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Title: The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the
Capture of Constantinople by the Turks

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE GREEK EMPIRE AND THE STORY OF THE
CAPTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE BY THE TURKS ***

THE DESTRUCTION
OF

THE GREEK EMPIRE

The Destruction of the Greek
Empire and the Story of the
Capture of Constantinople by
the Turks
BY

EDWIN PEARS, LL.B.
Knight of the Greek Order of the Saviour and Commander of
the Bulgarian Order of Merit
Author of ‘The Fall of Constantinople: being the
Story of the Fourth Crusade’

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK AND BOMBAY
1903

All rights reserved

PREFACE
My object in writing this book is to give an account of the capture of
Constantinople and the destruction of the Greek empire. In order to make
the story intelligible and to explain its significance I have given a summary
of the history of the empire between the Latin conquest in 1204 and the
capture of the city in 1453, and have traced the progress during the same
period of the race which succeeded in destroying the empire and in
replacing the Greeks as the possessors of New Rome.
It may be objected that the task which I have set before me has already been
accomplished by Gibbon, and that, as his chapter on the last siege of the
city is carefully compiled and written with a brilliancy of style which he has
nowhere surpassed, there is no need for any further study of the subject. My
answer is twofold: first, that an important mass of new material is now at
the disposal of any one who wishes to retell the story, and second, that
Gibbon told it with a bias which makes it desirable that it should be retold.
The historian of the ‘Decline and Fall’ had less than half the material before
him which is now available, and the story of the siege deserves telling with
more accuracy and completeness than either the authorities available to him
or the scope of his monumental work permitted. It is true that Professor J.
B. Bury, the latest editor of Gibbon, has, by the aid of scholarly notes and of
careful research, enabled the reader to become possessed of many of the
details regarding the siege which have recently become known, but he
would be the first to admit that there is ample room for a fuller history of
the siege than that given in the ‘Decline and Fall’ even with the aid of his
valuable notes.1 Gibbon himself regretted the poverty of his materials and
especially that he had not been able to obtain any Turkish accounts of the
siege.2 The only eye-witnesses whose narratives were before him were
Phrantzes, Archbishop Leonard, and Cardinal Isidore. If we add to their
narratives the accounts given by Ducas and Chalcondylas together with
what Gibbon himself calls ‘short hints of Cantemir and Leunclavius,’ we
have substantially all the sources of information which were available when
the ‘Decline and Fall’ was written.

The new sources of information regarding the siege brought to light since
Gibbon’s day enable us to gain a much more complete view of that event
and of the character of its principal actors than was possible at the time
when he wrote. Several Continental writers have taken advantage of some
at least of the new stores of information to rewrite its story,3 but I may be
allowed to claim the good fortune of being the first Englishman who has
even attempted to write a narrative of that event with the whole or even
with any considerable portion of the new material before him.
Before, however, proceeding to indicate what the new sources of
information are, I must say something regarding the second reason I have
assigned why those interested in the account of an event which marks the
end of an epoch of great traditions and of a civilisation on ancient rather
than on modern lines should not remain satisfied with Gibbon’s account of
it. Though he claimed to examine the authorities before him with
philosophical impartiality, the writers known to him belonged to the Roman
Church, and he was influenced unconsciously by their representations.
These writers wrote under the influence of the most bitter theological
controversies. They are imbued with a spirit of rancour towards those
Greeks (that is, towards the great majority of the population) who had not
accepted the Union with the Church of Rome which had been decreed at
Florence. Their testimony throughout their narratives is for the most part
that of violent partisans. But even if Gibbon, when dealing with the disputes
between the great historical Churches, had been in possession of statements
of the Greek case, his contempt for both Churches was too great to allow
him to do justice to the questions which divided them, questions which
nevertheless, as they prevented the united action of Europe to resist the
Turkish invasion, were among the most important of the time. His habit of
thought as an eighteenth century theist did not allow him to attach sufficient
weight to the theological aspect of the struggle between the East and the
West. Everything that smelt of the cloister was hateful. The theological
questions themselves were not worth discussion. The disputants were in his
view narrow-minded, ignorant, and superstitious. The refinements of the
definitions of the Double Procession were useless, trivial, or ridiculous.
Religious zeal or enthusiasm was a thing to be condemned—was the mark
of fanaticism and always mischievous. In this attitude of mind Gibbon was
neither better nor worse than the majority of his philosophical
contemporaries. He differed from them in being able to bequeath to future

generations a work of monumental learning, in which his and their reading
of the progress of Christianity in the Eastern empire was destined to have a
long and deservedly great reputation. His research and eloquence, his keen
sarcasm, his judicial manner, and the powerful influence of the ‘Decline and
Fall’ were employed to discredit Christianity rather than to try to discover
amid the fierce wranglings of theologians over insoluble problems what
was their signification for the history of the time of which he was treating
and in the development of the human mind. He began with a period in
which the emperor is worshipped as Divinity and traced the establishment
of Christianity as a national faith among Pagan subjects until in a
diversified form it became accepted by all; but he did this without affording
us any help to see how the human mind could accept the first position or
what were the movements of thought which led to the evolution of the
questions which agitated men’s minds in the later period.
The century in which he and his contemporaries lived was for them one of
hostility to Christianity rather than of investigation, the period of Voltaire,
who could only see in Byzantine history ‘a worthless repertory of
declamation and miracles, disgraceful to the human mind’ rather than of the
Continental and English writers of the modern historical school. Happily, in
the twentieth century those who look upon Christianity with an
independence as complete as that of Gibbon recognise that insight can only
be obtained by sympathetic investigation, that for the right understanding of
history it is essential to put oneself in the place of men who have attached
importance to a religious controversy, to consider their environment and
examine their conduct and motives from their point of view, if we would
comprehend either the causes which have led such controversy to be
regarded as important or the conduct of the controversialists themselves.
The absence in Gibbon of any sympathetic attempt to understand the
controversies which play so large a part in his great drama of human history
renders him as unsatisfactory a guide in regard to them as a writer of
English history during the period of Charles the First would be who should
merely treat with contempt the half religious, half political questions which
divided Englishmen. While the objection I have suggested to Gibbon’s
attitude would apply generally to his treatment of religious questions, I have
only to deal with it in reference to the period of which I am treating. When
writing of this period Gibbon did not realise that the religious question was
nearly always a political one, and that union with Rome meant subjection to

Rome. But unless it be realised how completely the citizens of
Constantinople and the other great cities of the empire were engrossed with
semi-religious and semi-political questions, no true conception of the life of
the empire can be formed; for these questions were of interest not merely to
Churchmen but to all.
Among the documents brought to light during the last fifty or sixty years
which have contributed to our better knowledge of the siege the most
important are the ‘Diary’ of Nicolo Barbaro and the ‘Life of Mahomet’ by
Critobulus.
Barbaro belonged to a noble Venetian family. He was present in
Constantinople throughout the siege, kept a journal4 of what he saw and
heard, and, though full of prejudices against Genoese, Greeks, and Turks,
contrives to tell his story in a manner which carries conviction of its
truthfulness. His narrative conveys the impression of an independent
observer who had no object in writing except to relate what he knew about
the siege. While probably written from day to day, the diary bears internal
evidence of having been revised after he had left the city. Its language is
old-fashioned colloquial Venetian and has often puzzled Italians whom I
have called in to my aid.
The original manuscript of the diary was preserved in Venice by members
of the Barbaro family until 1829. After various adventures it came in 1837
into the possession of the Imperial and Royal Marciana Library in Venice.
In 1854 it was entrusted to Enrico Cornet, and was published by him for the
first time in 1856.
Critobulus, the author of the ‘Life of Mahomet the Second,’ was a man of a
different type. Nothing is known of him beyond what is contained in his
Life of Mahomet.5 He describes himself as ‘Critobulus the Islander.’ After
the capture of Constantinople, when the archons of Imbros, Lemnos, and
Thasos feared that the Turkish admiral would shortly approach to annex
these islands, messengers were sent to the admiral and succeeded, by
offering voluntary submission and by paying him a large bribe, in avoiding
the general pillage which usually followed a Turkish conquest. Shortly
afterwards, Critobulus took service under the sultan and was made archon
of Imbros. In this capacity he received the submission of Lemnos and other
places. He continued to hold this office for at least four years. Book III. of

his history contains (inter alia) an account of what he himself did as the
servant of Mahomet. Probably he went to reside in Constantinople in 1460.
His history covers the first seventeen years of Mahomet’s reign. It is
dedicated to the sultan and is followed by an apology to his fellow Greeks
for having written it. While open to the charge of not allowing himself an
altogether free hand in revealing the faults and cruelties of his master,
Critobulus claims that he has taken great pains to know the truth of what he
relates. As he wrote a few years after the siege and at leisure, his narrative
does not show the signs of haste which mark many of the shorter narratives
of that event: such, for example, as those of Leonard, of the Podestà of
Pera, of Cardinal Isidore in the ‘Lamentatio,’ and of others. As he continued
to belong to the Orthodox Church and to the Greek as opposed to the
Roman party in that Church, his history is free from the denunciations of
his fellow Christians for having refused the union agreed to at Florence.
The writer’s characteristics as a Greek, but also as a servant of the sultan,
show themselves in his work. He expresses sympathy with his own people,
extols their courage, and laments their misfortunes. But in places his
biography of the sultan reads like the report of an able and courageous
official. His training and experience in the work of government, his service
under Mahomet, and perhaps something in the nature of the man, make his
narrative sober and methodical and impress the reader with the idea that the
author felt a sense of responsibility for the truthfulness of what he was
writing. While the narratives of Phrantzes, Chalcondylas, and Ducas
recount some of the incidents of the siege more fully than that of
Critobulus, the latter gives more details on others and supplies valuable
information which none of them have given. His Life of Mahomet is by far
the most valuable of the recently discovered documents, and, as will be
seen, I have made use of it as the nucleus of my narrative of the siege.
The manuscript of Critobulus was discovered by the late Dr. Dethier less
than forty years ago in the Seraglio Library at Constantinople. It was
transcribed by him and also by Herr Karl Müller and was published by the
latter in 1883 with valuable notes.6
Two other works of importance unknown to Gibbon were due respectively
to Tetaldi and Pusculus. Each of these authors took part in the defence of
the city. Tetaldi, who was a Florentine soldier, tells us of his escape from

the slaughter immediately following the capture, and of his being picked up
out of the water by a Venetian ship.7
Pusculus was a citizen of Brescia. Though his account of the siege is given
in Latin verse, it contains many details of value of what he himself saw
which are not to be found elsewhere. His poem was never altogether lost
sight of, but until its publication by Ellisen,8 in 1857, with a useful
introduction, its historical value had not been recognised. The MS. from
which Ellisen made his copy is dated 1470.
The late Dr. Dethier, who devoted much time and intelligent study to the
topography and archæology of Constantinople, compiled four volumes of
documents relating to the siege, many of which were previously unknown.
Two of them were printed about 1870, but they can hardly be said to have
been published, and are only to be procured with difficulty. The remaining
two contain, besides Critobulus, the ‘Threnos,’ Hypsilantes, an Italian and a
Latin version of the ‘Lamentatio’ by Cardinal Isidore, an Italian version of
Leonard’s report to the Pope, and other documents of interest to which I
refer in my pages. These volumes were printed by the Buda-Pest Academy
but never published. I am indebted, however, to that learned body for a
copy.
I append a list of documents (other than the four principal which I have
described) relating to the siege now available to the historical student which
were unknown to Gibbon:
1. Zorzo (or Zorsi) Dolphin (or Zorsi Dolfin), ‘Assedio e presa di Constantinopoli nell’ anno 1453.’
This is mainly a translation from Leonard, but the author claims to have added what he heard
from other eye-witnesses of the siege. It was published by G. M. Thomas in the
‘Sitzungsberichte’ of the Bavarian Academy in 1868. Another version is given by Dethier in his
collection of documents relating to the siege, a collection which I refer to simply as Dethier’s
‘Siege.’
2. ‘Rapporto del Superiore dei Franciscani presente all’ assedio e alla presa di Constantinopoli.’ This
report was made immediately after the siege and has long been published, but apparently was
not known to Gibbon. Dethier also published it in his ‘Siege.’
3. ‘Epistola Ang. Johannis Zacchariae,’ Podestà of Pera, written within a month of the capture of the
city, was first published in 1827. The version revised by Edward Hopf and Dr. Dethier is the one
used by me.
4. Montaldo’s ‘De Constantinopolitano excidio’ is reproduced in Dethier’s ‘Siege,’ and contains
useful hints by an eye-witness.
5. Christoforo Riccherio, ‘La Presa de Constantinopoli,’ first published in Sansovino’s ‘Dell’ Historia
Universale,’ was republished with notes in Dethier’s ‘Siege,’ and is a valuable and brightly

written narrative.
6. Θρῆνος τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, was first published by Ellisen in ‘Analekten,’ Leipzig, 1857. If
the author was in Constantinople during the siege, he has not given a single item of information
which is of value to the historian. His long wail is curious and interesting, but otherwise useless.
7. The Θρῆνος of Hierax the Grand Logothetes, or ‘History of the Turkish Empire,’ though only
written near the end of the sixteenth century, has valuable topographical hints. It was translated
by H. E. Aristarchi Bey, the present Grand Logothetes, from a MS. existing in the Monastery of
the Holy Sepulchre at the Phanar, and edited by Dethier.
8. ‘Libro d’ Andrea Cambini Florentino della Origine de’ Turchi et Imperio delli Ottomanni.’ I am not
aware whether xiv this has been published at a later date than the copy in my possession, which
was printed in Florence in 1529. It was then published by the son of the writer, and Book II.,
which treats of the siege, suggests that the author has gained his information from spectators of
the siege. It contains many useful statements.
9. ‘A Slavic Account of the Siege,’ published by Streznevski, is judged by Monsieur Mijatovich, on
account of its peculiar idioms, to have been written by a Serbian or Bulgarian. He speaks of it as
the ‘Slavonic Chronicle.’ A translation and a slightly different version was published by Dethier
as the ‘Muscovite Chronicle.’ Though the narrative has been largely added to by subsequent
hands, there is reason to believe that it was written by an eye-witness of the siege.
10. Another Slavic version is conveniently spoken of as the ‘Memoirs of the Polish Janissary.’ Its
author, after serving with the Turks and, according to his own statement, being present at the
siege, withdrew to Poland. The original MS. was first published in 1828.

The Turkish authors available who speak of the siege are:
11. Sad-ud-din, ‘The Capture of Constantinople from the Tajut-Tevarikh (1590),’ translated into
English by E. J. W. Gibb (Glasgow, 1879). This work professes to be based on the accounts of
earlier Turkish historians.
12. ‘Tarich Muntechebati Evliya Chelibi,’ a translation of which is given in the elder Mordtmann’s
‘Eroberung.’
13. Ahmed Muktar Pasha’s ‘Conquest of Constantinople and the Establishment of the Ottomans in
Europe,’ brought out only in 1902, on the anniversary of the present sultan’s accession.
14. An Armenian ‘Mélodie Élégiaque,’ written by a monk named Philip, who was present at the
siege. This was printed in Lebeau’s ‘Histoire du Bas-Empire.’ Dethier published the original
version in Armenian.

I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Mordtmann’s studies of
the archæology and topography of Constantinople,9 and to Professor A. van
Millingen’s ‘Byzantine Constantinople’10 a work which is the most careful
study of the history of those parts of the walls and other portions of the city
treated of which has yet been published. I must also tender him sincere
thanks for many suggestions made in the course of friendly intercourse and
in the discussion of matters of mutual archæological interest, and for
permission to reproduce his map of Constantinople. All future writers on
the topography and archaeology of Constantinople will be under obligations

to Dr. Mordtmann and Professor van Millingen, who have worthily
continued the work of Gyllius and Du Cange.
A few words must be added as to the title of this book. Why, it may be
asked, should it be the ‘Destruction of the Greek Empire’? Why not follow
the example of the late Mr. Freeman, and of his distinguished successor,
Professor J. B. Bury, and speak of the ‘Later Roman Empire’? My plea is
one of confession and avoidance.
I admit that when Charles the Great, in 800, became Roman Emperor in the
West the imperial territory of which the capital was Constantinople may
correctly be spoken of as the Eastern Roman Empire. But I avoid
condemnation for not adopting this name and for not calling the empire
Roman by pleading that I am reverting to the practice of our fathers in the
West during many centuries, and by defending their practice. The Empire
has sometimes been described as Byzantine and sometimes as the Lower
Empire. But these names are undesirable, because the first has a vague and
doubtful meaning, since no two writers who employ it use it to cover the
same period; and the second has a derogatory signification which the
researches of Freeman and Professor Bury, Krumbacher, Schlumberger, and
other modern writers, have shown to be undeserved. The name ‘Roman’ has
more to recommend it. The Persians and the Arabs knew the empire simply
as Roman, and the overwhelming reputation of Rome led them to speak
even of Alexander the Great as ‘Iskender al Roumy.’ The name of Rome, or
Roum, given to Roumelia, and found in other places as far east as
Erzeroum, had been applied when the Latin element dominated the empire.
The tradition of Rome passed on to the Turks, and the inhabitants of the
empire were and are to them I-roum or Romans. The Byzantine writers
usually called themselves Romans. But the term Roman can hardly be
applied to the empire without distinguishing it as Eastern, and while it is
true that down to 1453 the empire was Roman in name, there is some
danger in employing the term of forgetting how far the New Rome and its
territory had become Hellenised, and that a large portion of the population
preferred the name Greek. There had been a long struggle within the empire
itself between those who wished to adopt the latter designation and those
who desired to call it Roman. The inhabitants of Greece were indeed for
centuries preceding and during the Crusades disloyal subjects of
Constantinople. Even during the reign of Heraclius (610 to 641), they

insisted upon being called Hellenes rather than Romans. From that time
onwards a contest was continued as to whether the name of Greek or
Roman should be applied to the population. The influence of the Greeks
henceforth was constantly working to Hellenise the empire. In the reign of
Irene, at the time when the Western Roman Empire commenced to have a
separate existence, Greek influence was especially strong. Lascaris, four
centuries later, when he made his stand at Nicaea after the Latin conquest,
spoke of the empire as that of Hellas. On the recovery of the city under
Michael, the Church generally employed the term Roman, but declared that
Greek and Roman might be employed indifferently. Various writers speak
of the Latins as Romans and of the Byzantines as Hellenes.11 Manuel
Bryennius represents the preacher in St. Sophia as calling upon his hearers
to remember their Greek ancestors and to defend their country as they had
done. At times the people were appealed to as the descendants alike of
Greeks and Romans.
As being a continuation of the Roman Empire whose capital was New
Rome, the empire is correctly called Roman, and the name has the
advantage of always keeping in view the continuity of Roman history. It
was the Eastern Roman Empire which declined and fell in 1453. But if we
admit that the empire continued to be Roman till 1453, it must be
remembered, not only that its characteristics had considerably changed, but
that to the men of the West it had come to be known as the Greek Empire.
Latin had been as completely forgotten as Norman French was by English
nobles in the time of Edward III. Greek had become the official language,
as did English in our own country. The inscriptions on the coins since the
time of Heraclius are in Greek. The Orthodox Church, which aided as much
as even law in binding the inhabitants of the country together, employed
Greek, and Greek almost exclusively, as its language, and, although the
great defenders of the term Roman as applied to the population are found
among its dignitaries, the Church was essentially Greek as opposed to
Roman, both in the character of its thought and teaching and in the
language it employed. Hence it is not surprising that to the West during all
the middle ages, the Empire was the Greek Empire, just as the Orthodox
Church was the Greek Church.12 The Empire and the Church were each
alike called Greek to distinguish them from the Empire and Church of the
West. It is in this general use of the word Greek that I find my justification

for speaking of the capture of Constantinople, and the events connected
with it, as the Destruction of the Greek Empire.13
I have only in conclusion to call the attention of the reader to one or two
matters connected with the authorities which I quote. I must plead that my
residence in Constantinople has not allowed me to refer to the uniform
series of Byzantine authors available in the great public libraries of Western
Europe. My edition of Phrantzes is that published in the Bonn series;
Pachymer, Cantacuzenus, Chalcondylas, Ducas, and their contemporaries,
are quoted from the Venetian edition of the Byzantine writers edited by Du
Cange. My references to Archbishop Leonard are almost always to the
version in the collection of Lonicerus. Dr Dethier, however, published a
contemporary Italian version which has certain important variations, and to
this I have occasionally referred. The editors of other authorities are
mentioned in the notes to the text.
I have sometimes abstained from discussing the trustworthiness of my
authorities, but have said once for all that their statements, especially in
regard to the numbers they represent as engaged in battle, of victims
slaughtered or captured, and the like, can rarely be regarded as satisfactory.
The means of controlling them seldom exist. Even in the case of Sir John
Maundeville, I have quoted him without hinting that a doubt of his very
existence has been uttered. Whether he lived and was or was not a traveller,
or whether his book was, as has been suggested, a kind of mediæval
Murray’s Guide, does not in the least affect the statements which I have
reproduced from it. The work of sifting the evidence, new and old, to
ascertain its value has been long and tedious, and I must leave to other
students of the same period to say whether I have succeeded in selecting
what is of use and in rejecting only what is valueless. To have attempted a
critical examination of every important statement which I quote would have
extended my book to an inordinate length, and in regard to most of them the
reader will not find much difficulty in arriving at his own conclusions as to
their trustworthiness.
Edwin Pears.
Constantinople, February 1903.

CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
The Latin empire (1204–1261) and its struggles with and final overthrow by the Greeks of
Nicaea
1
CHAPTER II
Condition of and difficulties in reconstructing the empire: difficulties arising (a) from attempts
by Latins to recover the empire, (b) from Catalan Grand Company
22
CHAPTER III
The Turks: their entry into Asia Minor: not at first exclusively Mahometan: their characteristics:
Othman founds a dynasty: progress of Moslems in Europe and Asia Minor: capture of
Brousa in 1326 52
CHAPTER IV
Dynastic struggles in empire: appeals to Pope for aid; reigns of Andronicus the Second, John
Cantacuzenus, and John; repeated failure of efforts by Popes to induce Western Powers to
assist in checking Moslem advance 65

CHAPTER V
Reign of Orchan: struggles with empire; its successes and reverses; invasions of Tartars. Reign
of Murad: defeat of Serbians and Bulgarians by Turks; battle of Cossovo-Pol and
assassination of Murad
97
CHAPTER VI
Reign of Manuel: encroachments of Turks; Manuel visits West, Sultan Bajazed summoned by
Timour; friendly relations between Manuel and Mahomet the First; John associated with
Manuel. Siege of Constantinople by Murad; its failure. Efforts at union; misconceptions in
West regarding Greek Church; constancy of attempts at union; negotiations for meeting of
Council of Church. Internal struggles in Latin Church. Emperor invited by both parties;
accepts Pope’s invitation; meeting of Council at Ferrara and Florence; union accomplished;
John returns to capital; divisions in Greek Church
109
CHAPTER VII
131
Progress of Turks between 1391 and 1425: Sultan Bajazed’s reign: conquests in Europe:
Bulgarian kingdom ended: Western armies defeated at Nicopolis: Anatolia-Hissar built:
capital threatened: summons by Timour to Bajazed: Timour’s progress: reply of Bajazed:
battle of Angora and crushing defeat of Turks: further progress of Timour: death of Bajazed,

1403: alarm in Western Europe: departure of Timour: struggle between the sons of Bajazed:
ultimate success of Mahomet: his good understanding with Manuel: death of Mahomet,
1420: accession of Murad: war with empire: siege of Constantinople, 1422: death of
Manuel, 1425: triumphal progress of Murad: he besieges and takes Salonica: besieges
Belgrade but fails: combined movement under Hunyadi against Murad: battle of Slivnitza,
1443, and defeat of Turks: Murad sues for peace: treaty made with Ladislaus: violated by
Christians: battle of Varna, 1444: Murad ravages Morea: Iskender Bey, his origin: captures
Croia: Hunyadi again attacks Murad: defeated at Cossovo-pol, 1448: reasons for failure of
Christian attempts: John has to forego joining Western combination against Turks: death of
Murad, 1451: Mahomet the Second becomes Sultan

CHAPTER VIII
Causes leading to decay of empire: not due to demoralisation of Court; internal and external
causes; Latin conquest and form of government had produced internal dissensions and
checked assimilation of hostile races; method of Turkish conquest and its fatal
consequences; ravages of black death; population of capital in 1453; its commerce; relations
of people with government; resemblance to Russia; difficulty of obtaining idea of domestic
life
180
CHAPTER IX
Accession of Constantine Dragases; Patriarch Gregory deposed; renewed attempt to obtain aid
from the West; emperor meets with little success; arrival of Cardinal Isidore; reconciliation
service December 12, 1452, in Hagia Sophia; dissensions regarding it
201
CHAPTER X
Character of Mahomet the Second; receives deputation from city; returns to Adrianople from
Asia Minor; his reforms; builds Roumelia-Hissar; rejects overtures from emperor; castle
completed, August 1452; war declared; Mahomet returns to Adrianople; he discloses his
designs for siege of city. Constantine’s preparations for defence; arrival of six Venetian
ships; aid requested from Venice; Justiniani arrives, January 1453; boom across harbour
placed in position. Turkish army, estimate of; notice of Janissaries; mobility of army;
religious spirit of; casting of great cannon; Turkish fleet arrives in Bosporus; description of
vessels composing it. Mahomet’s army marches to city; offer of peace 206
CHAPTER XI
Topography of Constantinople; disposition of Mahomet’s forces and cannon; estimate of fighting
men under emperor; Venetians and Genoese: disparity in numbers: arms and equipment:
attacks on Therapia and Prinkipo 237

CHAPTER XII
THE SIEGE
Investment by Turks; first assault fails; attempt to force boom; attempt to capture ships bringing
aid; gallant fight and defeat of Turkish fleet; Turkish admiral degraded; transport of Turkish
ships across Pera into the Golden Horn
254
CHAPTER XIII

Constantine alleged to have sued for peace; attempt to destroy Turkish ships in the Golden Horn;
postponed; made and fails; murder of captives; reprisals; operations in Lycus valley; bridge
built over Golden Horn; sending to seek Venetian fleet; proposal that emperor should leave
city; attacks on boom; jealousy between Venetians and Genoese; new assaults fail both at
walls and boom; attempts to undermine walls; construction of a turret; destroyed by
besieged; failure of vessel sent to find Venetian fleet; unlucky omens 277
CHAPTER XIV
Dissensions in city: between Greeks themselves; between Greeks and Italians; between Genoese
and Venetians; charge of treachery against Genoese examined; failure of Serbia and
Hungary to render aid; preparations for a general assault; damages done to the landward
walls; construction of stockade 300
CHAPTER XV
Last days of empire: sultan again hesitates; message inviting surrender; Turkish council called;
decides against raising siege; proclamation granting three days’ plunder; sultan’s final
preparations; his address to the pashas and last orders to generals. Preparations in city:
religious processions: Constantine’s address to leaders and to Venetians and Genoese; last
Christian service in St. Sophia: defenders take up their final stations at walls, and close
gates behind them: emperor’s last inspection of his forces 313

CHAPTER XVI
General assault: commenced by Bashi-Bazouks; they are defeated; Anatolians attack—are also
driven back; attacks in other places fail; Janissaries attack; Kerkoporta incident; Justiniani
wounded and retires; emperor’s alarm; stockade captured; death of Constantine: his
character; capture of Constantinople
334
CHAPTER XVII
Attacks in other parts of the city: by Zagan and Caraja; by fleet; the brothers Bocchiardi hold
their own; panic when entry of Turks became known; incident of Saint Theodosia’s church;
massacre and subsequent pillage; crowd in Saint Sophia captured; horrors of sack; numbers
killed or captured; endeavours to escape from city; panic in Galata; Mahomet’s entry; Saint
Sophia becomes a mosque; fate of leading prisoners: attempts to repeople capital 358
CHAPTER XVIII
Capture of Constantinople a surprise to Europe; conquest of Trebizond; summary of its history.
Character and conduct of Mahomet: as conqueror; he increases Turkish fleet; as
administrator; as legislator; his recklessness of human life; as student; was he a religious
fanatic? summary 386
CHAPTER XIX
399
Dispersion of Greek scholars, and their influence upon revival of learning; Greek a bond of
union among peoples of empire; disappearance of books after Latin conquest; departure of
scholars to Italy begins after 1204; their presence stimulates revival of learning; enthusiasm
aroused in Italy for study of Greek; students from Constantinople everywhere welcomed;

increased numbers leave after Moslem conquest; Renaissance largely aided by Greek
studies; movement passes into Northern Europe; MSS. taken from Constantinople

CHAPTER XX
Conclusion; the capture epoch-marking; alarm in Europe; disastrous results; upon Christian
subjects and on Eastern Churches; demoralisation of both; poverty the principal result;
degradation of Churches: two great services rendered by the Churches; results on Turks:
powerless to assimilate conquered peoples or their civilisation
414
APPENDICES

I. Note on Romanus Gate and chief place of final assault 429

II. Where did the sea-fight of April 20, 1453, take place? 436

III. Note on transport of Mahomet’s ships. What was the route adopted? 443

IV. The influence of religion on Greeks and Moslems respectively 447

INDEX 459

ILLUSTRATIONS
Approximate Restoration of the Land Walls of Theodosius the Second between
the Golden and Second Military Gates Between
pages
Present Condition of a Portion of the Landward Walls 240–1
from photograph by M. Irenian of Constantinople.

Mahomet the Conqueror
from painting by Bellini. Between
Mahomet the Conqueror pages
from medallion by Bellini in the British Museum. 388–1

MAPS
Map illustrating Progress of Turks during Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Centuries Facing p. 1
Map of Byzantine Constantinople 237
Sketch Map showing the Disposition of Turkish Troops during the Last Days of
Siege; May 1453 335

Map illustrating Progress of Turks during 13th., 14th., & 15th. Centuries.

DESTRUCTION
OF
THE GREEK EMPIRE

CHAPTER I
THE LATIN EMPIRE (1204–1261) AND ITS STRUGGLES WITH AND FINAL OVERTHROW
BY THE GREEKS OF NICAEA

The later Roman Empire and its capital Constantinople never recovered
from the blow inflicted by the Fourth Crusade in 1204. A huge filibustering
expedition had been gathered together at Venice under pretext of making an
attack upon the Saracens in Egypt. Under the leadership of Boniface,
Marquis of Montferrat, and Dandolo, the famous doge of Venice, the
expedition had been diverted from its purpose, and, in spite of the strongest
possible protests by Innocent the Third, had attacked Constantinople. The
strength of the empire had been weakened by a hundred and fifty years’
resistance to the hordes of Asia, during which it had served as the bulwark
of Europe. Its reputation had been lessened by thirty years of dynastic wars,
during which the government had allowed its fleet to decay so that it was
unable to resist the Venetians and Crusaders. The result was that, for the
first time in its long history, the city was captured. There then followed the
plunder and division of its enormous wealth—a large part of which found
its way to the West, while perhaps a still larger portion was destroyed—the
appointment of a Latin emperor in Constantinople, and the partition of such
portions of the empire as could be occupied among the conquerors.
Baldwin, a Belgian, was elected emperor. An
arrangement for the division of the spoil had been made Baldwin, 1204–
1205.
by the leaders before the attack on the city, and this
seems to have been fairly carried out. To Baldwin were assigned the two
imperial palaces in Constantinople and one fourth of all that should be
captured within the city and throughout the empire. The remaining three
fourths were to be divided equally between the Crusaders and the Venetians.
The difficulties of the conquerors began with this further division of the
spoil. The task of parcelling out the empire was almost hopeless. It was next
to impossible to accomplish such a partition, even on
paper, because of the ignorance of the Western Difficulties
regarding division
conquerors of the empire they had destroyed. Its extent of empire.
was so great, the difficulty of communication so

extreme, and ignorance of geography so profound, that the conquerors did
not know what there was to divide. They sent into the provinces to obtain
information as to the revenues and general condition of the country so that
the partition might be fairly made; but, without waiting for the information,
they proceeded to divide up the countries and provinces which they
imagined to be within the empire. In their happy ignorance they drew lots
for Alexandria and for the various countries along the north shore of the
Mediterranean as well as for Georgia, Persia, and Assyria. They competed
for the possession of Konia itself, the capital of the Seljukian Turks.
It was still more difficult to make a partition which should represent
territory which could come at once into the occupation of the Crusaders.
The one system of land tenure with which they were acquainted was the
feudal. The lands of the empire must therefore be divided into fiefs and the
barons and persons of higher and of lower degree must have grants
according to their rank. But though Constantinople was in the possession of
the men of the West, they held no more of the remainder of the empire than
was within the actual sight of the barons and the comparatively small
bodies of retainers who were under them. The Greeks—or, as the subjects
of the later empire still generally called themselves, the Romans—had no
intention of recognising either the lordship of the barons who had become
their feudal superiors or the overlordship of Baldwin. They knew nothing of
a feudal system, and recognised the representatives of the late empire as
having a first claim to their service. They were ready to follow almost any
leader against men whom they knew only as invaders, belonging to a
different race, speaking a different language, and professing a form of
Christianity which was hateful to them because the conquerors tried to
impose it upon them.
The difficulties of the Latin empire were both internal and external.
The men from the West soon found that they were too
few to hold the country. Some of the Crusaders had Dissensions among
leaders.
insisted upon leaving the city in order to proceed to the
Holy Land in fulfilment of their vows and to avoid the censure of Innocent.
Others were anxious to return home with their share of the spoils. ‘Never
since the world was created,’ says Villehardouin the historian, who took an
active part in the capture of the city, ‘was there so much booty gained in
one city. Each man took the house which pleased him, and there were

enough for all. Those who were poor found themselves suddenly rich.’ If
they remained they had hardships to face which as the possessors of newly
obtained wealth they would rather avoid. As soon as new dangers appeared
the numbers of those who wished to get away increased. During the very
first year of Baldwin’s reign, his army on its retreat from an expedition
against the Bulgarians found at Rodosto seven thousand men at arms who
had quitted the capital and were leaving the country. It was in vain that a
cardinal and the leaders sent by the army, among whom was Villehardouin
himself, implored them even with tears to remain, for ‘Never,’ said these
leaders, ‘would they be able to succour a country in so great a need.’14 The
most favourable answer that they could obtain was that a reply would be
given on the morrow. The deserters set sail in the night without even giving
the promised response to the prayer made to them.
The internal difficulties were increased by the jealousy which existed
between the leaders of the Latins themselves. All through the journey to
Constantinople before the capture of the city, the Crusaders and Venetians
had mistrusted each other. Boniface, the leader of the Crusade, considered
himself ill treated because he had not been named emperor. Though
defeated, he had a large number of adherents. To him had been assigned
territory in Asia Minor. He applied to exchange it for the kingdom of
Salonica, alleging that as he had married the widow of the Emperor Isaac,
who was the sister of the King of Hungary, he would be at Salonica in a
better position to aid the emperor. His request was granted. Baldwin,
however, did not trust him, and, apparently under the impression that it was
the intention of Boniface to establish an independent sovereignty, insisted
on accompanying him to his newly acquired capital. To this course
Boniface objected so strongly that when the emperor started for Salonica,
Boniface not only refused to accompany him but went off towards
Adrianople, captured Didymotica, and laid siege to the former city. The
Greeks flocked to his standard, possibly being induced to do so by the
belief that as he had married the widow of Isaac he was entitled to their
allegiance.
As soon as Dandolo, Count Louis, and the other nobles who had remained
in Constantinople heard what Marquis Boniface was doing, they at once
took counsel in ‘parlement’ as to the measures to be adopted: ‘for,’ says
Villehardouin, ‘they thought that they would lose all the conquests they had

made.’ They decided to send a knight to Boniface without delay, and the
historian was himself chosen for the mission. He went at once to Adrianople
and succeeded in persuading the marquis to submit the questions between
him and the emperor to the arbitration of Dandolo and Count Louis, and for
the present to cease hostilities. Meantime the emperor had occupied
Salonica. As soon as he heard of the siege of Adrianople he at once
hastened to its relief and ‘pour faire tout le mal qu’il pourrait au marquis.’
On the way he met the messengers from the city, who besought him to
submit his case, as Boniface had consented to do, to arbitration, at the same
time plainly telling him that Dandolo, Count Louis of Blois, and the other
barons would not tolerate war between him and Boniface. The emperor
hesitated and consulted his council. Some of the members urged that the
message was an outrage and advised resistance. Violent language (‘grosses
paroles’) was used, but the emperor, who was unwilling to risk the hostility
of so strong a combination as Dandolo and Louis, gave way to the extent of
stating that he would undertake not to attack Boniface until he went to
Constantinople, although he would not pledge himself to refer the questions
between them to arbitration. Shortly after, when a peace was patched up
between them, it was under conditions which show that neither party trusted
the other. Villehardouin undertook to hold Didymotica until he knew by a
trusted messenger that Salonica had been handed over to Boniface.
Nor were the external differences which at once presented themselves less
serious. The history of Constantinople and the Latin empire during the
period between 1204 and 1260 is indeed that of a series of struggles
between Baldwin and his successors on the imperial throne, on the one side,
and the leaders of the Greek race who had refused to recognise the authority
of the invaders, on the other.
The Western barons seemed to have thought that with
the conquest of the capital the whole empire would fall Opposition of
Greek population.
to their lot. They were soon undeceived. In Macedonia
and in Epirus Greek leaders appeared, who rallied to them all who were
indisposed to accept new rulers. At Trebizond on the Black Sea, and at
Nicaea, the once famous city of the Creed, the Greeks flocked from the
capital and its neighbourhood, and soon there were rulers of these cities
who assumed the title of emperor.

The most important of those who refused to accept the
Latin rule was Theodore Lascaris. He had been the last Empire of Nicaea.
of the Greek nobles to leave the city when the invaders Theodore Lascaris,
1204–1222.
captured it. He made his way to Nicaea, and was
followed by many Greeks. Able, courageous, and patriotic, he was soon
recognised by the notables as the fittest man to have rule among them, and,
though without hereditary claim to the imperial throne, he aspired to be
emperor and was accepted as best suited to receive that dignity. Two years
after the capture of Constantinople, a new patriarch was elected, who
consented to live at Nicaea and who amid as much ceremony as if the
coronation had taken place in St. Sophia placed the crown on the head of
Theodore in the church of the same name at Nicaea. The prudence and
judgment of the new emperor did much to rally the best of his countrymen
around him, and justified the choice made in electing him to the imperial
throne. The Greek priests flocked to the city from all parts of Western Asia
Minor as well as from Thrace.
Nevertheless, his task was beset with difficulties. He had enemies on all
sides, pretenders of his own race, the Latin emperor and the sultan of the
Seljukian Turks. The latter, whose capital was at Konia, had no idea of
allowing any neighbour to become formidable. A Greek pretender held the
country to the west of Nicaea. The Latin emperor and barons chose to
regard Theodore as a rebel because he would not make submission. After
unsuccessful attempts against him by Baldwin and his successor, Theodore
was allowed in 1207 to remain in possession of Ismidt (the ancient
Nicomedia) and Cyzicus for a period of two years. He employed the period
in strengthening and extending his empire. At the end of it, Henry the
brother of Baldwin, whom he succeeded as emperor, made an alliance with
the sultan of the Seljukian Turks: that is to say, the Crusaders who had
justified themselves to Innocent the Third for attacking a Christian city on
the ground that the Greek emperors had allowed the Moslems to have a
mosque within the city, now found themselves under the necessity of
joining forces with the infidel to attack a Christian prince.
Upon the declaration of war by the sultan, Theodore pushed forward into
the valley of the Meander, and a battle was fought which, if the Byzantine
authorities are to be trusted, was decided in single combat between the two
sovereigns. The sultan was killed, and the empire of Nicaea was saved. The

Emperor Henry, however, when he heard of the extent of the loss in
Theodore’s army exclaimed, ‘The Greek is not conqueror: he is ruined.’
So far from being ruined, his success caused many Greeks to flock into his
empire from Constantinople. When, in 1214, the Emperor Henry again
declared war, Theodore was ready for him; and as the Greeks in Epirus had
commenced a vigorous attack on the crusading barons in Macedonia, Henry
was glad to make a peace which left Theodore undisputed master of a
territory bounded on the west by a line from Heraclea on the Black Sea to
Ismidt, thence to Cyzicus and to the coast just north of Pergamos. The
fruitful valleys of the Meander, the Cayster, and the Hermus marked his
boundaries on the south-west.
Theodore died in 1222. The first duty of the Greeks when driven out of
Constantinople was to make themselves secure against the conquerors and
to prevent the progress of the crusading armies into Asia Minor. This duty
had been effectually done by Theodore. During the eighteen years of his
reign he had made his capital and its beautiful neighbourhood the rallying-
place of what was best in the Greek-speaking populations of Asia Minor
and of Thrace. He had checked the progress of the crusaders into Asia
Minor and had left to his successors the task of working for the recovery of
Constantinople.
Meantime, the history of the Latin conquerors of
Constantinople had been one of almost continuous Henry succeeds
Baldwin, 1205–
disaster. The first Emperor Baldwin had been lost in an 1216.
encounter with the Bulgarians near Adrianople in April
1205, and was probably killed. As his fate remained doubtful, his brother
Henry acted as regent for a year and was then crowned emperor. Shortly
after the commencement of his reign in 1207, Boniface, Marquis of
Montferrat and King of Salonica, was killed in a skirmish. Henry seems to
have realised that in a policy of conciliation towards the Greeks lay the only
hope of the continuance of his empire. He made peace with the Bulgarians
and concluded an arrangement with both the emperor of Nicaea and the
Greek prince who had made himself recognised as despot in Epirus. He
employed Greeks in the public service. He refused to take part in the
persecution of the Greeks who would not obey the decrees of the pope’s
legate. He allowed them to employ the Greek language in their services,

and restrained the pretensions of the Roman priests. Unfortunately for the
Latin empire, the reign of the chivalrous Henry lasted only ten years.
He was succeeded by Peter of Courtenay, who was
invited by the barons to occupy the throne in the absence Peter succeeds,
1217–1219.
of male heirs of Baldwin and his brother Henry. Peter
left France with 140 knights and 5,500 men at arms, whom he had obtained
with the aid of his royal kinsman, Philip Augustus. The reports of the rich
plunder which had been obtained in the capture of the city had already
induced many French knights to leave their native lands to take service in
the empire, but the detachment with which Peter crossed the Alps was the
largest which had left the West for such purpose.
The Venetians bargained to transport them across the Adriatic on condition
that they would assist in recovering Durazzo from Theodore, the Greek
despot of Epirus. After a useless assault on that city, Peter started with his
followers on a journey across the peninsula to Salonica. He and his host
were soon lost amid the mountains of Epirus. Their provisions were
exhausted. They found the passes fortified, and their only chance of life was
to surrender to Theodore, who had held the country in defiance of the regent
who was governing in the name of the son of Boniface. Peter was detained
in captivity, and his death is as mysterious as that of the first Latin emperor.
He probably perished in prison in 1218.
Peter’s successor, Robert of Courtenay, succeeded in
finding his way to Constantinople, though not across Robert, 1219–1228.
Macedonia, accompanied by a number of troops
furnished at the request of Pope Honorius the Third. His reign was a series
of disasters. He made a treaty of peace with Theodore of Nicaea in order
that he might devote all his attention to the defeat of the other Theodore, the
despot of Epirus. The latter had been denounced by the pope for his
detention of Peter and of the legate who accompanied him. Honorius indeed
had invited the princes of the West to undertake a crusade for their
deliverance. When, however, the legate was released, Peter seems to have
been forgotten. The despot Theodore made a well-concerted attack upon
Salonica, captured it, and was proclaimed emperor in 1222. Robert led all
his forces against this new claimant for the imperial title and was badly
beaten. Theodore pushed on to Adrianople and hoisted his standard on the
walls of that city almost without opposition.

There were thus in 1222 four persons claiming to be emperors, and
occupying separate portions of what had been twenty years earlier the
Roman Empire in the East. These were Robert at Constantinople, Theodore
at Nicaea, another Theodore at Salonica, and Alexis at Trebizond.
The history of the next forty years (1222–1261) is that of
the strengthening of the Greek empire at Nicaea and the Nicaea, success of
John Ducas
decadence and downfall of the other so-called empires, Vataces, 1222–
and especially of that of the Latin Crusaders in 1254.
Constantinople. The successor of Theodore Lascaris was
John Ducas Vataces, who during a reign of thirty-three years fortified his
position at Nicaea and increased the prosperity of his empire. He restricted
the boundaries of the Latin territory in Asia Minor to the peninsula formed
by a line parallel to the Bosporus from Ismidt to the Black Sea. He rendered
property and life safe, and in consequence the Greek population continued
to flock into his territory. Even French soldiers in considerable numbers
quietly slipped away from Constantinople to take service with Vataces. At
the commencement of his reign he was attacked by the newly appointed
emperor, Robert of Courtenay, and in the combat which ensued not only
was Vataces successful, but the last of the knights who had taken part in the
capture of the city were left dead on the field. Until Robert’s death in 1228,
Nicaea had few troubles with the Latin empire.
Robert’s successor was a boy of eleven, who continued
nominally emperor under the title of Baldwin the Second Latin empire. John
of Brienne, 1228–
for upwards of thirty years, but the Latin knights wisely 1237. Baldwin II.,
placed power in the hands of John de Brienne. Indeed, 1237–1261.
the crusading leaders seem throughout the whole Latin
occupation to have assumed a large measure of the imperial authority. The
period is contemporary with that of the barons who resisted King John in
England, and who continued to assert their independence under the reign of
Henry the Third. The French barons in Constantinople had much of the
same spirit, with the additional incentive to independence that, as the
emperors were of recent creation, the glamour which had already gathered
about the kingly office in England and France was absent. The emperor was
indeed nothing more than primus inter pares, and his own designs were
often set aside for those of his associates. No one can doubt that they acted

wisely in appointing John de Brienne, but even he, with all his experience
and caution, failed as his predecessor had done when he attacked Nicaea.
The courage and ability of the old Crusader, who was already eighty years
of age, hardly retarded the decay of the Latin empire. Its needs were great,
and accordingly Baldwin the Second was sent on a visit to the pope and to
the Western courts to obtain further supplies of men and money. Indeed, the
greater part of his reign was occupied by three of such
journeys. His first visit to France was in 1237. Hardly Baldwin visits
had he arrived in Paris when he learned the death of France,
John de Brienne. The messenger who brought the tidings told a terrible
story of the distress in the imperial city. The barons and soldiers15 dared not
venture outside the walls. The supply of food had run so short that many of
the gentlemen of France who were charged with its defence disguised
themselves and escaped by sea or, notwithstanding that the country was full
of dangers, endeavoured to make their way by land to their own country.
The peril was so great that Baldwin was assured that if aid were not sent the
city could not resist an attack. Upon these tidings Baldwin did his utmost to
obtain aid. He was received with honour wherever he went, but he received
little else. In 1238, he paid a visit to England. On his landing at Dover he
was asked how he presumed to enter the country without
the permission of its independent sovereign, Henry the and England.
Third. Henry had had enough trouble with Crusaders.
John de Brienne, who had been in England, had obtained aid from the king
and had been honourably received. On his return to France he had joined
with Philip Augustus against England. Henry, however, sent word to
Baldwin that as he had arrived without troops he might come on to London.
After receiving this permission he paid a visit to the king and finally left
England with the miserable sum of seven hundred marks.
The pope had taken Baldwin’s cause greatly to heart. He
enjoined all Christian princes to give him aid. He Pope supports Latin
empire.
ordered the leading archbishops of the West to publish a
new Crusade against the Greek schismatics. He directed part of the Peter’s
pence to be given for the furtherance of the Crusade and ordered that the
money which St. Louis with pious zeal had extorted from the Jews as
obtained by usury should be employed for the same purpose. He begged the
king to direct that one third of the revenues of the churches should be thus

employed, and he wrote to the king of England with a similar request. In
1238 John de Bethune started from France with men and money. The
expedition, however, came to grief. Its leader died at Venice and the army
melted away, very few ever arriving at the Bosporus.
The character of the news from Constantinople
continued constantly to be more and more distressing. Decay of Latin
empire.
The revenue was yearly decreasing. The money obtained
in Europe was already spent, and the knights were driven to desperate
expedients to obtain more. Copper was torn from the domes of the churches
and other public buildings to be converted into coin. Empty houses were
pulled down to supply fuel. The sacred relics, which in the eyes of the
Crusaders constituted not only the most valuable treasures of the city but
the talisman of its safety, were sold to meet pressing needs. The Sacred
Crown of Thorns had been pledged for a sum of about
seven thousand pounds, and when the time came for Sale of relics.
redeeming it, the Latins were not able to find the money.
A Venetian endeavoured to obtain it in order to add to the prosperity of the
Bride of the Seas, but Baldwin, possibly out of gratitude to Saint Louis of
France, and with the object of obtaining a larger sum, preferred that it
should be sent to France. After considerable difficulty and many
negotiations, the sacred relic was redeemed and taken with solemn
procession from Venice to Paris, where the king himself, clothed in
penitential garments and barefoot, went out to meet it and to accompany it
to its temporary resting-place. This was in 1239. Baldwin received from
Louis, in recompense of his labour to obtain so valuable a prize, the sum of
ten thousand marks.
Nor was this the only relic which the crusading empire was obliged to
convert into money. A large portion of the true cross, the lance, the sponge,
and other objects, the parting with which must have cost Baldwin and his
barons many a regret, were also sent to France in order to raise money.16
By July 1239 Baldwin had collected in the West all the money and forces
available and started for Constantinople. The number of his army was
greatly exaggerated by the rumours which preceded it and greatly alarmed
the Greeks at Nicaea. He arrived at Constantinople at the end of December.
John Vataces, in consequence of these rumours and as a precaution, allied
himself with the Bulgarians. The armies of the two states attacked

Constantinople. The Venetians saved the city by arriving
in time to make it necessary to raise the siege. Then the Prosperity of
Nicene empire.
Bulgarians made friends with the Latins and allowed a
band of Comans (or Tur-comans) who had been driven over the Danube by
the Mongols to pass through Bulgaria and take service with the Latins. The
emperor of Nicaea could, however, play a similar game, and he induced a
band of the same race, who formed excellent light cavalry, to settle on the
banks of the Meander and in Phrygia.
John Vataces succeeded, partly by force, partly by persuasion, in inducing
the despot of Salonica to abandon the title of emperor and to recognise
Nicaea as the true representative of the former empire of Constantine.
Vataces thereupon became acknowledged ruler of the kingdom of Salonica
from the Aegean to the Adriatic.
Meantime the wealth and population of Constantinople
were diminishing every day. Its commerce had almost Decay of
Constantinople.
gone. What was left was in the hands of the Venetians.
No taxes could be levied on the poverty-stricken population. The Greeks of
the country around Constantinople, who had been the food-producers and
the source of revenue to the merchants of the capital, fled from the constant
harass of war and invasions, now by Latins, now by Bulgarians, and now by
Greeks, into Asia Minor, where they could labour in the fields or trade in
peace and quietness.
The population in other parts of the country were in like straits. The
continual money difficulties among the Latin knights and the Crusaders
generally caused a widespread spirit of lawlessness. Necessity compelled
them to live on the country they were passing through, and wherever they
were under the command of a weak ruler, pillage was common and almost
unchecked. Before men thus lawless, poor peasants fled in alarm across the
Marmora to be not only among their own people but where life and
property were secure.
As illustrating the lawlessness among the Latin nobles, a story told of the
Emperor Robert himself is significant. He was engaged to marry the
daughter of Vataces, a marriage which promised obvious advantages to the
Latin empire. He preferred, however, a lady who was affianced to a knight
of Burgundy. Her mother had acquiesced in her throwing over her fiancé in

favour of the young emperor. The Burgundian and his friends forced their
way into the palace, threw the mother into the sea, and brutally disfigured
the face of the girl. The barons approved of the deed, and the king went
whining to the pope to condemn the wrong-doers, since he himself was
powerless to avenge the insult offered to him.
Under such conditions of lawlessness, capital fled the country. The Latin
government had once more to resort to every possible device for raising
money, and the ornaments of the churches and other public buildings were
sent to the melting-pot or to auction.
While disaster and decay marked the condition of things in Constantinople,
Nicaea continued to increase in prosperity. The city itself, in a healthy
situation on the beautiful lake of Ascanius, had under the rule of John
Vataces already become wealthy. Taxes were light because the revenue was
not squandered, and the emperor had carried into the public expenditure the
same habits of carefulness which he displayed in the management of his
own private estates. It is recorded of him, as an illustration of his thrift, that
on presenting the empress with a coronet decked with jewels he explained
to her that it had been bought with money exclusively obtained from the
sale of eggs produced on his own estates. He paid especial attention to
agriculture, and, though distinguished as a warrior, set the example of
attending personally to his farm, his flocks and herds, the cultivation of his
fields, and the welfare of his labourers. We may excuse his sumptuary laws
for the reason that the object was to check the luxury of the nobles and to
encourage home manufactures. When he died, in 1254, after a reign of
thirty-three years, Nicaea had deservedly obtained the reputation of being
the chief city of all Greek-speaking people, whether in Europe or in Asia,
the city to which the people lifted up their eyes in confidence of a speedy
return to the queen city on the shores of the Bosporus.
The reign of Theodore Lascaris the Second, son of John
Vataces, lasted only four years, and though he lacked the Theodore II. of
Nicaea, 1254–1258.
ability of his father, and was a sufferer from epilepsy, the
empire of Nicaea continued to prosper. His military administration was able
and successful. He continued the policy of Vataces in endeavouring to
induce or to compel all the Greeks in the Balkan peninsula to come under
his rule. It may be fairly said of him that on his death, in 1258, the position
of Nicaea was stronger than on his accession.

