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Title: The Federalist Papers

Author: Alexander Hamilton
John Jay
James Madison

Release date: July 1, 1998 [eBook #1404]
Most recently updated: October 29, 2024

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1404

Credits: The Constitution Society, Anonymous Volunteers and David
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS ***

THE FEDERALIST PAPERS

By

Alexander Hamilton,

John Jay,

James Madison

CONTENTS

FEDERALIST No. 1. General Introduction
FEDERALIST No. 2. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force
and Influence
FEDERALIST No. 3. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
FEDERALIST No. 4. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
FEDERALIST No. 5. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
FEDERALIST No. 6. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions
Between the States

FEDERALIST No. 7. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
FEDERALIST No. 8. The Consequences of Hostilities Between
the States
FEDERALIST No. 9. The Union as a Safeguard Against
Domestic Faction and Insurrection
FEDERALIST No. 10. The Same Subject Continued (The Union
as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
FEDERALIST No. 11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to
Commercial Relations and a Navy
FEDERALIST No. 12. The Utility of the Union In Respect to
Revenue
FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in Respect to
Economy in Government
FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution
From Extent of Territory Answered
FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the Present
Confederation to Preserve the Union
FEDERALIST No. 16. The Same Subject Continued (The
Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 17. The Same Subject Continued (The
Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 18. The Same Subject Continued (The
Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 19. The Same Subject Continued (The
Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 20. The Same Subject Continued (The
Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)

FEDERALIST No. 21. Other Defects of the Present
Confederation
FEDERALIST No. 22. The Same Subject Continued (Other
Defects of the Present Confederation)
FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a Government as
Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
FEDERALIST No. 24. The Powers Necessary to the Common
Defense Further Considered
FEDERALIST No. 25. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers
Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 26. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative
Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 27. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of
Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 28. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of
Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia
FEDERALIST No. 30. Concerning the General Power of
Taxation
FEDERALIST No. 31. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 32. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 33. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 34. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the General Power of Taxation)

FEDERALIST No. 35. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 36. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 37. Concerning the Difficulties of the
Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government.
FEDERALIST No. 38. The Same Subject Continued, and the
Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed.
FEDERALIST No. 39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican
Principles
FEDERALIST No. 40. On the Powers of the Convention to Form
a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained.
FEDERALIST No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by
The Constitution
FEDERALIST No. 42. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution
Further Considered
FEDERALIST No. 43. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers
Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 44. Restrictions on the Authority of the
Several States
FEDERALIST No. 45. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of
the Union to the State Governments.
FEDERALIST No. 46. The Influence of the State and Federal
Governments Compared
FEDERALIST No. 47. The Particular Structure of the New
Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different
Parts.
FEDERALIST No. 48. These Departments Should Not Be So Far
Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.

FEDERALIST No. 49. Method of Guarding Against the
Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by
Appealing to the People Through a Convention.
FEDERALIST No. 50. Periodical Appeals to the People
Considered
FEDERALIST No. 51. The Structure of the Government Must
Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different
Departments.
FEDERALIST No. 52. The House of Representatives
FEDERALIST No. 53. The Same Subject Continued (The House
of Representatives)
FEDERALIST No. 54. The Apportionment of Members Among
the States
FEDERALIST No. 55. The Total Number of the House of
Representatives
FEDERALIST No. 56. The Same Subject Continued (The Total
Number of the House of Representatives)
FEDERALIST No. 57. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to
Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in
Connection with Representation.
FEDERALIST No. 58. Objection That The Number of Members
Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands.
FEDERALIST No. 59. Concerning the Power of Congress to
Regulate the Election of Members
FEDERALIST No. 60. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
FEDERALIST No. 61. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning
the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
FEDERALIST No. 62. The Senate

FEDERALIST No. 63. The Senate Continued
FEDERALIST No. 64. The Powers of the Senate
FEDERALIST No. 65. The Powers of the Senate Continued
FEDERALIST No. 66. Objections to the Power of the Senate To
Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 67. The Executive Department
FEDERALIST No. 68. The Mode of Electing the President
FEDERALIST No. 69. The Real Character of the Executive
FEDERALIST No. 70. The Executive Department Further
Considered
FEDERALIST No. 71. The Duration in Office of the Executive
FEDERALIST No. 72. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-
Eligibility of the Executive Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 73. The Provision For The Support of the
Executive, and the Veto Power
FEDERALIST No. 74. The Command of the Military and Naval
Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive.
FEDERALIST No. 75. The Treaty-Making Power of the
Executive
FEDERALIST No. 76. The Appointing Power of the Executive
FEDERALIST No. 77. The Appointing Power Continued and
Other Powers of the Executive Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 78. The Judiciary Department
FEDERALIST No. 79. The Judiciary Continued
FEDERALIST No. 80. The Powers of the Judiciary

FEDERALIST No. 81. The Judiciary Continued, and the
Distribution of the Judicial Authority.
FEDERALIST No. 82. The Judiciary Continued.
FEDERALIST No. 83. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to
Trial by Jury
FEDERALIST No. 84. Certain General and Miscellaneous
Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
FEDERALIST No. 85. Concluding Remarks

FEDERALIST No. 1. General Introduction
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, October 27, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution
for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance;
comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the
UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the
fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has
been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people
of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If
there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with
propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a
wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be
considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism,
to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for
the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious
estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations
not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be
wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations
affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local
institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its
merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the
discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of

a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard
a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they
hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another
class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the
confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects
of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial
confederacies than from its union under one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I
am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the
opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject
them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us
to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it
cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its
appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources,
blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray
by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful
are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we,
upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on
the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This
circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to
those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any
controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be
drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who
advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.
Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other
motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those
who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there
not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged
than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political
parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making
proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by
persecution.
And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have
already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases
of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will
be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be
led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their

opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of
their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal
for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the
offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of
liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people,
which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be
represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the
expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that
jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of
liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On
the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is
essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and
well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a
dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for
the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the
firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former
has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism
than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of
republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an
obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending
tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from
whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost
moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may
result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have
collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source
not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you
that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion
it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for
your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I
do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I
have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will
freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The
consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however,
multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the
depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be

judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not
disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:
THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY
THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO
PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT
LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE
ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE
PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN
STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY
WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF
THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO
PROPERTY.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory
answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that
may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of
the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it
whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution,
that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and
that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct
portions of the whole.(1) This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually
propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it.
For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged
view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new
Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to
begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the
probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution.
This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS
1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out
in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.

FEDERALIST No. 2. Concerning Dangers from
Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, October 31, 1787

JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to
decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the most
important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their taking a
very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will be evident.
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government,
and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the
people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with
requisite powers. It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it
would conduce more to the interest of the people of America that they
should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal
government, or that they should divide themselves into separate
confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which
they are advised to place in one national government.
It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly
united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest citizens
have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians now appear,
who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for
safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States
into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new
doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain
characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of the
number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have
wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentlemen,
it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt these new

political tenets without being fully convinced that they are founded in truth
and sound policy.
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was
not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected,
fertile, wide-spreading country was the portion of our western sons of
liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of
soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the
delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable
waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together;
while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances,
present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids,
and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been
pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people
descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing
the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels,
arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war,
have nobly established general liberty and independence.
This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and
it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper
and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest
ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien
sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the
same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made
peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a
nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into
various compacts and conventions with foreign states.
A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at
a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and
perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political
existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many
of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and

desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and
reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-
balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at, that a
government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be
found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to
answer.
This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more
remotely the latter; and being persuaded that ample security for both could
only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as with
one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take that
important subject under consideration.
This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the
people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their
patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts of
men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with minds
unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool,
uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been awed
by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they
presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint
and very unanimous councils.
Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not
imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to BLIND
approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and candid
consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand,
and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was remarked in the
foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it
may be so considered and examined. Experience on a former occasion
teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that
well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of
America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body
recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved
their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to
teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not
only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of

personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or
the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at
objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable
in their efforts to persuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic
Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority
of the people reasoned and decided judiciously; and happy they are in
reflecting that they did so.
They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the country,
they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful
information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in
inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must
have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were
individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore
that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such
measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent
and advisable.
These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly
on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their advice,
notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter them from it.
But if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of that Congress,
few of whom had been fully tried or generally known, still greater reason
have they now to respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it
is well known that some of the most distinguished members of that
Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and
abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were
also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated
knowledge and experience.
It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding
Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the
people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its Union. To
preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that
convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention
has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good
purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to
depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that three or

four confederacies would be better than one? I am persuaded in my own
mind that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that
their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union rests on
great and weighty reasons, which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in
some ensuing papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number
of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem
clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the
Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I
sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen, that
whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to
exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL
TO ALL MY GREATNESS."
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 3. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 3, 1787

JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the
Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.
That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high
opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly
entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one
federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and
national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear
to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they
are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY
seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a
great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords
great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND
arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it
is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to
examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial
Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best
security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world
will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the
causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE
them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many
JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by
DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United America will
probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union
tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.
The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of
treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with
no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are
maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive
commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two
latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws
of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this
will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government
than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct
confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other
contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or
courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive
reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to
recommend men to offices under the national government,—especially as it
will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of
proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will
result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial
decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and
judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more
satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with
respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties,
as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and
executed in the same manner,—whereas, adjudications on the same points

and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not
always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of
independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent
governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may
affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing
such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and
responsible only to one national government, cannot be too much
commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice;
but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently
having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will
be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty
of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to
resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do,
result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great
number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if
willing, to prevent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But
the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances,
will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or
inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties
and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they are less to be
apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones,
and in that respect the former most favors the SAFETY of the people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful
violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government
affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived
from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union.
Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the
present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of
Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of

individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish
offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some
States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those
who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent
interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, to excite war with
these nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a
national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished
by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than
the offending State. The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally
disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledging,
correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses. The national government,
in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with
moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to
extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united
nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or
confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge,
or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to
ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for
the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have
received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other
POWERFUL nation?
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 4. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 7, 1787

JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by
JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons show that
such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more
easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State
governments or the proposed little confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN
force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to
other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a
situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult; for it need not be observed
that there are PRETENDED as well as just causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations
in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything
by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to
get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as
thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private
compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.
These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the
sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the
voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to
war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well
deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations as often as
kings; and some of them will on examination be found to grow out of our
relative situation and circumstances.

With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, notwithstanding any
efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own or duties on foreign fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we
suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying
trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more
their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation,
inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a
manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with
commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent,
because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the
circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants
and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those
territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective
sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one
side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will
either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to
become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with
prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies
and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other
nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our
advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with
an eye of indifference and composure.
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out
of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and
that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for
operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely,
therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as
necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of
INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation

consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the
government, the arms, and the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be
provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire
whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question,
more competent than any other given number whatever.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience
of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can
move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and
protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its
foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard
the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as
connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of
the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and
expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can
possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia
under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of
subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into
one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into
thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the
government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of
Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales?
Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all)
be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so
effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if
we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one
national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to
make it a nursery for seamen—if one national government had not called
forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess
and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its
navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation and fleet—let Wales
have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its navigation and fleet—let
those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under four

independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would
each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen
or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what armies
could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one
was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and
money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into
neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for
peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake
of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose
importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct
would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the
states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such instances, and it
is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under similar
circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and
money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which
of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and
in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel
acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable
from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general
and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and
resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and
conduce far more to the safety of the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is,
that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act
toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient
and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly
organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed,
our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be
much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our
resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual
government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem
convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant

republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a
third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what
a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she
become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would
dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it
never fails to be against themselves.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 5. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign
Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 10, 1787

JAY
To the People of the State of New York:
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then
forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall
present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect
union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your
religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves,
and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must
increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island,
being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different
interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most
earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and
weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being
the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and
disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this
occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR
DELAY THIS UNION."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions at
home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more
to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within
ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the
best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their
experience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems
obvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but

one nation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that
those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one
another. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental
nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those
nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a
long series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than
they were useful and assisting to each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in
affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and
jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial
interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America,
would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most
other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in
disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal footing
in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first; but,
admitting that to be practicable, yet what human contrivance can secure the
continuance of such equality? Independent of those local circumstances
which tend to beget and increase power in one part and to impede its
progress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and
good management which would probably distinguish the government of one
above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and
consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same
degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be
observed by each of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on the
scale of political importance much above the degree of her neighbors, that
moment would those neighbors behold her with envy and with fear. Both
those passions would lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever
might promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain them
from measures calculated to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much
time would not be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly

dispositions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her
neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them.
Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind
conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and uncandid
imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the proposed
confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be unquestionably more
formidable than any of the others. No sooner would this become evident
than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the same ideas and sensations in
the more southern parts of America which it formerly did in the southern
parts of Europe. Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young
swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields
and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be
borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the
contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short,
that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations
doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are greatly
mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be
formed between these confederacies, and would produce that combination
and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would be necessary to
put and keep them in a formidable state of defense against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces against a
foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS.
Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by
distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and
proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different.
Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course
different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different
foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the foreign
nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be at war would be

the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would be the most
desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to their
immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed,
would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly
passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering our
distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies to
apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations, and therefore
that each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others by the
aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances
between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to
receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country,
than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests did
the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what
innovations did they under the same character introduce into the
governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us against
the hostilities and improper interference of foreign nations.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 6. Concerning Dangers from
Dissensions Between the States
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 14, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of
disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to
delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more alarming kind—
those which will in all probability flow from dissensions between the States
themselves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. These have been
already in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more
particular and more full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt
that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in
partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown
would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a
want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence,
would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To
look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent,
unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard
the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated
experience of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some
which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective
bodies of society. Of this description are the love of power or the desire of
pre-eminence and dominion—the jealousy of power, or the desire of
equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed
though an equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are the
rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And
there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take

their origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities,
interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of
which they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king
or of a people, have in too many instances abused the confidence they
possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not
scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or
personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute,(1) at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his
countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
SAMMIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
MEGARENSIANS,(2) another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution
with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a supposed theft of the
statuary Phidias,(3) or to get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought
against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of
popularity,(4) or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive
author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by
the name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various vicissitudes,
intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian
commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,(5) entertained hopes of
succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the
Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and interest of this enterprising and
powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary
to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his
counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid
fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the Emperor Charles
V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,(6) the petulance of
another,(7) and the cabals of a third,(8) had in the contemporary policy,
ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are topics that
have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the
production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to

their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but
a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be
drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have
a tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights
to form their opinion either of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps,
however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with
propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If
Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to be doubted
whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this
particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men, who stand
ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States,
though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics
(say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the
manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have
so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They
will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual
amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all
nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be
their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary,
invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest,
have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general
or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in
practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former
administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions,
predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect
nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to
the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular
and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are
often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and
are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the
objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a
passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars
founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing

system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or
dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered
new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let
experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an
answer to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,
Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of
the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and
Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very
war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her arms into the
heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an
overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the
commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till,
becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. found means
to accomplish that formidable league,(9) which gave a deadly blow to the
power and pride of this haughty republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and taxes,
took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. They had furious
contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the
most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose
one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the
predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been
more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has
been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal
wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of their representatives
have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or
continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary
to the real interests of the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority
between the rival houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept
Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the English
against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a

favorite leader,(10) protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by
sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views of the
court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure
grown out of commercial considerations,—the desire of supplanting and the
fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the
general advantages of trade and navigation, and sometimes even the more
culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their
consent.
The last war but between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of
the British merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish main.
These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on the part of
the Spaniards toward the subjects of Great Britain which were not more
justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a just retaliation and were
chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were
taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by
the usual progress of a spirit of resentment, the innocent were, after a while,
confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of
the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon
after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from that
body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued,
which in its consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years
before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial
fruits.
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose
situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can
we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an
expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present
confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of
the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us
with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and
evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the
deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the
direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of
the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and
perfect virtue?

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and
credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill
administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of North
Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual
insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare—!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets
of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and
hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long
observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics,
that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An
intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect:
"NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other
unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE
REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that
neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes
all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors."(11)
This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the
REMEDY.
PUBLIUS
1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public gold, with the
connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.
5. Worn by the popes.
6. Madame de Maintenon.
7. Duchess of Marlborough.
8. Madame de Pompadour.
9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of
France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and states.
10. The Duke of Marlborough.
11. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbé de Mably.

