life and that of his friends. Lucius Aemilius,
the surviving Consul, collected the spoils of the slain and sent them to
Rome, and restored the property taken by the Gauls to its owners. Then
taking command of the legions, he marched along the frontier of Liguria,

and made a raid upon the territory of the Boii; and having satisfied the
desires of the legions with plunder, returned with his forces to Rome in a
few days’ march. There he adorned the Capitol with the captured standards
and necklaces, which are gold chains worn by the Gauls round their necks;
but the rest of the spoils, and the captives, he converted to the benefit of his
own estate and to the adornment of his triumph.
Thus was the most formidable Celtic invasion repelled, which had been
regarded by all Italians, and especially by the Romans, as a danger of the
utmost gravity. The victory inspired the Romans with a hope that they
might be able to entirely expel the Celts from the valley of the Padus: and
b.c. 224. accordingly the Consuls of the next year, Quintus
Fulvius Flaccus and Titus Manlius Torquatus, were both
sent out with their legions, and military preparations on a large scale,
against them. By a rapid attack they terrified the Boii into making
submission to Rome; but the campaign had no other practical effect,
because, during the rest of it, there was a season of excessive rains, and an
outbreak of pestilence in the army.
32. The Consuls of the next year, however, Publius Furius Philus and Caius
b.c. 223. Flaminius, once more invaded the Celtic lands,
marching through the territory of the Anamares, who
live not far from Placentia.154 Having secured the friendship of this tribe,
they crossed into the country of the Insubres, near the confluence of the
Adua and Padus. They suffered some annoyance from the enemy, as they
were crossing the river, and as they were pitching their camp; and after
remaining for a short time, they made terms with the Insubres and left their
country. After a circuitous march of several days, they crossed the River
Clusius, and came into the territory of the Cenomani. As these people were
allies of Rome, they reinforced the army with some of their men, which
then descended once more from the Alpine regions into the plains belonging
to the Insubres, and began laying waste their land and plundering their
houses. The Insubrian chiefs, seeing that nothing could change the
determination of the Romans to destroy them, determined that they had
better try their fortune by a great and decisive battle. They therefore
mustered all their forces, took down from the temple of Minerva the golden
standards, which are called “the immovables,” and having made other
necessary preparations, in high spirits and formidable array, encamped

opposite to their enemies to the number of fifty thousand. Seeing
themselves thus out-numbered, the Romans at first determined to avail
themselves of the forces of the allied Celtic tribes; but when they reflected
on the fickle character of the Gauls, and that they were about to fight with
an enemy of the same race as these auxiliary troops, they hesitated to
associate such men with themselves, at a crisis of such danger, and in an
action of such importance. However, they finally decided to do this. They
themselves stayed on the side of the river next the enemy: and sending the
Celtic contingent to the other side, they pulled up the bridges; which at once
precluded any fear of danger from them, and left themselves no hope of
safety except in victory; the impassable river being thus in their rear. These
dispositions made, they were ready to engage.
33. The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon skill in this battle;
the Tribunes instructing the troops how they were to conduct themselves
Battle with the Insubres. both collectively and individually. They had learned
from former engagements that Gallic tribes were always
most formidable at the first onslaught, before their courage was at all
damped by a check; and that the swords with which they were furnished, as
I have mentioned before, could only give one downward cut with any
effect, but that after this the edges got so turned and the blade so bent, that
unless they had time to straighten them with their foot against the ground,
they could not deliver a second blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave out
the spears of the Triarii, who are the last of the three ranks, to the first
ranks, or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords only, after their
spears were done with, they charged the Celts full in front. When the Celts
had rendered their swords useless by the first blows delivered on the spears,
the Romans closed with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by
preventing them from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which
is their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point. The
Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them
not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces
of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this
was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is
thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this battle.
By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he rendered
impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because he left the

lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the
course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their
ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to
throw themselves into the river. However, the valour of the soldiers secured
them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and they returned to Rome with
abundance of booty of every kind, and of trophies stripped from the enemy.
34. Next year, upon embassies coming from the Celts, desiring peace and
b.c. 222. Attack on the making unlimited offers of submission, the new
Insubres. Consuls, Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Gnaeus
Cornelius Scipio Calvus, were urgent that no peace should be granted them.
Thus frustrated, they determined to try a last chance, and once more took
active measures to hire thirty thousand Gaesatae,—the Gallic tribe which
lives on the Rhone. Having obtained these, they held themselves in
readiness, and waited for the attack of their enemies. At the beginning of
spring the Consuls assumed command of their forces, and marched them
into the territory of the Insubres; and there encamped under the walls of the
city of Acerrae, which lies between the Padus and the Alps, and laid siege to
it. The Insubres, being unable to render any assistance, because all the
positions of vantage had been seized by the enemy first, and being yet very
anxious to break up the siege of Acerrae, detached a portion of their forces
to affect a diversion by crossing the Padus and laying siege to Clastidium.
Intelligence of this movement being brought to the Consuls, Marcus
Claudius, taking with him his cavalry and some light infantry, made a
forced march to relieve the besieged inhabitants. When the Celts heard of
his approach, they raised the siege; and, marching out to meet him, offered
him battle. At first they held their ground against a furious charge of cavalry
which the Roman Consul launched at them; but when they presently found
themselves surrounded by the enemy on their rear and flank, unable to
maintain the fight any longer, they fled before the cavalry; and many of
them were driven into the river, and were swept away by the stream, though
the larger number were cut down by their enemies. Acerrae also, richly
stored with corn, fell into the hands of the Romans: the Gauls having
evacuated it, and retired to Mediolanum, which is the most commanding
position in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed them closely, and
suddenly appeared at Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir; but upon
his starting on his return march to Acerrae, they sallied out, and having

boldly attacked his rear, killed a good many men, and even drove a part of it
into flight; until Gnaeus recalled some of his vanguard, and urged them to
stand and engage the enemy. The Roman soldiers obeyed orders, and
offered a vigorous resistance to the attacking party. The Celts, encouraged
by their success, held their ground for a certain time with some gallantry,
but before long turned and fled to the neighbouring mountains. Gnaeus
followed them, wasting the country as he went, and took Mediolanum by
assault. At this the chiefs of the Insubres, despairing of safety, made a
complete and absolute submission to Rome.
35. Such was the end of the Celtic war: which, for the desperate
determination and boldness of the enemy, for the obstinacy of the battles
fought, and for the number of those who fell and of those who were
engaged, is second to none recorded in history, but which, regarded as a
specimen of scientific strategy, is utterly contemptible. The Gauls showed
no power of planning or carrying out a campaign, and in everything they
did were swayed by impulse rather than by sober calculation. As I have
seen these tribes, after a short struggle, entirely ejected from the valley of
the Padus, with the exception of some few localities lying close to the Alps,
I thought I ought not to let their original attack upon Italy pass unrecorded,
any more than their subsequent attempts, or their final ejectment: for it is
the function of the historian to record and transmit to posterity such
episodes in the drama of Fortune; that our posterity may not from ignorance
of the past be unreasonably dismayed at the sudden and unexpected
invasions of these barbarians, but may reflect how short-lived and easily
damped the spirit of this race is; and so may stand to their defence, and try
every possible means before yielding an inch to them. I think, for instance,
that those who have recorded for our information the invasion of Greece by
b.c. 480. the Persians, and of Delphi by the Gauls, have
b.c. 279. contributed materially to the struggles made for the
common freedom of Greece. For a superiority in supplies, arms, or
numbers, would scarcely deter any one from putting the last possible hope
to the test, in a struggle for the integrity and the safety of his city and its
territory, if he had before his eyes the surprising result of those expeditions;
and remembered how many myriads of men, what daring confidence, and
what immense armaments were baffled by the skill and ability of
opponents, who conducted their measures under the dictates of reason and

sober calculation. And as an invasion of Gauls has been a source of alarm to
Greece in our day, as well as in ancient times, I thought it worth while to
give a summary sketch of their doings from the earliest times.
36. Our narrative now returns to Hasdrubal, whom we left in command of
Death of Hasdrubal in the Carthaginian forces in Iberia. After eight years
Spain, b.c. 221. See command in that country, he was assassinated in his
chap. 13.
own house at night by a certain Celt in revenge for
some private wrong. Before his death he had done much to strengthen the
Carthaginian power in Iberia, not so much by military achievements, as by
the friendly relations which he maintained with the native princes. Now that
Succession of Hannibal he was dead, the Carthaginians invested Hannibal with
to the command in the command in Iberia, in spite of his youth, because of
Spain. His hostility to
Rome.
the ability in the conduct of affairs, and the daring spirit
which he had displayed. He had no sooner assumed the
command, than he nourished a fixed resolve to make war on Rome; nor was
it long before he carried out this resolution. From that time forth there were
constant suspicions and causes of offence arising between the Carthaginians
and Romans. And no wonder: for the Carthaginians were meditating
revenge for their defeats in Sicily; and the Romans were made distrustful
from a knowledge of their designs. These things made it clear to every one
of correct judgment that before long a war between these two nations was
inevitable.

37. At the same period the Achaean league and King Philip, with their
allies, were entering upon the war with the Aetolian league, which is called
Social war, b.c. 220-217. the Social war. Now this was the point at which I
proposed to begin my general history; and as I have
brought the account of the affairs of Sicily and Libya, and those which
immediately followed, in a continuous narrative, up to the date of the
beginning of the Social and Second Punic, generally called the Hannibalic,
wars, it will be proper to leave this branch of my subject for a while, and to
take up the history of events in Greece, that I may start upon my full and
detailed narrative, after bringing the prefatory sketch of the history of the
several countries to the same point of time. For since I have not undertaken,
as previous writers have done, to write the history of particular peoples,
such as the Greeks or Persians, but the history of all known parts of the
world at once, because there was something in the state of our own times
which made such a plan peculiarly feasible,—of which I shall speak more at
length hereafter,—it will be proper, before entering on my main subject, to
touch briefly on the state of the most important of the recognised nations of
the world.
Of Asia and Egypt I need not speak before the time at which my history
commences. The previous history of these countries has been written by a
number of historians already, and is known to all the world; nor in our days
has any change specially remarkable or unprecedented occurred to them
The progress of the demanding a reference to their past. But in regard to the
Achaean league. Achaean league, and the royal family of Macedonia, it
will be in harmony with my design to go somewhat farther back: for the
latter has become entirely extinct; while the Achaeans, as I have stated
before, have in our time made extraordinary progress in material prosperity
and internal unity. For though many statesmen had tried in past times to
induce the Peloponnesians to join in a league for the common interests of
all, and had always failed, because every one was working to secure his
own power rather than the freedom of the whole; yet in our day this policy
has made such progress, and been carried out with such completeness, that
not only is there in the Peloponnese a community of interests such as exists
between allies or friends, but an absolute identity of laws, weights,
measures, and currency.155 All the States have the same magistrates, senate,
and judges. Nor is there any difference between the entire Peloponnese and