During these two prosperous reigns in the Greek empire that of the
Crusaders had continued to go from bad to worse. In spite of the anathemas
of the popes against those who should attack Constantinople, the Bulgarians
and the Greeks made war upon it whenever they thought the opportunity
favourable. In spite of the exhortation of the popes to Western Europe to
furnish men and money, and of the fact that both were furnished, the empire
grew weaker in men and its financial situation became worse.
We have seen that Baldwin returned to Constantinople with an army which
is said to have numbered 30,000 men, and which in any case was
sufficiently large to alarm the Nicene emperor. But these reinforcements
seem to have been a burden rather than an advantage, and the chief of the
crusading empire had to shock Christian Europe by consenting to give his
niece in marriage to the sultan of Konia in order to secure an alliance with
him against the Greek emperor. Baldwin’s necessities
again compelled him to visit France. He was once more Second visit of
received with honour, and at the Council of Lyons, in Baldwin to West.
1245, he was given the position of supreme honour, and was placed on the
right hand of the pope. All, indeed, that the sovereign pontiff could
accomplish in favour of his guest in this Council was done. An alliance
which the Emperor Frederick had made with John Vataces was denounced,
and the head of the Holy Roman Empire was solemnly excommunicated.
While nothing was said about the alliance with the Seljukian Turk,
Frederick was condemned for allowing his daughter to be married to a
schismatic Greek. Large sums were ordered to be contributed by the
dignitaries of the Church and by the religious orders for the succour of the
empire. St. Louis again gave Baldwin a welcome, and entertained him at his
court during nearly two years while aid was being collected. The pope gave
power to absolve from sins those who should join the Crusade or contribute
to the support of the empire. But, as Matthew Paris says, his empire
nevertheless daily decayed. It was not till 1248 that Baldwin returned to his
impoverished capital. Perhaps the lowest depth of degradation was attained
by him when in 1259 his necessity was so great that he was obliged to put
his only son in pledge to certain Venetian nobles as security for the payment
of what he had borrowed. The unfortunate lad was taken to Venice, and his
father was unable to redeem him until after the recapture of Constantinople.

Before the death, in 1258, of Theodore Lascaris the Second, the ruler of
Nicaea was acknowledged emperor, not merely throughout the northern part
of Asia Minor, but in the kingdom of Macedonia, and even in a
considerable portion of Thrace. His successor, John, was
a boy. John’s guardian was Michael Palaeologus, who John Ducas
was proclaimed emperor in January 1259–60. Seeing Emperor of Nicaea,
1258–1260.
that there was some disorder in Nicaea, occasioned by
the disputes between those in favour of the boy, who, in the ordinary course
of succession, would have been emperor, and those who had recognised that
the times were too critical to allow him to reign, and had
consequently followed Michael, the Latin emperor, Michael
Baldwin, judged the moment opportune to stipulate for Palaeologus.
concessions. Accordingly he sent a mission to Nicaea to learn what Michael
would give in order to avoid war. The historian Acropolitas, who was at
Nicaea at the time, records what passed. The emperor mocked the
ambassadors. They asked that he should surrender Salonica. The reply was
that that city was the emperor’s birthplace; how could he part with it? They
suggested Seres. The emperor responded that what they were asking was
neither just nor decent, since he had received it from his father. ‘Give us,
then, Bolero.’ But that was the emperor’s hunting-ground, and could not be
spared. ‘What, then, will you give us?’ ‘Nothing whatever,’ replied the
emperor. ‘But if you want peace with me, it is well, because you know me,
and that I can fight. Pay me part of the tribute collected at Constantinople,
and we shall be at peace.’ No better terms were to be had, and the
ambassadors left.
Michael probably understood that his refusal would be followed by war. He
therefore visited the fortifications already gained in Thrace by the Greeks,
strengthened them, and within a few months the Latin empire was reduced
to the occupation of Constantinople and a small strip around it. In the
following year, 1260, Michael’s general, Strategopulus, was entrusted with
the command in Thrace. He stormed Selymbria (the modern Silivria), and
tried but failed to capture Galata, which was already in the occupation of
the Genoese. Thereupon a truce was made for one year.
Seeing that the Venetians, whose great power in the Levant dates from the
fall of Constantinople in 1204, in which they had played so important a
part, still maintained their connection with the empire on the Bosporus and,

indeed, continued to be the principal source of such strength as it possessed,
Michael, to the great indignation of the pope and the West, made an alliance
with their rivals, the Genoese, an alliance which was the foundation of their
supremacy in trade in the Black Sea.
It is not impossible that Strategopulus had been sent into
Thrace in 1260 rather to form a judgment of the chances Capture of
Constantinople by
of capturing the city than of making war. It is quite the Greeks.
possible, as suggested even by Pachymer, that the
attempt on Galata was a mere feint in order that he might get into
communication with friends in the capital. In consenting to give a year’s
truce, however, Michael seems to have been sincere. Accordingly, when, in
1261, he again sent Strategopulus into Thrace it was with instructions that
he was not to attack the city. He had with him only 800 men, but as he
passed through the country behind Constantinople the Greek settlers
(Volunteers, as they are called, (Θεληματάριοι), who had friends in the city,
flocked to him, and urged that he would never have a better chance of
capturing it than at that time. The last detachment of troops which had come
from France had left the city, with the Venetian fleet, upon an expedition
into the Black Sea to capture Daphnusia. Constantinople might be surprised
in their absence. In spite of the imperial orders, the chance was too good to
be missed. He brought his men to the neighbourhood of the capital, and hid
them near the Holy Well of Baloukli, situated at about half a mile from the
Gate of the Fountain,17 one of the important entrances into the city through
the landward walls. His volunteers had not deceived him when they stated
that they had friends in the city. Probably every Greek was a secret
sympathiser.
George Acropolitas, who died in 1282, and whose account, therefore, must
have been written while the events were fresh in his memory, gives the
most trustworthy version of what happened. He says: ‘But as Strategopulus
had some men near him who had come from the city and were well
acquainted with all that had passed there, from whom he learned that there
was a hole in the walls of the city through which an armed man could easily
pass, he lost no time and set to work. A man passed through this hole;
another followed, then others, until fifteen, and perhaps more, had got into
the city. But, as they found a man on the walls on guard, some of them
mounted the wall and, taking him by the feet, threw him over. Others

having axes in their hands broke the locks and bolts of the gates, and thus
rendered the entry easy for the army. This is how the Cæsar Strategopulus,
and all the men he had with him, Romans and Scythians (for his army was
composed of these two peoples), made their entry into the city.’18 Probably
there were few inhabitants in that quarter, and the advance to the principal
part of the city might be made in the dark. At dawn the invaders pushed on
boldly, met with a brave resistance from a few—a resistance which they
soon overcame—and the rest of the French19 defenders were seized with
panic and fled. While the city was thus passing once more into the hands of
the Greeks, the French and Venetian ships were coming straggling down the
Bosporus, on their return from Daphnusia, which they had failed to capture.
Accordingly, the army of Strategopulus and his volunteers set fire to the
dwellings in the French and Venetian quarters in the city and to their villas
on the European shore of the Bosporus near Galata. While the foreigners
were occupied in saving their own property and their women and children
from the fire, Strategopulus strengthened his position in the city.
The weak and incapable Baldwin was at the palace of
Blachern when the Greeks entered the city. Afraid to Flight of Baldwin
II.
pass through the streets where the fighting was going on,
he entered a boat, made his way down the Golden Horn, and took refuge
among other fugitives with the Venetian fleet.
His flight was on July 25, 1261, and with it ends the
history of the Latin empire in Constantinople. It had End of Latin
empire.
been established by perjured Crusaders and filibustering
Venetians who were justly anathematised by Innocent the Third. It had
always been a sickly plant in a foreign and uncongenial soil, and, though
popes and kings had made quite remarkable exertions to make it grow, it
never even gave a sign of taking root. The empire had succeeded, as
Innocent predicted that it would, in making the Greeks loathe the members
of the Latin Church like dogs, and in rendering the union of the two
Churches impossible. The Crusaders, as Innocent had likewise foretold, had
seized an empire which they could not defend.20 Their expedition had
broken up the great machine of Roman government which had been
working steadily and, in the main, well for nearly a thousand years. It had
done irreparable mischief unaccompanied by any compensatory good. In
the course of two generations, the barons who had taken part in the capture

had died, and though among those who, at the bidding of successive popes
and of St. Louis, replaced them there must have been many actuated by
worthy motives, none among them have left any evidence whatever of
statesmanship or of those qualities which have enabled nations to conciliate
or to assimilate the people whom they have conquered. In sixty years the
peasants might have become content to acknowledge a change of rulers had
they been allowed to till their fields in peace: the traders might have
forgotten the hostility of their fathers if they had been permitted to exercise
their industry in security; but the continued and ever increasing exactions of
their masters forbade them to forget that they were under alien rulers. All
that were worthy in the city had sought refuge elsewhere: the priests, the
students with their priceless manuscripts, and the traders had escaped to
Nicaea or to Trebizond. The oppressors had seen themselves deserted and
the limits of the empire restricted almost to the boundaries of the city. The
Latin empire, which had never been formidable, had become an object of
contempt. When, however, its last emperor slunk away as a fugitive from
his imperial city, he was hardly more contemptible than when he was
present as a mendicant at the court of St. Louis or of Henry the Third. His
empire deserves only to be remembered as a gigantic failure, a check to the
progress of European civilisation, a mischievous episode, an abortion
among states, born in sin, shapen in iniquity, and dying amid ignominy.

CHAPTER II
CONDITION OF AND DIFFICULTIES IN RECONSTRUCTING THE EMPIRE: DIFFICULTIES
ARISING (A) FROM ATTEMPTS BY LATINS TO RECOVER THE EMPIRE, (B) FROM
CATALAN GRAND COMPANY.

When Constantinople was captured by the Crusaders
and Venetians it was adorned with the accumulated Condition of capital
on Baldwin’s flight.
wealth of centuries and decorated with art treasures for
which not only Greece but the whole Roman Empire had been ransacked.
When the city was recaptured by the Greeks it was a desolation. Houses,
churches, and monasteries were in ruins; whole quarters were deserted.
Heaps of rubbish marked where extensive fires had consumed houses which
no one cared to rebuild. The imperial palace itself was in so disorderly and
filthy a condition that it was some time before it could be occupied. In place
of a large population of the most educated and highly civilised people in
Europe, was a miserably small number of Greeks who had been reduced to
poverty with a number of foreign and principally French colonists. While
the foreign captors had plundered the city and carried off the bronze horses
of Lysippus and innumerable other objects of art and value to Western
Europe, they and their successors during the fifty-eight years of occupation
had, in their contemptuous ignorance of the art of a conquered people,
destroyed probably more than had been taken away as plunder.
The Queen City, which during many centuries had preserved her
inviolability and had largely for that reason become the treasure-house of
the empire and even of a large part of the Western world, had lost her
reputation as a place of safety. Amid the devastation in Egypt, in Syria, and
in Asia Minor, marked and mainly caused by the advances of the Saracens
and Seljukian Turks, by the struggles of the Crusaders, and the destruction
of the ancient civilisations of Eastern Asia Minor occasioned by the
westward movements of Asiatic hordes, the merchant had known only of
one city where his merchandise was safe and where he could trade in
security.
The stream of commerce between the East and the West which had flowed
through the Bosporus had been diverted into other channels, and the great

emboloi and warehouses were lying empty or in ruins.
Tana or the Azof, which had been the starting-point of a Loss of its
great caravan route through Bokhara, Samarcand, and commerce.
Balkh, now no longer contributed largely to the commerce of
Constantinople. Such of its trade as was not sent overland to Western
Europe was held by the Venetians, and at a somewhat later period by the
Genoese or other Italians, and scarcely contributed at all to the wealth of the
capital. The Danube became during the thirteenth century the highway
between the Black and the North Seas. The city which had been the great
centre for the collection and distribution of the furs, the hides, the caviare
and dried fish, the honey, wax, and other produce which the Russian
merchants collected and stored for the use of the West, was now studiously
avoided. The Western traders who had met those from Novgorod,
Tchernigov, and Kief at Constantinople now found their way to the mouth
of the Dnieper and arranged for the transit of their goods so as to avoid the
pirates whom the Latin rulers of Constantinople were unable to suppress, or
the exactions levied upon their merchandise if they came within the power
of the ancient capital. Trade which had come to Constantinople along the
ancient roads through Asia Minor had either ceased to exist or had been
diverted into other channels. The confidence arising from a sense of
security which through a long series of years had attracted commerce could
not be restored and in fact was never regained. The loss of her trade took
from Constantinople the only external source of revenue. The restored
empire had thus to depend almost exclusively upon the contributions which
it could levy upon the long harassed and impoverished peoples who
recognised its rule.
The recapture of the capital, though an epoch-marking event, was only one
step towards the restoration of the empire. It never really was restored. It
never recovered the commanding position which it had occupied during
even the worst periods of its history since Constantine. Its existence from
1261 to its capture by the Turks in 1453 is one long struggle.
The capital had been a centre which had kept well in
touch with even the remote corners of the empire. In it Difficulties of
restored empire.
had been the seat of government, the highest law courts
presided over by the ablest jurists, the continuators of the work of Justinian,
whose labour had formulated the law of all continental Europe. There also

was the centre of the theological and religious life of the empire and the
seat of the administration. Unhappily, during the sixty years of Latin rule
the whole framework of this administration had been broken up. A new plan
of government had to be devised. The new officials of the emperors were
called upon to govern without rules, without experience, and without
traditions. The forms of provincial and municipal government were hardly
remembered, and there were no men trained in affairs to breathe life into
them.
The influences at work in the capital had bound the empire together, but
they had been exercised through local administrations. The result now was
that the government became centralised: that is, that matters which
previously would have been dealt with in the provinces by men with local
knowledge had to be dealt with in the capital by men who were necessarily
under many disadvantages. The effort of its rulers after the city was
recaptured was not merely to restore to it the territory which had
acknowledged its sway, but to administer good government directly from its
capital.
Unfortunately, the desolation wrought in Constantinople was reproduced
throughout every portion of what had been the empire before the Latin
conquest. The country had been everywhere impoverished and the
population diminished by successive raids of Crusaders or pretenders.
Nor were the external difficulties of the restored empire
less alarming. When Michael the Eighth entered the From foreign states.
recaptured city he found anarchy throughout his
European territory and neighbouring states eager to enlarge their boundaries
at his expense. The Bulgarians were a formidable power, whose dominions
were not divided from his own by any natural boundary. The Serbians had
utilised the period of the Latin occupation to gather strength and were rising
once again to importance. The crusading families who had obtained fiefs in
Greece and the southern portion of Macedonia still retained their
independence. Genoese and Venetians, while struggling against each other
for the favour of the emperor, were each on the alert to obtain territory as
well as trading privileges at his expense.
One of the most serious evils inflicted on the empire by
the Latin occupation was the fierce antagonism it had From hostility
towards Roman

created in the Orthodox Church towards that of the elder Church.
Rome. We have seen that Innocent had foreseen this
result, but even he, great statesman though he was, could hardly have
anticipated that the hatred aroused would be of so long a duration. When the
city had been captured a Latin patriarch had been appointed, the union of
the Churches had been forced upon clergy and people, and the Church,
which had always considered itself the equal if not the superior of Rome,
was relegated to a position of inferiority. All attempts at reunion were
henceforward regarded not merely from the point of view of religion, but
from that of patriotism. Union was part of the heritage of bondage. Union
meant voluntary submission to the foreign Church which had been able to
impose its rule during two generations. Union, therefore, in the minds of a
majority of both clergy and laity had to be resisted as a badge of slavery.
Though the Latin empire had perished, there still remained a Latin emperor
or pretender, and he and his descendants, with the support of successive
popes and aided by adventurers from France, Italy, and Spain, made many
and constant attempts to regain the position which had been lost. For
upwards of a century after the city’s recapture there was a general scramble
by the European neighbours of the empire and Western powers for adjacent
territory. The dominions of the emperor were large and sparsely populated,
and offered an irresistible temptation to neighbouring states. More
formidable, however, than all other enemies were the Turks. Though they
had been attacked in the rear and were for a while rent by internal
dissensions, they were steadily increasing: adding constantly by conquests
to the territory over which their emirs ruled, and increasing in numbers by
the never-failing stream of immigrants and born warriors coming into Asia
Minor from Central Asia.
Among the first difficulties encountered in the
reconstruction of the empire must be noted that arising From Michael’s
usurpation.
from the irregularity of Michael’s own position. It is
worthy of note, not merely as a difficulty, but as showing the independent
spirit of the Orthodox Church. The reader will have ample evidence of the
inflexibility of its resistance on questions of dogma, but the very
commencement of the reign of Michael illustrates how it was prepared to
make a vigorous stand even against the deliverer of the empire on the
simple ground of righteousness. We have seen that Michael had no legal

claim to the throne. The de jure heir was John, a child of eight years when
his father, Theodore Lascaris, died. His guardians were Michael, who had
been made Grand Duke, and Arsenius the Patriarch. When a year
afterwards, in 1261, the city was recaptured, it was expected by some
persons of influence that Michael would either simply act as regent or
associate John with him as co-emperor as soon as he became of age.
Michael, however, in the same year, blinded the boy, so as to render him
incapable of ascending the throne.21 Arsenius the Patriarch, as soon as the
cruel deed became known, called a meeting of the bishops and boldly
pronounced against the emperor a formal sentence of excommunication.
None of the bishops opposed. They did not attempt to depose him. One can
only conjecture why they hesitated. Possibly it was because they considered
it expedient that he should remain on the throne, or it may be that they
regarded such a step as beyond their jurisdiction. The emperor was alarmed,
feared the consequences of excommunication among the troops, but feared
probably still more the spiritual penalties which would follow the sentence.
He preferred, says Pachymer,22 to die rather than to live burdened with the
anathemas of the Church. He sought out friends of the patriarch and begged
them to use all their influence to have the penalties removed. He urged that
penance should be imposed, and professed himself ready to undergo any
which might be deemed necessary to atone for his fault. The patriarch
replied that, even if he were threatened with death, he would never remove
the excommunication. The emperor went himself to visit Arsenius, and in
the conversation asked whether it was his wish that he should abdicate,
unbuckling his sword as he did so. When, however, the patriarch stretched
out his hand to receive it, the emperor put it back. The patriarch remained
firm. The emperor complained bitterly to his friends of the conduct of
Arsenius, and threatened that, as his own Church would not grant him
absolution, he would have recourse to the pope, who would be more
conciliatory. Years passed and Arsenius constantly refused to give way.
Every means thought of by the emperor of conciliating him had failed, and
he at length determined to have him deposed. But threats and promises were
equally unavailable. He had called together the bishops on several
occasions and complained that it was impossible for him to govern the
country unless he was relieved of so heavy a burden.23 On the last of these
occasions he claimed that by the law of the Church every Christian had a
right to absolution on doing penance, and he asked whether such laws were

to be construed less favourably for princes than for other sinners. He
submitted that the patriarch had treated him not only unjustly but illegally,
and concluded by inviting the bishops to depose Arsenius.
Once more he sent to ask the patriarch whether or not he would grant
absolution, and once more Arsenius refused. Upon this, as the bishops
would not consent to declare that he was not justified in maintaining the
anathema, the emperor had Articles of Accusation drawn against him. The
charges were not altogether of a trivial character. He accused him of having
shortened the prayer for the emperor in matins; of having ordered the
omission of the Trisagion; of having conversed in a friendly manner with
the sultan of the Seljukian Turks; of having allowed him and other
Mahometan companions to bathe in a bath belonging to the Church, where
there were crosses; of having ordered a monk to administer the Sacrament
to the sultan’s children, although he was not certain that they had been
baptised.
An assembly of bishops was convoked to examine the charges. The
patriarch replied by objecting to the meeting of the court in the palace,
refused to appear, and promised to send his answer to the charges in
writing. Pachymer recounts in some detail how the emperor endeavoured to
obtain absolution by a trick, and how Arsenius on discovering it asked him
if he thought he could deceive God. The emperor in reply insisted that some
of the charges should be pressed on to hearing and obtained a majority of
votes condemning the patriarch.24
The patriarch was thereupon exiled.
His successor, Germanus, removed the anathema, but doubts arose in the
emperor’s mind whether the removal was valid. After a few months
Germanus was persuaded by the emperor to retire, and in his place the
nominee of Michael, a certain Joseph, was named. The new patriarch was a
courtier, and probably knew that the principal reason for his election was
that absolution might be effectively and publicly given. The emperor
allowed Joseph a month within which to consider the best means of
granting him absolution, and then all was arranged. On the great feast of
Candlemas, February 2, 1267, there was a notable function in Hagia Sophia
for the removal of the anathema. The ceremony was a long and solemn one,
the patriarch and the bishops, and probably the emperor and his suite,

having had to pass the whole night in the church. The great church was
crowded with worshippers or spectators. When the liturgy was completed
the emperor, who had thus far remained standing surrounded by his guards
and senators, drew near the Holy Gates25 behind which stood the bishops.
Then, uncovered, he prostrated himself to the ground at the feet of the
patriarch, publicly confessed his sin, and humbly demanded pardon. While
he was thus prostrate, the patriarch, and after him each of the bishops, read
the formula by which he was absolved from the crime committed against
the young emperor. When all had thus given absolution, the emperor rose,
was admitted to Holy Communion, and, says Pachymer, henceforward
treated John with every kindness. The point, however, to be noted is that
even the emperor, strong-willed usurper as he was, was not merely afraid of
the terrors of the Church, but found it extremely difficult to bend it to his
will so as to obtain the removal of its sentence for an unjust act, although
there were many obvious advantages to the state in complying with the
emperor’s wish.

From the first year of his accession Michael the Eighth Difficulties arising
set himself the task of diverting from the empire the from attempts by
Latins to recover
attacks of Western states. It was not to be expected that the Empire.
Baldwin and the statesmen of the West would settle
down resignedly to the loss of a Latin empire. During many years their
attempts to regain the city constituted the most pressing danger to the
empire and contributed more than any other cause during Michael’s reign to
render it unable to hold its own against the encroachments of the Turks. To
Michael, as to all other statesmen in Europe, the representative of the West
was the pope. To satisfy the pope was to appease Western Europe, to divert
attacks from the empire, and to cause aid to be sent against the Moslems.
But the pope, on the accession of Michael, was doubly offended: first,
because the Latin empire had been overthrown, and second, because the
prospect of union between the two Churches was put back. Several years
had to pass and many struggles had to be borne before the pontiffs
reconciled themselves to the final disappearance of that Latin empire the
foundation of which the great statesman Pope Innocent the Third had
dreaded.

Michael, while resisting all attacks made or favoured by
the pope, saw the desirability of being reconciled with Attempts at
him so as, if possible, to induce him not to lend his reconciliation with
Roman Church.
support to the efforts of Baldwin to recover the city.
With this object he never lost an opportunity, even at the cost of alienating
the sympathies of his own people and being denounced by his own
ecclesiastics, of endeavouring to gain the pontifical favour by attempting to
bring about the Union of the Churches.
It is remarkable that from his accession until the end of his reign these
attempts fill a part of all contemporary histories quite disproportionate to
what at first sight appears their importance. It is even more remarkable that
during the whole period between the capture of the city by Michael and the
Moslem siege in 1453 the dominant question of interest was that of the
Union of the Churches. The fact that the representative of Western Europe
was the sovereign pontiff accounts to a great extent, though not altogether,
for the prominent part played by the religious question in nearly all the
negotiations between the later emperors and the West. Not even the constant
and almost unceasing struggle with the Turks occupies so much attention as
do the negotiations with Rome, the embassies, the Councils, and the ever-
varying tentatives to bring the two Churches into reconciliation. No true
conception of the life of the empire can be formed unless it is realised how
completely its citizens were occupied with these semi-religious, semi-
political questions. On one side the popes were almost constant in their
attempts, now to compel the Eastern Church to come in, now to persuade it;
on the other, the emperors, while fully cognisant of the importance of
diverting Western attacks and, at a later period, of receiving aid against the
common enemy of Christendom, had constantly to meet with the dogged
and unceasing opposition and bitter hostility of the great mass of their
subjects to purchasing help at the price of union with the Latin Church.
A struggle began immediately on the accession of Michael and soon
became a curiously complicated strife. The pope in 1262 proclaimed a
Crusade against him and against the Genoese, who still remained allied
with him. The pontiff characterised Michael as a usurper and a schismatic,
and granted the same indulgences to those who took up arms or contributed
to the expenses of the expedition against him as to those who fought for the
deliverance of the Holy Land. He urged St. Louis to collect tithes for the

same purpose.26 Michael, on the other hand, while preparing to resist
invasion and strengthening the city walls, increasing his fleet, and raising
new levies, yet sought to satisfy the pope by offering to do his utmost to
bring about the Union of the Churches. Possibly owing to the emperor’s
representations, Urban the Fourth countermanded the proposed expedition,
diverting it against the Tartars who were then invading Palestine. He sent
friars to Constantinople to exhort the emperor to carry out his proposal for
reunion. His successor, Clement, was, however, a man of a different spirit
and replied to the promises of Michael that they were only fair words
intended to prevent him from aiding the dethroned Baldwin. While Michael
had undoubtedly this object in view, he seems to have been sincere in his
desire for Union. One of his objections to the patriarch Arsenius was that he
would have nothing to do with the Latins. The Greek priests clamoured to
such an extent against the patriarch who succeeded Arsenius, because he
was believed to be willing to follow the emperor’s example in working for
Union, that he was compelled to resign.
As time went on, the Venetians, whose influence in the city had fallen with
the Latin empire, began to lose hope of seeing Baldwin re-established on
the throne, and in 1267 sent to make peace with Michael. Gregory the Tenth
threatened the doge with anathema if he even made a truce with him. The
emperor endeavoured, though in vain, to appease the wrath of the pope by
obtaining the intervention of Louis of France. Gregory, whom Michael had
congratulated on his accession upon the death of Clement, was more
conciliatory. He sent legates to the capital to treat once more on Union.
Pachymer gives a vivid account of the negotiations which followed, an
account from which it is difficult to doubt the sincerity of the emperor’s
wish for reconciliation or the persistence of the opposition which he had to
encounter. He states27 that the emperor followed the example of John Ducas
of Nicaea, that he sent many embassies to Rome, and that his real object
was to obtain from the popes protection for the Greeks. Gregory assured
him that no time was so favourable as the present for putting an end to the
Greek schism. The emperor on his side did his utmost to persuade the
patriarch and the bishops to aid him. The Latin delegates themselves were
men of piety who showed every possible respect for the Greek rite. They
were invited to discuss the differences between the dogmas of the two
Churches. In their interviews with the bishops they claimed that the

Filioque clause which constituted the great point of discussion was a divine
mystery which was impenetrable, that while the difference between the
Latin formula which declared that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
and the Son was not really at variance with the Greek that He proceeded
from the Father by the Son, they ought to be content with the reasons which
the Latins adduced for inserting it in the Creed. The bishops met these
observations with a rugged non possumus. Their Creed was what had been
consecrated by the usage of centuries. It was dangerous for any one Church
to add to the Symbols even words which were not contrary to the Catholic
faith. The bishops openly declared that, whatever the threats of the emperor
might be, they would hold to the ancient formula.
News of an expedition to restore the Latin empire came pouring in, and the
emperor determined to have his own way and to conciliate the pope. In an
assembly in which the patriarch, bishops, and other ecclesiastics took part
he spoke at great length in favour of reconciliation. The patriarch appointed
Veccus, a man famous for his eloquence and learning, to reply to him. His
reply is summed up by Pachymer: ‘There are heretics who are so called.
There are some who are not heretics and are not so called. There are some
who are called but are not heretics, and lastly there are others who are not
called but are heretics, and it is in this latter class that the Latins must be
placed.’
The emperor dismissed the assembly and was violently angry against
Veccus, whom he accused of having acted with bad faith. Having failed in
substantiating a formal charge, he arbitrarily sent him prisoner to the Tower
of Anemas. While in prison, however, Michael furnished him with books
which favoured the Latin case, and, says Pachymer, as he was a man of
singular simplicity and of sincere love for the truth he became disposed
towards reconciliation. He was released. The emperor pressed the patriarch
and the bishops to find a modus vivendi with the Latins, and was now aided
by Veccus, who had discovered that the sole fault of the Western Church
was that it had solely upon its own authority added the obnoxious clause to
the Creed. The patriarch and the bishops, however, were obdurate. By dint
of persecution, by requiring them to pay arrears of rent for their monasteries
and houses, he sought to force them to come to an arrangement. He called
another assembly and finally succeeded in obtaining a declaration from
them with which for the time he was forced to be content. In this very

assembly, however, one of the aged bishops besought him not to press the
Union, assuring him that even if the dignitaries signed no one else would
accept it. The Arsenites and the Josephites, as the followers of the two ex-
patriarchs who would not comply with the emperor’s wish were called, had
with them the great mass of the citizens, and the aged dignitary was
probably right when he stated28 that if the emperor persisted, civil war
would be the consequence.
Meantime the emperor, who could not or would not understand this bitter
opposition to his desires, was aware that negotiations were going on
between Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily (whose daughter had married the
son and heir of Baldwin, the ex-emperor), and the Venetians for an attack
upon his territories and the restoration of the Latin empire. Michael sent
costly presents to the pope, and once more declared his determination to
bring about Union, and asked his indulgence. Once more he sent delegates
to the pope, who in return ordered Charles to facilitate their passage through
his dominions and to postpone hostilities. The emperor insisted on Union,
and in the following year, 1274, he and some of the bishops sent other
delegates to Lyons to complete a formal reconciliation. On their arrival in
that city they pronounced during the celebration of Mass the obnoxious
clause. Gregory the Tenth declared that they had come voluntarily to submit
themselves, to make the Roman confession of faith, and to recognise his
supremacy. After George Acropolitas had read the emperor’s profession,
and the envoy of the bishops theirs, a Te Deum was sung and the Union
proclaimed. But whatever the pope or the emperor might wish or even do,
the Eastern Church was not prepared to ratify a reconciliation. The patriarch
still refused to yield. He had gone as far as he intended to go and declared
that he would abdicate if the Union were accomplished. Thereupon he was
deposed by the synod. Immediately afterwards the pope’s name was
introduced into the public prayers, but with the result that the breach
between those in favour of Union and those opposed to it became wider.
The emperor pertinaciously persevered, and with his consent Veccus, who
had now gone over to the emperor’s side, was named patriarch.
On the return of the delegates from Lyons, preaching friars were sent to
Constantinople by Innocent the Fifth. On his death, in 1276, his successor,
John the Twenty-fifth, sent nuncios, who were received with great honour,
and Michael, in return, together with the patriarch sent delegates to confirm

the Union. They arrived, however, in Rome after the death of John. In 1277
Michael and his son Andronicus, the heir to the throne, who was now of full
age, formally confirmed the Union of the Churches. Thereupon there began
a struggle with those who opposed it. The patriarch Veccus
excommunicated its adversaries, mentioning the leaders by name. John the
Bastard, the despot of Epirus, who was the foremost, at once called a
Council and submitted the question to its decision. This Council
anathematised alike the emperor, the pope, and the patriarch. Some of the
nobles and officers sent against John openly declared for him as the
defender of the ancient faith.
The new pope was convinced that the emperor was doing his utmost to
bring about Union, and in consequence refused permission to Charles of
Anjou to send an expedition against him. When his nuncios arrived, in
1279, in the capital, they learned that, in spite of the emperor and the
patriarch, the clergy and people would not accept Union. The nuncios were
taken to the prisons and saw nobles, even of the emperor’s own family, as
well as many others, loaded with chains on account of their opposition on
this question to the imperial wish. They were convinced of the emperor’s
good faith, but no definite statement could be obtained from the bishops.
Non possumus remained the expression of their attitude.
When, however, Martin the Fourth learned from the nuncios what was the
position in Constantinople, he seems either to have lost all hope of bringing
about Union by persuasion, or possibly to have thought that his predecessor
had been deceived by Michael; for in 1281 he excommunicated the emperor
and all the Greeks as schismatics. By so doing he became free to assist in
organising the long-threatened expedition for the restoration of the Latin
empire. Michael in reply simply contented himself with the omission of the
pope’s name from the prayers.
Martin followed up his excommunication by joining in a league with
Charles of Anjou and the Venetians in order to replace Michael by Philip,
the son of Baldwin the Latin emperor. In the following year the pope in
renewing his excommunication gave the emperor until May 1, 1282, within
which to submit himself under pain of being deposed.
Michael’s position was desperate. He had alienated his own subjects; he had
risked his throne, imprisoned his nearest relations, had tried bribes,

intrigues, flattery, and force. Worse than all, he had been forced to allow the
various hordes of Moslems in Asia Minor—Turks, Kurds, and Tartars—to
encroach on the territory of the empire at a time when, if he had had a free
hand, a serious check might have been put to their progress. All was in vain.
His failure with the popes was now as complete as with his own people.
The threat of an expedition under Charles of Anjou was so serious that he
sent thirty thousand ounces of gold to Peter of Aragon to assist him in
defeating Charles and diverting his expedition from the Bosporus. He
became irritable and melancholy at the obstinacy of his subjects and
punished them with unreasonable severity and great cruelty.29
The pope’s expedition was, however, put an end to by
the Sicilian Vespers in March 1282. The forces of Death of Michael
VIII.
Charles of Anjou found other employment than an
expedition to Constantinople. In December of the same year Michael
died.30
During the long reign of Andronicus the Second (1282
to 1328), the son and successor of Michael, the party Reign of
Andronicus II.,
which the latter had headed in favour of Union with 1282–1328.
Rome fell to pieces. The older emperor’s disappointment
probably hastened his death. Veccus the patriarch within a few months was
forced to withdraw to a monastery. His writings in favour of Union were
burned. He was put upon his trial before a synod and saved himself by
signing a declaration against further attempts at reconciliation with the
Latin Church. The ex-patriarch Joseph was brought back in triumph, and a
persecution at once commenced of those who had favoured the emperor’s
plans.
This hostility to the Unionist party was contemporaneous with a short
period during which the fear of an attack to reestablish a Latin empire had
lessened. The attention of the pontiff was directed towards sending aid to
the king of Armenia, who had been for years making a brave defence
against his Moslem assailants. But the attempt at Union and the re-
establishment of a Latin empire was not forgotten. In 1287 Nicholas the
Fourth endeavoured to accomplish these objects while allowing the Greek
emperor to remain on the throne. He favoured, and perhaps suggested, a
marriage between Michael, the eldest son of Andronicus, and Catherine of
Courtenay, the granddaughter of Baldwin. Her other grandfather, Charles of

Anjou, king of Sicily, claimed the imperial throne on her behalf.31 The
proposal of marriage had much to recommend it to the emperor, because it
appeared to be a means of putting an end to the attempts to regain the
imperial throne by the deposed family. The arrangements were broken off
because Andronicus would not agree to recognise the pope’s supremacy,
without which the pontiff refused his consent. Considering the attitude of
the Greek ecclesiastics, there can be little doubt that if the emperor had
agreed to the pope’s demand the already strained relations between the
Orthodox and the Roman parties would have become dangerous to the state,
would have probably brought about civil war, and might have cost
Andronicus his throne. The question after long negotiations was settled in
1295 by the marriage of Michael with the sister of the king of Armenia.
The popes thereupon took a bolder course. They had
seen the futility of the efforts to obtain Union by Popes favour
project for
negotiation with the emperor, and now supported a reestablishing Latin
series of attempts to recapture Constantinople and to empire.
place upon the throne a descendant of the last Latin
emperor, Baldwin the Second. If the recapture could be accomplished, the
Union so dear to Rome could be brought about by force.
In 1301 Catherine of Courtenay married Charles of Valois, brother of the
king of France.32 The marriage was a political one, its object being to give
the hand of Catherine to a Western prince of sufficient standing to arouse an
enthusiasm in all the West in favour of the restoration of the Latin empire.
Charles at once entered into a treaty with the Venetians for the conquest of
Constantinople, and arranged to recognise the assignment of certain
portions of the empire which had already been made to other descendants of
Baldwin. A Venetian was designated by the pope as Latin patriarch of
Constantinople. Eighteen Venetian ships went to the capital, and were
sufficiently powerful to force the emperor to grant trading concessions.
Charles of Anjou and Frederic of Aragon bound themselves to aid in the
attempts to recapture Constantinople.
It was in presence of this threatened attack, which appeared to be far the
most serious which had been contemplated since the city’s recapture, that
the emperor invited a certain Roger de Flor and his band of Spanish
mercenaries, who came to be known as the Catalan Grand Company, to
come to his aid.

Within the city itself great efforts were made, in presence of the common
danger, to unite the theological factions. The patriarch, who had pronounced
an anathema against the emperor, consented to withdraw it. The truce,
however, between the ecclesiastics was unfortunately of short duration. As
time passed, and the much-vaunted expedition did not present itself, the old
rancours again showed themselves.
Indeed, the expedition to place Charles of Valois on the imperial throne
made slow progress. In 1305 his brother, the king of France, gave it his
support. Once more the pontiff invited the Venetians to follow the example
of Dandolo and aid in the conquest of the city. It was not, however, till the
end of 1306 that a treaty of alliance was made between them and Charles.
The result which might have been anticipated followed when the news was
received in the capital. The Latin monks, who up to this time had been
tolerated within the city, were expelled, and the party in favour of Union
almost entirely disappeared. Meantime the preparations for the expedition
continued.
In 1308 its titular head, Charles of Valois, allied himself with the Servians.
Charles himself was ready, but apparently not eager, for the enterprise. The
Venetians desired speedy action; but the Western nobles only feebly
responded to the pope’s demand, although it was supported by the king of
France. Charles of Anjou was not ready. In the course of the next year
Catherine of Courtenay died, and partly on account of her death, and
probably also because he despaired of leading a successful enterprise,
Charles of Valois abandoned the design of capturing Constantinople. He,
however, transferred what he considered his rights to the throne to his son-
in-law, Philip of Tarentum.
The Venetians resigned themselves to a position which would allow them
once more to trade with the empire, and in 1310 concluded a truce with its
ruler for ten years.
Philip now prepared to organise an attempt against Constantinople, and
once more the pope, in 1313, weakened the position of the Latin party in
Constantinople by calling upon Frederic, king of Sicily, to aid the new
pretender. The king of France undertook to furnish five hundred men-at-
arms, and money to pay them for a year, and called upon Louis of
Burgundy to furnish another hundred. The undertaking, however,

languished, and when Philip of France died, in 1314, no one, except Philip
of Tarentum, seemed to have any further interest in it. He leagued himself
with the king of Hungary in 1318, and two years later purchased certain
rights in the principality of Achaia and what was still spoken of in the West
as the kingdom of Thessalonica. But no favourable opportunity came to
him, and in 1324 the doge of Venice notified the emperor that the princes of
the West had no intention of attacking the imperial city. The notification
turned out correct, for, until his dethronement, in 1328, Andronicus was no
longer troubled with tidings of expeditions against Constantinople from
Western Europe.

Meantime it is necessary to return to the invitation The Catalan Grand
which Andronicus had given to Robert de Flor to come Company.Expedition Against
to his aid. This aid was intended nominally against the Constantinople.
Turks, but really against the expedition which Charles of
Valois was preparing, with the sanction of the pope and the help of the
Venetians and of all men who would respond to the pope’s exhortation, to
assist in restoring a Latin emperor to Constantinople. The invitation brought
into the empire a band of auxiliaries from the West which, in its weakened
condition, was almost as mischievous and ruinous to the empire as any
expedition openly directed against its existence could have been. The evil
inflicted upon the empire by the band of mercenaries invited for its defence
was indeed so manifold that the story deserves telling with considerable
detail.
As already stated, Philip, the son of Baldwin, the last Latin emperor, had
married the daughter of Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily. Charles promised,
in 1278, to send an expedition to Constantinople, but the pope, seeing the
efforts which Michael continued to make for Union, refused his sanction.
Two years later, however, a new pope entered into a treaty with Venice and
Naples to attack the empire, and Charles undertook to send eight hundred
cavaliers to claim what he considered the rights of his granddaughter. A
body of troops was sent across the Adriatic to assist the Albanians, who
were fighting against the emperor. The invaders were utterly defeated, and
the empire was saved from the attack of Charles by the disorganisation
produced by the Sicilian Vespers in 1283, a massacre in which 8,000
Frenchmen perished.

In the twenty years that followed, a body of Spanish mercenaries played a
prominent part in the Sicilian troubles. Spain had been engaged for three
hundred years in a long and almost continuous struggle against the Moors.
Fathers had dedicated their sons in successive generations to the defence of
Christianity and their country, and the result was already to have formed a
nation of brave and disciplined soldiers, such as Western Europe had not
seen since the best days of the Roman empire. Peter of Aragon had supplied
a band of such soldiers to fight against France in Sicily and Calabria.
In 1301 the marriage of Catherine of Courtenay, daughter of Philip, and
granddaughter of Baldwin the Second, with Charles of Valois, son of Philip
the Second of France, and brother of the king, put an end to the troubles in
Sicily with the French.
Now that, in 1302, peace was concluded in Sicily, their employers were
anxious to be rid of the now useless mercenaries; for, though their courage,
their recklessness of danger, and their prowess were indisputable, their
lawlessness, their cruelty to the inhabitants of the country where they were
encamped, and their insubordination, even to their own officers, were no
less remarkable. Moreover, Frederic of Sicily was unable to pay them, and
they had already commenced to pay themselves by general plunder.
Unaccustomed to work, and used only to a life of rapine, they were ready to
take service under any leader who appeared able to offer them good chances
of pillage; but woe to the country to which they were sent, and to the cause
which they promised to serve!
Among their leaders was a German named Robert Blum, whose name
became changed or translated to Roger de Flor. He was a typical instance of
the worst kind of soldier of fortune of the middle ages. He entered the order
of the Templars, but was degraded because he betrayed the Christians in
return for bribes from the Moslems. Then he turned pirate, and sought
foreign service. The French refused to have anything to do with him. He
had therefore gone over to the enemy, and the king of Sicily made him vice-
admiral. He robbed for his master wherever he could find anything to steal.
If he met an enemy, he took all he could carry away, without
acknowledgment; if a friend, he took what he wanted, and gave
acknowledgments of a very doubtful value, which were to be paid by the
king of Sicily at the end of the war.

When the Sicilian war was over, the Grand Master of the Temple urged the
pope to insist that Roger de Flor should be surrendered for punishment.
Roger learned that such a demand was about to be made33 and anticipated
extradition by taking service with the Greek emperor, nominally to fight
against the Turks, promising to bring with him a body of Spanish troops.
The alarm of Andronicus at the report of the expedition of Charles of Valois
against him was great. It looked as if all Western princes were about to enter
upon a new crusade for the recapture of Constantinople. Hence he was
prepared to welcome aid from any source.
In 1303 Roger de Flor arrived at Constantinople with a fleet of seven ships
and eight thousand men, who are described by Pachymer as Catalans and
Amogavares, the latter being adventurers from other parts of Spain than
Catalonia. This band was soon spoken of as the Catalan Grand Company.
Roger was accompanied by Fernand Ximenes, who was also at the head of
a large body of retainers who were desirous of taking service under the
emperor. The reputation which Roger de Flor bore as the most daring of
soldiers caused him to be eagerly welcomed by the emperor, who conferred
upon him the title of Grand Duke and hoped much from his services. His
reckless followers knew only one virtue—that of courage. Their first
adventure showed, however, the spirit of lawlessness which existed in his
army. The emperor had borrowed a large sum of money from the Genoese
which Roger alleged that he had employed in raising new troops. When the
Genoese applied to Roger for payment it was refused. The emperor sent a
high official to arrange the difficulty, and the Catalans cut him in pieces.
The Grand Company were at this time encamped outside the city walls in
the neighbourhood of the present Eyoub. They seized the monastery of St.
Cosmas and held it as a fortress. The Genoese erected barricades on the
shore of the Golden Horn, and a struggle took place between the two in
which many were killed on both sides.
Shortly afterwards the Spaniards were induced to cross the Marmora to
Cyzicus, and a quarrel ensued between them and the Alans, one of the first
of many Asiatic tribes who had pushed their way into the valley of the
Danube, and a band of whom had been taken into the imperial service. The
son of the leader of the Alans was killed, and his soldiers vowed vengeance.
Roger de Flor then pushed on to attack the Turks. He was seen at his best
when he met the enemy. He raised the siege of Philadelphia and defeated

the various armies sent against him, killing, it is said, thirty thousand Turks
and driving the rest of them out of Lydia and Caria. But he was almost as
terrible to the Christians whom he had been sent to protect as he was to the
Moslems. His progress through Asia Minor was marked by constant
plunder. Pachymer says that those subjects of the emperor who fell into his
hands after they had escaped from the enemy had thrown themselves out of
the smoke into the fire. Those who gave up their property had difficulty in
saving their lives. The remark is made on the occasion of Roger’s visit to
Philadelphia, which he pillaged as if it had been an enemy’s city. He treated
Pergamos and Ephesus in the same way. His ships plundered the islands of
Chios, Lemnos, and Mytilene. The inhabitants of Magnesia resisted his
exactions, and he therefore laid siege to the city and did his utmost to
capture it. It was in vain that the emperor sent orders to raise the siege and
to attack Turks and not Christians. The Alans who were with him urged
obedience and withdrew when Roger refused. It was only after a long siege
that he recognised that he was unable to capture the city and abandoned the
attempt. In retreating he plundered the Greeks as remorselessly as he did the
Turks against whom he had been sent. ‘Notwithstanding,’ says Pachymer,
‘that the emperor had prepared all that was needed for the support of Roger
and his army, the peasants were robbed of everything they possessed and
were left without either seed-corn or oxen for ploughing. At the news of his
coming many abandoned their farms and took refuge in the islands. He
appropriated to his own use the tithes and other taxes which should have
gone to the emperor.’ Indeed there appears no reason to doubt the assertion
that this adventurer had now formed the intention of carving out a kingdom
for himself. It is possible indeed, and is in conformity with his conduct, that
from the first he had entertained such an intention. From this time until his
death he became the enemy of the emperor whom he had come to aid.
When the Greek troops heard of the outrages on their countrymen they
asked the emperor to be led against the Catalans instead of against the
Turks. But the emperor himself was unwilling to break with Roger and his
army, or even that they should be distant from the city so long as he
expected the arrival of the great expedition intended for its capture. He still
also cherished the hope that the services of the Grand Company might be
employed against the Turks in case the expedition from the West did not
arrive. While he was hesitating, Berenger of Catalonia arrived with new
reinforcements in nine large vessels, and soon he and Roger presented

themselves at the imperial court. Roger urged the emperor to subsidise
Berenger, and in reply to the question why the latter had come answered,
because he had heard of the liberality of the emperor’s payments. In a
formal assembly he reproached Roger with the lawlessness of his troops,
with the injury he had done to the Greeks, and especially with the burden of
expenses he had cast upon the empire. Finally, however, he consented to
receive Berenger and to assign to him a portion of the tithes for the
maintenance of the Catalan armies.
When, shortly after, a deputation of Catalans was sent to the emperor
demanding further pay, he replied by emptying in their presence sacks full
of letters complaining of exactions by the Spaniards. In spite of these
complaints and of the exactions and lawlessness of the Grand Company, he
appears to have been unwilling to lose their services. He recounted the
money payments he had made, but promised to give them more than they
had asked if only they would at once return to attack the enemy in Asia. The
deputation knew the emperor’s anxiety and desire to keep his own troops
for the defence of the city against the expedition of Charles, and therefore
refused to return without further payment. All argument was useless.
Berenger was dissatisfied with the offers made to him personally and sailed
away from the Golden Horn during the night for Gallipoli, which city was
held by his countrymen. Roger pleaded in vain for more money to be paid
at once. It was not there to be given. The tension between the Spaniards and
the emperor became so great that the latter sent orders to his son Michael,
encamped near Apros, to be ready against an attack by the Catalans.
Some months later, in 1307, Roger went to Adrianople under pretence that
he wished to pay his respects to Michael at Apros and to take leave of him,
as he declared he was about to quit the country. Pachymer, probably
reflecting the popular belief, states that his real object was to learn the
number of men in the Greek army and what were his chances in an attack
upon it. Michael received him in a friendly manner, but the Alans in his
service had not forgotten the vengeance they had vowed against him for
having at Cyzicus killed the son of George their leader, and as Roger was
entering the audience chamber he was stabbed by George himself. Upon
news of the assassination, the Catalans fled to Gallipoli,
putting men, women, and children to the sword during Assassination of
Roger de Flor.
their flight. Michael followed them and laid siege to the

city, but Berenger persuaded the Emperor Andronicus to grant the besieged
time and so arranged matters that the Spaniards were able to take ship and
escape. They made their way once more across the Marmora to Cyzicus, but
the inhabitants stoutly resisted, and the besiegers left for Perinthos, where
they killed every man they could lay hands on. When the news reached the
capital the inhabitants demanded vengeance on those of the Catalans who
had remained there and, taking the law into their own hands, burned their
houses. The patriarch, who had in vain attempted to check their fury, with
difficulty saved his own life.
The Spaniards were now at open war with the Greeks,
and even Andronicus would have been glad to get rid of Outrages by the
Grand Company.
them. They attacked the seafaring population at
Rhegium, now called Buyuk Chekmeji, burnt several men, impaled their
children, and massacred those whom they had employed to carry off their
booty. Their progress was checked for a while by the arrival of sixteen
Genoese ships. As the Genoese had had trouble with the emperor, the
Spaniards were in hopes of their aid, but the former sent secretly into the
city from their fleet to learn the truth about the situation, heard the Greek
version of the differences, and then declared for the emperor. The Genoese
and imperial fleets attacked the Spaniards, who were led by Berenger,
defeated them, captured their leader, and subsequently sent him prisoner to
Italy.
Gallipoli was, however, still in the hands of the Catalans
and an attempt to buy the aid of the Genoese to relieve it Turkish auxiliaries
enter Europe.
failed. Michael endeavoured to capture it. Both armies
had secured Turkish allies. A decisive battle was fought near Apros, in
which the Spaniards were successful. They followed up their victory by
ravaging the neighbouring country, and in this they were joined by a band
of Turks who had been invited to join them and by Alans who had quitted
the imperial service.
The country between Constantinople and Adrianople was laid waste, all the
inhabitants abandoning their houses to save their lives. The garrison of
Catalans in Gallipoli in like manner ravaged the western part of Thrace;
men were killed, women and children, flocks and herds were carried off.
The women and children were taken to be sold to, or to be held as slaves by,
the Turks.