FEDERALIST No. 7. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions
Between the States)
For the Independent Journal. Thursday, November 15, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what
inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each
other? It would be a full answer to this question to say—precisely the same
inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations
in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more
particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate
contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a
federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form
a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.
Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile
sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars
that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would
exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory
within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and
undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the Union
would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well
known that they have heretofore had serious and animated discussion
concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the
Revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown lands. The
States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were
comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have contended
that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union;
especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual
possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was
subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was

relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events
an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has
been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by
prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the
benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a
continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable
termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however,
would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At
present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if
not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at
an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal
compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to
reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a
proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a
grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating
in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy,
remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by
all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there
would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of
apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different States for
this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties,
they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.
In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample
theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to
interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the
future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would
sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The
circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania,
respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in
expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of
confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a
federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of
Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction
with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till,
by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found
for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is
intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no

doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and
States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to
their disadvantage.
Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions
which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the
district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from
States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and
can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have
been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two
motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our
future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence
in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual
government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims,
in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State,
than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all
occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and
Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada
and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small
States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness.
In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which
would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their
unpropitious destiny to become disunited.
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of
escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the
advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate
confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself.
This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would
beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges,
to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the
country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they
would naturally have independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE
READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE
IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT
SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of
enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no

occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this
unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by
which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their
own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to
prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and
these to reprisals and wars.
The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others
tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently
submitted to by the tributary States. The relative situation of New York,
Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an example of this kind. New
York, from the necessities of revenue, must lay duties on her importations.
A great part of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other
States in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would
neither be willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not
consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the citizens
of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there were not this
impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets.
Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by New York
for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long permitted to remain in the
quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession of
which we derived an advantage so odious to our neighbors, and, in their
opinion, so oppressive? Should we be able to preserve it against the
incumbent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating
pressure of New Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity
alone will answer in the affirmative.
The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision
between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first
instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike
productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree
upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that
can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual,
would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even
dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging
the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of
national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate
interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the
payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to

magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body
of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State
in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some
equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of the former would
excite the resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule would, in the
meantime, be postponed by real differences of opinion and affected delays.
The citizens of the States interested would clamour; foreign powers would
urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States
would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and
internal contention.
Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the
apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule
agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some
States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally
seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be
disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own
incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the
complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with
avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements
would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule
adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still
delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result
from a diversity of other causes—the real deficiency of resources; the
mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the management
of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which
men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the
exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of
immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be
productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps,
nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being
bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an
equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite,
that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.
Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on
the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be
considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to
expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the

legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any
additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances
disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to
retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities
perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer
that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of
PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of
moral obligation and social justice.
The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or
confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation
upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some
preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the
subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all,
or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would,
by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the
pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive
contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to
become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the
enemies of them all. Divide et impera(1) must be the motto of every nation
that either hates or fears us.(2)
PUBLIUS
1. Divide and command.
2. In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as possible
be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a week—
on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on Thursday in the Daily
Advertiser.

FEDERALIST No. 8. The Consequences of
Hostilities Between the States
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in
case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be
formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to
those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each
other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united
under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the
consequences that would attend such a situation.
War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence,
would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in
those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained.
The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe,
though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have,
notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering
sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation
which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art
of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are
encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.
Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain
admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur at every
step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly,
an invading army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country
almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received; but now a
comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive,
with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the
enterprises of one much more considerable. The history of war, in that
quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires

overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing;
of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little
acquisition.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of
military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want
of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would
facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun
their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as
difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.
PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The
calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events
which would characterize our military exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would not
long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most powerful
director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a
time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property
incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of
continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort
for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy
their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become
willing to run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is
said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore
inferred that they may exist under it.(1) Their existence, however, from the
very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But
standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution
of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require
a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker
States or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves
upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to
supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and
effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications.
They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive
arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a

progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase
the executive at the expense of the legislative authority.
The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States
or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their neighbors.
Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments,
and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over
large states, or states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute
of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important
States or confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying
and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to
those by which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-
eminence. Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of
this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of
the Old World. This, at least, would be the natural course of things; and our
reasonings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are
accommodated to this standard.
These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands
of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid
conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human
affairs.
It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not
standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted
the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory,
may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the
present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the
improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the
condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people
of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly
multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and
the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring
with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system
of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the
citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one

which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers
of the former can have no good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep
on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter.
These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for
interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military
subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of
military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted,
nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The
smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an
overmatch for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military
power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear
the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may
be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.
The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to
suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will
be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great
body of the people.
In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all this
happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be
always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant
defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance
of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The
military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of
territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent
infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those
rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not
only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this
disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor
difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such
impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported
by the military power.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An insular
situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great measure against the
possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a numerous army
within the kingdom. A sufficient force to make head against a sudden

descent, till the militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has
been deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor
would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its
domestic establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for
the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the
consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a
great degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this
day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the
contrary, Britain had been situated on the continent, and had been
compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military
establishments at home coextensive with those of the other great powers of
Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to
the absolute power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, that the
people of that island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by
the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually
kept up within the kingdom.
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great
distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too
much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous
annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be
necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral
parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be
thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short
course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe—
our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against
the ambition and jealousy of each other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves
the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man
of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and
meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they
will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences,
they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the
rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union.
The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of
its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of
dangers, real, certain, and formidable.

PUBLIUS
1. This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and it will be
shown that the only natural precaution which could have been taken on this
subject has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any
constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which
contain no guard at all on this subject.

FEDERALIST No. 9. The Union as a Safeguard
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 21, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of
the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is
impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy
without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with
which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of
revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional
calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are
to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold
them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing
scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of
sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the
gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at
the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should
pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted
endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so
justly celebrated.
From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics the
advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms
of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty.
They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of
society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its
friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on
the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious
instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the

broad and solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which
will be equally permanent monuments of their errors.
But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of
republican government were too just copies of the originals from which
they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models
of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have
been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as
indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has
received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well
understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the
ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the
introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts
composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the
representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own
election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal
progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful
means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained
and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of
circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil
government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add
one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an
objection to the new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the
ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the
dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States
into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately concerns
the object under consideration. It will, however, be of use to examine the
principle in its application to a single State, which shall be attended to in
another place.
The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to guard the
internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their external force and security,
is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries
and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the
subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great
assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the
necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they
seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man
expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the

consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready
acquiescence.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the
standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of
almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be
compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms
of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the
criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking
refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an
infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the
wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of
universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on
the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and
have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a
desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient,
might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who
possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow
circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
happiness of the people of America.
Referring the examination of the principle itself to another place, as has
been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to remark here that, in the
sense of the author who has been most emphatically quoted upon the
occasion, it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE of the more
considerable MEMBERS of the Union, but would not militate against their
being all comprehended in one confederate government. And this is the true
question, in the discussion of which we are at present interested.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to
a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a confederate
republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government,
and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
"It is very probable," (says he(1)) "that mankind would have been
obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person,
had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal
advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a
monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC."

"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller
STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to
form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one,
capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such
a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united
body."
"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support
itself without any internal corruptions. The form of this society prevents all
manner of inconveniences."
"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would
alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free
might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped
and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation."
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states
the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are
reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one
side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the
confederates preserve their sovereignty."
"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external situation, it is
possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large
monarchies."
I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting passages,
because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal arguments in
favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false impressions
which a misapplication of other parts of the work was calculated to make.
They have, at the same time, an intimate connection with the more
immediate design of this paper; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the
Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection.
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a
CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the
members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals
of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought

to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact
equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a
leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are, in the
main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has
indeed happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in
the manner which the distinction taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in
their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the
practice, which serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no
absolute rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of
this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has prevailed, it
has been the cause of incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.
The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states into one
state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are
mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the
members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity,
for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the
general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an
association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far
from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them
constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct
representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive
and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in
every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.
In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or
republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest to ONE.
The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and
magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most, delicate
species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any
thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the
appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this
association, says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate
Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the distinctions
insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian;
and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an
erroneous theory.

PUBLIUS
1. "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.

FEDERALIST No. 10. The Same Subject
Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against
Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
From the Daily Advertiser. Thursday, November 22, 1787.

MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to
break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and
fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He
will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for
it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular
governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite
and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most
specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American
constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot
certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality,
to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as
was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most
considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private
faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties,
and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these
complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit
us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a
candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we

labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments;
but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone
account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that
prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for
private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.
These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and
injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by
removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one,
by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by
giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was
worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment
without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish
liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than
it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,
because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As
long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise
it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists
between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have
a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which
the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to
a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object
of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of
acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property
immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and
views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we
see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to
the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well
of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to
co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind
to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents
itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to
kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But
the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without
property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are
creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A
landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized
nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different
sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be
both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most
important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not
indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of
large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but
advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law
proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors
are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold
the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the
judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful
faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be

encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures?
are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the
manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice
and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions
of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet
there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and
temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of
justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a
shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases,
can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and
remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good
of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction
cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of
controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views
by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society;
but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the
Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or
interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the
public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is
then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it
is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be
recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only.
Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same
time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or
interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to

concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the
opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor
religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not
found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their
efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in
proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for
the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every
case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.
Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence
and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security
or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as
they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have
patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by
reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would,
at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their
possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure
for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from
pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and
the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic
are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number
of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and
greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country,
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the

people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by
the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the
effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of
sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first
obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The
question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more
favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is
clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic
may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to
guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they
must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion
of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not
being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally
greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit
characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will
present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit
choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater
number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more
difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by
which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being
more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most
attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean,
on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too
much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little
acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by
reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little
fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal
Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and
aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to
the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent
of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of
democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which

renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the
latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the
more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller
the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the
compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and
execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where
there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication
is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose
concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has
over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large
over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing
it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local
prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the
representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite
endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater
variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to
outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased
variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does
it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and
accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?
Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political
faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over
the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger
from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an
equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will
be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular

member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to
taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being
republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the
character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 11. The Utility of the Union in
Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, November 24, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those
points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion,
and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who
have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our
intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous
spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has
already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of
Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that
carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the foundation
of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in America look
forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful
solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American
dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions,
and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful
marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of
fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an
ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the
threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation, of
monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the wings by which
we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail,
it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the
cabinets of ministers.
If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our
prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending, at the
same time, throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries to bid

against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This assertion will not
appear chimerical to those who are able to appreciate the importance of the
markets of three millions of people—increasing in rapid progression, for the
most part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local
circumstances to remain so—to any manufacturing nation; and the immense
difference there would be to the trade and navigation of such a nation,
between a direct communication in its own ships, and an indirect
conveyance of its products and returns, to and from America, in the ships of
another country. Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America,
capable of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty
of commerce) from all our ports; what would be the probable operation of
this step upon her politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the
fairest prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable
and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these
questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received a
plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been said that
prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the system of Britain,
because she could prosecute her trade with us through the medium of the
Dutch, who would be her immediate customers and paymasters for those
articles which were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not
her navigation be materially injured by the loss of the important advantage
of being her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its
profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their agency and
risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable
deduction? Would not so circuitous an intercourse facilitate the
competitions of other nations, by enhancing the price of British
commodities in our markets, and by transferring to other hands the
management of this interesting branch of the British commerce?
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will
justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a state of
things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in
favor of the American trade, and with the importunities of the West India
islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would let us
into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those islands elsewhere,
from which our trade would derive the most substantial benefits. Such a
point gained from the British government, and which could not be expected
without an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, would

be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations,
who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our
trade.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations
toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal
navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an
efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant,
to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime
powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of
either of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case in
relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent
opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to
decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most
commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the usefulness
of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in
the West Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable
would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges.
A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality.
By a steady adherence to the Union we may hope, erelong, to become the
arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of
European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that the
rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and would
frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed within
our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would be a prey to the
wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each other; who, having
nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple or remorse, supply their
wants by depredations on our property as often as it fell in their way. The
rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an
adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the
privilege of being neutral.
Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources
of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the
combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situation
would even take away the motive to such combinations, by inducing an

impracticability of success. An active commerce, an extensive navigation,
and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical
necessity. We might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or
vary the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.
But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and might
operate with success. It would be in the power of the maritime nations,
availing themselves of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions
of our political existence; and as they have a common interest in being our
carriers, and still more in preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all
probability combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would
in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should
then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our
commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to enrich
our enemies and persecutors. That unequaled spirit of enterprise, which
signalizes the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which
is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would be stifled and
lost, and poverty and disgrace would overspread a country which, with
wisdom, might make herself the admiration and envy of the world.
There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which are rights
of the Union—I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western
lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the Confederacy
would give room for delicate questions concerning the future existence of
these rights; which the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail
to solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard to the
Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with us in
the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their navigation.
They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent to that decided
mastery, of which experience has shown us to be possessed in this valuable
branch of traffic, and by which we are able to undersell those nations in
their own markets. What more natural than that they should be disposed to
exclude from the lists such dangerous competitors?
This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial benefit. All
the navigating States may, in different degrees, advantageously participate
in it, and under circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile capital,
would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when
time shall have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the

several States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment of a
navy, it must be indispensable.
To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in various
ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in proportion to the quantity
and extent of the means concentred towards its formation and support. A
navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an
object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy,
which would only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens,
indeed, that different portions of confederated America possess each some
peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more southern
States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval stores—tar, pitch,
and turpentine. Their wood for the construction of ships is also of a more
solid and lasting texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of
which the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern
wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or
of national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield a
greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn
from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval protection to external or
maritime commerce does not require a particular elucidation, no more than
the conduciveness of that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance
the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not only
for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign
markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, and will
acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the
commodities of every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater
scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the
staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its
aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for
exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be
conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a
given value than with a small number of materials of the same value;
arising from the competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets.
Particular articles may be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable
at others; but if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that
they should all be at one time in the latter predicament, and on this account
the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any considerable

obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will at once perceive the
force of these observations, and will acknowledge that the aggregate
balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much
more favorable than that of the thirteen States without union or with partial
unions.
It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are united or
disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse between them which
would answer the same ends; this intercourse would be fettered, interrupted,
and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes, which in the course of these
papers have been amply detailed. A unity of commercial, as well as
political, interests, can only result from a unity of government.
There are other points of view in which this subject might be placed, of a
striking and animating kind. But they would lead us too far into the regions
of futurity, and would involve topics not proper for a newspaper discussion.
I shall briefly observe, that our situation invites and our interests prompt us
to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may
politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having
a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms
and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees,
extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have
successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained
has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to
consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as
profound philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a
physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with
them the human species, degenerate in America—that even dogs cease to
bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.(1) Facts have too long
supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to
vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother,
moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another
victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of
European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and
indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior
to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the
terms of the connection between the old and the new world!
PUBLIUS "Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains."

FEDERALIST No. 12. The Utility of the Union In
Respect to Revenue
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, November 27, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the States have
been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote the interests of
revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.
The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by all
enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most productive
source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of
their political cares. By multiplying the means of gratification, by
promoting the introduction and circulation of the precious metals, those
darling objects of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and
invigorate the channels of industry, and to make them flow with greater
activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious
husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer,—all
orders of men, look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to
this pleasing reward of their toils. The often-agitated question between
agriculture and commerce has, from indubitable experience, received a
decision which has silenced the rivalship that once subsisted between them,
and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that their interests are
intimately blended and interwoven. It has been found in various countries
that, in proportion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And
how could it have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer
vent for the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the
cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in increasing the
quantity of money in a state—could that, in fine, which is the faithful
handmaid of labor and industry, in every shape, fail to augment that article,
which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of the objects upon which
they are exerted? It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have

had an adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a
spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and refinement, is
to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason and conviction.
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a
great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with
which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of
necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite
supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of
Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous territory,
a large proportion of which is situated in mild and luxuriant climates. In
some parts of this territory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in
Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that
monarch can boast but slender revenues. He has several times been
compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for
the preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the strength of
his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.
But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be seen to
conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of view, in which
its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is evident from the
state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we
have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very
considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been
multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried;
the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries
of the States have remained empty. The popular system of administration
inherent in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real
scarcity of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has
hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at
length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will be
surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that of Britain,
where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much more tolerable, and,
from the vigor of the government, much more practicable, than in America,
far the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the
indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles
form a large branch of this latter description.