a single city, except in the fact that its inhabitants are not included within
the same wall; in other respects, both as a whole and in their individual
cities, there is a nearly absolute assimilation of institutions.
38. It will be useful to ascertain, to begin with, how it came to pass that the
name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the
The origin of the name Peloponnese. For the original bearers of this ancestral
as embracing all the name have no superiority over others, either in the size
Peloponnese.
of their territory and cities, or in wealth, or in the
prowess of their men. For they are a long way off being superior to the
Arcadians and Lacedaemonians in number of inhabitants and extent of
territory; nor can these latter nations be said to yield the first place in
warlike courage to any Greek people whatever. Whence then comes it that
these nations, with the rest of the inhabitants of the Peloponnese, have been
content to adopt the constitution and the name of the Achaeans? To speak of
chance in such a matter would not be to offer any adequate solution of the
question, and would be a mere idle evasion. A cause must be sought; for
without a cause nothing, expected or unexpected, can be accomplished. The
cause then, in my opinion, was this. Nowhere could be found a more
unalloyed and deliberately established system of equality and absolute
freedom, and, in a word, of democracy, than among the Achaeans. This
constitution found many of the Peloponnesians ready enough to adopt it of
their own accord: many were brought to share in it by persuasion and
argument: some, though acting under compulsion at first, were quickly
brought to acquiesce in its benefits; for none of the original members had
any special privilege reserved for them, but equal rights were given to all
comers: the object aimed at was therefore quickly attained by the two most
unfailing expedients of equality and fraternity. This then must be looked
upon as the source and original cause of Peloponnesian unity and
consequent prosperity.
That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans acted in forming
their constitution might be demonstrated by many proofs; but for the
present purpose it will be sufficient to allege one or two in confirmation of
my assertion.
39. And first: When the burning of the Pythagorean clubs in Magna Grecia
was followed by great constitutional disturbances, as was natural on the

sudden disappearance of the leading men in each state; and the Greek cities
in that part of Italy became the scene of murder, revolutionary warfare, and
every kind of confusion; deputations were sent from most parts of Greece to
endeavour to bring about some settlement of these disorders.156 But the
disturbed states preferred the intervention of the Achaeans above all others,
and showed the greatest confidence in them, in regard to the measures to be
adopted for removing the evils that oppressed them. Nor was this the only
occasion on which they displayed this preference. For shortly afterwards
there was a general movement among them to adopt the model of the
Achaean constitution. The first states to move in the matter were Croton,
Sybaris, and Caulonia, who began by erecting a common temple to Zeus
Homorios,157 and a place in which to hold their meetings and common
Ζεύς ὁμάριος or ἀμάριος councils. They then adopted the laws and customs of
the Achaeans, and determined to conduct their
constitution according to their principles; but finding themselves hampered
b.c. 405-367. by the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse, and also by
the encroachment of the neighbouring barbarians, they
were forced much against their will to abandon them. Again, later on, when
the Lacedaemonians met with their unexpected reverse at Leuctra, and the
Thebans as unexpectedly claimed the hegemony in Greece, a feeling of
b.c. 371. uncertainty prevailed throughout the country, and
especially among the Lacedaemonians and Thebans
themselves, because the former refused to allow that they were beaten, the
latter felt hardly certain that they had conquered. On this occasion, once
more, the Achaeans were the people selected by the two parties, out of all
Greece, to act as arbitrators on the points in dispute. And this could not
have been from any special view of their power, for at that time they were
perhaps the weakest state in Greece; it was rather from a conviction of their
good faith and high principles, in regard to which there was but one opinion
universally entertained. At that period of their history, however, they
possessed only the elements of success; success itself, and material
increase, were barred by the fact that they had not yet been able to produce
a leader worthy of the occasion. Whenever any man had given indications
of such ability, he was systematically thrust into the background and
hampered, at one time by the Lacedaemonian government, and at another,
still more effectually, by that of Macedonia.

40. When at length, however, the country did obtain leaders of sufficient
ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic excellence by the accomplishment
of that most glorious achievement,-—the union of the Peloponnese. The
originator of this policy in the first instance was Aratus of Sicyon; its active
promotion and consummation was due to Philopoemen of Megalopolis;
while Lycortas and his party must be looked upon as the authors of the
permanence which it enjoyed. The actual achievements of these several
statesmen I shall narrate in their proper places: but while deferring a more
detailed account of the other two, I think it will be right to briefly record
here, as well as in a future portion of my work, the political measures of
Aratus, because he has left a record of them himself in an admirably honest
and lucid book of commentaries.
I think the easiest method for myself, and most intelligible to my readers,
will be to start from the period of the restoration of the Achaean league and
federation, after its disintegration into separate states by the Macedonian
kings: from which time it has enjoyed an unbroken progress towards the
state of completion which now exists, and of which I have already spoken
at some length.
41. The period I mean is the 124th Olympiad. In this occurred the first
league of Patrae and Dyme, and the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus,
124th Olympiad, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Ptolemy Ceraunus. In the period
b.c. 284-280. before this the state of Achaia was as follows. It was
ruled by kings from the time of Tisamenus, son of Orestes, who, being
expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, formed a kingdom in
Achaia. The last of this royal line to maintain his power was Ogyges, whose
sons so alienated the people by their unconstitutional and tyrannical
government, that a revolution took place and a democracy was established.
First Achaean league. In the period subsequent to this, up to the time of the
establishment of the supreme authority of Alexander
and Philip, their fortunes were subject to various fluctuations, but they
always endeavoured to maintain intact in their league a democratical form
of government, as I have already stated. This league consisted of twelve
cities, all of them still surviving, with the exception of Olenus, and Helice
which was engulfed by the sea before the battle of Leuctra. The other ten
b.c. 371. were Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium,
Aegeira, Pellene, Bura, Caryneia. In the period

b.c. 323-284. immediately succeeding Alexander, and before the
above-named 124th Olympiad, these cities, chiefly
through the instrumentality of the Macedonian kings, became so estranged
and ill-disposed to each other, and so divided and opposed in their interests,
that some of them had to submit to the presence of foreign garrisons, sent
first by Demetrius and Cassander, and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas,
while others even fell under the power of Tyrants; for no one set up more of
such absolute rulers in the Greek states than this last-named king.
But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change of sentiment
b.c. 284-280, Second prevailed among the Achaean cities, and they began
Achaean league. again to form a league. This was just at the time of
Pyrrhus’s invasion of Italy. The first to take this step were the peoples of
Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae. And as they thus formed the nucleus of
the league, we find no column extant recording the compact between these
cities. But about five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their
foreign garrison and joined the league; next, the people of Bura put their
tyrant to death and did the same; simultaneously, the state of Caryneia was
restored to the league. For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia, when he saw
the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of the despot in
Bura at the hands of Margos and the Achaeans, and when he saw that he
was himself on the point of being attacked on all sides, voluntarily laid
down his office; and having obtained a guarantee for his personal safety
from the Achaeans, formally gave in the adhesion of his city to the league.
42. My object in thus going back in point of time was, first, to show clearly
at what epoch the Achaeans entered into the second league, which exists at
this day, and which were the first members of the original league to do so;
and, secondly, that the continuity of the policy pursued by the Achaeans
might rest, not on my word only, but on the evidence of the actual facts. It
was in virtue of this policy,—by holding out the bait of equality and
freedom, and by invariably making war upon and crushing those who on
their own account, or with the support of the kings, enslaved any of the
states within their borders, that they finally accomplished the design which
they had deliberately adopted, in some cases by their own unaided efforts,
and in others by the help of their allies. For in fact whatever was effected in
this direction, by the help of these allies in after times, must be put down to
the credit of the deliberately adopted policy of the Achaeans themselves.

They acted indeed jointly with others in many honourable undertakings, and
in none more so than with the Romans: yet in no instance can they be said
to have aimed at obtaining from their success any advantage for a particular
state. In return for the zealous assistance rendered by them to their allies,
they bargained for nothing but the freedom of each state and the union of
the Peloponnese. But this will be more clearly seen from the record of their
actual proceedings.
43. For the first twenty-five years of the league between the cities I have
mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were elected by
each city in turn. But after this period they determined to appoint one
strategus only,158 and put the entire management of the affairs of the union
in his hands. The first to obtain this honour was Margos of Caryneia. In the
b.c. 255-254. Margos. fourth year after this man’s tenure of the office, Aratus
of Sicyon caused his city to join the league, which, by
b.c. 251-250. Aratus.
his energy and courage, he had, when only twenty years
of age, delivered from the yoke of its tyrant. In the eighth year again after
b.c. 243-242. this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time,
laid a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held by
Antigonus; and by his success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from
a source of serious alarm: and having thus liberated Corinth he caused it to
Victory of Lutatius off join the league. In his same term of office he got
the insulae Aegates, Megara into his hands, and caused it to join also. These
b.c. 241.
events occurred in the year before the decisive defeat of
the Carthaginians, in consequence of which they evacuated Sicily and
consented for the first time to pay tribute to Rome.
Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time,
Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean
league, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one single end;
which was to expel Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to depose the
despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom which their
ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore, as Antigonus
Antigonus Gonatas, Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual
b.c. 283-239. opposition to his interference, as well as to the
encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, and in both cases with signal skill and
success; although their presumption and contempt for justice had risen to

such a pitch, that they had actually made a formal compact with each other
for the disruption of the Achaeans.
44. After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms with
the Aetolians, and joined them energetically in the war against Demetrius;
and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility, there gradually
grew up a sentiment of brotherhood and affection between the two peoples.
Upon the death of Demetrius, after a reign of only ten years, just about the
Demetrius, b.c. 239-229. time of the first invasion of Illyricum by the Romans,
the Achaeans had a most excellent opportunity of
establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the despots
in the Peloponnese were in despair at the death of Demetrius. It was the loss
to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now Aratus was for
ever impressing upon them that they ought to abdicate, holding out rewards
and honours for those of them who consented, and threatening those who
refused with still greater vengeance from the Achaeans. There was therefore
a general movement among them to voluntarily restore their several states
to freedom and to join the league. I ought however to say that Ludiades of
Megalopolis, in the lifetime of Demetrius, of his own deliberate choice, and
foreseeing with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to
happen, had abdicated his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national
league. His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xeno
of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and
joined the democratic league.
45. But the increased power and national advancement which these events
brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the Aetolians; who, besides
The Aetolians and their natural inclination to unjust and selfish
Antigonus Doson, aggrandisement, were inspired with the hope of
b.c. 229-220.
breaking up the union of Achaean states, as they had
before succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with Alexander,159 and
had planned to do those of Achaia with Antigonus Gonatas. Instigated once
more by similar expectations, they had now the assurance to enter into
communication and close alliance at once with Antigonus (at that time
ruling Macedonia as guardian of the young King Philip), and with
Cleomenes, King of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus had undisputed
possession of the throne of Macedonia, while he was an open and avowed
enemy of the Achaeans owing to the surprise of the Acrocorinthus; and they

supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians to join them in their
hostility to the league, they would easily subdue it, by selecting a
favourable opportunity for their attack, and securing that it should be
assaulted on all sides at once. And they would in all probability have
succeeded, but that they had left out the most important element in the
calculation, namely, that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to
their plans of ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when
they attempted this violent and unjust interference in Achaia, so far from
succeeding in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened
Aratus, the then president of the league, as well as the league itself. So
consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced
them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear
in what I am about to relate.
46. There could be no doubt of the policy of the Aetolians. They were
The Aetolians intrigue ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans openly, because
with Cleomenes, King of they could not ignore their recent obligations to them in
Sparta, b.c. 229-227.
the war with Demetrius: but they were plotting with the
Lacedaemonians; and showed their jealousy of the Achaeans by not only
conniving at the treacherous attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea,
and Orchomenus (cities not only in alliance with them, but actually
members of their league), but by confirming his occupation of those places.
In old times they had thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an
appeal to arms against those who, after all, had done them no wrong: yet
they now allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and
submitted without remonstrance to the loss of the most important towns,
solely with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to
the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other officers
of the league: and they resolved that, without taking the initiative in going
to war with any one, they would resist the attempts of the Lacedaemonians.
Such was their determination, and for a time they persisted in it: but
immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to build the hostile fort in the
territory of Megalopolis, called the Athenaeum,160 and showed an
undisguised and bitter hostility. Aratus and his colleagues accordingly
summoned a meeting of the league, and it was decided to proclaim war
openly against Sparta.