The emperor, unable either to employ or to defeat the Spaniards and being
hard pressed by the Turks in Asia Minor, endeavoured now to buy them off.
An embassy was sent to them, but the conditions demanded were
impossible, and thereupon the scenes of violence were renewed. Bands of
Spaniards and their Turkish allies made incursions in the country behind
Constantinople as far as Chorlou, laid siege to Rodosto, and killed all whom
they found outside the walls. Those who could escape took refuge in
Constantinople. Pachymer states that the Spaniards claimed to have killed
five thousand of these peasants. Adrianople was besieged and, though it was
not captured, the army of the Alans, who had once more joined the Greeks,
was defeated, the vineyards around the city were rooted up and the fertile
country converted for the time into a desert. When the emperor again made
an effort to buy the Spaniards off he found their terms higher than ever, on
account of their success. They not only demanded heavy payments for
services never performed, but that the Emperor should pay ransom for the
towns, the fortresses and prisoners captured by them.
The two divisions of Spaniards, one under Rocafert, who had been
appointed to succeed Roger, and the other under Fernand Ximenes, were
now acting separately, and while the negotiations were going on the former
set out for Constantinople. They were, however, resisted by the imperial
troops and compelled to retire. They continued under Rocafert to devastate
Thrace. As they themselves received no food from abroad nor tilled the
ground in Thrace and had already devastated the country, they were at
length forced to retreat from want of provisions to Gallipoli.
Happily, serious divisions arose between the Spaniards
themselves. A large number of them refused to recognise Dissension in the
Grand Company.
Rocafert who had been named leader with the consent of
Ximenes. On the other hand, Rocafert declared that as he had conquered the
country he had no intention of abandoning the leadership. The influence of
Guy, the nephew of the king of Sicily, who had brought with him another
detachment of foreign freebooters in seven large ships and who counted
upon utilising the Grand Company for the re-establishment of the Latin
empire in his own family, was unable to settle the differences between the
two parties, and they were soon at open war with each other. On one side
was Rocafert, on the other were Guy, Ximenes, and Berenger, who had
been released by the Genoese.

In view of an attack by the imperial troops and of the necessity of finding
provisions, a peace was patched up between the two Spanish factions, and
they started in a body to attack Salonica and plunder Macedonia. The six
thousand Spaniards were accompanied by three thousand Turks. Rocafert’s
division led. The van of the second division reached the camping ground of
the first before it had been completely evacuated, and the two armies at
once began fighting each other. Berenger hastened to put an end to the
quarrel and was killed by Rocafert’s brother. Ximenes was captured.
Rocafert was now the sole leader. He attempted to capture Salonica but
failed. He then retreated in order to return to Thrace: but his position was
growing weak. He appealed to a French admiral, who had arrived in the
northern Aegean as the precursor of the expected great expedition from the
West, for his intervention with the Spaniards who distrusted him, but the
admiral seized and carried him off to the king of Naples, where he was
thrown into prison and starved to death.
When the partisans of Rocafert in the Grand Company learned of what they
regarded as the treachery of the French admiral, they murdered their
officers under the belief that they were parties to the capture. They elected
new leaders, marched into Thessaly, and took service with the descendants
of the crusading barons who had carved out territories for themselves in that
province and in Greece. It is unnecessary to follow them there. It is
sufficient to say that the Greek army had dogged their movements, had
fought well, had defeated them in many engagements,
and that what may be regarded as the last struggle with Its end, 1315.
the Grand Company took place in 1315.
The devastation caused by the attempts from the West to
re-establish the Latin empire culminating in the Disastrous results
from attempts to
disorders caused by the Grand Company was such that restore empire.
the empire’s chances of recovering its strength were
enormously diminished. The fall of the city in 1204 had been followed by
the destruction of the organisation in Asia Minor for resisting the progress
of Asiatic hordes towards Europe. One may conjecture that the great
statesman Innocent the Third, who had foreseen some of the evil effects
which would inevitably follow from the success of Dandolo and Montferrat,
would have realised the necessity of aiding Constantinople in making such
resistance. Unfortunately, Innocent’s successors were less statesmanlike.

Instead of seeking to strengthen the Greeks in Constantinople by
condemning the wild lawlessness of the Spaniards, their dominating idea
was to restore the Latin empire, so as to force the members of the Orthodox
Church to enter into Union. The results of all their attempts were altogether
disastrous. The empire was weakened on every side. Its component parts
had always been loosely bound together. Long distances in ages of badly
constructed roads had prevented the development of loyalty as a bond of
union. The traditional attachment to the autocrat at Constantinople had been
shaken by the change of dynasties. Peasants living far away from the
capital, who had no other desire than to till their lands in peace, were ready
to accept the rule of a Serbian or a Bulgarian, of a powerful rebel against
the empire or even of the Turks themselves, provided they were
undisturbed. Those who were in the neighbourhood of the capital were in
worse plight. The development of trade and commerce had been hindered.
Thrace had become a desolation. During five years the Spaniards had lived
on the country and only deserted it when there remained nothing further to
plunder. The thriving communities extending along all the northern shores
of the Marmora from the city to Gallipoli were impoverished or destroyed.
Flourishing vineyards and oliveyards were abandoned. The fishing and
shipping communities ceased to find occupation. Great numbers of the
inhabitants were exterminated.
The richest city in Europe had become poverty-stricken. The coinage,
which for centuries had served as the standard for the whole Western world,
had been debased in order to find money to pay foreign mercenaries. Worse
than all, while the empire had been employed in resisting these invaders
from the West, the Bulgarians, Serbians, and, far more important than
either, the Turks had gained strength and had enormously enlarged their
territories.
To the Catalan Grand Company must be attributed the introduction of the
first body of Turks into Europe. It might have been expected that the
traditions of Spaniards would have influenced them sufficiently to have
refused Moslem aid, that Western Europe would have raised the cry of
treason to Christendom when it learned that bands of Turks had been
engaged to fight against a Christian though a schismatic emperor; but the
filibusters who had been invited into the empire for the defence of
Christendom thought only of plunder, and Western Europe was either

indifferent or thought there was little to choose between schismatics and
Moslems.
The attempts to restore the Latin empire had failed, but the emperor and his
people were in presence of a much more formidable enemy than the West
had furnished. The Asiatic hordes whom the city had successfully resisted
for a century and a half before its capture were now constantly encroaching
on imperial territory. As these hordes were destined to be the destroyers of
the Empire, I propose next briefly to notice their origin and history.

CHAPTER III
THE TURKS: THEIR ENTRY INTO ASIA MINOR: NOT AT FIRST EXCLUSIVELY
MAHOMETAN: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS: OTHMAN FOUNDS A DYNASTY:
PROGRESS OF MOSLEMS IN EUROPE AND ASIA MINOR: CAPTURE OF BROUSA IN
1326.

The great central plains of Asia, stretching almost without an interruption
from the Caspian Sea to China, have during all historical time produced
hardy races of nomad warriors. On the three occasions in their history when
they have found skilful leaders, their progress as conquerors has been
epoch-marking. Twice their progress has been westward. Mounted warriors
and hordes of foot soldiers made their way towards the Euxine, some going
to the north and others to the south of that sea. The first of these waves of
population thus moving westward was that led by
Genghis Khan, a Mongol belonging to the smallest of Genghis Khan
moves westward.
the four great divisions of the Tartar34 race. His
followers were, however, mainly Turks, the most widely spread of these
divisions.35 He had established his rule before 1227, the year in which he
died, from the Sea of Japan to the Dnieper. He and his immediate
successors ravaged a greater extent of territory than any other conqueror.
Like Alexander the Great, he and they advanced with regularly organised
armies, with apparently no other object than conquest and plunder. Their
victories facilitated the migration of his own subjects into the newly
conquered territories and hastened the departure of large bodies of men,
who fled before the terrible massacres which marked the progress of their
ever victorious armies.
A branch of the same great horde, under the leadership of Subutai,
destroyed Moscow and Kiev in a campaign conducted with striking ability
and ending in 1239, and settled in Russia. Poland, aided by French Knights
Templars and the Grand Master of the Teutonic order, had put forward all
her strength to resist the same division of the all-devouring army, while
another wing attacked the Hungarians with half a million of men.
Their entry into Europe was in such numbers and the excesses of cruelty
committed by them were so alarming that their advance everywhere created

terror. The Tartars—coming from Tartarus, as some of the Crusaders
believed—were so little known, says Pachymer, that many declared they
had the heads of dogs and fed upon human flesh.36 Seen nearer, they were
less formidable as individuals, though infernal, terrible, and invincible as an
army.
In 1258, the year before the recapture of Constantinople and the destruction
of the Latin empire by the Greeks, Houlagou, the grandson of Genghis
Khan, captured Bagdad, and deposed the last of the Bagdad caliphs. He
extended his conquests over Mesopotamia and Syria to the Mediterranean.
Damascus and Aleppo were sacked. Houlagou sought to ally himself with
the Crusaders in order to overthrow the Saracens and the sultan of Egypt.
When Houlagou turned his attention to Asia Minor, he
found among the Christian populations a division of the The Seljukian
Turks.
Turkish race known as Seljuks, whose sultan resided at
Konia, and called himself sultan of Roum.37 He attacked and inflicted
injuries upon them from which they never recovered. It is difficult to state
precisely what were the boundaries of the Seljuks and of other Moslem or
partly Moslem peoples in Asia Minor and Syria, during the thirteenth
century, and this difficulty arises from the fact that their boundaries were
continually changing. The Saracens held certain places in Syria, but there
was a Christian prince in Antioch; there were cities occupied by the western
Knights Templars, a Christian prince in Caramania and a king of Lesser
Armenia. There were Turcomans at Marash and in the hill country behind
Trebizond, and Kurds invaded Cilicia in 1278. A large tract of country
around Konia was ruled over by the Seljuks. No natural boundary marked
the extent of territory occupied by any of these peoples or in Asia Minor by
the Roman emperor.
It is certain, however, that the entry of the armies of the followers of
Genghis Khan, continually renewed by the arrival of new hordes from
Central Asia, changed the distribution of the peoples and spread terror
everywhere at their approach. Even at Nicaea, within sixty miles of
Constantinople, the rumour in 1267 of the arrival of a Tartar army caused a
terrible panic.38 Two years later the Tartars attacked the Saracens in Syria,
whither they had been invited for such purpose by the Christians, defeated
them, and carried off a rich booty. For a while they were a terror alike to

Moslems and Christians. As from the followers of Genghis Khan there
ultimately came the race of Ottoman Turks who conquered New Rome and
its empire, it is desirable to consider them somewhat carefully.
It is important to note that the first hordes who came in
with the great conqueror and those who followed for at Characteristics of
Asiatic invaders.
least a century were not Mahometan fanatics. Some of
their leading generals were indeed Christians. Genghis himself had married
a Christian wife. Mango Khan (1251–1259), one of his successors, is
described by Maundeville, who visited Palestine in 1322, as ‘a good
Christian man, who was baptized and gave letters of perpetual peace to all
Christian men,’ and sent to win the Holy Land to put it into the hands of the
Christians and destroy the law of Mahomet.39 His great successor,
Houlagou, was the husband of the granddaughter of the famous Prester (or
Presbyter) John, the king of a Christian state in Central Asia, visited by
Marco Polo.40 The army led by Houlagou contained Mahometans, but it
contained also Christians, Buddhists, and professors of other creeds. Central
Asiatics had up to the time which concerns us not developed any violent
religious animosity. Christians, Moslems, and Buddhists dwelt together in
harmony.
It is probably correct to say that the races of the great
plains of Asia have never been religiously disposed. Mr. Not fanatical.
Schuyler, who was a keen observer, remarked, less than
a generation ago, that the people which had been recently conquered by
Russia in Central Asia were classified as to their religion with extreme
difficulty. A few declared themselves Christians. The remainder were
indiscriminately inscribed as Moslems, but very few among them really
knew anything about the religion of Islam and did not even consider
themselves as Moslems.41 The fierce fanaticism which the early followers
of Mahomet displayed and which led them within a century after his death
to make the most wonderful and enduring series of conquests which have
ever been accomplished by a people whose sole bond of union was religion
was not shown by the followers of Genghis. They preferred to fight the
Saracens and to aid the Christians rather than to do the reverse. We shall see
that when, a century and a half later, another great invasion from Central
Asia took place, its leader Timour the Lame’s greatest activity was directed

against the Mahometans, and that he demanded from them the restoration to
the Christian emperor of the cities which they had captured.
It is true that in the interval between the two invasions under Genghis Khan
and Timour, the Turkish invaders, who had remained in Asia Minor, caught
much of the fanatical spirit. But there are many indications which show that
this spirit was of slow growth.42 As their struggles with neighbouring and
Christian peoples compacted them into a warlike nation, they all came to
accept the religion of Mahomet, and as they became better acquainted with
the tenets of the most war-inspiring religion in the world, they held to them
tenaciously, and developed the hostility towards Christians which the
spiritual pride of believers who consider themselves the elect of heaven,
and their religion outside the range of discussion, always engenders. But
during the development of their power in Asia Minor, many years passed
before they isolated themselves, and were isolated from the Christians, on
account of their religion. Their princes sought marriage with the princesses
of the imperial and other noble Christian families. We obtain light only
incidentally upon the relations between the professors of the two creeds at
the period shortly after the recapture of Constantinople by the Greeks. But
such as we do obtain confirms the statement that the Asiatic settlers took
their religion very easily. In 1267 certain charges were brought, as we have
seen,43 by the Emperor Michael against the patriarch, which give us a
glimpse of interest. The relation is made by Pachymer, who was himself
one of the clerks of the court. The patriarch was accused, not only of having
conversed familiarly with a Turkish sultan, of having allowed him and his
companions to use the bath attached to the church, around which were the
Christian symbols, but of having ordered a monk to administer the
Sacrament to the children of the sultan without having been assured that
they were baptized. He was charged, further, with having said the Litanies
with the sultan and his followers. The patriarch replied to the two first with
contempt; if the Turks had used the church bath, no harm had been done. As
to giving Communion, he declared that he had been duly certified that the
children had been baptized.44 Witnesses asserted that it was true that the
accused had said the Litanies with the sultan, and that he had allowed him
to sit by his side during celebration, but added that they did not know
whether the sultan was a Christian or not! Other persons were found who
declared that he was not a Christian. The sultan, hearing of the proceedings,

sent to ask, either in jest or seriously, that the emperor would give him the
sacred relics which he wore round his neck, and offered to eat ham as a
proof that he was not a Moslem. Pachymer adds that in thus professing his
readiness to worship the relics and to eat the forbidden flesh, the sultan
caused the proceedings against the patriarch to fail. As it appeared that there
were eminent ecclesiastics in the court who really believed that the sultan of
the Turks was a Christian, those who desired the condemnation of the
patriarch tried to turn the question by suggesting that, whether he was
Christian or not, it was certain that members of his suite, who had been
present when Communion was administered, were unbelievers.45 That the
sultan should have been present at a Christian service at all, that his
children should have been allowed by him or his Moslem followers to
communicate, and that his children were baptized, or believed to be
baptized, show that, whether they were Christians or not, the fanatical spirit
which animated the Moslems of an earlier period, or the Turks a century
later, was not present among these representatives of the Asiatics who had
entered the country as followers of Genghis or his immediate successors.
The characteristics of the Turk have remained singularly
like those possessed by his ancestors. The Turkish Permanent
characteristics of
soldiers who had come in with Genghis, and the hordes Turkish race.
of those who followed during a century, had been for the
most part wandering shepherds, and the nomadic instinct still continued,
and still continues, in the race, notwithstanding that there has been a
considerable admixture of other races. The tent of their leader was larger
than that of his followers, and its entrance came, in the course of time, to be
known as The Lofty Gate, or The Sublime Porte. The shepherd warriors,
who were destined to destroy the empire of the New Rome, had few of the
desires, habits, or aspirations of civilisation. Commerce, except in its
simplest form of barter, was and has always been almost unknown to them.
Among the Turks of a later period the disinclination to change the
traditional habits of the race is to some extent due to the indifference or
contempt felt for trading communities by a race of conquerors; though,
perhaps, incapacity to hold their own as traders against the peoples they
subdued has had a larger share in producing their aversion to commerce.
The furniture of their huts is even yet only such as would have been found
in their felt tents. They have no desire to possess the ordinary utensils which
Europeans of every race consider either as the necessaries of life or as

adding largely to its comfort. They have never taken kindly to agriculture.
Surrounded by fertile land, the Turk will till only enough to supply him
with the barest necessaries of life, and the traveller in the interior of Asia
Minor is to-day, as he has been for centuries, astonished to see that Turkish
peasants who, as the owners of large tracts of fertile land, capable of
producing almost any fruits or vegetables, and of supporting even a large
number of cattle, may be accounted wealthy, are yet content to live upon
fare and amid surroundings at which the ordinary European peasant, and
even the Turks’ own neighbours of different races, would express their
dissatisfaction.46
We get few glimpses of the domestic life and manners of the Turks during
the first two centuries of their emigration into Asia Minor. But such as we
gain show them, in peace and war, to possess the same characteristics as
distinguish their descendants at the present day. When not under the
influence of their religion they are peaceful, kindly disposed, and truthful.
In the hospitality of the tent or hut they are irreproachable. They possess
little, but that little is at the disposal of the traveller. Judged by Western
ideas, they are lazy, and lacking in intelligence. In the ordinary business of
life they are singularly destitute of energy. They have learned, like their
fathers, to be content with the poverty amid which they were born. They
have not sufficient capacity to desire knowledge nor aspiration to make
them discontented. If, as I believe the evidence to indicate, the ancestors of
the present Moslems in Asia Minor were during the thirteenth and half of
the fourteenth century but little under the influence of religious fanaticism,
their easy-going, dolce far niente character may well be taken as sufficient
explanation of the passing over into Turkish territories of many Christians
who desired to escape from the heavy taxation under the rule of the
Christian emperors.
In describing the movement of the Asiatic races into
Asia Minor and Europe, but especially of the advance of Constant stream of
immigrants from
the Turkish hordes who came after the death of Genghis, Central Asia.
two facts ought never to be lost sight of. The first and
most important is that from a period even preceding the recapture of the city
in 1259 down to one within the memory of living men there was a constant
stream of immigrants from Central Asia westward. The numbers of the
immigrant settlers were thus steadily being increased. Probably at no time

has the Turkish race been as prolific as the Christian races of Asia Minor,
and the latter would long ago have outnumbered the conquering race had
the stream of immigration been dammed. The second fact to be noted is that
a constant settlement of the conquered lands was being
made, a settlement which, although possibly as nomadic All conquests
and uncertain as that of the Kurds and Yuruks of to-day, followed by
settlement.
was yet a real occupation of the country at the expense
of Christian populations, who were either massacred or dispersed. It is in
the nomadic character of the newcomers, in the wasteful character of their
occupation of the country, in the substitution of sheep and cattle industry for
agriculture, in their want of intelligence, and in their expulsion and
persecution of the Christian population, that the explanation is to be found
of the destruction and, in some cases, complete abandonment of cities still
populous and flourishing when they were captured: cities like Ephesus,
Nicaea, and a hundred others, whose ruins meet the traveller everywhere
throughout Asia Minor. The Turk has at all times been a nomad and a
destroyer. He has never been a capable trader or even agriculturist.
When the armies led by Genghis Khan and his successors retired, armies
which were well disciplined and well led, many of his soldiers or their
followers remained and took service with the Seljukian Turks. Others
formed separate communities. One of the chiefs who thus settled in Asia
Minor was Ertogrul or Orthogrul, the father of Osman or Othman, the
founder of the Ottoman dynasty.
During Ertogrul’s life, the Seljuks had been greatly harassed by the newer
invaders. Pachymer states that on the arrival of the Tartars the sultan of
Konia (the ancient Iconium) was surrounded by enemies, and that he had
sought the protection of the emperor. He had invited also the aid of the
sultan of Egypt, known to the Crusaders as the sultan of Babylon, against
the Tartars, by whom he was hard pressed. Three or four years after this
sultan’s death in 1277, Ertogrul died. His son Osman or Othman by his
courage and ability gave his followers the leading place among the Turks in
Asia Minor and firmly established the dynasty named after him. He began
his career by coming to an agreement with some of the other Moslem chiefs
to divide the territory occupied by the Seljuks and themselves in Asia Minor
into eight portions. Thereupon the combined forces of the old and new
Turks commenced a series of attacks upon neighbouring territory. During

the next twenty years, their success was almost unchecked. In 1282, they
laid siege to Tralles (the present Aidin), and, though opposed by the son of
Michael the Eighth, were able to capture and destroy the city.47 A short time
afterwards they obtained a fleet and took into their service a large number
of sailors who had been discharged by the emperor from motives of
economy. Twelve years later, Othman and Ali, chief of another Turkish
band, pushed their raids northward and even crossed the river Sangarius and
spread desolation throughout the Asiatic provinces of the Empire, before
they could be driven back. Two years later, they laid waste the country
between the Black Sea and Rhodes.
In 1299, Othman took the title of Sultan. In 1302, he and
other Turkish leaders inflicted a serious defeat upon the Othman, first
Ottoman Sultan,
imperial troops and a band of Alans on the river 1299–1327.
Sangarius near Sabanja. The defeat was shortly
afterwards turned into a rout and the subjects of the empire with the Alans
were driven to seek shelter in Ismidt, the ancient Nicomedia. The confines
of the empire were narrowed, and Othman established himself near Brousa
and the neighbouring city of Nicaea, and came to an arrangement for
division of the newly acquired territory with the other Turkish chiefs.
Alarmed for a while at the news that the emperor was to receive help from
the West, the Turks soon renewed their attacks upon imperial territory, and
the Greek population almost everywhere fled before them. They attacked
the wealthy cities on the Aegean coast of Asia Minor and occupied several
of the islands of the Archipelago. Pachymer states48 that they had inundated
the country north of Pergamus so completely that no Roman dared entertain
the hope of keeping his property, and all fled before the flood of invaders:
some to the city of Pergamus, others to Adramyttium or Lampsacus, while
others again crossed the Dardanelles into Europe.
The reign of Othman is contemporaneous with one of the great periods of
immigration from Central Asia. The numbers of the Turks were yearly
augmented by such hordes that the Greek writers continually use metaphors
derived from the torrent, from floods and inundations, to describe their
overwhelming force.
It was partly in order to resist this flood of invasion that
the Catalan Grand Company had been invited to aid the Entry of Turks into

emperor, but after having won several victories over the Europe, 1306–7.
Turks, the lawlessness of the Spaniards forced the
emperor to recognise that his Western auxiliaries were of no value for
checking the progress of the enemy. The Christians of Asia Minor flocked
to the capital to avoid the Company almost as much as to escape from the
soldiers of Othman. Worse than all, to these Christians of Spain must be
ascribed the introduction of the Turks into Europe. At the invitation of the
Company, a band of them, as we have seen, crossed the Dardanelles to aid
in attacking the empire which Roger and his Catalans had come to defend.
About the same time, another band of Turks landed in Greece for the
purpose of pillage. These invasions are epoch-marking, since from this time
(1306–7), Europe was never entirely free from the presence of Turks.
Their great progress was, however, more marked in Asia
Minor. In 1308, one of the divisions of Turks not under Their progress in
Asia Minor.
Othman captured Ephesus, which surrendered to avoid
massacre. The city still retained something of its ancient glory. Its famous
church of St. John, from the ruins of which the traveller may still gain an
idea of its former magnificence, was plundered, and its immense wealth in
precious vessels and deposits became the prey of the victors. Many of the
inhabitants were cruelly massacred, notwithstanding their submission, and
the remainder were driven away as fugitives to find the means of living
where they could or to starve. Other places under the rule of Constantinople
were attacked, and though many victories were gained—for the imperial
troops fought well—the Turks were constantly gaining cities and territory
from the Christians. It was in vain that the emperor entered into league with
bands of Tartars or with other Turks to attack the armies of Othman, for the
forces of this skilful leader were too numerous to be subdued. Brousa had to
purchase peace from him. Othman failed, however, to capture Rhodes,
which was bravely defended by the military knights from the West, and a
monk named Hilarion at the head of the imperial troops gained some
successes. The imperial troops succeeded also in 1310 in defeating a certain
Mahomet whose dominions were in Caramania. But even with the aid of a
band of Tartars who had allied themselves with the emperor, who was in
command of twenty thousand of the imperial troops, little could be done to
check Othman’s steady progress.

Meantime in Europe, on the north shore of the Marmora, the band of Turks
who had been associated with the Grand Company, but who did not
acknowledge the rule of Othman, besieged Ganos and laid waste the
surrounding country. The troubles which arose a few years later between the
Emperor Andronicus the Second and young Andronicus, enabled the Turks
steadily to encroach on the empire in Asia Minor, and their introduction as
partisans in the civil war which went on in 1322 familiarised them and
probably Othman himself with inroads into the country between
Constantinople and Gallipoli.49
So far we have been concerned almost exclusively with those portions of
the Asiatic army and the hordes which followed it which came westward to
the south of the Black Sea. But it must be noted that the body of invaders of
the same race who had come westward to the north of that sea, and who had
attacked Russia, Poland, and Hungary, had constantly received additions to
their numbers. This northern division was possibly more numerous than the
Turks in Asia Minor. As early as 1265, a certain Timour, the ruler of Tartars
who were in occupation of territory on the Volga, had sent twenty thousand
men to aid the Bulgarians against the Empire. Bulgarians and Tartars
together had occupied all the passes into Thrace, and the emperor had saved
himself with difficulty. In 1284, ten thousand Tartars came southward into
Thrace from the great host which were in Hungary. In 1300, the Turks who
had entered the Crimea were driven out by another horde of Tartars who
had occupied South Russia. The number and strength of these invaders
continued constantly to increase. Their power indeed remained firmly
established in South Russia until long after the conquest of Constantinople.
They had no special sympathy with the Ottoman Turks, and were ready, as
were the Alans, to fight either for the emperor or against him. Cantacuzenus
mentions that in 1324 one hundred and twenty thousand of them entered
Thrace and were beaten in detail by his friend the young Andronicus.
Weakened by having to meet this huge northern army,
for huge it must have been, although the number of the Capture of Brousa,
1326.
invaders is probably exaggerated,50 the young emperor
was forbidden or was unable to go to the relief of Brousa when, two years
afterwards, Othman laid siege to that city. Its surrender in 1326 is a
convenient mark of the progress made by the Ottoman Turks.
Their great leader, Othman, died in the following year.

CHAPTER IV
DYNASTIC STRUGGLES IN EMPIRE: APPEALS TO POPE FOR AID; REIGNS OF
ANDRONICUS THE SECOND, JOHN CANTACUZENUS AND JOHN; REPEATED
FAILURE OF EFFORTS BY POPES TO INDUCE WESTERN POWERS TO ASSIST IN
CHECKING MOSLEM ADVANCE.

When, in 1320, the Emperor Michael the Ninth died, the empire was
already threatened by large and ever-increasing armies of Asiatics, both on
the north and on the south. Those on the south were steadily being
incorporated into the group ruled over by Othman.
The sixty years which had passed since the expulsion of the Latins had
nevertheless done something, though not much, towards restoring the
empire. Territory had been recovered. The walls of the capital had been
repaired. The population had begun once again to look to the emperor at
Constantinople as their natural ruler.51
On the other hand the ravages of war had been terrible.
The population of those portions of the Balkan peninsula Distressed
condition of the
which were under the rule of the empire had greatly empire.
diminished. Thousands had been murdered by the
Catalan Grand Company and their allies during their successive
devastations of the country. Land had gone out of cultivation. In Asia Minor
many of the Christian inhabitants had voluntarily submitted to the Turks to
save their lives or to obtain protection. The demand for soldiers to serve the
national cause against the many enemies who attacked the empire, and the
demands for money which was needed for the conduct of the defence,
induced the peasants both in Europe and Asia to escape into neighbouring
territories where such demands were less rigorous. The wealth of the empire
had largely diminished. The great need of the country was peace. Peace and
security for life and property were absolutely essential if the empire were to
be restored to prosperity. The people were wearied of strife, and there are
indications which point to a general indifference as to what became of the
empire as a state. The peasant wanted to till his land and reap his harvest in
peace, the nobles to gather their revenues in peace. The means of
communication between the provinces and the capital were too few to

enable the mass of the people to take an interest in what was passing in the
capital. They had come to regard it not so much as their protector but as the
place from whence emanated new exactions, new demands for military
service, and general harassment.
Unfortunately, the dynastic struggles which were destined to come
strengthened this desire for peace, increased the indifference as to who was
their emperor, and still further weakened the empire.
The greatest misfortune which the struggle with the Spaniards had brought
about was the introduction of the Turk into Europe. We have seen that each
side, Orthodox emperors and Catholic invaders, had allied themselves with
bands of Turks and other barbarians, who had overrun Thrace and
Macedonia. The destruction of the population, the raiding of their cattle,
and the laying waste of fertile lands offered at once a facility and an
incentive to the Moslem invaders to remain in Europe. Indeed, from the
first entry of the Turks bands of nomads of that race began to occupy
portions of the desolated country.
For the next hundred and thirty years—that is, until the Moslem conquest—
the history of the empire is, so far as its rulers are concerned, largely one of
confused struggle during which no man of conspicuous ability came to the
front. To account for this confusion it should be noted that there was no rule
of succession to the throne which was regarded as inviolable, and that, even
among the nobles and in the Church, public opinion had little force except
upon religious questions. A few men in the city took an interest in political
questions; the great mass of the peasants took none. Representative
institutions did not exist. The reigning emperor, though in theory absolute,
was largely controlled by irresponsible and unorganised nobles. When a
majority of them agreed to support a rival candidate they were sufficiently
powerful to have their own way. The result was that dynastic struggles
where each rival for the throne was supported by a party of patricians were
frequent, and these struggles contributed very largely to weaken the empire.
On the death of the co-Emperor Michael the Ninth, his
father, Andronicus the Second, still occupied the Quarrels between
Andronicus the
imperial throne. Being now well advanced in years, he Second and his
desired, on the death of his son, to break through the grandson.
engagement by which Andronicus, his grandson, the son

of Michael, should become with him joint occupant of the throne. The
relations between the two men were far from friendly. While insisting that
his grandson should present himself at the court, the old emperor refused
for four months to speak to him. The grandson, usually known as Young
Andronicus, was supported by a powerful party and had no intention of
abandoning what he considered to be his rights. In order to get rid of him,
the emperor formally brought a charge of treason and sought to put him
upon his trial, but Cantacuzenus, the most distinguished noble, and his other
friends rallied to the palace in such force that the elder Andronicus was
alarmed. In presence of the patriarch and the nobles on whom he could rely,
the emperor accused his grandson of continual disobedience, and proceeded
as if to pass sentence. ‘This is why’ he began—but here Young Andronicus
stopped him, asking to be allowed to defend himself. The scene as
described by his great friend and most powerful supporter, Cantacuzenus, is
a striking one. The young man is seated on the chair and in the place
assigned to accused persons. He admits amid the silence of the court that he
has disobeyed his grandfather in such trivial matters as going out hunting,
attending races, and the like, but claimed that he had done nothing against
the emperor’s interest, and asked to be sent before independent judges. The
old man tried to shout him down, and roared out that he believed he was not
even a Christian. Young Andronicus replied with spirit and claimed that he
should be tried. ‘If you have made up your mind to condemn me without
hearing, do with me what you like and at once. If not, judge me according
to law.’ That was a reply which still appealed to all men in the city of
Justinian.
When the emperor had shouted at his grandson, the friends of Young
Andronicus, who had been near but in hiding, believing he was condemned,
came forward for his defence. A courtier warned the emperor of their
presence, telling him, says Cantacuzenus, that they were ready to do all that
was necessary for his grandson’s safety. Thereupon the emperor retired and
sent word that he would pardon him. A reconciliation was patched up, but it
was only temporary. After the lapse of a few weeks grandfather and
grandson were again openly hostile to each other. The young man was
forbidden to enter the capital, where he had many supporters, and the two
emperors remained enemies for years. In 1326 two officers in command of
the towers above the Romanus Gate enabled him to effect a surprise. The

gates were opened and the elder Andronicus became virtually a prisoner
until his death. The contest between them had lasted upwards of six years.
In 1328 the elder emperor abdicated and entered a monastery, and two years
afterwards the burial of a monk named Anthony marked the end of the life
of Andronicus the Second. Andronicus the Third was now the sole occupant
of the throne, which he held until his death in 1341.
During these thirteen years (1328–1341) war was
constantly being waged against the Turks. The emperor Reign of
Andronicus the
himself was always in delicate health, and died at the Third, 1328–1341.
age of forty-five. He continued his great friendship until
his death with Cantacuzenus, and invited him, even as early as 1329, to
occupy the throne as co-emperor, and the offer was renewed.52
Cantacuzenus, notwithstanding that he was pressed to accept by the only
noble near him in rank, Apocaukus, who afterwards became his great
enemy, refused. The emperor, however, continued to treat him as a friend,
and was constantly accompanied by him on his various expeditions.
Like every emperor from the recapture of
Constantinople down to 1453, Andronicus turned his Appeals for aid to
the pope.
attention to the West and sought to obtain aid against the
Turks, even at the price of coercing his people into a Union with Rome. The
Turks had invaded Macedonia and attacked Euboea and Athens. As the
southern portion of the Balkan peninsula was still ruled in part by the
descendants of the crusading barons and by the remnant of the Catalans,
there was reason to believe that the pope would be ready to arouse the West
against the common enemy of Christendom. Accordingly the emperor took
advantage of the passage of Dominican missionaries through
Constantinople from Tartary to convey to Pope John the Twenty-second his
desire for Union and his request for aid. The pope replied by sending
preachers and by urging the emperor to do all he could to accomplish his
part. His successor in 1335 grew alarmed at the attacks made by the Turks
by sea on various places in the Mediterranean, and finding that the Catalans
had seized Athens from Gautier de Brienne, who held it as his duchy, he
excommunicated them. He invited Andronicus to join the king of France
and Naples in a Crusade against the Turks which the Venetians and the
Genoese had promised also to aid. The emperor gladly gave his consent and
sent a number of ships, but the needs of Cyprus, which was being attacked

by the Saracens, were decided to be more pressing than those of the empire,
and the Crusade was not proceeded with. Andronicus in 1339 sent Barlaam,
the author of many controversial works, to the pope, at that time in
Avignon. On his arrival he pointed out that the Turks had seized the seats of
four metropolitan sees, and he suggested that as a condition of the Union of
the Churches the Turks should be expelled from Asia Minor. The pope
recognised the desirability of such an attempt as keenly as many of his
successors, but saw that the condition was impossible.
Andronicus on his death, in 1341, left a son, John
Palaeologus, who was then nine years old. His mother, Death of
Andronicus the
Anne of Savoy, was a woman of ability and energy. Third. Reign of
Cantacuzenus was associated with her as regent. He held John (1341 to
the dignity of Grand Domestic, and in the later years of 1391),
Cantacuzenus (1342
his life wrote a clear and able statement of the history of to 1355.)
his own times. He had been, as we have seen, the
intimate friend of Andronicus and his great supporter when the grandfather
of the same name endeavoured to exclude him from the throne. He had
been named by his friend and patron as the guardian of John, but the widow
of the emperor was from the first jealous of her co-guardian and never
worked sympathetically with him. He tells us that from the death of
Andronicus he was constantly urged to occupy the imperial throne and that
he as constantly refused. He undoubtedly possessed the confidence of a
large majority of the nobles. There was a general recognition that, in the
existing state of the empire, it was unwise to leave the government in the
hands of a boy and of a foreign princess. Ducas expressly states that
Cantacuzenus ultimately allowed himself to be proclaimed emperor because
his friends urged him to take the reins of government from the hands of a
woman and a child and because the empress and the senate were unjust and
unfair to him.53 In 1342 he was proclaimed joint emperor under the style of
John Cantacuzenus.
During the thirteen years of his reign, which lasted till 1355, the history of
the empire is in the main one of civil war and consequent decadence.
Distrusted by Anne, the mother of the boy emperor, his difficulties were
increased by the turbulent character of his ward, whom his mother could
not, or would not, restrain from wilfulness which led him even in early
youth into debauchery. The result was that during the whole of

Cantacuzenus’s reign there was a constant strain between the elder emperor,
on the one side, and the empress and her son on the other. Cantacuzenus
states that Apocaukus, the noble next to himself in rank, had suggested to
him that he should assume imperial authority and that he had rejected the
suggestion as treason to the empress and her sons and to the memory of the
emperor. But Apocaukus, with the support of the patriarch, soon formed a
party, nominally for the empress and her son, really against Cantacuzenus.
The patriarch himself claimed to be the guardian of the infant John,
excommunicated those who abandoned him, and even Cantacuzenus
himself.54 The account given by the emperor of his reluctance to accept the
crown might be regarded with distrust if Nicephorus Gregoras, who after he
had become a bitter enemy wrote his history of the events of the reign, were
not on this point in substantial accord with Cantacuzenus. Even before his
accession the troops, according to Gregoras, declared that they would
recognise no other regent than the Grand Domestic, and proposed to make
the oath of fidelity to the young emperor and his mother conditional upon
the recognition of Cantacuzenus as tutor of John and regent of the empire.
In presence of the opposition of Anne, Cantacuzenus offered to resign, but
the empress desired that he should remain, probably fearing revolt in case
his resolution was carried into effect. Among much which is doubtful, it is
clear that he had the confidence of the army and that the empress had not.
Civil war soon broke out between the new emperor and the partisans of
John and his mother. Apocaukus was named governor of Constantinople by
Anne and excited the population against Cantacuzenus apparently with the
intention of having himself elected emperor by a popular vote.
Meantime the rivalries of these two nobles allowed foreign enemies to
make progress. Two divisions of Turks were ravaging the empire in one
direction, while a band of Tartars who had crossed the Danube had
advanced as far as Didymotica. Stephen of Serbia had already marched
southwards and was rapidly consolidating the strength of his country. In
1344 the discontent at the civil war had become so great that the nobles
insisted that the empress Anne and Apocaukus should send an embassy to
Cantacuzenus to make peace. When this attempt failed, Apocaukus,
according to Cantacuzenus, endeavoured on two occasions to have him
assassinated. Driven thus to extremities, the emperor promised his daughter
Theodora in marriage to the Turk Orchan, the son and successor of Othman,

who thereupon sent an army of five thousand men to assist in the struggle
against the partisans of John.
Apocaukus had thrown into the prisons of Constantinople the partisans of
his rival and had ordered them to be treated with unusual barbarity. He was
then incautious enough to venture into prison among them. They fell upon
him, slew him, stuck his head upon a spike, and showed it to the citizens.
Next day, however, at the instigation of his widow, the prisoners were all
killed.
In 1346 Orchan was married to Theodora, the daughter
of Cantacuzenus. Her father had stipulated that she Marriage of Sultan
Orchan and the
should be allowed to remain a Christian, and the daughter of the
agreement was not violated. She was delivered at emperor.
Selymbria to the escort of Turkish cavalry which had
been commissioned to accompany her. Amid much pomp and ceremony,
with music, torches, and display of various kinds, the first imperial princess
of the Orthodox Church was handed over to the eunuchs of her barbarous
lord. We may pass over the father’s excuses for consenting to this marriage,
which doubtless appeared to many of his subjects a gross act of wickedness.
All that they amount to is that he believed the necessities of state required
him to obtain the aid of Orchan and that it could not be obtained in any
other way.
The next year, a much more promising marriage took
place, namely that of his daughter Helen with the young Marriage of the
emperor John to
emperor John Palaeologus. It had been brought about in another daughter of
the following manner. Cantacuzenus had approached the Cantacuzenus.
capital, and though the empress had been warned that he
was in the neighbourhood, she had taken no precaution to prevent his being
admitted, believing, indeed, that the story of his being near was an
invention to gain time so as to prevent the condemnation of a new patriarch
who was known to be a partisan of Cantacuzenus and was then on his trial
before a Council of the Church. The friends of Cantacuzenus were in
possession of the Golden Gate and opened it to him and his band of a
thousand trusted followers. He marched in triumph to the Palace of
Porphyrogenitus. The empress, as soon as she heard of the entry, shut
herself up in the Palace at Blachern and called to her aid the Genoese of
Galata. When the latter saw that the population were on the side of her rival,

they refused to aid her. John advised his mother to treat, and after
considerable hesitation she consented and articles of peace were agreed to.
An amnesty was to be granted by both sides, and John was during ten years
to permit Cantacuzenus to be the dominant ruler. Thereupon the latter
proposed that his daughter Helen should become engaged to John, and,
though the young man was unwilling, his mother accepted the arrangement.
Helen was thirteen years old and her proposed husband fifteen.
Peace and prosperity appear to have been anticipated from the cessation of
civil war which it was hoped this marriage would produce. Europe, if not,
as Gibbon asserts, ‘completely evacuated by the Moslems of Asia,’55 was
yet at peace with the empire. Within its borders all parties were supposed to
be reconciled, and at the church of Blachern (the bema of Hagia Sophia
having been destroyed by an earthquake) a remarkable coronation service
was held in May 1347. Two emperors, namely the young John Palaeologus
and John Cantacuzenus, and three empresses—Helen, wife of the
Palaeologus, Irene, wife of Cantacuzenus, and Anne of Savoy, the dowager
—were crowned with unusually elaborate ceremonial. The bystanders,
however, noted that the jewels were many of them false and the trappings of
far less value than had previously been displayed on similar occasions.
Ducas notes that the young emperor, who had been forced to marry the
daughter of Cantacuzenus, instead of taking part in the manly exercises of
arms which were still practised by the youth of the empire, plunged into
debauchery and soon disgusted his adherents by his drunkenness and by the
depravity of his private life. The narrative of Gregoras declares that John
complained bitterly of having been insulted by his father-in-law, and the
statement is probably true that, seeing his debauchery, Cantacuzenus urged
him to lead a better life and devote himself to duty.56
Pressed as he was for money in every direction, Cantacuzenus endeavoured
to obtain it by a popular vote. The notice of the incident is almost unique in
the later history of the empire and on that account merits attention.
Cantacuzenus himself tells its history. Finding that the state had been
greatly weakened by civil war, that the treasury was empty, the cities
reduced to poverty by domestic divisions or by the invasions of the various
foreign enemies who had ravaged the country, and his own private fortune
expended, he determined to summon a meeting in Constantinople of the
wealthy classes in order that they should contribute to the public

necessities. He expressly states that he had no intention of making a levy by
force. In the meeting thus called together there were representatives of all
ranks—soldiers, shopkeepers, artisans, heads of monasteries, and priests.
Cantacuzenus in addressing it declared that he had no desire to act against
the Palaeologi but recognised that the civil war had exhausted the treasury,
and promised that the money collected would be employed and his efforts
directed against the attacks of Serbians, Bulgarians, and Turks. He added
that it was not he who had sought the alliance of the Turks, though he had
given his daughter in marriage to Orchan, but that the aid of these
barbarians had been forced upon him by his enemies within the empire. The
partisans of John had been the first to ask the Turks for assistance. They had
delivered cities to the Turks, had paid them, and had made it necessary that
he, in his own defence, should ask for their alliance. He concluded by
urging the great assembly to consider in what manner means might be
found of preserving the empire.57
The nobles returned answer that they recognised the necessity of
contributing for the safety of the state, and advised that every person should
give what was in his power. The emperor, believing that he had
accomplished his purpose, then dismissed the assembly.
Very little result appears to have been produced. Nor does the voluntary
taxation appear to have yielded any considerable sum. In the meeting itself
there were many who were opposed to Cantacuzenus personally, and within
a short period the animosity between the partisans of the two emperors
became as rancorous as ever. Among the most violent of his own partisans
was his son Matthew, who, under the belief that Anne, the empress-
dowager, was conspiring against his father, boldly took possession of
several cities.
Wearied out by constant struggle, Cantacuzenus states that he wished to
abdicate and retire to a monastery, and that his wife approved of his design.
His writings show that he felt great interest in the discussion of theological
questions. The part which he himself took in several religious controversies,
the anxiety that he underwent to have the excommunication against him
annulled, first by the Patriarch John and afterwards, ‘for greater safety,’ by
John’s successor,58 Isidore, his negotiations with the pope for Union, and
many other circumstances, show that the withdrawal to a monastery was a
not unnatural development of his life.