In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for the means
of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it, excises must be
confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill brook
the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the
farmers, on the other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the
unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and personal
property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other
way than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.
If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which will best
enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource must be best
adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serious doubt, that
this state of things must rest on the basis of a general Union. As far as this
would be conducive to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the
extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as it would
contribute to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more
simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes of
making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it into the
power of the government to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.
The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers with which
they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores; the facility of
communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners; the
familiar habits of intercourse;—all these are circumstances that would
conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty,
and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each
other. The separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual
jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the lowness of
their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would
not permit those rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard
the avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water; and
which, even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous
stratagems of avarice.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly
employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers
in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these patrols at
upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in
preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland communication,

and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which the collection of
duties in this country would be encumbered, if by disunion the States
should be placed in a situation, with respect to each other, resembling that
of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers
with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free
country.
If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all the States,
there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but ONE SIDE to
guard—the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly from foreign
countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to hazard
themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would attend
attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread
both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after as before their
arrival at the places of their final destination. An ordinary degree of
vigilance would be competent to the prevention of any material infractions
upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at
the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made useful
sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same interest to
provide against violations everywhere, the co-operation of its measures in
each State would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here
also we should preserve by Union, an advantage which nature holds out to
us, and which would be relinquished by separation. The United States lie at
a great distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other
places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign trade.
The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as
between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neighboring nations,
would be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a direct
contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to one State,
through the medium of another, would be both easy and safe. The difference
between a direct importation from abroad, and an indirect importation
through the channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, according to
time and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland
communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.
It is therefore evident, that one national government would be able, at
much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond comparison,
further than would be practicable to the States separately, or to any partial
confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be asserted, that these

duties have not upon an average exceeded in any State three per cent. In
France they are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain they
exceed this proportion.(1) There seems to be nothing to hinder their being
increased in this country to at least treble their present amount. The single
article of ardent spirits, under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a
considerable revenue. Upon a ratio to the importation into this State, the
whole quantity imported into the United States may be estimated at four
millions of gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two
hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty;
and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an effect would
be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy, to the morals, and
to the health of the society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of
national extravagance as these spirits.
What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail ourselves of the
resource in question in its full extent? A nation cannot long exist without
revenues. Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its independence,
and sink into the degraded condition of a province. This is an extremity to
which no government will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be
had at all events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn from
commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It has been
already intimated that excises, in their true signification, are too little in
unison with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use being made of
that mode of taxation; nor, indeed, in the States where almost the sole
employment is agriculture, are the objects proper for excise sufficiently
numerous to permit very ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as
has been before remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot be
subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by taxes on
consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the subject of conjecture,
to occasion the oppression of individuals, without much aggregate benefit
to the State; but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the
eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the State,
nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of other
resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on the
possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the government
can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are
open to its demands, the finances of the community, under such
embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with its

respectability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the consolations
of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that valuable class of the
citizens who are employed in the cultivation of the soil. But public and
private distress will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite
in deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.
PUBLIUS
1. If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.

FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in
Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 28, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety
consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be
usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to be drawn
from the pockets of the people. If the States are united under one
government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are
divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national
civil lists to be provided for—and each of them, as to the principal
departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary for a
government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into thirteen
unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with
danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the
dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three
confederacies—one consisting of the four Northern, another of the four
Middle, and a third of the five Southern States. There is little probability
that there would be a greater number. According to this distribution, each
confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than that of the
kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the
affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government
less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been
proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a
certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same
forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.
This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by
which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the
government of any given number of individuals; but when we consider that
the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the supposed

confederacies, contains about eight millions of people, and when we reflect
upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions of so large a
society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that the like
portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society
far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable
of diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce
itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious arrangement of
subordinate institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be
likely to be divided would require a government not less comprehensive
than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposition, more
probable than that which presents us with three confederacies as the
alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to geographical and
commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of
the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they
will most naturally league themselves under two governments. The four
Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy
and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York, situated
as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and
unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are other
obvious reasons that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too
small a State to think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more
powerful combination; nor do there appear to be any obstacles to her
admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to
join the Northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her
own navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and
dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various
circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in the
encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which would give
unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the purchasers of
their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests
in a connection so adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a
frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety to have her
exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than
towards the stronger power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give
her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever
may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy

includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to
the south of that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able to
support a national government better than one half, or one third, or any
number less than the whole. This reflection must have great weight in
obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which is founded on the
principle of expense; an objection, however, which, when we come to take a
nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we take into
view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the
inland communication between the different confederacies against illicit
trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of
revenue; and if we also take into view the military establishments which it
has been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts
of the several nations into which the States would be divided, we shall
clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the
economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every
part.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed
Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
From the New York Packet. Friday, November 30, 1787.

MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against
foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the
guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only
substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the
liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the diseases of
faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and of
which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains,
within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an objection that may
be drawn from the great extent of country which the Union embraces. A few
observations on this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that
the adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the
prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of republican
administration, in order to supply, by imaginary difficulties, the want of
those solid objections which they endeavor in vain to find.
The error which limits republican government to a narrow district has
been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it
seems to owe its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a
republic with a democracy, applying to the former reasonings drawn from
the nature of the latter. The true distinction between these forms was also
adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet
and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and
administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy,
consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended
over a large region.
To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice of some
celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in forming the

modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects either of an absolute
or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or
palliate the evils of those forms, by placing in comparison the vices and
defects of the republican, and by citing as specimens of the latter the
turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the
confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic
observations applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the
observation that it can never be established but among a small number of
people, living within a small compass of territory.
Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular
governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in
modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no
example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same
time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering this
great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which the
will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force directed to
any object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit of
making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics. It is
only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of
the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment of the
comprehensive system now under her consideration.
As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point
which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their
public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join
in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the
centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may
be necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said that the
limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will not be said by those
who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the Union, that
during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the States have been
almost continually assembled, and that the members from the most distant
States are not chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those
from the States in the neighborhood of Congress.
That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this interesting subject,
let us resort to the actual dimensions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by
the treaty of peace, are: on the east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of

thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular
line running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others
falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie lies
below that latitude. Computing the distance between the thirty-first and
forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and seventy-three common
miles; computing it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred
and sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean for the distance, the
amount will be eight hundred and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The
mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed
seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of
several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our system
commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger
than Germany, where a diet representing the whole empire is continually
assembled; or than Poland before the late dismemberment, where another
national diet was the depositary of the supreme power. Passing by France
and Spain, we find that in Great Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the
representatives of the northern extremity of the island have as far to travel
to the national council as will be required of those of the most remote parts
of the Union.
Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations remain
which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.
In the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is
not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws.
Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all
the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the
separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend
their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for,
will retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the plan of
the convention to abolish the governments of the particular States, its
adversaries would have some ground for their objection; though it would
not be difficult to show that if they were abolished the general government
would be compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them
in their proper jurisdiction.
A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of the
federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen primitive States,
which we know to be practicable; and to add to them such other States as

may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighborhoods, which we cannot
doubt to be equally practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for
those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our northwestern
frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will
render more equal to the task.
Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse throughout the
Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere be
shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers will be
multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be
opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen
States. The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and
between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by
those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected
our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete.
A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as almost every
State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and will thus find, in regard to
its safety, an inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the general
protection; so the States which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of
the Union, and which, of course, may partake least of the ordinary
circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately contiguous
to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular occasions, in
greatest need of its strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for
Georgia, or the States forming our western or northeastern borders, to send
their representatives to the seat of government; but they would find it more
so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the
whole expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the
neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less benefit,
therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less distant States, they
will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper
equilibrium will be maintained throughout.
I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full
confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your decisions
will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you will never suffer
difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or however fashionable the
error on which they may be founded, to drive you into the gloomy and
perilous scene into which the advocates for disunion would conduct you.

Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of
America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no
longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue
the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow
citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to
the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government
recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it
has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it
rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen,
shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against
the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of
American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of
their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of
their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to be shunned,
believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects,
the most rash of all attempts, is that of rendering us in pieces, in order to
preserve our liberties and promote our happiness. But why is the
experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may
comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that,
whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and
other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for
custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense,
the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own
experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be indebted for the
possession, and the world for the example, of the numerous innovations
displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private rights and public
happiness. Had no important step been taken by the leaders of the
Revolution for which a precedent could not be discovered, no government
established of which an exact model did not present itself, the people of the
United States might, at this moment have been numbered among the
melancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring
under the weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of
the rest of mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole
human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They accomplished
a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of human society. They
reared the fabrics of governments which have no model on the face of the
globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is

incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works
betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred most
in the structure of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be
executed; this is the work which has been new modelled by the act of your
convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to
decide.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the
Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 1, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York.
IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow
citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the importance
of Union to your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to you a
complication of dangers to which you would be exposed, should you permit
that sacred knot which binds the people of America together be severed or
dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In
the sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the
truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts
and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which you will still have
to pass should in some places appear to you tedious or irksome, you will
recollect that you are in quest of information on a subject the most
momentous which can engage the attention of a free people, that the field
through which you have to travel is in itself spacious, and that the
difficulties of the journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes
with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the
obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be done,
without sacrificing utility to despatch.
In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of the
subject, the point next in order to be examined is the "insufficiency of the
present Confederation to the preservation of the Union." It may perhaps be
asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which
is not either controverted or doubted, to which the understandings and
feelings of all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by
the opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It must in
truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in other respects,
they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are

material imperfections in our national system, and that something is
necessary to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that
support this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced
themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at length
extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal share in
precipitating the extremity at which we are arrived, a reluctant confession
of the reality of those defects in the scheme of our federal government,
which have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of
the Union.
We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last
stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can wound the
pride or degrade the character of an independent nation which we do not
experience. Are there engagements to the performance of which we are held
by every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of constant and
unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners and to our own
citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our
political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory
provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important
posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations,
ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the
prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition
to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury,
nor government.(1) Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?
The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought
first to be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free
participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it.
Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We
seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is
commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of
declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard
against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even
forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere
pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the
value of land a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land in
most parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the
quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that
want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent

among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property of
every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most
useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the
narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from
the scarcity of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can
afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what
indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance that
could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as
we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public
misfortunes?
This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by those
very maxims and councils which would now deter us from adopting the
proposed Constitution; and which, not content with having conducted us to
the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that
awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that
ought to influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for our
safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the
fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and
prosperity.
It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn to be
resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract
proposition that there exist material defects in our national system; but the
usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries of federal
measures, is destroyed by a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only
principles that can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the
government of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against
conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy.
They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an
augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State authority;
at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in the members.
They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster
of an imperium in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal
defects of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we
experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from
fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be
amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main
pillars of the fabric.

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of
which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the
powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which
the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the
United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and
money; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending
to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that
though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws,
constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they
are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their
option.
It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human mind, that
after all the admonitions we have had from experience on this head, there
should still be found men who object to the new Constitution, for deviating
from a principle which has been found the bane of the old, and which is in
itself evidently incompatible with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle,
in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and
sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or
alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely
stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and
quantity; leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its
execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist
among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and
war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the
contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was
an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of compacts, from which the
politicians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never
realized. With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace
of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation were exhausted,
and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely
formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson
to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no
other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which oppose general

considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate interest
or passion.
If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand in a similar
relation to each other, and to drop the project of a general
DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be
pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been
enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit of being, at
least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views towards a
confederate government, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive
and defensive; and would place us in a situation to be alternate friends and
enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by
the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still
will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same
thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council,
we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may
be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and
a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of
the citizens,—the only proper objects of government.
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea
of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or
punishment for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to
disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will,
in fact, amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation. This
penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways: by the
agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military force; by the
COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first
kind can evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be
employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is evident that
there is no process of a court by which the observance of the laws can, in
the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them for
violations of their duty; but these sentences can only be carried into
execution by the sword. In an association where the general authority is
confined to the collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every
breach of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution must
become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can

certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any prudent man
choose to commit his happiness to it.
There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States, of the
regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense of
common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members,
and would beget a full compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of
the Union. This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a
great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought, when
we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom,
experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by
which human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to
the establishment of civil power. Why has government been instituted at
all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason
and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act
with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The
contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of
mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to
reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to
be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit
of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies
of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into
improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private
capacity.
In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign power, an
impatience of control, that disposes those who are invested with the
exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain
or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, that in every political
association which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common
interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of
eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of
which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common
centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its origin in
the love of power. Power controlled or abridged is almost always the rival
and enemy of that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple
proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect, that the
persons intrusted with the administration of the affairs of the particular
members of a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-

humor, and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the resolutions
or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of this results from the
constitution of human nature.
If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be executed
without the intervention of the particular administrations, there will be little
prospect of their being executed at all. The rulers of the respective
members, whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, will
undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures themselves. They will
consider the conformity of the thing proposed or required to their
immediate interests or aims; the momentary conveniences or
inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All this will be done; and in
a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of
national circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right
judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local objects, which
can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated
in every member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the
plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on the
discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those
who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who
have seen how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure of
circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on important points,
will readily conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such
assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at different times,
and under different impressions, long to co-operate in the same views and
pursuits.
In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is
requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete execution of every
important measure that proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to
have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have not been executed; the
delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an
extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the national
government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time
scarcely possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till
the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the
present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come to this
desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified
produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance

with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States
furnished the pretext of example and the temptation of interest to the
complying, or to the least delinquent States. Why should we do more in
proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political
voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the
common burden? These were suggestions which human selfishness could
not withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to
remote consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State,
yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has
successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems
ready to fall upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.
PUBLIUS
1. "I mean for the Union."

FEDERALIST No. 16. The Same Subject
Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present
Confederation to Preserve the Union)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 4, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or communities,
in their political capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we
have made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all
other governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account,
in exact proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of
this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall
content myself with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of
antiquity, which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean
leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most
free from the fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those
which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding
suffrages of political writers.
This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be styled the
parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies in the members of the
Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever they
happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of
the use of it, civil war.
It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government, in its
application to us, would even be capable of answering its end. If there
should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national
government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this
could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy
concerning the infractions of a league, in which the strongest combination
would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who

supported or of those who resisted the general authority. It would rarely
happen that the delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a single
member, and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty,
similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common defense.
Independent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and influential State
should happen to be the aggressing member, it would commonly have
weight enough with its neighbors to win over some of them as associates to
its cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty could easily
be contrived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could,
without difficulty, be invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the
passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not
chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the more
likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be
expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their
rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of
personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable they
would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If
associates could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of
foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the
dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union of which they had so
much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe
no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the
instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States against
which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to
avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of
this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.
This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy. Its more
natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the
federal system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial form. It is
not probable, considering the genius of this country, that the complying
States would often be inclined to support the authority of the Union by
engaging in a war against the non-complying States. They would always be
more ready to pursue the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal
footing with the delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And
the guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past experience
has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There would, in
fact, be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could with

propriety be employed. In the article of pecuniary contribution, which
would be the most usual source of delinquency, it would often be
impossible to decide whether it had proceeded from disinclination or
inability. The pretense of the latter would always be at hand. And the case
must be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with sufficient
certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It is easy to see that
this problem alone, as often as it should occur, would open a wide field for
the exercise of factious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the
majority that happened to prevail in the national council.
It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not to prefer a
national Constitution which could only be kept in motion by the
instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to execute the ordinary
requisitions or decrees of the government. And yet this is the plain
alternative involved by those who wish to deny it the power of extending its
operations to individuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would
instantly degenerate into a military despotism; but it will be found in every
light impracticable. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the
maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger States
within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be furnished of
forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever considers the
populousness and strength of several of these States singly at the present
juncture, and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance
of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme
which aims at regulating their movements by laws to operate upon them in
their collective capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to
them in the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic than
the monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous heroes and
demi-gods of antiquity.
Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members
smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign
States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. It
has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members;
and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have
been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of the confederacy has
displayed its banners against the other half.

The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly
this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal government
capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general
tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon
the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed
Constitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must
stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered
to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions.
The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the
medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of
each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears
of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the
strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the
means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers
with which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the
government of the particular States.
To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State should be
disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any time obstruct the
execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force, with
the necessity of which the opposite scheme is reproached.
The plausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we advert to the
essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT
and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State legislatures be
necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they have only NOT TO
ACT, or TO ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated. This neglect of
duty may be disguised under affected but unsubstantial provisions, so as not
to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in the people for the safety
of the Constitution. The State leaders may even make a merit of their
surreptitious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary convenience,
exemption, or advantage.
But if the execution of the laws of the national government should not
require the intervention of the State legislatures, if they were to pass into
immediate operation upon the citizens themselves, the particular
governments could not interrupt their progress without an open and violent
exertion of an unconstitutional power. No omissions nor evasions would
answer the end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner as

would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. An
experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a
constitution in any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people
enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal
usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not merely a
factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the courts of
justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were not embarked in a
conspiracy with the legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of
such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of the land,
unconstitutional, and void. If the people were not tainted with the spirit of
their State representatives, they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution,
would throw their weight into the national scale and give it a decided
preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often be
made with levity or rashness, because they could seldom be made without
danger to the authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of the federal
authority.
If opposition to the national government should arise from the disorderly
conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could be overcome by the
same means which are daily employed against the same evil under the State
governments. The magistracy, being equally the ministers of the law of the
land, from whatever source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready
to guard the national as the local regulations from the inroads of private
licentiousness. As to those partial commotions and insurrections, which
sometimes disquiet society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction,
or from sudden or occasional illhumors that do not infect the great body of
the community the general government could command more extensive
resources for the suppression of disturbances of that kind than would be in
the power of any single member. And as to those mortal feuds which, in
certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or
through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes
of discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some
violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of
calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and
dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either
avoid or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too
mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a
government because it could not perform impossibilities.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 17. The Same Subject
Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present
Confederation to Preserve the Union)
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 5, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated
and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against
the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America. It may be
said that it would tend to render the government of the Union too powerful,
and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be
judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the
utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require,
I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted
with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest
the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere
domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to
ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all
the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all
the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be
lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice
between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of
other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are
proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares
of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a
disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are
connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as
troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for that
reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the importance, or to the
splendor of the national government.