47. This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic war. At first the
Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for facing the
Cleomenes, b.c. 227- Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more
221. honourable not to look to others for preservation, but to
guard their own territory and cities themselves; and at the same time the
remembrances of his former services made them desirous of keeping up
their friendship with Ptolemy,161 and averse from the appearance of seeking
aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted some time; and Cleomenes had
revolutionised the constitution of his country, and had turned its
constitutional monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting
Aratus applies to the war with extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing
Antigonus Doson. clearly what would happen, and fearing the reckless
audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be
well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He satisfied himself that
Antigonus was a man of activity and practical ability, with some
pretensions to the character of a man of honour; he however knew perfectly
well that kings look on no man as a friend or foe from personal
considerations, but ever measure friendships and enmities solely by the
standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived the idea of addressing
himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations with him,
taking occasion to point out to him the certain result of his present policy.
But to act openly in this matter he thought inexpedient for several reasons.
By doing so he would not only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the
Aetolians, but would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves,
because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression that he had
abandoned all the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he
desired should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this
intrigue in secrecy.
The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act towards
the public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he might conceal
his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite nature. For which
reason there are some particulars which he did not even commit to his own
commentaries.
48. It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the people of
Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of
Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by Macedonia; for their

neighbourhood to Sparta exposed them to attack before the other states;
while they were unable to get the help which they ought to have, because
the Achaeans were themselves hard pressed and in great difficulties.
Besides they had special reasons for entertaining feelings of affection
Philip II. in the towards the royal family of Macedonia, founded on the
Peloponnese, b.c. 338. favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas.
He therefore imparted his general design under pledge of secrecy to
Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were family friends of his
own and of a character suited to the undertaking; and by their means
experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of Megalopolis to send
envoys to the league, to advise that an application for help should be made
to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves selected to go on
this mission to the league, and thence, if their view was accepted, to
Antigonus. The league consented to allow the people of Megalopolis to
send the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no time in obtaining an
interview with the king. About the interests of his own country he spoke
briefly and summarily, confining himself to the most necessary statements;
the greater part of his speech was, in accordance with the directions of
Aratus, concerned with the national question.
49. The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell on were “the
scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and
The message to Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part
Antigonus Doson. primarily of the Achaeans, but still more even on that of
Antigonus himself: first, because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the
attack of both; and, secondly, because if the Aetolians and Cleomenes
conquered them, any man of sense could easily see that they would not be
satisfied or stop there. For the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from
being content to be confined by the boundaries of the Peloponnese, would
find even those of Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition of
Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the Peloponnese: but
this obtained, he would promptly aim at that of all Greece, in which it
would be impossible for him to succeed without first crushing the
government of Macedonia. They were, therefore, to urge him to consider,
with a view to the future, which of the two courses would be the more to his
own interests,—to fight for supremacy in Greece in conjunction with the
Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in the Peloponnese; or to

abandon the most powerful race, and to stake the Macedonian empire on a
battle in Thessaly, against a combined force of Aetolians and Boeotians,
with the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to boot. If the Aetolians, from
regard to the goodwill shown them by the Achaeans in the time of
Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious to keep the peace as they were at
present doing, they were to assert that the Achaeans were ready to engage
Cleomenes by themselves; and if fortune declared in their favour they
would want no assistance from any one: but if fortune went against them,
and the Aetolians joined in the attack, they begged him to watch the course
of events, that he might not let things go too far, but might aid the
Peloponnesians while they were still capable of being saved. He had no
need to be anxious about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans: when
the time for action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees which
would be satisfactory to both parties; and similarly would himself indicate
the moment at which the aid should be given.”
50. These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been put by Aratus with
equal sincerity and ability: and after listening to them, he eagerly took the
first necessary step by writing a letter to the people of Megalopolis with an
offer of assistance, on condition that such a measure should receive the
consent of the Achaeans. When Nicophanes and Cercidas returned home
and delivered this despatch from the king, reporting at the same time his
other expressions of goodwill and zeal in the cause, the spirits of the people
of Megalopolis were greatly elated; and they were all eagerness to attend
the meeting of the league, and urge that measures should be taken to secure
the alliance of Antigonus, and to put the management of the war in his
Aratus wishes to do hands with all despatch. Aratus learnt privately from
without the king if Nicophanes the king’s feelings towards the league and
possible.
towards himself; and was delighted that his plan had not
failed, and that he had not found the king completely alienated from
himself, as the Aetolians hoped he would be. He regarded it also as
eminently favourable to his policy, that the people of Megalopolis were so
eager to use the Achaean league as the channel of communication with
Antigonus. For his first object was if possible to do without this assistance;
but if he were compelled to have recourse to it, he wished that the invitation
should not be sent through himself personally, but that it should rather come
from the Achaeans as a nation. For he feared that, if the king came, and

conquered Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and should then
adopt any policy hostile to the interests of the national constitution, he
would have himself by general consent to bear the blame of the result:
while Antigonus would be justified, by the injury which had been inflicted
on the royal house of Macedonia in the matter of the Acrocorinthus.
Accordingly when Megalopolitan envoys appeared in the national council,
and showed the royal despatch, and further declared the general friendly
disposition of the king, and added an appeal to the congress to secure the
king’s alliance without delay; and when also the sense of the meeting was
clearly shown to be in favour of taking this course, Aratus rose, and, after
setting forth the king’s zeal, and complimenting the meeting upon their
readiness to act in the matter, he proceeded to urge upon them in a long
speech that “They should try if possible to preserve their cities and territory
by their own efforts, for that nothing could be more honourable or more
expedient than that: but that, if it turned out that fortune declared against
them in this effort, they might then have recourse to the assistance of their
friends; but not until they had tried all their own resources to the uttermost.”
This speech was received with general applause: and it was decided to take
no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to bring the existing war to a
conclusion unaided.
51. But when Ptolemy, despairing of retaining the league’s friendship,
Euergetes jealous of the began to furnish Cleomenes with supplies,—which he
Macedonian policy of did with a view of setting him up as a foil to Antigonus,
Aratus, helps
Cleomenes.
thinking the Lacedaemonians offered him better hopes
than the Achaeans of being able to thwart the policy of
the Macedonian kings; and when the Achaeans themselves had suffered
three defeats,—one at Lycaeum in an engagement with Cleomenes whom
they had met on a march; and again in a pitched battle at Ladocaea in the
territory of Megalopolis, in which Lydiades fell; and a third time decisively
at a place called Hecatomboeum in the territory of Dyme where their whole
forces had been engaged,—after these misfortunes, no further delay was
possible, and they were compelled by the force of circumstances to appeal
unanimously to Antigonus. Thereupon Aratus sent his son to Antigonus, and
ratified the terms of the subvention. The great difficulty was this: it was
believed to be certain that the king would send no assistance, except on the
condition of the restoration of the Acrocorinthus, and of having the city of

Corinth put into his hands as a base of operations in this war; and on the
other hand it seemed impossible that the Achaeans should venture to put the
Corinthians in the king’s power against their own consent. The final
determination of the matter was accordingly postponed, that they might
investigate the question of the securities to be given to the king.
52. Meanwhile, on the strength of the dismay caused by his successes,
Cleomenes was making an unopposed progress through the cities, winning
The Achaeans offer to some by persuasion and others by threats. In this way,
surrender the he got possession of Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos,
Acrocorinthus to
Antigonus.
Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and
last of all Corinth, while he personally commanded a
siege of Sicyon. But this in reality relieved the Achaeans from a very grave
difficulty. For the Corinthians by ordering Aratus, as Strategus of the
league, and the Achaeans to evacuate the town, and by sending messages to
Cleomenes inviting his presence, gave the Achaeans a ground of action and
a reasonable pretext for moving. Aratus was quick to take advantage of this;
and, as the Achaeans were in actual possession of the Acrocorinthus, he
made his peace with the royal family of Macedonia by offering it to
Antigonus; and at the same time gave thus a sufficient guarantee for
friendship in the future, and further secured Antigonus a base of operations
for the war with Sparta.
Upon learning of this compact between the league and Antigonus,
Cleomenes prepares to Cleomenes raised the siege of Sicyon and pitched his
resist. camp near the Isthmus; and, having thrown up a line of
fortification uniting the Acrocorinthus with the mountain called the “Ass’s
Back,” began from this time to expect with confidence the empire of the
Peloponnese. But Antigonus had made his preparations long in advance, in
accordance with the suggestion of Aratus, and was only waiting for the right
Antigonus comes to the moment to act. And now the news which he received
Isthmus, b.c. 224. convinced him that the entrance of Cleomenes into
Thessaly, at the head of an army, was only a question of a very few days: he
accordingly despatched envoys to Aratus and the league to conclude the
terms of the treaty162 and marched to the Isthmus with his army by way of
Euboea. He took this route because the Aetolians, after trying other
expedients for preventing Antigonus bringing this aid, now forbade his

marching south of Thermopylae with an army, threatening that, if he did,
they would offer armed opposition to his passage.
53. Thus Antigonus and Cleomenes were encamped face to face: the former
desirous of effecting an entrance into the Peloponnese, Cleomenes
determined to prevent him.
Meanwhile the Achaeans, in spite of their severe disasters, did not abandon
their purpose or give up all hopes of retrieving their fortunes. They gave
The Achaeans seize Aristotle of Argos assistance when he headed a rising
Argos. against the Cleomenic faction; and, under the command
of Timoxenus the Strategus, surprised and seized Argos. And this must be
regarded as the chief cause of the improvement which took place in their
fortunes; for this reverse checked the ardour of Cleomenes and damped the
courage of his soldiers in advance, as was clearly shown by what took place
afterwards. For though Cleomenes had already possession of more
advantageous posts, and was in the enjoyment of more abundant supplies
than Antigonus, and was at the same time inspired with superior courage
and ambition: yet, as soon as he was informed that Argos was in the hands
of the Achaeans, he at once drew back, abandoned all these advantages, and
retreated from the Isthmus with every appearance of precipitation, in terror
of being completely surrounded by his enemies. At first he retired upon
Argos, and for a time made some attempt to regain the town. But the
Achaeans offered a gallant resistance; and the Argives themselves were
stirred up to do the same by remorse for having admitted him before: and
so, having failed in this attempt also, he marched back to Sparta by way of
Mantinea.
54. On his part, Antigonus advanced without any casualty into the
Antigonus receives the Peloponnese, and took over the Acrocorinthus; and,
Acrocorinthus. without wasting time there, pushed on in his enterprise
and entered Argos. He only stayed there long enough to compliment the
Argives on their conduct, and to provide for the security of the city; and
then immediately starting again directed his march towards Arcadia; and
after ejecting the garrisons from the posts which had been fortified by
Cleomenes in the territories of Aegys and Belmina, and, putting those
strongholds in the hands of the people of Megalopolis, he went to Aegium
to attend the meeting of the Achaean league. There he made a statement of