While he was making preparations to carry his design into execution, news
came of the progress of Stephen of Serbia, which forced him to postpone it.
Salonica, ‘one of the eyes of the empire,’ was in danger of surrendering to
Stephen. The partisans of the Palaeologi among the population of that city
were numerous. The neighbouring country was, however, under the power
of the great Serbian, and unless Stephen were checked without delay the
city would be given over to him. The old emperor sent word to his
followers to remain steadfast, promising that he would come to their relief.
In order to do so, he took a step which is sometimes incorrectly treated as
the first important introduction of the Turks into Europe.59 He induced his
son-in-law, Orchan, to send a body of twenty thousand cavalry, under his
son Suliman, across the Dardanelles to march against Stephen. The emperor
left the capital as soon as he had heard that the Turks had crossed the straits
to co-operate with them, and took his co-emperor John, who was obnoxious
to the Turks, with him. For some reason which is not clear, the Othman or
Ottoman Turks withdrew after they had crossed the Maritza, but the two
emperors with another body of Turks went to Salonica and put an end to
any design to surrender it. This was in 1349.
The history of the empire during the next six years is a medley of incidents,
due to the hostility between the two emperors. John refused to address his
elder colleague as emperor, and even proposed to join Stephen of Serbia,
whose power in the Balkan peninsula was now greater than that of any
other ruler. The Bulgarian king, appealed to by Cantacuzenus to enter into
alliance against Stephen, refused his co-operation, and shortly after joined
the Venetians to attack the empire.
Cantacuzenus asked for the aid of the Genoese, who
joined him in order to resist the Venetians. The rivalry Genoese and
Venetians.
during this reign between the two republics of Venice
and Genoa was great. Each was at the height of its power, and the
commerce and dominions of the empire were the principal objects of their
rivalry. A hundred and fifty years earlier there had been colonies of
Amalfians, Pisans, Anconans, Ragusans, and even Germans, within the
walls of the city. All these had disappeared,60 and Genoa the Superb and
Venice, Queen of the Seas, were the sole Italian competitors for domination
in or a share of the empire. At the period with which we are concerned they
were about equally matched in strength, and the two brave republics were

constantly fighting the battles of their great duel in the waters of the Greek
empire. Within a few months the Genoese were alternately the allies and the
enemies of Cantacuzenus. In 1350 a fleet of fourteen Venetian galleys, and
another of Catalans, prevented the Genoese from entering the Bosporus.
Two years later another formidable fleet of Venetian galleys joined one of
twenty-six Spaniards in order to attack the Genoese. After Pisani, the
Venetian admiral, had rested his men for two days on the island of Prinkipo,
he joined the imperial ships at Heptaskalion, and with a fleet of sixty-eight
vessels attacked the Genoese. The fleet of the latter, numbering seventy
ships, was at Chalcedon, and tried to intercept the enemy when they
endeavoured to make their way to the Golden Horn. In a battle which was
fought at the mouth of the Bosporus while a strong south wind was blowing
with a heavy sea—a battle which continued all night—both sides lost
heavily. Eighteen Genoese ships were sunk. Pisani withdrew to Therapia,
with a loss of sixteen ships. Galata, held by the Genoese, was not attacked,
on account of the prevalence of Black Death,61 or possibly because he
heard that seventy or eighty other galleys were on their way to aid the
Genoese.
Immediately afterwards the Genoese joined with the Turks, and transported
across the Bosporus a body of them to attack Constantinople.
Cantacuzenus, in consequence, was obliged to make peace with his rivals in
Galata by allowing them to include a large portion of additional territory
within new walls,62 as well as to take possession of Selymbria and Heraclia
in Thrace. The Genoese thereupon once more became his allies. Orchan was
ready to assist him, and again promised to send twenty thousand Turks to
resist the party of John.
Once more Cantacuzenus endeavoured to come to terms with his colleague.
The latter had also endeavoured to gain the aid of Orchan, but failed. John’s
reply to the overture of his father-in-law was again to refuse to recognise
that he had any right to the title of emperor. The followers of the rival
emperors, Cantacuzeni and Palaeologi, were more bitter in their opposition
than the leaders themselves, and the former in 1353 proclaimed Matthew,
the son of Cantacuzenus, co-emperor with his father.
It is clear from the statement of Cantacuzenus himself that, as John grew
older, his own party became weaker. The hopes of the people and of the
nobles for a peaceful reign had been disappointed. Instead of having peace,

the country had been disturbed by civil war. Serbia and Bulgaria had both
recovered strength. The Turks had encroached on the imperial territories.
The emperor’s greatest offence was rightly considered to have been the
employment of Turkish auxiliaries, and the permission granted to the
captors to sell the captured Christians as slaves, or the inability to prevent
them from doing so.63 The patriarch Philotheus remonstrated with him on
this account, and Cantacuzenus declares that he received the admonition as
the voice of God, and promised to conform to it.64 Probably because he
recognised that his own popularity was waning, he had allowed his eldest
son, Matthew, to be associated with him in the government, but though the
son displayed great activity, and gathered round him a strong party, both he
and his father were condemned by the popular judgment.
The account given by Cantacuzenus is that he was asked by the nobles to
nominate his successor, that he deferred giving his answer, but went to
consult the patriarch, who retired to a monastery and after a week sent word
that he would not return to the court nor to his church unless the emperor
would swear never to proclaim his son Matthew. Thereupon Cantacuzenus
called together the senate, who declared for Matthew. Cantacuzenus
protests that in the struggle going on between John, his son-in-law, and
Matthew he was always neutral, but that as the nobles wanted the latter he
consented to name him as his colleague and successor. Thereupon Matthew
was allowed to wear the purple buskin and the other imperial insignia. His
name, as well as that of his father and Anne, the mother of John, was
mentioned in the public prayers, while that of John was omitted.65 The
patriarch, however, remained obdurate. Matthew had not yet been
consecrated. An assembly of bishops declared that, notwithstanding the
patriarch’s opposition, he ought to be asked to perform the ceremony. The
answer of Philotheus was to decree excommunication against any one who
should attempt to lay upon him such a duty. The patriarch was threatened
with dismissal. He replied that he would be glad of it, and was dismissed
accordingly.66
The great anxiety of Cantacuzenus until, and even after, his abdication was
to see his son recognised as emperor. Matthew, however, fell into the hands
of John, who generously offered him his liberty on condition that he would
renounce all claim to the throne. Cantacuzenus states that he counselled his

son to accept this offer. After some hesitation he took his father’s advice.
Articles of peace were accepted, and among the stipulations it was provided
that Matthew might wear any buskin he liked except in purple. It was a
relief to both parties when John saved himself from the reproaches of his
father-in-law by leaving for Italy and Germany. His party appears to have
increased in strength during his absence.67
He remained abroad for two years. On his return he encountered at Tenedos
a Genoese adventurer, with a considerable number of followers, who was
on the look-out for an island which he might seize as the Venetians had
seized Chios. John proposed to employ the adventurer to aid him in
becoming sole emperor. They came together to Constantinople, where the
citizens had already risen in revolt against Cantacuzenus, who had in
consequence to shut himself up in the Blachern Palace with a foreign guard.
During the night John’s friends asked to be admitted at the postern of
Hodegetria, pretending that they were merchants with a cargo of olive oil,
and that the sea was rising and dangerous. They promised the guardians that
if they were admitted half the cargo should be paid for the favour. They
rushed the postern as soon as it was open, and two thousand men entered
the city, took possession of the walls, and made a demonstration in favour
of John. When morning broke, the Hippodrome was crowded with citizens,
and the city in a tumult. Cantacuzenus apparently lost
his head, entered the monastery of Peribleptis, and Cantacuzenus
submits and retires
assumed the habit of a monk. He at once made to Mount Athos,
submission to his young rival, asked and, after some 1355.
weeks, received permission to retire to Mount Athos,
and there passed nearly twenty-five years in the composition of his
voluminous History. He died in 1380.
Cantacuzenus, like his predecessors, looked to the West and especially to
the pope to aid him in checking the progress of the Turks. Throughout the
whole of his reign the attempts to obtain aid from the West and to bring
about the Union of the Churches, two objects which had become
inseparable, are constant. The zeal with which successive popes sought to
obtain the Union found a ready response in Cantacuzenus.
News travelled slowly from the Levant to Italy, but such as reached the
West made it known, not merely that Moslems were encroaching on
Christian territory; that the victories obtained in the great crusades had

largely become fruitless; that almost every inch of territory which had been
won in Syria at the sacrifice of so many lives and so much treasure had
been captured by the infidels, but that the Christian populations had been
everywhere treated with the barbarity that has always followed Moslem
conquest. The history indeed of Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor had been a
long series of massacres, culminating perhaps in that of Egypt where in
1354, when the Christians were ordered to abjure their faith and to accept
Mahometanism and refused, a hundred thousand were put to death.68
Under such circumstances, Clement the Sixth was not
less anxious than his predecessors had been to check Attempts by pontiff
(a) to resist
Moslem progress. Encompassed as he was with a host of Moslems, (b) to
difficulties, and insecure even in his own position, he effect union.
constantly kept before him the desirability of attaining
the two results which for nearly three centuries were prominent objects of
papal policy: resistance to the Mahometans and the Union of the two great
Christian Churches. In 1343, the year after his appointment to the pontifical
throne, he persuaded the queens of Sicily and Naples to send a fleet with
one fitted out by himself against the Turks. Two years later he urged all
Christians to aid in the defence of Caifa and, in return for their services in
defending that city, permitted the Genoese to trade with the infidels at
Bagdad. When he learned that the Christian expedition which he had
authorised was massacred by the Turks near Smyrna, he proclaimed a
crusade and appealed to Edward the Third of England not to prevent Philip
of France from taking part in it by making war against him, an appeal which
was unsuccessful and which was followed six months later by the victory of
Crécy. In the same year Clement sent two nuncios into Armenia to persuade
the members of the ancient Church of that people to enter into union with
Rome. In 1347 he wrote to congratulate Stephen of Serbia on his having
expressed the desire to enter the Roman Communion.
During the early years of the reigns of John and Cantacuzenus, Clement
does not appear to have had direct communication with Constantinople. He
had apparently a dislike to or prejudice against the elder emperor, for in
1345 he wrote to the dauphin of France not to treat with Cantacuzenus but
only with the Dowager Empress Anne.69 He had seen with indignation the
employment of Turks by Cantacuzenus against his enemies and considered
him a usurper of the throne which ought to be occupied only by John, the

son of a mother whose predilections in favour of Union were well known.
His information, according to the emperor’s narrative, was derived from an
Italian lady who had lived with the Empress Anne and whose sympathy
would naturally be with the cause of her mistress.
Cantacuzenus determined to explain to the pontiff his own position, to
justify his conduct and at the same time to offer his aid in any expedition
that might be formed for attacking the Mahometans and to express his
desire to accomplish the Union of the Churches.70
Accordingly he sent a deputation to Clement consisting of the
protovestarius and an Italian in his service who was known to the pope. On
their arrival they had long interviews with Clement and were astonished at
his detailed knowledge of the condition of the empire. According to
Cantacuzenus, the pope expressed great satisfaction at the clemency shown
by him to his enemies and especially at the marriage between his daughter
and John, in which he saw the prospect of a united empire and one which
would be able to aid in resisting the Moslems. Clement sent the deputation
back to Constantinople accompanied by two bishops as nuncios
distinguished alike by their piety and learning. They arrived in the capital in
1347. After expressing the satisfaction of the pope for the emperor’s
moderation towards his enemies and his kindness towards Anne, the
nuncios declared that the pontiff was even more zealous than any of his
predecessors for an attack upon the Turks and that he had already
endeavoured to induce the Italian princes to join in an expedition by
promising them aid in men and money, but that his zeal was still further
increased by the offer of the emperor to aid in such undertaking. If in
addition to this he could procure the reconciliation of the Churches, he
would gain the approval not only of the pope but of God and His angels.
Cantacuzenus in his reply expressed his thanks to the pontiff for his
promised aid against the infidels and in reference to the Union of the
Churches declared that he would willingly die if by his death he could
secure the object for which both ardently longed. He pointed out, however,
that the differences between the Churches related to doctrine, and that
Catholic teaching recognised that these could only be settled by a Council
of the whole Church. He himself could accept no new dogmas nor force
others to accept them before they had been definitely accepted by a
Council. He therefore suggested that one should be called, being confident

that its deliberations and its decisions would receive divine guidance. As the
pope could not come to Constantinople and Cantacuzenus could not go to
Rome, the emperor proposed that the Council should be summoned to meet
in some maritime city, midway between the two capitals.
The nuncios found, or professed to find, the proposal of the emperor
reasonable, and returned to Rome. The pope expressed his satisfaction, but
declared that he could not suggest a place of meeting till he had
communicated with the princes of the West. After some time he sent word
that though he regarded the Union of the Churches as the most important
question with which Christendom had to deal, he was obliged to defer
fixing the time and the place for the Council until he had secured peace
among the Italian princes. The death of Clement, in 1352, delayed the
execution of this project.
It is difficult to form an impartial judgment of the
characters of Cantacuzenus and John, whose reigns Character of
Cantacuzenus.
cover the period during which, if it had been possible,
the empire might have recovered its strength. The history of the reign
written by the former, as well as the narrative of Ducas, places the conduct
of the elder emperor in a favourable light. The charge most commonly
brought against him, of having introduced the Turks into Europe, can only
be accepted with considerable reserve. As we have already seen, he was not
the first to introduce them. The Spaniards must bear the responsibility of
this charge. Once it became necessary to fight, whether against Serbians,
Bulgarians, or internal enemies, an emperor can hardly be blamed for
obtaining auxiliaries. The mercenaries most easily obtainable were the
Turks. All contending parties in the Balkan peninsula were ready to accept
their aid. The excuses of Cantacuzenus are evidence which proves that he
realised the danger of their obtaining a permanent foothold in Europe. A
more valid justification is furnished by the fact that, with the object of
preventing them crossing into Thrace without his permission, he
endeavoured to close the two passages which they had been accustomed
before his time to employ—namely, from Lampsacus and between Sestos
and Abydos.
When his own conduct during the time of their joint emperorship is
compared with that of John it is seen that in love of country, in devotion to
its interests, as well as in sagacity, he is greatly his superior. The difficulties

that arose between them were in fact largely due to the jealousy, weakness,
debauchery, and incompetence of John. When a youth he was simply a
drunken reprobate. That a young emperor, who believed that he had been
supplanted by another in his right to the sole occupancy of the throne,
should resent references to his profligacy and his irregular life was natural
enough, but Cantacuzenus cannot justly be blamed because he refused to
surrender the government into his hands.
Our estimate of the character of Cantacuzenus has to be based mainly on his
own writings. But through them we know the man better perhaps than any
other emperor. When dealing with events illustrating his own motives and
conduct, he is an unconscious hypocrite. He gives us his version of all the
principal events of his reign. His despatches and his speeches are reported
at weary length, but they usually leave the impression of having been
revised and modified by the light of his subsequent experience. His own
narrative is confirmed to a considerable extent by that of Ducas, who,
however, is open to suspicion as a partisan. His grandfather had belonged to
the party of Cantacuzenus and had escaped into Asia Minor to avoid the
vengeance of Apocaukus. Ducas describes Cantacuzenus as distinguished
by the soundness of his judgment and by his great courage.71
Cantacuzenus is great in accounting for his failures. Judged by his own
narrative, which may be described as an apologia pro vita sua, he appears a
respectable ecclesiastically minded man of mediocre talent, seriously
desirous of the good of the people whom he governed, but anxious, above
all, not only to become emperor but to found an imperial family.
The vanity of Cantacuzenus leads him seldom to lose an occasion of
reporting what friends or enemies say in his favour. When he sent the
embassy to Pope Clement the Sixth to explain why he had employed Turks
and to propose to render aid to the sovereigns of the West in the expedition
which Clement contemplated, he remarks that the pontiff spoke in the
highest terms of his moderation and kindness in not having treated his
ungrateful enemies with more severity.72 In his many negotiations with
Rome he never fails to report expressions complimentary to his own
sagacity, character, and conduct. In like manner he records the flattering
expressions used regarding him by the Ottoman sultan, expressions which
then, as now, are nearly destitute of all meaning, as if they were a serious
representation of the sentiments of the writer. He cannot resist pointing out

that Nicephorus Gregoras, whose History he declares to be false and
malicious, had at one time awarded him unbounded praise.73
When the chief of the Genoese forces which had captured Heraclia and
were flushed with victory proposed to attack the capital, Cantacuzenus
makes him abandon his design because he knew that it was defended by the
emperor, who was the equal in wisdom and experience of any commander
of the age.74 It is in the same spirit of self-laudation that he declares that in
the struggle with the Serbians before Salonica he had exterminated some by
the simple terror of his name and others by his army.75

John occupied the throne after the retirement of Reign of John after
Cantacuzenus for upwards of thirty-five years. A youth retirement of
Cantacuzenus (1355
largely spent in selfish pleasures gave little promise that to 1391).
the young man of twenty-three would be able to cope
with the difficulties by which the empire was beset. With the aid of his
mother, Anne of Savoy, and of partisans whose only hope was in the
patronage of the new ruler, he had succeeded in ridding himself of his
elderly, respectable, and patriotic colleague. He had now to face the
difficulties with which the empire was beset. Of these the dynastic struggle
which still continued with Matthew, the son of Cantacuzenus, was soon
disposed of. An agreement had been arrived at before the withdrawal of his
father by which Matthew should retain the title of emperor and remain in
possession of certain districts of the Rhodope mountains, and of the island
of Lemnos. A few months later the island was exchanged for a lordship in
the Morea. Shortly afterwards Matthew was made prisoner by the Serbians,
delivered to John, and, after he had been kept for a while prisoner in
Tenedos, abdicated and retired in 1358 to the Morea.
John had no liking for religious controversies within his own Church, and
although Cantacuzenus in his retirement wished that the most important of
them should be continued John forbade it. There was a curious theological
controversy, related by the writers of the time, which is of value as showing
that in the midst of the most grave political difficulties the Byzantine people
had not yet lost their interest in religious questions. Barlaam, a Calabrian
abbot of the Greek Church—who, as we have seen, had been sent to Rome
to negotiate for Union and aid because, among other reasons, he was well

acquainted with Latin, ‘better indeed than with Greek’76—charged certain
monks at Mount Athos and their followers, known as Bogomils, with
heresy, called them Omphalopsychae, Messalians, men who believed that
by looking long at their navel they could see God with mortal eyes,77 or at
least with the uncreated light of Mount Tabor. Barlaam’s great opponent
was Palamas, archbishop of Salonica. The party headed by Palamas was
favoured by Cantacuzenus, whose mother, indeed, was a Bogomil. The
controversy waxed fierce and bitter, but Barlaam was unable to obtain the
condemnation he desired. It raged for fifteen years until forcibly put an end
to by John on the withdrawal of his colleague.78
By far the most important difficulty which John had to face was the
constantly increasing encroachments by the Turks. Their influence at the
beginning of his sole occupancy of the throne is shown by the consent he
was forced to give to the engagement of his infant daughter to the son of
Orchan, the great Turkish leader and successor of Othman. Their influence
at a later period, in 1374, is shown by his having been forced into an
alliance with Murad and, towards the end of his reign, by his having to
destroy a part of the walls of the capital at Murad’s bidding.
At no period of his life did the emperor show that he possessed ability
above the average. Neither he nor any of his ministers rose above
mediocrity. He nevertheless recognised the danger to his empire from the
advance of the Mahometans, the powerlessness of his own unaided subjects
to resist that advance, and the expediency of obtaining help from the West.
In dealing with some of the questions which disturbed his subjects he
possessed a certain aloofness which made him examine them as a
statesman. It is probably true, as Gibbon suggests,79 that in his appeals to
Rome he was greatly influenced by his mother, Anne of Savoy. She had
been brought up as a member of the Latin Church and, though compelled
on her marriage to change her name and her religion, she yet remained
attached to the Church and country of her childhood. Her struggles during
the minority of her son had not tended to make her look with favour on the
Orthodox, and her influence upon her son’s mind was probably sufficient to
make him regard with as much favour the Church to which his mother had
belonged as that of which he was now the temporal head. He had come to
regard the differences between the two Churches as matters rather for
ecclesiastics than for statesmen. He personally was ready to accept the

Union of the Churches and even papal supremacy in religious matters,
provided that in return he could obtain aid from the West against the
enemies of the empire. But, whatever were his own sentiments towards the
Church of Rome, his conduct during the long period of thirty-five years
showed that he felt the need of external aid if the empire were to be saved.
His reign is one long series of efforts to obtain it. He was ready to humiliate
himself, to use all his powers of persuasion for Union, provided that the
pontiffs would induce Western rulers to fight the Turks.
Hope was probably stimulated in the empire by the fact
that the pope and the West generally seemed at last to Renewed efforts by
popes against
recognise that, in their own interest, measures should be Moslems.
taken to defend the empire. Moreover, the danger was
now so pressing, not only to the Greeks but to Europe, that it appeared
possible to obtain aid without submitting to the humiliating conditions
hitherto imposed. While John knew that to persuade the Orthodox Church
to acknowledge any of its doctrines as heretical, and especially to induce
the ecclesiastics to accept the supremacy of the pope, was almost
impossible, he professed himself ready to make his own submission. The
Union of the Churches could be accomplished at a later day. There appeared
reason to hope that the pope regarded the danger from the Moslems mainly
from the statesman’s point of view and desired mutual action. John was so
far justified in this hope that it may be confidently asserted that had the
counsels of more than one of the popes during his reign been followed there
would have been a concerted action against the common enemy sufficient
to have delayed the Turkish progress, and possibly to have altogether
arrested it. We shall see, however, that, although all the states of Western
Europe still acknowledged the supremacy of the pope, their interests and
jealousies were as diverse as they have been in modern times, and that the
pontiff was able neither to induce nor to compel the nations acknowledging
his supremacy to act in concert.
Knowing from his own visit to Italy and from the negotiations carried on by
Cantacuzenus that Rome was predisposed to aid, John, immediately he
became sole ruler, sent an embassy to the pope. His delegates were
authorised to make the emperor’s submission to the papal authority in
exchange for the undertaking by the pope to furnish galleys against the
Turks.

In the following year, 1356, John sent a golden bull to the pope at Avignon
containing the terms of his submission.80 The pope thereupon expressed his
satisfaction by a reply to the emperor, and while communicating the good
news to the knights of Rhodes, the king of Cyprus, and the doge of Venice,
invited them to make preparations to aid the Christian cause. So far,
however, as the empire was concerned, the series of efforts made at the
pope’s instigation were without any satisfactory result. Ill planned,
inadequately supported, unenergetically pursued, they were all almost
useless. Six years afterwards—namely, in 1362—John was invited to join
the kings of France and Denmark and Guy de Lusignan of Cyprus in a
Crusade against the Saracens, an expedition of quite secondary importance
to the empire. To the men of the West, Turks and Saracens were all the
same. The Greeks knew better. Two years passed and a new pope, Urban
the Fifth, was still organising a plan against the Saracens. In reply to the
pontiff’s invitation John promised all the aid possible to the new Crusade,
though pointing out that the benefit to the empire would be slight. But the
sovereigns of the West had had enough of Crusades and would not respond
to the call from Avignon. The companies of military monks who were in
France equally refused to take part in the proposed undertaking, and the
efforts of the pope only succeeded in inducing a few English adventurers to
join with Peter of Lusignan in a fruitless attack upon Egypt.
At length, in 1366, a more hopeful Crusade, or at least one more likely to
result in advantage to the empire, was proclaimed. At the bidding of the
pope, Louis, king of Hungary, and Amadeo of Savoy proposed to attack the
Turks and to aid the emperor. Once more the condition was attached that
John should complete the Union of the Churches. But, once again, the
crusading army was weakened by the division of forces judged necessary
for an attempt at the same time upon the Saracens. Nor would other states
join. In vain the pope threatened the Genoese, Venetians, and Spaniards
with all the terrors of an interdict if they gave aid to the enemy. They
continued to trade with the Saracens as before. In vain he exhorted the
sovereigns of Western Europe to go to the aid of Cyprus and Rhodes, and
promised them indulgences if they would take part in this war of the Cross.
They turned deaf ears to his summons.
In 1367 Urban had entered Rome, and one of his first acts on taking
possession of the chair of St. Peter was to exhort the Genoese and Venetians

to facilitate the voyage of John to the imperial city. The emperor was
willing enough to go to Rome, provided that there was a reasonable chance
of obtaining substantial aid. He had made submission once and was ready to
do all that he could to complete the Union the pope so greatly desired, but
he knew much better than the pope how difficult it would be to induce his
people to accomplish the proposed task. His needs, however, were great,
and the summons of the pope was urgent. Accordingly, in 1369, he ventured
on the dangerous step of leaving Constantinople. He was received with
every honour in the elder Rome, and made a profession of faith which
satisfied the four cardinals who had been deputed to receive it. An
encyclical notified the great news to all Christian princes. The pope allowed
John to negotiate with English mercenaries then in Italy for service, granted
him religious privileges, loaded him with presents, and requested the rulers
of the states through which he had to pass on his homeward journey to
receive him with the respect due to his rank. Urban at the same time
addressed a letter to the Greek clergy urging them to accept the Union.
John, however, found little or no material help. He left Rome in debt, and
on his return to Venice, where, on his Romeward journey, he had been
received in great state and promised four galleys, he was detained until he
paid his debts. The emperor urged his son Andronicus, who had been
appointed regent during the absence of his father, to find the means of
releasing him. The son declared that as the treasury was empty and the
clergy would not help, he was unable to obtain ransom. His younger son,
Manuel, contrived, however, to find in Salonica sufficient money for his
father’s release.
Both Urban and his successor, Gregory the Eleventh, displayed a great
desire to aid the empire to stem the tide of Moslem progress. Gregory in
1371 urged the kings of France and England to join with the Genoese to
save the remnant of Christians in the Holy Land from the Saracens. All their
efforts were fruitless.
The Turkish invasion had meantime become more serious than the
Saracenic conquests, as the invaders had now penetrated by land and sea
respectively as far as Albania and Dalmatia. The pope once more urged
Louis of Hungary, the successors of the crusading nobles who still held
territory in Greece and along a portion of the coast of the Adriatic, the
knights of Rhodes, and the king of Sicily to combine in a great movement

with John against the common enemy. Once more he caused a new Crusade
to be preached and promised indulgences to those who took up the Cross.
He begged the Emperor Charles to make peace with Bavaria so that the
empire in the West might join the Crusade. On all sides, however, there was
a reluctance to enter upon it. In spite of the pope’s influence and promise to
arm twelve galleys for despatch against the Turks, John’s ambassador
returned from the West having completely failed in obtaining aid.
Gregory the Eleventh was equally persevering in his efforts to bring about
the Union of the Churches. Franciscan and Dominican missionaries were
sent into the East to expose the wickedness of the schism caused or
persisted in by the Orthodox Church. Nuncios were despatched to complete
the reconciliation. The emperor was reproached, quite unjustly, because he
was unable to persuade or compel his subjects to accept Union and to
become reconciled with the Latin priests.
The pontiff, however, did not lose sight of his political object. Louis of
Hungary fell under his condemnation because he had neglected to engage in
the Crusade. But Louis had seen the great defeat of Bulgaria and Southern
Serbia on the Maritza in 1371 and was not prepared to make war hastily
against so formidable a foe as the Turk had then shown himself to be.
In 1374 the pope returned to the charge and urged the king of Hungary to be
on watch against the incursions of the Turks into the empire until the fleet
prepared at the pontiff’s expense should arrive in the Marmora. At the same
time he invited John once more to visit Rome in order to discuss measures
for the accomplishment of Union.
In 1375 he again urged Louis of Hungary to do his duty as chief of the
Crusade. He sent five hundred knights of Rhodes and an equal number of
squires to defend the Greeks. He authorised the bishops in Western lands to
apply large sums from the Church revenues for the purpose of resisting the
enemy of Christendom. His influence fell far short of his desire. The
Hungarian king was reported to have misappropriated the money he had
been allowed to acquire from the Church, and the great fleet which the
Genoese had collected for the purpose of attacking the Turks endeavoured
to depose John in favour of his son Andronicus.
John himself was in serious difficulties with the Ottoman sultan, Murad.
These two sovereigns were now, indeed, the two great actors on the stage

during several years, but the character of Murad
dominated over that of the commonplace John. To avoid Difficulties with
possible treachery, the Christian emperor, who was not Sultan Murad.
trusted by Murad, was in 1374 compelled with his son Manuel to follow the
sultan in a campaign. During his absence he entrusted the government to
Andronicus, his eldest son. Thereupon an accident occurred which seems
greatly to have impressed contemporaries. Andronicus entered into an
arrangement with the son of Murad by which the two swore to be friends
and to act together, when one should become emperor and the other sultan.
A definite arrangement may well be doubted and possibly all that passed
was due to the impulsiveness of boyish friendship without any likelihood of
practical result. Murad, however, when he heard of the agreement, blinded
his son, insisted that John should treat Andronicus in the same manner, and
threatened war if he did not comply. According to Ducas, John blinded not
only Andronicus, but also his infant son.81 Probably the sight of one eye
only was destroyed. Andronicus was imprisoned in the Tower of Anemas
with his wife and son, and John’s younger son, Manuel, was crowned as co-
emperor. Two years afterwards Andronicus escaped to the Genoese in
Galata. With their aid he succeeded in entering Constantinople, proclaimed
himself emperor, and shut up his father in the same prison in which he had
himself been confined. Two years afterwards the prisoner escaped to
Scutari, and Andronicus had the sense to avoid civil war by coming to an
arrangement with his father by which John was once more placed on the
throne with his son Manuel. Andronicus in compensation received certain
of the towns on the north side of the shore of the Marmora.
When Andronicus had succeeded in obtaining possession of the city with
the aid of the Genoese, almost his first act was to arrest all the Venetians,
with whom the Genoese were again at war. With their aid, John
endeavoured to take Tenedos from his enemies, but failed. In the following
year (1379) the Genoese united themselves with Louis of Hungary and
defeated the Venetians at sea. They were still sufficiently influential in 1382
to compel the emperor to make peace with Andronicus.82 Constantly
strengthening themselves, they entered into a treaty in 1387 with the
Bulgarian prince of the Dobrutcha.
During this time the Turks were making steady and almost unchecked
progress in Greece, on the eastern shore of the Aegean, and in Bulgaria and

Macedonia. The inhabitants were becoming weary of the constant struggle
and it is significant that in 1385 the patriarch Nilos wrote to pope Urban the
Sixth that the Turks left complete liberty to the Church. Even Rome appears
to have been in despair. Urban the Sixth like his predecessors had so
completely made his action against the Turks conditional upon the
renunciation by the Greeks of their heresies and upon Union with Rome
that all hope of aid from him or from Western Europe had for a time died
out.83
The last years of the reign of John Palaeologus were once more disturbed
by domestic troubles. His eldest son, Andronicus, had died in 1385, but his
grandson, John, had many friends and was supported by the Genoese. His
party was sufficiently powerful to gain an entry into the city by the
Chariseus or Adrianople Gate and to compel the old Emperor John to
associate his grandson of the same name as emperor with Manuel, his
younger son, and himself. After a few months, however, Manuel, who had
never accepted the arrangement, entered by the Golden Gate and his
nephew fled. In 1391, the elder Emperor John died after
a reign of fifty-one years. Death of John.

During his long occupancy of the throne the power of the Turks had
enormously increased and the empire had almost become a vassal of
Murad. In the last year of his reign there occurred an incident, already
alluded to, which illustrates at once the weakness of John and his practical
vassalage to the Turks. Wishing to strengthen the landward walls and
especially at and near the Golden Gate, where the defences had fallen into
decay, he gave out that he was about to clear the city of its accumulated
rubbish and to ornament that gate. Bajazed, who was now the Ottoman
sultan and successor of his father, Murad, when he learned what had been
done, insisted that the new defensive works should be destroyed,
threatening that if his wishes were not complied with he would put out the
eyes of John’s son Manuel, who had gone by the Sultan’s orders to
accompany the Turkish army on a campaign in Pamphylia. John obeyed the
orders he had received.84

CHAPTER V
REIGN OF ORCHAN: STRUGGLES WITH EMPIRE; ITS SUCCESSES AND REVERSES;
INVASIONS OF TARTARS. REIGN OF MURAD: DEFEAT OF SERBIANS AND
BULGARIANS BY TURKS; BATTLE OF COSSOVO-POL AND ASSASSINATION OF
MURAD.

The death of John, in 1391, is a convenient period to resume the narrative
of the progress of the Turks.
Othman had died the year after the capture of Brousa, in 1326. He had
succeeded in making his division of the Turks the most formidable in Asia
Minor, in conquering or absorbing the Seljukian Turks, in destroying many
flourishing cities and strongholds on the Black Sea, in entirely preventing
the reorganisation of the power of the empire in the north-west portion of
Asia Minor, and, above all, in organising a fighting race into a formidable
army.
His successor was his son Orchan. Nicaea is only distant
four or five hours from Brousa, and had hitherto been Reign of Sultan
Orchan, 1326–
able to resist all attacks by the Turks. Its population was 1357.
fairly secure within its extensive and strong walls; the
beautiful lake of Ascanius adjoins one side of it, and furnished a constant
supply of water and of fish. Once, indeed, an emperor had sent up a fleet to
assist a great army of Western Crusaders, and to receive from their hands
the city which they were about to capture from the Seljuks.85 Orchan laid
siege to it, and its citizens defended themselves with courage until relief
came. Cantacuzenus and his sovereign hastily gathered together an army,
and acting upon the advice of the imperial Grand Huntsman Godfrey, the
bearer of the illustrious name which had won its first renown in the Crusade
before this very place, successfully drove back the Turks. Unfortunately, on
the evening of the same day, a panic seized the imperial troops, and the
enemy, taking advantage of it, struck hard, captured the baggage, changed
the panic into a rout, and captured the great and important city in the very
hour of its triumph.

Master of the two cities, Brousa, a natural stronghold which had been
strengthened by successive emperors, and Nicaea, whose ancient reputation
and importance as the City of the Creed had been increased by its having
served during two generations as the rallying place of the exiles from
Constantinople during the Latin occupation, Orchan now assumed the title
of sultan, made Brousa his capital, and struck the first Ottoman coins to
replace those of the Seljukian sultans.
During his reign of thirty-two years he enlarged the territory occupied by
the Ottomans, and greatly improved their national organisation. While
constantly engaged in war, and though not less bent on conquest than his
father, he neglected no opportunity of inducing the Christian subjects of the
empire to come under his rule. He took care that the taxes levied were less
than those paid in the empire. Although by this time Turkish armies were
probably almost exclusively Moslem, Orchan formed one of his best
regiments out of Christians who had voluntarily entered his service.
Orchan was far from obtaining uniform successes against the empire. He
was often and bravely opposed by the imperial troops. In 1329, a large
army, which had been transported into Thrace in a fleet of seventy ships,
was destroyed near Trajanopolis, and most of the Turks were either killed or
reduced to slavery. In 1330, a new invasion into Thrace of Turkish cavalry
was defeated, and fifteen thousand Turks were slain. Orchan’s attempt in
the following year to capture Ismidt failed, and he was obliged to sue for
peace. In spite of these disasters, he was always able within a few months to
assemble new armies, and to renew the struggle. Already he had succeeded
in exacting tribute from nearly the whole of Bithynia. His troops, within
two years, invaded Macedonia, Euboea, and Athens, and while
Cantacuzenus was with difficulty holding his own against them, another
army met Andronicus the Third in Thrace, and took possession of Rodosto
—an army, however, which the emperor shortly afterwards destroyed.
New recruits were continually making their way across the Dardanelles or
the Marmora into Thrace, until, in 1336, the Turkish army in that province
met with disaster in an unexpected manner. A band of Tartars from the north
made a descent upon them when they heard that they had been successful in
a raid upon the Christian population and were carrying off an enormous
mass of booty.86 Three months after the departure of the Tartars a new
descent into Thrace was attempted by the Turks. Once again the Greeks

were successful, and, in the same year, an army which ravaged the environs
of Constantinople was destroyed and the Turkish fleet which brought them
captured.
The efforts of Orchan were more successful in Asia Minor. A division of his
army had laid siege again to Ismidt, and the inhabitants, in order to avoid
imminent starvation, surrendered. The acquisition, in
1337, of this city, the most important seaport on the Nicomedia taken
(1337).
Asiatic side of the Marmora, and the head, then as now,
of all the roads leading from the capital to every part of Asia Minor, Persia,
and Syria, was of the utmost importance.
During the stormy joint reigns of John and Cantacuzenus (1342 to 1355),
the empire was attacked both by Tartars on the north, and by the Turks in
Asia Minor. The Bulgarian and Serbian kingdoms had both gained strength
during the Latin occupation at the expense of the empire, and were ready to
avail themselves of the aid alike of Turks and Tartars in their endeavours to
capture territory from the empire. When, in 1342, Cantacuzenus was
attacked by the Bulgarians, a division of the Turks, whose emir had taken
the title of sultan of Lydia, was induced to come to his aid. Twenty-nine
thousand arrived at the mouth of the Maritza, the ancient Hebrus, and with
their aid a temporary relief was afforded; but for some reason, possibly a
severe winter, they withdrew to Asia Minor. The Bulgarians on this
occasion were not aided by the Tartars, probably because the latter were
occupied in the Crimea, and throughout what is now southern Russia, in
fighting the Genoese, who had blockaded the northern coast of the Black
Sea. Apocaukus, the rival of Cantacuzenus, succeeded in the following year
in hiring a Turkish fleet and army. Both sides, indeed, in the civil war then
going on, as well as the Bulgarians and Serbians, never hesitated to increase
their armies by employing Turks or Tartars as auxiliaries.
When, in 1344, Cantacuzenus promised his daughter Theodora in marriage
to Orchan, he received at once the aid of a body of five thousand Ottoman
Turks, and this number was increased when the marriage took place, two
years later. But the young emperor John met him with another body of
Turkish auxiliaries. Orchan would have made short work of John; for in an
interview which took place with much ceremony and cordiality at Scutari to
congratulate his father-in-law on his second coronation, he appears to have
decided upon following the Turkish method of getting rid of a rival to the

throne of his father-in-law. Cantacuzenus, however, would not sanction
assassination. Orchan apparently could not understand any such scruples,
and shortly afterwards sent a number of Turks to the capital on a pretended
political mission, but really with the object of aiding Cantacuzenus by
murdering John. The elder emperor, as soon as he learned the design, at
once put his foot down, and declared that he would not permit John to go
outside the palace except accompanied by him.87
In the attacks by Stephen, the kral of Serbia, who had taken the title of
emperor of the Serbians and the Greeks, or emperor of Serbia and Romania
—for both forms are used—Orchan once more sent troops to aid his father-
in-law. In the struggles which took place at this time between the Genoese
and the Venetians, Orchan aided the first. When the emperor wished to
employ both, he was obliged to concede to the Turks a stronghold on the
Thracian Chersonese. They, however, always proved to be dangerous allies,
and the inhabitants of the whole northern coast of the Marmora were so
harassed by them that great numbers deserted their farms and fled to the
capital or elsewhere.
It was in 1355 that Cantacuzenus left the government in the hands of John.
His policy and his influence had been directed towards coming to an
agreement with the leading group of Turks—that, namely, ruled over by his
son-in-law. Almost the last act before his withdrawal was to persuade
Orchan and his son, Suliman, to give up the cities in Thrace which the
Turks had occupied, on his behalf, during the struggle with John.88 Orchan,
on his part, was to all appearances disposed, on the retirement of
Cantacuzenus, to be on friendly terms with John, and, in consequence, each
party assumed the attitude of an ally. It may be suggested that if a policy of
friendliness had been continued, the Turks might have been content with
their territory in Asia Minor. But such a solution was not possible. The
Turkish nomad warriors, to whom the cultivation of the soil was distasteful,
required new lands to roam over, and wanted new territories to plunder. The
arable lands, which had supported large populations, were too small for
nomad shepherds, and the latter were always being pressed forward to the
north and west by a constant stream of immigrants behind them. Indeed, in
the year when Cantacuzenus abdicated, Suliman, the son of Orchan, had to
lead his armies and defend his territories against a newly arrived horde of
Tartars in the north-east of Asia Minor. His successful defence was, at the

same time, one more blow against the empire, for in this campaign he
succeeded in capturing the important stronghold of
Angora, which commanded the great highroad to Persia. Angora taken
(1354).
But Orchan and John, though nominally on friendly
terms, distrusted each other, and indeed Orchan’s character and conduct
compare favourably with John’s. When Halil, the son of Orchan and of
John’s sister-in-law Theodora, was captured by pirates from Phocaea, at the
head of the Gulf of Smyrna, and then in the occupation of the Genoese, it
was with difficulty that John could be induced to join in the siege of that
city in order to release his nephew. He endeavoured to make a bargain with
Orchan before he consented to co-operate. Finally Halil was ransomed,
Orchan and John each paying half of the amount. On his release the two
rulers met, and at Chalcedon, the present Kadikeuy, John promised his
infant daughter to Halil, and the two rulers swore to establish a perpetual
peace.
In 1359 Orchan died. During the thirty-two years of his reign, he had
planted the Ottoman state firmly in Asia Minor. The landmarks of its
progress were the important cities of Nicaea, Ismidt, and Angora, each of
which dominated a large tract of country. He had compacted the Turks
together, had attracted to his rule many of those who had previously
acknowledged other emirs, and every year of his reign had seen the number
of Ottoman Turks increasing by defections from his rivals and by
immigrants from the eastward. He was an able commander and an
exceptionally good administrator. While Othman is the founder of the
Turkish dynasty, Orchan is the sovereign who caused his people to be
recognised as forming a separate nationality, and was thus the maker of the
Turkish nation.
Orchan was succeeded by his son Amurath or, adopting
the modern orthography, Murad. He was the younger Sultan Murad the
First, 1359–1389.
brother of Suliman, who died two months before his
father. The new sultan was not influenced by any tie of relationship with the
imperial family. Moreover, the influence of Islam was now becoming much
more serious than it had hitherto been. Mahometanism had become the
religion of most of the Turks, and Murad, stimulated by a certain mufti,
soon learned to become a fanatical persecutor of even his own Christian
subjects. He increased the amount of taxes which they had to pay, and

generally made their burdens heavy. But by far the heaviest of those
burdens was caused by the organisation of the body of ‘New Troops’
established by Orchan and known as Janissaries. He decreed a law, said to
be founded upon the sacred text of the Koran, that the Christians should be
required to give to himself absolutely one in five of their children. From the
boys thus obtained, he established the famous corps whose deeds were to
make them for ever famous.89
At the commencement of his reign, Murad turned to conquest. The work of
Orchan had been to establish and compact Ottoman rule in Asia Minor. That
of his successor was mainly to carry out a similar policy in Europe. After
capturing Heraclia on the Black Sea, he crossed over into Thrace and
occupied Adrianople, seized Didymotica and Chorlou, overran the whole
country between Constantinople and Bulgaria, and sent his ships to plunder
the Greek islands. In return for the fanaticism with which they had inspired
him, he promised that one fifth of the spoil captured by land and sea should
be given to the mollahs. When the sale of Christian captives took place, he
took care, says Ducas,90 that the young, the well set-up, and the strong men
should be bought at a low price to be added to the Janissaries.
The few remaining Turkish emirs in Asia Minor whose territories had not
been gained by the Ottomans joined forces to resist the new sultan. At the
same time the Serbians, Bulgarians, and Hungarians, all of whom had
become alarmed at Murad’s progress, declared war upon him. Compelled in
1363 to defend himself against the emirs to the east and south of his
territories in Asia Minor, he was sufficiently strong to force the emperor to
bind himself not merely to give aid to him in Asia but not to attempt to
recover any of the cities or territories which he had conquered in Europe.
When he had broken the strength of the rebel emirs he crossed rapidly back
into Thrace and near Adrianople defeated a combined army of Hungarians,
Serbians, and Bulgarians. Two years afterwards, in 1366, an army of fifty
thousand Serbians endeavoured in vain to drive Murad out of Adrianople.
The lowest degradation which the empire had yet reached was when the
miserable John consented to become the tributary of Murad in order that he
might enjoy his remaining possessions in Europe. In 1373 he formally
recognised the sultan as his suzerain, bound himself to render him military
service and to give his son Manuel as a hostage.91

The only palliative which can be offered for John’s conduct is that he felt
resistance to be useless. The empire wanted peace. The cities and towns had
been devastated, not merely by successive wars, civil and foreign, but by
the terrible Black Death, a plague which since 1346 had demanded
everywhere its large quota of victims. He had seen Turkish armies defeated,
but everywhere and always reappearing in greater numbers than ever.
Asiatics were in overwhelming numbers on every side. The Egyptian
Moslems had captured Sis, the capital of the Lesser Armenia, in 1369. Not
only was every district in Asia Minor overrun with Turks, but they had
penetrated Europe at many points. Bands of them had been left in the
country when the armies, invited into Macedonia or Thrace or crossing over
for plunder, had withdrawn. ‘For my part, I believe,’ says Ducas, ‘that there
is a greater multitude of them between the Dardanelles and the Danube than
in Asia Minor,’ and although Ducas wrote three quarters of a century later,
his remarks are applicable to the reign of John. He describes how Turks
from Cappadocia, Lycia, Cilicia, and Caria had sailed into Europe to pillage
and to ruin the lands of the Christians. A hundred thousand had laid waste
the country as far west as Dalmatia. The Albanians from being a large
nation had become a small one. The Wallachs, the Serbians, and his own
people, the Romans, had been completely ruined. Amid his lamentations
over the evils inflicted by the invaders, his saddest thought and gravest
source of complaint is that the victories gained by the Turks had been won
by men who were the offspring of Christian parents, by Janissaries who
were of Roman, Bulgarian, Serbian, Wallachian, or Hungarian origin. It is
in the hopelessness of further resistance to such overwhelming forces that
the only explanation of John’s acceptance of the position of a tributary
prince is to be found.
The ruin of the South Serbians and Eastern Bulgarians of which Ducas
speaks had really taken place. They had each ventured to declare
themselves empires. With the indifference which characterises the Greek
writers in regard to the conduct of other nations, they allude to rather than
mention how that ruin had been brought about. In 1371,
a great battle took place on the plains of the river Battle of Harmanli,
Maritza which sealed the fate of the Eastern Bulgarians 1371.
and of the Serbians who were in Macedonia. The three sons of the kral took
advantage of the absence of Murad in Asia and, having collected an army of
sixty thousand men, marched almost as far as Adrianople without

opposition. While they were feasting in front of a bridge over the Maritza
near Harmanli, fully assured of their safety by reason of their superiority in
numbers, suddenly a night attack was made upon them by a small division
of the Turkish army. It was soon joined by the entire army of seventy
thousand Turks. Wild confusion was followed by a terrible slaughter. One
of the three sons of the kral was killed and the other two were drowned in
the Maritza. Hundreds of soldiers perished in attempting to cross it. The
army was simply annihilated.92
To assist him in his conquest of Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Moldavia,
Murad allied himself, in 1373, with the Tartars north of the Danube, and
both prepared to attack these states.
Meanwhile in the troubles which arose in 1374 between John and his son
Manuel on the one side and Andronicus the grandson of John by his eldest
son of the same name, Murad exercised his right as suzerain. Shortly after
Manuel was associated with his father, the two were ordered to accompany
their lord on an expedition. It was during their absence that the eldest sons
of the emperor and sultan, as already mentioned, either swore friendship
and common action, when each succeeded to his father’s throne, or were
considered by their fathers to have done so. It may have been believed that
they had entered into a conspiracy to hasten such succession. Countouz, the
obnoxious son of Murad, raised a rebellion against his father when he heard
of his cruel resolve, but his troops passed over to the side of their sultan. He
fled to Didymotica and joined Andronicus, who was also a fugitive from his
father. Murad followed his son, and laid siege to that city. The inhabitants,
pressed by famine, opened the gates to him. Countouz was blinded by his
father, but Andronicus escaped; all the garrison was drowned and a large
number of the inhabitants had their throats cut, Murad adding to his
barbarity by compelling the fathers to be the executioners of their sons.93
In 1379, as already mentioned, John and his son Manuel, who had been
captured and imprisoned by his grandson Andronicus, escaped to Scutari
and took refuge with Bajazed, the son of Murad. The sultan, after assuring
himself that the inhabitants of Constantinople preferred Manuel to
Andronicus, made a bargain with John and his son by which, in return for
aid in restoring them, the empire should pay a large annual tribute, furnish a
contingent of twelve thousand soldiers, and surrender to him Philadelphia,

the last remaining city in Asia Minor which still acknowledged the rule of
Constantinople. John and Manuel entered Constantinople by the
Adrianople Gate, and Andronicus escaped across the Golden Horn to the
Genoese in Galata. Much as the two emperors may have regretted their
bargain, Murad held them to it, and they, Christian
emperors, marched to Philadelphia, in order to compel Philadelphia
surrendered, 1379.
their own subjects to open its gates to the Turks.
Everywhere the Moslem flood was becoming irresistible. The sultan of
Bagdad, in 1376, invaded Armenia and took prisoners both its king and
queen; at the other extreme of the empire the Turks were in Epirus and were
holding their own in many parts of Morea. The Knights-Hospitallers
surrendered Patras to them in order to purchase the release of their Grand
Master. One of the few strongholds in Thrace which Murad had not hitherto
obtained was Apollonia, the present Sissipoli, which, partly built on an
island in the Black Sea and in an otherwise strong position, had so far
avoided capture. It was taken, however, by Murad in 1383, and, as usual, its
garrison was cruelly massacred. In 1385, Murad captured Sofia, and then
sent two armies, one to take possession of Cavalla and other places on the
north shore of the Aegean, and the other to capture Monastir and various
towns in Macedonia. In the same year a Turkish army took Belgrade and
pushed on to Scutari in Albania, taking possession of it and of other
strongholds. In 1387, after a siege lasting four years, Salonica was captured.
The Serbians, by their defeat at Belgrade and elsewhere, were compelled to
become the vassals of Murad, and, following his usual custom, the sultan
compelled their kral in 1381 to send two thousand men to aid him in
subduing a revolt of his brother-in-law, the emir, in Caramania, the ancient
Cilicia. Many subjects of the empire had to render like military service.
On the return of the Serbians, their discontent was so great that the kral
Lazarus, son of the famous Stephen, collected a large army and made an
effort for freedom. But, though his armies succeeded in killing twenty
thousand of the enemy, Ali Pasha compelled them again to submit to the
Turkish yoke. The brave Serbians soon, however, recovered, and Lazarus
succeeded in making alliances with his Christian
neighbours which promised success. In 1389, with a First battle of
Cossovo-pol, 1889.
large army of his own subjects, of Hungarians, Wallachs,

Dalmatians, and Albanians, he once more endeavoured to crush the
common enemy. A decisive battle was fought on the Plain of Black Birds or
Cossovo-pol, in what is now called Old Serbia.94 Murad and his son
Bajazed were in command. The Christians broke the right wing of the
Turks, but the issue of the battle was turned by the daring of Bajazed.
Lazarus and his suite were taken prisoners, and the triumph of the enemy
was complete. The latest historian of Serbia observes that as the battle on
the Maritza in 1371 sealed the fate of the Eastern Bulgarians and of the
Serbians in Macedonia, so did this battle of Cossovo-pol in 1389 determine
that of the Northern Serbians and the Western Bulgarians.95
During or immediately after the battle, there followed a
dramatic incident. A young Serb ran towards the Turkish Assassination of
Murad.
army, and when they would have stopped him declared
that he wanted to see their sultan in order that he might show him how he
could profit by the fight. Murad signed to him to come near, and the young
fellow did so, drew a dagger which he had hidden, and plunged it into the
heart of the sultan. He was at once cut down by the guards.96 The Serbians,
according to Ducas, did not know of the sultan’s death for a considerable
time, and did not defend themselves with their usual courage. Lazarus was
captured, and was hewn in pieces.

CHAPTER VI
REIGN OF MANUEL: ENCROACHMENTS OF TURKS; MANUEL VISITS WEST, SULTAN
BAJAZED SUMMONED BY TIMOUR; FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN MANUEL
AND MAHOMET THE FIRST; JOHN ASSOCIATED WITH MANUEL. SIEGE OF
CONSTANTINOPLE BY MURAD; ITS FAILURE. EFFORTS AT UNION;
MISCONCEPTIONS IN WEST REGARDING GREEK CHURCH CONSTANCY OF
ATTEMPTS AT UNION; NEGOTIATIONS FOR MEETING OF COUNCIL OF CHURCH.
INTERNAL STRUGGLES IN LATIN CHURCH. EMPEROR INVITED BY BOTH PARTIES;
ACCEPTS POPE’S INVITATION; MEETING OF COUNCIL AT FERRARA AND
FLORENCE; UNION ACCOMPLISHED; JOHN RETURNS TO CAPITAL; DIVISIONS IN
GREEK CHURCH.

Manuel was with the Turkish army at Brousa when he learned the death of
his father in 1391. He escaped secretly, hastened to Constantinople, and
succeeded in being proclaimed as the sole occupant of the imperial throne.
Bajazed, who had become sultan on the assassination of his father, Murad,
in 1389, taken by surprise at the escape of his hostage, at once presented
alarming demands. He asked that the Turks should have a resident cadi
within Constantinople itself and that Manuel should declare himself to be
the sultan’s vassal and pay tribute. After a year of fruitless negotiations,
which Manuel had protracted in order that he might send to the West to
implore aid, Bajazed attacked the empire on every side. Within a few
months Turks were pillaging the Adriatic coast, were exterminating or
carrying off prisoners from Thrace, and were laying siege to the capital.
Their leader before the city urged the citizens to declare for Manuel’s
nephew, John, the son of Andronicus, who had, indeed, been compelled by
Bajazed to come forward as a pretender. In 1395 John joined the Turks in
attacking the capital, but was defeated. The Turkish leader returned across
the Bosporus, strengthened his position on the Gulf of Ismidt, by building a
castle or fortress, probably the one now seen at Guebseh, and another on the
Bosporus known as Guzel-hissar,97 and then once more summoned Manuel
to surrender the city. Thereupon the emperor took a step which, if the
version of Ducas is correct, justifies his historian for attributing it to
wisdom and patriotism. He arranged to share the empire with John, to leave
the city himself, and to allow him to enter on condition that he would not
hand it over to the Turks. John, however, on his side had agreed with

Bajazed that Selymbria and the other places on the north shore of the
Marmora which he had held since the death of his father should be
delivered to the Turks, and, this arrangement being concluded, the city was
saved from attack.98
Meantime the spread of the Turks over new territories once more alarmed
the West, and in 1394 Boniface preached a Crusade and urged in what is
now Austria and the states of Venice that immediate action should be taken
against them. The danger was pressing and the pope’s call to battle was this
time responded to. Sigismund, the Hungarian king, informed the emperor
that he had fifty-two thousand armed men, and invited his co-operation.
But the men of the West had not yet learned how
formidable the Turks could be. In 1396 at Nicopolis on Battle of Nicopolis,
1396.
the Danube the united Christian army was met by
Bajazed, who inflicted upon it a crushing defeat. How that defeat was
accomplished will be told when giving the story of Bajazed’s life. Bajazed
recaptured all the places in Hungary which he had previously lost,
threatened to besiege Buda, boasted that he would annex Germany and Italy
and feed his horse with oats on the altar of St. Peter at Rome. So serious
was the disaster of Nicopolis and the impression it produced that at length
the Venetian senate recognised the necessity of joining their traditional
enemies the Genoese in order to send a powerful fleet against the common
enemy. Boucicaut, a skilful sailor who was named admiral, took command.
He arrived at Gallipoli with a fleet containing fourteen hundred knights.
They met near the Dardanelles seventeen well-armed Turkish galleys and
defeated them. Shortly afterwards Boucicaut was proclaimed by Venetians
and Genoese admiral-in-chief. He pushed on to the Bosporus and arrived
just in time to relieve Galata, which was being besieged by the Turks.
Manuel named him Grand Constable. Boucicaut next endeavoured to
recapture Ismidt but without success. Elsewhere, however, he succeeded in
inflicting several losses on the Turks and especially harassed their
settlements on the eastern shore of the Bosporus. Finding he was powerless
without further aid to inflict serious damage upon them, he urged Manuel to
acknowledge the king of France as his suzerain, in order that he might
receive aid. His project met with the approval of the Venetians, the
Genoese, and of Manuel himself. Boucicaut returned to France to obtain
assistance and to employ his own influence in favour of the project, but

Charles the Sixth, being unable or unwilling to protect his proposed vassal,
refused to receive his submission.
Manuel, at the end of 1399, decided to follow the example of his
predecessor and to see whether his own efforts would not be more
successful in obtaining aid from the West. He was received, as they had
been, with imperial honours in Venice and elsewhere, but neither from that
city nor from Florence, Ferrara, Genoa, or Milan did he secure any
assistance. His public entry into Paris was with a display that was intended
more to please the Parisians than to be of use to him, and he soon learnt that
there was as little to be hoped from France as from Italy. Nor was he more
successful on his visit to Henry the Fourth in England. After an absence of
two and a half years, Manuel returned to his capital. He found that the
Turks had employed the time with energy and had made great progress in
their raids on the empire. His own people were almost in despair. The Turks
were once more besieging the capital and were securely established on the
opposite shore of the Bosporus. The population of Constantinople had
decreased. Many of its buildings had fallen out of repair, and its territory in
Thrace was almost limited by the walls of the city.
On the other hand, he arrived at a moment when if Christendom had been
united a great and possibly a fatal blow might have been struck against the
common enemy. The lieutenant of Boucicaut was defending Constantinople
against the third attempt by Bajazed to capture the city, when the tidings
from the great Timour or Tamarlane gave the besieger pause. Bajazed
withdrew. Timour, indeed, had summoned the sultan to give up to the
Greeks all territory that he had taken from them and had asked the Genoese
to co-operate and obtain the co-operation of other Western powers against
the Turks. Bajazed not only refused to obey the summons but went forward
to attack Timour and, as we shall see when dealing with the life of Bajazed,
was in the great battle of Angora, on July 25, 1402, defeated and made
prisoner. He died in the following year. The defeat of the sultan gave a new
lease of life to the city, but no aid came from the Christians of the West. The
Venetians and Genoese were again at war with each other and Western
Europe was as divided and as powerless for concerted action against the
Turks as it has so often been since.
The Turks in less than a generation after the withdrawal of Timour
recovered all their influence and territory. Manuel was compelled even as

early as 1403 to recognise Bajazed’s successor, Suliman (to whom, indeed,
he gave his granddaughter in marriage), as lord of a large portion of Thrace.
Suliman, however, proved himself a weak and worthless leader of the
Turks, and in 1409 the Janissaries, preferring his brother Mousa, arrested
and killed him. He was succeeded by Mahomet, the first of that name in the
Ottoman dynasty, who had been aided by Manuel and who in return gave
back to the emperor the fortified places on the Marmora and Black Sea
which had been in the occupation of the Turks: an almost solitary instance
of this kind of generosity on the part of the Turks, who hold as a religious
principle that they must only surrender territory to force. Mahomet had,
however, given his promise to Manuel and, says Ducas, he faithfully kept
it.99
During the next few years and until the death of the sultan, Manuel’s
relations with him were friendly. In 1415 the two sovereigns had an
interview at Gallipoli. Although the Turks were pursuing their
encroachments in Hungary and Dalmatia, Mahomet abstained from
attacking the empire. When they carried off nearly two thousand captives
into slavery from Euboea, its Venetian rulers were compelled to seek the
mediation of Manuel in order to obtain peace. Five years afterwards,
Mahomet in passing to his dominions in Asia Minor went by way of the
capital, and Phrantzes testifies that, in spite of suggestions to seize him,
Manuel refused to violate the right of hospitality. So great was the sultan’s
trust in the emperor that Mahomet named Manuel as the guardian of his two
younger sons.
Murad, the eldest son and successor of Mahomet, who became sultan in
1420, proposed a renewal of the alliance with Manuel. The latter would
probably have consented. He was overruled, however, by the senate, which
was in favour of a policy of war and decided that John should be associated
with his father. A demand was made to Murad to send his two younger
brothers to Constantinople, and the grand vizier returned the answer which
might have been expected, that the education of two Mussulmans could not
be entrusted to the enemies of their faith—believers to be educated by
infidels.100 War followed, and the Greeks supported a pretender to the
Turkish throne, who was soon defeated and hanged by Murad.
Thereupon, in 1422, siege was laid to Constantinople. The walls had largely
fallen out of repair and the three thousand men who were sent as a first

detachment sat down before it in hope of an easy
capture. A few days later Murad himself appeared, Siege of
bringing with him in chains the Greek ambassadors who Constantinople
Murad, 1422.
by

had been sent to treat of peace. A large army of two
hundred thousand men, together with a great crowd of bashi-bazouks,
encamped before the landward walls and built an earthwork for their
protection from the Golden Gate to the Xyloporta at the end of the walls on
the Golden Horn. Among them, or arriving shortly afterwards, was a certain
Mersaite, a Madhi, a half-mad fanatic at the head of five hundred dervishes.
He claimed to be of the blood of Mahomet and to possess prophetic powers.
He foretold that the capture of the city would happen when he gave the
signal, for which all were to be ready. The sultan had sat down before the
walls in the middle of June, but his primitive bombs, his wooden towers,
and his attempts to undermine the walls were of no avail. Mersaite
prophesied a capture on August 24. On that day the defenders of the foss
were rained upon with showers of arrows and a general assault was made,
but the two Theodosian walls, which were defended by crowds of citizens,
were far too strong to be captured by the simple fanatical onslaught of
dervishes. The Greeks fought valiantly, the young Emperor John being at
their head and on horseback, in the peribolos outside the Romanus Military
Gate, formerly knowm as the Pempton. Upon the failure of the attack by the
dervishes, Murad suddenly raised the siege and the Greeks pursued the
retreating army and captured some of their rude guns.101 The immediate
cause of the raising of the siege of Constantinople is variously stated.
Manuel had sent aid to the adherents of Mustafa, the younger brother of
Murad, aged only six years, and had thus strengthened the revolt which had
been raised in his favour in Asia Minor. It was of more importance to
Murad to put an end to this Turkish rising than to persist in his attempt to
capture the city.102
In 1425 Manuel, whom Ducas describes not incorrectly
as a wise and moderate prince, died, after a reign of Death of Manuel,
1425.
thirty-four years.
John, sometimes called the Fifth and sometimes the
Seventh of that name, now became sole emperor, and John, 1425–1448.
reigned from 1425 to 1448. The two features of his reign
which make all incidents in it that are not connected with them of

comparative insignificance, are, first, the steady almost unchecked progress
of the Turks in south-eastern Europe and in Asia Minor: the encroachment
of an overwhelming flood, now apparently receding in one direction, but
again sweeping over every obstacle in another, and in reality always
steadily advancing and submerging all the Christian populations in the
Balkan peninsula: and, second, the efforts of the emperor and those about
him to save the remnant of the empire by obtaining the help of Europe.
John’s reign was spent in one continuous effort to obtain assistance from the
West to save the city and to check the progress of the Turks. Like his
predecessors, he addressed himself to successive popes. Perhaps nothing
brings more vividly before the reader of European history the power of the
occupants of the pontifical chair than the fact that it was taken for granted
that from the pope, and the pope alone, that Western aid could be obtained.
We have seen that former emperors had looked to the kings of France and
England and to other princes, but their aid was sought only on the advice
and with the support of Rome. In justice also it must be admitted that no
princes recognised so completely as did a long series of popes the
expediency and duty of defending Constantinople as the first outwork of the
defences of Europe against the forces of Asia, and of aiding its emperors in
their efforts to check the Turkish invasion. They were the prime ministers of
Western Europe and almost the only persons who regarded the Eastern
question as statesmen.
Unfortunately, while the popes saw the necessity of preventing the progress
of the barbarians, they attached conditions to their offers of help which
made them unacceptable and which indeed were impossible: namely, that
the Greeks should accept the Union of the Churches, with which Union was
associated the supremacy of the pope.
A succession of pontiffs during the two hundred years preceding the
Moslem conquest of the city worked for Union with marvellous persistency.
The same passionate desire for reunion is not less manifest now in the
occupant of the chair of St. Peter; but modern efforts are made with this
essential difference, that while in the period which concerns us it was
believed that reunion could be imposed, every one now recognises that if it
is to be brought about, it must be by voluntary and full consent.