But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness and lust
of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition; still it may be
safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the national
representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would
control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far
more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national
authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State
authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of
influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with
uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a
circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and
intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains
cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is
compatible with the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments would
result partly from the diffusive construction of the national government, but
chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the attention of the State
administrations would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly weak
in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same
principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the
people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local
governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the force of
that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the
latter.
This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful
auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall under
the superintendence of the local administrations, and which will form so
many rivulets of influence, running through every part of the society, cannot
be particularized, without involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting to
compensate for the instruction it might afford.
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the
State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and
satisfactory light,—I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil

justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most
attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which,
being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its
benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating
all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of
individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other
circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection,
esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great cement of
society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the
particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would
insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render
them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous
rivals to the power of the Union.
The operations of the national government, on the other hand, falling less
immediately under the observation of the mass of the citizens, the benefits
derived from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by speculative
men. Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come home
to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an
habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the
experience of all federal constitutions with which we are acquainted, and of
all others which have borne the least analogy to them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of association.
There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority
extended over the whole nation; and a number of subordinate vassals, or
feudatories, who had large portions of land allotted to them, and numerous
trains of INFERIOR vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that
land upon the tenure of fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they
held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular
demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual opposition to
authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between the great barons or
chief feudatories themselves. The power of the head of the nation was
commonly too weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the
people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of

European affairs is emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal
anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike
temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and
influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular
authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the
prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the
great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In those
instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his
success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their
dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and
the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both;
till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union between them fatal
to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency
and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers and
followers, the contests between them and the prince must almost always
have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal
authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or conjecture.
Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will
furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day,
introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by
ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant
overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England
subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules
of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil
polity had previously established in the latter kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with
the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from the reasons
already explained, they will generally possess the confidence and good-will
of the people, and with so important a support, will be able effectually to
oppose all encroachments of the national government. It will be well if they
are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points
of similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both, and in the
CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the community into

particular DEPOSITORIES, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the
other case at the disposal of political bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended confederate
governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an inattention to
which has been the great source of our political mistakes, and has given our
jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review shall form the subject of
some ensuing papers.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 18. The Same Subject
Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present
Confederation to Preserve the Union)
For the New York Packet. Friday, December 7, 1787

MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that
of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From
the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very
instructive analogy to the present Confederation of the American States.
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states,
and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general
authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the
common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the
last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing
party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient;
to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion,
and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they
had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and
those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy
of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the
united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on
sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply
sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances, they exceed
the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation. The Amphictyons
had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of the principal engines
by which government was then maintained; they had a declared authority to
use coercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this
authority on the necessary occasions.

Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory. The
powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies
appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised
over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and
finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members,
instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively
over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of
Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-
nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans
had their turn of domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the
strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that judgment
went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and
Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of
them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The
intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes convulsions,
and carnage.
After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the
Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned out of
the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians,
finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer partisans by such a
measure than themselves, and would become masters of the public
deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of
history proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the ambition and
jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and degraded
condition of the rest. The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of
their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common
center, had become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were
courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the
necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of the peace
which followed their success against the Persian arms, to establish such a
reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with
the victories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then
enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered

from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in
the celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and slavery
of the Athenians who had begun it.
As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal
dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad.
The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to
the temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according to the
superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The
Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the
decree. The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the
authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The latter,
being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who
had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized the opportunity of
executing the designs he had long planned against the liberties of Greece.
By his intrigues and bribes he won over to his interests the popular leaders
of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission into the
Amphictyonic council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of
the confederacy.
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this
interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious
observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered
in her union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might
have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of Grecian
republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much wiser,
than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear, that though not
exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it.
The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction,
appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in
which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of peace and
war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and
alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who
commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the
senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate,
but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the

primitive constitution, there were two praetors associated in the
administration; but on trial a single one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same
weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect
proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in uncertainty. It
is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same
laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by
Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws
of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic
confederacy, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise
of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a
very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain of this
curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and regular operation be
ascertained, it is probable that more light would be thrown by it on the
science of federal government, than by any of the like experiments with
which we are acquainted.
One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians who take
notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the renovation of the
league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was
infinitely more of moderation and justice in the administration of its
government, and less of violence and sedition in the people, than were to be
found in any of the cities exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of
sovereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the
popular government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no
disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS
THERE TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF
THE CONFEDERACY.
We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did not, in a
certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less that a due
subordination and harmony reigned in the general system. The contrary is
sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.
Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the Achaeans,
which comprehended the less important cities only, made little figure on the
theatre of Greece. When the former became a victim to Macedon, the latter
was spared by the policy of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of

these princes, however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division
were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate
interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny
of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of
their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of
liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by others, as
opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The league soon
embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Macedon saw its progress; but
was hindered by internal dissensions from stopping it. All Greece caught
the enthusiasm and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy, when the
jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans,
threw a fatal damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power
induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria,
who, as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon. This
policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led by his
ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the Achaeans, and
who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and
Syrian princes to effect a breach of their engagements with the league.
The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to
Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The
latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the Greeks always afforded a
pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor of intermeddling in their
affairs. A Macedonian army quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished.
The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and
powerful ally is but another name for a master. All that their most abject
compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise of their
laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon provoked by his
tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achaeans, though
weakened by internal dissensions and by the revolt of Messene, one of its
members, being joined by the AEtolians and Athenians, erected the standard
of opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the
undertaking, they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of
introducing the succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation
was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued. A
new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it members.
These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular leaders became
mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen. The more

effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans had, to the
astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed
universal liberty(1) throughout Greece. With the same insidious views, they
now seduced the members from the league, by representing to their pride
the violation it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the
last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces;
and such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found
little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had commenced. The
Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with chains, under which it
is groaning at this hour.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important
portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and
because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it
emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy
among the members, than to tyranny in the head.
PUBLIUS
1. This was but another name more specious for the independence of the
members on the federal head.

FEDERALIST No. 19. The Same Subject
Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present
Confederation to Preserve the Union)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 8, 1787

MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not
exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this subject. There are
existing institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit particular
consideration. The first which presents itself is the Germanic body.
In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven distinct
nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the number, having
conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has taken its name
from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried
his victorious arms in every direction; and Germany became a part of his
vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took place under his sons,
this part was erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne
and his immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns
and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had
become hereditary, and who composed the national diets which
Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke and advanced
to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force of imperial
sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful dependants; or to
preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The most furious private
wars, accompanied with every species of calamity, were carried on between
the different princes and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain
the public order, declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the
anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death of the last
emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the
Austrian lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full

sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols and
decorations of power.
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features
of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which constitutes the
Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the
component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the
executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the
imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having
supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which
happen among its members.
The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the empire; of
making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing quotas of troops and
money; constructing fortresses; regulating coin; admitting new members;
and subjecting disobedient members to the ban of the empire, by which the
party is degraded from his sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited.
The members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into
compacts prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their
mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet; from
altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one another; or from
affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban
is denounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. The
members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the
emperor and diet, and in their private capacities by the aulic council and
imperial chamber.
The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most important of
them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to the diet; to negative its
resolutions; to name ambassadors; to confer dignities and titles; to fill
vacant electorates; to found universities; to grant privileges not injurious to
the states of the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and
generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors form
a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no territory within the
empire, nor receives any revenue for his support. But his revenue and
dominions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the most powerful
princes in Europe.
From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the representatives and
head of this confederacy, the natural supposition would be, that it must form

an exception to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems.
Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental principle on
which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is
a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns,
renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own
members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing
fermentations in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor and the
princes and states; of wars among the princes and states themselves; of the
licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the weak; of foreign
intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money
disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce them,
altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving the
innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion, and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the empire on his
side, was seen engaged against the other princes and states. In one of the
conflicts, the emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being made
prisoner by the elector of Saxony. The late king of Prussia was more than
once pitted against his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an
overmatch for him. Controversies and wars among the members themselves
have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody
pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany
was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half
of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the
opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign
powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a
fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the
necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military
preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from
the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign
bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the
field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into
winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in
time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local

prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to
the treasury.
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice among
these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing the empire
into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organization,
and of charging them with the military execution of the laws against
delinquent and contumacious members. This experiment has only served to
demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is
the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either
fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the devastation and
carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they
increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.
We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a
sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the
circle of Suabia, the Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities which
had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, on some public
occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. The
consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and the
Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment
to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand
troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the
beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors
had suffered the place to be dismembered from his territory,(1) he took
possession of it in his own name, disarmed, and punished the inhabitants,
and reannexed the city to his domains.
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine
from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of
most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy
of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members,
compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and
influence which the emperor derives from his separate and hereditary
dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his
family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in
Europe;—these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the
repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time
continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper

consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be
surmounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution to take
place which would give to the empire the force and preeminence to which it
is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in
the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, on various
occasions, betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over
local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any
proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such
institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defense, it has long
been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors; who have lately had the mercy
to disburden it of one third of its people and territories.
The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a
confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of
such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no
common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of
sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position;
by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful
neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources
of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners;
by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they
stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid
expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of
some regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among
the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose
four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose
an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces
definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. The
competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in their treaty
of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to
interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to employ force,
if necessary, against the contumacious party.
So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that
of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle intended to be

established. Whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it
appears that the moment a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying
its strength, it failed. The controversies on the subject of religion, which in
three instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in
fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have
since had their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are
adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to
take care of the common bailages.
That separation had another consequence, which merits attention. It
produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the head of
the Protestant association, with the United Provinces; and of Luzerne, at the
head of the Catholic association, with France.
PUBLIUS
1. Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abrég. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc., d'Allemagne," says
the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.

FEDERALIST No. 20. The Same Subject
Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present
Confederation to Preserve the Union)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 11, 1787.

MADISON, with HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of
aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the lessons
derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each
state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all
important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,
consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. They
hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one years; from two
provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and alliances; to
make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets; to ascertain quotas
and demand contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity and the
sanction of their constituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint
and receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already formed;
to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate
the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the
dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the general
consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from establishing imposts
injurious to others, or charging their neighbors with higher duties than their
own subjects. A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges
of admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an
hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are

derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial estates; from
his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and,
more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces,
as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment
of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees,
presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the
power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable prerogatives.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes between the
provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the deliberations of the
States-General, and at their particular conferences; to give audiences to
foreign ambassadors, and to keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign
courts.
In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides for
garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes of all
appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the governments and posts
of fortified towns.
In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and directs
every thing relative to naval forces and other naval affairs; presides in the
admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints lieutenant-admirals and other
officers; and establishes councils of war, whose sentences are not executed
till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three hundred
thousand florins. The standing army which he commands consists of about
forty thousand men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on
parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it?
Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign
influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar
calamities from war.
It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of his
countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined by the
vices of their constitution.
The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an
authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure harmony, but

the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the
theory.
The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy certain
contributions; but this article never could, and probably never will, be
executed; because the inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot
pay an equal quota.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles of the
constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces to
furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others; and then to obtain
reimbursement from the others, by deputations, which are frequent, or
otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and influence of the province of
Holland enable her to effect both these purposes.
It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be ultimately
collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in
a confederacy where one of the members exceeds in force all the rest, and
where several of them are too small to meditate resistance; but utterly
impracticable in one composed of members, several of which are equal to
each other in strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and
persevering defense.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a foreign
minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering with the
provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these
means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious.
In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to
overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a treaty of
themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by
which their independence was formerly and finally recognized, was
concluded without the consent of Zealand. Even as recently as the last
treaty of peace with Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity
was departed from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in
dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite
for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at
the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on
the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of
the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective

constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional
authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it has
been supposed that without his influence in the individual provinces, the
causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have
dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe Mably, "the Union
could never have subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within
themselves, capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to
the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder." It is remarked by
Sir William Temple, "that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership,
Holland, by her riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort
of dependence, supplied the place."
These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the tendency
to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose an absolute
necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time that they nourish by
their intrigues the constitutional vices which keep the republic in some
degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these vices,
and have made no less than four regular experiments by
EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to
apply a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible
to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known, the
acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us pause, my
fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and monitory lesson
of history; and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought on
mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude
mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has
distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.
A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be
administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries and
failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions,
from dissensions among the states, and from the actual invasion of foreign
arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on the
awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe
trial may issue in such a revolution of their government as will establish

their union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom and happiness:
The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these
blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and console
them for the catastrophe of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of
these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its
responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The
important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is
that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a
legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is
a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of
civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive
COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION
of the MAGISTRACY.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 21. Other Defects of the
Present Confederation
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 12, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the
principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius and fate
of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration
of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our
hopes from the system established among ourselves. To form a safe and
satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely necessary that
we should be well acquainted with the extent and malignity of the disease.
The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total
want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now composed,
have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their
resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of
privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. There is no express
delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members;
and if such a right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from
the nature of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference
and construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by which it is
declared, "that each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right,
not EXPRESSLY delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."
There is, doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind
does not exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that
supposition, preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining
away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of
those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of which, in that plan,
has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism.
If we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall
be obliged to conclude, that the United States afford the extraordinary

spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional
power to enforce the execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the
specimens which have been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this
particular, stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar
kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political
world.
The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another
capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind
declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty from
considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the
clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion
from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it might in its
consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its
existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.
Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in
repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the
existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may
rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people,
while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold
its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may
erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could
constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of
the government. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has
scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely
speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late
convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a
Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in
Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode
Island, of Connecticut or New York?
The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds an
objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal government, as
involving an officious interference in the domestic concerns of the
members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of one of the principal
advantages to be expected from union, and can only flow from a
misapprehension of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no
impediment to reforms of the State constitution by a majority of the people

in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain undiminished. The
guaranty could only operate against changes to be effected by violence.
Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot
be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend
absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head. Where
the whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is
the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional
distempers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-administration, in a
popular or representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by
the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of
rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the
community.
The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common
treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the Confederation. Its
repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national exigencies has been
already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared from the trial which has
been made of it. I speak of it now solely with a view to equality among the
States. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances
which produce and constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that there is
no common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be
ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers of the people,
which have been successively proposed as the rule of State contributions,
has any pretension to being a just representative. If we compare the wealth
of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Germany, or even of
France, and if we at the same time compare the total value of the lands and
the aggregate population of that contracted district with the total value of
the lands and the aggregate population of the immense regions of either of
the three last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no
comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and that
of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel were to be run
between several of the American States, it would furnish a like result. Let
Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut,
or Maryland with New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respective
abilities of those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to
their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population. The
position may be equally illustrated by a similar process between the
counties of the same State. No man who is acquainted with the State of

