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Title: The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914

Author: Edwin A. Pratt

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RISE OF
RAIL-POWER IN WAR AND CONQUEST, 1833-1914 ***

RISE OF RAIL POWER
IN WAR & CONQUEST
1833-1914

THE
RISE OF RAIL-POWER

IN WAR AND CONQUEST
1833-1914

WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY

BY

EDWIN A. PRATT
Author of "A History of Inland Transport,"

"Railways and their Rates," etc.

LONDON
P. S. KING & SON, LTD.
ORCHARD HOUSE
WESTMINSTER

1915

CONTENTS.

CHAP. PAGE
I A New Factor 1
II Railways in the Civil War 14
III Railway Destruction in War 26
IV Control of Railways in War 40
V Protection of Railways in War 54
VI Troops and Supplies 62
VII Armoured Trains 67
VIII Railway Ambulance Transport 81
IX Preparation in Peace for War 98
X Organisation in Germany 103
XI Railway Troops in Germany 122
XII France and the War of 1870-71 138
XIII Organisation in France 149
XIVOrganisation in England 175
XV Military Railways 205
XVI Railways in the Boer War 232
XVII The Russo-Japanese War 260
XVIII Strategical Railways: Germany 277
XIXA German-African Empire 296
XX Designs on Asiatic Turkey 331
XXI Summary and Conclusions 345
Appendix
Indian Frontier Railways 357
The Defence of Australia 368
Bibliography 376
Index 398

PREFATORY NOTE.
The extent to which railways are being used in the present War of the
Nations has taken quite by surprise a world whose military historians, in
their accounts of what armies have done or have failed to do on the battle-
field in the past, have too often disregarded such matters of detail as to how
the armies got there and the possible effect of good or defective transport
conditions, including the maintenance of supplies and communications, on
the whole course of a campaign.
In the gigantic struggle now proceeding, these matters of detail are found to
be of transcendant importance. The part which railways are playing in the
struggle has, indeed—in keeping with the magnitude of the struggle itself—
assumed proportions unexampled in history. Whilst this is so it is,
nevertheless, a remarkable fact that although much has been said as to the
conditions of military unpreparedness in which the outbreak of hostilities in
August, 1914, found the Allies, there has, so far as I am aware, been no
suggestion of any inability on the part of the railways to meet, at once, from
the very moment war was declared, all the requirements of military
transport. In this respect, indeed, the organisation, the preparedness, and the
efficiency throughout alike of the British and of the French railways have
been fully equal to those of the German railways themselves.
As regards British conditions, especially, much interest attaches to some
remarks made by Sir Charles Owens, formerly General Manager of the
London and South Western Railway Company, in the course of an address
delivered by him to students of the London School of Economics on
October 12, 1914. He told how, some five or six years ago, he had met at a
social function the Secretary of State for War, who, after dinner, took him
aside and asked, "Do you think in any emergency which might arise in this
country the railways would be able to cope with it adequately?" To this
question Sir Charles replied, "I will stake my reputation as a railway man
that the country could not concentrate men and materials half so fast as the
railways could deal with them; but the management of the railways must be
left in the hands of railway men." We have here an affirmation and a

proviso. That the affirmation was warranted has been abundantly proved by
what the British railways have accomplished in the emergency that has
arisen. The special significance of the proviso will be understood in the
light of what I record in the present work concerning the control of railways
in war.
Taking the railways of all the countries, whether friends or foes, concerned
in the present World-War, and assuming, for the sake of argument, that all,
without exception, have accomplished marvels in the way of military
transport, one must, nevertheless, bear in mind two important
considerations:—
(1) That, apart from the huge proportions of the scale upon which, in the
aggregate, the railways are being required to serve military purposes, the
present conflict, in spite of its magnitude, has thus far produced no
absolutely new factor in the employment of railways for war except as
regards the use of air-craft for their destruction.
(2) That when hostilities were declared in August, 1914, the subject of the
employment of railways for the purposes of war had already been under the
consideration of railway and military experts in different countries for no
fewer than eighty years, during which period, and as the result of vast study,
much experience, and many blunders in or between wars in various parts of
the world, there had been slowly evolved certain fixed principles and, also,
subject to constant amendments, a recognised and comprehensive
organisation which, accepted more or less completely by the leading
nations, with modifications to suit their national circumstances and
conditions, was designed to meet all contingencies, to provide, as far as
human foresight could suggest, for all possible difficulties, and be capable
of application instantly the need for it might arise.
The time has not yet come for telling all that the railways have thus far done
during the war which has still to be fought out. That story, in the words of a
railway man concerned therein, is at present "a sealed book." Meanwhile,
however, it is desirable that the position as defined in the second of the two
considerations given above should be fully realised, in order that what the
railways and, so far as they have been aided by them, the combatants, have
accomplished or are likely to accomplish may be better understood when
the sealed book becomes an open one.

If, as suggested at the outset, the world has already been taken by surprise
even by what the railways are known to have done, it may be still more
surprised to learn (as the present work will show) that the construction of
railways for strategical purposes was advocated in Germany as early as
1833; that in 1842 a scheme was elaborated for covering Germany with a
network of strategical railways which, while serving the entire country,
would more especially allow of war being conducted on two fronts—France
and Russia—at the same time; and that in the same year (1842) attention
was already being called in the French Chamber to the "aggressive lines"
which Germany was building in the direction of France, while predictions
were also being made that any new invasion of France by Germany would
be between Metz and Strasburg.
If, again, it is found that a good deal of space is devoted in the present work
to the War of Secession, criticism may, perhaps, be disarmed by the
explanation that the American Civil War was practically the beginning of
things as regards the scientific use of railways for war, and that many of the
problems connected therewith were either started in the United States or
were actually worked out there, precedents being established and examples
being set which the rest of the world had simply to follow, adapt or perfect.
The possibility of carrying on warfare at a great distance from the base of
supplies by means of even a single line of single-track railway; the creation
of an organised corps for the restoration, operation or destruction of
railways; the control of railways in war by the railway or the military
interests independently or jointly; the question as to when the railway could
be used to advantage and when it would be better for the troops to march;
the use of armoured trains; the evolution of the ambulance or the hospital
train—all these, and many other matters besides, are to be traced back to the
American Civil War of 1861-65, and are dealt with herein at what, it is
hoped, will be found not undue length.
As for the building up of the subsequent organisation in Europe—Germany,
France and England being the countries selected for special treatment in
relation thereto—this, also, has had to be described with some regard for
detail; and, incidentally, it is shown (1) that the alleged perfection of
Germany's arrangements when she went to war with France in 1870-71 is
merely one of the fictions of history, so far as her military rail-transport was
concerned; (2) that France learned the bitter lesson taught her by the

deplorable and undeniable imperfections of her own transport system—or
no-system—on that occasion, and at once set about the creation of what was
to become an organisation of the most complete and comprehensive
character; and (3) that the "beginning of things" in England, in the way of
employing railways for the purposes of war, was the direct outcome of the
conditions of semi-panic created here in 1859 by what was regarded as the
prospect of an early invasion of this country by France, coupled with the
then recognised deficiencies of our means of national defence.
Military railways, as employed in the Crimean War, the Abyssinian
Campaign, the Franco-German War, the Russo-Turkish War and the Sudan
are described; a detailed account is given of the use of railways in the Boer
War and the Russo-Japanese War; and this is followed by a description of
the strategical railways constructed in Germany for the purpose of
facilitating war on the possessions of her neighbours.
Chapters XIX and XX deal with the building of railways which, whether
avowedly strategical or what I have described as "economic-political-
strategical," are intended to effect the purposes of conquest, with or without
the accompaniment of war. The former of these two chapters, which shows
how, with the help of railways, Germany proposed to transform the African
continent into an African Empire of her own, should be found deserving of
notice, and especially so in view of the statements quoted (p. 311) as having
been made by German officers in what was then German South-West
Africa, to the effect that the main objective of Germany in going to war
would be the conquest of Africa, "the smashing up of France and Great
Britain" being regarded only as "incidents" which, followed by seizure of
the possessions of the smaller Powers, would make Germany the supreme
Power in Africa, and lead to the whole African continent becoming a
German possession.
From Chapter XX the reader will learn how Germany proposed to employ
railways for the furthering of her aims against, not only Asiatic Turkey, but
Egypt and India, as well.
The subsidiary articles on "Indian Frontier Railways" and "The Defence of
Australia" have no direct bearing on that evolution of rail-power in warfare
with which it is the special purpose of the present volume to deal; but in the
belief that they are of interest and importance in themselves, from the point

of view of the general question, they have been given in an Appendix. The
difficulties and other conditions under which the Sind-Pishin State Railway,
designed to serve strategical purposes, was built to the frontiers of
Afghanistan are unexampled in the history either of railways or of war. As
regards Australia, the gravity of the position there was well indicated by
Lord Kitchener when he wrote of the lines running inland that they were "of
little use for defence, although possibly of considerable value to an enemy
who would have temporary command of the sea."
At the end of the volume there is a Bibliography of books, pamphlets and
review or other articles relating to the use of railways for the purposes of
war. In the first instance this compilation was based on a "List of
References" prepared by the American Bureau of Railway Economics; but,
while many items on that list have here been omitted, a considerable
number of others have been inserted from other sources. The Bibliography
is not offered as being in any way complete, but it may, nevertheless, be of
advantage to students desirous of making further researches into the matters
of history here specially treated.
The assistance rendered in other ways by the American Bureau of Railway
Economics in the preparation of the present work has been most helpful. In
the writing of the chapters concerning German designs on Africa, Asia
Minor, etc., the resources of the well-arranged and admirably-indexed
library of the Royal Colonial Institute have been of great service. I have,
also, to express cordial acknowledgments to the General Managers and
other officers of various leading railway companies for information given
respecting the organisation of railways in this country for military purposes.
EDWIN A. PRATT.
November, 1915.

The Rise of Rail-Power in
War and Conquest

CHAPTER I
A New Factor
While the original purpose of railways was to promote the arts of peace, the
wide scope of their possibilities in the direction, also, of furthering the arts
of war began to be realised at a very early date after their success in the
former capacity had been assured in Great Britain.
Already the canal system had introduced an innovation which greatly
impressed the British public. In December, 1806, a considerable body of
troops went by barge on the Paddington Canal from London to Liverpool,
en route for Dublin, relays of fresh horses for the canal boats being
provided at all the stages in order to facilitate the transport; and in referring
to this event The Times of December 19, 1806, remarked:—"By this mode
of conveyance the men will be only seven days in reaching Liverpool, and
with comparatively little fatigue, as it would take them above fourteen days
to march that distance."
But when, on the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, in
1830, a British regiment was conveyed thereon, in two hours, a journey of
thirty-four miles, which they would have required two days to accomplish
on foot, far-seeing men became still more impressed, and began to realise
that there had, indeed, been introduced a new factor destined to exercise a
powerful influence on the future conduct of war.
The geographical position of the United Kingdom led, in those early days,
to greater importance being attached to the conveniences of railways as a
means of transport than to their actual strategical and tactical advantages;
and the issue by the War Office, in 1846, of a "Regulation Relative to the
Conveyance of Her Majesty's Forces, their Baggage and Stores, by Rail,"
may have appeared to meet the requirements of the immediate situation, so
far as this country was concerned.
On the Continent of Europe, however, the rivalry of nations divided from
one another only by a more or less uncertain or varying frontier, and still

powerfully influenced by the recollection of recent conflicts, resulted in
much greater attention being paid to the possibilities of the new
development.
The first definite proposals for the use of railways for strategical purposes
were advanced, as early as 1833, by Friedrich Wilhelm Harkort, a
Westphalian worthy who came to be better known in his native land as "Der
alte Harkort." A participant in the Napoleonic wars, he had subsequently
shown great energy and enterprise in the development of steam engines,
hydraulic presses, iron-making, and other important industries in Germany;
he had been the first writer in that country to give an account—as he did in
1825—of the progress England was making in respect to railways and
steamships; and he had, in 1826, placed a working model of a railway in the
garden of the Elberfeld Museum. These various efforts he followed up, in
1833, by bringing forward in the Westphalian Landtag a scheme for the
building of a railway to connect the Weser and the Lippe. Later in the same
year he published "Die Eisenbahn von Minden nach Köln," in which he laid
special stress on the value to Germany of the proposed line from a military
point of view. With the help of such a railway, he argued, it would be
possible to concentrate large bodies of troops at a given point much more
speedily than if they marched by road; he made calculations as to what the
actual saving in time, as well as in physical strain, would be in transporting
Prussian troops from various specified centres to others; and he proceeded:
—

Let us suppose that we had a railway and a telegraph line on the right
bank of the Rhine, from Mainz to Wesel. Any crossing of the Rhine by
the French would then scarcely be possible, since we should be able to
bring a strong defensive force on the spot before the attempt could be
developed.
These things may appear very strange to-day; yet in the womb of the
future there slumbers the seed of great developments in railways, the
results of which it is, as yet, quite beyond our powers to foresee.

Harkort's proposals gave rise to much vigorous controversy in Germany.
The official classes condemned as "nonsensical fancies" his ideas, not only
as to the usefulness of railways for the conveyance of troops, but, also, as to

the utility of railways for any practical purposes whatever; and
contemporary newspapers and periodicals, in turn, made him the butt of
their ridicule.
The pros and cons of the use of railways for military purposes were, none
the less, actively discussed in numerous pamphlets and treatises. Just as, in
France, General Rumigny, adjutant to Louis-Philippe, had already
foreshadowed the possibility of a sudden invasion by a German army
reaching the frontier by rail, so, also, in Germany, in the words of one
writer at this period, "anxious spirits shudder at the thought that, some fine
spring morning, a hundred thousand Frenchmen, thirsting for war, will
suddenly invade our peaceful valleys at bird-like speed, thanks to the new
means of locomotion, and begin their old game (das alte Spiel) over again."
On the other hand there were military sceptics—such as the author of a
pamphlet "Uber die Militärische Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Berlin,
1836)—who, basing their calculations on locomotive performances up to
that date, asserted that, although the railway might be of service in the
conveyance of supplies, guns and ammunition, it would be of no advantage
in the transport of troops. These, they declared, would get to their
destination sooner if they marched.[1]
The most noticeable of the various publications issued in Germany at this
period was a book by Carl Eduard Pönitz ("Pz."), which appeared at Adorf,
Saxony, in 1842, under the title of "Die Eisenbahnen als militärische
Operationslinien betrachtet, und durch Beispiele erlaütert." The writer of
this remarkable book (of which a second edition was issued in 1853) gave a
comprehensive survey of the whole situation in regard to railways and war,
so far as the subject could be dealt with in the light of railway developments
and of actual experiences of troop movements by rail down to that time; and
he argued strongly in favour of the advantages to be derived from the
employment of railways for military purposes. He even suggested that, in
the event of an inadequate supply of locomotives, or of operations having to
be conducted in a mountainous country where locomotives could not be
used for heavy traffic, the troops might still use their own horses to draw
the coaches and wagons along the railway lines, so that the men would
arrive fresh and fit for immediate fighting at the end of their journey.
Describing railways as the most powerful vehicle for the advancement of
"Kultur" since the invention of printing, Pönitz showed how Belgium and

Saxony were the two countries which had taken the initiative in railway
construction on the Continent of Europe; and his references to the former
country are especially deserving of being recalled, in view of recent events.
He pointed to the good example which had been set by the "far-sighted and
energetic" King of the Belgians, and continued:—

Although, in a land torn asunder by revolutionary factions, many
wounds were still bleeding; and although the newly-created kingdom
was threatened by foes within and without and could organise means
of resistance only with great difficulty, there was, nevertheless, taken
in hand a scheme for the construction of a network of railways
designed to extend over the entire country, while at the present
moment the greater part of that scheme has, in fact, been carried out.
In this way King Leopold has raised up for himself a memorial the full
value and significance of which may, perhaps, be appreciated only by
generations yet to come.

While Belgium was thus shown to have been setting a good example, the
only railways which Prussia then had in actual operation (apart from the
Berlin-Stettin and the Berlin-Breslau lines, which had been begun, and
others which had been projected) were the Berlin-Potsdam and the Berlin-
Magdeburg-Leipzig lines; though Saxony had the Leipzig-Dresden line, and
Bavaria the Nüremberg-Fürth and the Munich-Augsburg lines. Pönitz,
however, excused the backwardness of Prussia on the ground that if her
Government had refused, for a long time, to sanction various projected
railways, or had imposed heavy obligations in regard to them, such action
was due, not to prejudice, but to "a wise foresight"—meaning, presumably,
that Prussia was waiting to profit by the experience that other countries
were gaining at their own cost.
Having dealt with all the arguments he could advance in favour of the
general principle of employing railways for military purposes, Pönitz
proceeded to elaborate a scheme for the construction of a network of
strategical lines serving the whole of Germany, though intended, more
especially, to protect her frontiers against attack by either France or Russia.
Without, he said, being in the secrets of international politics, he thought he
might safely presume that Germany's only fear of attack was from one of
these two directions; and, although the relations of the Great Powers of

Europe were then peaceful, a continuance of those conditions could not, of
course, be guaranteed. So, he proceeded—

We have to look to these two fronts; and, if we want to avoid the risk
of heavy losses at the outset, we needs must—also at the outset—be
prepared to meet the enemy there with an overwhelming force. Every
one knows that the strength of an army is multiplied by movements
which are rapid in themselves and allow of the troops arriving at the
end of their journey without fatigue.

In a powerful appeal—based on motives alike of patriotism, of national
defence and of economic advantage—that his fellow-countrymen should
support the scheme he thus put forward, Pönitz once more pointed to
Belgium, saying:—

The youngest of all the European States has given us an example of
what can be done by intelligence and good will. The network of
Belgian railways will be of as much advantage in advancing the
industries of that country as it will be in facilitating the defence of the
land against attack by France. It will increase alike Belgium's
prosperity and Belgium's security. And we Germans, who place so
high a value on our intelligence, and are scarcely yet inclined to
recognise the political independence of the Belgian people, shall we
remain so blind as not to see what is needed for our own safety?

Pönitz could not, of course, anticipate in 1842 that the time would come
when his country, acting to the full on the advice he was then giving, would
have her strategic railways, not only to the French and the Russian, but,
also, to the Belgian frontier, and would use those in the last-mentioned
direction to crush remorselessly the little nation concerning which he
himself was using words of such generous sympathy and approbation.
The ideas and proposals put forward by Pönitz (of whose work a French
translation, under the title of "Essai sur les Chemins de Fer, considérés
commes lignes d'opérations militaires," was published by L. A. Unger in
Paris, in 1844) did much to stimulate the discussion of the general question,
while the military authorities of Germany were moved to make
investigations into it on their own account, there being issued in Berlin,

about 1848 or 1850, a "Survey of the Traffic and Equipment of German and
of neighbouring foreign Railways for military purposes, based on
information collected by the Great General Staff."[2]
In France, also, there were those who, quite early in the days of the new
means of transport, predicted the important service it was likely to render
for the purposes of war no less than for those of peace.
General Lamarque declared in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1832, or
1833, that the strategical use of railways would lead to "a revolution in
military science as great as that which had been brought about by the use of
gunpowder."
At the sitting of the Chamber on May 25, 1833, M. de Bérigny, in urging
the "incontestable" importance of railways, said:—

From the point of view of national defence, what advantages do they
not present! An army, with all its material, could, in a few days, be
transported from the north to the south, from the east to the west, of
France. If a country could thus speedily carry considerable masses of
troops to any given point on its frontiers, would it not become
invincible, and would it not, also, be in a position to effect great
economies in its military expenditure?

In a further debate on June 8, 1837, M. Dufaure declared that railways had a
greater mission to fulfil than that of offering facilities to industry or than
that of conferring benefits on private interests. Was it a matter of no
account, he asked, that they should be able in one night to send troops to all
the frontiers of France, from Paris to the banks of the Rhine, from Lyons to
the foot of the Alps, with an assurance of their arriving fresh and ready for
combat?
Then, in 1842, M. Marschall, advocating the construction of a line from
Paris to Strasburg, predicted that any new invasion of France by Germany
would most probably be attempted between Metz and Strasburg. He further
said:—

It is there that the German Confederation is converging a formidable
system of railways from Cologne, Mayence and Mannheim.... Twenty-
four hours will suffice for our neighbours to concentrate on the Rhine

the forces of Prussia, Austria and the Confederation, and on the
morrow an army of 400,000 men could invade our territory by that
breach of forty leagues between Thionville and Lauterburg, which are
the outposts of Strasburg and Metz. Three months later, the reserve
system organised in Prussia and in some of the other German States
would allow of a second Army being sent of equal force to the other.
The title of "aggressive lines" given by our neighbours to these
railways leave us with no room for doubt as to their intentions. Studies
for an expedition against Paris by way of Lorraine and Champagne can
hardly be regarded as indicative of a sentiment of fraternity.

France, however, had no inclination at that time to build railways designed
to serve military purposes, whether from the point of view of aggression or
even from that of national defence; so that in a letter to his brother Ludwig,
written April 13, 1844, von Moltke, then a member of the General Staff of
the Fourth Army Corps of the Prussian Army, declared that whilst Germany
was building railways, the French Chamber was only discussing them. This
was so far the case that when, later on, Germany had nearly 3,300 miles of
railway France was operating only a little over 1,000 miles.
Apart from the experiences, on quite a small scale, which had been obtained
on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, the earliest example of what
railways could do in the transport of large bodies of troops was afforded in
1846, when Prussia's Sixth Army Corps—consisting of over 12,000 men,
together with horses, guns, road vehicles and ammunition—was moved by
rail, upon two lines, to Cracow. In 1849 a Russian corps of 30,000 men,
with all its equipment, was taken by rail from its cantonments in Poland to
Göding, Moravia, whence it effected a junction with the Austrian army.
There was, also, a certain movement of German troops by rail to Schleswig-
Holstein in the troubles of 1848-50; but of greater importance than these
other instances was the transport of an Austrian army of 75,000 men, 8,000
horses and 1,000 vehicles from Vienna and Hungary to the Silesian frontier
in the early winter of 1850.
It is true that, owing to the combined disadvantages of single-line railways,
inadequate staff and rolling stock, unfavourable weather, lack of previous
preparations and of transport regulations, and delays from various
unforeseen causes, no fewer than twenty-six days were occupied in the

transport, although the journey was one of only about 150 miles. It was,
also, admitted that the troops could have marched the distance in the same
time. All the same, as told by Regierungsrat Wernekke,[3] the movement of
so large a body of troops by rail at all was regarded as especially
instructive. It was the cause of greater attention being paid to the use of
railways for military purposes, while it further led (1) to the drawing up, in
May, 1851, of a scheme for the construction throughout the Austrian
monarchy of railways from the special point of view of strategical
requirements; and (2) to a reorganisation of the methods hitherto adopted
for the transport of troops by rail, the result being that the next considerable
movement in Austria—in the year 1853—was conducted with
"unprecedented regularity and efficiency," and this, also, without any
cessation of the ordinary traffic of the lines concerned.
In 1851 a further striking object lesson of the usefulness of railways was
afforded by the moving of a division of 14,500 men, with nearly 2,000
horses, 48 guns and 464 vehicles, from Cracow to Hradish, a distance of
187 miles, in two days. Reckoning that a large column of troops, with all its
impedimenta, would march twelve miles per day, and allowing for one day's
rest in seven, the movement would, in this instance, have occupied fifteen
days by road instead of two days by rail.
It was in the Italian campaign of 1859 that railways first played a
conspicuous part in actual warfare, both strategically and tactically. "In this
campaign," said Major Millar, R.A., V.C., of the Topographical Staff, in two
lectures delivered by him at the Royal United Service Institution in 1861[4]
—

Railways assisted the ordinary means of locomotion hitherto employed
by armies. By them thousands of men were carried daily through
France to Toulon, Marseilles, or the foot of Mont Cenis; by them
troops were hastened up to the very fields of battle; and by them
injured men were brought swiftly back to the hospitals, still groaning
in the first agony of their wounds. Moreover, the railway cuttings,
embankments and bridges presented features of importance equal or
superior to the ordinary accidents of the ground, and the possession of
which was hotly contested. If you go to Magenta you will see, close to
the railway platform on which you alight, an excavation full of rough

mounds and simple black crosses, erected to mark the resting-places of
many hundred men who fell in the great fight. This first employment
of railways in close connection with vast military operations would
alone be enough to give a distinction to this campaign in military
history.

The French railways, especially, attained a remarkable degree of success. In
eighty-six days—from April 19 to July 15—they transported an aggregate
of 604,000 men and over 129,000 horses, including nearly 228,000 men and
37,000 horses sent to Culox, Marseilles, Toulon, Grenoble and Aix by lines
in the south-east. The greatest movements took place during the ten days
from April 20 to April 30, when the Paris-Lyons Company, without
interrupting the ordinary traffic, conveyed an average per day of 8,421 men
and 512 horses. On April 25, a maximum of 12,138 men and 655 horses
was attained. During the eighty-six days there were run on the lines of the
same company a total of 2,636 trains, including 253 military specials. It was
estimated that the 75,966 men and 4,469 horses transported by rail from
Paris to the Mediterranean or to the frontiers of the Kingdom of Sardinia
between April 20 and April 30 would have taken sixty days to make the
journey by road. In effect, the rate of transit by rail was six times greater
than the rate of progress by marching would have been, and this, again, was
about double as fast as the best achievement recorded up to that time on the
German railways. The Chasseurs de Vincennes are described as leaving the
station at Turin full of vigour and activity, and with none of the fatigue or
the reduction in numbers which would have occurred had they made the
journey by road.
As against, however, the advantage thus gained by the quicker transport of
the French troops to the seat of war, due to the successful manner in which
the railways were operated, there had to be set some serious defects in
administrative organisation. When the men got to the end of their rail
journey there was a more or less prolonged waiting for the food and other
necessaries which were to follow. There were grave deficiencies, also, in
the dispatch of the subsequent supplies. On June 25, the day after the defeat
of the Austrians, the French troops had no provisions at all for twenty-four
hours, except some biscuits which were so mouldy that no one could eat
them. Their horses, also, were without fodder. In these circumstances it was
impossible to follow up the Austrians in their retreat beyond the Mincio.

Thus the efficiency of the French railways was to a large extent negatived
by the inefficiency of the military administration; and in these respects
France had a foretaste, in 1859, of experiences to be repeated on a much
graver scale in the Franco-German War of 1870-71.
As regards the Austrians, they improved but little on their admittedly poor
performance in 1850, in spite of the lessons they appeared to have learned
as the result of their experiences on that occasion. Government and railways
were alike unprepared. Little or no real attempt at organisation in time of
peace had been made, and, in the result, trains were delayed or blocked, and
stations got choked with masses of supplies which could not be forwarded.
At Vienna there was such a deficiency of rolling stock—accelerated by
great delays in the return of empties—that many of the troop trains for the
South could not be made up until the last moment. Even then the average
number of men they conveyed did not exceed about 360. At Laibach there
was much congestion because troops had to wait there for instructions as to
their actual destination. Other delays occurred because, owing to the heavy
gradients of the Semmering Pass, each train had to be divided into three
sections before it could proceed. Between, again, Innsbruck and Bozen the
railway was still incomplete, and the First Corps (about 40,000 men and
10,000 horses) had to march between these two points on their journey from
Prague to Verona. Notwithstanding this fact, it was estimated that they
covered in fourteen days a journey which would have taken sixty-four days
if they had marched all the way. From Vienna to Lombardy the Third Army
Corps (20,000 men, 5,500 horses, with guns, ammunition and 300 wagons)
was carried by rail in fourteen days, the rate of progress attained being four
and a half times greater than by road marching, though still inferior by one
and a half times to what the French troop-trains had accomplished.
On both sides important reinforcements were brought up at critical periods
during the progress of the war. Referring to the attacks by the allies on
Casteggio and Montebello, Count Gyulai, the Austrian General, wrote:
—"The enemy soon displayed a superior force, which was continually
increased by arrivals from the railway"; and the special correspondent of
The Times, writing from Pavia on May 21, 1859, said:—

From the heights of Montebello the Austrians beheld a novelty in the
art of war. Train after train arrived by railway from Voghera, each train

disgorging its hundreds of armed men and immediately hastening back
for more. In vain Count Stadion endeavoured to crush the force behind
him before it could be increased enough to overpower him.

Then, also, the good use made of the railways by the allies in carrying out
their important flanking movement against the Austrians at Vercelli gave
further evidence of the fact that rail-power was a new force which could be
employed, not alone for the earlier concentration of troops at the seat of
war, but, also, in support of strategic developments on the battle-field itself.
Commenting on this fact the Spectateur Militaire said, in its issue for
September, 1869:—

Les chemins de fer ont joué un rôle immense dans cette concentration.
C'est la première fois que, dans l'histoire militaire, ils servent d'une
manière aussi merveilleuse et entrent dans les combinaisons
stratégiques.

While these observations were fully warranted by the results accomplished
in regard to concentration, reinforcements and tactical movements by rail,
the campaign also brought out more clearly than ever before the need, if
railways were to fulfil their greatest possible measure of utility in time of
war, of working out in advance all important details likely to arise in
connection with the movement of troops, instead—as in the case of the
Austrians, at least—of neglecting any serious attempt at organisation until
the need arose for immediate action.
From all these various points of view the Italian campaign of 1859 marked
a further important stage in the early development of that new factor which
the employment of railways for the purposes of warfare represented; though
far greater results in the same direction were to be brought about, shortly
afterwards, by the American Civil War of 1861-65. Not only does the real
development of rail-power as a new arm in war date therefrom, but the War
of Secession was to establish in a pre-eminent degree (1) the possibility,
through the use of railways, of carrying on operations at a considerable
distance from the base of supplies; (2) the need of a special organisation to
deal alike with restoration of railway lines destroyed by the enemy and with
the interruption, in turn, of the enemy's own communications; and (3) the
difficulties that may arise as between the military element and the technical

(railway) element in regard to the control and operation of railways during
war. To each of these subjects it is proposed to devote a separate chapter.

FOOTNOTES:
[1] In 1847 one of the leading military writers in Germany published a pamphlet
in which he sought to prove that the best-organised railway could not carry
10,000 Infantry a distance equal to sixty English miles in twenty-four hours. As
for the conveyance of Cavalry and Artillery by train, he declared that this would
be a sheer impossibility.
[2] "Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den inländischen und
den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen für militärischen Zwecke; nach
dem beim grossen Generalstabe vorhanden Materialen zusammen gestellt."
[3] "Die Mitwirkung der Eisenbahn an den Kriegen in Mitteleuropa." "Archiv
für Eisenbahnwesen," Juli und August, 1912.
[4] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," vol. v, pp. 269-308.
London, 1861.

CHAPTER II
Railways in the Civil War
Such were the conditions under which the War of Secession in the United
States was fought that without the help of railways it could hardly have
been fought at all.
The area of the military operations, from first to last, was equal in extent
almost to the whole of Europe. The line of separation between the rival
forces of North and South was fully 2,000 miles. Large portions of this
region were then unexplored. Everywhere, except in the towns, it was but
thinly populated. Civilisation had not yet progressed so far that an
advancing army could always depend on being able to "live on the country."
There were occasions when local supplies of food and forage were so
difficult of attainment that an army might be wholly dependent on a base
hundreds of miles distant from the scene of its operations.
Of roads and tracks throughout this vast area there were but few, and these
were mostly either indifferent or bad, even if they did not become positively
execrable in wet weather or after a considerable force of troops had passed
along them. In the low-lying districts, especially, the alluvial undrained soil
was speedily converted by the winter floods into swamps and lakes. Further
difficulties in the movement of troops were offered by pathless forests as
large as an English county; and still others by the broad rivers or the
mountain ranges it might be necessary to cross.
Apart from the deficient and defective roads and tracks, the transport
facilities available for the combatants were those afforded by coastal
services, navigable rivers, canals and railways. Of these it was the railways
that played the most important rôle.
The American railway lines of those days had, generally speaking, been
constructed as cheaply as possible by the private enterprise which—though
with liberal grants of land and other advantages—alone undertook their
provision, the main idea being to supply a railway of some sort to satisfy

immediate wants and to improve it later on, when population and traffic
increased and more funds were available. The lines themselves were mostly
single track; the ballasting was too often imperfect; iron rails of inadequate
weight soon wore down and got out of shape; sleepers (otherwise "ties"),
which consisted of logs of wood brought straight from the forests, speedily
became rotten, especially in low-lying districts; while, in the early 'Sixties
lumber, used either in the rough or smoothed on two sides, was still the
customary material for the building of bridges and viaducts carrying the
railways across narrow streams, broad rivers or widespread valleys.
All the same, these railways, while awaiting their later betterment, extended
for long distances, served as a connecting link of inestimable advantage
between the various centres of population and production, and offered in
many instances the only practicable means by which troops and supplies
could be moved. They fulfilled, in fact, purposes of such vital importance
from a strategical point of view that many battles were fought primarily for
the control of particular railways, for the safeguarding of lines of
communication, or for the possession, more especially, of important
junctions, some of which themselves became the base for more or less
distant operations.
The North, bent not simply on invasion but on reconquest of the States
which had seceded, necessarily took the offensive; the South stood mostly
on the defensive. Yet while the population in the North was far in excess of
that in the South, the initial advantages from a transport point of view were
in favour of the South, which found its principal ally in the railways.
Generals in the North are, indeed, said to have been exceedingly chary, at
first, in getting far away from the magazines they depended on for their
supplies; though this uneasiness wore off in proportion as organised effort
showed how successfully the lines of rail communication could be
defended.
In these and other circumstances, and especially in view of the paramount
importance the railway system was to assume in the conduct of the war, the
Federal Government took possession of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and
Baltimore Railway on March 31, 1861. This preliminary measure was
followed by the passing, in January, 1862, by the United States House of
Representatives, of "An Act to authorise the President of the United States

in certain cases to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines, and for
other purposes."
The President, "when in his judgment the public safety may require it," was
"to take possession of any or all the telegraph lines in the United States; ...
to take possession of any or all the railroad lines in the United States, their
rolling stock, their offices, shops, buildings and all their appendages and
appurtenances; to prescribe rules and regulations for the holding, using, and
maintaining of the aforesaid telegraph and railroad lines, and to extend,
repair and complete the same in the manner most conducive to the safety
and interest of the Government; to place under military control all the
officers, agents and employés belonging to the telegraph and railroad lines
thus taken possession of by the President, so that they shall be considered as
a post road and a part of the military establishment of the United States,
subject to all the restrictions imposed by the Rules and Articles of War."
Commissioners were to be appointed to assess and determine the damages
suffered, or the compensation to which any railroad or telegraph company
might be entitled by reason of such seizure of their property; and it was
further enacted "that the transportation of troops, munitions of war,
equipments, military property and stores, throughout the United States,
should be under the immediate control and supervision of the Secretary of
War and such agents as he might appoint."
Thus the Act in question established a precedent for a Government taking
formal possession of, and exercising complete authority and control over,
the whole of such railways as it might require to employ for the purposes of
war; although, in point of fact, only such lines, or portions of lines, were so
taken over by the War Department as were actually required. In each
instance, also, the line or portion of line in question was given back to the
owning company as soon as it was no longer required for military purposes;
while at the conclusion of the war all the lines taken possession of by the
Government were formally restored to their original owners by an
Executive Order dated August 8, 1865.
Under the authority of the Act of January 31, 1862, the following order was
sent to Mr. Daniel Craig McCallum, a native of Johnstone, Renfrewshire,
Scotland, who had been taken to America by his parents when a youth, had
joined the railway service, had held for many years the position of general

superintendent of the Erie Railroad, and was one of the ablest and most
experienced railway men then in the United States:—

War Department.
Washington City, D.C.,
February 11, 1862.
Ordered, That D. C. McCallum be, and he is hereby, appointed
Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in the United States,
with authority to enter upon, take possession of, hold and use all
railroads, engines, cars, locomotives, equipments, appendages and
appurtenances that may be required for the transport of troops, arms,
ammunition and military supplies of the United States, and to do and
perform all acts and things that may be necessary and proper to be
done for the safe and speedy transport aforesaid.
By order of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States.
Edwin M. Stanton,
Secretary of War.

McCallum commenced his duties with the staff rank of Colonel, afterwards
attaining to that of Brev.-Brig.-General. The scope of the authority
conferred on him, under the War Department order of February 11, 1862,
was widened a year later, when he was further appointed general manager
of all railways in possession of the Federal Government, or that might from
time to time be taken possession of by military authority, in the departments
of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and of Arkansas, forming the
"Military Division of the Mississippi."
The total mileage of the lines taken over by the Federal Government during
the course of the war was 2,105, namely, in Virginia, 611 miles; in the
military division of the Mississippi, 1,201; and in North Carolina, 293.
Much more was involved, however, for the Federal Government than a
mere transfer to themselves of the ownership and operation of these lines
for the duration of the war.
One of the greatest disadvantages of the American railways at the time of
the Civil War lay in their differences of gauge. The various companies had

built their lines with gauges chosen either to suit local conditions or
according to the views of their own engineers, with little or no
consideration for the running of through traffic on or from other lines.
There were, in fact, at that time gauges of 6 ft., 5 ft. 6 in., 5 ft., 4 ft. 10 in., 4
ft. 9 in., 4 ft. 8½ in. (the standard English gauge), and various narrower
gauges besides. These conditions prevailed until 1866, when the companies
adopted a uniform gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in.
During the Civil War the lack of uniformity was in full force, and military
transport by rail was greatly complicated in consequence. More than one-
half of the lines taken over and operated had a gauge of 5 ft., and the
remainder had a gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in., except in the case of one short line,
which was 5 ft. 6 in. As locomotives and rolling stock adapted to one gauge
were unsuited to any other, the obligations falling upon the Director and
General Manager of the Federal Military Railways included that of taking
up the lines of certain companies which had adopted the 5 ft. gauge, and
relaying them with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge, so that the same rolling stock
could be used as on lines connecting with them.
Incidentally, therefore, the Civil War in America taught the lesson that the
actual value of rail-power as influencing warfare in one and the same
country, or on one and the same continent, may vary materially according to
whether there is uniformity or diversity of railway gauge.
In certain instances the lines taken possession of were in so defective a
condition that it was imperatively necessary to relay them, apart altogether
from any question of gauge. When McCallum was appointed General
Manager of Military Railways for the Division of the Mississippi, the main
army was at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and its supplies were being received
from Nashville, 151 miles distant, over the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad. This was necessarily the main line of supply during the
subsequent campaigns from Chattanooga towards Atlanta, and from
Knoxville towards South-western Virginia; yet McCallum says of it, in the
Final Report he presented to the Secretary of War in 1866:—

The track was laid originally in a very imperfect manner, with a light
U-rail on wooden stringers which were badly decayed and caused
almost daily accidents by spreading apart and letting the engines and
cars drop through them.

In still other instances, lines which, though begun, were not finished, had to
be completed; in others new lines had to be constructed throughout, or
extensive sidings provided; so that once more we see that it was not then
simply a question of the Federal Government taking possession of and
operating an existing complete and efficient system of railways.
Whatever, again, the condition of the lines when taken over, the railways of
both combatants were subjected to constant attack by the other side with a
view to the interruption of communications, the destruction of railway
track, railway bridges, rolling stock and other railway property being
enormous.
Reviewing the general situation at this time, McCallum says in his report:—

In the beginning of the war military railroads were an experiment; and
though some light as to their management had been gleaned by the
operations of 1862 and 1863, yet so little progress had been made that
the attempt to supply the army of General Sherman in the field,
construct and reconstruct the railroad in its rear, and keep pace with its
march, was regarded by those who had the largest experience, and who
had become most familiar with the subject, as the greatest experiment
of all. The attempt to furnish an army of 100,000 men and 60,000
animals with supplies from a base 360 miles distant by one line of
single-track railroad, located almost the entire distance through the
country of an active and vindictive enemy, is without precedent in the
history of warfare; and to make it successful required an enormous
outlay for labour and a vast consumption of material, together with all
the forethought, energy, patience and watchfulness of which men are
capable.

To meet the various conditions which had thus arisen, McCallum was
authorised by the Federal Government to create two distinct departments,
destined to bring about a still further development in the application of rail-
power to war by establishing precedents which the leading countries of the
world were afterwards to follow more or less completely, according to their
own circumstances and requirements.
The departments were known respectively as the "Transportation
Department," embracing the operation and maintenance of all the lines

brought under use by the army of the North; and the "Construction Corps,"
which was to repair the damage done by wrecking parties of the enemy,
maintain lines of communication, and reconstruct, when necessary, railways
captured from the enemy as the Federals advanced.
Concerning the Construction Corps, and the great work accomplished by it
in keeping the lines open, details will be given in the chapter which follows.
In regard to the Transportation Department, it may be of interest to state
that this was placed by McCallum in charge of a General Superintendent of
Transportation on United States Railroads in the Military Division of the
Mississippi. For each of the principal lines there was appointed a
Superintendent of Transportation who, acting under the control of the
General Superintendent, was held responsible for the movement of all trains
and locomotives; and these superintendents, in turn, had under their
direction one or more Masters of Transportation, whose business it was to
be constantly moving about over the sections of line placed under their
charge, and see that the railway employés were attending properly to their
duties.
At each of the principal stations there was an Engine Dispatcher who was
required to see that the locomotives were kept in good order and ready for
immediate use whenever required, to exercise control over the drivers and
firemen, and to assign the requisite "crew" to each engine sent out.
Maintenance of road and structures for each line (as distinct from the
reconstruction work left to the Construction Department) was in charge of a
Superintendent of Repairs, assisted by such supervisors, road-masters and
foremen as he needed to control and direct his working staff; and
maintenance of rolling stock was delegated to (1) a Master Machinist,
responsible for repairs to locomotives, and (2) a Master of Car Repairs.
These various officers were independent of each other, and all of them
reported direct to the General Superintendent. The maximum force
employed at any one time in the Transportation Department of the Military
Division of the Mississippi (as distinct from the military lines in Virginia
and elsewhere) was about 12,000 men.
A sufficient staff of competent railwaymen for the operation of the Military
Railways was difficult to get, partly because of the inadequate supply of

such men in the United States at that period, and partly because those still at
work on railways not taken over for military purposes were unwilling to
give up what they found to be exceptionally good posts; but of the men
whose services he was able to secure McCallum speaks in terms of the
highest commendation.
Having got his Department and Construction Corps into working order,
McCallum had next to turn his attention to ensuring an adequate supply of
locomotives and cars, with the necessary shops, tools and materials for
keeping them in working order. Here the Secretary of War again came to his
help, issuing, on March 23, 1864, an Order addressed to locomotive
manufacturers in which he stated that Colonel McCallum had been
authorised by the War Department to procure locomotives without delay for
the railways under his charge, and proceeded:—

In order to meet the wants of the Military Department of the
Government, you will deliver to his order such engines as he may
direct, whether building under orders for other parties or otherwise, the
Government being accountable to you for the same. The urgent
necessity of the Government for the immediate supply of our armies
operating in Tennessee renders the engines indispensable for the
equipment of the lines of communication, and it is hoped that this
necessity will be recognised by you as a military necessity, paramount
to all other considerations.—By order of the President.

In January, 1864, McCallum had estimated that he would require 200
locomotives and 3,000 cars for the lines to be operated from Nashville, and
towards this number he then had only 47 locomotives and 437 cars
available. There was thus a substantial shortage which had to be made
good; but the manufacturers, inspired by "a spirit of zealous patriotism,"
responded heartily to the appeal made to them, putting their full force on to
the completion of further supplies. These were furnished with a speed that
surpassed all previous records.
Then, to maintain the locomotives and cars in good condition—more
especially in view of the constant attempts made by the enemy to destroy
them—extensive machine and car shops were built at Nashville and
Chattanooga. Those at Nashville—the terminal station for 500 miles of

railway running south, east or west—had, at times, as many as 100 engines
and 1,000 cars awaiting repair.
Next to that insufficiency of engines and rolling stock which hampered the
movements of both combatants came the difficulty in the way of obtaining
further supplies of rails, whether for new lines or to take the place of those
which had either worn out or been so bent and twisted by the enemy that
they could not be used again without re-rolling. For the Confederates, cut
off by the advance of General Grant to the south and west from their
sources of supply, the want of iron for new rails was declared to be a worse
evil than was the lack of gold for the Federals.
One expedient resorted to by the Federal Government, on finding they
could not procure from the manufacturers all the rails they wanted, was to
pull up the railway lines that were not wanted for military purposes and use
their rails for relaying those that were. Altogether the rails on over 156
miles of track in Virginia and the Military Division of the Mississippi were
thus taken up and utilised elsewhere. Later on the Federal Construction
Corps erected at Chattanooga some "very superior" rolling mills, equipped
with all the latest improvements in the way of machinery and mechanical
appliances; though these mills did not actually get to work until April 1,
1865. Their production of new rails during the course of six months from
that date was 3,818 tons, this supply being in addition to nearly 22,000 tons
which the Federal Government obtained by purchase.
These details may convey some idea of all that was involved in the
utilisation of rail-power in the American Civil War under such development
of railway construction as had then been brought about. Great, however, as
was the outlay, the forethought, the energy, the patience and the
watchfulness spoken of by McCallum, the results were no less valuable
from the point of view of the Federals, who could hardly have hoped to
achieve the aim they set before themselves—that of saving the Union—but
for the material advantages they derived from the use of the railways for the
purposes of the campaign.
Some of the achievements accomplished in the movement of troops from
one part of the theatre of war to another would have been creditable even in
the most favourable of circumstances; but they were especially so in view

alike of the physical conditions of many of the lines, the inadequate supply
of rolling stock, and the risks and difficulties to be met or overcome.
One of these achievements, carried out in September, 1863, is thus narrated
in an article on "Recollections of Secretary Stanton," published in the
Century Magazine for March, 1887:—

The defeat of Rosecrans, at Chickamauga, was believed at Washington
to imperil East Tennessee, and the Secretary [of War] was urged to
send a strong reinforcement there from the Army of the Potomac.
General Halleck (General-in-Chief of the Army of the United States)
contended that it was impossible to get an effective reinforcement
there in time; and the President, after hearing both sides, accepted the
judgment of Halleck. Mr. Stanton put off the decision till evening,
when he and Halleck were to be ready with details to support their
conclusions. The Secretary then sent for Colonel McCallum, who was
neither a lawyer nor a strategist, but a master of railway science. He
showed McCallum how many officers, men, horses, and pieces of
artillery, and how much baggage, it was proposed to move from the
Rapidan to the Tennessee, and asked him to name the shortest time he
would undertake to do it in if his life depended on it. McCallum made
some rapid calculations, jotted down some projects connected with the
move, and named a time within that which Halleck had admitted
would be soon enough if it were only possible; this time being
conditioned on his being able to control everything that he could reach.
The Secretary was delighted, told him that he would make him a
Brigadier-General the day that the last train was safely unloaded; put
him on his mettle by telling him of Halleck's assertion that the thing
was beyond human power; told him to go and work out final
calculations and projects and to begin preliminary measures, using his
name and authority everywhere; and finally instructed him what to do
and say when he should send for him by and by to come over to the
department. When the conference was resumed and McCallum was
introduced, his apparently spontaneous demonstration of how easily
and surely the impossible thing could be done convinced the two
sceptics, and the movement was ordered, and made, and figures now in
military science as a grand piece of strategy.