In the fourteenth century it never seems to have occurred
either to popes or emperors that people cannot be Errors in West
compelled to change their religious opinions. The idea regarding
Church.
Orthodox

was that the great mass of people were ready to accept
any opinion sanctioned by the ordinary civil authorities. The early
negotiations leave the impression that the Churchmen of the West thought
that the emperor and the patriarch could bring about a Union by their simple
decree, could change the profession of belief and obtain the admission of
papal supremacy without the voluntary consent of even the Greek
ecclesiastics. It never appears to have dawned upon Roman Churchmen that
the members of the Orthodox Church might refuse to accept Union and a
change in belief when these had been accepted by the civil and religious
chiefs. Such a view showed ignorance at once of the character, always
intensely conservative, and of the history of the Orthodox Church. Without
entering into a discussion of how far the population of the capital and the
empire was Greek by race, it is sufficient to recall that Greek was the
language of the people, that all that they knew of history and philosophy, all
their methods of thought, their theology and literature, had come to them in
Greek forms. They thought and spoke as Greeks. Most of them gloried in
being Greek. In matters of philosophic and religious speculation the Greek
mind was more acute, and more subtle, than the Western mind. In
theological questions, probably all classes were more interested than the
corresponding classes in the West. If in the course of centuries the common
people had ceased to take that keen interest in matters of theological
speculation which caused the artisan or tradesman to neglect his immediate
occupation in order to ask his customer’s opinion on the merits of the latest
heresy, it was largely because the great formulas of Christian belief had, as
it was believed, received their final adjustment. If any questions were
unsolved—as, for example, that of the Inner Light—the population was
always ready to take an interest in them; but it deeply resented any attempt
to dogmatise without full discussion. It especially resented the
determination of such questions by a foreign authority. The Greek
Churchmen considered themselves, and probably rightly, as better versed in
theology than those of Rome. They had the tradition of being admittedly
superior in learning to their brethren in the West, and, though ready at all
times to discuss, would not consent to be dictated to by the bishop of Rome.

The Catholic Church not only made the mistake of disregarding the
traditional susceptibilities of the Eastern people, who invariably, after 1204,
associated the rule of Rome with the abominations of the Latin occupation;
of disregarding also the universal interest felt in the Orthodox Church on
theological questions, but it greatly underrated the authority and influence
of the Orthodox clergy when such authority and influence were in conflict
with the emperor or even with the emperor and patriarch combined. Much
has been written of what is called Caesaropapism: that is, of the
combination of the secular and ecclesiastical powers which were supposed
to be vested in the emperors. At various times the autocrat undoubtedly
assumed much of the power which in the Holy Roman Empire in the West
was left to the popes. At other times, however, and in some matters at all
times, the patriarch of Constantinople exercised a jurisdiction independent
of the emperor. The religious sanctions possessed by the Church were not to
be set aside even by or for him. We have seen, for example, that when the
Emperor Michael the Eighth had usurped the crown and blinded the infant
John so as to prevent him coming to the throne, though the ecclesiastics
seemed to have considered it expedient that he should retain the office he
had usurped, the patriarch Arsenius and the prelates associated with him
could not be either coaxed or frightened into granting him absolution, and
that it was not until Arsenius and his successor, Germanus, had ceased to
occupy the patriarchal throne that the emperor could succeed in having the
anathema removed.103
Many other examples could be given which show that it is an error to
suppose that the patriarchs were merely or even usually the creatures of the
emperors. When questions of dogma arose the head of the Orthodox Church
supported by his clergy was jealous of the secular power. The history of
Constantinople during the time between the Latin and the Moslem
conquests of the city abounds in illustrations showing that the Church
would not consent to dictation from the emperors, and that the clergy would
not blindly follow the patriarch. But, when dictation was supposed to come
from Rome, the great mass of clergy and people were, as they had been
from the time of Photius, on the side of their Church and, if need be, against
the emperor.
It must be remembered also that the Eastern Church had steadily refused to
admit the supremacy of the Western. It had never regarded the phrase

‘under one fold and one shepherd’ as indicating that the whole Church of
Christ should be under the government of one bishop. It had never admitted
that the ‘One Shepherd’ should be other than Christ, and had therefore
constantly denied the supremacy of the pope. One Empire, one Church, one
Head of the Church was a Western theory which had never made much way
in the later Roman empire. The movements in the West which placed the
imperial power in commission, giving to the emperor the supreme secular,
and to the bishop of Rome the supreme ecclesiastical, authority had no
corresponding movement in the East. The emperors were only heads of the
Church in the same sense as the king of England is in all matters
ecclesiastical supreme. The emperors and ecclesiastics were usually agreed
in not allowing the supremacy of the bishop of the elder Rome.
To the popes, however, the Union of the Churches was indissolubly
associated with the admission of papal supremacy. It would be going too far
to say that they desired Union exclusively to obtain recognition of such
supremacy, but it may safely be said that they never lost sight in all their
negotiations for Union of the necessity of obtaining its recognition, and
that, in the opinion of many ecclesiastics both Western and Eastern, such
supremacy was the most important object aimed at.
Murad’s unsuccessful attempt, in 1422, to capture Constantinople made it
evident to the emperor that aid from Western nations was absolutely
necessary if the empire or even the city was to be saved. The pope also
recognised both the importance of saving the empire and its extreme
danger, and held out hopes of aid if Union were accepted. The imminence
of the danger was patent to all. When John became sole occupant of the
throne, in 1425, the empire was surrounded by Turkish armies. Nearly the
whole of Asia Minor was in their hands. Large armies had invaded
Hungary; Bulgaria had ceased to exist; Serbia was a vassal of the sultan. In
Macedonia and even in Thrace the Turks had made a desolation and held
many cities. If the city of Paris were worth a Mass, the empire was worth a
tenfold acknowledgment of the pope’s supremacy.
The emperor, the nobles, and a considerable part of the clergy came to
believe that they must purchase aid on any conditions or see the city
captured. Questions of dogma, the addition of the Filioque clause, the use
of unleavened bread, the condition of souls in purgatory, were to them
matters of secondary importance when the very existence of their country

was at stake. Even papal supremacy appeared to John and many laymen
worth accepting in return for the despatch of soldiers who would resist the
Turkish invasion.
We have seen that many attempts at Union had been made by all the
emperors since the recapture of the city, but that they had all failed, that the
traditional conservatism of the Orthodox Church, its stubborn resistance to
the slightest change of dogma or ritual, all intensified by the traditions of
the Latin occupation, had been more powerful than the energy and influence
of popes and emperors combined.104
The last and greatest attempt to bring about a Union was
now about to be made, and deserves fuller notice than The great attempt at
Reunion.
has been given to any which preceded it.
In 1429, in the fourth year of his reign, John sent to request the pope to
despatch a messenger to Constantinople to treat of Union. Eugenius gladly
complied and sent a friar to arrange conditions with the emperor and
patriarch. It was agreed that the canonical method of arriving at a binding
conclusion on matters of dogma should be adopted. The matters in dispute
were to be submitted to a Council of the Church at which John and the
patriarch were to be present.
Meantime Eugenius employed his influence during the next three or four
years to induce the Venetians and Genoese to unite against the common
enemy, to give aid to the knights in their defence of Rhodes, and to prevent
any attacks upon the empire from the West. So far all looked promising.
Unfortunately, however, at this time the Latin Church itself was divided.
Rival popes, one in Italy, the other at Avignon, had denounced each other as
pretenders. A Council of the Church opened at Bâle in March 1431 was by a
papal Bull ordered to be transferred to Bologna after the expiry of eight
months. The principal reason assigned for the transfer was the greater
convenience of John and the imperial party. Eugenius had taken this step
without consultation with the cardinals, and the change of place was at once
strenuously opposed. A majority of the Council refused to obey and replied
that as the Bohemians, the followers of John Huss, had been formally cited
to appear at Bâle, the place of meeting could not be changed. As to the
convenience of the representatives of the Greek Church, ‘the peace of
Germany is not to be sacrificed for the old song which has rung in the ears

of Europe for three centuries and ended in nothing, the reconciliation of the
Greek and Latin Churches.’105
The Council was supported in its opposition to Eugenius by the Emperor
Sigismund, by the duke of Milan, and by many kings, princes, bishops,
universities, and cities. Only four cardinals remained on his side.
Nevertheless he fearlessly denounced the Council as a Synagogue of Satan.
For a while the more he threatened the more the dignitaries of the Church
flocked to Bâle. Eugenius in vain endeavoured to extort from the Emperor
Sigismund the dissolution of the Council as the price of his consent to place
the imperial crown on his head. Sigismund would not yield, and Eugenius
had to crown him. With the exception of Venice and Florence, all Western
Europe was against Eugenius. An insurrection in Rome forced him to leave
the city, and he escaped in a mean disguise. He was driven for a while to
withdraw his denunciations and to admit the legality of the Council and of
its acts.
A temporary reconciliation was of short duration. The claims of the rival
parties were incapable of reconciliation. The Council was determined to
limit the power of the pope; the pope would endure no limitation.
Two years were lost in useless negotiations. John strongly urged that the
Council should consider the question of Union without delay, and sent a
representative to Bâle in October 1433. When the members refused by a
two-thirds vote to remove to Italy the emperor’s representative suggested
that the meeting-place should be Constantinople. The Council in 1434
declared against this proposal, but offered to pay the expenses of the Greeks
if they would come to Bâle. The latter, possibly from their ignorance of the
geographical situation of the city, refused to go thither. Other places were
suggested and the pope again gave his approbation for Bologna or some
other place in Italy.
Representatives arrived in Constantinople from both the Synod at Bâle and
the pope, who were again in opposition to each other. To such an extent had
these hostilities grown that the Council declared Eugenius guilty of perjury
and schism and incapable of holding any ecclesiastical office. Eugenius
retorted by calling them an assembly of devils.
The deputies from Bâle brought with them to Constantinople a
comminatory decree of the Council against the pope. The emperor and

patriarch had therefore to choose between the Council and Eugenius. Each
had invited them, had offered to bear the expenses and menaced them in
case of refusal. The deputies from Bâle were heard at a public session of the
Synod and threatened that if the Council were not recognised, the nations of
the West would make war upon the empire, and this notwithstanding the aid
of the pope, whose decrees they insisted were null and void. The
ambassadors from Eugenius, who had arrived with a band of three thousand
crossbowmen, offered terms as to transport and convoy similar to those
which the messengers from Bâle had proposed, and suggested that the
proclamation calling the meeting of the Council might be issued in the
emperor’s name. They were also heard in a public sitting of the Synod in
September 1437, a few days after the audience of the deputies from Bâle.
John and the patriarch decided to accept the proposal of Eugenius.106
When the news reached the pope he at once issued a Bull fixing Ferrara as
the meeting-place of the Council. In November 1437, the emperor, with a
large suite, embarked. The imperial party arrived at Venice in the following
February. The Venetians had been excommunicated by the Council of Bâle
as adherents of Eugenius, who was their fellow-citizen, and, probably with
a desire to induce the Greeks to throw in their lot entirely on the side of the
pope, received John and the patriarch with unwonted honour. The doge and
the senate in the ‘Bucentaur,’ with the galleys belonging to the republic and
a crowd of gondolas, went out to receive them. Lodging was found for their
followers on the Lido. Syropulus, who attended the patriarch and whose
history from the Greek point of view is the most trustworthy narrative of
these proceedings, was amazed at the display on the reception in Venice.
‘You could as easily number the leaves on the trees or the sands of the sea
as the gondolas and galleys of the Venetians.’ Phrantzes is not less
enthusiastic. He speaks of ‘Venice the marvellous, the most marvellous:
Venice the wise, the most wise; the city predicted in the psalm, “God has
founded her upon the waters.”’107
The Greeks were shown the treasures of St. Mark, but Syropulus remarks
that as they gazed upon them arose the thought, ‘These were once our own.
They are the plunder of Hagia Sophia and our holy monasteries.’
Their departure for Ferrara was with a like magnificence. Twelve noble
galleys and an innumerable number of gondolas, whose occupants and
sailors were bright with silks of various colours, attended them. The

imperial eagles were mingled with the gonfalons of St. Mark, and the city
which more than any other lends itself to display has seldom presented a
more brilliant spectacle.
Meantime the pope had threatened excommunication against the fathers of
the Church who should continue to sit at Bâle, and had given them four
months within which to present themselves at Ferrara. Their reply was a
formal deposition of Eugenius.
Upon the arrival of the imperial party at Ferrara and
after long negotiations regarding questions of First meeting of
Council.
precedence, it was decided that the first meeting of the
Council should be held on March 9, 1438, and it was so held, the business
being merely formal. Four cardinals, twenty-five bishops, and other nobles
had previously received the patriarch and conducted him to the pope, who
rose from his throne, embraced him, and led him to a seat near him similar
to those occupied by the cardinals. No decision could be taken during the
four months’ delay. As the recalcitrants did not come in at the appointed
time, a further postponement of two months was granted, probably for the
reason that the pope knew that the princes of the West were still disposed
rather to sympathise with the Council than with him. All this delay was in
the highest degree irksome to the Greeks. Many of them had left their
homes without much hope of arriving at a reconciliation, but when on
reaching Ferrara they realised the discord which existed in the Roman
Church itself not a few concluded that before anything could be done to
complete the Union a reconciliation must take place among the Catholic
factions themselves. During their long wait the restrictions imposed upon
their movements aroused their suspicions. They complained that they were
treated as prisoners. They could not leave the city without a permit. Three
of the leading men who escaped to Venice were ignominiously brought
back. They again escaped and this time found their way back to
Constantinople. Nor was the treatment of the ecclesiastics such as might
have been expected from hosts to guests. The bishop of Ferrara refused to
allow the Greeks to celebrate in one of his great churches, declaring that he
would not permit it to be polluted. The emperor and patriarch, for political
reasons among others, were impatient to return, and did their utmost to urge
on the work for which they had left their homes.

In October the second meeting of the Council was held. By this time a
considerable number of the fathers of the Church had made submission to
Eugenius and had arrived in Ferrara. Gibbon’s remark that ‘the violence of
the fathers of Basil rather promoted than injured the cause of Eugenius’108
is just. The delay had undoubtedly strengthened the papal authority. Hence
at the second meeting of the Council its business began
at once to progress. Six Latin and six Greek theologians Business of Council
commences.
were selected to formulate the questions in difference.
These related to the Procession of the Holy Ghost; the nature of the
penalties of purgatory; the condition of souls before the last judgment; the
use of unleavened bread in communion, and lastly, the supremacy of the
pope.
Meantime plague had broken out in Ferrara. Five only out of the eleven
cardinals remained, and all that had been done was to formulate the points
of difference. For some reason which is not quite clear, the Council was
transferred to Florence. The unhealthiness of the city was alleged, but
Syropulus says that the plague had ended. The Greeks were extremely
reluctant to go to so remote a place as Florence, but they finally consented,
in the hope of speedily concluding their mission.
At Florence the Council got fairly to work. Cardinal Julian Cesarini, who
had been president of the Council at Bâle, and John, the head of the
Dominicans in Italy, were the champions on the Latin, and Isidore of
Russia, Bessarion, and Mark, bishop of Ephesus, on the Greek side. Long,
weary, and profitless discussions took place on the subject of the Double
Procession. Two questions were involved: first, was the doctrine itself
orthodox—that is, did the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father alone or
from the Father and the Son; second, assuming the Double Procession to be
orthodox, by what authority had the Latin Church, claiming to speak as the
Universal Church, presumed to add to the Nicene Creed the words Filioque,
which proclaimed the disputed dogma, before the decision of a General
Council had been pronounced. After many meetings among the Greeks
alone, it was decided that as the Latin Church held that the Procession was
not from two ‘principles’ but from one, and this by one operation, its
teaching was in accord with that of the Orthodox Church, which
acknowledged that the Procession is from the Father but through the Son.
The scholars who brought about this agreement were Bessarion and George

Scholarius, the latter of whom was destined afterwards to play an important
part during the siege of Constantinople. The declaration of the Greeks was
approved at a meeting of the Council.
Greater difficulty arose on the second point, of the conduct of the Latin
Church in adding the clause to the Creed. The emperor was at length
convinced, or professed to be, that the clause had formerly existed in the
Creed at the time of the Seventh Council,109 but it required all his influence
to persuade some of the Greek ecclesiastics who were not convinced of this
fact to avoid an open rupture. The debates were obstinate and angry. But
emperor and pope were determined on Union, and each used all his
influence and authority to convince or compel the more refractory to
obedience. Finally, it was decided that the words Filioque had been lawfully
and with good reason inserted in the Creed.
The question of purgatory and the condition of souls in the intermediate
state occasioned little or no difficulty. On the use of unleavened bread,
however, the controversy became so violent that on five different occasions
the Greek bishops were with difficulty prevented from leaving the Council.
It was at length decided that each Church might maintain its usage in regard
thereto.
The most dangerous question, after that of the Double Procession, regarded
the pope’s supremacy, and was apparently not made the subject of a public
discussion.
In July 1439, after twenty-six sittings of the Council, the
Union was signed and all was ready for its formal Union
proclamation. Earth and heaven were called upon to accomplished,
14, 1439.
July

rejoice that the dividing wall between the Churches of
the West and East had been broken down. In August, the Act of Union was
published with imposing solemnity in the cathedral and a Te Deum was
sung in Greek.
The embassy from Constantinople had been greatly impressed by the
dissensions among the Latins. No French or German bishops had taken part
in the meetings at Ferrara or Florence. Fifty out of the sixty-two bishops
who were present were Italians, the remainder Spaniards or Burgundians.
When the latter were admitted to the Council they saluted only the pope,
doing this with the manifest intention of slighting the emperor. The

adherents of Bâle were, indeed, openly hostile, and as they were known to
have great influence among the princes of the West, the Greeks lost the
illusion that if they came to an agreement with the pope, aid would gladly
be sent from the great Catholic states.
It had been with difficulty that the emperor and the court party in
Constantinople had persuaded the Churchmen to go to the West. While the
former were willing to make many sacrifices, even perhaps to accept the
pope’s supremacy, in the hope of obtaining aid against the Turks, when they
recognised that the influence of Eugenius was not what they had believed it
to be, they were less urgent, and certainly less able, to coerce the
distinguished ecclesiastics who had been persuaded to accompany them. All
were, indeed, miserably disappointed and disillusionised. Though the
emperor never wavered in his determination to come to an agreement which
would aid in the preservation of his empire, his own brother, Demetrius,
refused to sign the Act of Union. Mark of Ephesus would not attend at the
solemn proclamation, nor were George Scholarius or Gemistes or any of the
bishops from Georgia present. The bishop of Heraclia, on his return to
Venice, was required to recite the Creed in St. Mark’s, but he did so with
the omission of the Filioque clause. The same bishop declared on his return
to Constantinople, that he would rather his right hand had been cut off than
that it should have subscribed the Union. In order to avoid the scandal of an
open rupture, the four copies of the decree did not mention the supremacy
of the pope. Other copies signed only by the Latin bishops were not
recognised as authentic by the Greeks.110
The patriarch, a man of eighty, died just before the decree of the Union was
signed, and was buried in the Baptistery of Florence. Religious animosity
dogmatised over his grave about his opinions. Some of the Greeks
subsequently pretended that his death was one of the several causes which
rendered the Council illegal. Some of the Latins maintained that he had left
a declaration of his acceptance of the Roman doctrine, and even of the
supremacy of the pope.
The two persons who had shown themselves sincerely
desirous of accomplishing a Union were the pope and John returns to
Constantinople,
the emperor. The former, who had paid the expenses of August 1439.
the Greek mission, now urged foreign states to prepare
and send forth armies in aid of the Greeks. On the departure of John, in

August 1439, for his capital, the pontiff not merely promised all the aid he
could furnish, but undertook to maintain, at his own expense as long as he
lived, three hundred men in the imperial service. He at once sent two well-
armed galleys, and declared that he would furnish twenty ships of war
during a period of six months. Eugenius and John had loyally stood by each
other, and so far as depended upon them the Union had been accomplished.
With the object of giving effect to the decisions arrived at, the pope retained
Bessarion and Isidore, both of whom he made cardinals. The latter, we shall
see, was present at Constantinople during the final siege. He was
metropolitan of Russia, and on his return to Moscow proclaimed the Union.
He gave dire offence by naming the emperor before the grand duke, and the
pope before the patriarch.
In 1442, the pope once again summoned certain princes, and especially
Ladislaus, king of Poland and Hungary, to aid Constantinople, Cyprus, and
Rhodes against the Turks. He, however, was at war in Italy, and
consequently unable to furnish the aid which he had promised. Ladislaus
was permitted to retain the Peter’s pence on condition that he would employ
it in raising troops against the infidels. The pope persuaded Alphonse of
Aragon to furnish armed galleys, and granted indulgences to all who sided
in the struggle against unbelievers. But all attempts to arouse a general
crusading spirit failed. With a few exceptions, those who went to fight the
battles of Christendom against Murad belonged to nations whose vital
interests were at stake. Many causes contributed to this result, and among
them the awakening to new life in Italy. The Renaissance which was now in
progress substituted the classic spirit for the Hebraic. Paganism itself,
among scholars and statesmen, was in competition with Christianity, and
the great movement which was destined to give birth to modern Europe and
which was greatly assisted, as we shall see, by the Greek scholars from
Constantinople, was antagonistic to the crusading spirit. A common
Christianity was no longer a bond of union to those who were dreaming of a
classic revival and of a return to pagan ideals. Except to men who were
outside the influence of the new movement, the pope and churchmen
appealed in vain.
News of the accomplishment of the Union was received in Constantinople
with mingled feelings. Hopes had been damped. The advantages to be
gained by sacrificing their Orthodox Faith were found to be doubtful. The

conservative party, led by Mark of Ephesus, gained greatly in strength.
Finding that the emperor had consented to the appointment of a new
patriarch who accepted the Union, Mark resumed his denunciations both of
it and of the Latin Church. The patriarchs of Syria and Egypt refused to
recognise the decisions of Florence and threatened with excommunication
the priests ordained by the patriarch of Constantinople.
John lived nearly eight years after his return to
Constantinople from Florence and died in October 1448. Death of John,
October 1448.
The events which happened during this interval relate
principally to the marvellous success of the Turks over the armies of
Central Europe, and will be better told in the story of their progress. It is
sufficient to say that these disasters hastened his death.
During his reign the condition of the empire had undergone little change.
Though when first associated with his father he had headed the war party,
he recognised after the siege of the city in 1422 that his father’s dying
counsel to keep on friendly terms with the Turks was wise. This policy, as
we have seen, did not prevent him from doing all he could to obtain aid
from the Western powers. He had paid the price which Rome exacted and
never lost hope that such aid would come. At the same time he was ready to
join with the Hungarians and other Christian nations, even at considerable
risk of precipitating an attack upon the city. His power, however, was too
small to make any co-operation outside the capital and the Straits of much
value. He did what he could. He repaired and strengthened the city walls.111
He kept the fleet in at least as good a condition as he had found it. He was
probably justified in believing that his wisest course was to obtain all the
aid possible from the West, to be ready to co-operate, and in the meantime
to keep quiet. His pliant policy delayed the siege of the city and thus for a
while averted the final calamity.

CHAPTER VII
PROGRESS OF TURKS BETWEEN 1391 AND 1425: SULTAN BAJAZED’S REIGN:
CONQUESTS IN EUROPE: BULGARIAN KINGDOM ENDED: WESTERN ARMIES
DEFEATED AT NICOPOLIS: ANATOLIA-HISSAR BUILT: CAPITAL THREATENED:
SUMMONS BY TIMOUR TO BAJAZED: TIMOUR’S PROGRESS: REPLY OF BAJAZED:
BATTLE OF ANGORA AND CRUSHING DEFEAT OF TURKS: FURTHER PROGRESS OF
TIMOUR: DEATH OF BAJAZED, 1403: ALARM IN WESTERN EUROPE: DEPARTURE
OF TIMOUR: STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE SONS OF BAJAZED: ULTIMATE SUCCESS
OF MAHOMET: HIS GOOD UNDERSTANDING WITH MANUEL: DEATH OF
MAHOMET, 1420: ACCESSION OF MURAD: WAR WITH EMPIRE: SIEGE OF
CONSTANTINOPLE, 1422: DEATH OF MANUEL, 1425: TRIUMPHAL PROGRESS OF
MURAD: HE BESIEGES AND TAKES SALONICA: BESIEGES BELGRADE BUT FAILS:
COMBINED MOVEMENT UNDER HUNYADI AGAINST MURAD: BATTLE OF
SLIVNITZA, 1443, AND DEFEAT OF TURKS: MURAD SUES FOR PEACE: TREATY
MADE WITH LADISLAUS: VIOLATED BY CHRISTIANS: BATTLE OF VARNA, 1444:
MURAD RAVAGES MOREA: ISKENDER BEY, HIS ORIGIN: CAPTURES CROIA:
HUNYADI AGAIN ATTACKS MURAD: DEFEATED AT COSSOVO-POL, 1448: REASONS
FOR FAILURE OF CHRISTIAN ATTEMPTS: JOHN HAS TO FOREGO JOINING
WESTERN COMBINATION AGAINST TURKS: DEATH OF MURAD, 1451: MAHOMET
THE SECOND BECOMES SULTAN.

It is convenient to halt here and to retrace the steps of the Ottoman
conquerors from the accession of Manuel, in 1391, with more care than was
necessary in describing their direct attacks upon the empire. The number of
Turks in Asia Minor and in Europe had now so much increased that their
leaders began to dream, perhaps were already planning, the conquest of as
wide a territory as had fallen before the immediate successors of the
prophet. They had already almost succeeded in completing a ring of
conquered states round Constantinople itself. The defeat of the Bulgarians
and South Serbians on the Maritza, the great victory over the Serbians at
Cossovo-pol, in 1389, enabled them to join forces with the Turks in the
Morea and at isolated places on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Nearly all
Asia Minor acknowledged the rule of the Ottomans, and it was to the
European portion of the empire that the attention of the Turk would now be
turned.112
An observer looking back upon all that was going on in Eastern Europe
during the first half of the fifteenth century can now see that all the great
events were part of a gigantic struggle against the hordes of Asia,

represented by the Turks on the south of the Danube and in Asia Minor and
the races whom it is convenient to call Tartars to the north of that river. The
humiliation of the emperors to obtain aid from the West, the proceedings at
Florence, the repeated calls upon Hungary and other Christian nations, were
all incidents of that struggle. The statesmen of the West were gradually
learning that the Ottomans had developed into a nation of fighters, and that
it was not merely the remnant of the Greek empire which was threatened,
but Christendom itself.
Upon the assassination of Murad at Cossovo-pol, his son
Bajazed became sultan. He had already acquired, or Reign of Sultan
Bajazed, 1389–
acquired shortly after his accession, the nickname of 1403.
Ilderim or the Thunderbolt.
He commenced his reign by strangling his elder brother, Jacoub. Ducas
declares that he was an irreconcilable enemy of the Christian name and a
passionate follower of Mahomet. During the reign of his predecessor, the
struggle between the empire and the Turks had taken a theological
character, and it is beyond reasonable doubt that religious animosity of a
kind which had not shown itself among the first armies of the Turks had
now diffused its baneful influence among the Ottoman armies. Under
Bajazed, this fanaticism was intensified to such an extent that it led to
cruelties of which it may be said that it is hardly possible to believe that
even Mongol barbarity was ever greater than that exercised by the followers
of the successor of Murad against Christians.
The commencement of his reign was marked by a series of rapid
movements which were crowned with success. He stands out in Turkish
history as the maker of swift marches and as the striker of sudden and
effective blows. It was on this account that he received the name of
‘Ilderim.’ He forced Stephen of Serbia, the son of Lazarus (whom he had
caused to be hewn in pieces upon the assassination of Murad), to become
his vassal and to give him his sister in marriage. Bulgaria, Wallachia,
Albania, and Macedonia with Salonica as its capital acknowledged his rule.
His fleet plundered the islands of the Archipelago and burnt the town of
Chios.113
The last message the emperor John had received before
his death, in 1391, from Murad was that unless he Reign of Manuel.

destroyed the work he had executed in repairing the towers of the Golden
Gate, he would put out the eyes of his son Manuel, who was then at Brousa.
Happily, his threat came to naught. On learning of the death of his father,
Manuel, as we have seen, escaped to the capital. Thereupon Bajazed, upon
the rejection of his impossible demands, commenced a series of attacks
upon the empire.
Bajazed carried war into every part of the Balkan peninsula. Durazzo was
threatened by a Turkish army, and the Venetian senate was compelled to
send aid to the relief of its signor. His armies employed themselves in
Thrace in raiding cattle and in capturing the Christian inhabitants,
thousands of whom were either killed or sold into slavery. Tirnovo was
taken, and Shishman, the king of Bulgaria, made
prisoner in 1393. With his death, in the same year, the End of Bulgarian
kingdom.
kingdom of Bulgaria came to an end. Ali Pasha, the
grand vizier of Bajazed, blockaded Manuel in Constantinople, and urged the
citizens to dethrone him and declare for John, the son of Andronicus, the
elder son of the late emperor John. But after the Turks had continued near
the capital for upwards of a year, Manuel attacked and defeated both them
and his nephew John.
The greater part of the Morea was still under the rule of the empire. Bajazed
organised a great expedition of fifty thousand men for its conquest. He
captured Argos, plundered the country nearly as far as Coronea and
Methone, in the Morea, and exterminated or brought away thirty thousand
captives.
In consequence of the success of these various expeditions, the pope and the
other princes of the West became thoroughly alive to the necessity of
putting forward all their strength to check the Thunderbolt’s progress. Their
hopes centred in the leadership of Sigismund, king of Hungary and brother
of the emperor in the West. The Venetian senate decided to treat with him
for an alliance. The pope and the chief of the Holy Roman Empire did their
best to engage the Christian powers to place themselves under his
leadership. In 1393, Sigismund had beaten the Turks at Little Nicopolis, and
hope rose high of greater successes. In the spring of 1396, the duke of
Burgundy, at the head of a thousand knights and nine thousand soldiers—
French, English, and Italians—arrived in Hungary and joined his forces.

German knights also came in considerable numbers. The Christian armies
defeated the Turks in Hungary, and gained victory in several engagements.
The emperor Manuel was secretly preparing to join them. Then the allies
prepared to strike a decisive blow. They gathered on the banks of the
Danube an army of at least fifty-two thousand—and possibly a hundred
thousand—men, and encamped at Nicopolis. The élite of
several nations were present, but those of the highest Battle of Nicopolis
rank were the French knights. When they heard of the 1396.
approach of the enemy, they refused to listen to the prudent counsels of the
Hungarians and, with the contempt which so often characterised the
Western knights for the Turkish foe, they joined battle confident of success.
Bajazed, as soon as he had learned the presence of the combined Christian
armies, marched through Philippopolis, crossed the Balkans, made for the
Danube, and then waited for attack. In the battle which ensued (1396),
Europe received its first lesson on the prowess of the Turks, and especially
of the Janissaries. The Christian army, with rash daring, broke through the
line of its enemies, cut down all who resisted them, and rushed on
irresistible to the very rearguard of the Turks, many of whom either
retreated or sought refuge in flight. When the French knights saw that the
Turks ran, they followed, and filled the battlefield with dead and dying. But
they made the old military blunder, and it led to the same old result. The
archers, who always constituted the most effective Turkish arm, employed
the stratagem of running away in order to throw their pursuers into disorder.
Then they turned and made a stand. As they did so, the Janissaries,
‘Christians of origin, from many Christian nations,’ as Ducas bewails, came
out of the place where they had been concealed, surprised and cut to pieces
Frenchmen, Italians, and Hungarians. The pursuers were soon the pursued.
The Turks chased them to the Danube, into which many of the fugitives
threw themselves. The defeat was complete. Sigismund saved himself in a
small boat, with which he crossed the river, and found his way, after long
wandering, to Constantinople. The duke of Burgundy and twenty-four
noblemen who were captured were sent to Brousa to be held for ransom.
The remaining Burgundians, to the number of three hundred, who escaped
massacre, and refused to save their lives by abjuring Christianity, had their
throats cut by order of the sultan.114

The battle at Nicopolis gave back to Bajazed almost at once all that the
allies had been able to take from him. The defeat of Sigismund, with his
band of French, German, and Italian knights, sent dismay to their
countrymen and the princes of the West.
In the same year, Bajazed gained successes over the Moslem prince of
Caramania and a Turkish pretender at Sinope, rebels who had been induced
to rise in the hope that they might take advantage of the attack of Sigismund
and his allies.
The sultan’s great object, however, was to complete his triumphs by the
capture of Constantinople. His grand vizier had, in 1396, while blockading
the city, urged the inhabitants to declare for the young Prince John, who
was the Turkish protégé. On refusal, Bajazed sat down to besiege the city,
and only abandoned the idea of an assault when it was pointed out that to do
so would make enemies of all the Christian powers.
In 1396, apparently immediately after the battle of Nicopolis, and as an
essential step towards the capture of the city, he built on the Bosporus the
castle still remaining at Anatolia-Hissar, about six miles from the city. It
served at once, and continued to serve until 1453, as a useful base of
operations. After having completed it, says Chalcondylas, he went to
besiege Byzance, and summoned Manuel to surrender the city.115 The
emperor, who had just welcomed six hundred French knights, sent by
Charles the Sixth of France, did not deign to reply. Two years later, in 1398,
in order to avoid an attack by the Turks, who were drawing near the capital
with an army numbering ten thousand, nominally to support John, Manuel
consented, as we have seen, to share the throne with his nephew, and
thereupon went to Western Europe to endeavour to secure help.
The aid sent to Sigismund from the West and that now sent to the Bosporus
under Boucicaut show that many statesmen had awakened to the need of
checking Turkish progress. The empire was able for a while to hold its own
against the attacks made by the sultan.
Bajazed, whose life was alternately one of great activity in warfare and of
indescribable debauchery in the intervals between his campaigns, had kept
the capital under terror of sieges during six weary years. In 1402, he
summoned John to surrender the city, and swore by God and the Prophet
that if he refused he would not leave in it a soul alive. John gave a refusal.

Chateaumorand, the lieutenant of Boucicaut, who, as we have seen, had
gone west to endeavour to obtain aid, took charge of the defence, and
waited for an attack.
At this time, remarks Ducas, the empire was circumscribed by the walls of
Constantinople, for even Silivria was in the hands of the Turks.116 Bajazed
had gained a firm hold of Gallipoli and thus commanded the Dardanelles.
The long tradition of the Roman empire in the East, save for the capture of
the city itself, seemed on the eve of coming to an end. No soldier of
conspicuous ability had been produced by the empire for upwards of half a
century: none who was capable of inflicting a sufficient defeat, or series of
defeats, on the Turks to break or seriously check their power. The empire
had fought on for three generations against an ever increasing number of
Turks, but without confidence and almost without hope. It was now lacking
in sufficiency of men and money. The often promised aid from the West had
so far proved of little avail. The armies defeated by the empire, either alone
or aided by Italians, were renewed by the constant stream of immigrants
from Asia. The power of Serbia had been almost destroyed. Bulgaria had
perished. The two states had been alternately at the mercy of hordes of
infidels from the north or those under the Turkish sultan. From Dalmatia to
the Morea the enemy was triumphant. The men of Macedonia had
everywhere fallen before Bajazed’s armies. Constantinople was between the
hammer and anvil: Asia Minor, on the one side, was nearly all under
Turkish rule; the European part of the empire, on the other, contained as
many Turks as there were in Asia Minor itself. The insolent tyrant passed in
safety between his two capitals—one at Brousa, the other at Adrianople—
and repeated his proud boasts of what he would do beyond the limits of the
empire. It seemed as if, with his overwhelming force, he had only to
succeed once more in a task which, in comparison with what he and his
predecessors had done, was easy, and his success would be complete. He
would occupy the throne of Constantine, would achieve that which had
been the desire of the Arab followers of Mahomet, and for which they had
sacrificed hundreds of thousands of lives, and would win for himself and
his followers the reward of heaven promised to those who should take part
in the capture of New Rome. The road to the Elder Rome would be open,
and he would yet feed his horse on the altar of St. Peter.

We have seen what was the insolent message he sent in his arrogance, in
1402, to John. The answer given would have completed a dramatic story if
it had seemed well to the gods. ‘Tell your master we are weak, but that in
our weakness we trust in God, who can give us strength and can put down
the mightiest from their seats. Let your master do what he likes.’ Thereupon
Bajazed had laid siege to Constantinople.
Suddenly, in the blackness of darkness with which the fortunes of the city
were surrounded, there came a ray of light. Had there been an interpreter
there as of old time, Bajazed might have learned the significance of the
handwriting on the wall. All thought of the siege was abandoned for the
time, and Constantinople breathed again freely.
What had happened was that Timour the Lame had challenged, or rather
ordered, Bajazed to return to the Greeks all the cities and territories he had
captured. The order was categorical and, given to a ferocious barbarian like
Bajazed, drove him to fury. The man who gave it was, however, accustomed
to be obeyed.
Timour117 or Tamarlane was a Mahometan and a Turk, though he claimed
to be of the same race as Genghis, who was a Mongol. Under him the
warrior shepherds of the south plains of Asia came westward in even
greater numbers than they had done under his famous predecessor. They
advanced in well-organised armies, under generals who seem to have had
intelligence everywhere of the enemy’s country and great military skill.
After having annexed Kharizon and Persia to Transoxiana and reduced
Turkestan to obedience, Timour turned westward. In 1386, he appeared at
Tiflis, which he subsequently captured at the head of an enormous host
estimated at eight hundred thousand men. At Erzingan he put all the Turks
sent there by the sultan to the sword.
Bajazed seems from the first to have been alarmed and went himself to
Erzingan in 1394, but returned to Europe without making any attempt to
resist the invader, probably believing that Timour had no intention of
coming further west.118 He soon learned his mistake. Timour was not
merely as great and cruel a barbarian but as ambitious as Bajazed himself.
In 1395, while the emperor was in the Balkan peninsula, Timour summoned
the large and populous city of Sivas to surrender. The inhabitants twice
refused. Meantime, he had undermined the wall. On their second refusal,

his host stormed and captured the city. A hundred and twenty thousand
captives were massacred. Bajazed’s son was made prisoner and put to
death. A large number of the prisoners were buried alive, being covered
over in a pit with planks instead of earth so as to prolong their torture.
Bajazed was relieved when he learned that from Sivas, which had been the
strongest place in his empire, the ever victorious army had gone towards
Syria.
Timour directed his huge host towards the frontier city of the sultan of
Egypt—namely, Aleppo—his object being to punish the sultan for his
breach of faith in imprisoning his ambassador and loading him with irons.
On his march to that city, he spread desolation everywhere, capturing or
receiving the submission of Malatia, Aintab, and other important towns. At
Aleppo, the army of the Egyptian sultan resisted. A terrible battle followed,
but the Egyptians were beaten, and every man, woman, and child in the city
was murdered.
After the capture of Aleppo, Hama and Baalbek were occupied. The latter,
which, like so many other once famous cities, has become under Turkish
rule a desolation with only a few miserable huts amid its superb ruins, was
still a populous city, and contained large stores of provisions. Thence he
went to Damascus and in January 1401 defeated the remainder of the
Egyptian army in a battle which was hardly less bloody than that before
Aleppo. The garrison, composed mostly of Circassian mamelukes and
negroes, capitulated, but the chief was put to death for having been so slow
in surrendering. Possibly by accident, the whole city was burned.
Timour was stopped from advancing to Jerusalem by a plague of locusts,
which ate up every green thing. The same cause rendered it impossible to
attack Egypt, whose sultan had refused to surrender Syria.119
From Damascus, Timour went to Bagdad, which was held by
contemporaries to be impregnable. Amid the heat of a July day, when the
defenders had everywhere sought shade, Timour ordered a general assault,
and in a few minutes the standard of one of his sheiks, with its horsetail and
its golden crescent, was raised upon the walls.120 Then followed the usual
carnage attending Timour’s captures. The mosques, schools, and convents
with their occupiers were spared: so also were the imaums and the
professors. All the remainder of the population between the ages of eight

and eighty were slaughtered. Every soldier of Timour, of whom there were
ninety thousand, as the price of his own safety, had to produce a head. The
bloody trophies were, as was customary in Timour’s army, piled up in
pyramids before the gates of the city.
It was on his return northwards from Damascus that, in 1402, Timour sent
the message to Bajazed which at once forced him to raise the siege of
Constantinople. Contemporaneously with this message, Timour requested
the Genoese in Galata and at Genoa to obtain aid from the West and to co-
operate with him to crush the Turkish sultan.
Timour organised or sent a large army on the Don and around the Sea of
Azof on the Cimmerian Bosporus, connecting that sea with the Euxine, in
order that, in case of need, it might act with his huge host now advancing
towards the Black Sea from the south. His main body
passed across the plain of Erzingan, and at Sivas Timour Bajazed’s reply to
Timour’s summons.
received the answer of Bajazed. The response was as
insulting as a Turkish barbarian could make it. Bajazed summoned Timour
to appear before him and declared that if he did not obey, the women of his
harem should be divorced from him, putting his threat in what to a
Mahometan was a specially indecent manner. All the usual civilities in
written communications between sovereigns were omitted, though the
Asiatic conqueror himself had carefully observed them. Timour’s remark
when he saw the sultan’s letter contained the name of Timour in black
writing under that of Bajazed which was in gold, was ‘The son of Murad is
mad!’ When he read the insulting threat as to his harem, Timour kept
himself well in hand, but, turning to the ambassador who had brought the
letter, told him that he would have cut off his head and those of the
members of his suite if it were not the rule among sovereigns to respect the
lives of ambassadors. The representative of Bajazed was, however,
compelled to be present at a review of the whole of his troops and was
requested to return to his master and relate what he had seen.
Meantime, Bajazed had determined to strike quickly and heavily against
Timour and by the rapidity of his movements justified the name of Ilderim.
His opponent’s forces, however, were hardly less mobile. Timour’s huge
army marched in twelve days from Sivas to Angora. The officer in
command of that city refused to surrender. Timour made his arrangements
for the siege in such a manner as to compel or induce Bajazed to occupy a

position where he would have to fight at a disadvantage. He undermined the
walls and diverted the small stream which supplied it with water. Hardly
had these works been commenced before he learned that Ilderim was within
nine miles of the city. Timour raised the siege and transferred his camp to
the opposite side of the stream, which thus protected one side of his army
while a ditch and a strong palisade guarded the other. Then in an
exceptionally strong position he waited to be attacked.
Disaffection existed in Bajazed’s army, occasioned by his parsimony, and
possibly nursed by emissaries from Timour. Bajazed’s own licentiousness
had been copied by his followers, and discipline among his troops was
noted as far less strict than among those of his predecessor. In leading them
on what all understood to be the most serious enterprise which he had
undertaken, his generals advised him to spend his reserves of money freely
so as to satisfy his followers; but the capricious and self-willed Ilderim
refused. They counselled him, in presence of an army many times more
numerous than his own, to act on the defensive and to avoid a general
attack. But Bajazed, blinded by his long series of successes, would listen to
no advice and would take no precautions. In order to show his contempt for
his enemy, he ostentatiously took up a position to the north of Timour and
organised a hunting party on the highlands in the neighbourhood, as if time
to him were of no consequence. Many men of his army died from thirst
under the burning sun of the waterless plains, and when, after three days’
hunting, Bajazed returned to his camping ground, he found that Timour had
taken possession of it. The enemy had almost altogether cut off his supply
of drinking water and had fouled what still remained.
Under these circumstances, Bajazed had no choice but to force on a fight
without further delay. The ensuing battle was between two great Turkish
leaders filled with the arrogance of barbaric conquerors, each of whom had
been almost uniformly successful. Nor were pomp and circumstance
wanting to impress the soldiers of each side with the importance of the
issue. Each of the two leaders was accompanied by his sons. Four sons and
five grandsons commanded the nine divisions of Timour’s host. In front of
its leader floated the standard of the Red Horse-tail surmounted by the
Golden Crescent. On the other side, Bajazed took up his position in the
centre of his army with his sons Isa, Mousa, and Mustafa, while his eldest
son Suliman was in command of the Asiatic troops who formed the right

wing. Lazarus of Serbia was in command of his own subjects, who had
been forced to accompany Bajazed and formed the left wing of the army.
The Serbians gazed in wonder and alarm upon a number of elephants
opposite to them, which Timour had brought from India.
At six o’clock in the morning of July 28, 1402, the two armies joined battle.
The left wing of Bajazed’s host was the first to be attacked, but the Serbians
held their ground and even drove back the Tartars. The right wing fought
with less vigour, and when the troops from Aidin saw their former prince
among the enemy, they deserted Bajazed and went over to him. Their
example was speedily followed by many others, and especially by the
Tartars in the Ottoman army, who are asserted by the Turkish writers to
have been tampered with by agents of Timour.121
The Serbians were soon detached from the centre of the
army, but Lazarus, their leader, at the head of his Defeat of Bajazed.
cavalry, cut his way through the enemy, though at great
loss, winning the approval of Timour himself, who exclaimed, ‘These poor
fellows are beaten, though they are fighting like lions.’ Lazarus had advised
Bajazed to endeavour, like himself, to break through, and awaited him for
some time. But the sultan expressed his scorn at the advice. Surrounded by
his ten thousand trustworthy Janissaries, separated from the Serbians,
abandoned by a large part of his Anatolian troops and many of his leading
generals, he fought on obstinately during the whole of the day. But the
pitiless heat of a July sun exhausted the strength of his soldiers, and no
water was to be had. His Janissaries fell in great numbers around him, some
overcome by the heat and fighting, others struck down by the ever pressing
crowd of the enemy. It was not till night came on that Bajazed consented to
withdraw. He attempted flight, but was pursued. His horse fell, and he was
made prisoner, together with his son Mousa and several of the chiefs of his
household and of the Janissaries. His other three sons managed to escape.
The Serbians covered the retreat of the eldest, Suliman, whom the grand
vizier and the Aga of the Janissaries had dragged out of the fight.
The Persian, Turkish, and most of the Greek historians say that Timour
received his great captive with every mark of respect, assured him that his
life would be spared, and assigned to him and his suite three splendid tents.
When, however, he was found attempting to escape, he was more rigorously
guarded and every night put in chains and confined in a room with grilled

windows. When he was conveyed from one place to another, he travelled
much as Indian ladies now do, in a palanquin with curtained windows. Out
of a misinterpretation of the Turkish word which designated at once a cage
and a grilled room, grew the error into which Gibbon and historians of less
repute have fallen that the great Ilderim was carried about in an iron
cage.122 Until his death, in 1403, he was an unwilling follower of his captor.
After the battle of Angora, Suliman (the eldest son of Bajazed), who had
fled towards Brousa, was pursued by a detachment of Timour’s army. He
managed to cross into Europe and thus escaped. But Brousa, the Turkish
capital, fell before Timour’s attack, and its inhabitants suffered the same
brutal horrors as almost invariably marked either Tartar or Turkish captures.
The city, after a carefully organised pillage, was burned. The wives and the
daughters of Bajazed and his treasure became the property of Timour.
Nicaea and Ghemlik were also sacked and their inhabitants taken as slaves.
From the Marmora to Caramania, many towns which had been captured by
the Turks were taken from them. Asia Minor was in confusion. Bajazed’s
empire appeared to be dropping away in every part east of the Aegean.
Suliman, however, established himself on the Bosporus at Anatolia-Hissar,
and about the same time both he and the emperor at Constantinople
received a summons from Timour to pay tribute. The emperor had already
sent messengers to anticipate such a demand. Timour learned with
satisfaction that the sons of Bajazed were disputing with each other as to the
possession of such parts of their father’s empire as still remained
uncaptured by him.
In 1402, the conqueror left Kutahia for Smyrna, which
was held, as it had been for upwards of half a century, by Timour captures
Smyrna.
the Knights of Rhodes. In accordance with the
stipulation of Moslem sacred law, he summoned them either to pay tribute
or become Mahometans, threatening them at the same time that if they
refused to accept one or other of these conditions all should be killed. No
sooner were the proposals rejected than Timour gave the order to attack the
city. With his enormous army, he was able to surround Smyrna on three
sides, and to block the entrance to it from the sea. The ships belonging to
the knights were at the time absent. All kinds of machines then known for
attack upon walled towns were constructed with almost incredible speed
and placed in position. The houses within the city were burned by means of

arrows carrying flaming materials steeped in naphtha or possibly petroleum,
though, of course, not known under its modern name.
After fourteen days’ vigorous siege, a general assault was ordered, and the
city was taken. The knights fought like heroes, but were driven back into
the citadel. Seeing that they could no longer hold out, and their ships having
returned, the grand master placed himself at their head, and he and his
knights cut their way shoulder to shoulder through the crowd of their
enemies to the sea, where they were received into their own ships. The
inhabitants who could not escape were taken before Timour and, without
distinction of age or sex, were butchered.
The Western settlers hastened to come to terms with Timour, who, like his
great predecessor, was not opposed to any Christians on account of their
religion. The Genoese in Phocaea, in the islands of Mitylene and Scios, sent
to make submission, and became tributaries of the conqueror.
Smyrna was the last of Timour’s conquests in western Asia Minor. He went
to Ephesus, and during the thirty days he passed in that city his army
ravaged the whole of the fertile country in its neighbourhood and in the
valley of the Cayster. The cruelties committed by his horde would be
incredible if they were not continually repeated during the course of Tartar
and Turkish history. In fairness, it must also be said that the Ottoman Turks,
although their history has been a long series of massacres, have rarely been
guilty of the wantonness of cruelty which Greek and Turkish authors agree
in attributing to the Tartar army. One example must suffice. The children of
a town on which Timour was marching were sent out by their parents
reciting verses from the Koran to ask for the generosity of their conqueror
but co-religionist. On asking what the children were whining for, and being
told that they were begging him to spare the town, he ordered his cavalry to
ride through them and trample them out: an order that was forthwith
obeyed.
Timour, wearied with victories in the west, now determined to leave Asia
Minor and return to Samarcand. This resolution he carried out. He
contemplated the invasion of China, but in the midst of
his preparations died, in 1405, after a reign of thirty-six Death of Timour.
years.