New York will doubt that the active wealth of King's County bears a much
greater proportion to that of Montgomery than it would appear to be if we
should take either the total value of the lands or the total number of the
people as a criterion!
The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of the
government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information they
possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these circumstances and
many more, too complex, minute, or adventitious to admit of a particular
specification, occasion differences hardly conceivable in the relative
opulence and riches of different countries. The consequence clearly is that
there can be no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no
general or stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can be
determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the contributions of the
members of a confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of
glaring inequality and extreme oppression.
This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the
eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a compliance
with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering States would not long
consent to remain associated upon a principle which distributes the public
burdens with so unequal a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish
and oppress the citizens of some States, while those of others would
scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they were
required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable from the principle
of quotas and requisitions.
There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by
authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own
way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of
consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its level
with the means of paying them. The amount to be contributed by each
citizen will in a degree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an
attention to his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be
frugal; and private oppression may always be avoided by a judicious
selection of objects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise
in some States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all
probability, be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in other States,

from the duties on other objects. In the course of time and things, an
equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated a subject, will be
established everywhere. Or, if inequalities should still exist, they would
neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so
odious in their appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from
quotas, upon any scale that can possibly be devised.
It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, that they
contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their
own limit; which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed,
that is, an extension of the revenue. When applied to this object, the saying
is as just as it is witty, that, "in political arithmetic, two and two do not
always make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the
collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so great as when
they are confined within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a
complete barrier against any material oppression of the citizens by taxes of
this class, and is itself a natural limitation of the power of imposing them.
Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of indirect
taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part of the revenue
raised in this country. Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to
land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value
of land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard. The state of
agriculture and the populousness of a country have been considered as
nearly connected with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended,
numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a preference.
In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a
country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties
are increased almost to impracticability. The expense of an accurate
valuation is, in all situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation
where no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the
nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with the
end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to leave that
discretion altogether at large.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 22. The Same Subject
Continued (Other Defects of the Present
Confederation)
From the New York Packet. Friday, December 14, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal
system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it
altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be
of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the
first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal
conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It
is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either
as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a
federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the
formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given
occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No nation acquainted with
the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into
stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of
any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on
the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and
while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage
they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their
momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered
at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for
regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries, should
preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions in former
bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great
Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should

appear whether the American government was likely or not to acquire
greater consistency.(1)
Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions,
and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular,
but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and
from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has hitherto frustrated every
experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same
obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist.
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to
the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of
umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this
nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and
extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord
than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of
the Confederacy. "The commerce of the German empire(2) is in continual
trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and
states exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories, by
means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany
is so happily watered are rendered almost useless." Though the genius of
the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly
applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts
of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be
considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners
and aliens.
The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the
articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions
upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the late
war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical
system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the States which
created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quotas required of
them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and
insupportable size. The hope of a still further increase afforded an
inducement to those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate their
enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable
periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical
emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense;

continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and
subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded
army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for raising men which were
upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of
liberty would have induced the people to endure.
This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and
vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near the
seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to
furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a
distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were
diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was
not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated by the
hope of a final liquidation. The States which did not pay their proportions of
money might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no account
could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not,
however, see much reason to regret the want of this hope, when we consider
how little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able
to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas
and requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a
system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice among the
members.
The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable
part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair
representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode
Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or
Connecticut, or New York; and to Delaware an equal voice in the national
deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its
operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government,
which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may
reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the
States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical
legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and
common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small
minority of the people of America;(3) and two thirds of the people of
America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial
distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the
management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while

revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in
such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not
merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire
of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the
last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare
depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not
relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.
It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two thirds of
the whole number, must consent to the most important resolutions; and it
may be thence inferred that nine States would always comprehend a
majority of the Union. But this does not obviate the impropriety of an equal
vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness; nor
is the inference accurate in point of fact; for we can enumerate nine States
which contain less than a majority of the people;(4) and it is constitutionally
possible that these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of
considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others,
concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in
favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation
to interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be observed
that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no
provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes.
But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a
poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always
the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its
tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.
Congress, from the nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in
the situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to
put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is
about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been
able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those
refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected
from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of
something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition
that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the
administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute
the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt
junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In

those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the
weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there
is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in some way
or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a
majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order
that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority;
and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater,
and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays;
continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public
good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises
can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of
accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously
suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of
obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state
of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border
upon anarchy.
It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater
scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction, than that which
permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this has
been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due
care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of
government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large
number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we
are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be
likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and
how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what
may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in
which they may happen to stand at particular periods.
Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one
foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation
demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the
prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate
terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find it
much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of government
from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that
object, than where a simple majority would suffice. In the first case, he
would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a greater number. Upon

the same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which
we were at war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in
a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar inconveniences. A
nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much
greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in
trade, though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.
Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of
the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they
afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch,
though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great
a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation,
that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he
would sacrifice by treachery to the state. The world has accordingly been
witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there
have been abundant specimens of every other kind.
In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the
suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and
power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but
minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to exceed the
proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to overbalance
the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many
mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican
governments. How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient
commonwealths has been already delineated. It is well known that the
deputies of the United Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased
by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield (if
my memory serves me right), in a letter to his court, intimates that his
success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's
commission for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties were
alternately bought by France and England in so barefaced and notorious a
manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a principal
cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without
tumult, violence, or opposition, became one of the most absolute and
uncontrolled.
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains
yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter

without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The
treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as
part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals,
must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To
produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in
the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be
instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves.
These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in each State a court of
final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on the
same point as there are courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions
of men. We often see not only different courts but the judges of the came
court differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would
unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of
independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish
one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and
authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil
justice.
This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so
compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened
by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested
with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be
expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the
bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local
regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be
reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular laws might be
preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural to men in
office than to look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which
they owe their official existence.
The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are
liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as many
different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those
legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are
thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the
interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that
foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it
possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor,
their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation?

In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the
exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those imperfections in
its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred
upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. It must be by this
time evident to all men of reflection, who can divest themselves of the
prepossessions of preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically
vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change
in its leading features and characters.
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of
those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A single
assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather fettered,
authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the federal head; but it
would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust
it with those additional powers which, even the moderate and more rational
adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the
United States. If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the
Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men who
may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its
dissolution, the probability would be, that we should run into the project of
conferring supplementary powers upon Congress, as they are now
constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its
structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop
it; or, by successive augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might
prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important
prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the
most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived.
Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of
the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal
system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better
foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed
to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and
has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of
legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been
contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was
ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a
COMPACT has a right to revoke that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has

had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature
proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government
deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of
American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF
THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately
from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.
PUBLIUS
1. This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on
introducing the last bill.
2. Encyclopedia, article "Empire."
3. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States,
but they do not contain one third of the people.
4. Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they will
be less than a majority.

FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a
Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to
the Preservation of the Union
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 18, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one
proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination
of which we are now arrived.
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches—the objects
to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of power
necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom
that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more
properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.
The principal purposes to be answered by union are these—the common
defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against
internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with
other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our
intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of
both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers
ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL
EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY
OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM.
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for
this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power
to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive
with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be

under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside
over the common defense.
This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind,
carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be
made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as
they are universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the
persons, from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected, ought
to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained.
Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of
the common defense, is a question in the first instance, open for discussion;
but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that
government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete
execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances
which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate
limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally
disputed, it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be
no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and
protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in
any matter essential to the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of
the NATIONAL FORCES.
Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this
principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it; though
they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Congress
have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money; to
govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their requisitions
are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in fact under the
most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them, the
intention evidently was that the United States should command whatever
resources were by them judged requisite to the "common defense and
general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of their true interests, and a
regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for
the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head.
The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was ill-
founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last head, will, I
imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning, that there
is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the

system; that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and
duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in
their collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal
government to the individual citizens of America; we must discard the
fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and
unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with
full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues
which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy,
in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound
instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the
essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the
OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different
provinces or departments of power; allowing to each the most ample
authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. Shall the Union
be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies
and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government of the Union must
be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have
relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to
every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the
administration of justice between the citizens of the same State the proper
department of the local governments? These must possess all the authorities
which are connected with this object, and with every other that may be
allotted to their particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each
case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the
most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the
great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing
them with vigor and success.
Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as that
body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided; which, as
the centre of information, will best understand the extent and urgency of the
dangers that threaten; as the representative of the WHOLE, will feel itself
most deeply interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the
responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly
impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the
extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone establish
uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the common

safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving
upon the federal government the care of the general defense, and leaving in
the State governments the EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be
provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence of
such a system? And will not weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of
the burdens and calamities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase
of expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had
unequivocal experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which
we have just accomplished?
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth,
will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the
federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which
are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and
careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled in such a manner as
to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan
which has been, or may be, offered to our consideration, should not, upon a
dispassionate inspection, be found to answer this description, it ought to be
rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be
trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any
government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the
NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE can with propriety be
confided, the coincident powers may safely accompany them. This is the
true result of all just reasoning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the
plan promulgated by the convention ought to have confined themselves to
showing, that the internal structure of the proposed government was such as
to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. They ought not to
have wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about
the extent of the powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the
OBJECTS of federal administration, or, in other words, for the management
of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory argument be
framed to show that they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as
has been insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the
difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the
country will not permit us to form a government in which such ample
powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our
views, and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will
move within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually

stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the most
essential national interests, without daring to trust it to the authorities which
are indispensable to their proper and efficient management. Let us not
attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational
alternative.
I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot be
shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet been advanced
of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations which have been
made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of that
position in as clear a light as any matter still in the womb of time and
experience can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be evident, that
the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the
strongest argument in favor of an energetic government; for any other can
certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire. If we embrace the
tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the
standard of our political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines
which predict the impracticability of a national system pervading entire
limits of the present Confederacy.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 24. The Powers Necessary to
the Common Defense Further Considered
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 19, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government,
in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met
with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that
proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies
in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on
weak and unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form,
supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument;
without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the
practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as
expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietary of this
remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under
consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the
LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military
establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State
constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present
juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the
convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it
contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in
time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of
levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the
control of the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to
discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the whole
power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the

EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of
the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead of the
provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be
found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the
legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of
money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a
precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real
security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be
apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say to
himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can
be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so
jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the
constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and
rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has
given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State
constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that TWO
ONLY of them(1) contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of
peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the
subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of the Legislature to
authorize their existence.
Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible
foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to
imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was
nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either
by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too
intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would
be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive
compact between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a
solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing
Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions against military
establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this model, in a
favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence
these political champions.

If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the
articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased, but
would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that
these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and
though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of the
State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on
that of the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or
ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors
as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan
which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all
sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could the authors of
them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a
point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of
America as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it
has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them?
If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate
feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would
lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true
merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so
unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man could
hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the
appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions,
rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their
understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by
precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of
its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints
upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in
time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the
necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there
are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or
security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing
settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and
extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and establishments
subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West
India Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them, in

respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common
interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as
our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear
from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of
navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant
nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the
principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between
these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing
remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of the
family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with
great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of
political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not to be
too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a
constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No
person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should
only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons
must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by
permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable;
and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all,
submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that
most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they could be
prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent
rotation of service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious
pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It
would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private
citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the
government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one,
indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the
subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional
interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter
to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be
said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military
establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be
exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and
encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier

garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might
be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which
will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future
invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be
keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be
wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or
the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would
be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our
Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this
purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense of these,
fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so
powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this
supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval
establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all
likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the
destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
PUBLIUS
1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of
State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which
contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of
peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is,
in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bills of
rights, a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and
ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the
Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a
word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions
of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally
silent. I am told, however that one or two States have bills of rights which
do not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right of the
legislative authority in this respect.

FEDERALIST No. 25. The Same Subject
Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common
Defense Further Considered)
From the New York Packet. Friday, December 21, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding
number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the
direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the
primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer
the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual
members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful
to the Confederacy.
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union
from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore
common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be
the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. It happens that
some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New York is of
this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to
sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate
safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This
would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected
the other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. The
States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments,
would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear
the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be
subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the
resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its
provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would
quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the

hands of two or three of its members, and those probably amongst the most
powerful. They would each choose to have some counterpoise, and
pretenses could easily be contrived. In this situation, military
establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond
their natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the
members, they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the
national authority.
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State
governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the
Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any
contest between the federal head and one of its members the people will be
most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition to this
immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by
the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford
too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises
upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the Union. On
the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of
things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national
government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon
of power, it had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely
to be jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For it
is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the people are
always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the
possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.
The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to
the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States,
have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops,
unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a
federal government and military establishments under State authority are
not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury
and the system of quotas and requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the
impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be
equally manifest. The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is
to preclude standing armies in time of peace, though we have never been
informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend; whether to

raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity
or not. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and
it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised
what shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the
Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it
be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be continued as long
as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? This would be
to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against
threatening or impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from
the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude
of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This
must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government, and the matter
would then be brought to this issue, that the national government, to
provide against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops,
and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace
or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to
perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room
for eluding the force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on
the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between
the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this
at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses of
approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would
always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances might
even be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely
concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have
been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of
success, the army, when once raised, from whatever cause, or on whatever
pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project.
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the
prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States
would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet
seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for
defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal
denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy
within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the
government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State. We

must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that
kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the
gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims
of a free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy
of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and
defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice,
dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the
means necessary to its preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural
bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This
doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost
millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts which,
from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to
permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war
against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted
by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of
stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the
course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected
eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that
the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts
alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is
a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by
time, and by practice.
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course
of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an
example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that State declares
that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in
time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace,
from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has
resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up
as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The
conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject, though on
different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress,
as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops
to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a
revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts
opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to

instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as
under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force
in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is
therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative discretion. It also
teaches us, in its application to the United States, how little the rights of a
feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents.
And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions
are to a struggle with public necessity.
It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that
the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The
Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the
Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that
capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to gratify
their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient
institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander
with the real power of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This
instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm
the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples; which is,
that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very
nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be
cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be
observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws,
though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to
be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country,
and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity
does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 26. The Idea of Restraining the
Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered.
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, December 22, 1788

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the
minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary
boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of
government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and
important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience,
and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future
attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one
chimerical project to another; we may try change after change; but we shall
never be likely to make any material change for the better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing
for the national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin
to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen, however,
that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this
country, where it made its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North
Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree
patronized; and that all the others have refused to give it the least
countenance; wisely judging that confidence must be placed somewhere;
that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power;
and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass
the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on
the legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution
combat, in this respect, the general decision of America; and instead of
being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into
which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into
others still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of

government had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach
are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which,
upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be
affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they
inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular
creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for any species of
government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended.
The citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into
anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep
and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of
government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and
progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military establishments
in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a
contemplation of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified by
the events that have happened in other ages and countries, yet as a national
sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive
from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general
sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of
the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the
prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by the
people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became
extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince
of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was
completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war,
an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own
authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And
this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil
list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority,
it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or
keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS
WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no
security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite,
beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority

of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable
revolution, were too temperate, too wellinformed, to think of any restraint
on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a certain number of
troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds
could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to every possible
contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they
referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the legislature, they
had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with
the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have
derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies
in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public
sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights, and
in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which
consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The attempts of two
of the States to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of
military establishments, are of the number of these instances. The principles
which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch
were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people
in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was
not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought
not to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had
introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not
applicable to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at
all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside
anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous, if
not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent
of a body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of
these constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York,
which has been justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the
best of the forms of government established in this country, there is a total
silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace, the
mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is
not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up, but that they

OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity of terms
appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and
conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at all
events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and
unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public
affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be interpreted
by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield to the
necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already
mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be
asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the moment there
is an inclination to disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy,
between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new
Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military
purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is
calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent
extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the
exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation.
The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision,
once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping
a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to
declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their
constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department
permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious
enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit
of party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies,
there will be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing enough to
arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision
for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for
declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention
will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if
the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the
community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of
taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national
legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State

legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous
guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the
federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the
conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing
improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the
VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME
to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace
those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which
would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the
legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is
it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it
would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive
variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would naturally
produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he
took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives, would
commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be
supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to
detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his
constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made, there
ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should
resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their
own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in
person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It
would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to
so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason could
be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations of the
military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and
the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow
the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of
money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be
unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large

enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that very
force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the
legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense could he be
put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we
suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic
insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles
of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops
in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend
that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an
invasion; and if the defense of the community under such circumstances
should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its
liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither preventative
nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government;
it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it
should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for
common defense.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a
disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil altogether
unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a
possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to
demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least
jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the
militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful
auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in another
place), the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable,
but almost unavoidable.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 27. The Same Subject
Continued (The Idea of Restraining the
Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, December 25, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind
proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military
force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have
been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by
any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is
founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the
objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be
disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal
nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or
inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire
what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless
we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will
be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to
be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the
people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence
in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the
goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are
exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on
accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to
the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged
of by general principles and maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to
induce a probability that the general government will be better administered

than the particular governments; the principal of which reasons are that the
extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude
of choice, to the people; that through the medium of the State legislatures
which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of
the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally
be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances
promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national
councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction,
and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary
prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently
contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of
the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a
momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress,
dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable
force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a
more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited
to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons
can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is likely
to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible
to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that
the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or
will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the
laws of the particular members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of
punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the
government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can
call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more
likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the LATTER, than
that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself?
A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with
the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated
as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this
reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular
combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that
of a single member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just
because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations

of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of
government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the
common occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to
their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which
touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of
the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the
respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of
habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little
influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of
sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The
inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the
citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its
extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less
occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and
comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those
channels and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the
less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of
compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one
proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than
that species of league contend for by most of its opponents; the authority of
which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective
capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no
sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members
are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as
often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and
violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the
government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of
its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common
apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might
proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for
securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the
government of each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion
which will result from the important consideration of its having power to
call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits

particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the
ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become
the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers,
legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the
sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the
respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws.(1) Any man who will pursue, by his own
reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is
good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the
laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of
prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any
inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an
injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was,
or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the
wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives
of public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the
interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by
such a conduct?
PUBLIUS
1. The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to
the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its proper place,
be fully detected.