his own proceedings, and consulted with the meeting as to the measures to
be taken in the future. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied
army, and went into winter quarters at Sicyon and Corinth.
At the approach of spring he broke up his camp and got on the march. On
b.c. 223. Recovery of the third day he arrived at Tegea, and being joined there
Tegea. by the Achaean forces, he proceeded to regularly invest
the city. But the vigour displayed by the Macedonians in conducting the
siege, and especially in the digging of mines, soon reduced the Tegeans to
despair, and they accordingly surrendered. After taking the proper measures
for securing the town, Antigonus proceeded to extend his expedition. He
Skirmish with now marched with all speed into Laconia; and having
Cleomenes. found Cleomenes in position on the frontier, he was
trying to bring him to an engagement, and was harassing him with
skirmishing attacks, when news was brought to him by his scouts that the
Capture of Orchomenus garrison of Orchomenus had started to join Cleomenes.
and Mantinea. He at once broke up his camp, hurried thither, and
carried the town by assault. Having done that, he next invested Mantinea
and began to besiege it. This town also being soon terrified into surrender
by the Macedonians, he started again along the road to Heraea and
and Heraea and Telphusa. These towns, too, being secured by the
Telphusa. voluntary surrender of their inhabitants, as the winter
was by this time approaching, he went again to Aegium to attend the
meeting of the league. His Macedonian soldiers he sent away to winter at
home, while he himself remained to confer with the Achaeans on the
existing state of affairs.
55. But Cleomenes was on the alert. He saw that the Macedonians in the
army of Antigonus had been sent home; and that the king and his
mercenaries in Aegium were three days’ march from Megalopolis; and this
latter town he well knew to be difficult to guard, owing to its great extent,
and the sparseness of its inhabitants; and, moreover, that it was just then
being kept with even greater carelessness than usual, owing to Antigonus
being in the country; and what was more important than anything else, he
knew that the larger number of its men of military age had fallen at the
battles of Lycaeum and Ladoceia. There happened to be residing in
Megalopolis some Messenian exiles; by whose help he managed, under
cover of night, to get within the walls without being detected. When day

broke he had a narrow escape from being ejected, if not from absolute
destruction, through the valour of the citizens. This had been his fortune
three months before, when he had made his way into the city by the region
which is called the Cōlaeum: but on this occasion, by the superiority of his
force, and the seizure in advance of the strongest positions in the town, he
succeeded in effecting his purpose. He eventually ejected the inhabitants,
and took entire possession of the city; which, once in his power, he
dismantled in so savage and ruthless a manner as to preclude the least hope
that it might ever be restored. The reason of his acting in this manner was, I
believe, that Megalopolis and Stymphalus were the only towns in which,
during the vicissitudes of that period, he never succeeded in obtaining a
single partisan, or inducing a single citizen to turn traitor. For the passion
for liberty and the loyalty of the Clitorians had been stained by the baseness
of one man, Thearces; whom the Clitorians, with some reason, denied to be
a native of their city, asserting that he had been foisted in from
Orchomenus, and was the offspring of one of the foreign garrison there.
56. For the history of the same period, with which we are now engaged,
163
Digression (to ch. 63) on there are two authorities, Aratus and Phylarchus,
the misstatements of whose opinions are opposed in many points and their
Phylarchus.
statements contradictory. I think, therefore, it will be
advantageous, or rather necessary, since I follow Aratus in my account of
the Cleomenic war, to go into the question; and not by any neglect on my
part to suffer misstatements in historical writings to enjoy an authority
equal to that of truth. The fact is that the latter of these two writers has,
throughout the whole of his history, made statements at random and without
discrimination. It is not, however, necessary for me to criticise him on other
points on the present occasion, or to call him to strict account concerning
them; but such of his statements as relate to the period which I have now in
hand, that is the Cleomenic war, these I must thoroughly sift. They will be
quite sufficient to enable us to form a judgment on the general spirit and
ability with which he approaches historical writing. It was his object to
bring into prominence the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, as
Mantinea. well as that of Aratus and the Achaeans; and he
accordingly asserts that, when Mantinea fell into their
hands, it was cruelly treated; and that the most ancient and important of all
the Arcadian towns was involved in calamities so terrible as to move all

Greece to horror and tears. And being eager to stir the hearts of his readers
to pity, and to enlist their sympathies by his story, he talks of women
embracing, tearing their hair, and exposing their breasts; and again of the
tears and lamentations of men and women, led off into captivity along with
their children and aged parents. And this he does again and again
throughout his whole history, by way of bringing the terrible scene vividly
before his readers. I say nothing of the unworthiness and unmanliness of the
course he has adopted: let us only inquire what is essential and to the
purpose in history. Surely an historian’s object should not be to amaze his
readers by a series of thrilling anecdotes; nor should he aim at producing
speeches which might have been delivered, nor study dramatic propriety in
details like a writer of tragedy: but his function is above all to record with
fidelity what was actually said or done, however commonplace it may be.
For the purposes of history and of the drama are not the same, but widely
opposed to each other. In the former the object is to strike and delight by
words as true to nature as possible; in the latter to instruct and convince by
genuine words and deeds; in the former the effect is meant to be temporary,
in the latter permanent. In the former, again, the power of carrying an
audience is the chief excellence, because the object is to create illusion; but
in the latter the thing of primary importance is truth, because the object is to
benefit the learner. And apart from these considerations, Phylarchus, in
most of the catastrophes which he relates, omits to suggest the causes which
gave rise to them, or the course of events which led up to them: and without
knowing these, it is impossible to feel the due indignation or pity at
anything which occurs. For instance, everybody looks upon it as an outrage
that the free should be struck: still, if a man provokes it by an act of
violence, he is considered to have got no more than he deserved; and, where
it is done for correction and discipline, those who strike free men are
deemed worthy of honour and gratitude. Again, the killing of a fellow-
citizen is regarded as a heinous crime, deserving the severest penalties: and
yet it is notorious that the man who kills a thief, or his wife’s paramour, is
held guiltless; while he who kills a traitor or tyrant in every country
receives honours and pre-eminence. And so in everything our final
judgment does not depend upon the mere things done, but upon their causes
and the views of the actors, according as these differ.

57. Now the people of Mantinea had in the first instance abandoned the
league, and voluntarily submitted, first to the Aetolians, and afterwards to
b.c. 227. Cleomenes. Being therefore, in accordance with this
policy, members of the Lacedaemonian community, in
the fourth year before the coming of Antigonus, their city was forcibly
taken possession of by the Achaeans owing to the skilful plotting of Aratus.
But on that occasion, so far from being subjected to any severity for their
act of treason, it became a matter of general remark how promptly the
feelings of the conquerors and the conquered underwent a revolution. As
soon as he had got possession of the town, Aratus issued orders to his own
men that no one was to lay a finger on anything that did not belong to him;
and then, having summoned the Mantineans to a meeting, he bade them be
of good cheer, and stay in their own houses; for that, as long as they
remained members of the league, their safety was secured. On their part, the
Mantineans, surprised at this unlooked-for prospect of safety, immediately
experienced a universal revulsion of feeling. The very men against whom
they had a little while before been engaged in a war, in which they had seen
many of their kinsfolk killed, and no small number grievously wounded,
they now received into their houses, and entertained as their guests,
interchanging every imaginable kindness with them. And naturally so. For I
believe that there never were men who met with more kindly foes, or came
out of a struggle with what seemed the most dreadful disasters more
scatheless, than did the Mantineans, owing to the humanity of Aratus and
the Achaeans towards them.
58. But they still saw certain dangers ahead from intestine disorders, and
the hostile designs of the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians; they
subsequently, therefore, sent envoys to the league asking for a guard for
their town. The request was granted: and three hundred of the league army
were selected by lot to form it. These men on whom the lot fell started for
Mantinea; and, abandoning their native cities and their callings in life,
remained there to protect the lives and liberties of the citizens. Besides
them, the league despatched two hundred mercenaries, who joined the
Achaean guard in protecting the established constitution. But this state of
things did not last long: an insurrection broke out in the town, and the
Mantineans called in the aid of the Lacedaemonians; delivered the city into
their hands; and put to death the garrison sent by the league. It would not be

easy to mention a grosser or blacker act of treachery. Even if they resolved
to utterly set at nought the gratitude they owed to, and the friendship they
had formed with, the league; they ought at least to have spared these men,
and to have let every one of them depart under some terms or another: for
this much it is the custom by the law of nations to grant even to foreign
enemies. But in order to satisfy Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians of their
fidelity in the policy of the hour, they deliberately, and in violation of
international law, consummated a crime of the most impious description. To
slaughter and wreak vengeance on the men who had just before taken their
city, and refrained from doing them the least harm, and who were at that
very moment engaged in protecting their lives and liberties,—can anything
be imagined more detestable? What punishment can be conceived to
correspond with its enormity? If one suggests that they would be rightly
served by being sold into slavery, with their wives and children, as soon as
they were beaten in war; it may be answered that this much is only what, by
the laws of warfare, awaits even those who have been guilty of no special
act of impiety. They deserved therefore to meet with a punishment even
more complete and heavy than they did; so that, even if what Phylarchus
mentions did happen to them, there was no reason for the pity of Greece
being bestowed on them: praise and approval rather were due to those who
exacted vengeance for their impious crime. But since, as a matter of fact,
nothing worse befel the Mantineans than the plunder of their property and
the selling of their free citizens into slavery, this historian, for the mere sake
of a sensational story, has not only told a pure lie, but an improbable lie. His
wilful ignorance also was so supreme, that he was unable to compare with
this alleged cruelty of the Achaeans the conduct of the same people in the
case of Tegea, which they took by force at the same period, and yet did no
injury to its inhabitants. And yet, if the natural cruelty of the perpetrators
was the sole cause of the severity to Mantinea, it is to be presumed that
Tegea would have been treated in the same way. But if their treatment of
Mantinea was an exception to that of every other town, the necessary
inference is that the cause for their anger was exceptional also.
59. Again Phylarchus says that Aristomachus the Argive, a man of a most
Aristomachus. distinguished family, who had been despot of Argos, as
his fathers had been before him, upon falling into the
hands of Antigonus and the league “was hurried off to Cenchreae and there

racked to death,—an unparalleled instance of injustice and cruelty.” But in
this matter also our author preserves his peculiar method. He makes up a
story about certain cries of this man, when he was on the rack, being heard
through the night by the neighbours: “some of whom,” he says, “rushed to
the house in their horror, or incredulity, or indignation at the outrage.” As
for the sensational story, let it pass; I have said enough on that point. But I
must express my opinion that, even if Aristomachus had committed no
crime against the Achaeans besides, yet his whole life and his treason to his
own country deserved the heaviest possible punishment. And in order,
forsooth, to enhance this man’s reputation, and move his reader’s
sympathies for his sufferings, our historian remarks that he had not only
been a tyrant himself, but that his fathers had been so before him. It would
not be easy to bring a graver or more bitter charge against a man than this:
for the mere word “tyrant” involves the idea of everything that is wickedest,
and includes every injustice and crime possible to mankind. And if
Aristomachus endured the most terrible tortures, as Phylarchus says, he yet
would not have been sufficiently punished for the crime of one day, in
which, when Aratus had effected an entrance into Argos with the Achaean
soldiers,—and after supporting the most severe struggles and dangers for
the freedom of its citizens, had eventually been driven out, because the
party within who were in league with him had not ventured to stir, for fear
of the tyrant,—Aristomachus availed himself of the pretext of their
complicity with the irruption of the Achaeans to put to the rack and execute
eighty of the leading citizens, who were perfectly innocent, in the presence
of their relations. I pass by the history of his whole life and the crimes of his
ancestors; for that would be too long a story.
60. But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if a man reaps as he
has sown; but rather if he is allowed to end his days in peace, without
experiencing such retribution at all. Nor ought we to accuse Antigonus or
Aratus of crime, for having racked and put to death a tyrant whom they had
captured in war: to have killed and wreaked vengeance on whom, even in
time of peace, would have brought praise and honour to the doers from all
right-minded persons.
But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of treachery to the
league, what shall we say that he deserved? The facts of the case are these.
He abdicated his sovereignty of Argos shortly before, finding himself in