Bajazed the Thunderbolt died at Aksheir two years earlier, and his son
Mousa was permitted to transport his body to Brousa.123
The battle of Angora gave the greatest check to the Ottoman power which it
had yet received. Considering the number of men engaged and the complete
victory obtained by Timour, one might have expected it to have been
fruitful in more enduring consequences than it produced. But its immediate
results, though not far-reaching, were important. The fourteen years’
victorious career of the Thunderbolt was brought suddenly to an end. The
empire of the Ottoman Turks which he had largely increased, and especially
by the addition to it of the north-west portion of Asia Minor, was for a time
shattered to pieces. The sons of the vanquished sultan, after the departure of
Timour and his host, were quarrelling over the possession of what
remained. Three of them gained territories in Asia Minor, while the eldest,
Suliman, retook possession of the lands held by his father in Europe. Most
of the leaders of the Ottoman host, the viziers, governors, and scheiks, had
been either captured or slain, and in consequence the sons of Bajazed
fighting in Asia Minor found themselves destitute of efficient servants for
the organisation of government in the territories which they seized on the
departure of Timour.
The progress of the great Asiatic horde created a profound impression in
Western Europe. The eagerness of the Genoese to acknowledge the
suzerainty of Timour gives an indication of their sense of the danger of
resistance. The stories of the terrible cruelties of the Tartars lost nothing in
their telling. When the news reached the neighbouring nations of Hungary
and Serbia and the republics of Italy of the defeat of Bajazed, the capture of
Brousa, of Smyrna, of every other town before which the Asiatic army had
sat down, and of the powerlessness of the military knights, it appeared as if
the West were about to be submerged by a new flood from Asia. No terror
so great had threatened Europe since the time when Charles Martel defeated
the Moslem hordes on the plains around Tours, or since the even more
threatening attack upon Christendom when the main body of the Arab
armies sat down for successive years before Constantinople and were
signally defeated by the obstinacy of its defenders.
Then, when news came of the sudden departure of the Asiatics and of the
breaking up of the Ottoman power, hope once more revived, and it appeared
possible to the pope and Christian peoples to complete the work which

Timour had begun by now offering a united opposition to the restoration of
an Ottoman empire. Constantinople itself when Bajazed passed it on his
way to Angora was almost the last remnant of the ancient empire, and
seemed as if it required only one more attempt, and that not needing that the
sultan should put forth all his strength, to secure its capture. The battle of
Angora saved it and gave it half a century more of life.
A struggle which lasted for six years began between the sons of Bajazed.
Suliman, in 1405, sought to ally himself with the emperor, and his
proposals show how low the battle of Angora had brought the Turkish
pretensions. He offered to cede Salonica and all country in the Balkan
peninsula to the south-west of that city as well as the towns on the Marmora
to Manuel and his son John, now associated as emperor, and to send his
brother and sister as hostages to Constantinople. The arrangement was
accepted.
Suliman, having thus made himself secure, attacked his brother Isa in 1405,
defeated and killed him.124 Another brother, Mousa, in the following year,
attacked the combined troops of Suliman and Manuel in Thrace, but the
Serbians and Bulgarians deserted the younger brother, and thereupon
Suliman occupied Adrianople. Manuel consented to give his granddaughter
in marriage to Suliman, who in return gave up not merely Salonica but
many seaports in Asia Minor: a gift which was rather in the nature of a
promise than a delivery, since they were not in his possession. Unhappily,
Suliman, like many of his race, had alternate fits of great energy and great
lethargy, and was given over to drunkenness and to debauchery. This caused
disaffection among the Turks; and Mousa, taking advantage of it, led an
army in 1409, composed of Turks and Wallachs, against him. The
Janissaries, who were dissatisfied with the lack of energy displayed by their
sultan, deserted and went over to the side of Mousa. Suliman fled with the
intention of escaping to Constantinople, but was captured while sleeping off
a drinking bout and killed.
Then Mousa determined to attack Manuel, who had been faithful to his
alliance with Suliman. He denounced him as the cause of the fall of Bajazed
and set himself to arouse all the religious fanaticism possible against the
Christian population under the emperor’s rule. According to Ducas, Mousa
put forward the statements that it was the emperor who had invited Timour
and his hordes, that his own brother Suliman had been punished by Allah

because he had become a giaour, and that he, Mousa, had been entrusted
with the sword of Mahomet in order to overthrow the infidel. He therefore
called upon the faithful to go with him to recapture Salonica and the other
Greek cities which had belonged to his father, and to change their churches
into mosques for the worship of God and Mahomet.125
In 1412, he devastated Serbia for having supported his brother, and this in
as brutal a manner as Timour had devastated the cities and countries in Asia
Minor. Then he attacked Salonica. Orchan, the son of Suliman, aided the
Christians in the defence of the city, which, however, was forced to
surrender, and Orchan was blinded by his uncle.
While successful on land Mousa was defeated at sea, and the inhabitants of
the capital, in 1411, saw the destruction of his fleet off the island of Plataea
in the Marmora. In revenge for this defeat he laid siege to the city. Manuel
and his subjects stoutly defended its landward walls, and before Mousa
could capture it news came of the revolt of his younger brother, Mahomet,
who appeared as the avenger of Suliman. The siege of Constantinople had
to be raised. Mahomet had taken the lordship of the Turks in Caramania
shortly after the defeat of his father at Angora, and had been unattacked by
Timour. The emperor proposed an alliance with him, which was gladly
accepted and the conditions agreed to were honourably kept by both parties.
Mahomet came to Scutari where he had an interview with the emperor. An
army formed of Turks and Greeks was led by Mahomet to attack his
brother. But Mousa defeated him in two engagements. Then Manuel, after a
short time, having been joined by a Serbian army, attempted battle against
him, and with success. The Janissaries deserted Mousa and went over to
Mahomet and Manuel, and his army was defeated. He was himself captured
and by order of Mahomet was bowstrung.126
Mahomet was now the only survivor of the six sons of Bajazed, with the
exception of Isa, the youngest, who was still living with Manuel as a
hostage. Three of his brothers had been the victims of
fratricide. In 1413, Mahomet proclaimed himself Grand Sultan Mahomet the
First, 1413–1420.
Sultan of the Ottomans.
He had been loyally aided by Manuel and the Serbians, and in return loyally
respected the agreements he had made with both. He gave up, as we have

seen, Salonica and the fortified towns on the Euxine, the Marmora and in
Thessaly which had been taken from the Greeks.
In 1415, the Turks, who had remained nearly undisturbed on the western
side of the Balkans, entered Bosnia. The inhabitants were mostly Bogomils,
who had been constantly persecuted by their Catholic neighbours in order to
force them to Union with the Church of Rome, were menaced, on account
of their refusal, by the king of Hungary, and in reply threatened that they
would coalesce with the Turks. Upon such an intimation, the Turks entered
the country.127
The two rulers, Manuel and Mahomet, continued on friendly terms. It was
probably due to the emperor’s influence that the sultan consented, in 1415,
to allow the Knights of Rhodes to build a strong fortification on the
boundaries of Caria and Lycia as a place of refuge for Christians who
should escape from the hands of the Moslems. Ducas gives an account of
the interview which took place between the grand master and Manuel and
adds that the emperor went so far towards conciliating the Christians that he
contented the rulers of Chios, Mitylene, and Phocaea. In returning from the
Morea in 1416, Manuel met Mahomet at Gallipoli, the sultan going on
board Manuel’s galley and eating with him.
Two years later, the good understanding between Mahomet and the emperor
was interrupted by an incident which is creditable to Manuel. A Turkish
pretender who claimed to be Mustafa, the elder brother of the sultan, who is
supposed to have been killed at Angora, aided by a body of Wallachs,
attempted to dethrone Mahomet. They were attacked and beaten back and
then took refuge in Salonica. Manuel declined to give them up, but
promised that he would prevent the pretender and the leader of the Wallachs
from making further attacks upon Mahomet. To accomplish this, he sent the
pretender Mustafa to the island of Lemnos and imprisoned the chief of the
Wallachs in the monastery of Pammacaristos in Constantinople. But
Mahomet would not be satisfied with any punishment less than the death of
the pretender, and from this time ceased to trust Manuel. Nevertheless,
when, in 1420, the sultan was in passage through Constantinople towards
his Asiatic possessions, Manuel behaved loyally. All the members of his
council, says Phrantzes,128 advised the emperor to seize him. Manuel
refused and declared that, though the sultan might violate his oath of
friendship, he would rather trust to God and respect his own. On Mahomet’s

return to Europe through Gallipoli, the council again urged the emperor to
capture him. Again, however, he refused, and sent a trusty general to escort
him from the Dardanelles to Adrianople. A short time
after his arrival, in 1420, Mahomet died. Death of Mahomet.

His death was kept secret for forty days, in order to give time for the arrival
of his son, Murad, who was then at Amasia. Murad was
proclaimed at Brousa and began his reign by proposing Reign of Murad,
1420–1451.
to Manuel the renewal of the alliance which had existed
with his father. We have already seen that this proposal was rejected, and
that, after fruitless negotiations for the surrender of two of Murad’s sons,
war was declared. The emperor thereupon sent to Mustafa the pretender,
who still remained prisoner at Lemnos, and, giving him assistance,
recognised or appointed him governor of Thrace and of all the places in that
province held by the Turks which he could occupy. In return, Mustafa
swore to deliver Gallipoli, which had been taken by the Turks in the reign
of Bajazed, to the emperor as soon as he had captured it, as well as certain
towns on the Black Sea. Mustafa succeeded for a while and with the aid of
the imperial troops captured Gallipoli (1420). A number of its Turkish
garrison joined his army. Manuel’s general now claimed the fulfilment of
his promise to deliver this important town, but Mustafa stated what has
often been advanced in our own time as a generally recognised rule in
Islam, that a true believer could not surrender to unbelievers territory held
by Moslems except by force, that his religion bound him to build a city on
the ruins of the Christian city, and that he would rather break his oath than
violate the duty imposed by his religion. It was in vain that the emperor’s
representative reminded him of his past history: how he had sought refuge
at Salonica, how the emperor had risked the anger of Mahomet by insisting
upon his refusal to give him up; how at Lemnos he had still been protected.
The pretender was obdurate.129
When Manuel heard of the bad faith of Mustafa, he endeavoured to re-
establish the same friendly relation with Murad which had existed with his
father. He offered to assist the sultan to recover all that his father possessed,
provided he would send his sons to Constantinople. According to Phrantzes
(who from this time takes an active part in many of the incidents he relates),
the sultan was equally ready to be friendly, provided that no further aid
should be given to Mustafa,130 but no understanding could be arrived at.

The perjured Mustafa was probably a very poor creature. He soon lost the
confidence of his followers, and shut himself in Gallipoli, giving himself up
to pleasures and paying little attention to the measures which Murad was
taking against him. The latter passed over into Asia, made arrangements
with the Genoese at Phocaea to send him a fleet and a number of Italian and
French soldiers, and, when they arrived, crossed the Dardanelles from
Lampsacus to Gallipoli.131
The troops who remained faithful to the pretender attempted to prevent the
landing of Murad and his native and foreign troops, but failed. Thereupon
Mustafa fled. Murad took possession of Gallipoli and then followed the
pretender to Adrianople with all possible speed. Mustafa hastened towards
Wallachia on the approach of the sultan. A band of young soldiers followed
and captured him. He was brought before the sultan, condemned, and
hanged like an ordinary malefactor.
Then the sultan thought himself strong enough to take up the task which
Bajazed had undertaken when summoned by Timour. He decided at once to
attempt the capture of Constantinople. He laid siege to it in the second week
of June 1422 and ended in failure, as we have already seen, at the end of
August in the same year.
One at least of the reasons why the siege in 1422 had been abandoned was a
rising against Murad on behalf of his younger brother named Mustafa. One
of his two brothers, had been strangled by his orders, but Mustafa was
saved by Elias Pasha. Murad had ordered Elias to bring the boy to Brousa.
Elias, however, succeeded in having him recognised in that city and at
Nicaea as sultan. The rebellion, therefore, had assumed alarming
proportions. Murad with a trusty band of followers went to Nicaea, gained
access to the city, and the boy Mustafa, who was only six years old, was
bowstrung, possibly without the consent of his brother. Then Murad in great
haste crossed again to Europe,132 occupied Adrianople, and made it his
European capital.
We have now arrived at the period when many of those who were destined
to be great actors in the tragedy of the Moslem conquest of Constantinople
appear on the scene. The young emperor John, who had become co-emperor
with his father in 1420 and who now alone possessed power, owing to the
debility of his father, went, in 1423, to Hungary to seek help against the

common enemy. He left his brother Constantine, who was destined to be the
last Christian emperor of the city, in charge of the capital with the title of
Despot. A few months later, Phrantzes, the historian of the conquest, and
Lucas Notaras, afterwards made Grand Duke, who also took a prominent
part in the events of 1453, were sent by Constantine to Murad and arranged
terms of peace, subject to ratification by John, when he returned from
Hungary. The associated emperor came back by sea to his capital in
October and terms of peace were ratified by which the empire had to pay a
heavy tribute and to surrender many towns on the Black Sea.
In July 1425, Manuel died. He was seventy-seven years old and had reigned
thirty-four years—or, counting the eighteen years when he was co-emperor
with his father, fifty-two years. In his old age, he had become hopeless of
saving the empire, or even the capital. He counselled John to make the best
of the situation, to try to live on good terms with the sultan, and to be
content to remain the vassal of Murad.
The Turks had now largely recovered from the disorganization produced by
the invasion of Timour. Everywhere they were regaining territory, and their
internal divisions were disappearing. Those occupying the south and south-
west of Asia Minor were the first to recover from the blow of the Tartars. As
early as 1415, Manuel had to resist them in the Morea. They had defeated
the Venetians, had plundered Euboea and carried off thousands of Christian
captives. Others had invaded Dalmatia and the Adriatic coast. Their
numbers in Hungary and south Russia had been enormously increased by
the conquests of Timour, the Turks of south Russia fleeing before his host.
In 1419, the Hungarians had defeated an army of three hundred thousand
who entered the great plain north of the Danube. Most of the Turks in Asia
Minor, if not all willing subjects of Murad, still rendered him at the time of
the death of Manuel, in 1425, a nominal submission. The prince of
Caramania was, however, always a troublesome feudatory.
Murad’s reputation may be judged by the fact that in the year in which
Manuel died he made a triumphal progress. Having traversed Thrace, he
went to Brousa, to Pergamos, Magnesia, Smyrna, and Ephesus. While at the
last-mentioned city, homage was done to him by the ambassadors of the
emperor John, of Lazarus, king of Serbia, Dan, prince of the Wallachs, and
the signors of Mitylene, Chios, and Rhodes. He was, in fact, the almost
undisputed lord of Asia Minor and of all places in the Balkan peninsula,

with the exception of a few fiefs in Greece, and of Constantinople, with a
small territory behind it. With the exception of the Venetians and the
Hungarians, he was at peace with all the world. But the Venetians were still
holding their own. They had supported the insurrection in Caramania. Their
fleet had been sent to prevent Murad from crossing into Asia, and they were
masters of Salonica. But even in that city Murad had still a triumph to
achieve. Pressed by famine when the inhabitants were besieged by the
Turks, shortly before Murad’s siege of the capital, the population had
offered the city to the Venetians, who gladly accepted it and sent a fleet to
its relief. But the Turks had constantly claimed that they had been
improperly deprived of their intended prey, and the answer given by Murad
to proposals of peace made by the republic were: Surrender Salonica first.
In 1428, Murad determined to fight for it. While he went south-west into
Macedonia, the whole population, including the southern Serbs and
southern Bulgarians, submitting to his rule, one of his leading generals laid
siege to Salonica. Ducas says that the besiegers were a hundred to one, and
there can be no doubt that there was a fatal discrepancy in numbers. On the
arrival of Murad, the Janissaries were promised permission to pillage the
city. In a general assault, they captured it without much difficulty, and the
brutalities, the atrocities, the wanton and useless cruelties inflicted upon the
population made a profound impression upon Western Christians. Probably
they learned more of the nature of these cruelties, owing to the presence of
Italians and the comparative proximity of Salonica to Western Europe, than
ever before. But though women were violated, houses pillaged, churches
profaned, and seven thousand of the captives sold into slavery, Europe did
not yet understand that these were the ordinary incidents of Turkish
conquest. Upon the capture of the city, in 1430, Murad and the Venetians
made peace.133
Great efforts, however, were yet to be made to check the progress of Murad,
and if in the course of his triumphal progress to Ephesus he was under the
illusion that the European nations were content to allow Moslem invasion to
remain unchecked, he was soon undeceived. Hungary, Serbia, and Poland
now formed the great line of defence against a Turkish advance, and when,
in 1428, the first two states were invaded by the Turks, it became evident to
the West that Catholic as well as Orthodox nations would have to resist the
progress of Turkish arms. Before the nations attacked were ready, Murad
struck swiftly and heavily, and Sigismund, king of Hungary, not having

received the aid he expected from Ladislaus, king of Poland, suffered a
serious disaster on the Danube.
On receiving news of the Turkish advance, the pope
once more preached a new Crusade and called upon all Preparations to
resist Murad.
Christians to go to the aid of the Poles and Hungarians.
But messengers travelled slowly, and preparations were long. Four years
afterwards, in 1433, Murad again invaded Hungary, but was stoutly resisted
by Elizabeth, mother of the infant Ladislaus, and had to retire. In
withdrawing he attempted to annex Serbia, on the pretext that Bajazed
having married the sister of Stephen, the former sovereign, the crown
belonged to him as the heir of Ilderim. In 1435, he laid siege to Belgrade,
and put out the eyes of two sons of the kral, under the pretext that they had
attempted to escape to their father. The siege lasted six months, but the
attempt failed. The Serbians defended the city bravely. The Turkish army
suffered from malarial fever, and a relieving army under a Polish general
compelled them to raise the siege.
It is worthy of note that during the absence of the emperor at Ferrara and
Florence in order to treat of the Union of the Churches—an absence from
his capital of two years and two months (November 1437 to February 1440)
—Murad proposed to attack the city and was advised to do so by all his
council with the exception of Halil pasha,134 who pointed out that as John
had gone to confer with the representatives of the Christian powers on
questions of religion, at the request of the pope, they would feel bound to
come to his aid, if advantage were taken of his absence to attack the capital.
Halil’s advice was taken.135
Immediately on John’s return, he and other European Christian rulers began
to make more or less combined movements against Murad. The influence of
the pope was energetically used to make an alliance successful. The
question was no longer one merely of defending a schismatic though
Christian emperor, but of preserving the existence of great Catholic states.
Nor were the means for offering a strong resistance to Turkish advance
wanting. The crown of Hungary was worn by Ladislaus, the young king of
Poland, who was crowned in 1440. Almost immediately after his accession,
his army succeeded in defeating a Turkish detachment in Hungary. In the
same year Scanderbeg—that is, Alexander Bey—at the head of a large body
of Albanians, declared war on Murad. Though John on his return from

Florence sent an embassy to the sultan to protest that he was a loyal vassal,
he was only waiting for the ships and aid promised by the pope and by
Western princes in order to join in a combined attack. Although the ships
promised were long in arriving, the West was known to be full of anxiety,
and preparations were being hurried forward. On New Year’s Day 1442, the
pope again preached a Crusade and called on all Christian princes, and
especially on Ladislaus, king of Poland and Hungary, to help in the defence
of the three bulwarks of Christendom—Constantinople, Cyprus, and
Rhodes.136 Cardinal Julian was commissioned to advise Ladislaus, and the
king was ordered to render every aid possible to him as the legate of
Eugenius. George Brancovich of Serbia bound himself to aid the Hungarian
king and for this purpose to send twenty-five thousand men and large sums
of money, the produce of the Serbian mines. The combined army of
Hungarians and Serbs, with the co-operation also of Scanderbeg, was
placed in June under the command of John Corvinus Hunyadi, the
waywode of Transylvania. Hunyadi had already
distinguished himself as a brave and skilful leader Hunyadi leader of
Christian armies.
against the Turks. In a short campaign of less than half a
year, he had captured five strongholds north of the Danube, won as many
battles, and had returned laden with booty and trophies of victory. In 1442,
at the head of twelve thousand chosen cavalry, he chased the Turks out of
Serbia and defeated in succession several armies. Christians from France,
Italy, and Germany hastened to enrol themselves under his leadership. Not
even before the terrible disaster at Nicopolis in 1396 had so powerful an
army been gathered together to attack the common enemy as was now
collected under Hunyadi. It represented all the force that the pope and
Western Europe could muster, and the presence of Cardinal Julian gave it
the sanction of an international army representing Christendom. Seldom
have soldiers had more confidence in their leader, and apparently that
confidence was well bestowed.
Near Nisch the army of twelve thousand chosen cavalry
under Hunyadi was joined by that of Ladislaus, His victories.
consisting of twenty thousand men, with whom were the
king and the cardinal. The first and most important battle of the campaign
with the united army was fought between Sofia and Nisch, probably near
Slivnitza on November 3, 1443. The Turks were completely defeated, and
thirty thousand of them are said to have been left on the field. Four

thousand were made prisoners and nine standards captured. Thereupon the
Christian army advanced to Sofia, which it captured, and then pushed on
towards Philippopolis. At Isladi near Ikhtiman, the beginning of the pass
about midway between Sofia and Philippopolis, Hunyadi found that Murad
had arranged for making a stand. The natural strength of the pass, the
principal entrance to which is the Gate of Trajan, and the measures taken on
the high tableland at the head of this pass to make the frozen ground
impassable to cavalry, made Hunyadi hesitate. A second pass appeared
more practicable. On Christmas Eve, the Christian army forced a passage,
triumphing over the Turks and over the equally serious obstacles of rocks
and ice. Murad’s strong entrenchments were carried by brilliant and
persistent attacks, the Christians having to make their way through
snowdrifts, while the enemy rolled rocks and masses of ice from the
heights. The Turks were driven from their stronghold and the Christian
army followed them down the slopes of the Balkans into the plain. Once
more the Turks stood, and again they were beaten.137 Upon this, the
triumphant Christian army halted and waited for reinforcements before
further advance.
It was probably immediately after this campaign, or possibly during the halt
in Roumelia, that Murad hastened into Asia, where the prince of Caramania
had engaged in a conspiracy with others of the emirs of Anatolia to rise
against the sultan and to attack his territory simultaneously with the attacks
made by Christians in Europe. Konia and many other cities had been sacked
and desolation carried far and wide even among the Turks wherever they
had stood for Murad.138 The sultan suppressed the rising with his usual
cruelty, treating the Turks as he had done the Christians.
The successes of Hunyadi compelled Murad, and this for several reasons, to
sue for peace. He sent an embassy to the Hungarian, but as the latter was
awaiting new troops to pursue his campaign, he at first declined to treat, and
sent Murad’s delegates to Szegedin, then occupied by the king and the
cardinal. Finding, however, that his reinforcements did not arrive, Hunyadi
consented to retire and take part in the negotiations. The Turks on their side
agreed to terms. Murad was to give up to George Brankovitch all the places
in Serbia which he had captured, to allow Wallachia to be added to
Hungary, to leave Scanderbeg in possession of Albania and Macedonia, and
to give up the two lads whom he had blinded and the other hostages.

Ladislaus and Hunyadi on the return of the latter to Hungary made a
triumphal entry into Buda. Thirteen pashas, nine Turkish standards, and
four thousand prisoners bore testimony to the success of the campaign. The
mission from Murad had gone forward into Hungarian territory to complete
the formalities of peace which had been agreed to at Szegedin. A formal
truce for ten years was concluded in June 1444 between
Murad and the king of Poland and Hungary and his Peace solemnly
allies. The treaty was not, however, signed by Hunyadi, accepted.
who declared that he was only a subject. Each party swore that the army of
his nation would not cross the Danube to attack the other. Ladislaus took
the oath to this effect solemnly on the Gospels and Murad on the Koran.139
The treaty of June 1444 thus solemnly ratified was almost immediately
broken.140 To the eternal disgrace of Ladislaus and of
the cardinal legate, Julian Cesarini, who had Treaty violated by
Christians.
accompanied Hunyadi on the campaign just described,
and who figures as the evil genius of Ladislaus until his death, it was
broken by the Christians. History furnishes few examples of equally bad
faith.
All the evidence goes to prove that the Turks intended to respect the treaty.
The sultan, indeed, had taken the opportunity of abdicating and of formally
handing over the government to his son, Mahomet, a boy fourteen years
old, and had already retired to Brousa with the intention of going on to
Magnesia, to live in peace and quietness. Murad wanted rest. Even when he
was seen by La Brocquière, probably in 1436, he was ‘already very fat.’ A
short, thick-set man with a broad brown face, high cheekbones, a large and
hooked nose, he looked, says the same writer, like a Tartar—that is, like a
Mongol. Voluptuous in the worst Turkish sense of the word, he also loved
wine and banished a believer who dared to reprove him for drinking it. ‘He
is thought,’ adds La Brocquière, ‘not to love war, and this opinion seems to
me well founded.’141 Just about this time also he lost his eldest son,
Aladdin, to whom he was much attached, and was overcome with grief.
Hence his determination to get rid of the cares of government.
The opportunity to the Christians seemed tempting. News had arrived that a
powerful fleet of seventy ships had appeared in the Bosporus, ten triremes
having been sent by the pope and ten others at his request by Latin princes.

The duke of Burgundy and a French cardinal had arrived at Constantinople
to urge John to join in a Christian league. The cities of Thrace were
undefended by the Turks, and the fleets, it was believed, could prevent
Murad with his army from crossing into Europe. The only obstacle to
vigorous and successful action was the newly signed treaty.
Pretexts were found that Ladislaus had had no right to agree to a truce
without the consent of the pope, and that Murad had not executed his part of
the treaty. Ladislaus hesitated to break his oath, but Cardinal Julian urged
that his league with the Christian princes of the West was better worth
respecting than his oath to the miscreant. According to more than one
author, he maintained the proposition that no faith need be kept with
infidels.142 Finally, the cardinal called down upon his own head all
punishment due to the sin, if sin there were, in violating the oath. But in the
name of the pope, the vicar of God on earth, he formally released the king
from the obligations to which he had sworn.143
The action of Ladislaus was in reality not merely wicked and immoral, but
ill-advised and hasty. Even in the short interval between the conclusion of
peace and the declaration of war, the French, Italian, and German
volunteers had gone home. John was not ready to aid him. Phrantzes had
been sent to Ladislaus, to the cardinal, and even to the sultan, to temporise
and to prevent an outbreak of war before a coalition could be formed.
Hunyadi very reluctantly gave his consent to the violation of the truce, and
then only on condition that the declaration of war should be postponed until
September 1. George of Serbia not only refused to violate the engagement
into which he had solemnly entered with Murad but refused to permit
Scanderbeg to join Ladislaus. The whole business was ill-considered and
ill-managed, and the fault lies mainly with the cardinal.
When Murad’s dream of quiet days at Brousa was disturbed by the news
that the treaty solemnly accepted a few weeks earlier had been violated by
the faithless Christians, who in this case are justly characterised by the
Turks as infidels, he at once resumed the duties of a ruler and prepared to
go to the aid of his son, young Mahomet. With the aid of the Genoese he
crossed the Bosporus, probably at the extreme north end below the Giant’s
Mountain, where the entrance into the Black Sea was, and long continued to
be, known, from the number of temples which had existed there from pre-
Christian times, as the Sacred Mouth. The Italian and Greek fleets near the

capital were unable successfully to resist the passage, the ascent of the
Bosporus being almost impossible for sailing vessels during the
continuance of the prevailing north winds. From thence Murad hastened to
meet the army of Ladislaus.144
The place of rendezvous for the Christian armies was
Varna. Ladislaus took the field in the autumn, with only Battle of Varna,
Nov. 11, 1444.
ten thousand fighting men. He marched along the valley
of the Danube, and was joined by Drakul, prince of Wallachia, with five
thousand of his subjects. The total of the two armies probably never
exceeded twenty thousand men.
The Wallachian prince advised prudence and delay. He pointed out that
even a hunting party of the sultan contained as many men as were now
collected to oppose him. Hunyadi, however reluctant he had been to enter
on the campaign, seems to have thought that, once the armies had started,
their only hope of safety lay in expedition and in being able to obtain a
strong position for fighting. The discussion between the two brave leaders
led to a quarrel, in which Drakul drew his sword, but was immediately
overpowered and compelled to purchase safety by the promise of a further
reinforcement of four thousand men.145 Drakul then retired, and his place
was taken by his son. Many of the towns and villages passed through on
their march were held by Turks, but the Christian armies, in most cases,
easily overcame all opposition, and in their course plundered the schismatic
Bulgarians and their churches as if they had been enemies.
At Varna the army proposed to rest. Further advance, if desirable, was
difficult, on account of the illness of Ladislaus.146 Hunyadi took up a strong
position.
Varna is at the head of a bay. On the south side was situated, at a distance of
about four miles from the town, a village named Galata. Between the two
stretched a long line of marsh, which is the termination of a lagoon,
bounded on the south side by a steep range of hills.147 Between the end of
the marsh and the bay the Christian army encamped with the hill on its rear.
Hardly had it taken up its position when scouts brought the startling news
that Murad’s army was encamped at a distance of four thousand paces. The
night was bright and clear, and by ascending the hill they could see the
fires, and make even an estimate of the number of their enemies. Their

astonishment at the rapidity with which Murad had advanced added to their
alarm. They found that he was at the head of an army of at least sixty
thousand men—a hundred thousand men are said to have crossed into
Europe—while their own consisted only of eighteen or twenty thousand.
Guards were doubled, and a council at once held, to decide upon what was
to be done. Cardinal Julian’s advice was that they should entrench
themselves, make a barrier around them of their carts, and await attack.
Their machines, or guns, the alarming effect of which had already been seen
at Belgrade, would be of value for their defence. He also urged that
probably a fleet would soon come to their aid. The bishops with the army,
and a few others, agreed with him.
On the other hand, Hunyadi and the leader of the Wallachs declared the
proposal to be absurd. The great Hungarian urged that the enemy was only
to be conquered by daring and dash. Every sign of hesitation, especially at
the beginning of a campaign, was fatal. Suppose the Turks also chose to
play the waiting game, were the Christians ready to stand a siege? Their
only salvation lay in audacity. He characterised what was said about the
coming of a fleet as ridiculous. Ships would be of no more use in their
present position than cavalry at sea. Even if the sailors landed, what could
they do against horsemen?
The advice of the experienced soldier carried the day. The young king,
though he was suffering great bodily pain, supported Hunyadi, and declared
against delay.
Hardly was the council of war over before the scouts announced that the
Turks had settled the question for them and were preparing to attack.
Though the alarm was false, or at least premature, Hunyadi at once made all
arrangements for defence, and strengthened his position. His army had its
back to a hill; on one side was the marsh, and on the other he placed his
baggage and other wagons, so as to make a rampart. He blocked up the
passes through the marsh as well as he could with carts and chariots. He
placed four companies of Wallachians on the left, where the marshes
afforded protection, while the Hungarians formed the right wing, of which
he himself took command. This was the position of greatest danger, as
being least protected. Ladislaus was placed in the safest place in the centre,
surrounded by Hungarians and Poles. The great black standard of Hungary
floated over Hunyadi, while the flag of St. George marked the place near

the king occupied by the cardinal and the Wallachian chief. A reserve of
Wallachs was stationed to act wherever there was necessity. Murad,
however, did not begin his attack as soon as the Christians expected. He
took four days before he completed his preparations. He came down further
into the plain, and carefully formed his plan of battle. The invincible
Janissaries occupied the centre, with the sultan in their midst. They formed
what may be called a zariba. Around them was a ditch or trench. Behind
that stood the camels, while behind them was a breastwork formed of
shields fixed to the ground immediately in front of the Janissaries
surrounding the sultan. The Anatolian troops, some of whom were armed
with arquebuses, were on the Sultan’s left, and the European or Rumelian
troops on his right. In front of the sultan, hoisted on a long spear, was
placed the violated treaty.
The Turks sent forward six thousand of their cavalry, who occupied the hill
near the Christian army. Their purpose was to examine the ground, and to
take note of the numbers of the enemy, and of their position. Nevertheless,
they discharged showers of arrows against the Christians, their archers
being, as usual, their best troops.148 When Franco, one of the standard-
bearers of Ladislaus, prevented his men from attacking them, the Turks,
believing that the Christians were overawed by their superior numbers and
dared not leave their entrenchments, came down into the plain and began
the battle. Then Franco let his troops go, and with such effect that the
Turkish cavalry were soon in full retreat. Murad thereupon brought forward
the main body of his army, and the fight became general. Hunyadi sustained
successfully the shock of the Anatolian division, drove it back and put it to
rout. The remainder of the Christian army in the plain were attacked at the
same time, but the Turkish horsemen were hard pressed, and fled. One of
the bishops who, says Callimachus, was more skilful in ecclesiastical than
in military matters, seeing the Turks retreating, hastened after them with a
band of soldiers, and, arriving at the densely packed host, was soon
floundering in the marsh, and he and his men were of no further use in the
fight. But the Turks were pursuing their usual method of fighting; ‘for,’
remarked La Brocquière only half a dozen years before this battle, ‘it is in
their flight that they are most formidable, and it has been almost always
then that they have defeated the Christians.’149

Meantime, Hunyadi, who knew their tactics well, on returning from his
fight with the Asiatic division, strictly charged the young king not to allow
the troops around him to move, to remain with them, and to wait for his
return after attacking the European division, or at least until he knew the
issue of the fight, because, if successful, he would then have to deal with
the Janissaries.150 The Christians of the left wing and even around the
standard of Ladislaus were hard pressed. The cardinal and Franco, with the
son of Drakul, had to fall back to the barricade of wagons. A fierce struggle
took place near and among the wagons, and the Turks for a while gained
ground. Hunyadi hastened to the aid of the Christians, and his arrival
changed for a while the tide of battle. The Turks retreated from the wagons
and were driven back two thousand paces. Hunyadi and his men were
fighting splendidly and manifestly succeeding. In their attack, Caradja, the
leader of the European division of the Turks, was killed.
At this moment occurred an incident which in all probability influenced and
perhaps altogether changed the fortunes of the day. According to
Chalcondylas, some who were near the king and were jealous of the fame
of Hunyadi persuaded Ladislaus not to leave the glory of the day to the
Hungarian, as if he were the only leader. ‘His would be the sole renown;
ours the ignominy of having remained idle.’ Influenced by these taunts, the
king led his followers into the fight while Hunyadi was attacking Murad’s
right, and made direct for the sultan himself in the midst of his
entrenchments. Hunyadi, who during the day was always at the point of
greatest danger, on galloping back after the retreat of the Turks before the
troops forming the left wing, found that the brave but too impulsive young
king had left his post. Hunyadi immediately went to his aid. He found that
Ladislaus and his followers had broken through the entrenchments, the line
of camels and the shields, and were among the Janissaries. Struggling
desperately, he had laid low many of the enemy, but had become separated
from his own men.
His absence caused many of the Christians to believe that he had been
either captured or killed and, in consequence, many of them began to give
way. The fortune of the day was at this time doubtful. Many among the
Turks and Christians were in flight, neither party being able to judge how
the battle was going. The unconquerable Janissaries, however, remained
firm and resisted the young king’s attack vigorously. In the crisis of the

battle, according to the Turkish annals, Murad prayed, ‘O Christ, if Thou art
God, as Thy followers say, punish their perfidy.’151
Hunyadi was in despair. He saw his men deserting and that his army had
already been greatly reduced in numbers, but he managed to reach the king.
Ladislaus was still fighting when his general drew near, but his horse fell
forward with him, in consequence of a great blow from an axe. As the king
fell, says Callimachus, he was instantly, not merely pierced, but simply
buried beneath the weapons of the Janissaries. His head was taken to
Murad, who had it at once hoisted upon a lance.152
The issue of the battle had been at various stages doubtful. Two divisions of
the Turks had been beaten and fled, but both had rallied and returned. At
one moment the sultan himself contemplated flight, but was stopped by a
Turk who cursed him as a coward and prevented him from leaving the field.
Hunyadi attempted to recover the king’s body, but when he saw one after
another of the small number of Wallachs who were with him struck down,
he looked to his own safety and made good his escape. The battle was lost.
He, Julian, Franco, and as many as could, when darkness came on, retreated
across the hills into the great neighbouring forest.
The fortune of battle had so often changed that it was not until the
following day that the Turks recognised how great was the success they had
gained. The slaughter in the small army of the Christians had been heavy.
Many, too, had perished in the marsh or had been drowned in the lagoon.
Others, among whom was Julian, were afterwards caught in the forest. The
remnant of Huns and Wallachs had the utmost difficulty in making their
way across the Danube. On his way home, Hunyadi was taken prisoner by
his old enemy, Drakul, prince of Wallachia, but was set free when the
Hungarians threatened war, as they immediately did, unless he was at once
released.
The great effort from which the emperor and the West had hoped so much
had proved futile. The fleets had been powerless. The struggle was over
before aid was received from the emperor or the Western princes. The
remark of a careful traveller is justified, that the bad faith of the Christians
did much to intensify among the Moslems dislike and distrust, and led to
reprisals commonly justified by the Turkish teaching that ‘no faith is to be
kept with infidels.’153

The part which the emperor John played, if he took any, in this campaign, is
doubtful. Chalcondylas states that he had declared war against the sultan,
but he is the only contemporary who makes this assertion. Probably he was
ready, though unable, to aid the Western ships in preventing Murad from
crossing the Bosporus.
Murad had inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Christians, was weary of
fighting, and readily promised the emperor that, if he abandoned all
concerted action with the Western powers, he should not be attacked. He
once more abdicated the throne in favour of his son Mahomet, and
withdrew to his beautiful gardens and palace at Magnesia, hoping once
more for peace in retirement.154
The same year—always 1444—he was forced by the Janissaries, who were
already beginning to claim a share in the government, and who had marked
their discontent by burning a large part of Adrianople, to resume the
guidance of the state.
After reducing them to complete submission, he turned his attention to
Greece, which on the death of the previous emperor had been divided
between three of his seven sons.
Constantine, brother of John, and afterwards the last emperor, had shown
energy in the Morea. He was in possession of a large part of the
Peloponnesus, and had chased the Turks out of Boeotia, Pindus, and part of
Thessaly. This weakening of their hold compelled Murad to bestir himself.
In November, 1446, he started for Greece at the head of an army of sixty
thousand men. Constantine sent an ambassador, the historian Chalcondylas,
to propose terms, which were, however, rejected. Murad then advanced and
attacked Constantine, who held a strong position behind the famous rampart
of the Hexamilion, extending across the Isthmus of Corinth. Murad carried
it by assault, and killed all the garrison. His principal general then ravaged
the Morea, and carried off sixty thousand Christians into slavery. Patras was
captured and burnt, and Constantine, who had fought well but whose army
was much smaller than the Turkish, had to pay tribute and surrender all
territory that he had conquered from the Turks beyond the Isthmus of
Corinth. He was still, however, able to retain possession of a large part of
the Morea.

After the campaign in Greece, Murad marched
northwards to attack the Albanians, and endeavoured to Iskender Bey and
the Albanians.
capture Kroya,155 the capital of the country. But it was
held by the Albanian leader, George Castriotes, whom we have already met
under the name of Iskender (or Alexander) Bey, a man who was a military
genius, and who in some respects recalls the adventures and characteristics
of Garibaldi. But he was unscrupulous as well as energetic. Devoting
himself like a new Hannibal to the salvation of his country, he held and
continued to hold absolute, but willingly rendered, sway during twenty-five
years over the Albanian mountaineers. Christian by birth, but given over
with his brothers to the Turks as hostages, and forcibly converted to
Mahometanism, he had become a favourite of Murad for his handsome
appearance, his strength of body, and his courage. He had gained power
over his countrymen in the first instance by a ruse as bold as it was
relentless. Scimitar in hand, he offered as an alternative to the reis-effendi,
or commander-in-chief, either immediate death or the affixing of his
signature and seal to a document ordering the governor of Kroya to hand
over to him the fortress and the adjacent country. Having obtained the
document in due form, he then killed the reis-effendi. At this time Iskender
Bey was only nineteen years old. Gathering a small band of Albanians
about him, he hastened across the peninsula and obtained possession of
Kroya by a stratagem even more desperate and dangerous than that by
which he had obtained the order for his appointment as Turkish governor.
Leaving his followers outside the city and in hiding, he presented his
credentials and obtained the keys of the fortress. During the night, he
personally admitted his followers, and the Turkish garrison were murdered
while they slept. Then he rapidly made his preparations for defence against
the attack of Murad which he knew would follow. It is sufficient for our
purpose to say that he was successful, and that at the approach of the winter
of 1447–8, Murad’s attempt to recapture Kroya entirely failed, and the great
sultan withdrew to Adrianople.
Meantime the Christians north of the Danube were preparing to make a
greater effort than ever to strike at the power of the sultan. The new pope,
Nicholas the Fifth, urged the duty of aiding the Hungarians and the Poles as
vigorously as his predecessor. But his appeals to other states were of little
avail. Hunyadi, notwithstanding the defeat at Varna, was named lieutenant-
general of the kingdom almost immediately on his return, and at once set

himself to reconstruct an army. In less than four years he possessed the
best-disciplined host which Hungary had yet seen. But it was far too small
for the purpose on hand. Among its twenty-four thousand men were two
thousand German arquebusers and eight thousand Wallachians. With this
force Hunyadi crossed the Danube near Turn-severin and invaded Serbia,
because its ruler, whose sister was married to the sultan, refused to break
the engagement with Murad.
When the sultan, who was preparing for another attempt to defeat Iskender
Bey and the Albanians, heard that George of Serbia was on the point of
being attacked, he at once made all haste to go to his assistance. Hunyadi
encamped near Cossovo, on the same Plain of Blackbirds where, in 1389,
Murad the First had been assassinated after his victory. The Turkish army,
probably numbering a hundred and fifty thousand men,156 occupied three
days in crossing the Sitnitza, a small river which runs through the plain into
the Vardar. Hunyadi, for some reason which is not evident, left his
entrenchment and crossed the stream, apparently with no other object than
of forcing on the fight. Why he should have done so, since he was hourly
expecting the arrival of a detachment of Albanians under Iskender Bey, it is
impossible to understand.
The battle commenced on October 18, 1448. The Turks
were drawn up in the same order as at Varna, the Second battle of
Cossovo-pol, 1448.
Janissaries in the centre surrounded by a trench, behind
which were ranged the camels, and behind them again a belt of shields or
bucklers fixed in the ground. To the right of the Janissaries was the
European, and to the left the Asiatic, division of Murad’s army. On the other
side, the centre of the Christian army was occupied by the German and
Bohemian arquebusers and some of the best troops of Transylvania. The
right wing was formed of Hungarians with a few Sicilian auxiliaries, while
the Wallachs were on the left.
The first day’s fight was not general. But at noon on the second, the whole
lines on both sides were engaged, and continued till sunset, when, in spite
of the superiority in numbers on the Turkish side, no advantage had been
gained. Hunyadi, indeed, believed that during the night his enemy intended
to break up his camp and commence a retreat. For this reason, he
determined upon a night attack—one of the measures, as General Skobeleff
testified after fighting in Central Asia under somewhat similar

circumstances, in which the best-disciplined army almost necessarily wins.
All the valour of the Hungarian army was powerless to break through the
line of the Janissaries, and the attack consequently failed. On the morning
of the third day, the fight was again renewed, and victory appeared
doubtful. But the Wallachs turned traitors, and in the midst of the fight, their
leader having obtained terms from Murad, passed over to the Turkish side.
The army of Hunyadi was now attacked in front and rear, but contrived to
reach its entrenchments. Judging that its condition was hopeless, Hunyadi
made his escape in the evening, leaving the Germans and Bohemians to
hold the central position of his encampment. This they did with magnificent
courage, but the battle was already lost. Out of the army of twenty-four
thousand, seventeen thousand men, including the flower of the Hungarian
nobility, are said to have been left dead on the field.157 But the victory had
been dearly bought by Murad. During the three days’ fight, forty thousand
Turks had fallen.158
The Christians had lost the battle through the rash courage and confidence
of their leader. Hunyadi had refused to wait for Iskender Bey and his
Albanians, had abandoned a strong position in order to attack an enemy
largely superior in numbers, and his desertion of the best of his auxiliaries is
inexplicable or unjustifiable. The defeat at Cossovo-pol, following that at
Varna, made men forget for a time the series of brilliant victories which the
great Hungarian had gained over the Turks in Transylvania and elsewhere.
But in the glorious defence of Belgrade against Mahomet after the capture
of Constantinople, Hunyadi recovered greater reputation than ever, and the
West recognised in that city the first bulwark of Christendom, and in its
defender the greatest soldier of the age.159
The effect in Hungary and Constantinople of these victories of Murad was
appalling. The sultan and his successors for many years had nothing to fear
from the enemy north of the Danube.
The great combined efforts of the West to break the
Ottoman power and, incidentally, to save Constantinople Reasons for failure
of Western attempts
had failed disastrously. Nor are the reasons for such against Turks.
failure difficult to understand. They are mainly two:
underestimating the power of the enemy, and dividing their own forces.
First and above all, neither the pope nor the statesmen of Europe had

realised the enormous number of fighting men which the Turk could bring
into the field. They knew that the empire of Constantinople had been
dismembered by Turkish armies, but they attributed this loss to secondary
causes, and do not appear to have realised that Turkish armies beaten again
and again constantly reappeared. The empire’s loss, in their opinion, was
due to the incapacity of some of its emperors, to civil war, to the pressure of
Serbia and Bulgaria, and to the judgment of Heaven upon the Greeks for
having refused to come within the one Christian fold, and to acknowledge
the one shepherd. The Turks were the instruments of divine justice to
punish schismatics, but, having done their work against the empire, they
would, now that they ventured to attack Catholic states, no longer be
permitted to make further encroachments.
The failure of the men of the West was largely due to the fact that they
despised the common enemy. They were under the curious delusion that the
Turk was not a fighting man; that, though he had been successful in beating
Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians, he was no warrior, and that he had thus far
succeeded because he had never encountered European soldiers. This
delusion lasted for at least two centuries after the capture of the city. Almost
every Western writer who visited Constantinople spoke of the defeat of the
Turks as a task well within the power of a European state. That such a
blunder influenced the men of the West before the capture of the city, may
be illustrated by the statement of two contemporaries. In an oration by
Aeneas Sylvius, who afterwards became Pope Pius the Second, delivered at
Rome in 1452, before Pope Nicholas, King Ladislaus, and a number of
cardinals, the orator appealed to the knowledge of his audience to recognise
that the Turks were ‘unwarlike, weak, effeminate, neither martial in spirit
nor in counsel; what they have taken may be recovered without
difficulty.’160 A like testimony is given by La Brocquière in 1438, but with
much more caution, since he had been through Asia Minor and had seen the
Turks. Nevertheless, this Western traveller states that, though he would not
depreciate them, he is ‘convinced that it would be no difficult matter for
troops well mounted and well led to defeat them,’ and, in regard to himself,
he adds, ‘I declare that with one half of their numbers I should never
hesitate to attack them.’161 He fully realised, as he explains again and again,
that their victories had been gained by their enormous superiority in
numbers, but though he was very far from despising them as soldiers, he

regards them individually as greatly inferior to the soldiers of Western
states. His estimate of the inferiority of the Turk was shared by his
countrymen and Western statesmen generally,162 but they did not recognise
to the same extent as he did how great and ever increasing was the host
which had to be fought. Nor did they recognise, as did he, the wonderful
mobility of the Turkish army. It was the same error of forgetting their
mobility which brought disaster upon Hunyadi at Varna and at Cossovo-pol.
While the first mistake was in underrating the might of the enemy in regard
to numbers, warlike spirit, and mobility, the Western powers blundered also
in dividing their forces. The sermon before the pope already referred to, on
New Year’s Day 1452, called for international concerted action to defend
Constantinople, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The mistake was in trying to do too
much. On many occasions, as we have seen, the forces sent against the Turk
were divided, and an army which might have been sufficiently strong to
strike an effective blow against one of the Turkish divisions was defeated in
detail when split into two or three, to be sent against Saracens, or to the aid
of the military knights, as well as against the Turks.
The one chance of safety for Constantinople now lay in the inhabitants
themselves, with such forces as, at the instigation of the pope, should be
sent to the aid of the emperor. But to add to the chagrin and difficulties of
the aged John at seeing the Christian armies defeated, he had once more
formally to promise the sultan that he would not assist any of the enterprises
set on foot from the West. Nor did the influence of the disasters upon the
emperor and people of Constantinople stop here. A formidable party in the
city, headed by the bishop of Ephesus, which was opposed to the Union,
and which strongly resented the proceedings at the Council of Florence,
was greatly strengthened. Its members pointed to the victories of Murad,
and asked, with scorn, what had been gained by the abandonment of their
faith. They knew that they had the support of Murad in their opposition to
the Unionists, and the fact that they were not forcibly suppressed by the
Court party during the reign of John’s successor can probably be best
accounted for on the ground that any strong steps taken against their
members would be represented to the sultan as a violation of the
engagement to have no further intrigues with the West.
The disaster of Cossovo-pol hastened the death of John, which took place
on the last day of October 1448, within a few days after he had heard the

news.163
Death of John,
In February 1451, his great contemporary, Murad, died October 1448.
at Adrianople. He had been a successful warrior, and,
with the exception of his failure to capture Belgrade, had Of Murad, February
succeeded in most of his enterprises. Gibbon is perhaps 1451.
justified in speaking of him as a philosopher in matters
of religion, but he was relentless in imposing his creed. Cantemir, his
eulogist, relates that in Epirus he converted all the churches into mosques,
and ordered every male Epirot, under penalty of death, to be forcibly made
a Mahometan. He deserves the praises of Turkish writers. Chalcondylas and
Ducas recognise in him certain good traits of character. The first says that
he was a just and equitable man, and Ducas gives him credit not undeserved
for having scrupulously respected the treaties which he made with
Mahometans or Christians. His son Mahomet, who now becomes the
second sultan of that name in the Ottoman dynasty, was at Magnesia when
he heard the news of his father’s death.