The feat thus accomplished was that of conveying by rail 23,000 men,
together with artillery, road vehicles, etc., a distance of about 1,200 miles in
seven days. It was estimated that if the troops had had to march this
distance, with all their impedimenta, along such roads as were then
available, the journey would have taken them three months. By doing it in
one week they saved the situation in East Tennessee, and they gave an
especially convincing proof of the success with which "a grand piece of
strategy" could be carried out through the employment of rail transport.
In December, 1864, General Schofield's corps of 15,000 men, after fighting
at Nashville in the midst of ice and snow, was, on the conclusion of the
campaign in the west, transferred from the valley of the Tennessee to the
banks of the Potomac, moving by river and rail down the Tennessee, up the
Ohio and across the snow-covered Alleghanies, a distance of 1,400 miles,
accomplished in the short space of eleven days. In 1865 the moving of the
Fourth Army Corps of the Federals from Carter's Station, East Tennessee, to
Nashville, a distance of 373 miles, involved the employment of 1,498 cars.
What, in effect, the Civil War in America did in furthering the development
of the rail-power principle in warfare was to show that, by the use of
railways, (1) the fighting power of armies is increased; (2) strategical
advantages unattainable but for the early arrival of reinforcements at
threatened points may be assured; and (3) expeditions may be undertaken at
distances from the base of supplies which would be prohibitive but for the
control of lines of railway communication; though as against these
advantages were to be put those considerations which also arose as to
destruction and restoration, and as to the control of railways in their
operation for military purposes.

CHAPTER III
Railway Destruction in War
One of the earliest and most obvious criticisms advanced against the use of
railways in war was based on the vulnerability of the iron road. The
destruction of a bridge, the tearing up of a few rails or the blocking of a
tunnel would, it was argued, suffice to cause an interruption in the transport
of troops or supplies which might be of serious consequence to the
combatants prejudiced thereby, though of corresponding advantage to the
other side. By means of such interruption the concentration of troops on the
frontier might be delayed; an army might be divided into two or more parts,
and exposed to the risk of defeat in detail; the arrival of reinforcements
urgently wanted to meet a critical situation might be prevented until it was
too late for them to afford the desired relief; a force advancing into an
enemy's country might have its rail connection severed and be left to starve
or to surrender at discretion; invaders would find that the force they were
driving before them had taken the precaution to destroy their own railways
as they retreated; or, alternatively, lines of railway constructed to the
frontier, and depended upon to facilitate invasion of neighbouring territory,
might—unless destroyed—be of material service to the enemy, should the
latter become the invaders instead of the invaded.
While these and other possibilities—foreshadowed more especially in the
controversies which the whole subject aroused in Germany in the 'Forties—
were frankly admitted, it was argued that, however vulnerable railways
might be as a line of communication, it should be quite possible either to
defend them successfully or to carry out on them such speedy repairs or
reconstruction as would, generally speaking, permit of an early resumption
of traffic; though experience was to show that these safeguards could only
be assured through a well-planned and thoroughly efficient organisation
prepared to meet, with the utmost dispatch and the highest degree of
efficiency, all the requirements in the way of railway repairs or railway
rebuilding that were likely to arise.

The earliest instance of an attempt to delay the advance of an enemy by
interrupting his rail communications was recorded in 1848, when the
Venetians, threatened with bombardment by the Austrians, destroyed some
of the arches in the railway viaduct connecting their island city with the
mainland. Then in the Italian campaign of 1859 the allies and the Austrians
both resorted to the expedient of destroying railway bridges or tearing up
the railway lines; although the allies were able, in various instances, to
repair so speedily the damage done by the Austrians that the lines were
ready for use again by the time they were wanted.
It was the American Civil War that was to elevate railway destruction and
restoration into a science and to see the establishment, in the interests of
such science, of an organisation which was to become a model for
European countries and influence the whole subsequent course of modern
warfare.
The destruction of railways likely to be used by the North for its projected
invasion of the Confederate States was, from the first, a leading feature in
the strategy of the South. Expeditions were undertaken and raids were made
with no other object than that of burning down bridges, tearing up and
bending rails, making bonfires of sleepers, wrecking stations, rendering
engines, trucks and carriages unserviceable, cutting off the water supply for
locomotives, or in various other ways seeking to check the advance of the
Northerners. Later on the Federals, in turn, became no less energetic in
resorting to similar tactics in order either to prevent pursuit by the
Confederates or to interrupt their communications.
For the carrying out of these destructive tactics use was generally made
either of cavalry, accompanied by civilians, or of bodies of civilians only;
but in some instances, when it was considered desirable to destroy lengths
of track extending to twenty or thirty miles, or more, the Confederates put
the whole of their available forces on to the work.
At the outset the methods of destruction were somewhat primitive; but they
were improved upon as the result of practice and experiment.
Thus, in the first instance, timber bridges or viaducts were destroyed by
collecting brushwood, placing this around the arches, pouring tar or
petroleum upon the pile, and then setting fire to the whole. Afterwards the
Federals made use of a "torpedo," eight inches long, and charged with

gunpowder, which was inserted in a hole bored in the main timbers of the
bridge and exploded with a fuse. It was claimed that with two or three men
working at each span the largest timber bridge could be thrown down in a
few minutes.
Then the method generally adopted at first for destroying a railway track
was to tear up sleepers and rails, place the sleepers in a heap, put the rails
cross-ways over them, set fire to the sleepers, and heat the rails until they
either fell out of shape or could be twisted around a tree with the help of
chains and horses. But this process was found to require too much time and
labour, while the results were not always satisfactory, since rails only
slightly bent could be restored to their original shape, and made ready for
use again, in much less time than it had taken for the fire to heat and bend
them. A Federal expert accordingly invented an ingenious contrivance, in
the form of iron U-shaped "claws," which, being turned up and over at each
extremity, were inserted underneath each end of a rail, on opposite sides,
and operated, with the help of a long wooden lever and rope, by half a
dozen men. In this way a rail could be torn from the sleepers and not only
bent but given such a spiral or corkscrew twist, while still in the cold state,
that it could not be used again until it had gone through the rolling mills. By
the adoption of this method, 440 men could destroy one mile of track in an
hour, or 2,200 men could, in the same time, destroy five miles.
The most effective method for rendering a locomotive unfit for service was
found to be the firing of a cannon ball through the boiler. Carriages and
wagons which might otherwise be used by the enemy, and could not be
conveniently carried off, were easily destroyed by fire. In one period of six
months the Federals disposed of 400 in this way. Stations, water-tanks,
sleepers, fuel and telegraph poles were also destroyed or rendered useless
by fire or otherwise.
In the first year of the war—1861—the Confederates gave the Federals a
foretaste of much that was to come by destroying forty-eight locomotives
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and making a complete wreck of 100
miles of the North Missouri Railroad track and everything thereon.
Much more serious than this, however, from a strategical point of view, was
the wholesale destruction carried out by the Confederates, in April, 1862,
on the Fredericksburg Railway, connecting Richmond and Washington, the

immediate result of the mischief done being to prevent an impending
combination between the Federal armies of the Potomac and the
Rappahannock, neither of which could act without the other, while neither
could join the other unless it could make use of rail communication. There
was much that required to be done, for the Confederates had carried out
their work in a most thorough-going fashion. Several indispensable railway
bridges had been destroyed; three miles of track had been torn up, the rails
being carried south and the sleepers burned; and wharves and buildings had
been burned or wrecked. The whole transportation service, in fact, had been
reduced to a state of chaos.
At the urgent request of the Secretary of War, the work of restoration was
undertaken by Mr. Herman Haupt, a railway engineer who had already
distinguished himself more especially as a builder of bridges, and was now
to establish a further record as the pioneer of those Construction Corps of
which so much was to be heard later on in connection with railways and
war.
In carrying out the necessary repairs the only help which Haupt could
obtain, at first, was that of soldiers detailed from the Federal ranks. Many of
these men were entirely unaccustomed to physical labour; others were
sickly, inefficient, or unwilling to undertake what they did not regard as a
soldier's duties, while the Army officers sent in a fresh lot daily until
Haupt's remonstrances led to their allotting certain men to form a
"Construction Corps." Other difficulties which presented themselves
included an insufficient supply of tools, occasional scarcity of food, and
several days of wet weather; yet the work advanced so rapidly that the
Akakeek bridge, a single span of 120 ft., at an elevation of 30 ft., was
rebuilt in about fifteen working hours; the Potomac Creek bridge, 414 ft.
long with an elevation of 82 ft. above the water, and requiring the use of as
much roughly-hewn timber as would have extended a total length of six and
a half miles, if put end to end, was completed in nine days;[5] and the three
miles of track were relaid in three days, included in the work done in that
time being the preparation of more than 3,000 sleepers from lumber cut
down for the purpose in woods a mile and a half distant from the track.
General McDowell subsequently said, concerning the Potomac bridge:—

When it is considered that in the campaigns of Napoleon trestle
bridges of more than one story, even of moderate height, were
regarded as impracticable, and that, too, for common military roads, it
is not difficult to understand why distinguished Europeans should
express surprise at so bold a specimen of American military
engineering. It is a structure which ignores all rules and precedents of
military science as laid down in the books. It is constructed chiefly of
round sticks cut from the woods, and not even divested of bark; the
legs of the trestles are braced with round poles. It is in four stories—
three of trestle and one of crib work.

While constructed in so apparently primitive a fashion, the bridge was,
General McDowell further said, carrying every day from ten to twenty
heavy railway trains in both directions, and had withstood several severe
freshets and storms without injury.
Thus early, therefore, in the more active phases of the Civil War, evidence
was being afforded that, although the railways on which so much depended
might be readily destroyed, they could, also, be rapidly restored; and
subsequent experience was to offer proofs still more remarkable in support
of this fact.
On May 28, 1862, Haupt was appointed Chief of Construction and
Transportation in the Department of the Rappahannock, with the rank of
Colonel. He was raised to the rank of Brigadier-General in the following
year, and did much excellent construction and other work for the
Government, though mainly in Virginia, down to September, 1863. In his
"Reminiscences" he relates that the supplies of repair or reconstruction
materials, as kept on hand by the Federals, included the interchangeable
parts of bridge trusses, in spans of 60 ft., and so prepared that, taken on flat
cars, by ox-teams or otherwise, to the place where they were wanted, and
hoisted into position by machinery arranged for the purpose, they could,
without previous fitting, be put together with such rapidity that one of his
foremen claimed to be able to build a bridge "about as fast as a dog could
trot." When the Massaponix bridge, six miles from Fredericksburg, was
burned down one Monday morning, a new one was put up in its place in
half a day—a feat which, he says, led some of the onlookers to exclaim,
"The Yankees can build bridges quicker than the Rebs can burn them

down." In May, 1862, five bridges over Goose Creek which the "Rebs" had
destroyed were reconstructed in a day and a half. In the following month
five other bridges, each with a span of from 60 ft. to 120 ft., were renewed
in one day. At the Battle of Gettysburg Lee's troops destroyed nineteen
bridges on the Northern Central Railroad and did much havoc on the branch
lines leading to Gettysburg; but the Construction Corps was hard at work on
the repairs whilst the battle was still being waged, and rail communication
with both Washington and Baltimore had been re-established by noon of the
day after Lee's retreat.
In some instances railway bridges underwent repeated destruction and
reconstruction. By June, 1863, the bridge over Bull Run, for instance, had
been burned down and built up again no fewer than seven times. Many of
the bridges, also, were swept away by floods, and this even for a second or
a third time after they had been rebuilt. Precautions thus had to be taken
against the destructive forces of Nature no less than against those of man.
Haupt's pioneer Construction Corps in Virginia was succeeded by the one
set up on much broader lines by McCallum when, in February, 1864, he
became General Manager of railways in the Military Division of the
Mississippi. This corps eventually reached a total of 10,000 men.
"The design of the corps," wrote McCallum, in his final report, "was to
combine a body of skilled workmen in each department of railroad
construction and repairs, under competent engineers, supplied with
abundant materials, tools and mechanical appliances." The corps was
formed into divisions the number of which varied from time to time, in
different districts, according to requirements. In the military division of the
Mississippi the corps comprised six divisions, under the general charge of
the chief engineer of the United States military railroads for that military
division, and consisted at its maximum strength of nearly 5,000 men. In
order to give the corps entire mobility, and to enable it to move
independently and undertake work at widely different points, each of the six
divisions was made a complete unit, under the command of a divisional
engineer, and was, in turn, divided into sub-divisions or sections, with a
supervisor in charge of each. The two largest and most important sub-
divisions in any one division were those of the track-layers and the bridge-
builders. A sub-division was, again, composed of gangs, each with a
foreman, while the gangs were divided into squads, each with a sub-

foreman.[6] Under this method of organisation it was possible to move
either the entire division or any section thereof, with its tools, camp
requirements and field transport, in any direction, wherever and whenever
needed, and by any mode of conveyance—rail, road, with teams and
wagons, or on foot.
To facilitate the operations of the corps, supplies of materials were kept at
points along or within a short distance of the railway lines, where they
would be comparatively safe and speedily procurable in case of necessity.
At places where there was special need for taking precautionary measures,
detachments of the corps were stationed in readiness for immediate action,
while on important lines of railway Federals and Confederates alike had, at
each end thereof, construction trains loaded with every possible requisite,
the locomotives attached to them keeping their steam up in order that the
trains could be started off instantly on the receipt of a telegram announcing
a further interruption of traffic.
At Nashville and Chattanooga the Federals built extensive storehouses
where they kept on hand supplies of materials for the prompt carrying out
of railway repairs of every kind to any extent and in whatever direction.
On the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway itself the Construction Corps,
from February, 1864, to the close of the war, relaid 115 miles of track, put
in nineteen miles of new sidings, eight miles apart and each capable of
holding from five to eight long freight trains, and erected forty-five new
water tanks.
The reconstruction of this particular line was more especially needed in
connection with General Sherman's campaign in Georgia and the Carolinas
—a campaign which afforded the greatest and most direct evidence up to
that time alike of the possibilities of rail-power in warfare, of the risks by
which its use was attended, and of the success with which those risks could
be overcome by means of efficient organisation.
In that struggle for Atlanta which preceded his still more famous march to
the sea, Sherman had with him a force of 100,000 men, together with
23,000 animals. His base of supplies, when he approached Atlanta, was 360
miles distant, and the continuance of his communications with that base, not
only for the procuring of food, clothing, fodder, ammunition and every
other requisite, but for the transport to the rear of sick and wounded,

refugees, freedmen and prisoners, depended on what he afterwards
described as "a poorly-constructed single-track railroad" passing for 120
miles of its length through the country of an extremely active enemy. Yet
Sherman is said to have made his advance in perfect confidence that,
although subject to interruptions, the railway in his rear would be "all
right"; and this confidence was fully warranted by the results accomplished.
Early in September, 1864, the Confederate General, Wheeler, destroyed
seven miles of road between Nashville and Murfreesboro', on the Nashville
and Chattanooga Railway, and in the following December Hood destroyed
eight miles of track and 530 ft. of bridges between the same stations; yet the
arrangements of the Federal Construction Corps allowed of the repairs
being carried out with such promptness that in each instance the trains were
running again in a few days.
The Confederate attacks on the Western and Atlantic Railway, running from
Chattanooga at Atlanta, a distance of 136 miles, were more continuous and
more severe than on any other line of railway during the war; but, thanks
again to the speed with which the repair and reconstruction work was done,
the delays occasioned were, as a rule, of only a few hours, or, at the most, a
few days' duration. One especially remarkable feat accomplished on this
line was the rebuilding, in four and a half days, of the Chattahochee bridge,
near Atlanta—a structure 780 ft. long, and 92 ft. high. Hood, the
Confederate General, thought still further to check Sherman's
communications by passing round the Federal army and falling upon the
railway in its rear. He succeeded in tearing up two lengths of track, one of
ten miles, and another of twenty-five miles, in extent, and destroying 250 ft.
of bridges; but once more the work of restoration was speedily carried out,
McCallum saying in reference to it:—

Fortunately the detachments of the Construction Corps which escaped
were so distributed that even before Hood had left the road two strong
working parties were at work, one at each end of the break at Big
Shanty, and this gap of ten miles was closed, and the force ready to
move to the great break of twenty-five miles in length, north of
Resaca, as soon as the enemy had left it. The destruction by Hood's
army of our depôts of supplies compelled us to cut nearly all the cross-
ties required to relay this track and to send a distance for rails. The

cross-ties were cut near the line of the road and many of them carried
by hand to the track, as the teams to be furnished for hauling them did
not get to the work until it was nearly complete. The rails used on the
southern end of the break had to be taken up and brought from the
railroads south of Atlanta, and those for the northern end were mostly
brought from Nashville, nearly 200 miles distant.
Notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the labour was
performed, this twenty-five miles of track was laid, and the trains were
running over it in seven and a half days from the time the work was
commenced.

Concluding, however, that it would be unwise to depend on the railway
during his further march to the sea, Sherman collected at Atlanta, by means
of the restored lines, the supplies he wanted for 600,000 men, sent to the
rear all the men and material no longer required, and then, before starting
for Savannah, destroyed sixty miles of track behind him in so effectual a
manner that it would be impossible for the Confederates—especially in
view of their own great lack, at this time, of rails, locomotives and rolling
stock—to repair and utilise the lines again in any attempted pursuit. It was,
in fact, as much to his advantage now to destroy the railways in his rear as it
had previously been to repair and rebuild them.
All through Georgia, for the 300 miles from Atlanta to Savannah (where he
was able to establish communications with the Federal fleet), Sherman
continued the same tactics of railway destruction; and he resumed them
when his army, now divided into three columns, turned northward to effect
a junction with Grant at Richmond.
On this northward march, also, there was no need for Sherman to make a
direct attack on Charleston. By destroying about sixty miles of track in and
around Branchville—a village on the South Carolina Railroad which
formed a junction where the line from Charleston branched off in the
directions of Columbia and Augusta respectively—one of Sherman's
columns severed Charleston from all its sources of supply in the interior,
and left the garrison with no alternative but to surrender. Commenting on
this event, Vigo-Rouissillon remarks, in his "Puissance Militaire des États-
Unis d'Amérique":—

Ainsi il avait suffi de la destruction ou de la possession de quelques
kilomètres de chemin de fer pour amener la chute de ce boulevard de
l'insurrection, qui avait si longtemps résisté aux plus puissantes flottes
du Nord. Exemple frappant du rôle reservé dans nos guerres modernes
à ce precieux et fragile moyen de communication.

In the aggregate, Sherman's troops destroyed hundreds of miles of railway
track in their progress through what had previously been regarded as a
veritable stronghold of the enemy's country; though meanwhile the
Construction Corps had repaired and reopened nearly 300 miles of railway
in North Carolina and had built a wharf, covering an area of 54,000 square
feet, at the ocean terminus of the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad in
order both to facilitate Sherman's progress northwards, by the time of his
reaching the lines in question, and to enable him to obtain supplies from the
fleet. The railways, in fact, contributed greatly to the brilliant success of
Sherman's campaign, and hence, also, to the final triumph of the Federal
cause.
The total length of track laid or relaid by the Federal Construction Corps
during the continuance of the war was 641 miles, and the lineal feet of
bridges built or rebuilt was equal to twenty-six miles. The net expenditure,
in respect alike to construction and transportation, incurred by the
department in charge of the railways during their control by the
Government for military purposes was close on $30,000,000.
From this time the interruption of railway communication became a
recognised phase of warfare all the world over; and, not only have
numerous treatises been written on the subject in various languages, but the
creation of special forces to deal alike with the destruction and the
restoration of railways has become an important and indispensable feature
of military organisation. These matters will be dealt with more fully in
subsequent chapters; but it may be of interest if reference is made here to
the experiences of Mexico, as further illustrating the universality of
practices with which, in her case, at least, no effective measures had been
taken to deal.
"How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and Bridges" was told by Mr. G.
E. Weekes in the Scientific American for September 13, 1913, and the
subject was further dealt with by Major Charles Hine in a paper on "War

Time Railroading in Mexico," read by him before the St. Louis Railway
Club, on October 10, 1913. The term "rebels" applies, of course, in Mexico
to the party that is against the particular President who is in office for the
time being; and in the revolutionary period lasting from 1910 to 1913 the
"rebels" of the moment found plenty to do in the way of destroying railways
not only, as in other countries, in order to retard the advance of their
pursuers, but, also, to spite the national Government, who control about
two-thirds of the stock in the railways of the Republic.
Altogether, the mischief done by one party or the other during the period in
question included the destruction of many hundreds of miles of track; the
burning or the dynamiting of hundreds of bridges, according as these had
been built of timber or of steel; and the wrecking of many stations and over
50 per cent. of the rolling stock on the national lines.
Concerning the methods adopted in the carrying out of this work, Mr.
Weekes, who had the opportunity of seeing track and bridge destruction in
full progress, says:—

Up to the past six months track destruction had been accompanied
either by the use of a wrecking crane, which lifted sections of rails and
ties (sleepers) bodily and piled them up ready for burning, or by the
slower process of the claw-bar, wrench and pick. But a
Constitutionalist expert devised a new system.
A trench is dug between two ties, through which a heavy chain is
passed around two opposite rails and made fast in the centre of the
track. To this one end of a heavy steel cable is hooked, the other end
being made fast to the coupling on the engine pilot. At the signal the
engineman starts his locomotive slowly backward, and as they are
huge 220-ton "consolidations," with 22-inch by 30-inch cylinders, one
can easily imagine that something has to give. And it does! The rails
are torn loose from the spikes that hold them to the ties and are
dragged closely together in the centre of the road bed. The ties are
loosened from the ballast and dragged into piles, while in many cases
the rails are badly bent and twisted by the force applied. A gang of men
follows the engine, piling ties on top of the line and leaving others
beneath them. These are then saturated with oil and a match applied. In
a short time the ties are consumed and the rails left lying on the ground

twisted and contorted into all sorts of shapes and of no further use until
after they have been re-rolled.

As for the bridges, those of timber were saturated with oil and burned,
while in the case of steel bridges rows of holes were bored horizontally in
the lower part of the piers and charged with dynamite, which was then
exploded by means of fuses connected with batteries of the type used in
Mexican coal mines.
Another favourite method adopted for interfering with transportation by rail
was that of attacking a train, compelling it to stop, taking possession of the
locomotive, and burning the cars.
There is no suggestion by either of the authorities mentioned above of any
well-organised Construction Corps in Mexico repairing damage done on the
railway almost as quickly as it could be effected by the destroyers. Mr.
Weekes believed, rather, that it would take years to restore the roads to the
condition they were in before the rebellion against President Diaz, and he
further declared that it would cost the national lines of Mexico many
millions of dollars to replace the destroyed rolling stock, bridges, stations,
etc.

FOOTNOTES:
[5] In May, 1864, when this bridge had been again destroyed, it was rebuilt,
ready for trains to pass over, in forty working hours.
[6] A division, completely organised, consisted of 777 officers and men, as
follows:—Division engineer, assistant engineer, rodman, clerk, and 2
messengers (6). Sub-division I: Supervisor of bridges and carpenters' work, clerk
and time-keeper, commissionary (taking charge of transport and issue of
rations), quartermaster (in charge of tools, camp equipment, etc.), surgeon,
hospital steward, 6 foremen (1 for each 50 men), 30 sub-foremen (1 for each 10
men), 300 mechanics and labourers, blacksmith and helper, and 12 cooks (356).
Sub-division II: Supervisor of track, and remainder of staff as in Sub-division I
(356). Sub-division III: Supervisor of water stations, foreman, 12 mechanics and
labourers, and cook (15). Sub-division IV: Supervisor of masonry, foreman, 10
masons and helpers, and cook (13). Sub-division V: Foreman of ox-brigade, 18
ox-drivers, and cook (20). Train crew: 2 conductors, 4 brakesmen, 2 locomotive
engineers, 2 firemen, and cook (11).

CHAPTER IV
Control of Railways in War
Curtailment of the efficiency of railways during war may be due to friend
no less than to foe; and there have been occasions when, of the two, it is the
friend who has caused the greater degree of trouble, hindrance and
interruption.
These conditions have arisen mainly from three causes—(1) questions of
control; (2) irregularities in the employment of railway material; and (3)
absence or inadequacy of organisation for military rail-transport purposes.
When the use of railways becomes an essential factor in the conduct of war,
it may appear only natural that the military authority charged with the duty
of furthering or defending national interests should, through the
Government concerned, have power to command the transport facilities of
all railway lines the use of which may be necessary for the movement of
troops or other military purposes.
Yet, while the soundness of the principle here involved is beyond dispute,
there is much to be said as to the circumstances and conditions under which
a military control of railways should be exercised.
It is, in the first place, especially necessary to bear in mind that the railway,
as a means of transport, must needs be regarded from a point of view
wholly different from that which would apply to ordinary roads. On the
latter any sort of vehicle can be used, and there are, generally, alternative
roads along which traffic can pass, in case of need. Railroads are not only
available exclusively for vehicles constructed to run upon them, but the
degree of their usefulness is limited by such considerations as the number
of separate routes to a given destination; the important matters of detail as
to whether the lines are single track or double track and whether they are on
the level or have heavy gradients; the number of locomotives and the
amount of rolling stock available; the extent of the station and siding
accommodation; the provision or non-provision of adequate facilities for

loading and unloading; and, in war time, the damage or destruction of a
particular line or lines by the enemy. The amount of traffic it is possible to
convey between certain points in a given time may thus be wholly
controlled by the physical conditions of the railway concerned, and such
conditions may be incapable of modification by the railway staffs, in case
of a sudden emergency, however great their desire to do everything that is
in their power.
In the next place, all these physical conditions may vary on different
railway systems, and even on different sections of the same system. It does
not, therefore, necessarily follow that military requirements which can be
complied with on one line or in one district can be responded to as readily,
if at all, under another and totally different set of conditions elsewhere;
though it is conceivable that a military commander or officer who fails to
realise this fact may, if he is left to deal direct with the railway people,
become very angry indeed at non-compliance with his demands, and resent
protests that what he asks for cannot be done at one place although it may
have been done at another.
Then a railway must be regarded as a delicate piece of transportation
machinery which can easily be thrown out of order, and is capable of being
worked only by railwaymen as skilled in the knowledge of its mechanism,
and as experienced in the details of its complicated operation, as military
officers themselves are assumed to be in the technicalities of their own
particular duties. The Chief Goods Manager of a leading line of railway
who offered to take the place of a General at the seat of war would arouse
much mirth in the Army at his own expense. It is, nevertheless, quite
conceivable that the General would himself not be a complete success as a
Chief Goods Manager. In the earliest days of railways it was assumed that
the men best qualified both to manage them and to control the large staffs to
be employed would be retired Army officers. This policy was, in fact,
adopted for a time, though it was abandoned, after a fair trial, in favour of
appointing as responsible railway officers men who had undergone training
in the railway service, and were practically acquainted alike with its
fundamental principles and its technical details.
In the operation of this delicate and complicated piece of machinery
dislocation of traffic may result from a variety of causes, even when such
operation is conducted by men of the greatest experience in railway

working; but the risk, alike of blocks and interruptions and of accidents
involving loss of life or destruction of valuable property must needs be
materially increased if military commanders, or officers, themselves having
no practical knowledge of railway working, and influenced only by an
otherwise praiseworthy zeal for the interests of their own service, should
have power either to force a responsible railwayman to do something which
he, with his greater technical knowledge, knows to be impracticable, or to
hamper and interfere with the working of the line at a time of exceptional
strain on its resources.
Under, again, a misapprehension of the exact bearing of the principle of
military control of railways for military operations in time of war, there was
developed in various campaigns a tendency on the part of commanders and
subordinate officers (1) to look upon railways and railwaymen as subject to
their personal command, if not, even, to their own will, pleasure and
convenience, so long as the war lasted; (2) to consider that every order they
themselves gave should be at once carried out, regardless either of orders
from other directions or of any question as to the possibility of complying
therewith; and (3) to indulge in merciless denunciations, even if not in
measures still more vigorous, when their orders have not been obeyed.
Apart from other considerations, all these things have a direct bearing on
the efficiency of the railway itself as an instrument in the carrying on of
warfare; and it is, therefore, a matter of essential importance to our present
study to see how the difficulties in question had their rise, the development
they have undergone, and the steps that have been taken to overcome or to
guard against them.
It was once more in the American Civil War that the control problem first
arose in a really acute degree.
The fundamental principle adopted for the operation of the railways taken
possession of by the Federal Government for military purposes was that
they should be conducted under orders issued by the Secretary of War or by
Army commanders in or out of the field. It was for the Quartermaster's
department to load all material upon the cars, to direct where such material
should be taken, and to arrange for unloading and delivery; but because the
Government had taken possession of the railways; because the
Quartermaster's department was to discharge the duties mentioned; and

because the railways were to be used during the war for the transport of
troops and of Army supplies, therefore certain of the officers came to the
conclusion that the whole operation of the particular lines in which they
were concerned should be left either to themselves individually or to the
Quartermaster's department.
Among those holding this view was General Pope, who, on taking over the
command of the Rappahannock Division, on June 26, 1862, disregarded the
position held by Herman Haupt as "Chief of Construction and
Transportation" in that Division, gave him no instructions, and left him to
conclude that the Army could get on very well without his assistance as a
mere railwayman. Thereupon Haupt went home. Ten days afterwards he
received from the Assistant-Secretary of War a telegram which said:
—"Come back immediately. Cannot get on without you. Not a wheel
moving." Haupt went back, and he found that, what with mismanagement
of the lines and the attacks made on them by Confederates, not a wheel was,
indeed, moving in the Division. His own position strengthened by his now
being put in "exclusive charge of all the railways within the limits of the
Army of Virginia," he was soon able to set the wheels running again; and
from that time General Pope exercised a wise discretion in leaving the
details of railway transportation to men who understood them.
Then there was a General Sturgis who, when Haupt called on him one day,
received him with the intimation, "I have just sent a guard to your office to
put you under arrest for disobedience of my orders in failing to transport my
command." It was quite true. Haupt had failed to obey his orders. Sturgis
wanted some special trains to convey 10,000 men, with horses and baggage,
the short distance of eighteen miles. The railway was a single-track line; it
had only a limited equipment of engines and cars; there was the prospect of
further immediate requirements in other directions, and Haupt took the
liberty of thinking that he had better keep his transportation for more
pressing needs than a journey to a prospective battle-field only eighteen
miles away—the more so as if the men were attacked whilst they were in
the train they would be comparatively helpless, whereas if they were
attacked when on the road—doing what amounted to no more than a single
day's march—they would be ready for immediate defence. These
considerations suggest that, of the two, the railwayman was a better
strategist than the General.

Sturgis followed up his intimation to Haupt by taking military possession of
the railway and issuing some orders which any one possessing the most
elementary knowledge of railway operation would have known to be
impracticable. Meanwhile Haupt appealed by telegraph to the Commander-
in-Chief, who replied:—"No military officer has any authority to interfere
with your control over railroad. Show this to General Sturgis, and, if he
attempts to interfere, I will arrest him." Told what the Commander-in-Chief
said in his message, Sturgis exclaimed, "He does, does he? Well, then, take
your damned railroad!"
Haupt found it possible to put at the disposal of Sturgis, early the following
morning, the transportation asked for; but at two o'clock in the afternoon the
cars were still unoccupied. On the attention of Sturgis being called to this
fact he replied that he had given his orders but they had been disobeyed.
Thereupon the cars were withdrawn for service elsewhere—the more so
since no other traffic could pass until they had been cleared out of the way.
The net results of the General's interference was that traffic on the lines was
deranged for twenty-four hours, and 10,000 men were prevented from
taking part in an engagement, as they might have done had they gone by
road.
Of the varied and almost unending irregularities which occurred in the
working of the lines as military railways during the progress of the same
war a few other examples may be given.
One prolific source of trouble was the detention or appropriation of trains
by officers who did not think it necessary to communicate first with the
Superintendent of the Line. A certain General who did inform the
Superintendent when he wanted a train was, nevertheless, in the habit of
keeping it waiting for several hours before he made his appearance, traffic
being meanwhile suspended, in consequence.
Special consideration was even claimed for officers' wives, as well as for
the officers themselves. On one occasion Haupt was much disturbed by the
non-arrival of a train bringing supplies which were urgently wanted for a
body of troops starting on a march, and he went along the line to see what
had happened. Coming at last to the train, which had pulled up, he made
inquiries of the engine-driver, who told him that he had received
instructions to stop at a certain point so that an officer's wife, who was

coming in the train to see her husband on the eve of an engagement, could
go to a neighbouring town to look out for rooms for herself. At that moment
the lady put in an appearance. She took her seat again and the train then
proceeded; but her side-trip in search of rooms meant a delay of three hours
alike for this one train and for three others following behind.
The impression seems to have prevailed, also, that officers were at liberty to
make any use of the trains they pleased for the conveyance of their own
belongings. To check the abuses thus developed, Haupt was compelled to
issue, on June 25, 1862, the following notice:—

Assistant Quartermasters and Commissaries are positively forbidden to
load on to cars on any of the Military Railroads of the Department of
the Rappahannock any freights which are not strictly and properly
included in Quarter and Commissary stores. They shall not load or
permit to be loaded any articles for the private use of officers, or other
persons, whatever their rank or position.

Officers, again, there were who, regardless of all traffic considerations,
would order a train to pull up at any point they thought fit along the main
line in order that they could examine the passes and permits of the
passengers, instead of doing this at a terminal or other station. In still
another instance a paymaster adopted as his office a box car standing on a
main line. He placed in it a table, some chairs, a money-chest and his papers
—finding it either more comfortable or more convenient than a house
alongside—and proceeded with the transaction of all his Army business in
the car. Invited to withdraw, on the ground that he was holding up the
traffic, he refused to leave, and he persisted in his refusal until troops were
called up to remove his things for him.
Defective arrangements in regard to the forwarding of supplies were
another cause of traffic disorganisation. The railwayman made from time to
time the most strenuous efforts in getting to the extreme front large
consignments of articles either in excess of requirements or not wanted
there at all. After blocking the line for some days, the still-loaded cars might
be sent back again, no fewer than 142 of such cars being returned on the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the course of a single day. If the
excessive supplies so sent were unloaded at the front, they might have to be

loaded into the cars again when the Army moved; or, as was frequently the
case in exposed positions, they might be seized or destroyed by the enemy.
Under a well-organised system an adequate stock of supplies would, of
course, have been kept in stores or on sidings at some point in the rear, only
such quantities being forwarded to the advanced front as were really
needed.
At the railway stations there were frequent disputes between the responsible
officers as to which should have the first use of such troop trains as were
available, and Haupt found it necessary to ask the Commander-in-Chief to
delegate some one who would decide in what order the troops should be
forwarded.
Much trouble arose because, in their anxiety to send off as many wounded
as they could, medical officers detained their trains for such periods as
dislocated the service, instead of despatching at schedule time the men they
had ready, and then asking for an extra train for the remainder.
In other respects, also, the arrangements for the transport of the sick and
wounded were defective. Telegraphing on this subject to the Assistant
Secretary of War on August 22, 1862, Haupt said:—

I fear that I may be compelled to-night to do what may appear
inhuman—turn out the sick in the street. Doctors will persist in
sending sick, often without papers, to get them off their hands, and we
cannot send forward the troops if we must run our trains to Washington
with sick to stand for hours unloaded. My first care is to send forward
troops, next forage and subsistence.

Still more serious were the irregularities due to delays in the unloading of
trucks and the return of empties. The amount of rolling stock available was
already inadequate to meet requirements; but the effect of the shortage was
rendered still worse by reason of these delays, due, in part, to the too
frequent insufficiency of the force available for unloading a train of
supplies with the expedition that should have been shown, and in part to the
retention of the cars for weeks together as storehouses; though the main
cause, perhaps, was the inability of military men, inexperienced in railway
working, to appreciate, as railwaymen would do, the need of getting the

greatest possible use out of rolling stock in times of emergency, and not
allowing it to stand idle longer than absolutely necessary.
How such delays interfered with the efficiency of the railways was
indicated in one of Haupt's oft-repeated protests, in which he wrote:—

If all cars on their arrival at a depôt are immediately loaded or
unloaded and returned, and trains are run to schedule, a single-track
road, in good order and properly equipped, may supply an army of
200,000 men when, if these conditions are not complied with, the same
road will not supply 30,000.

On July 9, 1863, he telegraphed to General M. C. Meigs:—

I am on my way to Gettysburg again. Find things in great confusion.
Road blocked; cars not unloaded; stores ordered to Gettysburg—where
they stand for a long time, completely preventing all movement there
—ordered back without unloading; wounded lying for hours without
ability to carry them off. All because the simple rule of promptly
unloading and returning cars is violated.

As for the effect of all these conditions on the military situation as a whole,
this is well shown in the following "Notice," which, replying to complaints
that railwaymen had not treated the military officers with proper respect,
Haupt addressed "To agents and other employés of the United States
Military Railroad Department":—

While conscious of no disposition to shield the employés or agents of
the Military Railroads from any censure or punishment that is really
merited, justice to them requires me to state that, so far, examination
has shown that complaints against them have been generally without
proper foundation, and, when demands were not promptly complied
with, the cause has been inability, arising from want of proper notice,
and not indisposition.
Officers at posts entrusted with the performance of certain local duties,
and anxious, as they generally are, to discharge them efficiently, are
not always able, or disposed, to look beyond their own particular
spheres. They expect demands on railway agents to be promptly

complied with, without considering that similar demands, at the same
time, in addition to the regular train service and routine duties, may
come from Quartermasters, Commissaries, medical directors,
surgeons, ordnance officers, the Commanding General, the War
Department and from other sources. The Military Railroads have
utterly failed to furnish transportation to even one-fifth of their
capacity when managed without a strict conformity to schedule and
established rules. Punctuality and discipline are even more important
to the operation of a railroad than to the movement of an army; and
they are vital in both.

It is doubtful if even the Confederate raiders and wreckers had, by their
destructive tactics, diminished the efficiency of the Union railways to the
extent of the four-fifths here attributed to the irregularities and
shortcomings of the Federals themselves. The clearest proof was thus
afforded that, if the new arm in warfare which rail-power represented was
to accomplish all it was capable of doing, it would have to be saved from
friends quite as much as from foes.
Haupt, as we have seen, suffered much from officers during the time he was
connected with the Military Railroads in Virginia. He had the sympathetic
support of the Commander-in-Chief, who telegraphed to him on one
occasion (August 23, 1862), "No military officer will give any orders to
your subordinates except through you, nor will any of them attempt to
interfere with the running of trains"; and, also, of the Assistant Secretary of
War, who sought to soothe him in a message which said:—"Be patient as
possible with the Generals. Some of them will trouble you more than they
will the enemy." But the abuses which arose were so serious that, in the
interest of the military position itself, they called for a drastic remedy; and
this was provided for by the issue of the following Order:—

War Department,
Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington,
November 10, 1862.
Special Order.

Commanding officers of troops along the United States Military
Railroads will give all facilities to the officers of the road and the
Quartermasters for loading and unloading cars so as to prevent any
delay. On arrival at depôts, whether in the day or night, the cars will be
instantly unloaded, and working parties will always be in readiness for
that duty, and sufficient to unload the whole train at once.
Commanding officers will be charged with guarding the track, sidings,
wood, water tanks, etc., within their several commands, and will be
held responsible for the result.
Any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this respect will be
reported by the Quartermasters and officers of the railroad, and his
name will be stricken from the rolls of the Army.
Depôts will be established at suitable points under the direction of the
Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac, and properly
guarded.
No officer, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with the running of
the cars, as directed by the superintendent of the road. Any one who so
interferes will be dismissed from the service for disobedience of
orders.
By order of the Secretary of War.
J. C. Kelton.

Commenting on this Order, General McCallum says in his report that it was
issued "in consequence of several attempts having been made to operate
railroads by Army or departmental commanders which had, without
exception, proved signal failures, disorganising in tendency and destructive
of all discipline"; and he proceeds:—

Having had a somewhat extensive railroad experience, both before and
since the rebellion, I consider this Order of the Secretary of War to
have been the very foundation of success; without it the whole railroad
system, which had proved an important element in conducting military
movements, would have been, not only a costly but ludicrous failure.
The fact should be understood that the management of railroads is just

as much a distinct profession as is that of the art of war, and should be
so regarded.

In Europe, Germany and Austria-Hungary were the first countries to
attempt to solve problems that seemed to go to the very foundations of the
practical usefulness of rail-transport in war. Various exhaustive studies
thereon were written by railway or military authorities, and it may be of
interest here to refer, more especially, to the views expressed by an eminent
German authority, Baron M. M. von Weber, in "Die Schulung der
Eisenbahnen," published in 1870.[7]
Railway irregularities peculiar to war service were stated by this writer to
be mainly of three kinds:—(i) Delays from unsatisfactory arrangements of
the service and from the misemployment of rolling stock; (ii) temporary
interruption of traffic owing to the crowding of transport masses at the
stations or sidings; (iii) unsuitableness of the stations and conveyances for
the required military services. The special reasons for the first of these
causes he defined as (a) the absence of sufficient mutual comprehension
between the military and the railway officials; (b) the strict limitation of the
efficiency of individual railway authorities to their own lines only; (c) the
ignorance of the entire staff of each line with regard to the details and
service regulations of the neighbouring lines; and (d) the impracticability of
employing certain modes of carrying on business beyond the circuit to
which they belong. It should, however, be borne in mind that these
criticisms of authorities and their staffs relate to the conditions of the
German railway system in 1870, at which time, as told by H. Budde, in
"Die französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege 1870-71," there were in
Germany fifteen separate Directions for State railways; five Directions of
private railways operated by the State; and thirty-one Directions of private
railways operated by companies—a total of fifty-one controlling bodies
which, on an average, operated only 210 miles of line each.
On the general question von Weber observed:—

The value in practice of mutual intelligence between military and
railway officials has hitherto been far too slightly regarded.
Demands for services from military authorities, impracticable from the
very nature of railways in general or the nature of the existing lines in

particular, have occasioned confusion and ill-will on the part of the
railway authorities and conductors. On the other hand the latter have
frequently declared services to be impracticable which were really not
so.
All this has arisen because the two parties in the transaction have too
little insight into the nature and mechanism of their respective callings,
and regard their powers more as contradictory than co-operative, so
that they do not, and cannot, work together.
If, on the contrary, the nature of the railway service, with its
modifications due to differences in the nature of the ground, the
locality, and the organisation of transport requirements, is apparent to
the military officer, even in a general way; if he appreciates the fact
that the same amount of transport must be differently performed when
he passes from a level line to a mountain line, from a double line to a
single line, from one where the signal and telegraph system are in use
to one in which these organs of safety and intelligence are destroyed; if
he can judge of the capability of stations, the length of track, and
arrangements for the loading, ordering and passing of trains, etc., he
will, with this knowledge, and his orders being framed in accordance
with it, come much sooner and with greater facility to an
understanding with the railway executives than if his commands had to
be rectified by contradiction and assertion, frequently carried on under
the influence of excited passions, or attempted to be enforced by
violence.
The railway official, also, who has some acquaintance with military
science, who understands from practical experience and inspection, not
confined to his own line, the capabilities of lines and stations in a
military point of view, will, at his first transaction with the military
authorities, enter sooner into an understanding with them than if he
were deficient in this knowledge, and will find himself in a position to
co-operate, and not be coerced.

Here the suggestion seems to be that the individual Army officer and the
individual railway executive, or railway official, should each become
sufficiently acquainted with the technicalities of the other's business to be
able to conduct their relations with mutual understanding. It would,

however, be too much to expect that this plan could be carried out as
regards either the military element in general or the railway element in
general.
The real need of the situation was, rather, for some intermediary
organisation which, including both elements, would provide the machinery
for close co-operation between the Army on the one side and the railway on
the other, guiding the Army as to the possibilities and limitations of the
railway, and constituting the recognised and sole medium through which
orders from the Army would be conveyed to the railway, no individual
commander or officer having the right to give any direct order to the
railway executives or staffs on his own responsibility, or to interfere in any
way with the working of the railways, except in some such case of extreme
emergency as an attack by the enemy on a railway station.
All these problems were to form the subject of much more controversy,
together with much further practical experience, in various other countries
—and notably in France during the war of 1870-71—before, as will be told
in due course, they were solved by the adoption of elaborate systems of
organisation designed to provide, as far as possible, for all contingencies.

FOOTNOTES:
[7] See Bibliography.

CHAPTER V
Protection of Railways in War
The liability of railway lines to interruption or destruction—whether by
bodies of cavalry sent across the frontier for that purpose, and aiming at
damage on a large scale; by smaller raiding parties operating in the rear of
an advancing army; or by individuals acting on their own account in a
hostile country—rendered necessary from an early date in the railway era
the adoption of protective measures of a type and character varying
according to circumstances; while these, in turn, introduced some further
new features into modern warfare.
Under the orders given by General McDowell for the guarding of railways
in the Department of the Rappahannock, in the American Civil War, twelve
sentinels were posted along each mile of track; block-houses were
constructed at each bridge, at cross-roads, and at intervals along the track;
pickets were thrown forward at various points; bushes and trees were
cleared away from alongside the line, and the men at each post had flags
and lanterns for signalling. General Sherman took similar measures to guard
his rail communications between Nashville and Atlanta.
Precautions such as these were directed mainly against the enemy in the
field; but an early example was to be afforded of how a civil population
may either concern themselves or be concerned against their will in the
maintenance of rail communication for military purposes. This position is
well shown in the following proclamation, issued July 30, 1863, by Major-
General G. G. Meade from the head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac at
a time when attempts to throw troop trains off the railway lines were a
matter of daily occurrence:—

The numerous depredations committed by citizens or rebel soldiers in
disguise, harboured and concealed by citizens, along the Orange and
Alexandria Railroad, and within our lines, call for prompt and
exemplary punishment. Under the instructions of the Government,

therefore, every citizen against whom there is sufficient evidence of
his having engaged in these practices will be arrested and confined for
punishment, or put beyond the lines.
The people within ten miles of the railroad are notified that they will
be held responsible, in their persons and property, for any injury done
to the road, trains, depôts or stations by citizens, guerillas or persons in
disguise; and in case of such injury they will be impressed as labourers
to repair all damages.
If these measures should not stop such depredations, it will become the
unpleasant duty of the undersigned, in the execution of his
instructions, to direct that the entire inhabitants of the district of
country along the railroad be put across the lines, and their property
taken for Government uses.