difficulties, owing to the state of affairs brought on by the death of
Demetrius. He was, however, protected by the clemency and generosity of
the league; and, much to his own surprise, was left unmolested. For the
Achaean government not only secured him an indemnity for all crimes
committed by him while despot, but admitted him as a member of the
league, and invested him with the highest office in it,—that, namely, of
Commander-in-Chief and Strategus.164 All these favours he immediately
forgot, as soon as his hopes were a little raised by the Cleomenic war; and
at a crisis of the utmost importance he withdrew his native city, as well as
his own personal adhesion, from the league, and attached them to its
enemies. For such an act of treason what he deserved was not to be racked
under cover of night at Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus
says: he ought to have been taken from city to city in the Peloponnese, and
to have ended his life only after exemplary torture in each of them. And yet
the only severity that this guilty wretch had to endure was to be drowned in
the sea by order of the officers at Cenchreae.
61. There is another illustration of this writer’s manner to be found in his
Megalopolis. treatment of the cases of Mantinea and Megalopolis.
The misfortunes of the former he has depicted with his
usual exaggeration and picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it
is the peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only
such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about the noble conduct of the
Megalopolitans at that same period he has not said a word: as though it
were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than with instances
of just and noble conduct; or as though his readers would be less improved
by the record of what is great and worthy of imitation, than by that of such
deeds as are base and fit only to be avoided. For instance, he has told us
clearly enough how Cleomenes took the town, preserved it from damage,
and forthwith sent couriers to the Megalopolitans in Messene with a
despatch, offering them the safe enjoyment of their country if they would
throw in their lot with him;—and his object in telling all this is to enhance
the magnanimity and moderation of Cleomenes towards his enemies. Nay,
he has gone farther, and told us how the people of Megalopolis would not
allow the letter to be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the
bearers of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so
appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and honourable

mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And yet he
had an opportunity ready to his hand. For if we view with approval the
conduct of a people who merely by their declarations and votes support a
war in behalf of friends and allies; while to those who go so far as to endure
the devastation of their territory, and a siege of their town, we give not only
praise but active gratitude: what must be our estimate of the people of
Megalopolis? Must it not be of the most exalted character? First of all, they
allowed their territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes, and then consented
to be entirely deprived of their city, rather than be false to the league: and,
finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they deliberately
preferred the loss of their territory, the tombs of their ancestors, their
temples, their homes and property, of everything in fact which men value
most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies. No nobler action has ever been,
or ever will be performed; none to which an historian could better draw his
reader’s attention. For what could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the
maintenance of frank and permanent relations between states? But of all
this Phylarchus says not a word, being, as it seems to me, entirely blind as
to all that is noblest and best suited to be the theme of an historian.
62. He does, however, state in the course of his narrative that, from the
spoils of Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of
and its wealth. which two thousand, according to custom, were given
to Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding
ignorance of the ordinary facts as to the resources of Greece: a knowledge
which above all others should be possessed by historians. I am not of course
now speaking of the period in which the Peloponnese had been ruined by
the Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of
intestine struggles; but of our own times, in which it is believed, by the
establishment of its unity, to be enjoying the highest prosperity of which it
is capable. Still even at this period, if you could collect all the movable
property of the whole Peloponnese (leaving out the value of slaves), it
would be impossible to get so large a sum of money together. That I speak
on good grounds and not at random will appear from the following fact.
Every one has read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the
b.c. 378. Thebans, entered upon the war with the
Lacedaemonians, and despatched an army of twenty
thousand men, and manned a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the

expenses of the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly
had a valuation taken, not only of the whole land of Attica and the houses in
it, but of all other property: but yet the value returned fell short of six
thousand talents by two hundred and fifty; which will show that what I have
just said about the Peloponnese is not far wide of the mark. But at this
period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely give more than three
hundred talents, as coming from Megalopolis itself; for it is acknowledged
that most of the inhabitants, free and slaves, escaped to Messene. But the
strongest confirmation of my words is the case of Mantinea, which, as he
himself observes, was second to no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers.
Though it was surrendered after a siege, so that no one could escape, and no
property could without great difficulty be concealed; yet the value of the
whole spoil of the town, including the price of the captives sold, amounted
at this same period to only three hundred talents.
63. But a more astonishing misstatement remains to be remarked. In the
Ptolemy Euergetes and course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts
Cleomenes. “that about ten days before the battle an ambassador
came from Ptolemy announcing to Cleomenes, that the king declined to
continue to support him with supplies, and advised him to make terms with
Antigonus. And that when this message had been delivered to Cleomenes,
he made up his mind that he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as
soon as possible, before his forces learnt about this message, because he
could not hope to provide the soldiers’ pay from his own resources.” But if
he had at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he
would have been better supplied than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with
Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he would
have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the writer states
two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes depended wholly on
Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become master of that
enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly careless besides? I might
mention many instances of a similar kind, not only in his account of this
period, but throughout his whole work; but I think for my present purpose
enough has been said.
64. Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the winter at Argos.
But at the approach of spring Cleomenes collected his army, addressed a
suitable exhortation to them, and led them into the Argive territory. Most

b.c. 222. Cleomenes people thought this a hazardous and foolhardy step,
invades Argos. because the places at which the frontier was crossed
were strongly fortified; but those who were capable of judging regarded the
measure as at once safe and prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had
dismissed his forces, he reckoned on two things,—there would be no one to
resist him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the Argives found
that their territory was being laid waste up to their walls, they would be
certain to be roused to anger and to lay the blame upon Antigonus:
therefore, if on the one hand Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints of the
populace, were to sally forth and give him battle with his present forces,
Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the other hand Antigonus
refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently aloof, he believed that he
would be able to effect a safe retreat home, after succeeding by this
expedition in terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own forces with
courage. And this was the actual result. For as the devastation of the country
went on, crowds began to collect and abuse Antigonus: but like a wise
general and king, he refused to allow any consideration to outweigh that of
sound strategy, and persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly
Cleomenes, in pursuance of his plan, having terrified his enemies and
inspired courage in his own army for the coming struggle, returned home
unmolested.
65. Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and Achaean soldiers
having assembled from their winter quarters, Antigonus moved his army,
The summer campaign. along with his allies, into Laconia. The main force
The army of Antigonus. consisted of ten thousand Macedonians for the phalanx,
three thousand light armed, and three hundred cavalry. With these were a
thousand Agraei; the same number of Gauls; three thousand mercenary
infantry, and three hundred cavalry; picked troops of the Achaeans, three
thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and a thousand
Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner, under the command of
Cercidas of Megalopolis. Of the allies there were two thousand infantry,
and two hundred cavalry, from Boeotia; a thousand infantry and fifty
cavalry from Epirus; the same number from Acarnania; and sixteen hundred
from Illyria, under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The whole
amounted to twenty-eight thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry.

Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the
The position of country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and
Cleomenes at Sellasia. felling trees; while he took up position at a place called
Sellasia, with an army amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated
that the invading forces would take that direction: which turned out to be
the case. This pass lies between two hills, called respectively Evas and
Olympus, and the road to Sparta follows the course of the river Oenus.
Cleomenes strengthened both these hills by lines of fortification, consisting
of trench and palisade. On Evas he posted the perioeci and allies, under the
command of his brother Eucleidas; while he himself held Olympus with the
Lacedaemonians and mercenaries. On the level ground along the river he
stationed his cavalry, with a division of his mercenaries, on both sides of the
road. When Antigonus arrived, he saw at once the strength of the position,
and the skill with which Cleomenes had selected the different branches of
his army to occupy the points of vantage, so that the whole aspect of the
position was like that of skilled soldiers drawn up ready for a charge. For no
preparation for attack or defence had been omitted; but everything was in
order, either for offering battle with effect, or for holding an almost
unassailable position.
66. The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an
immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He
pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the stream
called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing himself by
reconnaissances of the peculiarities of the ground and the character of the
troops, and at the same time endeavouring by feigned movements to elicit
the intentions of the enemy. But he could never find an unguarded point, or
one where the troops were not entirely on the alert, for Cleomenes was
always ready at a moment’s notice to be at any point that was attacked. He
therefore gave up all thoughts of attacking the position; and finally an
understanding was come to between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter
to the decision of battle. And, indeed, Fortune had there brought into
competition two commanders equally endowed by nature with military
skill. To face the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his
Macedonian hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in
alternate lines, under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and
Demetrius of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians

and Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act as a
reserve. His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were posted opposite
the enemy’s cavalry, under the command of Alexander, and flanked by a
thousand Achaean infantry and the same number of Megalopolitans.
Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries and Macedonian
troops in person against the division on Olympus commanded by
Cleomenes. Owing to the narrowness of the ground, the Macedonians were
arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the other, while the
mercenaries were placed in front of them. It was arranged that the Illyrians,
who had bivouacked in full order during the previous night along the river
Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas, were to begin their assault on the hill
when they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of Olympus; and
that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same when the king
raised a scarlet flag.
67. The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was given to
the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their men to do their
duty, and in a moment they started into view of the enemy and began
Battle of Sellasia. assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who were
stationed with Cleomenes’s cavalry, observing that the
Achaean lines were not covered by any other troops behind them, charged
them on the rear; and thus reduced the division while endeavouring to carry
the hill of Evas to a state of great peril,—being met as they were on their
Philopoemen’s presence front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being
of mind. charged and vigorously attacked by the light-armed
mercenaries on their rear. It was at this point that Philopoemen of
Megalopolis, with a clear understanding of the situation and a foresight of
what would happen, vainly endeavoured to point out the certain result to his
superior officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in
command and his extreme youth; and, accordingly he acted for himself, and
cheering on the men of his own city, made a vigorous charge on the enemy.
This effected a diversion; for the light-armed mercenaries, who were
engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas, hearing the
shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their attack upon this
party and hurried back to their original position to render assistance to the
cavalry. The result was that the division of Illyrians, Macedonians, and the
rest who were advancing with them, no longer had their attention diverted

by an attack upon their rear, and so continued their advance upon the enemy
with high spirits and renewed confidence. And this afterwards caused it to
be acknowledged that to Philopoemen was due the honour of the success
against Eucleidas.
68. It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion, for after
the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, with the view
of convicting him of his shortcoming, “Why he had engaged before the
signal was given?” And upon Alexander answering that “He had not done
so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis had presumed to anticipate
the signal, contrary to his wish:” Antigonus replied, “That young man acted
like a good general in grasping the situation; you, general, were the
youngster.”
What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy’s lines
advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their ranks
into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to continually higher
ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking them up and depriving
them, to begin with, of the advantages of their peculiar armour and
disposition, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his
position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the
advantages of the ground. As though victory were assured, he kept his
original position on the summit of the hill, with the view of catching the
enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the
longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been
Defeat of Eucleidas. anticipated, was exactly the reverse. For he left himself
no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach
his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the
disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill;
and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour and
their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the
Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because
they had no space for manœuvring on the top. The result was not long in
arriving: they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature
of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.
69. Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also
being brought to a decision; in which all the Achaean cavalry, and

especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gallantry, for to them it
was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed under
him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe wound
Defeat of Cleomenes. through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on
the other hill Olympus began by bringing their light-
armed troops and mercenaries into action, of which each of them had five
thousand. Both the kings and their entire armies had a full view of this
action, which was fought with great gallantry on both sides: the charges
taking place sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole
line, and an eager emulation being displayed between the several ranks, and
even between in dividuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother’s
division was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the
point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all points at
once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front, and to lead
out his whole force in line by one side of his position. A recall was sounded
on the bugle for the light-armed troops of both sides, who were on the
ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes shouting their war cries,
and with spears couched, charged each other. Then a fierce struggle arose:
the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the
superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta, and at another time the
Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before the overpowering weight
of the Macedonian phalanx. At length Antigonus ordered a charge in close
order and in double phalanx; the enormous weight of this peculiar
formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge the Lacedaemonians from
their strongholds, and they fled in disorder and suffering severely as they
went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard of cavalry, effected his retreat to
Sparta: but the same night he went down to Gythium, where all preparations
for crossing the sea had been made long before in case of mishap, and with
his friends sailed to Alexandria.
70. Having surprised and taken Sparta, Antigonus treated the citizens with
magnanimity and humanity; and after re-establishing their ancient
constitution, he left the town in a few days, on receiving intelligence that
the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were laying waste the country.
This was an instance of the fantastic way in which Fortune decides the most
important matters. For if Cleomenes had only put off the battle for a few

days, or if when he returned to Sparta he had only held out for a brief space
of time, he would have saved his crown.
As it was, Antigonus after going to Tegea and restoring its constitution,
arrived on the second day at Argos, at the very time of the Nemean games.
Death of Antigonus Having at this assembly received every mark of
Doson, b.c. 220. immortal honour and glory at the hands of the Achaean
community, as well as of the several states, he made all haste to reach
Macedonia. He found the Illyrians still in the country, and forced them to
give him battle, in which, though he proved entirely successful, he exerted
himself to such a pitch in shouting encouragement to his men, that he
ruptured a bloodvessel, and fell into an illness which terminated shortly in
his death. He was a great loss to the Greeks, whom he had inspired with
good hopes, not only by his support in the field, but still more by his
character and good principles. He left the kingdom of Macedonia to Philip,
son of Demetrius.
71. My reason for writing about this war at such length, was the
advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general purpose of my
history, of making clear the relations existing between Macedonia and
Greece at a time which coincides with the period of which I am about to
treat.
Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes, Ptolemy Philopator
succeeded to the throne of Egypt. At the same period died Seleucus, son of
that Seleucus who had the double surnames of Callinicus and Pogon: he
was succeeded on the throne of Syria by his brother Antiochus. The deaths
of these three sovereigns—Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus—fell in the
b.c. 284-280. b.c. 224- same Olympiad, as was the case with the three
220. immediate successors to Alexander the Great,—
Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus,—for the latter all died in the 124th
Olympiad, and the former in the 139th.
I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the introduction and laid
the foundation on which my history must rest. I have shown when, how,
and why the Romans, after becoming supreme in Italy, began to aim at
dominion outside of it, and to dispute with the Carthaginians the dominion
of the sea. I have at the same time explained the state of Greece,

Macedonia, and Carthage at this epoch. I have now arrived at the period
which I originally marked out,—that namely in which the Greeks were on
the point of beginning the Social, the Romans the Hannibalic war, and the
kings in Asia the war for the possession of Coele-Syria. The termination
therefore of the wars just described, and the death of the princes engaged in
them, forms a natural period to this book.

BOOK III

1. I stated in my first book that my work was to start from the Social war,
the Hannibalian war, and the war for the possession of Coele-Syria. In the
same book I stated my reasons for devoting my first two books to a sketch
of the period preceding those events. I will now, after a few prefatory
remarks as to the scope of my own work, address myself to giving a
complete account of these wars, the causes which led to them, and which
account for the proportions to which they attained.
The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken to write is to
show how, when, and why all the known parts of the world fell under the
A summary of the work dominion of Rome. Now as this great event admits of
from b.c. 220 to being exactly dated as to its beginning, duration, and
b.c. 168.
final accomplishment, I think it will be advantageous to
give, by way of preface, a summary statement of the most important phases
in it between the beginning and the end. For I think I shall thus best secure
to the student an adequate idea of my whole plan, for as the comprehension
of the whole is a help to the understanding of details, and the knowledge of
details of great service to the clear conception of the whole; believing that
the best and clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a
combination of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief summary
of its contents.
I have already described its scope and limits. As to its several parts, the first
consists of the above mentioned wars, while the conclusion or closing scene
is the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. The time included between these
limits is fifty-three years, and never has an equal space embraced events of
b.c. 220-216. such magnitude and importance. In describing them I
shall start from the 140th Olympiad and shall arrange
my exposition in the following order:
2. First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or Hannibalian war: and shall
1. The cause and course have to describe how the Carthaginians entered Italy;
of the Hannibalian war. broke up the Roman power there; made the Romans

tremble for their safety and the very soil of their country; and contrary to all
calculation acquired a good prospect of surprising Rome itself.
I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period Philip of Macedon,
2. Macedonian treaty after finishing his war with the Aetolians, and
with Carthage, b.c. 216. subsequently settling the affairs of Greece, entered
upon a design of forming an offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage.
Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and
3. Syrian war, b.c. 218. finally went to war with each other for the possession of
Coele-Syria.
Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the Byzantines, and
4. Byzantine war, compelled them to desist from exacting dues from ships
b.c. 220. sailing into the Pontus.
At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a disquisition upon
First digression on the the Roman Constitution, in which I shall show that its
Roman Constitution. peculiar character contributed largely to their success,
not only in reducing all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a
supremacy over the Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at last, after their
conquest of Carthage, to their conceiving the idea of universal dominion.

Second on Hiero of Along with this I shall introduce another digression on
Syracuse. the fall of Hiero of Syracuse.
After these digressions will come the disturbances in Egypt; how, after the
5. The attempted death of King Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip entered
partition of the into a compact for the partition of the dominions of that
dominions of Ptolemy
Epiphanes, b.c. 204.
monarch’s infant son. I shall describe their treacherous
dealings, Philip laying hands upon the islands of the
Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus upon Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.
3. Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of the
6. War with Philip, Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia, Libya, and Sicily, I
b.c. 201-197. shall, following the changes of events, shift the scene of
my story entirely to Greece. Here I shall first describe the naval battles of
Attalus and the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip and
Rome, the persons engaged, its circumstances, and result.

Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians, in
consequence of which they invited the aid of Antiochus, and thereby gave
7. Asiatic war, b.c. 192- rise to what is called the Asiatic war against Rome and
191. the Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this
war, and described the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall have to
show first in what manner he was driven from Greece; secondly, how, being
defeated in the war, he was forced to cede all his territory west of Taurus;
and thirdly, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls,
secured undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on the west
of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and the lawless violence of the
Gauls.
Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and Cephallenians, I
8. Gallic wars of shall pass to the wars waged by Eumenes against
Eumenes and Prusias. Prusias and the Gauls; as well as that carried on in
alliance with Ariarathes against Pharnaces.
Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the Peloponnese, and
of the growth of the commonwealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary of
9. Union of the my whole work, concluding by an account of the
Peloponnese. Antiochus expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt; of
Epiphanes in Egypt. Fall
of the Macedonian
the war against Perseus; and the destruction of the
monarchy, b.c. 188-168. Macedonian monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative
it will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans
in one after another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual
conquest of the whole world.
4. And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, for praise or blame,
could be adequately formed from a simple consideration of their successes
or defeats, I must necessarily have stopped at this point, and have
concluded my history as soon as I reached these last events in accordance
with my original plan. For at this point the fifty-three years were coming to
an end, and the progress of the Roman power had arrived at its
consummation. And, besides, by this time the acknowledgment had been
extorted from all that the supremacy of Rome must be accepted, and her
The plan extended to commands obeyed. But in truth, judgments of either
embrace the period from side founded on the bare facts of success or failure in
b.c. 168-146.
the field are by no means final. It has often happened

that what seemed the most signal successes have, from ill management,
brought the most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently the
most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, have been turned to actual
advantage. I am bound, therefore, to add to my statement of facts a
discussion on the subsequent policy of the conquerors, and their
administration of their universal dominion: and again on the various
feelings and opinions entertained by other nations towards their rulers. And
I must also describe the tastes and aims of the several nations, whether in
their private lives or public policy. The present generation will learn from
this whether they should shun or seek the rule of Rome; and future
generations will be taught whether to praise and imitate, or to decry it. The
usefulness of my history, whether for the present or the future, will mainly
lie in this. For the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes either of the
actors or their historians, simply to conquer others and bring all into
subjection. Nor does any man of sense go to war with his neighbours for the
mere purpose of mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for the mere sake of
the voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for the sole purpose of
learning them. In all these cases the objects are invariably the pleasure,
honour, or profit which are the results of the several employments.
Accordingly the object of this work shall be to ascertain exactly what the
position of the several states was, after the universal conquest by which
they fell under the power of Rome, until the commotions and disturbances
which broke out at a later period. These I designed to make the starting-
point of what may almost be called a new work, partly because of the
greatness and surprising nature of the events themselves, but chiefly
because, in the case of most of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in
some cases one of the actors, and in others the chief director.
5. The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the Celtiberians and
A new departure; the Vaccaei; those of Carthage against Massinissa, king of
breaking-up of the Libya; and those of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then
arrangement made after
the fall of Macedonia.
also Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia, having been
Wars of Carthage against ejected from his throne by Orophernes through the
Massinissa; and of Rome agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral
against the Celtiberians,
b.c. 155-150; and against
power by the help of Attalus; while Demetrius, son of
Carthage (3d Punic war, Seleucus, after twelve years’ possession of the throne of
b.c. 149-146). Syria, was deprived of it, and of his life at the same

time, by a combination of the other kings against him. Then it was, too, that
the Romans restored to their country those Greeks who had been charged
with guilt in the matter of the war with Perseus, after formally acquitting
them of the crimes alleged against them. Not long afterwards the same
people turned their hands against Carthage: at first with the intention of
forcing its removal to some other spot, but finally, for reasons to be
afterwards stated, with the resolution of utterly destroying it.
Contemporaneous with this came the renunciation by the Macedonians of
their friendship to Rome, and by the Lacedaemonians of their membership
of the Achaean league, to which the disaster that befell all Greece alike
owed its beginning and end.
This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon whether Fortune
protracts my life to the necessary length. I am persuaded, however, that,
even if the common human destiny does overtake me, this theme will not be
allowed to lie idle for want of competent men to handle it; for there are
many besides myself who will readily undertake its completion. But having
given the heads of the most remarkable events, with the object of enabling
the reader to grasp the general scope of my history as well as the
arrangement of its several parts, I must now, remembering my original plan,
go back to the point at which my history starts.
6. Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish to point out to
The origin of the 2d us the causes of this contest between Rome and
Punic war; Carthage, allege first the siege of Saguntum by the
Carthaginians, and, secondly, their breach of treaty by crossing the river
called by the natives the Iber. But though I should call these the first actions
b.c. 334, in the war, I cannot admit them to be its causes. One
b.c. 192, might just as well say that the
crossing of Alexander the Great
into Asia was the cause of the Persian war, and the descent of Antiochus
upon Demetrias the cause of his war with Rome. In neither would it be a
probable or true statement. In the first case, this action of Alexander’s could
not be called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father Philip in
his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in the second case, we
know that the Aetolian league had done the same, with a view to a war with
Rome, before Antiochus came upon the scene. Such definitions are only
worthy of men who cannot distinguish between a first overt act and a cause

or pretext; and who do not perceive that a cause is the first in a series of
events of which such an overt act is the last. I shall therefore regard the first
attempt to put into execution what had already been determined as a
“beginning,” but I shall look for “causes” in the motives which suggested
such action and the policy which dictated it; for it is by these, and the
calculations to which they give rise, that men are led to decide upon a
particular line of conduct. The soundness of this method will be proved by
the following considerations. The true causes and origin of the invasion of
Persia by Alexander are patent to everybody. They were, first, the return
b.c. 401-400, march of the Greeks under Xenophon through the
country from the upper Satrapies; in the course of
which, though throughout Asia all the populations were hostile, not a single
b.c. 396-394, barbarian ventured to face them: secondly, the invasion
of Asia by the Spartan king Agesilaus, in which, though
he was obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of his
expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance of any
importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances which convinced Philip
of the cowardice and inefficiency of the Persians; and comparing them with
his own high state of efficiency for war, and that of his Macedonian
subjects, and placing before his eyes the splendour of the rewards to be
gained by such a war, and the popularity which it would bring him in
Greece, he seized on the pretext of avenging the injuries done by Persia to
Greece, and determined with great eagerness to undertake this war; and was
in fact at the time of his death engaged in making every kind of preparation
for it.
Here we have the cause and the pretext of the Persian war. Alexander’s
expedition into Asia was the first action in it.
7. So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome. The cause was evidently the
and of the war with exasperation of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they
Antiochus. had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of
the war with Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to
go to every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time
had aroused in them. This was the cause. As for the pretext, it was the
liberation of Greece, which they went from city to city with Antiochus
proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the first act in the war
was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias.