CHAPTER VIII
CAUSES LEADING TO DECAY OF EMPIRE: NOT DUE TO DEMORALISATION OF COURT;
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CAUSES; LATIN CONQUEST AND FORM OF
GOVERNMENT HAD PRODUCED INTERNAL DISSENSIONS AND CHECKED
ASSIMILATION OF HOSTILE RACES; METHOD OF TURKISH CONQUEST AND ITS
FATAL CONSEQUENCES; RAVAGES OF BLACK DEATH; POPULATION OF CAPITAL IN
1453; ITS COMMERCE; RELATIONS OF PEOPLE WITH GOVERNMENT;
RESEMBLANCE TO RUSSIA; DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING IDEA OF DOMESTIC LIFE.

As the later Roman empire is now drawing to a close, it is worth while
endeavouring to realise what were the immediate causes of its weakness,
and what was its actual condition immediately preceding the final siege.
The empire to which Constantine Dragases succeeded on the death of his
brother John was over the city and a strip of land behind it which may be
estimated roughly at about a hundred miles in length from its walls towards
the north and west. To this and about half of the Peloponnesus still held by
his brother had the realm of Theodosius been reduced.
It has often been stated that the fall of the Empire was
due to, or at least largely contributed to by, the How far was
population
demoralisation of the Court, the nobles, and the citizens. demoralised?
This view had its origin largely, though not exclusively,
in the religious animosity of Latin Churchmen. The Court has been
described as given over to gorgeous displays, to meaningless ceremonies, to
luxury, and to effeminacy; the nobles as partakers in such displays and
themselves effeminate; the citizens as idle, delighting in spectacular shows,
and asking only to be amused. I know of no evidence which supports any
such conclusion and believe that, on the contrary, such evidence as exists is
against it. The population of the city, nobles and people alike, were
religious—given over to superstition, according to our modern view—but
they were not luxurious or mere pleasure-seekers. Their superstition
corresponded with that of their fellow Christians in the West. ‘I believe,’
says La Brocquière, who visited Constantinople in 1433, ‘that God has
spared the city more for the holy relics it contains than anything else.’164
But the same writer adds the qualification that ‘the Greeks have not the like
devotion that we have for relics.’ Nor is this religious or superstitious spirit

the necessary companion of either luxury or effeminacy. The effeminacy
and the luxury associated with Constantinople, in so far as they existed,
belong to the period before the Latin conquest. When any displays are
recorded after the recapture of the city—as, for example, at coronations—
they are merely the traditional ceremonies which survived as such
observances do in the coronation of our own sovereigns or at great
historical courts like the Austrian and papal. The trials and sufferings, the
long struggles against external and internal enemies which had gone on for
nearly two centuries, had divested nobles and people alike of any love for
idle ceremonies or mere diversions. The miracle plays which the people
crowded to see in Hagia Sophia do not show that they had degenerated. The
writer just quoted saw a representation of the three youths cast by
Nebuchadnezzar into the burning fiery furnace,165 which, while it may have
served to increase the congregation’s trust in God, can hardly be regarded as
a frivolous amusement.
The hippodrome was no longer used by the people for the shows which had
pleased their ancestors at an early period. La Brocquière, indeed, records
that he saw the emperor’s brother and a score of nobles amusing themselves
on horseback within its walls, but they were training themselves for war by
practising archery, and endeavouring to make themselves masters in it.166
He records also that he was present at a tournament which the emperor and
empress witnessed. Neither in his account nor in that of any contemporary
with which I am acquainted is there anything to show that the diminished
population of the city were other than an industrious and sober people, to
whom a question of religious dogma was of greater interest than any other,
except perhaps those relating to the progress of their great enemy.
But though the demoralisation of the Court and people in the usual sense of
the term ought not to be counted among the reasons for the decay of the
empire, the attitude of mind in the Court, in the Church, and among the
masses is indicative of decay. In any country, but especially in one under
absolute monarchy, the poorer classes of the people know and care little
about politics. Among them there was under the empire a general
indifference as to what was likely to happen. They were heavily taxed, were
called upon to send their sons to the wars, and if there were to be a change
of masters, it did not much matter. Their attitude was, indeed, not unlike
that which exists to-day among the poorer Turks. A change of rulers would

be welcomed by many, perhaps by most, though at the last moment
religious sentiment might and probably would come in to rouse opposition.
Present evils are so burdensome that the hope of a change of rulers is
constantly expressed.
There was also among the subjects of the empire, as among those of the
sultan, an underlying sentiment that the inevitable was happening. Ἀνάγκη
ἦν was the belief among the Greeks almost as firmly as the Turks of to-day
hold that it is their kismet to be driven out of Europe.
The poorer classes may be disregarded when we are considering the public
opinion of the empire. Such opinions as existed among them were a
reflection of those of the nobles, and especially of the Churchmen. Both
clergy and nobles were intensely conservative, and had become by habit
averse to any change. The energy had gone out of the Church. There was no
fervour of belief. The missionary spirit was absolutely extinct. No instances
are recorded of abandonment of self-interest for the common good. The
great body of idle monks contrast unfavourably with those of the West of
the same period. The patriotism of the priest Hilarion and his small
following had not been imitated. A dead level of contented mediocrity
characterised the clergy. An enthusiasm for Christianity, if it could not have
saved the empire, might at least have prolonged its existence. But
enthusiasm was dead. It would be a relief to read of wild enthusiasts leading
crowds into hopelessly impracticable schemes, for such things would at
least indicate life. Nothing of the kind exists. The life of the Church was
suspended, and it could only arouse itself to resist change. Even in the
greatest religious question of the two centuries preceding 1453, that of the
Union of the Churches, the Orthodox Church had to be stimulated into
action by the emperors and nobles.
The nobles themselves were, however, hardly less conservative than the
Churchmen. A lack of energy, an absence of vital force, is the distinguishing
characteristic of both. Until the Latin conquest, their conservatism was that
of a civilised and wealthy class, who had enjoyed for centuries the
advantages of peace and of security. In the two centuries after the recovery
of the city the nobles had regained much of their old influence, and up to
the final conquest felt, in Constantinople, much of the same security as
before and the contentment of acquired or inherited wealth. Commerce had
largely passed into the hands of the Genoese and Venetians, but the loss

hardly affected the nobles. To all appearance they remained as contented as
ever. Even in presence of the enemy which had constantly been lessening
their incomes and drawing an iron circle around the empire, they appear to
have been hardly conscious of the life and death character of the struggle.
So long as the emperor and nobles could employ their own peasantry or
could hire auxiliaries, they had resisted the Turks with a certain amount of
success. From Dalmatia to Matapan, from Durazzo to the capital, as well as
in Asia Minor, the progress of the enemy had been contested. The Greek
armies were destroyed by overwhelming numbers rather than defeated by
superior courage. When the capital was cut off from its supply of soldiers
from the provinces, it was in grievous straits, and to this condition it had
come on the accession of the last Constantine.
Priests and nobles appear to have gradually drifted into the belief that
resistance was hopeless. Their acquiescence in what they believed to be the
inevitable suggests the mediocrity of their leaders. Their merits and faults
were alike negative. They were not given over to vice and profligacy; they
were not cruel tyrants; they were not wanting in courage; but they were
without ability or energy, incapable of initiating or executing any successful
plan of campaign against the enemy or of making arrangements for securing
efficient foreign aid.
It is, of course, easy to suggest after the event that the empire might have
been saved, but it is difficult to believe that among the governing class there
was not a lack of vitality which contributed to its fall. Looking across the
centuries, we may, perhaps, conclude that the empire followed the natural
course of evolution under despotic rule: struggle for existence, success,
wealth, contentment to the point of stagnation, a general slackness and loss
of energy and a reluctance to struggle of any kind. But whether such
conclusion be justified or not, it cannot be doubted that weariness of strife
and general enervation characterised all classes of society. In remembering
this, it may be said that the morale of the empire was destroyed and its
population demoralised.167
Three causes mainly contributed to the diminution and ultimate downfall of
the empire: first, the establishment of the Latin empire,
with which must be associated (a) the internal Causes of decay of
dissensions among the Greeks themselves, and (b) the empire.

increased difficulty in assimilating the races occupying the Balkan
peninsula; second, the attacks, literally from every side, by hordes of
Turkish invaders, who usually, beginning by raids upon their cattle, ended
by expelling or exterminating the conquered people and taking possession
of their lands; and, third, the depopulation of the Balkan peninsula and of
the cities in Asia Minor held by the empire caused by Black Death or
Plague.
The history of the empire subsequent to the Latin
occupation bears evidence of the weakness which that Latin conquest.
occupation had caused. The whole framework of
government administration had been broken up. The imperial system was in
ruins. The ancient forms of administrative organisation were restored, but
there never existed sufficient strength in the capital to put new life into
them, and the old traditional spirit of municipal life and to a certain limited
extent of self-government had during two generations of hostile rule and the
subsequent series of attempts at the restoration of Latin rule been forgotten.
The empire was, indeed, kept together by obedience to law, but it was rather
a traditional obedience than one due to a strong administration. When a man
defied law it was public opinion which he had to face rather than dread of
the emperor. The Latin conquest and the growth of neighbouring states
consequent upon such conquest made it impossible for the emperors ever to
obtain a strong and sufficient hold over the territories which they
recaptured.
The divisions among the Greeks themselves, especially
those regarding the occupancy of the throne, led to civil Internal divisions.
wars and gave the Turks opportunities of entering the
country and occupying it. They were due in the first place to the change in
the succession when Michael the Eighth seized the imperial throne, and
were therefore also directly caused or contributed to by the Latin conquest.
Though the rules of succession had never been so strictly observed as in the
West, his usurpation weakened the office of emperor and manifestly
increased the power—not of a regularly constituted body like our House of
Lords, or the American Senate, but—of an irresponsible body of nobles. In
the next place, the dissensions may be attributed to the existing and
traditional form of government.

It is a commonplace to say that uncontrolled autocracy is the best
government if a succession of able men can be assured. The difficulty is
that, if the ordinary rules of succession are observed, the successor of a
Justinian or a Julius Caesar may be a fool. In Constantinople effective
control over the appointment of an emperor was wanting. The senate or
council of an absolute ruler, be he called emperor or sultan, is usually weak
in proportion to the strength of the ruler, and if, in the customary order of
succession, the heir to the throne is unsuited to the office, the ring of
creatures, by whatever name it is called, which his predecessor has gathered
round him is pretty sure to support the heir, irrespective of his merit or
ability. Others acquiesce for the sake of peace, or are drawn to support a
pretender. The nobles usually gained strength during the reign of a weak
prince, and in the support they gave to rival claimants the empire bled.
Democratic government in the modern sense of the term had not yet been
born. Sir Henry Maine claims that the modern doctrines of popular
government based on democracy are essentially of late English origin. It is
certain that nothing like them had existed in the Roman empire, either in the
East or West. Any traditions of self-government which the Greeks had
retained—a form of self-government which was never upon modern
democratic lines—had been entirely overshadowed, not merely by the
autocratic government of the emperors, but by that of the Church. The
government was that of an absolute sovereign moderated by irresponsible
nobles.
Without, however, seeking further to discover the reasons for the internal
divisions and the consequent civil wars, their existence and baneful effects
are the most manifest, though not the most important, of the evils which
weakened the Empire.
The second fact associated with the mischief caused by
the Latin conquest, which contributed to the decay of the Divisions of race in
Balkan peninsula.
empire, is that such conquest prevented the assimilation
of the various peoples occupying the Balkan peninsula. Even at the best
period of the empire that population had always been strangely diversified.
Albanians and Slavs had been there from very early times, side by side with
Greeks and the race known as Wallachs, each of the four races having a
distinct language.

The influence of good administration and the strong hand of the central
power kept these races in order. They had the usual tendency to hostility
one towards the other, but until the Latin conquest good government and
the Greek language, that of the Church and administration, were always a
force tending to break down the boundaries between them and to
incorporate isolated sections in the Greek-speaking community. But at all
times their mutual jealousies constituted, as indeed they do now, the most
difficult factor in the problem of the government of the Balkan
peninsula.168
This difficulty had been enormously increased by the Latin conquest. The
populations were harassed everywhere by native rebellions and by foreign
invaders: Greek pretenders to the empire who refused to recognise the
crusading kings: crusading knights who settled in Greece after the
expulsion of Baldwin: adventurous soldiers of fortune from Italy:
freebooters from the Catalan Grand Company: Venetians and Turks: and
lastly by dissensions between the emperors themselves, the most hurtful of
which were between Cantacuzenus and John.
The various invaders found their task easier from the hostility which existed
between the various groups. Racial animosity was fostered by inducements
held out by the newcomers to one group to join them in attacking another.
These troubles destroyed the work of assimilation which had been going on
for centuries. Communities now of Greeks, now of Slavs, were driven from
the localities they had occupied for long periods, and the constant
movement left the Balkan peninsula with its various races intermingled in
strange confusion. To adopt chemical nomenclature, hundreds of villages
were mechanically mixed with those of other races but never chemically
combined. There were Slav villages in the neighbourhood of Athens itself,
Albanians in Macedonia: Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians largely replaced
the Latin race of that province, which in the times of the Crusades was
known as Wallachia Proper. Language and race had taken the place of
subjection to the empire as a bond of union, and as the Turks gradually
pressed forward their advances into the interior, literally from every side,
they found the conquest of these isolated and generally hostile communities
greatly facilitated by the disunion existing among them.
Throughout Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus, and Greece the boundaries were
changed oftener even than allegiance, and though the Greek element

predominated in the south and along the coast as far as Salonica and around
the coasts of the Aegean and the Marmora, other communities were
interspersed among them in great numbers.
The subjugation of the Macedonian Serbs and the South Bulgarians can be
roughly stated as having been accomplished at the battle on the Maritza.
The defeat of the Serbians and Bulgarians was a harder task. But Serbia and
Bulgaria were the two portions of the Balkan peninsula where the people
were almost all of the same race and could organise themselves for defence.
No such organisation was possible south of their territory.
The second cause which had contributed to the
diminution of the empire and of its population was the System of Turkish
conquests.
system of Turkish conquests. Large numbers of the
Christian population were killed; larger numbers were driven away to
wander houseless and homeless and either to die of starvation or find their
way into the towns.
Conquest of a territory or capture of a city, forcible expulsion of the
inhabitants or massacre of most of them and occupation of the captured
places followed each other with wearisome regularity. The military
occupation was that of nomads who replaced agriculturists. Everywhere the
cattle of the Christians were raided. Arable lands became the wasteful
sheep-walks of nomad Turks.169
Lastly, the depopulation caused by the terrible diseases
which visited Europe in the century preceding the Black Death.
Moslem conquest aided greatly in destroying the empire.
The prevalence of Black Death or Plague killed in the Balkan peninsula and
especially in the towns hundreds of thousands and possibly millions of the
population. In 1347 this scourge, probably the most deadly form of
epidemic that has ever afflicted humanity, made its appearance in Eastern
Europe. The cities of the empire contained large populations crowded
together, and their normal population was increased by many fugitives.
These crowded cities, with their defective sanitary arrangements and
poverty-stricken inhabitants, offered a favourable soil for a rich harvest of
death. The disease had followed the coasts from the Black Sea, where, says
Cantacuzenus, it had carried off nearly all the inhabitants. At
Constantinople it raged during two years, one of its first victims being the

eldest son of Cantacuzenus himself.170 Rich as well as poor succumbed to
it. What proportion of the inhabitants of the city died it is impossible to say,
but, judging by what is known of its effect elsewhere, we should probably
not be wrong in suggesting that half the people perished. But its ravages
were not confined to the towns, and from one end of the Balkan peninsula
to the other it swept the country in repeated visitations and probably carried
off nearly the same proportion of inhabitants.171 Cantacuzenus, in a vivid
description of the disease, adds that the saddest feature about it was the
feeling of hopelessness and despair which it left behind.
The first visitation of the disease continued during two years in the capital.
In 1348 it spread throughout the empire. We have seen that in 1352 the
victorious Venetian and Spanish fleets dared not venture to attack Galata for
fear that their crews would be attacked by the malady. It raged in Asia
Minor as fiercely as in Europe. Trebizond was ruined. The Turks
themselves suffered severely. Between its entrance into Europe and 1364
the Morea had three visitations, and what remained of the Greek population
became panic-stricken. Further north, at Yanina its ravages were equally
terrible. In 1368 so many men died that Thomas, governor of the city,
forced their widows to marry Serbians whom he had induced or compelled
to enter the city for that purpose. A further outbreak seven years later took
place in the same city, and among its victims was Thomas’s own daughter.
During the same period Arta, which adjoins the ancient Cyzicus, suffered
severely. It is useless for our purpose to inquire whether Black Death and
Plague were identical, but one or the other continued to depopulate town
and country. We have seen it at Ferrara in 1438, but in the interval since it
first made its appearance it had visited the capital on seven different
occasions, the latest being in 1431 when the whole country from
Constantinople to Cape Matapan suffered severely.172
It may safely be assumed that the Turks, who lived in the open air, and in
the country rather than in towns, suffered less than the Christians. Though
they are reported to have lost severely, the process of depopulation scarcely
told against them. The places of those who died were taken by the ever-
crowding press of immigrants flocking westward. The successors of the
Greeks who perished were not Christians but Turks. In other words, while
the Christians died out of the land, there were always at hand Turkish
nomads to take their place.

It is when contemplating the devastation produced by successive attacks of
disease, one of which was sufficient to kill half the population of England,
when remembering the weakening of the empire by the Latin occupation
and the subsequent attempts to recapture the city, and when recognizing that
the empire was the bulwark against a great westward movement of the
central Asiatic races which forced forward the Turk to find new pastures in
Christian lands, that we can understand how the diminution of the Empire
and of its population and its ultimate downfall came to be inevitable.
Those who have travelled most in the Balkan peninsula
and in Asia Minor recognise most completely how Desolation on
accession of last
densely populated and flourishing these countries once empire and now.
were, and how completely they have become a
desolation. Everywhere the traveller is even now surprised at the sight of
deserted and fertile plains and of ruined cities, of some of which the very
names have been forgotten. From Baalbek to Nicomedia the ancient roads
pass through or near places whose names recall populous and civilised
towns which are but the ghastly shadows of their former prosperity.
Ephesus, which when visited by Sir John Maundeville in 1322, after it had
been captured by the Turks, was still ‘a fair city,’ is now absolutely
deserted. Nicaea, the city which has given its name to the Creed of
Christendom, was also at the time of the Turkish occupation populous and
flourishing. It now contains a hundred miserable houses within its still
standing walls. Hierapolis and Laodicea are heaps of uninhabited ruins. A
scholarly English traveller remarks that his search has been in vain for the
sites of many cities once well known, and that he met ruins of many cities
which he was unable to identify.173 The same story of depopulation and of
destruction was and is told by the condition of the Balkan peninsula. The
observant traveller La Brocquière, who made his journey through Asia
Minor to Constantinople and thence to Budapest, noted that desolation was
everywhere. In the district between the capital and Adrianople he adds that
‘the country is completely ruined, has but poor villages, and, though good
and well watered, is thinly peopled.’ He found Chorlou ‘destroyed by the
Turks.’ He visited Trajanopolis and describes it as once ‘very large, but now
nothing is seen but ruins with a few inhabitants.’ He found Vyra, to whose
church three hundred canons had been formerly attached, a poor place with
the choir of the church only remaining and used as a Turkish mosque.174 All

contemporaries bear witness to the depopulation and ruin of the country.
From pestilence and the results of the Latin conquest it might have
recovered, but when to these disasters was added that of conquest by
successive hordes of barbarians whose work was always destructive, its ruin
was complete.

It is impossible to arrive at an accurate estimate of the Population of
population of the city on the accession of the last Constantinople
accession of
on

Constantine. La Brocquière, in 1433, describes Constantine.
Constantinople as formed of separate parts and
containing open spaces of a greater extent than those built on.175 This is one
of many intimations that the population had largely decreased.176 Some of
the nobles as well as the common people had left the city as soon as they
saw that a siege was probable.177 To make an estimate we must anticipate
our narrative of the siege. Critobulus makes Mahomet appeal to the
knowledge of his hearers in proposing to besiege the city when he states
that the greater number of the inhabitants have abandoned it; that it is now
only a city in name and contains tilled lands, trees, vineyards, and
enclosures as well as ruined and destroyed houses, as they have all seen for
themselves. As his hearers could see as well as he whether this statement
was correct, there can be little doubt of its accuracy. He further declared
that there were few men in the city and that these for the most part were
without arms and unused to fighting, and that he had learned from deserters
that there were only two or three men to defend each tower, so that each
man had to guard three or four crenellations. Tetaldi states that there were in
the city from twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand men178 and six to
seven thousand combatants and not more.179 The actual census taken at the
request of the emperor and recorded by Phrantzes gives under five thousand
fighting men, exclusive of foreigners. Assuming the statement of the French
soldier and eye-witness Tetaldi to be substantially correct, there would
apparently be something like eighteen thousand monks and old men
incapable of bearing arms. The only other indications which assist in
forming an estimate of the population are furnished by the number of
prisoners. These are probably exaggerated. Archbishop Leonard estimates
them at above sixty thousand. Critobulus gives the number of slaves of all
kinds, men, women, and children, as fifty thousand citizens and five

hundred soldiers, estimating that during the siege and capture four thousand
were killed.180 Probably all captives are included as having been reduced to
slavery. The complete desolation of the city and the strenuous efforts made
by the sultan to repeople it after the capture raise a strong presumption in
favour of the existence of a comparatively small population at the time of
the siege. Gibbon judged that ‘in her last decay Constantinople was still
peopled with more than a hundred thousand inhabitants,’ forming his
estimate mainly upon the declaration of the archbishop as to prisoners. I am
myself disposed to think that this number is rather over- than under-
estimated. Taking the prisoners to be fifty thousand, and allowing for the
escape of ten thousand persons and another ten thousand for old men and
women who were not worth reducing to slavery, probably eighty thousand
would be about right.
Within the narrow limits of what had been possible, the citizens over whom
the new emperor was called to rule had done their duty to the city itself.
They had kept fourteen miles of walls the most formidable in Europe in
good repair and they had preserved the wonderful aqueducts, the cisterns,
the great baths and churches.
Commerce still continued to be the principal support of
the inhabitants. This was now largely shared by the Its commerce.
Genoese in Galata and by the Venetians who occupied a
quarter in Constantinople itself. The familiarity of the Italian colonists with
Western lands and their superiority in shipping, in which indeed at this time
they led the world, enabled them to achieve a success in what was then
long-voyage travelling which was denied to the Greeks; but the latter
collected merchandise from the Black Sea ports and from the Azof which
was either sold to the Frank merchants in Constantinople or transhipped on
board their vessels.
It is difficult to realise what were the relations between
the government and the governed during the two Emperor and
nobles.
centuries before the last catastrophe. The empire was the
continuator of the autocratic—or rather the aristocratic—form of
government which had been derived from the elder Rome. Emperor and
nobles governed the country. The nobles formed the senate. Like our own
Privy Council, it met rarely and had ill-defined functions, but upon
occasions of emergency it had to be consulted. Its co-operation gave to any

measures edicted by the emperor an important sanction. When the decision
of the senate was acquiesced in by or coincided with that of the Patriarch
and his ecclesiastical council, the emperor may be said to have possessed all
the approval that could be derived from public opinion.
Though the senate met rarely, its support was never altogether dispensed
with. The emperors did not claim to reign by divine right, nor was any such
pretext put forward on their behalf. The succession passed in the usual
manner and the emperor reigned with almost autocratic powers so long as
the nobles and the patriarch and ecclesiastics were content. In the period
with which we are concerned the nobles sometimes preferred to associate a
younger man with the occupant of the throne. Such association was usually,
though not always, in accordance with the desire of the reigning emperor,
and had the conspicuous advantage of allowing the elder to train his
younger associate in statecraft. In some cases, as in those of young
Andronicus and of John during the reign of his father, Manuel, it was
imposed upon the emperor in order to bring about a change of policy.
No form of popular representation existed. The mass of the people had
nothing to do with the laws except to obey them. So long as their lives and
their property were protected and the laws fairly administered they were
content.
So far as can be judged from the silence as well as from
the writings of the Byzantine writers, there was little Administration of
law.
fault to find with the administration of law. When cases
of the miscarriage of justice are mentioned they are generally brought
forward to show the scandal they had produced or in some other connection
which suggests that such cases were exceptional. It was not only that the
keen subtlety of a long succession of Greek-speaking lawyers had preserved
the traditions of their great ancestors of the time of Justinian and had
guarded law in admirable forms, but the still better traditions of an honest
administration of law had continued, and this with the result—simple as it
may appear to Western readers; strange as it would have sounded to a
Turkish subject at any time since the capture of Constantinople—that
people believed that the decisions of the law courts were fairly given.
The inhabitants of the capital retained until the last days
of its history as a Christian city their intense interest in Interest in religious

religious questions. It is of less importance to qualify questions.
such interest as superstitious or fanatical than to try to
understand it. That theological questions possessed a dominating influence
over the people of Constantinople is one of the facts of history, and
represents an important element in the education of the modern Western
world.
An able modern writer says with justice that ‘religious sentiment was down
to the fall of the empire as deep as it was powerful. It took the place of
everything else.’181 Probably the exclusion of the great bulk of the
inhabitants from all participation in government and the consequent want of
general interest in political questions or those regarding social legislation
helped to concentrate attention upon those relating to religion. The Greek
intellect—and, though there were large sections of the population which
were not Greek, the Greek element as well as the Greek language gave its
tone to all the rest—was essentially active and philosophical. The
investigation of theological questions was not conducted lightly. The same
spirit which made scholars of Constantinople espouse the study of Plato as
they had done for two centuries before 1453—a study which caused Pletho,
on his visit with John at the Council of Florence, to be regarded as an
authority to be eagerly sought after by those awakening to the new learning
in Italy—had been applied to many questions of philosophy and theology.
The examination of such questions was more speculative, thorough, and
scientific than in the West.182
While it is true that Constantinople had for centuries produced few ideas
and little of original value in literature, it had rendered great service to
humanity by preserving the Greek classics. Its methods of thought, its
civilisation as well as its literature, were on the model of classical antiquity,
but these were all modified by Christianity. Part of the mission of the
empire had been to save during upwards of a thousand years, amid the
irruptions of Goths, Huns and Vandals, Persians and Arabs, Slavs and
Turks, the traditions and the literary works of Greece. It had done this part
of its work well. Amid the obscurity of the Middle Ages in the West,
Constantinople had always possessed writers who threw light on the history
of the empire in the East. No European people, remarks a recent writer,
possesses an historical literature as rich as do the Greeks. From Herodotus
to Chalcondylas the chain is not broken.183 The Greek historians of the

period with which the present work is concerned, Pachymer, Cantacuzenus,
Gregoras, Ducas, Critobulus, and Phrantzes are in literary merit far superior
to the contemporary chroniclers of the West. Though their works are written
in a style which aims at reproducing classical Greek and imitating classical
models, they were not intended merely for Churchmen. Nor was
Constantinople rich only in historians.
Though intellectual life was never wanting in the city,
many of whose people possessed the quick, ingenious, Civilisation not
modern.
and piercing intellect of the Greek race, the reader of the
later historians feels that the civilisation amid which they lived was not that
of modern times. It is difficult to realise what it was like. It has often been
compared with that of Russia, and writers of reputation have spoken of that
empire as preserving the succession of the political and religious systems of
Byzantium as well as of its mission to the non-civilised nations of Asia.184
Allowing for the difference between the Greek and the Slav intellect, the
analogy in a general sense holds fairly good, and is especially noticeable in
two points, the religious spirit of both peoples and their contented exclusion
from all active participation in the government.
It is, however, difficult to determine how far the conditions of existence in
the first half of the fifteenth century among the citizens of the capital
resembled those found in Russia. The difficulty arises, not merely from
distance of time, but from the fact that in the empire manners, usages, the
conception of life, and the influence of religion were neither Western nor
modern. The people were governed much as Russia is governed now: but
there were important differences due to race, tradition, and environment.
Nevertheless, the condition of the empire reminds one of the Russia of fifty
years ago. There were the same great distances between the capital and the
provinces and the same difficulty of communication. News travelled
slowly; public opinion hardly existed. There were in the country a mass of
ignorant peasants tilling the ground and caring little for anything else,
peasants who were in a condition of serfdom, thinking of the emperor as a
demi-god and rendering unquestioning obedience to his representatives;
thinking of the Church as a divine institution entrusted with miraculous
powers to confer a life after death, but far too ignorant to trouble
themselves about heresies or dogmas. Among these peasants probably only
the priests and monks were able to read, although among a people naturally

intelligent this would not necessarily imply a want of interest in what was
going on around them. The analogy to Russia must not be pushed too far.
Religion and language, a common form of Christianity and the traditional
duty of submission to the rule of Constantinople were the bonds which held
the empire together, but the Greek tendency to individualism and the
political development of the empire which destroyed the belief that
allegiance was necessarily due to the ruler in the capital had been for two
centuries a disintegrating element which prevented the growth of the apathy
on political and social questions, and the deadly contentment which has
been a characteristic of the great Slavic race.
In the cities there was intellectual life: Salonica, Nicaea, Smyrna, and other
centres of population had in times past vied with the capital in general
culture and still retained something of their attachment to it. To the last hour
of the empire there was, as we have seen, general and absorbing interest in
the question of the Union of the Churches. But interest in other questions
which had once kept religious thought from stagnation had largely died out.
The more pressing questions of life interested the citizens. Moreover, the
people believed that all questions of Christian belief had been settled. The
Creed was final and had no more need of revision than the style of the
Parthenon. The practices adopted from Paganism had become so generally
accepted as to pass without dispute. Iconoclasts and Paulicians can hardly
be said to have left any representatives. A Pagan Christianity with a
Pantheism accepting holy springs, miraculous pictures, miracle-working
relics, had become the accepted form of faith, a form which we of the
twentieth century find it as difficult to understand as the earlier belief which
had regarded the emperor as divinity.
One of the difficulties of the student of political and social history of the
thirteenth and two following centuries is that of being unable to get
glimpses of personal characteristics or domestic life. The men who figure in
contemporary writings are too often little better than dummies who move
and turn, but do not suggest vitality. An historical novel of the period
written upon the lines of Scott or Dumas, of Kingsley or Charles Reade, or
better still, anything corresponding to Chaucer’s ‘Canterbury Tales,’ would
be of priceless value in giving indications not merely of what was the
environment of a Constantinopolitan but of the characteristics of an
individual of the period. The writers on whom we have to depend are

mostly Churchmen, who describe the persons of whom they write as if they
felt bound to make them correspond with one of half a dozen approved
models.
The absence of better indications may be accounted for. The subjects of the
empire during the century and a half preceding 1453 lived in the midst of
alarms. Its boundaries had been constantly changing and continually
narrowing. Disaster followed disaster; usurpations, dynastic struggles,
inroads of Genoese and Venetians; struggles with them and between them;
ever encroaching Turks, battles, triumphs, defeats, hopes of final success,
but territory still decreasing; hope of aid from the West or from Tamerlane;
illusions all: finally the last siege and extinction. The writers in the midst of
such times thought they had more important matter to deal with than the
depiction of scenes of domestic character or delineations of prominent
persons.

CHAPTER IX
ACCESSION OF CONSTANTINE DRAGASES; PATRIARCH GREGORY DEPOSED;
RENEWED ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN AID FROM THE WEST; EMPEROR MEETS WITH
LITTLE SUCCESS; ARRIVAL OF CARDINAL ISIDORE; RECONCILIATION SERVICE
DECEMBER 12, 1452, IN HAGIA SOPHIA; DISSENSIONS REGARDING IT.

The emperor John left no son, and the succession had therefore to pass to
one of his three brothers, Constantine, Demetrius, and Thomas.
Constantine, the eldest, was at the time of the emperor’s death at Sparta, but
Demetrius claimed that as his elder brother was not born in the purple,
while he had inherited that honour, the crown ought to be placed on his
head. The dowager empress, the widow of Manuel, the clergy, senate, the
troops and people generally, declared in favour of Constantine.185
While the matter was still under debate, Thomas, who had learned at
Gallipoli the death of his brother, arrived in the capital and immediately
supported the nomination of Constantine. An embassy was sent to the
Morea and on January 6, 1449, placed the crown on the head of Constantine
Dragases, the last Christian emperor of Constantinople.186
On March 12, he arrived in the capital and his brother Thomas, who had
been appointed despot, went after some days to the Morea. There he was
shortly afterwards joined by Demetrius who had withdrawn his opposition
and accepted the situation.
The party opposed to the Union had now become sufficiently strong to call
together a Synod, which met in the autumn of 1450. The three patriarchs of
the East were present, and under their guidance the assembly declared the
patriarch Gregory to be an enemy of the Orthodox Church and deposed
him. In his stead they appointed Athanasius.
During the interval between the death of John and that of Murad, on
February 3, 1451, the Christian cause looked more hopeful. Scanderbeg had
maintained himself successfully in the field, Murad had been compelled a
second time to raise the siege of Croya. In four separate battles the Turkish
armies had been defeated. In the siege of Sventigrad they lost thirty

thousand men, and, though the brave Albanian failed in capturing the city
and had to raise the siege, his campaign was a triumph.
It seems to have been generally recognised that young Mahomet, the
successor of Murad, had even before his accession determined to lay siege
to the city. The emperor, therefore, once more renewed the efforts of his
predecessors to obtain foreign aid. Once more the insuperable obstacle to
the Union of the Churches, the rigid refusal of clergy and people, came to
the fore. Constantine, like his predecessors, tried and failed to coerce the
Church. Athanasius, the new patriarch, declared himself ready to maintain
the Orthodox faith and declined to recognise the acts of the Council of
Florence. When Constantine asked aid from Rome, he found that the
deposed Gregory had taken refuge there, and while the patriotism of the
latter led him to seek the pontiff’s help against the Turks, his Catholicism
compelled the pope to espouse his cause. Nicholas the Fifth summoned the
emperor, as the price of his support, to replace Gregory and to take the
measures necessary for formally completing the Union agreed to at
Florence. Constantine was willing to do what he could, but knew the temper
of his subjects. He knew himself to be distrusted by them for what they
regarded as his Romanising tendencies. When Mahomet was at Magnesia,
where the news of the death of his father reached him, the Christians around
regarded the new emperor unfavourably on account of his predilection for
the Union, and spoke of him as a usurper. Constantine, who was on the look
out for a wife187 and had employed Phrantzes on various expeditions to find
one, had been compelled, on account of the opposition of his subjects to any
further relationship with the Latins, to abandon his intention of marrying
the daughter of Foscari, the doge of Venice. He had thus given offence to a
powerful state, and, though he had offered all sorts of concessions, Venice
would only promise to send ten galleys to the help of the city.
The emperor temporised. He begged the pope to send ships and also learned
and capable ecclesiastics who could aid him to make the Union acceptable
to the clergy. In reply Nicholas promised to send a fleet, although he was
powerless to persuade other Christian princes to follow his example. In
answer to his second request he deputed Cardinal Isidore, Metropolitan of
Russia, whom we have seen at the Council of Florence, to be his legate.
In November 1452, a great Genoese ship with the cardinal accompanied by
Leonard, archbishop of Chios, arrived at the city and was received by the

emperor with every honour. Isidore at once pressed for a formal recognition
of Union. The emperor and some of the nobles assented, but the majority of
the priests, monks, and nuns refused. Ducas says that no nun consented and
that the emperor only pretended to do so. It is not unlikely that he is right.
Mahomet had declared war. Preparations for the siege of Constantinople
were already being made, and not only the emperor but many priests,
deacons, and laymen of high rank were ready to accept everything that
Isidore proposed, provided only that the city could obtain additional
defenders. It was in this spirit that they consented to be present on
December 12, 1452, in the Great Church in order to celebrate the Union and
by so doing obtain aid in their time of mortal anguish.188 The service was
destined to be memorable. The party which would not accept the Union
took offence at the reconciliation service. While the emperor and a host of
dignitaries were present in Hagia Sophia a crowd went to the monk
Gennadius, better known as George Scholarius, and asked what they should
do.
The man whom they went to consult was not a mere monk who had won the
popular ear. He was a scholar with a European reputation, the most
distinguished advocate in the long contest between the rival systems of
Aristotle and Plato which marks the transition from mediaeval to modern
thought. He was the last of the great polemical writers of the Orthodox
Church whose works were studied in the West as well as in the East. His
great rival in the controversy was Pletho, a celebrated Platonic scholar. Both
these writers had accompanied John Palaeologus to the Councils of Ferrara
and Florence.189
The reply of Gennadius, who was now a monk in the monastery of
Pantocrator (a little over a mile distant from the Great Church), whither
they had gone to consult him, was distinct enough. He handed from his cell
a paper asking why they put their trust in Italians instead of in God. In
losing their faith he declared that they would lose their city. In embracing
the new religion they would have to submit to be slaves.
Something like a riot followed, and drunken zealots ran through the streets
declaring that they would have no Union with the Azymites—that is, with
those who celebrate with unleavened bread.

Meantime the congregation in the Great Church, after listening to a sermon
from the cardinal, formally gave their consent to the Union on condition
that the decrees of Florence should be again examined and, if need be,
revised. A Mass was celebrated in which Roman and Greek priests took
part; the names of Nicholas the Fifth and the restored Patriarch Gregory
were joined in the prayers, and both the cardinal and the patriarch shared in
the celebration in token that the old schism was at an end and that the great
reconciliation had been accomplished.
The reconciliation was, however, a delusion and a sham. Many who
accepted it, says Ducas, gave utterance to the thought, ‘Wait until we have
got rid of Mahomet, and then it will be seen whether we are really united
with these Azymites.’ Notaras, the grand duke and subject of highest rank in
the city, was reported to have declared that he would rather see the phakiola
of the Turk than the veil of the Latin priest. Those who conformed did so
under compulsion. They agreed with the mob in regarding the Latin priests
as the representatives of a foreign tyranny. The most devout among the
citizens were the most opposed to a change of belief in order to obtain a
temporal advantage. Without going so far as Lamartine, who says ‘L’Église
avait tué la patrie,’ we may safely admit that it had greatly divided the
people in presence of their great enemy.
We have now arrived at a period within a few months of the final siege of
the city and have to limit our attention to the struggle which is about to take
place over against its walls, to the incidents of this epoch-marking event,
and to the dramatis personae of the contest.

CHAPTER X
CHARACTER OF MAHOMET THE SECOND; RECEIVES DEPUTATION FROM CITY;
RETURNS TO ADRIANOPLE FROM ASIA MINOR; HIS REFORMS; BUILDS
ROUMELIA-HISSAR; REJECTS OVERTURES FROM EMPEROR; CASTLE
COMPLETED, AUGUST 1452; WAR DECLARED; MAHOMET RETURNS TO
ADRIANOPLE; HE DISCLOSES HIS DESIGNS FOR SIEGE OF CITY. CONSTANTINE’S
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE; ARRIVAL OF SIX VENETIAN SHIPS; AID
REQUESTED FROM VENICE; JUSTINIANI ARRIVES, JANUARY 1453; BOOM ACROSS
HARBOUR PLACED IN POSITION. TURKISH ARMY, ESTIMATE OF; NOTICE OF
JANISSARIES; MOBILITY OF ARMY; RELIGIOUS SPIRIT OF; CASTING OF GREAT
CANNON; TURKISH FLEET ARRIVES IN BOSPORUS; DESCRIPTION OF VESSELS
COMPOSING IT. MAHOMET’S ARMY MARCHES TO CITY; OFFER OF PEACE.

As Mahomet plays the principal part in the great tragedy
of the Capture of Constantinople, we may turn aside Character
Mahomet.
of

from the narrative in order to form a general estimate of
the young man, leaving until after the conquest of the city the attempt to
make a more complete sketch of his character.
As he was only twenty-one years old when he became sultan, the events of
his subsequent life inevitably colour any attempt to delineate him in his
youth. There exist many notices in regard to his character drawn by
contemporary writers, and though Gibbon’s remark, that it is dangerous to
trust either Turkish or Christian authors when describing Mahomet, is
useful as a warning, these notices and especially the Life of Mahomet by
Critobulus190 enable us to get a fair view of the man. He was well-formed
and handsome, about the middle height, with piercing eyes and arched
eyebrows. His most conspicuous feature was his long aquiline nose, which
seemed to overhang his thick red lips and made the Turks describe him in
after years as having the beak of a parrot surmounting cherries.
The dream of his boyhood was to capture Constantinople. He would
succeed where Bajazed and Murad had failed. Ducas gives a striking
picture of his sleeplessness and anxiety while at Adrianople before the siege
of the city commenced. His one thought was how he might obtain his
object. He passed his days in active preparations. He went in disguise
among his men accompanied by two soldiers to hear what they had to say
of him and of his enterprise, and is said to have killed any man who

ventured to recognise and salute him. He passed his nights arranging the
plan of his attack—where he should place his cannon; where he would
endeavour to undermine the walls; where the attack with scaling ladders
should commence. The anxiety he displayed when on the eve of this and
many subsequent undertakings; his desire to learn the opinion formed of
him by his own men and by foreigners; his many hasty acts and the many
legends which grew up during his lifetime and after his death representing
him as a rash and impulsive ruler, all indicate that he was of a highly strung
and nervous temperament.
There are two sides to his character, each well marked and distinct; the man
lived a double life, whereof one aspect would almost seem to be
irreconcilable with the other. In one he presents himself as a student,
sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought, doubting of everything and
anxious to learn what answers the best men of his time and of former ages,
philosophers and theologians, had to give to the greatest problems of life. In
the other aspect he is a bloodthirsty tyrant, a hunkiar or drinker of blood;
one who recked nothing of human slaughter and who seems even to have
delighted in human suffering. Yet the two lives are inseparably blended. He
would turn from study to slaughter, and after slaughter and torture would
show himself to be full of pity for the sufferings of his victims.
Nature had endowed him with intelligence far above the average of that
possessed by men of his race. He was the son of a slave, and probably of a
Christian, and like so many of the sultans before his time and until the
middle of the eighteenth century probably owed his intelligence to the non-
Turkish blood in his veins. His early struggles while yet a lad, and the great
responsibilities he had to assume in order to protect his very life, had
quickened his faculties and had made him both suspicious and self-reliant.
His environment, among men who were simply soldiers of the original
Turkish type; the tradition of his house and race, in accordance with which
any slaughter or any cruelties might be committed; the religion to which he
belonged, which regarded all non-Mussulmans as enemies of the true faith,
who were to be subdued: all tended to make him regardless of human life.
But amid his cruelties his better nature and his more thoughtful side
occasionally asserted itself.
In one respect his characteristics are those of his race. No man can show
himself more cruel and relentless in slaughter than the Turk whenever his

religious sentiment comes into play. The unbeliever is an enemy of God and
of Mahomet, and it is a sacred duty when he is fighting against the Moslem
to slay him. Those who are at war against Islam must be utterly destroyed,
root and branch, unless indeed they will accept the faith. Men, women, and
children must alike suffer the penalty. But when no religious sentiment
obscures the natural feelings of humanity, the same Turk is goodnatured and
kindly. Probably no race is more charitable towards its own poor or treats
animals with more kindness. Mahomet the Second both in his cruelty
towards his enemies and in his spasmodic kindness was a not unfair
representative of his race.
But in another respect the characteristics of Mahomet are quite un-Turk-
like. His interest in questions of philosophy and theology, in science and
even in art, recall the names of Western rather than of Turkish rulers. It was
indeed his interest in theological questions that led to various reports that he
was an atheist,191 that he was an unbeliever in the dogmas of his own
religion and that he contemplated embracing Christianity. That he felt an
interest in such questions separates him at once from the mass of his race:
for, probably more completely than the professors of any other religion,
Moslems accept their creed without question.192
Phrantzes notes that when as a mere boy he had been entrusted with kingly
power, some of the old viziers had warned Sultan Murad that it was not
prudent to leave the government to his son.193 Their warning was not
altogether disregarded, and the viziers who gave it paid dearly for their
counsels.
His father, Murad the Second, had died in February 1451
at Adrianople. When Mahomet learned the news he was Mahomet’s
accession.
in Magnesia. Calling upon all who loved him to follow,
he hastened as rapidly as possible to Gallipoli. During the two days he
remained there a great crowd flocked to his standard. Then he pushed on to
Adrianople. On the day after his arrival he was proclaimed sultan. Halil
Pasha the grand vizier and Isaac Pasha were in attendance, but as they were
the advisers who prevented the young sultan from retaining supreme power,
they were doubtful of their reception and kept themselves in the
background. Mahomet, however, ordered Halil to take his place as grand
vizier and appointed Isaac Pasha governor of Anatolia or Asia Minor.

Mahomet commenced his reign by one of those acts of cruelty which at
once proclaimed the brutal and the treacherous side of his character. Being
himself the son of a slave mother and having a younger brother, named
Ahmed, an infant still at the breast, who was the son of Murad by his
marriage with the sister of the Serbian kral, he ordered a certain Ali to
drown the young Ahmed in his bath. His predecessors had killed their
brothers, but the latter, as we have seen, were in open revolt. Von Hammer
states that there are Turkish historians who praise Mahomet the Second for
this act of cruelty, and this for the reason that it is easier to kill a babe than a
boy who is grown up.194 Fearing apparently the effect so wanton an act of
cruelty would have upon his followers, Mahomet disclaimed all
participation in it and put Ali to death.195
Mahomet is entitled to be classed among the men who at an early age
showed exceptional military skill. This skill was developed during almost
continual warfare to the end of his reign. His industry, his boundless desire
for conquest, his careful attention to every detail that was necessary to
secure success, and his confidence in his own judgment, recall the names of
Alexander and Napoleon. From his first and most important enterprise
against Constantinople itself down to the last expedition of his reign he was
not merely the nominal but the actual commander of the Turkish troops. He
would brook no interference. He allowed no council or other body of his
subjects to thwart his designs. The New Troops or Janissaries, flushed with
victory and already conscious of that solidarity which in later years made
them the terror of sultans, exacted from him a donative on his accession, but
they paid dearly for their temerity and soon learned that their new master
would neither be dictated to nor divide his sovereignty.
For the present we must be content to note that the young sultan was a man
of unusual intelligence, who as a boy had accepted responsibility with
eagerness; that he still had in 1452 the alternate confidence and hesitancy of
youth; that he was of great energy, of studious habits, of nervous
temperament, painstaking in the formation of his designs, ready to obtain
the judgment of others, but otherwise quick in arriving at a decision. His
maxim in later years was that in warfare secrecy and rapidity are the main
elements of success. In reply to an officer of high rank who asked why great
warlike preparations were being made he answered, ‘If a hair of my beard
knew, I would pluck it out and burn it.’196 His ambition was great. He

proposed to attack Naples, dreamed of leading his armies to the elder
Rome, and regarded his conquests as stages in a great design of conquering
the world.197 These objects were however in the future. The immediate one
before him was the capture of the city, and to its accomplishment he
directed all his thoughts and all his energy without wavering until he had
attained it.
Within a few weeks of Mahomet’s arrival in Europe
from Magnesia ambassadors were sent to his court at Conciliating
embassies.
Adrianople from Constantine and other rulers in Europe
and Asia Minor who were under his suzerainty to congratulate him on his
accession. As his first care was to make sure of his own position and to gain
time, Mahomet received them all with apparent cordiality and promised to
observe the treaties made by his father. At the request of the representatives
of the emperor he not merely confirmed the existing treaties, but declared
his willingness to pay an annual sum of three hundred thousand aspers
chargeable upon the produce of the Strymon Valley for the maintenance of
Orchan.198
Then he returned to Caramania, where Ibrahim Bey, who had already
shown himself ready to join Hunyadi and other enemies of the Turks, was
in revolt.199 There must be no repetition of the incident which had made
Murad’s attempt to capture the city a failure. No sooner had the sultan left
Europe than, with an indiscretion which Ducas condemns, ambassadors
from the emperor were sent to ask that the pension promised for the support
of Orchan should be doubled and at the same time to demand leave, if the
request were refused, that Constantine might be at liberty to set him free.
The messengers insinuated that in such case Orchan would be an acceptable
candidate for the Ottoman throne. The request was of course a threat, and
was so treated by Halil Pasha—who had been friendly to the late emperor
and who continued his friendship to Constantine—and by Mahomet
himself. When Halil heard their demand he bluntly asked them if they were
mad. He told them that they had a very different man to deal with from the
easy-going Murad; the ink on the treaty was not yet dry, and yet they came
as if they were in a position to demand better conditions than had been
already granted. ‘If you think,’ said Halil, ‘you can do anything against us,
do it: proclaim Orchan prince; bring the Hungarians across the Danube and
take from us, if you can, the lands we have captured; but I warn you that

you will fail and that if you try you will lose everything.’200 The account
given by Ducas has every appearance of truthfulness. Halil felt that his own
attempts to save the city were being thwarted by the emperor himself. He,
however, promised to report to Mahomet what they had said and kept his
word.
His master dealt with the ambassadors much more diplomatically. He was
outside Europe, and it would be inconvenient if any attempt should be made
to prevent him returning to Adrianople. Besides, he must have time to come
to terms with Caramania. He therefore represented that he was quite
disposed to accede to the demands submitted to him, but that, as he was
going to Adrianople in a short time, it would be better that they should
submit to him there that which was judged best for the empire and the
citizens.
Thereupon the sultan with all haste made terms with
Ibrahim Bey of Caramania and returned to his European Returns to
Adrianople, and
capital. When there he at once gave orders that the begins his active
pension to Orchan should no longer be paid, and sent to preparations.
arrest all the tax-gatherers in the Strymon Valley who
were collecting the money to pay it.
He had quieted one possible ally of the empire. He addressed himself next
to another opponent who had shown that he could be terribly formidable.
He made a truce with John Hunyadi for three years and concluded
arrangements with the rulers of other states. He strengthened his army. He
amassed stores of arms, arrows, and cannon-balls. He superintended the
thorough reform of the administration of the revenue, and in the course of a
year he accumulated a third of the taxes which would otherwise have been
squandered.
Then he determined to carry into execution a plan which
would give him a strong base for operations against the Purposes building
fort on Bosporus.
city he was resolved to capture. He was already master
of the Asiatic side of the Bosporus. At what is now Anatolia-Hissar he
possessed the strong fortification built by Bajazed. It is at the place where
Darius crossed from Asia into Europe and where the Bosporus is narrowest,
being indeed only half a mile broad. Mahomet already possessed by treaty,
made with his father, the right to cross the straits and to march through the

peninsula behind Constantinople to his capital at Adrianople. He now,
however, proposed to build another fortification at some point on the
opposite—that is the European—shore. It would serve the double purpose
of enabling him to command the straits and of giving him a base for
obtaining his supplies from Asia and for the attack by sea upon the city.
With a fleet already large at the Dardanelles and with the command of the
Bosporus, he hoped to isolate Constantinople so far as to prevent it from
receiving any aid in men or supplies of food. The command of the Bosporus
would be a blow to the trade of Venice and Genoa as well as to the emperor.
Ships would be prevented from trading freely with, and bringing supplies
from, the Black Sea. It might have been expected that the emperor would
have put forth all his strength to oppose the execution of such a design. The
all-sufficient explanation is, that, even if his naval strength had been
sufficient to delay the crossing of Mahomet’s crowd of builders, the army
was too hopelessly insignificant to hold the shore against that which could
soon arrive from Adrianople on its rear.
When the emperor and citizens learned, in the spring of
1452, the preparations which were being made by the Remonstrances
against project.
collection of building materials and the bringing
together of crowds of workmen, they recognised all the importance of the
project and its danger to the city. Ambassadors were sent to the sultan at
Adrianople to learn whether it was possible in any way to divert Mahomet
from his purpose. They urged the existence of treaties with the grandfather,
the father, and even with Mahomet himself: treaties which had expressly
stipulated that no fortification or other building should be erected on the
European side of the Bosporus.201 They claimed that these stipulations had
hitherto been scrupulously observed, that armies had been allowed to pass,
but Mahomet’s predecessors had prevented any of their subjects putting up
fortifications or other buildings. The messengers urged upon the sultan that
to break the treaties was to commit an act of injustice to the emperor.
In reply, the sultan, who was determined to avoid war till
he was ready, declared to the messengers that he had no Mahomet’s reply.
intention of breaking treaties: a statement which was, of
course, in flagrant violation of the truth. He pointed out, however, that in
the time of his father the Italians had tried to hinder the passage of his
troops when it had become necessary to fight the Hungarians, and urged

that it had become essential for the protection of his European possessions
that he should be in a position to prevent such detention in future. He
claimed that the land on which he proposed to build his fortress belonged to
him, and professed to think it strange that the emperor should wish to place
any difficulties in the way of the execution of so necessary a project. If
indeed, he significantly added, the emperor was not peaceably disposed,
that would be a different matter.202
When the messengers reported their interview, the emperor’s first idea was
to fight, and he was only prevented by the entreaties of the clergy and
people from sending a detachment of his troops to destroy the builders and
their work. Some indeed of the inhabitants were in favour of such action,
but the emperor203 had to come to the miserable conclusion that it was
impossible to prevent the young sultan from carrying out his project except
by war in the open country, and that for such war he was not prepared.
When the spring of 1452 was further advanced the
sultan himself took the lead in the execution of his Selects a site at
Roumelia-Hissar.
project. He assembled thirty well-armed triremes and a
large number of transports and sent them from Gallipoli to the Bosporus. At
the same time he himself marched at the head of a large army towards its
European shore.
On his arrival he selected, with the aid of his engineers, the most
advantageous position for his proposed fortifications. This was found
immediately opposite Anatolia Hissar.204
Once the plan had been decided upon, every available
man seems to have been set at work to aid in its speedy Building begins.
execution. Mahomet himself superintended the
construction of the new fortification and pushed on the works with the
energy that characterised all his military undertakings.
At the beginning of the operations Constantine with the object of saving the
crops of the peasants around the city, and of appearing to be reconciled to
the project which he could not prevent, sent provisions to the workmen.
Mahomet in reply, and probably with the intention of forcing on war in the
open, permitted his men to scour the country and gather or destroy the
crops. All the neighbouring churches and houses, including the famous

church of the Asomatoi at Arnoutkeui, were destroyed to furnish
material.205
The land enclosed, says Critobulus, was rather a fortified town than a fort.
The walls and towers still remain and form the most picturesque object
which the traveller sees on his passage through the Bosporus. Each of two
peaks is crowned with a strong tower. These are connected by a long high
wall interrupted with smaller towers, and from the two largest towers
similar walls at right angles to the long wall connect them with great towers
on the shore at the end of another line of walls parallel to the channel. Small
guns or bombards enabled the enclosure to be defended against any attack
by land. On the sea shore and under the protection of the walls were
stationed large cannon which threw heavy stone balls and commanded the
passage.
The work had been commenced in March 1452. It was
completed by the middle of August of the same year. Completed middle
of August 1452.
The city had hoped to maintain peace and Turks had
entered and left it apparently without difficulty. When the fortification was
finished and Mahomet’s army had robbed the peasants of their crops, this
hope vanished. Constantine closed the gates, making the few Turks within
its walls prisoners. They were, however, a few days afterwards sent to the
sultan. Upon the closing of the gates, Mahomet formally declared war and
followed up his declaration by appearing with an army
of fifty thousand men before the walls. But his War declared.
preparations for a siege were far from ready. After
remaining three days he withdrew on September 6 to Adrianople and at the
same time the fleet returned to the Dardanelles.206
Within the next few weeks the city as well as the
Venetian and Genoese colonies learned how greatly the Capture of ships at
Roumelia-Hissar.
new fortification of Roumelia-Hissar had strengthened
Mahomet’s position. On November 10, two large Venetian galleys under the
command of Morosini were fired at as they were passing and captured. A
fortnight later, on November 26, another Venetian ship was fired at and also
captured. Some of the crew were sawn in halves. These captures, says
Barbaro, led to the beginning of the war with the Venetians. For the first
time the Turks commanded the Bosporus.

Now that he had provided himself with a safe base of operations against the
city and withdrawn to Adrianople, Mahomet threw off all disguise, and
calling together the principal officers of the army
announced to them the object of his preparations, which, Mahomet’s address
to the pashas.
in accordance with his habitual practice, he had hitherto
kept secret. Critobulus gives us an address which he represents Mahomet as
making to his leaders. He describes the progress made by his ancestors in
Asia Minor, how they had established themselves at Brousa and had taken
possession of the Hellespont; had conquered part of Thrace and Macedonia,
Bulgaria, Serbia, and even Selymbria, and had overcome nearly every
obstacle. The great barrier to their progress was the city and the army of the
Romans. Whatever the sons of Othman wanted to do was opposed at
Constantinople. The citizens had fought them everywhere pertinaciously
and continually. This opposition must be ended; this barrier removed. It was
for his hearers, said Mahomet, to complete the work of their fathers. They
had now against them a single city, one which could not resist their attacks;
a city whose population was greatly reduced and whose former wealth had
been diminished by Turkish sieges and by the continual incursions made by
his ancestors upon its territory, a city which was now only one in name, for
in reality it contained cultivated lands, orchards, and vineyards. Its
buildings were useless and its walls abandoned and for the greater part in
ruins. Even from its weakness, however, they knew that from its favourable
situation, commanding both land and sea, it had greatly hindered their
progress and could still hinder it, upsetting their plans, and being always
ready to attack them. Openly or secretly it had done all it could against
them. It was the city which had brought about the attack by Tamerlane and
the suffering which followed. It had instigated Hunyadi to cross the Danube
and on every occasion had been in every possible manner their great enemy.
The time had now come when in his opinion it should be captured or wiped
off the face of the earth. One of two things: he would either have it within
his empire, or he would lose both. With Constantinople in his possession
the territories already gained could be safely held and more would be
obtained; without it, no territory that they possessed was safe.
Critobulus professes that the sultan claimed to have information that the
Italians in Constantinople would not give any aid to the emperor, and were
indeed his enemies, and that on account of the difference of religion there
was bitter strife between them and the Greeks. Mahomet concluded by

urging that there was great risk in delay and that the city should be attacked
before any aid could be sent to its relief. He gave his vote for war, and
nearly all the assembly followed his example.207
Mahomet now pushed on his preparations for the siege with the utmost
activity. The general commanding the European troops was ordered to take
a portion of them into the neighbourhood of Constantinople and clear the
country. This he did, and attacked in the usual Turkish fashion all the
villages on the route which still remained under the rule of the emperor.
Selymbria, Perinthos, and other places on the north shore of the Marmora
were sacked.
The inhabitants of Constantinople seem at first to have
hoped against hope, notwithstanding the construction of Hopes that siege
could be avoided.
the fortress at Roumelia-Hissar, that the sultan would
have remained content with his position on the Bosporus thus strengthened.
They soon realised that an attempt was about to be made to capture the city
far more serious than any that had been made within living memory. They
knew their weakness and the strength of their foe. They knew that in a siege
they would be under greater disadvantages than ever before; that conquest
would mean falling into the hands of implacable enemies, the slaughter of
their young men, the loss of all their property, the plunder of their churches,
and the enslaving of their women. The statement of Critobulus is probable
enough that the inhabitants remarked to each other that in former sieges the
position of the city was better, because it had command of the sea and the
inhabitants had therefore only need to defend the walls on the landward
side. We may dismiss, as being merely curious and characteristic of the
period, the stories of supernatural events which increased the tribulation of
the inhabitants, of earthquakes, and strange unearthly groanings, of
lightning and shooting stars, of hurricanes, torrential rains and floods, and
of other signs which indicated the wrath of God against the city. Those of
the inhabitants who did not believe in omens had something more serious to
think about than perspiring pictures, men and women possessed of the
devil, and mad enthusiasts who prophesied misfortune to the city, and
helped to depress the spirits of the fighters. Those who kept their heads,
with the emperor as their leader, behaved like men and met the danger
bravely. They set themselves in the first place to strengthen the defences.
Their first task was to repair the walls, for which purpose tombstones and

all other materials available were freely employed. Arrows and all other
kinds of arms were collected.
During the whole of the winter the emperor and his people pushed on their
preparations. In November 1452, as we have seen,
Cardinal Isidore had arrived with two hundred soldiers Arrival of Isidore
with 200 soldiers;
sent by the pope. Six Venetian vessels—not, indeed, of Venetian ships;
intended for war but capable of being adapted to such of Cretans.
purpose—came to the city, and their captains together
with those of three large ships from Crete yielded to the request and
promises of the emperor and consented to render help. The leading Venetian
commander was Gabriel Trevisano, who, in reply to the imperial request,
consented to give his services ‘per honor de Dio et per honor de tuta la
Christianitade.’208 When the Venetian ships coming from the Black Sea
were destroyed by the Turks at Hissar, the emperor and leading nobles, the
cardinal and Leonard, with the ‘bailey’ of the Venetian colony and its
leading members, held a council to arrange conditions on which Venice
should be asked to send aid. Their deliberations took place on December 13,
the day after the famous service of reconciliation in Hagia Sophia, and on
several following days. Trevisano and Diedo, the most important sea
captains, were also present. An agreement was concluded and messengers
were sent to Venice to ask that immediate aid should be sent to the city.
Finally the council decided that no Venetian vessel should leave the harbour
without express permission.209
On January 29 the city received the most important of all
its acquisitions; for on that day arrived John Justiniani. Arrival of
Justiniani.
A Genoese of noble family, he was well skilled in the art
of war and had gained great reputation as a soldier. On board his two
vessels were four hundred cuirassiers, whom he had brought from Genoa,
and others whom he had hired at Chios and Rhodes, making together with
his crew in all seven hundred men.210 A soldier of fortune, he had come on
his own accord to offer his sword when he heard of the straits in which the
emperor found himself, and had received a promise that in case of success
he should receive the island of Lesbos. He was cordially welcomed by the
emperor and nobles and was shortly afterwards, by the consent of all,
named commander-in-chief, with the powers of a dictator in everything that
regarded the war. He at once took charge of the work already begun of

strengthening the defences. He distributed small guns upon the walls where
they could throw their stone balls to greatest advantage. He classified the
defenders and appointed to each his station.
In the last days of March Trevisano with his crew, aided also by Alexis (or
Aloysius) Diedo, whose three galleys had come from Tana on the Azof,
reopened a foss from the Golden Horn in front of the landward walls as far
as the ground remained level, and at the same time repaired the walls in the
neighbourhood.211 A few days later the Italians were assigned to the most
important positions on the landward walls. Barbaro, with the enthusiasm of
a Crusader, gives a list of Venetian nobles who took part in the defences,
and this ‘for a perpetual memorial’ of his brave countrymen.
Justiniani appears at first to have chosen to defend the walls at Caligaria.
On April 2 the chain or boom which defended the
entrance to the Golden Horn was either closed for the Closing the harbour.
first time or strengthened.212 It extended from the Tower
of Eugenius near Seraglio Point to the Tower of Galata,213 within the Galata
Walls, and near the present Moumhana, and was supported on logs. Ten
large ships, of which five were Genoese, three from Crete, one from
Ancona, and an imperial ship, were stationed at the boom, bows towards it,
and with long triremes near them for support. The guardianship of the boom
was entrusted to the Genoese.214
By the end of March Mahomet’s preparations were nearly complete. He had
already summoned all available cavalry and infantry from Asia and the
parts of Europe under his control. As they arrived he drilled, classified, and
formed them into bodies of cuirassiers (or men with breastplates), slingers,
archers, and lancers.
While it is impossible to state with anything like
certainty what was the number of fighting men whom The Turkish army.
Mahomet was shortly to bring before the walls of the
city, the materials for forming a general computation are not wanting. The
Turkish army was composed of regulars and irregulars. The first and most
important division of regulars were the Janissaries. After them came a great
horde of Turks from those who had occupied Asia Minor and Europe. Every
Turk was bound to serve, and a call had been made on all. The Turkish

nation was the Turkish army. Among them were many men who represented
the class subsequently known as Derrybeys, chieftains who held their lands
from the sultan on condition of bringing a number of retainers into the field
during war. The irregulars, or, as they may be conveniently called, the
Bashi-Bazouks, consisted partly of the poorest class of Turks, who did not
possess a horse, and partly of Christians attracted by the hope of plunder.
Amid the estimates of the number of men in Mahomet’s army, that of
Barbaro may be taken as safe and substantially correct. He takes note of
both regulars and irregulars—that is, of all the combatants—while he
disregards the camp-followers as non-combatants. He states, when speaking
of the siege, that there were a hundred and fifty thousand men stationed
between the Golden Horn and the Marmora. As, excluding the men on the
fleet, all Mahomet’s followers took part in it, the number mentioned may be
taken as Barbaro’s estimate of the whole Turkish army. Cheirullah, a
Turkish chronicler, affirms that there were not more than eighty thousand
effective fighting men, excluding in this estimate apparently the Bashi-
Bazouks.215
Barbaro’s estimate of one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men is
substantially confirmed by Tetaldi, who states that there were two hundred
thousand men under Mahomet, of whom a hundred and forty thousand were
effective soldiers including thirty thousand to forty thousand cavalry, the
rest ‘being thieves, plunderers, hawkers, and others following the siege for
gain and booty.’216 Taking the estimate of Cheirullah and Tetaldi, we may
perhaps safely say that in the army of one hundred and fifty thousand men
there were at least twenty thousand cavalry.
In this great army the Janissaries played the most important part and formed
beyond all doubt the most efficient division. These were at least twelve
thousand in number.217 The name Janissaries signifies ‘New Troops,’ and
was given by a famous dervish and saint, Hadji Bektash, when they were
formed, in 1326, into a new infantry by Sultan Orchan. From their
institution they constituted a fraternity governed in religious matters by the
rules of Hadji Bektash.218 Under the care of the first Murad, the son of
Orchan, their organisation had been developed, and by the time of Mahomet
the Second they had already acquired high repute for discipline and daring.

The part they played in the capture of the city and their subsequent renown
deserve a somewhat complete notice. The order took its origin in a long
recognised Moslem rule, that when a people at war with Mahometans is
summoned to make submission and refuses it may be enslaved, and that in
such a case one fifth of the property captured should belong to the sultan.
Christian captives fell within the limit of this rule. In practice, however, the
sultans by no means considered themselves bound to restrict themselves to
the prescribed one fifth. They held that as many of the children as the
conqueror thought fit should be given over to him to be trained for the
public, and especially for military, services. Accordingly, without regard to
the fact that the parents had already surrendered one or more sons to the
ruler, they were often called upon to furnish others. The demand for
Christian children to be given up absolutely to the sultan was regular and
methodic. No tithe or other tax required for the service of the Church was
ever claimed with more regularity and insistence than this blood tax for the
service of Islam. A formal examination of Christian children available for
service was made every five years, when a Turkish inspector, at the head of
a troop of soldiers and bearing an imperial firman of authorisation, visited
the portions of the empire assigned to him. The registers of the churches
were carefully examined to see how many children ought to be brought
forward for inspection, and the priests, under the penalty of death, were
bound to show a correct list. The boys selected were usually between the
ages of ten and twelve years. Those were preferred who were distinguished
either by their strength, intelligence, or beauty. In addition to these regular
and legal contributions to the services of the state, it was the custom of the
pashas, on returning from the provinces to bring presents of Christian
children to their imperial master.
The boys thus taken away from their parents and their homes were forcibly
converted to Mahometanism. From the day of their reception into Islam
they were kept under strict surveillance and instructed with the object of
making them useful servants of the sultan. After a while they were divided
according to their aptitudes and told off for special training for different
branches of civil and military service. It is with the latter that we are most
concerned, though it may be mentioned that many of those who had been
Christian slaves rose to the highest positions in the civil service and greatly
increased the efficiency of Turkish rule. All were thoroughly drilled in the
observances and taught the precepts of the Moslem religion. All were

subjected to a severe discipline, were trained to practise self-denial, to
endure hardships cheerfully and not to repine at scantiness of food or loss of
sleep. Day and night they were under supervision. The obedience exacted
from them towards their superiors was absolute, prompt, and, in appearance
at least, willing. All were taught to be expert in archery, and to ride well.
After a probation lasting usually six years, those who were drafted into the
military service were still subject to severe restraints. Bertrandon de la
Brocquière bears witness to the excellence of their discipline, and the same
testimony is borne by a series of other witnesses for two centuries later.
What may be called the Articles of War to which they were subject, besides
prescribing absolute obedience to every command of their chief, required
abstinence from every kind of luxury and the strict performance of the
many rules of devotion laid down by Hadji Bektash.219 All men who were
not within barracks at the hour fixed were detained for punishment. No
Janissary was allowed, until long after the conquest, to marry.220
On the other hand, the same Articles contained regulations which enable us
to understand how in time service among the Janissaries came even to be
coveted. Though discipline was strict, punishment could only be inflicted
upon a Janissary by one of his own officers. It is true that, after receiving
the bastinado, the offender had to rise, bend low, and salute the officer who
had superintended the punishment, but no disgrace was attached to this act
of discipline. The boy who was admitted into the brotherhood of the
Janissaries was provided for as completely as if he had become a monk.
When by reason of age or wounds he became weak, he was retired from
active service and received a pension of three aspers daily more than he had
received when on service.
In times of warfare the sternest features of the barracks were relaxed. Camp
life was the recreation, and furnished the joy and hope, of the Janissary. War
was for him a delight. His regiment marched to battle with every sign of
rejoicing and of military display compatible with discipline.
The effect of the long training, with its strictness on the one hand and its
relaxations on the other, was to develop an esprit de corps among them
such as has rarely existed in any other army. Everything was done that
could be done to cultivate this spirit. Every means was employed to make
the Janissary live his life in and look only to the interests of his regiment.

He was forbidden to exercise any trade or occupation whatever, lest he
should possess an interest outside his regiment. In the time of Suliman the
sultan ordered the aga of a regiment of Janissaries to be beheaded because
one of his men was found mending his clothes. The officer was spared at
the request of his comrades, but the private soldier was dismissed from the
service. The regiment was to be everything to the Janissary; the outside
world nothing. No man was allowed to accumulate wealth, although his
regiment could do so. Each man followed the good or ill fortune of the
powerful body of which he was a member.
The result was that the regiment represented to the Janissary everything that
he held dear. He became jealous of its honour, and the regiment in its turn
became exclusive towards outsiders. The Janissary came before long to
think of his position as privileged and to regard entrance into his corps as
only to be allowed under severe restrictions. So careful indeed did he
become of the rights of his regiment that before long no person born of
Mahometan parents was admitted, even though his father had been one of
themselves. As a consequence of this cultivation of regimental rights, the
popularity of the New Troops became so great that many young Christians
of adventurous spirit voluntarily sought to join their ranks.
The Janissaries developed into a species of imperium in imperio. Perhaps
the body in Western Europe to which they may most aptly be compared is
the Order of Knights Templars. Each was a partly religious, partly military
Order. Each was jealous of its own privileges and constituted a fraternity
largely isolated from the rest of the community. But the isolation of the
Janissary was more complete than that of the Templar at any time. The
Moslem had been cut off from his own family and had forgotten all the
Christians he had known as a child, and his regiment had taken the place of
father and mother, wife and home. His individual rights had been merged in
those of his regiment. The resemblance between the Janissaries and the
Templars might be noted in one other respect—namely, that their religion
sat lightly upon them. Though the former were bound by the precepts of
Hadji Bektash, these precepts were, from the Mahometan point of view,
extremely latitudinarian.221
All their discipline and training tended to make them devoted to the sultan
as commander-in-chief. The Janissary had nothing to gain and nothing to
fear from any person except his military superiors. Each man’s promotion

depended on the arbitrary will of his commanding officer, or ultimately of
the sovereign. Each man saw before him a career in which he could rise to
the command of an army or to other high office, provided he won the
approval of his sultan.
Such a military organisation had never been seen in the world’s history, and
furnished to the early sultans a force which was almost irresistible. Wholly
Christian and largely European in origin, it was yet completely Mahometan
in spirit and in action. It was indeed an army which would have satisfied
Frederick the Great or any other ruler who has desired to model a force
according to preconceived ideas. Take a number of children from the most
intelligent portion of the community; choose them for their strength and
intelligence; instruct them carefully in the art of fighting; bring them up
under strict military discipline; teach them to forget the home of their
childhood, their parents and friends; give them a new religion of a specially
military type; saturate them with the knowledge that all their hope in life
depends upon their position in the regiment; make peace irksome and war a
delight, with the hope of promotion and relaxation from the hardships and
restraints of the barracks: the result will be a weapon in the hands of a
leader such as the world has rarely seen. Such a weapon was the army of
the Janissaries.
The success of Mahomet’s predecessors in the Balkan peninsula had been
largely due to the New Troops. Though their numbers appear to have been
limited to twelve thousand, they had already proved their value. We have
seen that when John Hunyadi had put the Turks under Murad the Second to
rout, it was the Janissaries who saved the day and turned the disaster of
Varna into a great victory. Their discipline and strength were even more
triumphant in the defeat of the great Hungarian on the plain of Cossovo in
1448. Black John, as the Turks named him from the colour of his banner,
succeeded in putting to flight the Anatolian and the Rumelian divisions of
his enemy. But the attack on the Janissaries failed utterly. They stood like a
wall of brass until the moment came for them to become the attacking
force, and through their efforts the triumph of the sultan was complete.
The force which had thus shown its quality only five years previously was
by far the most important division under Mahomet’s command. The ablest,
bravest, most terrible portion of the army of the arch-enemy of Christendom
was composed exclusively from Christian families. The most formidable

instrument employed by the Turks for the conquest of the Christians of
South-eastern Europe and for attacking the nations of the West was formed
of boys born of Christian parents, enslaved, forcibly converted to a hostile
religion, who yet became devotedly attached to the slavery to which they
had been condemned. It was their boast in after years that they had never
fled from an enemy, and the boast was not an idle one.
The remainder of the Turkish forces which may be classed among regular
troops came from all parts occupied by the Turks but mainly from Anatolia.
Their organisation, discipline, and powers of endurance probably made
them as formidable an army as any which a European power of the period
could have put into the field.
The Bashi Bazouks constituted an undisciplined mob who were good
enough to be employed where numbers and wild courage were of use in
annoying or weakening the enemy. La Brocquière states that the
‘innumerable host’ of these irregulars took the field with no other weapon
than their curved swords or scimitars. ‘Being,’ says Philelphus, ‘under no
restraint, they proved the most cruel scourge of a Turkish invasion.’
In speaking of the Turkish host it must not be forgotten that in 1453 hardly
any European power can be said to have possessed a standing army. It is
with no surprise, therefore, that we note that contemporary European
writers from the West speak with astonishment of the discipline which
prevailed. ‘Their obedience to superiors,’ says La Brocquière, ‘is boundless;
none dare disobey even when their lives are at hazard, and it is chiefly
owing to their steady submission that such great exploits have been
performed and such conquests gained.’ The same writer bears testimony to
the great mobility of the Turkish army. ‘Ten thousand Turks on the march
will make less noise than a hundred men in our Christian armies. In their
ordinary marches they only walk, but in forced marches they always gallop,
and, as they are lightly armed, they will thus advance further from evening
to daybreak than others in three days. It is by these forced marches that they
have succeeded in surprising and completely defeating the Christians in
their different wars.’222
The army which Mahomet commanded was not merely endued with the
fatalism and confidence of an ordinary army of Islam; it was engaged upon
a work in which many generations of Moslems had longed to take a part.

The prophet himself was represented in the Sacred Traditions as holding
converse with Allah respecting the capture of New Rome, and was told that
the Great Day of Judgment would not come before Constantinople had been
captured by the sons of Isaac. On another occasion Mahomet declared that
‘the best prince is he who shall capture Constantinople, and his the best
army.’ The inspired words had filled his immediate followers with the
determination to capture the city. The Arabs attempted the task no less than
seven times. At the third, in 672, they were accompanied by the aged
Eyoub, who in his youth had been the standard-bearer and favourite of the
Prophet. The huge army had sat down before the city during seven years,
sowing the fields on the neighbouring coasts and gathering in the harvest,
but determined to win the reward which Mahomet had promised to those
who should capture the New Rome. Eyoub’s death before its walls and the
failure in these Arab attempts of the largest and most powerful army and
fleet which Islam could ever collect had not rendered the words of the
Prophet void. The sacred promise still held good and served to stimulate
every soldier to increased exertion. Seven centuries had passed since the
long struggle against the Arabs, in which the Queen City saved European
civilisation, and now, once again in the fulness of time, that which the early
Moslems had desired to see was within the reach of those who fought under
a leader who bore the same name as the Prophet. Among those who in the
army were under the influence of religious ideas or traditions the coming
attempt to capture the city was looked forward to hopefully and joyfully. To
the ignorant and thoughtless among his barbarous followers the promise of
unlimited plunder which Mahomet the Second held out was a stronger
inducement; but to the better informed and more religious, and to some
extent to all, the hope of winning paradise furnished a powerful allurement
to battle or at least a compensatory consolation at the prospect of death.

After this digression I return to the preparations which Mahomet was
making at Adrianople for the execution of his great design, and to those
which the emperor had in hand for the defence of the city.
In the first weeks of January, the fame reached
Constantinople of a monster bombard or gun which was Urban’s great
bombard.
being cast in Adrianople. Ducas gives interesting

information of its history and describes it as the largest possessed by the
Turks.
In the autumn of 1452, while Mahomet was finishing the castle on the
Bosporus, a Hungarian or Wallachian cannon founder named Urban, who
had offered his services to the emperor and had been engaged by him, was
induced by higher pay to go over to the enemy. He would have been
content, says Ducas, with a quarter of the pay he received from
Mahomet.223 After learning from him what he could do, the Turks
commissioned him to make as powerful a gun as he could cast. Urban
declared that if the walls were as strong as those of Babylon he could
destroy them. At the end of three months he had succeeded in making a
cannon which remained for many years the wonder of the city and even of
Europe, and marks an epoch in the continually increasing power of guns.
The casting was completed at Adrianople.224
In January it was started on its journey to the capital. Sixty oxen were
employed to drag it, while two hundred men marched alongside the wagon
on which it was placed to keep it in position. Two hundred labourers
preceded it to level the roads and to strengthen the bridges. By the end of
March225 it was brought within five miles of the city. But, though the fame
of this monster gun has overshadowed all the rest, we shall see that it was
only one amongst many.226

Above all, says Critobulus, Mahomet had given special Turkish fleet.
attention to his fleet, ‘because he considered that for the
siege the fleet would be of more use than even his army.’227 He built many
new triremes and repaired his old ones. A number of long boats, some of
them decked over, and swift vessels propelled by from twenty to fifty
oarsmen were also ready. No expense had been spared. The crews of his
fleet were gathered from all the shores of Asia Minor and the Archipelago.
He selected with great care the pilots, the men who should give the time to
the oarsmen and the captains.
At the beginning of April, his fleet was ready to leave Gallipoli, which had
been the place of rendezvous. Baltoglu, a Bulgarian renegade, was placed in
command. A flotilla of a hundred and forty sailing ships started for the
Bosporus.228 Of these, twelve were fully armed galleys, seventy or eighty

were fustae, and twenty to twenty-five were parandaria. Amid shouts from
one ship to another, the beating of drums, and the sound of fifes, all
marking the delight of the Turks that their period of inactivity was at an
end, the fleet made its way through the Marmora. The sight carried dismay
to the remnant of the inhabitants of the Christian villages along the shores,
for within the memory of none had such a fleet been seen. Within the city
itself the news of the enormous number of vessels on their way was not less
alarming.
The fleet arrived in the Bosporus on April 12 and anchored at the Double
Columns or Diplokionion just below the present Palace of Dolma
Bagtche.229
At the Double Columns the detachment of the fleet which had come from
the Dardanelles was joined by other vessels which had been swept in from
the Black Sea and the Marmora. Phrantzes gives the total number at four
hundred and eighty.230 Many of the vessels from the Black Sea were laden
with wood or with stone balls.
The Turkish fleet under Baltoglu’s command thus consisted of a number of
vessels from all the shores of the Marmora, the Bosporus, and the Black
Sea. Among them were triremes, biremes, fustae, parandaria, and galleys.
As we shall find these terms recurring, it will be well to realise what they
signified. The trireme of the fifteenth century was a long and fast vessel
which had usually two masts, was very low in the water and, though
employing sails, was mainly dependent for propulsion on her oars. The
arrangement of oars from which she derived her name was not in tiers one
above the other and thus requiring oars of different length. The ‘banks’ or
benches, unlike those in ancient ships, were all on the same level. The oars
were short and all of the same length: but three oars projected through one
rowlock port, each oar working on a tholepin. ‘One man one oar’ was the
invariable rule. Three men occupied one bench or seat. Down the middle of
the trireme ran a central gangway called the histodokè, primarily intended
as a rest for the mast, but upon which the officer passed to and fro to keep
time for the oarsmen. There were thus three upon each side of him, or six
men nearly abreast throughout the length of the trireme. The arrangement
upon a bireme was of a similar character, except that two men instead of
three occupied one bench. There was also but one mast. The fusta
resembled the bireme in having two oarsmen on each bench on each side of

the histodokè from the stern to the one central mast, but only one on each
side from the mast forward.231
The fusta was a lighter boat than the trireme, and could thus be propelled
more rapidly. The parandaria were heavy boats, probably not differing
much from the sailing barges or mahoons still used in the harbour of
Constantinople, the Bosporus, and Marmora. The name ‘galley’ was in the
fifteenth century applied to war vessels propelled by a single bank of long
oars on each side. Leonard employs the term dromon, not, as it had been
used in earlier days from about 500 A.D., as a generic term for war ships,232
but to indicate the large caiques, usually of twelve oars, which could not be
classed as triremes, biremes, or fustæ.
Probably the majority of the vessels in Mahomet’s fleet were not larger than
the ordinary bazaar caiques which ply between Constantinople and distant
villages on the Bosporus or the Marmora or are employed in deep-sea
fishing.233

Mahomet, leaving Adrianople in the early days of April Turkish army
with the whole of his army, overspread and ravaged the arrives before the
walls, April 5.
country which had not already been swept by the
vanguard of his force and arrived on the 5th of that month before the city.
He encamped at about a mile and a half’s distance from the landward walls.
Apparently, before the arrival of the main body of Mahomet’s army, a sortie
was made by the Greeks and Italians against those who had arrived, and this
was possibly led by Justiniani.234 They met at first with success, wounded
many and killed a few Turks, but when Mahomet arrived the advantage of
the besiegers in numbers was so overwhelming that no further sorties were
attempted. The bridges leading across the foss to the Gates were broken
down; the Gates were closed and were not again opened so long as the siege
lasted.
The Turkish army on April 6 advanced three quarters of a mile nearer to the
walls, and on the following day again approached still closer. The imperial
guard extended from the height crowned by Top Capou235 to the Adrianople
Gate, and thus occupied the valley of the Lycus. This district was known as

the Mesoteichion. Their camp was so near to the walls as only to be just out
of range of missiles discharged by the besieged.236
The law of the Koran requires, or is believed to require,
that before war is definitely declared there shall be a Formal offer of
peace.
formal offer of peace, and accordingly before the siege
commenced Mahomet made such a proposal. To men who knew their own
weakness and the tremendous odds against them any such offer must have
been tempting. He sent messengers to declare that if the city were given up
to him he would consent to allow the citizens to remain; he would not
deprive them of their property, their wives or their children, but take all
under his protection. As the inhabitants knew well the fate of a population
when conquered by a Turkish army, they might possibly have accepted the
proposal, if they had had any confidence in the oath of the proposer. The
answer sent was that they would consent to other conditions, but never to
the surrender of the city.237
Upon this refusal Mahomet at once made his dispositions for a regular
siege.

Map of BYZANTINE CONSTANTINOPLE.
Drawn by F. R. von Hubner for and under the direction of Professor A. van
Millingen.
Reproduced by kind permission of Prof. A. van Millingen from ‘Byzantine
Constantinople’ (John Murray).
The indications in red ink are inserted by Mr. Pears. The bridges shown on
the Golden Horn are modern. The red line at its mouth indicates the Boom.

CHAPTER XI
TOPOGRAPHY OF CONSTANTINOPLE; DISPOSITION OF MAHOMET’S FORCES AND
CANNON; ESTIMATE OF FIGHTING MEN UNDER EMPEROR; VENETIANS AND
GENOESE: DISPARITY IN NUMBERS: ARMS AND EQUIPMENT: ATTACKS ON
THERAPIA AND PRINKIPO.

In order to understand these dispositions and the
operations of the siege which had now begun it is Topography of
Constantinople.
necessary to take account of the topography of the city.
Constantinople in modern times comprises not only Stamboul but the large
and even more populous district situated on the northern shore of the
Golden Horn. This district was known in mediaeval times as Pera.238 On
the slope of Pera hill towards the Horn the Genoese were in possession of a
walled city called Galata. Sometimes this city is described as Galata of
Pera. In modern times, however, Pera is the name of the city on the north of
the Golden Horn, exclusive of Galata. In 1453 what is now known as
Stamboul was the only portion of the present city to which the name
Constantinople was applied.239
The city about to be besieged is situated on a peninsula at the south-west
extremity of the Bosporus. It is, roughly speaking, an isosceles triangle with
its base to landward. One of the sides is bounded by the Marmora and the
other by the Golden Horn. It was surrounded by walls, which, with a few
short intervals, still remain. On the two sides bounded by the sea they were
built close to the water’s edge. In the course of centuries the Golden Horn
had silted up a deposit of mud which even before 1453 formed a foreshore
outside the north walls of a sufficient extent to have allowed Cantacuzenus
to open a foss from Seraglio Point to Aivan Serai, formerly known as
Cynegion. The side of the triangle most open to attack was that which faced
the land and extended from the Horn to the Marmora. The walls on this
landward side, constructed mainly during the reign of Theodosius the
Second, had proved themselves during a period of a thousand years
sufficiently strong to have enabled the citizens successfully to resist
upwards of twenty sieges, and previous to the introduction of cannon were
justly regarded as invulnerable.240

The landward walls are four miles long. From the Marmora to a point
where the land has a steep slope for about half a mile down to the Golden
Horn, they are triple. The inner and loftiest is about forty feet high and is
strengthened by towers sixty feet high along its whole length and distant
from each other usually about one hundred and eighty feet. Outside this
wall is a second, about twenty-five feet high, with towers similar to though
smaller than those along the inner wall. This wall alone is of a strength that
in any other mediaeval city would have been considered efficient.
Between these two walls was the Peribolos or enclosure, which, though of
varying width, is usually between fifty and sixty feet broad. Outside the
second was yet another wall, which was a continuation in height of the
scarp or inner wall of the ditch or foss and which may conveniently be
called a breastwork. This breastwork, like the other two, was crenellated.
Though, from the fact that it has been easier of access than either of the
others, the summit has mostly perished, some portions of it are still
complete. It is important, however, to note that the third wall or breastwork
is disregarded by contemporary writers, and that they speak of the second as
the Outer Wall. A second enclosure, called by the Greeks the Parateichion to
distinguish it from the Peribolos, exists between the second and the third
walls. The foss or ditch, which has withstood four and a half centuries of
exposure since it last served as the first line of defence, is still in good
condition. It has a width of about sixty feet.
The landward wall contained a number of gates which are conveniently
described as Civil Gates and which during times of peace gave access to the
city over bridges which were destroyed when it was besieged. The most
important of these for our present purpose are the Chariseus, the modern
Adrianople Gate; Top Capou or Cannon Gate, known in earlier times as the
St. Romanus Gate, and the Pegè or Gate of the Springs, now called Silivria
Gate. Besides these there were Military Gates leading from the city through
the inner wall into the enclosures which were known in earlier times by
their numbers (counting from the Marmora end of the walls) or from the
division of the army stationed near them. The most noteworthy of these
were the Third or Triton and the Fifth or Pempton. The latter is in the Lycus
valley, about halfway between Top Capou and the Gate of Adrianople, and
was spoken of during the siege as the St. Romanus Gate.241

As the most important military events in the history of the siege of
Constantinople took place in the valley of the Lycus, between the Top
Capou on the south and the Adrianople Gate on the north of the valley, it is
desirable that the configuration of the locality should be noted carefully.
Each of these gates is upon the summit of a hill, the Adrianople Gate indeed
being the highest point in the city and, as such, having had near it, as is the
almost invariable rule in lands occupied by Greeks, a church dedicated to
St. George, who took the place of Apollo when the empire became
Christian.242 Between the two gates exists a valley, about a hundred feet
below their level, which is drained by a small stream called the Lycus. The
distance between the two gates is seven eighths of a mile. The double walls
of Theodosius connect them, while in front of the Outer Wall was an
enclosure with the usual breastwork forming the side of the foss. The Lycus
enters below these walls through a well-constructed passage still in
existence, and flows through the city until it empties itself into the Marmora
at Vlanga Bostan. The tower beneath which it has been led is halfway
between the Adrianople Gate and Top Capou. About two hundred yards to
the north of this tower is the Fifth Military Gate or Pempton, spoken of
sometimes by the Byzantines as the Gate of St. Kyriakè, from a church
within the city which was close to it, called the Romanus Gate by the
writers on the siege, and on old Turkish maps described as Hedjoum Capou
or the Gate of the Assault.243 The foss has a number of dams at irregular
distances down each side of the valley. In its lowest part no dams were
necessary.244
The walls between Top Capou and the Adrianople Gate were known as the
Mesoteichion, and the name seems to have been applied also to the whole
of the valley. The portion of the walls on either side of the Adrianople Gate,
or perhaps those only on the high ground to the north of it, was known as
the Myriandrion—a name which was applied occasionally to the Gate itself.
From a tower to which Leonard gives the name Bactatinian, near where the
Lycus entered the city, to Top Capou, the walls were described as the
Bachaturean.

Approximate Restoration of the Land Walls of Theodosius the Second
between the Golden and Second Military Gates.
Scale of Metres.

This photograph shows the present condition of a portion of
the Landward Walls. They remain for the most part in an
equally good state of preservation. The Inner and the Second,
usually called the Outer, Wall and the Foss (now without
water) are clearly shown. The Third Wall or Breastwork has
lost its upper portion and its crenelations, except in a few
places. The photograph is reproduced from one by M. Irenian,
of Constantinople.

Though the two magnificent Theodosian walls were as well constructed as
elsewhere, and to the eye of an ordinary observer the city was as strongly
protected in the Lycus valley as anywhere, yet this place appears to have
been considered by many of the enemies of the city as its weakest point.
Here, says Dethier, with whom Professor Van Millingen agrees, was the
Heel of Achilles.245 Many previous invaders, ending with Murad in 1422,
had encamped in the Mesoteichion as the most suitable position for an
attack upon the city.246
The accompanying sketch of the walls will show their general plan.
Under normal conditions a large detachment of the defenders of such high
lines of walls ought to have been on the city side of the great Inner Wall. So
few, however, were the besieged, that all had to pass into the enclosures to
meet the enemy at the second or Outer Wall. Partly because of the small
number of men, but partly also because it had been allowed to get out of
repair,247 the Inner Wall, which, as the highest and strongest, ought to have
been the most serious obstacle, was hardly relied upon as a means of
defence. Chalcondylas says248 that the emperor and the leading Greeks
deliberated as to where the enemy was to be resisted, and that they decided
that they should defend the Outer Wall, which was strengthened by the foss
in front of it, as had been done when Murad had attacked the city thirty-one
years before. Leonard expressly states that the imperial troops were
sufficient to guard only the Outer Wall, and the stockade which, at a late
period of the siege, replaced a portion of it. As his own countrymen took
part in this task, his testimony is entirely credible.249 He adds, however, that
in his opinion this plan of defence was a blunder; that he was always
persuaded that the lofty Inner Wall ought to have been kept ready as a
refuge in case of retreat; that those walls which, through neglect or hard

weather, had become broken or useless for operations against the enemy,
might have been repaired even within the time which elapsed between the
proposal for war and the commencement of the siege. Had they been
repaired and guarded, they would have provided a reserve of safety to the
city. It is when regretting that these repairs were not undertaken that, while
excusing the emperor, Leonard breaks out into indignation, justifiable if his
belief was well founded250 against two persons in particular, Jagarus and a
monk named Neophytus who had embezzled the moneys which had been
bequeathed for the repair of the walls, and declares that the city was lost
through the rascality of public robbers. Through their dishonesty, the
besieged were driven to place all their hope in the Outer Wall and the foss.
The Jews, he adds, were more prudent who when, at the siege of Jerusalem,
they were defeated at the first wall, retreated to the second, and then to the
third, by which they prolonged the siege of Vespasian and Titus for four
years.
Probably the opinion of the soldiers on such a question was worth more
than that of the archbishop.251
Under these circumstances, the defenders of the city took up their position
in the Peribolos or enclosure. The broken Inner Wall was behind them, the
strong Outer Wall was in front. The Military Gates from the city into the
enclosure were few and far between, there being only one usually in the
long distance between the Civil Gates. The only other entrances into the
enclosures were at the ends terminating at the Civil Gates.
With this explanation we may now understand the
disposition of his troops and cannon made by Mahomet. Disposition of
Mahomet’s army.
He placed Zagan Pasha at the head of an army which
was charged to guard the whole of Pera, to watch the Genoese in Galata and
the whole of the northern shore of the Golden Horn, together with a part of
the southern shore as far as the Woodgate or Xyloporta, which was at the
extremity of the landward walls. He was ordered to build a bridge over the
upper portion of the Horn, so that his troops might take part in the attack
upon the city.
The attack upon the landward walls between the Woodgate and up the hill
in front of the palaces of Blachern and Porphyrogenitus, and as far as the
Chariseus or Adrianople Gate, was entrusted to Caraja Pasha, the head of

the European division. Certain of the guns were given to him in order that
he might attack the wall at one of its weakest parts, probably where it runs
at right angles to the end of the foss.
Isaac Pasha, the head of the Asiatic troops, and Mahmoud, both men who
had had great experience in war, commanded the Asiatic division, which
covered the ground between Top Capou and the Marmora.
The most important position, however, was that which existed between the
Adrianople Gate and Top Capou known as the Mesoteichion. This was the
place which Mahomet chose as the principal point of attack. There, he
considered, was the Achilles’ heel of the city. There, with Halil Pasha under
him, were his head-quarters. His lofty tent of red and gold252 was pitched
about a quarter of a mile from the walls on a small knoll, which is described
as opposite the Adrianople Gate and also as opposite that of Romanus. His
tent was surrounded by those of the invincible Janissaries who, with other
chosen troops, constituted his bodyguard and occupied the same valley.
The Turkish army extended in front of the entire length of the landward
walls. The Turks had dug a trench for their own defence in front of the
whole of their line, and had placed a wooden palisade upon the earth thus
dug out. This was quite near the edge of the foss itself and was pierced at
intervals, so that, while it protected the besiegers, it also allowed them to
keep up a constant fire on the besieged.253
On the Marmora the walls were to be watched by the fleet under Baltoglu
from the southern end of the landward walls, round the present Seraglio
Point as far as Neorion, which was near the end of the boom. The main
object of the fleet was, however, to force an entry into the harbour, and for
this purpose to capture or destroy the ships at the boom, an object which
Baltoglu attempted to attain from the very commencement of the siege.254
The city was thus under attack on two sides, the third—namely, that looking
over the Golden Horn—protected by the boom, was for the present
inaccessible to the Turkish fleet.
The difficulty of determining the number and disposition of Mahomet’s
cannon opposite the landward walls arises from the fact that the position of
several of them was changed and that their numbers possibly varied.
Phrantzes mentions fourteen batteries along the length of the wall, each

containing four guns. Barbaro speaks of nine batteries. Montaldo says that
the Turks had in all two hundred guns or ‘torments.’255 Each of the nine
batteries was strengthened by the addition of a heavy gun. Critobulus
represents Mahomet as stating after his guns had done their work that he
had opened a way into the city at three places, and this declaration affords a
safe guide to the general disposition of the cannon. These were, first,
between the present Tekfour Serai and the Adrianople Gate; second,
opposite or near the Pempton or Gate of the Assault (usually spoken of by
contemporaries as the Romanus Gate256) in the Lycus valley, and the last
near the Third Military Gate between the Pegè or Silivria Gate, and the
Rhegium Gate, now called Mevlevihana Capou. Here were the three
principal stations of Mahomet’s cannon. At these three places the ruined
condition of the wall bears testimony to the vigorous attack of cannon. At
them and nowhere else is it possible to pass over the foss, the breastwork
and Outer Wall, and to see that the Inner Wall has been so broken down that
a passage into the city was possible.257
Three cannon are especially remembered on account of their great size.
According to Leonard, the largest—that, namely, cast by Urban, which
threw a ball of twelve hundred pounds weight—was first placed at
Caligaria258 which then, as now, was ‘protected neither by a foss nor by a
front wall.’ It was destroyed either by the besieged or through an accident
by which Urban was killed, after it had done considerable damage to the
walls.259 It was, however, recast and transferred to the Lycus valley, where
it demolished the Bactatinean tower.260 The statement of Chalcondylas is
that of these three large guns one was stationed opposite the Imperial
Palace, probably at Caligaria, the second opposite the Romanus Gate, where
the sultan had fixed his camp, and the third between them.261
The largest and most powerful gun remained during the siege at the
Mesoteichion, in front of the imperial tent.262
These cannon are variously described as bombards, machines, skeves,
helepoles (or ‘takers of cities’), torments, heleboles, and teleboles. They
threw stone balls of great size. The balls had been brought from the Black
Sea. The largest, says Chalcondylas, was fired seven times a day and once
each night. Archbishop Leonard states that he measured one which had
been fired over the wall, and found it to be eleven spans (or eighty-eight

inches) in circumference. Nor is such measurement exaggerated. Some of
the stone balls have been preserved. They were probably fired over the wall,
did not break, and remain nearly in the position where they fell. I have
measured two of them, and they are exactly eighty-eight inches in
circumference.263 Tetaldi states that there were ten thousand culverins, and
the same number is given by Montaldo. The number is possibly
exaggerated. Yet Leonard speaks of ‘innumerable machines’ being
advanced towards the wall, and afterwards of a great number of small guns
being employed to batter the walls along all their lines. None of the cannon,
I think, were mounted on wheels: the Great Cannon certainly was not, for
Critobulus describes how it was first carefully pointed towards the object
intended to be struck, and then embedded in its position with blocks of
wood preparatory to firing.
Contemporaneously with the disposal of the large cannon, orders were
given to fill up the ditch in front of them.

When we turn from the preparations made by Mahomet to besiege the city
to those which the emperor and the citizens had made or
were making, the first point which strikes us is the Constantine’s army.
enormous disparity in numbers which the respective
leaders had under them. To meet the mighty host of trained warriors under
Mahomet, the emperor had only about eight thousand men. This is the
estimate in which nearly all writers concur. Phrantzes had exceptional
means of forming a judgment on this point. He states264 that Constantine
ordered a census to be made of all men, including monks, capable of
bearing arms, and that when the lists were sent in he was charged with
making the summary. This showed that there were four thousand nine
hundred and eighty-three available Greeks and scarcely two thousand
foreigners. The result was so appalling that he was charged by the emperor
not to let it be known. The estimate made by Phrantzes, though almost
incredible, is substantially confirmed by other writers. Tetaldi says that
there were between six thousand and seven thousand combatants within the
city ‘and not more.’265 Leonard makes the number a little higher and gives
as an estimate six thousand Greeks and three thousand foreigners. Dolfin,
probably following Leonard, arrives at a like conclusion. Ducas says that
‘there were not more than eight thousand.’

The powerful contingent of three thousand Italians is worthy of separate
notice. Nearly all were of Venetian or Genoese origin. In them the city had
the aid of men belonging to the most virile communities in the
Mediterranean. The story of the trading establishments in the Levant, the
Archipelago, and the Black Sea belonging to the citizens of Venice and
Genoa is a brilliant record of daring, of adventure, and of energy. The
expansion of the two states began about the time of the Latin conquest.
Everywhere along these shores are the remains of castles built by Genoese
or Venetians during the two centuries preceding the Moslem conquest.
Dandolo had played the most important part in the capture of the city in
1204, and the capture gave Venice the sovereignty of the seas. The Genoese
had aided the Greeks to recapture the city. Each republic had gained
territory in Eastern lands. Each owned certain islands in the Aegean. The
Genoese had succeeded in forming a large and important colony in Galata,
which was now a fortified city. To check Turkish progress was almost as
important to the republics as to the Greeks. Venetians and Genoese
recognised that once Constantinople was in the hands of the sultan, there
would be an end of their development eastward of Cape Matapan. They
were, therefore, both fighting for their own interests. They had much to lose
and nothing to gain by the success of Mahomet. Nor were the soldiers of the
republics destitute of chivalrous spirit. The rough sailor-surgeon, Barbaro,
notes that other Venetians as well as Trevisano were willing to fight for the
honour of God and the benefit of Christendom. Leonard and other writers
testify to equally lofty sentiment on the part of the Genoese Justiniani. In
their character and conduct, not less than in their mixed motives, derived
from self-interest and chivalry, these foreign adventurers remind English
readers of the Drakes, Frobishers, Raleighs, and other heroes of our own
Elizabethan period. Unhappily for the city and for civilisation, Venice was
unable to send more men before the final catastrophe. But to the eternal
glory of the Venetians within the city, whose names are duly recorded by
Barbaro ‘for a perpetual memorial,’ and of the Genoese who aided them, the
conduct of the combatants from both republics was worthy of the
compatriots of Marco Polo and of Columbus.

On the one side was an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men,
containing at least twelve thousand of the best trained troops in the world;