FEDERALIST No. 28. The Same Subject
Continued (The Idea of Restraining the
Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered)
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, December 26, 1787

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be
necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has
corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that
emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however
constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as
inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural
body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law
(which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican
government), has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors
whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed
must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight
commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue would be
adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is that they would
be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate
cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if
not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the
contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the
general government should be found in practice conducive to the prosperity
and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be
disinclined to its support.

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a
principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might
become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to
raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that Pennsylvania,
from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens,
has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State
of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the
inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an
enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been
compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of
her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a
force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is
applicable to the State governments themselves, why should the possibility,
that the national government might be under a like necessity, in similar
extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that
men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge as
an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight
to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation
in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged
scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and
frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty republics?
Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one
general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be
formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of
either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the
same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to
the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in a
government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be
more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case of
a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due
consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally
applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one
government for all the States, or different governments for different parcels
of them, or even if there should be an entire separation of the States, there
might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted
differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community and to

maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of
them which amount to insurrections and rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to
those who require a more peremptory provision against military
establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the
proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the
rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.(1)
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then
no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense
which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against
the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better
prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In
a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers,
the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having
no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense.
The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without
system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers,
clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition
in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it
be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the
more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more
speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military
force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against
the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a
peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular
resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with
the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their
rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the people in
a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the
government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to a
struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a
confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of

the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale,
will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either,
they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will
it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an
advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.
Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape
the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The
legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the
danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the
confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of
opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community.
They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and
unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already
experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would
have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in
the national councils. If the federal army should be able to quell the
resistance of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to
make head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be
abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the part
which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would be
renewed, and its resistance revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all
events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to
come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of
doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the community
will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that the federal
government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism
over the great body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a
situation, through the medium of their State governments, to take measures
for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of
independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for

which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and
reasoning.
PUBLIUS
1. Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.

FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia
From the New York Packet. Wednesday, January 9, 1788

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in
times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of
superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal
peace of the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the
organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most
beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public
defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the
field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment
in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire
the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to
their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by
confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national
authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of
the convention proposes to empower the Union "to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as
may be employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING TO
THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA
ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan
of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or
is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has
been attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defense of a
free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal
of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If
standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the

militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed,
ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to
such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid
of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in
support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the
employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the
former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army
unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than
a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere
any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE
COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty, whence
it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only
auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have
appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated
to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their
authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the
federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next,
that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE
COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the
former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all
laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its declared powers, would
include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who
may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe,
that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and
collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of
the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases
relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of
power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of
color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its
application to the authority of the federal government over the militia, is as
uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force
was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is
a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the
motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How
shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction?

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are
even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the
federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed,
composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the
views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be
pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far
from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select
corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my
sentiments to a member of the federal legislature from this State on the
subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the
following discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile
as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A
tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time
and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the
attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other
classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through
military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire
the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-
regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious
public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the
productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the
present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense
of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would
abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would
be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it
would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with
respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and
equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary
to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be
abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost
importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted
for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the government
ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of
moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in
case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an

excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the
defense of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for
military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the
government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be
formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of
citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms,
who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-
citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a
standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should
I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very
sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how
the national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither
they nor I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it
with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill,
like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instil
prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism.
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not
trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What
shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the
rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings,
sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension
can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the
militia, and to command its services when necessary, while the particular
States are to have the SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE
OFFICERS? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia
upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government, the
circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at
once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will
always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt
to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which
instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but
frightful and distorted shapes—

"Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire";

discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
everything it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable
suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the
services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia,
of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky
to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be
paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is
to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another
moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or
six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and
that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the
refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who
rave at this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any
conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths?
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism,
what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the
militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless
expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of
their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had
meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their
imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just
vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in which
usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do
they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their
intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton
and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon
themselves universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort
the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are
they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If
we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ
such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that
the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a

common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or
sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the
course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of
our political association. If the power of affording it be placed under the
direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless
inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had
superadded the incitements of self-preservation to the too feeble impulses
of duty and sympathy.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 30. Concerning the General
Power of Taxation
From the New York Packet. Friday, December 28, 1787.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought to
possess the power of providing for the support of the national forces; in
which proposition was intended to be included the expense of raising
troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expenses in any wise
connected with military arrangements and operations. But these are not the
only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue,
must necessarily be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for
the support of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts
contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all those matters
which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury. The
conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of the
government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body
politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform
its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a
regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community
will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every
constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must
ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a
substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the
government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time,
perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other respects
absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to
impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or
governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn,

squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his
own exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the
government of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay,
approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of
the people in both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in
the proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the public
might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in the United
States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary wants of the
Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done in
such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the
articles which compose that compact (as has already been stated), are
authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their
judgment, to the service of the United States; and their requisitions, if
conformable to the rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense
obligatory upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of
the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of
furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and truly the
case; though the assumption of such a right would be an infringement of the
articles of Union; though it may seldom or never have been avowedly
claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly exercised, and would
continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the Confederacy should remain
dependent on the intermediate agency of its members. What the
consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every
man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded
in different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed
to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification
to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of the system
which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and delusive system of
quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be imagined for this ignis
fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the national government to raise its
own revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-
ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with
plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out any other
expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and embarrassments
naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public treasury.

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit the force
of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a distinction between
what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation. The former they
would reserve to the State governments; the latter, which they explain into
commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare
themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This distinction,
however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy, which
dictates that every POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and
would still leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State
governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can
pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the
present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into the account the
existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which
a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and
public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all
parties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter
ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would
even suffice for its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of
calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once adverted
to, the power of making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally
unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the
history of mankind, that, IN THE USUAL PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE
NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF ITS EXISTENCE,
WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions upon the
States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system cannot be
depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing
beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and
deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated in the
course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the
national interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency,
whenever it is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow
the seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and its
members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected that the
deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the total wants of
the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same mode? It ought to be
recollected that if less will be required from the States, they will have

proportionably less means to answer the demand. If the opinions of those
who contend for the distinction which has been mentioned were to be
received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude that there was
some known point in the economy of national affairs at which it would be
safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be
promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is
unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half
supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution,
can provide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the
reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or
stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad?
How can its administration be any thing else than a succession of
expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid
a frequent sacrifice of its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it
undertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in the very
first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will presume, for
argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the
purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for
the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the
probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by
experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of
requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and
urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the
expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper
objects to the defense of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this
kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would
prove the destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was
becoming essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis
credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the
modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have
recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this
necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government
that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that
no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying?
The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as
burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the same

principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors,
with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the resources of
the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds in the case
supposed would exist, though the national government should possess an
unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet
all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the
community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit
of the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can
without difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its
own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as far as its
necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of America,
could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to depend
upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments
for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly
understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in
the pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual
sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who hope to
see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age;
but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common portion of
the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other nations,
they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the
actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the
evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon
it.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 31. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the General Power of
Taxation)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 1, 1788.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or
first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These
contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or
combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this
effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of
perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or
prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is
greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another; two
straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each
other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that
there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be
proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with
its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a
purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in
the two latter sciences which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of
axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in
themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of
common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased
mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.
The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from those
pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions of the human
heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more simple
theorems of the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes which, however
they may appear susceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the
natural conceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would

be led to entertain upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of
matter, or, in other words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing,
extending even to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among
geometricians, though not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any
of those mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity have
been so industriously leveled.
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less
tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this should be the
case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor against error and
imposition. But this untractableness may be carried too far, and may
degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot
be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in
general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet
they have much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct
of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The
obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner
than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own
understandings fair play; but, yielding to some untoward bias, they entangle
themselves in words and confound themselves in subtleties.
How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in their
opposition), that positions so clear as those which manifest the necessity of
a general power of taxation in the government of the Union, should have to
encounter any adversaries among men of discernment? Though these
positions have been elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be
improperly recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an examination of
what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in
substance as follows:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full
accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the complete
execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other
control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of the people.
As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the
public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for
casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can be assigned, the
power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the
exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.

As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the
national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that article in
its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for
those exigencies.
As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring
revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective
capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an
unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes.
Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to conclude
that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the national government
might safely be permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions,
unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact,
that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in
their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous effort
against this part of the plan. It may therefore be satisfactory to analyze the
arguments with which they combat it.
Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem in
substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies of the
Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying taxes
ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite to the purposes of the local
administrations as to those of the Union; and the former are at least of equal
importance with the latter to the happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as
necessary that the State governments should be able to command the means
of supplying their wants, as that the national government should possess the
like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union. But an indefinite power of
taxation in the LATTER might, and probably would in time, deprive the
FORMER of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would
subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of
the Union are to become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power
to pass all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the
authorities with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government
might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the
pretense of an interference with its own. It might allege a necessity of doing
this in order to give efficacy to the national revenues. And thus all the
resources of taxation might by degrees become the subjects of federal

monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the State
governments."
This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the supposition
of usurpation in the national government; at other times it seems to be
designed only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of its
intended powers. It is only in the latter light that it can be admitted to have
any pretensions to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about
the usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable
abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning. Imagination
may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an
enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn to extricate itself
from the perplexities into which it has so rashly adventured. Whatever may
be the limits or modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to
imagine an endless train of possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of
jealousy and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute
scepticism and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed in substance
in another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of
usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the
government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The State
governments, by their original constitutions, are invested with complete
sovereignty. In what does our security consist against usurpation from that
quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due
dependence of those who are to administer them upon the people. If the
proposed construction of the federal government be found, upon an
impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the
same species of security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought
to be discarded.
It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to
encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition
in the Union to encroach upon the rights of the State governments. What
side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means
which the contending parties could employ toward insuring success. As in
republics strength is always on the side of the people, and as there are
weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will
commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is that
such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the Union; and
that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the

federal head, than by the federal head upon the members. But it is evident
that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible: and
that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine
our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are
delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the
prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in
their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the
constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State governments.
Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to
obviate the objections which have been made to an indefinite power of
taxation in the United States.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 32. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the General Power of
Taxation)
From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 2, 1788.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the
consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State governments from
a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money, because I am
persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the
resentments of the State governments, and a conviction of the utility and
necessity of local administrations for local purposes, would be a complete
barrier against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here to
allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the
individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable
authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And
making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on
imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the convention, retain
that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an
attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the
exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any
article or clause of its Constitution.
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national
sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever
powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general
will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or
consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act,
EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation,
or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three
cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive

authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the
Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like
authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally CONTRADICTORY
and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from
another which might appear to resemble it, but which would, in fact, be
essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction
might be productive of occasional interferences in the POLICY of any
branch of administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or
repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three cases of
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified by the
following instances: The last clause but one in the eighth section of the first
article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "EXCLUSIVE
LEGISLATION" over the district to be appropriated as the seat of
government. This answers to the first case. The first clause of the same
section empowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises"; and the second clause of the tenth section of the same article
declares that, "NO STATE SHALL, without the consent of Congress, lay
any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of
executing its inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in
the Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular exception
mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause, which declares
that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; in
consequence of which qualification, it now only extends to the DUTIES
ON IMPORTS. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in
that clause which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish an
UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This
must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe
a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.
A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but which is
in fact widely different, affects the question immediately under
consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than
exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal
authority in the United States and in the individual States. There is plainly
no expression in the granting clause which makes that power EXCLUSIVE
in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits
the States from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that a plain

and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced from the restraint
laid upon the States in relation to duties on imports and exports. This
restriction implies an admission that, if it were not inserted, the States
would possess the power it excludes; and it implies a further admission, that
as to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished. In
any other view it would be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be
unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of laying such
duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even their subordination in this
particular, there could be no need of such a restriction; it would be
dangerous, because the introduction of it leads directly to the conclusion
which has been mentioned, and which, if the reasoning of the objectors be
just, could not have been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases to
which the restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of
taxation with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what
lawyers call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing,
and an AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States
to impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their authority
to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue
that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from the imposition of
taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others
SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national legislature. The restraining
or prohibitory clause only says, that they shall not, WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties; and if we are to understand
this in the sense last mentioned, the Constitution would then be made to
introduce a formal provision for the sake of a very absurd conclusion;
which is, that the States, WITH THE CONSENT of the national legislature,
might tax imports and exports; and that they might tax every other article,
UNLESS CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the intention, why
not leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural
operation of the original clause, conferring a general power of taxation
upon the Union? It is evident that this could not have been the intention,
and that it will not bear a construction of the kind.
As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation in the
States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense which would be
requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is, indeed, possible that a tax
might be laid on a particular article by a State which might render it
INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax should be laid on the same article by

the Union; but it would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a
further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency
of an increase on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence; but
there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The particular
policy of the national and of the State systems of finance might now and
then not exactly coincide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is
not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers,
but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate
and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the
division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which
the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with
them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is
clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the
articles of the proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding
the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed
care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities
should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the
exercise of them by the States. The tenth section of the first article consists
altogether of such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indication of the
sense of the convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the
body of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes
every hypothesis to the contrary.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 33. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the General Power of
Taxation)
From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 2, 1788.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the Constitution in
respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clause. The last clause of
the eighth section of the first article of the plan under consideration
authorizes the national legislature "to make all laws which shall be
NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by
that Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof"; and the second clause of the sixth article
declares, "that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made IN
PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by their authority shall be
the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and
petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution. They have been
held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation as
the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be
destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose
devouring jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor
sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all this clamor,
to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in the same light,
it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation
of the intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses
were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article. They are
only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by necessary and
unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a federal
government, and vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a

proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely listen to the railings which
have been so copiously vented against this part of the plan, without
emotions that disturb its equanimity.
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the
ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS necessary to
its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making
LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but
LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a
LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and
collect taxes? What are the proper means of executing such a power, but
NECESSARY and PROPER laws?
This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by which to
judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us to this
palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power to pass
all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the execution of that power; and
what does the unfortunate and calumniated provision in question do more
than declare the same truth, to wit, that the national legislature, to whom the
power of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in
the execution of that power, pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER to
carry it into effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly to the
power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under consideration,
and because it is the most important of the authorities proposed to be
conferred upon the Union. But the same process will lead to the same result,
in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution. And it is
EXPRESSLY to execute these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has
been affectedly called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all
NECESSARY and PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it
must be sought for in the specific powers upon which this general
declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be
chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly harmless.
But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer is,
that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to guard against
all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to
curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union. The Convention
probably foresaw, what it has been a principal aim of these papers to
inculcate, that the danger which most threatens our political welfare is that

the State governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and
might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to
construction. Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wisdom of
the precaution is evident from the cry which has been raised against it; as
that very cry betrays a disposition to question the great and essential truth
which it is manifestly the object of that provision to declare.
But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and
PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the
Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as fully upon the
simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory clause; and I answer,
in the second place, that the national government, like every other, must
judge, in the first instance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its
constituents in the last. If the federal government should overpass the just
bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people,
whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take
such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency
may suggest and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional
light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers upon which it
is founded. Suppose, by some forced constructions of its authority (which,
indeed, cannot easily be imagined), the Federal legislature should attempt to
vary the law of descent in any State, would it not be evident that, in making
such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that of
the State? Suppose, again, that upon the pretense of an interference with its
revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a landtax imposed by the
authority of a State; would it not be equally evident that this was an
invasion of that concurrent jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax,
which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the State governments? If
there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due
to those reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their animosity to the plan
of the convention, have labored to envelop it in a cloud calculated to
obscure the plainest and simplest truths.
But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME LAW of
the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what would they
amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident they would amount
to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It
is a rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This
results from every political association. If individuals enter into a state of