On the Manassas Gap Railway General Auger further sought to protect
Federal army trains against guerilla attacks by placing in a conspicuous
position in each of such trains some of the leading Confederates residing
within Union lines, so that, should any accident happen to the train, they
would run the risk of being among the victims.
In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 the principle of punishing the civil
population for attacks on the railway lines underwent a further
development. Captain Webber says in reference to the line through Turnau,
Prague and Pardubitz to Brünn[8]: "The Prussians were fortunate in being
able to preserve the line intact from injury by the inhabitants, partly by the
number and strength of the guards posted along it, and partly from the terror
of reprisals which they had inspired." Captain Webber suggests that, in the
face of an active enemy, and in a country where the population was hostile,
it would have been impossible to depend on the railway as a principal line
of communication; but the significance of his expression, "the terror of
reprisals," as denoting the policy adopted by Prussia so far back as 1866,
will not be lost on those who are only too well acquainted with more recent
developments of the same policy by the same country.
The number of men per mile required for guarding a line of rail
communication is declared by Captain John Bigelow, in his "Principles of
Strategy" (Philadelphia, 1894), to be exceedingly variable, depending as it

does upon the tactical features of the country and the temper of the
inhabitants. According, he says, to the estimate of the Germans for the
conditions of European warfare, the number will average about 1,000 men
for every stretch of fifteen miles. At this rate an army sixty miles from its
base requires about 4,000 men for the protection of each line of
communication.
With the help of figures such as these one may, perhaps, understand the
more readily how it is that a Commander-in-Chief, of merciless disposition,
and wanting to retain the active services of every soldier he possibly can in
the interests of an early and successful advance will, by spreading a feeling
of "terror" among the civil population, seek to reduce to as low a figure as
circumstances will permit the number of men he must leave behind to guard
his lines of rail communication.
These considerations will be found to apply with the greater force when it is
remembered that in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 the Prussians had
to adopt an especially elaborate system for safeguarding their lines of
communication with Germany during the time they occupied French
territory. At each railway station they placed a guard formed of detachments
of the Landwehr, while small detachments were stationed in towns and
villages in the neighbourhood. In each signal-box a detachment of troops
was stationed, and the whole line of railway was patrolled from posts
established along it at distances of every three or four miles. Altogether, the
Germans are said to have employed, on over 2,000 miles of French railway
lines controlled by them, as many as 100,000 troops for protective purposes
only; and even then the franc-tireurs were able to cause many interruptions.
Under a Prussian regulation dated May 2, 1867, it was laid down that after
the restoration of any lines taken possession of in an enemy's territory,
notice should be given that in the event of any further damage being done to
the railway, the locality would be subject to a fine of at least 500 thalers, the
belongings of the inhabitants would be liable to seizure, and the local
authorities might be arrested.
As a further precautionary measure in the war of 1870-71, the Germans
took a hint from the example of the Union Generals in the American Civil
War by compelling a leading citizen of the district passed through to ride on
the engine of each train run by them on French soil. In defence of this

practice, the German General Staff say in their handbook on "The Usages of
War"[9]:—

Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were, without any fault on
their part, thereby exposed to grave danger, every writer outside
Germany has stigmatised this measure as contrary to the law of nations
and as unjustified towards the inhabitants of the country. As against
this unfavourable criticism it must be pointed out that this measure,
which was also recognised on the German side as harsh and cruel, was
only resorted to after declarations and instructions of the occupying
authorities had proved ineffective, and that in the particular
circumstances it was the only method which promised to be effective
against the doubtless unauthorised, indeed the criminal, behaviour of a
fanatical population. Herein lies its justification under the laws of war,
but still more in the fact that it proved completely successful, and that
wherever citizens were thus carried on the trains ... the security of
traffic was assured.

Writing under date December 16, 1870, Busch offered the following
justification for the course adopted:—

They were taken, not to serve as a hindrance to French heroism, but as
a precaution against treacherous crime. The railway does not carry
merely soldiers, ammunition and other war material against which it
may be allowable to use violent measures; it also conveys a great
number of wounded, doctors, hospital attendants, and other perfectly
harmless persons. Is a peasant or franc-tireur to be allowed to
endanger hundreds of those lives by removing a rail or laying a stone
upon the line? Let the French see that the security of the railway trains
is no longer threatened and the journeys made by those hostages will
be merely outings, or our people may even be able to forgo such
precautionary measures.

In the South African War, Field-Marshal Earl Roberts issued at Pretoria, on
June 19, 1900, a proclamation one section of which authorised the placing
of leading men among the Boers on the locomotives of the trains run by the

British on the occupied territory; but this particular section was withdrawn
eight days afterwards.
The English view of the practice in question is thus defined in the official
"Manual of Military Law" (Chap. XIV, "The Laws and Usages of War," par.
463):—

Such measures expose the lives of inhabitants, not only to the
illegitimate acts of train wrecking by private enemy individuals, but
also to the lawful operations of raiding parties of the armed forces of
the belligerent, and cannot, therefore, be considered a commendable
practice.

To guard against the attacks made on the railway lines in the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal during the British occupation, entrenched posts
were placed at every bridge exceeding a 30-feet span; constant patrolling
was maintained between these posts; and the block-houses introduced (in
1901) by Lord Kitchener were erected along all the railway lines, at
distances of about 2,000 yards. Each block-house, also, was garrisoned by
about ten men, and each was surrounded by wire entanglements which,
together with various kinds of alarm fences, were also placed between the
block-houses themselves in order both to impede the approach of the enemy
and to warn the garrison thereof.
Block-houses are to-day regarded as one of the chief means of protecting
railways against attacks. Their construction and equipment are dealt with by
Major W. D. Connor, of the Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., in "Military
Railways" (Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army,
Washington, 1910).
Supplementary to the adoption of this block-house system, in time of war, is
the practice followed in various Continental countries, in time of peace, of
building permanent fortresses, in solid masonry, alongside railway bridges
crossing important rivers. In some instances the fortress is so constructed
that the railway lines pass through the centre of it. Not only, as a rule, are
these fortresses extremely solid and substantial, but they may be provided
with bomb-proof covers and be stocked with a sufficient supply of
provisions to be able to stand, if necessary, a fairly prolonged siege. One
can assume, also, that the garrison would have under its control facilities

arranged in advance for the destruction of the bridge, as a last resort, in case
of need.
The theory is that such fortresses and their garrisons should be of especial
advantage, on the outbreak of war, in checking any sudden invasion and
allowing time for the completion of defensive measures. Their construction
in connection with all the principal railway bridges crossing the Rhine was
especially favoured in Prussia after the war of 1870-1.
Similar fortresses, or "interrupting forts," as the Germans call them, are also
built for the protection of important tunnels, junctions, locomotive and
carriage works, etc.
Another method adopted for the safeguarding of railway lines in war is the
use of armoured trains; though in practice these are also employed for the
purposes of independent attacks on the enemy, apart altogether from any
question of ensuring the safety of rail communication.[10]
For the protection of locomotives and rolling stock, and to prevent not only
their capture but their use by the enemy, the most efficacious method to
adopt is, of course, that of removing them to some locality where the enemy
is not likely to come.
When, in 1866, Austria saw that she could not hold back the Prussian
invader, she took off into Hungary no fewer than 1,000 locomotives and
16,000 wagons from the railways in Bohemia and Saxony. Similar tactics
were adopted by the Boers as against ourselves in the war in South Africa.
On the British troops crossing into the Orange Free State, from Cape
Colony, they found that the retreating enemy had withdrawn all their rolling
stock, as well as all their staffs from the railway stations, leaving behind
only a more or less damaged line of railway. Subsequently, when the forces
occupied Pretoria, they certainly did find there sixteen locomotives and 400
trucks; but the station books showed that in the previous forty-eight hours
no fewer than seventy trains, many of them drawn by two engines, had been
sent east in the direction of Delagoa Bay.
When it is not practicable to withdraw locomotives and rolling stock which
it is desired the enemy shall not be able to use, the obvious alternative is
that measures should be taken either to remove vital parts or to ensure their
destruction. Certain of the methods adopted during the Civil War in

America were especially efficacious in attaining the latter result. In some
instances trains were started running and then—driver and fireman leaping
off the engine—were left to go into a river, or to fall through a broken
viaduct. In other instances two trains, after having had a good supply of
explosives put in them, would be allowed to dash into one another at full
speed. Many locomotives had their boilers burst, and wagons were set on
fire after having been filled up with combustibles.
Still another method which has been adopted with a view to preventing an
enemy from using the railways he might succeed in capturing is that of
constructing them with a different gauge. The standard gauge of the main-
line railways in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Austria-
Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Roumania and Turkey (like that, also, of
railways in Great Britain, Canada and the United States), is 4ft. 8½in.,
allowing trains to pass readily from one country to the other with the same
rolling stock; but the gauge of the Russian railways is 5ft., necessitating a
transshipment from one train to another when the frontier is reached.
Similar conditions are found in Spain and Portugal, where the standard
gauge is 5ft. 6in.[11]
Russia adopted her broader gauge so that, in case of invasion, the invader
should not be able to run his rolling-stock over her lines, as Germany, for
instance, would be able to do in the case of the railways of Belgium and
France. Thus far, therefore, Russia strengthened her position from the point
of view of defence; but she weakened it as regards attack, since if she
should herself want, either to become the invader or to send troop trains
over neighbouring territory to some point beyond, she would be at a
disadvantage. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, when the Russian
forces passed through Roumania on their way to Turkey, the difference in
gauge between the Russian and the Roumanian railways caused great delay
and inconvenience by reason of the necessary transfer of troops, stores,
guns, ammunition, torpedo boats, etc., at the frontier.
It should, also, be remembered that the reduction of a broad gauge to a
narrow one is a much simpler matter, from an engineering point of view,
than the widening of a narrower gauge into a broad one. In the former case
the existing sleepers, bridges, tunnels, platforms, etc., would still serve their
purpose. In the latter case fresh sleepers might have to be laid, bridges and
tunnels widened or enlarged, and platforms and stations altered, use of the

broader-gauge rolling stock thus involving an almost complete
reconstruction of the railway lines. To this extent, therefore, the balance of
advantage would seem to be against the country having the broader gauge.
The conclusion may, at least, be formed that such a country is far more bent
on protecting her own territory than on invading that of her neighbours.
The course adopted by Germany for overcoming the difficulty which, in the
event of her seeking to invade Russia, the difference of railway gauge in
that country would present, will be told in Chapter XVIII.

FOOTNOTES:
[8] "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866." By Capt. Webber, R.E. Papers
of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., vol. xvi. Woolwich, 1868.
[9] "The German War Book. Being the Usages of War on Land"; issued by the
Great General Staff of the German Army. London, 1915.
[10] The subject of armoured trains will be dealt with more fully in Chapters VII
and XVI.
[11] See "Field Service Pocket Book, 1914," pp. 151-2.

CHAPTER VI
Troops and Supplies
In the earlier controversies as to the use of railways in war, attention was
almost entirely concentrated on questions relating to the movement of large
masses of troops, the saving of time to be effected, and the strategic
advantages to be gained. These considerations quickly passed from the
theoretical to the practical, and when the results attained were put against
such facts as, for instance, the one that in 1805 Napoleon's Grand Army of
200,000 men took forty-two days to march the 700 kilometres (435 miles)
between Ulm on the Danube and the French camp at Boulogne, there was
no longer any possibility of doubt as to the services that railways might
render from these particular points of view.
Quicker transport was, however, only one consideration. There was the
further important detail that the movement of troops by rail would bring
them to their point of concentration, not only sooner, but in more complete
numbers, than if they had to endure the fatigues of prolonged marches by
road.
According to German authorities, the falling-out of infantry and cavalry
when marching along good roads under conditions of well-maintained
discipline and adequate food supplies averages three per cent. in cool and
dry weather, and six per cent. in hot or wet weather; while in unfavourable
conditions as regards roads, weather and supplies, the diminution may be
enormous. When, in the autumn of 1799, Suvóroff made his famous march
over the St. Gothard, he lost, in eleven days, no fewer than 10,000 men
owing to the hardships of the journey. In his invasion of Russia, in 1812,
Napoleon's losses in men who succumbed to the fatigues and trials they
experienced on the road were out of all proportion to the casualties due to
actual fighting. It was, too, a saying of Blücher's that "he feared night
marches worse than the enemy."
An English authority, Lieut.-Col. R. Home, C.B., R.E., wrote in a paper on
"The Organisation of the Communications, including Railways," published

in Vol XIX. of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (1875):—

If an army of moderate size, say 50,000 men, simply marches one
hundred miles without firing one shot or seeing an enemy the number
of sick to be got rid of is very great.
Experience has shown that in a good climate, with abundant food, easy
marches, and fair weather, the waste from ordinary causes in a ten
days' march of such a force would be between 2,000 and 2,500 men,
while the number of galled, footsore or worn-out horses would also be
very large. A few wet days or a sharp engagement would raise the
number of both very considerably. An inefficient man or horse at the
front is a positive disadvantage.

Another equally important detail relates to the provision of supplies for the
troops and animals thus transported by rail both more quickly and with less
fatigue.
In all ages the feeding of his troops in an enemy's country has been one of
the gravest problems a military commander has had to solve; and though, in
some instances, vast armies have succeeded in drawing sufficient support
from the land they have invaded, there have been others in which an army
intending to "live upon the country" has failed to get the food it needed, and
has had its numbers depleted to the extent of thousands as the result of
sheer starvation. This was the experience of Darius, King of Persia, who, in
513 B.C., crossed the Bosporus, on a bridge of boats, with an army of
700,000, followed the retreating Scythians, and lost 80,000 of his men in
wild steppes where no means existed for feeding them. When, also,
Alexander the Great was withdrawing from India, in 325 B.C., two-thirds of
his force died on the desert plains of Beluchistan from thirst or hunger.
Lack of the supplies from which he found himself entirely cut off was,
again, a main cause of the disaster that overtook Napoleon in his Russian
campaign. Even fertile or comparatively fertile lands, satisfying the needs
of their inhabitants in time of peace, may fail to afford provisions for an
invading army, either because of the great number of the latter or because
the retreating population have destroyed the food supplies they could not
take with them into the interior whether for their own sustenance or with a
view to starving the invaders.

Should the invading army succeed in "living on the country," the effect of
leaving the troops to their own resources, in the way of collecting food, may
still be not only subversive of discipline but of strategic disadvantage
through their being scattered on marauding expeditions at a time when,
possibly, it would be preferable to keep them concentrated.
General Friron, chief of the staff of Marshal Masséna, wrote concerning
Napoleon's campaign in Portugal:—

The day the soldier became convinced that, for the future, he would
have to depend on himself, discipline disappeared from the ranks of
the army. The officer became powerless in the presence of want; he
was no longer disposed to reprimand the soldier who brought him the
nourishment essential to his existence, and who shared with him, in
brotherly goodwill, a prey which may have cost him incalculable
dangers and fatigues.

The extent to which a combination of physical fatigue and shortness of
supplies in an inhospitable country may interfere with the efficiency of an
army is well shown by Thiers ("Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire") in
regard to the conditions at the very outset of Napoleon's Russian campaign.
The French troops arriving on the Niemen—at which point they were
merely on the frontiers of Russia—were already overcome by the long
marches they had made. They had no bread, no salt, and no spirits; their
craving for food could no longer be satisfied by meat without salt and meal
mixed with water. The horses, too, were out of condition for want of proper
food. Behind the army a great number of soldiers dropped out of the ranks
and had lost their way, while the few people they met in a scantily-
populated district could speak nothing but Polish, which the wearied and
famished men were unable to understand. Yet, under the conditions of
former days, it was by troops thus exhausted by marches of hundreds of
miles, done on, possibly, a starvation diet, that battles involving the severest
strain on human energy were fought.
When "living on the country" is no longer practicable, the only alternative
for an army is, of course, that of sending supplies after it for the feeding of
the troops; but when, or where, this has had to be done by means of
ordinary road services, it has involved—together with the transport of

artillery, ammunition and stores—(1) the employment of an enormous
number of vehicles and animals, greatly complicating the movements of the
army; and (2) a limitation of the distance within which a campaign can be
waged by an army depending entirely on its own resources.
The latter of these conditions was the direct consequence of the former; and
the reason for this was shown by General W. T. Sherman in an article
contributed by him to the Century Magazine for February, 1888 (pp. 595-6),
in the course of which he says:—

According to the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon its belly,
not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons can operate more
than a hundred miles from its base because the teams going and
returning consume the contents of their wagons, leaving little or
nothing for the maintenance of men and animals at the front who are
fully employed in fighting.

There was, again, the risk when food supplies followed the army by road
either of perishables going bad en route, owing to the time taken in their
transport by wagon, or of their suffering deterioration as the result of
exposure to weather, the consequence in either case being a diminution in
the amount of provisions available for feeding the army.
All these various conditions have been changed by the railway, the use of
which for the purposes of war has, in regard to the forwarding of supplies,
introduced innovations which are quite as important as those relating to the
movement of troops—if, indeed, the former advantages are not of even
greater importance than the latter.
Thanks to the railway, an army can now draw its supplies from the whole of
the interior of the home country—provided that the lines of communication
can be kept open; and, with the help not only of regular rail services but of
stores and magazines en route those supplies can be forwarded to railhead
in just such quantities as they may be wanted. Under these conditions the
feeding of an army in the field should be assured regardless alike of the
possible scanty resources of the country in which it is engaged and of its
own distance from the base of supplies.

CHAPTER VII
Armoured Trains
In the issue of the now defunct London periodical, Once a Week, for August
13, 1859, there was published an article on "English Railway Artillery: A
Cheap Defence against Invasion," in which it was said, among other things:
—

We have hitherto regarded the rail merely as a vehicle of transport, to
carry materials which are not to be set in work till off the rails. If we
look at the rail as part of an instrument of warfare, we shall be startled
at the enormous means we have at hand, instantly available, from
mercantile purposes, to convert to engines of war.

The writer was William Bridges Adams (1797-1872), an authority on
railways who had grown up with them, had introduced into their operation
many inventions and improvements (including the fish-joint still used for
connecting rails), and was the author of various books and papers on
railways, transport, and other subjects. His new idea, as set forth in the
article in question, was specially directed to the utilisation of railways for
defending the shores of Great Britain against an invader; and in developing
this idea he was, also, as far as can be traced, the first to suggest the
employment of armoured trains.
The immediate reason alike for the writing of the article and for the making
of the suggestion was that in 1859 Great Britain appeared to be faced by the
prospect of invasion by France,—a prospect which, in view of the then
admittedly defective condition of the national defences, led to the creation
of the Volunteer Corps, to the appointment of a Royal Commission to
inquire into the question of coast defence, and to suggestions being put
forward by many different authorities as to what should be done. Among
those suggestions was one by the writer in question for supplementing any
system of coast defence that might be adopted by the mounting of guns on
railway trucks protected by armour, such trucks being moved from point to

point along the coast railways to meet, as far as possible, the needs of the
military situation.
Heavy artillery, wrote Adams, though the most formidable implement of
modern warfare, had the disadvantage of requiring many horses to draw it.
So the problem arose as to how the horses could be dispensed with. This
could best be done, he thought, by putting artillery on "our true line of
defence,—our rails," and having it drawn, or propelled, by a locomotive.
"Mount," he said, "a gun of twenty tons weight on a railway truck, with a
circular traversing platform, and capable of throwing a shot or shell
weighing one hundred to one and a half a distance of five miles. A truck on
eight wheels would carry this very easily, and there would be no recoil."
Such a battery would be "practically a moving fortress," and, used on the
coast railways, which he regarded as constituting lines of defence, would be
"the cheapest of all possible fortresses—absolutely a continuous fortress
along the whole coast." Communication with coast railways at all
strategical points should, however, be facilitated by the placing of rails
along the ordinary highways. After giving some technical details as to the
construction alike of coast railways and road tramways, he proceeded:—

With these roads communicating with the railroads, the whole railway
system becomes applicable to military purposes.
The railway system is so especially adapted for defence, and so little
adapted to invaders, that it should become at once a matter of
experiment how best to adapt Armstrong or other guns to its uses. The
process of fitting the engines with shot-proof walls to protect the
drivers against riflemen would be very easy.... Nothing but artillery
could damage the engines or moving batteries, and artillery could not
get near them if it were desirable to keep out of the way.
One gun transportable would do the work of ten which are fixtures in
forts, and there would be no men to take prisoners, for no forts would
be captured.
The more this system is thought of the more the conviction will grow
that it is the simplest mode of rendering the country impenetrable to
invaders at a comparatively trifling cost.

It will be seen that the scheme here proposed included three separate
propositions—(1) the use of railways, as "engines of war," for coast
defence; (2) the mounting of Armstrong or other guns on railway trucks
from which they could be discharged for the purposes of such defence; and
(3) the providing of the engines with "shot-proof walls" for the protection of
the drivers. A similar protection for the men operating the guns on the
trucks was not then, apparently, considered necessary; but we have here
what was clearly the germ of the "armoured train."
Among the other suggestions advanced on the same occasion were some for
the employment of railways in general for strategical purposes, and more
especially for the defence of London; and here, again, the employment of
armoured trains was advocated.
"A Staff Officer," writing in The Times of July 16, 1860, declared that the
most efficacious and the most economical line of defence which London
could have would be a circular railway forming a complete cordon around
the Metropolis at a distance of fifteen miles from the centre, and having for
its interior lines of operation the numerous railways already existing within
that radius. On this circular railway there should be "Armstrong and
Whitworth ordnance mounted on large iron-plated trucks" fitted with
traversing platforms in the way already recommended by W. Bridges
Adams, the trucks themselves, however, and not only the locomotives,
being protected by "shot-proof shields." The circular railway was to be
constructed primarily for strategical purposes; but during peace the line
would be available for ordinary traffic, and in this way it could be made to
yield at least some return on the capital expenditure.
The writer of this letter, Lieut. Arthur Walker, then an officer of the 79th
Highlanders and the holder of a staff appointment at the School of
Musketry, Fleetwood, followed up the subject by reading a paper on "Coast
Railways and Railway Artillery" at a meeting of the Royal United Service
Institution on January 30, 1865.[12] On this occasion he specially advocated
the use of "moveable batteries" for coast defence in conjunction with
railways constructed more or less within a short parallel distance of the
entire coast line. Field artillery, he recommended, should be mounted on a
truck the sides of which would be "encased in a cuirass of sufficient
thickness," while the engine and tender would also be "protected by an iron
cuirass, and placed between two cupolas for further protection." He

considered that "to attempt to land in face of such an engine of war as this
would be simply impossible." Moving batteries of this kind would be "the
cheapest of all possible fortresses.... We have nothing to do but to improvise
well-adapted gun-carriages for our rails." At the same meeting Mr. T.
Wright, C.E., gave details of a proposed railway train battery for coast,
frontier and inland defence which was designed to carry ten, twenty or forty
guns or mortars.
Another early advocate of the use of railways as an actual instrument of
warfare was Colonel E. R. Wethered, who, in 1872, wrote to the War Office
suggesting that heavy ordnance should be mounted on wheeled carriages so
constructed that they could be moved along any of the railways, from point
to point. In this way the three-fold advantage would be gained of (1)
utilising the railway system for purposes of national defence; (2) rendering
possible a concentration of artillery with overwhelming force at any given
spot, and, (3) by the use of these moveable carriages for the conveyance of
the guns, exposing the men to less risk.
Colonel Wethered further communicated to The Times of May 25, 1877, a
letter on "Portable Batteries" in which he declared that if, before an enemy
could effect a landing, we were to provide the means of concentrating, with
unerring certainty, on any given points of the coast, a crushing force of
artillery, with guns of heavier calibre than even the warships of the invader
could command, it would be impossible for the vessels of an invading force
to approach near enough to effect the landing of their men. He continued:—

My proposal is to take the full advantage which our railway system, in
connection with our insular position, affords, and provide powerful
moveable batteries which can be sent fully equipped in fighting order
direct by railway to any required point; and the recent experimental
trials of the 81-ton gun have proved that the heaviest ordnance can be
moved and fought on railway metals with considerable advantage.... In
connection with our present main lines of railway, which probably
would require strengthening at certain points, I would construct branch
lines or sidings leading to every strategical point of our coast and into
every fort, as far as possible, with requisite platforms.... These branch
lines during peace would, doubtless, be of some small commercial
value.... I would mount as many of our heaviest guns as practicable on

railway gun carriages so that they could be moved by rail from one
face of a front to another, and from one place to another.

He also recommended that guns thus mounted, fully equipped, and ready
for use, should be kept at three large central depôts which might be utilised
for the defence of London. At each of them he would station (1) Militia and
Volunteer Artillery able not only to work the guns but to construct, repair or
destroy railway lines, and (2) a locomotive corps specially trained in the
working of traffic under war conditions.
By reading a paper at the Royal United Service Institution on April 24,
1891, on "The Use of Railways for Coast and Harbour Defence,"[13] Lieut.
E. P. Girouard, R.E. (now Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard,
K.C.M.G.), made what was, at that time, an important contribution to a
subject on which there was then still much to be learned. Sketching a
detailed scheme comprising the employment of all the coastal railways for
the purposes of national defence, he emphasised the value of Britain's
"enormous railway power" as the strong point of her defensive position,
whether regarded from the point of view of (1) railway mileage open as
compared with the square mile of coastal area to be defended, or (2) the
length of coast line compared with the railway mileage at or near that coast
line, and, therefore, locally available for its defence. "Why," he asked,
"should we not turn to account the enormous advantage which our great
railway power gives us to concentrate every available gun at a threatened
point in the right and the proper time, which the proper utilisation of our
railways can and will do, thereby practically doubling or quadrupling our
available gun power?"
Whilst the subject had thus been under discussion in the United Kingdom,
America, in her Civil War of 1861-65, had set the rest of the world an
example by actually introducing armoured-protected gun-carrying trucks
into modern warfare.
Writing from Washington, under date August 29, 1862, to Colonel Herman
Haupt, then Chief of Construction and Transportation in the Department of
Rappahannock, Mr. P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, said:—"An
armour-clad car, bullet proof, and mounting a cannon, has arrived here and
will be sent down to Alexandria." A later message, on the same date added:
—"After you see the bullet-proof car, let me know what you think of it. I

think you ought at once to have a locomotive protected by armour. Can you
have the work done expeditiously and well at Alexandria, or shall I get it
done at Philadelphia or Wilmington?" The car was duly received; but
Haupt's comments in respect to it, as recorded in his "Reminiscences," show
that he was not greatly impressed by the innovation. "P. H. Watson,
Assistant-Secretary of War, sent me," he says, "an armour-clad, bullet-proof
car, mounting a cannon. The kindness was appreciated, but the present was
an elephant. I could not use it, and, being in the way, it was finally side-
tracked on an old siding in Alexandria."
It would seem, however, that other armour-clad cars were brought into
actual use during the course of the Civil War.
In the Railway Age Gazette (Chicago) for January 22, 1915, Mr. Frederick
Hobart, associated editor of the New York Engineer and Mining Journal,
writes, from personal knowledge, of two armoured cars which were in use
in the Civil War. One of these, formed by heavy timbers built up on a flat
car, was put together in the shops of the Atlantic and North Carolina
Railroad Company at Newberne, N.C., in 1862, about two months after the
city had been captured by the Burnside expedition. The armour consisted of
old rails spiked on the outside of the planking composing the sides and front
of the car. Along the sides there were slits for musketry fire, and at the front
end there was a port hole covered with a shutter behind which a gun from
one of the field batteries was mounted. The second car was similarly
constructed, but was armed with a naval howitzer. The cars were run ahead
of the engine, and were used in reconnoitring along the railroad line west of
Newberne. Mr. Hobart adds that he was quite familiar with the cars, having
assisted in the design and construction of both.
In the Century Magazine for September, 1887 (page 774), there is given an
illustration ("from a photograph") of an armour-clad car described as "the
Union Railroad Battery" which was, apparently, used in connection with the
springing of the mine in front of Petersburg on July 30, 1864. The car is
shown to have consisted of a low truck with, at one end, a sloping armour
plate coming down almost to the rails, and having a hole through which the
gun placed behind it on the truck could be fired. The sides of the truck were
protected from the top of the sloping armour downwards, but the back was
open. The car was, of course, designed to be pushed in front of the
locomotive.

Mr. L. Lodian, also, contributed to the issue of the American periodical,
Railway and Locomotive Engineering, for May, 1915, a communication,
under the title of "The Origin of Armoured Railroad Cars Unquestionably
the Product of the American Civil War," in which, claiming that "our own
Civil War" originated those cars, he said:—

Attached is a picture of one in use on the old Philadelphia-Baltimore
Railroad. The illustration appeared in Frank Leslie's illustrated
periodical on May 18, 1864. No better proof could be furnished of the
authenticity of the fact that such a car was in use at that time.... There
appears to be no great variation even to-day in armoured car design
from the initial effort of half a century ago. Pictures are appearing in
numerous periodicals, at the period of writing, of those in use by the
European belligerents, and in general appearance and outline they are
about the same as the original, the chief variation in their use being
that the war-going locomotive is also sheathed in armour, whereas that
in use in the sixties was entirely unprotected, except in front, and then
only by reason of the mailclad car being placed in front to do the
fighting.

As against this suggestion, there is the undoubted fact that in the American
Civil War the plan was adopted of having the locomotives of ordinary troop
or supply trains protected by armour-plating as a precaution against attack
when there was no armoured car in front of them. Writing to the Director of
Military Railroads on October 8, 1862, Haupt said:—

I have been thinking over the subject of locomotives. It is one which,
at the present time, and in view of the future requirements of the
service, demands especial attention. Experience has shown that on
engines men are targets for the enemy; the cabs where they are usually
seated have been riddled by bullets, and they have only escaped by
lying on the footboard. It will be necessary to inspire confidence in our
men by placing iron cabins (bullet proof) upon all or nearly all our
engines, and the necessity will increase as we penetrate further into the
enemy's country.
Again, it is desirable that the smaller and more delicate portions of the
apparatus should be better protected than at present, and I would be

pleased if you would give to the plans, of which I spoke to you
recently, a careful consideration. It seems to me that they are peculiarly
well adapted to military service.

Haupt adds that "protected locomotives and bullet-proof cabs were soon
after provided, as recommended"; and elsewhere in his "Reminiscences" he
says, on the same subject:—

The bullet-proof cabs on locomotives were very useful—in fact,
indispensable. I had a number of them made and put on engines, and
they afforded protection to engineers and firemen against the fire from
guerillas from the bushes that lined the road.

In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 guns mounted on four armour-
plated trucks, fitted up in the workshops of the Orléans Company, under the
supervision of M. Dupuy de Lorme, Engineer-in-Chief for Naval
Construction, were taken into action on four occasions during the siege of
Paris, namely, at Choisy-le-Roi, for the sortie preceding the one from
Champigny; near Brie-sur-Marne, to support the Champigny sortie; at Le
Bourget, for one of the attempts to recapture that position; and at La
Malmaison, to support the Montretout sortie. The wagons were protected by
a covering which consisted of five plates of wrought iron, each two-fifths of
an inch thick, and giving, therefore, a total thickness of two inches. The two
engines used were also protected by armour-plating. One or two of the
wagons were struck by field-gun shells without, however, sustaining further
damage than the denting of their plates. The engines escaped damage
altogether. On going into action the armoured wagons were followed by
another bullet-proof engine conveying a party of men with tools and
materials to repair any interruption of the lines that might interfere with the
return of the trains; but the only damage done was so slight that it was
remedied in about a quarter of an hour.[14]
Further use was made of armoured trains in the Egyptian Campaign of
1882. One that was put together to assist in the defensive works at
Alexandria is declared in the official history of the campaign[15] to have
"proved most serviceable." Two of the trucks, fitted with iron plating and
sand bags as a protecting cover, carried one Nordenfelt and two Gatling
guns. A 9-pr. was also placed on one of the trucks, together with a crane by

means of which it could be lowered out immediately. Other trucks, rendered
bullet proof by sand bags and boiler-plating, and carrying a force of 200
bluejackets, with small arms, completed the fighting force. On July 28, the
train took part in a reconnaissance sent out to ascertain the extent of the
damage which had been done to the railway lines near Arabi's outpost.
Shots were fired at the train by the enemy, but without effect. The
reconnaissance was a complete success inasmuch as it enabled such repairs
to be done to the railway as gave the use of a second line between Ramleh
and Alexandria.
So useful had the train been found that it was now further improved by
adding to it a 40-pr. on a truck protected by an iron mantlet. The locomotive
was put in the middle of the train and was itself protected by sand bags and
railway iron. Thus strengthened, the train went into action in the
reconnaissance in force carried out from Alexandria on August 5, and "the
most interesting incident of the engagement," according to the official
account, "was the good service done by the 40-pr. from the armoured train."
Early in the morning of September 13 the train, consisting of five wagons,
and having, on this occasion, one Krupp gun and one Gatling in addition to
the 40-pr., was sent to support the attack on Tel el-Kebir. It was followed by
another train having 350 yards of permanent-way materials, with all the
necessary tools and appliances for the prompt carrying out of any repairs
that might be necessary. Owing, however, to the hazy and uncertain light
and to the ever-increasing clouds of smoke that hung over the battle-field, it
was impossible to fire the 40-pr.
In the futile attempt made in 1885 to construct a railway from Suakin to
Berber, in support of the Nile Expedition of 1884-85, resort was had to an
armoured train for the purpose of protecting the line from the constant
attacks to which it was subjected by the enemy. The train carried a 20-pr.
B.L., which could be fired only either in prolongation of the line or at a
slight angle from it.
At the Camp of Exercise in Delhi in January, 1886, some important
experiments were carried out with a view to testing the practicability of
firing guns at right angles to an ordinary line of railway, the result being to
establish the fact that a 40-pr. R.B.L. could be fired with perfect safety
broadside from (a) small empty wagons mounted on four wheels; (b) small

empty wagons weighted up to four tons; and (c) empty eight-wheel bogies.
These experiments were especially successful when account is taken of the
fact that no attempt was made to reduce in any way the energy of recoil.
Other experiments, begun in 1885, were successfully conducted during a
succession of years both by the French Government and by private firms in
France in the transport and the firing of guns from railway trucks with a
view to obtaining definite data on the subject, more especially in relation to
firing at right angles to the line.
In Italy a distinguished officer raised the question in the Italian Parliament,
in 1891, as to whether Sicily should not be defended by means of a coast
railway and armoured trains.
Some experiments carried out at Newhaven, Sussex, in 1894, were the more
interesting because the results attained were due to the combined efforts of
Artillery Volunteers and of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway
Company.
Under the Volunteer mobilization scheme of 1891 there were some 300
members of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers to whom no special duties
had been allotted, and there happened to be, at Shoreham, a 40-pr.
Armstrong B.L. gun which was then serving no particular purpose. Inspired
by these two facts, the Secretary of the Committee for National Defence
suggested, in November, 1891, that negotiations should be opened with the
London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company with a view to their
mounting the 40-pr. on a specially prepared truck, designed to form part of
an armoured train, experiments in firing the gun from the truck—in order to
test the efficiency of this expedient for the purposes of coast defence—
being afterwards carried out by the Artillery Volunteers whose services
were available for the purpose.
On being approached, the directors of the railway company readily
consented to the fitting up of the truck being carried out at their engineering
and carriage works; they contributed towards the expenses, and members of
their staff entered with great cordiality into the scheme, Mr. R. J. Billington,
the locomotive superintendent, being the first to suggest the mounting of
the gun on a turntable to be fixed on the truck,—a "bold departure," as it
was regarded at the time, and one expected to produce excellent results. The
railway staff were the more interested, also, in the proposed experiments

because a large proportion of the members of the 1st Sussex Artillery
Volunteers consisted of men employed at the Brighton Company's works.
In commenting upon these facts, Col. Charles Gervaise Boxall, the
commanding officer, said in a paper on "The Armoured Train for Coast
Defence," read by him at a meeting of officers and N.C.O.'s of the Brigade,
held at Newhaven Fort, Sussex, on May 14, 1894:—

When one considers that a railway company is neither a philanthropic
institution nor a patriotic society, the generous support given to this
experiment by so powerful a body as the directors of the London,
Brighton and South Coast Railway Company is in itself some
considerable evidence of the importance they themselves ascribe to
this effort in the direction of the maintenance of coast defence and
protection from invasion.

Preliminary experiments with the gun were conducted on May 5, 1894, and
they conclusively showed, Col. Boxall said, "that the gun will require no
traversing to correct variation caused by the recoil, while the muzzle of the
gun can be directed to any part of its circumference by handspike traversing
within half a minute." He was evidently proud of the results even of these
preliminary trials. They were the first occasion on which a heavy gun had
been fired broadside on the permanent way of an English railway, and the
truck was the first armour-plated one on which a turntable, a recoil cylinder,
and other inventions introduced had been employed. So, he further
declared:—

We do confidently submit that, having proved that such a gun as this
can be mounted so as to be transportable to any part of our railway
system at a moment's notice, brought into action, and fired with
accuracy either end on, broadside, or in any other direction, without
danger of capsizing, and without injury to the permanent way, we have
become pioneers of a new departure in artillery which must lead to
results of the highest importance.

This was written prior to the full trials, which took place at Newhaven on
May 19, 1894, in the presence of a distinguished company of military men
and others. An account of the event will be found in The Times of May 21,

1894. The gun and its carriage are described as standing on a turntable
platform pivoted on the centre of the truck, and revolving on a central
"racer." The gun detachments were protected by a plating six feet high
round three sides of the turntable, and the gun was fired through an aperture
in the plating. Drawn by an ordinary locomotive, the truck on which the gun
was mounted was accompanied by two carriages conveying the Volunteer
Artillerymen who were to serve the gun. Several rounds were fired at a
target some 2,500 yards distant, and "the armoured train passed through the
searching and severe ordeal most successfully, the jar caused being so slight
that a stone placed on the rails remained unmoved by the firing." The truck,
it is further stated, had been provided with some cross girders which could
be run out and supported on blocks in order to secure a broad base when the
gun was fired at right angles to the line, and there was a further arrangement
for connecting the truck to the rails by strong clips; but the truck remained
sufficiently steady without any need for making use of these appliances.
Finally, as will be told more fully in Chapter XVI, the South African
Campaign of 1899-1902 definitely established the usefulness of armoured
trains as an "instrument of war," and led both to the creation of an efficient
organisation for their employment on the most scientific and most practical
lines and to the establishment of certain principles in regard to such
important matters of detail as uses and purposes, administration, staff,
armament, tactics, etc. Published in the "Detailed History of the Railways in
the South African War" which was issued by the Royal Engineers' Institute,
Chatham, in 1905, these principles were adopted in the United States with
modifications to suit American conditions, and, so modified, are reproduced
in Major William D. Connor's handbook on "Military Railways," forming
No. 32 of the Professional Papers of the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. An
excellent treatment of the subject, from a technical point of view, will be
found in a paper, by Capt. H. O. Nance, on "Armoured Trains," published,
with photographs and drawings, in "Papers of the Corps of Royal
Engineers," Fourth Series, Vol. I., Paper 4 (Chatham, 1906).

FOOTNOTES:
[12] See the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" Vol. IX., pp. 221-
31, 1865.

[13] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," Vol. XXXV., 1891.
[14] For detailed description, with diagrams, of the trains here in question, see
"Armour-plated Railway Wagons used during the late Sieges of Paris," by Lieut.
Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX, 1872.
[15] "Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt." Prepared by the
Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition. London, 1908.

CHAPTER VIII
Railway Ambulance Transport
According to statistics which have been compiled in relation to wars alike
in ancient and in modern times, for every ten men among the armies in the
field who have died from wounds received in battle there have been from
thirty-five to forty who died from sickness or disease. Writing in the
Journal des Sciences Militaires, Dr. Morache, a surgeon in the French
Army, has said that while the total number of deaths among combatants
taking part in the Crimean War was 95,000, no fewer than 70,000 were due
to typhus, scurvy, cholera or other diseases. In the Italian campaign of 1859
the French lost 5,498 men, of whom 2,500 died from sickness. On the
conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War the Russians had 51,000 of their
troops sick, the ravages of typhus having been especially severe.
These conditions have been materially aggravated by the gathering together
of great numbers of sick and wounded into overcrowded hospitals situate on
or near to the theatre of war and destined inevitably to become hot-beds of
disease and pestilence far more dangerous to human life, under these
conditions, than even the most deadly weapons which the art of war had
invented for use on the battle-field itself.
Nor was it the armies alone that suffered. Returning troops spread the seeds
of disease among the civil population, causing epidemics that lingered, in
some instances, for several years and carried off many thousands of non-
combatants, in addition to the great number of victims among the
combatants themselves. In a volume of 866 pages, published by Dr. E.
Gurlt, under the title of "Zur Geschichte der Internationellen und
Freiwilligen Krankenpflege im Kriege" (Leipzig, 1873), will be found
many terrible details concerning the ravages in France, Germany and
Austria of the typhus which Napoleon's troops brought back with them on
the occasion of their disastrous retreat from Russia.
The most practicable means of mitigating, if not of avoiding, these various
evils is to be found in the prompt removal of the sick and wounded from the

theatre of war, and their distribution in smaller units, not simply among a
group of neighbouring towns, but over an area extending to considerable
distances inland. The adoption of this remedy only became possible,
however, with a provision of adequate rail facilities, and even then many
years were to elapse before an efficient system of railway ambulance
transport was finally evolved.
The objects which the use of the railway in these directions was to attain
were alike humanitarian and strategical.
To the sick and wounded among the troops, prompt removal and
widespread distribution among hospitals in the interior meant (1) that they
avoided the risks to which they would have been subjected in the aforesaid
overcrowded and pestilential hospitals near the fighting line, where slight
injuries might readily develop dangerous symptoms, and contagious disease
complete the conditions leading to a fatal issue; (2) that, apart from these
considerations, it would be possible to give them a greater degree of
individual attention if they were distributed among a large number of
hospitals away from the scene of the fighting; (3) that more conservative
methods of surgery became practicable when operations of a kind not to be
attempted either on the battle-field or in temporary hospitals (from which
the inmates might have to be suddenly removed, owing to some change in
the strategical position) could be delayed until the sufferer's arrival at some
hospital in the interior, where better appliances and better facilities would
be available, and where, after the operation, the patient would be able to
remain undisturbed until he was cured; (4) that these improved conditions
might more especially permit of the avoidance of amputations otherwise
imperatively necessary; and (5) that, on the whole, the wounded soldier was
afforded a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and of saving both
life and limb than would be possible if railways were not available.
To the army in the field the innovation meant that with the speedy removal
of the sick and wounded it would be relieved of the great source of
embarrassment caused by the presence and dependence upon it of so many
inefficients;[16] depôt and intermediate hospitals could be reduced to the
smallest proportions, and would thus occasion less inconvenience if, owing
to a retreat or a change in the strategical position, they were brought within
the sphere of military operations; with the delegation of so many of the sick
and wounded to the care of civil practitioners in the interior, fewer of the

divisional, brigade and regimental medical officers would require to be
detached from the marching column; a smaller supplementary medical staff
would suffice; a considerable reduction could be effected in the stocks of
ambulance supplies kept on hand at the front; while important strategical
advantages would be gained through (1) the greater freedom of movement
which the army would secure; (2) the decreased risk of the number of
efficients being reduced through the outbreak of epidemics; and (3) the
prospect of a large proportion of the sick and wounded being enabled to
rejoin the fighting force on their making a speedy recovery from their
illness or their wounds.
The earliest occasion on which the railway was made use of for the
conveyance of sick and wounded from a scene of actual hostilities to the
rear was on the occasion of the Crimean War, when the little military line
between Balaklava and the camp before Sebastopol, of which an account
will be given in Chapter XV, was so employed. The facilities afforded were,
however, of the most primitive character. Only the wagons used for the
transport of supplies to the front—wagons, that is to say, little better than
those known as "contractors' trucks"—were available, and there were no
means of adapting them to the conveyance of sufferers who could not be
moved otherwise than in a recumbent position. Sitting-up cases could,
therefore, alone be carried; but what was to develop into a revolution in the
conditions of warfare was thus introduced, all the same.
In the Italian war of 1859 both the French and the Austrians made use of
the railways for the withdrawal of their sick and wounded, and, in his
"Souvenir de Solferino," Jean Henri Dumant, the "Father" of the Red Cross
Movement, speaks of the transportation of wounded from Brescia to Milan
by train to the extent of about 1,000 a night. No arrangements for their
comfort on the journey had been made in advance, and the changes in the
military situation were so rapid, when hostilities broke out, that no special
facilities could be provided then. All that was done was to lay down straw
on the floor of the goods or cattle trucks used for the conveyance of some of
the more serious cases. The remainder travelled in ordinary third-class
carriages, and their sufferings on the journey, before they reached the long
and narrow sheds put up along the railway lines at Milan or elsewhere to
serve as temporary hospitals, must often have been very great. They may,
nevertheless, have escaped the fate of those who died, not from their

wounds, but from the fevers quickly generated in the overcrowded hospitals
at the front, where there was, besides, a general deficiency of ambulance
requirements of all kinds. The good resulting from the removal by train is,
indeed, said to have been "immense."
These experiences in the campaign of 1859 led to a recommendation being
made in the following year by a German medical authority, Dr. E. Gurlt,[17]
that railway vehicles should be specially prepared for the conveyance of the
sick and wounded in time of war. The plan which he himself suggested for
adoption was the placing of the sufferers in hammocks suspended from
hooks driven into the roof of the goods van or carriage employed,
mattresses being first put on the hammocks, when necessary. By this means,
he suggested, the sufferers would travel much more comfortably than when
seated in the ordinary passenger carriages, or when lying on straw in the
goods wagons or cattle trucks.
Dr. Gurlt's pamphlet served the good purpose of drawing much attention to
the subject, and his proposals were duly subjected to the test of experiment.
They failed, however, on two grounds,—(1) because the roofs of the goods
vans, designed for shelter only, were not sufficiently strong to bear the
weight of a number of men carried in the way suggested; and (2) because
the motion of the train caused the hammocks to come into frequent contact
with the sides of the wagon, to the serious discomfort of the occupants.
In November of the same year (1860) the Prussian War Minister, von Roon,
appointed a Commission to enquire into the whole subject of the care of the
sick and wounded in time of war, and the question of transport by rail was
among the various matters considered. As a result of these investigations,
the Minister issued, on July 1, 1861, an order to the effect that in future the
less seriously wounded should travel in ordinary first, second or third-class
carriages, according to the degree of comfort they required, care being
taken to let them have corner seats; while for those who were seriously ill,
or badly wounded, there were to be provided sacks of straw having three
canvas loops on each side for the insertion of poles by means of which the
sacks and the sufferers lying upon them could be readily lifted in or out of
the goods wagons set apart for their conveyance. In these wagons they were
to be placed on the floor in such a way that each wagon would
accommodate either seven or eight. In the event of a deficiency of sacks,
loose straw was to be used instead. The door on one side of the truck was to

be left open for ventilation. A doctor and attendants were to accompany
each train, and they were to have a supply of bandages, medicines and
appliances. Of the last-mentioned a list of five articles was appended as
obligatory. The medical officer was to visit the wagons during the
stoppages, and the attendants on duty in the wagons were to carry flags so
that, when necessary, they could signal both for the train to pull up and for
the doctor to come to the sufferers.
This was as far as Prussia had got by 1861, when the arrangements stated
were regarded as quite sufficient to meet the requirements of the situation.
Real progress was to come, rather, from the other side of the Atlantic.
In the early days of the War of Secession (1861-65) the arrangements for the
conveyance by rail of the sick and wounded from the battle-fields of the
Eastern States to the hospitals in the large cities were still distinctly
primitive. Those who could sit up in the ordinary cars were conveyed in
them. Those who could not sit up, or would be injured by so doing, were
carried to the railway, by hand, on the mattresses or stretchers they had
occupied in the hospitals to which they had first been taken. At the station
the mattresses were placed on thick layers of straw or hay strewn over the
floors of the freight cars in which supplies had been brought to the front.
Large window spaces were cut in the sides or ends of the cars to provide for
ventilation. On some occasions, when hay or straw was not available, pine
boughs or leaves were used instead. As only the floor space was occupied
no more than about ten patients could be carried comfortably in each car,
though as many as twenty were occasionally crowded in. The wide doors of
the box cars readily permitted of the beds being lifted in or out. Medical
officers, with supplies, accompanied each train. On arrival at New York,
Washington, Philadelphia, Harrisburg, or other destination, the sufferers
were taken out and carried, still on the same mattresses or stretchers, to the
hospitals there.
Large numbers of sick or wounded were conveyed by rail under one or
other of these conditions, and the work was done with great expedition.
Between the morning of June 12 and the evening of June 14, 1863, over
9,000 wounded, victims of the Federal disaster at Chancellorsville, were
taken by the single-track Aquia Creek railroad from Aquia Creek to
Washington. Many even of the severely wounded declared they had
suffered no inconvenience from the journey. After the battle of Gettysburg,

July 1-3, 1863, more than 15,000 wounded had been sent by rail from the
field hospitals to Baltimore, New York, Harrisburg or Philadelphia by July
22. An even more rapid distribution was effected after the battles of the
Wilderness and Spottsylvania when, with a few exceptions, the transfer to
the hospitals in the cities mentioned was effected in the course of a few
days. Following on the battle of Olustree (February 20, 1864), the serious
cases were removed on the Mobile Railway by freight cars bedded with
pine boughs, palmetto leaves and a small quantity of straw, each patient
having a blanket, in addition.
As an improvement on these methods of transport, the plan was adopted of
fixing rows of upright wooden posts, connecting floor and ceiling, on each
side of a car as supports for two or three tiers of rough wooden bunks, a
central gangway through the car being left. In this way the available space
in the car was much better utilised than with the straw-on-floor system.
Next, in place of the bunks, came an arrangement by which the stretchers
whereon the patients lay could be securely lashed to the uprights; while this
was followed, in turn, by the insertion of wooden pegs into the uprights and
the placing on them of large and strong india-rubber rings into which the
handles of the stretchers could readily be slipped, and so suspended. The
first car so arranged came into use in March, 1863.
Meanwhile the Philadelphia Railroad Company had, at the end of 1862,
fitted up an ambulance car on the principle of a sleeping car, but so planned
that the stretchers on which the sufferers lay could be made to slide in or
out of the wooden supports. This particular car was capable of
accommodating fifty-one patients, in addition to a seat at each end for an
attendant. Other innovations introduced on the car were (1) a stove at which
soups could be warmed or tea made; (2) a water tank, and (3) a locker.
What the introducers of these improvements mainly prided themselves upon
was the fact that the patient could remain, throughout the entire journey
from field hospital to destination, on the stretcher he had been placed on at
the start. The adoption of this principle necessitated, however, uniformity in
the dimensions of the stretchers in order that these could always be
accommodated on the ambulance-car fittings.
The next important development was reached when the ambulance car, run
in connection with ordinary trains, and used for exceptionally severe cases,

was succeeded by the ambulance train. Here came further innovations, the
nine or ten "ward-cars," of which such a train mainly consisted in the
Eastern States, being supplemented by others fitted up as dispensary and
store-room, kitchen, and quarters for surgeon, attendants, and staff of train,
besides carrying all necessary appliances and provisions for the journey.
What was now specially aimed at was to make the train as close an
approach to an actual hospital on wheels as circumstances would permit.
"At present," wrote the Medical Director of the Department of Washington,
"the sick and wounded are transferred in cars ill-adapted for the purpose
and with difficulty spared from the other pressing demands; and lives are
lost on the route not infrequently which, in all probability, might be saved
by a more comfortable and easy method of transportation." The train he
caused to be constructed consisted of ten ward-cars, one car for the surgeon
and attendants, one as a dispensary and store-room, and one as a kitchen,
etc. The ward-cars, arranged on an improved principle, each accommodated
thirty recumbent and twenty or thirty seated patients. The train was to run
regularly on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad between the theatre of war
and the base hospitals at Alexandria and Washington. It was either to
supplement or to supersede the freight cars with their bedding of straw, hay
or leaves. If only from the point of view of the inadequate supply of rolling
stock, a car fitted up to accommodate fifty or sixty patients offered an
obvious advantage, in the speedy removal and distribution of sick and
wounded, over a car, without fittings, in which the floor space alone could
be utilised.
Several complete trains of the type stated were soon running on the Orange
and Alexandria Railroad, within the Union lines, and the hospital train thus
became an established institution in modern warfare.
It was, however, in connection with the chief army in the West, the Army of
the Cumberland, operating under General George H. Thomas, that the
useful purposes which could be served by hospital trains became most
conspicuous.
The need for them in the West was even greater than in the East, because
the distances to be covered were greater and lay, also, to a considerable
extent, in enemy country.

In the fall of 1863 and the winter of 1864, as narrated in the "Medical and
Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion," the chief army of the West
was concentrated principally along the line of railroads leading from
Nashville, Tennessee, to the South-west, viâ Chattanooga, Tenn., and
onwards towards Atlanta, Georgia. At the outset the sick and wounded who
could travel in ordinary passenger cars to points in the North were so taken.
Severe cases had to remain in the nearest available hospital depôt. In
addition to the discomfort suffered by the former in having to travel in cars
not suited to invalids, they were liable to frequent and prolonged delays on
the single-track lines by reason of the constant passing of supply trains
proceeding to the front; and not unfrequently the detentions were at points
where nothing could be obtained for feeding the sufferers or making them
comfortable, while even if rations could be drawn the train afforded no
means of cooking them. So it was resolved to have a train which would be
the equivalent of an ambulating, self-contained hospital, capable of carrying
both recumbent and sitting-up patients and supplying all their wants on the
journey.
On August 11, 1863, instructions were sent from the Assistant-Surgeon-
General's Office to the Medical Officer of the Army of the Cumberland
directing him "to take immediate measures to fit up a special train for
hospital purposes, with every possible comfort," to run between Nashville,
Ten., and Louisville, Ken. General Thomas, in turn, accorded the fullest
authority to the Medical Officer to select for the purpose the best
locomotives and the best cars to be found among the railway rolling stock,
and to have new cars fitted up whenever necessary. He further directed that
the most experienced drivers, conductors and other necessary railway
employés should be selected for the conduct of the hospital-train service.
Three of these trains were ready by the spring of 1864, and they ran
regularly—each taking a section of the journey—between Atlanta and
Louisville, a distance of 472 miles. They consisted, apparently, in part of
specially-built and in part of adapted rolling stock, the large open American
passenger cars, with their greater freedom from internal fittings than
ordinary European railway carriages, lending themselves specially to the
purpose. In the converted passenger cars the carrying of the stretchers
through the end doors was avoided by removing two windows and the
panelling underneath them from the side of the car, and making an opening

6 ft. in width which could be closed by a sliding door. Each train provided
five ward-cars (converted passenger cars) for lying-down patients; a
surgeon's car (a passenger car from which the seats had been removed, with
partitions and fittings for the accommodation of the doctor and his helpers);
a dispensary car (in which an ample supply of medicines, instruments and
appliances was carried); an ordinary passenger car for sitting-up patients or
convalescents; a kitchen car (divided into kitchen, dining-room and store-
room); and a conductor's car. The kitchen car was supplied with a small
cooking range, boilers, and other requisites for the feeding of from 175 to
200 patients. The cars were warmed and lighted in winter, and special
attention was paid to ventilation, so that Dr. F. L. Town, of the United States
Army, was able to report of them:—"In visiting these hospital trains, the air
is found sweet and pure, the wards are neat and inviting; and it may
unhesitatingly be said that men on hospital trains are often as comfortable
and better fed and attended than in many permanent hospitals." The trains
had distinguishing signals which were recognised by the Confederates, and
none of them were ever fired on or molested in any way.
One, at least, of the trains was despatched daily from the vicinity of the
field hospitals. The services rendered by them during the last eighteen
months of the war were of the greatest value. It has been said, indeed, that
the combined effect of all the provision made for the care of the sick and
wounded and their speedy recovery—including therein, as one of the most
important items, their prompt removal and distribution by rail—was to
ensure for the Federals the retention of a force equal in itself to an army of
100,000 men. No single fact could show more conclusively the strategical
as well as the humanitarian value of railway ambulance transport.
These details as to what was accomplished in the American Civil War are
the more deserving of record because they show that the evolution of the
"hospital on wheels," from the initial conditions of a bedding of straw on
the floor of a railway goods wagon, was really carried out, step by step, in
all its essential details, in the United States. The hospital train was thus not
an English invention, as is widely assumed to be the case; though much was
to be done here to improve its construction, equipment and organisation.
Whilst America had been gaining all this very practical experience, the
Danish War of 1864 had given Prussia the opportunity of testing the system
approved by her in 1861 for the conveyance of the less severely wounded in

ordinary passenger carriages and of the seriously wounded on sacks of
straw laid on the floor of goods wagons. The results were found so
unsatisfactory that on the conclusion of hostilities a fresh series of
investigations and experiments was begun, and matters were still at this
stage when war broke out between Prussia and Austria.
The conditions in regard to the care of the sick and wounded in the
campaign of 1866 were deplorably defective. Not only, according to Dr. T.
W. Evans[18]—an American medical man, settled in Paris, who visited the
battle-field and assisted in the work of relief—was there no advance on
what had been done in the United States, but the American example was in
no way followed, the combatants having made no attempt whatever to
profit from her experience.
After the battle of Sadowa, thousands of wounded were left on the battle-
field, and many remained there three days and three nights before they
could be removed in the carts and wagons which were alone available for
the purpose. Within five days every village in a radius of four leagues was
crowded with wounded. Those taken to Dresden and Prague in ordinary
passenger carriages or goods vans were detained for days on the journey
owing to the congestion of traffic on the lines. Some of them, also, were in
the trains for two days before their wounds were dressed. Then the use of
straw, depended on by the Austrians, was found to be unsatisfactory. It
failed to afford the sufferers a sufficient protection against the jolting of the
wagons, especially when they worked through it to the bare boards; and
even then there was not always sufficient straw available to meet
requirements. Altogether, it is declared, the wounded suffered "unheard-of
tortures."
Shortly after the conclusion of the war there was appointed in Prussia a
further Commission of medical and military authorities to renew the
investigation into the care and transport of sick and wounded. The
Commission sat from March 18 to May 5, 1867. In the result it still
favoured the use of sacks of straw, with canvas loops, as the simplest and
most comfortable method to adopt for the rail transport of recumbent
sufferers, though it recommended that the sacks should be made with side
pieces, giving them the form of paillasses, as this would afford a greater
degree of support to those lying on them. The American system of
suspending stretchers in tiers by means of india-rubber rings depending

from pegs let into wooden uprights was disapproved of, partly because of
the continuous swinging of the stretchers so carried, and partly because of
the assumed discomfort to one set of patients of having others just above
them. The report also recommended the adoption of the following
principles:—(1) Through communication between all the carriages
employed in one and the same train for the conveyance of sick and
wounded; (2) provision, for the severely wounded, either of beds with
springs or of litters suspended from the roof or the sides of the carriages;
and (3) extra carriages for the accommodation of doctor, nurses, surgical
appliances, medical stores, cooking utensils, etc.
These principles were subjected to various tests, and it was found that in
Germany the existing carriages which could best be adapted to the desired
purpose were those belonging to the fourth-class, inasmuch as they had no
internal divisions or fittings, travellers by them being expected either to
stand during the journey or to sit on their luggage. The only structural
alteration necessary was the placing of the doors at the end of the carriages
instead of at the sides, so that, on opening these end doors, and letting down
a small bridge to be provided for the purpose, access could readily be
obtained from one carriage to another. Instructions were accordingly given
that all fourth-class carriages on the Prussian railways should thenceforward
have end doors—an arrangement which had, in fact, already been adopted
in South Germany. Steps were also taken in Prussia to adapt goods vans and
horse boxes for the conveyance of sick and wounded in the event of the
number of fourth-class carriages not being sufficient to meet requirements.
The widespread interest which was being attracted throughout Europe to the
subject of the care of the sick and wounded in war led to a series of
experimental trials being carried out at the Paris International Exhibition of
1867, when, with the help of a short line of railway laid down in the
exhibition grounds and of a goods wagon supplied by the Western of France
Railway Company, a number of different systems were tested. On this
occasion, also, a model of an American car fitted up with india-rubber rings
for the handles of stretchers was shown.
At this time, and for many years afterwards, the ideal arrangement was
considered, on the Continent of Europe, to be one under which railway
vehicles sent to the front with troops, supplies or munitions could be readily
adapted for bringing back the sick and wounded on the return journey; and

alike in Germany, Russia, France, Austria and Italy the respective merits of
a great variety of internal fittings designed to adapt existing rolling stock,
whether passenger coaches, luggage vans, Post Office vans or goods
wagons, to the serving of these dual purposes formed the subject of much
experiment and controversy. Rope cables across the roof of a goods wagon,
with dependent loops of rope for the reception of the stretcher handles (as in
the Zavodovski method); stretchers laid on springs on the floor, suspended
from the roof either by strong springs or by rope, resting on brackets
attached to the sides, or partly resting and partly suspended; and collapsible
frames of various kinds, each had their respective advocates.[19] The use
and equipment of ambulance or hospital trains constituted, also, a regular
subject of discussion at all the international congresses of Red Cross
Societies which have been held since 1869.
The experimental trials at the Paris Exhibition of 1867 were followed by the
appointment in Prussia of still another Commission of inquiry, and, acting
on the recommendations of this body, the Prussian Government adopted the
"Grund" system, under which the stretchers whereon the recumbent
sufferers lay in the goods wagons or fourth-class carriages were placed on
poles resting in slots over the convexity of laminated springs having one
end screwed into the floor while the other, and free, end was provided with
a roller designed to respond to the varying conditions of weight by sliding
to and fro. This was the system mainly used in the "sanitary trains" of the
Germans in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. It was criticised on the
ground (1) that the sick and wounded were still subject to the same jolts and
concussions as ordinary seated passengers; (2) that the number who could
be carried per carriage or wagon was very small, since it was still the case
that only the floor space was utilised; and (3) that it was inconvenient for
the doctor and the attendants to have to kneel down in order to attend to the
patients.[20] Apart from these disadvantages, the ambulance service of the
Germans was well organised during the war. Of ambulance trains, fitted up
more or less as complete travelling hospitals, twenty-one were run, and the
total number of sufferers removed by rail is said to have been over 89,000.
Owing to traffic congestions, the transport to Berlin of wounded from the
army engaged in the investment of Paris occupied no less a period than six
days; but these journeys were made in the special ambulance trains which,
provided in the later stages of the war, ensured full provision for the

feeding, nursing and general comfort of the sufferers. The fact that such
journeys could be undertaken at all showed the great advance which had
been made since the battle of Sadowa, when most of the wounded could be
conveyed no further than to cottages and farm-houses in neighbouring
villages.
In the South-African War of 1899-1902 the system favoured was that of
having hospital trains either expressly built for the purpose or adapted from
ordinary rolling stock and devoted exclusively, for the duration of the war,
to the conveyance of the sick and wounded. The "Princess Christian"
hospital train, specially constructed for the British Central Red Cross
Committee by the Birmingham Railway Carriage and Wagon Company
Ltd., according to the plans of Sir John Furley and Mr. W. J. Fieldhouse,
and sent out to South Africa early in 1900, consisted of seven carriages,
each about 36 ft. in length, and 8 ft. in width, for running on the Cape
standard gauge of 3ft. 6in. The carriages were arranged as follows:—I.,
divided into three compartments for (a) linen and other stores, (b) two
nurses and (c) two invalid officers; II., also divided into three
compartments, for (a) two medical officers; (b) dining-room and (c)
dispensary; III., IV., V., and VI., ward-cars for invalids, carried on beds
arranged in three tiers; VII., kitchen, pantry, and a compartment for the
guard. The train carried everything that was necessary for patients and staff
even though they might be cut off from other sources of supply for a period
of two or three weeks.
Seven other hospital trains, all adapted from existing rolling stock in Cape
Colony or Natal, were made available for the transport of sick and wounded
in the same war. One of these, No. 4, was arranged and equipped at the cost
of the British Central Red Cross Committee, under the direction of Sir John
Furley, then acting as the Society's Chief Commissioner in South Africa.
The arrangement of the other converted trains was carried out by the Army
Medical Service in South Africa, with the co-operation of the Government
Railway officials in Cape Town and Natal. A number of specially-fitted
carriages, placed at convenient distances on the railways occupied by the
British, were made use of to pick up small parties of sick from the various
posts along the lines, such carriages being attached to passing trains for the
conveyance of the sufferers to the nearest hospital. Many of them had a
regular service up and down a particular stretch of railway. Some were

provided with iron frames for the support of service stretchers, and others
were fitted up similarly to the ward-carriages of the converted hospital
trains. Convalescents and "sitting-up" patients for whom no special
accommodation was necessary travelled in such ordinary trains as might be
available.
In effect, there are four classes of trains by which, under the conditions of
to-day, the sick and wounded may be despatched from the seat of war:—(1)
Permanent hospital trains, specially constructed for the purpose; (2)
temporary hospital trains, made up either entirely of converted ordinary
vehicles or partly of converted and partly of specially-constructed rolling
stock, their use for this purpose continuing for the duration of the war; (3)
ambulance trains improvised at railhead out of rolling stock bringing troops,
supplies and stores to the front, the internal fittings for "lying-down" cases
being of such a kind that they can be readily fixed or dismantled; and (4)
ordinary passenger carriages for slightly wounded or convalescents.
The advantages conferred on armies from a strategical point of view, under
all these improved conditions, are no less beyond dispute than the benefits
conferred on the individual soldiers, and if railways had done no more in
regard to the conduct of warfare than ensure these dual results, they would
still have rendered a service of incalculable value. While, also, their
provision of an efficient ambulance transport system, with its speedy
removal of non-effectives, has served the purposes of war, it has, in
addition, by its regard for the sick and wounded themselves, further served
to relieve warfare of some, at least, of its horrors.

FOOTNOTES:
[16] A saying attributed to Napoleon is that he preferred a dead soldier to a
wounded one.
[17] "Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und Kranker im Kriege, nebst
Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der Eisenbahnen dabei." 33 pp. Berlin, 1860.
[18] "Les Institutions Sanitaires pendant le Conflit Austro-Prussien-Italien." Par
Thomas W. Evans. Paris, 1867.
[19] For "A short consideration and comparison of the regulations for the
transport of sick and wounded by rail, as laid down in four of the leading
Continental armies (the German, French, Austrian and Italian)," see a paper on
"Continental Regulations for the Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail," by

Surg.-Capt. C. H. Melville, A.M.S., Royal United Service Institution Journal,
vol. 42 (1898), pp. 560-594.
[20] In an article on "Military Hospital Trains; their Origin and Progress," in The
Railway Gazette of December 4, 1914, it is said: "The comparatively small loss
of the Germans by death from wounds in 1870 was due solely to the fact that
they entered upon the war with what were then considered wonderfully elaborate
arrangements for removing the wounded.... The trains were composed partly of
first-class carriages, for the less badly wounded, and partly of covered goods
wagons.... In these covered vans were placed beds formed of boards laid on
springs. Each van would hold four or five men, and a sister rode in the van." One
would not, however, consider to-day that there was anything wonderfully
elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than four or five sufferers
were accommodated in each goods van.

CHAPTER IX
Preparation in Peace for War
The greater the experience gained of the application of rail-power in
practice, and the closer the study devoted to its possibilities, in theory, the
more obvious it became that the fullest degree of advantage to be derived
therefrom could only be assured as the result of preparation and
organisation in peace; and this conclusion appeared specially to apply to
countries whose geographical and political conditions led them to regard it
as expedient that they should always be ready to meet some great national
emergency. The Federal Government of the United States certainly did
succeed, in the early sixties, in creating an excellent military rail-transport
organisation after hostilities had broken out; but the conditions of warfare
to-day make it essentially necessary that arrangements for the use of
railways for military purposes should, as far as possible, be planned,
perfected or provided for long in advance of any possible outbreak of
hostilities.
Among other considerations which strengthen this view are the following:
—
I. The increasing dependence of armies on rail transport owing to (a) the
vastly greater number of troops employed now than in former days; (b) the
supreme importance of time as a factor in enabling a Commander-in-Chief
to effect, possibly, an earlier concentration than the enemy, and so obtain
the power of initiative; and (c) the magnitude of the supplies, munitions and
other necessaries wanted to meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in
the field, and only to be assured by the employment of rail transport from a
more or less distant base.
II. The complications, confusion and possible chaos which may result if,
without prior preparation, railway lines designed to serve ordinary transport
purposes are suddenly required to meet military demands taxing their
resources to the utmost extreme.

III. The further troubles that will assuredly arise if, in the absence of
efficient control by properly-constituted and responsible intermediaries,
railwaymen unfamiliar with military technicalities are left to deal with the
possibly conflicting and impracticable orders of individual military officers
themselves unfamiliar with the technicalities and limitations of railway
working.
IV. The imperative necessity of having an organised and well-regulated
system of forwarding military supplies, etc., in order both to avoid
congestion of stations and lines and to ensure the punctual arrival of those
supplies in the right quantities, at the right spot, and at the right time.
V. The need, in view of the vital importance of the part that railways may
play in war, of having organised forces of railway troops and railway
workers available, together with stores of materials and appliances, to carry
out, speedily and thoroughly, all the work that may be necessary for the
repair, construction or destruction of railway lines.
In making the necessary preparations, in time of peace, to ensure the
successful realisation of these and other purposes, there is a vast amount of
work that requires to be done.
In readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown on the railways as
soon as they pass from a peace footing to a war footing, on the order being
given for mobilisation, the military authorities and the railway authorities
must needs have at their command the fullest information as to the physical
conditions, the resources and the transport capabilities of every line of
railway in the country which, directly or indirectly, may be able to render
useful service. Details as to double or single track; gradients; number of
locomotives, carriages, wagons, horse-boxes and other vehicles available;
and facilities afforded by stations in important centres as regards number
and length of platforms and sidings, water supply, loading, unloading or
storage accommodation, etc., are all carefully compiled and kept up to date.
As regards rolling stock, lines not likely to be called upon to carry any
military transports at all may still be able to contribute to the supply of
carriages and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other railways.
By including all lines of railway in the collected data, it will be known
exactly where additional rolling stock may be obtained if wanted. The
carrying capacity of the different types of carriages, trucks, etc., is also

noted. If necessary, arrangements will be made for the reduction of
gradients, the improvement of curves, the construction of connecting links
between different main lines, the lengthening of station platforms, or the
provision of increased loading or unloading facilities.
On the basis of the information collected elaborate calculations are made in
regard to such matters as (1) the number of vehicles required for a given
number of men, with horses, guns, munitions, stores, road vehicles, etc., so
that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage and according as to
whether the troops carried belong to the Infantry, Cavalry or the Artillery;
(2) the number of vehicles that can be made up into a train going by any
one route; (3) the length of time likely to be taken for the entraining and
detraining respectively of a given unit; (4) the time intervals at which a
succession of troop trains can follow one another on the same line; (5) the
speed of troop trains; and (6) the further intervals to be allowed in the
arrival at one and the same station, or centre, of a number of trains starting
from different points, so as to avoid the risk of congestion and of
consequent delays.
Military time-tables, corresponding to those in everyday use, have next to
be prepared, showing exactly what trains must run from given stations, at
fixed hours, by clearly defined routes, to specified destinations as soon as
the occasion arises. The great aim kept in view in the compilation of these
time-tables is, not alone preparation in advance, but the most complete
utilisation possible of the available transport facilities of the country as a
whole.
A selection must also be made in advance of the stations at which troops on
long journeys can obtain food, as well as of the stations to be used as depôts
for stores and supplies, all the necessary arrangements being provided for.
After the initial great strain on the railway resources involved in
mobilisation and concentration, there will still be an enormous amount of
transport to be done during the campaign. In the one direction there will be
a constant despatch of reinforcements, provisions, clothing, munitions and
supplies or stores to the front; in the other direction there will be a steady
flow of sick and wounded, of prisoners of war, and of materiel not wanted
at the front, followed by the final return home of the troops at the end of the
campaign.

At each important point along the lines of communication where special
services in connection with the rail transport, in either direction, are to be
rendered, there must be organisation of such kind as will ensure that
whatever is necessary shall be done promptly and efficiently under the
control of persons of recognised authority and responsibility, and without
any of the friction that would, inevitably, lead to delays, traffic blocks and
other complications.
Nor can the same system of organisation apply to the whole line of
communication, from the base to the limit of the rail service at the front. A
point will be reached therein where the control, if not the actual operation,
of the railway lines must needs be transferred from the civil to the military
authorities, rendering necessary a scheme of supervision and working
different from that which can be followed on the sections not within the
actual theatre of war.
Then, if the army should be compelled to retreat before the enemy, there
should be available a sufficiency of forces skilled in the art of rapidly and
effectively destroying lines, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, or other railway
property, with a view to retarding the enemy's movements until, it may be,
reinforcements can be brought up in sufficient number to check his further
progress. If, alternatively, the army should advance into the enemy's
country, there must again be a provision of Railway Troops fully qualified
by previous training and experience both to repair quickly the demolitions
or the damage which the enemy will have carried out on his own lines and
to construct hastily such new lines—light railways or otherwise—as the
circumstances of the moment require. These things done, and still further
advance being made into the invaded territory, the need will also arise for a
staff capable of operating, under war conditions, the lines of which
possession has been taken, in order that communications with the advanced
front and the forwarding of reinforcements and supplies can still be
maintained.
All these and many other things, besides, must needs be thought out and
prepared for in time of peace, long in advance of any probable or even any
possible war. They are, in fact, made the subject of exhaustive and
continuous study alike by military officers specially entrusted with the task
and by railway managers commanding all the technical knowledge requisite
for making arrangements calculated to ensure the prompt and efficient

satisfaction of all such demands for military rail-transport as may, with
whatever urgency, and under whatever conditions, some day be put
forward.
Still more practical do the preparations in peace for war become when they
include the construction of a network of strategical railways expressly
designed to facilitate the mobilisation of troops, their speedy concentration
on the frontier, or their movement from one point of attack to another at the
theatre of war.

CHAPTER X
Organisation in Germany
In no country in the world was the desirability of preparing in time of peace
for military rail-transport in time of war recognised earlier than in Germany.
In none has the practice of such preparation in peace been followed up with
greater study and persistence.
As shown in Chapter I, the military use of railways led to the proposal and
discussion in Germany of definite schemes for such use as early as 1833;
and it is not too much to say that, from that date down to the outbreak of the
World-War in 1914, the whole subject had received there an ever-increasing
degree of attention from the military authorities, and, also, from a large
body of writers as a question of the day in its relation more especially to
German expansion.
One great mistake, however, made alike by historians, by writers in the
Press, and by popular tradition, has been the attributing to Germany of a far
higher degree of credit in regard to the alleged perfection of her
preparations for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 than she was really
entitled to claim. Nor, indeed, has the fact been sufficiently recognised that
the organisation eventually elaborated by Germany for the efficient conduct
of her rail-transport in war had been evolved from studies, investigations,
trials, experiments and tests (in actual warfare or otherwise) extending over
a period of half a century or more, during which time, also, there was issued
a bewildering mass of laws, rules and regulations, each more or less
modifying those that had gone before and adding still further to the
elaborate, if not the extremely complicated, machinery laboriously built up
as the result of the universally recognised genius of the German people for
organisation.
The final great test of all this machinery was to be applied in 1914. Here,
however, it must suffice, for present purposes, to show how the machinery
itself was created and the form it finally assumed.

Down to 1861 Prussia had done no more, in the way of organising military
transport by rail, than issue a series of Ordinances dealing with the
movement of large bodies of troops, such Ordinances being akin to those
which all the leading countries of Europe had either compiled or were
engaged in compiling. Directly influenced by the developments of the Civil
War in America, Prussia took the further step, in 1864, of forming a
Railway Section of her General Staff. This new body was actively
employed in the furtherance of Prussia's interests in the Danish War of the
same year, when confirmatory evidence was given of the advantages to be
derived from the use of rail transport for military movements, journeys that
would have taken the troops sixteen days by road being done within six
days by rail.
The organisation thus applied on a comparatively small scale in 1864 was
further developed by Prussia in the campaign of 1866.
On that occasion mobilisation and concentration of the Prussian troops were
both carried out mainly by rail, under the direction of an Executive
Commission consisting of an officer of the General Staff and a
representative of the Ministry of Commerce. This Executive Commission
sat in Berlin, and was assisted by Line Commissions operating on the
different railways utilised for military purposes. Movements of troops by
rail were certainly effected in one-third of the time they would have taken
by road, while the Prussians, gaining a great advantage, by the rapidity of
such movements, over Austria, routed her combined forces within seven
days of crossing the frontier, and dictated terms of peace to her within a
month.
Some serious faults were nevertheless developed, even in the course of this
very short campaign, in Prussia's rail-transport arrangements, such being
especially the case in regard to the forwarding of supplies. These were
rushed to the front in excess of immediate requirements, the only concern of
contractors or of officers at the base being to get them away, while the
railway companies—bound to accept goods for transport and delivery as
ordered—dispatched them without regard for any possible deficiency in the
unloading and storage arrangements at the other end. The supplies,
forwarded in bulk, followed as close up behind the troops as they could be
taken; but the provision made for unloading was inadequate, the railway
staffs disclaimed responsibility for the work, and, before long, stations and

sidings at the front were hopelessly blocked, although elsewhere the
shortage of wagons was so great that everything was at a standstill. Even
when wagons had been unloaded, they were too often left on the lines, in
long trains of empties, instead of being sent where they were most needed.
Each railway company disposed of its own rolling stock independently of
the other companies, adopting the view that it had no concern with what
was happening elsewhere. In some instances special trains were dispatched
for the conveyance of a few hundred men or a few hundredweights of
stores. Orders which should have gone direct from one responsible person
to another went through a variety of channels with the result that serious
delays and no less serious blunders occurred. One East Prussian Battalion,
for instance, was sent off by train in a direction exactly opposite to that
which it should have taken.
All these and other troubles experienced were directly due to the absence of
a central controlling body formed on such a basis that it could (1) govern
the rail-transport arrangements as a whole; (2) supervise the forwarding of
supplies; (3) provide for a proper distribution, and better utilisation, of
rolling stock; (4) secure the prompt unloading and return of wagons, and (5)
form a direct link between the military authorities and the railway
managements and staffs.
Immediately on the close of the war a mixed committee of Staff officers
and railway authorities was appointed, under the supervision of von Moltke,
to inquire what steps should be taken to organise the Prussian military
transport services on such a basis as would avoid a repetition of the faults
already experienced, and give a greater guarantee of efficiency on the
occasion of the next war in which Prussia might be engaged. The
desirability of making such preparations in time of peace doubtless
appeared the greater in proportion as it became more and more evident that
the trial of strength between Prussia and Austria would inevitably be
followed by one between Prussia and France.
The scheme elaborated by the committee in question took the form of a
Route Service Regulation which was approved by the King on May 2, 1867,
and was, also, adopted by most of the other German States, but was kept
secret until the time came for applying it in practice, as was done in the war
of 1870-71.

The basis of the scheme was the creation of a system of Route Inspection
("Etappen Inspektion") constituting a department of the General Staff, and
designed—
I. To watch over the replenishing of the operating army with men, horses,
provisions, ammunition, and other military stores.
II. To see to the removal into the interior of the country of the sick and
wounded, prisoners and trophies of war.
III. With the assistance of the troops appointed for the purpose and the
Railway Field Corps, to maintain the line of communication, viz., railway,
roads, bridges, telegraphs, and postal arrangements; to undertake the
government of the hostile conquered provinces, and other duties.
The preparation of the necessary plans for the attainment of these objects
was entrusted to a Central Commission composed, partly of officers
connected with the General Staff and the Ministry of War, and partly of
prominent functionaries on the staffs of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry
and Public Works (then in supreme control over the railways), and of the
Minister of the Interior. Two of its members—a Staff Officer and a railway
expert from the Ministry of Commerce—formed an Executive Commission
and exercised a general supervision over the arrangements for military
transports; though on the removal of the Great Head-quarters from Berlin,
the Executive Commission was to be succeeded by an Auxiliary Executive
Commission, which would supervise the railways in the interior to be made
use of for supplying the needs of the army.
In time of war the Central Commission was to be supplemented by Line
Commissions formed by military officers and railway officers in
combination, and operating each in a leading centre of railway traffic. Their
function it would be—with the assistance of District Line Commissions—
not only to communicate to the line or lines of railway in their district such
orders as might be necessary for the transport of troops, guns, ammunition,
horses, and supplies, but, also, to draw up or make the final arrangements in
connection with the time-tables for the running of military trains; to fix the
direction in which the trains would go; to decide at what stations the troops
should stop for their meals or for their coffee; and, in fact, to arrange
everything connected with the said transport down to—as it appeared at the
time—the smallest details.

In the forwarding of supplies, each Army Corps was to have its own line of
communication, separate and distinct from that of the other Army Corps,
the object aimed at being that of avoiding the confusion and disorder which
might result from the fact of several Army Corps using the same railway.
Each of such lines of communication would start from some large railway
station forming a Point of Concentration ("Etappenanfangsort") for the
collection and the dispatch therefrom of supplies for the Army Corps it
would serve, or for the receipt and further distribution in the interior of
persons or commodities coming back from the seat of war.
Along the line of railway, at distances of about 100 or 125 miles, stations
were to be selected which would serve as halting-places for the feeding of
troops, for the watering of horses, for the reception of sick and wounded
unable to continue their journey, for the repair of rolling stock, or for other
such purposes. The furthest point to be reached by rail from day to day
would constitute Railhead ("Etappenhauptort"), whence communication
with the fighting line would be carried on by road, being further facilitated
by Halting Places ("Etappenörter") en route.
The whole of this elaborate organisation—and here we come to the weakest
point in the system—was to be under the supreme direction and control of
an Inspector-General of Communications—a sort of Universal Provider of
every requirement the Army could possibly need, and responsible for the
fulfilment of a long and exceedingly varied list of obligations among which
the conduct of military rail-transport became simply one of many items.
The special merit of his position was assumed to be that of a superior
authority who, having the rank of Commandant of a Division, and being in
constant touch both with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and with the
War Minister, would be able to establish harmony in the operations of the
different services and corps. The principle itself was sound; but, in practice,
such a multiplicity of duties fell upon him, or, through him, on his
department, that the break-down which actually occurred in the campaign
of 1870-71 should have been foreseen in advance.
On the declaration of war the Inspector-General was to organise the stations
for the feeding of the troops and horses proceeding to the front, and was
then himself to go to some station one or two marches from the fighting-
line, and fix, each day, the Railhead Station for the time being, moving his

own head-quarters as occasion might require. From these head-quarters he
was to exercise control and direction over a staff among whose duties—
apart from those relating to railways or rail-transport—were the following:
—A centralisation of all the services through a Chief of the Staff giving a
common impulse to them according to the instructions of the Inspector-
General; the forwarding of all troops to the front, special precautions having
to be taken that none were left behind; distribution of the troops on arrival
at their destination; the forwarding of all supplies; decision of all personal
questions that might arise in connection with the troops; the keeping of
journals and registers, the drawing up of reports, and the carrying on of
correspondence with the War Minister and the Chiefs of the army;
everything concerned with horses for the troops, transport and distribution
of prisoners of war, and maintenance of good order among the troops;
assurance of an ample supply of ammunition for the artillery; construction
or provision of barracks, huts, or temporary hospitals; maintenance of roads
and telegraphs; control of telegraphs and postal services at the seat of war;
supervision of road communications; responsibility for the safe and regular
delivery to the troops of all supplies and necessaries ordered to meet their
requirements, and establishment of hospitals, infirmaries and convalescent
homes, with the arrangements for the removal thereto of the sick and
wounded.
In regard to railway matters, the Inspector-General was assisted by a
Director of Field Railways who, in turn, had many duties to perform.
Acting in the name and with the authority of the Inspector-General, he gave
directions to the Line Commissions concerning the succession in which
supplies were to be forwarded, and, in conjunction with the military and
railway authorities, drew up the time-tables for military transports,
submitting them, however, for the approval of his chief before they were
put into operation. The actual transport of troops and material—on the basis
of principles the details of which would have been worked out in advance—
was also to be conducted under the supervision of the Director of Railways.
In the event of any of the lines being destroyed by the enemy, he was to
undertake their reconstruction, obtaining through the Inspector-General
such helpers—whether soldiers or civilians—as he might require to
supplement his own working staff in the accomplishment of the necessary
work. On the lines being restored, the Director was further to take control of
their operation by means of troops and, also, of railway employés to be

furnished by the Minister of Commerce on the requisition of the Inspector-
General of Communications.
Such was the elaborate machinery which, constructed alike in peace and in
secret by the Great General Staff, under the direct supervision of von
Moltke himself, was to be tested in the inevitable war with France for
which it had been designed.
According to popular belief, Germany's preparations for that war were so
complete that she had only, as it were, to press a button, or pull a lever, in
order to ensure the immediate and perfect working of all the plans she had
made in advance. Whether or not this was really so in regard to her
transport arrangements, at least, is a point to which attention may now be
directed.
At the beginning of the war a Route Inspection, organised on the basis
already detailed, and having its own Inspector-General of Communications
in charge of, and responsible for, the efficient working of the entire network
of duties and obligations, was called into being for each of the three
German armies. Subsequently a fourth, under the Crown Prince of Saxony,
was added.
So far as the mobilisation of the German troops and their concentration on
the frontier were concerned the plans worked, on the whole, remarkably
well; though even in this respect complete success was not attained. There
were, in 1870, nine lines of concentration available, namely, six for the
Northern and three for the Southern Army; and between July 24 and August
3, there were dispatched by these different routes 1,200 trains, conveying
350,000 men, 87,000 horses, and 8,400 guns or road vehicles. Yet the
delays which occurred to some of these trains were alone sufficient to show
that the machinery which had been elaborated was not working with perfect
smoothness. On, for example, the route known as line "C," the troops sent
to Giessen were—as told by Balck, in his "Taktik"—eleven hours late in
their arrival. They then had their first warm food after a journey which had
lasted twenty-one hours. For the transport to Homburg-in-der-Pfalz and
Neunkirchen forty hours had been allowed. The first train did the journey in
the time, but the next one took ninety hours.
It was, however, in the forwarding of supplies and in the provisioning of the
troops that the greatest difficulties were experienced; and here there

certainly appeared to be little real advance on the shortcomings of the
campaign of 1866, notwithstanding all the preparations which had been
made in the meantime.
Comprehensive as it undoubtedly was, the scheme prepared in time of
peace included no adequate organisation for regulating the transport of
supplies to the front and for ensuring alike their dispatch and their arrival in
just such quantities, and under just such conditions, as would provide for
the needs of the troops from day to day. Magazines had certainly been set
up, but not in sufficient number or always in the right place. The system,
too, of operating them was defective. Just as in 1866, so in 1870, army
officers, contractors and railway companies, all inspired by zeal for the
welfare of the troops, rushed off train-load after train-load of supplies to
stations provided with an inadequate supply alike of sidings where the
wagons could be accommodated and of labour for the work of unloading.
Stores were handed to the railway staffs under the same conditions as in
peace time, the idea being, apparently, that if they were only dispatched as
soon as possible they would be sure to get to the troops in want of them.
As for the conditions at the other end, it not unfrequently happened that
even though the supply-trains might go to stations where the facilities for
unloading them were ample, the Commissariat or other officers in charge
would follow the example already being set in France by regarding loaded
railway trucks as convenient movable magazines which should not be
unloaded until their contents were really wanted. This was done regardless
of the fact alike that the trucks thus kept standing on the lines impeded the
traffic and that they were urgently wanted to meet the shortage of trucks
elsewhere. But for the stringent action taken to check it, the evil due to this
use of railway trucks for storage purposes would have assumed even graver
proportions than was actually the case. Defective, also, as the German
arrangements in this respect undoubtedly were, they still did not attain to
the same degree of inefficiency as was the case in France.
All the same, the general result of these various conditions was that serious
difficulties were experienced on the German no less than on the French
railways. No sooner had the concentration of the Prussian troops been
completed than provisions and stores were sent after them in such volume
that a hopeless block, extending to Cologne in one direction and Frankfort
in the other, was speedily produced on the lines along the left bank of the

Rhine, while the feeding of the troops was brought to a temporary standstill.
The combined efforts of the Prussian Executive Commission, of the
Minister of Commerce and of the Line Commissions failed for a time to
overcome the conditions of chaos and confusion thus brought about, and on
August 11, 1870, instructions had to be given that thenceforward supplies
were to be forwarded only on the express order of the Intendant-General or
of an Inspector-General of Communications. Yet on September 5 there were
standing, on five different lines, a total of no fewer than 2,322 loaded
wagons, containing 16,830 tons of provisions for the Second Army, or
sufficient to keep it supplied for a period of twenty-six days. Such blocks on
the German lines—though not always on so great a scale—were of frequent
occurrence throughout the war.
Trouble arose, also, in getting provisions from the railway to the troops by
reason either of the inadequate number of road vehicles or because of the
use of these for the conveyance of ammunition or for other purposes,
instead. Thus the Inspector-General of the First Army started with 2,000
road vehicles; but on October 17 the total number still at his disposal was
only twenty. The position became still worse as the retreating French
destroyed the lines behind them, increasing the difficulties of the invaders
in maintaining their communications with the Fatherland.
While the food supplies for the German troops were thus blocking the
railway lines—or, alternatively, were going bad on account either of the
heated conditions of the closed wagons or of exposure to the weather after
unloading—many of the German troops were suffering severe privations
from lack of adequate nourishment; and they would have suffered still more
but for the provision-trains or stores of supplies seized from the French at
Metz, Forbach, Verdun, Dôle, Le Hans, and elsewhere. If, indeed, the
French had only refrained from rushing their own supplies to the extreme
front in excessive quantities, or if they had destroyed those they could not
remove in time, the invaders would, on various occasions, have found
themselves in a condition bordering on starvation. Even as it was, they were
often reduced to the necessity of dependence on their "iron" rations.
Difficulty was especially experienced in feeding the army of occupation
during the investment of Paris. The supplies received by train from
Germany were equal to scarcely one half of the actual requirements; a
resort to "requisitions" on the French territory occupied yielded inadequate

results; and the making of a regular daily money-allowance to officers and
men, so that they could purchase their own supplies in the open market or
otherwise, was, at first, far from satisfactory. It was, in fact, only owing to
the most strenuous effort on the part of the responsible officers, both during
the investment of Paris and in earlier phases of the war, that the German
troops were often saved from actual want.[21]
The main reasons for the defects and shortcomings thus developed in a
scheme on which so much care and preparation had been bestowed were (1)
that, while based on fundamentally sound principles, the scheme in its
actual application threw too great a strain on the department of the
Inspector-General of Communications, which, as we have seen, was
expected to look after, not only rail transport, but route marching,
telegraphs, postal arrangements, and a great variety of other things besides;
(2) that, owing to the larger number of Army Corps, it was no longer
possible, as had been done in 1866, to place a separate line of railway at the
disposal of each, so as to allow the said department to superintend the
traffic on the basis of its own organisation; and (3) the absence of a central
administration specially designed (a) to act as an intermediary and to ensure
co-operation and mutual working between the various Line Commissions
and, also, between the individuals and administrations, both military and
civil, engaged in the conduct of rail-transport; and (b) to control the traffic
as a whole, avoiding difficulties, blocks and delays assuring a prompt and
efficient distribution of supplies, and guaranteeing the utilisation of rolling
stock to the best advantage.
With a view to overcoming, as far as possible, the trouble due to the wide
extent and the great variety of duties falling on the department of the
Inspector-General of Communications, it was arranged, during the latter
part of the war, to relieve that department of all responsibility for the
railway services and to transfer the control and direction of these to the
Executive Commission established at the Royal Head-quarters. In this way
it was hoped to utilise the rail-transport facilities to greater advantage, to
decrease the risk of collisions and delays, and, through a central
organisation, to distribute the transport demands more equally among the
various railways concerned. By means of these provisional modifications in
the original scheme a better system of operation was obtained during the
remainder of the war. But the complete reorganisation that was really

necessary was then impracticable, and much friction in the working of the
railway services was still experienced, partly because this needful
reorganisation could not be carried out, and partly because of the conflicting
orders coming from different authorities, each of whom, under the
conditions then existing, was perfectly within his right in giving them.[22]
The difficulties due to the attempts to rush supplies in excessive quantities
direct to the fighting-line, or as near thereto as possible, were also met, to a
certain extent, during the course of the war, by the setting up of additional
railway magazines or depôts where the forwarding of necessaries could be
better controlled; but it was not until the end of 1870 that any approach to
regularity in supplying the wants of the German forces was finally secured.
No sooner had the war come to an end than the work of remedying the
defects which had been developed was taken in hand by the Minister of War
and the Great General Staff. Following the creation, on October 1, 1871, of
a Railway Battalion on a permanent basis came, on July 20, 1872, a new
Regulation cancelling the one of May 2, 1867, which had been in operation
during the war, and substituting a new basis of organisation in its place.
While retaining the principle of a Central Commission in Berlin, the
scheme of 1872 relieved the route authorities of all responsibility for rail
transport as well as for railway restoration and operation at the theatre of
war, transferring to a new military department all the duties falling under
these heads, with the further advantage that such department would be able
to control the railways in time of war independently of the civil authorities,
and without the disadvantages hitherto resulting from the need to deal, in
regard to railway questions, with nine separate Ministries of Commerce and
about fifty different railway companies. At the same time the principle of
co-ordination was to be maintained by the appointment of an Inspector-
General of Railways and Lines of Communication who, in each of these
departments, would control a far more efficient organisation than had
previously existed, and, also, as director-in-chief, would constitute a central
authority and an intermediary between the services concerned and the head
of the Great General Staff, under whose direction he would himself act.
Another important feature of the new Regulation was that a distinction was
now drawn between (1) railways on or near to the theatre of war which
could not be worked by their ordinary staffs, and must needs pass under

military operation, with a paramount military control; and (2) "home" or
other railways, in the rear of the fighting, which might carry ordinary traffic
—except so far as the lines were wanted for military purposes—and might
still be worked by their own staffs, but in the operation of which there
should be a military element in time of war in order to facilitate the
transport of troops and military necessaries.
Various other Regulations, and notably a series in 1878 and 1888, followed
that of 1872, and eventually the whole scheme of organisation, with its
additions and modifications, seeking to provide for every possible
contingency, became extremely complicated. Of the multifarious
instructions, provisions and orders which had been compiled, some applied
to peace only, some to war only, and some to both peace and war; some to
"home" railways and some to railways at the seat of war; some to military
men and some to railway men, and so on. As an elaborate piece of
machinery the organisation was more comprehensive and more complete
than ever; but the fear arose that there had again been a failure to take the
human element sufficiently into account. Of those in the military and the
railway service who should have applied themselves in time of peace to a
study of the elaborate and extremely involved provisions which would
apply in time of war, comparatively few, it was found, were disposed to
devote themselves to so uninviting a task.
So there was issued, on January 18, 1899, still another new Regulation
which repealed some of the earlier ones and aimed at amplifying,
condensing, rearranging and facilitating reference to the provisions
remaining in force, in order that the whole scheme should be made clearer,
simpler and easier to grasp. These results were fully attained, and, though
still subject to the final test of a great war, such as that which broke out in
1914, the German Regulation of 1899 might certainly be considered a
masterpiece of organisation as prepared in time of peace. One especially
useful purpose it served was that of defining clearly the duties,
responsibilities, and spheres of action of all the authorities, civil or military,
concerned in the control and operation of railways for military purposes.
The various Regulations here in question have been supplemented from
time to time by Field Service Regulations, the first series of which, issued
under date May 23, 1887, was designed to take the place of the Ordinances
of 1861 relating to the movement by rail of great bodies of troops. These

Field Service Regulations of 1887 constituted an epoch in the military
history of Germany. They were regarded at the time as offering a resumé of
the most advanced ideas of Moltke, if not, also, as the crowning glory of
military organisation in the reign of William I; and they certainly exercised
a powerful influence on German military literature. They were, further, the
starting-point of a prolonged series of similar Regulations, all amending,
modifying, adding to, or abbreviating their predecessors. These changes led
to the issue, on January 1, 1900, of a new edition, based on the exhaustive
studies of a Commission of fourteen members; and still later revisions
resulted in the publication of a further series on March 22, 1908.[23]
Here, then, we get still further evidence of the keenness with which
Germany has followed up, in times of peace, her preparations for war, while
the Field Service Regulations, no less than the other Regulations already
detailed, show the important place that military rail-transport holds in the
view of those responsible in Germany for the making of these
arrangements. "Railways," it is declared in the Regulations of 1908,
"exercise a decisive influence on the whole conduct of a war. They are of
the greatest importance for mobilising and concentrating the army, and for
maintaining it in a state of efficiency, and they enable portions of it to be
transported from one place to another during the operations." What the
Field Service Regulations do is to present in concentrated and compact
form the working details, in respect to field service requirements, of those
other and fuller Regulations which cover the whole ground of military
transport in general.
Taking these various sources of information, the nature of the organisation
that Germany has thus effected as the result of so many years of study and
experience may be summarised as follows:—
In time of peace the authorities entrusted with the task of ensuring, by their
preparations in advance, the success of the whole system of military rail-
transport include (1) the Minister of War; the Prussian Chief of the General
Staff of the Army; the members of the Railway Section of the Great General
Staff, the Line Commissions and the Station Commissions; authorities
concerned in the forwarding, transport and receiving of supplies, and
representatives of the Commissariat department; and (2) the Imperial
Chancellor, the Imperial Railway Bureau, the Imperial Administration of
Posts and Telegraphs, and the various railway administrations.

The Prussian Minister of War is the chief representative of the interests of
the Army in all questions relating to the military use of the railways.
The Prussian Chief of the General Staff of the Army has under his orders, in
time of peace, the military authorities concerned in rail-transport, and gives
them the necessary instructions. He keeps in close relations with the
Imperial Railway Bureau, and serves as intermediary between that Bureau
and the Prussian Minister of War. It is he who gives the directions according
to which the use of the railways in war-time is regulated, and he prescribes
all the preparations that are to be made in advance for the facilitating of
such use. On mobilisation, he discharges all the duties appertaining to the
office of the Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication
until that officer has himself taken them in hand. From that time he issues
instructions according to circumstances.
The Railway Section of the Great General Staff is required, among other
duties, to collect, and have always available, the fullest and most complete
information as to the powers and facilities of the railways for the transport
of troops, etc. To this end it keeps in constant communication with the
railway administrations, and, also, with the Imperial Railway Bureau
(which centralises all questions affecting railway administration),
completing, if necessary, through investigations made by its own officers,
the information furnished annually by the Bureau. The Railway Section
further takes charge of a wide range of details and preparations concerning
military rail-transport in war-time.
On the outbreak of hostilities there is appointed for each theatre of war an
Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication who, receiving
his orders from the Chief of the General Staff, co-ordinates the two groups
of services, and ensures harmony in their joint working. For the operation
of the railways, as applied to military purposes, there is a Director of Field
Railways who, acting under the Inspector-General, controls the whole
railway service. Through the Line Commissions or Commandants
subordinate to him he conveys to the railway authorities the necessary
demands or instructions in respect to military transport, and, in concert with
his superior officers, he fixes the boundary between the lines to be operated
on a peace footing and those that are to be subject to military working. In
the discharge of these and other duties he is assisted by a staff composed
partly of military men and partly of railwaymen. Each officer concerned in

the transport arrangements has a recognised deputy who can act for him in
case of need.
Of Line Commissions, placed in charge, for military purposes, over the lines
of railway in certain districts, and becoming Line Commandants on the
outbreak of war, there were twenty under the revised Regulation of 1899,
the number being increased in 1904 to twenty-one. The headquarters of
these Commissions are at such centres of traffic as Berlin, Hanover, Erfurt,
Dresden, Cologne, Altona, Breslau, etc. They serve as intermediaries
between the higher military authorities and the railway administrations with
which they are associated. Each Line Commission consists, normally, of a
staff officer of the active army and a prominent railway functionary, the
former having a non-commissioned officer, and the latter a railway official,
as secretary, with such further assistance as may be needed.
Subordinate, in turn, to the Line Commissions are the Station Commissions,
which, receiving instructions from the former, see to the carrying out of the
necessary transport requirements either at their particular station or on the
section of line of which they are placed in charge.
While full provision is thus made for the representation of the military
element in the conduct of rail-transport in time of war, with a view to
ensuring its efficiency, precautions are no less taken to avoid repetitions of
earlier troubles due to questions of responsibility and control, and, more
especially, to the interference of military officers in the technical operation
of the railway lines. On this subject the Field Service Regulations of 1900
stated (paragraph 496):—

Railways can only fully accomplish their important and difficult task
during war if no serious hindrances to their management are created by
the conduct of the troops.

In the later Regulations of 1908 it was said (paragraph 527):—

The important rôle which railways have to fulfil renders it incumbent
on every commander to do all in his power to prevent any interference
with the traffic due to delay, etc., on the part of the troops. The railway
staff and conducting officers are bound by the transport arrangements
made by the railway authorities.

The conducting officer is responsible for the administration of the
detachment of troops or consignment of stores under his charge. It is
his duty, as regards himself and his charge, to obey the instructions of
the railway officials.
Any interference with the service of the railways is forbidden.
At important stations Railway Staff Officers are appointed who act as
intermediaries between the conducting officers and the railway
officials.

Concerning Lines of Communication the Field Service Regulations of 1908
say:—

A railway station, to serve as a Home Base ("Etappenanfangsort") will
be assigned to every Army Corps. From these home bases supplies are
sent forward to Collecting Depôts ("Sammelstationen"), which will be
established at not too great a distance from the theatre of war.
In the theatre of war a base will be assigned to each Army, the situation
of which will change according to the progress of the operations. The
Army Corps are connected with the Field Base by lines of
communication roads ("Etappenstrassen"), and on these roads posts are
formed about 13½ miles apart.

As for the mass of working details also included in the various Regulations,
these may well appear to provide in advance for every possible requirement
in regard to military transport by rail, from the movement of entire armies
down to the supply of drinking water at stations and the taking of carrier
pigeons in the troop trains.

FOOTNOTES:
[21] In "Der Kriegs-Train des deutschen Heeres," by E. Schäffer, (Berlin, 1883),
the author, dealing with the subject of transport in the war of 1870-71, and its
effect on the feeding of the German Army, says of the situation in August-
September, 1870: "Immerhin wurden den Truppen damals nicht unerhebliche
Entbehrungen auferlegt"; while concerning the position of the army of
occupation in France he writes: "Immerhin erforderte es umfassender
Massregeln seitens der Intendantur, die Truppen vor wirklichem Mangel zu

schützen, namentlich da die Requisitionen wenig ergiebig ausfielen, und
anfänglich auch der freihändige Ankauf keinen rechten Erfolg hatte."
[22] "Revue militaire de l'Étranger," 27 Novembre, 1872.
[23] "Field Service Regulations (Felddienst Ordnung, 1908) of the German
Army." Translated by the General Staff, War Office. London, 1908.

CHAPTER XI
Railway Troops in Germany
The innovation introduced into modern warfare by the Federal Government
of the United States, in the organisation on a comprehensive scale of a
Construction Corps for the combined purposes of repairing, destroying and
operating the railways on which so much might depend in the conduct of
war, attracted great attention in Europe, and more especially so in Germany,
which was the first country on this side of the Atlantic to follow the
American precedent, since adopted more or less completely by all nations
possessed alike of railways and a standing army.
Down to the time of the War of Secession the need for such a corps had not
been realised in Europe; but the advantages which might be gained
therefrom had been shown in so unmistakable a form that when, in 1866,
there was the certainty of an early conflict between Prussia and Austria, one
of the first steps taken by the former country was to provide, under a decree
of May 6, 1866, for a Field Railway Section, ("Feldeisenbahnabteilung,") to
be formed, and designed to operate, on a basis closely approximating to that
which had applied to the corresponding American corps. The special
purposes to be served were defined as those of rapidly repairing lines of
railway destroyed by the enemy and of destroying railways it might be
thought expedient to prevent the enemy from using. The section was to be
under the orders of the General Staff either of the Army or of an Army
Corps. It was, however, not to come into being until its services were really
required, and it was then to act for the duration of the war only.
On the outbreak of hostilities three divisions of the corps were mobilised,
under Cabinet Orders of May 25 and June 1, one division being allotted to
each of the three Prussian armies operating in different parts of the theatre
of war. The composition of the corps was partly military and partly civil.
The military element was supplied by officers of the Engineers (one of
whom acted as chief), non-commissioned officers, and a detachment of
Pioneers, the last-mentioned being either carpenters or smiths. The civil

element comprised railway engineers, thoroughly acquainted with the
construction and repair of permanent way, bridges, etc.; assistant railway
engineers, performing the duties of clerks of the works; head platelayers,
foremen, locomotive drivers, machinists (for the repair of engines, rolling-
stock, water pumps and water tanks), and others. The members of the civil
section were chosen from the staff of the Prussian State railways by the
Minister of Commerce, their services being placed by him at the disposal of
the War Minister. Each of the three divisions constituted a complete unit.
On the side of the Austrians there was at that time no similar force
available. Three years before there had been published in Vienna a book, by
Oberst. von Panz, entitled "Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom militärischen
Standpuncte," in which the author expressed the view that details on the
following points, among others, concerning railways should be collected in
time of peace and classified for reference in case of need:—Permanent way:
system and construction; gauge and number of lines; whether lines single or
double. Stations: size and construction; which of them best fitted to serve as
depôts. Bridges: underground works, etc.; which of these could be the most
easily destroyed, or soonest repaired if destroyed, and if prepared
beforehand for destruction. Embankments: size; how made; slope; if
provided with culverts and size of these. Cuttings: length and depth; slopes;
nature of ground; whether much or little water, and whether danger of
landslips. Tunnels: dimensions and construction; if lined or cut in rock;
nature of cuttings at end and whether they can be blocked. Large bridges
and viaducts: system of construction; span of arches; whether or not the
piers are mined.[24] Where men, tools, stores and materials can be obtained,
and to what extent.
These recommendations attracted much attention at the time. They were
quoted by H. L. Westphalen in his book on "Die Kriegführung unter
Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Leipzig, 1868), of which a French translation
was published under the title of "De l'Emploi des Chemins de Fer en Temps
de Guerre" (Paris, 1869); yet when, just before the outbreak of war with
Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Northern Army
recommended that a Construction Corps should be formed, the Minister of
War replied that "the repair of railways was work which should be done by
the railway companies concerned."

All the same, the retarding of the Prussian advance by interrupting the rail
communications became an important phase of Austrian tactics and was
followed up with great activity. Bridges and viaducts were destroyed, rails
torn up, sleepers burned, points and turntables carried away, tunnels
obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered useless. At one place
(between Libenau and Sichrau), where the railway passed through a deep
cutting, the explosion of mines along the top of each bank detached great
masses of rock which, falling on the lines, filled up the cutting to a height of
six or eight feet for a distance of about 250 ft., and could not be removed
until, by means of blasting, they had been broken up into pieces sufficiently
small to be carried away in ballast trucks.
The arrangements made by the Prussians were, however, so complete as to
permit, in most instances, of a speedy restoration. Even in the instance just
mentioned, fifty Pioneers, aided by twenty labourers, had the line clear for
traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was caused.
Each division of the Construction Corps had at its disposal two locomotives
and thirty closed wagons or open trucks, provision thus being made for the
transport of, among other things, six light covered carts (for use on the
roads in the country to be invaded, horses being requisitioned therein as
necessary); tools; supplies of blasting powder or gun-cotton; and rails,
sleepers, bolts, etc., for 250 yards of railway, reserve materials for a further
quarter of a mile of track being left at intermediate depôts, supplemented by
an unlimited supply at the base of operations. The construction trains also
carried timber, ropes, nails, scaffolding, clamps, etc., for the prompt repair
of small bridges. Materials for larger bridges or viaducts were stored at
convenient centres.
How the reconnaissance of a line which might have been subjected to the
enemy's destructive tactics was carried out is thus told by Captain C. E.
Webber, R.E., in his "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866":—

The reconnaissance starts with, and, until interrupted, keeps up with,
the advance guard, the movement being covered by cavalry scouts on
each side of the line.
The greater portion of the train in charge of the department, with one
engine in front and another behind, advances slowly, preceded at a

distance of about 500 paces by a trolley carrying one of the officers,
four men to work it, and a bugler. On arriving at any obstruction the
trolley signals to the train by bugle and extra caution is used in
advancing towards it. If in presence of the enemy, the scouts give
warning to the officer in the trolley, who returns to the train and the
whole retires. The second engine can be detached from the rear to send
messages or bring up fresh supplies.

But for the successes already gained in the same direction by the Federals in
the United States, the speed with which repairs were carried out by the
Prussian Construction Corps—then so recently organised—would have
been regarded as remarkable. In various instances communication was
restored within from one and a half to three days after the destruction even
of important bridges.
As it happened, however, whilst the Austrians had shown an excess of zeal
in some directions by destroying bridges when the tearing up of the rails
would have answered the same purpose, the hesitation of the responsible
Austrian officer to fire the mines which had already been laid to the bridge
over the Elbe at Lobkowitz was of great advantage to the Prussians, leaving
them the use of the line from Turnau to Prague, Pardubitz and Brünn
between July 18 and July 27, on which latter date the bridge was at last
destroyed by order of the governor of Theresienstadt. This particular bridge
was one of exceptional strategical importance, and, according to Captain
Webber, the construction even of a temporary substitute—had the Austrians
blown up the bridge before the Prussians could cross it—would have taken
no less than six weeks. The omission, also, of the Austrians to remove or to
destroy the railway rolling stock they left behind at Prague, on their
retirement from that city, conferred a further benefit on the Prussians. These
examples would seem to show that promptness in carrying out destruction
at a critical moment may be no less important on the one side than efficient
organisation on the other for accomplishing the work of restoration in the
shortest possible time.
While the Construction Corps had thus fully justified its existence, the
sudden creation of such a corps for the purposes of a particular war, and for
the period of the war only, was considered inadequate for a country where a
large standing Army had to be maintained in readiness for action at any

moment, in case of need. Hence it was thought desirable that Prussia should
have a Field Railway Section established on a permanent and well-
organised footing. There was the further reason for adopting this course
because the Pioneers, composed almost exclusively of reservists, had
received no special training in railway work, while the railway men
themselves, accustomed to building lines in a solid way for public use, were
at a disadvantage when called on to carry out, with great rapidity, and in a
rough and ready manner, work that was wanted only to serve the temporary
purposes of the Army with which they were associated.
It was found, also, that the corps, comprising so large a civil element, had
escaped the supervision and control of the Executive Commission at Berlin
which had for its function the regulation of all matters concerning military
rail-transport. Nor did the Construction and Destruction Corps constitute, as
well, an Operation Corps, providing for the working of railways at the
theatre of war, and especially of railways taken from the enemy. The
Prussians had, indeed, been able to command the services of Austrian
railwaymen in working the railways seized in that country; but there was no
certainty that the adoption of a like expedient would be possible in any
future war.
By this time the whole subject of the destruction and restoration of railway
lines as an important element in modern warfare was attracting attention
among military authorities and writers in Germany. A translation of
McCallum's report was published, and the issue was begun of what was to
develop into a long series of technical papers, pamphlets or books—such as,
for example, Wilhelm Basson's "Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege, nach den
Erfahrungen des letzten Feldzuges" (Ratibor, 1867)—dealing with the art of
rapidly destroying and restoring railways in time of war and the most
effective measures to be adopted in the attainment of either end.
These various considerations and developments were, no doubt, the reason
for the issuing, on August 10, 1869, of a Prussian Royal Decree which
created a permanent cadre of Railway Troops to be constituted of Pioneers
who were to undergo regular instruction in everything relating to the
construction, destruction and operation of railways. A new Battalion of
Pioneers was to be raised for the purpose, and the whole scheme was to be
carried into effect in the course of 1871.

When, in 1870, the war with France broke out, the preparations for the
creation of this permanent corps were still proceeding; but the Prussians
were, nevertheless, able to enter on the campaign with four sections of
Railway Troops, subsequently increased to six, including one Bavarian
section. Each section comprised Engineers, Pioneers, railwaymen and
auxiliary helpers, all of whom wore a uniform having the letter "E"
("Eisenbahntruppen") on the shoulder, and carried rifles. Prussia, in fact,
once more started, as in 1866, with such advantage over her enemy as might
result from her control of a Railway Construction Corps. At the outset
France had no similar body, and though, during the progress of the war, she
hurriedly set about the creation of a Construction Corps of her own, that
corps did not do very much beyond collecting at Metz and Strasburg a great
store of railway materials which was afterwards to fall into the hands of the
Prussians, and assist them in their own operations.
Notwithstanding the advantage thus gained, the practical benefits secured
by the Germans, although important in their effect on the final issue, were
far from being as great as the Army leaders may have anticipated or desired.
The destruction work carried out by the French on their own railways, on
their retirement, was much more serious than anything experienced in the
Prussian campaign in Austria. Thus the works for the re-establishment of
the Paris-Strasburg line (of primary importance to the Germans for the siege
of Paris) extended from September 17 to November 22. The French had
blocked the tunnel of Nanteuil by the explosion therein of six mines which
brought down the walls and filled the western end of the tunnel with about
4,000 square yards of sand. Attempts to clear away the obstruction were a
failure, owing to the occurrence of fresh slips due to the wet weather, and
eventually the Construction Corps built a loop line which avoided the
tunnel, and so restored communication. The defence of some of the
principal lines by fortresses also contributed to the difficulties of the
invaders; though, on the other hand, these difficulties would have been
greater still if the French had always adopted the best and most scientific
methods of interrupting rail communications, as, presumably, they would
have done if they had had the advantage of a well-organised corps prepared
in advance for the work that required to be done.
At Fontenoy-sur-Moselle, between Nancy and Toul, there was, for example,
a bridge of seven arches, effective destruction of which would have made a

very serious check in the communications along the principal line between
Germany and Paris; but, instead of blowing up the bridge in the middle, the
men entrusted with the work (in January, 1871) brought down two arches at
the side of the bridge, causing a break which the Germans were able to fill
in with stones and earth, restoring communication in about seventeen days.
Then, although several of the tunnels in the Vosges mountains were mined,
the mines had not been charged, and before instructions to blow up the
tunnels had been received by those awaiting them, the Germans were on the
spot and took possession.
On the other hand the absence on the side of the French of an organised
corps for destruction as well as construction did not prevent the carrying out
of some very bold and highly successful work by parties of franc tireurs,
who showed alike their appreciation of the importance of rail
communications and their skill in impeding them.
One especially striking feat in this direction was accomplished by a
company known as the "Franc Tireurs of the Meuse."
Learning that a Prussian troop train was to pass through Lanois (on the line
between Reims and Mons) on October 26, 1870, they resolved to effect its
destruction. How they operated is told by Lieutenant Fraser, R. E.,[25] who
arrived on the spot shortly afterwards, and heard the story from some of the
men engaged on the work.
Any obstruction placed on the line would have been seen. Hence a different
course had to be adopted. Selecting a spot where the line ran along a 12-ft.
high embankment, to which a well-wooded slope came down on one side,
the franc tireurs took up a pair of rails, removed the sleepers, cut a deep
trench across the line, laid some pieces of iron at the bottom of the trench,
placed on the iron a box containing thirty kilos (2 qrs. 10 lbs.) of powder,
and fixed into the lid of the box a French field shell in such a way that,
when the rail was replaced over the box, the head of the fuse would be just
below the lower flange of the rail. In restoring the line again in order that
there should be nothing to attract attention, the franc tireurs omitted one
sleeper so that the weight of the locomotive should in passing press the rail
down on to the head of the fuse. The party—some seventy-five strong—
then withdrew to the shelter of the woods to await developments.

In due time the train of forty coaches approached at the ordinary speed, the
driver not suspecting any danger. When the engine reached the spot where
the "torpedo" had been placed, an explosion occurred which tore up a mass
of earth, rails and sleepers, threw the engine and several carriages down the
embankment, and wrecked the train. Those of the Prussian troops who got
clear from the wreckage were shot down by the franc tireurs under the
protection of their cover. The number of the enemy thus disposed of was
said to be about 400.
Altogether the French, in their efforts to impede the rail movements of the
invader, destroyed many miles of line, together with no fewer than seventy-
eight large bridges and tunnels, apart from minor interruptions. The repairs
and reconstruction thus rendered necessary threw a great amount of labour
on the Prussian Railway Troops, and much trouble arose from time to time
on account, not only of the inadequate supply of materials even for
temporary constructions, but, also, by reason of the shortcomings of the
workers themselves. The sections of Railway Troops had been so recently
formed that the men were still without adequate training. In 1870-71, as in
1866, military members and civilian members of the Construction Corps
were alike unfamiliar with the special class of work called for in the repair
or the rebuilding of railways under the emergency conditions of actual
warfare. This instruction had, in fact, to be completed at the theatre of war
at a time when the Corps should have been prepared to show the greatest
efficiency.
Difficulties arose, also, on the side of the Germans in operating the 2,500
miles of French railway lines of which they took possession.
There was, in the first place, a deficiency both of locomotives and of rolling
stock. So far as circumstances would permit, the French, as they retreated,
either took their railway rolling stock with them or destroyed it, in order
that it should not be used by the enemy. Attempts were made to meet the
difficulty by obtaining constant reinforcements of engines and wagons from
Germany; but even then the organisation for controlling the use of rolling
stock, among other transport details, was still so defective that commanders
who wanted to ensure the movement of their own troops by rail did not
hesitate to take possession of engines and carriages set aside for the regular
services of the line. There were, in fact, occasions when, for this reason, the
regular services had to be stopped altogether.

In the next place troubles with the personnel were no less acute than those
with the matériel. In proportion as the Germans advanced towards Paris the
bulk of the French population retired, while threats and offers of liberal pay
alike failed to secure from those who remained assistance either in repairing
or in operating the lines of which the invaders had taken possession. In
these circumstances not only engines, carriages and wagons, but no fewer
than 3,500 railwaymen—in addition to the German Railway Troops already
in France—had to be brought from Germany. Yet even the resort to this
expedient started a fresh lot of troubles. The railwaymen so imported had
been in the service of different German railway companies whose
equipment and methods of operation varied considerably; so that when the
men were required to work together—and that, also, on the lines of a
foreign country, with the accompaniment of much laxity in discipline as
well as of much mutual misunderstanding—a vast amount of friction arose.
All these experiences emphasised and strengthened the conclusion arrived
at even before the campaign of 1870-71—that the real efficiency of
Railway Troops can only be obtained by organising them in time of peace
in readiness for times of war. Such conclusion being now beyond all
possible dispute, action was taken by Prussia with characteristic
promptness.
In accordance with a Royal Order of May 19, 1871, there was added to the
Prussian Army, on October 1 of the same year, a Railway Battalion
("Eisenbahnbataillon"), the special purposes of which were (1) to afford to
those constituting it the means of obtaining, in time of peace, such technical
training as would enable them to construct any railway works necessary in
time of war, to repair promptly any damage done to railways, and to
undertake the entire railway traffic along lines of communication; (2) to
procure, or prepare, in time of peace, all plant, materials, tools, etc., likely
to be required in time of war; and (3) to constitute the nucleus of all
necessary railway formations in war. The Battalion was formed of non-
commissioned officers and men of the now disbanded sections of Railway
Troops who were still liable to military service, supplemented by three-year
volunteers and recruits from all parts of the territory subject to the Prussian
Minister of War, only those being accepted, however, whose previous
occupations fitted them for one or other of the various grades of railway
work. The officers were obtained mainly, though not exclusively, from the

Engineers. Members of that corps, together with others who were
mechanical engineers by profession, were accepted as one-year volunteers.
On a peace footing the Battalion was composed of a Staff and four
Companies, each of 100 or 125 men, with a depôt, and provided with its
own means of transport. One of the Companies consisted exclusively of
platelayers and watchmen. On mobilisation each Company was to be
enlarged into two Construction Companies and one Traffic Company,
giving a total, on a war footing, of eight Construction and four Traffic
Companies. The Corps also had a reserve division consisting of a Staff, two
Companies and a section of railway employés. All officers having railway
experience who had served in the war of 1870-71 were included in the
reserve.
The training of the Battalion was under the direction of the Inspector-
General of the Engineers Corps. It comprised (1) theoretical and scientific
instruction of the officers in all branches of railway construction, repair and
destruction, coupled with the study of every branch of railway science
likely to be of advantage in military transport, while special importance was
attached to a close and constant intercourse with the staffs of the various
railways, and (2) practical experience of railway construction and operation.
This experience was afforded (a) on the Battalion's practice grounds, where
instruction was more especially given in the art of rapidly destroying
railway track; (b) through the employment of the men—subject to the
continued maintenance among them of the principle of a military
organisation—on many of the private as well as on the State railways in
Germany, such employment including the repair of bridges, the laying of
track, the enlargement of stations, etc., and (c) by the construction,
operation and management of a short line of railway which, on completion,
was devoted to the public service. The period of training was for either one
or three years and the Battalion was kept up to a normal standard of about
500 men by a succession of recruits. These recruits were generally men of a
good type, admission to the Battalion being regarded with the greater
favour inasmuch as the experience gained was found to be of advantage to
the men in obtaining railway employment on their return to civil life.
In the giving of this practical instruction the purpose specially kept in view
was that of anticipating as far as possible actual war conditions, and
providing for them accordingly. Thus in the laying of rails for any new line

built by the Railway Troops great importance was attached to the speed
with which the work could be done, the records of the time taken being very
closely watched.
To one group of officers was allocated the duty of studying all
developments in railway science and operation at home or abroad and
conveying information thereon to those under instruction. A further
important feature of the scheme included the publication of a series of
textbooks on railway subjects regarded from a military standpoint. A
beginning was also made with the collection of large supplies of rails,
bridge materials, etc., for use as required.
In December, 1872, Bavaria created a similar Battalion, comprising a single
Company attached to the 1st Bavarian Corps. The constitution and the
operations of this Battalion followed closely the precedents established by
Prussia.
Such was the importance attached by the highest military authorities in
Germany to the formation of these Railway Troops that the Chief of the
Great General Staff was their Inspector-General from the time of the first
Prussian Battalion being created down to the year 1899.
In December 30, 1875, came the conversion of the Railway Battalion into a
Railway Regiment. It was felt that the cadres of the former did not respond
sufficiently to the needs of the military rail-transport situation, and they
were accordingly enlarged into a Regiment of two Battalions, with a
regimental Staff of forty-eight, and 502 men in each Battalion. In 1887 the
Prussian Regiment was increased from two Battalions to four, and the
Bavarian Battalion expanded to the extent of two companies in place of
one. In 1890 the Prussian Regiment further became a Brigade of two
Regiments, each of two Battalions, the number of units thus remaining the
same as before; though in 1893 the Prussian Brigade was augmented by two
more Battalions, increasing its force to three Regiments, each of two
Battalions with four Companies in each Battalion, or a total of twenty-four
Companies, of which one was a Würtemberg Company and two were Saxon
Companies, while the Bavarian Battalion acquired three Companies in the
place of two.
In 1899 Prussia took a further new departure by grouping together, as
Communication Troops ("Verkerstrüppen"), all the technical units

concerned in the railway, the telegraphic and the air-craft services. This new
arm was put under the control of an officer holding the rank of a General of
Division and receiving his orders direct from the Emperor. A change was
also effected in regard to the Berlin-Juterbog railway—a single-track line,
70 km. (44 miles) in length, which, originally constructed mainly by the
Railway Troops, was operated by them as a means of acquiring experience
in railway working. Prior to the passing of the law of March 25, 1899,
troops for the working staff were supplied by the Brigade, and the frequent
changes were a cause of some inconvenience. Under the new law a section
constituted of three Prussian Companies and a Saxon detachment, with a
Lieutenant-Colonel as director, was specially created for the operation of
the line.
Altogether the Railway Troops comprised a total of thirty-one Companies,
having 180 officers and 4,500 non-commissioned officers and men; but
these figures were irrespective of carefully-compiled lists (subjected to
frequent revision) of all reservists possessing railway experience and still
liable for military service. Brigade, Battalions and Companies thus formed
only the cadres of a small army of men considered qualified to undertake
railway work of one kind or another in time of war.
Even in Germany itself the need for having so large a body of Railway
Troops was called into question some years ago, on the ground, partly, that
it was desirable to keep to the lowest practicable minimum the number of
non-combatants closely associated with the Army; and, partly, because of
the view—favoured by Von der Goltz, in his "Kriegführung"—that much of
the construction work which the Railway Troops would carry out might be
left to contractors, without hampering the Army with further bodies of new
troops for special purposes.
To these suggestions it was replied, in effect, (1) that in any future war the
movement of large bodies of troops would be directly associated with the
provision and the maintenance of adequate railway facilities; (2) that
Railway Troops, constituted in time of peace, would alone be capable of
ensuring the rapid renovation of damaged lines, or the construction of new
ones, in time of war; (3) that works of this kind, done under great pressure,
and serving temporary purposes only, would differ essentially from railway
works undertaken in peace by ordinary contractors; and (4) that Germany
required a large body of Railway Troops on account of her geographical

position, inasmuch as she might have to face an enemy on either, or both, of
two fronts—France and Russia; while if, in the event of a war with Russia,
she should want to send her forces into that country by rail, she would
require to have a large body of Railway Troops available either for the
conversion of the Russian 5 ft. gauge into the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the
German lines (in order that the engines and rolling stock of the latter could
be utilised on Russian territory), or for the construction of special military
railways as substitutes for the Russian lines.
Whatever the merits of these respective arguments, the fact remains that the
Railway Troops of Germany, created under the circumstances and
conditions here detailed, have been maintained in steadily increasing
numbers, and, also, in constantly expanding efficiency thanks to what is, in
effect, their School of Railway Instruction and to the great amount of
practical work they have been called upon to do, whether in the building of
strategical lines or in other departments of railway construction, destruction
or working in which they could gain experience likely to be of advantage in
time of war.
There was, also, according to M. Paul Lanoir, as related by him in his book
on "The German Spy System," a still further purpose that these Army
railwaymen might be called on to serve. He tells how in 1880, the chief of
the system, the notorious Stieber, conceived the idea of securing the
appointment in every portion of the national railway system of France (and
more especially at important junctions or strategical centres) of German
spies who, competent to act as railway workers, would, in the event of any
future war between Germany and France, and on receiving the necessary
instructions, destroy or block the railway lines at those points in such a
manner—as planned, of course, in advance—that great delay would occur
in the mobilisation of the French troops owing to the traffic being paralysed
for the time being; the Germans, in the meantime, rushing their own forces
to the frontier. "The extremely important rôle which would devolve on our
railwaymen," adds M. Lanoir, "at the moment of the declaration of war, in
fulfilling their functions as indispensable auxiliaries to the combatant army,
was already thoroughly appreciated at this period."
Submitted to Prince Bismarck, Stieber's scheme was approved by him, and,
so far as the obtaining of appointments on the French railways by Stieber's
agents was concerned, the plan had been quietly carried into effect by the

end of 1883; but a casual incident then led to the discovery of the
conspiracy by M. Lanoir himself. Within a week, as the result of his
communications with General Campenau, Minister of War, the railway
companies received a confidential circular requiring that they should call
upon every foreigner employed by them in any capacity whatever to
become naturalised without delay. Those who would not adopt this course
were to be immediately dismissed. The number of foreigners then in the
employ of the railway companies was 1,641, and, although 1,459 of them
agreed to become naturalised, there were 182 Germans who refused so to
do. These 182 were at once discharged—the assumption being that they
were the spies, qualified to act as railway workers, by whom the dislocation
of traffic was to have been ensured whenever they might receive word to
that effect.

FOOTNOTES:
[24] Captain A. de Formanoir states in his book, "Des Chemins de Fer en Temps
de Guerre" (Conférences militaires belges. Bruxelles, 1870), that in France and
Austria all the railway bridges have mine-chambers so that they can be readily
destroyed when the occasion arises.
[25] "Account of a Torpedo used for the Destruction of a Railway Train on the
26th of October, 1870." By Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal
Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872.

CHAPTER XII
France and the War of 1870-71
When France went to war with Germany in 1870-71, her military rail-
transport was still governed by regulations which, adopted as far back as
1851 and 1855, related only to such matters of detail as the financial
arrangements between the Army and the railway companies, the length of
troop trains, etc., without making any provision for an organisation
controlling the transport of large bodies of men in time of war. It certainly
had been under these regulations that the French troops were conveyed to
Italy when they took part in the campaign of 1859; but the defects then
developed, coupled with the further lessons taught by the Austro-Prussian
War of 1866, had shown the need for bringing these early French
regulations into harmony with the conditions and requirements of modern
warfare.
Impressed by these considerations, and realising the disadvantages and
dangers of the position into which his country had drifted, the French
Minister of War, Marshal Niel, appointed in March, 1869, a "Commission
Centrale des Chemins de Fer," composed of representatives of the Army,
the Ministry of Public Works, and the principal railway companies, for the
purpose not only of revising the existing regulations on military transports
but of preparing a new one to take their place. The Commission held
twenty-nine sittings and it drew up a provisional scheme on lines closely
following those already adopted in Germany and Austria and based,
especially, on the same principle of a co-ordination of the military with the
railway technical element. This provisional scheme was subjected to
various tests and trials with a view to perfecting it before it was placed on a
permanent basis. But Marshal Niel died; no new regulation was adopted;
the projected scheme was more or less forgotten; time was against the early
completion of the proposed experiments, while political and military
developments succeeded one another with such rapidity that, on the
outbreak of war in 1870, it was no longer possible to carry out the proposed
plans. So the studies of the Commission came to naught, and France

embarked on her tremendous conflict with no organisation for military
transport apart from the out-of-date and wholly defective regulations under
which her troops had already suffered in the Italian war of 1859.
There was an impression that the talent of the French soldier would enable
him to "se débrouiller"—to "pull," if not (in the English sense) to "muddle,"
through. But the conditions were hopeless, and the results speedily brought
about were little short of chaos.
So far as the actual conveyance of troops was concerned, the railway
companies themselves did marvels. "The numerical superiority of
Germany," as Von der Goltz says in his "Nation in Arms," "was known in
Paris, and it was thought to neutralise this superiority by boldness and
rapidity. The idea was a good one ... but ... it was needful that the Germans
should be outdone in the rapidity with which the armies were massed." That
the railway managements and staffs did their best to secure this result is
beyond any possibility of doubt.
On July 15, 1870, the Minister of Public Works directed the Est, Nord and
Paris-Lyon Companies to place all their means of transport at the disposal
of the War Minister, suspending as far as necessary their ordinary passenger
and goods services; and the Ouest and Orléans Companies were asked to
put their rolling stock at the disposal of the three other companies. The Est,
to which the heaviest part in the work involved was to fall, had already
taken various measures in anticipation of an outbreak of war; and such was
the energy shown by the companies, as a whole, that the first troop train
was started from Paris at 5.45 p.m. on July 16, within, that is to say, twenty-
four hours of the receipt of the notice from the Minister of Public Works.
Between July 16 and July 26 there were despatched 594 troop trains,
conveying 186,620 men, 32,410 horses, 3,162 guns and road vehicles, and
995 wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies. In the nineteen days of the
whole concentration period (July 16-August 4) the companies carried
300,000 men, 64,700 horses, 6,600 guns and road vehicles, and 4,400
wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies.
All this activity on the part of the railway companies was, however,
neutralised more or less by the absence of any adequate organisation for
regulating and otherwise dealing with the traffic, so far as concerned the
military authorities themselves.

The first regiment to leave Paris, on July 16, arrived at the station at 2 p.m.
for the train due to start at 5.45 p.m. The men had been accompanied
through the streets by an immense crowd shouting "À Berlin!" and, with so
much time to spare, they either blocked up the station or were taken off by
their friends to the neighbouring taverns, where the consumption of liquor
was such that, by the time the train started, most of the men were
excessively drunk. In addition to this, many had been relieved of their
ammunition—taken from them, perhaps, as "souvenirs" of an historic
occasion, though destined to reappear and to be put to bad use in the days of
the Commune, later on.
If, however, at the beginning, the troops got to the station three hours before
there was any need, other occasions were to arise when they kept trains
waiting three or four hours before they themselves were ready to start.
Then, in Germany the concentration of the troops at some safe point in the
interior, and their transport thence by rail to the frontier in complete units,
took place as separate and distinct operations. In France the two movements
were conducted simultaneously; and this, in itself, was a prolific source of
confusion and disorganisation on the railways. The troops came to the
stations on a peace footing and in various strengths. One regiment might
have only one-third the strength of another despatched earlier the same day
or on the previous day, although the railway company would have provided
the same number of vehicles for both. There was thus a choice of evils as
between removing two-thirds of the carriages (a procedure which time or
the station arrangements did not always permit); sending the train away
only partially loaded; or filling up the available space either with men
belonging to other corps or with such supplies as might be available at the
moment. Some trains did leave nearly empty, but it was the last mentioned
of the three courses that was generally adopted. Men of different arms—
Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery; mobilised troops, reservists, and
individuals, separated, it might be, from their own officers and not willing
to show themselves amenable to the discipline of other officers—were thus
transported at the same time as, possibly, a miscellaneous collection of
horses, material and commissariat supplies. Other trains, again, went away
so overcrowded that they could not accommodate all the men who should
have gone by them, many being left behind in consequence.

Confusion and delays at the railway stations during the entraining of the
troops were rendered the more complete because the railway staffs failed to
get an adequate degree of support from the military authorities. According
to one of the articles in those regulations of 1855 which were still in force,
"officers were responsible for the prescribed movements in connection with
the entraining, and should personally co-operate in ensuring observance of
the regulations referring thereto"; but, according to Baron Ernouf,
("Histoire des Chemins de Fer Français pendant la Guerre Franco-
Prussienne,") there were officers who refused absolutely to concern
themselves with the entraining of their men at the Est station in Paris,
declaring that this was a matter to be looked after by the railway officials
with the help of subordinate officers, if they wanted it.
Under such conditions as these, officers in charge of troops got hopelessly
separated from their men, who themselves might have been sent off with no
knowledge of their proper destination. One General telegraphed to Paris on
July 21:—"Have arrived at Belfort. Not found my Brigade. Not found
General of Division. What should I do? Don't know where my Regiments
are." As for the men, it was not many days before the stations en route to
the front were occupied by a floating mass of "lost" soldiers, who pretended
to be looking for their corps but too often found it much pleasanter to
remain in the station buffets, and there enjoy the hospitality of local
patriots. Such proportions did this evil assume that in August, 1870, the
railway station at Reims had to be protected against a mob of from 4,000 to
5,000 "lost" ones, who wanted to plunder the wagons containing supplies
for the front.
Confusion, again, was made still worse confounded by the multiplicity of
orders—too often contradictory or impossible to carry out—which
bombarded the railway officials, and must have driven them at times almost
to distraction. Orders came direct from anybody and everybody possessed
of the slightest degree of military authority. They came from the Ministry of
War, the General Staff, and the Administrative Staff; from the
Quartermaster-General's Department and the Commissariat; from officers
and non-commissioned officers of Infantry, Artillery and Engineers; while
each individual invariably gave his orders based on the range of his own
particular sphere, or the convenience of his own particular troops, without
any regard for the situation as a whole, for what might be wanted in other

spheres, or for whether or not it was physically possible for the railway
staffs to do at all what was asked of them, even if they were not being
overwhelmed with those other orders, besides. Commanding officers of
different corps especially distinguished themselves by presenting to the
railway managements claims for priority in the despatch of Infantry,
Artillery or supplies, as the case might be, threatening them with grave
consequences if, in each instance, they did not yield such priority at once,
though leaving them to meet an obviously impracticable position as best
they could. Then it might happen that when all the necessary arrangements
—involving much interference with other traffic—had been made, another
order would come countermanding the first one, or postponing the
execution of it until a later occasion.
As though, again, the orders from all these independent military authorities
were not sufficient, the railways were further worried by local authorities
who wanted special trains for some such service as the conveyance of
detachments of garde mobile a distance of ten or twelve miles to an
instruction camp so that the men would not have to march by road. There
were even demands from certain of the local authorities that they should be
allowed to use railway wagons as barracks for troops.
M. Jacqmin, general manager of the Chemin de Fer de l'Est, relates in his
book, "Les Chemins de Fer Pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," that at the
moment when the Compagnie de l'Est was providing for the transport of
Bourbacki's forces, and preparing for the revictualling of Paris, the préfet of
the Rhone demanded the use of railway wagons in which to house the garde
nationale mobilised on the plain of Vénissieux, on the left bank of the
Rhone, there having been a delay in the delivery of the material for
barracks. The company refused the request, and they had with the
departmental authorities a lively controversy which was only settled by the
decision of the Bordeaux Government that those authorities were in the
wrong.
Typical of the general conditions, as they prevailed not only in Paris but
elsewhere in France, were the circumstances under which the Nineteenth
Army Corps, of 32,000 men, 3,000 horses and 300 guns, was sent from
Cherbourg to Alençon. The troops were late in arriving at the station; the
officers neglected to look after the men; the men refused to travel in goods
trucks; orders and counter-orders succeeded one another in rapid

succession; two or three hours were required for the despatch of each train,
and delays occurred which must have disorganised the traffic all along the
line.
Great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of despatch, it was far
surpassed by that which prevailed at stations to which trains were sent
regardless of any consideration as to whether or not they could be unloaded
there with such despatch as to avoid congestion. No transfer stations—
constituting the points beyond which only the supplies wanted for
immediate or early use at the extreme front should be taken, the remainder
being forwarded as wanted—had been arranged, and the consignors,
military or civil, had assumed that all supplies should be sent in bulk to
places as near to the troops as possible. There were, consequently, many
stations close to the frontier where the rails leading to them were occupied
for miles together by loaded wagons, the number of which was being
constantly added to by fresh arrivals. Many of these wagons were, in fact,
used as magazines or storehouses on wheels. The same was, also, being
done to a certain extent on the German lines, though with this difference—
that whereas in Germany there were at the railway stations route
commandants whose duty it was to enforce the prompt unloading of
wagons, in France there was no corresponding authority. It suited the
officers or the military department concerned to keep the supplies in the
wagons until they were wanted; and this arrangement may have appeared an
especially desirable one from their point of view because if the army moved
forward—or backward—the supplies could be more readily moved with it
if they were still in the wagons.
For these various reasons, there were officers who gave the most stringent
orders that the wagons were not to be unloaded until their contents were
actually required. It was evidently a matter of no concern to them that the
wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere, and that, for lack
of them, other troops might be experiencing a shortage in their own
supplies.
When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it might still be
impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no military
in attendance to do the work. As for the picking out, from among the large
number in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of which were specially
wanted, the trouble involved in this operation must often have been far

greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the supplies stored in the
first instance.
Even the stations themselves got congested, under like conditions. The
Commissariat wanted to convert them into depôts, and the Artillery sought
to change them into arsenals. There were stations at which no platform was
any longer available and troops arriving by any further train had to descend
some distance away, several days elapsing before their train could be moved
from the place where it had pulled up. At stations not thus blocked trains
might be hours late in arriving, or they might bring a squadron of cavalry
when arrangements had been made for receiving a battalion of infantry.
In one instance a General refused to allow his men to detrain on arrival at
their destination at night, saying they would be more comfortable in the
carriages than in the snow. This was, indeed, the case; but so long as the
train remained where it was standing no other traffic could pass. Sometimes
it was necessary for troop trains to wait on the lines for hours because no
camp had been assigned to the men, and there was at least one occasion
when a Colonel had to ask the stationmaster where it was his troops were to
go.
Most of the traffic had been directed to Metz and Strasburg, and the state of
chaos speedily developed at the former station has become historic.
The station at Metz was a large one; it had eight good depôts and four miles
of sidings, and it was equal to the unloading of 930 wagons in twenty-four
hours under well-organised conditions. But when the first infantry trains
arrived the men were kept at the station four or five hours owing to the
absence of orders as to their further destination. The men detrained, and the
wagons containing road vehicles, officers' luggage, etc., were left unloaded
and sent into the sidings. Other trains followed in rapid succession, bringing
troops and supplies, and the block began to assume serious proportions.
The railway officials appealed to the local Commissariat force to unload the
wagons so that they could be got out of the way. They were told that this
could not be done because no orders had been received. The Commissariat
force for the division also declined to unload the wagons, saying it was
uncertain whether the troops for whom the supplies were intended would
remain at Metz or go further on.

Any unloading at all for several days was next rendered impossible by the
higher military authorities. They asked the railway officers to prepare for
the transport of an army corps of 30,000 men. This was done, and forty
trains were located at various points along the line. An order was then given
that the trains should be brought to Metz, to allow of the troops leaving at
once. Within four hours every train was ready, and its locomotive was
standing with the steam up; but no troops appeared. The order was
countermanded. Then it was repeated, and then it was countermanded over
again.
All this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition had been arriving
at Metz, adding to the collection of unloaded wagons which, having filled
up all the sidings began to overflow and block up, first the lines leading to
the locomotive sheds and next the main lines themselves. Everything was in
inextricable confusion. Nobody knew where any particular commodity was
to be found or, if they did, how to get the truck containing it from the
consolidated mass of some thousands of vehicles. "In Metz," telegraphed
the Commissary-General to Paris, "there is neither coffee, nor sugar; no
rice, no brandy, no salt, only a little bacon and biscuit. Send me at least a
million rations to Thionville." Yet it was quite possible that the articles
specified were already in some or other of the trucks on hand, had the
Commissary-General only known where they were and how to get them.
The railway people did what they could. They unloaded some of the
consignments and removed them a considerable distance by road—only to
have them sent back again to Metz station for re-loading and conveyance
elsewhere. Hay unloaded at the station was sent into Metz to some
magazines which, in turn, and at the same time, were sending hay to the
railway for another destination. Finally, as a last resource, and in order both
to reduce the block and to get further use out of the wagons, the railway
officials began to unload them and put their contents on the ground
alongside. A big capture alike of wagons and of supplies was made by the
enemy on his occupation of Metz.
Analogous conditions prevailed in many other places. At Dôle (Dep. Jura)
an accumulated stock of loaded wagons not only filled up all the sidings but
blocked up a large portion of the main line. When the evacuation was
decided on a great waste of time occurred in selecting the wagons to be
moved. Orders given one hour were countermanded the next; trains which

had been made up were moved forward and backward, instead of being got
out of the way at once; and, eventually, a considerable quantity of rolling
stock, which might and should have been removed, had to be left behind.
On the Paris-Lyon railway a collection of 7,500 loaded trucks had
accumulated at a time when a great truck shortage began to be felt, and the
whole of these, together with the provisions and the materials they
contained, fell into the hands of the Germans, whose total haul of wagons,
including those captured at Metz and other places, numbered no fewer than
16,000. The wagons thus taken were first used by them for their own
military transport during the remainder of the war; were then utilised for
ordinary traffic on lines in Germany, and were eventually returned to
France. Not only, therefore, had the French failed to get from these 16,000
railway wagons the benefit they should have derived from their use but, in
blocking their lines with them under such conditions that it was impossible
to save them from capture, they conferred a material advantage on the
enemy, providing him with supplies, and increasing his own means both of
transport and of attack on themselves.
The proportions of the German haul of wagons would, probably, have been
larger still had not some of the French railway companies, on seeing the
advance the enemy was making, assumed the responsibility of stopping
traffic on certain of their lines and sending off their rolling stock to a place
of safety. In taking this action they adopted a course based alike on
precedent and prudence, and one fully warranted by the principle of
keeping railway rolling stock designed for purposes of defence from being
utilised by the enemy for his own purposes of attack.

CHAPTER XIII
Organisation in France
While, on the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, Germany began, as
we have seen in Chapter X., to improve her own system of military rail-
transport, with a view to remedying the faults developed therein, France
applied herself with equal, if not with even greater, determination and
perseverance to the task of creating for herself a system which, in her case,
had been entirely lacking.
Recognising alike her own shortcomings, the imperative need to prepare for
future contingencies, and the still more important part that railways would
inevitably play in the next great war in which she might be engaged, France
resolved to create, in time of peace, and as an indispensable factor in her
scheme of national defence, a system of military transport comprehensive in
its scope, complete in its working details, and leaving nothing to chance.
Everything was to be foreseen, provided for, and, as far as circumstances
would permit, tested in advance.
The Prussian organisation of 1870-71 was, admittedly, and as recommended
by Jacqmin, taken as a starting point for what was to be done. From that
time, also, every new regulation adopted by Prussia in regard to military
transport, and every important alteration made in the Prussian system, was
promptly recorded and commended or criticised in the ably-conducted
French military papers; though in the actual creation of her own system
there was no mere following by France of Prussian examples. What was
considered worth adopting certainly was adopted; but the organisation
eventually built up, as the result of many years of pertinacious efforts, was,
in reality, based on French conditions, French requirements, and the most
progressive ideas of French military science. The French were, also, to
show that, when they applied themselves to the task, they had a genius for
organisation in no way inferior to that of the Germans themselves.
In his review of the events of 1870-71, Jacqmin declared that, while the
education of France in the use of railways in time of war had still to be

completed, the basis for such education had already been laid down by
Marshal Niel's "Commission Centrale" of 1869. The two essential
conditions were (1) unification of control in the use of railways for military
purposes, whether for the transport of men or of supplies; and (2)
association of the military element and the technical element,—an
association which should be permanent in its nature and apply to every
phase of the railway service, so that before any order was given there
should be a guarantee that it was one possible of achievement, and this,
also, without prejudice to other transport orders already given or likely to
become necessary.
It was these essential conditions that formed the basis of the organisation
which France created.
As early as November, 1872, there was called into existence a Commission
Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Fer consisting of twelve members,
who represented the Ministry of Public Works, the Army, the Navy, and the
great railway companies. Attached to the Ministry of War, and charged with
the task of studying all questions relating to the use of railways by the
Army, the Commission had for its first duty a revision of the proposals
made by Marshal Niel's Commission of 1869. Following on this came a
succession of laws, decrees and instructions dealing with various aspects of
the situation in regard to military transport and the military organization of
the railways, the number issued between 1872 and 1883 being no fewer
than seventeen. These, however, represented more or less tentative or
sectional efforts made in combination with the railway companies, who
gave to the Chambers and to the administrative authorities their most
earnest support and the full benefit of all their technical knowledge and
experience in regard to the many problems which had to be solved.
In 1884 there were issued two decrees (July 7 and October 29) which
codified, modified or further developed the various legislative or
administrative measures already taken, and laid down both the fundamental
principles and the leading details of a comprehensive scheme which, after
additional modifications or amendments, based on later experiences, was to
develop into the system of organised military rail-transport as it exists in
France to-day.

These later modifications were more especially effected by three decrees
which, based on the law of December 28, 1888, dealt with (1) the
composition and powers of the Commission Militaire Superieure des
Chemins de Fer; (2) the creation of Field Railway Sections and Railway
Troops; and (3) the organisation of the military service of railways.
Since its original formation in 1872, the Superior Military Commission had
already undergone reconstruction in 1886, and still further changes, in
addition to those made by the decree of February 5, 1889, were to follow. In
its final form the Commission still retains the principle of representation
thereon alike of the military and the technical (railway) element. Presided
over by the Chief of the General Staff—who, with the help of a special
department of that Staff, exercises the supreme direction of the military
transport services, subject to the authority of the War Minister—the
Commission is composed of six Generals or other military officers of high
rank, three representatives of the Ministry of Public Works, and the
members of the Line Commission appointed for each of the great railway
systems and, also, for the Chemin de Fer d'État.
All the members of the Commission are nominated by the Minister of War.
The function they discharge is a purely consultative one. Their business it is
to give to the Minister their views on all such questions as he may submit to
them for consideration in regard to the use of the railways by the Army, and
more especially in regard to—
1. Preparations for military transports.
2. Examination of all projects for new lines or junctions and alterations of
existing lines, as well as all projects which concern railway facilities
(stations, platforms, water supply, locomotive sheds, etc.)
3. The fixing of the conditions to be fulfilled by railway rolling stock in
view of military requirements, and the alterations which may be necessary
to adapt it thereto.
4. Special instructions to be given to troops of all arms as to their travelling
by rail.
5. Agreements to be made between railway companies and the War
Department in respect to transport of troops, provisions, etc.

6. Organisation, instruction and employment of special corps of railwaymen
(for repairs, etc.).
7. Measures to be taken for ensuring the supervision and protection of
railways and their approaches.
8. The means of destroying and of rapidly repairing lines of railway.
Heads of the different services at the Ministry of War can attend meetings
of the Commission, in a consultative capacity, in respect to matters coming
within their jurisdiction, and the Commission can, in turn, apply to the
Minister for the attendance of any person it may desire to hear.
As far as possible, all plans and arrangements concerning the transport of
troops and supplies in time of war, from the moment of mobilisation
onward, are thus prepared, examined or provided for in advance. In article 8
of the Regulation of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports by Railway
("Réglement sur les transports stratégiques par chemin de fer") it is, in fact,
stated that—

All the arrangements relating to the organisation and carrying out of
transport for mobilisation, concentration, revictualling and evacuation
are studied and prepared in time of peace. The Minister gives, to this
effect, all the necessary instructions to the General Staff, to the
commanders of Army Corps, and to the different services. A like
course is adopted, in time of peace, with regard to the study of the
conditions under which the railways will be operated on the lines of
communication.

The creation, under the law of March 13, 1875, of Field Railway Sections
and Railway Troops was the outcome of the obvious need of having an
organised force able to take up the duties of constructing, repairing,
destroying or operating railways at the theatre of war, such force being
established in time of peace and assured all the experience needed to
qualify them for the discharge of those various duties. France, in fact, was
now, in this respect, to follow the example of Germany, just as Germany
had already been inspired by the example of the United States.
Under a decree of February 5, 1889, Field Railway Sections ("Sections de
chemins de fer de campagne") were defined as permanent military corps

charged, in time of war, and concurrently with the Railway Troops, with the
construction, renovation and operation of those railways of which the
working could not be assured by the national companies. Their personnel
was to be recruited from among the engineers, officials and men employed
by the railway companies and by the State Railways Administration, such
recruiting being carried out either voluntarily or by reason of liability to
render military service; and they were to form a distinct corps, having its
own governing body with, as its head, a commandant exercising the
functions of a Chef de Corps. In time of peace there were to be nine
sections, each designated by a distinctive number according to the particular
railway system or systems from which it was formed; though authority was
given to the Minister of War to call further sections into being in case of
war. The number in peace was increased, in 1906, by the formation of a
tenth section from among the staffs of railways in the "secondary" group,
including local lines and tramways, in order to assure, or to assist in, the
operation of these railways or tramways for military transport in time of
war.
In time of peace the sections were to be subject to inspections, musters,
reviews and assemblies, as ordered by the Minister of War. A further
provision in the decree of 1889 says:—"All the arrangements relative to the
mobilisation of each section shall be studied and planned in time of peace.
Each section should always be ready, in the most complete manner, to
render its services to the Minister of War."
Subsequent decrees or instructions constituted each of the sections a
complete unit on the following basis: (1) A central body; (2) three distinct
divisions, namely, (a) "movement," (b) "voie," and (c) "traction"; (3) a
central depôt common to the three divisions and the central body; and (4)
complementary territorial subdivisions in the same three classes, and
attached to the central depôt of the section. The territorial subdivisions are
designed to provide a reserve force of men who can complete or strengthen
the existing sections, or, alternatively, be constituted into additional
sections, if so desired by the Minister of War. The total strength of each
section (including 141 allotted to the central depôt) was fixed as 1,466.
The administration of a section rests with an Administrative Council formed
by the president and the heads of the several departments, and meeting at
least once in every three months in time of peace, and once a week in time

of war. Authority is exercised over the sections by the Field Railway
Commissions to which they are attached.[26]
Men in the active divisions of the sections who are liable to military service
are excused from taking part in the ordinary military exercises, but may be
assembled for inspections, etc., or to undergo courses of instruction in
railway work. Men in the territorial subdivisions can be summoned by the
Minister of War for "a period of exercises" in railway work in time of
peace; and the fact may be recalled that advantage of this power was taken
during the French railway troubles of 1910, when the strikers were required
to assume the rôle of soldiers doing railway work under military authority
and control.
The Railway Troops ("Troupes de chemin de fer") now constitute a Railway
Regiment ("5e régiment du génie") organised under the decree of July 11,
1899, and comprising on a peace footing, three Battalions, each of four
Companies.
Recruits for the Railway Regiment come from one or other of the following
classes: (1) Young soldiers who were in the railway service before they
joined the Army; (2) an annual contingent of railway employés selected by
the Minister of War from lists supplied for this purpose by the
administrations of the five great railway companies and of the State
railways, the number so selected not to exceed 240, distributed as follows:
Compagnie du Nord, 42; Est, 18; P. L. M., 54; Orléans, 42; Midi, 15; État,
69; and (3) soldiers belonging to Infantry Regiments who, after one year of
training therein, are sent to the Railway Regiment, those chosen for this
purpose being, by preference, men whose previous occupation in life has
adapted them for railway work.
The railway administrations are also required to provide from among their
officials a certain number of officers and non-commissioned officers to
form a reserve for the Regiment.
A most complete and systematic course of instruction is arranged.[27] It is
divided into (1) military instruction and (2) technical instruction, the
purpose of the latter being defined as that of qualifying the Railway Troops
to undertake at the theatre of war, subject to the authority of the Director-
General of Railways and Communications, works of repair or destruction of
railway lines, or, in case of need, the provisional working of the railways. In

time of peace it is the duty of the Superior Military Commission for
Railways to advise on all questions concerning the organisation, instruction
and employment of the special troops for railway work. To enable it to
discharge this function the Commission receives, through the Chief of the
General Staff, all programmes, proposals or reports that may be issued in
regard to the technical instruction of the troops, giving its views thereon,
and making such recommendations as it may consider desirable.
Such technical instruction comprises (a) that which is given to the whole of
the troops; (b) instruction in particular branches of railway work given to a
limited number of individuals; (c) instruction to groups of men operating in
companies or otherwise, and (d) instruction obtained on the ordinary
railways. It is further divided into (i) theoretical and (ii) practical.
Among the measures adopted for ensuring the success of the general
scheme, mention might be made of the issuing of special series of
textbooks; the regular working by the Regiment of about forty miles of
railway—including an important junction—between Chartres and Orléans,
on the State Railway system; and arrangements made with the railway
administrations under which (1) a certain number of Companies belonging
to the Regiment are attached to the ordinary railway systems every year, for
periods of two or three months; and (2) power is given to the railway
administrations to engage the services of the Railway Troops in carrying out
repairs or construction works on their lines, a mutual advantage thus being
obtained.
Finally there is a Railway School ("École de chemins de fer") which has
charge of all the materials, tools, etc., used in the technical instruction of the
troops; draws up, under the orders of the Colonel, programmes of practical
work and instruction; and provides (1) a library which is supplied with
books and periodicals dealing with military, railway, scientific and
historical subjects, together with maps, plans, decrees, regulations, etc.,
relating to the military operation of railways; (2) a collection of tools,
instruments and models; (3) photographic and lithographic departments; (4)
stores of railway construction material for instruction purposes; (5) other
stores of like material for use in case of war; (6) workshops for practical
instruction in railway repairs, etc.; and (7) practice grounds reserved
exclusively for the Railway Troops.

The fact of these two bodies of Field Railway Sections and Railway Troops
being organised on so practical and comprehensive a basis secured to
France the control of forces certain to be of the greatest service to her in the
next war in which she might be engaged. It would, also, even suffice by
itself to prove the earnestness, the vigour and the thoroughness with which,
after 1870-71, France entered upon the improvement of her system of
military rail-transport for national defence. There was, however, much more
to be done, besides, before that system could be considered complete; and
here, again, a vast amount of study, foresight and energy was shown.
Following, indeed, the laws, decrees, regulations, orders, and instructions
issued down to 1889 came so many others—dealing, in some instances,
with even the minutest detail concerning some particular phase of the
organisation in course of being perfected—that a collected series of those
still in force in 1902 formed a volume of over 700 pages.[28] Since the issue
of this somewhat formidable collection, still further changes have been
introduced, the general conditions being finally modified by decrees passed
on December 8, 1913.
Without attempting to indicate all the successive stages in this prolonged
series of legislative and administrative efforts, it may suffice to offer a
general sketch of the French organisation of military rail-transport on the
basis of the laws, regulations and practices in operation on the outbreak of
war in 1914.
Connected with each of the great railway systems there is a permanent Line
Commission ("Commission de réseau") which consists of (1) a technical
member who, in practice, is the general manager of the line; and (2) a
military member, who is a member of the General Staff of the Army. The
former is chosen by the railway administration, subject to the approval of
the War Minister, and the latter by the War Minister himself. Each Line
Commission controls the services of a combined technical and military
staff, and each Commissioner has a deputy who can take his place and
exercise his powers in case of need. While the Military Commissioner is
specially responsible for measures adopted from a military point of view,
the Railway Commissioner is specially responsible for putting at the
command of the Army, as far as may be necessary or practicable, all the
resources of the particular railway system he represents.

The authority of a Line Commission on any one of the great railway
systems extends to the smaller, or secondary, lines situate within the same
territory; but the smaller companies may themselves claim to be represented
on the Commission by a duly credited agent.
Among the duties to be discharged by a Line Commission in time of peace
are the following:—
1. Investigation of all matters to which military transport on the line or the
system can give rise.
2. Study of all the available resources of the system, in material and men,
from the point of view of military requirements.
3. Preparation of plans, estimates, and other data in connection with the
movement of troops, etc.
4. Verification of reports concerning extent of lines, rolling stock, and
station or traffic facilities.
5. Special instruction of the railway staff.
6. Inspection of lines, bridges, etc.
7. The carrying out of experiments of all kinds with a view to ameliorating
or accelerating the facilities offered by the system in respect to military
transports.
Should several Line Commissions be interested in some particular question
concerning military movements by rail, the Chief of the General Staff can
summon them to a joint conference as often as may be necessary. The fact,
also, that the members of the Line Commissions are members of the
Superior Commission assures co-ordination in the studies carried on as
regards the railways in general, and provides a ready means by which the
central body can obtain the information it desires concerning any one
system or group of systems.
As their district executives, the Line Commissions have such number of
Sub-Line Commissions as may be found necessary. Each of these is, in turn,
composed of a military member, nominated by the Minister, and a technical
member, chosen by the Line Commission. Then, also, to discharge the
function of local executive, there is at every important centre of traffic a
Station Commission ("Commission de gare") which consists of a military

officer and the stationmaster. It receives from the Line or Sub-Line
Commission all orders or instructions concerning military transport to,
from, or passing through, such station, and is the recognised intermediary
for carrying them into effect and seeing that efficiency is ensured and good
order maintained.
A staff, formed of military men and railwaymen acting in combination, is
allotted to each Line, Sub-Line or Station Commission. Concerning the
representation of these two elements, military and civil, on the one body,
article 10 of the decree of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports says:
—

The special function of each of the agents, military or technical, on the
Commissions or Sub-Commissions must, in the operation of the
service, be maintained in the most absolute manner. At the same time
these agents should not lose from their view the fact that their
association is designed to effect harmony between the exigencies alike
of military requirements and of rail transport, subordinating those of
the one to those of the other, according to circumstances.

From the time that mobilisation begins—or even earlier, on the order of the
War Minister—the members of the Superior Commission take up their posts
en permanence at the War Office, and those of the Line, Sub-Line and
Station Commissions locate themselves at the stations which will have been
allotted to them in time of peace. Thenceforward each Station Commission
is in constant communication by telegraph with the Line or Sub-Line
Commission under which it acts, supplementing such communication by
daily written reports. Among the duties to be discharged by the Station
Commissions are those of superintending the entrainment or detrainment of
troops and the loading or unloading of material; seeing that the trains
required for transport purposes are provided; preventing congestion of the
lines or of the station approaches; and ensuring the security of the station
and of the lines within a certain radius thereof.
On the outbreak of war the railway companies must place at the service of
the State either the whole or such of their lines, rolling stock, and other
means of transport as may be needed for the conveyance of troops, stores,
etc., to any points served by them. Thenceforward the lines so required for

"strategic transports"—including therein mobilisation, concentration,
reinforcements, supplies and evacuations from the theatre of war—can be
used for ordinary passengers and goods only to such extent as the Minister
may approve.
Following on the order for mobilisation the Minister, after consultation with
the Commander-in-Chief, divides the railways of the country into two zones
—the "Zone of the Interior," and the "Zone of the Armies." Of these the
former passes under the supreme control of the War Minister, and the latter
under that of the Commander-in-Chief. The location of the Stations of
Transition, dividing the one zone from the other, can be varied from time to
time by the Minister, in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief,
according to the developments of the military situation.
The Zone of the Interior is that part of the railway system which, though not
situated at the theatre of war, is subject to military control by reason of the
services required of it in the forwarding of troops, supplies, guns,
ammunition and other necessaries. Operation by the ordinary staffs of the
railway systems is continued, but the transports ordered by the War Minister
are regulated by the Chief of the General Staff. The execution of the orders
given is entrusted from the day of mobilisation to the Line Commissions,
each of which, acting under the authority of the War Minister, takes charge
over the whole of the services on the lines comprised in its particular
territory.
The Zone of the Armies is, in turn, divided into two sections (1) the "Zone
de l'avant," in which military operation of the railways is necessary on
account of their nearness to the fighting-line; and (2) the "Zone de
l'Arrière," in which the railways can still be operated by the ordinary
railway staffs, under the direction of Line and Station Commissions, as in
the adjoining Zone of the Interior.
Orders given by the Commander-in-Chief in respect to transport in the Zone
of the Armies are carried out under the supreme control of an officer now
known as the Directeur de l'Arrière. The history of this important
functionary affords an excellent example of the way in which the whole
scheme of operations has been evolved.
The "Règlement général" of July 1, 1874,—one of the earliest attempts to
meet the difficulties which had arisen in 1870-71 in respect to military rail-

transport—was found to be defective inasmuch as it did not apply, also, to
those road and rear services ("Services de l'Arrière") which are necessarily
associated with the rail services and themselves constitute so important a
phase of military transport as a whole. In 1878 an attempt was made to meet
this defect by the inauguration of a system of "Services des Étapes"; but
here, again, the existence of separate organisations for rail service and road
service, without any connecting and controlling link, was found to be
unsatisfactory. In 1883 a Commission, presided over by General Fay, was
appointed to consider what would be the best course to adopt, and, in the
result, there was issued, on July 7, 1884, a Decree creating a "Directeur
Général des Chemins de Fer et des Étapes," whose duties were more clearly
defined under a Decree of February 21, 1900. In 1908 the title of this officer
was changed to that of "Directeur de l'Arrière," and, after further revisions,
the scope of his authority and responsibility was eventually fixed by the
Regulation of December 8, 1913.
Taking up his position at the head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, and
keeping in close touch, also, with the Minister of War through the Chief of
the General Staff, the Directeur de l'Arrière has for his special function that
of securing complete co-ordination alike between rail services and road
services and between the services in the Zone of the Interior and those in
the Zone of the Armies. Both from the Minister and from the Commander-
in-Chief he receives information as to operations projected or in progress,
and as to the needs of the armies in personnel and matériel. His business it
is to see that these needs, according to their order of urgency—as further
communicated to him—are supplied under conditions which shall provide
for all contingencies and guard against all possible confusion or delays. He
fixes, among other things, the lines of communication; he keeps in close
touch with the road services, and—having, within the limit of his
instructions, complete control over the railways in the Zone of the Armies
—he decides on the conditions to be adopted in respect to all transport alike
from the interior to the armies and from the armies to the interior. As
between, also, the Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief, he
maintains a constant exchange of information concerning time-tables for
military trains and other such matters.
In the discharge of these duties the Directeur de l'Arrière is aided by a staff
which comprises both the technical and the military elements; but he is not

himself responsible for the actual working of either the rail or the road
services.
Railway services in the Zone of the Armies are—subject to the supreme
authority of the Directeur de l'Arrière—under the control of a Director of
Railways who is assisted by (1) a combined military and technical staff; (2)
a Line Commission for that section of the zone where the railways can still
be worked by their ordinary staffs; and (3) one or more Field Line
Commissions ("Commissions de chemins de fer de campagne"), together
with Railway Troops, for the section where military operation is necessary.
In the interests of that co-ordination to which so much importance is rightly
attached, the Director of Railways refers to the Directeur de l'Arrière all
demands for transport that concern the railways of both the Zone of the
Interior and the Zone of the Armies or involve conveyance by road as well
as by rail. He also passes on to the Commissions in charge of either section
of the railways included in the Zone of the Armies the orders he himself
receives from the Directeur de l'Arrière in respect to such transport
requirements as may concern them. Time-tables drawn up, and other
arrangements made, by these Commissions are subject to his approval. He
further decides as to the distribution, within the Zone of the Armies, of the
rolling stock and the railway personnel placed at his disposal by the
Commander-in-Chief.
The Field Line Commissions are the executive agents of the Director of
Railways in the discharge of the various duties assigned to him. The
number of these Commissions is decided by the Directeur de l'Arrière, and
the date of their entering on their functions is fixed by the Director of
Railways. Each Commission consists of a staff officer and a railway
engineer. Of these the former is military president of the Commission and
has the controlling voice. When he considers it necessary that he should
accept, in addition to his own responsibility, that of the technical
commissioner, the latter must defer to his views and to the orders he gives.
The president has an assistant—also a staff officer—who can replace him
when necessary, while the Commission has a staff of secretaries and
orderlies as approved by the Minister of War. The personnel of the
Commissions includes Railway Troops ("Sapeurs de chemins de fer" and
"Sections de chemins de fer de campagne"); a telegraphy staff; Station

Commissions; and "gendarmerie" to undertake police duties in the stations
and on the trains.
In addition to making traffic arrangements and undertaking the operation of
those lines at the theatre of war that may pass under full military control,
the Field Line Commissions are required to carry out such construction,
repair, maintenance or destruction work on the railways as should be found
necessary.
On the Lines of Communication passing through the two zones and ensuring
direct communication between the interior and such accessible points on the
railway as may, from time to time, be nearest to the armies in the field, the
leading stations en route are required to serve a variety of military purposes;
though in each and every such instance the system of organisation is such
that the duties to be discharged or the responsibilities to be fulfilled are
undertaken by, or are under the control of, a Commission formed on the
now established basis of representation thereon of both the military and the
technical elements.
For the conveyance of troops, there are, in the first place, Mobilisation
Stations and Junction Stations, whence the men within a certain district are
sent to the Embarkation Stations, at which complete units for the front are
made up. These are followed by Stations for Meals ("Stations haltes-
repas"), for men and horses; though in this case the "stations" may really be
goods or locomotive sheds, able to accommodate a large number of men. At
the end of the railway line, so far as it is available for troops, come the
Detraining Stations.
In regard to supplies and stores, the first link in the chain of organisation is
constituted by the Base Supply Stations ("gares de rassemblement"). Here
the supplies going from a certain district outside the theatre of operations to
any one Army Corps must be delivered; and here they are checked, made up
into full train loads, or otherwise dealt with in such a way as to simplify and
facilitate their further transport.
In certain cases full train-loads arriving at these assembling stations pass
through to destination, after being checked; but the general practice is for
the consignments forwarded from base supply stations to go to the Supply
Depôts ("Stations-magasins"), serving the purposes of storehouses from
which supplies, whether received from the base or collected locally, can be

despatched in just such quantities, and at just such intervals, as
circumstances may require. These depôts are organised on a different basis
according to the particular service or purpose for which they are designed,
—Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, Medical, Telegraph Corps; provisions, live
stock, clothing, camp equipment, etc. Their number, character, and location
are decided by the Minister of War in time of peace. On the outbreak of war
those in the Zone of the Armies pass under the control of the Commander-
in-Chief together with the railway lines within that zone. The situation of
the depôts may be changed, or additional depôts may be opened, by the
Directeur de l'Arrière, with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief.
Each station depôt is under the charge of the military member of the Station
Commission. His special function it is to supply therefrom the wants of the
Army in accordance with the demands he receives. These demands he
distributes among the different departments of the depôt, giving instructions
as to the time by which the railway wagons must be loaded. He also takes,
with the stationmaster, all the necessary measures for ensuring the making
up, the loading, and the departure of the trains; but he must not interfere
with the internal administration of the station or with the technical direction
and execution of the railway services.
Provision is also made for the immediate unloading of trains bringing
supplies to the station depôts for storage there, the military commissioner
being expressly instructed to guard against any block on the lines in or near
to the station. Wagons need not be unloaded if they are to be sent on after
only a brief detention, or if they contain ammunition forming part of the
current needs of the Army.
From the supply depôts the supplies and stores pass on to the Regulating
Station ("gare régulatrice"). This is located at such point on each line of
communication as, while allowing of a final regulation of supplies going to
the front, does not—owing to its nearness to the fighting line—permit of
any guarantee of a fixed train service beyond that point. The locality of the
regulating station is changed from day to day, or from time to time,
according to developments in the military situation.
The regulating station is in charge of a Regulating Commission
("Commission régulatrice"), constituted on the same basis as a Sub-Line
Commission. Receiving orders or instructions as to the nature and quantities

of the supplies and stores required by the troops at the front, and drawing
these from the supply depôts, the Commission must always have on hand a
sufficiency to meet requirements. It is, also, left to the Commission to
arrange for the further despatch of the supplies from the regulating station
by means of such trains as, in the circumstances of the moment, may be
found practicable.
As a matter of daily routine, and without further instructions, the supply
depôts send one train of provisions each day to the regulating station, and
the latter sends on one train daily to the front, always, however, keeping a
further day's supply on hand, at or near the regulating station, to meet
further possible requirements. Additional trains, whether from the supply
depôts or from the regulating station (where rolling stock is kept available)
are made up as needed.
Supplementing these arrangements, the Regulating Commission may, at the
request of the Director of Road Services, further keep permanently within
its zone of action a certain number of wagons of provisions in readiness to
meet contingencies, the wagons so utilised as Stores on wheels being known
as "en-cas mobiles." Should the Directeur de l'Arrière so desire, railway
wagons with ammunition can, in the same way, be kept loaded at any
station within the Zone of the Armies, or, by arrangement with the Minister
of War, in the Zone of the Interior. It is, however, stipulated that the number
of these wagons should be reduced to a minimum, in order to avoid
congestion either of the stations or of the railway lines.
Beyond the regulating station comes Railhead, which constitutes the
furthest limit of possible rail-transport for the time being, and the final point
of connection between rail and road services, the latter being left with the
responsibility of continuing the line of communication thence to the armies
on the field of battle.
It is the duty of the Regulating Commission, as soon as it enters on the
discharge of its functions and as often afterwards as may be necessary, to
advise both the General in command of the Army served by the line of
communication and the Director of Road Services as to the station which
can be used as railhead and the facilities offered there for the
accommodation, unloading, and loading of wagons. On the basis of the
information so given the General-in-Command decides each day, or as the

occasion requires, on the particular station which shall be regarded as
railhead for the purposes of transport. He advises the Regulating
Commission and the Director of Road Services accordingly, and he further
notifies to them his wishes in regard to the forwarding of supplies to the
point thus fixed.
These elaborate arrangements for ensuring a maintenance of efficiency
along the whole line of communication from the interior to the front equally
apply to transport of all kinds from the theatre of war to the interior. In
principle, evacuations from the army of sick and wounded, prisoners,
surplus stores, and so on, are effected from railhead by means of the daily
supply-trains returning thence to the regulating station, where the
Regulating Commission takes them in charge, and passes them on by the
trains going back to the Depôt Stations, or beyond. Should special trains be
necessary for the removal of a large number of wounded, or otherwise, the
Director of Road Services communicates with the Regulating Commission,
which either makes up the desired specials from the rolling stock it has on
hand or, if it cannot do this, itself applies, in turn, to the Director of
Railways.
For dealing with the sick and wounded, every possible provision is made
under the authority of the Minister of War and the Director-General, the
arrangements in advance, as detailed in the decrees relating to this branch of
the subject, being on the most comprehensive scale. Among other measures
provided for is the setting up of Evacuation Hospitals ("hôpitaux
d'évacuation") in the immediate neighbourhood of the Regulating Stations,
if not, also, at railhead. Elsewhere along the line certain stations become
Infirmary Stations, ("infirmaries de gare") where, in urgent cases, and under
conditions laid down by the War Minister, the sick and wounded en route to
the interior can receive prompt medical attention in case of need. From the
Distribution Stations ("gares de répartition"), the sick and wounded are sent
to the hospitals in the interior to which they may be assigned.
It will be seen that this comprehensive scheme of organisation aims at
preventing the recurrence of any of those defects or deficiencies which
characterised the military rail-transport movements of France in the war of
1870-71.

The presence, at every important link in the chain of rail communication, of
a Commission designed to secure regularity and efficiency in the traffic
arrangements should avoid confusion, congestion and delay.
The association, on each of these Commissions, of the military and
technical elements, with a strict definition of their respective powers, duties
and responsibilities, should ensure the best use of the available transport
facilities under conditions in themselves practicable, and without the risk
either of friction between the representatives of the two interests or,
alternatively, of any interference with the railway services owing to
contradictory or impossible orders being given by individual officers acting
on their own responsibility.
The setting up of the supply depôts and regulating stations along the line of
communication should prevent (i) the rushing through of supplies in
excessive quantities to the extreme front; (ii) the congestion of railway lines
and stations; (iii) the undue accumulation of provisions at one point, with a
corresponding deficiency elsewhere, and (iv) the possibility of large stocks
being eventually seized by the enemy and made use of by him to his own
advantage.
The measures adopted both to prevent any excessive employment of
railway wagons as storehouses on wheels and to secure their prompt
unloading should afford a greater guarantee of the best utilisation of rolling
stock under conditions of, possibly, extreme urgency.
Finally, the unification of control, the co-ordination of the many different
services involved, and the harmony of working established between all the
various sections on the line of communication linking up the interior of the
country with the troops in the fighting line should assure, not only the
nearest possible approach to complete efficiency in the transport conditions,
but the conferring of great advantages on the armies concerned, with a
proportionate increase of their strength in the field.
The effect of all these things on the military position of France must needs
be great. Had France controlled a rail-transport organisation such as this—
instead of none at all—in 1870-71; and had Germany controlled a system
no better than what we have seen to be the admittedly imperfect one she put
into operation on that occasion, the results of the Franco-German war and

the subsequent course of events in Europe might alike have been wholly
different.
Tests of what were being planned or projected in France as precautionary
measures, for application in war, could not, of course, be carried out
exhaustively in peace; but many parts of the machinery designed came into
daily use as a matter of ordinary routine. Full advantage was taken, also, of
whatever opportunities did present themselves—in the form of exercises in
partial mobilisation, reviews, and other occasions involving the movement
by rail of large bodies of troops—to effect such trials as were possible of
regulations and instructions already based on exhaustive studies by the
military and railway authorities. In 1892 the results attained were so
satisfactory that a German authority, Lieutenant Becker, writing in his book
on "Der nächste Krieg und die deutschen Bahnverwaltungen," (Hanover,
1893,) concerning the trials in France, in that year, of the new conditions
introduced by the law of December 28, 1888, was not only greatly
impressed thereby but even appeared disposed to think that the French were
becoming superior to the Germans in that very organisation which the latter
had regarded as their own particular province. The following passages from
his book may be worth recalling:—

Towards the middle of September, 1892, from a military railway
station improvised for the occasion, there were sent off in less than
eight hours forty-two trains conveying a complete Army Corps of
25,000 men.
In their famous mobilisation test of 1887 the French despatched from
the Toulouse station 150 military trains without interrupting the
ordinary traffic, and without any accident.
Such figures speak a significant language. They show what enormous
masses of troops the railway can carry in the course of a few hours to a
given point....
If I have referred to the results obtained by our neighbours on their
railway systems, it is not because I have the least fear as to the final
issue of the next war. Quite the contrary; but the fact does not prevent
me from asking why the German Army cannot base on the railways of

that country the same hopes which neighbouring countries are able to
entertain in regard to theirs.

The favourable impression thus given, even to a German critic, by the
progress France was making in her creation, not so much de novo as ab ovo,
of a system of organised military rail-transport, were confirmed by many
subsequent trials, experiments and experiences, all, in turn, leading to
further improvements in matters of detail; but it was, indeed, the "nächste
Krieg" concerning which Lieutenant Becker wrote that was to be the real
test of the organisation which, during more than forty years of peace,
France followed up with a zeal, a pertinacity and a thoroughness fully equal
to those of Germany herself.
In any case it would seem that France, though having to make up for the
headway gained by Germany, finally created a system of military rail-
transport which would be able to stand the fullest comparison with even the
now greatly-improved system of her traditional foe; while the organisation
she thus elaborated, not for the purposes of aggression but as an arm of her
national defence, illustrates in a striking degree the ever-increasing
importance of the problem of rail-power, and the comprehensive nature of
the measures for its effective exercise which a great Continental nation
regards as indispensable under the conditions of modern warfare.

Defensive Railways

The measures adopted included, also, the improvement of the French
railway system, since this was no less in need of amendment and additions
in order to adapt it to the needs of the military situation.
Whilst, as we have seen in Chapter I, the important part that railways were
likely to play in war was recognised in France as early as 1833, and whilst,
in 1842, attention was called in that country to the "aggressive lines" which
Germany was then already building in the direction of the French frontiers,
the French railway system itself was, prior to the war of 1870-71,
developed on principles which practically ignored strategical
considerations, were based mainly on economic, political and local
interests, and not only refrained from becoming "aggressive" in turn, but

even failed to provide adequately, as they should have done, for the
legitimate purposes of national defence.
Apart from the absence of any designs on the part of France against her
neighbours' territory, during this period of her history, one of the main
reasons for the conditions just mentioned is to be found in the predominant
position of Paris as the capital and centre-point of French life and French
movement. Germany at this time consisted of a collection of States each of
which had its own chief city and built its railways to serve its own
particular interests, without much regard for the interests of its sister States,
even if it escaped the risk of cherishing more or less jealousy towards them.
In France there was but one State and one capital, and Paris was regarded as
the common centre from which the main lines were to radiate in all
directions. Communication was thus established as between the capital and
the principal inland towns or important points on the frontiers or on the
coasts of France; but the inadequate number of lateral or transverse lines
linking up and connecting these main lines placed great difficulty in the
way of communication between the provincial centres themselves otherwise
than viâ Paris.
Some of these disadvantages were to have been overcome under a law
passed in 1868 which approved the construction of seventeen new lines
having a total length of 1,840 km. (1,143 miles). When, however, war broke
out in 1870, comparatively little had been done towards the achievement of
this programme, and France entered upon the conflict with a railway system
which had been even less developed towards her eastern frontiers than
towards the north, the west and the south, while for the purposes of
concentrating her troops in the first-mentioned direction she had available
only three lines, and of these three one alone was provided with double-
track throughout. Such were the inadequacies of the system at this time that
the important line between Verdun and Metz had not yet been completed.
No sooner had the war come to an end than the French Government started
on the improvement of the railway system in order to adapt it to the
possible if not prospective military requirements of the future, so that they
should never again be taken at a disadvantage; and in carrying on this work
—in addition to the reorganisation of their military-transport system in
general—they showed an unexampled energy and thoroughness. Within
five years of the restoration of peace the French railway system had already

undergone an extension which, according to Captain A. Pernot, as told in
his "Aperçu historique sur le service des transports militaires," would have
been possible in but few countries in so short a period; while of the
situation at the time he wrote (1894) the same authority declared:—"One
can say that everything is ready in a vast organisation which only awaits the
word of command in order to prove the strength of its capacity."
Without attempting to give exhaustive details of all that was done, it may
suffice to indicate generally the principles adopted.
One of the most important of these related to an improvement of the
conditions in and around Paris.
Here the purposes specially aimed at were (1) to establish further
connecting links between the various trunk lines radiating from the capital,
and (2) to obviate the necessity for traffic from, for example, the south or
the west having to pass through Paris en route to the east or the north.
These aims it was sought to effect by means of a series of circular railways,
or "rings" of railways, joining up the existing lines, and allowing of the
transfer of military transport from one to the other without coming into
Paris at all. An "inner" circular railway ("Chemin de Fer de Petite
Ceinture") had already been constructed within the fortifications prior to
1870, and this was followed in 1879 by an "outer" line, ("Chemin de Fer de
Grande Ceinture"), which provided a wider circle at an average distance of
about 20 km. (12½ miles) and established direct rail connection, not only
between a large number of the more remote suburbs, together with the
different trunk lines at a greater distance from the city, but, also, between
the various forts constructed for the defence of Paris.
These circular railways were, in turn, succeeded by a series of connecting
links which ensured the provision of a complete ring of rail communication
at a still greater distance around Paris, the towns comprised therein
including Rouen, Amiens, La Fère, Laon, Reims, Chalons-sur-Marne,
Troyes, Sens, Montargis, Orléans, Dreux, and so on back to Rouen. Within,
again, this outermost ring there was provided a further series of lines which,
by linking up Orléans, Malesherbes, Montereau, Nogent, Epernay,
Soissons, Beauvais and Dreux, established additional connections between
all the lines from Paris to the north and the east of France, and gave
increased facilities for the distribution in those directions of troops arriving

at Orléans from the south-west, this being once more done without any need
for their entering Paris or even approaching it at a closer distance than about
forty miles.
Orléans itself was recognised as a point of great strategical importance in
regard to the movement of troops, and it was, accordingly, provided with a
number of new lines radiating therefrom, and establishing better
connections with other lines. Tours and other centres of military
significance, from the same point of view, were strengthened in a like
manner. At important junctions, and notably so in the case of Troyes
(Champagne), loop lines were built in order that troop trains could be
transferred direct from one line to another without stopping, and with no
need for shunting or for changing the position of the engine.
In the direction of the eastern frontier the line from Verdun to Metz was
completed, and by 1899 the three routes which could alone be made use of
in 1870-71 had been increased to ten. Most of them were provided with
double-track throughout, and all of them were independent of one another,
though having intercommunication by means of cross lines.
Other new railways established connection with or between the forts on
both the eastern and the northern frontiers. Others, again, provided direct
communication between different harbours or between each of them and
strategical points in the interior, thus contributing to the possibilities of their
defence in case of attack from the sea. Still others were designed for the
defence of the French Alps.
Apart from the provision of all these new lines, much was done in the
doubling or even the quadrupling of existing track wherever the question of
military transport came into consideration at all. Then at railway stations
near to arsenals, and at important strategical centres, specially long
platforms were provided to allow of the rapid entraining of men or material
in case of need.
While, also, so much was being done for the improvement of the French
railway system from an avowedly strategical point of view, there were
many additional lines constructed or improvements made which, although
designed to further the interests of trade and travel, also added to the sum
total of available facilities for military transport.

The advantages specially aimed at were (1) the ensuring of a more rapid
mobilisation of troops through the betterment of cross-country connections;
(2) the avoidance of congestion of traffic in Paris; (3) the securing of a more
rapid concentration on the frontiers, especially when each Army Corps
could be assured the independent use of a double-track line of rails for its
own use; and (4) the more effective defence of all vital points.
National defence, rather than the building of strategical lines designed to
serve "aggressive" purposes, was the fundamental principle on which the
policy thus followed since 1870-71 was based; and if, as Captain Pernot
wrote in 1894, everything was even then ready for all emergencies, the
continuous additions and improvements made since that time, bringing the
railway system of the country more and more into harmony with the
"perfectionnement" aimed at by France in the organisation of her military
transport, must have made the conditions of preparedness still more
complete by 1914.

FOOTNOTES:
[26] For details concerning the functions and duties of the various divisions,
subdivisions, etc., see "Mouvements et Transports. Sections de chemins de fer de
campagne. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er septembre, 1914." Paris: Henri
Charles-Lavauzelle.
[27] "Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de la Guerre. Génie. Troupes de chemins de
fer. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er décembre, 1912."
[28] "Transports militaires par chemin de fer. (Guerre et Marine.) Édition mise à
jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en octobre, 1902." For later publications,
dealing, in separate issues, with particular departments of the military rail-
transport organisation, see Bibliography.

CHAPTER XIV
Organisation in England
The difference between the geographical conditions of the British Isles and
those of the principal countries on the Continent of Europe led to the
systematic organisation of rail transport for military purposes being taken in
hand at a later date in the United Kingdom than was, more especially, the
case in Germany. Here there was no question of building lines of invasion
or lines to facilitate the massing of troops on a neighbour's frontiers. The
questions that alone seemed to arise in England were—(1) the relations
between the State and the companies in regard to the use of the railways for
the transport of troops and military necessaries under conditions either of
peace or of war; (2) the employment of railways both for resisting invasion
and for the conveyance of expeditionary forces to the port of embarkation;
(3) the adoption of such means as would ensure the efficient working of the
railways under war conditions; and (4) the creation of an Army engineering
force providing for the construction, repair, operation or destruction of
railways either at home, in case of invasion, or to facilitate operations in
overseas expeditions through the building and working of military railways.
With these various considerations it may be convenient to deal in the order
as here given.

The State and the Railways

In the Railway Regulation Act, 1842, (5 and 6 Vict., c. 55,) entitled "An Act
for the better Regulation of Railways and for the Conveyance of Troops," it
was provided, by section 20:—

Whenever it shall be necessary to move any of the officers or soldiers
of her Majesty's forces of the line ... by any railway, the directors shall
permit them, with baggage, stores, arms, ammunition and other
necessaries and things, to be conveyed, at the usual hours of starting, at
such prices or upon such conditions as may be contracted for between

the Secretary at War and such railway companies on the production of
a route or order signed by the proper authorities.

This was the first provision made in the United Kingdom in respect to the
conveyance of troops by rail. It was succeeded in 1844 by another Act (7
and 8 Vict., c. 85,) by which (sec. 12) railway companies were required to
provide conveyances for the transport of troops at fares not exceeding a
scale given in the Act, and maximum fares were also prescribed in regard to
public baggage, stores, ammunition, (with certain exceptions, applying to
gunpowder and explosives,) and other military necessaries. In 1867 these
provisions were extended to the Army Reserve. Further revision of the fares
and charges took place under the Cheap Trains Act, 1883, (46 and 47 Vict.,
c. 34,) entitled "An Act to amend the Law Relating to Railway Passenger
Duty and to amend and consolidate the law relating to the conveyance of
the Queen's forces by railway."
State control of the railways in case of war was provided for under the
Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, (34 and 35 Vict., c. 86,) "An Act for the
Regulation of the Regular and Auxiliary Forces of the Crown, and for other
purposes relating thereto." Section 16 laid down that—

When her Majesty, by Order in Council, declares that an emergency
has arisen in which it is expedient for the public service that her
Majesty's Government should have control over the railroads of the
United Kingdom, or any of them, the Secretary of State may, by
warrant under his hand, empower any person or persons named in such
warrant to take possession in the name or on behalf of her Majesty of
any railroad in the United Kingdom, and of the plant belonging
thereto, or of any part thereof, and may take possession of any plant
without taking possession of the railroad itself, and to use the same for
her Majesty's service at such times and in such manner as the Secretary
of State may direct; and the directors, officers and servants of any such
railroad shall obey the directions of the Secretary of State as to the user
of such railroad or plant as aforesaid for her Majesty's service.
Any warrant granted by the said Secretary of State in pursuance of this
section shall remain in force for one week only, but may be renewed

from week to week so long as, in the opinion of the said Secretary of
State, the emergency continues.

Provision was also made for the payment of "full compensation" to the
interests concerned.
The powers of control thus acquired by the Government followed, in effect,
closely upon the precedent already established in the United States, (see p.
16,) even although they were not defined with the same elaborate detail. On
the other hand greater emphasis is laid in the English Act on the provision
that the Government "may take possession of any plant without taking
possession of the railroad itself." This gives them the right to take over the
locomotives and rolling stock of any railway in any part of the United
Kingdom, even though the lines in question may not themselves be wanted
for the purposes of military transport.
Under the provisions of the National Defence Act, 1888, (51 and 52 Vict., c.
31,) traffic for naval and military purposes is to have precedence over other
traffic on the railways of the United Kingdom whenever an Order for the
embodiment of the Militia is in force.
It was by virtue of the above section of the Act of 1871 that the Government
took control over the railways of Great Britain on the outbreak of war in
1914.
As regards the earlier Acts of 1842 and 1844, these were mainly domestic
measures relating to the conveyance of troops in time of peace rather than
war. The beginnings of organisation of military rail-transport for the
purposes of war followed, rather, on a realisation both of the possibilities of
invasion and of the weakness of the position in which England at one time
stood from the point of view of national defence.

Invasion Prospects and Home Defence

In 1847 the Duke of Wellington, (then Commander-in-Chief,) addressed to
Sir John Burgoyne a letter in which he said he had endeavoured to awaken
the attention of different Administrations to the defenceless state of the
country. We had, he declared, no defence, or hope of chance of defence,
except in our Fleet, and he was especially sensible both of the certainty of

failure if we did not, at an early moment, attend to the measures necessary
to be taken for our defence and of "the disgrace, the indelible disgrace," of
such failure. Then, in words that greatly impressed the country, he added:—

I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in honour; I
hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the witness of the
tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures
to avert.

As the result alike of this pathetic warning; of a "Letter on the Defence of
England by Volunteer Corps and Militia" issued in pamphlet form by Sir
Charles Napier in 1852; and of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, which event
called attention to the defenceless condition of the Empire as a whole,
continuous efforts were made to secure the creation of Volunteer Corps for
the purposes of defence. For a period of twelve years these efforts met with
persistent discouragement, the Government refusing official recognition to
certain corps of riflemen tentatively formed; but in 1859 the prospect of an
early invasion of this country by France aroused public feeling to such an
extent that on May 12 the then Secretary of State for War, General Peel,
addressed a circular to the Lord-Lieutenants of counties in Great Britain
announcing that Volunteer Corps might be formed under an Act passed in
1804, when a like course had been adopted as a precautionary measure
against the threatened invasion of England by Napoleon.
The formation of Volunteer Corps was thereupon taken up with the greatest
zeal, and by the end of 1860 the number of Volunteers enrolled throughout
Great Britain was no fewer than 120,000. Other results of the national
awakening in 1859 were the public discussion of the questions of coast
defence and armoured trains, (of which mention has been made in Chapter
VII,) and the appropriation, in 1860, of a loan of seven and a half millions
for the improvement of our coast defences and notably the fortifications of
Portsmouth and Plymouth.

Engineer and Railway Staff Corps

Already in December, 1859, the necessity for some definite engineering
instruction for Volunteers was being pointed out, and in January, 1860, the
first corps of Volunteer Engineers was created, under the title of the 1st

Middlesex Volunteer Engineers. Similar corps were formed in various parts
of the country, and by 1867 the number of Volunteer Engineers enrolled was
6,580.
At the beginning of 1860 a further proposal was made for the formation of a
body which, composed of eminent civil engineers, the general managers of
leading lines of railway, and the principal railway contractors or other
employers of labour, would undertake a variety of duties considered no less
essential in the interests of national defence.
There was, in the first place, the question of the transport by rail alike of
Volunteers and of the regular forces, either on the occasion of reviews or for
the protection of our coasts against an invader. While it was evident that the
railways could be efficiently worked only by their own officers, it was no
less obvious that plans for the movement of large bodies of men, and
especially of troops, with horses, guns, ammunition and stores, should be
well considered and prepared long beforehand, and not left for the occasion
or the emergency when the need for them would arise.
In the next place it was suggested that the engineering talent of the country
should be made available for the purpose of supplementing the services of
the Royal Engineers in carrying out various defensive works, such as the
destruction of railway lines, bridges and roads, the throwing up of
earthworks, or the flooding of the lowland districts, with a view to resisting
the advance of a possible invader.
Finally the great contractors were to be brought into the combination so that
they could provide the labour necessary for the execution of these defensive
works under the direction of the civil engineers, who themselves would act
under the direction of the military commanders.
Each of the three groups was to discharge the function for which it was
specially adapted, while the co-ordination of the three, for the purpose of
strengthening the country's powers of resisting invasion, was expected to
add greatly to the value of the proposed organisation.
The author of this scheme was Mr. Charles Manby, F.R.S., (1804-1884,) a
distinguished civil engineer who for nearly half a century was secretary of
the Institution of Civil Engineers and was closely associated with the
leading civil engineers, contractors and railway interests of the country. He

submitted his ideas to several members of the Council of his Institution, and
though, at first, the scheme was not well received, he was subsequently so
far encouraged that in August, 1860, he laid his plan before Mr. Sidney
Herbert, then Minister at War in Lord Palmerston's second administration.
Mr. Herbert expressed cordial approval of the project, giving the assurance,
on behalf of the War Office, that an organisation on the basis suggested
could not fail to be of public benefit; but Mr. Manby still met with
difficulties alike from several members of the Council, who either offered
direct opposition to the scheme or else gave unwilling consent to join, and,
also, from the railway companies, who thought that arrangements for rail-
transport might very well be left to themselves, and that there was no
necessity for the suggested system so far as they, at least, were concerned.
In these circumstances Mr. Manby made, at first, very little progress; but he
was unremitting in his efforts to demonstrate alike to civil engineers and to
the railway companies the practical benefits from the point of view of
public interests that would result from the organisation he advocated, and in
1864 he felt sufficiently encouraged to lay his views once more before the
War Office. Earl de Grey, then in charge of that Department, thereupon
instructed the Inspector-General of Volunteers, Colonel McMurdo,
(afterwards General Sir W. M. McMurdo, C.B.,) to inquire into and report
to him on the subject.
In the result there was created, in January, 1865, a body known as the
Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, constituted, according to its
rules, "for the purpose of directing the application of skilled labour and of
railway transport to the purposes of national defence, and for preparing, in
time of peace, a system on which such duties should be conducted." The
Corps was to consist of officers only, and its members were to be civil
engineers and contractors, officers of railway and dock companies, and,
under special circumstances, Board of Trade Inspectors of Railways. Civil
engineers of standing and experience who had directed the construction of
the chief railways and other important works, general managers of railways
and commercial docks, and Board of Trade Inspectors of Railways, were
alone eligible for the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Other civil engineers and
contractors connected chiefly with railway works, and, also, railway
officers other than general managers, take the rank of Major. Col. McMurdo
was appointed Honorary Colonel of the Corps on February 9, 1865.[29] As

ultimately constituted, the corps consisted of an Honorary Colonel (now
Maj.-Gen. D. A. Scott, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.C.), thirty Lieutenant-Colonels
including a Commandant, (now Lieut.-Col. Sir William Forbes, general
manager of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway) and twenty
Majors.[30]

Functions and Purposes

That the Corps thus created was the direct outcome, first, of the Volunteer
movement, and, through that movement, of the state of semi-panic into
which the country had drifted in 1859, as the result both of the anticipations
of invasion and the admitted weakness, at that time, of our national
defences, has thus been clearly established. Writing in 1869, Major-General
McMurdo, who had been raised to that rank in 1868, said in a pamphlet he
issued under the title of "Rifle Volunteers for Field Service" that the Corps
was "prepared to work, not for Volunteers alone, but for the entire defensive
forces of the country."
In this same publication Major-General McMurdo gave an account of the
functions and purposes the Corps had been designed to serve. Alluding first
to the Volunteer movement, he showed how the railway carriage must both
carry and shelter the Volunteer when moving from one part of the country
to another; and he proceeded:—

I will ask you to look attentively for a moment at a Bradshaw's railway
map, and you will see that throughout the network of rails that
overspreads the land none of the meshes, so to speak, in any vital parts
of the country, exceed fifteen miles across, from rail to rail; but as the
eye approaches the Metropolis, or any of the commercial centres, these
meshes are diminished to about one-half the area of the others.

He then dealt with the operations which the movement of troops along these
lines of railway would involve, and continued:—

The railway schemes for the accomplishment of such delicate
operations would emanate from the Council of the Engineer and
Railway Staff Corps....

During peace the railway branch of this body is employed in working
out hypothetical plans of campaign, in the development of which they
manipulate in theory the entire rolling-stock and railway resources of
the country, elaborated by special time-tables and technical reports.
The share taken by the civil engineers is not confined to providing
merely for the class of railway works contingent on war, whether of
construction, demolition, or of reconstruction, but in supplying the
military engineers with information, advice and labour. No one, for
example, can be more familiar with the features and character of a
district than the engineer who has constructed a line of railway through
it. No one is so well able to point out the results of letting in that which
he had been so often employed in keeping out, viz., the inundations of
the sea. None better acquainted with the existing distribution of labour
power throughout the country, and of the means by which it could be
concentrated upon given points, for the construction of works of
defence. All these elements, in short, by which the gigantic resources
of our country may be safely wielded for her defence, are now being
silently considered and woven into strategical schemes of operations
by these eminent and patriotic men, the value of whose voluntary
services will not be fully comprehended or appreciated till the day
comes when the discomfiture of the invader shall be accomplished
through their instrumentality.

The same distinguished authority wrote concerning the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps in an article on "Volunteers" which he
contributed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica" (ninth edition):—

The ready labour power of this useful Corps is estimated at from
12,000 to 20,000 navvies, with tools, barrows and commissariat
complete. It has already performed important service in tabulating, and
printing at great private cost, complete time-tables and special reports
for six general concentrations against possible invasion. A special
return was also prepared by the Corps (the first of its kind) of the
entire rolling stock of all the railways in Great Britain. This important
work—which is corrected and republished annually—shows where the
requisite number of carriages of every description can be obtained for
the composition of troop trains.

In the official catalogue of books in the War Office Library there is an item
which reads:—"Time Tables for Special Troop Trains, etc. Compiled by the
Railway Companies. 311 pp. 8vo. London, 1866." This, presumably, refers
to the first of the complete time tables mentioned in the "Encyclopædia
Britannica" article as having been compiled by the Corps. It is evident, from
the date given, that the Corps must have got quickly to work after its
formation in 1865.
At one time there was an expectation that the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps would develop into a body exercising still wider and
more responsible duties than those already mentioned. On this point we
have the testimony of the late Sir George Findlay, formerly general manager
of the London and North-Western Railway Company, and himself a
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Corps.
Col. J. S. Rothwell had written some articles[31] in which, while admitting
their practically unlimited resources, he questioned the ability of the British
railways, at a few hours notice, to transport to any part of our coasts which
might be the scene of a hostile invasion a sufficient body of troops to
dispute the advance of an army upon London, and he further suggested that
the whole question was one which had not yet received the mature
consideration it deserved. Col. Rothwell said, in the course of what he
wrote:—

Though the actual working of our railways must be left in the hands of
the proper railway officials, it does not follow that the planning of the
arrangements for the military traffic should also be entrusted to them
exclusively. This, however, appears to be contemplated, as, under
existing circumstances, such arrangements would rest with the
members of a body called the "Volunteer Engineer and Railway Staff
Corps."... Though the efficiency of these gentlemen in their own
sphere is undeniable, it appears open to question whether they are
likely to have sufficient leisure personally to work out the details of a
large concentration of troops by rail, and whether the special
requirements of military transport will be fully appreciated by them, or
by the subordinates whom they presumably will employ.

Much, he argued, required to be done before the country could be
considered ready to meet a possible invader; and he concluded:—

If the invasion of England is to be regarded as an event which is within
the bounds of possibility, it is surely not unreasonable to ask that those
precautionary measures which require time for their elaboration shall
be thoroughly worked out before there is any risk of our wanting to
employ them. The organisation for the conveyance of our troops by
railway is such a measure.

To these criticisms Sir George Findlay replied in an article "On the Use of
Railways in the United Kingdom for the Conveyance of Troops," published
in the United Service Magazine for April, 1892. The complete network of
railways covering these islands, admirably equipped and efficiently worked
as they were, would, he declared, be found equal to any part they might be
called upon to play in a scheme of national defence. As regarded the
attention already paid to the question he said:—

The War Office, so far from having in any way neglected the subject,
have devoted considerable attention to it, and a complete scheme for
the working of our railways for transport purposes in time of war has
been elaborated, and would at once be put in operation, if ever the
emergency arose.

Passing on to describe the composition and duties of the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, he spoke of its members as meeting in
council at their headquarters to discuss from time to time details of railway
organisation and other matters delegated to their consideration, afterwards
reporting their conclusions to the War Office; and he went on to say that for
the operation of the railways, under State control, on any occasion of
national energy or danger—

A draft scheme has been prepared, has been worked out in detail, and
would, in all probability, be adopted and put in operation if, unhappily,
the necessity should ever arise.
This scheme in its main features provides that, at such time as we are
contemplating, the principal railway officials in Great Britain and

Ireland would at once become, for the time being, the officers of the
State, and in addition to the general managers of the leading railways,
who are officers of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps,
military rank of some kind would be conferred upon the engineers,
locomotive superintendents, chief passenger superintendents and
goods managers of the principal railway companies, as well as on the
managers of the principal Irish railways.
The railways of the country would be divided into sections, and for
each section there would be a committee composed of the general
managers of the railways included in the section, together with the
principal engineers, locomotive superintendents and other chief
officers. The railways would be worked and controlled for military
purposes by these committees of sections, each committee having as
its president a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps, who would be directly responsible for providing
transport for troops and stores over the section of which his committee
had charge, while if the operation to be carried out required the co-
operation of one or more sections of the railways, the committees of
those sections would act in unison. In such a case the Quartermaster-
General's requisition for the service to be performed would be made
upon the president of the section embracing the point of departure, that
officer and his committee taking the initiative and arranging with the
other committees for the performance of the service.
For each section, or group, of railways, a military officer of rank
would be appointed, with full power to arrange for food, forage and
water for the troops and horses en route, and having at his disposal a
sufficient number of soldiers or labourers to assist in loading and
unloading baggage, stores, etc., at the points of entrainment and
detrainment within his section. He would also be able to command the
services of the Royal or Volunteer Engineers to assist in the erection of
temporary platforms or landings, or the laying down of temporary
rails, and would be instructed to co-operate with, and assist in every
way, the committee of section having charge of his district, but not in
any way to attempt to interfere with the working of the line or the
movement of the trains or traffic.

The number of sections into which the railways were to be divided for the
purposes of this scheme was nine. After defining the various areas, Sir
George continued:—

It is contemplated that during any such period of crisis as we are now
discussing, the Council of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff
Corps would be sitting en permanence at its headquarters, and, with a
full knowledge of the nature and extent of the operations to be carried
out, would have power to regulate the supply and distribution of
rolling stock throughout the area affected, all the vehicles in the
country being, for the time being, treated as a common stock.
This is a mere outline of the scheme, with the further details of which
it is not necessary to trouble the reader, though probably enough has
been said to show that the subject, far from having been neglected, as
Colonel Rothwell appears to assume, has been carefully studied and
thought out.

Had the scheme in question been matured and adopted on the lines here
stated, a still greater degree of importance would have been attached to the
position and proceedings of a Corps then—and still—almost unknown to
the world at large, since its chief function was to carry out investigations at
the request of the authorities, and prepare reports, statements and statistics
which have invariably got no further than the War Office and the Horse
Guards, where, alone, the value of the services rendered has been fully
understood and appreciated. The scheme was, however, allowed to drop, the
policy eventually adopted being based, preferably, (1) on the railways of
Great Britain being operated in war time as one group instead of in a series
of groups or sections; and (2) on such operation being entrusted to a body
specially created for the purpose; though prior to the adoption of the latter
course there was to be a fresh development in another direction.

The War Railway Council

While the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps remained, down to
1896, the only organised body which (apart from the individual railway
companies) Government departments could consult as to the technical
working and traffic facilities of the railways, from the point of view of

military transport, it was thought desirable, in the year mentioned, to
supplement that Corps by a smaller body known at first as the "Army
Railway Council" and afterwards as the "War Railway Council."
Designed to act in a purely advisory capacity, without assuming any
administrative or executive functions, this Council was eventually
constituted as follows:—The Deputy Quartermaster-General (president); six
railway managers, who represented the British railway companies and
might or might not already be members of the Engineer and Railway Staff
Corps; one Board of Trade Inspector of Railways; two members (not being
railway managers) of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps; the Deputy-
Assistant Quartermaster-General; one mobilisation officer; two Naval
officers; and one officer of the Royal Engineers, with a representative of the
Quartermaster-General's Department as secretary.
The Council approximated closely to the "Commission Militaire Superieure
des Chemins de Fer" in France, of which an account has been given in
Chapter IX. It also undertook many of the duties which in the case of the
German Army would be performed by a special section of the General
Staff; though some of these duties it took over from the Engineer and
Railway Staff Corps, reducing the functions and the importance of that
body proportionately.
In time of peace the Council was (1) generally to advise the Secretary of
State for War on matters relating to military rail-transport; (2) to draw up, in
conjunction with the different railway companies concerned, and on the
basis of data to be supplied to them by the War Office, a detailed scheme
for the movement of troops on mobilisation; (3) to arrange in advance as to
the composition of the trains which would be required for any such
movement; (4) to determine the nature of the data to be asked for from the
railway companies,[32] and to prepare the necessary regulations and
instructions in regard to the said troop movements; (5) to draw up rules for
the organisation of a body of Railway Staff Officers who, located at railway
stations to be selected by the Council, would act there as intermediaries
between the railway officials and the troops; and (6) to confer with the
different railway companies as to the provision of such extra sidings,
loading platforms, ramps, barriers, etc., as might be necessary to facilitate
military transport, and to decide on the best means by which the provision
thereof could be arranged. Information on these subjects was to be carefully

compiled, elaborated, and, with explanatory maps, placed on record for use
as required.
In the event of mobilisation, or of some national emergency, the Council
was, also, to advise the Secretary of State for War in regard to matters
relating to the movement of troops by rail; to act as a medium of
communication between the War Office and the railway companies, and to
make all the necessary arrangements in connection with such movements.
Other questions likely to arise, and requiring consideration in time of peace,
included the guarding of the railways against possible attack; the prompt
repair of any damage that might be done to them; the equipment of
armoured trains, and the provision of ambulance trains on lines where they
might be required.
All these and various other matters were dealt with at the periodical
meetings held by the Council, which, within the range of its limitations as
an advisory body, rendered good service to the War Office; though that
Department was still left to deal with the individual railway companies in
regard to all arrangements and matters of detail directly concerning them.

Railway Transport Officers

In the foregoing statement as to the functions to be discharged by the War
Railway Council it is mentioned that these were to include the drawing up
of rules for the organisation of a body of Railway Staff Officers who were
to act as intermediaries between the troops and the railway station staffs in
the conduct of military rail-transport.
We touch here upon those questions of control and organisation of military
traffic which had been a fruitful source of trouble in earlier wars, and more
especially so on the French railways in the war of 1870-71. There was,
indeed, much wisdom in the attempt now being made, as a precautionary
measure, to provide well in advance against the risk of similar experiences
in regard to movements of British troops by rail, while the course adopted
led to the creation of a system which was to ensure excellent results later
on.
In the first instance the officers appointed under the system here in question
were known as "Railway Control Officers," (R.C.O.'s,) their chief as the

"Director of Railways," (D.R.,) and the organisation itself as the "Railway
Control Establishment"; but the titles of Railway Transport Officers
(R.T.O.'s), Director of Railway Transport (D.R.T.) and Transport
Establishments were afterwards substituted.
The functions of the Director of Railway Transport are thus defined in Field
Service Regulations, Part II, section 23 (1913):—

Provision of railway transport and administration of railway transport
personnel. Control, construction, working and maintenance of all
railways. Provision of telegraph operators for railway circuits. Control
and working of telephones and telegraphs allotted to the railway
service. For the erection and maintenance of all telegraph circuits on
railways which are worked by the troops, a representative of the
Director of Army Signals will be attached to his headquarters and the
necessary signal troops allotted to him as may be ordered by the I.G.C.
(Inspector-General of Communications).

As regards the Railway Transport Establishments, the Regulations say
(section 62):—

In railway matters, the authority of each member of a railway transport
establishment will be paramount on that portion of a railway system
where he is posted for duty.
Railway technical officials will always receive the demands of the
troops for railway transport through the railway transport
establishment.
Except when fighting is imminent or in progress, a member of the
railway transport establishment will receive orders from the Director
of Railway Transport only, or his representative.
An officer, or officers, of the railway transport establishment,
recognized by a badge worn on the left arm marked R.T.O., will be
posted for duty at each place where troops are constantly entraining,
detraining, or halting en route. Their chief duties will be:—

1. To facilitate the transport of troops, animals and material.

2. To act as a channel of communication between the military
authorities and the technical railway personnel.
3. To advise the local military authorities as to the capacity and
possibilities of the railway.
4. To bring to the notice of the Director of Railway Transport any
means by which the carrying power of the railway may, for
military purposes, be increased.

All details as to the entraining and detraining of troops and the loading
and unloading of stores will be arranged in conjunction with the
technical officials by the railway transport establishment, who will
meet all troops arriving to entrain, inform commanders of the times
and places of entrainment, and allot trucks and carriages to units in
bulk. They will see that the necessary rolling stock is provided by the
railway officials, that only the prescribed amount of baggage is loaded,
and that no unauthorised person travels by rail. They will meet all
troop trains, and see that troops and stores are detrained with the
utmost despatch.

It will be observed from these regulations that, whatever his own rank may
be, the R.T.O., subject to the instructions he has received from his superior
Transport Officer, exercises at the railway station to which he is delegated
an authority that not even a General may question or seek to set aside by
giving orders direct to the station staff. The R.T.O. alone is the "channel of
communication" between the military and the railway elements. He it is
who, acting in conjunction with the railway people, must see that all the
details in connection with entraining and detraining are properly arranged
and efficiently carried out, while the operations of the station staff are, in
turn, greatly facilitated alike by his co-operation and by the fact that there is
now only one military authority to be dealt with at a station instead,
possibly, of several acting more or less independently of one another.

Volunteer Reviews

While all these developments had been proceeding, the railway companies
had, since the formation of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps,

given repeated evidence of their capacity to move large bodies of
Volunteers with complete efficiency. They specially distinguished
themselves in this respect on the occasion of the great Volunteer reviews
held from time to time. In a book entitled "England's Naval and Military
Weakness," (London, 1882,) Major James Walter, of the 4th Lancashire
Artillery Volunteers, was highly eulogistic of what was done by the
railways on the occasion of the reviews in Edinburgh and Windsor in 1881.
In regard to the Windsor review he wrote:—

The broad result has been, so far as the railway part of the business
goes, to prove that it is perfectly feasible to concentrate fifty thousand
men from all parts of the kingdom in twenty-four hours.... The two
lines most concerned in the Windsor review—the Great Western and
the South Western—carried out this great experiment with ... the
regularity and dispatch of the Scotch mail.

Major Walter seems to have had the idea, rightly or wrongly, that the
success of this performance was mainly due to the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps. He says concerning that body:—

Not the least valued result of the Windsor and Edinburgh reviews of
1881 is the having introduced with becoming prominence to public
knowledge the necessary and indispensable services of the "Engineer
and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps." Until these reviews bore
testimony to the national importance of this Corps, few knew anything
of its duties, or even existence, beyond a list of officers recorded in the
Army List.... Since the embodiment of the Volunteers the Engineer and
Railway Transport Corps has done much service, invariably thorough
and without a hitch.... These several officers of the Railway Staff
Corps set about their transport work of the 1881 reviews in a manner
worthy of their vocation. They proved to the country that their Corps
was a reality and necessity.

In 1893 the authors of the "Army Book for the British Empire" wrote (p.
531):—

There is every reason to believe that, in case of the military forces in
the United Kingdom being mobilised for the purposes of home

defence, and being concentrated in any part or parts of the country for
the purpose of guarding against or confronting an invasion, the railway
arrangements would work satisfactorily. The remarkable success which
has attended the concentration of large bodies of Volunteers gathered
from all quarters of the Kingdom for military functions and reviews,
on more than one occasion, has shown the extraordinary capabilities of
the British railway system for military transport on a great scale.
Rolling stock is abundant. The more important lines in England have a
double line of rails; some have four or more rails. Gradients, moreover,
as a rule are easy, an important point, since troop trains are very heavy.

The South African War

While no one was likely to dispute these conclusions, it had to be
remembered that the transport by rail even of exceptionally large bodies of
Volunteers, carrying their rifles only, was a very different matter from the
conveyance, under conditions of great pressure, of large forces of troops
accompanied by horses, guns, ammunition, road wagons, stores and other
necessaries for prospective actual warfare. So the accepted capacity of the
British railways had still to stand the test of actual war conditions, with or
without the accompaniment of invasion; and this test was applied, to a
certain extent, by the South African War.
The bulk of the military traffic on that occasion passed over the lines of the
London and South Western Railway Company, troops from all parts of the
country being conveyed by different routes and different lines of railway to
Southampton, whence they and their stores, etc., were shipped to the Cape.
Such was the magnitude of this traffic that between the outbreak of the war,
in 1899, and the end of 1900 there were carried on the London and South
Western, and despatched from Southampton, 6,160 officers; 229,097 men;
29,500 horses; and 1,085 wheeled vehicles. The conveyance of this traffic
involved the running of 1,154 special trains, in addition to a large number
of others carrying baggage, stores, etc. At times the pressure was very great.
On October 20, 1899, five transports sailed from Southampton with 167
officers and 4,756 men, besides guns horses and wagons. Yet the whole of
the operations were conducted with perfect smoothness, there being no
overtaxing either of the railway facilities or of the dock accommodation.[33]

Much of this smoothness of working was due to the fact that the War Office
had, in accordance with the principle adopted on the appointment of the
War Railway Council, stationed at Southampton a Railway Transport
Officer who was to act as a connecting link, or intermediary, between the
railway, the docks, the military and the Admiralty authorities, co-ordinating
their requirements, superintending the arrivals by train, arranging for and
directing the embarkation of the troops and their equipment in the transports
allotted to them, and preventing any of that confusion which otherwise
might well have arisen. Similar officers had also been stationed by the War
Office at leading railway stations throughout the country to ensure co-
operation between the military and the railway staffs and, while avoiding
the possibility of friction or complications, facilitate the handling of the
military traffic.
In the account to be given in Chapter XVI. of "Railways in the Boer War," it
will be shown that a like course was pursued in South Africa for the
duration of the campaign.

Army Manœuvres of 1912

Further evidence as to what the British railways were capable of
accomplishing was afforded by the Army Manœuvres in East Anglia in
1912. This event also constituted a much more severe test than the
Volunteer reviews of former days, since it meant not only the assembling, in
the manœuvre area, of four divisions of the Army and some thousands of
Territorials, but the transport, at short notice, and within a limited period, of
many horses, guns, transport wagons, etc., together with considerable
quantities of stores. Certain sections of the traffic were dealt with by the
Great Northern and the London and North-Western Companies; but the bulk
of it was handled by the Great Eastern and was carried in nearly 200 troop
trains, consisting in all of about 4,000 vehicles. Of these trains 50 per cent.
started before or exactly to time, while the others were only a few minutes
late in leaving the station. Such was the regularity and general efficiency
with which the work of transportation was carried out that in the course of
an address to the Generals, at Cambridge, his Majesty the King referred to
the rapid concentration of troops by rail, without dislocating the ordinary
civilian traffic, as one of the special features of the manœuvres. The

dispersal of the forces on the conclusion of the manœuvres was effected in a
little over two days, and constituted another smart piece of work.[34]

A Railways Executive Committee

In view of all such testimony and of all such actual achievements, there was
no reason to doubt that the railway companies, with their great resources in
material and personnel, and with the excellence of their own organisation,
would themselves be able to respond promptly and effectively to such
demands as might be made upon them in a time of national emergency.
There still remained, however, the singular fact that although, so far back as
1871, the Government had acquired power of control over the railways, in
the event of an emergency arising, a period of forty years had elapsed
without any action being taken to create, even as a precautionary measure,
the administrative machinery by which that control would be exercised by
the State. Such machinery had been perfected in Germany, France, and
other countries, but in England it had still to be provided. Not only had
section 16 of the Act of 1871 remained practically a dead letter, but even the
fact that it existed did not seem to be known to so prominent a railway
manager as Sir George Findlay when he wrote "Working and Management
of an English Railway" and the article he contributed to the United Service
Magazine of April, 1892, his assumption that the State would control the
railways in time of war being based, not on the Act of 1871—which he
failed to mention—but on the Act of 1888, which simply gives a right of
priority to military traffic, under certain conditions.
Notwithstanding, too, the draft scheme spoken of by Sir George Findlay,
under which the operation of the railways was to be entrusted, in case of
emergency, to the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, that body and, also,
the War Railway Council, continued to occupy a purely advisory position.
So it was clearly desirable to supplement the recognized efficiency of the
railways themselves by the creation of a central executive body which,
whenever the State assumed control of the railways, under the Act of 1871,
would (1) secure the necessary co-operation between Government
departments and the railway managements; (2) ensure the working of the
various railway systems on a national basis; and (3) co-ordinate such

various needs as naval and military movements to or from all parts of the
Kingdom; coal supply for the Fleet; transport of munitions; the
requirements of the civil population, etc.
The necessity for this machinery—which could not possibly be created at a
moment's notice—became still more apparent in the autumn of 1911, and
steps were taken to provide what was so obviously a missing link in the
existing organisation.
Thus it was that in 1912 the War Railway Council was succeeded by a
Railways Executive Committee which, constituted of the general managers
of leading railway companies, was to prepare plans "with a view to
facilitate the working" of the provisions of the Act of 1871, and would, also,
in the event of the Government assuming control over the railways of Great
Britain, under the provisions of that Act, constitute the executive body for
working them on behalf of the State, becoming the recognised intermediary
(1) for receiving the instructions of Government departments in respect to
military and naval requirements; and (2) for taking the necessary measures
in order to give effect to them through the individual companies, each of
which, subject to the instructions it received from the Committee, would
retain the management of its own line.
In accordance with the principle thus adopted, it was through the Railways
Executive Committee that the Government, subject to certain financial
arrangements which need not be dealt with here, established their control
over the railways of Great Britain on the outbreak of war in 1914, the
announcement to this effect issued from the War Office, under date August
4, stating:—

An Order in Council has been made under Section 16 of the
Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, declaring that it is expedient that
the Government should have control over the railroads in Great
Britain. This control will be exercised through an Executive
Committee composed of general managers of railways which has been
formed for some time, and has prepared plans with a view to
facilitating the working of this Act.

In a notification issued by the Executive Committee, of which the official
chairman was the President of the Board of Trade and the acting chairman

was Mr. (now Sir Herbert A.) Walker, general manager of the London and
South Western Railway, it was further stated:—

The control of the railways has been taken over by the Government for
the purpose of ensuring that the railways, locomotives, rolling stock
and staff shall be used as one complete unit in the best interests of the
State for the movement of troops, stores and food supplies.... The staff
on each railway will remain under the same control as heretofore, and
will receive their instructions through the same channels as in the past.

As eventually constituted, the Committee consisted of the following general
managers:—Mr. D. A. Matheson, Caledonian Railway; Sir Sam Fay, Great
Central Railway; Mr. C. H. Dent, Great Northern Railway; Mr. F. Potter,
Great Western Railway; Mr. Guy Calthrop, London and North Western
Railway; Mr. J. A. F. Aspinall, Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway; Sir
Herbert A. Walker, London and South Western Railway; Sir William
Forbes, London, Brighton and South Coast Railway; Sir Guy Granet,
Midland Railway; Sir A. K. Butterworth, North Eastern Railway, and Mr. F.
H. Dent, South Eastern and Chatham Railway, with Mr. Gilbert S. Szlumper
as secretary.

1860 AND 1914

Such, then, was the final outcome of a movement which, started in 1860, by
individual effort, as the result of an expected invasion of England by
France, was, in 1914, and after undergoing gradual though continuous
development, to play an important part on behalf of the nation in helping
France herself, now England's cherished Ally, to resist the invader of her
own fair territory.
With what smoothness the transport of our troops was conducted cannot yet
be told in detail; but the facts here narrated will show that the success
attained was mainly due to three all-important factors,—(1) the efficiency
of the railway organisation; (2) the willingness of the Government, on
assuming control of the railways under the Act of 1871, to leave their
management in the hands of railway men; and (3) the ready adoption, alike
by the railway interests and by State departments, of the fundamental
principle enforced by a succession of wars from the American Civil War of

1861-65 downwards,—that in the conduct of military rail transport there
should be, in each of its various stages, intermediaries between the military
and the railway technical elements, co-ordinating their mutual
requirements, constituting the recognised and only channel for orders and
instructions, and ensuring, as far as prudence, foresight and human skill can
devise, the perfect working of so delicate and complicated an instrument as
the railway machine.

Railway Troops

While Germany, inspired by the American example, had begun the creation
of special bodies of Railway Troops in 1866, it was not until 1882 that a
like course was adopted in England. Prior to the last-mentioned year it was,
possibly, thought that the labour branch of the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps would suffice to meet requirements in regard to the
destruction or the re-establishment of railways at home in the event of
invasion; but the arrangements of the Corps did not provide for the supply
of men to take up railway construction and operation on the occasion of
military expeditions to other countries.
It was this particular need that led, in the summer of 1882, to the conversion
of the 8th Company of Royal Engineers into the 8th (Railway) Company,
R.E., the occasion therefore being the dispatch of an expeditionary force
under Sir Garnet (afterwards Lord) Wolseley to Egypt, where the necessity
for railway work of various kinds was likely to arise. This pioneer corps of
British Railway Troops was formed of seven officers, one warrant officer,
two buglers, and ninety-seven N.C.O.'s and sappers. So constituted, it was
thought better adapted for railway work under conditions of active service
than a body of civilian railwaymen would be. There certainly was the
disadvantage that those constituting the 8th were not then proficient in
railway matters; but, before they left, both officers and men were given the
run of the London, Chatham and Dover Railway lines, and were there
enabled to pick up what they could of railway working in the locomotive
and traffic departments, while on the London and South Western and the
South Eastern Railways they were initiated, as far as could be done in the
time, into the art of platelaying. The Corps took out to Egypt four small
tank locomotives; two first-class, two second-class and six third-class

carriages; forty cattle trucks; four brake vans; two travelling cranes; two
breakdown vans, and five miles of permanent way, complete, with
accessories, tools, etc. Excellent work was done in carrying on regular train
services, repairing damaged track, etc., running an armoured train,
constructing supplementary short lines, and conveying troops, sick and
wounded, and stores, the practical utility of such an addition to the
engineering forces of the Army being thus fully assured.
In January, 1885, the 10th Company, Royal Engineers, was converted into
the 10th (Railway) Company, and sent to Egypt to assist in the construction
of the then contemplated Suakin-Berber line, to which further reference will
be made in Chapter XV. Both companies also rendered good service in the
South African War.
According to the "Manual of Military Railways," issued with Army Orders
dated March 1st, 1889, the duties likely to be required from the Royal
Engineers with regard to railways are as follows:— (1) Laying, working,
and maintaining a military line of railway between two places; (2) restoring
an existing line which has been damaged or destroyed by an enemy; (3)
destroying an existing line as much as possible with a given number of men
and in a specified time, and (4) working and maintaining an existing line.
The "Manual" itself gave much technical information as to the construction,
maintenance, destruction and working of railways. It was re-issued by the
War Office in 1898 as Part VI of "Instruction in Military Engineering," and
was stated to embody a portion of the course of instruction in railways at
the school of Military Engineering, Chatham. In the "Manual of Military
Engineering," issued by the General Staff of the War Office in 1905,
instructions are given (Chap. XVII, pars. 238-244) on the "hasty
demolition, without explosives," of railways, stations, buildings, rolling
stock, permanent way, water supply, etc.; and in Chapter XXIII, "Railways
and Telegraphs," the statement is made that—

The duties likely to be required of troops in the field with regard to
railways (apart from large railway schemes, for which special
arrangements would be necessary,) may be considered as either
temporary repairs or the laying of short lengths of line to join up
breaks, the construction of additional works, such as platforms, etc., to
adapt the line for military use, or the demolition of an existing line.

Detailed information is given, for the benefit of R.E. officers, concerning
railway construction, repair and reconstruction, and the main principles on
which such work should be carried out for military purposes are explained.
The best system to adopt for the effecting of rapid repairs is said to be that
of establishing construction trains. "The reconstruction staff live in these
trains, which rapidly advance along the line as it is being repaired,
conveying, also, the necessary material."
The peace training[35] of the Companies includes: reconnaissance, survey
and final location of a railway; laying out station yards; laying out
deviations; rapid laying of narrow-gauge "military" lines; construction of all
kinds of railway bridges; signal installation; water supply; repairs to
telegraphs and telephones necessary for working construction lines;
working of electric block instruments; fitting up armoured trains;
construction of temporary platforms, and working and maintenance of
construction trains.
Instruction in reconnaissance and survey work is given to officers while at
head-quarters, and a certain number of N.C.O.'s and men are also instructed
in railway survey work. Parties, each commanded by an officer, are sent to
carry out a reconnaissance and final location of a railway between two
points about forty miles apart on the assumption that it is an unmapped
country, and complete maps and sections are prepared. The Companies have
also undertaken the construction and maintenance of the Woolmer
Instructional Military Railway,—a 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge military line, about six
miles in length, connecting Bordon (London and South Western Railway)
with Longmore Camp. All the plant necessary for railway work and
workshops for the repair of rolling stock are provided at Longmore.
In time of war the chief duties of a Railway Company, R.E., would be to
survey, construct, repair and demolish railways and to work construction
and armoured trains.
In the South African campaign, when the military had to operate the
railways of which they took possession in the enemy's country, some
difficulty was experienced in obtaining from the ranks of the Army a
sufficient number of men capable of working the lines. As the result of
these conditions, it was arranged, in 1903, between the War Office and
certain of the British railway companies that the latter should afford

facilities in their locomotive departments and workshops for the training of
a number of non-commissioned officers and men as drivers, firemen and
mechanics, (capable of carrying out repairs,) in order to qualify them better
for railway work in the field, in case of need. This arrangement was carried
out down to the outbreak of war in 1914. The period of training lasted either
six or nine months. In order to avoid the raising of any "labour" difficulties,
no wages were given during this period to Army men who were already
receiving Army pay as soldiers, but a bonus was granted to them by the
railway companies, when they left, on their obtaining from the head of the
department to which they had been attached a certificate of their efficiency.

Strategical Railways

The subject of strategical railways will be dealt with, both generally and in
special reference to their construction in Germany, in Chapter XVIII. In
regard to Great Britain it may be said that the position as explained by Sir
George Findlay in his article in the United Service Magazine for April,
1892, is that whilst Continental countries have been spending large sums of
money on the building of strategical lines for the defence of their frontiers,
(or, he might have added, for the invasion, in some instances, of their
neighbours' territory,) Great Britain, more fortunate, possesses already a
system of railways which, though constructed entirely by private enterprise,
could not, even if they had been laid out with a view to national defence,
"have been better adapted for the purpose, since there are duplicated lines
directed from the great centres of population and of military activity upon
every point of the coast, while there are lines skirting the coast in every
direction, north, east, south and west."
Some years ago there were certain critics who recommended the building of
lines, for strategical purposes, along sections of our coast which the
ordinary railways did not directly serve; but the real necessity for such lines
was questioned, the more so because the transport of troops by rail on such
short-distance journeys as those that would have been here in question
might, with the marching to and from the railway and the time occupied in
entraining and detraining, take longer than if the troops either marched all
the way, or (in the event of there being only a small force) if they went by
motor vehicles to the coast.

One point that was, indeed, likely to arise in connection with the movement
of troops was the provision of facilities for their ready transfer from one
railway system to another, without change of carriage, when making cross-
country journeys or travelling, for instance, from the North or the Midlands
to ports in the South.
We have seen that in France many such links were established, subsequent
to the war of 1870-71, expressly for strategical reasons; but in Great Britain
a like result has been attained, apart from military considerations, from the
fact that some years ago the different railway companies established
physical connections between their different systems with a view to the
ready transfer of ordinary traffic. When, therefore, the necessity arose for a
speedy mobilisation, or for the transport of troops from any part of Great
Britain to any particular port for an overseas destination, the necessary
facilities for through journeys by rail, in the shortest possible time, already
existed.
In effect, the nearest approach to purely strategical lines in Great Britain is
to be found, perhaps, in those which connect military camps with the
ordinary railways; yet, while these particular lines may have been built to
serve a military purpose, they approximate less to strategical railways
proper, as understood in Germany, than to branch lines and sidings
constructed to meet the special needs of some large industrial concern.
Generally speaking, the attitude of Parliament and of British authorities in
general has not been sympathetic to suggestions of strategical railways,
even when proposals put forward have had the support of the War Office
itself.
This tendency was well shown in connection with the Northern Junction
Railway scheme which was inquired into by a Select Committee of the
House of Commons in 1913. Under the scheme in question, a railway was
to be constructed from Brentford, on the west of London, to Wood Green,
on the north, passing through Acton, Ealing, Wembley Park, Hampstead and
Finchley, and establishing connections with and between several of the
existing main-line systems. In this respect it compared with those "outer
circle" railway systems which, as a further result of the war of 1870-71,
were expressly designed by the French Government for the better defence
of Paris.

The Northern Junction scheme was introduced to the Select Committee as
one which, among other considerations, "would be important from a
military point of view for moving troops from one point to another without
taking them through London." Lieut.-General Sir J. S. Cowans,
Quartermaster-General, a member of the Army Council responsible for the
movement of troops, and deputed by the Secretary for War to give evidence,
said:

The proposed line would be a great advantage in time of emergency if
it was constructed in its entirety. The Army Council felt that it would
provide important routes between the South of England and East
Anglia and the North. At present trains had to come from Aldershot to
Clapham Junction by the South-Western line, and be there broken up
and sent over congested City lines on to the Great Northern. By the
proposed line military trains could be handled without dividing them
and be transferred to the Great Northern or Great Eastern without
being sent over the congested City lines.

Strong opposition was offered, however, on the ground that the construction
of the line would do "irreparable damage" to the amenities of the
Hampstead Garden Suburb; and, after a sitting which extended over several
days, the Committee threw out the Bill, the Chairman subsequently
admitting that "they had been influenced very largely by the objection of
the Hampstead Garden Suburb."
In 1914 the scheme was introduced afresh into the House of Commons,
with certain modifications, the proposed line of route no longer passing
through the Hampstead Garden Suburb, though near to it. One member of
the House said he had collaborated in promoting the Bill because "he most
earnestly believed this railway was of vital import to the mobilisation of our
troops in time of emergency"; but another declared that the alleged military
necessity for the railway was "all fudge," while much was now said as to
the pernicious effect the line would have on the highly-desirable residential
district of Finchley. In the result strategical considerations were again set
aside, and the House rejected the Bill by a majority of seventy-seven.

FOOTNOTES:
[29] Colonel McMurdo had special qualifications for the post. Becoming a
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army in October, 1853, he was Assistant-Adjutant-
General at Dublin from May, 1854, to January, 1855. On February 2, 1855, he
was entrusted with the duties of Director-General of the new Land-Transport
Corps, and was sent out to the Crimea, with the local rank of Colonel, to
reorganize the transport service, then in a deplorably defective condition. He is
said to have accomplished this task with great energy and success. Before the
close of the campaign his corps numbered 17,000 men, with 28,000 horses,
mules, etc. He also took over the working of the pioneer military railway in the
Crimea. In 1857 the Land-Transport Corps was converted into the Military
Train, with Colonel McMurdo as Colonel-Commandant. Early in 1860, when the
Volunteer movement was assuming a permanent character, Colonel McMurdo
was appointed Inspector of Volunteers, and in June of the same year he became
Inspector-General, a post he retained until January, 1865. He was chosen as
Colonel of the Inns of Court Volunteers on January 23, 1865, and his further
appointment to the post of Colonel of the newly-formed Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps followed, as stated above, in February, 1865. He was
created K.C.B. in 1881 and G.C.B. in 1893. He died in 1894.
[30] The names of present members of the Corps will be found in "Hart's Army
List." Under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907 the Corps became
part of the Territorial Force, and the designation "Volunteer" was dropped from
its title, which since that date has been "The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps."
[31] "The Conveyance of Troops by Railway." By Col. J. S. Rothwell, R.A.,
Professor of Military Administration, Staff College, United Service Magazine,
Dec., 1891, and Jan., 1892.
[32] Detailed information as to the capacity of British rolling stock; composition
of trains required for units at war strength; truck space taken up by Army
vehicles; standard forms of reports on existing railways, and other matters, is
published in the official publication known as "Railway Manual (War)."
[33] The Railway Magazine, May, 1901.
[34] For details as to the nature of the organisation by which these results were
effected, see an article on "The Great Eastern Railway and the Army Manœuvres
in East Anglia—1912," by H. J. Prytherch, in the Great Eastern Railway
Magazine for November, 1912. In the Great Western Railway Magazine for
November, 1909, there are given, under the heading, "The Transport of an
Army," some details concerning the military transport on the Great Western
system during the Army manœuvres of that year. The traffic conveyed was,
approximately, 514 officers, 14,552 men, 208 officers' horses, 2,474 troop
horses, 25 guns, 34 limbers, and 581 wagons and carts. "The military authorities
and the Army contractors," it is said, "expressed their pleasure at the manner in
which the work was performed by the Company's staff."
[35] "General Principles, Organisation and Equipment of Royal Engineers,"
Royal Engineers Journal, February, 1910.

CHAPTER XV
Military Railways
By the expression "military railways" is meant lines of railways which, as
distinct from commercial lines serving public purposes, have been designed
expressly for military use. The fact that any line forming part of the
ordinary railway system of the country is employed for the conveyance of
troops either direct to the theatre of war or to some port for embarkation
therefrom does not constitute that line a "military" railway, in the strict
sense of the term, whatever the extent of its use for military transport for the
time being. Such line remains a commercial railway, all the same, and the
application to it of the designation "military" is erroneous.
Military railways proper fall mainly into two groups—(1) "field" or "siege"
railways, constructed on the theatre of war for moving heavy guns, platform
materials, etc., to their position; conveying ammunition and supplies to
siege batteries, magazines, advanced trenches or bombproofs; bringing up
reinforcements rapidly in case of a sortie; conveying working-parties to and
from their work; removing sick and wounded to the rear, and other kindred
purposes, the loads being generally hauled by animals, by gasoline motor or
by men; and (2) "supply" railways, specially constructed to convey troops,
stores, etc., from the base to the front, in time of war, or from an ordinary
main-line railway to a military camp or depôt in time of peace, where local
lines of railway are not available for the purpose.
These two main groups include various types of railways coming under one
or the other designation, and ranging from a very light portable tramway,
put down at express speed to serve an emergency, and worked by small
engines, mules or horses, to substantially built lines, of standard gauge,
designed both to be worked by locomotives and to carry the largest possible
number of troops or amount of freight.
In any case, the details of construction, equipment and operation of a
military railway vary from those of a commercial railway since the one
would be intended to serve only a specific and possibly temporary purpose,

in the attainment of which the question of speed would be a secondary
consideration, whereas the other would require to assume a permanent
form, be capable of higher speeds, and afford adequate guarantee of safety
for the public, by whom it would be used. The building, also, of a military
railway may be, and generally is, carried out by a corps of Railway Troops
to which are specially delegated the duties of laying, working, maintaining,
repairing, restoring or destroying railways; and, provided the desired lines
were built with sufficient dispatch, and answered the desired purpose, the
military commanders who would alone be concerned might well be
satisfied.
In many different ways the resort to military railways, whatever their
particular type, has greatly extended the range of advantages to be gained
from the application of rail-power to war. A full record of all that has been
accomplished in this direction could hardly be attempted here; but a few
typical examples of what has been done in this direction—though not
always with conspicuous success—may be offered.

The Crimean War

The earliest instance of a purely military railway being constructed to serve
the purpose of a campaign occurred in the Crimean War; and, although the
line then made would to-day be regarded as little more than an especially
inefficient apology for a railway, it was looked upon at the time as a
remarkable innovation in warfare. It further established a precedent
destined to be widely followed in later years.
Between the camp of the allies at Sebastopol and their base of supplies at
Balaklava the distance was only seven or eight miles; yet in the winter of
1854-55 the fatigue parties sent for rations, clothing, fuel, huts, ammunition
and other necessaries were frequently no less than twelve hours in doing the
return journey. The reason was that during the greater part of that time they
were floundering in a sea of mud. The soil of the Crimea is clay
impregnated with salt, and, under the combined influence of climatic
conditions and heavy traffic, the route between camp and base had been
converted into a perfect quagmire. Horses, mules and carts were, at first,
alone available for transport purposes; but, although plenty of animals were
to be obtained in the surrounding country, only a limited number could be

employed by reason of the lack of forage, a totally inadequate supply
having been sent out from England. As for the animals that were used, their
sufferings, as the result of those terrible journeys, their own shortage of
food, and the effect of the intense cold on their half-starved bodies, were
terrible. "In the rear of each Division," says General Sir Edward Hamley, in
"The War in the Crimea," "a scanty group of miserable ponies and mules,
whose backs never knew what it was to be quit of the saddle, shivered, and
starved, and daily died." They died, also, on every journey to or from the
base. The toil of going through the quagmire even for their own forage, or
of bringing it back when they had got it, was too great for them, and the
whole line of route was marked by their remains.
As for the troops, they experienced great hardships owing to the inadequate
supplies of provisions and fuel at the camp, although there might be plenty
of both at the base. Apart from the physical conditions of the roads, or
apologies for roads, between the two points, the campaign was begun
without transport arrangements of any kind whatever. A transport corps
formed for the British Army in 1799, under the title of the Royal Wagon
Train, had been disbanded in 1833, and, whether from motives of economy
or because the need for war preparations in time of peace was not
sufficiently appreciated, no other corps had been created to take its place.
Hence the troops sent to the Crimea were required, at the outset, to look
after the transport themselves, and in many instances they even had to do
the work of mules and horses. It was not until January 24, 1855, that a Land
Transport Corps, composed of volunteers from various arms of the service,
was raised by Royal Warrant and began to provide for a defect in the
military organisation which had, in the meantime, involved the allies, and
especially the British, in severe privations owing to the frequent shortage of
supplies. The original intention to establish a depôt at head-quarters before
Sebastopol had had to be abandoned because of the hopelessness of any
attempt to get a sufficient surplus of provisions to form a store.
Such were the conditions that the pioneer military railway was designed to
remedy. Built, at a very slow rate, by English contractors, who arrived at the
Crimea with their men and material during the month of January, 1855, the
line was a single-track one, with a 4 feet 8½ inch gauge. For the first two
miles from Balaklava it was worked by a locomotive. Then the trucks were
drawn up an incline, eight at a time, by a stationary engine. Six horses next

drew two trucks at a time up another incline. After this came a fairly level
piece of road, followed by two gullies where each wagon was detached in
succession and made to run down one side of the gully and up the other by
its own momentum. Then horses were again attached to the trucks and so
drew them, finally, to the end of the line on the Upland.
Five locomotives, of from 12 to 18 tons weight, were provided, and there
were about forty ordinary side-tip ballast wagons—all entirely unsuitable
for use on a military railway.
At first the men belonging to the contractors' staff—navvies and others—
were entrusted with the working of the line. The question had been raised as
to whether their services should not be made use of in other directions, as
well. On their being sent out from England the idea was entertained that
they might construct trenches and batteries, in addition to building the
railway, and there was a suggestion that they should, also, join the siege
parties in the attack on Sebastopol. In order to test the question (as recorded
by Major-General Whitworth Porter, in his "History of the Corps of Royal
Engineers"), Sir John Burgoyne wrote to Mr. Beattie, principal engineer of
the Railway Department, asking if he would approve of an invitation being
given to the men to undergo such training as would qualify them to defend
any position in which they might happen to be. In his answer Mr. Beattie
wrote:—

The subject of your letter was very fully and anxiously discussed in
London before I left, and it was determined not to arm the men. They
were considered too valuable to be used as soldiers, and were
distinctly told that they would not be called upon to fight.

Their value, however, did not stand the test it underwent when they were
called on to work the railway they had built. They were found to be lacking
in any sense of discipline; they repeatedly struck work when their services
were most urgently needed, and they had to be got rid of accordingly. They
were replaced by men from the Army Works Corps and the Land Transport
Corps, then in operation in the Crimea, and the members of the new staff—
constituting a disciplined force—worked admirably. Major Powell, who
became traffic manager of the line in March, 1855, and chief superintendent
in the following July, has said concerning them[36]:—

Many lost their lives in the execution of their duty. When I required
them to work night and day to throw forward supplies for the great
struggle—the capture of Sebastopol—several of them remained
seventy-two hours continuously at work.

The quantities of ammunition and stores which could be carried were below
the requirements of the troops engaged in the siege operations; but during
the last bombardment of Sebastopol—when the line was worked
continuously, night and day, by a staff increased to about 1,000 men, of
whom 400 were Turks—the transport effected rose from 200 tons a day, the
limit attained under operation by the undisciplined navvies, to 700 tons. The
line also did excellent work on the re-embarkment of the troops at the end
of the campaign.

American Civil War

In the American War of Succession, the existing lines of railway were
supplemented in various instances by "surface railroads," which consisted
of rails and sleepers laid on the ordinary ground without any preparation of
a proper road bed, yet serving a useful purpose, notwithstanding the rough
and ready way in which they were put together.

The Abyssinian Campaign

How a railway specially constructed for the purpose may assist a military
expedition in the prosecution of a "little war" in an uncivilised country,
practically devoid of roads, and offering great physical difficulties, was
shown on the occasion of the British Campaign in Abyssinia in 1867-68;
though the circumstances under which the line in question was built were
not in themselves creditable to the authorities concerned.
Sent to effect the release of the British prisoners whom King Theodore was
keeping in captivity at Magdala, the expedition under Sir Robert Napier
(afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala) entered upon what was to be quite as
much an engineering as a military exploit. Not only was Magdala 300 miles
from Annesley Bay, the base of operations on the Red Sea, but it stood, as a
hill fortress, on a plateau more than 9,000 feet above the sea-level. To reach

it meant the construction of roads in three sections. The first, which, in
parts, had to be cut in the mountain side, rose to a height of 7,400 feet in 63
miles; the second allowed of no more than a cart road, and the third and
final stage was a mere mountain track where the only transport possible was
that of mules or elephants.
When, in October, 1867, the advance Brigade landed at Zoulla, the port in
Annesley Bay from which the advance inland was to be made, they took
with them the materials for some tramway lines intended to connect two
landing piers with the depôts it was proposed to establish a mile inland. In
November these plans were altered in favour of a line of railway, twelve
miles in length, from the landing-place to Koomayleh, at the entrance of the
Soroo Pass, the route to be taken by the expedition on its journey to the
Abyssinian highlands. All the necessary plant was to be supplied by the
Government of Bombay, who also undertook to provide the labour; but it
was the middle of January, 1868, before a real start could be made with the
work.
Even then, as told by Lieut. Willans, R.E.,[37] who took part in the
expedition, the progress made was extremely slow. The rails obtained from
different railway companies in India were of five different patterns, of odd
lengths, and varying in weight from 30 lb. to 65 lb. a yard. Some of them
had been in use many years on the harbour works at Karachi, had been
taken up and laid down several times, and had, also, been bent to fit sharp
curves or cut to suit the original line. Some single-flanged rails had been
fitted in the Government workshops at Bombay with fish-plates and bolts;
but the holes in the plates and rails were not at uniform distances, and the
bolts fitted the holes so tightly as to allow of no play. Then, when the rails
arrived, no spikes came with them, and without spikes they could not be
laid. When the spikes followed, it was found that the augurs for boring
holes in the sleepers had been left at Bombay, to come on by another ship;
though this particular difficulty was met by the artisans of the 23rd Punjab
Pioneer Regiment making augurs for themselves.
If the rails gave much trouble—and even when they had been laid it was no
unusual thing for them to break between two sleepers and throw the engine
off the line—the locomotives and rolling stock caused still more.

Six locomotives were shipped from Bombay; but, owing to the great
difficulty in landing and the labour involved in putting them together, only
four were used. Of these, one was a tank engine which, although just turned
out from the railway workshops at Bombay, required new driving wheels
after it had been running a fortnight. Another came with worn-out boiler
tubes, and these had to be replaced at Zoulla. The two others, tank engines
with only four wheels each, had previously seen many years' service at
Karachi. All the engines were very light, weighing with coal and water from
16 to 20 tons each. The best of them could do no more than draw fifteen
small loaded trucks up an incline of one in sixty.
The sixty wagons sent were ordinary trolleys having no springs, no spring
buffers and no grease boxes. Their axle-boxes were of cast iron, and wore
out within a fortnight, owing to the driving sand. As the railway came into
use, every truck was loaded to its fullest capacity, and the combination of
this weight with the jarring and oscillation on a very rough line led either to
the breaking of the coupling chains or to the coupling bars being pulled
from the wagons at starting. When fresh coupling chains were asked for it
was found that the boxes containing them had either been left behind at
Bombay or were buried beneath several hundred tons of other supplies on
board ship. At least forty per cent. of the trucks were either constantly under
repair or had to be put aside as unfit for use. In May a number of open
wagons with springs and spring buffers arrived from Bombay. Some of
these were converted into passenger carriages.
Difficulties arose in other directions, besides.
The plant forwarded was adapted to the Indian standard gauge of 5 feet 6
inches, and was heavy and difficult to handle, especially under the
troublesome conditions of landing. To-day, of course, a narrow-gauge
railway, easily dealt with, would be employed in circumstances such as
those of the Abyssinian expedition.
The Indian natives who had been sent in the first instance to construct the
line were found unsuitable, and had to be replaced by gangs of Chinese
picked up in Bombay. The latter worked well and gave no trouble.
The country through which the line was laid was timberless, if not, also,
practically waterless. Wells had to be sunk for the water wanted for the
locomotives and the working-parties.

The heat was excessive. The temperature at times was 180 degrees Fahr. in
the sun. English navvies could not have made the line at all.
The two piers where the incoming vessels could alone be unloaded got so
congested with traffic that it was only with the greatest trouble railway
material could be landed.
Use began to be made of the line as soon as any of it was ready, and the
traffic at the shore end at once became so heavy that it was difficult to get
materials and supplies through to the construction parties at the other end.
Officers, also, who should have been superintending the construction had to
devote a good deal of time, instead, to details of operation, or to looking
after the repairs of rolling stock.
In all these circumstances one cannot be surprised at the slow rate of
progress made. One may, rather, wonder that the line got built at all. As it
was, four months were spent on eleven miles of railway, or a total of twelve
miles including sidings. There remained still another mile or so to be built
when, at the end of April, news arrived that the object of the expedition had
been attained, and that Magdala had fallen. It was then decided not to
complete the line, but to devote all energies to preparing for the heavy
traffic to be dealt with in the conveyance of troops, baggage and stores on
the return journey.
From the middle of May to the middle of June the resources of the line were
severely taxed; but a great improvement had been made in the working
arrangements, and a railway which had involved so much trouble in the
making was eventually found to be of great practical service. Lieutenant
Willans says of it:—

The Abyssinian railway was a great success, if one may gauge it by the
amount of assistance it gave to the expedition, by the celerity and
dispatch with which, by its aid, stores were landed and brought up to
the store sheds, and by the rapidity and ease with which the troops and
their baggage were brought back and re-embarked at once....
As an auxiliary to the expedition, and as an additional means of
transport, no one who had anything to do in connection with it can
have doubted its extreme utility.

Faulty, therefore, as had been the conditions under which the line was
constructed, the results nevertheless established definitely the principle that,
in such campaigns as the one in Abyssinia, military railways might serve an
extremely useful purpose in facilitating the transport of troops and supplies.
The Abyssinian experiences did, however, further show the desirability of
any country likely to find itself in a position requiring the construction of
military railways—as an aid to wars small or great—creating in advance an
organisation designed to enable it, as far as possible, to meet promptly
whatever emergency might arise, without the risk of having to deal with
defective material, unsatisfactory labour, and administrative
mismanagement.
The same lesson was to be enforced by other expeditions in which England
has taken part, and, down to the period when improvements in our system
—or lack of system—began to be effected, there was much scope for
criticism as to the way in which military railways, designed to facilitate
operations undertaken in countries having a lack of communications, had
been either constructed or worked. Writing, in 1882, in the "Professional
Papers" of the Royal Engineers (Chatham) on "Railways for Military
Communication in the Field," Col. J. P. Maquay, R.E., observed in regard to
what had been the experiences to that date:—

In most of the wars that England has undertaken during the past thirty
years, attempts have been made to construct railways for the transport
of stores and materials from the base of operations. This base must
necessarily be on the sea coast for a country situated as England is.
These railways have not been successful chiefly because, when war
had broken out, such material was hastily got together as seemed most
suitable to the occasion; and, further, the construction of these lines
was not carried out on any system. It is not surprising, therefore, that
our military railways were never completed in time to be of much use
to the troops they were intended to serve.

Franco-German War

In the Franco-German War of 1870-71 the Germans constructed two
military railways—(1) a line, twenty-two miles in length, connecting

Remilly, on the Saarbrück Railway, with Pont à Mousson, on the Metz-
Frouard line; and (2) a loop line, three miles long, passing round the tunnel
at Nanteuil, blown up by the French.
Special interest attached to these two lines inasmuch as they were the result
of construction work done, not in anticipation of a war, or even immediately
preceding hostilities, but during the course of an active campaign. In
addition to this, they afforded an opportunity for showing what Prussia
could do, under pressure, with the Construction Corps she had formed in
order, among other things, to meet just such contingencies as those that now
arose.
At the beginning of the war the Prussian General Staff had (according to
Rüstow) assumed that Metz would offer a prolonged resistance, and that the
defenders would be certain to make an attempt to interrupt the rail
communication between Germany and her troops in the field. To meet the
position which might thus be created, it was decided to build from Pont à
Mousson to Remilly a field railway which, avoiding Metz, would link up at
Remilly with the line proceeding thence to Saarbrück, and so ensure the
maintenance of direct rail communication to and from Germany. On August
14, 1870, the day of the rearguard action at Borny, the survey and the
levelling of the ground were begun, and three days later a start was made
with the construction. Altogether some 4,200 men were employed on the
work, namely, 400 belonging to two Field Railway Companies; 800
forming four Fortress Pioneer Companies, and about 3,000 miners from the
colliery districts of Saarbrück who had been thrown out of work owing to
the war and accepted employment on the railway. The building corps had at
their disposal a park of 330 wagons and other vehicles, and patrol and
requisition duties were performed for them by a squadron of Cavalry.
Notwithstanding that so considerable a force was available for the purpose,
the work of building the twenty-two miles of railway took forty-eight days,
the line not being ready for operation until October 4. This was in no way a
great achievement, and it did not compare favourably with much that was
done by the Federal Construction Corps employed in the American War of
Secession. It is true that the irregularities of the ground were such as to
render necessary numerous cuttings and embankments, and that two bridges
and two viaducts had to be provided; but the cuttings were only about 3 feet
deep, and the embankments were only 5 feet high, except near one of the

viaducts, where they were 10 feet high. The viaducts and bridges were of
timber, with spans of about 16 feet. The building of the line was, therefore,
in no way a formidable undertaking, from an engineering point of view.
Not only, however, did it take over 4,000 men nearly fifty days to make
twenty-two miles of line, but the work had been done in such a way that
when the autumn rains came on the track settled in many places; traffic on
the lines became very dangerous; one of the bridges was washed away by
the floods, and almost as many men had to be put on to do repairs as had
previously been employed for the construction. Traffic of a very moderate
description—each locomotive drawing only four wagons at a time—was
carried on for just twenty-six days, and then, happily for the engineers
concerned, the developments in and around Metz rendered the line no
longer necessary.
How the restoration of the traffic interrupted through the explosion of
French mines in the tunnel at Nanteuil occupied from September 17 to
November 22 has already been told on page 128.

Russo-Turkish War

In the opinion of one English military critic, what short lines were made in
the Franco-German War "were neither so speedily constructed nor so
successful in result as to encourage the idea that lines of any length could
be made during a campaign"; but a different impression is to be derived
from the story of what was accomplished in the same direction in the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.
Russia planned her campaign against Turkey in the hope and expectation
that it would be short, sharp and decisive. She started her mobilisation in
good time, that is to say, in November, 1876, although she did not declare
war until April 24, 1877. Making the mistake, however, of despising her
foe, she anticipated no serious opposition from the Turks, but expected,
rather, to paralyse them by a rapid advance, have a triumphal march to
Constantinople, secure the desired safeguards for the Christians in Turkey,
and see the war over before the end of the summer.
One reason why Russia specially desired to bring the campaign to so early a
conclusion lay in the deficient and precarious nature of the rail

communication. Under a convention which had been agreed to with
Rumania on April 16, 1877, Russia was to have a free passage for her
troops through that country. She was, also, to have the use of the Rumanian
railways and of all their transport facilities. But the only line then running
through Rumania was one that went from Galatz, on the Russo-Rumanian
frontier, to Bucharest, and thence (with a branch to Slatina) to Giurgevo, on
the Danube, where it connected with a Bulgarian line from Rustchuk, on the
south of the river, to Varna, the Turkish base of supplies on the Black Sea.
Not only was the Rumanian railway system thus limited in extent, but the
lines had been indifferently constructed, they were badly maintained, and
they had an inadequate personnel together with an insufficiency both of
rolling stock and of terminal facilities. Still further, the fact that the Russian
railways had a broader gauge than the railways of Rumania (among other
European countries) caused great delay in the transfer, at the frontier, from
the one system to the other, not alone of 200,000 men, but of the 850 field
and 400 siege guns, of the ammunition, and of much other material the
troops required to take with them. The alternative to dependence on the
railway was a resort to roads impassable in wet weather.
What really caused the Russian plans to miscarry, however, was the
obstinate defence of Plevna by Osman Pasha, who took up his position
there on July 19, subjected the Russians to successive repulses, and did not
capitulate until December 10, the siege costing the Russians 55,000 men
and the Rumanians 10,000.
When it was realised that the check at Plevna rendered certain a
prolongation of the campaign, Russia set about the construction of a series
of new lines of railway during the course of the war. The principal lines
thus taken in hand were:—
1. A line in Russia, from Bender, on the Dniester, to Galatz, establishing
direct communication between the Odessa railways and the Rumanian
frontier, and affording improved facilities for the sending of reinforcements
to the seat of war.
2. A line from Fratesti, on the Bucharest-Giurgevo Railway, to Simnitza, the
point on the north bank of the Danube where, on the night of June 26-7, the
Russians built the bridge which enabled them to cross the river.

3. A line from Sistova, on the south side of the Danube, to Tirnova
(Bulgaria), situate about thirty miles south-east of Plevna, and about
twenty-five north of the Shipka Pass.
Of these three lines the construction of the first, 189 miles in length, was
begun at the end of July, 1877. The original intention was to build a railway
to serve the purposes of the war only; but the conclusion that ulterior
strategical and commercial purposes would alike be served by linking up
Odessa with the Rumanian frontier led to the building of a railway likely to
be of permanent usefulness. The line was a single-track one, with a
sufficient number of stations and passing places to allow of the running of
seven trains in each direction in the twenty-four hours. The construction,
carried out by contract, involved the building of a number of timber bridges
and the provision of several embankments, one of which was over three
miles in length. Great difficulties were experienced in regard to labour, and
especially by reason of the refusal of the men to work either on Sundays or
on their numerous saints' days. Trains were, nevertheless, running on the
line within 100 days of the construction being started, and this
notwithstanding the fact that the number of actual working days had been
only fifty-eight. Whereas, therefore, the Germans had, in 1870, with the
help of a Construction Corps over 4,000 strong, taken forty-eight days to
build twenty-two miles of railway between Pont à Mousson and Remilly,
the Russians in 1877 built, by contract, 189 miles of railway in just over
double the same period.
A railway from Fratesti to Simnitza had become indispensable inasmuch as
the main line of communication for the Russian Army could not be
continued for an indefinite period along the forty miles of defective roads—
speedily worn out by the heavy traffic—which separated the Bucharest-
Giurgevo line from the bridge built across the Danube. The only important
earthwork necessary was an embankment a mile and a half long and
fourteen feet high. The bridges to be provided included one of 420 feet and
two of 210 feet each. In this instance the troubles experienced were due to
the difficulty in getting the necessary materials for the work of construction
owing partly to the existing Rumanian lines being blocked with military
traffic, and partly to the state of the roads and to the use of all available
draught horses for Army transport purposes. There could thus be no great
celerity shown in construction, and the forty miles of railway, begun in the

middle of September, were, in fact, not ready for working until the
beginning of December.
Like difficulties were experienced, though to a still more acute degree, in
regard to the Sistova-Tirnova line, the length of which was to be seventy-
five miles; and here only the earthworks could be finished before the end of
the campaign.
What, however, had been accomplished during the time the war was in
progress was (1) the completion of 229 miles of new railway, and the
making of the road-bed for another seventy-five miles, together with the
carrying out of a number of minor railway works; (2) the acquisition, by
purchase in different countries, of 120 locomotives and 2,150 wagons and
trucks, all new, and (3) the provision of a steam railway ferry across the
Danube.[38]
So the development of the rail-power principle in warfare was carried still
further by this construction, during the course of the Russo-Turkish conflict,
of a greater length of railways, designed for military use, than had ever been
built under like conditions before. The world gained a fresh lesson as to the
importance of the rôle played by railways in war, and it was offered, also, a
striking example of what could be done in the way of rapidly providing
them in a time of emergency.
On the other hand it had to be remembered that, of the three railways in
question, the one which included 189 miles out of the total 229 miles built
was constructed on Russian territory where there was no danger of
interruption by the enemy, while the delays which occurred with the two
other lines, owing to the congestion of traffic, under war conditions, on
existing railways depended upon for the supply of materials, seemed to
point (1) to the risk that might, from this cause, be run if the building of
lines necessary or desirable in the interests of some prospective campaign
were left until the outbreak of hostilities, and (2) to the wisdom of
constructing all such lines, as far as necessary and practicable, in time of
peace.

The Sudan

If we turn now to the Sudan, we gain examples of military railways which,
designed for the purposes of war, and constructed, in part, during the
progress of active hostilities, first rendered great services in facilitating the
conquest of a vast area, and then developed into a system of Government
railways operated, in turn, for the purposes of peace, and accomplishing
results as conspicuously successful in the latter direction as they had
previously done in the former.
During the time that Saïd Pasha was Viceroy of Egypt (1854-63) there was
brought forward a scheme for the linking up of Egypt and the Sudan by
means of a single line of railway from Cairo to Khartoum, with a branch to
Massowa, on the Red Sea. It was an ambitious proposal, and, if it could
have been carried into effect, the opening up of the Sudan to civilisation, by
means of an iron road, might have altered the whole subsequent history of
that much-suffering land. But the cost was regarded as prohibitive, and the
scheme was abandoned for a time, to be revived, however, in a modified
form in 1871, when Ismail Pasha was Khedive. It was then proposed that
the line should start at Wady Halfa and be continued to Matemmeh
(Shendy), situate about 100 miles north of Khartoum—a total distance of
558 miles. In 1875 a beginning was made with the building of this railway,
which was to consist of a single line, with a gauge of 3 feet 6 inches, and
was to be made with 50-lb. rails and 7-ft. sleepers; but when, in 1877, after
an expenditure of about £400,000, the railway had been carried no farther
than Sarras, thirty-three and a half miles from the starting-point, it was
stopped for lack of funds.
In the autumn of 1884 the British expedition to Khartoum, where General
Gordon was endeavouring to maintain his position against the Mahdi's
followers, was resolved upon, and it was then decided to extend the Sudan
Railway beyond the point already reached, at Sarras, in order to facilitate
still further the journey of the troops along the valley of the Nile, which had
been selected as the route of the expedition.
Platelaying for the extension was begun in September by a party of English
and Egyptian infantry and native labourers, afterwards joined by the 4th
Battalion Egyptian Army and the 8th (Railway) Company of the Royal
Engineers. While, however, materials previously stored at Sarras were
found to be still available, the trucks containing rails, etc., for the extension
work had to be pushed by hand from Sarras to railhead owing to the

absence of engines; sleepers were carried on the backs of camels, of which
300 were employed for the purpose, and the coolie work was entrusted to
700 native labourers, mainly old men and boys, most of whom had deserted
by the end of October, when further platelaying was discontinued. By that
time the extension works had reached the thirty-ninth mile, and the line
from Sarras to this point was opened on December 4.
Following on the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon in January,
1885, came the decision to extend the line to Firket (103 miles), in view of
a then projected further campaign in the autumn of that year. The extension
was sanctioned towards the end of February; fifty-two miles of permanent
way were ordered from England; 300 platelayers and railway mechanics
were obtained from India, to supplement the construction forces already
available; and on August 7 the extension was completed as far as Akasha
(87 miles).
Meanwhile, however, there had been a change of policy which affected the
whole situation. On the return of the expeditionary force to Korti (situate at
the southern extremity of the great Nile bend), the whole of the country to
the south thereof passed under the control of the Dervishes; and the British
Government, reluctant at that time to enter on the formidable task of
reconquest, decided that no further military operations should be taken in
hand, and that the Sudan must be definitely abandoned. Orders were
accordingly given by Lord Wolseley in May, 1885, for the withdrawal of
the troops from all stations south of Dongola, which itself was abandoned
on June 15, the retreat continuing as far as Akasha. Beyond this point,
therefore, platelaying for the proposed railway extension was not carried,
although the formation levels had been completed to Firket.
Subsequently the British retreat was continued to Wady Halfa, which then
became the southern frontier of Egypt, the railway extension thence to
Akasha, together with all posts to the south of Wady Halfa, being also
abandoned.
Excellent service had, nevertheless, been rendered by the railway, as far as
it was carried.
Operation of the line had been taken over by the 8th (Railway) Company,
R.E., who, at the outset, had at their disposal only five more or less decrepit
locomotives, fifty open trucks, five covered goods vans, and six brake vans.

The troops were conveyed in the open trucks, and by the end of 1884 all the
stores for the opening of the campaign had been passed up. During the
course of 1885 additional locomotives and rolling stock were obtained from
the Cape.
Summing up the work done on the Sudan Military Railway for the Nile
Expedition of 1884-5, Lieut. M. Nathan, R.E.,[39] says that it included (1)
the repair and maintenance of thirty-three and a half miles of existing
railway; (2) the construction of fifty-three and a half miles of new line
through a nearly waterless desert, with no means of distributing material
except the line itself; (3) the transport, for the most part with limited and
indifferent stock, of about 9,000 troops round the worst part of the second
cataract when going up the river, and round nearly the whole of it when
coming down; and (4) the carriage of 40,000 tons for an average distance of
thirty-six and a half miles.
As against what had thus been achieved in the Nile Valley must be set a
failure on the Red Sea.
When, on the fall of Khartoum in January, 1885, the British Government
first decided on an extension of the Nile Valley Railway, they further
resolved on the building of a military railway from Suakin to Berber, on the
Nile, in order to have a second line of communication available for Lord
Wolseley's Army; and an Anglo-Indian force was sent to Suakin, under the
command of General Sir Gerald Graham, in order, first, to defeat the
Dervishes in the Eastern Sudan, and then to protect the construction of the
proposed railway. Such a line would obviously have been of great
strategical value to a Nile expeditionary force; but the attempt to build it
broke down owing, in part, to the defective nature of the organisation
resorted to, though still more to the active opposition of the enemy.
Sir Andrew Clarke, Inspector-General of Fortifications, had from the first
advocated that the line should be supplied and laid by the military
engineering strength then available; but he was over-ruled, and the work
was given to an English firm of contractors in the expectation, as Major-
General Whitworth Porter tells, in volume two of the "History of the Corps
of Royal Engineers," "that the necessary material would be supplied more
readily, and in shorter time, through civilian agency." It was, however,
decided to send the 10th (Railway) Company of Royal Engineers both to

carry out some local works in the neighbourhood of Suakin and to assist the
contractors in the longer undertaking; and this military element was
strengthened, not only by a force of Indian coolies, but, also, by the addition
of thirty-nine members of Engineer Volunteer Corps in England who had
enlisted for the campaign, all having had experience in trades qualifying
them for railway work.[40] There was thus practically a dual system,
workable, in the opinion of Sir Andrew Clarke, "only by a species of
compromise which was both unscientific and uneconomical."
As for interruptions by the Dervishes, these took the form of constant
attacks both on the line under construction and on the workers. Several
actions were fought, and at Tofrik, near Suakin, the British sustained a
serious loss of life. Posts were erected as the work slowly progressed, and
the bullet-proof train mentioned on page 76 was used for patrolling the line
at night; but in face of all the difficulties experienced the work was
definitely abandoned when only twenty miles of the intended railway had
been completed. The troops were recalled in June, 1885, the railway
material not used was brought back to England, and a line linking up
Suakin (and Port Sudan) with Berber, via Atbara Junction, was not finally
opened until 1906.
Reverting to the Nile Valley Railway, it is gratifying to be able to say that
the success already spoken of as having been attained in this direction was
but a prelude to still more important developments that were to follow.
To prevent the carrying out of schemes which the Dervishes were known to
be preparing for an invasion of Egypt, the British Government decided,
early in 1896, to allow Egypt to resume occupation of the country along the
Nile Valley abandoned at the time of the withdrawal in 1885, and on March
12, 1896, Sir Herbert (now Earl) Kitchener, who had succeeded to the
command of the Egyptian army in 1892, received instructions to advance to
the south from Wady Halfa. Akasha, the point to which the Nile Valley
Railway had been built, was occupied on March 20, the Dervishes
retreating to Firket.
As a means towards realising the objects of the expedition, Sir Herbert
Kitchener resolved to continue the railway along the Nile Valley to Kerma;
but this meant the construction of practically a new railway, since the
Dervishes had torn up over fifty of the eighty-seven miles of the original

line between Wady Halfa and Akasha, burning the sleepers and twisting the
rails, while the remainder of the line was in such a condition that it required
relaying. The work of construction was entrusted to a staff of Royal
Engineers operating under Lieut. (now Major-General Sir E. Percy C.)
Girouard, and it was pushed forward with great energy, the line being
urgently required for the forwarding of stores to the front, and especially so
on account of the impediments to navigation along the Nile due to the
cataracts.
With the help of the railway, so far as it had then been restored, Sir Herbert
Kitchener concentrated a force of 9,000 men at Akasha, and early in June he
made a successful advance on Firket. The Dervishes retired to Dongola; but
it was thought prudent, before following them up, to await a further
extension of the railway. This was completed as far as Kosha, 116 miles
from Wady Halfa, by August 4, 1896. Three weeks later some heavy rains,
lasting three days, were the cause of floods which, in a few hours, destroyed
twelve miles of the newly-constructed line. The repairs were completed in
about a week, but in the same month there was an outbreak of cholera
which carried off a large number of the working staff.
Utilising the railway as far as Kosha, Sir Herbert Kitchener concentrated
the whole of his force at Fereig, on the north of the Kaibar cataract, and
from thence a further advance was made to Dongola, which place the
Dervishes made no attempt to defend.
The immediate purpose of the expedition had thus been attained; but, in the
meantime, a further campaign had been resolved upon for the purpose of
breaking down the power of the Khalifa and effecting the conquest of
Khartoum. To this end the railway was continued another hundred miles,
from Kosha to Kerma, which point was reached in May, 1897. Some 216
miles of railway had thus been completed in about thirteen months,
notwithstanding interruptions which had led to very little progress being
made during five months of this period, and notwithstanding, also, the fact
that construction work had to be carried on simultaneously with the
transport of troops and stores so far as the line had been completed.
Before, however, Kerma was reached, Sir Herbert Kitchener instructed the
staff of the Royal Engineers to make a survey of the Nubian Desert with a
view to seeing whether or not it would be practicable to build an alternative

line of railway across it from Wady Halfa direct to Abu Hamed (a distance
of 232 miles), thus giving a direct route to Khartoum.
A survey carried out at the end of 1896 showed that the work was not likely
to present any unsurmountable engineering difficulties, and that the absence
of water could be overcome by the sinking of wells. The only doubtful point
was whether construction could be carried through without interruption by a
still active enemy.
It was seen that the proposed desert line was likely to be of far greater
importance, both strategically and politically, than a continuation of the
Wady Halfa-Kerma line round the remainder of the Nile bend. The cutting
off of this bend altogether would confer a great advantage on the
Expeditionary Force. It was thus resolved to build the line, to run the risk of
attacks by the enemy, and to push construction forward with the greatest
energy.
A start was made with the work on May 15, 1897, the staff which had been
engaged on the Nile Valley line to Kerma returning to Wady Halfa in order
to take the desert line in hand. By the end of July, 115 of the 232 miles of
line had been completed, and Sir Herbert Kitchener, utilising the railway
which had already been constructed to Kerma, then sent a force along the
Nile Valley to effect the capture of Abu Hamed. This was accomplished on
August 7, and the constructors of the desert line were thus enabled to
resume their work with greater security and even accelerated speed. Abu
Hamed was reached on October 31, 1897, the two extreme points of the
great Nile bend being thus brought into communication by a direct line of
railway. The construction of the 232 miles of track had been accomplished
in five and a half months, notwithstanding the fact that the work was carried
on during the hottest time of the year. An average length of a mile and a
quarter of line was laid per day, while on one day in October a maximum of
three and a quarter miles was attained. So well, too, had the work been done
that trains carrying 200 tons of stores, drawn by engines weighing, without
tender, fifty tons, were taken safely across the desert at a speed of twenty-
five miles per hour.
From Abu Hamed the line was at once pushed on in the direction of Berber,
and its value from a military point of view was speedily to be proved.
Receiving information, towards the end of 1897, that the Dervishes were

planning an attack on Berber, Sir Herbert Kitchener sent to Cairo for a
Brigade of British troops to join with the Egyptian forces then at Berber in
opposing this advance, and the Brigade arrived in January, 1898, having
travelled by the desert railway not only to Abu Hamed, but to a point twenty
miles farther south, which then constituted railhead. Early in March the
Anglo-Egyptian Army was concentrated between Berber and the Atbara
river, and the battle of Atbara, fought in the following month, led to the
complete annihilation of the forces sent by the Khalifa to drive the
Egyptians out of Berber.
There was known to be still an army of 50,000 men in Omdurman, at the
command of the Khalifa; but it was considered desirable, before any further
advance was made by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, to await not only the
completion of the railway to the Atbara but the rise, also, of the Nile, so that
the river would be available for the bringing up of steamers and gunboats to
take part in the attack on Omdurman.
Once more, therefore, Lieut. Girouard and his staff had to make the most
strenuous efforts, and these were again so successful that the line was
carried to the Atbara early in July. It was of the greatest service in
facilitating the concentration of an Anglo-Egyptian Army, 22,000 strong, at
Wad Hamed, and the victory of Omdurman, on September 2, 1898—when
20,000 of the enemy were killed or wounded—followed by the occupation
of Khartoum, meant the overthrow of the Mahdi, the final reconquest of the
Sudan, and the gaining of a further great triumph in the cause of
civilisation.
In the account of these events which he gives in volume three of the
"History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers," Colonel Sir Charles M.
Watson says concerning this ultimate outcome of a rebellion which had
lasted, altogether, for a period of eighteen years:—

Lord Kitchener, of course, by the skill and determination with which
he conducted the operations to a successful termination, deserves the
principal credit for the happy conclusion of the campaign. But it must
not be forgotten that a large part of the work was carried out by the
officers of the Royal Engineers, especially those who had charge of the
construction and maintenance of that railway without which, it is fair
to say, the campaign could not have been conducted at all.

The final triumph was the more gratifying because, although the desert
railway had contributed so materially thereto, dependence upon it had not
been without an element of serious risk which cannot be told better than in
the words of Lord Cromer, in his book on "Modern Egypt":—

The interval which elapsed between the occupation of Abu Hamed and
the final advance on Khartoum was a period of much anxiety. Sir
Herbert Kitchener's force depended entirely on the desert railway for
its supplies. I was rather haunted with the idea that some European
adventurer, of the type familiar in India a century and more ago, might
turn up at Khartoum and advise the Dervishes to make frequent raids
across the Nile below Abu Hamed with a view to cutting the
communication of the Anglo-Egyptian force with Wady Halfa. This
was unquestionably the right military operation to have undertaken;
neither, I think, would it have been very difficult of accomplishment.
Fortunately the Dervishes ... failed to take advantage of the
opportunity presented to them. To myself it was a great relief when the
period of suspense was over. I do not think that the somewhat perilous
position in which Sir Herbert Kitchener's army was undoubtedly
placed for some time was at all realised by the public in general.

Within about two months of the battle of Omdurman the plans were made
for a further extension of the railway from Atbara to Khartoum, and
Khartoum North was reached on the last day of 1899. The construction of a
bridge over the Blue Nile subsequently allowed of trains running direct into
Khartoum.
To-day this same railway has been carried a distance of 430 miles south of
Khartoum. It continues along the Blue Nile to Sennah, where it turns to the
westward, crosses the White Nile at Kosti, and has its terminus at El Obeid,
the capital of Kordofan Province. What this means is that an enormous
expanse of territory has been opened up both to civilisation and to
commercial development.
Apart from the important gum trade of which El Obeid is the centre, the
Sudan is pre-eminently a pastoral country. The number of its cattle, sheep
and goats is estimated at "several millions"; it has thousands of square miles
available for cotton-growing, already carried on there for centuries, and it

has wide possibilities in other directions, besides; though stock-raising and
cotton cultivation should alone suffice to ensure for the Sudan a future of
great wealth and commercial importance.
Beyond the districts immediately served by the extension there are others
which are to be brought into touch with the railway, either direct or via the
Nile, by means of a "roads system" linking up towns and villages with a
number of highways extending to all the frontiers of the Sudan. On these
roads and highways motor traction will, it is hoped, be gradually substituted
for transport animals, the troubles caused by the tsetse fly and other pests
being thus avoided.
The scheme here in question is certainly an ambitious one, considering that
the Sudan covers an area of 1,000,000 square miles, and is equal in extent
to the whole of British India; but already the outlook is most promising. For
twelve years before its rescue from heathenism by the British and Egyptian
forces in 1898, Khartoum, which formerly had a population of 50,000, was
represented by the mass of ruins to which it had been reduced by order of
the Khalifa. To-day it is a large, beautiful, and well-built city, possessed of a
Governor-General's palace, cathedrals, a mosque, schools, hospitals, hotels,
broad streets, public gardens, boulevards, imposing business premises, a
good water supply, electric light, tramways, ferries, and other essentials of a
capital city of the most progressive type. Khartoum itself has now about
30,000 inhabitants; in Khartoum North, on the other side of the Blue Nile,
there are 20,000, and in Omdurman 70,000, a total of 120,000 for the three
sister cities. Not only, also, have the natives, once living under the terror of
their oppressors, settled down to peaceful pursuits, but many thousands of
immigrants have come into the Sudan from West Africa (a striking
testimony of the confidence felt by native tribes in the justice and security
of British rule), while great expansion has taken place in the commercial
interests of the Sudan and more especially in the export of cattle and sheep.
In the bringing about of these developments, affecting the peace and
prosperity of so huge a country and of so many millions of people, the
Sudan Military Railways have played a leading part. They rendered
possible, in the first instance, the conquest of the Sudan, and then (save for
the now abandoned line from Wady Halfa to Kerma) they became, with
their extensions and improvements, the system of "Sudan Government
Railways," having their branches to-day both from Atbara to Port Sudan

and Suakin, on the Red Sea, and from Abu Hamed to Kareima, on the south
side of the great Nile bend, whence there is free communication by water to
the third cataract at Kerma. Concurrently, also, with the carrying out of the
railway extension schemes, and in order to make greater provision for the
prospective increase of traffic, 460 miles of the line north of Khartoum
were relaid with 75-lb. rails, in place of the 50-lb. rails originally used, and
the whole of the track from Khartoum to El Obeid was also laid with the
heavier rails.
So we are enabled to regard military railways from still another point of
view—that, namely, in which they may develop into lines of permanent
communication and promote the blessings of peace and security no less
than afford unquestionable advantages in the prosecution of war. Other
examples of a similar kind might be offered from the history of British rule
in Africa; but the record of what has been accomplished in the Sudan may
suffice to establish the further claim here presented as to the varied
purposes that military railways may serve.

FOOTNOTES:
[36] See lecture by Capt. C. E. Luard, R.E., on "Field Railways and their general
application in war." Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xvii,
1873.
[37] "The Abyssinian Railway." By Lieut. Willans, R.E. Papers on Subjects
Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal Engineers. New Series. Vol.
xviii. 1870.
[38] "The Construction of Military Railways during the Russo-Turkish War of
1877-8." By Captain M. T. Sale, R.E. Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution, vol. xxiv, 1881. "De la Construction des Chemins de Fer en temps de
guerre. Lignes construites par l'armée russe pendant la campagne 1877-78." Par
M. P. Lessar, Ingénieur du Gouvernement russe. Traduit du russe par M. L. Avril.
Paris, 1879.
[39] "The Sudan Military Railway." By Lieut. M. Nathan, R.E. "Professional
Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Occasional Papers," vol. xi, 1885.
[40] In his dispatch of May 30, 1885, Sir Gerald Graham said concerning these
Volunteers: "Their services would have been of great value had the campaign
lasted longer. As it was the Volunteers worked well with their comrades of the
Royal Engineers.... It may be considered the first experiment in associating the
Volunteer force with a combatant branch of the Regular Army on active service."

CHAPTER XVI
Railways in the Boer War
The South African campaign of 1899-1902 afforded to Great Britain and to
British Imperial interests their greatest, most instructive, and, also, their
most anxious experiences, down to that time, not only of the services
railways can render in the conduct of war, but of the difficulties and
complications which may result from their employment, and especially
from dependence on them for the purposes of military transport; though, in
the result, the services so rendered were a material factor in the success by
which the military operations carried out by the British forces were
crowned.
When the Boers declared war in October, 1899, the various railway
systems, working in direct communication with one another, in South
Africa, had a total length of 4,268 miles, namely, British South Africa,
3,267; the Transvaal, 918; the Orange Free State, 388; and in Portuguese
territory, 55. These railways consisted of single-track, narrow-gauge lines (3
feet 6 inches), never designed for such heavy traffic as the transport of an
army and all its impedimenta would involve; but it was obvious from the
first that they must needs play a part of paramount importance in the
campaign. Independently of all that was involved in the conveyance of
troops, munitions, supplies, etc., from England to the Cape, there was the
consideration that from Cape Town, the principal base of our forces, to
Pretoria, their eventual objective, the distance was 1,040 miles. From Port
Elizabeth it was 740 miles, and from Durban 511 miles. Journeys such as
these could be made only by rail, and there was seen to be an imperative
need, not only for the railways themselves, but for an organisation which
would, among other things, superintend military rail-transport in order to
ensure efficiency in the movement of troops, stores, etc., and, also, provide
for the speedy repair or rebuilding of damaged lines as well as for the
operation of lines taken possession of in the captured territory.

In view of the uncertainty of events in the Transvaal, and as a precautionary
measure, the 8th (Railway) Company, Royal Engineers, was sent out to the
Cape in July, 1899; and when, subsequently, the dispatch of an Army Corps
was being arranged by the British Government, it was decided to create a
Department of Military Railways, of which Major Girouard, R.E. (now
Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard, K.C.M.G.), who had rendered
such valuable services in connection with military railways in the Sudan,
and was then President of the Egyptian Railway Administration, was put in
charge as "Director of Railways for the South African Field Force." A
number of other Royal Engineer officers who had had experience of railway
work in India and other parts of the British Empire were selected to serve as
Assistant Directors or staff officers in various capacities, and the 10th
(Railway) Company, Royal Engineers, with the 6th, 20th, 31st and 42nd
Fortress Companies, were sent to join the 8th (Railway) Company in the
carrying out of railway work.

Organisation and Control

The creation of this Department of Military Railways for South Africa
carried still further the development of those questions of organisation and
control which, as we have seen, had already raised important issues in the
United States, in Germany, and in France.
According to the official "History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902,"
the Director and his staff were (1) to be the intermediaries between the
Army and the technical working administration of the railway; (2) to see
that the ordinary working of the railway was carried on in such a manner as
to ensure the greatest military efficiency; and (3) to satisfy the demands of
the Army on the railway without disorganising the working of the railway
system as a whole.
"In war," the official "History" further declares, "these services are
essential, for the officers of a civil railway administration cannot
discriminate between the demands of the various branches and departments
of the Army, or class them in the order of urgency." This is perfectly true of
the civil railway administration, and it is only what could be expected of
railwaymen who, while competent to discharge their ordinary railway
duties, might not be well versed in military matters, and ought not to be left

with the responsibility of deciding between the possibly conflicting orders
of different military commanders.
All the same, there was another side to the question; and this is dealt with
by Sir Percy Girouard in his "History of the Railways during the War in
South Africa," wherein he says, in regard to rail transport conditions in time
of war:—

Military commanders who have not previously studied the working of
a railway attempt to seize and work the portion of line nearest to them,
regardless of the remainder of the system. They often look upon trucks
as another form of commissariat wagon which may be kept loaded for
an indefinite period. They expect trains to stop and off-load, or load,
on the main line. They like to have a number of trains ready, either
loaded or unloaded, in case they should be required. They are apt to
give orders for large entrainments and detrainments to be carried out at
any part of the line, regardless of the railway facilities at that point,
although perhaps a suitable place is within reasonable distance.
Frequently they have been known to countermand their orders for
entrainments, heedless of the fact that, once arrangements have been
made to concentrate rolling stock on a certain place, it takes time to
alter these arrangements, and is sure to cause confusion. Many of them
expect railway accommodation for troops to be on a liberal scale, and
consider that there is no necessity, when close to a railway, to make
any effort to cut down baggage and stores....
Commandants of posts on the line, which are very often placed at
railway stations, are inclined to think that, because they are called
"station commandants," it means that they are in charge of the railway
station, and can give orders to railway officials as to traffic and other
matters....
Civil railway officials have been heard to say that attacks by the enemy
are not nearly so disturbing to traffic as the arrival of a friendly
General with his force.

It was under these circumstances that Sir Percy Girouard saw from the first
the necessity for having in South Africa, for the duration of the war, a staff
of officers whose business it would be, as he himself defines their duties,