My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack the historians in
question, but to rectify the ideas of the studious. A physician can do no
good to the sick who does not know the causes of their ailments; nor can a
statesman do any good who is unable to conceive the manner, cause, and
source of the events with which he has from time to time to deal. Surely the
former could not be expected to institute a suitable system of treatment for
the body; nor the latter to grapple with the exigencies of the situation,
without possessing this knowledge of its elements. There is nothing,
therefore, which we ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the
causes of every event which occurs. For the most important results are often
produced by trifles; and it is invariably easier to apply remedial measures at
the beginning, before things have got beyond the stage of conception and
intention.
8. Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the Hannibalian
The credibility of Fabius war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum, was
Pictor. the encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal.
“Having secured great power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design
of destroying the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the
leading statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded
themselves together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this
Hasdrubal retired from Libya, and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at
his own will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian
Senate. This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous
supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia he
continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with Rome, was
acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the Carthaginians;
for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of his attack upon
Saguntum.” This is the statement of Fabius, who goes on to say, that “after
the capture of that city an embassy arrived in Carthage from Rome
demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain of a declaration of
war.”
Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following
question to him? “What better chance or opportunity could the
Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to
your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they
not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the

injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the
odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory by
ridding themselves of the threatened war—all of which they could have
effected by merely passing a decree?” If this question were put, I say, it
would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from doing anything of
the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with Hannibal’s policy for
seventeen years; and refused to make terms until, at the end of a most
determined struggle, they found their own city and persons in imminent
danger of destruction.
9. I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their wearing
such an air of probability in themselves as to gain any credit,—for the fact
is that his assertions are so contrary to reason, that it does not need any
argument of mine to help his readers to perceive it,—but I wished to warn
those who take up his books not to be misled by the authority of his name,
but to be guided by facts. For there is a certain class of readers in whose
eyes the personality of the writer is of more account than what he says.
They look to the fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the
Senate, and assume without more ado that everything he says may be
trusted. My view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this
writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as all-
sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a reference to the
facts themselves.
This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is the war between
The Hannibalian or 2nd Carthage and Rome. The cause of this war we must
Punic war. First cause. reckon to be the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed
Barcas, the father of Hannibal. The result of the war in Sicily had not
broken the spirit of that commander. He regarded himself as unconquered;
for the troops at Eryx which he commanded were still sound and
undismayed: and though he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a
concession to the exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the
Carthaginians at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of
revenge; and, had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage,
he would at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about
a war, as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the
domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.

10. When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary war, proclaimed
war with Carthage, the latter at first was inclined to resist at all hazards,
b.c. 238. Bk. i. ch. 88. because the goodness of her cause gave her hopes of
Second cause. victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without
which it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what is
to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and the
Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances; and though
feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do anything, evacuated
Sardinia, and consented to pay a sum of twelve hundred talents, in addition
to the former indemnity paid them, on condition of avoiding the war at that
time. This is the second and the most important cause of the subsequent
war. For Hamilcar, having this public grievance in addition to his private
feelings of anger, as soon as he had secured his country’s safety by reducing
the rebellious mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian
power in Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against
Third cause. Rome. So that I record as a third cause of the war the
Carthaginian success in Iberia: for it was the confidence
inspired by their forces there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It
would be easy to adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had
been dead ten years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about
the second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to
establish the fact.
11. When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last quitted
Hannibal’s oath. his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus,
the warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the
Romans to send ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of
the king’s intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined
to the Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome; they accordingly
b.c. 195. paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing
him into suspicion with the king. And in this they
entirely succeeded. As time went on the king became ever more and more
suspicious of Hannibal, until at length an opportunity occurred for an
explanation of the alienation that had been thus secretly growing up
between them. Hannibal then defended himself at great length, but without
b.c. 238. success, until at last he made the following statement:
“When my father was about to go on his Iberian

expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice to Zeus
I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed, my father
poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He then bade all the
other worshippers stand a little back, and calling me to him asked me
affectionately whether I wished to go with him on his expedition. Upon my
eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish enthusiasm to be allowed to go,
he took me by the right hand and led me up to the altar, and bade me lay my
hand upon the victim and swear that I would never be friends with Rome.
So long, then, Antiochus, as your policy is one of hostility to Rome, you
may feel quite secure of having in me a most thorough-going supporter. But
if ever you make terms or friendship with her, then you need not wait for
any slander to make you distrust me and be on your guard against me; for
there is nothing in my power that I would not do against her.”
12. Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced that it was told
with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all his suspicions. And we, too,
must regard this as an unquestionable proof of the animosity of Hamilcar
and of the aim of his general policy; which, indeed, is also proved by facts.
For he inspired his son-in-law Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal with a
bitterness of resentment against Rome which nothing could surpass.
Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented by death from showing the full extent of
his purpose; but time gave Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the
hatred of Rome which he had inherited from his father.
The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is the motives of
those who lay aside old enmities or form new friendships; and to ascertain
when their consent to treaties is a mere concession to the necessities of the
hour, and when it is the indication of a real consciousness of defeat. In the
former case they must be on their guard against such people lying in wait
for an opportunity; while in the latter they may unhesitatingly impose
whatever injunctions are necessary, in full reliance on the genuineness of
their feelings whether as subjects or friends. So much for the causes of the
war. I will now relate the first actions in it.
13. The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss of Sicily, but their
resentment was heightened still more, as I have said, by the transaction as to
Sardinia, and by the addition recently made to their tribute. Accordingly,
when the greater part of Iberia had fallen into their power, they were on the

alert to seize any opportunity that presented itself of retaliating upon Rome.
At the death of Hasdrubal, to whom they had committed the command in
Iberia after the death of Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain the
Death of Hamilcar, feelings of the army; but when news came from thence
b.c. 229. that the troops had elected Hannibal as commander-in-
chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and the choice of the army
confirmed by a unanimous vote. As soon as he had taken over the
Death of Hasdrubal, command, Hannibal set out to subdue the tribe of the
b.c. 221. Olcades; and, having arrived before their most
formidable city Althaea, he pitched his camp under its walls; and by a series
of energetic and formidable assaults succeeded before long in taking it: by
which the rest of the tribe were overawed into submission to Carthage.
Having imposed a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed
of a large sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter. There, by a
liberal treatment of the forces under his command, giving them an
instalment of their pay at once and promising the rest, he established an
excellent feeling towards himself in the army, as well as great hopes for the
future.
14. Next summer he set out on another expedition against the Vaccaei, in
b.c. 220. Hannibal which he took Salmantica by assault, but only
attacks the Vaccaei. succeeded in storming Arbucala, owing to the size of
the town and the number and valour of its inhabitants, after a laborious
siege. After this he suddenly found himself in a position of very great
danger on his return march: being set upon by the Carpesii, the strongest
tribe in those parts, who were joined also by neighbouring tribes, incited
principally by refugees of the Olcades, but roused also to great wrath by
those who escaped from Salmantica. If the Carthaginians had been
compelled to give these people regular battle, there can be no doubt that
they would have been defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with admirable
skill and caution, slowly retreated until he had put the Tagus between
himself and the enemy; and thus giving battle at the crossing of the stream,
supported by it and the elephants, of which he had about forty, he gained, to
every one’s surprise, a complete success. For when the barbarians attempted
to force a crossing at several points of the river at once, the greater number
of them were killed as they left the water by the elephants, who marched up
and down along the brink of the river and caught them as they were coming

out. Many of them also were killed in the river itself by the cavalry, because
the horses were better able than the men to stand against the stream, and
also because the cavalry were fighting on higher ground than the infantry
which they were attacking. At length Hannibal turned the tables on the
enemy, and, recrossing the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army,
to the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After the defeat of this
host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured to face him except the people
of Saguntum. From that town Hannibal tried his best to keep aloof; because,
acting on the suggestions and advice of his father Hamilcar, he did not wish
to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war until he had thoroughly
secured the rest of the country.
15. But the people of Saguntum kept sending ambassadors to Rome, partly
Saguntum appeals to because they foresaw what was coming, and trembled
Rome. Winter of b.c. for their own existence, and partly that the Romans
220-219.
might be kept fully aware of the growing power of the
Carthaginians in Iberia. For a long time the Romans disregarded their
words: but now they sent out some commissioners to see what was going
on. Just at that time Hannibal had finished the conquests which he intended
for that season, and was going into winter quarters at the New Town again,
which was in a way the chief glory and capital town of the Carthaginians in
Iberia. He found there the embassy from Rome, granted them an interview,
and listened to the message with which they were charged. It was a strong
injunction to him to leave Saguntum alone, as being under the protection of
Rome; and not to cross the Iber, in accordance with the agreement come to
in the time of Hasdrubal. To this Hannibal answered with all the heat of
Hannibal’s defiance. youth, inflamed by martial ardour, recent success, and
his long-standing hatred of Rome. He charged the
Romans with having a short time before, when on some political
disturbances arising in the town they had been chosen to act as arbitrators,
seized the opportunity to put some of the leading citizens to death; and he
declared that the Carthaginians would not allow the Saguntines to be thus
treacherously dealt with, for it was the traditional policy of Carthage to
protect all persons so wronged. At the same time he sent home for
instructions as to what he was to do “in view of the fact that the Saguntines
were injuring certain of their subject allies.” And altogether he was in a
state of unreasoning anger and violent exasperation, which prevented him

from availing himself of the real causes for war, and made him take refuge
in pretexts which would not admit of justification, after the manner of men
whose passions master all considerations of equity. How much better it
would have been to demand of Rome the restoration of Sardinia, and the
remission of the tribute, which she had taken an unfair opportunity to
impose on pain of a declaration of war. As it was, he said not a word of the
real cause, but alleged the fictitious one of the matter of Saguntum; and so
got the credit of beginning the war, not only in defiance of reason, but still
more in defiance of justice. The Roman ambassadors, finding that there
must undoubtedly be a war, sailed to Carthage to enter the same protest
before the people there. They expected, however, that they would have to
fight not in Italy, but in Iberia, and that they would have Saguntum as a base
of operations.
16. Wherefore the Senate, by way of preparing to undertake this business,
Illyrian war, b.c. 219. and foreseeing that the war would be severe and
protracted, and at a long distance from the mother
country, determined to make Illyria safe. For it happened that, just at this
time, Demetrius of Pharos was sacking and subduing to his authority the
cities of Illyria which were subject to Rome, and had sailed beyond Lissus,
in violation of the treaty, with fifty galleys, and had ravaged many of the
Cyclades. For he had quite forgotten the former kindnesses done him by
Rome, and had conceived a contempt for its power, when he saw it
threatened first by the Gauls and then by Carthage; and he now rested all
his hopes on the royal family of Macedonia, because he had fought on the
side of Antigonus, and shared with him the dangers of the war against
Cleomenes. These transactions attracted the observation of the Romans;
who, seeing that the royal house of Macedonia was in a flourishing
condition, were very anxious to secure the country east of Italy, feeling
convinced that they would have ample time to correct the rash folly of the
Illyrians, and rebuke and chastise the ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius.
But they were deceived in their calculations. For Hannibal anticipated their
measures by the capture of Saguntum: the result of which was that the war
b.c. 219. Coss. M. Livius took place not in Iberia, but close to Rome itself, and in
Salinator L. Aemilius various parts throughout all Italy. However, with these
Paullus.
ideas fixed in their minds, the Romans despatched

Lucius Aemilius just before summer to conduct the Illyrian campaign in the
first year of the 140th Olympiad.
17. But Hannibal had started from New Carthage and was leading his army
Hannibal besieges straight against Saguntum. This city is situated on the
Saguntum. seaward foot of the mountain chain on which the
frontiers of Iberia and Celtiberia converge, and is about seven stades from
the sea. The district cultivated by its inhabitants is exceedingly productive,
and has a soil superior to any in all Iberia. Under the walls of this town
Hannibal pitched his camp and set energetically to work on the siege,
foreseeing many advantages that would accrue if he could take it. Of these
the first was that he would thereby disappoint the Romans in their
expectation of making Iberia the seat of war: a second was that he would
thereby strike a general terror, which would render the already obedient
tribes more submissive, and the still independent ones more cautious of
offending him: but the greatest advantage of all was that thereby he would
be able to push on his advance, without leaving an enemy on his rear.
Besides these advantages, he calculated that the possession of this city
would secure him abundant supplies for his expedition, and create an
enthusiasm in the troops excited by individual acquisitions of booty; while
he would conciliate the goodwill of those who remained at Carthage by the
spoils which would be sent home. With these ideas he pressed on the siege
with energy: sometimes setting an example to his soldiers by personally
sharing in the fatigues of throwing up the siege works; and sometimes
cheering on his men and recklessly exposing himself to danger.
After a siege extending to the eighth month, in the course of which he
Fall of Saguntum. endured every kind of suffering and anxiety, he finally
succeeded in taking the town. An immense booty in
money, slaves, and property fell into his hands, which he disposed of in
accordance with his original design. The money he reserved for the needs of
his projected expedition; the slaves were distributed according to merit
among his men; while the property was at once sent entire to Carthage. The
result answered his expectations: the army was rendered more eager for
action; the home populace more ready to grant whatever he asked; and he
himself was enabled, by the possession of such abundant means, to carry
out many measures that were of service to his expedition.

18. While this was taking place, Demetrius, discovering the intentions of
Rome, threw a sufficient garrison into Dimale and victualled it in
Illyrian war, b.c. 219. proportion. In the other towns he put those who were
opposed to him to death, and placed the chief power in
the hands of his own partisans; and selecting six thousand of the bravest of
his subjects, quartered them in Pharos. When the Consul arrived in Illyria
with his army, he found the enemies of Rome confident in the strength of
Dimale and the elaborate preparations in it, and encouraged to resistance by
their belief in its impregnability; he determined, therefore, to attack that
town first, in order to strike terror into the enemy. Accordingly, after
addressing an exhortation to the several officers of the legions, and
throwing up siege works at several points, he began the siege in form. In
seven days he took the town by assault, which so dismayed the enemy, that
envoys immediately appeared from all the towns, surrendering themselves
unconditionally to the protection of Rome. The Consul accepted their
submission: and after imposing such conditions as appeared suitable to the
several cases, he sailed to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Being
informed that the city there was strongly fortified, thronged with excellent
soldiers, and well-furnished with provisions and all other munitions of war,
he began to entertain misgivings that the siege would be long and difficult;
and therefore, with a view to these difficulties, he adopted on the spur of the
moment the following stratagem. He crossed to the island by night with his
whole army. The greater part of it he disembarked at a spot where the
ground was well-wooded and low; while with only twenty ships he sailed at
daybreak to the harbour nearest the town. The smallness of the number of
the ships moved only the contempt of Demetrius when he saw them, and he
immediately marched out of the town down to the harbour to oppose the
landing of the enemy.
19. A violent struggle at once began: and, as it went on, division after
Capture of Pharos. division of the troops in the city came down to support
him, until at length the whole force had poured out to
take part in the engagement. The Romans who had landed in the night
arrived at the critical moment, after a march by an obscure route; and
seizing a strong position on some rising ground between the city and the
harbour, efficiently cut off from the city the troops that had sallied out.
When Demetrius became aware of what had taken place, he desisted from

opposing the disembarkation; and having rallied his men and addressed the
ranks, he put them in motion, with the resolution of fighting a pitched battle
with the troops on the hill. When the Romans saw the Illyrian advance
being made in good order and with great spirit, they formed their ranks and
charged furiously. At the same moment the Roman troops which had just
effected their landing, seeing what was going on, charged the enemy on the
rear, who being thus attacked on both sides, were thrown into great disorder
and confusion. The result was that, finding both his van and his rear in
difficulties, Demetrius fled. Some of his men retreated towards the city; but
most of them escaped by bye-paths into various parts of the island.
Demetrius himself made his way to some galleys which he kept at anchor at
a solitary point on the coast, with a view to every contingency; and going
on board, he sailed away at nightfall, and arrived unexpectedly at the court
of King Philip, where he passed the remainder of his life:—a man whose
undoubted boldness and courage were unsupported by either prudence or
judgment. His end was of a piece with the whole tenor of his life; for while
endeavouring at the instigation of Philip to seize Messene, he exposed
himself during the battle with a careless rashness which cost him his life; of
which I shall speak in detail when I come to that period.
The Consul Aemilius having thus taken Pharos at a blow, levelled the city
to the ground; and then having become master of all Illyria, and having
ordered all its affairs as he thought right, returned towards the end of the
summer to Rome, where he celebrated a triumph amid expressions of
unmixed approval; for people considered that he had managed this business
with great prudence and even greater courage.
20. But when news came to Rome of the fall of Saguntum, there was indeed
Indignation at Rome at no debate on the question of war, as some historians
the fall of Saguntum. assert; who even add the speeches delivered on either
side. But nothing could be more ridiculous. For is it conceivable that the
Romans should have a year before proclaimed war with the Carthaginians
in the event of their entering the territory of Saguntum, and yet, when the
city itself had been taken, should have debated whether they should go to
war or no? Just as absurd are the wonderful statements that the senators put
on mourning, and that the fathers introduced their sons above twelve years
old into the Senate House, who, being admitted to the debate, refrained
from divulging any of its secrets even to their nearest relations. All this is as

improbable as it is untrue; unless we are to believe that Fortune, among its
other bounties, granted the Romans the privilege of being men of the world
from their cradles. I need not waste any more words upon such
compositions as those of Chaereas and Sosilus;165 which, in my judgment,
are more like the gossip of the barber’s shop and the pavement than history.
The truth is that, when the Romans heard of the disaster at Saguntum, they
Envoys sent to Carthage at once elected envoys, whom they despatched in all
to demand surrender of haste to Carthage with the offer of two alternatives, one
Hannibal.
of which appeared to the Carthaginians to involve
disgrace as well as injury if they accepted it, while the other was the
beginning of a great struggle and of great dangers. For one of these
alternatives was the surrender of Hannibal and his staff to Rome, the other
was war. When the Roman envoys arrived and declared their message to the
Senate, the choice proposed to them between these alternatives was listened
to by the Carthaginians with indignation. Still they selected the most
capable of their number to state their case, which was grounded on the
following pleas.
21. Passing over the treaty made with Hasdrubal, as not having ever been
made, and, if it had, as not being binding on them because made without
their consent (and on this point they quoted the precedent of the Romans
themselves, who in the Sicilian war repudiated the terms agreed upon and
accepted by Lutatius, as having been made without their consent)—passing
over this, they pressed with all the vehemence they could, throughout the
discussion, the last treaty made in the Sicilian war; in which they affirmed
that there was no clause relating to Iberia, but one expressly providing
security for the allies of both parties to the treaty. Now, they pointed out that
the Saguntines at that time were not allies of Rome, and therefore were not
protected by the clause. To prove their point, they read the treaty more than
once aloud. On this occasion the Roman envoys contented themselves with
the reply that, while Saguntum was intact, the matter in dispute admitted of
pleadings and of a discussion on its merits; but that, that city having been
treacherously seized, they had only two alternatives,—either to deliver the
persons guilty of the act, and thereby make it clear that they had no share in
their crime, and that it was done without their consent; or, if they were not
willing to do that, and avowed their complicity in it, to take the
consequences.

The question of treaties between Rome and Carthage was referred to in
general terms in the course of this debate: but I think a more particular
examination of it will be useful both to practical statesmen, who require to
know the exact truth of the matter, in order to avoid mistakes in any critical
deliberation; and to historical students, that they may not be led astray by
the ignorance or partisan bias of historians; but may have before them a
conspectus, acknowledged to be accurate, of the various compacts which
have been made between Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to our
own day.
22. The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was made in the year of
Treaties between Rome Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first
and Carthage. Consuls appointed after the expulsion of the kings, by
which men also the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated. This was
twenty-eight years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Of this treaty I
The first treaty, b.c. 509- append a translation, as accurate as I could make it,—
508. for the fact is that the ancient language differs so much
from that at present in use, that the best scholars among the Romans
themselves have great difficulty in interpreting some points in it, even after
much study. The treaty is as follows:—
“There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the
Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions:
“Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond the Fair Promontory,
unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies. If any one of them
be driven ashore he shall not buy or take aught for himself save what is
needful for the repair of his ship and the service of the gods, and he shall
depart within five days.
“Men landing for traffic shall strike no bargain save in the presence of a
herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the presence of these, let the price
be secured to the seller on the credit of the state—that is to say, if such sale
be in Libya or Sardinia.
“If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in Sicily he shall enjoy
all rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians shall do no injury to the
people of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Tarracina, nor any other
people of the Latins that are subject to Rome.

“From those townships even which are not subject to Rome166 they shall
hold their hands; and if they take one shall deliver it unharmed to the
Romans. They shall build no fort in Latium; and if they enter the district in
arms, they shall not stay a night therein.”
23. The “Fair Promontory” here referred to is that which lies immediately to
the north of Carthage; south of which the Carthaginians stipulated that the
Romans should not sail with ships of war, because, as I imagine, they did
not wish them to be acquainted with the coast near Byzacium, or the lesser
Syrtis, which places they call Emporia, owing to the productiveness of the
district. The treaty then goes on to say that, if any one of them is driven
thither by stress of weather or fear of an enemy, and stands in need of
anything for the worship of the gods and the repair of his vessel, this and no
more he may take; and all those who have come to anchor there must
necessarily depart within five days. To Carthage, and all the country on the
Carthaginian side of the Fair Promontory in Libya, to Sardinia, and the
Carthaginian province of Sicily, the treaty allows the Romans to sail for
mercantile purposes; and the Carthaginians engage their public credit that
such persons shall enjoy absolute security.
It is clear from this treaty that the Carthaginians speak of Sardinia and
Libya as belonging to them entirely; but, on the other hand, make a
distinction in the case of Sicily, and only stipulate for that part of it which is
subject to Carthage. Similarly, the Romans also only stipulate concerning
Latium; the rest of Italy they do not mention, as not being under their
authority.
24. After this treaty there was a second, in which we find that the
Second treaty, b.c. 306 Carthaginians have included the Tyrians and the
(?). township of Utica in addition to their former territory;
and to the Fair Promontory Mastia and Tarseium are added, as the points
east of which the Romans are not to make marauding expeditions or found a
city. The treaty is as follows: “There shall be friendship between the
Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and township of
Utica, on these terms: The Romans shall not maraud, nor traffic, nor found
a city east of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, Tarseium. If the Carthaginians
take any city in Latium which is not subject to Rome, they may keep the
prisoners and the goods, but shall deliver up the town. If the Carthaginians