society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their
conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a larger political
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those
societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would
otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and
not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER
AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of
the large society which are NOT PURSUANT to its constitutional powers,
but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies,
will become the supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of
usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that
the clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the
one we have just before considered, only declares a truth, which flows
immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal government. It
will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that it EXPRESSLY confines
this supremacy to laws made PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION;
which I mention merely as an instance of caution in the convention; since
that limitation would have been to be understood, though it had not been
expressed.
Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United States
would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be opposed or
controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid
by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and exports), would not
be the supreme law of the land, but a usurpation of power not granted by
the Constitution. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same
object might tend to render the collection difficult or precarious, this would
be a mutual inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power
on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the
other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and
presumed, however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert in this
respect which would avoid any material inconvenience. The inference from
the whole is, that the individual States would, under the proposed
Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise
revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of
taxation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next
paper that this CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation

was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to
this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 34. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the General Power of
Taxation)
From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 5, 1788.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the
particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL
authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on
imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the
resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion that they
would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of
their own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is
sufficiently wide will more fully appear when we come to advert to the
inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it will fall to the lot
of the State governments to provide.
To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority cannot
exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and reality. However
proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing OUGHT NOT TO
EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to prove
that it does not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well
known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the last resort,
resided for ages in two different political bodies not as branches of the same
legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each of which an
opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the plebian.
Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the unfitness of two
such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to ANNUL or
REPEAL the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded as
frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence. It
will be readily understood that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA
and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which the people voted by

centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician interest;
in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an entire
predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the
Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness.
In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such
contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on either
side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is little reason to
apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course of time, the wants
of the States will naturally reduce themselves within A VERY NARROW
COMPASS; and in the interim, the United States will, in all probability,
find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the
particular States would be inclined to resort.
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question, it
will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that will require
a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will require a
State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited,
and that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In
pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our
view to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity.
Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of
existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these with the probable
exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human
affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of
any power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from an
estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to
provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are
illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is
true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient accuracy to
answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the
subsisting engagements of the Union, and to maintain those establishments
which, for some time to come, would suffice in time of peace. But would it
be wise, or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this point,
and to leave the government intrusted with the care of the national defense
in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the
community against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign war or
domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point,
where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of providing for

emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert, in general terms,
the possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision against
probable dangers, yet we may safely challenge those who make the
assertion to bring forward their data, and may affirm that they would be
found as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the
probable duration of the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects
of internal attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of
no satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people, it
must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce.
The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that
must baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in
politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war founded
upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding
the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. A cloud has
been for some time hanging over the European world. If it should break
forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury
would not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce
that we are entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials that
now seem to be collecting should be dissipated without coming to maturity,
or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us, what security can
we have that our tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other
cause or from some other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will
not always be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we
may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the
ambition of others. Who could have imagined at the conclusion of the last
war that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were,
would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other? To
judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude that
the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with
much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of
peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting
tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.
What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has
occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of the
European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly is, wars and
rebellions; the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the

body politic against these two most mortal diseases of society. The expenses
arising from those institutions which are relative to the mere domestic
police of a state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial
departments, with their different appendages, and to the encouragement of
agriculture and manufactures (which will comprehend almost all the objects
of state expenditure), are insignificant in comparison with those which
relate to the national defense.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of
monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth part of the annual
income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses last mentioned;
the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of
debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has been
engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand, it
should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a
proper standard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a
republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be remarked that there should be as
great a disproportion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy
kingdom in its domestic administration, and the frugality and economy
which in that particular become the modest simplicity of republican
government. If we balance a proper deduction from one side against that
which it is supposed ought to be made from the other, the proportion may
still be considered as holding good.
But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves contracted in
a single war, and let us only calculate on a common share of the events
which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall instantly perceive, without
the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there must always be an immense
disproportion between the objects of federal and state expenditures. It is
true that several of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable
debts, which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen
again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are
discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the State
governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere support of
their respective civil list; to which, if we add all contingencies, the total
amount in every State ought to fall considerably short of two hundred
thousand pounds.

In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we ought, in
those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to calculate, not on
temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a just
one our attention would be directed to a provision in favor of the State
governments for an annual sum of about two hundred thousand pounds;
while the exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even in
imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained
that the local governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an
EXCLUSIVE source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two
hundred thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in EXCLUSION of
the authority of the Union, would be to take the resources of the community
out of those hands which stood in need of them for the public welfare, in
order to put them into other hands which could have no just or proper
occasion for them.
Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon the
principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between the Union and
its members, in PROPORTION to their comparative necessities; what
particular fund could have been selected for the use of the States, that
would not either have been too much or too little too little for their present,
too much for their future wants? As to the line of separation between
external and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough
computation, the command of two thirds of the resources of the community
to defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union,
one third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to
nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary and content
ourselves with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses
and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between the MEANS
and the END; the possession of one third of the resources of the community
to supply, at most, one tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been
selected and appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would
have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular
States, and would have left them dependent on the Union for a provision for
this purpose.
The preceding train of observation will justify the position which has
been elsewhere laid down, that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the
article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire
subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State authority to that

of the Union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could have
been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great
INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the individual States. The
convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that
subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an
indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with
an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own
necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this important subject
of taxation will claim a further consideration.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 35. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the General Power of
Taxation)
For the Independent Journal. Saturday, January 5, 1788

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite
power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark; which is,
that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue,
should be restricted to particular objects, it would naturally occasion an
undue proportion of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils
would spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of
industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among the several
States as among the citizens of the same State.
Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation were to
be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the government, for want
of being able to command other resources, would frequently be tempted to
extend these duties to an injurious excess. There are persons who imagine
that they can never be carried to too great a length; since the higher they
are, the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant
consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and to promote
domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious in various ways.
Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general spirit of
smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to
the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the community
tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to whom
they give a premature monopoly of the markets; they sometimes force
industry out of its more natural channels into others in which it flows with
less advantage; and in the last place, they oppress the merchant, who is
often obliged to pay them himself without any retribution from the
consumer. When the demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the

consumer generally pays the duty; but when the markets happen to be
overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not
only exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think
that a division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often
happens than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to raise the
price of a commodity in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid
upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital,
is often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to a more
expeditious sale.
The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true than
the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable that the duties on
imports should go into a common stock, than that they should redound to
the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But it is not so generally true
as to render it equitable, that those duties should form the only national
fund. When they are paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax
upon the importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the
character of consumers. In this view they are productive of inequality
among the States; which inequality would be increased with the increased
extent of the duties. The confinement of the national revenues to this
species of imposts would be attended with inequality, from a different
cause, between the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing States. The
States which can go farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by their
own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers or wealth, consume
so great a proportion of imported articles as those States which are not in
the same favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone
contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abilities. To make them
do this it is necessary that recourse be had to excises, the proper objects of
which are particular kinds of manufactures. New York is more deeply
interested in these considerations than such of her citizens as contend for
limiting the power of the Union to external taxation may be aware of. New
York is an importing State, and is not likely speedily to be, to any great
extent, a manufacturing State. She would, of course, suffer in a double light
from restraining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.
So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the import
duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be observed,
conformably to a remark made in another part of these papers, that the
interest of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against such an

extreme. I readily admit that this would be the case, as long as other
resources were open; but if the avenues to them were closed, HOPE,
stimulated by necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous
precautions and additional penalties, which, for a time, would have the
intended effect, till there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude
these new precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false
opinions, which it might require a long course of subsequent experience to
correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often occasions false hopes, false
reasonings, and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous. But even
if this supposed excess should not be a consequence of the limitation of the
federal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue,
though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have been
noticed. Let us now return to the examination of objections.
One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition, seems
most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is not sufficiently
numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, in order to
combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community, and to
produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its
constituents. This argument presents itself under a very specious and
seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those
to whom it is addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it
will appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object it
seems to aim at is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the sense in
which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place the
discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the
representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself with
examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary
supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries.
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by
persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly
provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send one
or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics
and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give
their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions
or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and
manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and
industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the

operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their natural
patron and friend; and they are aware, that however great the confidence
they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can be more
effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. They are sensible
that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired
endowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural
abilities are for the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and
superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a contest
with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the public councils,
unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These considerations,
and many others that might be mentioned prove, and experience confirms it,
that artisans and manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their
votes upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore
consider merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the
community.
With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed; they truly
form no distinct interest in society, and according to their situation and
talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of
each other, and of other parts of the community.
Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political view, and
particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly united, from the
wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land
which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres as well as the
proprietor of a single acre. Every landholder will therefore have a common
interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common interest
may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we
even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder
and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the first
would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national legislature than
the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look into our own senate and
assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both;
nor is this less the case in the senate, which consists of a smaller number,
than in the assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where the
qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they have to choose a
small or a large number, their votes will fall upon those in whom they have
most confidence; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of
moderate property, or of no property at all.

It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have some of
their own number in the representative body, in order that their feelings and
interests may be the better understood and attended to. But we have seen
that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of
the people free. Where this is the case, the representative body, with too few
exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the government, will be
composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions.
But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different
classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three
descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel whatever will
promote or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not, from his
own interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist every
attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and
be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the
mechanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly
allied? Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality
to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to
prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it
shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?
If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions which
may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and to which a wise
administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation leads to
extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a competent judge of
their nature, extent, and foundation than one whose observation does not
travel beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural
that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is
dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his
public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and
inclinations, and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of
influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being
bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent,
are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the
representative and the constituent.
There is no part of the administration of government that requires
extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of
political economy, so much as the business of taxation. The man who
understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive

expedients, or sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procurement of
revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of
finance will always be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in
order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the
person in whose hands it should be acquainted with the general genius,
habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the resources
of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge
of the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition
has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense let every
considerate citizen judge for himself where the requisite qualification is
most likely to be found.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 36. The Same Subject
Continued (Concerning the General Power of
Taxation)
From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 8, 1788.

HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the
foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the natural
operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the
community, whether the representation of the people be more or less
numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of
merchants, and of members of the learned professions, who will truly
represent all those different interests and views. If it should be objected that
we have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer
that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient
number to influence the general complexion or character of the government.
There are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise superior to the
disadvantages of situation, and will command the tribute due to their merit,
not only from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the
society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for
the credit of human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous
plants flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation; but
occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning founded upon
the general course of things, less conclusive.
The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all lead to
the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What greater affinity or
relation of interest can be conceived between the carpenter and blacksmith,
and the linen manufacturer or stocking weaver, than between the merchant
and either of them? It is notorious that there are often as great rivalships
between different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there
are between any of the departments of labor and industry; so that, unless the

representative body were to be far more numerous than would be consistent
with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations, it is impossible
that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we have been considering
should ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a
matter which has hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an
accurate inspection of its real shape or tendency.
There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that claims
our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal taxation in the
national legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as well from
the want of a sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, as from an
interference between the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular
States. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely
destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State legislature
respecting one of the counties, which demands a knowledge of local details,
how is it acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the
county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legislature
from the representatives of each State? And is it not to be presumed that the
men who will generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary
degree of intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the
knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute
topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams,
highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its
situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture, commerce,
manufactures, with the nature of its products and consumptions, with the
different degrees and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry?
Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind,
usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or to
boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first
instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards passed into laws by the
authority of the sovereign or legislature.
Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best
qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for revenue;
which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight
in the question, of the species of knowledge of local circumstances requisite
to the purposes of taxation.

The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of
internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the DIRECT and those of the
INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning
upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the
latter, by which must be understood duties and excises on articles of
consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the
difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be
of a kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or
can easily be procured from any well-informed man, especially of the
mercantile class. The circumstances that may distinguish its situation in one
State from its situation in another must be few, simple, and easy to be
comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would be to avoid
those articles which had been previously appropriated to the use of a
particular State; and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue
system of each. This could always be known from the respective codes of
laws, as well as from the information of the members from the several
States.
The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands,
appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this view it will
not bear a close examination. Land taxes are commonly laid in one of two
modes, either by ACTUAL valuations, permanent or periodical, or by
OCCASIONAL assessments, at the discretion, or according to the best
judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is to make them. In either case,
the EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge of
local details, must be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of
commissioners or assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the
government for the purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the
persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix
their numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their
powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well be
performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature? The attention
of either can only reach to general principles; local details, as already
observed, must be referred to those who are to execute the plan.
But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be placed
that must be altogether satisfactory. The national legislature can make use
of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT STATE. The method of

laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State can, in all its parts,
be adopted and employed by the federal government.
Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to be left to
the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be determined by the
numbers of each State, as described in the second section of the first article.
An actual census or enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a
circumstance which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression.
The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against
with guarded circumspection. In addition to the precaution just mentioned,
there is a provision that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
UNIFORM throughout the United States."
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers on
the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power of internal
taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment to be really
inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear the use of it, and
have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By way of answer to this, it has
been triumphantly asked, Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous
power, and rely upon the latter resource? Two solid answers may be given.
The first is, that the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable,
because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in theory, or
otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously
exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most probable. The second answer
is, that the existence of such a power in the Constitution will have a strong
influence in giving efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the
Union can apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for
exertion on their part.
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its
members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repugnancy
of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere with each
other; and it is far from impossible to avoid an interference even in the
policy of their different systems. An effectual expedient for this purpose
will be, mutually, to abstain from those objects which either side may have
first had recourse to. As neither can CONTROL the other, each will have an
obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where
there is an IMMEDIATE common interest, we may safely count upon its
operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their

expenses come to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility
almost of interference will vanish. A small land tax will answer the purpose
of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource.
Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal taxation, to
excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue officers, a
duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful forms of
odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been played off with all the
ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain.
As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no room
for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing the tax is
exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports; the
other, where the object has not fallen under any State regulation or
provision, which may be applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases,
the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the
objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State
officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This
will best answer the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the
collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to the State
governments and to the people. At all events, here is a practicable expedient
for avoiding such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than
to show that evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.
As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it is a
sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but the
supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should
infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the
accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State officers as much as
possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their
emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into the
channels of the national government, instead of making federal influence
flow in an opposite and adverse current. But all suppositions of this kind are
invidious, and ought to be banished from the consideration of the great
question before the people. They can answer no other end than to cast a
mist over the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants of
the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by the
authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by that of the

State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must
be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be
made by the Union that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which
is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a
much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course
will render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and
with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in
the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to
greater care in the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally
tend to make it a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as
far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the
public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions
which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous classes
of the society. Happy it is when the interest which the government has in
the preservation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution of
the public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the
community from oppression!
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them;
and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States(1)
which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should
lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government.
But does it follow because there is a power to lay them that they will
actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this
kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State
governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this
power? If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a
charge against the national government, or even be urged as an obstacle to
its adoption? As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still
feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it ought to
exist in the federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in
which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne,
become essential to the public weal. And the government, from the
possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making
use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may be
considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself,
for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect.
There may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State,

in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know
nothing to exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities
that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every
project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon,
which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the
general defense and security.
(I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers
proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as
having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have
endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been made to
them. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities, which are either
too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the
opponents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of
controversy. The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an
investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration that its
organization and its extent may be more advantageously considered in
connection. This has determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries
upon which we shall next enter.)(E1)
(I have now gone through the examination of those powers proposed to
be conferred upon the federal government which relate more peculiarly to
its energy, and to its efficiency for answering the great and primary objects
of union. There are others which, though omitted here, will, in order to
render the view of the subject more complete, be taken notice of under the
next head of our inquiries. I flatter myself the progress already made will
have sufficed to satisfy the candid and judicious part of the community that
some of the objections which have been most strenuously urged against the
Constitution, and which were most formidable in their first appearance, are
not only destitute of substance, but if they had operated in the formation of
the plan, would have rendered it incompetent to the great ends of public
happiness and national prosperity. I equally flatter myself that a further and
more critical investigation of the system will serve to recommend it still
more to every sincere and disinterested advocate for good government and
will leave no doubt with men of this character of the propriety and
expediency of adopting it. Happy will it be for ourselves, and more
honorable for human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough to set so
glorious an example to mankind!)(E1)

PUBLIUS
1. The New England States.
E1. Two versions of this paragraph appear in different editions.

FEDERALIST No. 37. Concerning the Difficulties
of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of
Government.
From the Daily Advertiser. Friday, January 11, 1788.

MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing
that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before
the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of
course under consideration. But as the ultimate object of these papers is to
determine clearly and fully the merits of this Constitution, and the
expediency of adopting it, our plan cannot be complete without taking a
more critical and thorough survey of the work of the convention, without
examining it on all its sides, comparing it in all its parts, and calculating its
probable effects. That this remaining task may be executed under
impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this
place be indulged, which candor previously suggests.
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures
are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a
just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good;
and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those
occasions which require an unusual exercise of it. To those who have been
led by experience to attend to this consideration, it could not appear
surprising, that the act of the convention, which recommends so many
important changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights
and relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and
interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and
on the other, to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In
some, it has been too evident from their own publications, that they have
scanned the proposed Constitution, not only with a predisposition to
censure, but with a predetermination to condemn; as the language held by

others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias, which must render their
opinions also of little moment in the question. In placing, however, these
different characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions, I
wish not to insinuate that there may not be a material difference in the
purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favor of the latter
description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be peculiarly
critical, and to require indispensably that something should be done for our
relief, the predetermined patron of what has been actually done may have
taken his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well as from
considerations of a sinister nature. The predetermined adversary, on the
other hand, can have been governed by no venial motive whatever. The
intentions of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary be
culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright, and must be culpable. But
the truth is, that these papers are not addressed to persons falling under
either of these characters. They solicit the attention of those only, who add
to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a
just estimate of the means of promoting it.
Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan
submitted by the convention, not only without a disposition to find or to
magnify faults; but will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan
was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make allowances for the errors
which may be chargeable on the fallibility to which the convention, as a
body of men, were liable; but will keep in mind, that they themselves also
are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the
fallible opinions of others.
With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these inducements
to candor, many allowances ought to be made for the difficulties inherent in
the very nature of the undertaking referred to the convention.
The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has been shown
in the course of these papers, that the existing Confederation is founded on
principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently change this first
foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown,
that the other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have
been vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can therefore furnish no
other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be
shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most

that the convention could do in such a situation, was to avoid the errors
suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own;
and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future
experiences may unfold them.
Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important
one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in
government, with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the
republican form. Without substantially accomplishing this part of their
undertaking, they would have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their
appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily
accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray his
ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential to that security
against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary
execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good
government. Stability in government is essential to national character and to
the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the
minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society.
An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is
odious to the people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the
people of this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the nature, and
interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good government,
will never be satisfied till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and
uncertainties which characterize the State administrations. On comparing,
however, these valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we
must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them together in their due
proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side,
not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those
intrusted with it should be kept in independence on the people, by a short
duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the
trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hands. Stability, on the
contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue
for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a
frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures from a
frequent change of men: whilst energy in government requires not only a
certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand.
How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their work,
will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the cursory view here

taken, it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part.
Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of
partition between the authority of the general and that of the State
governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as
he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects extensive
and complicated in their nature. The faculties of the mind itself have never
yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the
efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception,
judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated
by such delicate shades and minute gradations that their boundaries have
eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of
ingenious disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the great
kingdom of nature, and, still more, between the various provinces, and
lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford another illustration of
the same important truth. The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have
never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the
district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of unorganized matter,
or which marks the termination of the former and the commencement of the
animal empire. A still greater obscurity lies in the distinctive characters by
which the objects in each of these great departments of nature have been
arranged and assorted.
When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations are
perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of
the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the
obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it
is contemplated, we must perceive the necessity of moderating still further
our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. Experience
has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been
able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great
provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges
and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in
the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reins in these
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.
The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors of the
most enlightened legislatures and jurists, has been equally unsuccessful in
delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws and

different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the common law, and the
statute law, the maritime law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations,
and other local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally
established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more
industriously pursued than in any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of
her several courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of admiralty, etc., is
not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting
the indeterminate limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. All
new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure
and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series
of particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising
from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties,
the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each
other adds a fresh embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas.
Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly
formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and
exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply
words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include
many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen that
however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and
however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of
them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it
is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less,
according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the
Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language,
his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the
cloudy medium through which it is communicated.
Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions:
indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception,
inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of these must produce a
certain degree of obscurity. The convention, in delineating the boundary
between the federal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced the full
effect of them all.
To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering
pretensions of the larger and smaller States. We cannot err in supposing that
the former would contend for a participation in the government, fully

proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the latter
would not be less tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We
may well suppose that neither side would entirely yield to the other, and
consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It
is extremely probable, also, that after the ratio of representation had been
adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh struggle
between the same parties, to give such a turn to the organization of the
government, and to the distribution of its powers, as would increase the
importance of the branches, in forming which they had respectively
obtained the greatest share of influence. There are features in the
Constitution which warrant each of these suppositions; and as far as either
of them is well founded, it shows that the convention must have been
compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous
considerations.
Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which would
marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various points. Other
combinations, resulting from a difference of local position and policy, must
have created additional difficulties. As every State may be divided into
different districts, and its citizens into different classes, which give birth to
contending interests and local jealousies, so the different parts of the United
States are distinguished from each other by a variety of circumstances,
which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And although this variety of
interests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper, may have a
salutary influence on the administration of the government when formed,
yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence, which must have
been experienced in the task of forming it.
Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these difficulties, the
convention should have been forced into some deviations from that
artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the
subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution
planned in his closet or in his imagination? The real wonder is that so many
difficulties should have been surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity
almost as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible
for any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance without partaking of
the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to
perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently
and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revolution.

We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the repeated trials
which have been unsuccessfully made in the United Netherlands for
reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their constitution. The history
of almost all the great councils and consultations held among mankind for
reconciling their discordant opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and
adjusting their respective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and
disappointments, and may be classed among the most dark and degraded
pictures which display the infirmities and depravities of the human
character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented,
they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by
their lustre to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are
contrasted. In revolving the causes from which these exceptions result, and
applying them to the particular instances before us, we are necessarily led to
two important conclusions. The first is, that the convention must have
enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential
influence of party animosities the disease most incident to deliberative
bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second
conclusion is that all the deputations composing the convention were
satisfactorily accommodated by the final act, or were induced to accede to it
by a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and
partial interests to the public good, and by a despair of seeing this necessity
diminished by delays or by new experiments.

FEDERALIST No. 38. The Same Subject
Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections
to the New Plan Exposed.
From The Independent Journal. Saturday, January 12, 1788.

MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history,
in which government has been established with deliberation and consent,
the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but
has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and
approved integrity.
Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of Crete,
as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco
and Solon, instituted the government of Athens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver
of Sparta. The foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by
Romulus, and the work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa
and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition of royalty the consular
administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward with a
project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tullius
Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the assent and ratification of
the senate and people. This remark is applicable to confederate
governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which
bore his name. The Achaean league received its first birth from Achaeus,
and its second from Aratus.
What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their
respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the
legitimate authority of the people, cannot in every instance be ascertained.
In some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. Draco appears to
have been intrusted by the people of Athens with indefinite powers to
reform its government and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in a

manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take
upon him the sole and absolute power of new-modeling the constitution.
The proceedings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the
advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes
towards the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of
seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative
body of citizens.
Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the Greeks
were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of caution as to place
their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have
proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who would not suffer an army to be
commanded by fewer than ten generals, and who required no other proof of
danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen, should
consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes
of themselves and their posterity, than a select body of citizens, from whose
common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have
been expected? These questions cannot be fully answered, without
supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of
counsellors exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single
individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties with which these
celebrated reformers had to contend, as well as the expedients which they
were obliged to employ in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon,
who seems to have indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he
had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their
happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus, more true
to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with
the authority of superstition, and of securing his final success by a voluntary
renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life. If these lessons teach
us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the
ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government,
they serve not less, on the other, to admonish us of the hazards and
difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of
unnecessarily multiplying them.
Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be contained
in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted rather from the
defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject,
than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it; and,

consequently such as will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have
pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many
considerations of a general nature, but by the particular case of the Articles
of Confederation. It is observable that among the numerous objections and
amendments suggested by the several States, when these articles were
submitted for their ratification, not one is found which alludes to the great
and radical error which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we
except the observations which New Jersey was led to make, rather by her
local situation, than by her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether
a single suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the
system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial
as these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very
dangerous inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and
supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of self-
preservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several years in
refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole period at
our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor was her pliancy
in the end effected by a less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with
protracting the public calamities, and endangering the event of the contest.
Every candid reader will make the proper reflections on these important
facts.
A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an
efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger, after
coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different physicians,
selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering
relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend; the case of
the patient is carefully examined; a consultation is held; they are
unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with
proper and timely relief, is so far from being desperate, that it may be made
to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are equally unanimous
in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The
prescription is no sooner made known, however, than a number of persons
interpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of the disorder, assure
the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid
him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient
reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that the
authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other remedy

to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much from one another
as from his first counsellors, would he not act prudently in trying the
experiment unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than be
hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy
remedy, nor agree in proposing one?
Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment. She has
been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and unanimous
advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned by others
against following this advice under pain of the most fatal consequences. Do
the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No. Do they deny the necessity
of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of
them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper
one to be substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us that
the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a
confederation of the States, but a government over individuals. Another
admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent,
but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the
government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a
bill of rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights,
but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of
individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity.
A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous
and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for the fatal
power of regulating the times and places of election. An objector in a large
State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in
the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally loud against the
dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we
are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are
to administer the new government. From another quarter, and sometimes
from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will
be but a shadow of a representation, and that the government would be far
less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in
a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections
against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of
great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of
taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the
Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that is equally

sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these
shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of
them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence affirms
that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these
dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright
and firm against its opposite propensities. With another class of adversaries
to the Constitution the language is that the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all
the ideas of regular government and all the requisite precautions in favor of
liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions,
there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward
with his particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly agreed upon
the subject. In the eyes of one the junction of the Senate with the President
in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this
executive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the
organization. To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives,
whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and
partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With
another, the admission of the President into any share of a power which
ever must be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is
an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of
the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of
impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the
legislative and executive departments, when this power so evidently
belonged to the judiciary department. "We concur fully," reply others, "in
the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a reference
of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment of the
error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive
powers already lodged in that department." Even among the zealous patrons
of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance is discovered
concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of one
gentleman is, that the council should consist of a small number to be
appointed by the most numerous branch of the legislature. Another would
prefer a larger number, and considers it as a fundamental condition that the
appointment should be made by the President himself.
As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the federal
Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most zealous, so they are

also the most sagacious, of those who think the late convention were
unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might
and ought to be substituted. Let us further suppose that their country should
concur, both in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their
unfavorable opinion of the convention; and should accordingly proceed to
form them into a second convention, with full powers, and for the express
purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the
experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it
seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided by the sample of opinions
just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors, they
would, in any one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the
discord and ferment that would mark their own deliberations; and whether
the Constitution, now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance for
immortality, as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to
depend on his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately
adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but until
ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers.
It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many
objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the
defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the
former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No
man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had
some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering
habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a
porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller,
or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned
them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of
the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight
against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money
dangerous in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress
can make requisitions to any amount they please, and the States are
constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long
as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as
long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops
dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and they
have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix
the different powers of government in the same body of men? Congress, a

single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the federal powers. Is it
particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of
the army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the
hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights essential to liberty? The Confederation
has no bill of rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it
empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make
treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress, without
any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have declared,
and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land.
Is the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty
years? By the old it is permitted forever.
I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers may be in
theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the State
for the means of carrying them into practice; that however large the mass of
powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place,
that the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring
certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely necessary, and at
the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory; and, in the next place,
that if the Union is to continue, and no better government be substituted,
effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing
Congress; in either of which events, the contrast just stated will hold good.
But this is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent
power, which tends to realize all the dangers that can be apprehended from
a defective construction of the supreme government of the Union. It is now
no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory is a
mine of vast wealth to the United States; and although it is not of such a
nature as to extricate them from their present distresses, or for some time to
come, to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it
hereafter be able, under proper management, both to effect a gradual
discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal
tributes to the federal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been
already surrendered by individual States; and it may with reason be
expected that the remaining States will not persist in withholding similar
proofs of their equity and generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that a
rich and fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the
United States, will soon become a national stock. Congress have assumed
the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive.

Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new
States, to erect temporary governments, to appoint officers for them, and to
prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the
Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without the least color of
constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has
been sounded. A GREAT and INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing
into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS to
an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an
INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And yet there are men, who have not
only been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the
system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against the new system
the objections which we have heard. Would they not act with more
consistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less necessary to
guard the Union against the future powers and resources of a body
constructed like the existing Congress, than to save it from the dangers
threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly?
I mean not, by any thing here said, to throw censure on the measures
which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they could not have
done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon
them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits. But is not the fact an
alarming proof of the danger resulting from a government which does not
possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or
usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 39. The Conformity of the
Plan to Republican Principles
For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 16, 1788

MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to
introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the
convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our
undertaking.
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and
aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other
form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with
the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable
determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our
political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the
plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican
character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.
What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an
answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in
the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution of
different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which
no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed
almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has
been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the
people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of
hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of
monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same
appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch
only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with
equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These
examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine

republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in
political disquisitions.
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different
forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at
least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered
by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or
during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be
derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles,
exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to
the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title
of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons
administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people;
and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified;
otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other
popular government that has been or can be well organized or well
executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to
the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of
government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most
of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one,
this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of
the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the
highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both
within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years.
According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as
according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the
members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm
tenure of good behavior.
On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the
standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense,
conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at
least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of
the people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of
Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President
is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the
example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the

Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice,
of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally
conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State
constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all
the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina.
The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year
more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that
of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in
office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief
magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In
the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no
constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief
magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of
office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during
his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their
places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The
tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal
regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the
State constitutions.
Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this
system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of
titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in
its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.
"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed
Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They
ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which
regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of
which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the
Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it is asked by what
authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle
which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined
with some precision.
Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the
objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first,
to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to
inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a

government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could
supply any defect of regular authority.
First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be
considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to
the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the
operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by
which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the
Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of
America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the
other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and
independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent
and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in
each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore,
establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL
act.
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are
understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many
independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from
this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a
MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of
the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several
States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent
than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of
the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as
forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the
United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority
in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be
determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by
considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a
majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been
adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a
sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own
voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established,
be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.

The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of
government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its
powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in
the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature
of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL.
The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as
political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the
principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress.
So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power
will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of
the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The
votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly
as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same
society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the
legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this
particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations,
from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the
government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as
many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.
The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to
the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this,
that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the
Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual
citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the
Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the
FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been
understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to
which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in
their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance
of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal
features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the
operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in
its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it,
in this relation, a NATIONAL government.
But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its
powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the
EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it,

not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite
supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful
government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy
is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united
for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the
municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are
subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished
by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their
respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is
subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed
government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction
extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that
in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the
tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general
government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision
is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all
the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this
impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to
the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be
established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to
speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone,
is a position not likely to be combated.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which
amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor
wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate
authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and
this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of
every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it
wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the
Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all.
The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either
of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In
requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion
by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and
advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of

less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the
FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national
nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is
federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the
government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the
operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them,
again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 40. On the Powers of the
Convention to Form a Mixed Government
Examined and Sustained.
For the New York Packet. Friday, January 18, 1788.

MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were
authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution.
The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an
inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective
constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the
recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to
that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these
particular acts.
The act from Annapolis recommends the "appointment of commissioners
to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH
FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the
Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE
EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that purpose,
to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and
afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually
provide for the same."
The recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following:
"WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and
perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress
of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and
whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present
Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and
PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions to
their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes

expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be
the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT:
"Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the
second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have
been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole
and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures
such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when
agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal
Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT
AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION."
From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was
to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d,
that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE
EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE
UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS
AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is
expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS
AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory
act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be
reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the
former and confirmed by the latter.
From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of
expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention
acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the
EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce
the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these
purposes.
There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as
founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression
ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to
some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be
made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important
part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the
means.

Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the
convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a
NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the
judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and
PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of
the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was
the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which
the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the
most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention, answer
these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the
happiness of the people of America, that the articles of Confederation
should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the
Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and
the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the
preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a reform of
the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the
establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the
end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they
ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed.
But is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely
irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in
the articles of the confederation could possibly mould them into a national
and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by
the convention?
No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a
change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power.
ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized.
NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a
power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of
necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the
old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to
mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between
that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS
AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a
TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the alterations
ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States
would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor

described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform
had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the
convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these
principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution,
the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They
are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the
members of the government should derive their appointment from the
legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new
government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the
Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed
immediately by the people, and in two States(1) are actually so appointed.
Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States,
and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown,
the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective
characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act
immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post
office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims
under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials
by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted
without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these
cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons
and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require,
particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of
the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain
extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by
Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But
pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the
convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation
of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as
would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress
repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one;
had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to
recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine,
require that the powers of the general government should be limited, and
that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their

sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government,
as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all
unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and
independent jurisdiction.
The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the
convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion
of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The
misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so
feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have
been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to
the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old.
In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the
tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the
confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have
reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be
carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this
objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the
publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance
can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of
subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a
thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a
MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved
and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths
of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every
citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As
this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have
criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further
observation.
The THIRD point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty
arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular
authority.
In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been
analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had
been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the
United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even
on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely